THE U. S. COAST GUARD SECTOR CONSTRUCT:  
A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

by

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Submitted to MIT Sloan School of Management
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ABSTRACT

The U. S. Coast Guard has recently merged the operational forces responsible for
maritime security in port and coastal zones into a new organization called the Sector construct.
This thesis examines the cultural issues associated with this reorganization and poses three
questions:

1. What are the cultural challenges associated with the Sector organization?
2. To what extent is cultural management relevant to the Coast Guard’s strategic
   planning process?
3. How can the senior managers of the Coast Guard intentionally manage culture in
   order to facilitate lasting organizational change?

The application of frameworks from several academic fields presents a holistic view of
Coast Guard culture - its history, present state of transition, and future implications.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For reasons of non-attribution, I regret not being able to name the numerous Service members who provided enormous insight about the Coast Guard. Many thanks to all who willingly gave their time and honest input during my research. I am also indebted to Professor John Van Maanen for his wise counsel and impressive patience as my thesis advisor. Most importantly, I salute all the men and women of the Coast Guard who always get the job done.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to Richard Kermond. Recently retired from the Coast Guard, Richard inspired my choice of topic and enthusiastically supported me during this challenging and rewarding experience. I am thankful for our journey to come.
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I. AMERICA’S MARITIME GUARDIAN

Though we are America’s smallest armed service, we perform an astonishingly broad range of services to our country – so broad that it is possible to devote a fulfilling career to one or even several major mission areas without understanding how the whole Service works together for our nation’s benefit.


The proud history of the U. S. Coast Guard dates back to 1790, when the First Congress of the United States established the Revenue Marine, a small maritime law enforcement agency, to assist in customs duties collections. Later called the Revenue Cutter Service, at the time this agency was America’s only naval force and thus soon acquired military duties. The Revenue Cutter Service continued to acquire new duties as it merged with other federal agencies that had complementary or intersecting maritime responsibilities. In 1915, the military Revenue Cutter Service merged with the civilian Life-Saving Service to become the Coast Guard. In 1939 the Coast Guard assimilated the Lighthouse Service and in 1946 the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation. As America’s maritime guardian, today’s Coast Guard has a unique service character that is military, multi-mission, and maritime1 (U. S. Coast Guard December 2002).

This unique character has lent itself to the development of an extremely strong organizational culture shaped by the Service’s core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty. The Coast Guard has long prided itself on its ability to perform new duties with existing assets and minimal disruption to its other responsibilities. Throughout the Service, this belief that “Coasties” will always get the job done has become a fundamental assumption which, although at times a double-edged sword, is mainstream in Coast Guard culture.

1 For more background on the evolution of the Coast Guard’s unique service character, see Greene 2005, Buschman 2004, and McAllister 2003.
OPERATORS VERSUS REGULATORS

The longstanding multi-mission character of the Coast Guard has also resulted in the evolution of several organizational subcultures. An organizational subculture refers to a way of life or work life that is shared by a subset of organizational members. Sub-cultural perspectives are taken for granted because they are often deeply rooted in common backgrounds or work experience. Only when subcultures clash do they become apparent (Van Maanen forthcoming).

The operational forces of the Coast Guard broadly fall into three categories: long range mobile assets, deployable units, and shore-based units (Allen 2006). Each category of operational forces has traditionally had its own commanding officer and significant autonomy. Long range mobile assets include ships (also known as cutters), patrol boats, and aircraft. Having evolved only over the last three decades, deployable forces are units that the Coast Guard sends to work with other agencies, both domestic and foreign, in support of missions such as defense readiness and maritime security. Examples of deployable forces are port security units, patrol boats, international training teams, and maritime safety and security teams. Shore-based units consist of small boat stations and marine safety offices (MSOs).

Each of these categories has a different mission mode; i.e., the “value proposition” for the public the Coast Guard serves (Allen 2006). The primary mission mode for long range mobile assets is to maintain a presence for offshore law enforcement. Their area of operations typically spans more than one geographic region of command and control. Still a relatively new concept, deployable units do not have a clearly defined concept of command and control yet; therefore, for the sake of clarity, I will omit them from the mission mode discussion.

The area of operations for shore-based units is typically in one geographic region of command and control, usually a port and its coastal waters. Several small boat stations in one
region comprise a ‘group,’ whose primary mission mode is immediate response for search and rescue (SAR) missions. Commonly co-located with groups, patrol boats are long-range mobile assets that work in overlapping missions modes, both response and presence. Similarly, air stations provide long-range mobile assets that work with groups and cutters in both response and presence modes.

With a primary mission mode of prevention, marine safety offices (MSO) have traditionally focused on the regulatory aspects of the maritime industry such as vessel inspections and mariner certifications. Strike teams, personnel who ensure pollution regulation compliance and respond to oil spills, perform in prevention mode until there is an oil spill, when they shift to response mode. Strike teams have traditionally worked in the marine safety community. Similarly, buoy tenders (vessels that service aids to navigation such as lighthouses, beacons, and buoys) function primarily in prevention mode until they need to respond to an aids malfunction. The primary resource of marine safety offices is human capital; for groups it is boats. Therefore, because they are boats, small buoy tenders (65 feet long or less) have traditionally been attached to groups. Finally, vessel traffic services, the marine equivalent of air traffic controllers, have performed in prevention mode while ensuring the safe and efficient flow of vessel traffic into and out of ports. See Figure 1-1 for a depiction of the traditional grouping of units based on mission mode.

Please note that these categorizations are overly simplistic since all operational units serve in numerous service roles; however, this generalization of primary mission modes is helpful in understanding the rationale behind the new Sector organization.

As noted, organizations tend to have subcultures based on common roles and experiences. Operations personnel are an organizational subculture that consists of those people
who are the point of delivery of services (Schein 1996). In the Coast Guard, the operations community (called “O”) has traditionally referred to all operational forces except the marine safety community (“M”). Coasties have referred to this distinction between “O” and “M” as operators versus regulators.

As mentioned earlier, these two communities have traditionally had their own commanding officers and distinct lines of command and control. However, in ports and coastal areas, marine safety offices regularly relied on groups’ boats to conduct routine tasks such as offshore vessel inspections. At times the priorities of the “O” commander conflicted with those of the “M” commanding officer, resulting in suboptimal resource allocation and mission accomplishment. A legacy “M” officer related several instances during his tour at an MSO when he sheepishly had to ask local harbor police to transport Coast Guard marine inspectors to an incoming vessel because the group’s small boats were occupied with other missions.

In 1994, the Coast Guard created four prototype ‘activities’ by combining “O” and “M” field commands and missions in New York City, Baltimore, San Diego, and South Texas. The
well-coordinated efforts of Activities New York and Activities Baltimore during and after September 11th highlighted the advantages of combining these two communities under one command. In both these ports, the commanding officer who owned the security mission also owned the boats to complete the mission. Subsequently, with the Coast Guard's increased focus on combating maritime terrorism, operators and regulators have had to work together much more frequently, and the Coast Guard's senior leadership determined that there was strategic benefit to combining these two communities service-wide.

In May 2004, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas Collins, approved what is arguably the most significant reorganization of the Service since 1946. "M" merged with the shore-based forces of "O" under one command called 'Sectors.' Sector Commanders are now directly responsible for marine safety offices, groups, strike teams, and vessel traffic services. These legacy units are reorganized into three departments according to function: Prevention, Response, and Logistics. The purpose of this merger is to provide unified command and control for high-performance service delivery across the full range of Coast Guard missions.

The Prevention Department consists of forces from marine safety offices. Small buoy tenders went from boat-focused groups to Prevention Departments. The Prevention Department also took on Vessel Traffic Services. The Response Department is primarily group forces. Similarly, because of the responsive, operational nature of strike teams, they went from MSOs to Response Departments. Furthermore, a Logistics Department was created to support Sectors in the areas of engineering, finance, and administration. See Figures 1-2 and 1-3.

In the Coast Guard's new organizational structure, there is no "O" and there is no "M." These sub-cultural identities are officially gone as the Coast Guard moves toward creating a new organizational culture. In order for this new structure to succeed, Coast Guard members must
change the way they have traditionally conducted business to create a new collaborative, interdependent culture where there is less distinction between operators and regulators. And changing culture is a monumental task.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this thesis is to examine the cultural issues associated with the Coast Guard’s new Sector organization and to ask (and hopefully answer) three questions:

1. What are the cultural challenges associated with the Sector organization?
2. To what extent is cultural management relevant to the Coast Guard’s strategic planning process?
3. How can the senior managers of the Coast Guard intentionally manage culture in order to facilitate lasting organizational change?

By applying frameworks from several academic fields, I will examine Coast Guard culture - its history, present state of transition, and future implications.

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2 Though associated with Sectors, mobile assets; i.e., patrol boats, buoytenders, and air stations retain their own commanding officers.
II. METHODOLOGY

*If you don’t know where you’re going, any direction will do.*
- C. S. Lewis (Alice in Wonderland)

FRAMEWORK

Since human behavior is at the center of this thesis, I chose to apply two Human Performance Technology models to frame my analysis of the Coast Guard.

**Organizational Analysis: Rossett**

Organizational analysis is a monumental, complicated task, and numerous frameworks for a systematic and systemic approach exist. Allison Rossett, professor of Educational Technology at San Diego State University, developed the model depicted in Figure 2-1.

![Figure 2-1. Human Performance Technology Model (Rossett 1987)](image)

The first phase of analysis is to identify optimals; i.e., the desired end states of the organization. Vision statements, strategic objectives, measures of effectiveness, and interviews
with top management point to an organization's optimals. While human nature tends to look first at the actual state of an organization, Rossett recommends defining the destination first in order to guide recommended steps to get there. Once desired benchmarks are defined, the actual state can be compared to those in order to identify gaps accurately. The second phase entails selecting high priority gaps to address then determine the causes of these gaps along with goals, opportunities, and rationale for resolving selected gaps.

The final phase of organizational analysis is developing solution systems. Rossett groups solutions into four categories: human resource development, human resource management, environmental engineering, and organizational development. Figure 2-1 provides examples of solutions in each of these categories. For this thesis, I will address solutions in all four categories with an emphasis on organizational transformation and cultural change. Finally, evaluating solutions systems involves monitoring and measuring performance against the desired end states of the organization, the optimals.

**Causes of Performance Gaps: Wile**

Synthesizing the human performance technology frameworks of five prolific authors (Allison Rossett, Joe Harless, Robert Mager, Thomas Gilbert, and Dean Spitzer), David Wile created a model of the causes of performance drivers. Wile's model is helpful for Phase Two of Rossett's organizational analysis framework, identification of causes of selected gaps. Wiles categorizes drivers as external and internal to the performer. He further categorizes external drivers into tangible and intangible. I have added one additional dimension: culture. An organizational quality, culture is arguably an intangible environmental factor. However, I will focus on how cultural values and beliefs motivate people to behave in certain ways. Therefore, I
have chosen to categorize culture as a factor internal to the performer. See Figure 2-2.

![Figure 2-2. Causes of Performance Gaps (Wile 1996)](image)

**RESEARCH**

In addition to an academic literature review on strategic management, corporate culture, mental models, and organizational change, I examined a number of documents such as national and departmental strategies, Coast Guard publications and internal communications, and other relevant theses. I also conducted a total of 32 formal interviews at the headquarters, district, and Sector levels. Headquarters interviews included the current Commandant, Admiral Collins, the current Chief of Staff and incoming Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen, the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, Admiral Kenneth Venuto, and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, Master Chief Franklin Welch. I also interviewed headquarters staff members responsible for strategic planning, maritime homeland security, Sector implementation, officer assignments, and organizational climate. For officer training, I conducted a phone interview with a training course supervisor. Interviews averaged approximately one hour each.
At the district level, I interviewed Admiral David Pekoske, Commander of the 1st Coast Guard District, which includes the northeastern portion of the U. S. I also interviewed officers stationed in one Sector in the 1st District and one in the 5th District. Additionally, I surveyed the Commanders and Deputy Commanders of all 33 Sectors. 27 Commanders and 22 Deputies responded to a brief survey about command leadership styles. (See Figure 2-3 for a partial depiction of Coast Guard organization highlighted with levels interviewed and surveyed.) Additionally, I had informal conversations with seven officers about Coast Guard mental models.

The Coast Guard has contracted analysis of Sector responsibilities to Perot Systems, and I was able to meet with that team as well. In the course of all my interviews, I was able to collect both quantitative and qualitative data.

Figure 2-3. Coast Guard Levels Interviewed and Surveyed
III. LITERATURE REVIEW

If we all worked on the assumption that what is accepted as true is really true, there would be little hope of advance.

- Orville Wright

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND STRATEGY

The learned, shared, and tacit assumptions that drive people's daily behavior are the essence of organizational culture. These assumptions shape the personality of an organization and influence among other things work environment, business processes, and organizational customs. Despite the fact that culture is the very context for not only daily work, but also strategic planning and decision-making, it is human nature to overlook it. Culture is like the air we breathe; we take it for granted and hardly give it notice. However, as documented by a number of organizational development experts, there are great gains to be had by understanding and managing culture.

Strategic Management: Hax and Majluf

What should happen after an organization finishes its strategic planning process? Managers should put strategy into action. This is strategic management. In The Strategy Concept and Process, Hax and Majluf (1996) assert that managers, guided by three principles of strategic management, should integrate strategy into all their decisions and activities.

1. **Value of people as the greatest assets of the firm.** A skilled, developed, and motivated workforce is a unique asset not easily replicated; therefore, management should focus on people as the most sustainable, differentiating resource.

2. **Integration of strategy, business processes, performance, and culture.** Firms
should first define strategy, then the facilitating organizational structure. The firm should then
define business processes that cut across organizational units and put metrics in place to control
and reward performance. Performance metrics impact organizational culture, and culture, in
turn, impacts strategy. Figure 2 details this cycle. Within this organizational architecture,
information and communication processes are crucial to coordinating organizational units.

3. Importance of both formal and informal managerial processes and systems.
Complex organizations require disciplined, formal managerial processes and systems; however,
informal processes and systems are also crucial as reinforcement and support. The manager’s
challenge is to balance both.

![Figure 3-1. Strategic Management Framework (Hax and Majluf 1996)](image)

**Corporate Culture: Schein**

Known as the founding father of the field of corporate culture, Edgar Schein is a
professor emeritus at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Schein contends that culture is inseparable from mission, strategy, and structure.
“Culture matters because it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that
determines both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and
values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine
strategy, goals, and modes of operating” (Schein 1999). Schein has identified three levels of
culture which range from tangible to intangible. See Figure 3-1.

**Level One: Artifacts.** Artifacts are the visible aspects of an organization such as
uniforms, physical environment, working hours, rituals, and level of formality in authority
relationships. However, artifacts do not reveal why an organization is constructed as it is or why
its members behave as they do. The next level of culture, espoused values, may provide some
explanation.

**Level Two: Espoused Values.** Level Two culture encompasses the claimed and/or
documented values, principles, ethics, and visions of an organization. When employee behavior
is inconsistent with an organization’s espoused values, a deeper level of culture is at play, shared
and tacit assumptions.

**Level Three: Basic Underlying Assumptions.** The jointly learned values and beliefs
that have made an organization successful throughout its history result in assumptions which are
invisible, taken for granted. These are the building blocks of organizational culture, and they are
deep, broad, and stable. The accumulated learning of a group of people is a strong force that
shapes their ways of thinking, feeling, and perceiving the world. These shared assumptions that
an organization has developed make life predictable and meaningful. Therefore, efforts to change culture will inevitably result in anxiety and resistance because people do not like having their taken-for-granted truths challenged. Major organizational transformation is required to change deeply embedded and long-held assumptions.

When examining organizational culture, Schein offers a framework for identifying and grouping artifacts, espoused values, and underlying assumptions. See Figure 3-2.

External survival issues refer to organizational constructs which will ensure success in the industry; i.e., the espoused values, structure and processes, and metrics. Internal integration issues are artifacts that bond people together within an organizational identity. These qualities are observable such as common language, badges of membership, the nature of hierarchy, and elements of status. Deeper underlying assumptions grow from beliefs and values that have
ensured success throughout the organization’s history. For example, an organization that assumes human beings are innately lazy impose incentives and controls such as accounting for each hour of the workday. On the other hand, an organization that assumes that human beings are basically motivated to work will have more flexible policies and focus more on ends than means.

Understanding external survival and internal integration issues is a way to decipher the basic underlying assumptions which drive an organization. These assumptions are extremely difficult, but not impossible, to change. Schein offers numerous examples of businesses failing because of a lack of understanding of organizational culture. Likewise, he details numerous strategic successes when organizations have acknowledged culture and intentionally managed it as a part of their change efforts.

The Three Lenses: Ancona, Kochan, Van Maanen and Westney

In Managing for the Future: Organizational Behavior and Processes, Ancona et al (2005) explain that a full picture of an organization is useful for understanding issues and exploring a relevant range of management approaches. They introduce three classic perspectives described as lenses that build upon people’s underlying assumptions about an organization. Combining these three lenses is a distinctive holistic method of organizational analysis.

The three lenses for viewing an organization are strategic design, political, and cultural. The strategic design lens examines the grouping of tasks and activities, linking and integration of these groupings, and alignment of elements such as metrics, incentives and rewards, and resources. Strategic design is the rational foundation for ensuring that an organization achieves its goals. Of course, there exist other forces which can rock a rational foundation.
Organizations are also political systems. The political lens examines the distribution of power and influence and the manner of competition, conflict, and negotiation. The ability to understand interests and power, get buy-in, build coalitions and networks, and use negotiation skills is crucial to effective leadership.

Strategic design and political factors do not fully explain human behavior. The cultural lens focuses on social and personal identities, mental maps for navigating daily activities, and the taken-for-granted assumptions which have long ensured success throughout an organization’s history. As Schein noted, culture is deep, broad, stable, and difficult to define clearly and relevantly. Ancona et al present the following six aspects of the cultural lens which are particularly important when analyzing organizations.

1. Symbols and meaning
2. Identity
3. Social control
4. Subcultures
5. Cultural relativity
6. Habits and history

Symbolism is central to culture. Symbols are vehicles for meaning and they are both material, such as insignia on military uniforms to indicate rank, and ideational, such as an American flag to invoke the concept of freedom. Symbols are produced and used for certain purposes, and they mean different things to different people. Furthermore, historical and social contexts shape and limit the possible meanings symbols carry. Identity is in many ways interchangeable with the definition of culture. Identity is a powerful force that defines values, beliefs, and interests that are entrenched, even in the face of compelling, rational argument.
Social control refers to practices that ensure employees behave in ways that benefit the organization; e.g., recruitment policies, training and education, and incentives and rewards.

Subcultures commonly emerge as a result of shared experiences from the nature of organizational structure and personnel development. New policies and programs will often have different meaning to different subcultures; therefore, an explicit understanding of subcultures is helpful in anticipating and resolving problems. Similarly, leaders should understand that cultural incompatibilities can post serious challenges. Additionally, the working habits that have ensured success throughout an organization's history are the fabric of culture. If leaders understand and respect these habits, they will be more successful in their change efforts.

**MENTAL MODELS: SENGE**

In *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, Peter Senge (1990) explains why understanding mental models is important in management. Senge defines mental models as “deeply held internal images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting” (p. 174). Mental models are extremely powerful in shaping human behavior because they affect how people perceive the world. Unexamined mental models can lead to gaps between perception and reality which in turn can result in counterproductive action.

By clarifying mental models, Royal Dutch/Shell gained significant competitive advantage in the oil industry in the 1970's. Shell practiced scenario planning, a method for summarizing alternative future trends. When managers repeatedly dismissed scenarios that were contradictory to their years of experience in the oil industry, planners realized that they needed to design scenarios that would force managers to question their own mental models. Abandoning the
prevailing view that “the oil business would continue as usual” (p. 180) allowed Shell managers to plan effectively for a changing geopolitical world. Consequently, when the OPEC oil embargo occurred in 1973, Shell responded very differently from its competitors and went from being the weakest of the top seven oil companies in 1970 to the strongest in 1979. By the 1980’s, defining mental models was institutionalized in Shell’s strategic planning process.

Senge explains that the discipline that Shell exercised requires two critical tasks. First, managers must uncover the tacit assumptions about important business issues. Second, managers must develop and hone their interpersonal skills. Articulating mental models requires reflection and face-to-face inquiry. Chris Argyris, an esteemed action science practitioner, defines reflection as the process of slowing down one’s thinking to become more aware of mental models and their influence on actions. Inquiry concerns how people behave when dealing face-to-face with others in complex situations. In addition to scenario planning, Shell uses mental mapping tools such as system dynamics and computer simulation software to expose assumptions about important business issues. Moreover, Shell has evolved the role of planning with the epiphany that it is more important to use planning to accelerate learning than to produce flawless plans. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower once noted, “I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

**ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE**

Several seminal works on organizational change exist; I have chosen two based on the role of culture and applicability to the Coast Guard.³ Schein’s model emphasizes the role of

³ For additional summaries of relevant change leadership models, see McAllister 2003.
culture in organizational change. John Kotter’s *Leading Change* framework complements Schein’s work and is directly applicable to a military organization.

**A Model of Transformative Change: Schein**

According to Schein, transformative change requires members of an organization to unlearn and relearn culture. He suggests that there are three stages of organizational change: unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. See Figure 3-3.

![Figure 3-2. Figure 3-3. A Model of Transformative Change](Schein 1999, p. 117)

**Stage One: Unfreezing**

Kurt Lewin, a prominent social psychologist, called the process of unlearning ‘unfreezing’ (Schein 1999). Normally, a crisis, threat, or sense of dissatisfaction has to occur before people in a mature organization will change; this type of disconfirmation starts the unfreezing process. Schein categorizes threats as economic, political, technological, legal, moral, and internal
discomfort. Other sources of disconfirmation include scandal, mergers and acquisitions, charismatic leadership, and training and education.

Once people recognize the need for change, they usually feel survival anxiety caused by having to abandon old ways of doing business in order to succeed in the organization. What follows next is learning anxiety, which is fear related to temporary incompetence, punishment for incompetence, loss of personal identity, and loss of group membership. In order to achieve transformative change, leaders must ensure that survival anxiety is greater than learning anxiety. Furthermore, leaders must focus on reducing learning anxiety rather than increasing survival anxiety. Increasing survival anxiety with greater threats and guilt will result in more defensive reactions and resistance to change. To reduce learning anxiety, Schein recommends that leaders create a sense of psychological safety with tactics such as coaching and formal training with practice fields for safely making mistakes and learning from them.

**Stage Two: Changing**

The second stage of organizational change involves shifting mental models and organizational systems. Shell uses scenario planning and mental mapping methods to redefine people's most basic values and beliefs. Schein suggests that people will also change their mental models by relating to positive and negative role models. In the absence of role models, people can change their mental models by trial and error. Schein suggests that trial and error, with its personal experiential factor, results in longer lasting change than role modeling.

**Stage Three: Refreezing**

In order for new behaviors to refreeze, they need to be consistent with organizational culture. If people learn new behaviors that do not fit with their work or social group, they will either revert to old ways or leave the group. Managers must therefore align organizational
systems such as incentives and rewards with the new desired behaviors and provide training for groups rather than individuals.

Understanding the three stages of transformative change is not enough. Schein cites the work of Beckhard and Harris (1987) which contends that a change team must act as a temporary, parallel system that manages the organization from the current state to the desired future state. Schein contends that the new way of thinking and behaving must be concretely defined in order to determine if the current culture will help or hinder change progress.

**Leading Change: Kotter**

A professor emeritus of leadership at Harvard Business School, John Kotter has identified common reasons that change efforts fail and eight steps to ensure lasting transformation in *Leading Change* (1996). The most common reasons organizations fail to achieve lasting change are:

- Allowing too much complacency
- Failing to create a powerful enough guiding coalition
- Underestimating the power of vision
- Undercommunicating the vision
- Permitting obstacles
- Failing to create short-term wins
- Declaring victory too soon
- Neglecting to anchor changes in the corporate culture

Based on these common errors, Kotter identified eight steps to transformative change which complement Schein’s model of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. (McAllister 2006)
See Figure 3-4. The first four steps shake up the status quo:

1. Establish a sense of urgency,
2. Create a guiding coalition,
3. Develop a vision and strategy, and
4. Communicate the change vision.

The next three steps introduce new ways of thinking and behaving:

5. Empower a broad base of people to take action,
6. Generate short-term wins, and
7. Consolidate gains to produce even more change.

And the final step is making change stick:

8. Institutionalize new changes into the culture.

Kotter suggests that skipping a step will almost assuredly result in problems, and that culture change occurs after people have seen the benefits of new behaviors. Leaders must
reinforce the validity of new practices by aligning processes such as promotions and assignments with the new culture. Furthermore, people must embrace change at a level deeper than the rational; they must feel it. Therefore, rather than focusing on only technical solutions, leaders should also focus on strategies that impact emotions, namely, people solutions (Kotter 2002).
IV. COAST GUARD CULTURE

Transition and transformation have become watchwords as we unite to assure the security of the country.


To understand the current state of Coast Guard culture, I will apply Schein’s framework of external survival issues, internal integration issues, and deeper underlying assumptions.

EXTERNAL SURVIVAL ISSUES

External survival issues are organizational constructs that ensure success in an industry. In Hax and Majluf’s framework, the external survival issue of strategy drives structure which drives processes. Therefore, in addition to the Coast Guard’s stated roles and missions, I will examine post 9/11 strategies and legislation, and the new Sector organization.

Coast Guard Roles and Missions

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 lists the Coast Guard’s five roles and 11 associated missions. See Figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. Coast Guard Roles and Missions
Maritime Safety

In partnerships with other agencies, the Coast Guard preserves maritime safety through programs of prevention, response, and investigation. Prevention activities include developing and enforcing vessel regulations, licensing commercial mariners, and educating the public. Since the incorporation of the Life-Saving Service in 1915, search and rescue has been the Coast Guard’s highest priority mission. When maritime mishaps do occur, the Coast Guard responds immediately to save property and lives. In addition to responding to incidents, the Coast Guard also conducts investigations of accidents to identify ways to improve maritime safety.

Maritime Mobility

The Coast Guard facilitates the movement of goods and people in the U. S. Maritime Domain in support of commerce, transportation, and scientific operations. The Coast Guard’s Aids to Navigation mission ensures a safe, secure, efficient, and accessible marine transportation system. Furthermore, the Coast Guard conducts icebreaking to provide navigable waterways in the Great Lakes, Northeast, Arctic, and Antarctic.

Protection of Natural Resources

The Coast Guard seeks to eliminate natural resource degradation and environmental damage associated with maritime commerce and transportation, commercial fishing, and recreational boating. Protecting the marine environment from oil and chemical spills through prevention, regulation, and response is a high priority Coast Guard mission. The Coast Guard also protects the U. S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by enforcing fisheries laws.

National Defense

The Coast Guard is one of the five U. S. Armed Forces that support national security and military strategies both domestically and abroad. Coast Guard assets protect, secure, and escort...
military sealift departures, provide port security for defense operations, and conduct vessel boardings in support of military operations and United Nations mandates.

**Maritime Security**

The Coast Guard enforces or assists in enforcing federal laws, treaties, and other international agreements such as drug, immigration, fisheries, and environmental laws. On the high seas and waters under U. S. jurisdiction, the Coast Guard has the authority to board vessels to conduct inspections, searches, and arrests. Arguably the most challenging mission in support of maritime homeland security has proven to be Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS), which is a primary driver of the Coast Guard’s new Sector organization.

**Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS)**

Now the top priority along with search and rescue (SAR), the PWCS mission is to prevent and protect against maritime security threats, reduce America’s vulnerability to those threats, and minimize the impacts of any maritime security incidents that do occur. Before September 11th, the Coast Guard dedicated only one percent of its resources to PWCS. Afterwards, the Coast Guard shifted 58 percent of its resources to PWCS. By 2003, the Coast Guard scaled back its PWCS budget to a sustainable 22 percent. See Figure 4-2 (Greene 2005).

Along with PWCS, the Coast Guard considers drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, other law enforcement, and defense readiness significant contributors to maritime homeland security. Therefore, the Coast Guard actually dedicates 45 percent of its resources to maritime homeland security, and this is the expected distribution for the next several years (Greene 2005). This is a dramatic change in priorities for the Coast Guard which was driven by several Executive Branch strategy papers and pieces of legislation that address homeland security.
Before 11 SEP  

FY 2002 Surge  

After  

FY 2003 Sustainable  

Figure 4-2. Resources Dedicated to Coast Guard Missions in Fiscal Years 2001-2003  
(Source: Greene 2005)  

Figure 4-3. Mission Resources Dedicated to Maritime Homeland Security  
(Source: Greene 2005)
Strategies and Legislation

The documents that set the stage for the Coast Guard’s refocused PWCS mission are:

- *The National Strategy for Homeland Security,*
- *The Homeland Security Act of 2002,*
- *The Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002,*
- *The National Strategy for Maritime Security,*
- *The Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,* and
- *Maritime Sentinel*

In July 2002, President George W. Bush signed *The National Strategy for Homeland Security,* which outlined strategic objectives for preventing terrorist attacks within the U. S., reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing any damage from attacks that do occur (White House 2002). In November that same year, Congress passed *The Homeland Security Act of 2002,* which established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and designated the Coast Guard as the lead agency for maritime homeland security.

The Coast Guard’s responsibilities greatly increased with the passage of *The Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002* (MTSA). For example, the Coast Guard became responsible for newly required port facility and vessel vulnerability assessments and security plans, both at home and in foreign ports with U. S. interests. Additionally, MTSA mandated maritime intelligence systems, authorized a sea marshal program, and established port security committees to coordinate federal, state, local, and private agencies. This led to the creation of *The National Strategy for Maritime Security.*

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4 For a detailed account of strategies and legislation Guard from 2001-2003, see Bushman (2003).
The National Strategy for Maritime Security

Derived from The National Strategy for Homeland Security, this document enacted eight plans for maritime security:

1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan
3. Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan
4. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy
5. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan
6. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan
7. Maritime Commerce Security Plan
8. Domestic Outreach Plan

These plans, particularly those concerning domain awareness, threat response, and transportation system security, were instrumental in developing the Coast Guard’s own strategy.

The Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security

Published in December 2002, The Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, has five strategic objectives:

1. Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist exploitation of, the U. S. Maritime Domain.
2. Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within the U. S. Maritime Domain.
3. Protect U. S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams between them.
4. Protect the U. S. Maritime Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits.
5. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within the U. S. Maritime Domain as either the Lead Federal Agency or a supporting agency (U. S. Coast Guard December 2002).

In order to achieve these strategic objectives, the Coast Guard identified six tactics:

1. Increase Maritime Domain Awareness.
2. Conduct enhanced maritime security operations.
3. Close port security gaps.
4. Build critical security capabilities and competencies.
5. Leverage partnerships to mitigate security risks.
6. Ensure readiness for homeland defense operations (U. S. Coast Guard December 2002).

With the guidance of these strategic objectives and tactics, the Coast Guard identified the need for extended offshore security operations (EOSO) in addition to the PWCS mission. PWCS activities focus mainly on inshore and near-shore regions and leverage the Coast Guard relationship with the maritime industry as well as state and local authorities. EOSO focuses further seaward and leverages current presence and law enforcement competencies. The combination of these two missions, now known as the combating maritime terrorism (CMT), aligns with the merger of “M” and “O” into Sectors by melding traditionally stove-piped missions. The Coast Guard’s detailed strategic plan for CMT is *Maritime Sentinel*.

*Maritime Sentinel*

The Coast Guard regularly operates in the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well as the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; these are the regions through which maritime threats must pass in order to reach the U. S. To the U. S., the open nature of the
The maritime environment is both a source of economic opportunity and security vulnerability. *Maritime Sentinel* describes the strategic environment of the maritime domain in detail.

Approximately 95% of the United States' overseas trade passes through its ports, accounting for two billion tons and almost $800 billion of domestic and international freight each year. Our coastal waterways support approximately 110,000 commercial fishing vessels contributing $110 billion to state economies each year. Additionally, more than 141 million U.S. citizens—over half the population—live within 50 miles of the coast. By 2025, that is expected to grow to 75 percent of the population. The coastlines of the U.S. host approximately 181 million tourists each year and support over 28 million jobs. In addition to coastal waterways, there are nearly 12,000 miles of commercially active inland and intracoastal waterways in the United States. These waterways are supported by locks and dams with a replacement value of over $125 billion. Approximately 1,800 river terminals are distributed across 21 states, with 59% servicing dry bulk cargoes and 27% servicing liquid bulk cargoes. Approximately 22,000 dry cargo barges and 3,000 tank barges service these terminals. The nation's inland waterways cargo transportation services support nearly 800,000 jobs. Inland waterways carry approximately 15% of the total freight transported in the U.S., with the annual value of goods exchanged between states using water transportation exceeding $100 billion. Total inland waterway freight is expected to increase by 1.3% annually, to more than 836 million tons by 2020.5

With such economic significance and relatively few access barriers, the maritime domain poses an extraordinary challenge for combating terrorism. *Maritime Sentinel* puts forth a threat-based, risk-managed approach to combating maritime terrorism. The strategic objectives, derived from the preceding documents, are:

- Prevent and respond to a terrorist/subversive attack within the maritime domain.
- Reduce America's vulnerabilities to terrorist/subversive acts.
- Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, waterways, coastal approaches, offshore regions, and the boundaries and seams between them.

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5 *Maritime Sentinel*, pp. 5-6.
• Minimize the damage to and expedite recovery from terrorists/subversive attacks that may occur within the maritime domain (U. S. Coast Guard March 2006).

This strategic plan emphasizes identifying and intercepting threats before they reach U. S. shores through layered, multi-agency, maritime security operations and strong security postures in strategic economic and military ports. Layered security embraces the concept of defense-in-depth, which is depicted in Figure 4-4. The Coast Guard patrols, monitors, and exerts control in every maritime layer. An at-sea presence reassures the American public, deters lawbreakers and adversaries, and increases the capability to engage adversaries before they reach the United States.

![Figure 4-4. Coast Guard Layered Security](Source: U. S. Coast Guard, Maritime Sentinel)
The Sector Construct

In order for lasting change to occur, Kotter explains that there must be a sense of urgency. The terrorist attacks of September 11th and quick creation of the Department of Homeland Security provided a breeding ground for transformational change in the Coast Guard. While all Coast Guard commands performed admirably during and after September 11th, Activities New York and Activities Baltimore were particularly responsive. Activities were experimental units where groups and marine safety offices were already under one command, and they were the basis for the Sector construct. The new Sector organization changes the way the Coast Guard traditionally managed the domestic and coastal zones of the maritime domain by placing them under the purview of single commands. The first Sector stood up in Miami, Florida in July 2004. There are now 33 Sectors that cover nearly the entire U. S. Figure 4-5 shows the areas of responsibility for each Coast Guard Sector. (Recently, the Commandant decided not to establish Sectors in the 17th district, Alaska, because of the unique nature of their operations and the geographic dispersion of units there.)

The Sector construct represents a major transformation from organizing around “O” and “M” programs to organizing around the service delivery processes of prevention and response. Prevention focuses on gaining compliance with regulatory standards and maintaining waterway systems. Response focuses on security enforcement and incident response. Logistics supports Prevention and Response by balancing the maintenance and availability of assets (boats and aircraft), preparing and provisioning personnel, and managing financial aspects of operations. Three sections – Planning, Intelligence, and the Sector Command Center – support Prevention and Response as well.
The new Sector organization is designed to provide strategically guided, goal-focused, high performance service delivery across all Coast Guard missions. The Commandant of the Coast Guard envisions the relationship between the Prevention, Response, and Logistics departments to be one characterized by collaborative interdependence. A review of Coast Guard documents relevant to the new Sector organization reveals that this new organization is designed to achieve the following benefits:

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6 Referenced documents include the draft Sector Organization Manual (2005), Greene (2005), Shumaker (2005), and Commandant Decision Memo (2004).
1. Unified command and control with integrated conduct of operations

2. Coordinated leveraging of maritime partnerships

3. Foresight in planning

4. Aggressive employment of assets and capabilities within the area of responsibility

5. Improved understanding of all missions

6. Better customer service

7. Common intelligence and operating pictures

8. Improved communication

9. Rapid, full transition to an incident command system (ICS)\(^7\)

The Prevention Department has three divisions. The Inspections Division is responsible for the regulation and inspection of vessels and port facilities. The Investigations Division conducts inquiries and assesses penalties for marine casualties, pollution incidents, and boating violations. The Waterways Management Division oversees aids to navigation, safety and security zones, and vessel traffic control. Previously associated with the “O” community, aids to navigation units have joined traditional “M” units to form the Prevention Department.

The Response Department consists of two divisions. The Incident Management Division is responsible for search and rescue missions, pollution regulations and other hazard response. The Enforcement Division enforces all maritime laws and treaties and conducts PWCS activities such as vessel escorts and armed boardings. Strike Teams, a traditional “M” unit, are now a part of the Response Department, along with small boat stations, patrol boats, tugs, and air stations (Shumaker 2005).

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\(^7\) An incident command system is an interagency organizational structure for managing major incidents such as September 11\(^{th}\) and Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 4-6 shows the standard organizational structure of Sectors. Units that have moved from their traditional communities are highlighted.

Prevention Department Units
- Marine Safety Units
- Marine Safety Detachments
- Regional Exam Centers
- Small Buoytenders
- Aids to Navigation Teams

Response Department Units
- Small Boat Stations
- Patrol Boats
- Icebreaking Tugs
- Small Harbor Tugs
- Air Stations
- Strike Teams

Logistics Department Units
- Sector Field Offices

Figure 4-6. Sector Organization
The Logistics Department has three divisions, Engineering/Support, Administration/Personnel, and Finance/Supply. Also in support roles to the Prevention and Response Departments are three sections that report directly to the Deputy Sector Commander. The Contingency Planning and Force Readiness Staff coordinate with the three departments for integrated contingency planning (and for operational planning as well in some Sectors). They also oversee the training and readiness of Sector reserve personnel. The Intelligence Staff provides a common intelligence picture by collecting, evaluating, and disseminating operational intelligence within the Sector. In addition to maintaining a common intelligence picture, the Sector Command Center (SCC) presents the current common operating picture; i.e., the status of all vessels, aircraft, communications equipment, and personnel from the Coast Guard and its partner agencies in the Sector. The SCC supports the Prevention Department during a major marine event such as a sailing regatta; during a PWCS or SAR incident, the SCC supports the Response Department.

As shown in Figure 4-6, the Sector Commander also has four supporting staff members. The Command Master Chief is the advocate for the morale and well-being of Sector personnel and their families. The Senior Reserve Officer oversees and manages the readiness of Sector Reserve forces (part-time Coast Guard members). As the titles imply, the Flight Safety Officer is an advisor on flight safety issues, and the Auxiliary Coordinator facilitates Auxiliary service (volunteer Coast Guard members) to the Sector.

A draft version of the Coast Guard’s Sector Organization Manual outlines the responsibilities of each officer position. Understanding these responsibilities of key personnel provides insight on how traditional communities with their different subcultures must interact in this new organization.
Sector Commander

"The Sector Commander is responsible for the proper administration of the Sector; for the efficient, safe, and economical performance of the duties of the Coast Guard within the Sector; and for the indoctrination, training, discipline, and proper utilization of the personnel under the Sector Commander's command. The Sector Commander shall require subordinates to attain and maintain a state of readiness to perform all duties for which they may be called upon, and to promptly, energetically, and effectively perform such duties. The Sector Commander shall establish and maintain an adequate relationship with the public generally, and with the maritime industry specifically, and shall require subordinates to do likewise."8

The Sector Commander has the combined responsibilities of two legacy commands - groups and marine safety offices. This vast span of control requires the Sector Commander to serve in the following specialized roles:

1. Sector Commander
2. Captain of the Port (COTP)
3. Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC)
4. Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC)
5. Officer in Charge, Maritime Inspection (OCMI)
6. Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC)

As the principal agent of the District Commander, the Sector Commander is the local Coast Guard spokesperson who partners with DHS agencies as well as other federal, state, and local public and private stakeholders to address maritime threats and vulnerabilities. As Captain of the Port (COTP), the Sector Commander supervises and controls all vessel movements within the Sector, ensures the security, safety, and environmental soundness of the navigable waters within the Sector, and coordinates general law enforcement activities.

8Sector Organization Manual, pp. 2-7 through 2-8.
In the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) role, the Sector Commander is responsible for establishing and directing an Area Maritime Security Committee, which consists of local stakeholders from federal, state, public, and private agencies. While serving as Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), the Sector Commander develops, exercises, and executes pollution response plans. As Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI), the Sector Commander administers, enforces, and directs the inspection programs for vessels, port facilities, and offshore structures. Furthermore, the OCMI is responsible for licensing seamen and investigating marine casualties and violations. Finally, the Sector Commander is the designated SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC); i.e., the tactical director of search and rescue cases within the Sector’s area of responsibility.

Since the span of control is so great and there is a significant responsibility to focus on external partners, it is important that Sector Commanders have an empowering leadership style that is comfortable with delegating authority. (The Commandant and the District Commander designate COTP and OCMI authorities; therefore, the Sector Commander may not be permitted to delegate these.) Additionally, the Sector Commander should have more of a strategic than tactical focus. As such, the Sector Implementation Team described the Sector Commander as a “mini-District Commander,” which is a different concept from the traditional one of Group Commander or MSO Commanding Officer. Since the sphere of influence was much smaller for Group Commanders and MSO Commanding Officers, they had more opportunity for direct control within their areas of responsibility. The Sector Officer Assignment Guide explains,

Officers selected for command cadre billets will represent the Coast Guard and oversee multi-agency operations across wide geographic areas. Their duties are more aligned to those of a District Commander than a single-unit Commander. Their staffs include “subject matter experts” so that they are not expected to have in-depth experience and expertise in all missions they oversee. As Sector
Commanders are reliant upon subject matter experts, in-depth expertise must be embedded throughout the Sector construct. Primary duties of the Sector Commander are public outreach, developing partnerships, fostering interagency cooperation, and overseeing operational readiness, performance and professional development of their staff.9

Deputy Sector Commander

The Deputy Sector Commander is the second in command. In the absence of the Sector Commander, the Deputy serves as the alternate for the Sector Commander roles (some only with Commandant designation). Moreover, the Deputy Sector Commander assists the Sector Commander in meeting mission objectives with an emphasis on building and maintaining unity of command. In this regard, the Deputy’s focus is more internal than external as well as more tactical than the Sector Commander’s role.

The Deputy should exert different levels of control over various Sector components. The Deputy directs activities such as the training and education program, the planning and execution of the budget, and the safety program. The Deputy supervises the Contingency Planning and Force Readiness staff, the Intelligence staff, and the Sector Command Center. Finally, the Deputy oversees the Prevention, Response, and Logistics Departments.10

Chief, Prevention Department

The Chief, Prevention Department is responsible for ensuring that vessels and port facilities comply with safety, security, and environmental protection regulations. Furthermore, the Prevention Chief is responsible for ensuring effective and efficient commerce and safe navigable waterways within the Sector. Related duties include overseeing vessel traffic services as well as aids to navigation and ice operations programs. Additionally, the Prevention Chief is

9 p. 27.
10 Deputy responsibilities as defined by CDR Dale Jones.
responsible for investigating marine casualties, pollution incidents, and mariner misconduct. The Prevention Chief also oversees and supports small buoy tenders, aids to navigation teams, and in some Sectors, marine safety detachments and units.

**Chief, Response Department**

The Chief, Response Department is responsible for security, law enforcement, and incident response operations such as PWCS harbor patrols, recreational boating safety inspections, pollution response, and search and rescue. Unless assumed by the Sector Commander, the Response Chief serves as the SAR Mission Coordinator during search and rescues cases. The Response Chief also oversees and supports small boat stations, patrol boats, and in some places, icebreakers.

**Chief, Logistics Department**

The Chief, Logistics Department directs the management and execution of all support activities including administration and personnel, finance and supply, and engineering support. In addition, the Logistics Chief serves as the Chief of Military Personnel. These duties include resolving personnel and medical issues, coordinating collateral duties, and administering the training/education and career development programs. Such responsibilities have traditionally rested at the command level with the Executive Officer (informally known as “XO”) because of their unit-wide nature. However, because the command’s span of control at Sectors is so large, the Logistics Chief has been assigned these “XO” duties.

Post 9/11 strategies and legislation that impacted the Coast Guard in its maritime security role were catalysts for changing the structure of the Service in response to threats in ports and coastal waters. The dramatic increase in focus on combating terrorism has not only changed a
major portion of the Coast Guard’s organization, but it has also demanded a change in culture which is manifesting itself in internal integration issues. As Schein contends, understanding external survival issues and internal integration issues of an organization can reveal deeper underlying assumptions that are significant factors of mission success.

INTERNAL INTEGRATION ISSUES

Internal integration issues are artifacts that bond people together within an organizational identity. These qualities are observable ones such as common language, badges of membership, elements of status, and allocation of rewards. For the Coast Guard, internal integration issues such as the Service’s core values and the Commandant’s direction provide foundational direction and language for all Coasties. Group identities such as officer specialties have their own badges of membership such as uniforms and insignia as well as elements of status such as rank and command. Furthermore, the officer assignment process is a significant way not only to distribute competencies to units, but also to allocate rewards. I will describe these internal integration issues in order to set the stage for understanding their place in the new Sector organization.

Core Values

The statement of the Coast Guard’s core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty was formally stated only recently in the mid-1990’s. However, because these values are deeply rooted in the long tradition of the Service to assume new responsibilities with the same people and equipment, these values quickly became a part of everyday language for Coast Guard members. New members learn the core values at every accession point and leadership training program. Strong leaders develop and enforce these values in their peers and subordinates. The
core values are the bedrock of the Coast Guard’s character; they fundamentally guide how Coasties act by challenging them to live up to the highest standards of excellence and service.

See Figure 4-7 for the official core values statement. (U. S. Coast Guard January 2002)

![Figure 4-7. Coast Guard Core Values](image)

**Commandant’s Direction**

Each new Commandant issues a direction statement which details his/her focus. The Commandant’s Direction is a touchstone to guide and align senior decision makers. The theme of the current Commandant’s Direction is Readiness, People, and Stewardship.

**Readiness**

The readiness of personnel and equipment has long been a priority for the Coast Guard. Admiral Collins placed a significant emphasis on readiness in the maritime security role.

“America expects that we will bring the same level of professionalism and maritime leadership to the war on terrorism that we have traditionally brought to all our other missions. We must be ready in all of our mission areas, while building our maritime security capability as a priority.”

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11 Commandant’s Direction 2003.
To improve maritime security readiness, Admiral Collins directed that the Service:

- Build robust maritime homeland security strategies, capabilities, and competencies.
- Design and implement a maritime domain awareness capability that provides integrated afloat, ashore, and airborne C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).
- Build strategic partnerships at the federal, state, and local levels for mission planning and execution.

People

The ability to attract, develop, retain, and deploy a quality workforce is key to the Coast Guard’s future. Recognizing that Coasties will work in an increasingly complex and technologically sophisticated environment, the Commandant stated that transforming the workforce by restructuring outdated human resource policies and processes is a top priority. In order to develop a more agile workforce and to provide for quality of life and workplace, the Commandant directed that the Service:

- Emphasize education, training, and professional growth.
- Grow the workforce to meet increasing mission demands.
- Rapidly implement restructured personnel, operations, and support systems for assignments and advancement.
- Design and deploy new information technology that leverages personnel as well as technology to implement new policies driven by the changing security environment.

Stewardship

The Commandant emphasized customer-focus and outcome-based operations to
strengthen the Coast Guard’s stewardship of the public trust. In so doing, the Commandant directed that the Service:

- Inspire a culture of innovation and process change that ensures the use of technology to enhance productivity and quality while reducing workload.
- Take advantage of the opportunities presented by systems acquisition initiatives, such as the Integrated Deepwater System project, to develop strategic relationships with industry and revolutionize operational and support processes.
- Deliver measurable results that directly contribute to the desired outcomes of the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard Strategic Plan.

Officer Careers

The military component of the Coast Guard consists of enlisted personnel with various technical specialties and officers who serve in general management and leadership positions. According to the advocate for the enlisted workforce, currently Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Frank Welch, the new Sector organization has not significantly impacted the enlisted workforce. Interviewed officers at various Sectors agree. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, I will examine only officer specialties.

The hierarchy of officer rank is clearly defined and visible in uniform. Formal rank structure in the Coast Guard, as with all military organizations, is a core characteristic of the Service. Shoulder and collar insignia, shoulder boards, and sleeve striping indicate officer rank. See Figure 4-8 for the rank insignia of the Coast Guard officer corps. According to The Coast

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12 In the Coast Guard, senior officers are ranked O-5 and above.

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Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook, the goals of an officer’s career are to:

- Determine basic personal interests that best match the needs of the Service.
- Fortify those interests by training and education to the best of one’s ability.
- Seek opportunities to serve in areas which allow fortified abilities to be used.

Although not explicitly stated, it is common for high-performing officers to aspire to command. Assignment to a command position means that a single officer is in charge of a military unit or region. One of the most significant recognitions of performance and leadership, command is one of the highest indicators of status in the Service. Command screening panels meet annually to select qualified applicants. A highly competitive process, screening panels consider performance, leadership, and experience as the primary qualifiers for command. The command screening process is an important rite of Coast Guard culture. As one officer described it, “Applying for command is tossing your name into a hat, a way to measure yourself against your peers. Having your name appear on the command screening list is a big deal.”

Officer Insignia

The value placed on command in the Coast Guard also manifests itself in tangible artifacts. Command has its own insignia, which are metal or embroidered devices indicating a professional qualification or designation. The command pin, depending on where it worn, indicates that an officer is currently serving or has served in command. There are two types of command insignia, one for afloat and one for ashore commands. Insignia such as the command pin are important artifacts of Coast Guard culture. Insignia, as well as medals and ribbons which indicate awards, publicly display information about an officer’s career path and performance that is discernible to all other service members. Certain officer specialties have their own insignia to
indicate professional qualifications and designations. The oldest insignia in the Coast Guard are the cutterman and aviator pins. The marine safety and operations ashore communities just recently acquired specialty insignia as well. See Figure 4-9 for a sample of officer insignia with traditional community associations noted as “O” or “M.”

Rank and command are not the only symbols of status in an officer’s career. The Coast Guard has traditionally held the “O” community in higher regard than “M” and support specialties such as engineering and legal. For example, for medals and ribbons there is an accessory called the Operational Distinguishing Device, a silver “O.” The Coast Guard’s Medals and Awards Manual states that eligibility is based on a person’s or unit’s:

- Direct participation in missions of an operational “hands on” nature (e.g., SAR, firefighting, law enforcement, disaster relief, pollution response, aids to navigation).
- Extended periods of service (rather than a specific incident) only if the major cited achievement used to justify the award is operational vice administrative, and the individual/unit participated “hands on” in the operational achievements.

The silver “O” indicates the status that the operations community has over other functions in the Coast Guard.

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13 Although the exact reason why the cutterman and aviator pins were the two dominant insignia is unknown, I suspect that the roots are in the Service’s modeling of the Royal British Navy.
14 The other U. S. Armed Forces do not have this type of distinguishing device.
15 p. 39.
All officer communities commonly refer to the Marine Safety insignia as ‘the shrimp fork.’ I note this as another possible example of a cultural bias toward the “O” community.
Traditional Officer Specialties

The traditional assumption about Coast Guard officers is that mission accomplishment would best be served by a corps of generalists. A generalist is an officer who acquires general knowledge and skills in multiple Coast Guard missions without specializing in only one set of competencies. The reality of the Coast Guard officer corps, however, is that a number of specialties and sub-specialties have arisen to meet mission needs. And with the changing security environment and new Sector organization, the Coast Guard has had to rethink these officer career paths.

An officer specialty is a field of expertise with a defined set of competencies and an authorized career path. Each field encompasses a group of positions, called billets that require similar professional skills and experiences. The following are the traditional career fields that existed prior to the new Sector organization.

- Operations Ashore
- Marine Safety
- Operations Afloat
- Aviation
- Naval Engineering
- Civil Engineering
- Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
- Financial Resource Management
- Legal
- Health Care
- Reserve Program Administrators
Officer specialties have distinct identity boundaries. There are badges of membership such as rank insignia that are common to all officers, but distinct roles and experiences have resulted in sub-cultural differences. At the most elementary level, officers of different specialties generally serve at different units. For example, cuttermen serve on ships and interact very little, if at all, with marine safety officers. Additionally, different missions have different technical languages, most fraught with acronyms and jargon. And as shown in Figure 4-9, certain officer specialties have their own insignia - a tangible badge of membership if ever there was one.

_The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook_ states that to be successful, officers must understand a broad range of Coast Guard policy and management; therefore, spending an entire career in single specialty was not recommended. Breadth of experience in the officer corps was more desirable than depth of expertise. This belief is but one of the many deeper underlying assumptions that have been the foundation of Coast Guard culture. And even in the new Sector organization with new officer specialties forthcoming, these assumptions are proving difficult to shake.

The new Sector organization has impacted all the officer specialties to some degree; however, the two career fields most impacted are operations ashore and marine safety. Therefore, I will delve into more detail about those communities than the others.

**Operations Ashore ("SAR Dogs")**

Since the days of the Life-Saving Service in the early 1900’s, operations ashore personnel have traditionally focused on search and rescue, thus their nickname “SAR Dogs.” Groups and small boat stations have performed a number of other missions such as law enforcement, environmental protection, and aids to navigation, but SAR has long been a top priority mission - one that has been the trademark of the Coast Guard’s identity, both within the organization and
Because of the nature of SAR and law enforcement, the "O" community is characterized by a decisive decision-making style and a willingness to work for extended hours. Additionally, the "O" community has a largely transactional relationship with the public. During search and rescue cases, operations personnel have to respond immediately to pluck people out of the water at any hour, set them ashore, and wish them good day. Similarly, Coast Guard law enforcement officers must make quick decisions during pursuits in order to make arrests before continuing onto the next case.

Operations ashore billets range from coordinating small boat operations at stations to managing the national SAR program at Coast Guard Headquarters. At the district and area levels, billets include command center controllers who manage information relevant to operations and division managers who oversee and support local groups. Additionally, there are operations ashore billets at vessel traffic services and the National Search and Rescue School. Billets provide exposure to varying degrees of SAR planning and multi-mission resource management. *The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook* recommends that officers apply for an assignment at a group or station early in their careers to lay the foundation for a career in operations ashore. It has been rare for officers from other communities to serve in operations ashore.

Command opportunities in operations ashore have traditionally been at groups and small boat stations at the O-3 (Lieutenant) through O-6 (Captain) levels. *The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook* states that officers should have previous group operational experience to screen for group command. When the Life-Saving Service became part of the Coast Guard, all members of that previously civilian organization were given enlisted status.
Through the years, the operations ashore community has remained enlisted-heavy and officer-light. Therefore, command opportunities at groups and stations were limited and selection highly competitive. When the new Sector organization merged groups with marine safety offices, many group command opportunities were eliminated.

**Marine Safety (“M”)**

The major programs in the “M” field are commercial vessel safety, port safety and security, and marine environmental protection. The commercial vessel safety program develops and enforces U. S. and international standards in merchant vessel design, construction, operation, inspection, and other marine activities. Officers in this specialty approve designs, conduct inspections, investigate incidents, and enforce mariner qualifications. Port Safety and Security specialists have traditionally overseen the safety and security of vessels, port facilities, national assets, and U. S. citizens in the domestic zone. Officers in the marine environmental protection field protect the marine environment and preserve natural resources while promoting commerce. Key programs include prevention, preparedness, response, enforcement, and outreach. All of these programs have a regulatory aspect which accounts for marine safety officers being referred to as regulators. Another common nickname is “M weenies.” I do not know the origin of this moniker, but it certainly highlights the “O” bias in Coast Guard culture prior to 9/11.

Concentration is in the following areas:

- Oil/freight shipping
- Offshore oil

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17 Another common nickname is “M weenies.” I do not know the origin of this moniker, but it certainly highlights the “O” bias in Coast Guard culture prior to 9/11.
• Shipyards and shipbuilding
• Commercial towing
• Great Lakes trade
• Port authority
• Marine environmental protection

Unlike the “O” community, “M” officers are focused on promoting commerce; consequently, not only do they have in-depth knowledge of the maritime transportation system, but they also have a strong ongoing relationship with industry partners. Because of this regulatory and industry focus, the “M” community’s pace of operations is more proactive than reactive, with more deliberate planning and more routine hours. There’s a saying about search and rescue, “You have to go out - you don’t have to come back.” The “O” community jokes that “M” officers have a corollary saying, “You have to go out to lunch - you don’t have to come back.” The significance of this joke is that going to lunch to partner and plan with industry stakeholders actually contributes to marine safety goals.

Officers need to begin the marine safety training program in the early stages of their career. *The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook* details the three stages of entry-level training. The first is two to three months of orientation and indoctrination at a marine safety office (now Sector). The second phase is attendance at the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety School to learn about port operations (including pollution response), investigations, and inspections. The final stage is qualifying as an MSO Command Duty Officer. Other “M” assignments include the National Maritime Center, the National Strike Force, and district, area, and headquarters staff positions. Before the Sector organization, command of marine safety offices existed at the O-4 (Lieutenant Commander), O-5 (Commander), and O-6 (Captain) levels.
The "M" community is officer-heavy and enlisted-light, so there is a lot of competition for command. In the Sector construct, command now exists for the most part only at the O-6 level.

**Operations Afloat ("Cuttermen")**

The operations afloat career field encompasses the historic roles of the Coast Guard in its sea-going roles, starting with the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790. Those who serve at sea are thus known as "cuttermen." Because of the highly specialized and high-risk nature of afloat billets, officers must make the decision to go afloat early in their careers; otherwise, the opportunity to pursue an afloat career may be lost. Operations afloat billets support several missions, but there are three afloat specialties commonly recognized and referred to by the color of the cutter: white hull, black hull, and red hull.

White hull sailors typically focus on law enforcement, search and rescue, and defense readiness. A fleet of high endurance cutters (designated WHEC), medium endurance cutters (WMEC), and patrol boats (WPB) strategically homeported throughout the United States patrol both coastal and offshore waters all over the world. Black hull sailors serve on buoy tenders and focus on establishing, maintaining, and operating aids to navigation such as buoys, lights, and beacons. Several black hull classes exist including seagoing buoy tenders (WLB) and coastal buoy tenders (WLM). Red hull sailors provide icebreaking capability to support interests in both domestic and polar regions, facilitate navigability through ice-laden waters, and assist government and civilian scientific organizations with marine science research. Ice operations specialties include polar operations, domestic icebreaking, and international ice patrol. There are numerous opportunities for command afloat at both the junior and senior levels.

**Aviation ("Airdales")**

The Coast Guard has both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft to support missions such as
search and rescue, law enforcement, ice operations, and PWCS. Commonly known as "airdales," aviators operate aircraft and perform vital functions in aeronautical engineering, aeronautical administration, aircraft maintenance, avionics engineering, and aviation safety. To apply for flight training, junior officers from all specialties with a strong performance record, a command endorsement, and a complete medical physical are eligible. The Coast Guard also brings in pilots from other military services. Command of air stations exists at the O-5 (Commander) and O-6 (Captain) levels. Like operations ashore and afloat, aviators have a primarily transactional relationship with the public.

**Naval Engineering**

Naval engineers handle the life cycle logistics of Coast Guard cutters and boats. Life cycle logistics includes planning, design, constructing, outfitting, operating, maintaining, and altering ships and boats with complex machinery, electrical, and weapons systems. Naval engineers normally complete two to three years in afloat and ashore assignments to learn about afloat operations and support. An entry level afloat engineering tour is required for pursuing a naval engineering career. Afloat engineering tours focus on the operation and maintenance of a cutter's engineering plant, as well as the management of department personnel and finances. Naval engineers have opportunities to command shore-based naval engineering support units and the Coast Guard Yard (a shipyard). Depending on relevant experience and qualifications, naval engineers may also compete for operations afloat and ashore commands as well.

**Civil Engineering**

Civil engineers are involved in the following functions of shore facilities life cycle: planning, programming and budgeting, design, construction, operation, maintenance and disposal, and environmental management. Specialization in civil engineering is open to all
officers with a degree in civil engineering or an allied field. Civil engineering billets include facilities engineering and civil engineering staff duty. Command of a civil engineering unit (CEU) or the Facilities Design and Construction Center occur at the O-6 (Captain) level.

**Other Career Fields**

Other officer specialties include other specialized engineering fields; command, control, and communications; financial resource management; legal; health care; and reserve program administrators. Command, control, and communications specialists deal with electrical engineering, computer and information system management, and telecommunications management. Financial resource managers have a wide array of responsibilities ranging from Supply Officer on a cutter to commanding officer of the Coast Guard Finance Center; nearly 75 percent of the billets in this field require a postgraduate degree in finance, materiel management, or acquisitions. The legal field consists of lawyers who are versed in the unique needs of the Coast Guard with its regulatory, law enforcement, domestic and international nature. Coast Guard lawyers provide support to operational Commanders, managers and administrators, programs, and Coast Guard members and their families. Health services is a unique field since most officers come to the Coast Guard from the U. S. Public Health Service. Coast Guard doctors, dentists, pharmacists, health specialists, and physicians' assistants provide healthcare for military members and their families. There are also 20 medical administration billets at logistics commands and headquarters. The Reserve Program Administrator field consists of reserve officers assigned to active duty to recruit and manage the reserve component of the Coast Guard.

**New Officer Specialties**

In the past few years, the Coast Guard conducted a comprehensive review of the officer
corps management system and recently published a new framework for officer specialties to be implemented in 2008 or 2009. The current Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, Rear Admiral Kenneth Venuto, explained that the new framework reflects the evolution of the officer corps from primarily generalists to specialists and broadened specialists. Specialists are officers who have in-depth expertise in one career field. Broadened specialists are officers who possess two or more specialties. Admiral Venuto contends that in this new organization the majority of officers will be specialists or broadened specialists. Convincing officers that a specializing in one field will not be potentially damaging to their careers may prove to be a challenge. In fact, the recently published *Sector Officer Assignment Guide* (October 2005) still advises officers that the more diverse experience is in terms of types of jobs and geographic locations, the better prepared officers will be to tackle new challenges.

In the new Sector organization, operations ashore and marine safety specialties have merged to create two new career fields: operations ashore/prevention and operations ashore/response. What is notable about these specialties is that legacy “M” missions are now called operations ashore/prevention in recognition of the fact that those missions are the delivery of services. Regulators have officially been dubbed operators. There will also a logistics sub-specialty in engineering; however, that is yet to be developed. Additionally, intelligence, human resources, and management are three new career paths to deal with those increasingly complex Service needs. See Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Old and New Officer Specialty Frameworks
(*Logistics sub-specialty to be developed)

Officer Assignments

The goal of the Coast Guard’s assignment system is to deliver the right person with the right skills at the right time. The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook states,

The fundamental tenets of the officer assignment system require equitable, unbiased, consistent consideration of both individual desires and Service needs. Officer assignments are driven by the Coast Guard’s need to serve public interest. The specific skills and experience mix to meet this need constantly changes with new technology, changing budgets and new legislation. Since the Coast Guard serves the public, the first consideration for officer assignments should be, and is, the needs of the Service.

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18 From The Human Resources Directorates World of Work pamphlet.
19 p. 5-3.
The key concepts from the Coast Guard’s assignment process are therefore:

- Equitable
- Unbiased
- Consistent
- Individual desires
- Needs of the Service above all

When making decisions, assignment officers (AOs) consider four organizational needs: officer career patterns, qualifications, occupational specialties, and diversity. One of the primary duties of AOs is to counsel officers on how to shape their career paths for success. There is no one formula for a successful officer career, but there are common notions of the characteristics of a successful career such as demonstrated performance and leadership in challenging assignments, an operational career base with staff experience, out-of-specialty tours, formal training and advanced education, and consequently, promotions. In addition to meeting unit needs by filling billets with qualified officers, AOs make training and education assignments to ensure officer specialties maintain the requisite competencies. And in keeping with the Commandant’s commitment to diversity, AOs look to assign women and minorities to positions that serve as role models for junior officers, enlisted members, and the public community.²⁰

One of the espoused values of the assignment system is to recognize the desire for Coast Guard members to have geographic stability throughout their careers. *The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook* states:

The need for geographic stability reflects changing societal attitudes and values coupled with substantial, increasing numbers of geographic bachelors and dual-

²⁰ *The Coast Guard Officer Career Development Guidebook*, p. 5-4.
career Coast Guard families. Fewer PCS (permanent change of station) moves also result in cost savings, managing the personnel transfer account prudently is always a factor and critical in lean financial times. In addition, the Coast Guard wants to use its personnel's local knowledge to enhance its service to the public. 21

As mentioned before, this espoused value is not adopted in the officer corps' cultural mindsets. While enlisted members can reasonably expect to remain in the same geographic area for a large part of their careers, active duty officers traditionally expect to move every two to four years. Interviews and anecdotal experience indicate that geographic stability is still considered potentially damaging to an officer's career. Moreover, meeting Service needs while balancing geographic stability with equal opportunity for assignments in desirable areas is a challenge. Tour lengths for officers vary by individual situation but have generally been four years for operations ashore and two to three years for marine safety, operations afloat, aviation, and staff jobs. Anecdotally, serving in one geographic location for more than two tours in a row still seems unusual and undesirable. Moreover, The Sector Officer Assignment Guide states that generally speaking, it is beneficial to seek jobs in different geographic areas within the Sector construct in order to gain a broader perspective of the total Coast Guard mission in preparation for senior leadership billets. 22

Sector Officer Assignments

According to The Sector Officer Assignment Guide, officer must make decisions about their careers earlier than ever before. Qualification processes are extensive, and officer promotions are occurring at a faster rate. It is expected that officers will enter the Sector world of work sometime during their first and third tours. Sectors are designed to be a primary career

21 p. 5-7.
22 p14.
path for prevention and response officers; as such they are operational field tours, not staff tours for officers from other communities. However, the Coast Guard’s policy for commanding Sectors is, “The Sector Commander and Sector Deputy Commander billets are open to officers from all career paths, with one of the foremost requirements being strong leadership and a demonstrated commitment to Coast Guard core values.” A billet that is available to officers from all communities is called an ‘01’ coded billet. This coding is a shift from the traditional mindset that to command an operational unit, an officer must have had a successful career path in that community.

Eligibility for Sector Department Head positions remains in the traditional mindset. Candidates for Prevention, Response, and Logistics Chiefs enter the Sector construct with experiences and competencies gained in relevant career paths; e.g., operations ashore, marine safety, engineering, and finance. “Prevention requires expertise in the technical understanding and practical conduct of verification inspections of vessels, investigations of casualties, enforcement of waterways safety and security standards, and waterways analyses.”

Four Sector positions require a screening process: Sector Commanders and Prevention, Response, and Logistics Department Heads. During the screening process, a panel of senior officers reviews candidate records to identify personnel qualified to serve in command. The stated reason for screening Department Heads is that they are key operational leadership positions that require the same level of scrutiny. Consequently, however, AOs have a smaller pool of candidates from which to make Sector assignments. The Sector construct introduces a

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23 The Sector Officer Assignment Guide, p. 6.

24 p. 8.
new concept of operations for these previously disparate officer communities – collaborative interdependence. Collaborative interdependence requires increased multi-mission agility and a broader set of competencies. Until the Coast Guard has grown officers in the new Sector sub-specialties, AOs are challenged to ensure that the overall composition of officer assignments at Sectors provides the multiple competencies needed.

DEEPER UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

As Schein explains, the commonly held values and beliefs that have made an organization successful throughout its history result in assumptions which are taken for granted and often unarticulated. The building blocks of organizational culture, these assumptions, or mental models are an extremely strong force that shapes how people think, feel, and act.

“Where you stand depends on where you sit.”

Based on Coast Guard history, an examination of the external survival and internal integration issues, and research on the Sector construct, I have identified some mental models of the Coast Guard officer corps and its sub-communities. Please note that these assumptions are generalizations, and that depending on timing and perspective, there may be Coast Guard officers who will dismiss my interpretation of the Service that follows.

Equity and Equality

The concepts of equity and equality are fundamental not only to the Coast Guard, but to human beings in general. People in an organization believe that there should be an equitable division of labor, and that if a person or community does more than their fair share, the organization should reward them for it. Likewise, resentment brews when people perceive that
others have more than they deserve. This need for equity underlies most human conflicts; it is
the classic ‘haves versus have nots.’ Equality is the basis for the American dream - the belief
that anyone can succeed with determination and hard work. The Coast Guard acknowledges this
value by trying to engineer all career specialties with a path to the top of the Service. There is an
understanding that some specialties have stronger paths, but officers want to know that everyone
has a chance to become Commandant with determination and hard work.

It is human nature to expect a sense of equity and equality. When people perceive that
these fundamental values are being violated, the ensuing discontent can disrupt an organization,
especially if the discontented have a lot of power. Power does not necessarily correspond to an
organizational chart; viewing an organization through the political lens can reveal the informal
networks that wield significant power to change strategic design.

The Status of “O”

The Coast Guard has an operations-centric culture, specifically operations excluding the
marine safety community. “O” is arguably the most powerful officer community in the Service
as artifacts of Coast Guard culture demonstrate. Visible aspects of the uniform such as insignia,
ribbons, and medals, are significant symbols of status in Coast Guard culture. Some of these
artifacts such as the silver “O” device, which distinguishes operational accomplishments, reflect
this bias. Also, non-operational specialties such as legal and C3 (command, control, and
communications) do not have their own insignia. The absence of this kind of recognition is a
subtle indication of the status of “O.” Furthermore, less than flattering “M” references such as
‘M weenies’ and ‘shrimp fork’ (both of which are common) speak for themselves.

Moreover, a brief glance at the history of the Commandants of the Coast Guard also
reflects this value. The Coast Guard's stated value is that above all performance and leadership matter most for a successful career. In a pyramidal organization, promotion up the hierarchy is essential to a successful career, and in the officer corps, the pinnacle is to become Commandant. Every single Commandant of the Coast Guard has had an "O" background. 17 out of the 20 Commandants had operations afloat backgrounds; only two of those were naval engineers. Four of the 20 had operations ashore backgrounds, and three were aviators. The Exxon Valdez oil spill and subsequent Oil Pollution Act of 1990 spotlighted the marine safety community, as evidenced by the following Commandant selection, Admiral J. William Kime. Admiral Kime was the only Commandant from the "M" community, but he also had "O" experience as a naval engineer on cutters. (See Appendix A.)25

"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."26

Therefore, although there is no one single formula for a successful officer career, there is a mental model that officers with an "O" career base are best suited to lead the Service. This is but one of the cultural assumptions that are currently causing some misalignments in strategy, policy, and procedures.

**Good Coasties**

The Coast Guard's long history of successfully assuming new missions and accomplishing them without additional equipment or people has resulted in the belief that good Coasties will always get the job done. A double-edged sword, this cultural belief has inspired tremendous faith in Coast Guard members, but it has also undermined efforts to increase

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25 For the biographies of Coast Guard Commandants, see http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp /history/ FAQS/ comm.html.
26 Orwell, George, 1946. *Animal Farm*. 
personnel strength and financial support. This belief is articulated in the Coast Guard's core value of devotion to duty and is the foundation for Coast Guard culture.

**Virtue of Command**

The consolidated major command cadre screening panel (CMCCSP) is a group of officers selected annually to choose candidates for command of the Coast Guard's operational units. The precept to the CMCCSP for assignment year 2006 underlined the importance of their task.

In view of our 215-year legacy as a military, multi-mission, maritime service, we must select our most capable and responsible officers for operational Command and Key Leadership positions. Selection for these positions represents the highest degree of trust and confidence the Coast Guard can place in an officer. Those selected must have a proven record of superior leadership and reflect the highest standards of conduct, character, capability, attitude, and military bearing. We must ensure that Coast Guard personnel serving under our officers you select do so in an environment that inspires and develops our junior ranks. If we are to be successful in retaining a quality, diverse, and motivated work force, we must select the absolute best leaders. You and your fellow Panel members are the principal guarantors of this commitment. You have been very carefully selected to accomplish this task.27

The notion of command is rooted in the Coast Guard's beginnings as the Revenue Cutter Service, modeled after the British Royal Navy. Sailors perceive command as a virtuous job because of the enormous responsibility. On the internet website for the Coast Guard cutter DALLAS, this value is reflected in their description of the Commanding Officer's job.

The Commanding Officer (CO) of the DALLAS is a Captain (O-6) in the United States Coast Guard, which is the highest-ranking officer the Coast Guard sends to sea. He or she commands a multi-million dollar piece of government equipment, which is entrusted to their care. The responsibility for the equipment and much more importantly the lives of the personnel assigned to the DALLAS, are ultimately in the hands of the Commanding Officer. The commanding officer bears the tremendous burden of command, and does so alone.

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27 p 5.
Every Coast Guard Commandant had operational command, and almost every admiral in the flag corps today has had operational command. It is a core part of Coast Guard culture for high-performing officers to aspire to command.

**Breadth Over Depth**

The core value of devotion to duty combined with the multi-mission character of the Service has resulted in the officer corps valuing generalist breadth of experience over depth of expertise. The most successful officers have a working knowledge of numerous missions and geographic areas. Both the current and incoming Commandants are generalists with experience in operations afloat, operations ashore, and finance.

Despite espoused statements of evolving the officer corps towards more specialization, this mental model continues to manifest itself in several aspects of officer management such as tour lengths and assignments. Officer tours lengths of only two to four years do not promote the development of in-depth expertise. Furthermore, tour rotations generally follow the pattern of operations followed by staff, out-of-specialty, or advanced training/education (and vice versa). For the most part, AOs discourage officers from completing two consecutive tours of the same nature.28 A career Coast Guard member ironically remarked, “If you’ve done something once in the Coast Guard, you’re an expert.”

In addition, despite the recognized benefits of geographic stability, most officers do not spend the majority of their careers in one location. Those who do recognize that geographic stability is a tradeoff since it limits the number of career enhancing opportunities. A Coast

28Exceptions include aviators and junior operations afloat officers going from major cutters to patrol boats.
Guard Academy recruiter commented that one of the ways she sells the Service is by telling prospective applicants “You’ll do lots of different things in lots of different places.”

**Sub-Cultural Mental Models**

Different officer communities have their own mental models as well. Schein (1996) describes three subcultures that are common in any organization: executives, operators, and engineers. These subcultures do indeed exist in the Coast Guard. A significant nuance, as described earlier, is that operators are further divided into operators and regulators. The different values of these communities translate into different behaviors. Prior to the Sector organization, operations ashore and marine safety personnel were responsible for largely different missions and worked in separate commands. This strategic design encouraged different associated behavioral styles which are coming to light in the new Sector organization.

**Customer Focus**

As described earlier, the “O” community has a largely transactional relationship with the public. As a result, during non-response work hours, “O” officers focus on internal matters, in particular ensuring personnel and asset (boats and aircraft) readiness. Maintaining peak readiness is the Coast Guard’s motto: Semper Paratus, which means ‘Always Ready.’ Therefore, the routine focus of the “O” community is primarily internal to the organization.

The routine focus of the “M” community, in contrast, is external to the organization. One of the main goals of the marine safety community is to facilitate commerce. As such, “M” officers spend a large portion of routine work hours focused on maritime industry stakeholders. With “O” and “M” merged into Sectors, Sector Commanders are responsible for ensuring that both internal and external customer needs are being met.
Battle Rhythm

Battle rhythm is a military term that refers to the synchronization of a unit’s daily operating tempo with planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycles to ensure that the Commander makes timely decisions (Duffy et al, 2004). The different nature of response and prevention missions results in different operational tempos and cycles. Because search and rescue and law enforcement are reactive missions, decisions must be quick; otherwise, the consequences can be grave. A fast operational tempo drives short planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycles as well. Prevention missions such as marine environmental protection, on the other hand, have longer cycles because of longer time horizons for consequences. Consequently, operational tempo in the “M” community is more deliberate. Synchronizing these different tempos and cycles at Sectors for an effective battle rhythm is crucial to mission success.

Work Hours

The different nature of prevention and response missions has also resulted in different perspectives on work hours. During search and rescue and law enforcement cases, members of the “O” community frequently have to work extended hours and at night. Therefore, an important element of success is stamina; moreover, stamina is one of the most important indicators of devotion to duty in the “O” community. This belief manifests itself during routine work hours as well. For many members of the “O” community, the number of hours worked directly correlates with dedication, stamina, and performance. Prevention missions, on the other hand, have a more deliberate pace of operations and longer cycles. Consequently, “M” officers generally do not value working overtime in the same sense. There seems to be more respect for efficient time management. These different interpretations of devotion to duty must be
acknowledged in order to ensure fair performance evaluation in the merged world of Sectors.

**Resource Constraints**

In any organization, executives are responsible for a larger purview than field personnel. As such, differences in values and perspectives are common. From the perspective of field operations in the Coast Guard, a common challenge is overworked personnel and limited financial resources. One again, this persistent situation has its roots in the mental model that good Coasties will always get the job done. However, another underlying assumption is significant here, and that mental model is the executive belief that the Coast Guard must strategize and operate within resource constraints. For the most part, the senior leadership of the Coast Guard is reluctant to ask Congress for additional resources. A senior Coast Guard officer commented, “We’re boy scouts and girl scouts who don’t want to ask for more money to do what’s right. We’re plucking people out of the water, we’re keeping drugs out of schools, we’re protecting the fish stocks and the economy. Regardless of the money, we’re going to complete these missions because they’re so important.”

Although it is acknowledged that resourcing to strategy instead is optimal, there is a strong executive belief that this is not realistic. The Coast Guard presented the Sector construct to Congress as a resource-neutral plan; i.e., that implementing this reorganization would not require additional personnel or funds. The phrase ‘resource-neutral’ has a negative connation in the Service, but executives maintain that field personnel do not comprehend political realities.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Combining Schein’s concepts of organizational culture with the three lenses perspective of Ancona et al, I have developed a framework for organizational culture. See Figure 4-10.

This framework encompasses broader the concept of organizational culture as deeper underlying assumptions to include strategic design and political aspects. The strategic design perspective of an organization consists of its external survival and internal integration issues such as mission, strategies, structure, processes, and identity. The cultural lens, as defined by Ancona et al, delves into deeper underlying assumptions that are the foundation of an organization. These values and beliefs can be categorized into three levels: mental models that are common to all human beings, to an entire corporate culture, and to its sub-cultures. The political dimension of an organization refers to the informal power networks that can influence both strategic design and organizational culture. The application of my research on the Coast Guard officer corps to this framework is depicted in Figure 4-11.
The strategic design view of the Coast Guard officer corps consists of external survival and internal integration issues. These are the rational, observable artifacts such as stated missions and core values, strategies, Sector organization, officer career paths and assignments. The cultural view of the officer corps articulates deeper underlying assumptions about human nature and the values and beliefs that span the Service and characterize officer communities. These mental models are the foundation of the officer corps culture, and it is very difficult, though not impossible, to change these assumptions. The political dimension of the officer corps details power networks such as the status of the "O" community and deference to Congress.

Yet another aspect of human nature is to lead and manage from only the strategic design view. In keeping with the reviewed academic research, I contend that the Coast Guard has much to gain from acknowledging the political and cultural aspects of the Service as well; that is, understanding the building blocks of what we are in order to become what we want to be.
V. CULTURAL CHALLENGES

My greatest challenge has been to change the mindset of people. Mindsets play strange tricks on us. We see things the way our minds have instructed our eyes to see.

— Muhammad Yunus

Still in its infancy, the Sector organization does not have a systematic evaluation program yet; in the meantime, Sector Commanders have been tasked with developing their own unit performance metrics. However, the Coast Guard did contract Perot Systems Government Services to establish job performance standards and required competencies for Sector officer positions and accepted the final report in January 2006. A team of performance consultants visited six Sectors (Boston, New York, Baltimore, San Diego, North Carolina, and Miami), surveyed 19 Sectors, and reviewed numerous Coast Guard documents to establish optimal performance standards, identify gaps and root causes, and make recommendations. Since the Sector Commander optimal accomplishments are the best available standards for sector performance, I will focus on those related gaps.

SECTOR COMMANDER PERFORMANCE

To review, the Sector construct was designed to have the following desired benefits:

- Unified command and control
- Integrated conduct of operations
- Coordinated leveraging of maritime partnerships
- Foresight in planning
- Aggressive employment of assets and capabilities within the area of responsibility
- Improved understanding of all missions
- Better customer service
- Common intelligence and operating pictures
- Improved communication

Anecdotal data indicates that there have been improvements in understanding missions, cross-mission communication, and common operating picture. Physically locating Prevention, Response, and Logistics personnel in one command has significantly contributed to these gains; furthermore, the integrated Sector command center has been key to developing and communicating a common operating picture, previously non-existent at the field level. The best data currently available on performance gaps is Perot Systems’ final report. Two major gaps were identified in mission accomplishment and unity of command. See Table 5-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Performance</th>
<th>Current Performance</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Coast Guard mission objectives accomplished within assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR)</td>
<td>1. Sector operations are not always closely coordinated.</td>
<td>1. Department and Staff duties, authorities and responsibilities vary across Sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Command and control of operations is not always fully optimized.</td>
<td>2. Inter-Departmental/Staff interaction does not always take place with regularity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Partnerships with federal, state, and local government representatives as well as public and private stakeholders are not always fully optimized.</td>
<td>3. Sector Commanders do not always have the needed access to data/information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The full range of Sector Commander designated roles are not always fully executed.</td>
<td>4. Real time Common Intelligence Picture (CIP)/Common Operational Picture (COP)/Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is not always maintained and shared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unified Coast Guard command presence within assigned AOR</td>
<td>5. Classified and Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is not easily shared with other federal, state, and local government personnel or maritime industry representatives and stakeholders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Interaction between Sector Commanders and national, state, and local media representatives is often problematic.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Current Sector Commanders often do not possess all the knowledge, skills, and attributes needed to conduct the full range of Sector operations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Delegation of authority from the Sector Commander to subordinate personnel varies across Areas and Districts.</td>
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Table 5-1. Sector Commander Performance Gaps
(Perot Systems 2006)
As described in Chapter IV\textsuperscript{29}, because of the vast span of responsibility, the Sector Commander has been likened to a “mini-District Commander.” According to the Commandant and the Sector Implementation Team, the leadership style of Sector Commanders should therefore be primarily externally-focused, strategic, and empowering. Deputies should have a complementary style that is more internally-focused and tactical. During a Sector Commander conference in April 2006, 27 of 33 Commanders completed a 15-question survey to assess their own customer focus and leadership style. In addition, 22 Deputies responded to an online survey on the same topic (See Appendices B and C for the complete surveys.) \textsuperscript{30} All of these Commanders and Deputies were the first to be assigned to sector field commands. Table 5-2 details the composition of respondents.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{SECTOR COMMANDER} & \\
\hline
Primary Specialty & # \\
\hline
Legacy Marine Safety & 18 \\
Legacy Operations Ashore & 10 \\
Operations Afloat & 3 \\
Aviation & 3 \\
Legal & 0 \\
Naval Engineering & 0 \\
Civil Engineering & 1 \\
Finance & 0 \\
Other: Personnel & 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{DEPUTY COMMANDER} & \\
\hline
Primary Specialty & # \\
\hline
Legacy Marine Safety & 12 \\
Legacy Operations Ashore & 11 \\
Operations Afloat & 2 \\
Aviation & 1 \\
Legal & 1 \\
Naval Engineering & 0 \\
Civil Engineering & 0 \\
Finance & 0 \\
Other: Information Technology & 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Composition of Respondent Sector Commanders and Deputies}
\end{table}

With regard to customer focus and strategic versus tactical style, Sector Commanders assessed both what they perceive themselves to be as well as what they believed the role of the

\textsuperscript{29} p. 45.
\textsuperscript{30} I owe a special debt of gratitude to Captain Dean Lee and Commander Dale Jones for their help with these surveys.
Sector Commander should be. In order to assess degree of empowerment granted to Department Heads, the survey posed situational questions with multiple choice responses. In addition, respondents had the opportunity to provide qualitative comments on the role of the Sector Commander. Tables 5-3 through 5-9 detail the results.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>COMMANDER FOCUS IS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal between external and internal</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More internal than external</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER FOCUS SHOULD BE</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal between external and internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More external than internal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More internal than external</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-3. Sector Commander Customer Focus Responses

Table 5-4. Deputy Commander Customer Focus Responses

There appears to be a general understanding that the focus of the Sector Commander should be more external than internal, and 17 of 27 Commanders perceive themselves to have that focus. Their Deputies agree. However, 5 of 27 Commanders believe that their focus should be equal between external and internal, and over one third of Sector Commanders do not perceive themselves as having a primarily external focus. This is a significant gap.

In March 2006, the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued a service-wide message on the subject of maritime industry outreach because of a perception that customer service from the Coast Guard at the Sector level had decreased. (See Appendix D for the complete message.)

As the owners and operators of vessels and commercial infrastructure, industry plays a critical role in the safety, security, and environmental health of our ports and waterways. A constructive, professional relationship with them is an essential element in achieving our national goals in these areas. Indeed, part of
the rationale for creating Sectors was to provide 'one stop shopping' for the public. Recently, however, we have received feedback in several national level forums that some in industry are reluctant to approach Sector Commanders based upon the perception that senior field leadership is no longer focused on matters that are of great importance to commercial operators.

In his message, the Commandant directed that Sectors conduct outreach activities such as hosting industry days; he also required Sectors to report all outreach efforts to headquarters. One of the root causes of this performance gap is likely to be the different mental models of the "O" and "M" communities regarding customer focus. Nearly 70 percent of legacy "M" respondents are more externally focused, compared with half of the legacy "O" respondents. A Deputy at a Sector where both the Commander and Deputy are have legacy "O" backgrounds described their response to the Commandant's message. "We held a one-day community event here and then checked a box - yup, we did the outreach thing. It was just another operation."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER STYLE IS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More strategic</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More tactical</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equally strategic and tactical</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5-5. Sector Commander Strategic/Tactical Responses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER STYLE IS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>More strategic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More tactical</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally strategic and tactical</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5-6. Deputy Commander Strategic/Tactical Responses*

12 of 27 Sector Commanders who responded view themselves as spending equal amounts of time making strategic and tactical decisions, and 11 view themselves as more strategic. More than half the responding Deputies, on the other hand, view their Commanders as spending more
time on tactical decisions. Eight of the Deputies characterized their Commander as more strategic. For analysis purposes, I averaged Commander and Deputy responses that were more strategic \[\frac{(11+8)}{2} = 9.5\]. One of the root causes of this gap is simply that the Sector organization is still new. There are no senior officers who have grown up in the Sector career path yet. A lack of confidence in unfamiliar missions may cause some Sector Commanders to exert more direct control at the tactical level. Another possible correlation is that “O” Commanders are accustomed to being briefed at frequent intervals during response cases such as search and rescue. The quick battle rhythm of SAR and law enforcement reinforces this practice. “M” commanding officers have a slower battle rhythm and the nature of prevention missions does not necessitate the same frequency and level of involvement.

19 Sector Commanders responded that they delegate authorities to their Department Heads, and eight responded that they did not. Those who do delegate explained that Department Heads are key leadership positions and the span of control is unmanageable without delegation. Furthermore, delegating authorities enhances professional development and efficiency of the sector. Some Commanders explained that their District Commanders do not allow delegation of authorities, and others felt that “it’s important that all authorities are concentrated at the top.”

The Sector Commander survey presented five scenarios for assessing the level of empowerment given to Department Heads. Scenarios included both routine work and incident response for operations missions. Responses to the scenarios represented three degrees of empowerment which, for analysis purposes, is represented as A = very empowering, B = somewhat empowering, and C = non-empowering.\(^{31}\) Tables 5-7 through 5-9 detail the results.

\(^{31}\) Sector Department Head input was key to developing scenario-based questions.
There was no correlation between level of empowerment and officer specialty. Individual personality is the primary driver of empowerment style. However, the nature of work seems to dictate the level of control Sector Commanders exert. Sector Commanders tend to monitor and control incidents more closely when the consequences are higher and the decision cycles are shorter.

According to the design, Sector Commanders should be primarily externally-focused, strategic, and empowering. The Sector Commander and Deputy Commander surveys point to gaps that likely have cultural root causes. Since the data on level of empowerment was inconclusive, I will graph only two characteristics: externally focused and strategic. The optimal value for each of these dimensions is 27, the number of respondents. See Figure 5-1 for highlighted gaps.
Perot Systems identified several recurrent causes for the gaps noted in Table 5-1. These causes are relevant to the gap identified in Figure 5-1 as well.

**Knowledge and Skills**

- Sector Commanders do not always have all the knowledge and skills needed to oversee the full range of Sector missions.
- Many Sector Commanders do not have the competencies to work with other federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel or maritime industry representatives.

**Incentives**

- There is no Sector-specific performance evaluation for Sector Commanders.

**Cognitive Tools**

- Lack of cognitive tools, combined with operational tempo and time constraints, hinder information sharing.

---

32 Refer to Wile’s framework of performance drivers in Figure 2-2.
**Organizational Systems**

- There is no official Sector organization manual with guidelines for policy, processes, and procedures at the field level.

**Culture**

- The sense of commitment to the Sector construct varies from officer to officer.
- Sectors lack the resources and dedicated staff to manage the change process.

Perot Systems recommended numerous, detailed interventions to address these causes such as a mandatory Sector command school, a Sector evaluation mechanism, a learning management system, a Sector organization manual, and a survey to assess officer commitment. These interventions will be most effective when they are aligned with desired organizational culture. Schein contends that when processes contradict espoused values (the claimed and/or documented principles, ethics, and visions of an organization), a deeper level of culture is at work; i.e., mental models.\(^{33}\) Applying the framework in Figure 4-11, I will identify misalignments in the officer assignment system to demonstrate how they contribute to Sector Commander performance gaps.

**01 CODE**

The goal of the assignment system is to meet the needs of the Service by delivering the right person *with the right skills* to the right job at the right time.\(^{34}\) Perot Systems identified the required competencies for Sector Commander, and as to be expected, they are heavy in marine safety and operations ashore specialties. The six major roles of the Sector Commander are:

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\(^{33}\) See p. 21.

\(^{34}\) From *The Human Resources Directorates World of Work pamphlet.*
1. Sector Commander

2. Captain of the Port (COTP)

3. Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC)

4. Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC)

5. Officer in Charge, Maritime Inspection (OCMI)

6. Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC)

Five of these six roles are specific to legacy marine safety and operations ashore missions. Before sectors, a prerequisite for screening for command of a marine safety office or group was prior experience at these types of units. And *The Sector Officer Assignment Guide* states that sectors are a primary career path for prevention and response officers; as such sectors are operational field tours, not staff tours for officers from other communities. However, the sector command billets were 01-coded; i.e., available to officers from all specialties. Therefore, officers from other communities applied at the first opportunity for sector command in assignment year 2005.

When the consolidated command cadre screening panel (CMCCSP) met, it selected officers from mostly the marine safety and operations ashore communities. The following year, the precept for the CMCCSP clarified that, “Leadership is the key criterion for selection of our Sector Commanders … Their staffs include ‘subject matter experts’ so that they are not expected to have in-depth experience and expertise on all of the missions they oversee.” There was no such clarification for other operational commands. The panel consequently selected significantly more officers from other communities for sectors. See Table 5-10.
As mentioned, this most recent CMCCSP precept stated that Sector Commanders "are not expected to have in-depth experience and expertise on all of the missions they oversee."\(^{35}\) It did not state that Commanders are not expected to have in-depth experience and expertise on any of the missions they oversee. The traditional prerequisite for command of an operational field unit is prior experience in that type of unit. For example, in this same CMCCSP precept, one of the listed prerequisites for a senior afloat command is having served in an O-5 afloat position since 1 June 1999. Senior aviation command has a similar criterion. These prerequisites for sector command, although previously required for command of marine safety offices and groups, are notably absent. The only criteria listed for Sector Command were:

(a) Are in year group 78 or junior;

(b) Are tour complete in 2006, or will have completed at least two years in their current assignment by September 15, 2006.

In their analysis Perot Systems also identified Sector Commander assignments as problematic. One of the listed causes of Sector performance gaps is improper job selection.

\(^{35}\) The original sector construct included air stations in the organization which accounts for the significant number of aviation selections. Just recently, however, the Commandant approved that air stations will largely not be a part of the sector organization. Additionally, some of the operations officers selected had a second specialty of support, but no officers with a solely support background were selected for 2006.

\(^{36}\) p. 5.
Although a list of Sector Commander job competencies was not approved at the time of either CMCCSP, in both years the panel received a description of the responsibilities of Sector Commanders. In addition, various members of the screening panel came from marine safety and group backgrounds. However, Perot Systems observed that “competencies were not always considered when selecting and assigning Sector Commanders.”

The 01 coding of Sector Commander billets is a misalignment of the assignment process with the following espoused values:

- Evolving the officer corps towards more specialization
- Creating new officer specialties in operations ashore/prevention and operations ashore/response
- Delivering the right person with the right skills to the right job
- Valuing the needs of the Service above all

Several officer mental models and informal power networks provide contribute to this misalignment. The basic human desire for equity and the value placed on command led some officers to voice their discontent over the first CMCCSP results in assignment year 2005. The opportunity to command a new large operational field unit was extremely desirable for officers with high career aspirations. In particular, senior operations afloat officers perceived that the legacy “M” and operations ashore communities got more than their fair share. Sectors are a new path to the top of the organization, and operations afloat officers did not want to miss out on this opportunity. Although there had been some opportunity for afloat officers to cross over to groups, there had been virtually no opportunity for afloat specialists to enter the “M” world.

After the first CMCCSP for sectors, attendees at the Atlantic Area major cutter commanding officer conference voiced their concerns about perceived inequities to Area program managers. There was also a lively email discussion about rewarding good Coasties and generalists. Despite acknowledged specialized competency requirements for operational field command, afloat officers maintained that outstanding performance and strong leadership mattered most. This rationale reflected the assumptions that good Coasties will always get the job done and breadth of experience is more valuable than depth of expertise. The Commandant agreed, and the second CMCSSP selected Sector Commander candidates from a more even distribution of officer communities.

COMMAND OPPORTUNITIES

Many senior officers in the marine safety and operations ashore communities initially opposed the sector organization because one-third of their command opportunities at the O5 and O6 level were eliminated. The subsequent 01 coding of Sector Commander billets exacerbated this concern because it significantly enlarged the candidate pool and increased competition. Table 5-11 details senior command opportunities for marine safety and operations ashore specialties before and after Sectors.  

38 Before Sectors, there were six combined group/air stations commands for which operations ashore personnel were not eligible. Two of those, San Diego and Corpus Christi, became Sector/Air Stations, but the other aviation commands remained outside the sector construct.
Table 5-11. Marine Safety and Operations Ashore Command Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Sectors</th>
<th>O6</th>
<th>O5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSO/Activity</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO/Group</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel Traffic Service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group/Air Station</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Sectors</th>
<th>O6</th>
<th>O5</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector/Air Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Safety Unit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Field Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a heated debate on establishing commands at the Prevention, Response, and Logistics Department Heads level, and Admiral Collins initially agreed for sectors that met certain criteria. Three of the earliest Sectors (Boston, Miami, and San Juan) stood up with Commanding Officers for the departments. In January 2005, the Commandant rescinded the decision to establish subordinate commands at sectors.

Many high performing Commanders are aggressively seeking any command positions that remain. The decision to have departments rather than commands at Sectors will decrease the number of command opportunities available, thereby disappointing many of these officers. The decision is expected to impact retention for some top performers who choose to retire. However, this concern is not considered widespread enough to impact operational readiness.39

The Commandant explained that the overwhelming advantages of consolidating and synchronizing command and control into a single field unit drove his decision to rescind. He assured the officer corps that Sector Department Heads would have a scope of responsibility similar to Group and MSO commands. He also charged promotion boards, advanced training and command screening panels, and assignment officers to focus on competitiveness based on scope of responsibility and performance, “not strictly on who has commanded and who has not.”

Admiral Collins explained, “The objective of a Coast Guard officer career is not command.”

Nevertheless, afloat officers fought for and won the opportunity to compete for these new operational field commands by championing Service-wide beliefs. Although their arguments conflicted with espoused values, Coast Guard mental models, reinforced by the political power of the “O” community, remained rock solid. The result is an assignment policy that is misaligned with the Sector construct and its associated strategies and missions. See Figure 5-2.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.
- Albert Einstein

Perot Systems applied thorough academic and analytical rigor to develop numerous, detailed interventions that address Sector performance gaps. All of these strategic interventions fall into Rosett’s four categories of solutions systems: human resource development, human resource management, environmental engineering, and organizational development. If implemented as a system, these interventions will undoubtedly reap gains for the Service. However, if these interventions are not aligned with either espoused values and cultural beliefs, the gains will be only short-term.

Schein describes the phases of transformative organizational change as unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. As described in Chapter III, the combination of Kotter and Schein’s research on transformative change provides a useful framework for transformative organizational change.

Unfreezing

1. Establish a sense of urgency.
2. Create a guiding coalition.
3. Develop a vision and strategy.
4. Communicate the change vision.

Changing

5. Empower a broad base of people to take action.
7. Consolidate gains to produce even more change.
Refreezing

8. Institutionalize new changes into the culture.

The Coast Guard is currently in the changing phase. If the changes underway are going to refreeze, then the Service must institutionalize new changes into organizational culture.

THE MOUNTAIN

Figure 6-1 is a metaphor for organizational alignment based on the famous saying, “If the mountain will not come to Mohammed, Mohammed will go to the mountain.”

As Senge urges, leaders need to uncover tacit assumptions about important business issues in order to achieve lasting organizational change. And as Ancona et al explain, there must be an understanding of informal power networks as well so that their influence is effectively leveraged for the benefit of the organization. Once mental models and power networks are articulated (no easy task), leaders face two options to ensure lasting organizational change. They can align strategic design issues with existing cultural assumptions; i.e., go to the mountain, or
they can bring the mountain to them by changing organizational culture.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{MOVING THE MOUNTAIN}

With the current focus on homeland security and the sector construct, the Coast Guard needs to move the mountain. In the post 9/11 environment, the Service must explicitly acknowledge that some longstanding cultural mindsets have to change. Since it is not possible to change mental models by simply issuing a directive that announces a change in culture, leaders must examine the strategic design of their organizations from the perspective transforming people's deeper underlying assumptions about success. When internal integration issues such as espoused values and specialty management are aligned with external survival issues such as strategies and organizational structure, cultural mindsets will follow. This type of effort is a huge undertaking that requires a systematic approach and its own change management strategy.

\textbf{People Solutions}

In order to transform organizational culture, people must embrace change at a level deeper than the rational; they must \textit{feel} it. Kotter contends that in addition to technical solutions, leaders must implement strategies that impact emotion - namely, people solutions. As described in Chapter III, Rossett categorized 'people solutions' into the four categories: human resource development, organizational development, environmental engineering, and human resource management.

The Coast Guard currently lacks an active human resources strategy.\textsuperscript{41} Rossett's

\textsuperscript{40} Thanks to Professor John Van Maanen for inspiring the idea of moving mountains.
categorizations serve not only as a framework for human resource interventions, but also for human resource strategy. In December 2000, the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Human Resources at the time published a strategy to reengineer the Service’s human resources systems for optimal mission accomplishment in the 21st century. This strategy was called Project Future Force 21, and it addressed elements of each of Rossett’s quadrants: workforce structure, workforce specialization, career entry and progression, assignments, and compensation. Several initiatives from that project are underway and have come to fruition, but in the wake of 9/11 and the drastic changes the Service has experienced, I recommend that Coast Guard revisit framework of Project Future Force 21. Human resource strategy should be aligned with the current emphasis on homeland security and flexible enough to account for an ever-changing world. Moreover, human resource strategy should have a cultural management dimension to ensure lasting success.

The Foundation

Mental models are the foundation of culture. The eight steps in the combined models for transformative change can help institutionalize new mental models into organizational culture.

Unfreezing

1. Establish a sense of urgency.

The team tasked with developing a new human resource strategy must understand its urgent importance since the Coast Guard is in such a state of transition. People are an organization’s most valuable resource; therefore, strategy on how to optimize this resource

41 Perhaps the mental model that good Coasties will always get the job done is at work here.
should be as important as operational strategy. The most effective way to create a sense of urgency is for the Commandant of the Coast Guard to address the team personally and repeatedly and to set a challenging but realistic deadline. The Commandant must communicate this sense of urgency to the entire organization as well.

2. Create a guiding coalition.

The standard practice at Coast Guard Headquarters is to charter a strategic working team with a supervising Guidance Team of senior officers and an Executive Steering Committee of top level stakeholders who make the final decision on recommendations. These are the guiding coalitions. Selection of these members is crucial, and a major challenge is to make them aware of their own mental models about human resource strategy and cultural management in order to gain their support. Senge explains that institutionalizing the definition of mental models in strategic planning requires leaders with honed interpersonal skills. The Coast Guard officer corps is largely left-brain, rational, and logical; consequently, convincing senior leaders to endorse an unconventional approach to strategic planning will likely require a great deal of charisma from highly influential leaders such as the Commandant and other admirals.

3. Develop a vision and strategy.

As mentioned earlier, an organization must decide what it wants to be. For example, if the Coast Guard is committed to aligning the entire Service with current mission priorities, homeland security strategies, and the sector organization, then there must be a vision and a strategy to change counterproductive mental models such as breadth over depth and the status of “O.” For example, Project Future Force 21 defined a vision of a strength-based organization. In this vision people are classified into appropriate specialties based on identified talents. Furthermore, the Service manages officer specialties and the up-or-out promotion policy is
modified for needed competencies. This vision shatters officer assumptions about a successful career and breadth over depth.

Similarly, a vision of the Sector construct is the integration of “M” and “O” into one operational identity. Merging these missions in the Sector construct has blurred the lines to some extent, but the new terminology of Prevention and Response will continue to carry “M” and “O” connotations unless there is a human resource strategy that intentionally manages culture.

4. **Communicate the change vision.**

Communication about changing counterproductive mental models must start at the top of the organization. Furthermore, it must be explicit, frequent, multi-modal, and echoed by all layers of leadership throughout the Service. Every Coastie needs to understand and believe that changing certain assumptions is necessary.

**Changing**

5. **Empower a broad base of people to take action.**

Kotter explains that empowering people to take actions requires removing as many barriers to achieving the vision as possible. Sometimes barriers are managers who are resistant to change. Very often organizational structure has too many layers, and processes are too bureaucratic. Reorganizing and reengineering processes are strong messages that senior leadership is serious about change. The vertical alignment of Districts, Areas, and Headquarters with the Sector organization sent this message.

As described earlier, because of their vast span of control Sector Commanders need to empower their Department Heads for optimal mission accomplishment. This applies to the senior leadership of the Coast Guard as well. For example, all Sector Commanders should be permitted to delegate authorities to Department Heads at their own discretion. This is not only
one small but powerful way to align policy with strategy and structure, but it is also a way to change the mental models about command and span of responsibility in this new organization.


Allowing and promoting Sector Commanders to delegate authority is also a short-term win that builds momentum for cultural change. The Commandant and Executive Steering Committee must be willing to approve immediately implementable recommendations (known as “Strokes of the Pen”) such as delegation authority to provide evidence of success. Short-term wins should occur within six months of the start of a change effort, and actively pursuing short-term wins should be embedded in formal planning (Kotter 1995).

7. *Consolidate gains to produce even more change.*

In addition to embedding short-term wins into formal planning, guiding coalitions should monitor and track milestones, communicate and praise successes throughout the Service, then leverage those successes to expand mental model change efforts into new arenas.

**Refreezing**

8. *Institutionalize new changes into the culture.*

Institutionalizing cultural change requires diligent alignment of internal integration issues with external survival issues in order to move the mountain. The reengineering of human resource systems must support the current mission focus, security strategies, Sector construct, and new cultural mental models. Rossett’s quadrants in Figure 6-1 provide a systematic view of human resource systems.

If these aligning internal processes such as promotions, assignments, training, and geographic location seem repeatedly counterintuitive, then senior leadership may need to reevaluate the current external survival issues and organizational culture required for success.
In order to change mental models that are counterproductive to external survival issues, human resource development systems must intentionally address those models. Sector training programs should articulate the different behaviors that have arisen from different sub-cultural values and beliefs. Officers need to be aware of the differences in customer focus, battle rhythm, and work hours so that they can synchronize and synergize effectively. Additionally, cross-training and mission familiarization must increase for officers at all levels. Sectors Boston and Buffalo have developed their own unit training programs which rotate junior officers through the Prevention, Response, and Logistics Departments as well as the Command Center and Planning and Readiness Section. This approach to breaking down sub-cultural distinctions encourages lasting organizational change.

Organizational development practices must also be aligned with the desired new culture. For example, to achieve unity of command, teambuilding strategies for Prevention, Response, and Logistics personnel will encourage improved communications, camaraderie, and less distinction between legacy “M” and “O” personnel.

Environmental Engineering systems such as physical location have a significant impact
on cultural change as well. The Coast Guard promised Congress a resource-neutral reorganization which limited the Coast Guard’s ability to co-locate Sector elements into one location. Sectors where the Prevention and Response departments are not co-located are handicapped in achieving unity of command and its benefits.

It is crucial to align human resource management systems such as assignments as well. For instance, the Sector officer assignment system needs to overcome mental models that dilute unit capabilities. The officer corps is better equipped for mission accomplishment with more specialists and broadened specialists – breadth and depth. Accordingly, the assignment system must make every effort to fill jobs with specialized requirements with officers who possess those specialized competencies. Furthermore, the Coast Guard must reinforce a new notion of command and a successful career with changes in precepts to command screening panels and promotion boards. When more Prevention and Logistics officers become admirals and commandants, the culture will have changed - as will have the power networks.

THE ROAD AHEAD

I have articulated only a handful of mental models in the Coast Guard officer corps. The task of continually defining deeper underlying assumptions and realigning an organization is paramount, which is why it requires a strategy of its own. I recommend that the Coast Guard begin by recognizing the need for human resource strategy and cultural management. Each quadrant of human performance systems then needs to be systematically analyzed to ensure that policies and processes are not yielding to counterproductive mental models. And the Service should be forthright and explicit about such a change effort rather than assuming that at the field level good Coasties will figure it out on their own.
VII. CONCLUSION

After September 11th, the image of the Coast Guard quickly changed with the increased mission focus on maritime security. The slogan on the Coast Guard’s official recruiting website, currently reads, “I am the defender of the homeland. I am the port in the storm. I am the enforcer of the sea. I am the shield of freedom.” As mentioned, post 9/11 the Coast Guard shifted most of its financial resources to the PWCS mission. The Service created marine safety and security teams (MSSTs) which have been likened to SWAT teams. The old working uniforms were replaced with operational dress uniforms (ODUs) which more resemble Department of Defense combat fatigues. And the Coast Guard has been receiving more media attention in its increased homeland security role.

Although a mission shift can change service image fairly quickly, mental models that are the building blocks of service culture are slower to change. I do believe that good Coasties will always get the job done. But I also believe that senior leadership must not only put Coasties at the center of strategic planning, but also articulate those counterproductive assumptions that have long been taken for granted. To transform culture, then, senior leadership must acknowledge and abandon a mental model that exists at the level of human nature:

One of the difficulties in bringing about change in an organization is that you must do so through the persons who have been most successful in that organization, no matter how faulty the system or organization is. To such persons, you see, it is the best of all possible organizations, because look who was selected by it and look who succeeded most within it. Yet, these are the very people through whom we must bring about improvements.

- George Washington42

42 http://www.managersforum.com/Quotes/QuoteDetail.asp?Type=CHANGE
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IX. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWEES

Commandant of the Coast Guard
Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard
Assistant Commandant for Human Resources
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard
Sector Implementation Team Members (4)

*Maritime Sentinel* Strategists (2)
Officer Assignments Staff (5)
Workforce Cultural Assessment Staff
Sector Command Cadre Indoctrination Course Staff
Commander, First Coast Guard District
Sector Commanders (2)
Sector Deputy Commanders (2)
Sector Department Heads (6)
Sector Section Chiefs (4)
Informal Mental Model Interviews (7)
## APPENDIX B. COMMANDANTS OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Commandant</th>
<th>Operational Background</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>2006-Present</td>
<td>Admiral Thad W. Allen</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations Ashore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Operations Afloat</td>
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<td>Naval Engineering</td>
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<td>Operations Afloat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>Admiral James S. Gracey</td>
<td>Operations Ashore</td>
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<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1982</td>
<td>Admiral John B. Hayes</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
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<td>Operations Ashore</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>Admiral Owen W. Siler</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-1974</td>
<td>Admiral Chester R. Bender</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>Admiral Willard J. Smith</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949-1954</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Merlin O'Neil</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1949</td>
<td>Admiral Joseph F. Farley</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936-1946</td>
<td>Admiral Russell R. Waesche.</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1936</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Harry G. Hamlet</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1932</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Frederick C. Billard</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1924</td>
<td>Rear Admiral William F. Reynolds</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1919</td>
<td>Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf</td>
<td>Operations Afloat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Revenue Cutter Service became the Coast Guard in 1915.*
APPENDIX C. SECTOR COMMANDER SURVEY

OFFICER SPECIALTY

1. What is your background? (Check all that apply.)

☐ Legacy "M"
☐ Boat Forces/Ops Ashore
☐ Cutterman
☐ Aviator
☐ Legal
☐ Naval Engineer
☐ Civil Engineer
☐ Finance

2. What is your Deputy's background? (Check all that apply.)

☐ Legacy "M"
☐ Boat Forces/Ops Ashore
☐ Cutterman
☐ Aviator
☐ Legal
☐ Naval Engineer
☐ Civil Engineer
☐ Finance

FOCUS

External = Industry stakeholders, other federal, state, and local agencies, etc.
Internal = CG units and personnel

3. What kind of customer focus do you currently have?

☐ Equal between external and internal
☐ More external than internal
☐ More internal than external

4. What kind of focus do you think you SHOULD have?

☐ Equal between external and internal
☐ More external than internal
☐ More internal than external
5. What kind of focus does your Deputy currently have?

- Equal between external and internal
- More external than internal
- More internal than external

6. What kind of focus do you think your Deputy SHOULD have?

- Equal between external and internal
- More external than internal
- More internal than external

LEADERSHIP STYLE

7. Which of the following best describes you?

- I spend more time on strategic decisions.
- I spend more time on tactical decisions.
- I spend equal time on strategic and tactical decisions.

8. Do you currently delegate any authorities to your department heads?

- Yes
- No

9. Please describe why you delegate or do not delegate authorities to Department Heads.

10. Your Prevention Department head submits an updated COI for your signature. You:

- Skim it quickly then sign it.
- Read it carefully, ask any questions that arise, then sign it.
- Compare the updated COI with the original, ask any questions that arise, then sign it or return it for further work.

11. On Saturday night, the Command Center notifies you that an 800' tank vessel loaded with no. 4 oil has grounded in a channel in your AOR. You:

- Wait for your Prevention Department Head to provide you with an initial case report.
- Immediately ask the Command Center or Prevention Department Head for initial details about the case.
- Head to the Command Center to monitor/direct the case.
12. Which of the following best describes you?

- My Response Department Head decides when and where to conduct LE patrols.
- My Response Department Head and I collaboratively decide when and where to conduct LE patrols.
- I direct my Response Department Head on when and where to conduct LE patrols.

13. Late Monday evening during a storm, the Command Center notifies you that they have a correlated mayday from a sailboat with 6 POB 15 miles offshore. You:

- Wait for your Response Department Head to provide you with an initial case report.
- Immediately ask the Command Center or Response Department Head for initial details about the case.
- Head to the Command Center to monitor/direct the case.

14. Which of the following best describes your relationship with your Logistics Department Head?

- My Logistics Department Head makes the majority of decisions and briefs me afterwards.
- My Logistics Department Head and I work collaboratively on most decisions.
- I guide most Logistics Department issues.

COMMENTS

15. Please provide any other comments on the role of Sector Command Cadre. Thank you.
APPENDIX D. DEPUTY SECTOR COMMANDER SURVEY

OFFICER SPECIALTY

1. What is your background? (Check all that apply.)

- Legacy "M"
- Boat Forces/Ops Ashore
- Cutterman
- Aviator
- Legal
- Naval Engineer
- Civil Engineer
- Finance

2. What is the background of your Sector CO? (Check all that apply.)

- Legacy "M"
- Boat Forces/Ops Ashore
- Cutterman
- Aviator
- Legal
- Naval Engineer
- Civil Engineer
- Finance

FOCUS

3. What kind of focus does your Sector CO have?

- More external than internal
- More internal than external
- Equal between external and internal

4. What kind of focus do you think your Sector CO SHOULD have?

- More external than internal
- More internal than external
- Equal between external and internal
5. What kind of focus do YOU currently have?

- More external than internal
- More internal than external
- Equal between external and internal

6. What kind of focus do you think you SHOULD have as a Deputy Sector CO?

- More external than internal
- More internal than external
- Equal between external and internal

SECTOR CO LEADERSHIP STYLE

7. Which of the following best describes your Sector CO?

- Spends more time on strategic decisions
- Spends more time on tactical decisions
- Spends equal time on strategic and tactical decisions

8. Which of the following best describes your Sector CO?

- Spends more time getting briefed on strategic issues
- Spends more time directing strategic issues
- Spends equal time getting briefed on and directing strategic issues

9. Which best describes your Sector CO?

- Spends more time getting briefed on tactical decisions
- Spends more time directing tactical decisions
- Spends equal time getting briefed on and directing tactical decisions

COMMENTS

10. Please provide any other comments on the role of Sector Command Cadre. Thank you.
APPENDIX E. COMMANDANT MESSAGE ON OUTREACH

R 061931Z MAR 06 ZUI ASN-A00065000017
FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//C/P//
TO COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA
COMPACAREA COGARD ALAMEDA CA
AIG 4956
BT
UNCLAS //N16700//
SUBJ: REACHING OUT TO THE MARITIME INDUSTRY
REF (A): ALCOAST 440/05

1. AS WE UNDERGO SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES,
PARTICULARLY WITH THE STAND-UP OF SECTOR COMMANDS, WE MUST BE
CAREFUL TO PRESERVE HISTORICALLY PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
WITH INDUSTRY CUSTOMERS. AS THE OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF VESSELS
AND COMMERCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, INDUSTRY PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE IN
THE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH OF OUR PORTS AND
WATERWAYS. A CONSTRUCTIVE, PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM
IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN ACHIEVING OUR NATIONAL GOALS IN THESE
AREAS. INDEED, PART OF THE RATIONALE FOR CREATING SECTORS WAS
TO PROVIDE "ONE STOP SHOPPING" FOR THE PUBLIC. RECENTLY,
HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECEIVED FEEDBACK IN SEVERAL NATIONAL LEVEL
FORUMS THAT SOME IN INDUSTRY ARE RELUCTANT TO APPROACH SECTOR
COMMANDERS BASED UPON THE PERCEPTION THAT SENIOR FIELD LEADERSHIP
IS NO LONGER FOCUSED ON MATTERS THAT ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
COMMERCIAL OPERATORS. ALTHOUGH THESE PERCEPTIONS MAY BE
ERRONEOUS, WE SHOULD MAKE THE
OUTREACH EFFORT TO CORRECT THEM, AND THEREBY ENSURE THE SUCCESS
OF THE SECTOR CONSTRUCT AS IT RELATES TO A LARGE SEGMENT OF OUR
CUSTOMER BASE.

2. I STRONGLY ENDORSE THE NEED FOR OUR LEADERS TO KNOW AND
UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNITIES THEY REGULATE. OPEN LINES OF
COMMUNICATION WILL PAY DIVIDENDS IN FURTHERING OUR
ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES. A PROVEN WAY TO INITIATE OUTREACH IS
TO SPONSOR AN INDUSTRY DAY. TYPICALLY, THESE EVENTS ARE
STRUCTURED TO PRESENT TOPICS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE LOCAL
COMMUNITY AND OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIALOG AND DISCUSSION. IT
NOT ONLY HELPS INDUSTRY UNDERSTAND COAST GUARD REQUIREMENTS IN A
CONGENIAL SETTING, THEY GENERALLY ENHANCE OUR EFFECTIVENESS BY
GETTING THE WORD OUT ON COAST GUARD REGULATORY EXPECTATIONS.
MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT OPENS UP LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WHEREBY
PROBLEMS, AS THEY ARISE, CAN BE RESOLVED AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE
LEVEL. WHETHER YOU CHOOSE TO HOLD INDUSTRY DAYS, OR OTHER
COMPARABLE MEETINGS OR EVENTS, OUTREACH IS IMPORTANT AND SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE SECTOR COMMANDERS RESPONSIBILITIES, AS
DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY IN REFERENCE (A).
3. I HAVE ASKED G-P TO TRACK FIELD OUTREACH EFFORTS. AREAS, DISTRICTS, AND SECTOR COMMANDERS SHALL ADVISE G-P OF ANY SUCH OUTREACH EFFORTS BY PROVIDING E-MAIL NOTIFICATION TO "FLDR-G-PCV(AT SYMBOL) COMDT.USCG.MIL" WITH A COPY OF A FLYER OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT DESCRIBES THE PARTICULARS OF THE MEETING.

4. INTERNET RELEASE AUTHORIZED.

5. T. H. COLLINS, ADM, COMMANDANT SENDS.

BT

NNNN
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