Congressional Sea
Change:
Conflict and Organizational Accomodation in the House of Representatives, 1878 - 1921 - Volume I

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CONGRESSIONAL SEA CHANGE: CONFLICT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMODATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1878 - 1921

by

THOMAS WESTERMAN WOLF

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on June 16, 1981 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

ABSTRACT

This thesis focusses on the 1878 to 1920 period of the history of the United States House of Representatives in an attempt to explain the momentous changes which occurred within the House during that time. It was during this time that the central features of the contemporary Congress (the fragmentation of power, the dispersion of decision-making responsibilities, the compartmentalization of legislative tasks, and the adoption of an institutional role which emphasized policy oversight) first asserted themselves in an enduring way. Understanding why these traits emerged, therefore, serves as a useful means of understanding the forces which continue to sustain Congressional behavior today.

In general, the study argues that the changing inner world of Congress is largely the product of the specific and varying forms and patterns of conflict which that institution must ultimately resolve. It suggests that variations in the patterns of conflict within the House stem from changes which occur in the American political system as a whole. Conflict
within the House, it proposes, both reflects the divergent pressures of the dynamic political environment, and at the same time serves as the primary source of organizational and normative change. The sources of that internal conflict and the way external pressures are translated into legislative conflict, therefore becomes the key to understanding why Congress has evolved the way it in fact has evolved, and implicitly, why the House behaves as it does.

Ultimately, the Thesis suggests that the institutional character of the House is best explained by the peculiar changes which encouraged that body's national constituency to discard the political norms, the organizational assumptions, and the political expectations which had so marked the American political culture of the late nineteenth century, and to adopt those which increasingly after 1908 began to mark that of the twentieth century. The weakening of the political party at the turn of the century, the particularization of the national issue agenda, and the transformation of the norms of public participation in political affairs shaped (and were clearly reflected in) the process which took the House from its nineteenth century institutional form to its twentieth century form.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The modern House of Representatives is an institution which owes a great deal to its past. Many of the characteristics which together define the House have strong and explicit links with decisions made and changes brought about by earlier generations of Congressmen attempting to create a legislative system capable of functioning in the vastly altered twentieth century American political environment. This debt to the past is readily acknowledged if rarely explained in most contemporary studies of Congressional behavior. Analyses of House leadership patterns, for example, typically invoke turn of the century changes in organization and structure, particularly the 1910 revolt against Joseph Cannon, as central to the fragmented power structure which obtains in Congress today. Students of the committee system almost ritually ascribe major portions of that system to the dispersion of power and authority which occurred quite dramatically in the first decades of the twentieth century. Implicit throughout much of the contemporary literature on Congress is the idea that although specific patterns of modern Congressional behavior are the products of equally specific factors at work within the contemporary legislative system, they are both circumscribed and constrained by structural transformations imposed on Congress' organization sometime in the past.
The major problem of course has been to resurrect this past in a usable form. Clearly, the changes which the House of Representatives underwent in the first decades of the twentieth century were important, but it is less clear what role these changes played in shaping modern Congressional behavior. What meaning, in fact, do these historical events have for contemporary patterns of legislative behavior? What role do turn of the century changes play in constraining or regulating the patterns which constitute the modern Congressional process? On the one hand, the persistent inclusion of the historical dimension in Congressional studies, however vague, suggests that the past indeed merits serious attention. And yet the very vagueness of these scholarly appeals to the past indicates that much remains to be done by way of developing a systematic use of using history to explain contemporary institutional behavior.

This study, then, will attempt to develop a useful set of generalizations about present Congressional behavior through an examination of the forces which tended to define the evolution of that behavior. It will begin with the assumption, which prevails, at least implicitly in the current literature, that the present Congress is largely an outgrowth of turn of the century changes in the American political system, and changes within the House of Representatives itself. It will argue furthermore that these changes affected modern Congresses not as contemporary scholars tend to view it -- in particularistic, isolated ways -- but rather in a systematic and comprehensive manner. It will suggest that to a
very large extent, the norms, constraints, patterns of membership interaction, and most centrally the manner in which conflict is managed are the products of the House of Representatives' accommodation or truce with the vast changes which altered the shape of its political environment between 1880 and 1920. With the marginal modifications, contemporary Congresses function within the broad limits of this accommodation process defined and consummated by the end of that period.

The study will examine the late nineteenth century House of Representatives and the forces within and outside which shaped its institutional assumptions, with particular emphasis on its partisan approach to conflict. Among other advantages, concentration upon this era of Congressional history provides a comparative model against which the contemporary legislative process can be usefully contrasted. For, by and large, the historical changes which led the House to develop its modern legislative style during this period reveal much about the forces which continue to sustain and reinforce the organizational assumptions, the norms and patterns of conflict which collectively constitute the national legislative system today.

The central proposition of this study is a relatively simple and straightforward one. That is, the most critical alteration to occur in the development of the contemporary Congressional process -- an alteration which developed between 1880 and 1920 -- involved the manner in which
political conflict was managed by that institution. During this period, the House shifted from norms of conflict which were largely mandated by the nature of the party system toward one which functioned in an environment where accumulative voting cleavages in American political life had become increasingly rare. By the early 1920's, this bi-partisan conflict mode was well on its way toward being supplanted by a far more complex, pluralistic and institution-specific system of conflict and conflict resolution. It will be argued that the transformation which occurred in the Congressional process -- its norms of member behavior, its distribution of power, its reallocation of tasks and its altered demands upon and criteria for assessing member performance -- was the result of the House's attempt to conform to the exigencies of the new style of political conflict emerging between 1900 and the early 1920's.

The decline of partisanship is a well-worn and almost hackneyed theme in both the general political literature of the period, as well as in much of the recent work on the development of Congress during this time. The point here is not that the House simply adapted to the internal organization vacuum left by the decay of national parties -- an argument often forwarded -- but rather that the transformation of the lines of political conflict, outside as well as within Congress, forced members to dramatically and consciously restructure the entire internal workings of the legislative process.

The fall of parties within Congress was only a part --
and in itself more a reflection than a cause -- of this restructuring process. This pluralization of conflict was the product of changes in the American political culture, changes in the mechanics and values surrounding the election and representation processes, changes in the nature of demands placed upon national political leaders and changes in the policy outputs of American political institutions as a whole. It was also the result of changes in the way the individual member of Congress perceived his own role in the House and in the national political system, as well as changes in his fundamental approach to political decision-making. These and other changes in national political life forced the House of Representatives to search for new, more appropriate ways of carrying out its legislative function.

These changes confronted the House with the task of devising an organization which was at once capable of managing conflict -- conflict increasingly independent of external links and constraints -- while at the same time ensuring that the fundamental decision-making process would not be immobilized by that conflict. More than anything else, this search for consensus in a plural House served as the logic beneath the norms, structural traits and broad institutional assumptions which arose to give the nineteenth century Congress its modern form.

If observers of the contemporary Congressional process
are relatively quick to acknowledge certain connections between early twentieth century changes in the House and present practices, they are rather more reluctant to explain why these changes occurred. And, for the most part, they tend to shrink from drawing more than the vaguest links between those changes and modern patterns of legislative behavior. What occurred between 1900 and 1920 in the House of Representatives is generally viewed as a series of episodic historical events which nevertheless tended to have a significant impact on specific aspects of modern Congressional behavior. As such, these "accidents" -- which remain either unexplainable or unworthy of explanation -- serve as immutable givens in analyses of why the House of today acts the way it does.

Studies of the House power structure, for example, typically recall the 1910 St. Patrick's Day revolt against the Speaker as a critical event in the development of its contemporary form. Nelson Polsby, for one, in spite of the fact that he has probably done more than anyone else to evolve a systematic portrait of Congressional history, nevertheless forwards a most unsystematic view of the relationship between turn of the century events and latter-day legislative process. "Principally because of historical accidents that destroyed the temporary unity of both the national parties earlier in this century," he asserts, "Congress built on some 19th century precedents in ways that have maintained and in some cases enhanced its independence in the political system."
This feature -- the relative weakness of the party and consequently of the structures of formal centralized leadership -- is the key to the dispersion of power in the House of Representatives and the political resiliency of the Member of Congress, who Polsby adds, stands in marked contrast to the Members of Parliament "in most Parliamentary systems" who are little more than mindless creatures of the political parties that run them.¹

Robert Peabody similarly sees the early twentieth century as a watershed in the historical development of modern leadership norms and resources. While before 1910, Speakers -- particularly Republican Speakers after 1890 -- were viewed as heavy-handed partisan leaders with immense power at their disposal, Peabody notes that

since the revolt against Cannon in 1910
the problem has been almost the opposite. How can any Speaker make use of his much more limited formal powers to achieve his party's legislative objectives, let alone help Congress maintain a parity with an ever expanding executive branch?²

Leroy Rieselbach, in a typical critique of the Congressional process broadens Peabody's focus on leadership to suggest that many of the problems which plague the House's participation in national policy making stem from these same turn of the century changes. The

palace revolution in the House of Representatives that overthrew Speaker Joseph Cannon marks the beginning of the modern era. Since then, with the single exception of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the main outlines of Congressional organization and procedures have evolved slowly until in recent years the
situation has become almost static. The major elements (of Congress' present problems) have been intact for some years. 3

Yet, while Congress' past is readily recalled, it is usually done so in a manner which tends to reinforce the sense that however important the changes of the early twentieth century were for modern Congressional behavior, they are to distant in time or conceptually too indirect to be worthy of detailed exploration. Despite the implied suggestion that Congress labors under constraints imposed early in the century, it remains a characteristic of behavioralist Congressional research to dismiss the sources of these constraints by confining references to them in introductory remarks or in the most perfunctory acknowledgements of their existence.

Such a treatment of Congress' past raises a number of questions then. While it is clear that the events of the turn of the century are significant, it is not at all clear how they have affected subsequent patterns of institutional development in anything but the most limited manner. One of the stumbling blocks to the use of the historical dimension in Congressional research, first of all, stems from a partial uncertainty about what exactly happened -- what changed in the Congressional process during this time beyond the formal curtailment of the Speaker's powers. It is therefore important to achieve a fuller understanding of the Congressional transformation which occurred between 1900 and the early 1920's.
Secondly, the search for historical relevance poses potential problems of fit with the prevailing tendency in modern research to view the House as a discrete social system. This structural-functional approach to the Congressional process has inherent weaknesses in explaining the kinds of dramatic changes which occurred in the House at the turn of the century, and suggests that perhaps certain modifications be made in the way we observe and characterize the sources of Congress' behavior. Given the assumption, therefore, that the House's present complexion is in fact directly related to these historical changes, it is necessary to both understand what happened around the turn of the century and at the same time develop some way of incorporating those changes into a consistent and comprehensive view of Congress' institutional development.

While the mainstream of scholarly work on the House of Representatives remains largely wedded to the anti-historicist approach to legislative patterns of behavior, an important literature has arisen to explore these questions. For the most part, the search for a useful institutional past can be grouped into three identifiable categories by the nature of the assumptions they make about the political process and the methodological and epistemological approaches they tend to bring to their tasks.

The first group consists largely of those who have
produced descriptive institutional histories of the House. Some of the less impressive examples of this group's contribution to the field are works such as Ernest Sutherland Bates' *The Story of Congress*, and Marjorie Fribourg's *The United States Congress*, which do little more than describe which event preceded which. Bates, for example, organizes his study along a simple time line, allotting one chapter to each Congress. Better examples of this descriptive-chronological school of House historiography include Alexander's *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives*, and Congressional Quarterly's *Origins and Development of Congress*, and Galloway's *History of the United States House of Representatives*. The most important studies in the descriptive-historical group, however, tend to be those with what Peabody calls the "reformist" orientation. Galloway's *Congress at the Crossroads*, and Burns' *Deadlock of Democracy* and *Congress on Trial*, are two notable examples of this approach to Congressional history.

The chronological group's contribution to Congressional research tends to vary in value with the accuracy and depth of its reporting of events. Thus, Alexander's study is still read as a useful collection of nineteenth century Congressional developments -- particularly in regard to formal aspects of the House organization. The reformist group's studies, on the other hand, tends to vary in value with the extent to which the central issues addressed by the authors
reflect relatively time-bound public debates over such issues as Congress' role in American Politics or its general effectiveness. Thus, Galloway and Burns (particularly Congress on Trial) are out of fashion today as little more than interesting examples of the major concerns of political analysts thirty years ago. The historical dimension, while employed in these studies, tends to be molded to meet the needs of whatever argument is being forwarded, and as such does not take us very far forward integrating congressional history into the mainstream of legislative research.

The second group of scholars devoted to the search for a meaningful Congressional past consists of those who confine that search, for the most part, to questions dealing with the House of Representatives' internal structures and processes. This group tends to be most closely associated, through the assumptions its brings to its studies (either explicitly or implicitly), and through its reification of specific internal aspects of House behavior, with the type of research which now dominates Congressional scholarly work. Its systems orientations and its inherent belief in the pre-eminence of Congress' internal dynamic is the most important hallmark of this school.

Nelson Polsby unquestionably stands as the one who has done the most to develop the systems or internalist approach to the House of Representatives' past, both in his actual studies of Congressional history (for example, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" and "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of
Representatives"\textsuperscript{13}), and in his attempts to establish a broader theoretical framework within which the search for meaning in Congress' past could be usefully linked to the body of scholarship which makes that same search in the contemporary setting.\textsuperscript{14} This group also, to a certain extent finds a kinship with the pre-behavioralist descriptive-historians who examined various portions of the House's internal system. Polsby cites, for example, Follett's and Giang-Wei Chiu's studies of the Speaker, Hasbrouk's study of the party system in the House, Brown's examination of leadership and interestingly enough Alex- ander's \textit{History and Procedure of the House of Representa- tives} among others as rather embryonic expressions of the systems approach which would by the 1960's emerge to dominate the central norms of Congressional research.\textsuperscript{15}

The third broad approach to Congressional historical scholarship tends, by and large to lay heavy stress upon the nature of the House's political environment. In its historical development and in its present behavior, this group argues, Congress is largely the product of the constraints which surround it. Although there has not yet emerged from this group a comprehensive theory of the way in which Congress' evolution has shaped its behavior, a number of important steps have been taken in that direction. H. Douglas Price's elucidation of careerism, for example, has focussed attention on a significant aspect of Congress' early twentieth century transformation. The study also
provides an interesting counter to the internalists' view of Congressional history by suggesting that at least in some ways the relationship of the House with its political environment was remarkably direct and important. Other contributions to this general approach have been made by Burnham, Erikson, and Ferejohn who tend to focus on elections both as reflections of political reality and as concrete determinants (or constraints) of political institutional -- particularly House -- behavior.

The major debate over the nature and significance of Congress' past has developed, of course, between the latter two groups of scholars -- between those who like Polsby see the House of Representatives as a relatively stable and above all discrete political institution and who consequently search for explanation of Congressional behavior (past and present) among internal norms, structures and relationships -- and those, who like Burnham and Price tend to see Congress as inextricably linked to its external political world and the forces at work there. For the internalists, the House is a system which labors under norms, values and structures defined by its function in American political life. For the ecologists, on the other hand, Congress is an adaptive mechanism which is linked with, and reflects the changing realities of its environment. These lines of contention, therefore, and the major arguments which each group forwards in its attempt to relate the House to both its political world, and to its political past, merits serious attention.
This intellectual conflict provides insights into Congress' past and a useful point of departure for our attempt to expose the salient features of Congress' turn of the century transformation. It also serves to concentrate our focus upon the extent to which that transformation remains an integral part of (and consistent with) contemporary views of Congressional behavior.

The search for historical relevance can be most usefully begun through a review of Polsby's "Institutionalization of the House of Representatives," which stands as the most ambitious attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of Congressional development. Indeed, more than this, it can be said to be the most systematic exposition -- as well as the single most important justification -- of the assumptions which underlie the bulk of the post-1950's scholarship on the House of Representatives. In many ways, its shortcomings and conceptual problems reflect the broader problems inherent in that general approach to Congressional research which constitutes the post-behavioral phase, in Peabody's terms, of research on the House of Representatives.²⁰

Polsby's attempt to engraft onto the political evolution of the House the theory of institutionalization begins with the assumption that the central dynamic in that history is to be found within the institution itself. The norms, patterns of behavior and structural features which uniquely
contribute to Congress' character as a representative legislature have essentially developed internally. The House has developed, not evolved into an increasingly complex institution capable of contributing to the policy-making needs of a twentieth century political system. The distinction is a real one for Polsby. Development is pursued by relatively autonomous (autonomous in the structural-functional sense that they determine their own internal values) organizations which internally create the structures and mechanisms they need to accomplish the tasks and fulfill the political roles they have created for themselves. Evolution, by contrast, is largely the process whereby an organization adapts itself to the demands and constraints imposed upon it by forces external to the institution.

The process of institutionalization generally results, according to Polsby, in the organizational movement from simplicity to complexity, which is itself the product, he surmises, of the historical increase in the level of responsibility placed upon the national government in the American political system (itself, presumably the result of the growing modernization and integration of the nation), and its growing centrality within that system. "As the responsibilities of the national government grew," he suggests, "as a larger proportion of the national economy was affected by decisions taken at the center, the agencies of the national government institutionalized." Consistent with the main assumptions of structural-functional analysis,
institutionalization is characterized by an attachment to ideas of gradualness and continuity.\textsuperscript{22} For Polsby, then the history of the House is essentially the story of its logical and continuous progression into modernity.

The process itself is reduced to three broad components. First, "an institutionalized organization... is relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment."\textsuperscript{23} Polsby invests this "autonomy" variable with a great deal of importance and, particularly as it is elaborated in a later article entitled "Legislatures"\textsuperscript{24} it stands as the distinguishing mark, not only of an institutionalized organization but also of his general view of the House of Representatives as well. For, the extent to which the House is in fact bounded or autonomous, determines in large part, the extent to which the other attributes of the legislative process are developed according to an internal logic or whether they are thrust upon it by its political environment. The measures of boundedness include the levels of membership turnover and the extent to which House leaders are tied to predominantly House careers recruited from within the body.

With the establishment of autonomy as the first attribute of institutionalization, Polsby turns to the second component of the process -- the increased complexity of the House. This variable is operationalized to include "the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, ... the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and
... the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members ..." The presumption is, once again, that since the House is a bounded organization, the development of complexity proceeds according to an internal logic and develops along lines consonant with the functional needs of the institution itself. This is of special importance for the third and final variable in the institutionalization process which relates to the nature of decision-making in the House of Representatives.

The institutionalization of the House, Polsby argues, is associated with a shift from particularistic and discretionary toward universalistic and automated decision making. This trend is most centrally reflected in the growth of the seniority system which of course transferred the committee leadership recruitment process from partisan and personal considerations (i.e. of the Speaker) to more uniform and automatic standards (seniority). The decline of blatantly partisan conflict over contested election results is also introduced as an index of this process. Taken together, these three components reaffirm the prevailing contemporary portrayal of the House of Representatives as a closed political system autonomously designing its internal system to meet the demands of its legislative role in a modern political setting.

The historical view which thus emerges from Polsby's essay is one in which the House moves inexorably toward and ultimately through the process of becoming an autonomous,
complex and professional actor within the national political system. Congress' past is essentially an integrated part of this gradual process of functional change. This devotion to the idea of gradualness and continuity is especially problematic in view of Polsby's own acknowledgement of the dramatic nature of the changes Congress underwent around the turn of the century. As his data shows, the shifts in turnover, seniority violations and previous tenure levels of House leaders (Speakers) during this period were anything but gradual.

Polsby attempts to integrate these major changes into his institutionalization theory by suggesting that the House was jolted by a series of non-incremental yet consistent changes which dramatically thrust it through a final organizational threshold. "Some of our indicators," he asserts,

give conditional support for a "take-off" theory of modernization. If one of the stigmata of the take-off to modernity is the rapid development of universalistic, bounded, complex institutional forms, the data presented here lend this theory some plausibility. The "big bang" seems to come in the 1890-1910 period on at least some of the measures.27

The idea that the turn of the century changes were wholly consistent with the gradualness of the Congressional drive toward autonomy is developed further in "Legislatures", where Polsby argues that this "take-off" consolidated many
of the already potent forces working toward the creation of an autonomous legislative system. In particular, he suggests that the House discarded the last vestiges of its pre-modern state (which he characterizes as an arena) during this time and became the essentially modern, autonomous (transformative in his words) legislative system described by contemporary scholars.28

Polsby's view of institutionalization, and particularly the heavy stress placed on the idea of autonomy fulfills two broad conceptual functions in the literature on Congress. It first of all gathers together in a logical manner the divergent strands of the history of the House of Representatives into an integrated whole, and secondly it does so with a theoretical framework which remains faithful to, and thereby justifies the assumptions which have led post-1950 researchers toward the lines of inquiry they have in fact taken. In a sense, Polsby leads Congress' past inexorably toward the present in a manner which renders internal norms, member attitudes, and formal structures of the House's internal organization the legitimate foci of those who wish to understand the national legislative system. To be sure, Polsby does not dismiss completely the latent power of external forces to shape internal behavior. As he notes:

our present findings give us ample warning that institutions are also continuously subject to environmental influence and their power to modify and channel that influence is bound to be less than all-encompassing.29
And, as he adds in "Legislatures", "Between the pure cases of arenas and transformative legislatures, there stretches a continuum whose breadth and main features are not well understood." The main point remains, however, that Congress is far closer to the autonomy of the latter portion of that continuum than it is to the relatively permeable former position. As such, the key to understanding Congressional behavior lies pre-eminently in its internal processes.

Building upon this logical base, then, it becomes theoretically consistent to study the House as an isolated, internally dynamic system. It becomes useful to dissect Congress, as modern scholarship has in the main tended to do, into constituent parts or sub-systems. Fenno's research on committees, for example, legitimately transcends its case study format to become a comprehensive analysis of a dynamic component of the Congressional system. In isolating these sub-systems, and focusing on purely internal processes, he in no way undermines his ability to derive a plausible explanation of committee behavior. Examples of leadership succession in Peabody's Leadership in Congress can be similarly viewed as part of a legislative attempt to derive a comprehensive explanation of Congressional behavior, despite the fact that it isolates the process from external forces (including that of political parties). This approach is fully consistent with Polsby's exposition of Congressional history. As an autonomous and discrete
system, it becomes possible to dismiss external linkages, as Tufte does in "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two Party Systems," where he suggests that Congressional independence reaches as far as relatively complete control of the electoral process (through gerrymandering). Charles O. Jones' attempt to attribute the overthrow of Joseph Cannon and the curtailment of the powers of the Speakership almost entirely to internal questions of coalition building and strategic miscalculation is squarely in this tradition, and, attempts by Fenno and others to relate changes in the Congressional appropriation process between 1885 and 1921 to largely internal forces (i.e. committee-specific voting interests) are also examples of the internalist approach to congressional history. Finally, Dexter's assertion that Members of Congress hear what they want to hear and respond in ways they themselves determine proper is yet another illustration of the extent to which Polsby's conception of the history of the House is reaffirmed in the literature on Congress.

The questions which this approach to the House of Representatives' history raises, of course, nevertheless remain. In particular, how sound is the theoretical base Polsby has constructed for both this literature and for the main lines of Congress' past? Despite the fact that it develops an integrated and comprehensive theory of Congressional history which fits neatly with current views of legislative behavior, does institutionalization adequately and realistically describe how the legislative process has
become what it is today? Does it accurately explain how the House of the nineteenth century became the House of the twentieth century? Finally, does it focus upon the primary source of organizational change -- the dynamic core and the key explanatory variable -- in the development of the structures and norms which define the modern House? The argument can of course be made that Polsby's institutionalization-autonomy thesis is more at home as a post hoc justification of modern research trends than it is as a guide to the history of the House. And, while institutionalization theory does expose certain elements of the nature of Congress' historical transformation, it confronts certain problems when it attempts to explain and describe precisely what it was that happened to Congress during the first decades of the twentieth century.

The problems encountered in adapting institutionalization theory to Congress' evolution stem first of all from weaknesses inherent in institutionalization theory itself and, secondly, from Polsby's particular attempt to fit the transformation of the House of Representatives into his own variant of that theory. The first of these problems concerns the theoretical utility of the concept of institutionalization. As Polsby notes, "The process of institutionalization is one of the grand themes in all of modern social science." It carries with it many of the attributes which are viewed as critical and eminently desirable in a modern political system. Notions of institutional
identity, for example, as well as ideas relating to structural complexity, widely shared and deeply rooted norms of orderly interaction among members, organizational efficiency, functional independence, the ability to exercise political authority, stability, and an autonomous internal decision making process are central to the various definitions of institutionalization, as indeed they are to broader political development theory itself. Yet, while institutionalization stands as a potentially useful analytic device, and while scholars have been able to convey a general idea of what it means the concept remains rather vague and ill-defined.  

In a sense, institutionalization theory tends to divide the process into two distinct portions. On the one hand, institutionalization is often defined as a goal or end point on the developmental continuum -- an end point which essentially encompasses the qualities which together constitute a developed and modern organization. The second general preoccupation of institutionalization theory involves the process of becoming. It is concerned primarily with how an organization takes on the attributes which together constitute institutionalization. 

The first aspect of institutionalization theory, then, is typically descriptive. It sets forth the characteristics viewed as desirable (or imperative) in a modern organization. Some of these descriptive definitions are relatively narrow as for example Polsby's or S.N. Eisenstadt's which tend to see the institutionalized body as
one largely governed by routinized and well-bounded norms of behavior. Eisenstadt, unlike Polsby, however, links his simple routinization and autonomization to broader more complex patterns of modernization. That is, the institutionalization of organizations must, if it is to be a significant force, occur along lines consistent with the demands of a modernizing society and polity. Thus, for example, the attributes of routinization and autonomy cannot be viewed as part of modernizing (or positive) dynamic if it tends to proceed at the increasing expense of that organization's status and efficacy in the political system.40

Others, like Richard Sisson, a student of Indian state legislatures, tend to view institutionalization as incorporating the notion of legitimacy. An organization -- particularly a political organization -- which regularizes its internal norms to the detriment of its enduring ability to command compliance for its outputs (in the case of legislatures, laws and public policy) is not institutionalized.41 This characterization is echoed and elaborated by Loewenberg who argues that institutionalization is inextricably tied to the nature and level of support it can elicit, and related to this its perceived centrality to the political system of which it is a part.42

The most notable attempt to include these and other ideas into a unified and comprehensive concept, and to develop it beyond the level of a heuristic theory is probably Huntington's formulation in which institutionalization
is defined as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire validity and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organization and procedures." The more adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent an organization is, the more institutionalized it is. But, how do we apply this idea to concrete political organizations? Exactly how adaptable must a body be before it can be said to be institutionalized? How does one measure complexity or autonomy?

Another set of questions arises from what Sisson suggests are "problems of conceptual tension that are not resolved" by Huntington or indeed by any other political development theorist. "That is to say," Sisson continues, "complexity may be disruptive of coherence; autonomy, in terms of the pluralization of social representation may endanger coherence; complexity may in certain instances be disruptive of autonomy."

The problem of evaluation is an even more serious one for Huntington and indeed for institutionalization itself. In the first chapter of Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington suggests that a polity is institutionalized if it is able to successfully manage the increased participatory demands placed upon it by its constituents without either destroying itself or lessening its value to society. In a sense, he creates a circular or tautological argument which states that an organization is sufficiently institutionalized
if it continues to maintain its existence, and insufficiently institutionalized if it is unable to maintain its status or existence. As Sisson asks of Huntington:

What is the relationship between institutionalization and performance? Performance is here conceived largely in terms of self-maintenance and is thus synonymous with institutionalization itself. As it stands there is no way of judging institutionalization with respect to external measures of effectiveness or performance.45

In the absence of such independent measures, institutionalization threatens to become little more than an organizing concept, useful in assembling disparate fragments of data into one piece, but relatively useless as a springboard for developing broader generalizations. Is, in fact, the essence of institutionalization stability and self-preservation as Huntington seems to imply? Or does it indeed exist as an independent and measurable factor in political organizational life? If it is an independent force, (as, once again Huntington has yet to demonstrate) what role does it play in actually shaping the development of political institutions?

These questions are central to the second major aspect of institutionalization theory which involves, once again, the way in which an organization achieves the attributes generally viewed as important in a modernizing institution. This notion of becoming is distinct, if often largely implicit (as for instance in Polsby's formulation of the
concept) from the actual definition of what an institutionalized organization actually is. As we have noted, Huntington tends to view the process of institutionalization as being a fairly deterministic process which occurs if the demands placed upon an organization, at any one time, do not overreach that body's ability to cope or adequately respond to those demands. The implication is that institutionalization proceeds in a natural progression unless it is interrupted by a non-incremental or dysfunctional increase in the level of inputs (demands) loaded onto the organization.

Other scholars tend to view the details of the process of becoming quite differently. Adam Pzeworski, for example, using the Western European case, tends to see institutionalization as peculiarly vulnerable to non-incremental decreases in participatory impulses of a political system's constituency. Peter Gerlich, partially reinforcing Huntington, however, tends to view institutionalization as the product of the extent to which the increase in pressure on political organizations is consistent and gradual over long periods of time. He elaborates upon this theme by suggesting that this pressure variable is the creature of large scale socio-economic forces at work in the political environment. To a certain extent, his pressure variables as well as his notion of their impact on political institutional development is a variant of some of the themes stressed in the social mobilization and political development literature.
At the same time, while these and other theorists view the institutionalization process as being affected by different broadly (and usually vaguely) defined forces, all tend to agree that the process is a long term deterministic one. This teleological quality, in other words, tends to invest institutionalization itself with a built-in dynamic quality. It implies that, left alone, institutions will naturally tend to develop from simple to complex ones, for example, and from subordinate to autonomous ones. Institutionalization is, thus at once a natural tendency inherent in organizations as well as the indirect product of very long term, large-scale environmental forces. This deterministic view of organizational development stands in vivid contrast to those models, which will be explored later, which conceive of organizations as the products of contextual forces at work in their usually very immediate political environment.

The two components of institutional theory (institutionalization as an end-point and institutionalization as a process of becoming) become very important in Polsby's study because they hold the key to whether his invocation of that theory serves to explain certain facets of Congress' development, or whether it merely serves to organize random pieces of data into a coherent descriptive whole. To serve the needs of explanation, Polsby must first show that his indices are indeed the central variables in the institutionalization process and second that this institutionalization
process is in fact the motive force behind the evolution of the House of Representatives.

How well, first of all, do Polsby's indicators of institutionalization reflect the complex process other political development theorists have attempted to define and explicate? As he admits, his own version of institutionalization does in fact depart from those of others, and in particular reduces the process to a much simpler scale. The broad range of theoretical views of institutionalization, Polsby concedes, is:

bound to prove an embarrassment to the empirical researcher, since, unavoidably, in order to do his work, he must pick and choose among a host of possibilities -- not those that initially may be the most stimulating, but those that seem most likely to be reflected in his data, which, perforce are limited. Thus the operational indices I am about to suggest which purport to measure empirically the extent to which the U.S. House of Representatives has become institutionalized may strike the knowledgeable reader as exceedingly crude...

To be sure, this is a legitimate caveat. Any attempt to operationalize grand theory must confront such a problem. Given, furthermore the inherent vagueness, and as we have shown above, the questions of internal consistency which tend to plague institutionalization theory in particular, certain theoretical modifications -- even if they are made in order to fit a specific data set -- are decidedly in order. At the same time, it nevertheless remains useful to
ask whether or not in the process of adapting theory to
data, Polsby has not shifted the idea of institutionaliza-
tion far enough away from its original meaning to cast
doubt on the applicability of the concept to Congressional
development.

For Huntington as well as for Sisson and Loewenberg,
for example, institutionalization involves questions of
validity as well as stability. To be institutionalized,
an organization must acquire stability and validity,
Huntington reminds us. This inclusion of some sense of
institutional efficacy is central to Huntington's notion
of the process and indeed makes sense because it forces
institutionalization to distinguish between simply static
and insulated organizations and stable and autonomous ones
(at least qualitatively if not quantitatively). Huntington
also includes the notions of adaptability and coherence in
his theory suggesting that institutionalized organizations
are neither rigid and routinized nor fragmented and
immobilized by the process which confers stability upon its
internal structure. The stability which accompanies
institutionalization should not, in other words, be achieved
at the expense of an institution's ability to adapt to changes
in its environment nor at the expense of its ability to per-
form its natural tasks. These three components of institu-
tionalization then - efficacy, adaptability and coherence --
which are critical for Huntington's and others' scheme are
absent in Polsby's. By comparison, Polsby's institutional-
ization process becomes more accurately characterized as a less grand (if still useful) theory of routinization (e.g. Polsby's discretionary to automatic decision making) and insulation (e.g. boundedness).

The central indicators of Polsby's theory do come closer to the formulations of S.N. Eisenstadt, however, whose immediate view of institutionalization is more uniquely concerned, as Polsby is, with the routinization dimension. But then, institutionalization does not, for Eisenstadt, carry with it all of the profound positive implications with which Polsby seems to want to invest it. As Eisenstadt suggests, institutionalization can serve as a source of institutional stagnation as well as of development and modernization. "Specific processes of institutional change," he writes, "open up some potentialities but may block others, and in some cases the institutionalization of a given solution may 'freeze' further development or give rise to stagnation or continual breakdown." Thus, the limits Eisenstadt places on his definition of institutionalization also places real limits on its significance as a component in the political development process. As a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for the growth of organizational strength and value, institutionalization is not meant to stand on its own as a single determinant of the extent to which an organization is viable or not. In this narrowed sense of the term, institutionalization has a significant impact on political development only if it is accompanied by other functional forces surrounding the modernization process. To invoke
institutionalization as Eisenstadt defines it then, and indeed as Polsby seems to view it, tells us very little in and of itself about that organization's value, strength, resiliency or power within a political system.

Finally, Polsby cites Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, and his exposition of the rational-legal typology as a source of insights into what constitutes institutionalization. To be sure, the House of Representatives does reflect the rational-legal patterns of organizational behavior in its norms of conduct and of decision-making. It is unclear, however, particularly from Polsby's study, whether this is an attribute which was peripheral to early Congresses and has become a central part of House behavior (we are of course shown that Members of Congress are certainly more civil to one another now than they were in the early to mid-nineteenth century), or whether Congress has by and large always functioned under more or less rational-legal forms of behavior (for example, decisions have always been made through votes, specialized committees have always had a measure of influence over the decision-making process, and formal rules and procedures have almost from the start played a role in guiding and constraining membership interaction).

More significantly, however, is the relationship of the idea of hierarchy in the bureaucratic model to the concept of rational-legal modes of organizational behavior. According to Weber, the increasing complexity of an institution in
the rational-legal mold, tends to force that organization to adopt some coordinative structures. This coordinative capacity is typically developed through the centralization of power and authority within the institution.⁵⁴ This notion of centralization is of course absent in Polsby's institutionalization scheme and indeed could be said to undermine, in part, the saliency of viewing the House of Representatives' development as having proceeded according to the dictates of a modernizing dynamic (at least in terms of Weber's own conception of that modernizing dynamic). For, as is evident, the period which constituted Congress' most dramatic surge (or "take-off" in Polsby's terms) toward institutionalization was also the period which witnessed the abandonment of centralized leadership as a primary organizational norm (for example the overthrow in 1910 of Speaker Cannon).

These problems of fit between the general, albeit vaguely defined idea of institutionalization and Polsby's concrete application thus raise questions as to whether or not the changes which occurred over the course of the history of the House were in fact essentially and pre-eminently those of the modernization process Polsby seems to suggest. The suspicion, of course, is that by and large Polsby shows that only certain aspects of what is generally thought to constitute institutionalization are apparent in Congress' historical development.

This suspicion is fueled by Polsby's inability to demonstrate how this process was achieved largely through
changes which were originated from within the House itself. This, in a sense, is the critical distinction he seems to want to make between his view and that of other Congressional historians who stress outside political forces (particularly immediate contextual ones) as the motive force behind the internal changes which occurred. Yet, to be able to make this distinction clear, he must somehow show that the transformation the House underwent, did in fact stem from long term incremental adjustments which were made in functional response to the emerging organizational needs of a modernizing institution. He must show that Congress was not randomly shaped by the erratic forces working in its fluid political environment, but rather that it developed according to a modernizing dynamic marked above all by a continuity and an independence from the political struggles and issues which animated that environment. This he fails to do. The only insight we thus gain from Polsby into the sources of institutionalization (in other words, the process of becoming), is the muted suggestion taken from Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society that perhaps it grew out of the increasing responsibilities placed on the national government.55

Among the problems this admittedly tentative effort to relate Congressional history to an autonomous, internally dynamic set of motive forces must deal with are the following: Did all governmental institutions institutionalize? Did they do so together and at the same rate? More critically
we must ask, How can we conceptualize in clearer terms the relationship between the level of responsibility placed on the national government and the specific nature of its institutions' functional adaptation to those increasing responsibilities? In effect, is institutionalization an identifiable dynamic process which led Congress toward its present form?

These questions point to a number of weaknesses, then, in the institutionalization model both as a concept and as an explanation of Congress' historical development. Institutionalization is incomplete in its attempt to identify and indeed to fully describe the range of changes Congress experienced in its transformation from its late nineteenth century form to its contemporary form. It is also unable to show that this transformation was largely the product of internal forces. To be sure "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" does describe important portions of Congress' historical development (routinization and organizational insulation), but it is not able to explain why these particular facets of that development process were so pronounced. Nor is it able to explain why they tended to become so rapidly and deeply entrenched in the Congressional system when they did. This is largely a function of institutionalization theory's difficulty with the whole idea of change itself, which is not at all overcome by the simple abstract presumption that Congress has largely developed according to the functional imperatives of a modernizing dynamic.
Finally, institutionalization is unable to either fully integrate external change with internal organization change or to produce a logical reason for its theoretical exclusion from the model. Of course its inclusion would raise serious problems of internal consistency in the model, but its exclusion raises even more serious questions, particularly given the systematic linkages which exist between Congress and its outside world (elections, the representation norms, and the structural ties with other political and governmental institutions). The attempt to deny the importance of external forces is perhaps not as critical a weakness in contemporary analyses of Congress which focus on period of time when major shifts in the United States political environment are relatively rare. But, it is critical when the attempt is made to apply these assumptions to Congressional behavior during an era when such major shifts did occur in the House's political environment. In other words, theories which focus upon largely internal aspects of political institutions find it difficult to cope with the influences major external change is likely to impose on those institutions.

Consequently, the internalists' consistent difficulty in coping with the external dimension throughout Congress' history (by neither integrating it into their models of Congressional development nor adequately denying its importance) is magnified in their attempts to account for the dramatic shifts which in fact occurred in the character of
the House of Representatives in the first two decades of the twentieth century. That something major was indeed happening to Congress at this time is clearly acknowledged, both in "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" and in "Legislatures".

In the former, Polsby makes a casual attempt to incorporate these changes into his model by alluding to a take-off stage in the institutionalization process, but this line of reasoning is never really pursued. In "Legislatures", he suggests that the turn of the century appears to have been a critical period in the history of the House, but concedes that difficulties exist in determining exactly what happened or why. The suspicion is raised, however, that the changes which transformed the House during the opening years of the twentieth century (and by extension Congress' long term development) were at least partially the products of forces which were at work beyond both the boundaries of the House's internal world and the narrow limits of institutionalization theory. 57

This suspicion is given free rein in the body of literature which stands at the opposite end of the internalist-ecologist spectrum, and which in contra-distinction to Polsby's view, argues that Congress' development was in fact dominated and molded by its political environment. For these scholars, the dramatic shifts in Congressional behavior at
the turn of the century were a clear reflection of larger shifts occurring in the American political system.

Whereas, for example, the internalists argue that the development and continuing behavior of the house of Representatives is largely the function of the norms, structures and relationships which dominate its internal character, the ecologists tend to argue that Congress behaves primarily according to the kinds of constraints (e.g. elections, party shifts, normative changes in the American political culture) which affect all American political institutions. Secondly, while the internalists tend to seek confirmation for their views in analyses of present forms of Congressional behavior (which ecologists would argue places Congress in a relatively static political environment), the ecologists tend to find reaffirmation of their approach in the shifts which occurred in Congressional behavior between 1890 and 1920. Finally, where internalists tend to stress the essential continuity of Congressional history, ecologists find ample evidence that the institutional evolution of that body is marked by sharp and vivid discontinuities.

It is therefore useful to explore the arguments of this latter group, as it was to explore those of Polsby and the internalists, because they clarify the central issues of the debate between these two groups and indeed address the fundamental questions which continue to surround the attempt to develop a productive approach to Congressional history. The examination of the ecologists' approach also lends
additional support to the idea that the attempt to understand Congress' early twentieth century transformation is an important part of the attempt to explain that institution's political development.

In general, the ecologists tend to view the House of Representatives as the product of factors which characterize and animate that body's immediate political environment. In contrast to the institutionalization theorists' approach, this body of scholars is intimately concerned with the notion of contexts. Variations in the immediate political environment of the House over the course of its history are seen as the keys to that institution's evolutionary tendencies. In the era of intense regionalism (in the first half of the nineteenth century) for example, Congress was very much the creature of sectional pressures; in the era of strong parties the House of Representatives, in its organizational structures and normative values was the creature of partisanship; and in the era of group politics, it is very much the creature of pluralist values and interests. Although no one student of Congress has articulated a comprehensive theory which works through the details of these general assertions, such a characterization can be seen to emerge from the collective assumptions of the ecologists' approach to various portions of political behavior in the House of Representatives.

The most comprehensive statement of the assumptions which underlie the ecologists' conceptual view of American politics in general and national political institutions by
extension is found in Walter Dean Burnham's various studies of the electoral process. In *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*, for example, he suggests that the American Political System is fundamentally static and insulated from the dynamic social and economic forces which surround it and periodically impose upon it a re-definition of its nature and role. As he argues:

The periodic rhythm of American electoral politics ... arises out of an interaction between rapid change leading to dislocation in an autonomous socio-economic system, and glacial or non-existent change in the structures and routines of mass electoral politics.

As the socio-economic system develops but the institutions of electoral politics and of polity remain essentially unchanged, dysfunctions centrally related to the largely untrammeled evolution of the former become more and more visible, until whole classes, regions or other major sectors of the population are injured or threatened with injury. Finally the triggering event occurs, critical realignments follow, the universe of policy and of electoral coalitions is broadly re-defined, and the tensions generated by the crisis receive some resolution. 58

American political institutions are therefore supremely governed by the particular forces at work within their immediate environment. These contextual factors emerge most centrally as crises, which because of the inherent inability of the political system to adjust incrementally to socio-economic change (because of rigidities within party structures, between partisan political groups or because of formal
and normative restraints on the relationship of the govern-
mental structures with its social and economic environment),
must do so in cyclical jolts. Thus, American history is
viewed as the dramatic appearance of a succession of polit-
tical and ideological coalitions which were relevant to the
immediate crises to which their appearance was a response
(1828, 1860, 1896, and so forth) interspersed with periods
during which these forceful coalitions gradually decayed.

To Sundquist, another critical realignment theorist,
these cyclical eruptions of political activity and change
are automatic in their occurrence. For, Burnham, however,
while decay is inevitable or almost inevitable, regeneration
of the political system through the emergence of new, pur-
poseful coalitions built upon the altered demands and needs
of its dynamic social and economic system is not. In fact,
this view, which holds that decay is the natural tendency
of American political coalitions as well as the institutions
they dominate, is quite the obverse of institutionalization
theory which implicitly holds that modernization, rationaliza-
tion and the drive toward complexity are the elemental forces
in organizational development. Consequently, the ability
of political institutions to respond adequately is depen-
dent upon the extent to which the central ingredients of
that realignment process - parties, economic institutions,
electoral entrepreneurs or political leaders, ideological
groupings -- view the political system (or institutions
within that political system) as the logical arena for the
struggles and conflicts they seek to resolve. Critical realignment, then, tends to view the structures and institutions of American politics, in vivid contrast to the internalists, as the relatively neutral locus for the resolution of conflicts which develop out of the constant changes which enliven its dynamic social and economic environment.

This view of political institutions as rather passive and chronically maladaptive actors in American history is reinforced by Louis Hartz who in The Liberal Tradition in America suggests that at base, the United States' political system has exhibited a relatively strong and consistent attachment to the broad assumptions of the Lockian creed. Government is to remain, so this creed holds, largely the creature of its constituents; it is to be controlled by its environment rather than the reverse. Clearly the unique structural characteristics imposed upon the American political edifice by the founders in 1789 are a reflection of these Lockian norms, but significant indicators of their enduring relevance can also be seen in such qualities as the United States' historical tendency toward electoral moderation and the continuing salience of the 'limited government' ethos in political institution-building (from the notion of economic self-regulation to the ideas which initially supported and which continue to sustain the establishment of independent and quasi-independent regulatory agencies, for example).

The sources of this limited role for the state in the United States, Hartz argues, are to be found in the unique
elements of American social and political history. Unlike most Western European nations, for example, American society has found itself in basic agreement over the social and economic assumptions which have shaped the establishment of its governmental system. The Hamiltonian challenge to these assumptions, and the debate over slavery, notwithstanding, American history has been marked, in Hartz' view, by an enduring value consensus. This consensus has emerged because American bourgeois society never faced the consistent and prolonged challenges its European counterparts faced.

Hart's point here is that the European liberal states, characterized by a more prominent role in shaping and guiding European society, were forced into that prominent role by the nature of the historical conflicts between feudal and bourgeois economic and social traditions and needs. Control of the state became critical in determining the outcome of those struggles and for maintaining the hegemony of middle class interests in the transition from feudal-agrarian to industrial societies. The fundamental feature of American history, Hartz continues, has been the absence of this conflict between values and social norms of feudal and bourgeois traditions. The absence of this historical conflict in the United States and the presence by contrast of a relatively strong sense of value unanimity precluded the development of a strong central polity. As Burnham characterizes this feature of American politics, "We have not government in our domestic affairs so much as non-rule." 62

In large part, Huntington amplifies this point in the
second chapter of his study, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, where he suggests that the American political system was born out of the rather fragmented, decentralized traditions of Tudor England. The structures and values which stemmed from that organizational mold, preceded, in Hartz's terms, the greatest historical struggles which occurred from the seventeenth century on in Europe and which ultimately shaped the patterns of the "modern" political systems which developed from those struggles. As such, the United States can be viewed as a fragment culture which broke away from the European whole before Europe had become dominated by the conflicts which proved to be the source of its modern political systems.

The implications then of the Hartzian concept of political development in the United States, to Huntington's own way of thinking, are that the American political system is uniquely marked by (1) the supremacy of fundamental law as a constraint on political action; (2) the structural fragmentation of authority; (3) the consequent non-sovereignty of the state (sovereignty is seen to reside in either the people or in fundamental law); and thus (4) the competence of the polity to act as a source of fundamental change is limited. "In seventeenth-century Europe," Huntington explains,
an authoritative restraint on human behavior. In addition, in America, human authority or sovereignty was never concentrated in a single institution or individual but instead remained dispersed throughout society as a whole and among many organs of the body politic. Traditional patterns of authority were thus decisively broken and replaced in Europe; in America they were reshaped and supplanted but not fundamentally altered.  

Once again, Huntington echoes Hartz in identifying this rejection of centralized political sovereignty noting that the American polity was never called upon to provide the impetus for the transformation of the society or the economy to the extent the states of Western Europe were called upon to do. In addition, the United States (presumably up until the twentieth century) was not faced with the constant need to coordinate a strong national defense effort.  

This view of American history, then, imposes certain assumptions upon the analysis and evaluation of the evolution of national political institutions. Above all, it tends to deny the existence of the conditions which would lead institutions to develop the ability to direct their own development. It presents a historical view in which the process of sustained institutional modernization -- in the classic European form -- is inconsistent with the central elements of American political history. It further suggests that the attempt to view institutional development as the product of institutionalization is incompatible with the broadly anti-modern tendencies at work in the American political system. It consequently strongly implies that the changes in Congressional
behavior Polsby saw as part of an institutionalization process must logically be something quite different. But, the question remains, if the changes which Polsby identified are not part of a continuous modernization dynamic, what then do they represent?

The ecologists' answer, which is largely fragmentary, tends to be rooted in historical contexts. Given the anti-developmental conception of American history, the search for the roots of institutional change focusses upon these aspects of Congress' environment which from time to time forcefully redefined its role in national political affairs. As such, ecologists derive their answers from the events or crises which tended to directly affect that redefinition process. Logically, this approach can be applied to the entire sweep of Congressional history. The emergence of mass parties and sectionalism, for example, are viewed as important elements in the strengthening of the Speakership under James Polk between 1837 and 1839. Yet, for the most part, the scholarly attention of ecologists as well as internalists tend to settle on the events which shaped the House between 1890 and 1920.

The concentration on this era stems first of all from the magnitude of the changes which occurred (as Polsby clearly shows) and secondly, from the impact those changes continue to have on the House today. The energies of these scholars tend to be focussed, as indeed those of Polsby and the internalist historians are, on attempts to explain why
these changes occurred and on understanding why they continue to be relevant for contemporary Congresses. Within this search, the idea of a "System of 1896" stands as an extremely important point of departure.

Clearly, the significance of the 1896 Presidential Election was appreciated by most of its participants and observers, but E.E. Schattschneider was the first to suggest that its meaning far transcended the bounds of its immediate political impact. "To understand what has happened in American politics in the past generation," he wrote in 1960,

it is necessary to go back to the election of 1896, one of the decisive elections in American history. It is necessary to understand what happened in 1896 in order to understand the Republican party system which dominated the country in the first third of this century.69

The importance of this election, he stressed, lay in the manner in which the Republican Party, particularly the conservative wing of that party, achieved and maintained its dominance of American political life in the first part of the century. Essentially, this dominance was founded upon the conservatives' ability "to impose on the country the conflict which divided the people the way they wanted them to be divided." This "substitution of one conflict for another" (i.e. the northern conservative - southern conservative conflict for the radical-conservative conflict) was designed to isolate "southern and western radicals from
each other", and was made possible by a tacit alliance between northern conservative Republicans and southern conservative Democrats. 70

This transformation of the lines of conflict, other observers have noted, was accompanied by other more structural changes in the United States political system. Between 1890 and 1920, voting regulations were modified in a manner which to some reformed and democratized the electoral system 71 but which to others simply consolidated the gains of the northern-southern conservative alliance by undermining many of the norms and procedures which had helped to sustain the strong role of mass parties in the late-nineteenth century. 72 Voter participation dropped markedly in the years after 1896 throughout many parts of the nation and electoral coalitions became less monolithic and less effective in mobilizing support for broad aggregations of political issues.

In the society at large, meanwhile, other significant, if less direct, shifts were imposing equally notable changes on America's political behavior. The nationalization of social and economic organizations along functionally specific lines tended, according to Samuel Hayes, for example, to mirror the progressive dismissal of parties -- tied to localistic and therefore outmoded issues and interests -- from national political relevance. 73 In their places, formal interest groups asserted their right to manage political conflict and campaign in their own ways for preferred policies; independent regulatory commissions were either strengthened
or established and their apolitical tendencies encouraged; and other institutions increasingly beyond the immediate grasp of partisan conflict (such as administrative agencies) gained levels of power and salience which lent further weight to the forces shifting American politics from its traditional paths. To some, these changes were direct outgrowths of the decisions made and bargains struck after the 1896 elections. To others, that election's outcome was but another symptom of broader changes occurring nationally which mixed a belief in progress and order with a forceful repudiation of the old norms of political conflict. 74

The significance of these large-scale transformations has not been lost on a number of scholars who seek to link them with specific changes within Congress. H. Douglas Price, for example, argues that the rise of the seniority system was a function of the growth of careerist tendencies among Members of Congress. The decline of membership turnover (due to new primary and election laws which tended to free the congressman from strict reliance on his party; the demise of anti-election norms among both political leaders and evidently the electorate; and the rise of one-party dominance within election districts), the increasing tenure of Members of Congress, the decreased frequency of "alterations in party control" of Congress since 1894 and the growth of political careers tied exclusively to service in the House of Representatives were among the major sources of the ensconce of the seniority norm. 75
To a certain extent, this casual pattern can be reduced to Huntington's simplified assertion that "the longer men stay in Congress, the more likely they are to see virtue in seniority." This view of seniority, then, is strongly linked to the changes occurring in Congress' turn of the century environment. As the constraints which underwrote the competitive and partisan organizational and procedural qualities of the nineteenth century House began to fade, and the Congressional role in national politics underwent a redefinition process, the natural political tendencies of Members of Congress were given freer rein -- they were allowed to construct an institution more in line with their own personal goals and ambitions.

Polsby, on the other hand, devaluing the importance of external changes, views the roots of the rise of seniority, as lying in the internal dynamics of the House during this time. The gradual emergence of seniority, he suggests, is largely attributable to the strategic realities of coalition building within the House of Representatives which changed in the first decades of the twentieth century. Although indirectly related to changes in the national (particularly the Republican) party structures, the increasing reliance on seniority was more directly the product of shifts in the way the House ordered its internal political system. As he argues:

Cannon's problem seems to have been that he took over a relatively unified party and had
little need at first to build a special supportive coalition. When the party began to split apart in his third term, he responded by attempting to maintain a workable coalition by dumping insurgent chairmen and rewarding loyal Republicans with chairmanships. . . . The costs of Cannon's efforts to maintain a supportive coalition are clear . . .

The weakening of the powers of the Speaker by Republican Party insurgents in union with Democrats which followed Cannon's strategic miscalculation, therefore, serves for Polsby as a major cause of the rise of seniority. Polsby also suggests that the norms of specialization and organizational differentiation, inherent in institutionalization theory were also at work.

In his argument, Polsby's differences with the ecologists becomes somewhat less distinct but nevertheless remain. By and large, the links between specific actions in the House of Representatives and broad external political changes are extremely indirect. To be sure, the fragmentation of the Republican party begun in the 1890's did lead to the increasingly pronounced break-up of the Republican legislative party in the period between 1900 and 1910, according to Polsby, which in turn affected Cannon's ability to retain traditional committee selection procedures. But, the emergence of seniority was more directly tied, once again in Polsby's view, to the institution-specific realities of the House of Representatives as an increasingly institutionalized political system.

Price, himself, tends to see this as a contrast to his own (and the ecologists) approach to the question of internal
changes in the House. The rise of seniority was for him part of a broader, externally directed process which, beginning in the 1890's, and as part of the general transformation of American politics which occurred during that time, removed Congress, as it did other creatures of partisan conflict, from the mainstream of the national policy-making system (at least in relation to the powerful role it had played in the latter half of the nineteenth century).

In effect, the rise of seniority was but another pathological symptom of the twentieth century insulation of the House of Representatives. As the links which bound Congress (and indeed the entire political system) to its constituents were modified and the House of Representatives became less directly tied to the often dramatic fluctuations of the nineteenth century electoral system, as Price suggests, it took on forms more consonant with a stable -- some argue static and stagnant -- organization. This is certainly Huntington's view and it is echoed by Burham who argues that the changes experienced by the House during this era were but reflections and symptoms of a process that ultimately served to insulate and in a sense isolate that institution from the mainstream of American politics and public policy making. It is appropriate, he asserts, to note two things about this process. In the first place, it was a process by which an institutional structure was adapted, or adapted itself, to the increasingly depoliticized and elite-insulated environment of American politics which reached its height in the 1920's. In the
second place, the institutional patterns established during this evolution toward its contemporary form have never been substantively altered since the 1920's, either by the New Deal realignment or any subsequent development in our electoral politics. 81

Burnham clearly views the House of Representatives as a casualty of the American political system's retreat from partisanship. In a less qualitative vein, he also sees a sharp relationship between the broad changes of the 1890's and early 1900's and the structural modifications Congress effected within itself. This theme is elaborated in his later article "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," where he details the magnitude and direction of electoral changes working on Congress' behavior. Here, he shows that competitiveness in House elections has declined; that the incumbent is increasingly less affected by electoral change; that there is a corresponding decline in the differences between the legislative parties; that Congressional (i.e. House) elections exhibit their own peculiar dynamic which appears to be independent of partisan electoral behavior in, for example, Presidential elections; and finally that voter participation is declining. 82

The suggestion is of course that these factors are the result of the long term depoliticization of the American electorate and the emergence of alternate modes of political participation. Candice J. Nelson argues, for example, that the growing power of incumbency (itself a reflection of Congress' insulation) is the result of the increased numbers of
independent voters in the electorate.\textsuperscript{83} Erikson reinforces this point arguing that the power of incumbency "coincides with ... the reported erosion of party identification as an electoral force."\textsuperscript{84} Finally, Ferejohn suggests that the decline in electoral competitiveness and the consequent rise in the strength of incumbency derives from that fact that even party identifiers are now "more responsive to non-partisan criteria for decision making in House elections."\textsuperscript{85}

To a certain extent, the present insulation of Congress, which Burnham traces, once again back to the changes in the American political system between 1890 and 1920, exhibits qualities which are also characteristic of the internalists' notion of autonomy. The distinctions which exist between these two concepts, however, are more than semantic. For ecologists, the House is an institution which has been rendered progressively more peripheral to the mainstream of American political decision making. Its position is a pathological symptom of the extent to which it has been unable to adapt fully to the exigencies of twentieth century American politics.

The insulated House, then, approaches the internalists' view of the legislative "system" only insofar as it is left relatively free (by its insulation) to create its own set of procedural norms and roles. In quiescent political times, the House does indeed tend to take a life all its own, and patterns of socialization on the part of the members into the various sub-systems and systems of Congress become a
logical focus of study. Unhampered by large-scale infusions of new members with new goals and new ideological orientations, the House does tend to exhibit many of the system-like qualities stressed by the internalists. 86

Thus, in the absence of significant electoral intrusions onto the internal world of Congressional organization, Members of Congress exploit a number of organizational resources to protect their incumbency. Mayhew suggests, for example, that the creative use of the frank and other public relations tools greatly enhance a representative's re-election chances and of course help reinforce key aspects of the overall insulation phenomenon. 87 Fiorina argues that Members also exploit their special relationship with executive branch agencies by serving as intermediaries between constituents and the bureaucracy to good electoral advantage. 88

In a sense, the increased reliance on resources involves certain modifications of the House procedural and normative organizational structure (itself evidence of a continuing adaptation process to the real if nevertheless minor changes occurring in the House's political environment). Thus, insulation is not institutionalization or autonomy. Congress continues to be the creature of its environment, according to the ecologists, a notion which becomes more apparent during times of relatively major external changes (for example, the changes in Congress' internal procedures which followed the 1974 House elections). 89

Despite the relevance which ecologists continue to see for their approach to Congressional behavior in modern times, however, most attention remains heavily focussed on the
changes which affected the House at the turn of the century. There are, nevertheless, gaps in the ecologist argument. While, for example, the magnitude of the shift in Congress' environment is clearly shown by ecologists, the precise impact of these changes on the House's internal structure tends to be implied more readily than it is actually demonstrated.

The most successful attempts to establish and define the nature of this link, tend to be those which resort to inductive assumptions about the mix between presumed member goals and institutional structure. Thus, Price views the reorganization of the House of Representatives in the early twentieth century as the combined product of an organization evolving the ability to meet the longer term career goals of its members (for example, freer and more immediate access to power, a more permeable decision-making system, and an increase and a broadening of the distribution of concrete perquisites and symbols of status and prestige). Mayhew applies much the same approach to the contemporary House suggesting that the present structures and norms are ideally suited to enhancing the re-election probabilities and thus prolonging the political careers, of Members of Congress. The notion remains, however, that this adaptation of institutional structures to member goals is made possible by the decline of the external constraints which affected Congressional behavior before the turn of the century and which from time to time still emerge to restrain and mold the internal structure of the House. It is a function of Congress' insulation rather than of its institutionalization.
The concentration upon individual ambition as the central dynamic in Congress' turn of the century reorganization and redefinition process places perhaps too much weight on this one dimension of political behavior. On the one hand, of course, Price is concerned primarily with the relationship between careerism and the seniority norm. At the same time, he does see the causal link between these two variables as an important reflection of the other changes which accompanied the emergence of the seniority rule in the normative and formal structure of the House.

In either case, the sole reliance upon professionalization or careerism as an explanation of the changes Congress underwent leaves a number of questions unanswered. First of all, how well does the careerist impulse explain the rise of seniority? To be sure, it makes intuitive sense to relate individual goals with organizational structure, particularly where that structure is relatively free of other constraints (i.e. where it is free to respond to its members' wishes). Given this assumption of insulation, nevertheless, does seniority really serve as an adequate fulfillment of the professionalist drive? Does seniority intuitively meet the professional goals of the careerist? Would not the quintessential careerist organizational solution have lain more properly in the democratization of the committees themselves and the diminution of the often arbitrary powers of the committee chairmen (which is essentially what has been happening in the House since 1970)?
As Price himself notes, the adoption of seniority also failed to reduce the element of chance inherent in the important decisions relating to committee assignments. While this responsibility was transferred from the Speaker to various incarnations of a committee on committees, it still remained in the hands of a very few members and open to the same vagaries which had characterized its exercise in the era of the strong Speakers. 92

Secondly, the professionalist focus as defined by Price and others tends to ignore other impulses which animate the institutional outlook of the Member of Congress. Beyond a career measured by longevity, it can be safely assumed that an early twentieth century careerist must have also wanted the House to remain a body in which the pursuit of a career was a worthwhile endeavor. He must have certainly wanted the House to maintain at least a semblance of power and influence in national political life. He must have also wanted it to be structured in such a way that it would be able to resolve important questions of public policy and make decisions as much in line with his own views as possible. He might also have wanted to erect an organizational structure which would encourage his own desire to develop a specific expertise necessary for handling the increasingly complex subjects dominating the national policy-making agenda. These and other goals competed with the simple uni-dimensional drive for stability and longevity among members and consequently exerted their own influences on Congress' organization in a
manner not easily accounted for in the careerist paradigm.

Thirdly, the extent to which the system of 1896 insulated the House of Representatives and removed major constraints on Congressional procedures remains problematical. As Burnham argues, many individual seats in Congress remained highly competitive throughout this period, thus moderating the extent to which the "safe seats" syndrome affected the organizational goals of all members. 93

Finally, the emergence of new external linkages (interest groups, for example) also raise questions as to how unrestrained the professionalist impulse was in influencing internal House norms and procedures. This thesis is only partially but promisingly explored in the literature on pluralism and the rise of interest group politics in the United States beginning around the turn of the century. Truman, for example, shows that interest groups emerged as effective political organizations most dramatically in the early years of the twentieth century. This rise in terms of numbers as well as importance, of functionally specific groups was most compatible with a political system which was permeable and which provided multiple points of access to the various institutions of government. 94 The dispersion of power and the entrenchment of the committee system certainly coincided, at the very least with the development of this group based norm of political conflict. And, as Price points out in his article, "Micro- and Micro-politics: Notes on a Research Strategy," the rise of interest associations had a profound effect on the general
notion of representation -- an impact which was undoubtedly felt very keenly by the House of Representatives. 95

This development of the political power of interest groups also had an important impact on the relationship between Congress and the Executive branch, and on the way legislators perceived their own law-making role. Regulatory commissions, and executive bureaus tended to serve as the political focus of the new pluralist order and, as Lowi notes, Congress tended to adapt and even reinforce this trend by granting progressively greater degrees of autonomy and discretion to these agencies and commissions. 96 While, in any case, the precise relationship of pluralism to Congressional organization has not been adequately studied, it is nevertheless clear that the appearance of this new and powerful force in the national political arena at the turn of the century certainly exerted a major influence on the legislative process.

The problems inherent in the attempt to relate the rise of pluralism in American politics to the internal legislative process reflects the wider problem ecologists confront in inferring Congressional behavior from external changes in the legislative environment. In its broadest sense, the concentration on electoral change, on changes in the fundamental norms shaping national lines of political conflict, and on the transformations in the manner in which that conflict was organized clearly hold significant implications for the way an institution like Congress develops its internal system of rules and procedures. There remains,
however, the problem of relating these broad changes to specific aspects of the Congressional process in more precise terms. Price is more successful here than others, but as we have noted, even he faces problems in his attempt to show that the careerist impulse was the major motivating element behind the adoption of the seniority norm and by extension the other characteristics of the post 1910-1920 House of Representatives. He finds it difficult to dismiss the idea that careerism competed with other forces in the ultimate determination of what would come to constitute the modern Congressional process (for example, the modernization dynamic discussed by Polsby and to a certain extent implied by Price's use of the term professionalization).

A related problem is that ecologists tend to underestimate the strength of internally derived norms and patterns of behavior at work in Congress. As Polsby strongly suggests, and despite the questions his own approach raises, the House of Representatives is not now, nor was it at the turn of the century a simple adaptive organism whose nature was unilaterally shaped by external events. The problem ecologists tend to confront in this regard is the identification of the dynamic nexus where external forces are translated into internal institutional characteristics. They tend to ignore the manner in which the institutional forces at work within Congress exert their own independent influence in modifying and cushioning the impact of changes in the larger national political environment. They find it difficult to explain why the House adapted
precisely as it did to the changes working in its outside world. Ecologists tend to observe the nature and direction of changes in Congress and then argue that intuitively these changes are largely consistent with the external changes to which they are a presumed response. But, it is not clear whether the sum total of internal change is equal to the sum total of the changes working on the House's environment.

Despite this vagueness in identifying the link between external change and organizational change within Congress, the ecologists' approach exhibits two major qualities as an explanatory model. It first of all integrates Congress' development into the mainstream of American political history. The evolution of the House of Representatives is woven into the broader fabric of the progression and alteration of other major forces in American political life. The second, and more significant strength of the ecologists' approach derives from this first quality, but is important in its own right. The integration of Congress with its political environment the ecological approach provides, introduces a critical dynamic element into the model of institutional change. Unlike the internalists, who devalue external influences and who are only impartially successful in identifying alternate sources of tension and change within Congress, ecologists are able to rely on the inherent and readily visible dynamic properties of large-scale social, economic and political change (as reflected, for example, in electoral realignments) as the central force impelling the House from old to new forms of organizational behavior.
The difficulty internalists face in explaining organizational change in Congress, on the other hand, is partially offset by the important value they place on internal processes. The stress they lay on the independent effects of internal norms, values and organizational traditions suggests that the assumptions which lead students of Congressional change toward a wholly external perspective ignores the manner in which an institution modifies and to a certain extent manipulates the impact of large-scale change on its internal structures. Thus, while the evolutionary or adaptive model of Congressional development provides a useful basis for examining organizational change, the internalist caveat provides a necessary balance for understanding more precisely how those external sources of change affected the internal workings of a House of Representatives in transition. Combined with the ecological model, it suggests that the roots of the modern House are to be found neither entirely in the political transformations occurring at the turn of the century, nor entirely within the organization itself, but rather at the point where internal and external forces intersect.

This study will be devoted to the identification and exploration of this critical intersection in an attempt to explain the source and nature of the changes which transformed the House of Representatives between 1890 and 1920. It will suggest, first of all, that Congress was in fact particularly affected by the forces which at once redefined the political world in which it functioned and at the same time
altered the expectations placed upon it. The study will argue that among the changes thrust upon the House, the most significant were the general depoliticization of the national policy-making process, the heightened expectations placed upon the national government, the progressive decline of electoral competitiveness in certain regions of the country, and the shift from cumulative and aggregative to plural and fragmented norms of political organization. It will suggest, secondly, that these changes interacted with the career goals of the Members of Congress themselves, as well as with the primary legislative tasks of the House of Representatives, the political values and beliefs of the members, and the standards of performance devised by the institution to incorporate, modify or redirect the impact of changes in the external world. Those two broad sets of constraints combined to redefine the internal organizational structures and procedures of the House at the turn of the century.

Clearly, the House was centrally affected by some amalgam of these two sets of forces. The simple listing of these constraints, however, takes us no further than the debate between the ecologists and the internalists. Yet, they do suggest the utility of synthesizing both arguments into a somewhat modified approach to the question of Congressional change in the opening decades of the twentieth century and indeed Congressional change in general. As we have noted, both groups tend to agree more or less that major changes affecting Congress' internal processes and to a very decided
degree the main characteristics of its role in the United States' political system occurred between 1890 and 1920. Neither group, however, agrees upon what the overall impact of these changes was for Congressional behavior and Congress' role in the national policy-making system. What appears to result in institutionalization for the internalists seems in some respects to result in insulation for the ecologists. The other portion of the debate between these two groups and the other major source of disagreement centers upon the question of causality. Each group distinguishes itself from the other in the assumptions each makes about the general nature and source of institutional political change.

These divergent assumptions lead the two groups, as we have noted, into the two equally different approaches to Congressional behavior and Congressional change we have explored above. The problem each continues to confront, however, is the extent to which the identification of a relatively clearly defined central dynamic still eludes their grasp. And, as long as a clearer portrait of the nature of the forces animating Congressional behavior continues to exist only as a vague quantity, research on the sources and characteristics of Congressional organizational change is likely to remain equally vague.

What is needed is some concrete and visible link between what are viewed as independent forces in the political system (for the ecologists these forces include once again the electoral system and its socio-economic environment and for
internalists it includes very broad forces of modernization and social mobilization outside of Congress and an independent institutionalizing dynamic within it) and the actual struggle to develop and change the organizational realities of the House legislative process. How, in effect, is the House of Representatives linked to the motive source of organizational change? Through what channels do elections come to affect the nature of Congressional organization? Or, where do we look for evidence of an institutionalizing dynamic in Congress?

The most successful attempt in this regard remains Price's identification of the individual member and his career goals as one observable and particularly relevant factor in the welter of forces impelling Congress through the organizational changes of the 1890-1920 period. More than anyone else, Price has brought attention to the fact that change in Congress is not so much a mechanistic process whereby the institution either evolves in mute and automatic response to environmental change or develops as the unconscious servant of some vague institutionalizing force, but rather it is a creative struggle of members, ideas and wills. The strength of the careerist approach lies in this concentration upon an active mediative nexus -- a critical intervening variable -- in the history of the House of Representatives. The question which must still be posed, however, revolves around the extent to which careerism is comprehensive enough to explain more than a portion of the changes
Congress underwent in the first decades of the twentieth century. While it is a useful beginning, the limitations inherent in the careerist approach to Congressional behavior, are strong enough to urge upon students of the House a broader search for a more productive focus -- one which encompasses more of the components affecting the process of institutional change.

One possible alternative which builds upon the careerist contributions to the identification of the central intervening variable in Congressional development and evolution lies in the concentration on the nature of conflict in the House of Representatives. As a political institution, the most elemental imperative Congress responds to is that of managing conflict in such a manner that it is able to carry out its most basic decision making functions. The peculiarities in Congress' recruitment process, in its linkages with an external world and in the expectations and demands placed upon it, suggest that its approach to the dual problem of conflict and consensus is likely to be unique and relevant to internal patterns of behavior. It could be argued, then, that the structure and character of a legislative institution in general is essentially the continual formal attempt of that body to reconcile the singular properties of its political world and the patterns of conflict that world creates within the organization, with the elemental need to resolve that conflict and make decisions. Its members must devise a set of procedures which effects some balance between the inherent
legislative tendency toward conflict and the need to achieve some measure of policy consensus.

The decision-making system of the House, -- the system devised by its members to resolve, dampen, or defer conflict within that institution -- will therefore be built around the specific and varying forms of conflict Congress is forced to confront and manage. This assertion suggests a possible model of legislative behavior and change. Figure 1 shows the outline of this proposed model. It begins with the assumption that the House must confront and adapt to a set of conditions over which it has little control -- conditions which determine the pattern and scope of conflict which exists within the legislative process. These, for the most part, external political "givens" include the nature of the issues which from time to time animate American political life and the kinds of demands and strains on the political system they tend to produce. Sharp divisions in society, and intense conflict over specific issues can be expected to have an impact on the terms of conflict within Congress.

Similarly, the nature and patterns of political organization in the society as a whole can be expected to impinge upon the manner in which conflict emerges in the House. Strong cumulative political cleavages in the national political system which are well organized will tend to produce one kind of conflict in the House and more fragmented pluralistic forms of political organization in the nation can be
Figure 1 -- A proposed Model of Institutional Adaptation in the U. S. House of Representatives.
expected to produce quite another pattern of internal conflict. Finally, the patterns of recruitment are important in the determination of political conflict in the House. Since the members of Congress are selected through the electoral process, significant shifts in voting behavior will have equally significant impacts on the issues which divide Congress' internal world. The lack of competitiveness in one particular region, for example, will tend to affect the internal distribution of views, ideals and interests in the House.

These realities of Congress' external world have important effects on the internal workings of the House. But, their impact is not a purely direct or linear one. The simple fact, for example, that the wishes, ideals and interests of an entire population are reduced through the process of representation to the individual wills, beliefs and interests of three to four hundred Members of Congress produces its own dynamic effect on the nature of conflict in the House. The external "givens" are mediated by individuals who have their own legislative, personal and career goals, who have their own unique sets of political beliefs and ideals, and who carry with them their own often peculiar ways of viewing the external world and its demands.

These internal "givens" are also affected by the interaction of members and indeed, as the internalists suggest, by the patterns and norms of conduct and behavior which obtain in the ongoing legislative process. The infusion,
for example, of relatively small numbers of new members can be expected to produce a few changes in the way the House conducts its business. In such cases, the existing values in the House can be expected to play a great role in shaping the new members' beliefs, perceptions and even their goals. An infusion, on the other hand, of relatively great numbers of new members, who have been elected on the basis of dramatic shifts in the issue-orientation of the electorate, or in response to very intense public conflict over demands, can be expected to have more influence and power in shaping the internal norms of the House. In the absence of strong external impulses, and in the absence of large-scale infusions of new members into the House, systemic processes can be expected to play a significant role in shaping House behavior. Notions of socialization, social control and stability are quite relevant to the analysis of the Congress during such times. Strong external forces can, on the other hand, be expected to produce patterns more in line with ecologist assumptions (patterns of institutional adaptation, for example).

These differing forces, in any case, affect the way members interact over the scarce resources of the House's internal world. And, the way they interact over these scarce resources determines (or in effect defines) the nature of conflict within the institution. Shifts in the patterns of conflict, in turn, produce changes in the way the House must manage conflict and make decisions. The House must adjust
its internal processes to reconcile its need to make decisions with the inevitable though variable nature of conflict. It responds to this variation in the terms of conflict by changing portions of its procedural and normative code of behavior -- its rules, norms of conduct and its distribution of power.

Congress has three broad sets of mechanisms for responding to conflict. It affects the resolution of conflict 1) by the way it distributes power, prestige and status in the House; 2) by the way it structures its decision-making process -- in the roles it apportions, in the procedures it creates, and in the structures it erects; and 3) by the way it defines the limits and scope of its decisions (Congress, for example, can moderate the level of conflict in part by simply reducing the ultimate importance and impact of its decisions). The curtailment of the powers of the Speaker in 1910 and 1911 can be seen as example of the first mechanism; the increasingly strong reliance on seniority and the growth of committee (particularly veto) powers after 1910 are examples of the second mechanism; and the progressively more significant grants of discretion and authority to commissions, and executive agencies since World War I can be viewed as examples of the third mechanism.

As Figure 1 proposes, these new norms and procedures either affect or can be affected themselves by modifications in the terms of conflict. Patterns of conflict within the House can be marked by a measure of continuity, in which case existing norms and structures become reinforced. Or
the terms of conflict can be marked by major changes which will tend to upset the existing procedural changes. As noted, the consensus system does have its own independent impact on both the combination of attributes which constitute the institution's internal political "givens", as well as on the nature of conflict itself.

This study, then, will attempt to explain House behavior by counterposing conflict for consensus as the real intervening variable which shapes its internal processes. It will approach the organization and procedural norms of Congress through the kinds of conflict it must resolve. In contrast to those who search for the roots of Congressional behavior among the elements of its "social structure" defined by stable and recurring patterns of membership interaction, it will argue that norms of behavior and structural aspects of the institution are themselves alterable and adaptive to internal changes in the nature and scope of political conflict mandated largely by changes in the external political world.

It will argue that conflict is central to a legislative organization and the evolution of such an organization is really the story of its adaptation to, and the accommodation of, the changing modes of conflict it must manage. And, unlike those who tend to view the House as essentially a discrete social system, the view of Congressional evolution as essentially the reflection and product of changes in the nature of the conflict it has been forced to confront, assumes neither a homeostatic urge to maintain a specific equilibrium on the part of the House (defined as either the desire to retain a
relatively stable set of norms and procedures or as the attempt to retain a fixed idea of Congress' role in the national political system), nor a logical progression from lower to higher forms of organization (as expressed in institutionalization theory). Nor does it assume an institution (such as Fenno's committees) which has a commanding control over its environment. Unlike the Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees, for example, the turn of the century House had no such power to manipulate the recruitment of its members. It had no real power as an institution to create a consensus through its recruitment process. Congress was forced to deal with a world it did not make and which it could only fractionally mold to its wishes (for example, Gerrymandering, but it could even be argued here that gerrymandering is only effective in a stable or static political environment).

Of course, the House has exhibited elements of continuity and stability throughout its history. The fact that certain members did manage to win re-election over relatively long periods of time indicates that certain elements of the internalist paradigm are relevant and important. The significance nineteenth century Congressmen attached to seniority and the deference with which they tended to deal with members who had enjoyed lengthy careers in the House do suggest that elements of a social system were at work even before the turn of the century. The idea here is that particularly major changes in the nature of conflict in the
House tend to invert the systems view of institutional behavior by forcing that institution to rearrange its internal values by adapting to new imperatives mandated by new forms and lines of conflict. In periods of significant change in the terms of conflict within the House (mandated, once again, by large infusions of new members, major changes in the relative salience of various issues or the transformation of the national policy-making agenda) the forces which tend to promote continuity and stability give way to discontinuities and instability in internal norms and relationships. In such times, members do not become socialized into the behavioral patterns of the House. Rather they tend to force the House to redefine its internal social structure to meet the new lines of conflict which they represent. In this regard, the experience of the freshman class in the ninety-fourth Congress, and its resistance to the existing norms in the House, demonstrate that the internal Congressional system is still not immune from the imperatives of altered patterns of conflict.

The following chapters, then, will deal with the way the House of Representatives in effect responded to the political world of which it was a part, and how it incorporated and modified the intrusion of that world through the manipulation of its internal norms, rules and structures. These chapters will explore the manner in which the House employed its own resources -- the power to distribute authority, the power to allocate decision-making responsibility, the ability to structure debate and the power to define the limits of its
own decisions -- to solve the dilemma of building a measure of consensus and agreement out of the specific forms of conflict and disagreement it faced.

To this end, the study will first attempt to show that the external political world has in fact played a pre-eminent role in ordering the patterns as well as the scale of conflict within the House. Chapters II and III, first of all, will explore the 1880 to 1921 period in an effort to describe the changing political culture of the United States during this time and demonstrate the impact of those changing forms on the shape of conflict within the House. Chapter II will be devoted to an examination of the 1890 to 1896 period, and Chapter III will concentrate on the 1896 to 1920 period in a further attempt to distinguish the partisan character of the former from the anti-partisan, particularistic and increasingly plural character of the latter. This shift in the American political system from the partisan to the pluralist style produced a dramatic series of changes in the forms of conflict within the House of Representatives.

The changing forms of conflict within the House -- the products of transformations in the American political system as a whole (once again, transformations in the way constituent demands were articulated and organized, and transformations in the specific concerns of those constituents) -- in turn forced the Congress to re-design and re-structure the system by which it managed and resolved conflict, and modify the process by which it achieved its legislative decisions. In
a partisan setting, for example, the House decision-making system faced quite different pressures and different obstacles to the construction of a policy-making consensus, than it did in a setting in which political coalitions were less monolithic, less united, and more permeable. Similarly, the Congresses dominated by a majority party plagued by serious factional disputes (the Democratic party in the late nineteenth century, for example) produced a different legislative process and exhibited a character distinct from one dominated by a coherent, unified and cohesive majority party. Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII, then, will attempt to demonstrate the responsiveness of the legislative process to periodic variations in conflict styles, by comparing four different periods of Congressional evolution between 1880 and 1921.

It will first describe the case of the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century in an attempt to demonstrate the impact of factionalism upon the Congressional process. The extent to which this process was sensitive to changes in conflict styles within the House will be shown by an examination, in Chapter V of the quite different legislative system which emerged when the unified and coherent Republican Party dominated the House in the same late nineteenth century political era. Finally, Chapters VI and VII will discuss the effects of the disintegration of the national party system, the changing shape of political participation and demand-making in the nation, and the emergence of a new more fragmented and particularistic political culture upon the internal
character of the House of Representatives. As these four chapters will show, the Congress was during this period (and presumably remains), extremely sensitive and responsive to shifts in the norms of conflict it must ultimately manage and resolve.

Within the 1880 to 1921 period, this study will concentrate on five periods of formal Congressional reorganization. Through the use of election data, manuscript sources and secondary historical research materials, it will attempt to describe and explain the nature of the normative and physical constraints which affected Congressional behavior. It will also attempt to relate those constraints to the debates and struggles which occurred over Congress' formal efforts at reorganization. Although it is clear that the mix between external and internal political pressures brought to bear on the House of Representatives throughout this period are apparent in most of its activities, the structural as well as normative shifts which occurred in the patterns of Congressional behavior are most dramatically reflected in those debates which centered around organizational changes. Nowhere else do individual Members of Congress confront the terms of their own ambitions, their own sense of the institution, than in the often strenuous and prolonged conflicts which shaped the distribution of authority, power and prestige in the House. The struggle over these formal rules then provides potentially useful insights into the way the institution as a whole faced and responded to the challenges hurled at it by the new political world emerging at the turn
of the century in the United States. The exploration of these rules can tell us a good deal about why the House of Representatives of the nineteenth century became, by and large, the House of today.
Conflict is inevitable in legislative institutions. It is an unavoidable fact which, this study argues, serves as the single most important force in the evolution of legislative norms and procedures. The form of internal conflict, its scale and patterns does much to determine the way such an institution carries out its goals and functions and indeed, as we have suggested in the last chapter, how these goals and functions are themselves defined. The courses of conflict and the multiple factors which sustain that conflict thus constitute a natural focus in the study of the evolution of the United States House of Representatives. For, as has been argued, the rules and norms of the House are essentially that institution's attempt to build a consensus out of the particular and varying forms of fragmentation and dissensus it confronts.

This chapter then will attempt to identify the sources of conflict in the House of Representatives between the later 1870's and the mid-1890's. It will suggest, in the process, that the conflict within Congress was the product of a welter of forces which worked both outside of the
institution as well as within. It will argue, however, that the extent to which internal sources of conflict (competing career goals, divergent ideological and issue orientations of the members themselves, differing perceptions of the roles and functions of Congress in national affairs, and conflicts over the distribution of power and authority in the House) affected the patterns of internal legislative conflict was a function of the constraints imposed on those internal forces by the political environment and its own organizational norms, conflicts and agenda.

In turn, the extent to which the political environment affected the internal Congressional process was itself a function of the normative as well as substantive links it forged with Members of the House through its party (or other political organizational) structures -- both local and national -- and through the force of electoral competition. The force of purely internal sources of tension and competition on the patterns of conflict in the House, for example, tended to be greater when the weakness of the external constraints left those internal sources relatively free of outside interference. Conversely, when the links which bound the House to its political environment were relatively strong, internal sources of competition were forcibly restrained and their impact on the patterns of conflict in the House (and indeed on the Congression process as a whole) were suppressed.
It will thus be argued that the precise combination of factors affecting internal conflict in the House of Representatives was determined above all by the extent to which the external political system established -- or failed to establish -- its control over the institutional dynamics of the Congressional process. It will be suggested that the characteristically non-insular quality of Congress (the levels of insulation, it must be noted, varied perceptibly within this period of time), and of the degree to which that institution was integrated with the national political system was not, as the internalists argue, a function of weakness or a lack of development in the House, but rather a function of the strength and nature of the structural and normative constraints which linked Congress with its outside world.

Among the forces working to constrain and influence the patterns of Congressional conflict and behavior, this chapter will focus first on the nature of political organization in the United States between 1878 and 1895, and the extent to which parties tended to be nationally cohesive, and relatively unified on policy and ideological goals, or fragmented. It will secondly attempt to identify the issues, (particularly the tariff, voting rights, and the currency question) which either reinforced party distinctiveness and complimented organizational strengths, or which underscored inherent weaknesses and divisions within these parties. Thirdly, this chapter will attempt to show that the force of electoral
competitiveness played a major role in linking party organizations and broad national policy and ideological concerns to the internal world of the House of Representatives. Finally, it will attempt to demonstrate how these external factors directly affected the behavior of members of Congress and constrained them in their pursuit of institution-specific goals, issues and prizes. Subsequent chapters will be devoted to more detailed examinations of the specific patterns of conflict upon which the normative and procedural internal organization of the House was constructed or modified. This chapter will simply attempt to describe in general the sources of these conflicts; show in general how the external and internal worlds tended to interact; and in the process, demonstrate the pre-eminent influence of the external over the internal world.

In 1882, Carl Schurz, the veteran reformer who was already well known for his pronounced antipathy to the strong party system, suggested that partisanship was on the very brink of extinction. Arguing that the forces of factionalism within the two major parties "are much fiercer than the contests between them," he attributed this disintegration to "the gradual disappearance of the issues which originally divided the parties . . . . The questions immediately connected with the Civil War," he concluded, "are virtually disposed of." As David Rothman notes, however, Schurz's dismissal of party government was somewhat premature as it remained
apparent that despite the internal dissension, parties in general, and the Republican Party in particular, "still possessed a strong hold on the people's affections and did not intend to relinquish it."\(^3\) Indeed, as a committed proponent of Civil Service Reform, to whom the idea of strong partisanship was anathema, Schurz was expressing an ardent hope about the immediate future of party government more than he was accurately reporting the actual character of American politics. Although it was the kind of assessment many of the readers of the patrician *North American Review* wanted to believe, it grossly underestimated the strength of the party in the national political system.

Closer to reality, perhaps, was the view of an equally ardent, if less notable supporter of the Civil Service idea, John I. Mitchell, who in October of the same year suggested a more realistic if less rosy view of the conflict between the forces of partisanship and reform. Noting that some Congressmen want to serve their country (defined, of course, as serving the Civil Service cause), Mitchell acknowledged that others, "who, regarding their highest allegiance as due their party, their faction or their own political ambition, devote themselves principally to the sort of civil service reform, thus defined: 'How to get the other fellow's man out and yours in.' As (this) class appears to be more numerous, at present, than the former," Mitchell conceded, "reform by congressional action will probably be postponed until public opinion imperatively demands it."\(^4\) And, in
the early 1880's, most indications pointed toward the con-
clusion that public opinion was not yet prepared to abandon the principle of partisanship.

In many ways, the fortunes of the Civil Service reform movement (or the "Snivel Service" as its detractors called it) reflected the strength of the party system upon which it was an assault. To be sure, there appeared to be a grow-
ing, if still relatively small group of citizens, largely confined to the articulate middle classes who found the corrupt excesses of partisanship distasteful. As a result of this political disenchantment, as well as of their own professionalist ideology, they sought to undermine the entire party system by directing their reform efforts at the very heart of the patronage system through which parties derived much of their strength and resiliency. The assassination of James A. Garfield in 1881 by a Stalwart Republican, had pro-
vided a major stimulus to the reform cause and did much to galvanize overnight, support for the Pendleton Act which created a significant if still tenuous opening wedge for the forces opposed to what were perceived as bossism and corrup-
tion in government. At the same time, the limits of the relatively modest Civil Service Act and the reluctant and usually half-hearted support it generally received when it was implemented, made it abundantly clear that the strong party system still retained its pre-eminence in American politics.
This public attachment to partisanship was supported by a diverse combination of factors. The patronage power of the majority party was a major source of formal support, of course, since through the mechanism of public appointments, the party in power possessed concrete resources and sanctions. In the distribution of postmasterships, collectorships and the entire range of political jobs at its disposal, the party (at Federal, state and local levels) could physically reinforce its hold on the loyalties of its followers by rewarding party regularity and penalizing deviation. Yet, the utility to parties of the patronage system was not confined simply to the fact that it provided a means for granting or withholding requests for employment. The enduring value of patronage lay, in the 1880's and 1890's, in the manner in which it complemented both the localistic and geographically-specific organization of the parties themselves. As Sorauf suggests, parties in the United States have traditionally emerged as confederations or merely aggregations of local political organizations. And, as Hays points out, this mode of organization fit neatly with the way American society was itself structured in the nineteenth century. The kinds of patronage dispensed meshed easily with this social reality, and as a result tended to reinforce the allure of partisanship. By and large, in other words, the jobs which lay at the disposal of party leaders were precisely those which tended to strengthen the geographical appeal of the party system. In an era when
appeals to region were of greater importance than those to functional groups, for example, and indeed when appeals to functional interests were virtually indistinguishable from regional appeals, the power to distribute postmasterships, collectorships, bonuses, subsidies and other types of constituency-oriented largess has a compelling political value. Appointments such as these, which had a direct relevance to the region-bound loyalties and political concerns of the electorate, and which made up the bulk of the patronage arsenals at the disposal of party leaders, aided the party organization and strengthened the legitimacy of partisanship as a social norm.

The pervasiveness of party loyalty also derived from the nature of the issues which animated American political life in the 1880's and 1890's. Here, the towering reality of the Civil War bore its inevitable and unmistakable mark on the specific issues which fueled party competition. More than a mere symbol of the beliefs and attachments which powered the political machinery of the nation, the War remained in the early 1880's a potent source of conflict and division, a ready standard of orthodoxy, as well as a unifying symbol for a host of ancillary ideas and ideologies. In part, its resiliency stemmed from the significance of the event itself. No other single experience in 19th century American life so mobilized and guided the political emotions and actions of the electorate. Yet, the Civil War also
symbolized and concretely complimented the inherent sectional nature of the conflicts which had underlaid, and which continued to dominate, the political agenda of the nineteenth century, thereby reinforcing and re-legitimating the lines of those conflicts.

As a distant issue unto itself, the Civil War—still kindled, in the 1880's deep and often violent passions. The war was still close enough to have been the major experience of the majority of mature adults during this time, and yet still far enough away from the collective consciousness of the electorate to have taken on an almost religious and mystical quality. It had its own mythology, its own hagiography (in the North and in the South), both of which were reaching full bloom fifteen years after Appomattox. War heroes were routinely trotted out by both parties during election campaigns in overt and usually successful attempts to translate marshal glory into partisan victory. Honorable service during the war (variously defined) was a prerequisite for higher public office. Thus, as late as 1889, George Hoar could safely claim:

The men who have given character to the great free states of the North are, in the main, the men who have given and now give character to the Republican Party. The men who gave character to the slave states of the South and to the civil administration of New York City are, in the main, the men who have given and who now give character to the Democratic Party.
Memories of the hardships and suffering of war gradually faded as groups like the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.) successfully built extensive social and political networks based on remembrances of the War's more benign and noble aspects, and on the feelings of kinship which it had spawned among its participants. Such memories and social networks, however, also served to remind Americans of the roots of that conflict and helped sustain the antagonisms which had marked the war. In this way, partisanship was at least implicitly presented to the American electorate as the logical extension of the war in terms of the manner in which it played on both the solidarities and the divisions created by that war. Party conflict was a surrogate war, viewed in many ways as a legitimate continuation of the struggles which had divided the nation between 1861 and 1865.

To an extent, both parties were thus able to establish supremely legitimate bases for their political crusades for public office. The Republicans were more successful in this regard than the Democrats, but both parties enjoyed a measure of success in constructing strong links between their electoral campaigns and the Civil War. There was a continuing attempt to merge the goals of the War with the ongoing struggle for political power. In both North and South, the "Bloody Shirt" was waved as an invitation to voters to consider how closely sectional loyalties and partisan support were tied. The Republican Party's rather greater success
in building these links in the minds of its supporters stemmed from its more homogeneous base of support. In the North and Midwest, it could appeal to wartime memories unequivocally since it was intimately associated with the war which it, with the help of those regions, had prosecuted and won. As Brand Whitlock of Ohio observed, the Republican Party, even in the 1890's, "was merely a synonym for patriotism, another name for the nation... It was inconceivable that any self-respecting person should be a Democrat." \(^9\) And, as Wayne Morgan adds, "during those halcyon days, a youth could mature outside the South without knowing there was another party." \(^{10}\) Even in the South, where it pursued its strategy of building a political coalition of white yeoman farmers and former slaves, the Republican Party could be almost as forceful in identifying itself with the issues of the war.

The extent to which the Republican Party defined itself in terms of Civil War rhetoric, and allied itself with broad Civil War ideals, while it served to strengthen its appeal, also helped solidify the party structure and indeed the whole idea of partisanship itself. If, in other words, the goals of the Civil War crusade were indistinguishable from the goals of the Republican Party, then party disloyalty was tantamount to treason. Civil Service reformers, therefore, no less than Democrats and former Confederates, were all targets of the kind of vitriol zealots generally reserve for
challengers of orthodoxy. The 1870's were marked by this kind of crusading fervor (both on behalf of the Republican Party and on the behalf of partisanship) against Republican opponents and probably marked the high water point of the idea of party for party's sake. Oliver Morton, for example, was one of the leaders of the Senate during this time and one of the strongest adherents of Republican party allegiance. Rooted firmly in the perceived identity of purpose between the Republican Party and the Civil War, Morton was vehement in his support for the idea of partisanship. In the course of one tirade against Civil Service reform he reiterated this support, asserting: "I hold the Republican Party superior in importance to any man who is a member of it . . . this is a government of parties." But, as Matthew Josephson notes, this statement paled in comparison to the strong party sentiments of Zach Chandler of Michigan who repeatedly "called down upon those who opposed Stalwart policy not only the plagues of Egypt, but even the curse of nuptial sterility." And, while this brand of extreme partisanship had cooled somewhat by the 1880's, American politics was still seen as the creature of parties. In Henry Adams' novel Democracy, for example, one of the central characters, Senator Ratcliffe (probably a caricature of James G. Blaine) clearly expresses the prevailing mood of his political generation when he suggests that "Our strength lies in this twisted and tangled mass of isolated principles, the hair of the half-sleeping giant of Party." For the
Republicans in particular, therefore, while party passions had cooled somewhat, and while some of the initial force behind party regularity had been mellowed by the inevitable emergence of factionalism, the idea of party and party government continued throughout the 1880's and 1890's to command a significant following among Republicans.

The extremist brand of partisanship found in the Republican party was conditioned in the Democratic party by the existence of important constraints on cohesiveness and party unity. Above all, the Democrats suffered from an inability to translate the Civil War into a truly national organizing asset as the Republicans had done. To be sure, the War was a central factor in the already commanding, and in the 1880's, still growing Democratic dominance of Southern politics. As Lawrence Goodwin suggests, for example, assorted appeals to the past, to the southern war effort and to the party of the fathers which symbolized both, did much to break the back of the Populist movement in the late 1880's and early 1890's in the South. In other words, the Democrats in the South were able to equal, if not surpass the achievements of the Republicans in equating the nobility and glory of the Civil War with their own brand of partisan politics.

In the North and Midwest, however, Democrats found themselves at a decided disadvantage wherever they were foolish enough to challenge the special mystique the Civil War seemed to confer on the Republican Party. Despite their
assorted attempts to neutralize this Republic asset, for example, through the nomination of northern war heroes for positions of leadership (Hancock's nomination for President in 1880 and allusions to Speaker Samuel J. Randall's honorable Union war record), they were never able to erase their opponents' powerful Civil War legacy. As a result, the Democratic Party outside of the south, and to some extent in the south, tended to represent a loose coalition of those whose political ideals were based on concerns which had developed independently of the Civil War. Thus, northern Democrats tended to be a curious mixture of urban machines, old school Jacksonians, Jeffersonian agrarians and political reformers who were often bound together by little more than a common antipathy to the Republican party. The Democratic Party was in 1880, Morgan argues, "little more than a collective grievance . . . The overriding concept of 'local rule,' remembrance of things past, and dislike of the Republicans kept the party an entity, but this was self-defeating, since it meant a lack of focus and discipline."16

The issues which enlivened, and gave a measure of substance to, partisan conflict in the 1880's tended to complement the sectional cleavages reflected in the Civil War. While legislation and reforms aimed at consolidating the principle goals of the War had already reached their peak in the late 1860's and 1870's, issues which emerged directly from the War continued to have a place in the campaign rhetoric and on the public agenda. The aftermath of the
contested 1876 Presidential election had led to a dramatic relaxation of Republican attempts to push forward its programs of civil rights for freed slaves in the South and a virtual end to the attempt to form a competitive Southern Republican Party. Locally relevant issues -- residues from the Civil War -- continued to animate politics around the nation throughout the 1870's, particularly in the South where state governments confronted problems and conflicts left by the retreating Republican-installed governments, but by the early 1880's the Republican party nationally had all but abandoned the substantive portions of its reconstruction program and the South began its unfettered slide into one party rule.

While the Republican party retreated from its commitment to comprehensive civil rights reform -- the Supreme Court's 1883 Civil Rights rulings marked the end of a lingering death which had lasted from 1877 -- a few issues taken from the civil war agenda remained as reminders of the Republican Party's ideological roots. Voting rights controversies continued to spark partisan conflict throughout the 80's and early 1890's, as Republicans and Democrats paid, from time to time, symbolic and self-serving tribute to the conflicts which had divided the nation between 1860 and 1877. In 1879, for example, the Democrats in control of the House of Representatives attached a succession of political amendments (or "riders") to the Army Appropriations
bill which in effect barred federal troops from maintaining order (and presumably guaranteeing black and Republican voting rights) at the pools in the South. President Hayes' vetoes of a succession of Appropriation bills with such riders attached to them led to a virtual stalemate between executive and legislative branches, and left the army unpaid for months.

The eruption of this issue, and the manner in which the Democratic House pursued its goals in this regard, surprised and angered Republicans and not a few Democrats in the North who were content to allow the issues of the Civil War recede from the public's mind. Republicans quickly sensed a useful campaign issue at hand and competed among themselves to provide the public with the most eloquent and the most imaginative analysis of the crisis. James G. Blaine, for example, suggested that behind the Democratic refusal to appropriate funds for the army was a thinly veiled and sinister attempt to "get rid of the civil power of the United States in the elections to Representatives to Congress." Indeed, Blaine charged, this was only part of a broader Democratic attempt to repeal "all the war measures of Abraham Lincoln." Roscoe Conkling of New York echoed the sentiments of his factional rival (Blaine) in a colorful speech ten days later on April 24, 1879. "This is a struggle for power," he thundered.

It is a fight for empire. It is a contrivance to clutch the National Government . . . The nation has tasted, and drunk to the dregs, the
sway of the democratic party, organized and dominated by the same influences which dominate it again and still. You want to restore that domination. We mean to resist you at every step and by every lawful means that opportunity places in our hands. We believe that it is good for the country, good for every man North and South who loves the country now, that the Government should remain in the hands of those who were never against it."19

Northern Democrats, meanwhile, feared a strong voter reaction in the 1880 elections. "I am astonished at yesterday's work in the House!!" a friend frantically wrote to Speaker Randall; "Has Congress gone mad!!"20 Another Northern Democrat, Leopold Morse of Boston was even more morbid about the effect the appropriation issue would have on his party's electoral chances in 1880:

The story goes at Washington that Speaker Randall met Congressman Leopold Morse of one of the Boston districts the other day, and blandly inquired how the party stood at Boston. "Which party?" replied Morse. "Why the Democratic party, of course," said Randall. "There isn't any Democratic party there," exclaimed Morse, in his quick business-like way. "This Congress has killed it."21

For the most part, however, agitation over voting rights in the South remained a secondary issue which erupted to enliven national politics only occasionally throughout the 1880's and 1890's. The last real attempt to ensure equal access to the polls (and not so incidentally to ensure the possibility of
Republican electoral success in the southern states) was Henry Cabot Lodge's 1890 bill which passed the House but died in the Senate.

Other vestiges of the Civil War legacy surfaced from time to time during the 1880's to remind political leaders that at least a few of the issues raised therein were not completely forgotten. Grover Cleveland, for example, enraged Northern war veterans when in 1887 he tentatively approved the suggestion of his Secretary of War Endicott that captured Confederate battle flags be returned to the South. The reaction of the G.A.R., among others, was immediate and intense and led Cleveland to rescind his order, not, however, before much damage was done to his chances for re-election. Cleveland also antagonized Northern war veterans with his persistent vetoes of pension bills and found, much to his dismay, that while many of the war issues had been laid aside, a few narrow yet deeply held ones remained to claim a place on the national political agenda. Indeed, the G.A.R. would continue to be a major and formal force in national politics well into the twentieth century.

Aside from these exceptions, however, Republicans as well as Democrats were content to table the specific policy goals of the Civil War in favor of less concrete, if more electorally rewarding symbolic appeals to the past. And yet, if the Civil War issues were themselves abandoned, the conflicts which emerged to take their place in the 1880's tended
to conform to the sectional basis of American politics essentially laid down during the war. Some, like Wilfred Binkely, for example, argue that the demise of the Civil War conflicts left American politics in a sterile vacuum devoid of any issue aside from the artificial ones created by the parties for electoral purposes. The parties, he asserts, had become ends in themselves. Yet, while it is true that none of the issues which emerged after the mid-1870's ever again excited the kinds of emotional response produced during the reconstruction era, a number of significant and (at least ultimately) polarizing issues did begin to emerge in the early 1880's.

The tariff issue was raised with increasing urgency during the decades of the eighties and nineties, and to a certain extent actually dominated the public political forum between 1884 and 1890. Of course, the tariff was not at all new to American politics. It had been a traditional focus of often sharp debate throughout much of the nineteenth century and underscored, in its early years, the deep sectional tensions which underlaid pre-Civil War politics. Its resurrection in the early 1880's was due in part to the demise of the Civil War issues, but it was also the product of an active redirection of public attention toward economic questions. The resurgence of the tariff was also the result of conscious attempts on the part of the national parties to develop more relevant, and for the Democrats, more electorally
appealing issues to replace the declining policy remnants of the Civil War. In the main, the call for tariff reform (by which the Democrats meant a reduction in tariff schedules or "tariff for revenue only") had a logical attraction for a party which had traditionally espoused the low tariff cause. Support for the protectionist cause was similarly a natural direction for the Republican Party which still paid tribute to many of its Whig ideological roots.

The emergence of the issue, therefore, was partially the result of the conscious effort of the national parties to find a new set of issues worthy of voter attention and support. But, the rise of political conflict over the tariff was also the product of economic conditions and popular pressure which worked independently of party strategic interests. Taussig, for example, attributes the emergence of the tariff issue in the 1880's to the progressively greater Federal revenue surpluses which began appearing in the late 1870's. After the nation recovered from the severe depression of 1873, he suggests, the focus of the economic debate was shifted from the currency question (which tended to be a characteristic political preoccupation of Americans during bad economic times throughout the nineteenth century) to the tariff issue.

The revival of (business) activity in 1879 and the years following caused a great increase in imports, and so a great increase in customs
revenue. For several years after 1879, the surplus revenue was on the average over a hundred million annually. The redundant revenue compelled a revision of the customs duties, and it was inevitable that not only the financial but the economic aspects of the tariff should once more become prominent. In theory, the Democrats took what by right should have been an undeniably attractive position on the tariff question. Their growing call for tariff reduction had a clear appeal to an electorate perennially interested in tax relief. In practice, however, the Democrats found numerous stumbling blocks to their attempts to actually implement their reform and retrenchment policies. While, for example, the principle of lower tariffs had an obvious general appeal, attempts to achieve just this tended to crumble before the special appeals of specific regional and economic interests. The sugar industry in Louisiana could not lend its support to a tariff schedule which lowered the duties on refined sugar imports, for instance, and Philadelphia Democrats were equally adamant about reductions in the iron and steel rates. Thus the renewed focus on the tariff did little to invest the Democratic party with the unity or cohesiveness it so desperately sought.

Nevertheless, the tariff question did come to serve as the predominant focus of political conflict throughout the 1880's. In 1884, for example, William Morrison's attempt to achieve a horizontal or across-the-board reduction of the tariff schedule failed in the face of united Republican
opposition supplemented by a group of Democratic insurgents led by Samuel Randall (dubbed by the tariff reformers as Samuel Randall and his forty thieves). In 1886, Cleveland presented Congress with a strong Presidential message which for the first time identified tariff reform as the primary goal of his administration. With the battle joined, Democrats united, more or less, around the very moderate 1887 Mills bill which, despite its numerous concessions to special interests, was defeated in the Republican Senate. Both parties then went to the hustings in 1888 with the tariff issue high on the agenda. That election gave the Republicans working control of both Houses of Congress as well as the Presidency for the first time in eighteen years. With victory in hand, the Republicans proceeded to push through the protectionist McKinley Tariff, an effort which more than anything else cost them the 1890 mid-term elections.

The emergence of the tariff once again filled the void left by the demise of the issues produced by the Civil War. It constituted a policy concern which did much to give a measure of new life to the Democratic Party, but it also exacerbated some of the old tensions within the party. Throughout the 1880's and 1890's, the Democrat's tariff rhetoric tended to alienate some of their followers whose interests were threatened by reduction, and the party's actual performance (which deviated markedly from its rhetoric) tended to disappoint its more vocal tariff reform supporters. But, the reform appeal did mesh fairly well
with the traditional bases of Democratic support even if it did little to alter the enduring regional schisms which cleaved across America's political map and through the Democratic party ranks. In the end, the sectional appeal of the tariff did little more than reinforce the already existing lines of partisan political conflict in the 1880's.

The tariff, therefore, became a major substitute for the issues which had propelled the party machinery in the years immediately following the Civil War. But, while it proved to be an immensely important issue to a number of voters and while it conveniently did little to change the lines of political conflict established by the Civil War, it did not inspire the kind of passion, the solidarity or the unequivocal support of the voting public that those earlier issues had. And, while it did produce a new focus of debate, it did little to enliven partisan conflict or infuse the party system with fresh ideas or a new relevance for the electorate. Nor did it measurably strengthen or unify either party's internal structure. For the most part, the tariff issue did little to halt the gradual decay of the Civil War political alignment. This was true of both parties to a certain extent, but the Democratic party in particular found in the tariff little relief from the internal factionalism, the internecine warfare which had plagued its existence, and constrained its influence on the course of national politics since the end of the Civil War.
Democratic voters were equally ambivalent about their party's traditional stand against excessive federal spending. On the one hand, many seemed to applaud the Jacksonian stance of their leaders in opposing what they termed extravagance (largely the responsibility of the Republicans) in government spending. For many of these voters, the feeling persisted that federal spending was indistinguishable from federal interference in local affairs. At the same time, however, the Democratic attachment to the principle of governmental frugality was undermined by requests of particularistic (usually regional) interests for public money. The farm bloc, for example, tended in general to demand a progressively greater share of federal assistance throughout the 1880's, as did merchants and farmers in the south and central portion of the country demand funds for improvements in flood control and transportation systems along the Mississippi River. At a Rivers and Harbors convention held in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, for example, in 1885, the assembled members adopted a resolution "heartily favoring liberal appropriations by Congress for the improvement of the rivers and harbors in all parts of the United States," and attempted to underscore "the importance of making these adequate appropriations." To be sure, many of the demands for increased federal expenditures among Democrats were neatly couched in traditional party rhetoric. Thus, in explaining the reasons for supporting increased federal spending for rivers and harbors bills, Congressman A.S. Willis (D)
of Kentucky suggested that increased spending would in this case actually save the government money. "I have always contended," he said in an interview, "that hundred of thousands of dollars have been annually lost to the government by a failure to appropriate money to carry on existing improvements on rivers and harbors." 30

Republican voters, meanwhile, had far less trouble supporting increases in Federal spending. Wedded to the Whig philosophy of active governmental intervention in the nation's economy, many Republicans welcomed an acceleration of federal developmental efforts. Railroads had already become a legitimate beneficiary of the national government's largess (including a 200 million dollar subsidy for the Texas and Pacific railroad in the 1870's), and few Northern Republicans had qualms about extending the scope of federal spending, at least in principle. Republicans also seemed to derive a special pleasure from the differences this issue brought out in the Democratic Party, and tended to encourage Southern requests for funding over the resistance of "their fellow Democrats of the North, who lectured them strongly about 'Grantism', public morals and reform." 31 Republicans also tended to unite around the idea of federal spending simply because many of them were direct recipients of federal money in the form of pensions and bonuses granted, by the late 1880's, to progressively greater numbers of those who had served in the Union Army during the war.
The fourth set of issues which fueled party conflict throughout the eighties and nineties revolved around the currency question. Like both the tariff question and the federal spending issue, the currency problem was a recurrent focus of national political conflict. Eventually, however, it would do what neither of the other two issues had been able to do by serving as the central instrument of a wrenching partisan political realignment in the mid-1890's. Although the specific terms of the currency debate were modified between the 1870's and 1896, the general outlines of that debate remained fairly constant. Ranged along one side of the question were those who supported a hard currency system tied at that point to the gold standard. Against them arose various strands of support for a "soft" currency system based either on the fiat greenback dollar issued during the Civil War, or on some other "elastic" medium which was in some way tied to the productive needs or wealth of the nation. The search for such a soft currency ultimately, and ironically, concluded with an attachment to the silver standard.

From the beginning of the soft currency debate, Democrats tended to be more susceptible to the appeals of both Greenbackers and their ideological descendants, the Free Silverites. In the 1870's, Greenbacker-Democratic coalitions were elected in the South and in the North and Midwest. Ohio, Indiana and Maine were all scenes of at least partially successful soft money electoral drives as were many areas of the South where Democrats and Greenbackers entered into loose
coalitions in the 1870's. Republicans were themselves not immune from the appeals for a flexible currency, and a number of Republican political leaders endorsed the idea of soft money. Free Silver continued to attract more Democratic than Republican voters, but neither party was in the end free of the internal dissention this issue caused. Republicans from western silver producing states like Colorado, Nevada and others were particularly prone to the enticements of free silver as were Democrats from the South and Midwest whose agrarian constituents were by the late 1880's and early 1890's caught between the twin binds of chronic indebtedness and a deflated dollar. To both groups, an elastic currency held out great, if often overstated, promises of economic gain. And thus, for both parties, the Greenback agitation and later the Free Silver movement posed a continuing and in the end decisive organizational dilemma for the attempts of both parties to maintain or develop an internal cohesiveness.

Finally, Civil Service reform continued to attract some attention throughout the 1880's and 1890's. But beyond the limited reforms initiated during the Arthur administration, little of substance was done to advance in any comprehensive manner, the cause of professionalism in the national bureaucracy. Both Cleveland and Harrison, for example, were harried by the conflicting demands of spoilsmen and reformers within their parties who competed for Presidential attention. Cleveland, for example, began office with overt pledges of
support for the civil service movement, but the exigencies of coalition building, and the eagerness of his fellow partisans to enjoy the fruit of a long awaited electoral triumph inevitably forced him away from the kind of commitment his Mugwump backers sought. Harrison too faced unrelenting, if somewhat less divisive pressure for reform from zealots like Civil Service Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt who constantly complained to friends of the President's indifference to meaningful and substantive reform. "I do wish the President would give me a little active, even if only verbal, encouragement," Roosevelt confided to Henry Cabot Lodge; 'It is a dead weight to stagger under without a particle of sympathy from any of our leaders here."35

As Roosevelt quickly learned, however, the neutralization of the patronage system was not the kind of issue which would provoke much support among members of the strong, and in the 1880's and 1890's, relatively cohesive national Republican Party.36 Indeed, as late as 1899, President McKinley found it relatively easy to withdraw from the civil service umbrella close to ten thousand appointive positions.37 The Civil Service Reform issue, therefore, had a variable and, with only a few exceptions (the ignition of public opinion in the wake of the Garfield assassination was one example and the importance of the Mugwump voting bloc in states like New York and Massachusetts was another) a minor impact on the shape of political conflict in the late nineteenth century.
These issue clusters then (primarily focussed around the Civil War, the tariff, federal spending, the currency question and to a lesser extent civil service reform), tended on their own, and in combination, to significantly affect the nature of conflict within the nation's political institutions. The decline of the Republican single-mindedness which had emerged out of the Civil War, and the emergence or the re-emergence of new issues in the late 1870's and 1880's tended to reflect and indeed to play a major role in the gradual decay of the political and organizational alignments brought about by the Civil War. The Democrats, who during the entire Reconstruction era had been unable to develop an issue base around which their supporters could rally, were particularly hard hit by the uncertainties and the continued fragmentation inherent in the increasingly clouded political agenda of the late nineteenth century. Yet, the Republicans were also affected by a perceptible, if by comparison with the Democrats, a gradual erosion of their once monolithic, committed and disciplined organizational base. As divisions within each party (again, much more apparent in the Democratic party than in the Republican party) became more animated -- as the issues which came to dominate the political agenda of the 1880's and 1890's increasingly cleaved across existing lines of party solidarity -- the institutions of government were forced to seek new organizational methods of accommodating the increasingly complex and more diffuse lines of conflict these new political realities created.
The House of Representatives was particularly sensitive to, and constrained by the alterations in the issue content of electoral campaigns and particularly the debilitating effect this had on the Democratic party, which together forced it to constantly modify the manner in which it defined and achieved its own legislative consensus. To a certain extent, this evolving issue agenda was the product of political leaders themselves, and insofar as this was true, it represented a controllable political resource for getting votes and winning elections. To a great extent, however, the appearance of new issues, of new centers of voter interest, occurred independently of institutions like the House. And, to the extent this was so, these issues exerted an important and an autonomous external influence on the patterns of conflict within the Congress, and ultimately on the norms and organizational procedures which from time to time were devised to manage these changing patterns of conflict.

These diverse and often cross-cutting issues affected the internal conflict of the House primarily through the mechanism of elections through which, every two years, proponents of one cause or another were recruited to pursue their own and their supporters' political, ideological and partisan goals. In their most obtrusive form, elections determined the relative strengths of each party in the House of Representatives, and equally important, the make-up of the competing institutions of federal power -- the Executive Branch and the Senate. Yet, elections throughout the 1880's and 1890's also
reaffirmed in a concrete way the underlying political tensions which existed in American politics and channeled those tensions to national political institutions like the House of Representatives. In so doing, these elections also magnified the strengths and weaknesses, the cohesiveness and the fragmentation, and the discipline and the disorder of the parties which organized campaigns and channeled public demands for political action in the halls of Congress.

The regionally, heterogeneous nature of the Democratic Party, for example, which was torn between a stronghold in the South and diverse power centers in the Midwest and Northeast, was continually reaffirmed by Congressional election patterns in the late nineteenth century. These election patterns also reflected the relative homogeneity (at least in terms of the Civil War alignment) of the Republican regional base. The northeast and Midwest were the primary sources of that party's strength, while some of the border states (for example, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri) also returned, from time to time, Republican candidates to the House. Table 2.1 shows the partisan electoral patterns for three Congresses in the years 1878, 1884 and 1888.
Table 2.3
Regional Distribution of Party Strength in the House of Representatives in the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses (percentages down in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include states admitted to the Union after the 1888 elections (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Washington). Percentages subject to rounding error.
Clearly, the Democrats dominated the South Atlantic and South Central region of the country. In that area, which made up 37 percent of the Congressional seats between 1878 and 1888, the Democratic party derived 70%, 62%, and 69% of its total House membership. The Republican source of support, meanwhile, was equally skewed toward the Northeast and Midwestern regions of the country. Those areas which collectively controlled between 60 and 62 percent of the seats in Congress returned 92%, 85%, and 86% of the total Republican House membership in the years 1878, 1884 and 1888.

The Democratic hold on the Southern Congressional Districts was by 1878 already extremely strong. Elections there tended to be less competitive on the whole than those in other regions of the country. As Table 2.2 shows, the South tended to have a lower proportion of highly competitive contests (defined as producing a percentage margin of victory between the winning and second place candidate of ten percent or less) and a much higher proportion of decidedly non-competitive contests (margins of victory above thirty percent). Clearly, the most highly competitive region of the country in the 1880's was the Midwest where between 59 and 63 percent of the Congressional election contests were won with less than a ten percent margin of victory in the three elections summarized. In 1878, for example, although only 29% of the House membership came from the Midwest, that region represented over 40 percent of the constituencies which were won by less than ten percent. The Middle Atlantic States were also relatively competitive
Table 2.1 -- Regional Variations in Margins of Victory in House Elections (46th, 49th, and 51st Congresses)

Margins of Victory (percentage difference between 1st and 2nd Place)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 to 10.0</td>
<td>10.1 to 30.0</td>
<td>10.1 to 30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 10.0</td>
<td>10.1 to 100.0</td>
<td>10.1 to 100.0</td>
<td>10.1 to 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0 to 30.0</td>
<td>10.0 to 100.0</td>
<td>10.0 to 100.0</td>
<td>10.0 to 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New England  | 11  | 13  | 4  | 28  | 10  | 11  | 5  | 26  | 12  | 10  | 4  | 26  |
Middle Atlantic  | 31  | 24  | 2  | 27  | 32  | 29  | 7  | 60  | 28  | 33  | 8  | 69  |
South Atlantic  | 11  | 18  | 14 | 43  | 18  | 13  | 18 | 49  | 24  | 16  | 9  | 16  |
South Central  | 12  | 25  | 26 | 63  | 23  | 52  | 24 | 127 | 22  | 32  | 22  |
Middle West  | 50  | 29  | 6  | 85  | 63  | 32  | 5  | 100 | 62  | 35  | 3  | 100  |
Mountain  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  |
Far West  | 4  | 1  | 0  | 5  | 5  | 2  | 0  | 7  | 5  | 2  | 0  | 7  |

Totals 121   | 120  | 52  | 293  | 153  | 118  | 54  | 325  | 155  | 112  | 58  | 325*  |

* Figure does not include the four states admitted to the Union following the 1888 elections.
All percentages subject to rounding error.
(or more accurately, contained significant pockets of intense electoral competitiveness) particularly in the 1884 elections when 48% of the contests there were decided by a ten percent margin of victory or less.

Because of the nature of electoral competitiveness in the South, the Democrats tended to have a greater number of "safe seats" in Congress -- or at least as safe as norms of office rotation and nominating convention contests allowed. In the three elections surveyed, for example, between 22 and 28 percent of the Democratic seats were won in districts which gave their candidates margins of victory which exceeded thirty percent. The Republicans, by contrast, could count on only seven to nine percent of their membership being returned with such margins. The Republican dominance of its Northern and Midwestern heartland, was thus conditioned by pockets of significant Democratic competition.
Table 2.3  -- Distribution of Competitiveness by Party (46th, 49th and 51st Congresses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5%</td>
<td>27 (19) 29 (22) 11 (50) 67 (20)</td>
<td>35 (29) 40 (33) 8 (26)</td>
<td>83 (24) 44 (11) 2 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1-10%</td>
<td>19 (14) 23 (25) 3 (19) 55 (20)</td>
<td>36 (21) 34 (25) 4 (19)</td>
<td>72 (22) 28 (18) 45 (27) 3 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1-20%</td>
<td>32 (23) 35 (26) 5 (23) 72 (25)</td>
<td>43 (25) 33 (24) 0 (13)</td>
<td>76 (23) 52 (20) 50 (33) 3 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1-30%</td>
<td>22 (16) 22 (17) 3 (14) 47 (16)</td>
<td>40 (24) 18 (13) 2 (17)</td>
<td>40 (12) 11 (7) 13 (8) 0 (0) 24 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1-40%</td>
<td>9 (6) 7 (5) 0 (4) 16 (5)</td>
<td>11 (6) 7 (5) 1 (6)</td>
<td>19 (6) 11 (7) 7 (4) 1 (11) 19 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1-50%</td>
<td>9 (6) 4 (3) 0 (4) 13 (5)</td>
<td>5 (3) 3 (2) 0 (0)</td>
<td>8 (2) 11 (7) 3 (2) 1 (11) 15 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% and over</td>
<td>22 (16) 1 (1) 0 (0) 23 (8)</td>
<td>23 (13) 2 (13)</td>
<td>27 (8) 22 (14) 2 (1) 0 (0) 24 (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 140 (100) 133 (99) 22 (101) 293 (100) 173 (100) 137 (99) 15 (99) 325 (99) 152 (99) 164 (99) 9 (99) 325* (99)

* Figure does not include the four states admitted to the Union immediately following the 1888 election.
All percentages subject to rounding error.
The quest for House seats tended therefore to become most intensively focussed upon those Northern and Midwestern states which were marked by high levels of electoral competitiveness. Given the Democrats' almost exclusive dominance of the South and the Republicans' almost equally commanding control of much of the North and Midwest, Congressional elections tended to hinge on the few remaining marginal states like New York, Ohio, Illinois and Indiana where, as a consequence, national elections tended to be won or lost. For the Republican party, the search for electoral victory in these states did little to dilute its essential policy, sectional and ideological orientation beyond the obligatory factional bargains which were required to gain and sustain support from these areas. For the most part, this took the form of recruiting natives of these states to high party and political posts. Thus, between 1876 and 1896 every Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidate of the Republican as well as the Democratic party (with the exception of the Republican nomination of Blaine of Maine in 1884 and the Democratic nomination of Hancock of Pennsylvania in 1880) came from one of these four pivotal states. These concessions posed few ideological or sectional problems for the Republican party since each of these states contained significant pockets of voters who shared the Republican attachment to the portent symbols (if not always the substance) of the Civil War. Large segments of the electorates of these states also found little difficulty in espousing the Republican party's views on the
tariff, the currency question, the role of the national government in economic development, and civil service reform.

For the Democrats, on the other hand, the need to solicit votes in these Northern and Midwestern States did introduce an element of heterogeneity (both sectional and, as has been noted, ideological) into the party organization, and with it inevitably a measure of tension. For clearly, Democratic voters in the South had somewhat different reasons for supporting the party, and a different set of symbols and traditions linking them to the goals of the Democracy than did the citizens of Ohio, New York, Illinois and Indiana. And, indeed, beyond the thin common bond of anti-Republicanism, little else seemed to hold this disparate collection of Democrats -- voters as well as leaders -- together.

These electoral realities created major tactical dilemmas, however, for both Republican and Democratic parties in their quests for national political power. Although the forms of these dilemmas were different for each party, they nevertheless imposed equally major constraints on both organizations in their attempt to optimize the trade-offs between the pursuit of ideological purity, unity and electoral victory. Of these three problems, for example, electoral victory in Congressional elections tended to be the most elusive for the Republicans. While they remained throughout the 1870 to 1895 period a relatively unified and cohesive party (despite often major factional disputes), they tended to be consistently unable to assemble numerical majorities in the House of Representatives.
That this problem was real, and for the most part unique to the particular patterns of House elections (as opposed to Senate and Presidential elections where they tended to do much better) is demonstrated by the fact that between 1875 and 1895 the Republicans were in control of the House only twice, during the 47th and 51st Congresses (1881-1883 and 1889-1891). During this same period of time, the Republican party lost control of the Senate only twice (in the 46th and in the 53rd Congresses) and controlled the Executive Branch in all but six years (Cleveland's first term 1885-1889 and the first half of his second term 1893-1895).42

Thus, while for the Republicans, maintaining a semblance of organizational unity and coherence was relatively easy, actually gaining a majority of seats in the House of Representatives was a chronic problem. Restricted, by the early 1880's to the North and Midwest, the party was forced into a position where it had to win towering majorities in those regions in order to achieve an even modest edge in the House. Given the competitiveness and consequent electoral uncertainty of many of the Congressional districts in this region, this was a formidable task indeed. The elections of 1888 are a useful example of how convincingly the Republican party had to win in the North and Midwest if it wanted to control the House. In that election, the Republicans won 88 percent of the seats in the New England States, 64 percent of the Middle Atlantic contests and 73 percent of the one hundred Midwestern contests. Given the relative competitiveness of those regions,
particularly the Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern areas, these results reflected a major tactical victory. And yet, this election provided only the barest of majorities for the Republican party in the 51st House. Thus, while gaining control of the House of Representatives was a major problem for the Republicans, once accomplished, the party, because of its relatively homogeneous base of support, produced a more cohesive and disciplined legislative organization.

The Democrats, by contrast, found that winning numerical majorities in House elections was the least of their problems during the late nineteenth century. The power to control the South and to make significant and enduring inroads to the North gave them the upper hand in producing what were at least on paper, legislative majorities in the House. The ideological and sectional heterogeneity of the party's base of voter support, however, provided major obstacles to the Democratic attempt to turn numerical majorities into coherent legislative organizations. The inter-regional nature of the Democratic coalition created problems, as did the growing challenge of the Populists to the internal cohesiveness of the once solid southern wing of the party.43 Thus, the Democratic party was continually, throughout this period of time, forced to expend a great deal of energy coping with the often debilitating strains and tensions of internal divisiveness. This, more than the problem of winning elections, was the primary organizational problem of the Democratic party in the late nineteenth century.
While election results determined which party gained the right to organize the House of Representatives, and while they do indicate some of the central issues which animated both parties in their attempt to achieve and effectively exercise political power on a national level, the simple description of these electoral patterns tells us little about the relative significance of elections as constraints on the behavior of the victorious candidate once seated as a Member of Congress. The results, by themselves, tell us little about how directly the factors which surrounded the election of a Congressman continued to guide or constrain him once he reached Congress. Nor do they tell us consequently how directly the conflicts, the issues or the ideological preoccupations of the nation as a whole were likely to be either reflected, modified or ignored by the House of Representatives once its members assembled. The central problem can be reduced here to the question of how strongly the Members of Congress (and therefore the House itself) were linked to the broader political environment.

Clearly, the process of representation carries with it certain obstacles to the existence of a perfect match between the national political spirit and Congressional policy making orientations. The simple act of selecting three to four hundred men to translate the national political will of 100 million people into concrete action assures that national policy and public interests will sometimes clash. Imperfections in the apportionment process, vagaries in the patterns
of electoral support, and indeed the constituency system of representation itself, also tend to affect the extent to which political decision making in a legislative body accurately reflects the nation's priorities. Beyond these unavoidable refractions of the democratic process, there can exist wide variations in the levels of legislative responsiveness or insulation. In the 1880's and 1890's, the House of Representatives tended to be strongly affected by the partisan and sectional tensions working in America's national political environment. To be sure, it was an impact which was conditioned and mediated by the exigencies of institutional partisan conflict. Yet, while this party linkage certainly imposed its own peculiar coloring to the representative process, it nevertheless forced the House to respond to external forces in the pursuit of its own institutional goals. The party link also imposed real constraints on the extent to which Members of Congress could follow personal ideological or career goals.

A number of factors supported this nineteenth century Congressional integration with the society at large. The strength of the partisan norm, for example, which was strong in the electorate, undoubtedly affected the behavior of Congressmen in the House. While it is difficult to gauge precisely the nature or hierarchy of members' loyalties, clearly the attachment to party was important. This abstract allegiance to the ideal of partisanship was reinforced by the nature of the election process itself. In the 1880's and 90's, the party, through its local and national committees
was directly responsible for selecting nominees (through caucuses or conventions) supporting their campaigns, distributing ballots and sometimes buying votes. Party regularity was a necessary, if (due to the competitive nature of nineteenth century elections) not a sufficient condition for electoral victory. And, although this loyalty was often directed as much to the local party apparatus as it was toward the national party and its platforms and goals, it did exert a significant influence on political candidates, forcing them to be cognizant of party rather than purely personal goals. Members of Congress in the nineteenth century tended to rise and fall with, rather than independently of, their party. 43A

The strength of external political attachments for the nineteenth century Member of Congress can be described most vividly and perhaps most accurately as the absence of the possibility for developing strong alternative attachments to the House of Representatives. This, in turn, was a partial function of the levels of competitiveness which marked many of the House election contests and which consequently reduced the chances for long, uninterrupted terms of service for many Congressmen. It was also a partial function of restraints on service imposed by local party officials, and to a certain extent, of voters who had their own ideas about the length of tenure of their representatives. The norm of office rotation, for example, was strong in many areas of the nation throughout the nineteenth century, and placed major obstacles in the way of careerist attachments to the House of Representatives.
Finally, personal choice often dictated relatively short terms of service for Congressmen. For many, Washington was far away from their home districts and the constant necessity of long distance commuting made the prospect of a lengthy career something less than attractive. Life in the nineteenth century Capital, itself, was also often seen as a hardship for Representatives on a limited income, with its assorted problems of housing, weather and an absence of family life which did little to induce the reluctant Member of Congress to consider long term residence there.

The effect of the combination of these factors on the length of Congressional service can be seen in part in an examination of tenure patterns of Congressmen between 1878 and 1890. Although the precise causes are less clear in this data, it is nevertheless apparent that throughout the 1880's and early 1890's Members of Congress, by and large, were not in the habit of developing strong attachments to the internal world of the House of Representatives. And, as long as this was the case, Congress' internal processes were directly tied to, and constrained by, at least one important portion of its political environment. The electoral system, with its conflicting issues, promises, demands and ideals mediated by a healthy party structure, played an enormous role in ordering the priorities, goals and therefore the patterns of conflict which appeared in the House.

The 1880's and 1890's were marked, first of all, by a continuation of the high levels of membership turnover which
had obtained throughout the first seventy-five years of the century. Over 60 percent of the members of the 48th Congress were Freshmen, as were 53.8 percent of the 54th Congress. During this period the proportion of Freshmen to non-Freshmen ranged between a low of 38.6 percent in the 47th Congress to a high of 60.3 percent in the 48th Congress. As both ecologist and internalist scholars of Congress argue, this pattern of high turnover effectively kept the house from insulating itself from the external political world, and sustained the links which in the main tied Congress to the fluctuations and reverses of national political life.

Within the high turnover patterns, there were of course minor regional and party differences in actual rates, as Table 2.4 shows. As the elections of 1878, 1884 and 1888 demonstrate, the Mid-Atlantic region tended to be slightly overrepresented by Freshman members. In 1878, for example, 48 percent of the Members of Congress from that region were Freshmen. The only region with a higher percentage was the Rocky Mountain region, which at that time had only two Representatives in Congress. In 1884 and 1888, 39 percent of the Representatives of the Middle Atlantic region were Freshmen (this during a time when the figures for the House as a whole were 41 percent in 1878, 30 percent in 1884, and 33 percent in 1888). The South, meanwhile, was slightly underrepresented by Freshman members. In 1878, 1884 and 1888, while representatives of the South Atlantic region constituted 15 percent of the total membership of the House,
Table 2. First Term Members by Party and Region (percentages of First Term Members in each Delegation in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Central</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figure does not include the four states admitted to the Union immediately after the 1888 election.
only 14 percent (1878), 13 percent (1884), and 14 percent (1888) of the House Freshmen were from that region (40 percent, 31 percent and 41 percent of its total delegation were Freshmen in these three Congresses). The same was true of the Midwestern region's Congressional delegation which tended to be slightly though consistently lower in turnover (37 percent of its members were Freshmen in the 46th Congress, 33 percent in the 49th, and 32 percent in the 51st Congress) than the norm. The other regions tended to vary in their turnover figures. The Northeast had only five Freshmen in its regional delegation in 1884 (19 percent), but in 1888 returned eleven (42 percent) Freshmen members. The South Central States also fluctuated between a high of 40 percent (25 Freshmen in 1878) and a low of 24 percent (17 Freshmen) in 1888. Finally, Republican turnover was slightly higher than Democratic turnover in all three elections (40 percent Republican to 37 percent Democratic in 1878, 36 percent to 35 percent in 1884, and 35 percent to 30 percent in 1888). Despite these relatively minor differences, however, the striking feature of nineteenth century turnover patterns, as reflected in these three elections, is the extent to which relatively high rates were normal throughout the country and in both major parties.

These relatively high turnover rates (certainly high when compared to twentieth century rates) do much to explain as well as reflect the contention that Members of Congress in the late nineteenth century tended to view their association with the House of Representatives in short term perspectives.
This is clear, for example, in an examination of tenure patterns in general for the 1878, 1884 and 1888 elections shown in Table 2.5. In all three cases, well over a majority of Congressmen (72 percent in 1878, 69 percent in 1884, and 57 percent in 1888) were in either their first or second term of office. Table 2.5 also indicates that while lengthier terms were becoming slightly more evident by the time of the 1888 election, two to three terms constituted the normal length of service for a Member of the House. The few Congressmen who did remain in Congress for longer terms tended to be fairly evenly distributed between the two major parties in all three elections.

Although these tenure patterns were the products of a combination of forces which were not fully observable, some idea of their roots can be seen in the electoral decisions made by the Members of these Congresses, at the end of their two-year terms. Table 2.6 provides a view of what subsequently happened to the Members of Congress elected to the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses after their terms expired. Of the 293 Members of the 46th Congress, for example, 110 were not re-elected to the 47th Congress. Of these, 56 were Democrats (40 percent of the total Democratic membership in the House), 42 were Republicans (32 percent) and 12 were Independents or third party candidates (55 percent of the Independent membership). Of this 110, sixty-two or 56 percent declined to be candidates for re-election. Only thirty-seven (34 percent) were actually defeated either for renomination or in the general
Table 2.5  Distribution of Tenure Patterns by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Terms Served</th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Term</td>
<td>52 52 17 121 60 50 5 115</td>
<td>45 57 4 106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Term</td>
<td>38 51 1 90 58 45 9 112</td>
<td>39 38 2 79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Term</td>
<td>31 9 0 40 18 17 0 35</td>
<td>26 25 2 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Term</td>
<td>10 9 1 20 13 9 0 22</td>
<td>20 20 0 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Term</td>
<td>5 4 0 9 11 7 0 18</td>
<td>6 6 0 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Term</td>
<td>2 4 0 6 5 4 0 9</td>
<td>3 5 0 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Term</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 3 2 0 5</td>
<td>4 6 0 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Term or Above</td>
<td>2 2 3 7 5 3 1 9</td>
<td>9 7 1 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140 131 22 293 173 137 15 325 152 164 9 325*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figure does not include the four states admitted to the Union immediately following the 1888 election.
Table 2.6 -- The Sources of Membership Turnover in the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Tot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died in Office</td>
<td>2 2 0 4 4 1 3 8 0</td>
<td>5 1 3 2 6</td>
<td>5 1 3 2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resigned in Office</td>
<td>1 3 0 5 0 0 5 1 3 2 6</td>
<td>1 6 0 0 6</td>
<td>1 6 0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unseated</td>
<td>2 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 6 0 0 6</td>
<td>1 6 0 0 6</td>
<td>1 6 0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Seek Re-election</td>
<td>26 28 8 43 23 4 70 25 40 1 66</td>
<td>25 11 63 0 74</td>
<td>25 11 63 0 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeated for Re-election or for Renomination</td>
<td>25 4 37 30 20 2 52 11 63 0 74</td>
<td>25 4 37 30 20 2 52 11 63 0 74</td>
<td>25 4 37 30 20 2 52 11 63 0 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-elected</td>
<td>84 89 10 183 91 92 6 189 103 53 5 161</td>
<td>84 89 10 183 91 92 6 189 103 53 5 161</td>
<td>84 89 10 183 91 92 6 189 103 53 5 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140 131 22 293 173 137 15 325 152 164 9 325</td>
<td>140 131 22 293 173 137 15 325 152 164 9 325</td>
<td>140 131 22 293 173 137 15 325 152 164 9 325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
election. The proportion of members voluntarily retiring from the House remained relatively high throughout this period, although the figures do show a noticeable decline. In the 49th Congress, for example, (where 136 or 42 percent of the membership was not re-elected) seventy Members of Congress or 51 percent of those not re-elected refused to seek another term while in the 51st Congress (where 164 or 50 percent of the total membership was not re-elected in 1890) sixty-six or 40 percent of the group leaving Congress, voluntarily retired. Mirroring this decline in voluntary exits from the House of Representatives was an associated proportionate increase in the number of Congressmen who sought renomination but were defeated (34 percent in the 46th Congress, 38 percent in the 49th Congress, and 45 percent in the 51st Congress). In terms of the total membership, however, the proportion of voluntary retirements was relatively stable throughout this period. For example, 21 percent of the total membership of the 46th Congress voluntarily retired after the expiration of their two-year term while the figure was 22 percent for the 49th Congress and 20 percent for the 51st Congress.

To a certain extent, these figures lend credence to the argument that the House of Representatives was just not attractive enough to its members to induce them to invest time and energy in a career there. The relatively large number of members declining to serve further suggests that whatever political ambitions these men entertained, they were not confined to the walls of the House. Nor, we can
safely assume, were their loyalties likely to be directed primarily toward an institution from which they would so frequently and so readily retire. This in turn supports the contentions of those who, like Polsby, suggest that the attractiveness or unattractiveness of the House as a career focus was the primary factor in determining the rates of turnover in Congress. The significant role of voluntary retirements in the late nineteenth century turnover rates suggests to these internalists that the House was not yet sufficiently institutionalized to encourage the kind of professionalism among its members which marks a "modern" legislative body.

Further examination, however, suggests that the attractiveness factor was a function of forces which had little or nothing to do with the modernization of Congress, and that the House was unattractive to careerists primarily because of external constraints on member behavior which not only discouraged, but even prohibited Congressmen from making the House supportive of careerist ambitions. This can be shown, to a certain extent, by an analysis of some of the sources of voluntary membership retirement. In most cases, as Table 2.7 shows, voluntary retirements and electoral defeats were part of the same external phenomenon -- electoral competitiveness -- and not necessarily personal or institutionally determined career choices. Excluding the Members of Congress who either died in office, were unseated in contested election contests within Congress, or resigned
Table 2.7 -- Electoral Competitiveness as a Factor in Members' Re-election Decisions in the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory in last election</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Tot</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Tot</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Tot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1-10%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1-20%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1-30%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1-40%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1-50%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.1% and Above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals                             | 62| 37| 183| 282 | 70| 52| 189| 311 | 66| 74| 161| 301 |

* Excludes those who died in Office, resigned or were unseated during their terms.

A= Did Not Seek Another Term at Office
B= Was either defeated for re-election or for renomination
C= Was Re-elected
in mid-term (eleven in the 46th Congress, fourteen in the 49th Congress, and twenty-four in the 51st Congress), both voluntary retirements and electoral defeats were highly related to margins of victory within each Congressional District.

In the 46th Congress, for example, of the 62 Members who retired at the end of their two-year term, 37 (or 59 percent) were from the most competitive districts (where margins of victory were 10 percent or less). The pattern is about the same for those who ran for re-election but who were defeated. Of the 37 members who were defeated for re-election in 1880, 22 (or 59 percent) were from the most highly competitive districts. The figures were equally clear for subsequent elections. In the 49th Congress, 36 of the 70 retiring members (51 percent) were from the most competitive districts as were 24 of the 52 Members of Congress (46 percent) defeated for re-election. And, in the 51st Congress, 30 of the 66 retirees (46 percent) were from competitive districts, as were 69 percent of those defeated for re-election (the elections of 1890 were disastrous for the Republican Party, particularly in the House -- a factor which explains the sharp rise in the overall number of electoral defeats).

The point here then is that the relatively high turnover rates in the nineteenth century House were at base a function of electoral competitiveness irrespective of whether the member of Congress voluntarily retired or was defeated in a bid
to retain his seat. The relatively high numbers of competitive districts simply rendered the idea of a career in Congress impossible for many Representatives. As a result of this -- and not the internal forces of institutionalization or mal-institutionalization -- there was little opportunity or little inducement to design a House which complimented the needs of the careerist. The party (nominating system) and the electoral process constituted strong restraints on the extent to which a Member of Congress could ignore or fail to focus both his attention and his ambitions on the forces and structures which worked beyond the halls of Congress.

Once again, electoral competitiveness was not the sole cause of high turnover rates. They were also a function of non-electoral yet equally external factors such as local party strictures on lengthy terms of service, the necessity of balancing the claims to office of rival groups or localities within a Congressional District, or voter attachments to norms of rotation. In all of these cases, however, just as in the case of electoral competitiveness, Members' careers were routinely placed in the hands of people, organizations, or political norms which acted independently of the internal world of Congress. William Robinson, for example, writing in 1930, reminded his readers that:

The principle of rotation in office and the ordinary uncertainties of State and District politics have always tended to shorten the
average term of service, and these influences were even more potent in the last three decades of the nineteenth century than in our own day. The natural result has been to place on the incoming member the burden of proving that he is entitled to a hearing ere an ungrateful constituency consigns him again to private life.\footnote{51}

A Congressman, in other words, could contemplate a long career in legislative politics only if he was fortunate enough to be free of all of these externally imposed constraints. A colleague wrote of James A. Garfield, who spent nine terms in the House of Representatives, for example, that "His situation as a Representative of the nineteenth Ohio District was exceedingly favorable to his aspirations, as it was the custom of that district to continue a man in its service when once installed, and its overwhelming majority relieved him of all concern about the result."\footnote{52} Thomas B. Reed, James G. Blaine, Nelson Dingley and other Representatives of Maine also tended to benefit from the traditions of their local Republican Parties which similarly tended to encourage long terms of service in Congress.\footnote{53}

The majority of Congressmen, however, were not as fortunate as these exceptions to the nineteenth century rule. B. A. Fryer's \textit{Congressional History of Berks District 1789 - 1939}, for example, describes in relatively great detail the strict rotation formula enforced by the Republicans of Berks District in Pennsylvania in the late nineteenth century to assure a measure of proportionate representation to the two counties (Lehigh and Berks) which made up that district.\footnote{54}
Much earlier in the century in 1843, Abraham Lincoln confronted the same intra-district rivalry for the honor of sending a Representative to Congress\(^5\) and in effect the same constraint on tenure in 1848 when he was denied renomination by his District Party organization.\(^56\) Even Thomas B. Reed confronted this kind of pressure for rotation of a Congressional District's seat among its constituent localities when he first ran for his party's Congressional nomination in 1976. "The sitting member was from York (Maine)," Reed's biographer, Samuel McCall recounts, "and it was claimed by his friends that he was entitled to another nomination because the representative had been chosen from Cumberland County, where Reed lived, much more than its proportionate share of the time." Reed was eventually nominated despite this appeal to the principle of distributive rotation by his opponents within the party, but years later, he would draw a lesson from this experience suggesting that "In politics, if you want to defeat a man because he is a bad lot, a thief, or a knave, don't say that; explain how he comes from the wrong town."\(^57\)

Robert Struble also suggests that the public (i.e. voter) attitudes toward norms of rotation were relatively strong in the late nineteenth century. As he notes, re-election chances tended to diminish (to a marked if gradually decreasing extent throughout the nineteenth century) with the number of terms served.\(^58\) The combined totals of the experience of the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses reaffirms Struble's findings that
re-election chances tended to vary inversely with the number of terms served (as Table 2.8 shows) suggesting that even those who were given the nomination by their local party committee faced the possibility of voter resistance to lengthy terms. These figures exclude the Congressional Districts in the South where the electoral decision was overshadowed in importance by the Democratic nominating conventions in dictating the tenure patterns of its Representatives.

Taken together, these electoral and structural properties of the national system which recruited Members of Congress lend support to the argument that the high turnover (and the consequent non-institutionalized or non-insular qualities of the House of Representatives) was predominantly the product of constraints imposed outside of Congress and not of the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness of the House as a career base. In terms of causality, then, what happened within the House in terms of career choices and presumably therefore in other realms of Congressional behavior, was largely determined by what happened outside of Congress. In other words, just as the combination of electoral competitiveness, structural and normative restrictions on lengths of service, and voter and party norms of rotation forced the Member of Congress to fix his own political attention upon institutions and forces outside of Congress, so too was the House thus forcibly integrated with, and reflective of the issues, conflicts and dynamics of national politics.
Table 2.8 -- The Relationship Between Re-electoral Defeat and the Total Number of Terms Served by Members of the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses. (Non-Southern Congressional Districts Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of Service</th>
<th>Number of Members Defeated in Re-election Bid</th>
<th>Percentage of Unsuccessful Re-election Attempts to Total Membership seeking Re-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Term</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Term</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Term</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Term</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Term</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Term</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Term</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Term or More</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be sure, there were always tensions between the local and national loyalties and demands within Congress placed on the Member of Congress by his political environment, but the extent to which one was a primary pre-occupation over the other was a function of the nature and organizational strengths or weaknesses of the party structures which attempted to reconcile the two, and not necessarily of the internal consensus building structures of the House itself.

These figures on membership career patterns tell us two important things about the relationship of the House of Representatives with its environment. They first reaffirm the ecologist assumption that the extent to which the House pursues an isolated, internally oriented course in general is determined by the nature of its political environment and the links which forcibly bind, or fail to bind, that institution to the outside world. Congress is a creature of this external world. These figures secondly suggest that in the late nineteenth century, this external world engaged the instruments of constraint actively and successfully. Although the level and the effectiveness of these external constraints did vary, even within the relatively short period between 1878 and 1895, the House was generally not left to its own devices during this time. Career choices were deeply affected, for example, by actors, structures and norms created and working outside of Congress. Issue positions, and voting decisions on the part of Congress were also deeply affected by such external forces. Thus, although there
existed an inevitable tension between the demands of its political environment and the desires and orientations of its members once seated in Congress, the House was forced to relegate its internal dynamic to that of the external political world.

That a tension existed between the restraining force of the political environment and the internal institutionally-specific tendencies of the House of Representatives can be seen in the changes which occurred in turnover patterns during the 1880's. Table 2.9, for example, which shows the interrelationships between re-election choices in the 46th, 49th and 51st Congresses, indicates that while turnover remained high in all three of these Congresses (First term membership actually increased with time in these three cases), there was an important shift in the relationship between voluntary retirement, electoral defeat and re-election success. The proportional relationship between voluntary retirement and electoral defeat are most striking. Of those members of Congress of the 46th Congress who were not re-elected to the 47th Congress, for example, the majority were voluntary retirees (62 retirees to 37 who unsuccessfully sought re-election). This difference diminished in the 49th Congress where 70 Members of Congress voluntarily retired and 52 attempted without success to achieve re-election. In the 51st Congress, this pattern was reversed, when the majority of those leaving Congress were those who were defeated for re-election). Once again, the 1890 Republican electoral disaster helps
Table 2.9 -- The Relative Decline in the Proportion of Members Voluntarily Retiring From Congress At the End of Their Terms of Office*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>46th Congress</th>
<th>49th Congress</th>
<th>51st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Seek</td>
<td>62 (22)</td>
<td>70 (23)</td>
<td>.66 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sought Re-elec-</td>
<td>37 (13)</td>
<td>52 (17)</td>
<td>74 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion But Failed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-elected</td>
<td>183 (65)</td>
<td>189 (61)</td>
<td>161 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include those who died in office, resigned during their terms of office or who were unseated in election contests in the House. The figures for the 51st Congress also excludes the five Representatives of the Four states admitted to the Union immediately following the 1888 election.
explain this reversal. But the changing proportion of voluntary to involuntary retirements also suggests that to a certain extent, the House, despite the external constraints on its behavior, was become (or being made into) a more attractive place to reside for longer periods of time. The increasing desire for tenure, which these figures suggest existed, however, was still tightly controlled by an environment which, in these same three elections, was responsible for progressively higher rates of turnover.

Again, the point is that the internal urges of Congress and members of Congress (member goals, ideals, ambitions and issue orientations) were deeply affected by the restraining influence of the national electoral and party system. The relaxation of this active intervention of the environment into Congressional affairs in the twentieth century would later create new patterns of institutional behavior, and new definitions of Congress' role in American politics. The weakening of the externally imposed constraints on Congressional behavior would later give the House more latitude in aligning its rules and norms with the internal goals and ambitions of its members, in relative independence of the demands of its political environment. But, the fact remains that just as the behavior of the late nineteenth century Congress was a function of the broader, external patterns of conflict and political organizational norms of that era, so too was the twentieth century insulation of the House a
function of the forces working (or failing to work) in its environment. This latter point will be brought out in the second half of this study. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the late nineteenth century House of Representatives functioned in a political system which forcibly integrated that institution with the issues, ideologies, and political cleavages which animated American political life at that time. Congress was very much the creature of partisanship, sectionalism, and the specific issues which constituted the national political agenda of that era.

These largely external forces, then, played important roles in determining the patterns of conflict which developed within the House in the 1880's and 1890's. The general cultural attachment to the party as a norm of political organization tended to impose a measure of tactical discipline, if not actual unity upon members elected to Congress. That this partisan constraint worked differently among Republicans and Democrats, was, in turn, a function of the issues, and the sectional electoral coalitions each party contained. The Civil War, as well as ancillary sectional issues like the tariff, tended to reinforce both the relative cohesiveness of the Republican Party and the heterogeneity and the strong pull of fragmentation (reinforced by the rampant localism and issue-based factionalism) in the Democratic Party. At the same time, new issues were emerging in the last decades of the nineteenth century (currency reform, civil service
reform and federal spending) which tended to dilute the organizational strengths of both parties to a certain extent. Yet, even here, the unity of the Democratic Party base of support was affected more than that of the Republican Party.

The impact of these external forces on the internal conflict in Congress was relatively direct. Given the strength of the partisan norm and the sectional specificity of issues (which, once again, conformed to both the basis of party organization and Congressional representation), the cohesiveness and diversity of the electorate tended to be fairly accurately reflected in the House of Representatives. By and large, the Republican constituency tended to be more united over basic political goals than the Democrats, and consequently, both the national Republican party structure as well as the Republican Legislative Party in the House tended to be more cohesive than its Democratic counterpart.

This difference between the parties in terms of cohesiveness was a continuing source of anguish for Democrats and a constant focus of Republican scorn. "The difference ... between the Democratic party and the Republican party in Congress is this." John G. Fitzgerald of Boston suggested in 1879, "The Republicans invariably vote for their party -- too many of the Democrats first look to their districts and themselves." In 1885, the New York Herald underscored this point in noting that "The Democrats have a majority of forty in the House. But it would be difficult, and probably impossible to find a single point of public policy, good or
bad, upon which enough Democrats in the House are agreed."
The Herald concluded by suggesting that the "Democratic party in the House is not an organized body capable of united action, but a mob." 62

While Republicans in general took great pleasure in reminding the Democratic party of its organizational shortcomings, no one took this task more seriously than Thomas Reed, who with obvious relish dismissed that party as a "hopeless assortment of discordant differences, as incapable of positive action as it is capable of infinite clamour." 63 The master of invective, Reed was constantly drawn to the spectacle of Democratic disarray:

In the heat of the summer sun we watch the perspiring Democratic patriot engaged in the only work his House of Representatives has ever undertaken, the work of trying to find a day of adjournment, which when it comes, will again land him on the stump with principles to let suitable to each locality, and hampered by no deed done or policy established; the same old Democratic maverick, never branded until the day of sale and not even then indelibly. 64

He concluded his article asserting that the "Democracy certainly do enter the next campaign unembarrassed by their immediate past, and with great power of being natural, that is, of being all things to all men." 65

While Republicans were thus gleeful over the organizational problems of their opponents, Democrats were just as often frustrated by the disunity and fragmentation of their
party. A friend of Samuel J. Randall, for example, complained in 1879 that "To me it appears certain that our bickering and our dissensions will make it easy for (the Republicans) to reinstate themselves in possession of the National Government." One prominent Democratic member of the House, Hillary A. Herbert of Alabama, attempted to explain this disunity by ascribing it to the strong pull of constituency service. In 1894, at the height of a period of bitter Democratic divisiveness, he argued that "individual members are too sensitive to what they imagine to be the demands of their immediate constituencies. They are generally too apprehensive that they may not please everybody, and rather than incur displeasure they abandon, now and then, the principles of the party which elevated them (to power)." His generalizations were meant to be drawn from the House membership as a whole, but Herbert clearly shows a preoccupation with the sources and effects of the painful problems which were just then tearing his party apart.

These subjective evaluations of the fragmented nature of the Democratic party, as well as those which saw the Republican Party as a unified monolith -- The Washington Post, for example, attempted to equate this unity in an 1885 editorial with "intolerance" -- are borne out by Clubb and Traugott's study "Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, 1861 - 1974."
Table 2.10 is reproduced from this article, and while Clubb and Traugott remind us that aggregate data such as this potentially masks a great deal of individual variation in political behavior, it is nevertheless interesting to note that in the years of Democratic control of the House of Representatives, the indicators of both party unlikeness and association of vote with party tend to be lower than they are for the Republican Congresses. The only exception is the 46th Congress which was controlled by the Democrats and which produced relatively high indices of partisanship. The prolonged and bitterly partisan conflict over the Army Appropriations Bill during the extra session in 1879 does much to explain this deviation from the normal pattern. With this single exception, the indicators are at their highest points during the Republican controlled 47th and 51st Congresses.

When the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, therefore, the consensus building system (the internal norms, the rules and the institutional roles taken on by Congress) was confronted by patterns of conflict which were somewhat more diffused and less coherent than those which were produced by a Republican control of the House. The organizational system of the House tended, therefore, to differ in times of Democratic rule from those of Republican dominance, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. It is important to note here, however, that the late nineteenth century House of Representatives was a constantly changing political institution in terms of the conflicts and con-
### Table 2.14 — Democratic and Republican Differences in Party Voting in the House of Representatives Between 1879 and 1895 (Taken from Clubb and Traugott, "Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, 1861-1974.")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress Number</th>
<th>Majority Party</th>
<th>Average Party Unlikeness</th>
<th>% Party Votes</th>
<th>Average Association of Vote with Party (Lambda)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46 (1879-1881)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 (1881-1883)</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 (1883-1885)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 (1885-1887)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 (1887-1889)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 (1889-1891)</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 (1891-1893)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 (1893-1895)</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democratic Averages  
Republican Averages  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Averages</th>
<th>46.7</th>
<th>58.5</th>
<th>.33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Averages</td>
<td>64.85</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sequent internal pressures which these variations in party control created, and which the organizational structures of the House were thereby forced to manage.

This chapter has attempted to describe the forces which defined the essential elements of the political system in the late nineteenth century United States, and consequently of the forces which in turn determined the lines and patterns of conflict which animated the internal world on the House of Representatives during this period. It has suggested that these forces not only produced a unique political environment for Congress, but that they also fashioned an equally unique and powerful set of links between that environment and the internal House system.

These links were constructed and channelled through the local constituencies to which the Members of Congress were singularly attuned. This constituency link was mediated in turn by a number of factors which in combination created the patterns of conflict which obtained in the nineteenth century Congressional process. Among the forces which characterized and conditioned the constituency link in the nineteenth century were the abstract attachment of the American public to party as a legitimate instrument of political organization and competition; a concrete attachment to party organizations in the public pursuit of preferred goals; an ideological and historical attachment to sectional interests (reflected in both the issues which
emerged during this period and in the distribution of party strength); a fundamental divergence between the two major parties in their ideological and specific issue orientations and in their levels of organizational efficacy and coherence; and a relatively high degree of electoral competitiveness which, along with the other restraints on long terms of office for House members, integrated Congress' internal patterns of conflict and policy making with the character of its political environment.
Chapter III

The Triumph of Particularism:
The Courses of Legislative Conflict
1896 - 1921

The forces which constrained and in turn determined the patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives in the late nineteenth century were transformed by the events and movements which rearranged the shape of America's political system in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The conditions which had combined to produce and reinforce broad political coalitions before 1900 either decayed, were modified or replaced by a new generation of voters and ideals. Sectional loyalties were becoming increasingly irrelevant to a nation more concerned with functionally defined attachments. Powerful political symbols such as those which had come out of the Civil War and which were able to anchor and unify the political beliefs of huge portions of the American population had run their course without being supplanted. The organs of national political conflict -- the parties which coordinated decision-making, which existed to build and sustain workable national political coalitions and which provided a link between voters and leaders, federal and local levels, and different regions of the country -- were declining as effective instruments of democratic rule. Indeed, by the first decade of the new century, the whole idea of partisanship
was at least suspect in the minds of many, and under direct attack by a host of others. New issues which cleaved across the traditional structures of American politics in very non-traditional ways, were creating a compartmentalized and particularized approach to political demand-making and to the public policy process. Finally, the electoral system which had integrated political institutions with the broader political world were beginning to weaken as competitiveness, voter participation and rates of membership turnover declined. Members of Congress, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, were already beginning to find themselves freed from many of the restraints which had so affected their predecessors in office.

The relaxation of the environmental constraints on Congressional behavior took three distinct forms. First, the Progressive Era assault on traditional norms of political organization in the nation was but a part of the broader attempt to transform both the manner in which demands were channelled from the public to the institutions of national power, and the manner in which political decisions were actually achieved at the national level. Partisanship, as a norm, as well as the parties themselves suffered an eclipse (the powers of the national party organization were particularly hard hit) and indeed the whole idea of conflict as a decision-making tool suffered as new and optimistic ideas about rationality and efficiency in public policy-making became popular. These
new ideas, which were nevertheless based on very traditional American assumptions which mixed a belief in social progress with a mistrust of centralized power, tended to encourage the development of alternate forms of political organization which existed both independently of the party system as well as independently of each other.

The second broad shift in American politics was reflected in the types of issues which appeared on the national public agenda at the turn of the century. The demands for governmental intervention in social and economic matters, heretofore centered largely on state and local institutions, became focused on the Federal government. The idea of regulation itself (a major part of the new public agenda of the early twentieth century) produced the demand for new institutional forms of responding to public political demands, and in effect, further encouraged the pluralization of American politics. Coupled with the new public management ethos, this regulatory responsibility, and the particular institutional forms it tended to take (rationalization of the bureaucracy, the creation of independent commissions, and the normative faith in the idea of expertise) both narrowed the perspectives and limited the powers of purely political (i.e. elective) structures of the Federal Government.

Finally, and as a result of both of the above factors, the electoral system was transferred from its status as the single most important source of authority for an individual office-holder and the primary constituency link, to one of
competing with other sources of authority, and other linkages between government and the public. This was partially the result of new laws which regulated and limited the scope of party activity and which indeed redefined the role of the party in the national political system. It was also the result of restraints applied to the voting process itself, which in some areas merely discouraged voter participation in elections but which in others actually disenfranchised entire segments of the population. Finally, it was the result of the early twentieth century dispersal of political authority among a growing number of non-elective structures. This fragmentation of national political authority relieved elective institutions of the virtual monopoly (the Supreme Court notwithstanding) they had exercised over the national policy making process in the nineteenth century. Voter participation tended to decline dramatically as a consequence of these factors, as did electoral competitiveness, both of which contributed to a significant weakening of elections as a major constraint on legislative behavior. These factors also transformed the manner in which the electoral link influenced Congress' internal processes.

The transformation of American politics of which these three conditions were a part, had an important effect on the nature of conflict within the House of Representatives. In the absence of strong coordinative national structures working outside of Congress, and indeed of the tendency of the American
public to attach itself to the kinds of broad issue coalitions which were so apparent in the nineteenth century, and finally in the absence of powerful elective inducements for members of Congress to look beyond the walls of the House toward integrative parties, conflict in the House of Representatives turned inward and became fragmented. Left free of the coordinative influences so characteristic of the nineteenth century political system, the interaction of Members of Congress began taking forms mandated by internal problems, pressures and forces. External links which existed between the representative and his constituency (a constituency itself increasingly free from national political constraints) tended to exacerbate the tendencies toward parochialism and particularism in Congress and lend further weight to the fragmentation of conflict.

This chapter will attempt to describe these changes which occurred in Congress' political environment, and show how they affected conflict within the House of Representatives. It will suggest that just as the nineteenth century Congress was the product of its environment and the structural relationships which had tied the House to that environment, so too was the Congress emerging in the early twentieth century the product of its altered surroundings. The unique political system which had supported coherent and cumulative patterns of conflict in the nineteenth century House of Representatives gave way to one which increasingly allowed the internal patterns of conflict in Congress to become more reflective
of segmented and often parochial (if not personal) goals, ideals and interests. Coalition building became a function of specific issues and personalities brought together by more momentary than long term causes.

The idea that the fragmentation of conflict within Congress was primarily the result of major transformations in the American political system as a whole stems from assumptions about how an unconstrained or relatively insulated House of Representatives would behave. There is little in the constitutionally prescribed Congressional system, for example, that encourages the attachment of the individual Member of Congress to long term, cohesive and disciplined political coalitions or organizations. The legislative system outlined in the constitution tends to work away from the kinds of cumulative and cohesive internal patterns of political conflict which were so much a part of the late nineteenth century Congresses. Residency requirements, regular biennial elections and the independent and localized constituency-oriented perspectives which such requirements encourage, provide sizeable hurdles to the forces working to construct enduring and meaningful policy-making coalitions.¹

Such coordinative forces must also work within a constitutional system which by its Federal structure encourages and even mandates fragmentation (separation of powers) and parochialism in the national policy making process, and which explicitly attempts to block the development of cumulative political cleavages.² Peculiarities in the
historic evolution of the United States as a nation have also tended to preclude the emergence of the kinds of massive and reinforcing social cleavages which have often underlaid the emergence of strong party structures in other nations. All of these factors contributed to the extent to which the mass party system came, by the end of the first two decades of the twentieth century, to rest upon an increasingly fragile and tenuous base. As strong as partisanship and party government were as national norms of political organization in the latter half of the nineteenth century, both became progressively more vulnerable to attacks on their power -- particularly their relatively centralized (at least by American standards) power over national policy making -- as the peculiar events (the Civil War and Reconstruction) which had created and strengthened them faded from the American public consciousness.

This growing disaffection with parties, and the transformation of political demand making in the United States of which this disaffection was a part, stemmed from a number of different nineteenth century (and to a certain extent, characteristically American) roots. This movement away from the political party as an organizational norm was first of all the product of a growing, if very diffuse disenchantment with the performance of the nineteenth century political system. This disenchantment was expressed by a loose collection of protest movements united by little more than the
common belief that the parties and the governmental process they directed constituted a distortion of the true democratic ideal. Various reform movements such as the Mugwumps, the Populists and later the Progressives all came to equate the specific evils they sought to erase with the parties and indeed the party system which produced them. The issues each of these groups espoused tended to lead them ultimately beyond a single attempt to displace or win control of the parties they opposed, to a fervent moral crusade against the underpinnings of the system which, they thought, had led those parties to behave the way they did. These groups were at once the symbol and the instrument of a national reaction against the excesses of American political life in the late nineteenth century with which the parties were associated.

Interlocked with these forces working against partisanship, was a very traditionally American distrust of centralized power, which the parties, by the late nineteenth century, had come to symbolize. Thus, in many ways, the assaults on trusts and other forms of centralized economic power in the nation were often indistinguishable from the assault on parties. In part, this was because the exercise of power on the part of the parties was believed by many to be as dangerous to democratic ideals as the unfettered exercise of economic power by the trusts. Indeed, it was felt that the one simply led to the other. The parties, in other words, were seen as the creatures of the trusts they had protected and strengthened. Anti-partyism was also the product of an often paranoid fear of mass political movements. Populism, for example, had
created a great uneasiness among southern elites and many northern and mid-western middle class groups, much as the urban party machines had unsettled northerners throughout the nineteenth century. This fear was followed throughout the nation (but particularly in the Northeast and in the South) by an attempt to both limit the dependence of parties and public institutions on the will of its constituents and at the same time restrain the power of those institutions to affect public policy.

To the extent that this particular set of forces constituted the motivation for the forces working to transform the norms of national political organization, the reaction against partisanship existed as a loosely defined protest movement. Indeed, elements of all of these negative motivating factors probably existed in most of the attacks on the party system. Yet, the attempt to reform the organizational basis of American politics also had more positive strains. Many of those who sought the overthrow of strong party government did so out of the belief that there existed better ways of making public policy. Traditional nineteenth century political decision making procedures which relied on conflict, emotional appeals to voters and party supporters, on demagoguery\(^5\) and on a fundamental concern for political power as an end in itself was outmoded, many reformers felt, and stood in the way of meaningful national advancement.

Imbued with an abiding faith in the inevitability of social progress, and touched in part with an enlightenment
faith in the power of individuals to control and perfect their environment, the missionaries of reform joyously attacked the party system with promises of better, more productive and less corrupt methods of managing national priorities. Old forms of political conflict, they assured themselves, could be replaced by structures, procedures and norms which would allow public policy to be guided by the laws of reason and logic. With the zeal of moral crusaders, party reformers called for the establishment of a political order based on the new twentieth century virtues of rationality, efficiency and expertise. The forces opposed to the continuance of strong party control over the nation's political institutions were thus arrayed along a continuum which encompassed at the one end a single-minded protest against the two major parties and at the opposite extreme, an optimistic belief that America's political salvation was at hand. For the most part, however, the assault on party government was a distended and often vaguely defined mixture of the two.

The most virulent opposition to the major parties and the political system which they dominated arose from those groups which sought unsuccessfully to supplant the Republicans and the Democrats in that dominance. The Populist movement, for example, provided extremely sharp denunciations of the party system, as it did of other salient features of American politics. This antagonism was probably strongest in the South where the Democratic Party unsuccessfully and often fraudulently frustrated the electoral efforts of the Populist Party.
Strong party rule was equated with political persecution by Southern Populists who like Tom Watson saw their cause as a principled battle against the entrenched forces of repression. Thus, he could proudly, if prematurely, proclaim the overthrow of Democratic party tyranny in Georgia in 1896 as one of the most significant achievements of the Populist movement: "No citizen any longer hesitates to take sides with any party he likes, or to vote for any candidate he prefers. The day of political persecution is over -- even in the South -- and Populism did it."\(^7\)

The belief that the People's movement had been victimized by the major parties in its attempt to establish itself as a significant political force in American politics, led its supporters to be among the most vitriolic critics of existing norms of partisanship. In his utopian novel, *Looking Backward*, for example, Edward Bellamy, a Christian Socialist tractarian who worked on the fringes of the Populist protest, created a perfect civilization of the future in which there are "no parties or politicians, and as for demagoguery and corruption, they are words having only an historical significance." In that novel, Bellamy envisioned a post-partisan and indeed a post-political world which no longer placed "a premium on baseness."\(^8\)

To many, the disenchantment with the parties and the party organizational norm stemmed from the emergence of a closer, and to many a more sinister relationship between business and parties. "The will of the party machine," Henry George charged
in 1905, has to a great extent superseded the great democratic will . . . That is to say, the people at large have long since been so engrossed by the business of getting a living that they have turned over the matter of their political thinking largely to party machines, and Privilege has only had to capture those machines to acquire control of a greatly centralized political power. 9

Parties were the instruments, many felt, of big business' control of the national political system. As such, assaults on the powers of industry were often indistinguishable from assaults on the party system.

George Mayer suggests that this merger of purpose between party (particularly the Republican party) and business was already in progress by 1884. "Without apology or equivocation," he suggests, the new Republican leaders of the mid-1880's "tried to identify the party with the emerging entrepreneurial class." 10 Matthew Josephson, on the other hand, places this union in 1888 and describes it more emphatically as "a kind of invisible revolution wherein the party institution, the living core of political government, was to be completely adapted or made over in accordance with the needs of an advanced, large-scale capitalism." 11 This growing identity of purpose between business and party government (again particularly visible in the Republican party, although key economic interests were by the late nineteenth century also consummating stronger links with the Democratic party) rendered those parties vulnerable to reformers who wanted to
curb the monopolization of American industry, and in effect fueled their arguments that huge industrial combines threatened not only the economic well-being of the nation, but its democratic system as well.

Fear of party government, however, also provoked intense opposition from those who, alarmed at the fury and partial success of the Populist movements (and to a certain extent, the later activity of the Socialist parties) or the Free-Silverite capture of the Democratic party in 1896, feared mass parties as instruments of an unbridled popular (read mob) will. The efforts of the Southern elites to reassert their control over the Democratic party in the wake of the Populist movement is one example of this as were the various attempts of state legislatures in the Northeast to restrain the exercise of political power by the urban machines.

The fear of partisan conflict was also, however, evident in the gentler and more reasoned critiques forwarded by increasingly vocal elements of the middle class who were both suspicious of party rule and eager to implant their new professionalist outlook on America's political system. The Mugwump reformers of the 1880's, for example, "hoped that governmental efficiency and economy would balance a tendency to ruthless social mass." They believed that civil service reform would stabilize the gains they had made since the Civil War by keeping "power in the hands of those fitted to rule."
This underlying fear of radical change also permeated much of the Progressive movement which would later implement some of the Mugwump program. The progressivism of William Allen White, for example, was tinged with an elitist mistrust of mass political action. This mistrust can be seen in White's earlier bouts with Kansas Populists whom he had at once feared and scorned. In his famous attacks on the supporters of Bryan in the 1896 election, White echoed the very sentiments expressed in the Federalist Papers over a century before, and revealed the same paranoia over the prospect of giving free rein to the demands of a mobilized "faction". "Give the prosperous man the dickens!" White parodied the Democratic appeal,

Legislate the thriftless man into ease, whack the stuffing out of the creditors and tell the debtors who borrowed the money five years ago . . . that the contraction of the currency gives him the right to repudiate.
Whoop it up for the ragged trousers; put the lazy, greasy fuzzle, who can't pay his debts on the altar and bow down and worship him."15

This fear that the mechanisms of political organization -- the parties -- were susceptible to the same process by which the "radicals" had captured the Democratic party in 1896, seemed to pervade the thinking of many other notable and articulate critics of the nineteenth century partisan political norms.16 Fear, mistrust and frustration brought wildly divergent political views together on the question of party rule.
For the most part, however, efforts aimed at transforming the organizational basis of American politics struck a more balanced and positive tone -- one which diluted the fear and frustration with promises of something better. Optimism, and a belief in social progress, two characteristic aspects of the American creed, were by the early 1900's reasserting themselves more forcefully than ever before. Laced through with an additional dose of typically American moralism and zeal, these twin values were a major source of Reformers' yearnings. "The progressive mentality," Mowry notes, which translated these beliefs into political action:

was imbued with a burning ethical strain which at times approached a missionary desire to create a heaven on earth . . . (It) was generated in part from both a fear of the loss of group status and a confidence in man's ability to order the future. Had progressive militancy come in a more despondent intellectual climate and in a bleaker economic day, group fear might have overcome group hope . . . But in the warm and sunny atmosphere of 1900 the optimistic mood prevailed.

An enlightenment spirit pervaded the society and the feeling rapidly emerged that man was fully able to control his environment.

This new pragmatism resembled the Enlightenment of a century and a half before in that it fostered the kind of optimism and bred a sense of competence and efficacy in the minds of men of action similar to that sense which had animated the great changes in thought (and subsequently in action) of
of the eighteenth century. Unlike that earlier movement, however, the new twentieth century American did not focus his search on the great, universal, and inevitable abstract mechanism or law which drove the world, but instead sought to discover the particular methods by which his part of the world could be driven to specific ends. Much of the reformist economic, social, and political concerns in the early decades of the twentieth century fully reflected this new mood. Thus William Allen White could equate the reformist spirit with the same ingenuity and drive that led Henry Ford to develop the affordable automobile. In 1908, White later wrote:

Henry Ford had not come along to democratize the motor car, and it was still a toy of the upper middle class . . . But everyone sensed the fact that the expensive toy which then cost anywhere from eight hundred to three thousand dollars would soon be within reach of all. How? No one knew. But they had a hunch, a deep conviction probably based on the fact that we Yankees generally got what we wanted, that soon the motor car would come to all the middle class. It was probably that same hunch that set us marching to Utopia, that gave Bryan and Roosevelt their hold on the imagination of the people.

Ray Stannard Baker, too, would later recall the youthful exuberance with which he confronted the "Great American Renaissance". Were not the economic problems, the social ills, and the political corruption, he asked himself, "mere blemishes on the rugged countenance of America, easily to be removed when we had time to turn from the enormous labor of
This belief in human competence and American social perfectability was an abiding faith of the new turn-of-the-century thinkers. Simon Patten's *The New Basis of Civilization*, for example, trumpeted this theme as did William James and John Dewey. New ideas of management entered the industrial sector which displayed a new commitment to efficiency and productivity. Time clocks began appearing in factories, fences were erected and consonant with the spirit of the new order, "more systematic and more centralized schemes of management" appeared in the private sector. Inevitably, this enlightenment spirit also forced its way into the political sphere as people like Gifford Pinchot and F.A. Cleveland sought ways of applying the principles of scientific management to policy making institutions. Preachers of the new order attacked the evils of the old with a whole-hearted almost religious devotion to the new "Gospel of efficiency."

To these reformers, the traditional norms of political organization, and the reliance on the party system those norms encouraged, constituted major stumbling blocks to the realization of their better world. Partisanship was also to many a symbol of the waste, the irrationality and the corruption they sought to eradicate. In particular, reformers of the early twentieth century sought to remove the structures and political procedures which, they felt, distorted democratic politics and which reduced the power of the political system to effectively and fairly dispense public goods. State
governments thus began regulating parties by removing, or attempting to curb the features of the political system which concentrated coordinative power in the hands of the party leadership. The Australian ballot was introduced in more and more states as the reform movement gathered strength, as were other laws designed to moderate the power of parties in the electoral process. Some states attempted to further circumvent the parties by implementing new initiative, referendum and recall provisions in their constitutions. Voter registration became widely approved throughout the nation and by 1908 almost two thirds of all the states in the United States had initiated some form of the direct primary.25

These reforms had an unavoidable impact on the saliency, power and coherence and, in turn, the effectiveness of the political parties. In many cases, they tended to reduce the role of the party in the general political process. Yet, they also, and perhaps more significantly, forced on the American public a critical re-examination of its ties to parties as supreme instruments of political decision-making. Party regularity and other normative foundations of the nineteenth century party strength and resiliency were questioned and independence in voting and other facets of political activity was extolled. These reforms, therefore, measurably weakened the parties' power to control their representatives in public office and in turn to coordinate policy making. The effects of these efforts, however, were not evenly distributed throughout the political system. As Wiebe notes,
local bosses were remarkably immune from the progressive challenge to partisanship, and at the state level, progressives were successful only in selective regions.26 Still, the reform movement did have a decisive impact on the highest levels of the party structure -- particularly in the extent to which it weakened the ability of the parties to produce purposive and united national political coalitions.

In effect, then, the Progressive movement was most effective in undercutting the fragile mechanisms and links which bound diverse local and state party organizations into coherent wholes. The routinized channels of communications between state and local party organizations and national party structures were weakened as Federal powers of patronage (particularly those aimed at the lowest and most local levels of the bureaucracy) were reduced by civil service reform. The rising costs of local and state level political campaigns, which now included primaries, pushed campaign financing further beyond the ability of national party institutions to supply the electoral needs of its members. Indeed, the intra-party struggles for ascendancy which these primary elections now placed on a public stage also undermined the national party's ability to coordinate and to a certain extent control the recruitment process, and contain factionalism. Party reforms tended to magnify local and regional tensions within parties at the same time they were reducing the resources these parties possessed for dampening internal
conflict and disagreement. The net effect was to give local party organizations relatively greater autonomy in their pursuit of public power. As such, the brand of partisanship which emerged from the Progressive era, in part due to the structural reforms enacted during that era, was one increasingly devoid of national purpose and universal symbols, and one which was fragmented and diffuse in its sense of mission.

The national party structure and indeed the electoral system was also the casualty of another side of the progressive vision -- the side which sought to turn political decision making from its traditional paths of conflict resolution to new paths of public management. This aspect of the reform movement sought to remove from the political arena, policy decisions which would best be made by disinterested, neutral and highly qualified experts. 26B Regulatory commissions proliferated between 1910 and 1920, and burgeoning executive bureaus arrogated progressively greater power in growing independence of elected officials. Shrouded in the misty glow of scientific management and legitimized by the twentieth century faith in the virtue of expertise, these new autonomous wielders of political authority, tended to constrain the scope of legislative, and to a certain extent, executive decision-making power.

The rise of these new institutions of public power reflected, and in turn contributed to, a perceptible diminution of the role of parties, and brought into question the value of partisanship itself. The belief in reason and logic which
these new bodies were seen to represent tended to disparage of organizational norms which remained wedded to old and worn-out methods of public decision-making. There was a growing belief that government decision-making bodies should have the same high regard for efficiency and productivity as business and industry. In 1910, Senator Dolliver suggested as much in a speech in which he called for a creative mixture of business in politics. He was quite willing to concede, however, that "Our executive departments are not only business institutions, but there is a cheerful sense in which they are also political institutions." But even this stand was too moderate for many, like the Chicago businessman who wrote his Congressman in 1922, "We want to see more business and less politics in Congress."28

The normative shift away from parties as the single legitimate link between public institutions and private interests and away from partisanship as the central instrument of political decision-making (and indeed the increasing fragmentation of the national party structures) had an important independent impact on the nature of conflict within the House of Representatives. The Republicans were particularly shaken by this new approach to political organization, which led them toward the internal disarray they had in the past so gleefully observed among Democrats. Party regularity among voters and among the party's office-holders (particularly Members of Congress) was no longer an assured behavioral pattern. In the absence of national cohesiveness -- once again a partial
result of Progressive reforms -- formal powers to sanction deviation evaporated and were supplanted by an increasing impatience with the coordinative restraints imposed by a central party leadership. The public disaffection with parties and party government; the emergence of competing institutions of public authority (and a corresponding proliferation of interest groups); and the structural limits placed on the power of party leaders to discipline their rank and file and command a broad allegiance all contributed to a dramatic shift away from the kind of party coherence, unity and power which had so marked the political process in the late nineteenth century. The party lash, as Tom Watson had so gleefully contended, was indeed losing its sting (at least outside the South).

The issues, which by and large found their way onto the public agenda between 1896 and 1921, reinforced this normative and structural shift away from the strong partisanship of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, a major concern of a sizeable portion of the American electorate was the issue of party regulation itself. But these issues also had an independent effect on the organization of political ideas and personalities in the manner in which they interacted with the new reformist institutions of public authority (again; the strengthened bureaucracy, the independent commissions and quasi-autonomous boards). Broad issue clusters seemed to
form less readily as diverse agencies of Federal power tended to encourage a segmentation and pluralization of demand-making. Specific interests were no longer forced to channel their often particularistic demands through the single Congressional bottleneck. Their fortunes were no longer automatically tied to the complex bargaining process through which Congress, with its towering demonance of the nineteenth century policy-making system, balanced competing claims and demands.

Clearly, the fragmentation of the issue agenda, the dispersal of political authority at the Federal level, and the emergence of anti-partyism were all interrelated phenomena. Each of these tendencies had independent, if reinforcing roles in transforming the nineteenth century political system of conflict to its twentieth century form. Thus, just as the normative and structural changes in the organization of political demand-making had a direct effect on the nature of conflict within the House of Representatives, so too did the issues which emerged after 1896 tend to lead the nation away from the cumulative cleavages which had been so characteristic of American politics in the late nineteenth century.

A major, perhaps the most compelling, issue cluster to work its way onto the public agenda involved the broad question of privilege -- economic and political -- and the distribution of power in the nation. Armed with a fundamental antipathy to the concentration of economic and political power, reformers led an increasingly vocal assault on an
extremely broad range of social, political and economic institutions. Linked together in many cases by little more than the common assumption that gross inequalities in the distribution of economic and political resources inevitably led to abuse, manipulation and corruption, these new reformers scattered their energies across a wide and often diffuse range of very specific problems.

Industries and businesses came under their muckraking scrutiny as did political parties. Local, state and national governmental bodies and even universities were also targets of the reformist investigation into American life. Lincoln Steffens, for example, exposed urban corruption in his articles for *McClure's Magazine*, and Ida Tarbell exposed the hold Standard Oil exercised over the petroleum and transport industry. Reformist novelists too entered the arena in the frantic rush to expose imperfections in American society. Frank Norris wrote of the economic and political tyranny of the Railroad over the farmers in California in his novel, *The Octopus* and Theodore Dreiser described the corrupt world of the urban traction magnate in *The Titan*. Entire magazines were devoted to the new progressive brand of social criticism which unlike previous political reform movements (particularly the Populist movement) which were aimed at general and sometimes abstract distortions of American society, "called names and exposed specific abuses with documented facts." Paradoxically, however, the specificity which characterized the progressive assault on the evils of the
American system kept the reform movement from developing the broad unity of purpose and the organizational coherence which had characterized the Populist movement and indeed earlier third party campaigns. Progressives attacked the American political and economic system in segments and in the process contributed to the fragmentation of the national issue agenda.

This progressive movement also differed from the Populist movement, which Wiebe suggests, "acted as reform's precipitant," in its ultimate faith in middle class values and indeed in the perfectibility of American society. Viewing the basis of that society as essentially sound, reformers generally saw themselves as social tinkerers rather than the agents of massive change. On the one hand, this led to an ambivalence about the social problems they faced and on the other hand it further contributed to the fragmentation of the progressive cause. Richard Hofstadter argues that

This ambivalence is in itself not startling. It can be seen, for example, in the naturalistic writers who condemned the dog eat dog morality of the competitive world and yet succumbed to admiration for the mastery of the survivors. One finds it in Jack London's entire career; it colors all of Dreiser's treatment of his tycoon in The Titan. At another level it can be seen in the work of the muckraker like Lincoln Steffens, who in his autobiography reported the high regard in which he came to hold city bosses at the very time he was interviewing them for his muckraking essays on their evil works; and it can be seen in another way in Ida Tarbell, whose devastating book on Standard Oil was followed not long after by works extolling big business leaders. It can be seen, oddly enough, in the Socialist press, whose analyses of capitalism were sandwiched between advertisements for get-rich-quick investments.
This curious ambivalence can also be seen in the measures reformers urged on American society to curb the abuses they sought to expose. The call for rational methods of regulation and expert management of political and economic institutions paid implicit tribute to some of the very sources of economic and political power and strength they criticized. In one sense, for example, the optimistic belief in the doctrine of efficiency was derived from the organizational advances private industries had made in the late nineteenth century. Thus the social and political distortions which emerged from the society were merely specific abuses of institutions and processes which were fundamentally good. This notion can be seen throughout the body of progressive literature in the mixed reviews reformers gave the increasing centralization of economic organizations. Ida Tarbell's attack on the excesses of the trusts, for example, was moderated by a respect for the rapid social and technological progress they had underwritten:

The temptation to condemn industry as a whole because a few powerful men became inordinately rich not only prevented a proper weighing of the advantages the public was receiving, but it prevented a cool and effective dealing with the roots of the evil. Popular attention fastened on the conspiracies or the wicked individual rather than on the nature of his practices which the existing economic and political system made possible.

It was this ambivalence then that led to the fragmentation of the attack on the social and political ills so
characteristic of the progressive era. The trust problem, for example, meant different things to different reformers, a fact which was reflected by the wide divergence of viewpoints progressives brought to the search for solutions to American social and political problems. Centralization, many decided, was not an inherently bad thing. There were good and bad trusts, it was believed by Progressives who consequently divided over the question of which trust (or indeed which twentieth century problem) posed the greatest threat to their vaguely defined vision of the preferred American way of life.

Amidst the fragmentation of the issue agenda, characterized by divergent reform approaches to distinct sub-sets of twentieth century American society, Progressives tended to unite over the need to change the manner in which political decisions were made. In particular, the system needed an infusion of "democracy" by which was meant a more open recognition of the divergent reform or policy concerns of different people and interests from different regions of the country. Reformers wanted a less rigid set of political structures -- one which would give a freer hand to the specific demands and concerns which they brought to the national government. Thus, the internal workings of Congress became a major preoccupation of the reformist search for a purer America. Institutional change became a primary issue concern since it was a virtual prerequisite for further and more particularistic reforms.
State governments had already been targets of reform crusades and in many areas major political changes had been introduced and enacted. The national institutions of government, however, became a focus of the Progressive cause only in the first decade of the twentieth century. This focus on the national government was the result of a number of different factors. It emerged first of all out of the growing realization that reforms, particularly those aimed at regulating the abuses of business power, was not something individual states could do well. "If one State passes good laws and enforces them, and another state does not," Progressive Senator Albert Beveridge reasoned,

then the business men in the former state are at a business disadvantage with the business man in the other State. The business men in the State that has good laws suffer from the very righteousness of that State's bad laws, and the business man in the State that has bad laws profits by the very wickedness of that State's laws. 39

Divergent state reforms were ineffective in the absence of some measure of national regulation.

National elective institutions also came under the reformist scrutiny because in many ways the existing arenas of public decision-making were not capable of recognizing and implementing the often competing policies progressives wanted to enact. The ambivalence of the emerging Progressive attitude toward trusts and the often vague distinctions reformers wished to draw between good and bad trusts, for example, led many to
believe that effective and realistic economic regulation was beyond the ability of a legislative or purely political body. The determination of subtle qualitative differences between industrial combinations, and the realistic control of the trusts, it was believed by both reformers and many businessmen, were better left to commissions of experts empowered by broad legislative mandates to deal with specific questions of interpretation on a case by case basis. Reformers wanted to use the commissions to curb the power and corrupt excesses of the trusts. But many industrialists were also eager to establish a better defined set of ground rules which ordered the relationship between government and business. Many of them saw in the progressive solution a system which would insulate businesses from (and to a certain extent moderate) the fluctuating demands and pressures of their political environment.

The increasing focus on institutions of national government as any independent political issue, was also the result of the interplay of other issues on the public agenda. The tariff question continued to be a major issue concern of political activists and one which did much to precipitate the external call for the reform of the internal organization of Congress. "The Progressive movement," Cordell Hull suggested in his Memoirs, "broke on the country with a fury following the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill. The new tariff became the spearpoint of the attacks of the progressive forces . . . against the many alleged evils
calling for liberal remedies." The tariff dispute which surrounded the 1910 Payne-Aldrich Bill increased the pressure for Congressional reform because it symbolized for Progressives the close and insidious relationship which existed between parties and the trusts. The belief was fostered that neither party, nor any other political organization could make any progress toward tariff reform in a Congress organized along existing centralized lines.

This delegitimization of the internal Congressional process was further reinforced in the Public mind and elevated to a national issue by the fortunes of other specific reform crusades in the House and Senate. The Ballinger-Pinchot dispute, for example, greatly heightened public impatience with the Congress, as did House action on other conservation measures such as the 1908 Appalachian-White Mountain Bill which was blocked by Joseph Cannon and his supporters over the objections of President Roosevelt and "the practically unanimous opinion of the Republican Party throughout the country." Concluded Outlook, a progressive magazine, "This is what we mean by government by oligarchy." Each of these issues, and the manner in which Congress dealt with them, combined to create the impression among a growing portion of the voting public that useful popular reform was impossible as long as the outmoded internal organization of the House continued to allow a few leaders to exercise an arbitrary, absolute and unresponsive power over the legislative process.
Beginning in 1908, the national press began publicizing the "evils" of Cannonism with a veritable deluge of articles and features on Uncle Joe Cannon himself as well as on other aspects of the internal structure of the House of Representatives. The 1908 Democratic Convention included the reform of the internal procedures of the House as one of its goals in the platform, and Progressive Republicans like Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin, who was that year running for his first term in the House, found it politically useful to stress his opposition to Cannonism. "We will never have representative government in the House," Lenroot argued in his campaign pamphlet, "with the present rules and Speaker Cannon."

This campaign against the collective abuses of the legislative system provoked a bitter and very divisive struggle within the once united Republican party. Opposing camps within the party rapidly advanced toward open rupture. "Shake hands with Cummins, Dolliver, Bristow, Murdock, and a few of the (other progressives in the Congress), the salt of the earth," one Iowan wrote a friend, "and tell them that out here in the west we admire them." Congressional letter boxes were flooded with correspondence from constituents who had an active concern over the outcome of the internal struggle which approached its climax in 1910. "We believe in the cause of the insurgents," a group of citizens wired George Norris, a leader of the anti-Cannon or insurgent faction of the Republican House membership. "We are unalterably opposed to the present 'system' under which laws are enacted by the few for
the benefit of a few." And, "Down old Joe Cannon if possible," was the cryptic injunction of another constituent.

Outside the Midwest, however, support for the insurgent cause was weaker. One of the feelings "that I encounter frequently here (in the east) " Ray Stannard Baker wrote Robert La Follette late in 1910, "is that the insurgent movement is largely an agricultural movement . . . In short many thoughtful Eastern people look upon the movement as sectional in its character." Even within the Midwest, there were deep divisions between pro and anti- Cannon stands. "Dimicrats and a few hot air yowlers that hav no political pricipals will pat you on the back," one legislator wrote Norris from his home state of Nebraska in questionable English, but in terms that were clear enough. "But you are not fooling the inteligent Men of the Republican Party that are Republicans because they beleave in republican Principals."

Cannon himself scoffed at the reform element in his own party and accused them of seeking major changes with little thought toward ultimate goals. "I am sometimes reminded," he later wrote, "of a newspaper waif I read many years ago:

I'm thankful that the sun and moon  
Are both hung up so high  
That no pretentious hand can stretch  
And pull them from the sky  
If they were not, I have no doubt  
But some reforming ass  
Would recommend to take them down  
And light the world with gas."
Assured of the correctness of his position Cannon once remarked, "Yes, I know that I am a Czar in Democratic platforms and in some moral-uplift magazines, but only just so long as I have a majority behind me who like a Czar." 53

Despite his outward composure and his characteristically crusty complacency, however, little could mask the fact that his party was becoming wrenched apart by increasingly voluble dissension. "The conditions are the worst I have ever known to exist in the Republican party," one advisor wrote President Taft in 1909 of the state of the party in the Mid-west,

In a word, to use a popular expression, the issue in the Middle West is sharply defined as "Cannonism" and "Aldrichism".

If the party fail to pass from the control of these men, then there will be a demand for a new party, which shall comprise the independents of both parties. 54

Another wrote the President, "I have never seen the feeling as strong as it is now since the Blaine vs. Cleveland campaign." Taft's correspondent concluded that a Cannon victory in the legislative battle then going on in the House of Representatives would mean a massive Republican defection to the Democrats, particularly in the Midwest in 1910 and possibly in the 1912 Presidential elections. 55

Clearly, the internal divisiveness within the party, borne out of the Progressive frustrations with the existing structures of legislative decision-making worked to the immediate advantage of the Democrats, but in the long run,
neither party could find much profit in the reformist revolt. For, in the end, the national progressive assault on coordinative rule in Congress, and the break-up of the Republican party which it effected, led to the evolution of a new political order in which the substantive features of the nineteenth century form of majority rule -- the encouragement of cumulative voting cleavages and the existence of accountable national political parties -- would play a less central role. The issue agenda of the early twentieth century contained concerns of major importance to a democratic nation, but the manner in which those concerns were debated, the forms of conflict they engendered and the solutions which emerged from that debate, more than anything else fragmented, and to a certain extent obscured the lines of political conflict in American politics.

Other issues and other concerns of this period tended to reaffirm the fragmenting dynamic inherent in the Progressive challenge to the nineteenth century form of democracy. Foreign Affairs, for example, gained a new divisive relevance in national politics in the closing years of the nineteenth century as Americans became preoccupied with the debate over the nation's imperial ambitions and responsibilities. To many members of both parties, and both conservatives and progressives, this expansionist impulse was at odds with American traditions and ultimate self-interest. Some progressives like Theodore Roosevelt and Albert Beveridge were ardent expansionists while others were equally committed anti-
imperialists. Robert LaFollette was opposed to the scheme to create an American empire as was William Jennings Bryan. Main-line Democrats and Republicans also opposed the movement to acquire colonies overseas. Twenty-five Democratic Senators (including Senator Gorman and Senator Mills), for example, voted against the Treaty of Paris in 1899, and, many other prominent supporters of the anti-imperialist cause were solid party members. John Sherman, George S. Boutwell and Thomas B. Reed from the Republican party opposed American expansionism as did John G. Carlisle and Grover Cleveland of the Democratic party. Other notables like Andrew Carnegie, Carl Schurz and Charles Francis Adams, Jr., men of a more indeterminate partisan stamp, too lent their support to the cause.

Like so many other political questions raised in the American public forum around the turn of the century, the debate over foreign expansion in general (and the Spanish-American War in particular) tended to bring the relationship between the traditional ideals of the nation and its actual behavior into sharp focus. Edward Atkinson, for example, charged that an imperialistic course would bring the United States "down to the level of the semi-barbarous states and nations of continental Europe." Expansionism, he asserted, was "uncalled for, totally foreign to our system of government." Charles Francis Adams, Jr., grandson of John Quincy Adams and a patrician Mugwump, was equally uneasy about the acquisition of overseas colonies. "We are blood guilty; and we are doing
to others, in violation of our traditional policy and all the teachings of history, what we have protested against when attempted on us or doing elsewhere."  

At one point, in 1899, anti-imperialists, who had given institutional shape to their ideals by creating the Anti-Imperialist League in 1898, threatened to lead a bolt from the two major parties and run a third party campaign in the 1900 Presidential election on the Spanish-American War issue. The insertion, however, of an anti-imperialist plank in the Democratic platform in June, 1900, largely at Bryan's request, and the withdrawal of support and money by Andrew Carnegie in January, 1900 from the proposed course, quashed the third party idea. 61 For the most part, the anti-imperialist movement subsided at this point, but, not before it had produced yet another breach in the party system, and contributed to an already growing disillusionment with the American political system. This disillusionment extended as far as the powerful Thomas B. Reed who, frustrated in his efforts to block the Spanish-American War and the imperialist adventure, resigned both the Speakership and his Congressional seat in 1899 and left politics in disgust. 62  

World War I also brought foreign policy into sharp focus as a political issue. The 1916 Presidential elections were to a great extent fought over the issue of American neutrality with both sides claiming their candidate was most committed to the task of keeping the nation out of the European war.
The entrance of the United States into that conflict in 1917 tended, however, to change public opinion from opposition to support for America's war effort. As such, World War I did not lead to the divisive intra-party bitterness which the Spanish-American War had provoked. Yet, while divisiveness was not a major problem for the parties of the War era (there was of course some notable opposition to the war from the likes of Robert LaFollette and George Norris), United States entry into the European War did have other equally important consequences for American politics. The war tended, for one thing, to further obscure party distinctions and in a sense accelerate the movement away from partisanship and party government toward the more Progressive concept of public management. The war effort was organized in a way, for example, which circumvented Congressional politics. New wartime regulations were implemented by a host of new commissions and executive agencies; representatives of trade associations or large-scale industries became directly linked to the Federal war effort through the establishment of special War Boards; the demands of war financing taxed Congress' unstructured and to some, capricious appropriations system and further undermined public confidence in that institution's ability to perform even its most essential duties effectively and wisely; and finally the quasi-consensual political mood of the nation led to a virtual suspension of overt partisanship both outside the government and within at least for the duration of the
War. The restoration of a more normal pattern of politics after the war, revealed the extent to which World War I had merely continued, if not accelerated, the compartmentalization and in a sense the depoliticization of the American policy-making system. The technocratic approach to politics which the turn of the century America brought to its governmental system was explicitly encouraged during the war, at the inevitable expense of the more traditional decision-making structures and processes. 62A

The norms of political organization and the issue concerns which emerged around the turn of the century, thus complimented each other in their impact on political conflict in the United States. The major coordinative institutions of political organization -- the parties -- were weakened by legislation, by regulation and by a growing popular disenchantment with the idea of partisanship itself. Parties were relieved of their virtual monopoly over the political processes of the nation, replaced by a system which distributed power more widely among competing institutions of authority. To be sure, parties continued to play a major -- perhaps even a predominant -- role in American politics well after 1921, but their relative strength and their control over the public decision-making process, particularly at the national level were both severely restricted by the turn of the century reformist movement. 63 As the public tendency toward cumulative political cleavages, upon which mass parties rested, declined; as regulations and new laws increasingly
expropriated many of the resources of national party organizations (the patronage arsenal, the forced contributions from government workers to party coffers, the relatively centralized control over national political institutions); as state and local party organizations became more autonomous and more responsive to purely local issues, interests and concerns; and as primary laws, voter registration laws, and ballot laws came into wider use, the ability of political parties to coordinate, discipline and marshal their memberships into cohesive national political coalitions declined. As the issue agenda itself became more compartmentalized (functionally as well as regionally), both as a cause and a consequence of the decline of the national party structures, national political conflict became more fragmented and diffuse.

The emergence of the new political order at the turn of the century, therefore, was essentially the story of the emerging triumph of particularism in national political affairs. The emergence of particularism, in turn, was the result of the weakening of the forces which in the nineteenth century had served to moderate and dampen the fragmenting impulses of America's diverse political culture and its segmented constitutional structure. This fragmentation of the national political process was at once caused by and symbolic of the normative changes in the public's manner of organizing its demands and interests, and in the actual concerns which made
up the national political agenda. This transformation was also reinforced and reflected by changes in electoral patterns. Voter turnout declined throughout this era, for example, whether because of restrictions on voting rights, through outright disenfranchisement or through increased apathy toward what Goodwyn terms the narrowing of the national political debate. Competitiveness, and voter participation declined in House elections and the power of incumbency correspondingly increased dramatically, as candidates freed from the demands of strong extra-local party ties were more singlemindedly able to pursue campaigns based on a strong allegiance to local issues, demands and concerns. The increasing weakness of the national party structures in relation to local party organizations and to a certain extent the new primary electoral system which allowed candidates to circumvent parties altogether in the quest for national public office relieved Members of Congress of the often difficult and unappealing task of having to balance national allegiances with purely local demands. Increasingly the transformation of the national political system allowed candidates to direct their attention, and their political appeals to the local interests and concerns of those few people who voted for them.

A major effect of this dispersal of public attention was the overall reduction of voter participation and presumably interest in national elections. Table 3.1 shows the decline in voter turnout at Congressional elections between 1878 and
Table 3.1 -- Voter Turnout in Congressional Elections, 1878-1918
(source: Walter Dean Burnham, 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Non-South</th>
<th>Total, U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average levels
1878-1896 53.6 77.3 71.8
1898-1918 25.8 65.4 56.7
1918. To be sure, part of this decline must be attributed, as Jerrold Rusk and others have suggested, to the legal impediments to voting enacted between 1896 and 1918. Voter registration laws, more stringent residency requirements and other attempts to curb fraud at the polls played a role here as did the institution of poll taxes, literacy tests and the other mechanisms of disenfranchisement predominantly used in the South. Yet, the decline in turnout seems to have stemmed as well from what Burnham and others have come to see as an accelerating depoliticization of the national policy-making process and indeed of the American political system. The progressive belief in public management, the twentieth century decapitation of the party system all contributed to this fragmentation of the public's political focus. In undermining the monopoly elective bodies had over the national public policy-making process (which undermined the party's role in public policy-making), the architects of the new pluralist order reduced the relative importance of governmental institutions like Congress to the voters, and as a result encouraged the decline in participation in the electoral process.

As public attentiveness to national elective institutions of government declined, the constraints which had in the nineteenth century bound Members of Congress to their political environment also atrophied. This decay of the links between the Member of Congress and national political concerns
and a national political constituency was a product, in part, of the disintegration of the coordinative influences which had been so important to nineteenth century representatives. As the public attachment to broad national political symbols and ideals (sectionalism, for example, and the Civil War ideology) declined, and as norms of political organization shifted away from broad integrative structures, Members of Congress were left relatively free of constraints on parochialism. As the interests and attachments of their constituents became more fragmented, so too did the focus of the Member of Congress become diverted toward more particularistic concerns.

The constraints which bound the Member of Congress to a local constituency were also visibly weakened in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Most notably, levels of competitiveness which, particularly outside the South, had remained high throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, began a precipitous decline. Table 3.2 shows the declining frequency of closely contested elections between 1878 and 1918 in an examination of five Congressional elections in that period. It is evident that an increasing number of seats were being won in the post-1900 period by wide margins of victory. In the 1878 elections, for example, only 18 percent of the House membership had won its seat by a margin of over 30 percent. By the time of the 1918 election, fully 47 percent of the House had been returned with such margins.
Table 3.2 -- Proportion of Competitive to Non-Competitive Seats in Five Congressional Elections between 1878 and 1918. (All Seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>0 to 10%</th>
<th>10.1% to 30%</th>
<th>30.1% and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, whereas 41 percent of the House membership elected in 1878 had won by a margin of victory of ten percent or less, only 24 percent of the 66th Congress (elected in 1918) were from such competitive districts.

Clearly, the southern states produced the highest number of non-competitive seats throughout this forty-year period. In part, the product of the one-party system which had become entrenched by the 1880's, the proportion of non-competitive districts to competitive districts in the south nevertheless continued its decline between 1878 and 1918 as Table 3.3 demonstrates. Whereas, for example, thirty-three percent of the Representatives of the South Atlantic region were elected by margins of over thirty percent in 1878, sixty-six percent of that region's members were elected by such margins in 1918.

Competitiveness, however, also declined throughout the nation. In 1878, for instance, only three percent of the Representatives of the Middle Atlantic region were returned to Congress with margins of victory of over 30 percent. By 1918, fully 47 percent of the elections in this region were won by margins of over thirty percent. Even the Mid-Western states, which had been so marked by high levels of electoral competitiveness in the 1880's showed major shifts away from close margins of victory. In the 1878 election, for example, 59 percent of the Representatives of this region won their contests by a ten percent margin or less over their nearest opponent. In 1908 this had declined to 44 percent and by
Table 3.3 -- Proportion of Competitive to Non-Competitive Seats in the Different Regions of the Country, 1878 to 1918 (46th, 49th, 51st, 61st, and 66th Congresses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>46th Cong</th>
<th>49th Cong</th>
<th>51st Cong</th>
<th>61st Cong</th>
<th>66th Cong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West Mountain Region</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>46th Cong</th>
<th>49th Cong</th>
<th>51st Cong</th>
<th>61st Cong</th>
<th>66th Cong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West Mountain Region</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>46th Cong</th>
<th>49th Cong</th>
<th>51st Cong</th>
<th>61st Cong</th>
<th>66th Cong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West Mountain Region</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>46th Cong</th>
<th>49th Cong</th>
<th>51st Cong</th>
<th>61st Cong</th>
<th>66th Cong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West Mountain Region</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the time of the 1918 election, only twenty-seven percent of the Mid-Western States' Representatives were elected by a ten percent margin or less.

Because of the heavy reliance of the Democratic party upon the southern region for its Representatives, its members were far more likely to come from non-competitive districts than Republicans. In the election of 1908, for example, 47 percent of all Democrats in the House had won their seats by margins of victory of over thirty percent, and by 1918, well over half (64%) of the total Democratic membership came from such districts (indeed, 55% had won their seats by a margin of over 50%). Again, the contrasts between these figures and those of the late nineteenth century Congresses are striking. Compared to the 47 percent and 64 percent figures for the Democrats in 1908 and 1918, for example, only 28 percent of the Democrats of the 46th Congress had won their seats by a margin of victory of over 30 percent. In subsequent Congresses these totals fluctuated only slightly -- 22 percent in the 49th Congress and again 28 percent of the Democrats of the 51st Congress were elected by a margin of victory of thirty percent or more.

The Republicans were far less likely to have won with such overwhelming margins at any point during this period, but, even their figures showed marked increases between the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the three nineteenth century Congresses surveyed, for example, the proportion of Republicans
Table 3.4 — Competitiveness by Party in the Elections of 1908 and 1918 (percentages down in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>61st Congress</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>66th Congress</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0% to 5%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1% to 10%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1% to 20%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1% to 30%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1% to 40%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6 )</td>
<td>(7 )</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1% to 50%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3 )</td>
<td>(7 )</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(3 )</td>
<td>(5 )</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% and above</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
N.A.               | 5   | 6   |       |       |     |     |       |       |
elected from highly non-competitive districts remained consistently low (nine percent in 1878, eight percent in 1884 and seven percent in 1888). In 1908, however, seventeen percent of the Republican election victories were by margins of over thirty percent and in 1918 this figure had risen to twenty-eight percent. Clearly, in other words, there was a massive shift in the levels of competitiveness between the 1880's and the twentieth century in both parties. However else the "System of 1896" affected the American political system in the decades which followed, it was certainly accompanied by dramatic changes in the competitiveness of House elections.

These widening margins of victory and the increasing ease with which Congressional elections won, in turn constituted a significant relaxation of the external constraints affecting individual Members of Congress in the House of Representatives. Relieved of the acute sensitivity to the peculiar and often contradictory demands (e.g. national vs. local constituencies, and national vs. local demands and interests) of the nineteenth century electoral system, early twentieth century Representatives were increasingly attentive to and directed by the social and political dynamics at work within the House.

The loosening of the electoral leash (both in the sense that the political environment with its norms of political organization, issue clusters and the process of political coalition-building had changed, and also that Members of
Congress were less strongly linked by elections to this changed environment) during this era provided the Member of Congress with an autonomy unknown to his nineteenth century predecessors. Membership turnover, for example, declined rapidly during this period as the environmental constraints which had, among other things, underwritten the electoral uncertainties of the nineteenth century Congressional career weakened. The proportion of Freshman members which had averaged 39.62 percent between 1878 and 1901, dropped to 24.99 percent between 1901 and 1921. In 1899, the turnover rate reached its lowest level (30.1 percent Freshmen) in the history of the House of Representatives, breaking a record which had been set in 1881 in the 47th Congress. This mark was itself surpassed in the next Congress (the 57th Congress, 1901-1903) when turnout declined to 24.4 percent and again in the 59th Congress (1905-1907) when the proportion of Freshmen to non-Freshmen reached 21.0 percent and yet again two years later when the figure declined to 19.9 percent in the 61st Congress.71 As Table 3.5 shows, this sharp drop in the turnover rate occurred in every section of the country. The percentage of Freshman members was lowest in the Northeastern states' delegation which in the 61st Congress contained only three Freshmen (10%) and which in 1919 had only two (6%). The South Atlantic and Far West also had relatively low turnover rates (15% and 16% in 1900 and 1919 in the South Atlantic delegation and 8% and 19% in the Far West's delegation.
Table 3.5 -- First Term Members as a Percentage of Total membership of Each Regional delegation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>61st Congress</th>
<th></th>
<th>66th Congress</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Region</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As these figures suggest, Members of Congress were not only more secure from electoral defeat in the twentieth century, than they had been in the late nineteenth century, but they were also freer to serve longer terms in office. As Table 3.6 shows, 33 percent of the members of the 61st Congress had served five terms or more in office and in the 66th Congress, this figure had dropped only slightly to 28 percent. By contrast, only seven percent of the total House membership had served five terms or more in the 46th Congress and only fourteen percent in the 49th and 51st Congresses. These figures reinforce the notion that consistently lower rates of membership turnover were becoming increasingly commonplace in the twentieth century as they had not been in the nineteenth century.

To a certain extent, the dramatic decline in the turnover rates of the early twentieth century were the products of an increasingly attractive House of Representatives. As Table 3.7 shows, voluntary retirements from the House declined both in relation to total membership and as a proportion of the total number of members of Congress leaving the House. Where, for example, 56 percent of the Members of the 46th Congress who were not re-elected to the 47th Congress, were those who did not choose to stand for re-election, only 32 percent of the membership turnover between
Table 3.6 -- Total Terms served by Members of Each Party in the 61st and 66th Congresses. (Percentages down in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Terms Served</th>
<th>61st Congress</th>
<th>66th Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Total</td>
<td>Dem Rep Other Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one</td>
<td>34 38 2 7</td>
<td>32 58 7 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two</td>
<td>38 28 3 52</td>
<td>62 26 12 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three</td>
<td>20 36 1 55</td>
<td>12 22 17 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>four</td>
<td>16 32 2 51</td>
<td>12 30 9 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>five</td>
<td>17 18 0 36</td>
<td>17 11 3 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>six</td>
<td>9 16 0 25</td>
<td>13 5 0 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seven</td>
<td>16 21 0 37</td>
<td>12 7 1 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eight or more</td>
<td>9 25 0 34</td>
<td>27 20 3 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>170 212 8 390</td>
<td>181 202 52 435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the 61st and the 62nd Congress was attributable to voluntary retirements, and only 31 percent of the turnover between the 66th and the 67th Congress was the result of a voluntary withdrawal of the membership from the re-election contest. As the House of Representatives entered the twentieth century, in other words, the total number of Representatives actively seeking to remain in Congress rose. In the 46th Congress, for example, 75 percent of the members sought re-election. In the 49th and 51st Congresses, this figure had dropped slightly to 74 percent and 72 percent. By 1911, however, 85 percent of the members of the 61st Congress actively tried for re-election while the figure was 83 percent in 1921.

Yet, while attractiveness, or the desire for re-election was a necessary condition for sustained decreases in the turnover rates, it was clearly not a sufficient condition. The increasing desire to remain in Congress had to be accompanied by the growing probability that a Member of Congress could actually be re-elected. Although, in other words, the simple desire to seek re-election was at least a partial function of the attractiveness of the House of Representatives' internal world, it was, to an even larger extent, dependent on the realities of the external electoral system. Changes in the internal processes of the House, designed to make that body more attractive to the careerist, it could therefore be argued, were more the products than the cause of reduced turnover levels. It was the increased probability that
Table 3.7 -- The Sources of Membership Turnover in the 61st and 66th Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>61st Congress</th>
<th></th>
<th>66th Congress</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died in Office</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resigned in Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unseated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Seek Re-election</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeated for Re-election or for Renomination</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-elected</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seeking Re-election</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
progressively greater number of Representatives would in fact be re-elected -- the result itself of declining electoral competitiveness -- that allowed Members of Congress to direct their energies toward the creation of a more alluring and professionally rewarding internal House system.

This can be shown in a number of ways. We have already noted (in Chapter 2) that voluntary retirements by Members of Congress at the end of their two-year term, as well as the probability of re-election, were both directly related to competitiveness throughout the late nineteenth century. This pattern continued into the twentieth century as Table 3.8 demonstrates. In the 61st Congress, for example, 33 percent of the active membership (i.e. those who had neither died in office, resigned in mid-term or were unseated in a contested election case) had been elected by a margin of victory of ten percent or less. Yet, 43 percent of those who decided against standing for re-election were from this category, as were 48 percent of those who stood for re-election but were defeated. In the 66th Congress the proportion of the members elected from the more competitive districts had declined to 25 percent. In that Congress, 23 percent of the voluntary retirees were from this category. While voluntary retirees were thus slightly underrepresented here, the proportion of those who sought re-election but failed was a relatively high 43 percent. The declining relationship between competitiveness and voluntary retirements
Table 3.8 -- Voluntary Retirements, Unsuccessful Re-election Attempts and Re-election by Competiveness in the 61st and the 66th Congresses (percentages down in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>A*</th>
<th>B*</th>
<th>C*</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>A*</th>
<th>B*</th>
<th>C*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0% to 5%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1% to 10%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1% to 20%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1% to 30%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1% to 40%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1% to 50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% and above</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals    42  71  257  370  44  .65  294  403

A = Members who retired at the end of their term
B = Members who were defeated for re-nomination or re-election
C = Members who were re-elected

Figures exclude those who died in office, resigned their seat in mid-term, or who were unseated in election contests.
can be partially explained by the increasing attractiveness of the House to its members which led them to seek re-election irrespective of their chances. But, it can also be viewed as the product of the relative increase in the number of members who decided to retire after serving relatively long terms in the House (whether for reasons of age or sheer weariness). In either case, the likelihood of re-election still tended to increase, in the twentieth century, as competitiveness declined.

These figures suggest two things. First, although the decision to seek re-election continued to be conditioned by external electoral realities (i.e. competitiveness), continued membership in the House of Representatives was, by the first two decades of the twentieth century, becoming more attractive to incumbents. Despite electoral uncertainties, members from both parties and from both competitive and non-competitive districts were more likely to desire re-election in the first two decades of the twentieth century than their precursors had in the nineteenth century. Indeed, as Table 3.9 shows, the effect of competitiveness in curbing the desire for re-election diminished between 1878 and 1918. The decision to seek re-election, in other words, is not as closely tied to competitiveness in the later Congresses surveyed as it is in the earlier ones (particularly the 46th and 49th Congresses).

At the same time, the actual proportionate re-election rate (i.e. those who are successful in their attempt to gain
Table 3.9 -- Percentages of Successful Re-election Attempts to Total Seeking Re-election by Competiveness in the 46th, 49th, 51st, 61st and 66th Congress.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>46th Cong A</th>
<th>46th Cong B</th>
<th>49th Cong A</th>
<th>49th Cong B</th>
<th>51st Cong A</th>
<th>51st Cong B</th>
<th>61st Cong A</th>
<th>61st Cong B</th>
<th>66th Cong A</th>
<th>66th Cong B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0% to 5%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1% to 10%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1% to 20%</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1% to 30%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1% to 40%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1% to 50%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.1% and above</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Percentage of membership seeking Re-election
B = Percentage of those seeking Re-election who Succeed

*(All figures exclude those who either died in office, resigned their seat in mid-term or who were unseated in election contests)
re-election) remains relatively consistent throughout this forty-year period in its relationship with competitiveness. In 1878, for example, 63 percent of those members from the most competitive districts seeking re-election were actually successful. In the 49th Congress, this figure had jumped to 77 percent, but in the 51st, the 61st and the 66th Congress, it declined to 61 percent, 68 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Similarly, of the total number of members actively seeking re-election, 83 percent of the 46th Congress were re-elected, as were 78, 69, 79 and 82 percent of the 49th, 51st, 61st and 66th Congresses. These figures thus secondly show that decreases in competitiveness, far more than the increasing attractiveness of the internal workings of the House, explain the decline in the membership turnover rates in the first decades of the twentieth century. This implies further that internal changes in the House system designed to render that body more attractive to its members and more compatible with their careerist aspirations, were the results of the external relaxation (in terms of competitiveness) of the electoral link between constituents and Members of Congress. The decline in competitiveness, and the corresponding increase in seat security which accompanied that decline, allowed individual representatives in growing, and by the end of the first two decades of the twentieth century decisive numbers to seek and ultimately achieve the creation of an internal House of Representatives reflective of the needs of long term careerists.
The normative strictures against lengthy careers among the voting public also declined as factors in Congressional elections. As Struble notes, length of service as measured by the number of terms served was no longer a negative attribute for voters by the second decade of the twentieth century. Table 3.10 reaffirms this suggestion by demonstrating that the clear relationship between the number of terms served and the likelihood of electoral defeat evidenced in the late nineteenth century Congressional elections had, by the early twentieth century, diminished. Whereas, in other words, the probability of electoral defeat had risen almost uniformly with the number of terms served in the nineteenth century Congresses surveyed, in the twentieth century Congresses surveyed (again the 61st and 66th Congresses) the probability of re-election tended to vary independently of the number of terms served. A visible change had occurred between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the public attitude toward careerism in the House of Representatives. This increased constituency tolerance of, if not an active normative support for longer terms of service for Members of Congress, constitutes an additional indication of the extent to which the electoral tie was loosening.

This increasing insulation from the electoral uncertainties and fluctuations of the nineteenth century voting system had a dramatic effect on the behavior of Members of Congress
Table 3.10 -- The Relationship Between Re-electoral Defeat and the Total Number of Terms Served by Members of the 61st and 66th Congresses (Non-Southern Districts Only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term of Service</th>
<th>Number of Members Defeated in Re-election Bid</th>
<th>Percentage of Unsuccessful Re-election Attempts to Total Membership Seeking Re-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Term</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Term</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Term</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Term</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Term</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Term</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Term</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Term or More</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in general, and on the patterns of conflict within the House in particular. The influence of this increasing electoral insulation was largely directed toward the growth of autonomy and independence of the Member of Congress. To be sure, the simple decrease in the level of competitiveness in Congressional elections masked locally important variations in the recruitment of representatives. Intra-party contests and primaries in dominant party districts were sometimes close, even if the general election fights were not. Still, the overall relationship between competitiveness and turnover suggests that, in general, the Member of Congress of the early twentieth century was far more secure in his seat than his counterparts in the late nineteenth century. And, by and large, this security tended, along with the other changes in the American political system, to lead toward less cohesive, less durable and more fragmented patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives.

This fragmentation of conflict was inextricably linked to the general and dramatic changes which occurred in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century. It was in part the product of the weakening of the national party system and the compartmentalization of the national issue agenda. Members of Congress were freed by these two transformations from important and
powerful constraints on their behavior within the House. Lines of accountability between the Member of Congress and his constituents became altered, and political priorities of both member of Congress and constituent became less well defined, more variable and more diffuse. The increasingly weak party lash and indeed the emerging respect for partisan independence diminished the idea of party regularity.

The new distended issue agenda and the emerging vagueness in the floating lines of political conflict in Congress' external world also tended to obscure the performance of the Member of Congress from the view of the public. The tendency of the voting population to develop long term, consistent and broad political attachments declined as the tendency to view political demand-making in discrete, issue-specific ways increased. The signals sent by the political environment to the House of Representatives, in turn, became less powerful as they became less clear. Thus, as conflict in the American political system became less coherent and well defined, the links which had forcibly bound the House to its nineteenth century political world weakened. Elections, too, declined as a coordinative constraint (indeed it declined in many areas as any kind of a constraint at all) as competitiveness at the polls gradually disappeared and as voter participation dropped off markedly. The dispersion of national political authority to other Federal institutions also contributed to the insulation of the House and the relaxation of the strong links which
had formerly existed between Congress' inner world and the national political environment.

Thus, conflict within the House became less and less the function of cohesive, programmatic and sustained attachments to broad and long-term ideological and partisan goals, and more a reflection of particularistic differences over parochial interests and demands, or over personal perceptions, desires and ambitions. Increasingly unchained from the constraining and integrative influence of its national environment, the House of Representatives began, in the first decades of the twentieth century, to develop patterns of conflict which were more the product of an internal dynamic. Unchecked by accountability to coordinative pressures from the outside world (again partially because those coordinative pressures were becoming increasingly rare, and in part because the electoral links were themselves weakening), Congress slipped further into a conflict mode in which temporary coalitions, momentary issues, personal goals and parochialism became predominant.

Clubb and Traugott have quantified this decline in partisanship in a more precise manner. Party regularity in general, they suggest, has shown a steady but cyclical tendency to decline between 1861 and 1974. The cyclical upswings in the indices of party cohesion or party dissimilarity, they argue, correspond to the three realignment periods encompassed by their study (the Civil War realignment, the realignment of 1896 and the New Deal realignment). These upswings, however,
were each followed by perceptible declines in partisanship within the House. As they point out, however, there were considerable differences in the rates at which the cohesiveness, developed by massive party realignments, decayed. The Civil War realignment, for example, was following by a relatively slight decline in the levels of partisanship and party dissimilarity in the House of Representatives (a moderate negative slope of -.56). The realignment of 1896, by contrast, was followed by a significant decline (slope of -2.02). This decay was even greater than the rate at which the levels of party dissimilarity within the House of Representatives declined between 1933 and 1974, and certainly far greater than that which followed the establishment of the Civil War party system. "On the one hand," Clubb and Traugott conclude,

this pattern provides at least limited confirmation of the hypothesis that the stronger partisan institutions and structures of the latter nineteenth century worked to attenuate the deterioration of the partisan alignments and coalitions produced by the Civil War and Reconstruction. The weakened, and weakening, partisan institutions of the twentieth century, on the other hand, can be seen as accentuating the deterioration of the partisan alignments and cleavages produced by the realignments of 1896 and 1932.81

Clubb and Traugott's indices of partisan cohesion in the House of Representatives provide further indication that the patterns of conflict in that institution in the early decades of the twentieth century differed markedly from the patterns
of the 1861-1897 period. In this latter period, for example, Democratic cohesion declined with time while Republican cohesion increased. Following the realignment of 1896, however, both parties suffered extremely high rates of decay in their levels of party cohesion (-1.19 for the Democrats and -1.30 for the Republicans on all votes and -1.50 for the Democrats and -1.51 for the Republicans on party votes). In fact, these coefficients (once again, derived from a regression line fitted to the changes in party cohesion over time) for both parties are higher -- that is to say, the decline is sharper -- in the 1897 to 1932 period than the rates for either the Civil War era or the New Deal period.

To be sure, partisan dissimilarity and cohesion were initially very high around the time of the 1896 realignment, primarily as a result of the extraordinary levels of party cohesiveness and unity among House Republicans throughout much of the 1890's. Nevertheless, by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, both Republicans and Democrats were as fragmented internally as the Democratic party had been in the 1880's and early 1890's. Clearly, in other words, the period following the 1896 realignment was one of major and very rapid change in the patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives. And, these new twentieth century transformations in the patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives provoked equally new and dramatic changes in the way the House's organizational system went about its task of
creating and sustaining a workable consensus.

These internal changes in the patterns of conflict -- the movement away from partisan unity in the pursuit of legislative goals -- were rooted, this chapter has argued, in the broad transformations which occurred in the American political system around the turn of the century. The fragmentation of the patterns of conflict, it has suggested, was the product of the decline of mass political mobilization along party lines among the voting public, the increasing rarity of accumulative and long term political coalitions, and the evaporation of unifying national political symbols and ideologies. The emergence of new competing structures, values and ideals dedicated to a more particularistic and more segmented approach to political decision-making, weakened the coordinative, and to a certain extent, integrative forces at work outside Congress. In the absence of such strong integrative and coordinative forces, and in the wake of the relaxation of the electoral and structural (i.e. partisan) links which bound the Congress in general to its environment, patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives took on forms which were consonant with an insulated social institution. Conflict became a function of transitory coalitions, particularistic interests and often parochial external demands. And just as the House of the nineteenth century had developed rules, norms and procedures designed to manage the lines of conflict apparent in
that era, the House of the twentieth century was forced to adapt itself to the new exigencies of conflict in that evolving pluralistic environment.

The external political world of the nineteenth century was vastly different from the world which influenced the House of the early twentieth century. Because of its pervasive partisan norms of political behavior and because of the strong links which tied those external partisan norms to the internal world of the House of Representatives, the consensus building system of the Congress was forced to respond to relatively cohesive, disciplined and certainly well-defined and consistent lines of conflict. By the end of the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, this pattern of conflict had given way to less well-defined, more variable and more diffuse lines of conflict.

These changes in the pattern of conflict were largely the result of changes in the external political world, but they had real consequences for the ways in which the Congress went about its task of effecting some sort of legislative consensus. Forced by new external norms of political organization, by issue agendas it could only marginally control, by issue coalitions increasingly tied to particularistic and more specific policy goals, and by a changing electoral system, to manage changing forms of conflict and to reconcile new and more diverse interests, needs and ambitions, Congress' form of internal organization -- its ongoing response to the need
for a system of conflict resolution -- transformed itself. Gradually, but persistently throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, the nineteenth century House of Representatives assumed its contemporary form.
CHAPTER IV
Democratic Factionalism and
The Legislative Process
1878 - 1895

The legislative process is constructed around the forms of conflict it must contain and manage. As Chapter I has suggested, Congressional behavior is determined, structured and indeed, defined by the specific problems varying patterns of conflict introduce into the House political system. The roots of Congressional behavior -- and by extension, the sources of Congressional change -- are to be found in the forces which produce conflict within the House. As has been argued already, this internal conflict is most centrally the product of forces working in Congress' political environment. Conflict within Congress, in other words, is a function of the demands and issues which animate American political life in general; of the manner in which these demands and issues are organized in the American political system as a whole; and of the ways in which the competition between issue sets and divergent interests intrude upon the Congressional process (i.e. the ties which link the House to the broader political struggles occurring in its political environment).

As Chapters II and III have suggested, the nature of
political competition in American politics in general underwent a number of dramatic changes between 1878 and 1921. The changes in Congress' political environment throughout this period, in turn, produced often equally dramatic changes in the nature and patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives. The relative fragmentation or coherence of conflict tended to vary with the party in power, with the extent to which one party controlled the different branches of the Federal government, with the extent to which the constraints of the electoral system were strong or weak, and with the cohesiveness or divisiveness of the ideological or issue-bound coalitions which existed within the American electorate.

As conflict varied within this period, so too did the nature of the House's internal system of rules, and the character of its norms of membership behavior vary. In periods of fragmented conflict, internal decision-making structures themselves fragmented, and power tended to be more widely distributed among the membership. Norms of individualism and constituency service predominated, and sensitivity to the idea of minority rights in the legislative process emerged triumphant. By contrast, in times when more polarized and more accumulative patterns of conflict were evident (e.g. when partisanship within the House was strong), power became more centrally exercised, decision-making was more likely to be coordinated, and the cry
"majority-rule" became the normative (indeed almost the ideological) standard to which members were forced or were predisposed to conform.

Clearly, the transformation of the American political system after 1896 produced sweeping changes in the patterns of conflict, and in turn in the normative and structural features which characterized each House. Within the generally partisan 19th century period (1878-1895), however, there were also some major variations in both the styles of conflict within the House, as well as the manner in which the Members of the House responded to those changing and divergent styles of conflict. Periods of Democratic control, for example, tended to produce normative and organizational responses which differed significantly from those periods of Republican dominance. The Democratic approach to legislative organization between 1878 and 1895 differed quite markedly from that taken by the more unified, coherent and disciplined Republican party during the same period of time. Indeed, in many ways, this unique and fragmented Democratic approach to the Congressional process produced a preview of the way the House of Representatives would later respond to its pluralist twentieth century environment.

The following chapters, then, will be devoted to a more detailed examination of the ways in which the House actually responded to these fluctuations and changes in its political environment, and the manner in which it responded, over time, to the patterns of internal conflict which those environmental
changes forced upon it. Specifically, each chapter will deal with the ways Members of Congress in four different periods between 1880 and 1921 struggled to reconcile the patterns of conflict they brought with them into the legislative process with the need to manage and resolve those varying forms of conflict and disagreement.

Each chapter will focus upon a different period of Congressional reorganization in an effort to demonstrate the continuing sensitivity of the legislative process -- and indeed the sensitivity of the membership itself -- to the changing structural, normative and procedural imperatives of conflict within the House. The distinctive forms of conflict the Congresses of each of these periods confronted, were met by equally distinctive responses. As the following chapters will attempt to show, the character, the norms and the formal procedures each of these Congresses ultimately designed and constructed were pre-eminently the products of Congress' ongoing struggle to reconcile the legislative process with the forms of dissensus it was forced by its changing political environment to manage and resolve.

This chapter will begin the examination of the organizational response of the House of Representatives to the varying patterns of conflict it was forced to manage, with a description of the approach the Democratic party took to the legislative process between 1878 and 1895. It will begin with a brief view of the Democratic legislative party during
this period, with particular emphasis on its internal lack of unity and its recurrent and chronic problems of factionalism. Focussing on the 46th and 49th Congresses, it will secondly attempt to describe the historical setting, and explain the timing of the formal organizational changes which the Democrats brought to the legislative process of the late nineteenth century. Finally, and most significantly, this chapter will argue that the content of these formal organizational changes was also quite clearly the product of forces and events working in the immediate political environment of the House of Representatives.

In particular, this chapter will stress the impact of Democratic divisiveness on the nature of that party's organizational approach to the legislative process. Above all, this divisiveness tended to produce an atrophy of the central organs of political power in the House; a formal recognition of the rights and prerogatives of sub-groups (if not individual members); and a marked dispersion of decision-making responsibility. In a highly partisan age, the Democrats were curiously divided whenever they controlled the House, and many of the organizational changes brought about within Congress during the years of this control reflected (and can be most centrally explained by) this disunity. Subsequent chapters will elaborate upon this point by demonstrating the extent to which the Democratic approach differed measurably from the Republican approach to legislative organization during the same general period of time. As will be shown, the differences between the
Republicans and the Democrats in terms of the patterns of conflict each had to manage and contain, in the levels of dissensus each had to confront when they controlled the House, led to important differences in the legislative system each party produced in the late nineteenth century.

Two specific actions by the Houses of the late nineteenth century will be used as illustrations of both the strategic problems the Democratic party faced whenever it found itself in control of the lower chamber, and of the unique organizational responses which these problems led it to make. The Revision of 1880 and the Reform of the Appropriations process in 1885 both reflect the problems the Democratic party faced in attempting to pursue its goals (or its members' goals), serve its diverse and divided constituency, and produce legislation. The former was a mild attempt to simplify and streamline the existing rules of the House -- one which produced few major changes in the way the House actually behaved. The Revision did, however, produce for the first time since 1860 a real debate over the nature of rules-making, and over the central tenets of legislative organization, and a conscious examination of the basic behavioral norms and structural characteristics which animated Democratic Houses of Representatives in the late nineteenth century. In the end, the Revision of 1880 did little more than produce a formal and explicit reaffirmation of what had since the mid-1870's served as the quintessential Democratic approach to law-making. As such, however, it provides a number of valuable
insights into the ways Members of Congress (particularly Democratic Members of Congress) tended to view their profession; why they held the views they did; and finally, how those views affected the design of the legislative process.

The Reform of the Appropriations process in 1885, meanwhile, had a much more immediate and visible impact on the legislative system. At the same time, the debate itself, while more intense, was far less comprehensive in its examination of House procedures than the Revision of 1880. By and large, the 1885 reform was aimed at a redistribution of power and authority away from the Appropriations Committee. To be sure, this had a significant impact on the legislative process, but the questions raised during the consideration of this redistribution, and the range of opinions expressed were not as great or as far-reaching as those which had emerged in the 1880 debate. Still, although the debate over this action was far less comprehensive in scope than that which surrounded the Revision of 1880, it does nevertheless provide another important view of the manner in which Democratic Members of Congress reconciled, from time to time, the legislative process with their own unique goals, the expectations of their constituents, and the varying patterns of conflict and disagreement which the pursuit of those goals and expectations produced.

Both the Revision of 1880 and the Reform measure of 1885, then, serve as useful indicators of the ways in which Democratic Congresses in the late nineteenth century dealt with the problem of constructing a consensus out of a particularly fragmented
membership. Both also serve to demonstrate the responsiveness of the rules, the norms and in effect the character of the House to the unique style of conflict nineteenth century Democrats brought to their legislative task.

It is clearly appropriate to begin the examination of the late nineteenth century legislative process with a discussion of the peculiar coalition problems the Democrats faced in this era. More than anything else, the behavior of the Members of the House and their approach to legislative organization during periods of Democratic control were the direct outgrowth of the particular patterns of divisiveness and disarray which marked that party between 1860 and 1895. This disunity within the Democratic party can be seen quite clearly in contemporary press reports, in the private correspondence of the legislative actors directly involved, and in the more dispassionate observations of the political analysts of the day. Of this latter group, Woodrow Wilson provides, in his classic treatise on the Congress of the 1880's, a useful introduction to the style and the traits of the Democratic House of Representatives during this period.

In 1885, Wilson published his Doctoral Dissertation entitled Congressional Government. Working at Johns Hopkins University in an academic discipline newly imported from Europe, Wilson brought to his task ideas which were also
borrowed from European political thinkers. Walter Bagheot was a particularly notable influence on Wilson's emerging view of the American political process.\(^1\) Evident in *Congressional Government*, for example, was Bagheot's notion of the inevitable supremacy of the legislative branch over the executive in modern political systems. Thus, Wilson stressed the power of Congress in the Federal system, and the dominant role it played in national public policy-making. To understand the American political system, he believed, it was necessary to understand how the United States Congress worked.\(^2\)

Armed with the broad assumptions of legislative politics derived from Bagheot and others, Wilson nevertheless produced an insightful and in many ways original view of how Congress actually functioned. The Congress of the early 1880's, he suggested, was essentially a Government of Committees -- a "disintegrate ministry" -- where powerful and often autonomous Committee Chairmen held uncontested sway over large portions of the Federal policy making process.\(^3\) Yet Wilson also noted the existence of other, more centralized sources of power in the nineteenth century House of Representatives. The importance of the committees, he conceded, conferred an extraordinary amount of power upon the Speaker who in the nineteenth century appointed the committees.

The most esteemed writers upon our Constitution have failed to observe, not only that the standing committees are the most essential machinery
of our governmental system, but also that the Speaker of the House of Representatives is the most powerful functionary of that system. So sovereign is he within the wide sphere of his influence that one could wish for accurate knowledge as to the actual extent of his power. 4

Bound as it was, in other words, to a fragmented decision-making system, the House nevertheless contained countervailing institutional structures capable of manipulating and coordinating that system.

Despite the tendency of modern scholars, therefore, to invoke the Committee Government characterization of the nineteenth century House of Representatives, Wilson himself was much more tentative and almost ambivalent about the role of committees in the legislative process. While it is true that he did emphasize the strength of the committees and their independence, he was never able to dismiss the contradictory idea that there were forces (if sometimes latent) which were in fact capable of controlling the fragmented committee system. Wilson's struggle with this point is evident throughout his treatment of the House. While the Lower Chamber is fragmented, he argues, by its reliance on the committee-based decision-making system, there nevertheless exist sources of power and authority within that body which are fully capable of imposing a measure of coherence on the legislative process. This Wilson concedes, for example, in his treatment of the Speaker and the party caucus. 5 Ultimately, however, Wilson comes no closer to an explanation (or indeed an explicit recognition)
of this structural contradiction which exists within Congress
between the forces of fragmentation and those of coherence
than the rather weak conclusion that one predominates over
the other depending on the character and competence of the
Speaker himself. "Mr. Speaker's powers," he writes:

cannot be known accurately, because they vary
with the character of Mr. Speaker. All Speakers
have, of late years especially, been potent
factors in legislation, but some have, by reason
of greater energy or less conscience, made more
use of their opportunities than have others.  

Clearly, however, the impediments to the centralization
of power in the House of Representatives were not to be found
solely in the character flaws of the men the Democrats ele-
vated to the Speakership between 1878 and 1889 (as Wilson
implies). Rather, it was the divisiveness and disunity of the
party itself which precluded the exercise of strong central
control and which underwrote the fragmented committee system
Wilson so clearly described. Temporarily unified in 1877
over the contested Presidential election of 1876 (The Crime
of '76 to many ardent Democrats), the Democratic coalition
quickly disintegrated into often bitter factionalism as the
1880's approached. Leadership contests within the party
became more divisive and issue differences which had been
repressed by the sense of collective outrage with which most
Democrats met the final decision of the electoral
commission in 1877 (to deny Samuel Tilden's election)
resurfaced in more fractious form. The point which in the end seems to elude Wilson's grasp, therefore -- and the point this chapter seeks to make -- is that while the House of Representatives of 1885 was indeed capable of coherence (at least structurally), its dominant party, the Democratic party, was not.

The Democratic party, as we noted in Chapter II, contained deep divisions over the major political questions of the day -- divisions which were not readily healed by even the most adept leaders. "The surest way to defeat the Democrats," the New York Tribune crowed, for example, "is to let them talk. One of the results of the financial debate will be to set them quarreling among themselves." Attempts to unite party factions were constantly thwarted by such fundamental disagreements as those which existed over the tariff question. Protectionists such as Speaker Samuel J. Randall were bitterly opposed by the strong and vocal tariff reform wing made up largely of Southerners, but led by Illinois Congressman William Morrison. As early as 1879 Randall found himself locked into a major struggle with Morrison over the tariff and in turn over the leadership of the Democratic legislative party. The rift between the two men, and indeed between the two sides of this issue, defied compromise.

Speakership contests in the Democratic party caucus became major tests of strength between implacably opposed factions, and the bitterness with which they were waged did little to provide the ultimate victor with the base of support
necessary to strengthen the office. As Richard Vaux suggested to Randall in the midst of the caucus battle for the Democratic nomination for Speaker in 1879, "The bitterness of the other side augurs badly for the unity of the Democratic party in this the critical moment of its fortunes." Even after his election, therefore, Randall continued to be plagued by attempts of his own party members to undermine both his personal prestige as well as the authority of the Speakership. Daniel Ermentrout, for example, wrote Randall early in the special session of the 46th Congress to suggest that he postpone naming his committees until later in the year. Arguing that the Southern Democrats were trying to take control of the Democratic legislative party as well as the House, Ermentrout warned Randall not to add to the tension and rancour by rushing through his committee nominations. "The demand for immediate appointment of committees," Ermentrout argued, "is for the purpose of beginning to break down your influence as far as possible, by the usual dis-satisfaction attending announcement of Committees." 

John G. Carlisle, who became Speaker in the 48th Congress, and who represented the Southern and Tariff reform wing of the party faced much the same situation as Randall. Like Randall, he too found himself hobbled throughout his Speakership by intense factional warfare. "The Democratic Speaker Carlisle", Matthew Johnson related:

found the utmost difficulty in making up the various Congressional committees without splitting his
followers into warring classes. There was no agreement among Eastern, Western and Southern Democrats upon the tariff question, or upon the currency question. At critical moments Carlisle could never depend upon his party for harmonious action. A quorum would actually be lacking upon the day when the Speaker of the House must be chosen. In Congress, the Democratic party made an unfortunate impression of inconsistency and indiscipline.12

Party regularity was at a discount during these years as divisions within the Democratic party often produced opposition to stands taken by the leadership which was often more vocal and bitter than that which emerged from the Republicans across the aisle. Indeed, the Democratic Members of Congress of the back benches (dubbed the "Barbary Coast" by reporters13) were consistent only in their apparent devotion to the cause of upsetting the efforts their own leadership in the House to create a measure of programmatic unity and harmony. "The topics uppermost -- the Silver Question and tariff revision," Henry Ward suggested in 1885, "divide . . . the sentiment of the Lower House not at all on party lines . . . There is no politics by party lines just now."14

This fragmentation of the Democratic Party, and its inability to produce a significant consensus over public policy had a decisive impact on the organizational style, on the structure of the decision-making process, and on the norms which dominated the interaction of members during periods of Democratic control. In the absence of an internal partisan consensus, the Democrats were forced to construct a legislative
system which would itself do what the Democratic party organization could not -- provide a forum and the necessary institutional mechanisms for settling differences, resolving conflict and insofar as it was possible, make decisions.

The Democratic approach to the design and construction of a legislative process in the late nineteenth century, then, was clearly guided by the peculiar patterns of disarray which that party contained. This is apparent in a view of the general character of the Democratic concept of legislative organization, as it was in the timing of the specific procedural reforms which the party enacted. This disarray, in turn, as well as the manner in which the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century went about the task of building a suitable and workable legislative system were both very much the product of the broader relationship which linked the House to its political environment. The way that political environment left its mark on the internal world of the House of Representatives, and indeed the unique way both world interacted during the periods of Democratic control, provide ample evidence that the behavior of the nineteenth century Congress was extremely sensitive and responsive to forces and events working beyond the narrowly defined limits of its internal world.

The significance of immediate environmental forces on internal House behavior is perhaps clearest in an examination
of the timing and the sources of the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885. The origins of the Revision of 1880, for example, were rooted, according to the few modern scholars who have examined it, in the almost purely internal desire of the House leadership (of both parties) to streamline and systematize the formal procedure which regulated the legislative process. Most of these students of Congressional history invoke the preamble to the Revision itself, which argued that "The objective point with the committee (on rules) was to secure accuracy in business, economy of time, order, uniformity and impartiality." The origins of the Revision, these observers suggest, lay in the growing frustration of the members with the old rules -- "the accretion," in James A. Garfield's words, "of ninety years practice" thrown "together by a mere accident of time and place" ....

The thing most needed is to simplify the present rules of the House, and if we did not make a single material change in the rules, we might get them put in order and when any collision of the rules is found, to rectify that collision and make them clear and plain.

The notion that the Revision of 1880 grew out of this frustration with existing rules and an almost "modern" preoccupation with functional efficiency, reinforces internalist assumptions about the developmental dynamics of the House and the institutionalizing tendencies of complex organizations.

A closer examination of the circumstances surrounding the
growth of the support for a revision of the rules of the 46th Congress, however, provides a quite different explanation. While frustration with the tangled mass of rules certainly played a role in pushing the House toward revision, non-Congressional considerations and environmental forces played an even greater part. In particular, the need for party calm in a Presidential election year provided the Democratic, as well as the Republican leadership with a far more compelling reason for wanting to set the legislative agenda around a non-controversial consideration of the rules.

Democrats seems particularly attentive to the need for political calm, since for the first time in twenty-four years they could reasonably look forward to the election of one of their own to the Presidency in 1880. Nursing that possibility, therefore, became a major preoccupation of Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives. Indeed, one of the contestants for the Democratic nomination -- to many Samuel Tilden's chosen heir -- was speaker Randall himself,\textsuperscript{18A} who was thus especially eager to dampen Democratic divisiveness and to calm the irascible southern wing of the party. "There must be a changed state of things in the south, and southerners must be a little less conspicuous and a little more careful what they say in Congress," was one Democrat's prescription for victory in 1880, and Randall tended to agree. Responding to another party leader, the Speaker wrote, "I agree with you as to the policy of the present House -- a short session,
This sensitivity to the need for party calm was particularly pressing in the wake of the bitter and explosive extra session of 1879 which had produced the highly publicized and extremely controversial fight between the Democratic House and the Republican President Hayes over the Army Appropriation Bill.

The Revision of 1880, then, promised to dampen or at least defer tensions and mute the internal divisiveness which had in part revealed itself during the extra session. Consideration of the rules, Randall hoped, would steer Congressional debates away from the questions most likely to inflame Democratic factional passions -- the tariff and the currency question. He also hoped it would allow him to postpone until the latest possible moment the inevitable and usually volatile debate over the annual Appropriations bills. In sum, Randall wanted to divert the attention of both the public and his party colleagues away from the fundamental disunity which existed within the Democratic ranks.

In June of 1879, therefore, Randall proposed to the House that a select Rules Committee composed of Alexander Stephens of Georgia, Blackburn of Kentucky, and Randall from the Democratic party, and William Frye of Maine and James A. Garfield of the Republican side, meet over the summer recess to "condense and codify the rules." Garfield, leader of the minority Republican party in Congress, like Randall, was also eager to design a legislative agenda for the upcoming session.
which would essentially mark time until after the 1880 presidential elections. For he, too, had his eyes on the Presidency.

The committee met in August at Long Branch, a resort on the northern New Jersey shore, amidst only mild public interest, and quickly and amicably drafted a proposed recodification of the rules. There was little disagreement within the rules committee over the report. Indeed, "The committee determined at the very threshold of their labors . . . that their reported revision should be the unanimous action and agreement of the committee."21

This lack of controversy within the committee largely reflected the corresponding lack of interest most committee members felt for the project. Alexander Stephens, alone among his colleagues felt a real need for a streamlining of the cumbersome rules of the House, and consequently took the Committee's publicized task quite seriously. The others evidently did not share Stephens' abiding belief in the need for reform. Randall's own conversion to the idea of reform had clearly not come until the closing days of the extra session and only then after he had latched upon the idea as a useful means of spreading calm on the troubled waters of Democratic divisiveness. So late had this conversion to the cause of reform come, for example, and so late had the decision to hold the conference been made, that Randall had difficulty securing hotel reservations for the committee in Long Branch.22 Frye, meanwhile, was late in arriving, and Garfield made every effort to ensure that his own stay was as short as possible.23
end, the committee drafted a report which did little more than reorganize the rules manual (although a few substantive changes were proposed) and provide a non-controversial agenda for the upcoming winter session.

As contemporary accounts show, the Long Branch rules report had its intended effect. As debate over the proposed revision, begun in early January, 1880, dragged on into March, an exasperated press corps, which had eagerly anticipated more of the conflict and rancour which had characterized the stormy special session of the previous year, vainly sought for news in what quickly became known as a "do-nothing Congress." As Harper's Magazine reported:

Congress is in session, but the news from Washington is very meagre and uninteresting. The general object evidently is avoidance. The Democratic fingers were so terribly burned in the extra session . . . that the majority in Congress is mainly anxious to do nothing and see what comes of it.

Another observer judged the behavior of the House of Representatives during this period as "the dullest session I have ever seen." Yet, the dullness was calculated, as most reporters were quick to point out. "The politicians are engaged in forming Presidential combinations, and none of them have any time to waste in transacting the business of the session." Debate over legislation likely to produce the kind of conflict which erupted in the extra session of 1879, particularly tariff or
financial (appropriations) legislation, was to be avoided until the last possible moment. "The discussion of the new rules," a New York Times correspondent reported:

has materially assisted in guarding the House against financial matters, and there seems to be a disposition on the part of the majority on both sides to nurse the new rules until the regular appropriation bills are ready for presentation and consideration.28

The Revision of 1880, then, provided the Democrats, and to a certain extent the Republicans, with what they most needed in a Presidential election year -- a measure of calm and an outward illusion of party consensus and unity. This was probably recognized throughout the Democratic party, but the idea of treading water until the November election was probably most attractive to the Tilden faction to which Randall was allied. This group had come to the conclusion, during the stormy extra session of 1879, that the only issue upon which they could unite the Democratic party and win the coming election was that of the Republican behavior during the contested election of 1876. It was believed that an appeal to the electorate to reverse that political crime could alone produce a modicum of party unity and win votes in every section of the country.

Randall thus hoped that the consideration of the Revision of the rules would work to divert the attention of Democrats (within as well as outside of the House) away from the issues
which divided the party and toward the one issue (the fraud issue) which still promised to unite it. "It strikes me that the whole matter is plain enough," Perry Belmont concluded in a March, 1880 letter to Senator Thomas Bayard of Delaware (one of Randall's rivals for the Democratic Presidential nomination),

that Randall and the rest of Tilden's creatures in Congress have purposely and systematically stood in the way of any Democratic measure of tariff reform, finance or whatever else might have been done by two Democratic Houses because they have, in the Tilden interest, endeavored to deprive the Democratic party of any other issue but the one of having been defrauded by the electoral decision (of 1877).

Clearly, the Revision of 1880 was a prime instrument of this general strategy of bringing the focus of the Democratic party back to the one issue which could ensure success, both for the party and not so incidentally for Tilden and Randall, in the approaching Presidential election.

Just as the Revision of 1880 appeared in response to the immediate strategic needs of the dominant wing of the Democratic party in the House, so too was the emergence of an Appropriations reform measure in 1885 tied to the political needs of yet other segments of the party. Although the supporters of a redistribution of the powers of the Appropriations committee suggested that their efforts were largely aimed at
unblocking the log jam of Appropriations bills which were inevitably brought to the floor of the House during the last weeks of each session (and usually under a suspension of the rules which limited debate and often forbade amendments),

two broad issues, and a few smaller ones provided the immediate spur to the reform movement of 1885. The tariff and federal spending, and the debate both concerns provoked within the Democratic party were largely responsible for the emergence of a desire to curb the power of the Appropriations Committee and its powerful chairman Samuel J. Randall. Committee chauvinism and executive-legislative competition may also have played a role in sparking the anti-Randall and anti-Appropriations committee struggle, but the tariff and the desire to increase member access to the federal treasury were the paramount issues at hand.

The tariff played a curious role in the 1885 reform of the Appropriations committee. For years the center of an increasingly vituperative conflict between the proponents of protection and the supporters of reform, the tariff issue had, by 1885, become a personal struggle between Samuel Randall (leader of the protectionist wing of the Democratic party) who had been named chairman of the Appropriations Committee in 1883 after losing the Speakership to fellow Democrat John G. Carlisle) and William Morrison, who as Ways and Means Committee Chairman was just as deeply committed to the cause of tariff reduction. Relations between the two had never been good, but they became most visibly strained in 1884
when Randall and his Democratic allies ("The Forty Thieves") voted with the Republicans to defeat (actually to strike out the enacting clause of) Morrison's proposed bill to reduce tariff schedules. Randall's opposition to this bill, and his power as Appropriations Chairman to block legislation by manipulating the House calendar, by using of dilatory tactics and by using the resources of his committee to engage in log-rolling, made him a central target of tariff reformers. As free trader Henry Watterson declared in his influential newspaper, the Louisville Courier-Journal, Randall could expect little gratitude from a Democratic party upon which he had so clearly turned his back during the fight over the Morrison bill.

Dismay at Randall's performance during this 1884 tariff struggle quickly turned into a concerted effort on the part of tariff reformers to curb Randall's power, and weaken the Appropriations Committee. As Morrison himself noted to free trade economist David Wells, "Without amending the rules . . . old Kelly, Witterd, Randall and Co. can prevent our reaching anything as our calendar is already lumbered up." As long as Randall controlled the appropriations process, the emerging Democratic allegiance to tariff reform would never see the light of day. "Randall, Eaton and the like," he lamented, "do not intend the Democratic party to succeed except upon conditions which will enable them to control it in the interest of protection." As the St. Louis
Globe-Democrat concluded:

When Mr. Morrison declares, therefore, that his object in urging the distribution of Appropriations Bills among a number of committees, instead of referring them all to the Committee on Appropriations, is to get the bills reported at earlier periods of the session, and obviate the necessity for the passage of any of them under a suspension of the rules, he prevaricates. His actual feeling is that if these measures shall be put beyond the control of Mr. Randall, the way will be opened for the anti-protection element of the party to shape and govern the course of the House.38

In this sense then, the move to fragment the powers of the Appropriations Committee, and distribute those powers among a host of other substantive committees, came from the rising free-trade element of the House which, like Edward Atkinson, had come to believe that "a Democratic party which permits itself to be ruled by pig-iron men of Pennsylvania through their advocate Randall has ceased to be the true Democratic party."39

The 1885 reform measure was also, however, the product of a new determination by Democratic Members of Congress to increase Federal spending.40 Although proponents of the rules change continued to insist that the measure would not only relieve the Appropriations Committee of responsibilities which "have been too great for one committee,"41 but also do so in a way which "is in the interest of economy and wise legislation,"42 many observers saw more selfish motives behind the proposed change. "The proposition to revise the
rules by distributing the several appropriations to the several sub-committees appeals strongly to both ambition and interest," the Philadelphia Times argued. Others, more explicit in their assessment, suggested that it would unlock "the doors of the Treasury to all manner of jobs," while yet another paper concluded, "There is nothing in it except jobbery and that kind of confusion which jobbers like." Traditionalist Democrats railed against the abandonment of old party values and predicted that the fragmentation of the Appropriations Committee would give free reign to the "hunger of the lobbyists, the promoters of questionable or corrupt schemes and all the audacious rings which have long been held in check." Many tended to agree with Randall that the distribution of appropriations powers to the interested substantive committees would inevitably break down "what is now a most wholesome check possessed by the House, through the Appropriations Committee, over each committee and by all of the committees over that of Appropriations." Thus, while supporters of the change saw in it no marked departure from traditional Democratic ideals, opponents tended to agree with the notion that the fragmentation of the powers of the Appropriations Committee constituted a virtual "caving in of the head of the barrel into which the patriots will shortly be found with their carms clear up to their shoulder." While Democrats debated among themselves throughout the fall of 1885, Republicans, traditionally quite comfortable
with high levels of federal spending, cheerfully lent their support to the Appropriations reform measure. One reporter suggested, in fact, that the report of the Rules Committee which recommended the distribution of Appropriations bills "has taken the precise form which Messrs. Hiscock and Reed, the two Republican members of the (Rules) Committee commended; and it is a Republican device." It was viewed as a Republican device for two reasons. First, it accomplished the immediate and, to the Republicans, extremely important goal of removing what the traditional Democrats considered to be the Congressional safeguards against excessive federal spending. The loosening of the Appropriations Committee constraint, however, also promised to increase expenditures to the point where tariff reform would become difficult for the Democrats to justify. Higher expenditures would require, so most Republicans believed, higher revenues and consequently pose a major problem for those in the Democratic party who desired a reduction in tariff rates. The decision of the Republicans to oppose the "champion Democratic protectionist (Samuel Randall)," the New York Times argued, "is only to be explained by their confidence that they were securing themselves much more strongly against any tariff reduction this year." So certain, in fact, were many that the Appropriations reform measure was in fact a Republican inspired plot, that on the day after the bill passed the House, the Pittsburgh Daily Post led its description of the floor fight and final result with the headline: "Democrats Duped: Outwitted
by Republican Leaders in Congress. 53

Other explanations of the origins of the 1885 reform measure have been forwarded by more contemporary observers of Congressional history. Fenno and others, for example, have persuasively argued that the redistribution of the powers of the Appropriations Committee was primarily the result of the demands by members of the committees affected for easier access to federal funds, and consequently for more political power in the House decision-making process. 54

While this argument is clearly compelling, it does not go very far forward explaining why this consideration was so much more pressing in 1885 than it had been before that time. Nor does it adequately account for the fact that the committees for the 49th Congress themselves were not appointed until after the conclusion of the fight over the rules change. 55

Finally, Joseph Cannon, who was a member of the Appropriations Committee in 1885, later suggested that a number of executive branch department heads lent their support to the reform cause in an effort to arrogate more power over the legislative policy-making process.

The members of President Cleveland's cabinet supported Morrison's plan not only to humiliate Randall, but to curb his power, and I have sometimes thought they were shrewder than they were credited with being, and that they saw the advantage to the executive department as well as the punishment of Randall in the change. It was the beginning of executive interference in legislation which has led to executive dominance in legislation for appropriations to meet the demands of the spenders instead of the demands of the taxpayers. 56
Cannon's claim certainly coincides with the idea that the fragmented Democratic majority in the House of Representatives tended to rely fairly heavily upon Cleveland and the executive branch for the leadership and coherence which they themselves so obviously lacked. Yet, it is not clear that the support of the executive branch officials was decisive in the House rules struggle.

The important point remains, however, that the factors which combined to produce the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885 were deeply rooted in historical contexts. Both of these measures, in their timing and in their purposes, were direct responses to the immediate needs of the legislative actors who were involved. The emergence of the Revision of 1880 as a central focus of legislative concern, for example, was in response to the needs of the Democratic leadership (again primarily the Tilden wing of the party) to dampen the divisive conflict which threatened to destroy the party's chances in the 1880 Presidential elections. The 1885 reform of the Appropriations process, similarly, was the outgrowth of a major struggle between the tariff reform and protection elements of the Democratic party. Both, in other words, were instrumental issues, or surrogates, for the broader conflicts within the Democratic party which they represented. In the timing of their emergence as issues and in the wider concerns they reflected, the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885 were the products -- not of an institution-specific modernizing urge -- but of more immediate and recognizable contextual factors working both within and outside of the House.
While immediate issue needs explain the timing and the purposes of the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885, the particular forms these measures took and the decisions ultimately made by the members of the House during the debates, were determined by the conflict setting in which each one appeared. Both of these revisions, in other words -- the debates they produced, and the organizational solutions which came out of them -- reflected the patterns of conflict which dominated the House of Representatives in the 1880's during periods of Democratic rule. Both were part of the attempt to reconcile the varied political needs of a diverse party membership (both within Congress and outside), and the patterns of legislative conflict which these varied needs spawned within the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century, with the persistent need to define and achieve a measure of policy consensus.

The extent to which both the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885 were directly tied to the forms of conflict peculiar to the Democratic party of the 1880's becomes clear in an examination of the debates and decisions ultimately encompassed by these two measures. In the precise way these debates and decisions affected the distribution of power in the House of Representatives, apportioned roles in the decision-making process, and determined the role of the House in the national policy-making system, they reflected the unique constraints imposed upon the legislative process by the
patterns of Democratic divisiveness. The following sections of this chapter will thus be devoted to a brief examination of the extent to which the Democratic Congresses of the 1880's used the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885 to mold the internal organization of the House to the needs and particular conflict styles which that party brought to the Congressional process.

One of these peculiar needs, amply reflected in the Revision of 1880, was the Democratic members' insistent regard for what they termed "minority rights" and what their opponents dubbed obstructionism. More than anything else, this preoccupation was a hallmark of the internal organization of the House of Representatives during periods of Democratic control throughout the 1880's. To a certain extent, the Republicans encouraged the adherence to this organizational norm, particularly in the 1870's during a time when their own Civil War coalition was beginning to crumble, and before they had once again become united around the tariff issue. Republicans also tended to be more attentive to the idea of minority rights whenever they were the minority party in the House. Yet, it is still clear, nevertheless, that the keenest support for minority rights throughout the late nineteenth century came from the ranks of the perennially fragmented and diffuse Democratic side of the House. Representative Herbert of Alabama would later recall that:
Twenty and even ten years ago, the Democratic and Republican parties so profoundly distrusted each other that each was afraid to smooth for the other the pathway to easy legislation. The Republicans feared that some political revolution might 'wipe away war legislation' including the tariff, and the Democrats feared a more sweeping reconstruction law. . . . For these reasons 'rights of minorities' were for many years sedulously cared for in the rules. 59

Despite Herbert's claim, however, bipartisan support for the idea of minority rights was never as evident during periods of Republican dominance as it was during periods of Democratic control of the House. As Samuel Randall argued, the Democratic party was far more solicitous of the rights of the minority, than the Republicans even in the 1880's. The rules and norms which were designed to restrict obstructionism or curb the rights of minority members (or dissenting members within the majority party) were largely adopted in Republican Houses. "As soon as the party now in the majority (the Democratic party) obtained control of the House," Randall noted in 1879, "they immediately repealed those clauses of the rules which fettered the minority as they thought unduly." 60 As the decade of the 1880's progressed, and as the internal divisiveness of the Democratic party became more pronounced, concern for these minority rights increased.

To the increasingly united and cohesive Republicans, meanwhile, this regard for minority rights during periods of Democratic control of the House became a major source of frustration. It was an impatient Thomas B. Reed, for example,
who in 1884 apologized to a constituent for having failed to secure passage of a bill by blaming the obstruction-oriented rules of the then Democratic House of Representatives. "You and the community," he complained to his friend Andrew Hawes, "little realize how hard it is to pass a bill under the rules of our House. I tried my very best to have them changed but such is the fear that the Democrats have to trust even themselves that they wouldn't take the power even tho' they had a 70 majority and more ..." 61

There were a number of instruments of minority obstruction in the Democratic House during the 1880's but the most visible and most widely used was the Disappearing Quorum. This tactic was based on the parliamentary need for a quorum, or the requirement that a majority of the membership be present for the consideration of all legislation. Bills could not be passed when less than a quorum was present. In the 1870's and 1880's, and during the Democratic controlled 52nd Congress in the 1890's, a quorum could be broken if members present in the House chamber simply refused to vote. In an era when, because of poor communications and transportation, and because of the inevitable problems of absenteeism due to sickness or death, membership attendance in the House during even the most critical debates was often less than enough to assure a majority party enough votes to establish a quorum, the Disappearing Quorum was a potent strategic tool. In the face of a determined and silent minority, majorities often found themselves defeated by their inability to bring enough of their
members into the well of the House to constitute an actual majority or quorum of the total membership.

The Disappearing Quorum had been used sporadically throughout the nineteenth century. The earliest instance of its use was during the second session of the 23rd Congress in 1835, when John Quincy Adams had refused to vote on a bill before the House. For the most part, the Disappearing Quorum was most heavily used in times when party coalitions were at their most fragile. The late 1850's, for example, produced repeated instances of the resort to the Disappearing Quorum, as in the case of the consideration in 1858 of a Presidential message concerned with the Lecompton constitution of Kansas.

The 1870's also saw an increased reliance on the Disappearing Quorum to obstruct controversial legislation during periods of both Democratic and Republican rule. In fact, the practice was most emphatically reaffirmed as a legitimate tactic, much to the later embarrassment of the Republicans, in a ruling from the chair made by the then Speaker James G. Blaine in 1875. Cognizant, perhaps, of the gradual decay of his own party's unity, and certainly aware of the fact that the Democrats had won control of the House in the 1874 elections and were due to take power in less than two weeks, Blaine, on February 24, 1875 refused to overrule the Democratic use of the Disappearing Quorum to block an election bill (or force bill to the southerners). Arguing that to do so would bring the House to the "very brink of a volcano,"
Blaine underscored the right of the minority to refrain from voting even if doing so prevented the establishment of a quorum.\textsuperscript{64}

As the Republicans languished in their minority role for the rest of the decade, they were of course content to support the continuance of the Disappearing Quorum and other tactics of obstruction to help guard against Democratic assaults on their legislation. More significant, however, was the equally strong commitment of the majority Democrats to the idea of minority rights — a commitment which was borne out of their divisiveness and policy incoherence. There were, of course, movements from Democratic Members of Congress to terminate their party's tolerance of what was essentially the right of a minority to veto legislative initiatives, but none of these attempts were ever successful. At the Long Branch conference, for example, J.C.S. Blackburn of Kentucky had apparently called for the insertion of a provision which would have given the House the power to "compel its members to vote." According to contemporary press reports, Blackburn "pressed this subject upon the committee, but it was finally laid over until the next session."\textsuperscript{65}

During the debate on the Revision of 1880, this proposal was reintroduced, and became the focus of the first real struggle over the provisions of the new rules code. On January 27, 1880, John Tucker of Virginia stunned many of his colleagues by proposing an amendment to Rule VIII which would have allowed the House to count those present but not voting
as part of the quorum. "The purpose of the amendment," Tucker noted, "is to prevent the non-action of the House when a quorum is actually present." The response to this move was immediate and sharp. Republicans, wary of the Democratic party which had provoked the army appropriation struggle in the extra session of 1879, and which still contained elements keen on dismantling the civil war legislative initiatives of the 1860's and 1870's, vehemently protested this proposed amendment. "It would be wrong in itself; it would be unconstitutional; it would be violently partisan," Conger of Michigan charged. Admitting that he had "in former years desired such a rule," particularly when the Republicans were in the majority, he suggested that only fair-mindedness had led him to refrain, as indeed he hoped it would lead Democrats in the present House, to refrain from adopting "so violent and partisan a measure." Even Thomas B. Reed, who would ten years later surprise the nation with his famous ruling effectively ending the use of the Disappearing Quorum, in 1880 rose to protest the Tucker proposal. "It is a valuable privilege for the country," Reed argued, with his attention riveted to the immediate self-interest of his minority party:

that the minority shall have the right by this extraordinary mode of proceeding to call the attention of the country to measures which a party in a moment of madness and of party feeling is endeavoring to force upon the citizens of this land. And it works equally well with regard to all parties, for all parties have
their times when they need to be checked, so that they may receive the opinions of the people who are their constituents . . . 69

While Republicans expressed a sense of righteous, if clearly selfish, indignation over the proposed amendment, Democrats were predictably divided over the issue. Despite their majority status, the internal divisions within the party provided a real inducement to many Democratic Members of Congress to tolerate, and often actively support the anti-majoritarian features of the disappearing quorum. "I think we had better leave the rule just as it is," the venerable Alexander Stephens cautioned his party brethren. The Member of Congress is responsible to his constituency, he reasoned and therefore, if these constituents "send a member here who will not vote when in his seat, . . . it is a matter that concerns him and them and not the House." 70 Blackburn of Kentucky, however, supported the idea of change, as he had done during the Long Branch conference, arguing that the Tucker amendment conformed to normal Anglo-Saxon parliamentary practice. It does not, he suggested, "abridge in any respect the right that the minority should hold in the House." 71

Ultimately, however, the Tucker amendment was rejected by the Revisers of 1880 as a real threat to the rights and prerogatives of both the minority Republicans and, more decisively, of the factions within the Democratic party. This latter concern was effectively and quickly voiced in Democratic circles on the night of January 28, 1880, and by the next
morning, Tucker was ready to withdraw his proposal. As Roger Q. Mills, a Democratic Representative from Texas in the 46th Congress later noted, Tucker's amendment "met with so little encouragement from his own side, and such determined opposition from the Republicans, that he withdrew it to save it from defeat." Tucker himself found "so many gentlemen on my own side of the House, as well as a solid phalanx on the other side of the House, in opposition to it," that he decided against forcing the issue. In the end, therefore, it was not the Republican opposition to the measure, but the determined support of important segments of his own party for minority guarantees which sealed the fate of the Tucker amendment.

In a sense, the Tucker amendment threatened the heart of the decision-making process which had emerged in the Democratic Houses of the 1870's and which would continue to mark that party's approach throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. In the absence of a clearly defined, coherent policy orientation, and in the face of deep internal divisions, the Democratic party within the House was not likely to support the removal of veto instruments from the decision-making system. The dilatory quorum was one way an intransigent faction could guard against party initiatives which were viewed as antipathetic to their goals, interests or political ideals. As an open guarantee that was available to each group within the party, and as a deterrent against majority rule, it also reflected the absence of a central and comprehensive consensus
within the diffuse internal world of the Democratic legislative party.

The disappearing quorum, however, was but one of the procedural safeguards of minority rights reaffirmed in the Revision of 1880, and but one of the checks on majority rule which existed in the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century. Another, more frequently abused privilege in this vein was the Dilatory motion, which gave individual members the right to filibuster House proceeding by proposing an endless series of time consuming, although technically admissible motions from the floor. Under the rules of the House, and indeed under the tenets of parliamentary law in general, certain motions always take precedence over others. The motion to adjourn, for example, takes precedence over all other motions under the rules of the House of Representatives. Thus, obstructionists could typically move to adjourn whenever an objectionable bill was brought before the House for a vote. When that motion was defeated by a voice vote, the obstructionist could usually call for a roll call vote. Failing that, the member could, under the rules of the House both before and after the Revision of 1880, reintroduce a motion to adjourn to a specific date, thus setting the filibuster on its course once again. Clearly, the admission of dilatory motions was a resource for those who favored a more fragmented and more fluid legislative decision-making system. Reaffirmed by the Revision of 1880, it provided yet another veto instrument for intransigent minorities fearful of the concerted action of a majority against their
own interests or goals.

Once again, the Democrats more than the Republicans continually propped up the idea of the dilatory motion. In January of 1875, for example, the Republicans had forwarded a proposal "to prevent dilatory motions for the remainder of the session, but it failed to receive the two-thirds vote needed to suspend the rules and give it a passage." Again in February of the same year, the Republicans, now less than a month from handing over control of the House to the Democratic party (which had come out of the 1874 elections with a majority in the Lower Chamber), tried once again to pass a civil rights bill over the opposition of an obstructionist Democratic minority by directing the Speaker to withhold recognition of all dilatory motions except "one motion to adjourn and one motion to fix the day to which the House of Representatives shall adjourn." This rule was agreed to by the House Republicans over the "strenuous objections" of Samuel Randall and the Democratic party. Predictably, then, when the next Congress convened in December of 1875, with the Democrats now in the majority, this specific rule was struck down. "Thus," Asher Hinds notes, "obstruction was officially reinstated." Randall later justified his support of dilatory motions by arguing that "Every presiding officer of almost every legislative body in the United States has always deemed, in the administration and execution of rules, that he stood as a protector of the minority on such administration."
Despite this avowed concern for minority rights, Randall himself quietly but consistently worked to at least preserve and to a certain extent expand the latent powers of the Speakership.\(^\text{78}\) The Revision of 1880, for example, largely at Randall's insistence, gave the Rules Committee its status as a standing committee, and although it would be a decade before that committee would blossom into the prime instrument of centralization in the House, majoritarianism and the strong Speakership, it did represent a step (if in Randall's career as Speaker, an unfulfilled one) away from the fragmented, veto-oriented legislative organizational style of the Democratic party in the 1880's.

Randall also successfully resisted a number of attempts on the part of his fellow Democrats, during the debate over the Revision of 1880, to curtail the formal powers of the Speaker including that one which gave him the right to name the committees of the House.\(^\text{79}\) The most potent, if indirect attack on the prerogatives of the Speakership was Oscar Turner's proposed amendment to the 1880 rules code which would discharge committees of consideration of any bill which had not been acted upon (by that committee) after thirty days. This discharge amendment was aimed, on the one hand, at protecting "the rights of the majority and (preventing) the will of the majority from being stifled by a committee."\(^\text{80}\) Yet, it was also a straightforward attack on the power of the committees (and not so indirectly of the Speaker who had appointed those committees) to control the legislative agenda.
of the House of Representatives. "The power of the committees of this House," one angry Member of Congress charged, "has reached a point startling to all lovers of democratic government, and smacks of the Star Chamber and secret doings of the privy council." Another member cautioned his colleagues, in terms likely to strike a responsive chord among fragmented Democratic party membership that "The tendency of our legislation is growing more and more toward centralism and the concentration of power in the hands of a few to the exclusion of the many and that feature is as objectionable in the rules governing this House as it is elsewhere."

The immediate source of this minor revolt, however, lay not so much in the general organizational tendencies of the House, but rather in an intra-party dispute over the tariff. Tariff reformers, within the Democratic party, were constantly thwarted in their attempts to pass a rate reduction bill by the actions of the Ways and Means Committee which refused to report such bills to the House floor for debate. In choosing the members of the Ways and Means Committee (responsible for revenue bills), Speaker Randall had been very careful to select members who generally shared his protectionist views, and so under the leadership of New York's Fernando Wood, the committee successfully quashed attempts to enact or even (once again) report bills aimed at reducing tariff schedules. Incensed by this blocking action, the tariff reform element in the party, led in 1880 by Turner and Adlai Stevenson, attempted
to undermine the power of the Ways and Means Committee to forestall revenue legislation. The debate over the thirty-day discharge rule was essentially, therefore, a debate over the tariff.

Predictably, Republican Members of Congress sided with Randall, Wood and the protectionist wing of the Democratic party in opposing the measure. Garfield, for example, charged that Turner's amendment was clearly a "disorganizing measure." Although he made reference to its hidden purpose when he suggested that "we do not want to run in tariff legislation in this way just now." Hendrick Wright, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, however, was even more direct in his denunciation of the Turner proposal warning that "in this amendment there is 'a cat in the meal tub,' and that a concerted effort was being made to overthrow the protective tariff. Wright concluded, "I think the protective principle is in better keeping now, in the hands of the proper committee, than it would be if the plan suggested here were adopted." After a brisk debate, the Turner amendment was soundly defeated as was the more pointed substitute amendment offered by Stevenson who proposed restricting the discharge option to revenue bills only.

In the end, then, the Revision of 1880 did little more than reaffirm the Democratic commitment to a fragmented decision-making system. The veto powers inherent in the disappearing quorum, the dilatory motion and other facets of the party's scrupulous regard for minority rights were left largely
intact. Plagued by internal dissension and a broad diversity of viewpoints, the Democratic party was in no position, in 1880, to push through a reform of the rules oriented toward legislative action. Republican control of the Executive Branch and the Senate also supported the organizational tendency among Democrats toward a fragmentation of the decision-making process and a broad distribution of veto powers among the House membership.

To be sure, a portion of the Democratic membership (e.g. tariff reformers) were anxious to take the legislative initiative and attempted to change the rules to fit this activist desire. Frustrated by six years of footdragging and outright opposition (both within and outside their party) to the cause of tariff reductions, these Members of Congress like Turner, Stevenson, Morrison and Mills sought ways of unleashing the Democratic legislative majority. Mills of Texas, for example, pleaded with the Rules Committee in 1879 to "so simplify the rules that the majority can make their will the law as far as the House is concerned." Yet, as the debate over the Revision of 1880 demonstrated, there really was no coherent or decisive Democratic majority to be unleashed. Ultimately, the Democratic party followed the advice of those like Samuel S. Cox of New York, who counseled his colleagues to embrace a measure of deliberateness in the legislative process and thus "avoid giving too much fluency to everything which comes here."
The dispersion of decision-making in the House of Representatives under the Democrats was necessarily underwritten by a relatively broad distribution of power and authority. The same divisiveness and disagreement over legislative goals which precluded the emergence of support for a centralized and coordinative decision-making system, also precluded support for a centralized exercise of power in the House. The basic divergence within the Democratic legislative party over policy goals produced an unwillingness on the part of party members to submit to one faction's political agenda. In a party which contained multiple agendas, the centralization of power had little support and even less legitimacy. It was also relevant to the Democratic consensus building task. In a divided party, agreement over specific legislative proposals could only come in a system which recognized the fluidity and temporary nature of issue coalitions within the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century. A dispersion of power, therefore, which gave individual members and factions the flexibility and bargaining leverage to propose and consider specific pieces of legislation (and thereby set the legislative agenda such as it was) was preferable to giving one group the power to impose its own agenda on the legislative process.

To a certain extent, the guarantees given minorities within Congress during the periods of Democratic control, (guarantees most forcefully reaffirmed, once again, in the Revision of 1880) represented a major concession to this demand for a devolution of power within the House and for a
more flexible policy bargaining process. The distribution of power, however, also took other more significant forms during the late nineteenth century era of Democratic rule in Congress. The most important of these was the continuous Democratic assault on the powers of the Appropriations Committee between the late 1870's and 1885. The nature and ultimate success of this assault on the Appropriations Committee illustrates the fragility of centralized power, in whatever form, during periods of Democratic rule between 1875 and 1895.

The Appropriations Committee has been, throughout its existence, one of the most powerful committees in the House of Representatives. Created in 1865 when, along with the Banking and Currency Committee, it was split off from the Ways and Means Committee, the Appropriations Committee reached the height of its powers in the late 1870's and early 1880's. The emergence of the strong Appropriations Committee was assured from the outset by its crucial control of one of the House's most important prerogatives -- the control of the Federal purse-strings. Yet, its relatively unbridled exercise of power and authority during the late nineteenth century was rooted even more squarely in the organizational nature of the Democratic Houses of that time. In the fragmented internal world of the nineteenth century Democratic Congresses, the centralized power of the Appropriations Committee over federal expenditures inherently gave it a great deal of leverage over the other actors in the legislative process.

This leverage was reinforced by the provisions of the
rules which gave the committee an almost unlimited power to report its bills at any time. This meant, of course, that the Appropriations Committee could essentially block legislation reported by other committees which a majority of its members opposed, by simply loading the House calendar down with its own Appropriations bills. The power to obstruct legislation in general and to report at any time bills which went to the heart of the House's own role, and the source of its own power in the Federal government (i.e. appropriations bills) thus provided the Appropriations Committee with a commanding position in the House of Representatives. In the absence of a strong Speakership, and a unified and action-oriented legislative process, for example, the Appropriations Committee played a dominant role in setting the legislative agenda, in obstructing or permitting the consideration of public and private bills and in distributing political rewards or sanctions (i.e. granting or denying public funds). In the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century, therefore, where individual members jealously guarded their own prerogatives to obstruct legislative action, and where rampant factionalism within the party precluded the development of a strong leadership, the Appropriations Committee became, by default, the de facto instrument, or more correctly, the embodiment itself of political leadership (such as it was). As the decade of the 1870's passed, however, it became clear that even this surrogate for central leadership was unacceptable to the fractious Democratic legislative party.
"This House," one Democratic Member charged in 1880, "should have recognized the fact ... . that no one committee should be clothed with more power than is found necessary to encompass the public interest." The present rules tend to hurt many of the Members, he continued:

for the reason that in reference to many matters in which they are interested they have not the opportunity to present them to the House, because the floor has been constantly occupied by the members of the Committee on Appropriations . . . 90

Another Democrat warned that, "There has been during the last few years a gradual concentration of power in the hands of the Committee on Appropriations, and it has grown to such an extent that the whole House is ready to rebel against it."91

The resentment thus expressed was shared by other Democrats in the House to the extent that a partially successful attempt was made by the members of the Commerce and Agricultural Committees to distribute appropriations responsibilities to other committees. Indeed, the Commerce Committee had formally won the right to report appropriations bills for rivers and harbors legislation in 1879, and Hinds suggests that it had actually exercised that power even before that.92

In 1880, during the debate over the Revision of 1880, the Commerce Committee once again successfully defended this prerogative over the objections of Randall and the Rules Committee, and in the process sparked a more general revolt against the powers of the Appropriations Committee.93
In the wake of the Commerce Committee's successful fight to report rivers and harbors bills, the House erupted in a flurry of amendments aimed at forcing a wholesale redistribution of the power of the Appropriations Committee. On February 3, 1880, Representative Aiken of South Carolina introduced a proposal to give the Agriculture Committee power to report appropriations bills for subjects relating to agriculture -- a proposal which was eventually passed. In quick succession amendments were proposed which would further divide the Appropriations process among a host of other committees including the Military Affairs Committee, the Post Office and Post Roads Committee, The Public Buildings and Grounds Committee and the Committee on Patents.

Ultimately, only the Agriculture and Commerce Committees were conceded the privilege of reporting appropriations bills within their own specified jurisdiction. Yet, despite the successful efforts of Randall and his allies (including most Republican leaders) in the struggle, it was clear that the termination of the debate over the revised rules in 1880 had not reflected any noticeable dampening of the resentment many members felt toward the Appropriations Committee. Clearly, the exercise of relatively central control over major portions of the legislative process was at odds with the prevailing views and interests of large segments of the diverse Democratic coalition. Given the array of ideals and goals represented by the Democratic legislative party, attempts to foster strong leadership and party discipline through institutions
of centralized power rested on a weak foundation indeed.

By 1885, this restiveness among Democrats had once again blossomed into open revolt against the power of the Appropriations Committee, (which was now chaired by Samuel Randall). Randall had been defeated in his bid to reassume the Speaker's chair in the 48th Congress (the Republicans had controlled the 47th Congress) by John G. Carlisle of Kentucky. Carlisle had nevertheless appointed Randall to the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee in an attempt to both recognize Randall's eminence in the House and placate his numerous followers. In this position, Randall dominated the legislative process to the extent that little passed the House that did not meet with his approval. This, coupled with his decisive role in the defeat of the Morrison tariff reduction bill in 1884 produced a renewed assault on the powers of the Appropriations Committee.

By the fall of 1885, as the first session of the 49th Congress approached, anti-Randall and anti-Appropriations Committee sentiment was clearly evident among Democrats throughout the nation. In early November, Henry Watterson published the results of a survey his newspaper had taken of incoming Members of Congress which showed that changing the rules in an effort to curb the power of the Appropriations Committee was the "demand of the hour." Many of those who responded to Watterson's poll, in fact, shared the view of Representative Barksdale of Mississippi who charged that the present rules gave the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee
the almost limitless power "to obstruct legislation upon measures to which he may be opposed." He concluded, "It is an extraordinary prerogative of which he should be divested." 100

In Washington itself, the sentiment against Randall was constantly encouraged by editorials in the local press. The Post, for example, long a bitter opponent of the Appropriations Chairman, recalled the previous session of the House in terms not likely to arouse sympathy for the cause of either Randall or his committee. The story of that previous session, the Post suggested, "is one unbroken record of repression as regards all measures not approved by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and of unfair and improper favoritism to all that he chose to further." 101 Members of Congress, themselves eager to open up the legislative process (particularly now that Democrat Grover Cleveland sat in the White House), called for the taming of the Appropriations Committee and its Chairman. "I am satisfied now that a change is necessary in the House rules," Dockery of Missouri told reporters, "for, after hurrying to get the reports on worthy objects (from his own committee on Claims to the House floor), we were rewarded by being put on the calendar and smothered in a heap" in large part by the Appropriations Committee. 102

As debate opened in the House over the issue, it became clear that the Democrats were no longer willing to tolerate the Appropriation Committee's control over the legislative process. "I do not believe," one Democrat explained, "in
this pretentious sort of honesty that some men set up here that they and they alone are competent and qualified solely to manage and distribute the treasure of this country." He announced his support for the distribution of Appropriations powers to the substantive committees "for the simple reason that it emancipates the members of this House, that it makes each member equal."103

The Rules Committee report itself proposed stripping the Appropriations Committee of its jurisdiction over appropriations bills dealing with matters originating in the Military Affairs Committee, the Committee on Naval Affairs, the Committee on Post Office and Post Roads, the Indian Affairs Committee and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Each of these committees, in addition to the Agriculture Committee, would have the right to report Appropriations bills for their own specified substantive areas at any time.104 Randall was the lone voice of dissent on the committee, (the favorable votes coming from Carlisle and Morrison of the Democratic Party and Reed and Hiscock of the Republican side), and he warned his colleagues that the Appropriations reform would inevitably lead toward excessive Federal spending.105

Few Democrats agreed with Randall's assessment, or at least few saw the threat of a wholesale raid on the Federal Treasury as important enough to outweigh the marked political advantages promised by a more even distribution of the Appropriations Committee's powers. Some, of course, like Hammond of Georgia were wary of what was certain to lead to
a decided departure from traditional Democratic ideals, particularly now that the party, for the first time since 1860, controlled the Executive Branch. "I am afraid to try this experiment when we have been posing for years as the party of reform and the party of economy par excellence." 106 Benton McMillin, too, warned that the fragmentation of Appropriations powers "will destroy the unity of design which should characterize the Appropriations for the various departments." 107.

For the most part, however, Democrats and indeed Republicans were, for different reasons, eager to weaken the Appropriations Committee's control of the legislative process. That control, Ollin Wellborn declared, constituted an "aristocracy" within the House which was "subversive of the representative principle." 108 A frustrated Randall responded to these charges by suggesting that "It has become the fashion in Congress that every proposition which does not meet with favor or does not secure a hearing has its defeat attributed to the Appropriations Committee." 109 And, in fact, this was precisely the contention of many Democrats who sought a broader distribution of political power, a freer access to the resources of political power, and a greater role in the decision-making system in the House. Thus, on December 18, the House voted overwhelmingly to reduce the Appropriations Committee's control over the disbursement of Federal funds. Although it still retained control over approximately 50 percent of the funds actually appropriated by the House, it
was forced to accede to the distribution of the other 50 percent to six other committees.

The next day, the Washington Post gleefully proclaimed in its article headline, "An end to Randallism . . . The House Votes Itself Honest." Suggesting that the House Democrats had at last emancipated themselves from the autocracy of the Appropriations Committee, the Post concluded that: "By the adoption of the new rules, the individuality of every member has been made of much more consequence." From a different perspective, however, the reform also promised to relieve the House democrats of the last center of legislative coordination. "What grand log-rolling there will be!" the pro-Randall New York Sun predicted, "Come see for yourself. It will remind you of old times."

Indeed, the move away from any form of central coordination of the legislative process, whether through the refusal to provide the Speakership with the legitimacy, the organizational tools or the support for unified action or through the weakening of the Appropriations Committee did lead to the kind of unstructured amorphous legislative system in which log-rolling and fragile and temporary political coalitions formed and dissolved. This was particularly ill-suited to the policy needs, as loosely expressed as they were, of a Democratic party publicly committed to tariff reform and fiscal stringency. The structural requirements of both of these issue orientations clearly lay in the direction of discipline and legislative coordination. Log-rolling and
a dispersed decision-making system, in other words, were not the institutional characteristics most likely to produce the kinds of fiscal sacrifices or tariff rate schedules demanded by Democratic ideology.

It would be difficult indeed to ignore or restrain the impact of the numerous constituency interests of those Members of Congress now so deeply involved in the decision-making process. In fact, as Pressman shows, the level of Appropriations rose dramatically in the areas covered by the committees which in 1885 gained the right to report spending bills. 113 Democratic action on tariff reform was similarly compromised as the House of Representatives turned away from the horizontal reduction idea to the much more moderate itemized revision proposed in the 1888 Mills Bill. Clearly, in other words, the legislative system of procedures and norms adopted by the Democrats between 1879 and 1885 were much more sharply attuned to their intra-party patterns of conflict and dissensus than they were to the specific organizational needs of their loosely defined legislative agenda.

A final illustration of the extent to which organizational form responded to the exigencies of conflict rather than to an internal institutional dynamic or to the functional demands of specific issues, is the manner in which the Democratic party, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, modified the role of the House in the national policy-making system. In part a response to the levels of fragmenta-
tion within the legislative party, these modifications in Congress' role were also related to the conflicts which existed between the House of Representatives and the Executive. This changing role perception can be most clearly seen in the forms the legislative outputs of the House took between the 1870's and the late 1880's. When the Republicans controlled the Executive Branch, Democrats tended to view their role as one which involved checking the policy excesses of the Administration. When Cleveland was in the White House, on the other hand, Democratic Houses modified their role toward actually making public policy. The best single example of this fluctuating role lies in the changing Democratic attitude toward political riders on Appropriations Bills.

In the spring of 1879, Democrats attracted the nation's attention in their showdown with President Hayes over the Army Appropriations Bills. The instrument of their challenge was the legislative rider attached to the appropriations bill which essentially forbade the use of Federal troops at Southern polling stations. These riders, in turn, were permitted in the House legislative process by what came to be known as the Holman Rule, named for its author, Democratic Representative William S. Holman of Indiana. Holman, later known as the "watchdog of the Treasury", had led the movement in 1876 to amend the rule regarding appropriations bills to allow riders (or amendments) on such bills if they worked to "retrench" expenditures.114 Up until that time (or at least throughout the years of Republican control of the House since
the 1860's), legislation or legislative riders were prohibited by the rules.

Clearly, Holman's intentions in proposing this change in the rules were purely those of ensuring greater economy in Appropriations bills. In an 1883 article, he made this clear, reaffirming his view that the greatest threat to American democratic ideals lay in "the remorseless growth of Federal expenditures." Holman believed that allowing legislative riders on Appropriations bills which reduced expenditures would broaden the power of the House membership to control Federal expenditures. The actual effect of the Holman rule, however, went far beyond those of guaranteeing fiscal stringency. In giving the Members of the House the license to attach legislative riders or provisos to Appropriations bills as long as they in some way led to a reduction of expenditures, the Holman Rule also gave Democrats in Congress the power to obstruct the political will of a Republican Executive and Senate. For the most part, then, the Holman Rule was used to veto Republican attempts to continue implementing its Civil War legislative policies (for example, the 1879 Army Appropriations struggle). 

The Holman Rule also conformed to the exigencies of conflict within the Democratic party. In the 1870's and early 1880's, it provided the Appropriations Committee with an additional resource for controlling, in the absence of any other center of leadership within the party, the legislative output of the House. In a period when Democrats could at
least unite in opposition to Republican-supported policies, most party members were content to give the Appropriations Committee the power to guard against measures not in their interest. The Holman Rule thus worked in Democratic Houses as a useful veto instrument, which if it failed to serve positive legislative ends, it at least provided Democrats with the ability to obstruct Republican policy initiatives (or the power to obstruct implementation of those initiatives).

In the late 1870's and early 1880's, therefore, Democrats tended to support the inclusion of the Holman proviso in the rules as the Republicans tended to oppose it. To Randall, the Holman Rule was "the rock upon which the Representatives of the Democratic party on this floor placed their party." It protected, so he reasoned, the Democratic party from falling prey to the Republican policy-making monolith. Others, like Goode of Virginia, agreed, noting that the Holman Rule "has not only been the means of enabling this Congress to save $30,000,000 of the people's money . . . but it has been the bulwark beyond which we have been able to keep the army from the polls." Republican, meanwhile, denounced the rule as "unwise in practice, revolutionary in tendency, and contrary to the spirit and genius of the Constitution." Minority leader Garfield attacked the rule arguing that:

Every conceivable scheme of partisan legislation that has torn this House with passion . . . all
these Trojan Horses, all these evils, all these political volcanoes which have burst in American politics for the last three years in this Chamber have done so through the crater of that rule (the Holman Rule). 120

The only value of the Holman Rule, Thomas B. Reed suggested, was the role it would play in "the extirpation of the Democratic party, which is to occur the next time the people of the United States have an opportunity to pass upon it." 121

Despite opposition, the Holman Rule was retained in the Revision of 1880 as Democrats decided to continue in their legislative role as the stumbling block to Republican political initiatives. By 1885, however, this role no longer suited the purposes of the Democratic rank and file. With the election of Grover Cleveland to the Presidency in 1884, Democrats had little to fear from the Republican party, and could envisage a somewhat different role for the House of Representatives in national policy-making. Party members were also becoming restive under the control of the Appropriations Committee and sought freer access to the Federal Treasury. Over Holman's protest, therefore, the Democrats voted overwhelmingly to replace the Holman proviso with a rule which made the introduction of any amendment "changing existing law" out of order on all Appropriations bills. 122

Clearly, the Holman Rule reflected a portion of the Democrats' view of the role their Congresses would play in the national policy-making system. To a certain extent, this perception was directly related to the partisan composition
of the other branches of government. When Republicans in
the Executive Branch of the Senate threatened Democratic
interests, the Democratic House retreated to the role of
legislative spoiler. When, on the other hand, a Democrat
was in the White House, Democrats relaxed their vigilant
stance in the House of Representatives and sought a part-
nership with the Executive Branch in national policy-making,
as was the case in 1885.

If the repeal of the Holman Rule in 1885 was related
to the partisan character of the Executive Branch, however,
the nature of the partnership which existed between the House
and the Presidency during Grover Cleveland's years in the
White House was more a function of the continued divisive-
ness within the Democratic legislative party. The repudia-
tion of its role as legislative spoiler did not reflect a
new activist role for the House in national policy-making.
For, if there was in the late 1880's a Democratic program
(and it is difficult to find evidence of a broad and compre-
hensive political program within the Democratic party at
that time), it was largely designed and produced in the
Executive Branch. The tariff issue, for example, dominated
the legislative process only after Cleveland identified it
as the major area of concern for the party in his 1887 message
to Congress. The Mills Bill of 1888 was in response to this
message.123

Coordination of the legislative process was also exer-
cised by the Executive Branch during Cleveland's tenure as
President. The lack of such coordination within the House, and the fragmented decision-making system which continued to preclude the emergence of such coordination in Democratic Houses throughout the late nineteenth century was largely responsible for the extraordinary number of bills which Grover Cleveland felt compelled to veto between 1885 and 1889. To a certain extent, Cleveland's use of the veto was aimed at providing the legislative process with the coordination and restraint which its dominant party within the House was unable or unwilling to exercise.

The role of the House of Representatives in the national decision-making system, therefore, was heavily colored by the internal disarray of the Democratic party throughout the late nineteenth century. As in its distribution of power, and in the dispersion of decision-making responsibilities, the role of the House in the American political process was largely determined by contextual forces working in its immediate political environment and the levels of dissensus it confronted from within its own halls. When the Republicans controlled the Senate and the Presidency, the Democratically led House of Representatives was not likely to play a dominant or initiative role in the national policy-making process. This is almost self-evident. More to the point, however, is the fact that the House would also fail to play a dominant role in national policy-making when the Democratic majority within the House was torn apart by internal factionalism. Thus, for example, even with Grover Cleveland in the White House, the
severely divided Democratic party in the House could not afford to play a positive role in national affairs.

As Joseph Cannon suggested later, the internal disarray of the Democratic party between 1885 and 1889 forced the House to take a subordinate role to the executive during that period of time, despite the initially positive intentions implied in the elimination of the Holman Rule in 1885. Congress' role, like other aspects of its internal organizational behavior, was a significant reflection as well as a conscious response to the exigencies of internal conflict or cohesiveness within the dominant party within the House.

The internal world of the House of Representatives during periods of Democratic control between 1878 and 1895, then reflected that party's weakness, the internal fragmentation and the organizational problems it was forced to confront. Unable to create a measure of unity and discipline within its own ranks during this time, it forced the House to provide a system for building the consensus that the party itself was unable to provide. In the absence of internal party cohesiveness, the Democratic decision-making process in the House was driven, not by centralized coordination, but rather by the disparate and often disjunctive groups, interest, structures, and actors which competed, bargained and struggled for preferred political prizes within the legislative arena.

This in turn placed real limits on the role the House
played in the national decision-making process. As an institution which spoke not with one political voice, but with many, and as one which expressed not one comprehensive political program, but a diverse number of specific policy goals, the House was forced to rely on the Executive Branch for a measure of legislative coherence. Unwilling to provide its own internal structures or leaders the power and authority to define programmatic goals and to arbitrate between competing interests and views, Members of the House were forced to depend upon and accede to the policy coordination imposed by the President. Of the 414 bills which were vetoed by President Cleveland between 1885 and 1889, for example, only two were ever overridden by the Congress.126

Ironically, therefore, the internal processes of the late nineteenth century House of Representatives during the periods of Democratic rule, presaged, in many ways, the organizational forms twentieth century Congresses would later take. In many ways, the distribution of power, the fragmented decision-making system, the reactive (i.e. to the policy initiatives of the President and the Executive Branch) role they assumed in the late nineteenth century, the Democratic Congresses were products of the same kinds of ill-defined and fragmented conflict patterns which, for somewhat different reasons, would mark both parties in the twentieth century House of Representatives. In the absence of cohesive partisanship, in the absence of clearly defined and widely shared policy goals, and in the absence of a clearly defined mandate from its
national constituency, the Democrats of this era, like the parties of the twentieth century, were forced to construct an internal legislative system in which momentary coalitions, log-rolling, dispersed centers of power and authority and multiple veto points were predominant.

In this sense, the case of the late nineteenth century Democratic Houses of Representatives illustrates the extent to which Congress' internal world is determined far more decisively by forces working in its immediate political environment than it is by more long range developmental dynamics. External political realities and the effects of those external realities on conflict within Congress produced the internal world of the nineteenth century Democratic House of Representatives rather than a monotonic and gradually unfolding modernizing urge. Indeed, as subsequent chapters will show, Congress' evolution was essentially the composite of a series of discrete organizational responses to changes in that body's political environment. As such, the Democratic House of the late nineteenth century was essentially a direct organizational response to the political tensions, the conflicts and disarray which that party brought into the legislative process during this period of time.
Chapter V
Republican Party Coherence
and the
Legislative Process

Internalists suggest that Congress' development has proceeded along relatively deterministic lines toward its present form. This inexorable march toward modernity has produced an institution which is at once an autonomous and effective actor in Federal politics. The suggestion is, of course, that the changes the House of Representatives has undergone in the past century have been, by and large, consistent with the internally-specific needs of a political body entrusted with the task of producing legislation for a modern society. The history of organizational change within Congress, in other words, conforms to the logic of an institutionalization process carried on independently of the forces working in the House's immediate political environment. Congress has progressed toward its present stage, contemporary internalists tend to imply, in a constant, gradual and, despite minor fluctuations or deviations, an almost linear fashion. The history of the House of Representatives, therefore, is essentially the one-dimensional story of that body's triumphant rise to modernity.
As ecologists argue, however, Congressional history has no more proceeded according to the logic and imperatives of one grand dynamic force than the rest of American history. The story of America's political evolution, Burnham suggests, for example, "is not quite all of a piece,"¹ and as both he and Price claim, neither is the study of Congress' evolution. Rather, the patterns of Congressional change suggest that the House is an evolving body -- an adaptive and relatively fluid one which has gone through a number of significant institutional transformations in the course of its history. Indeed, as even Polsby concedes, its development has been marked by decidedly rapid and non-incremental shifts in the very indicators he employs to demonstrate its relative continuity. Thus, for example, he struggles with the problems of relating the major changes which occurred in the House around the turn of the century to his theoretically gradual notion of institutionalization.²

These non-incremental patterns of change, then, suggest that the search for the roots of the evolution of the House of Representatives be carried on beyond the systems-oriented limits of the internalist approach to Congressional history. This suggestion also finds support in an examination of the extent to which the House did in fact change shape throughout its history. Internal norms, rules and procedures, and indeed even its role in the national political system changed from era to era and even from Congress to Congress often in such rapid and dramatic fashion, that the evolution of the House
of Representatives can be more realistically viewed in terms of a parade of almost discrete organizational incarnations than it can in terms of a coherent developmental progression.

This theme can perhaps be best illustrated through an examination of the dramatic fluctuations the House underwent between the late 1880's and mid-1890's. During this period, control of the House alternated between the Democrat and the Republicans four times, with the Republicans ultimately establishing their hegemony in the 54th Congress. This period, consequently produced often dramatic changes in the way in which the House was organized and in the norms and procedures which ruled the legislative process. As the prevailing level of dissensus varied from Congress to Congress, and as the contextual features of the House of Representatives' political environment (in particular, once again, the constraints which bound Members of Congress to their constituents, and the manner in which the political demands of those constituents were expressed and organized) changed, the internal legislative world followed suit. When, for example, the House was confronted by periods of fragmented conflict, as it was when the internally divided and heterogeneous Democratic Party was in control, the organizational system responded with a characteristic decentralization of power and decision-making roles and a typically high regard for the rights of minorities to veto special pieces of legislation. Periods of Republican dominance, on the other hand, produced a House which was more attuned to the demands and organizational resources of a coherent, unified and deter-
mined majority interested in legislative action.

The contrasts between the Democratic and Republican Congresses during this period serve as useful examples of the extent to which the nature of the House of Representatives was largely determined by forces working in that body's political environment. The timing of the internal changes within the House, as well as the magnitude and nature of those changes can be best explained by a search for the changing political realities which encouraged Members of Congress to seek the goals they in fact sought and which in turn forced Congress to behave the way it did. By and large, in other words, the pressures which worked to define the patterns of conflict and dissensus within the House, also worked to define the way Congress molded its organizational style and designed its legislative process.

The point is that Members of Congress make the rules and procedures, and create the kind of House system which best meets their political needs. Mayhew and Price have already suggested as much -- Mayhew arguing that election needs dominate the Members' search for an internal organizational style, while Price suggests that career goals serve as the primary consideration. Clearly, however, there is a multitude of needs and a number of goals which Members of Congress pursue in the House. These needs, which are the product of the combination of their own personal ambitions, goals and political views are also constrained and conditioned by the
demands and expectations, as well as the organization of those demands and expectations of their constituents. The accumulation and interplay of all these diverse needs and forces impinging on the individual member (and leading him to pursue the specific goals he in fact does pursue) are reflected in the patterns of conflict, disagreement and divisiveness which each House contains.

Irrespective of which specific goal or which particular political need dominates the outlook of the Member of Congress, in other words, it is the scale and pattern of dissensus (which the pursuit of these individual goals and needs on the part of Members of Congress produces) to which the legislative process must adapt. Different and varying patterns of conflict (whether there is a diversity of goals and needs or whether there is a relative congruence of goals and needs) will confront the Members of the House with different and varying hurdles to the achievement of their goals. In either case, it is this conflict and these specific patterns of divisiveness which must be managed and resolved if Members are to successfully pursue the goals and meet the needs they have set for themselves (or again, which their constituents have set for them). The legislative process, then, is designed by the Members of Congress to resolve the kind of conflict and the patterns of disagreement they confront in a way which allows them to best meet their legislative needs.
This point has already been brought out in the examination of the Democratic Houses of the 1880's, but it can also be seen in the characteristics which distinguished those Democratic Houses from the Republican Congresses of the same period. In this chapter, these contrasts will be examined in an attempt to reinforce the notion that the Congressional process has evolved in an ongoing response to the forces which shaped the patterns of conflict which existed within the House of Representatives. The rules, norms and procedures which emerged and disappeared, gathered strength or were weakened through succeeding Congresses, were essentially the instruments the Members of those Congresses employed to reconcile their own goals and needs with the kinds of conflict and dissensus they faced.

This chapter, then, will continue the examination of the evolution of the House between 1878 and 1921 with a description of the Republican organizational response, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, to the needs and patterns of conflict which it confronted within the House. It will attempt to both explain the nature of that response -- the norms, the rules and the procedures which came to dominate the legislative process during the years of Republican rule -- as well as the forces which produced that response. It will suggest, finally, that the differences which existed between Democratic and Republican Houses in the late nineteenth century, and the changes each party brought with it to the legislative process, were the products of the
political worlds each party represented, and of the distinctive conflict styles which each party consequently brought to the internal world of the House.

In the fall of 1888, the Republicans narrowly won control of the House of Representatives for the first time since 1880 and only the second time since 1874. So narrow, in fact, was the margin of victory (in terms of seats) over the Democratic party that many observers expected the Republicans to do little more than mark time until the 1890 elections. Indeed, in view of the large number of contested election cases awaiting disposition by the House, the Republicans, it was believed, could expect to control no more than three or four seats above a simple majority, and given the inevitable problems of absenteeism, sickness and death, the prospects for a workable and sustainable majority were not at all bright. In addition, the existing rules promised to help the Democrats in obstructing any Republican legislative initiative which they deemed acceptable.

The rules of the House and the norms which animated the behavior of its members, however, were the creation of the Democratic party and depended for their strength on the continued existence of a majority party which was in disarray. The dispersion of authority, the wide distribution of veto powers, the broad opportunities provided for obstruction, and the marked devolution of decision-making responsibility
were all products of the very diffuse, ill-defined and uneasy character of the Democratic legislative coalition. As the first session of the 51st Congress (i.e. the Congress elected in 1888) approached, it was clear to an increasingly nervous Democratic party that, despite the narrowness of the Republican majority, the House of Representatives was to be a very different place in 1889-1890 than it had been during the decade and a half of Democratic rule which had preceded it.

For one thing, the 1888 election had given one party control of all three branches of government for the first time in fifteen years. Clearly, the Republican party had the resources and the power to take the policy-making initiative. More significantly, however, was the fact that the Republican party was ideologically geared toward legislative action. This penchant for activism, moreover, was as evident in that party's organizational base -- its inherent issue coherence, the homogeneity of its constituency base, its organizational unity, and its party discipline -- as it was in the programmatic outlook of its members. Majority rule, therefore, was the normative standard to which Republican Members of Congress tended to pledge allegiance.

This attachment to the principle of legislative action -- one which was reinforced by the specific provisions of the party's political platform -- had been evident in the House throughout the 1880's, and had been encouraged by the brilliant and majestic Thomas B. Reed. Reed towered over
the other House figures of his time—and far more than anyone else became both the guiding spirit and the reflection of the legislative outlook which emerged within the Republican party in the 1880's and which ultimately worked to reshape the House of Representatives in the 1890's. Above all, Reed redefined and rejuvenated his party's commitment to legislative action (a commitment which had clearly waned in the 1870's) and did much to set the agenda and secure the organizational basis upon which this renewed commitment could project itself on to the legislative stage.

Reed had been a consistent supporter of political activism since his early days in the House. His arguments, however, became more compelling as he himself rose in eminence within his party. As early as 1885, for example, shortly after he had been elected leader of the (then minority) Republican party delegation in the House, Reed's appeals for a restoration of the principle of majority rule in the Congress became more insistent. "The greatest grievance," he observed that year, "and the one that calls most loudly for remedy is that under the rules that have grown up, the majority of the House is without power over the business of the House." Reed's early calls for a streamlining of the internal procedures of the House were constantly thwarted by a Democratic majority which, as he himself recognized, had neither the organizational nor the ideological resources for such an approach to legislative decision-making. "The
Democratic party wants no legislation," he once quipped in an address to the citizens of his home town, Portland, Maine. "All the Southern men, who control the party, want or ask for is to be left alone . . . Hence, all their plans, whether in power or out, are centered on obstruction." 7

Reed also tended to believe that the Democrats' obsession with minority rights stemmed from their inability to assemble and sustain a coherent policy coalition. Fragmented and weakened as they were by internal conflict, the legislative process of the Houses they ruled therefore was designed as much to protect Democrats from themselves as they were designed to protect and further the party's ill-defined and diffuse political interests. Thus, Reed argued, "the rules of the House, instead of being merely business regulations, a mere systematization of labor, were a charter of privileges for those whose arguments were too weak to convince the House." 8 The Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean reiterated this charge when it suggested that "the abuse of the powers of the minority . . . largely grew out of the fact that under the Randall rule the House presented the spectacle of a free-trade body presided over by a protectionist." Thus, the paper concluded, "The Speaker was at heart more than willing to have the minority hold the majority in check." 9 The Democrats, in other words, were both pragmatically disinclined, and organizationally unable to produce the kind of legislative process Reed wanted, and so long as they were in control -- and so long as they designed that
legislative process — adherence to the tenets of majority rule was unlikely.

With the Republican victory in 1888, therefore, Reed was given the opportunity to implement his organizational ideas, much to the chagrin of his Democratic opponents. Throughout the months preceding the opening of the first session of the 51st Congress, political observers and supporters of both parties, engaged in a debate over the shape the new House would take under Republican rule. Reed himself, meanwhile, left little doubt that he would lead the struggle to reorganize the House. In January of 1889, for example, Reed reiterated his support for a changed state of affairs in the House. "Minority rights in this country are guaranteed by a written constitution," he told his colleagues. "The rules of this House are not for the purpose of protecting the rights of the minority, but to promote the orderly conduct of the business of the House." 10 Democrats, uneasy with Reed's devotion to the idea of majority rule, responded with characteristic expressions of disapproval of what they viewed as a majoritarian steamroller. "The rules of the House are made not only . . . for the orderly conduct of the public business," Charles Crisp charged, retreating to the traditional Democratic position, "but there is a greater and higher object, and that is to protect the rights of the minority, to restrain, in the language of the old law-writers, the unbridled license of the majority." 11
As the opening of the new Republican Congress approached, others added their voices and pens to the discussion. Lloyd S. Bryce, for example, lent his reasoned arguments to the side of majoritarianism in a North American Review article in which he suggested that under the existing rules, the House was far less than the representative body it claimed to be.

For instance, is it not an absolute denial of the rights of the people, what is occurring now? Here is a large majority of the House desirous of expressing their views in one form or another upon the Oklahoma and the Union Pacific funding bills -- measures affecting countless numbers of people and vast interests -- and yet one man holds them in check, obstructing also all other kinds of legislation for the transaction of which three hundred and twenty-four other members were sent here.12

Nor were the Democrats without their sympathizers in this growing national debate. The Nation, for example, supported the cause of obstruction and minority rights. As late as 1891, this prestigious journal would continue to lend its weight to the Democratic side, arguing that "The great legislative mischief of our time is not the difficulty which majorities find in legislating, but their disposition to legislate overmuch . . . The legislative fever of the majorities is one of the great curses of the day."13 More pointed criticisms were forwarded by Democrats who, like McCreary of Kentucky, warned the Republicans that if they "attempt to commit arbitrary, unjust and oppressive acts, the Democrats should fight them to the uttermost." When asked what would
constitute an overt act of oppression, McCreary replied, "An attempt to revise the rules of the House and impose on the minority an arbitrary and tyrannical code."¹⁴

The majority rule principle thus had its adherents and detractors, both within and outside of the House of Representatives, and throughout the summer and fall of 1889, these advocates made their cases to the American people. "Recognizing the fact that party supremacy must depend upon public opinion," Roger Q. Mills cynically charged, the Republicans "have been persistently courting its approval of the changes (against the wishes of the Democratic obstructionists) in order that they may have its support when they proceed to level the barriers in their way."¹⁵ Indeed, the Republicans did court public opinion, but they did so with arguments designed to persuade the nation in general and their own constituents in particular, that the attachment to majoritarianism was securely rooted in a consistent and non-partisan regard for democratic ideals.

Yet, although the Republican commitment to an evolving idea of majority rule was sustained in part by such an abstract belief in the righteousness of that path, it was also nurtured by the specific policy goals and the organizational basis of the Republican party itself. On the one hand, in other words, the Republican party -- now in control of the Senate, the Executive Branch and the House of Representatives -- was anxious to press forth its policies and goals. "Unless the House could be emancipated from the bad traditions
of fifty years," Reed later argued, "there was no hope of legislation, and all the fierce contests by which a Republican President had been elected and a Republican House had been installed would have been in vain." Among the specific pieces of legislation which a rules change would allow to be passed, Henry Cabot Lodge promised, were changes in the tariff schedules, the passage of an election law and the extension of civil service reform. The Republican party which had for fifteen years been unable to control the Federal Government, was in 1889 eager to enact and implement its national program. Thus, in October of 1889, Reed promised that an attempt would be made to clear the path for the Republican party agenda in the House by establishing "rules which will facilitate the public business." Reed was predictably vague as to the forms these changes would take, but it was clear nevertheless that they would reflect his own belief that "Statesmanship does not consist in attitudinizing and throwing responsibility on somebody else but in doing something." 

The Republican assault on the rules -- supported as it was by abstract appeals to democratic ideals and an activist political orientation -- was in the end, however, based upon the unity of the party. This relative lack of internal discord within the Republican party was the critical element in the growing support for an overthrow of a set of rules which had been enacted to serve the interests of a fragmented and
divisive Democratic party. The House of 1889 was a far different one than the Democratic Houses which had preceded it, and thus the call for a change of the rules was essentially a call for the recognition of that difference.

The internal workings of the House system which had been created and sustained in the 1880's by a party that lacked a clear political consensus, by a majority that lacked programmatic coherence, and by the existence of intense Democratic factional strife, would give way to a party coalition that was programmatically united and relatively free of the internal problems which had forced the Democrats to decentralize the decision-making system, to allow the devolution of power and to oversee the emergence of a passive, vete-oriented role for the House, in national political affairs. The Republican victory in 1888, in other words, had laid the foundation for a significantly altered legislative body -- one in which new normative assumptions and more powerful organizational resources would be brought to bear. As one alarmed Democrat concluded therefore from Reed's statements and actions in the months preceding the opening of the 51st Congress, "He does not propose to amend any rules, he looks to bringing forward a spick and span new set!" 20

Clearly, the Republican House of Representatives would be different from the Democratic Houses which had preceded it, but as Congress assembled in December of 1889, it was still uncertain precisely how different that Republican House
would be. For one thing, Reed was not assured the renomination as his party's candidate for Speaker. It was unclear, therefore, exactly how far the leadership would go in pushing through major organizational changes. The presumption was that McKinley (Reed's prime Republican opponent) might not be as zealous in pushing through the majoritarian reform package as Reed. Beyond this, however, was the uncertainty as to the level of support the majoritarian course would find among the rank and file Republican members. To be sure, the Republican party was united and capable of organizational discipline, but the overthrow of the obstructionist norms and rules promised not only a strengthening of the central institutions of power and authority in the House, but also a corresponding decline in the levels of power and autonomy individual Members of Congress had come to enjoy in the 1880's.

On November 30, 1889, the Republican party caucus met and on the second ballot nominated Reed for Speaker giving him 85 votes to the 38 of his nearest rival, McKinley. Reed was then duly elected to the Speakership by a vote of the House on December 2, 1889, with the solid support of his party. From that moment, it became clear that major changes in the internal procedure of the House were imminent. Yet, it was still unclear how far Reed's Republican colleagues were prepared to allow the Speaker to go in creating the organizational setting capable of ensuring the decisive legislative action he desired. Reed, meanwhile, did little before the December 21, Christmas recess to show his hand beyond the
selection of committees, but all observers "were well aware that trouble was brewing" for a confrontation over the rules.21 On January 6, 1890, the House resumed amidst speculation that Reed would soon make his move.22 Still functioning under general parliamentary procedure, the House awaited the Republican reform campaign. On January 22 Reed won a minor skirmish over the call for a Teller vote on a Democratic motion to adjourn. Reed rejected the motion as obstructionist and inadmissible, and was sustained by his party on a vote of 149 to 137.23 The Democratic press reacted with predictable outrage to this parliamentary highhandedness, accusing Reed of running the House of Representatives on "the plan of the ward primary mass meeting where the side which gets its man in the chair controls regardless of the vote."24 In the days following this ruling, it became clear that Reed was prepared to brook no compromise in securing the type of legislative organization necessary for clear and decisive action.

It was also clear that one of the first hurdles to that preferred system was the Disappearing Quorum tactic which promised to be a major weapon of the obstructionist Democratic minority in the closely divided 51st Congress. The disappearing quorum, however, had also become a central symbol of what Reed believed was more generally wrong with the internal procedures of the House. The use of the disappearing quorum was originally meant, so Reed felt, to be "a convenient method of demanding debate, of calling the attention of the
country to violent political measures, and deserved many of
the commendations it then received,

but when in 1882 it commenced to be the common
method of preventing a decision of election
cases, and finally in 1889 reestablished the
Liberium Veto of the old Polish Diet, whereby
a single member became the arbiter of destiny,
every man of sense recognized the fact that
the practice was doomed. 25

Reed believed, in other words, that the disappearing quorum
had deviated from its original intent to the point where it
had become a major impediment to legislative action.

Reed had earlier found support for his position on the
disappearing quorum tactic in an article written by Lloyd S.
Bryce which characterized the "habit of non-participation
while physically present (as) unfortunate." To the typical
British Member of Parliament, Bryce added, "the view which
recognized those who were physically present as being also
legally present (would commend) itself to his common-sense." 26
The Clerk of the British House of Commons would himself later
make much the same point in even stronger language. Commis-
issioned by the North American Review to examine Reed's
rulings in 1890, Reginald Palgrave characterized the dis-
appearing quorum as a "device beneath the tactics of the
most radical vestryman in effete old England." 27 He also
caricatured the Democrats who engaged in this exercise as
"jesters" who "pipe their brethren into dance" and who "then
sit still and decline to make up the set." 28
The opinions of such outside observers, however, had far less importance on the outcome of the struggle over the disappearing quorum than those of the Republican Members of Congress upon whom Reed had to rely for support, and in this group there appeared to be some uneasiness about the scope, not only of Reed's imminent assault on the disappearing quorum, but that which he also seemed eager to make upon the entire range of minority rights and individual prerogatives in the House. The Washington Post, for example, reported on January 8 that "Mr. Reed's code of rules is not likely to be altogether acceptable to his Republican colleagues on the (Rules) Committee -- Messrs. McKinley and Cannon." The Post concluded that "The chances are that all the innovations proposed by Speaker Reed will not be sustained." 29

Other newspapers around the country were meanwhile searching for clues as to exactly what Reed would ultimately propose. The consensus seemed to be that the Speaker would probably be careful to cultivate the support of his Republican colleagues, but that something dramatic was, nevertheless, in the works. McKinley himself, believed by many to be a moderate on the rules issue, fueled this type of speculation by dismissing opposition to the reform cause as little more than empty bravado. "The people of the country," he argued, after all, "are infinitely more concerned in what the House is doing than they are in the rules that they are working under." 30
By mid-January, both sides began marshalling their forces for a major struggle. Rules Committee member Samuel Randall, who lay dying of cancer in his Washington residence, summoned John G. Carlisle, the Democratic minority leader, to his bedside to discuss Reed's proposals for reform. "I think the proposed changes, many of them, very obnoxious in their character," Randall told Carlisle who was the other Democratic member of the Rules Committee, "and the House will expect you and me to join in a minority report succinctly setting forth the vital changes and our objections thereto." 31

The Republicans, meanwhile, began making their own preparations for the fight, the details of which were still unknown to all but Thomas B. Reed. On January 17, 1890, Thomas Henderson, Chairman of the Republican Caucus, sent a circular around to all of his Republican colleagues urging their attendance in the House chamber. Noting the chronic absence of "some thirty Republican members," from the daily sessions, Henderson requested all party members "to be present every day from now on until the adjournment, it being absolutely necessary that there should be present during the sessions of the House a quorum of Republicans for the transaction of public business." 32

On January 27 the Republicans caucussed once again to discuss the new rules which were at that point still being considered by the Rules Committee. A number of members lent their support to the idea of delaying the introduction of the new rules until after the contested election cases
had been decided. To many, the temporary powers granted the Speaker under general parliamentary practice would allow the quick and, to the Republicans, satisfactory settlement of such cases. Others, however, who, like Representative Cheadle of Indiana and Anderson of Kansas, were uneasy with any broad-based reform which would radically and permanently curtail the powers of the individual Member of Congress, expressed the hope that the favorable disposition of the contested election cases would give the Republicans a more comfortable majority and thereby eliminate the need for anything as dramatic as an eradication of the devices of obstructionsim. 33

In the end, the caucus acquiesced to Reed's relatively vague appeal for support in case the Democrats should decide to attempt to obstruct the debate over the election cases. Despite, or indeed perhaps because of this decision, many left the caucus meeting uncertain as to just what they had actually committed themselves to, 34 and at least one member (Anderson) had to be coerced into giving his blanket approval for the Speaker's future actions. 35 Even within the Republican inner circle, uncertainty prevailed. "We agreed with (Reed) that the filibuster must be destroyed if the House was to accomplish anything for which it had been elected," Joseph Cannon later recalled, but "no decision was made as to when or how this was to be done. The Speaker had to be the judge of the situation and conditions." 36
On January 29, Reed made his long expected move. After the disposition of some routine legislative matters in the House, John Dalzell, a Republican of Pennsylvania, brought up for consideration the contested election case of Smith vs. Jackson. In this case Jackson, a Democrat of West Virginia, had been awarded his seat in the House by the Governor of the State under what were at best clouded circumstances, and the Republicans had an extremely strong case for overturning his election and seating his Republican opponent, Charles B. Smith.

The Democrats had apparently been anticipating the report, but had not decided upon a course of action. The New York Times reported that minority leader Carlisle had noted earlier in the day that "he did not believe the Democrats would prevent consideration, but would make their fight on the adoption of the resolution unseating Jackson." The ranking minority member of the Elections Committee, Charles Crisp of Georgia, however, reacted immediately by raising the question of consideration (i.e. should the matter be considered at this time?). Reed thereupon put the question to the House on a voice vote, and determined that the issue had been decided in the affirmative. Crisp responded once again by demanding a division and followed this with a demand for a roll call vote. The Republicans, meanwhile, had lost their power to assemble a quorum (a majority of the House membership) through the death on January 9 of William
Kelley of Pennsylvania, the sickness of another member and family problems of a third. When the roll was called, therefore, the results showed that the Republicans did not have the 165 votes needed to constitute a quorum. After a recount, the result of the vote gave the ayes 162 and the nays 1, with 163 not voting. The Democrats had used the disappearing quorum to block the unseating of one of their members.

During the call of the roll, however, Speaker Reed had been seen checking names on the tally sheet in front of him. When the final result was announced, he calmly directed the Clerk "to record the following names of members present and refusing to vote." Beginning with Representative Newton Blanchard of Louisiana, Reed called out the names of the Democrats whose physical presence he had noted during the roll call. The applause and cheers which greeted Reed's move from the Republican side of the House were quickly equalled by the howls of protest from the Democratic side. "I deny the power of the Speaker and denounce it as revolutionary," Breckenridge of Kentucky roared while Reed continued with his list. At one point, James McCreary of Kentucky jumped to his feet to protest Reed's calling of his name. "I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me as present," he cried, over the din of raised voices. To this point Reed had not acknowledged the Democratic protest, but after McCreary's outburst, he calmly looked up from his list of names and gave his now-famous reply, "The chair is making a statement
of the fact that the gentleman from Kentucky is present. Does he deny it? The Republican side erupted once again with laughter and cheers, and the Democrats increased the vigor of their protest, as the House settled in for a protracted and unruly four-day debate over the issue. By the end of the first day, however, it was clear that Reed with the united support of his party had successfully taken the first step toward the massive reform program he had promised.

The unity of the Republican party during this crisis was clearly the decisive factor in the struggle for majoritarian reform which was effectively begun during the fight over the Smith-Jackson election case. Without that support, Reed could never have been successful in his assault on the doctrine of minority rights. This unity, in turn, hinged partially upon the nature of the Republican coalition and its policy coherence and unity of purpose in the House of Representatives. Prepared to enact a major legislative program, the Republican side of the House was clearly intent on creating the procedural instruments and designing a system capable of achieving its collective legislative goals. The checks on majority action which the divided Democratic party had been forced to enact by the pressures imposed by its own fragmented and conflict-ridden membership was clearly unsuited to the disciplined activist leanings of the relatively united Republican majority which now ruled the House.

The assault on the obstructionism of the Democratic
Congresses, however, also succeeded in part because of the extraordinary leadership of Thomas B. Reed. To be sure, the factors which combined to produce the partisan unity -- the strong allegiance of the members to (and their dependence on) the party organization; the coherent and comprehensive issue orientation of Republican representatives; the short-term career perspectives; the tactical resources the combination of these factors gave the Republican House leadership; and the willingness of that leadership to use these resources to encourage loyalty and discourage deviation -- were the keys to the success of the reform movement in the 51st Congress. Yet, it was Reed's leadership which ultimately gave life to these latent forces and which produced a clear definition of their legislative purpose.

Even the opposition within, as well as outside, which immediately began assailing Reed as a Czar, a dictator and even a "Mongolian-faced Despot," acknowledged the force and importance of his determination and courage. In the midst of the storm over the quorum ruling, the Washington Post reported, "Speaker Reed, against whom all this tumult was directed, sat resolutely and grimly immovable, a constant remainder to the Democrats that they must expect no quailing on his part." Wrote another observer:

I am not one of those who question at all his honesty or his sincerity. These are the very qualities which make him dangerous. He is clearly earnest all the time. His belief in himself and in the correctness of all his views never is shaken.
Even Lord Bryce, who found many of Reed's political views distasteful, betrayed a grudging respect for his decisive leadership. "You are always sure that he is dead wrong," Bryce explained, "but he makes you think at the moment that he is dead right, for he not only has the talent of knowing just what to say, but the genius of knowing just when to leave off . . . He is a tower of strength, to which all his party cling."44

In part, Reed's decisiveness and courage stemmed from the certainty that his course of action over the rules was the correct one. Years of reflection had led him to believe that the Democratic approach to legislative organization was neither consistent with the stature of the House of Representatives in national politics (or at least with the stature he believed it ought to have in national political affairs), nor in line with the goals of an activist and unified Republican legislative party. The preoccupation with minority rights and obstructionism, the diffusion of power and authority, the weakening of central instruments of decision-making, the lack of a coordinated policy (legislative)-making process, and a passive House of Representatives, he believed, were all pathological symptoms of a majority party handicapped by its own divisiveness and disarray. Reed saw little reason why the House should continue to function under rules and norms which were essentially the products of the organizational and political shortcomings of the Democratic party.
A Republican House should not be compelled to submit to a legislative process designed to cater to the internal weaknesses and failings of the Democratic party. His belief in the virtue of his own reform course of action, therefore, was firmly rooted in his contempt for the impotence of the Democratic party. When asked, for example, how he felt facing the Democratic uproar over his quorum ruling, Reed betrayed both his confidence in the logic and wisdom of his action, and his disdain for the opposition by replying, "I felt "Just as you would feel if a big creature were jumping at you and you knew the exact length and strength of his chain and were quite sure of the weapon you had in your hands."45

Reed's self-confidence, however, was also sustained by his ability to cushion criticism and opposition with a sense of humor and perspective. "What was done in the House was right and will surely sustain itself," he suggested in a letter to Theodore Roosevelt,

I have no fear of that, but meanwhile I expect no little buffeting from the enemy and more backbiting from certain quarters but the clouds always roll by and the Lord knows his own. I wish, however, that more distinct recognition of them in this world was part of the divine plan.46

Finally, Reed's decisive leadership was the result of a personal determination to get his way with the rules or leave the House. If he had lost the quorum ruling in 1890,
Reed later revealed, "I should simply have left the Chair, resigning the Speakership, and left the House . . . I had made up my mind that if political life consisted in sitting helplessly in the Speaker's chair, and seeing the majority powerless to pass legislation, I had had enough of it." Reed added that "it is a very soothing thing to know exactly what you are going to do, if things do not go your way." Thus, although the dramatic changes in the procedures of the House of Representatives were built upon the foundation of the Republican party itself and the unity of purpose which it brought to the Congress in 1889, they were in no small way also the product of Reed's leadership. While, in other words, the Republican legislative coalition itself provided the essential raw materials (unity, coherence, and a fundamental agreement on issues and goals) for such a radical transformation of the rules, it was Reed himself who defined the strategic options open to the party, who mobilized these resources, and who ultimately gave shape to the form the legislative process would take under Republican rule in the 1890's and, as it turned out, during the first decade of the twentieth century.

The dramatic quorum ruling proved to be merely the opening salvo in Reed's campaign to restructure the House, both to meet the legislative goals of the Republican party and to more adequately reflect the party's organizational strengths. On February 5, 1890, two days after the Smith-Jackson case had
finally been settled, Reed conveyed a party caucus to announce his proposed new rules package. Included in the proposed new code were provisions giving the Speaker the arbitrary power to refrain from recognizing motions he considered to be dilatory, and the right to count members for the purpose of establishing the presence of a quorum. By and large, the new rules presented to the Republican caucus, adhered to Reed's broad vision of an activist House which functioned under majoritarian principles.

Although these new rules would be brought to a vote in the House, the real test of their acceptability came in the February 5 Republican caucus meeting. For, implementing the dramatic changes they entailed and the radical redistribution of power and authority they promised, required the full support of the Republican membership. Indeed, near unanimity among caucus members was imperative if Reed's Rules were to be passed in the full House in the face of what was certain to be the unanimous opposition of the Democratic party. Beyond that, however, the caucus vote was also a significant test of whether or not the Republican majority would agree to the curtailment of individual power which was implied in the new rules. The Boston Herald, for example, reflected upon this aspect of the new rules in an article written on the eve of the caucus vote. "This year," the Herald reporter suggested,
the Republican leaders are trying to frame rules that will render . . . filibustering impossible. It is delicate work. Independent Republicans like Anderson of Kansas, Cheadle of Indiana and others are apparently resolved to oppose any change that will rob them of the power they held (as filibusters) in the last Congress. 49

Dependent as Reed's vision of the new House of Representatives was on the unity of purpose, the congruence of member goals, and the discipline of the Republican legislative party, the caucus vote on the rules became the ultimate test of that unity, congruence and discipline. The caucus vote on the rules would essentially provide an indication of the kind of conflict -- the unity or fragmentation, the coherence or disarray -- which would characterize the Republican approach to the design of the legislative process in the 51st Congress. In turn, it would also provide an indication as to how far the rules could go in centralizing power and decision-making and how active the House would be in national political affairs.

The timing of the caucus meeting was largely due to Reed's insistence that the House begin its legislative work. In part, Reed believed that the momentum gained during the quorum fight would be used to push reluctant Republicans toward a more comprehensive restatement of the legislative process. His actions during the quorum debate had aroused a great deal of anger among opposition members, but they had also worked to galvanize support within his own party. He wanted to take advantage of that momentary Republican euphoria.
At the same time, however, Reed was becoming increasingly sensitive to charges that he was cynically manipulating the rules and expanding his personal power under the guise of general parliamentary procedure. The delay in bringing a formal rules proposal to the House, his critics suggested, showed that Reed was both afraid of his own party and eager to pursue his own and his party's narrow interests (for example, ensuring that the contested election cases were settled in ways favorable to the Republican party) in occupying the Speaker's chair. Reed dismissed the criticism outwardly, explaining to reporters:

When we first came here the obstructionists declared that they would die in the last ditch against my rules . . . and now they are wanting to die at Thermopylae in defense of the liberties of their country because we don't force rules on them. If there would be fewer deaths at Thermopylae and more business in the House the country would be better off.

Despite the outward calm, however, Reed was himself anxious to bring the new rules and his new vision of the House to life.

The February 5 caucus meeting revealed a few cracks in the unity of the Republican party. There was, for example, a prolonged debate over the provision granting the Speaker power to deny dilatory motions, but it was finally passed. Representative Atkinson of Pennsylvania was also successful in amending the rules to give the Committee on Invalid Pensions (a prime Republican dispenser of pensions to party friends)
the right to report pension bills at any time. For the most part, however, the rules received the support of the caucus although a formal vote on the total reform package itself was never taken. In the end, "The opposition that was shown to any proposition . . . was feeble," the New York Times reported, "the Speaker's boldness having awed his own party associates. Cheadle of Indiana and Anderson of Kansas did a good deal of 'kicking' in the cloakroom, but they were as obedient as well-spanked children in the caucus." On the following day, the rules were presented to the House, and with only minor modifications and over a strenuous Democratic protest, they were eventually adopted on February 14 by a strict party vote of 161 to 145. "The Rules Passed," the Atlanta Constitution headlined its news of the action in the next day's edition, "And Reed is the United States of America."

To a certain extent, the passage of the rules reform package was indeed a personal triumph for Reed. Yet, it was even more centrally a triumph for Reed's vision of how the House should go about its business and of what role it should play in national affairs. In accepting Reed's restructuring of the House, the Republican majority had instituted a new procedural and in fact behavioral code for Congress which was based upon the new and, in contrast with the Democratic party approach, distinctive principles of majoritarianism and action rather than those of minority rights, individual
autonomy and legislative passivity. In accepting Reed's vision of the legislative process, the Republicans had acted to reverse the gradual devolution of power and the increasing fragmentation of decision-making which had so characterized preceding Democratic Congresses. Individual rights, powers, and prerogatives were severely limited and the powers of the central institutions of authority to control and coordinate the House process were strengthened. The House of Representatives became, once more, an initiator rather than a ratifier of national political decisions.

The most notable aspect of Reed's rules, of course, and the feature most commented upon in the national press was the dramatic increase in the power wielded by the Speaker. This increase in power came at the direct expense of the powers individual Members of Congress had gained during the years of Democratic ascendancy in the House in the 1880's. The power to count a quorum and the elimination of the right to obstruct legislation through the refusal to vote deprived small groups of the ability to thwart bills which they opposed (particularly in Congresses ruled by a thin majority). The Speaker also gained the right to refuse to entertain dilatory motions, which further undermined the individual member's right to filibuster.54

Coupled with the traditional rights to appoint committees and dispense other forms of patronage in the House, these two features of the new rules gave the Speaker almost absolute
control over the legislative process. Once again, these new powers were derived from and dependent upon the sustained support of the majority party. The Speaker's new powers would have meant very little, for example, (indeed they would not have been granted) had the Republican majority coalition fallen prey at any point during the life of the 51st Congress, to the kind of internal factionalism which so marked the Democratic legislative party in the late nineteenth century. The fact that the Republicans were relatively united, however, allowed the Speaker to use his newfound powers to the fullest.

The centralization of power in the House of Representatives and the strengthening of the Speakership was viewed by many observers as a natural outgrowth of obstructionism. One Democratic leader, for example, suggested that the Speaker was the natural beneficiary of the majority's impatience with minority filibustering. "The inevitable result of filibustering," he wrote:

has been the extension of power of the presiding officer. When a minority becomes obstructive, the majority retaliates by curtailing the privileges which have been abused. The Speaker is usually the instrument by which the purpose of the majority is accomplished. The business of the House is placed more completely under his control, so that he may afford the majority an opportunity to secure the passage of legislation which it desires. The power of the Speakership has thus increased enormously and its growth has been at the expense of the parliamentary privileges of the individual members.55

The author of this article implied, in other words, that the
growth of the Speaker's powers under Reed was but the most recent and obvious example of a more deep-seated tendency in national political life. Reed's Rules, in other words, were the natural products of an exuberant and dynamic new order overthrowing an old and decaying order.

Others tended to see Reed's Rules instead as the most recent step in a long-term and almost deterministic centralizing trend in political institutions in general and in the House of Representatives in particular. Borrowing from Bagehot's assumptions about the inevitable supremacy of the legislative over the Executive, and other assumptions about the centralizing tendencies of political institutions, Albert Bushnell Hart saw in Reed's Rules simply the latest manifestation of those broad historical progressions.

The recent addition to the Speaker's power has not been conferred by the recent vote of the House in adopting rules, and in fact is not expressed in the Constitution, the acts of Congress, or the rules of the House. It is a natural growth, and in part the tendency throughout the national, state, and municipal systems to put responsibility upon individuals rather than upon boards. It is a wholesome reaction from the divided irresponsibility and wasteful system of conducting the business of legislation.56

If, however, some of the more dispassionate observers of national politics viewed the emergence of the Speaker as "Czar" as the natural fulfillment of a long-term organizational process of development, many participants on the rules fight did not. Democratic members of the House, for example, tended
to see Reed's innovations as dangerous departures from American legislative tradition. The proposed change of the rules, one Member of Congress insisted, means "that the Speaker, instead of being, as for the past one hundred years, the servant of the House, shall be its master."\(^{57}\) Another charged that Reed had set himself up as an autocrat and had proceeded to radically transform the role of the individual member. "Under this system of rules you reduce the individual member simply to a wooden image. He has no rights under this new code."\(^{58}\) Far from adhering to the historic organizational tendencies of the House, in other words, Reed had dramatically changed course. "Reform should have commenced by curtailing instead of extending the authority of (The Speaker)," John G. Carlisle contended in an article predictably critical of Reed's reform. Greater equality was the direction of Democratic organizational changes, he implied, noting that "It is not strange that the advocates of equal rights in the House should look with some degree (of anxiety) upon every proposition to confer additional authority upon its presiding officer."\(^{59}\)

Despite this strong undercurrent of opposition to a stronger Speakership in the House of Representatives, Reed himself had decided early on in his career that the centralization of power was the key to achieving the activist legislative process he sought. In 1882, for example, he had suggested to his House colleagues:
that whenever it is imposed upon the Congress to accomplish a certain work, whether by the Constitution or by a law, it is the duty of the Speaker, who represents the House, and in his official capacity is the embodiment of the House, to carry out that rule of law or of the Constitution. It then becomes his duty to see that no fractious opposition prevents the House from doing its duty. He must brush away all unlawful combinations to misuse the rules and must hold the House strictly to its work. 60

Reed pushed this belief consistently throughout his years as opposition leader in the House to an increasingly receptive, but powerless Republican minority. When the 51st Congress convened, however, with its Republican majority, Reed re-emphasized the need for a strong Speakership to his colleagues and ultimately made it the keystone of his organizational revolution.

Many of the resources which Reed would use to achieve greater control over the legislative process already lay at the disposal of the Speaker who was determined enough (and who had the support of his party) to mobilize them. The power to appoint committees, for example, used by some Democratic Speakers to reward factional allies or to safeguard factional interests, was used by Reed to consolidate support for centralization. Reed's appointments, for example, caused little of the bitterness, frustration or disappointment which generally greeted the announcement of committee selections under his predecessors. Indeed, the great rules struggle of January and February, 1890, which was carried on with the overwhelming support of Reed's Republican colleagues, occurred
after he had named his committees. In addition to the committee appointment powers, the Speaker also possessed immense if (under the Democratic Speakers since 1880) latent political resources as chairman of the Rules Committee. The power of recognition, while largely unused, also existed in the Speaker's organizational arsenal.

Of these existing organizational resources, the Rules Committee was probably the most significant to Reed's attempt to consolidate the Speaker's control over the legislative process. Made a standing committee in the Revision of 1880, it had already begun to emerge as a major force in setting the legislative agenda by 1883. Under existing rules, the committee was composed of five members (three from the majority party and two from the minority party) and was chaired by the Speaker. The committee's power stemmed from its right to report at any time, bills pertaining to the rules, thus circumventing the formal House calendar. In a legislative body which could typically deal with only a fraction of the bills which were introduced in each session, the power to report at any time was a major political and legislative resource. Other committees had the same right with respect to their own bills (for example, Ways and Means on revenue bills and Appropriations Committee on appropriations bills) but none of them had as broad a mandate to report as the Rules Committee.

The key to the Rules Committee's power to control the legislative agenda stemmed from its right to report special
orders. These special orders or temporary rules, allowed the Rules Committee to introduce bills which essentially permitted the consideration of substantive bills from other committees, which would otherwise have languished on the House calendars. Special orders were themselves not unknown to the House before the 1880's, but as Hinds notes, the manner in which they were brought before the House was different in the years before the creation of a standing Rules Committee. Before 1883, bills could be taken from the calendar, out of their regular order, only by unanimous consent (which of course meant the unanimous consent of the House membership) or by a suspension of the rules (which required the support of two-thirds of the House membership). These methods, as Hinds suggests, were "cumbersome;" since on any question which involved party differences, the attempt was very likely to fail."63

In 1883, during the second and final session of the 47th Congress, the majority Republicans attempted to report a tariff bill over the opposition of the Democratic side of the House. Lacking the ability to procure either unanimous consent or the two-thirds vote necessary to suspend the rules and allow the bill to be considered out of its regular order (and before the reports of other equally privileged committees), the Rules Committee sent a special order to the floor. As a committee report, the special order in this form, needed only a simple majority to pass the House. The Democrats again objected to this procedural innovation, but
it was sustained by the Republican majority. Ironically, it was Thomas B. Reed who made the Rules Committee report.64

The Rules Committee's right to report special orders remained a serious point of contention during the succeeding three Congresses, as the majority Democrats refused, for the most part, to make use of that power. In 1887, for example, the special report was still "regarded as a proceeding of doubtful validity."65 In the 51st Congress, however, it was reestablished as a legitimate means for both "bringing up for consideration bills difficult to reach in the regular order" and for limiting the time for debate.66 Although the Democrats in the 52nd and 53rd Congresses (in which they were once again the majority party) allowed this practice to continue and even encouraged its use, it was the Republican party and particularly Thomas B. Reed who did the most to politicize the Rules Committee and transform it into an instrument of centralized legislative control.

As in the case of the Rules Committee and the special order, then, Reed built upon the existing, if often once again latent powers of the Speakership, to strengthen central control over the legislative process. Redefining some of these existing prerogatives and creating others, he greatly expanded the ability of the Speaker to direct the business of the House of Representatives. The scope of the Speaker's recognition powers, for example, which had laid dormant as an instrument of control under his predecessors (although
Carlisle had occasionally made use of it to suit his needs, and was broadened under Reed's Rules.

The initial target of this expansive approach to the power of recognition was of course the dilatory motion. Reed had spent years decrying the use of such motions to stall consideration of legislation. In 1882, for example, at a time when Democrats were blocking the resolution of a number of contested election cases, Reed introduced a bill from the Rules Committee which would allow no more than one dilatory motion during the consideration of an election dispute. The Speaker was given the right to decide which motions were in fact dilatory, and which were not. The measure was quickly passed and adopted by the Republican House which thereby, according to Reed, "summarily took away the power of using dilatory motions in election cases, and thus put down the parliamentary rebellion." The provision was struck out of the rules by subsequent Democratic Congresses, but in 1890 it was reintroduced as part of Reed's reform package. Reed, however, did not confine the stricture against dilatory motions to election cases alone, but broadened it to cover all debates in the House. The broadened rule simply provided that "No dilatory motion shall be entertained by the Speaker." Simply phrased in the new rules code, this new provision nevertheless gave the Speaker immense new powers to control the legislative agenda. "We destroyed a system," Henry Cabot Lodge, a member of the 51st Congress later wrote of this innovation in
House procedures, "where one man's voice could put a stop to legislation and restored that in which the duly-elected representatives of the people could do the public business." The quashing of dilatory motions, however, was but a portion of Reed's expansion of the Speaker's recognition powers. Reed, for example, reaffirmed a precedent which had actually been established by Samuel Randall in 1881 and sustained by Republican Speaker Keifer in 1882 that decisions by the Speaker on a question of recognition are not subject to appeals from the floor. Reed expanded the recognition power even further by invoking a procedure first used by John G. Carlisle, which demanded that a member state the purpose for which he wished to be recognized on the floor of the House. These powers gave the Speaker almost total control over the legislative agenda. Through them, "he could decide what matters would come before the House and discipline Members who failed to comply with his wishes."

The exercise of this power was of course dependent upon the willing support of the Republican legislative party. Despite the unity and relative coherence of the majority party, Reed could not have expanded the recognition powers to the extent he did, without the cooperation of his Republican colleagues. The Democratic experience in previous Congresses had clearly demonstrated, and Reed was aware of the fact that a fractious majority party or a group of recalcitrant members could easily block the will of an activist Speaker. Reed's primary resource in the struggle to expand
his recognition powers, therefore, lay in the extent to which his own party was willing and politically able to provide him with the unity and support he needed.

Reed built upon this base, strengthening the consensual impulses and emphasizing the congruence of needs and goals within his party, and imparting a sense of purpose to his aggrandizement of the Speakership to the point that his own victories were effectively those of his supporters. Thus, although a few Republicans grumbled over their diminished prerogatives, many more took great satisfaction from Reed's initiatives. One Republican, John Houk of Tennessee, for example, who took great pleasure in "frequently badgering his Democratic friends," was especially taken by Reed's masterful control of the legislative process, and his taming of the obstructionist Democratic minority. To David Culberson of Texas, Houk was once heard to have remarked:

Dave, we Republicans have the ideal Speaker. He is the best Speaker who ever presided over this House. He won't recognize a Democrat to make a motion to adjourn; he won't recognize the demands of a Democrat for tellers, and (leaning over confidentially) he is considering a proposition to require the endorsement of two Republicans for a Democrat to introduce a bill. I will endorse you, Culberson, if you can get anyone for a second.74

Reed's centralization of power in the House, therefore, was in part effected through the broadening of the right to recognize or refuse to recognize Members of Congress during debate, but it was also achieved through the formalization
of the right to count a quorum. The rules bill presented to
the House in February included the provision that members who
are present but not voting shall be considered present for
the purposes of a quorum. This removed what in a closely
divided House was one of the most potent weapons of obstruc-
tion -- the disappearing quorum, and as in the case of the
expanded recognition powers, Reed presented the reform meas-
ure in terms of party, rather than personal gain. Again,
Reed succeeded in identifying the expansion of the Speaker's
powers with the goals of his majority party colleagues. This
he did by clearly associating the centralization of power
with the right of the majority to rule. Whether there existed
other means of destroying obstructionism or not, in other
words, Reed's success lay in his ability to convince his
colleagues that the most effective guarantee of majority rule
was the existence of powerful Speakership.

The debate over this disappearing quorum issue (both
during the January battle over the Smith-Jackson case and in
the debate over the new rules code in February) demonstrated
the success with which Reed had in effect aligned his own
procedural reforms with the general goals and views of his
party colleagues. "A majority under the Constitution is
entitled to legislate," Joseph Cannon argued in the House,
for example, and "if a contrary practice has grown up, such
practice is unrepulican, undemocratic, against sound public
policy and contrary to the Constitution." Other Republi-
cans returned to this theme again and again, invariably
claiming that the majority party had the right and the duty
to do the work it was elected to perform. They did not come
to Washington, one Republican member noted of his colleagues,
"with no higher mission in proposing measures than to ascer-
tain the will of an arbitrary and controlling minority."77

Whatever problems were inherent in a strong Speakership,
then, Republican Members of Congress tended to see even great-
er problems in allowing an obstructionist minority the right
to thwart their legislative (both public and private) goals.
For a united party and one which after years in the minority
sought positive action on an array of political questions,
maintaining the individual right to obstruct or veto legis-
lative initiatives was a far less attractive option than
the alternative of sacrificing certain personal prerogatives
to a centralized system which promised to expedite the pass-
age of bills through the House.

To some Democrats, this was indeed the motive force
behind the institution of Reed's Rules. "Under the proposed
rules," one Democratic Member of Congress charged, "we will
meet to simply vot money out of the Treasury without debate
or deliberation. Cliques and combinations will meet and
tell us the amount they want and without delay we will surr-
nder the Treasury key."78 As Reed, however, maintained,
with the evident agreement of his fellow Republicans, legis-
lation rather than deliberation and action rather than debate
were the true ends of the legislative process. As he later
argued:
In order to make laws wisely, the body must be a deliberative body; but deliberation, however necessary or valuable, is only the means to an end; and that end is the right decision whether to make a law or not, and in what shape to put it in if made. Debating is useful in law-making, but it is not in itself an end or an aim. 79

In part, then, Reed's success in broadening the powers of the Speaker derived from his ability to convince his fellow Republicans that the Democratic preoccupation with deliberation (a preoccupation which was itself the product of Democratic disarray and internal disagreement over legislative goals) would produce fewer political returns than an institutional commitment to action. Republicans, essentially united over broad policy concerns, could gain more by working in concert with one another and through the party structure than they could by returning to the individual and factional prerogatives afforded by an obstructionist (i.e. deliberative) system. The extent to which Reed could mobilize support for his legislative steamroller in the House of Representatives, in other words, was dependent on his ability to transfer the locus of bargaining, of logrolling, of the dispensation of political goods and indeed the deliberation itself, from the House floor to the party caucus. Generally agreed among themselves over broad principles and working under a creative, competent, and generous leadership, most Republican Members of Congress were content to have the House act, for the most part, as the forum where decisions actually made by the party
or by the party leaders were simply ratified. The centralized control over the business of the House was thus merely the most visible aspect of Reed's parliamentary system. The recognition of power, the right to overrule the use of the disappearing quorum and the manipulation of the House agenda by the Rules Committee merely expedited the confirmation of decisions made off the House floor.

In streamlining House procedures, Reed clearly expedited the process of legislation. In so doing, he also transformed the role of the House in the national policy-making system. Essentially reversing the trend of the presiding Democratic Congresses where the House had assumed a rather passive and reactive role in national politics, Reed was determined to elevate the legislature to an active and prominent role in shaping Federal policy and setting the policy-making agenda. Personally ambitious, Reed did not want to lead a House which was content to pass judgment on a policy agenda set by either the President or the Senate. In part, Reed's concern for the House's role also stemmed from feelings about the superiority of that body over the other branches of Government. He personally disliked President Harrison, for example, and he openly scorned the Senate, once calling it "the place where politicians go when they die." Reed, thus intent on expanding the stature of the House, saw the reform of the rules as the instrument of that expansion.

The link between the centralization of power in the
House and the new expansive role envisaged for that body by Thomas B. Reed was noted by a number of contemporary observers -- both critics and supporters alike. The Nation, for example, accused Reed of using his reforms as the instrument of a process by which the Speaker sought to redefine the role of the House in the national political system (and indeed, the instrument by which Reed implicitly sought to re-design the national political system itself). Charging Reed with adhering to the belief that "the House is not a deliberative body but an executive body," the journal suggested that the House of Representatives was becoming more Parliamentary than Congressional, and that the presiding officer viewed his role more as a Prime Minister than a Speaker. Albert Bushnell Hart agreed with this assessment of Congress' new role and saw it as an almost inevitable and clearly welcome milestone in the evolution of the American national legislature.

The powers now exercised by the Speaker will probably be exercised by each succeeding Speaker, and will somewhat increase. Since the legislative department in every republic constantly tends to gain ground at the expense of the executive, the Speaker is likely to become, and perhaps is already, more powerful, both for good and for evil, than the President of the United States. He is premier in legislation; it is the business of the party that he be also Premier in character, in ability, in leadership and in statesmanship.

Both critics and admirers thus saw in Reed's rules a dramatic departure from tradition in their impact on Congress' role in national politics. The 51st Congress had stepped beyond the
paths of its immediate predecessors into one marked by
activism and a sense of purpose. "We have reversed the
uniform precedent of the national House," Henry Cabot Lodge
wrote a friend, "and such was our intention. We mean to
break down the vicious system which has reduced the House
to a position of impotence." 85

As in the case of the centralization of power and the
construction of mechanisms of central control over the
legislative decision-making process, the expansion of the
House's role was built upon the foundations of political
self-interest. Republican members supported Reed's Rules
and the broadening of the powers of the House as an institu-
tion in the national political system not because of a
visionary attachment to the abstract principle of legisla-
tive dominance, but rather because those changes promised to
produce concrete legislative dividends to the members them-
selves. United as they were over broad policy goals, most
Republican members tended to see the strengthening of the
House as yet another means by which those goals could be
more readily achieved.

To many, then, Reed's Rules as well as Reed's vision
of the House were simply the organizational expression of
a membership which was able and eager to translate the
unique and powerful resources which it possessed (unity,
coherence, and a more or less common legislative purpose).
into a policy-making system which produced the specific
outcomes which that membership sought. The reforms of the
51st Congress then, -- the redistribution of power, the establishment of a coordinative decision-making system and the new more expansive role of the House in national political affairs -- were simply portions of the organizational groundwork Republicans were laying for the enactment of new tariff laws, a new election bill and dramatically higher rates of federal spending. 86

The extent to which the 51st Congress constituted both a marked departure from the organizational traditions of the Democrats, and a clear reflection of the unique demands and resources of the Republican party can be best illustrated by a brief account of the actions that were taken by the Democratically controlled 52nd and 53rd Congresses. Having lost the 1890 elections by a wide margin, the Republicans retreated to their familiar role as minority party, and a shattered Reed attempted to regroup his decimated ranks. The massive Democratic victory had come largely as the result of the McKinley tariff, but Reed's Rules had also figured in the Republican electoral disaster. 87 McKinley himself had lost his bid for reelection as did Cannon, and many of those Republicans who had managed to win re-election confronted a bleak prospect in the House of Representatives. With only 88 Republicans in the new House, Asher Hinds later recalled, for example, "my faith was weak that another Republican majority would be seen in the House in my lifetime." 88 The only positive voices were from those who,
like Thomas Carter of Montana, could at least look forward to sniping at the Democratic majority. We will have a "field day in stirring up the animals," was Carter's view of the 52nd Congress. "Our Republican boys look forward to a session of Congress without responsibility, and with many pleasing episodes in store." 89

The Democrats, meanwhile, prepared to organize the House in accordance with their own peculiar partisan needs and weaknesses. Divided as ever, it was clear that the Democrats would begin their task by repudiating the form and substance of Reed's Rules. Charles Crisp of Georgia, who was nominated and eventually elected Speaker over the expected victor, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, was particularly keen on restoring Congress to its traditional obstructionist ways. Crisp had won the nomination for Speakership over Mills because of his moderate attachment to protectionism. A spokesman for the "New South," Crisp had attracted the support of the large number of northern Democrats who had been elected to the House in the 1890 landslide. 90 While this infusion of Northern (protectionist) Democrats into the House had certainly helped Crisp in his bid for the Speakership, it also heightened the internal tension and the divisiveness within the party. 91 As in the case of the Democratic Congresses of the 1880's, the 52nd Congress would have to mold its organizational procedures and its behavioral norms to reflect the internal fractiousness and lack of
consensus within the majority party. The system of central control and the coordination of the decision-making process which had served Reed so well was clearly out of the question in the 52nd Congress.

Indeed, the demands for a broader distribution of power were clearly reflected in Crisp's first act as Speaker. It had become the practice of both Republican and Democratic Speakers to appoint the Chairmen of the Ways and Means Committee and the Appropriations Committee to the Rules Committee. Crisp departed from this tradition by naming two other Democratic Representatives to the Rules Committee in an apparent effort to produce "a wider distribution of power and responsibility." 92

In January of 1892, Crisp continued this trend by reporting out of the Rules Committee a code which essentially returned the organization of the House to its pre-Reed's Rules days. With few exceptions, the new rules of the 52nd Congress were to be those of the 50th Congress. Crisp did pay partial tribute to Reed's concern for legislative efficiency in commenting on the Rules Committee report (suggesting that the new Democratic rules would encourage legislative efficiency every bit as much as Reed's Rules had done), but the actual nature of the proposed code paid a far more substantial tribute to the traditional Democratic preoccupation with obstructionism and minority rights. The powers of recognition were curtailed, the right to count a quorum was eliminated and the Holman Rule was reinstated in a thorough attempt to
reconcile House procedures once again to the exigencies of a divided Democratic party. More than anything else, this return to the norms of fragmentation and individualism in Congress reflected the pervasive lack of consensus within Democratic ranks. As the Nation would later suggest, disunity and disarray were the hallmarks of both the Democrats in 1892 and the House of the 52nd Congress. "The enormous majority of the Democratic party in the present House," the Nation argued:

was regarded with apprehension by its most intelligent leaders, and the result has, to a certain extent, justified their fears. To subject a vast crowd of new members -- many of them owing their election to such elements as the People's Party or the Farmers' Alliance than to regular Democratic voters -- to the discipline required to make party government effective, proved to be impossible. 93

When the 53rd Congress convened in 1893, Crisp, again named Speaker by his party, decided to force a greater measure of discipline on his still divided colleagues. Expectant Republicans enjoyed watching an uneasy Crisp (who now led a reduced majority in the House) try to convince his fellow Democrats that they should submit to a more centralized legislative structure, particularly since Democrat Grover Cleveland was once again President. "I see Crisp thinks the rules must be modified." J.C. Burrows wrote Reed in 1893, "We agree with him don't we? It seems to me we ought to insist on a code of rules under which the democratic party can't help
itself but must do business. It will be interesting then to see the machine work."94

Crisp, meanwhile, attempted to frame his reform proposals in terms which he hoped would reflect the sensibilities of his party colleagues and win their support. Outlining a reform which would give the Rules Committee a more prominent role in controlling legislative business, for example, Crisp rather lamely suggested that "Democrats didn't object to the rules of the 51st Congress as they did to the imperious behavior of the Speaker himself. Under the 53rd Congress' rules, the Rules Committee dominates, but a majority of the Congress must ratify each move of the Rules Committee."95

Republicans, for their part, feigned surprise that the Democratic party, which had in the past spent so much energy guarding the "rights of the individual member, standing upon his sole leather and his conscience to stop the business of the House," should "now depute three gentlemen (the Democratic members of the Rules Committee) to put an end to him so abruptly."96 Many Democrats themselves were uneasy with the proposed changes and sought to moderate the centralizing impact of such a change by increasing the list of committees given the right to report at any time.97 In the end, however, Crisp was given the more powerful Rules Committee he sought and filibustering received a setback.

While the new Rules Committee powers generally lessened the opportunities for filibustering (the Rules Committee
would typically limit the time for debate on important bills, for example, little was done to alter the traditional Democratic approach to the Disappearing Quorum. Although the 53rd Congress did adopt the Reed provision making one hundred Members of Congress (rather than a majority) sufficient for the purposes of a quorum in the Committee of the Whole, the Speaker was given no right to count non-voting members during House votes. Individuals could continue to absent themselves from roll calls for the purpose of breaking a quorum.

This raised serious problems for the Democratic leadership, which found it increasingly difficult to assemble and sustain the presence of its party members for roll call votes. Divided as ever before, Democrats were quick to find in the disappearing quorum a useful means of circumventing Crisp's attempt to foster a measure of party discipline. As the Nation noted:

The Democrats refuse to make a quorum in order either to embody their own ideas in legislation or to reverse the policy of the Republicans. A large number of them hardly seem to think attendance in Congress necessary at all. They draw their salaries and attend to their private affairs in various parts of the country. In other words they refuse to discharge their duties under the Constitution.

The plan of these recalcitrant Democrats, whose diverse interests were not adequately recognized by their leaders within the House "is simply to stay away from the legislative halls,
and leave the Speaker to hammer and search for legislators.100

By February of 1894 the absenteeism and consequent difficulties Democrats faced in assembling a quorum threatened to bring the beleaguered Congress to a standstill. Republicans, eager to force a Democratic Speaker to formally vindicate Reed's practice of counting a quorum, began to make use of the Disappearing Quorum tactic themselves. Democratic leaders responded only cautiously at first by proposing (among themselves) different means of counting the quorum and coming to an actual agreement on none of those means. So anxious were the Democrats to find ways of dealing with the Disappearing Quorum without giving the Speaker the right to count the non-voting members himself, that a bemused Reed at one point rose to suggest that "Perhaps it would be well to appoint a justice of the peace to administer the business of the House."101

In early April, the legislative crisis reached its peak. The Democrats were unable to assemble a quorum from among their own membership and the Republicans had little trouble bringing all business to a grinding halt by refusing to vote on the formal approval of the journal. After days of stalemate and immobilism, the Democratic leadership bowed to necessity and introduced a proposal which would essentially grant the Speaker the right to count a quorum. Although the provision was actually worded to give tellers appointed by the Speaker the power to note the presence of members refusing to vote, it was nevertheless a full-scale surrender to Reed's Rule.102 A number of prominent Democrats protested
the proposed change, but it was eventually adopted on April 17, 1894.103 Business proceeded more smoothly after this point, but Democrats were never able to recreate the efficient machine Reed and the Republican party had developed in the 51st Congress.

In the end, Reed's Rules received little more than a forced and half-hearted Democratic endorsement despite the fragmentation within the party. The divided Democratic majority had been driven to accept a measure of central control through Republican prodding, rather than by the wishes of its own membership. For centralization was largely out of place and irrelevant to a party as divided as the Democratic was in the late nineteenth century. The imposition of Reed's Rules on the Democratic House in 1894 did little more than apply a temporary patch to massive party wounds which showed no signs of healing.

In effect, then, the centralization of power, the coordination of decision-making and the elevation of the House to an active initiative role in Federal politics which Reed had brought to the Republican 51st Congress, and which were reaffirmed when the Republicans regained control of the House in the elections of 1894, was an attempt to reconcile the internal legislative process with the peculiar resources and interests of the late nineteenth century Republican party. The norms, procedures and rules which had emerged during the years of Democratic control were clearly irrelevant to the
unity, the activism and the congruence of issue concerns within the Republican party of that time. The desire for legislative action on a specific range of goals and a concrete policy-making agenda, coupled with the unique organizational resources of the Republican party, produced the mandate for a House of Representatives which was unfettered by the normative and procedural constraints -- the preoccupation with minority rights, the rampant individualism, and the acute sensitivity to factional interests -- which the Democrats had been forced to accommodate when they were in the majority.

In a sense, this striking contrast between Republican and Democratic Houses, and the diametrically opposed ways each party approached the design and construction of the legislative process, presaged the twentieth century struggle between the forces of individualism and fragmentation and those of centralism and coordination. To a limited extent, furthermore, these different approaches were rooted in the same conditions and motivated by the same forces which underlaid this later struggle. In either case, the nineteenth century struggle between individual or factional autonomy and organizational coherence illustrates the types of forces which tended to give the House of Representatives its internal shape.

The dramatic fluctuations in the organizational style of the House of Representatives which occurred in the late
nineteenth century, however, were most clearly and uniquely related to which party held power. The relatively detailed examination of the distinctive Democratic and Republican approaches to Congressional organization during this period suggests that the House was subject to abrupt change whenever one or the other party ascended to power. The abruptness of these changes themselves tend to challenge the assumption that the House was developing a purely internal normative and procedural system according to the dictates of a long-term organizational progression. An institutionalization process, for example, would probably not have been as deeply and decisively affected by such fluctuations in party control. In fact, therefore, one finds little evidence of any broad trend in the evolution of the House of Representatives during this period of time. Rather, the evidence suggests that the House evolved in relatively direct fashion to forces working in its immediate political environment. Democratic Houses tended, for example, to differ quite markedly and consistently from Republican-controlled Houses. Those controlled by the Democrats during the Cleveland administration, furthermore, tended to differ from Democratic Houses during the periods of Republican control of the Executive Branch. The sensitivity of Congress to these forces, therefore, and the degree of variability which existed from Congress to Congress, lends credence to the ecologist assumption that the search for the roots of Congressional behavior -- at least in the nineteenth century -- be carried on beyond Congress' internal world.
This traditional ecologist approach to House behavior, it has been noted, is marked by a preoccupation with electoral trends. The relationship between electoral competitiveness and House behavior is assumed to be critical in this regard. As David Brady suggests, for example, the struggle between centralized control of the House and decentralization between 1896 and 1911 was most prominently the product of the decline of electoral competition. "The most obvious explanation for the transition from a centralized structure to a decentralized structure," he argues, "seems to have been the increasing number of safe seats in the House." This is clearly a persuasive argument for the relatively rapid decline of the strong Speakership after 1908. Such an explanation, however, does not take us very far toward explaining variations in the pre-1900 period when both parties experienced much the same levels of competitiveness. Within the late nineteenth century period, therefore, it is necessary to consider other forces working in Congress' political environment and consequently on the internal shape of the House of Representatives. This study's preoccupation with the nature and sources of Congressional conflict serves as a more useful focus here.

As this study has suggested, the nature, the intensity and the patterns of conflict within the House are determined by such factors as the strength and level of integration of formal political organizations outside of Congress, the manner in which demands on the part of the national constituency are expressed and organized, the distribution and content
of those demands, and the pervasiveness or absence of broad and cumulative ideological, interest-oriented or even effective cleavages in the nation (e.g. sectionalism in the nineteenth century). The nature of conflict within the nineteenth century House of Representatives was clearly determined by a combination of these forces. The sectional heterogeneity of the Democratic party, and the relative homogeneity of the Republican party base created major differences in the levels of consensus or unity which each party brought to Congress.

The different levels of organizational integration of each national party also led to major distinctions in the patterns and scales of conflict Democrats and Republicans brought to the House, as did the pervasiveness of broad and unifying political symbols and ideologies each party was able to mobilize in the electorate. This in turn reflected the types of issues and interests which both parties encompassed and which distinguished each from the other. These issue clusters, and the levels of divergence or convergence which characterized the constituents and interests reflected in those issues, also produced, therefore, tendencies toward internal partisan factionalism or disarray or internal unity and coherence.

After 1896, the decline of electoral competitiveness for both parties added yet another force to these other conditions working on the nature of conflict in the House. The decline of electoral competitiveness tended, as Burnham, Price, Brady and others have suggested, to lead toward an
increase in the autonomy and political independence (independent at least from the often dramatic political fluctuations evident in the national political arena in the nineteenth century, if not necessarily independent from more narrow and focussed constituency demands and interests) of the individual members, and introduced a new (and largely disintegrative) element into the patterns of conflict both parties contained. Before 1896, however, conflict in the House of Representatives was largely a function of the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the national party structures, and of the divergent or convergent sectional loyalties, issue concerns and interests each party contained within it. Clearly, each of these forces worked differently for the Republican party which had a better defined, more coherent and more active approach to public policy-making than they did for the Democrats who were chronically divided by their own peculiar and diverse combination of issue concerns, sectional loyalties, and economic and political interests.

Each party thus brought with it different patterns of conflict or unity to the House of Representatives. When the Democrats held power, the House was forced to conform itself to the prevailing lack of consensus which characterized that party's policy coalition. Dispersion of power, resistance to the central coordination of the legislative decision-making process and a normative emphasis on minority rights, obstructionism and individualism were logical
outgrowths of a party unable to effect an enduring internal agreement on political goals. In the absence of such an enduring and sustainable agreement, the House was forced to work under a decision-making structure which was flexible and permeable -- one which recognized the Democratic dependence on a moving or momentary consensus, issue-specific legislative coalitions, and an open and broad-based bargaining system.

The Republican party, on the other hand, brought to its organizational task a greater measure of internal harmony over a broad range of issues and political concerns. This broad consensus within the Republican party was reflected in the House by a diminished formal regard for individual rights and prerogatives. Coalitions were built and sustained within the party, political goods were centrally distributed and legislative decisions were made and coordinated by party leaders, armed by their rank and file members with the authority (and the legitimacy) to direct the legislative process. That legislative process, in sum, was designed not to achieve a political consensus, but in effect rather to ratify an already existing one.

The organizational system of the House of Representatives -- its norms, its rules, its procedures -- is, this study argues, the general instrument by which Congress reconciles its need to make legislative decisions with the particular forms of disagreement and dissensus it confronts. Different levels and patterns of conflict within the majority
party and within the House as a whole produce different demands on the organizational system, which in turn produce different obstacles to Congress' ability to make legislative decisions (and not so incidentally to the ability of the members to pursue and achieve their own particular political and legislative goals).

Congress, and the membership, responds to the emergence of these obstacles by modifying the system through which those obstacles are overcome and through which conflict is resolved. The central force in the evolution of the House of Representatives' internal system, them, is the kind of conflict it must manage. The late nineteenth century provides a useful illustration of the relationship between conflict and organization in a legislative body because of the often dramatic and visible changes which occurred in both during this period of time. As the patterns of conflict changed, as the obstacles to an ongoing legislative consensus varied, so did the House itself change as an institution. This sensitivity of the internal world of the House to conflict, thus suggests that the dynamic force in Congress' evolution is to be found largely in the forces which define and constrain that political conflict. More than anything else, in other words, Congress is the product of the forces which determine the levels and patterns of dissensus with which its political environment forces it to contend.
Most students of Congressional history view the events surrounding the 1910 "overthrow" of Joseph G. Cannon as a major turning point in the evolution of the House of Representatives. For Nelson Polsby, the St. Patrick's Day revolt was part of a deeper developmental dynamic which reached a "take-off" stage during the first decade of the twentieth century. Other internalists who, like Charles O. Jones, see the decline of the strong Speaker as the result of a failure of leadership, provide more limited explanations for the major changes which affected the House during this era. Nevertheless, both men, and both approaches tend to stress the long term significance of this critical period in Congress' history, and suggest that the changes brought about during this time had lasting effects on the shape of the twentieth century House. Neither approach, however, takes us very far toward understanding why these events occurred when they did or, particularly in the case of the latter, why their effects were so decisive and so persistent.

Ecologists, on the other hand, who view the turn of the century as a major turning point in the structure and
organization of American politics in general, tend to be more successful in identifying both a visible source of Congress' transformation, and in proposing reasons why that transformation had the lasting impact it in fact had. The emphasis of Burnham and Price on elections, for example, has led both toward assumptions about the links which exist between changes in the electoral system and changes within the House. Both relate the dramatic changes in the national norms of political participation, the depoliticization process which surrounded it, and the fragmentation (or the pluralization) of political forms of organization in the electorate to changes within Congress during the turn of the century period. As American politics as a whole changed, they argue, the House of Representatives responded by essentially redesigning its own internal world to reflect those broader external changes.

Although the ecologist argument is persuasive, particularly in terms of the changes which occurred at the turn of the century, questions do arise around the extent to which the House can be seen as a purely adaptive body. How directly, for example, is the internal world of the House linked to changes in the electoral system? What type, or what magnitude of electoral change affects the legislative process; and does the House alter its internal world in response to other forces working either within or outside its walls? Finally, through what channels do these
electoral changes make their impact on Congress and through what mechanism does the legislative process respond (for example, is the response a conscious one on the part of the members or is it a more or less automatic institutional response?)?

While, in other words, the ecologist argument seems to work very well in explaining Congressional change during the first decade of the twentieth century -- when there were major and clearly identifiable changes both in the American political system as a whole and in the House of Representatives -- it does less well in explaining the often dramatic fluctuations which characterized Congress' internal world before 1896. Without a clearer idea of precisely how and where the external world of elections, issues, ideologies and norms of political organization intrude upon the internal world of the House, ecologists risk underspecifying some of the more subtle yet significant features of the relationship between Congress and its environment.

This study has suggested that the patterns of political conflict within Congress provides a useful focus in the search for this intersection between the environment and the inner world of the House. On the one hand, the focus on conflict directs attention toward a process which is central to the internal workings of any legislative body. Conflict is at least a major, if not, as this study argues, the major force to which a legislative institution must respond. A legislative body must achieve a workable consensus out of
the varying forms of dissensus it confronts. A legislative system is, in other words, a conflict-resolution system.

On the other hand, while conflict is an internal feature, it is nevertheless one which has strong and explicit roots outside of the legislative body. To be sure, conflict can be generated internally and even to a certain extent manipulated, as internalists seem to imply, by the legislative process itself. In a representative institution, however, the external world inevitably leaves its mark on the patterns and sale of conflict within that institution by constraining it (for example, along party-specific lines or along more particularistic lines), by making concrete demands (the manner in which constituents express and organize their demands is clearly important in producing conflict in the House and determining the patterns that conflict will take), by identifying political goals, and in turn by defining the criteria upon which individual members of Congress are judged, and ultimately, sanctioned or rewarded. In sum, conflict in the House is at once a phenomenon which is central to the internal legislative process, and yet one which has clear links with the external political world.

This chapter intends to show, therefore, that conflict and the roots of that conflict both inside the House and outside, continued to have dramatic effects upon the legislative process in Congress in the twentieth century. As in the nineteenth century, the House was confronted by patterns of dissensus in the twentieth century which were constantly
evolving in response to changing political conditions in the national political system as a whole. Variations in the nature of political demand-making, in the issue agendas, in the norms of political participation, in the organization of political parties, in the structural characteristics (the strengths, the weaknesses and the resilience, the vitality or the decay) of these parties, and in the regional, social and economic interests which coalesced or which opposed each other in the American political system, produced equally important variations in the forms of conflict which tended to emerge in the House of Representatives.

Congressional conflict in the partisan nineteenth century, for example, was particularly conditioned by such variable factors as the strength or weakness of national party structures, the coherence or divisiveness of national party organizations, and the levels of consensus or disagreement among leaders and constituents of the national political coalitions over central political symbols, ideals and goals. To these were added in the twentieth century the declining role of integrative (particularly national-level) political organizations in the recruitment of Members of Congress. In the face of the disintegration of national party structures, the pluralization of political demand-making, changes in the voting laws (which disenfranchised some groups and placed hurdles in front of others), the decline of patronage and other resources of political control, local constituencies and individual Members of Congress
gained levels of autonomy and independence unknown in the nineteenth century. Conflict tended to become more firmly rooted in local concerns or particularistic interests as these countervailing forces of central coordination and integration weakened. As this happened -- as accumulative political cleavages, unifying ideological symbols and nationally based issue coalitions gave way to pluralistic political cleavages and less comprehensive political symbols, and more momentary and parochial political coalitions -- conflict tended to become more fragmented and less susceptible to central control by party leaders within the House. As broad cleavages, in other words, lost their relevance to the national electorate, they also lost their relevance within the House.

These broad changes were generally reflected in the nation's electoral patterns as Burnham, Schattschneider, Sunquist and others have shown. These transformed electoral patterns (and electoral expectations as well) in turn served to force the House to reorient its internal organization. To be sure, this readjustment of the legislative process was effected in immediate response to changes within the House (members themselves reoriented the legislative process, not elections, for example). Altered member expectations, new demands on the part of individual representatives that they be given a greater share of power, more bargaining leverage and latitude, and a more active role in the decision-making
process, all contributed to the transformation of the organization of the House in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Yet, all of these changes in member expectations, and in the increased assertiveness of the individual Representative, were the products of changes in the character of the voters those members of Congress represented. Increased seat security, for example, which as we noted in Chapter II was more the result of changes in the electorate and in the constituencies than it was the result of changes within Congress, gave individual Members of Congress the political autonomy they needed to establish their independence from the party machine within the House. Altered constituency expectations also played a role in encouraging and even forcing sometimes reluctant Congressmen to exploit this political independence within the House. Thus, although the organizational transition which occurred in the House of Representatives around 1910 did represent an institutional adjustment to new internal pressures, these new internal pressures were themselves the products of a fundamental transformation of American politics and of the electoral system after 1896.

This chapter will begin the examination of this transition of the House from its nineteenth century to its twentieth century form with a focus on the events surrounding the dramatic changes brought on between 1909 and 1913. The "overthrow" of Joseph Cannon in 1910 is usually seen as a
pivotal event in this transition process, and to a certain extent it was just that. Yet, the changes which marked this era of Congressional history certainly went beyond the removal of the Speaker from the Rules Committee. In effect, the revolt against Cannon was but one important part of a broader revolution which erupted between 1909 and 1913. In the end, Cannon was a victim in part of his own limitations as a leader, but to an ever greater extent, his downfall was but part of the chain of events which led the House of Representatives from its attachment to the patterns of conflict, member expectations and political goals created by the nineteenth century American political system, to an attachment to the new forces working in American political life in the twentieth century.

As this chapter will attempt to show, the events of 1910 were simply part of Congress' long-term attempt to reconcile the needs of its members for a measure of consensus and for legislative decisions, with the demands and obstacles placed in the way of that consensus and those decisions by the patterns and nature of conflict. As in the nineteenth century, the House adapted its institutional character to the forms of disensus and fragmentation it was forced, by its broader political environment to confront, manage and resolve.

The Republican party, which in 1895 reassumed control of the House of Representatives, was if anything more cohesive
and united than that which had controlled Congress in 1890. Although the election of 1896 would mark the formal beginning of a new era of Republic dominance of national politics -- a dominance which would extend well into the twentieth century -- the Republicans in the House had by the early 1890's and certainly by 1895 already coalesced, for the most part, around a common approach to the tariff and the currency question into a disciplined and determined political organization. The legislative process in 1896 reflected this return to power of a unified majority party by adhering to the rules and procedures, and by working to encourage the behavioral norms which had first emerged in the 51st Congress.

The cohesiveness of the Republican majority in the 54th Congress, and its size (the Republicans controlled 246 out of 357 seats in the House) rendered the return to Reed's Rules and the legislative process of 1890 a relatively simple and routine matter. The precedents for streamlining the House already existed; the majority party supported the return to the majoritarianism of 1890; and Thomas B. Reed, once again elected to the Speakership, remained firm in his commitment to the idea of an activist House of Representatives. For the most part, therefore, the revision of 1896 passed the House with little difficulty and even less public notice.

There was apparently a minor disagreement within the Republican ranks over the need to reinstate the Disappearing Quorum rule, particularly in view of the large Republican
majority. There was little need, some thought, for a rule which would never, in all likelihood, be used. Reed, however, insisted on its inclusion, maintaining that its adoption was even more imperative under such circumstances. "Mr. Reed thinks the present is a good time to adopt (the Disappearing Quorum rule)," Asher Hinds noted in his diary, "since the Republican majority is so large that it is not needed and hence is not under any suspicion of being demanded for partisan purposes."¹

Despite this minor disagreement within the Republican caucus, the party was united in its support of the new rules. The Disappearing Quorum provision not only passed the House in the end, for example, but did so with the active approval of the Republican members. The depth of the Republican party allegiance to Reed's vision of the House process in general and to his insistence that the Disappearing Quorum rule be retained intact, was perhaps best reflected in the way party members greeted Reed's first quorum count. Hinds recounts the event:

On Saturday (January 13, 1896) an interesting little incident occurred. Only a few having voted on a proposition, Wanger (R-Pa.) made the point of no quorum, whereupon Mr. Reed began to count the house. This act -- a very frequent one in the 51st Congress -- had not been performed before this Congress, and as he began and continued the members burst into loud applause. The new members were especially interested in the process.²

The final rules package was eventually presented to the House
and passed on January 23, 1896. Subsequent Republican Congresses adhered to the procedures established by these rules and continued to encourage the kind of legislative process which reflected both the unity of the Republican party, and its allegiance to the principles of legislative action.

The commitment to the centralization of power and the relative lack of independence and autonomy for individual members were both upheld by the belief among Republican Congressmen that they were necessary instruments of effective party rule. And many of them further believed that effective party rule was the system which best promised to meet their individual political needs. The continued existence of this form of legislative government, then, depended upon the persistence throughout the late 1890's of shared goals among Republican members, the perception that individual and party self-interest along a range of concerns were compatible, and the continued strength of the links which at once bound the member to his constituency and his constituency to the national party organization. These characteristics and forces, working within the Republican party in the late nineteenth century, generally combined to provide a strong foundation for the kind of House Thomas B. Reed had created and hoped to sustain.

There were, of course, occasional cracks in the support for this kind of legislative organization -- cracks which began to become more numerous and significant in the first decade of the twentieth century. Reed himself, for example,
had recognized from the start that Republican Members were likely to become restive sooner or later under the centralized system he had established. Reed believed, Hinds noted in his diary in 1896, that "the pendulum has of necessity swung rather far in the direction of shutting off debate, because of the vicious system of using debate to kill and not to consider. With the power of killing debate taken away, there may be a fuller consideration without trouble."³ To this recognition of the fragility of the procedures, structures and norms upon which Reed's system was based were added occasional voices of disquiet within the Republican party. Mild at first, these voices of dissent became more persistent as time wore on.⁴

By the opening of the 59th Congress, these cracks in the Republican legislative edifice were beginning to attract notice. During the 1905 debate over the rules, for example, John Sharp Williams, the Democratic floor leader, claimed that support among Republicans for a continuation of the legislative process designed by Reed (and inherited and sustained by his successors Thomas Henderson and now Joseph G. Cannon) was beginning to erode, and that the unity and cohesiveness within the Republican party which had underlaid and nurtured this system were beginning to crumble. "There is a great difference of opinion growing up in the ranks of the Republican party," he suggested,
The LaFollette idea, the Cummins idea, the new Massachusetts free-raw materials idea, all sorts of stand-pat ideas come in upon us on the breezes from the west and from the Northeast, all of them from people pretending at any rate to want to revise the present exorbitant tariff schedules .... Right here at the threshold I tell you that if you adopt this resolution (to continue Reed's Rules) ... you have adopted rules that will render you just as helpless as a bird trying to fly in an asphalt lake.5

Despite these warnings, and the evident appeal by Williams to a new and still emerging diffuseness in the Republican party coalition (and new conceptions on the part of Republican Members of their own self-interest), the 59th Congress adopted the by now traditional Reed's Rules. Yet, it was clear that his observations about the state of the Republican legislative party were not without a measure of truth.

By 1907 and the commencement of the 60th Congress, the implications of Williams' remarks two years before were beginning to be felt. Although Reed's Rules were once again adopted, resistance to the kind of legislative process which they sustained was beginning to gather strength within the Republican party. This resistance became particularly evident toward the end of the 60th Congress as a full-blown assault on the rules began to take shape. In the 61st Congress this nascent movement erupted into a formal and organized revolt on what had by that time become the conservative Republican conception of the legislative process.

The insurgency which erupted in 1910 had actually begun
taking shape in 1908 during the closing months of the 60th Congress. A handful of Republicans, Hepburn of Iowa and Gardner of Massachusetts (who was Henry Cabot Lodge's son-in-law) among them had in that Congress risen to protest the automatic adoption of Reed's Rules in the party caucus. In 1908, however, this as yet unorganized group of progressive dissenters brought their reservations to the floor of the House. In the opening session of the 60th Congress, for example, Henry Cooper of Wisconsin made a short speech against the "adoption of the rules without revision." Then, in December of 1908, Augustus Gardner introduced a resolution to discharge the foreign affairs committee of a bill which directed the Secretary of State to determine whether or not the British House of Commons had recently reformed its own rules of procedure. Hidden within this rather innocuous bill was a passage which directed Speaker Cannon to appoint a committee to look into a revision of the rules in the United States House of Representatives. The discharge motion passed the House, but when Gardner then amended the bill itself by proposing to strike out all but the clause which actually directed the Speaker to appoint a committee for the revision of the rules, the bill was voted down.7

Cannonism had meanwhile become a national political issue in 1908. The Democratic platform contained a plank condemning the power exercised by the United States Speaker of the House, newspapers and periodicals were beginning to
call for a curtailment of Cannon's powers, and segments of the public -- particularly in the Midwest -- were beginning to urge their Representatives on toward open revolt. 8 It was also in that year that a group of Republican Members of Congress had begun meeting to plan for a revision of the rules. George Norris was one of the leaders of this ad hoc progressive-insurgent conclave, but others like Victor Murdock of Kansas, and Gardner, were also important contributors to this reform effort. As divergent pressures on individual Members of Congress added urgency to the movement to change the rules, this group grew in size and became more active in its opposition to Joseph Cannon.

The insurgents first turned to the White House for aid. Conservative Republicans had been particularly hard on Theodore Roosevelt in his last year as President, 9 and the dissenting Republicans in the House believed that he and William Howard Taft, his chosen successor, would be especially inclined to help those in Congress who had most vigorously supported Roosevelt's progressive policies. In fact, however, although Roosevelt did evince a measure of interest in the insurgent cause, he was reluctant to interfere in what he saw as a problem which more squarely involved Taft and the Congress. 10 Taft, meanwhile, who was less than eager to begin his Presidency on the sour notes of party discord, publicly and privately sought a compromise between the insurgents and Cannon. "What I am working for," he told William Allen White,
is a compromise agreement by which the insurgents shall cease their insurrection for this session . . . It is essential to the business of the country that the tariff be settled and settled quickly . . . I cannot afford, merely to accomplish one good purpose, to sacrifice all others, when those others are, as compared with the one, much more important."

Insurgents saw this as an implicit rejection of their quests for aid, and in effect it was just that. Trapped between the progressive legacy left by Roosevelt, and the need to work with the conservative and pro-Cannon majority within his own party in the House, Taft vacillated at first, but ultimately bowed to what he saw as the demands of political necessity and lent his weight to the side of Joseph Cannon. "The question with me," Taft wrote an acquaintance,

is practical, not theoretical, and I ask you how a man of sense, looking at the situation as it is, can expect me to do otherwise than support the regular organization in the House. I should have been glad to beat Cannon and to have changed the rules within the party, but I must rely upon the party and party discipline to pass the measures that I am recommending. How could I go to the party and ask for this if I should support thirty insurgents who have broken away from the other 190?"

As the insurgency developed in the early months of 1909 then, it was clear that little could be expected from Taft in the way of assistance.

Denied the blessings of the President, the insurgents explored other alternatives, and other sources of support. In February of 1909, Victor Murdock issued an appeal to the
newly elected Freshman members of the 61st Congress to support the Progressive cause in Congress. Writing on behalf of the insurgent group, Murdock outlined the reform measures he and his colleagues sought. Included in the list of proposed reforms were the transfer of the power to appoint committees from the Speaker to a committee appointed by the House; a curtailment of the Speaker's recognition rights; and the establishment of a virtually inviolable Calendar Wednesday Rule and a Calendar Tuesday rule (under which all members would be permitted to circumvent the Rules Committee and report bills directly to the House every Tuesday). For the most part, the incoming Freshmen were non-committal in their replies to Murdock's letter, many asking for more time to examine the rules of the House themselves.13 A few did promise support for the insurgent cause, and Murdock duly added their names to the small but growing list of House reformers.14

Throughout this period, the Democrats were quite eager to do what they could to widen the rift between Progressive and Conservative factions of the Republican legislative party as the struggle over the rules gathered momentum. To this end, Democrats publicized what they viewed as the evils of Cannonism and did much to make the fight over the rules a national political issue. Within the House, meanwhile, the Democrats also encouraged insurgents by lending their enthusiastic, if somewhat qualified, support to the effort to democratize the House. Democrats were quite willing to
throw their weight behind all of the insurgents' demands for reform in part because of their long-standing opposition to the brand of legislative organization Cannon and his immediate Republican predecessors in the Speaker's chair had sustained. The Democratic party had never been comfortable with the principles of strong central control which had guided the Republican approach to law-making from Reed's time up to Cannon's.

Democrats also hoped, however, that their allegiance to the insurgent reform program might lead dissident Republicans to consider a more comprehensive and formal political relationship with the House Democratic party. To this end, Democratic leaders entered into discussion with insurgents over the possibility of forming a coalition government of sorts within the House of Representatives. "Really, the only way to smash the combination," Wallace Bassford, Clerk of the Minority (Democratic) Conference, wrote to the publisher of Success Magazine, "is for 24 insurgents to join with the 172 Democrats--who will vote for Mr. (Champ) Clark for Speaker." The mere transfer of the committee appointment powers from the Speaker to a Steering Committee would accomplish little, Bassford continued, since "Cannon would dominate the steering committee." Nor would the Democrats be able to give their unanimous support to an insurgent candidate for Speaker. "It is not practicable to attempt to drag the mountain to Mahomet--172 Democrats cannot be rounded up without the loss of a vote to support some
insurgent -- and no insurgent stands out as good Speaker-
ship timber, either." The only solution, Bassford continued,
lay in the insurgent support for the Democratic nominee for
the Speakership.15

The insurgents, however, were not quite prepared to
bolt their party. In the early days of the 61st Congress,
consequently, they produced their own nominee for the
Speakership, Victor Murdock. Democrats still held onto the
belief, however, that the insurgents, who hoped to at least
force a three-way deadlock in the Speakership vote (between
Cannon, Murdock and Clark), would eventually throw their
weight to the Democratic side. "After the deadlock," Bass-
ford suggested, "it is hoped that the Clark and Murdock
forces can coalesce, elect one of the other Speaker, and
proceed to the adoption of new rules and the appointment
of a joint steering committee to select the majority of
the committees from among the combined forces."16 Murdock,
however, quashed these hopes by withdrawing from the race.
When the vote for Speaker took place on March 15, therefore,
Cannon was easily re-elected by a margin of 204 to 106 over
Champ Clark. Twelve insurgents did cast their ballots for
other progressives in the House (8 for Cooper, 2 for Norris,
and 1 for Esch and 1 for Hepburn), but this small show of
intransigence did not affect the outcome of the vote.

The insurgents were clearly more interested in revis-
ing the rules than in actually unseating Cannon. "The
vote for Cannon," one student of the insurgency suggests,
"was no surprise, for most of the insurgents were concerned with overthrowing the Cannon machine by changing House rules rather than with waging a personal vendetta against the Speaker himself." Insurgents, in other words, wanted a new legislative process instead of merely a new Speaker. Thus, the real struggle between insurgents and conservative Republicans came on the vote on the rules.

Following the election of the Speaker, Dalzell of Pennsylvania moved that the rules of the 60th Congress be adopted as the rules of the 61st Congress. In an effort to forestall debate, he immediately called for the previous question (a parliamentary motion which immediately cuts off debate). This motion was ordered on a close Roll Call vote, 193 to 189, but to the surprise of the organization Republicans, the House promptly proceeded to reject the resolution (the main resolution) adopting the rules of the 60th Congress by an equally close vote of 189 to 193. Champ Clark then introduced an alternative resolution on the rules which proposed that the House adopt the rules of the 60th Congress with certain major modifications. Among them was the curtailment of the Speaker's power to appoint committees (the Speaker would retain the power to appoint only five standing committees -- Ways and Means, Printing, Mileage, Enrolled Bills and Accounts), the enlargement of the Rules Committee and the removal of the Speaker from membership on that committee. Clark followed this resolution with a call for the previous question in attempt to cut off debate and
bring the resolution to an immediate vote. To the surprise of most observers, this motion was soundly defeated despite the fact that thirty-one Republican insurgents had, as expected, lent their support to the measure.

The defeat of Clark's proposal was largely the work of John J. Fitzgerald, a Democrat of New York, who with twenty-three of his party colleagues opposed such a reform of the rules. In the wake of this defeat, Fitzgerald himself introduced what he termed a compromise measure which centered largely upon the Calendar Wednesday rule. This rule had originally been designed to set aside a specific time for the consideration of bills brought directly to the floor from committees. As the insurgents had also noted in their own proposals, however, the growth of the Rules Committee, and the emergence of the Special Order as the primary channel through which Committee reports and resolutions gained access to the floor, the Calendar rule had largely lapsed. A simple majority vote could dispense with it, for one thing, and the time allotted for committee reports, even when it was employed, was too short to allow much business to be transacted. In addition, one committee could usually prolong debate over one of its own bills and over a succession of calendar days to the point that few other committees would ever get a chance to present their own bills and reports. Insurgents, therefore, had hoped to resurrect the Calendar Wednesday rule as a viable channel of Committee access to the floor. Progressives hoped that it could become a potent
counterweight to the Speaker's (working through the Rules Committee) control of the legislative agenda.

Fitzgerald's compromise measure, which probably had Speaker Cannon's blessings, addressed this particular portion of the progressive reform program by strengthening the Calendar Wednesday rule (under his proposed change, for example, the Call of the Committees on Calendar Wednesday could only be dispensed with by a two-thirds vote of the House.) 21 Clearly, however, his proposal did little to alter the central targets of the 'insurgents' displeasure. The Speaker's power to appoint committees was left untouched as was his recognition power. Indeed, even the Rules Committee would retain most of its control over the business of the House. With over fifty committees in the House of Representatives, Calendar Wednesday would accommodate no more than a tiny fraction of the resolutions and reports which awaited action of the House floor. Thus, the pro-Cannon forces had little difficulty in supporting the Fitzgerald amendment to the Rules, and after a short but stormy debate, it passed 211 to 173. 22

The adoption of the Calendar Wednesday compromise signalled defeat for the insurgents, but it was also clear that Cannon and his allies had done little more than buy time in their struggle to hold the House process to its traditional organizational paths. President Taft, for example, was aware of the transiency of the calm which followed the insurgent defeat on the rules in March, but hoped that the
momentary respite from internecine warfare thus brought about might give him time to mollify progressives with substantive reform legislation -- particularly reform of the tariff which had become an obsession within insurgent ranks. "I am glad to say that the solution of the difficulties in the House was extremely satisfactory to me," a relieved Taft wrote his brother,

I had sympathy with those who were protesting against Uncle Joe's absolute rule, but I had to deprecate, as the leader of the party, the insurrection by 30 against 180, when I had to count on the 180 to put through the legislation which we have promised to the public. I think the tariff bill will be a step in the right direction.23

Cannon, himself, had gained time to attempt to use the resources at his disposal to defuse the bitterness which existed within his party and to attempt to rebuild his disintegrating political coalition. The judicious dispensation of political favors to insurgents might do much to reunite the Republican legislative party.

Despite the relative calm which followed the March, 1909 fight over the rules, however, and despite the opportunities that calm provided party leaders for effecting some sort of reconciliation between Conservative and Progressive wings of the party, Taft appeared unable and Cannon appeared both unable and unwilling to reach an accord with
the insurgent faction. The tariff debate, for example, quickly dashed the hopes of many progressives for real reform, and did much to heighten antagonisms within the Republican ranks.

To be sure, the tariff bill reported out of the Ways and Means Committee by its Chairman, Sereno E. Payne, of New York, did contain minor reductions in particular duties, but by and large the bill was poorly received by progressives. Insurgent disappointment, however, turned to outrage when the House version of the bill reached the Senate. There Aldrich and his followers transformed what had at least maintained a semblance of moderation in its passage through the House, into a protectionist masterpiece. Nor were House progressives at all happy with Cannon's subsequent manipulation of the rules to insure final passage of the (now protectionist) Payne-Aldrich Bill when it was returned to the House.24

Even Taft betrayed a certain displeasure over the Speaker's actions during the tariff debate. "I don't think that Cannon played square in one respect," he told his brother. "He nominated a conference committee (to formally iron out the differences between the House and Senate versions of the tariff bill) that had four high tariff men on it, and men who would not fight for the low provisions of the House bill."25 In the end, therefore, progressives regarded the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as a reminder of how intractable the differences were that separated them from
the conservative Republicans, and an indication of the lengths to which Cannon himself was willing to go to manipulate the House process to meet his "stand-pat" political philosophy.

Clearly, Cannon was unwilling to attempt to placate insurgents through the use of his patronage powers within the House. His intransigence on the tariff issue was matched by an equally rigid refusal to include progressive Republican Members of Congress in his distribution of political prizes and resources. Insurgents were generally appointed to unimportant committees and denied recognition for even private bills. As Norris wrote to one constituent:

You cannot fully appreciate or understand just how difficult it is to do anything surrounded as we are on all sides by rules, regulations, individuals, machines, and powers, owned entirely by the opposition. We are ostracized politically and socially. We have been deprived of all House patronage and robbed of all good committee appointments.

Although it is far from clear that Cannon could have done anything to defuse the insurgent opposition to his policies and organizational preferences, it is also plain that he made little effort in this direction. Spurred on by his own personal irascibility and combattiveness, and his immoderate allegiance to political principles which he believed to be correct, Cannon virtually backed himself, throughout 1909, into a tactical corner in which his only
options were total victory or capitulation to the insurgent demands for reform.

Throughout 1909, then, the insurgent impatience and frustration mounted steadily. Cannon refused to countenance compromise, and a weak and vacillating Taft felt himself unable and increasingly unwilling to intervene on the insurgents' behalf. "What a fool I would be," he argued, "If I joined ... the yelping and snarling at Cannon and Aldrich, which these so-called "progressives" and their amateur political newspaper correspondents are insisting upon as a mark of loyalty to the Roosevelt policies." Guided by what he saw to be the mandates of political expediency, Taft chose to cast his lot with Cannon and do little to extricate himself or his party from the deepening conflict in Congress.

As 1910 approached, this conflict resurfaced as Conservative intransigence and insurgent frustration combined to bring the Republican legislative party to an open break. The revolt, which had long been brewing, was sparked largely by the Pinchot-Ballinger dispute which by early 1910 had moved to the center stage of national politics. Briefly, the controversy grew out of the smoldering rivalry which pitted conservationists against those who favored a less restrained approach to the exploitation of natural resources. Conservationism had become a cornerstone of Theodore Roosevelt's progressivism and a potent political symbol of the progressive cause in general. Gifford Pinchot, the able bureaucratic entrepreneur who had served as Chief Forester under Roosevelt,
and for a time under Taft, was the principal spokesman for the conservationist cause, and the focus of the specific conflict which exploded into national prominence in the spring and summer of 1909.

The immediate source of the controversy lay in a charge made by Louis Glavis, an investigator for the Interior Department, that the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate had secretly and improperly bought 5280 acres of public land (laden with coal) in Alaska in 1904. Under existing laws, public lands were sold in blocks of 160 acres to individual claimants for ten dollars per acre. Although the intent of the law was to encourage individual settlement and development of the public lands in Alaska, the biggest purchasers of this land were often large syndicates of investors who worked through "front men." These "front men" would buy mineral-rich land as individuals at the specified government price, and then sell it according to terms worked out in advance to the development syndicate.

In 1904 the law which governed the sale of public lands was changed to prohibit this type of arrangement. The new law specified that each claimant to a 160-acre parcel of land in the public domain had to promise that his claim "was made in good faith for his own benefit" and not on behalf of any other individual or group. As Glavis was able to show, the Morgan-Guggenheim group had violated this provision in their purchase of Alaska coal land, and had probably done so
with the knowledge, if not the assistance, of the then Land Commissioner, Richard Ballinger. Whether or not Ballinger personally profited from the Morgan-Guggenheim sale is not clear, but it was clear to those concerned that Ballinger was not in sympathy with the ardent conservationist leanings of those like Pinchot. Indeed, Ballinger had resigned his post as Commissioner in 1908, largely in protest against Roosevelt's public land policies.

In 1909, Taft surprised conservationists in general, and Pinchot in particular, by naming Ballinger Secretary of the Interior. Pinchot and others responded immediately by reopening first privately with Taft and later in the year publicly, the Alaska land case. What followed was an inept and confused attempt by the Taft administration to defuse the problem, which included a half-hearted administration-led investigation, the dismissal of Glavis from his post for insubordination, inconsistent denials of wrong-doing, and an ill-conceived and poorly executed "cover-up."31

By December of 1909, heightened public interest in the case produced calls for Congressional action. On December 21, the Senate called on the President to send it all materials on the Ballinger case, and after negotiations between Congressional leaders of both chambers and the President, it was decided to convene a joint House-Senate investigation of the matter. Taft acquiesced to this course of action since it was clear that few, if any, conservationists would be appointed to the investigative committee.32 Insurgents in
the House, however, who had been waiting for an opportunity to reassert their call for organizational reform, decided to resist what they saw as a rubber-stamp investigation of the Ballinger affair.

When, on January 7, 1910, the resolution authorizing the Speaker to appoint the investigative committee was brought before the House, therefore, the insurgents responded by introducing a substitute resolution which instead gave the House as a whole the power to name the members of that committee. Introduced by George Norris, this insurgent resolution passed the House with Democratic backing by a vote of 149 to 146. This victory provided the momentum which had been lost in March of 1909, and re-ignited the drive among House dissidents to effect a broader reform of the legislative process in the House. Taft's dismissal of Gifford Pinchot on the evening of January 7, in obvious response to the successful insurgent struggle in the House (over the right to appoint the members of the investigative committee), merely heightened the progressives' determination to force reform on their reluctant conservative Republican colleagues.

The increasingly determined insurgent bloc, however, continued to be met with stiff and effective opposition from the pro-Cannon faction. Access to the floor was still denied to most progressives, and their proposals for reform of the rules generally languished in committee pigeon-holes. Despite these hurdles, insurgents and particularly George Norris,
bided their time, waiting for the inevitable miscalculation or procedural blunder on the part of Cannon and his friends. Then in March "quite by accident," Norris remembers, "in the unguarded moment I knew would come, the opening for a reformation of those rules presented itself." 34

This unguarded moment, ironically arose out of an attempt by the Republican leadership to weaken the provisions of the Calendar Wednesday rule. On Wednesday, March 16, 1910, Edward Crumpacker "one of the minor subalterns of the organization," 34A introduced a resolution which dealt with the census. Crumpacker claimed that since his bill dealt with an issue mandated by the constitution, it should enjoy the highest possible privilege (that is, to take precedent over all other resolutions including those which would otherwise have been considered first under the Calendar Wednesday rule). Cannon predictably supported Crumpacker's contention, but after a lengthy debate, was himself surprisingly overruled by a vote of 163 to 112. 35 The following day, however, the same motion was reintroduced by Crumpacker, and this time the Speaker's ruling was sustained. "They therefore decided, on that fateful day," Norris recalls, "that the Constitutional provision conferred a constitutional privilege supreme over the general rules of the House." 36

Norris responded to this decision by demanding the right to introduce a resolution aimed at enlarging the Rules Committee and relieving the Speaker both of membership on, as well as his control over the recruitment of members to
that committee. Contending that the rules of the House were mandated by the Constitution, Norris argued that any resolution which dealt in any way with those rules, therefore, had the claim to constitutional privilege as the Speaker had conceded to the Crumpacker resolution on the census. Dalzell of Pennsylvania immediately rose to protest Norris' motion on a point of order. Cannon, meanwhile, sensing danger, attempted to forestall the inevitable by allowing debate over Dalzell's motion to continue well into the next day. Fearing that his decision to sustain Dalzell's protest would be overruled by the House insurgents and their Democratic allies, he bought time while his friends worked to rebuild their sagging defenses. Finally, on March 19, Norris' resolution which was amended to stipulate that the Rules Committee should be composed of ten members (six majority and four minority members) elected by the House, and should not include the Speaker, was passed.

In a sense, this "resolution" fell short of effecting the comprehensive reform of the House system which progressives had sought. Speaker Cannon retained his office in an extraordinary contest which followed the Rules Committee vote (Norris and many other insurgents supported him in this vote), and the Republican conservatives who still constituted a majority within the party caucus, were able to appoint their own candidates to the new committee. Yet, the March, 1910 revolt was a major symbolic victory for the forces
opposed to the kind of centralized control of the legislative process which had characterized the House since the early 1890's. It also marked the beginning of a significant and unfolding transformation of both the formal organization of the House, and the way in which individual Members of Congress approached their own tasks and responsibilities.

This transformation, the outlines of which were provided by the 1910 revolt, were reinforced by the Democratic dominated 62nd House which convened in 1911. In that Congress, Democratic Representatives continued, for the most part the insurgent-inspired assault on the institutions of central control by transferring the right to appoint committees from the Speaker to the House as a whole. Within the party, furthermore, the committee selection or nomination process was entrusted to a Committee on Committees chaired by the Floor Leader, Oscar Underwood. The 61st Congress also retained the Calendar Wednesday rule, reaffirmed its commitment to the Discharge Rule, and strengthened the rights of individual Members of Congress to introduce private bills. In effect, the Democrats of the 62nd Congress reinforced and broadened the organizational trend away from centralization which had been conceived, but only partially achieved, by the Republican progressives.
That this organizational revolution which occurred between 1908 and 1911 was essentially directed against centralization in the House of Representatives, can be seen in the reform proposals which were actually introduced by progressive Members of Congress. During that period of time, opponents of centralization and the strong Speakership directed their energies toward a number of specific areas of concern. As Hepburn of Iowa suggested in 1909, there were three aspects of the central system of legislative control against which progressives were directing their efforts: (1) the Speaker's power to appoint committees (i.e. the idea of a Speaker's cabinet); (2) the Speaker's power of recognition on the floor of the House; and (3) the lack of an automatic system for (or at least more broadly distributed power over) setting the legislative agenda. 38

On the first of these obstacles to what many in the anti-Cannon camp viewed as meaningful democratization of the House process, progressives and Democrats were more unified and more specific in opposing the existing means of appointing committees than they were in actually coming up with viable alternatives. Quite simply, George Norris suggested on the one hand, the Speaker "appoints the committees, he controls the whole situation." 39 This power, he argued, had a particularly decisive and sinister impact on the behavior and independence of Members of Congress since it allowed the Speaker and his inner circle to "hold in their hands . . . the political welfare of every Member." 40 As
Victor Murdock added:

This House has surrendered its power to one man. You can not get any power back yourself as a Member on this floor . . . unless you go to the sole place it is lodged, and that is with the Speaker. He holds that power largely, but not wholly, by means of committee appointments.41

While insurgent reformers were thus clear in their call for changes in the committee appointment process, few were willing or able to propose concrete reform measures. In the early days of the 62nd Congress, George Norris did propose that a geographically balanced Rules Committee be given the power to appoint committees,42 but the Democrats who were in the majority decided upon their own system under which each party would choose its own nominees for committee positions. Both insurgent and conservative Republicans united in opposing this solution. Norris objected to the strong role of the caucus, and argued that caucus selection was little better than the old system which gave the Speaker that power. In a sense, he agreed with Republican leader James Mann who argued that the Democratic method was little more than a cosmetic departure from previous practice. "You have simply provided a different method for carrying out your caucus action," Mann suggested, "which you could have carried out under the old rules with equal facility."43

Yet Norris, unlike Mann, was not simply sniping at the form of the committee selection system proposed by the
Democrats, but was more profoundly upset with the entire thrust of that new system. A proponent of procedures which would somehow render committee appointments more automatic and uniform, Norris was galled by the continued Democratic insistence that the process should retain its discretionary and political character. Despite Norris' objections that "we ought to get away from the caucus just as much and as far as we can," the Democratic solution ultimately adhered, at least in theory, more to the traditionalist Republican idea that committee appointments could only be made "by an authority that can with certainty be located and made to bear the burden of responsibility," than it did to Norris' idea that the process should be carried out according to automatic criteria.

At the same time, Democrats did agree with Norris' prescriptions to the extent that Seniority -- itself an automatic criterion -- did become more solidly entrenched as a norm for the selection of Committee Chairmen. The Democratic reliance upon seniority, however, was not so much the product of a specific reform philosophy as it was the product of peculiar party needs. As in the past, the primary consideration of the Democratic leadership centered around the need to encourage unity and harmony in a clearly factionalized party. "By following the rule of seniority," one observer suggested at the time, "there was a chance to achieve it; . . . So the seniority rule was pretty closely observed, though it was stretched a bit to give Northern
states sixteen chairmanships."^46

The Speaker's recognition powers represented a second broad concern of insurgents who sought to reform and decentralize the organization of the House of Representatives. To a certain extent, the narrow preoccupation with this particular instrument of centralization was in reaction to Cannon's insistence (which was once again in full accord with the practice of Speakers since the late nineteenth century) that all petitions for recognition on the floor of the House be cleared with him in advance. This, to some, humiliating procedure served as one of Cannon's chief means of controlling the dispensation of patronage in the House (for example, recognizing supporters who wanted House approval of bills designed to aid local constituents in one way or another), and of rewarding loyal Members of Congress and penalizing opponents. ^47 "No member of Congress . . . can secure recognition upon any bill, no matter how trivial, without first going to the private office of Speaker Cannon." Irvine Lenroot remarked in a Wisconsin speech in 1908. ^48 Without this prior approval, and without recognition of the floor of the House, another Member suggested, a representative "might as well be doing the morning milking into a sieve . . . for all the legislative bricks he can hope to set."^49 Insurgents generally sought to curb this enormous power by attempting to "neutralize" the Speakership along the lines of the English Speaker of the House of Commons. ^50 In 1911, the Democrats claimed to have done just this,
suggesting that although the Speaker necessarily retained the parliamentary "right of selection among several members who seek recognition at the same time on questions of equal privilege," his power to abuse that right had been "very much curtailed."\(^{51}\)

To a certain extent, this curtailment of the Speaker's discretionary recognition rights was effected voluntarily by the new Democratic Speaker himself. Champ Clark simply refused to exercise many of the powers of the office or make any effort to re-establish the kind of central control Cannon had wielded. "I have been in the minority so long," he reportedly told John Fitzgerald in 1910:

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\text{that I have seen the advantage and power of the Speaker. The minority Leader is pitted against the Speaker as the leader of the majority, and the Speaker has all the advantages which his power over members gives him. If I am Speaker I do not want that power. Let it be a fair fight between the leaders of the two parties on the floor of the House, and the Speaker be the umpire instead of the majority leader and umpire as well.}^{52}\]

It was argued at the time that Clark's reluctance to assume all the powers of the Speakership stemmed from his wider political ambitions. "Because he is a candidate for the Presidency," the reasoning went, he "doesn't wish to hurt anyone's feelings . . . "\(^{53}\)

The curtailment of the Speaker's power was also accomplished, however, by a number of formal reforms effected between 1909 and 1911 which reflected the third broad (and
often vaguely expressed desire of progressives to relieve the Speaker of his power "to prevent," in George Norris' words, "the House from participating in Legislative action. We want the House to be a representative of the people," he continued in a letter to a constituent, "and each individual member to have his ideas presented and passed on, and at the same time to assume his share of the responsibility."\(^5^4\)

To this end, progressives supported, among other things, the establishment of a stronger individual or private calendar rule. In 1909 (during the 60th Congress) for example, the minority Democrats had proposed, with the evident support of the Republican insurgents, a Calendar Tuesday resolution which stipulated that one day each week be set aside for individual resolutions. Under this proposal, each member would be called in turn (by alphabetical order) and would have the right to introduce one public bill from either the House or Union Calendar for consideration (with twenty minutes debate allowed on each side of the question). Clearly aimed at circumventing both the Rules Committee and the Speaker, this proposal also included a discharge provision which would allow the House to resurrect bills from committee pigeonholes.\(^5^5\) Pro-Cannon Republicans responded by proposing a weak alternative which Norris characterized as "a homeopathic dose of nothingness,"\(^5^6\) and both sides resolved to resume the debate after the commencement of the 61st Congress.
When the insurgents and Democrats opened the new Congress two weeks later with their almost successful assault on the old rules, Cannon conceded some ground on the Calendar rule by supporting the Fitzgerald compromise. Insurgents were clearly disappointed with the failure of their struggle for wider reform, but claimed to have won a partial victory, nevertheless, in forcing the Republican leadership to accept this Calendar reform. Republican leaders generally resisted efforts to use the Calendar Wednesday Rule, and, fearing that such reforms threatened to transform the House of Representatives "from a deliberative Chamber into a wrangling club," did what they could to limit its use. For the most part, therefore, insurgents had to wait until the majority Democrats of the 62nd Congress formally committed themselves to an effective Calendar Wednesday Rule.

The Democrats in that Congress also implemented another plank of the Insurgent reform platform when they resurrected and strengthened the Discharge rule. Under the rules of the 62nd Congress, any bill could be taken out of committee and introduced to the full House if the motion to discharge was seconded by a simple majority of members present. This was a major boost to the proponents of individual rights in the House, and it received the enthusiastic support of most progressive Republicans, despite warnings from conservative Republicans like James Mann who argued that it would ultimately work to the advantage of no one.

Ultimately, it worked too well for even the de-centralizing Democrats who within a year decided to modify and
effectively weaken it. In February of 1912, Democrats introduced an amendment which would give motions to suspend the rules (the old and more difficult manner by which bills were brought before the House out of their regular order) precedence over motions to discharge committees. Although an apparently minor modification which was largely intended to deprive Republicans of an instrument of filibustering,\(^6\) it nevertheless promised to nullify the discharge rule and signalled a partial departure from the original insurgent-Democrat reform agenda. As Republicans suggested on the floor, the Speaker could totally circumvent the discharge calendar by simply arranging to have friendly Members load it up with innocuous bills, or by having those same members exhaust time set aside for the discharge calendar, by introducing an endless string of motions to suspend the rules. This "is a step backward," an outraged Norris fumed. "It is a surrender of the rights of the individual member and a wonderful increase of the Speaker's power."\(^6\)

Despite Norris' denunciation, and despite the modifications Democrats imposed on their reform agenda, the members of that party in the House generally moved toward, rather than away from the kinds of change insurgent Republicans sought. The Democrats had never been comfortable with a strong Speaker and total central control over the legislative process, and this traditional disinclination was amply reflected in the rules of the 62nd Congress. It was also reflected in Champ Clark's reluctance to exploit the still
significant, if latent, resources at his command. To be sure, the Democratic Caucus, and its leader, Oscar Underwood, assumed an importance which insured a measure of legislative policy coherence, but despite Republican and progressive claims to the contrary, neither the caucus nor Underwood ever possessed the power and the authority, or exercised the kind of central control that the strong Republican Speakers had wielded between 1890 and 1910. By and large, then, the Democratic 62nd Congress gave institutional shape to the insurgent demands for reform by working to elevate the role of the individual Member of Congress in the legislative process and by undermining the institutional supports of centralization.

The revolt against centralization within the House of Representatives reflected a number of broader changes which were occurring in the American political system as a whole. As that wider system changed, the House itself responded by transforming the lines of its own conduct, style, and ultimately its role in the policy-making process. The transformation of the internal world of the House during the 1909 to 1911 period was largely the product of changes in national electoral patterns, in the organization of political demands and ideologies, and in the norms of political participation among constituents. As national policy organizations fragmented, as voting laws and pluralistic norms of political participation reinforced the latent
parochial tendencies of Congress' constituent base, and as the individual Member of Congress became more immune to electoral defeat, the cohesiveness, unity and coherence of the political coalitions within the House became more fragile.

In effect, the assault on centralization in Congress was the product of a far deeper and far broader revolt in the electorate against the nineteenth century style of national politics. In the House, therefore, this revolt was essentially a reaction against an organizational system and a particular form of leadership which no longer reflected the political or electoral needs, concerns or interests of an increasingly autonomous and (thus) fragmented membership. The electoral needs of the individual Member of Congress in the era of primary elections, for example, were quite different from those of members who served in a time when (or indeed areas where) party caucuses still nominated Representatives. Similarly, allegiance to national partisan goals, symbols and concerns proved to be of declining value to candidates at a time, and in constituencies where, the most potent and best organized political demands were coming from more particularistic regional and functional interests.

In sum, the once powerful party machinery within Congress, and the centralized, coordinative legislative process which served that machinery in Congress, were by 1910 becoming progressively less able to provide either adequate inducements for organizational conformity or sufficiently
harsh penalties for deviance. The growing electoral power of incumbency and the individualism and political independence which that encouraged, tended to create patterns of conflict and levels of divisiveness which were increasingly beyond the power of a rigid centralized organization to control or manage. As Members of Congress began voicing their own singular demands, interests and expectations, seeking to set their own political agendas and in turn calculating the political costs and benefits of allegiance to the traditional Republican legislative system, support for centralization evaporated. The question remains, however, why did this revolt occur when it did? What changed in the 1909 to 1913 period to cause Members of Congress (particularly, once again, Republican Members of Congress) to shift their energies from toleration of (if not support for) a centralized organization to outright opposition?

For the most part, the sources of the revolt were rooted in three sets of long and short term forces at work both within Congress and in its political environment after 1896. Specific issues, first of all, worked between 1900 and 1910 to fragment the Republican party, nationally as well as within the House. As the 1896 Realignment receded into history, the concerns which had initially unified the Republican party -- the tariff, the currency question, and to a certain limited extent residual issues of the Civil War such as voting rights and pensions -- gave way to the new interests which produced no such factional or even regional unity.
Secondly, the post-1900 era saw a dramatic increase in the electoral autonomy and consequently of the political independence (independent of the national party machinery and often independent of the local party machinery as well) of the individual Member of Congress. The proliferation of new voting regulations, and particularly of primary laws tended to separate party fortunes from individual electoral or political careers. The normative revolt on the part of the electorate against the strong party and the subsequent pluralization of political demand-making in the nation also encouraged this emergent individualism in the House. Both contributed to the increasing separation of the Member of Congress from the kind of strict allegiance to broad political coalitions, and broadly expressed partisan goals which had so characterized the Republican party in the late nineteenth century.

Finally, forces within the House, particularly personalities played a role in encouraging the revolt against centralization. Cannon's intractibility, as well as Taft's incompetence mixed with the often acute sensibilities of many of the insurgents, tended to exacerbate party differences, and perhaps hasten the dissolution of the centralized legislative system which had by 1910 become the hallmark of Republican legislative politics. All of these factors combined to fragment the lines of conflict within the House of Representatives in ways the traditional organizational system could not control. Ultimately, it was the inability
of this late nineteenth century Republican incarnation of
the legislative process to manage and resolve these new
patterns of internal conflict, or to meet the new altered
needs and expectations of the Members of Congress in the
early twentieth century which led to its demise.

Among the issues which first of all contributed to
this increasing fragmentation of the Republican Party in
the House were the tariff and trust question, conservation
and a number of particularly progressive concerns which
centered around the general question of "good government."
Republicans had begun to divide over these issues before
1909, but a number of specific factors at work in the first
decade of the twentieth century did much to transform these
growing division into open factional warfare.

Theodore Roosevelt's Presidency, first of all, the
approach he took to these central issues, and the differ-
ences which separated his own peculiar brand of Republican-
ism from that of the more conservative and traditional party
leaders in the House, did much to accentuate these growing
party fissures. "By the time Roosevelt left office," Mowry
suggests, for example,

a distinct cleavage had appeared in the Republi-
can party. Roosevelt had not started the schism, and it would have developed with or without his
aid. But he had abetted it, especially in his
last two years. In fact, his unsatisfied legis-
lative demands during 1907 and 1908 had provided
the progressive faction with a program. Thus
the inheritance Roosevelt left was a party
divided between an increasingly stubborn conservative majority and a growing progressive minority whose reform claims against the party were underwritten by the most popular Republican President since Lincoln.63

The issues which Roosevelt had emphasized in office, therefore, often in disregard of the views of the majority of his party, produced particularly severe strains on the Republican coalition in the House. By sometimes flaunting his independence from the party's mainstream, he implicitly encouraged those Members of Congress whose consciences or constituents also placed them on the Republican fringes, to assert their own independence within the House of Representatives.

The conservation issue, for example, had become a portent symbol of both Roosevelt's policy outlook and of that of the progressives as well.64 It also created a breach in the Republican party between conservatives who were eager to retain their party's traditional support for economic development and progressives who wanted to moderate and restrain development where it threatened to exhaust the nation's natural resources. To a certain extent, Roosevelt and Pinchot had managed to bridge this gap through their approach to forestry. The administrations' concern for the idea of scientific management (or the exploitation of forest reserves at rates and in ways which guarded against permanent deforestation) was clearly calculated to appeal to both naturalists and developers.
By the advent of the Taft administration, however, conservationists and developers were moving apart in their approach to the management of the country's natural resources. Unlike the forestry question which could be dealt with in a manner which satisfied the progressive concern for the environment and the lumber industry's desire for a renewable source of timber, the new concerns tended to polarize the two camps. The question of exploiting non-renewable resources, for example, posed somewhat different problems for policy-makers intent on optimizing the returns to both the conservationist and the development interests. Clearly, acceptable trade-offs were more difficult to achieve in dealing with non-renewable resources than they were when forestry was the central focus of concern. 65

The involvement of large syndicates on the side of the developers was also cause for concern among many progressives. The Ballinger-Pinchot dispute is a useful illustration of the extent to which questions of privilege and private power were closely linked to the concerns of many conservationists. This dispute, and the impact it had upon American politics in 1909 and 1910, both within the Congress and outside, is also a useful illustration of how important the general conservationist issue was within the Republican party during this time. Like the broader struggle between Progressives and Conservatives this particular conflict symbolized, the Ballinger-Pinchot dispute both reflected and created strains within the Republican party coalition.
The tariff also created significant tensions within the party, as the voices of diverse regional interests became more insistent in the first decade of the twentieth century. The growing conflict between the forces of tariff reform and those of protectionism had begun to surface during Theodore Roosevelt's administration, but it mushroomed into a major confrontation during Taft's administration. Roosevelt, who sensed the explosiveness of the issue as early as 1904 had, throughout his second term, assiduously guarded against placing the tariff on the national legislative agenda. To a certain extent, he merely postponed the inevitable struggle, but he also did so in a way that mollified the reform element of his party. Mowry and Blum suggest, for example, that the success of Roosevelt's progressive program in the House in 1905 and 1906 was the result of a tacit agreement reached with Cannon that he (Roosevelt) would not push tariff reform if the latter agreed not to stand in the way of the rest of the administration's program. Progressives were thus willing to accede to the delay in reforming the tariff as long as some of their other concerns were given attention.

By 1908, however, reform sentiment in the nation and within Congress became strong enough to force Taft, in his campaign for the Presidency, to promise a revision of the tariff. As Roosevelt had wisely feared, this promise quickly exposed the deep divisions which had been developing in the Republican party since 1900 at least, and heightened
the tensions between conservative and progressive Republicans. These tensions rapidly escalated into full-scale factional warfare as the Progressives' almost emotional attachment to the cause of tariff reductions clashed with Cannon's zealous support for protection. The conflict which thus raged over the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was further heightened by Taft's well-meaning, but ill-advised support for a reciprocal tariff agreement with Canada. This agreement, which would largely have reduced the duties on Canada's agricultural exports to the United States, found little support, and provoked much resentment in the agricultural Mid-West, and further soured the relationship between progressives and the administration.

Finally, the Republican leadership's rigid disregard of the specific reform proposals from progressive members of Congress was a continual irritant. The persistent refusal of Cannon and his fellow conservatives in the House to consider even minor and often little more than symbolic progressive efforts to streamline or clean up portions of the Federal government only increased the Progressive distaste for Cannon and his legislative style. One such effort which brought a measure of notoriety to its author, and which became a minor cause celebre in progressive circles was that of Victor Murdock. Murdock, a representative from Kansas, had discovered that the postal service was being overcharged by the Railroad Companies which carried the mails. In Murdock's home state, the "good government"
movement had become an important electoral force, and Murdock clearly hoped to reap political dividends from his work in exposing the anomaly in postal rates.

Briefly, Murdock found that the legally prescribed method for calculating Railroad charges to the postal service entailed weighing the mails carried by each Railroad Company for seven days each week for a period of thirty to ninety days. From this, the railroads would estimate their average weekly mail load for the entire year. This weekly figure was then divided by the number of working days (i.e. the number of days the Railroads actually carried the mails) in the week -- which the Railroads claimed was six -- in order to arrive at a daily average. As Murdock rightly pointed out, this divisor produced an inflated picture of the daily weight figures (since the Railroads really carried mail seven days a week), and led to an overcharge which he estimated to be in the millions of dollars.69

When Murdock made this discovery, he introduced a bill to change the divisor rate to seven. This resolution was favorably received by the Post Office committee of which he was a member, but was effectively blocked, nevertheless, by Cannon and the Rules Committee. Despite public pressure to reform the divisor system (which followed publicity given the issue in a surprisingly large number of magazines), the House leadership refused to concede its power to interfere with the postal system's rate structure (claiming it was legally an issue which had to be resolved by the Post Office
Department), and in the process reaffirmed the notion that progressive and conservative Republican interests were incompatible. This was clearly the view of Murdock, himself, who noted of the experience, "I believed . . . that I was doing a public service of moment. I suffered the slings and arrows of dalmuny, abuse and ridicule because of it . . . I am chiefly indebted to the experience myself for the revelation it was to me." 70

To a certain extent, then, the insurgent ranks were filled by individuals bound together by an often vague and certainly diffuse allegiance to a number of diverse reform causes. The tariff, the conservationist movement and other more minor and narrowly focussed reform campaigns which surfaced from time to time, produced disappointment, frustration or anger among Republican Members of Congress in growing numbers and thus added recruits to the ever-growing insurgent crusade in the House. The 1908 Republican National Convention, with its implicit (to many progressives at least) repudiation of Roosevelt's policies, 71 and the Congressional leadership's treatment of the President in his last months in office, also worked to transform the latent internal strains within the Republican coalition into an open political struggle between conservative and progressive factions.

In part, then, the insurgent movement blossomed into full-fledged revolt because of increasingly urgent and insoluble conflicts over important political issues, both
within the Republican party as a whole, and clearly within the Republican party in the House of Representatives. As unity of political purpose gave way to divisiveness within the Republican ranks in the House, party leaders and the traditional Republican approach to legislative organization were both confronted with a dilemma which may have been beyond the power of either to resolve. These emergent contradictions within the Republican party, however, were at least complicated, however, by personal incompatibilities and weaknesses which were magnified by the political struggles which dominated the 61st Congress.

In general, the 61st Congress was marked by an uncharacteristic heightening of personal tensions within the Republican party coalition. The spirit of compromise and tolerance which had so marked that coalition in previous Congresses quickly gave way to patterns of intransigence, zealotry and dogmatism which were particularly inappropriate for the kind of internal harmony the Republican party needed in order to maintain its legislative system intact. As the willingness on the part of both Progressive and Conservative factions to subsume personal goals to common party goals evaporated (and as those personal goals became more diverse within the Republican legislative party), the centralized organizational form lost one of its most important sources of strength and legitimacy. The conflict of personalities was at least a secondary factor in the dissolution of the consensus which had been so central to the Republican design
of the legislative process between 1890 and 1908.\textsuperscript{72}

The struggle between Cannon and Norris, for example, was probably a struggle between two distinct egos and two flawed personalities as much as it was a contest between two divergent political philosophies. Norris, for his part was an honest and diligent individual who nevertheless lacked, according to one contemporary, "the broad vision, the thoroughly trained mind, and the controlled imagination that characterizes political giants."\textsuperscript{73} These intellectual limitations tended to lead him toward a brand of zealotry, single-mindedness and intransigence which he believed were the hallmarks of courage and dedication. Despite this veneer, however, Norris was at heart a crafty, proud and opportunistic politician. He enjoyed the limelight and assiduously courted political advancement. Cordell Hull recalls, for example, that during the March revolt against Cannon, Norris "would not agree to lead the progressive Republicans in supporting the Democrats unless he were permitted himself to offer the resolution (on the reform of the Rules Committee)."\textsuperscript{74}

There is also reason to suspect that Norris' espousal of the insurgent cause was not so much the result of long-standing political differences with Cannon and his conservative Republicanism, as it was in part the product of personal pique. Before the beginning of his third term in the House in 1906 (the 60th Congress), Norris wrote to Speaker Cannon
asking him for a seat on the powerful Ways and Means Committee. He concluded his rather amiable petition by noting that "From several things I have heard and read . . . I am satisfied that my ideas on the tariff question are in full accord with your own." Cannon decided against acceding to this request and Norris later learned that the Speaker had never really given serious consideration to his candidacy for the Ways and Means Committee. "If he was disappointed," his biographer correctly suggests, "his papers reveal no record of it." Yet it is also clear and perhaps significant that it was during the 60th Congress that Norris threw his support to the nascent insurgent cause.

Joseph G. Cannon, for his part, was equally prone to the kind of intransigence and self-righteousness Norris displayed, and there is some reason to believe that both qualities became more pronounced as the opposition to his rule increased. Up until 1908, Cannon had become a sort of national folk-hero. He enjoyed the "Uncle Joe" image which his earthy, slightly old-fashioned and unorthodox political style had created among members of the press and the public, and he did what he could to foster that image. Newspapers and magazines published numerous stories about the Cannon style which clearly pleased him and amused the public. "He wears tailor-made home-spun clothes," wrote one contemporary, in a light-hearted approving vein,
drinks champagne at banquets from his water tumbler, smokes fifteen-cent cigars at a two-fer angle and takes the outside seat when riding in his friends' automobiles so that he can spit over the side. 78

Cannon basked in the warm glow of national attention and did what he could to encourage the public to fawn over his down-home, no-nonsense brand of politics. Yet, if the public seemed to love him, he was also the subject of admiration and respect in the House. Members of his own as well as the Democratic party often seemed as eager as the public to show their support and demonstrate their approval of his folksy style. 79

Beneath Cannon's charming and quaint exterior, however, lay a number of human weaknesses which would cause problems between 1908 and 1910. Like Norris, he had a fairly limited political vision (one which was largely shaped in the Republican party political culture of the mid- to late nineteenth century) and a very healthy ego. He was somewhat insecure about his intellectual capabilities -- his enormous respect for Thomas B. Reed was tinged, for example, with a measure of envy and mistrust for his towering intellect -- and tended to be combative, even defiant, when his judgment was questioned. Like Norris, he often tended to see intrinsigence as a positive human virtue. He lionized James G. Blaine, for example, and believed that the secret of his leadership "was courage to meet situations, accept responsibility, and fight as a gladiator with a challenge to any
extremity of conflict." It was this outlook which tended to lead Cannon toward confrontation when compromise might have been more appropriate; to be often rigid in his view of politics and political orthodoxy when adaptability might have been useful; to be quick to use his powers to quash opposition when magnanimity might have been more effective; and to be dogmatic and extreme when accommodation and moderation might have accomplished his purposes.

This combattiveness tended to heighten tensions in the House and provoke equally combattive and determined opposition on the part of insurgents, at least some of whom might have been supportive of a centralized House process under a gentler, more flexible Speaker. As George Norris noted of Cannon:

Other men, placed in the same position, with the same power behind them, might be able to do the same evil, or at least continue doing evil longer than the present Speaker, because they would be more circumspect and more politic in the exercise of their power. They would not exercise it so openly and defiantly, and would thus be able to conceal the real machine.

Norris thus believed that although the revolt against the strong Speakership was clearly inevitable, Cannon himself did much to exacerbate tensions and accelerate the process which brought about his overthrow.

Norris' assumptions about the impact of Cannon's personality on the insurgent movement were probably correct to a certain extent, but even more to the point were his views
about the inevitability of a revolt against centralization. This revolt was probably inevitable because the Member of Congress of the late nineteenth century -- particularly once again the Republican Member of Congress -- who had been so well served by the centralized system, was beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century, to give way to a new brand of Member for whom centralization was less attractive. While the issues and the personalities had both contributed, in other words, to the assault on Cannon and the strong Speakership, that assault was more firmly rooted, and its inevitability more clearly assured by the broader and more profound changes which were occurring after 1896 in the rules and norms that shaped the American political system.

The decay of the Republican political coalition after 1908, first of all, played an important role in producing a factionalized House in 1910 for which, as the Democrats had found in the late nineteenth century, centralization and decision-making coordination had no place. Increasingly fractious constituent voices within the Republican party tended to force the representatives of those constituents away from conformity to the party machinery in the House. Direct constituency pressure, for example, played a major role in leading George Norris to espouse the insurgent cause. In 1908 he had won re-election to the House with only the slimmest of margins after a campaign which had focussed heavily on the issue of Cannonism. Up to the point, Norris'
relationship with the Speaker was at least ambiguous enough as far as the voters in his home district were concerned to give his own supporters reason for doubt and concern and his opponents a campaign theme. "You know," a friend wrote Norris in the middle of the 1908 race,

that Mr. Ashton is working the Cannon racket in the district and especially in this county, saying you are a special friend of Cannon's and supported him in all his policies. It has been talked of by a number of your friends here, and some have suggested asking you to declare yourself (against Cannon). . . . They concluded not to do so, but the feeling here is very strong against Mr. Cannon."

Norris' subsequent revolt against the Republican party machine in the House only enhanced his image with Republican voters in Nebraska. By early 1910, he was already being urged to set his political sights on the Senate by the same constituents who had barely supported his 1908 run for the House. Noting that his conversion to the insurgent cause "may not be popular with the politicians and office-holders," one constituent argued, "With the rank and file it is the thing. If they (the old guard) will keep up their fight against you they will drive you into the Senate." Indeed, Norris was ultimately elected to the Senate in 1912 after having declined a nomination in 1910 in order to allay suspicions that his attachment to the insurgent movement was guided by "selfish motives."

There is also evidence to suggest that other insurgents
particularly from the Midwest, were encouraged and guided toward insurgency by the wishes of constituents whose specific interests were no longer compatible with the policies expressed and pursued by the national Republican organization. In Kansas, for example, where the Populist movement had become synthesized into a milder middle-class progressivism by the turn of the century, the insurgent cause received a great deal of support from old-line Republicans who had only recently been converted to the cause of progressive reform. William Allen White suggests that the progressive movement in Kansas was in fact founded by Thomas Benton Murdock (editor of the Eldorado, Kansas Republican and a creative political activist), who, along with his brother Marshall (editor of the Wichita Eagle and father of Victor Murdock) and his brother-in-law, took up the "good government" banner with an assault upon the conservative state Republican party.

The Murdock rebellion as it was apparently known, was motivated, so White suggests, by a clearly opportunistic attempt on the part of the Murdocks to seize upon both the reformist appeal of populism and the weaknesses and political excesses of the state Republican party organization. The Murdocks believed that a call for a thorough house-cleaning of the state party would provide new political opportunities for the Murdock family. Skeptics "hooted" over the Murdock's transparent conversion to the cause of good government, but the citizens of Kansas, themselves
tired of the Republican Old Guard, ultimately rewarded the family by sending son Victor to Congress, and by supporting his insurgent stand. 85

Elsewhere in Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, voters provided reform candidates with a growing string of impressive electoral victories. These electoral rewards, in turn, merely prodded those representatives toward more progressive and independent courses in the House. In the 1910 election, for example, 81 percent of the most ardent insurgents (those who supported the insurgent reform agenda throughout 1909 and 1910), and 70 percent of all Republican Members of Congress who voted against Cannon in the celebrated St. Patrick's Day revolt, were re-elected to the House. By contrast, only 54 percent of all Republicans were re-elected to Congress in the 1910 elections. 86 Clearly, support for the insurgent cause (and the political independence within the House which that cause signified) produced sizeable electoral dividends that year.

Indicative of the multiple splits which had begun to appear within the national Republican party in the first decade of the twentieth century, was the marked regionalist flavor of the insurgent movement. As Table 6.1 shows, Midwestern Representatives played a disproportionately large role in supporting the cause of reform in the House. The 61st Congress, for example, contained five state delegations
Table 6.1 -- Regional Breakdown of Republican Support Within the 61st Congress for the Insurgent Cause (1909-1910).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Committed Insurgents*</th>
<th>Other Insurgent Supporters**</th>
<th>Total Insurgents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of State's Republican Delegation</td>
<td>Percentage of State's Republican Delegation</td>
<td>Percentage of State's Republican Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
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<td>25%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
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<td>North Dakota</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Committed Insurgents = Republicans who took the Insurgent position on the March 15, 1909 vote on the rules; on the Fitzgerald Amendment of the same day; and on the March, 1910 Norris resolution on the Rules Committee.

** Other Insurgents = Republicans who did not always vote with the Insurgents on all procedural matters, but who voted for the Norris Amendment in March, 1910.
in which at least half the members stood with the insurgents throughout 1909 and 1910. All five were Mid-western delegations (North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska and Iowa). Similarly, on the St. Patrick's Day vote on the Norris Amendment to the Rules, there were eight state delegations in which at least 50 percent of the members supported the insurgent position, seven of which were from the Mid-western region. The only exception here was the Vermont contingent on which one of the two members voted with the insurgents on the March 18, 1910 roll call vote. 87

If regional strains in the Republican coalition were evident in the insurgent revolt in the House of Representatives, so too were other political tensions. There is reason to believe, for example, that the insurgent movement in the 61st Congress was prompted by increasingly serious generational strains within the Republican legislative party. These strains were themselves the products, as Paul Abramson suggests in his study of post-New Deal voting patterns, of discrete and (in the case of the turn of the century Republican party) increasingly incompatible historical perspectives and political values. 87B

Just as Joseph Cannon was himself clearly driven by values and assumptions reflective of the immediate post-Civil War political culture, during which he received his initiation into American politics, so too were many of the House conservatives of 1910 animated by experiences
and beliefs gleaned from an earlier age. By contrast, as Table 6.2 shows, House progressives tended to be the products of a later political era, and presumably of quite different historical experiences. Younger, on the average, than their conservative colleagues, these insurgents were more likely to have been imbued with the new, and in many ways, distinctive values and outlooks which were emerging in the American political culture at the turn of the century -- values which were increasingly at odds with those of their political elders in the House. Thus, just as divergent regional needs and experiences (as well as interests) were promoting divisiveness in the Republican party, so too were different time-bound perspectives frustrating efforts of party leaders to promote unity and coherence within the Republican legislative coalition.

Finally, direct constituency pressure also worked to force reluctant Members of Congress to espouse the insurgent cause. In Michigan, for example, voters and newspapers in one district reacted so angrily to the equivocation of their Representative (Charles E. Townsend) on the March, 1909 vote on the rules, that he ultimately voted with the insurgents in March of 1910, after first promising local voters in a public letter that he was in fact a dedicated progressive and a committed insurgent.88

To a certain extent, then, the revolt against the Speaker in 1910 and the movement to effect a broader
Table 6.2 -- Generational Tensions Within the Republican Party in the 61st Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>All Republicans</th>
<th>All Insurgents</th>
<th>Conservative Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1840</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840-1849</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850-1859</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-1869</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870+</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
transformation of the House system which followed that revolt, was symptomatic of specific coalitional problems that had developed within the Republican party. As the twentieth century progressed, and as the decisive policy coalition which had been formed in the Realignment of 1896 began to decay, the Republican party found itself more susceptible to the kinds of internal disarray that had so marked the Democratic party in the late nineteenth century. The party which had once been so unified, was by 1910 falling prey to increasingly insistent and discordant local, regional, ideological, and generational groups, demands and values. By 1910, the conflicts and contradictions which existed within the Republican party coalition could no longer be reconciled by the party organization either within or outside of Congress. The Republican party of Nebraska, for example, was building an identity and a set of interests which had increasingly little in common with the Republican party of New York.

Many of the constituents elements of the national Republican coalition, therefore, began to see greater virtue in a legislative (and indeed a political) system which gave their Members of Congress the ability to pursue more independent courses in the House. They began supporting calls for a democratization of the legislative process which would allow their representatives a freer hand in actually promoting their new and often more unique (in relation to those of other constituencies around the nation) interests, and one
which would allow them to maximize their chances of achieving preferred constituency goals. In an era when the national Republican organization could no longer simultaneously address all of the interests and concerns of its increasingly distended constituency, those constituencies began seeking ways of circumventing that party organization in the national policy-making process. The insurgent movement in the House, then, was a portion of that attempt to reconcile the national political system with the altered needs and new more diverse demands of a fragmenting electorate.

Yet, if the fragmentation of the Republican party was a significant factor in the timing of the 1910 revolt against the Speaker, and in the demands for a more fluid and flexible House of Representatives, it does little to explain why the changes brought about by that party decay had such an enduring impact on the shape of the legislative politics. The House, in other words, had throughout the nineteenth century fallen prey to the recurrent and almost cyclical crises of partisan decay and realignment. The strong Speakership of the 1830's (under James Polk), for example, had given way to the amorphous immobilism of the 1850's as the Jacksonian coalition crumbled, and the nation headed toward Civil War. The House process had also reflected the varying levels of cohesiveness and discord within the Republican party between 1860 and the early 1890's. The centralized
and coherent House system erected by Thaddeus Stevens in the 1860's had, like the centralized and determined system built by Polk, eventually been weakened by the gradual, if less disastrous, decay of the Republican Civil War policy coalition in the 1870's and 1880's. Why then was the early twentieth century decay of the centralized legislative system first erected by Thomas B. Reed in the 1890's (at a time of Republican party insurrection) so significant and, as it turns out, so enduring?

The answer to this must lie, as Burnham, Schattschneider and Price have suggested in the more fundamental changes which occurred, in the early years of the twentieth century in the American political process as a whole. As they argue, this period, while it was also a time of upheaval within the Republican party, was more profoundly a time of major changes in the rules of the American political game. Changes in the electoral system, changes in the ways diverse constituencies and constituents organized their demands and defined their interests, and changes in the way they voiced their political concerns, placed new and quite different pressures upon the institutions of Government, and the people in those institutions of government who made public policy.

Congress, no less than any of the other national political institutions, was clearly affected by these new pressures. As the political party, which had so dominated
the nineteenth century political landscape receded into a less obtrusive role, as partisanship itself declined as the central normative reality in America's political culture, Members of Congress were forced to adapt to a new reality in which political agendas were more fragmented and particularistic, in which local, regional and increasingly functionally specific groups pressed forth their own often narrow and highly focussed views and ideals, and in which strict allegiance to broad clusters of goals, platforms or ideologies on the part of constituents was increasingly rare. As these features of the American political system became more deeply entrenched, the bases upon which members of Congress were elected or re-elected, sanctioned or rewarded changed.

Among the most fundamental and important shifts in the rules of the American political game to have an influence on Congressional behavior, three specific changes had particularly strong and enduring impacts on the shape of the legislative process. First, the weakening of the political party on the national level and the loosening of the constraints which tied the individual member to broad and concrete national policy agendas, produced major changes in the manner in which the individual member set his own political and legislative priorities. Confronted by a new political system in which political agendas were increasingly set by disparate, autonomous and particularistic groups and interests in the
electorate, the member was given a greater latitude in actually constructing his own personal agenda -- one tailored to fit the specific and unique interests and priorities of his constituents. Secondly, the legislative process was acutely affected by changes in the electoral process itself. New voting laws and new ways of nominating and electing representatives (e.g. primary laws) changed the entire range of electoral incentives under which a candidate, or an incumbent member of the House labored. Finally, changes in electoral outcomes -- specifically the decline throughout the nation in competitiveness -- which began occurring in the first decade of the twentieth century, clearly affected the way individual members of Congress viewed both their tasks and their roles in the legislative process.

The decline of the political party as an integrative force in elections, and by extension in the legislative process, can be best shown in an examination of the increasing independence of Congressional elections from other national elections. The emergence of office-specific voting behavior clearly reflected the extent to which Members of Congress were becoming tied to demands and interests which had little in common with the goals and interests expressed in the process by which other candidates were recruited to fill other positions in the policy-making system. As Burnham shows in his article, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," for example, voters, from 1904 on, were beginning
Table 6.1 -- Correlation Between Percentage Democratic of the Congressional Vote and the Presidential Vote. (Non-Southern States Only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Vote (r)</th>
<th>$r^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+.984</td>
<td>(.968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
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<td>+.874</td>
<td>(.763)</td>
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<td>1908</td>
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<td>(.757)</td>
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<td>1912</td>
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<td>(.574)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.240)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37</td>
<td>+.553</td>
<td>(.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>(.402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+.592</td>
<td>(.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+.819</td>
<td>(.671)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>(.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+.470</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+.335</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
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to employ different criteria for choosing Members of Congress than they were in choosing Presidents.

To be sure, the declining relationship between Presidential and Congressional elections does not tell us exactly what criteria distinguished the two electoral processes from each other. Yet, it is nevertheless clear that whatever those specific differences were, voters after 1904 were increasingly selecting their representatives in Congress on different bases, and presumably judging them according to different standards of performance than they were their presidential candidates. This suggests, in turn, that the individual Member of Congress, or the individual Congressional candidate was becoming free to set his own political agenda to conform more singularly to demands of the constituents who elected him. The nineteenth century political system, in other words, which forced Congressional candidates to balance and simultaneously align themselves with both the national party agenda and local constituency demands, had by 1904 begun to give way to an electoral system which allowed or indeed forced them to address more completely the demands, the concerns and the agenda of their local constituents.

This change, which increasingly forced Members of Congress to serve the interests of their own particular constituencies more directly and more single-mindedly was reinforced by changes in the way candidates for office were
nominated. By 1910, the nineteenth century system by which the Congressional candidate had been forced to rely on the party organization in his constituency in order to stand for election, had given way, in many parts of the country, to a system which allowed him to stand on his own rather than his party's political record and performance. Primary elections, for example, not only gave Congressional candidates the right to circumvent state and local party organizations, but also encouraged Members of Congress, once in office, to subordinate their party loyalties -- especially once again loyalty to the national party organization -- to their constituency loyalties.

As in the case of the increasing uniqueness of Congressional electoral patterns, the growing reliance on the primary election had decided effects on fragmenting the lines of conflict, and pluralizing the lines of bargaining and coalition building in Congress. This, in turn, tended to lead members in progressive larger numbers to call for a more open and more flexible legislative process -- one which recognized the peculiar needs of a member thus tied to his constituency needs. It is probably significant, for example, that twenty-one of the twenty-seven Republicans who supported the insurgency movement from March, 1909 onward, were from states which had mandatory, state-wide primary election systems, and most of the other six came from states which at least had some, if more rudimentary form of the primary nomination system.
Finally, the decline in competitiveness produced levels of electoral security for members of Congress which were largely unknown in the nineteenth century (at least outside the South). H. Douglas Price, on the one hand, suggests that this had a direct impact on the design and restructuring of the legislative process in the early twentieth century. Members increasingly free of the spectre of electoral defeat, Price argues, tended to develop a careerist perspective in the House. Such members naturally wanted the Congress to be the kind of place in which the long-term pursuit of a career would be a rewarding and worthwhile endeavor. To this end, the careerists who, in the 1900 to 1910 period, began to become more numerous in the House, set about to remake the legislative process to correspond to their needs and general goals (e.g., a more even distribution of influence in the House; an increase in the member access to decision-making centers within the House; the emergence of a measure of predictability in the process by which decision-making roles were apportioned; and finally a modicum of security in a position once achieved). 92 In a period of declining turnover, Price thus argues, the legislative process is, and in the early twentieth century was, forced to adapt itself to the demands and expectations likely to predominate in a House populated by a growing number of careerists.

The problem here comes in determining why the specific changes which occurred in the legislative process took the
forms they did. Presumably, for example, the careerist would have wanted a far greater democratization of the House than was actually accomplished in the early twentieth century. There were, in other words, clearly limits on the extent to which the careerist could go in reshaping the House to fit his needs. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that careerism played a decisive role in the insurgent movement, which itself was part of a wider campaign to effect a more even distribution of power and influence in the House system between 1908 and 1913. Indeed, as Table 6.4 shows, the insurgents themselves tended, if anything, to be slightly more junior (i.e., less deeply imbued with the careerist perspective) than those who supported the continuance of the centralized legislative system. Despite this paradox, and despite its inherent vagueness, the Careerist paradigm nevertheless does present a compelling and intuitively sensible portrait of the long term relationship between competitiveness and membership turnover and the internal workings of the legislative process.

The decline in electoral competitiveness also, however, reflects and helps explain changes in the legislative process in a more limited, if for the purposes of this study and its assumptions, a more relevant way. As Burnham has suggested, the decline in electoral competitiveness in Congressional elections has tended to insulate incumbents from the often dramatic fluctuations which characterized electoral life in
Table 6.4 -- Number of Terms served by Conservative and Progressive Republicans in the 61st Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms Served</th>
<th>Ardent Insurgents 1909 - 1910</th>
<th>Pro-Norris vote in March, 1910 only</th>
<th>All Republicans</th>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the late nineteenth century. The increasing autonomy of the individual member of Congress, and his independence from the changing electoral fortunes of the party of which he was nominally a representative, was reflected by his growing political autonomy within the legislative process.

The decline in competitiveness in the early twentieth century, meant, in other words, that incumbents were less readily affected by the kinds of voter shifts which in the nineteenth century would have produced electoral defeat for individual incumbents and a party and (given the importance and distinctiveness of parties in the nineteenth century) a policy shift within the House of Representatives. As competitiveness declined, neither the individual incumbent nor the House as a whole was as sensitive to the electoral changes, shifts or fluctuations which in the nineteenth century would have produced equally significant shifts in the political orientations of the House and its members. Presumably then, this insensitivity of House elections to changing electoral tides on the national level produced a much more heterogeneous House membership. Elected in different times, on the basis of different local issues and indeed on the basis of different national issues, the House membership in a non-competitive electoral system represented a broad and, over time, a more diverse set of political goals and interests, and indeed more diverse sets of electoral mandates.
This increasing heterogeneity produced by the decline in competitiveness as well as by the other equally important changes in the post-1896 American political system (the decline of the political party, its increasingly peripheral impact on Congressional elections, changes in the rules of the electoral game, and fundamental changes in electoral behavior) all tended to contribute to a fragmentation of the lines of conflict, a diversification of needs and goals, and a less cohesive political perspective (on the part of the Members of Congress) within the House of Representatives.

This transformation of the lines of conflict, in turn, produced new and distinctive problems for Congress' conflict resolution system. As this heterogeneity increased, as members' needs and goals became more diffuse, the legislative process itself was forced, by its participants, to adapt to the realities and demands of these new patterns of dissensus. The House system developed by Reed in 1890 to deal with and take advantage of the unique conflict-resolution needs of the coherent and unified Republican party coalition, was by 1910, irrelevant of the needs of members, and unable to contain or resolve the kind of conflict produced by the multiplicity of legislative agendas which characterized the House from that time on.

There were thus major contrasts between the episodic disarray which appeared within Congress in the nineteenth
century, and the more systemic disarray which began taking root in the early twentieth century. While fragmentation, disunity and to a certain extent individualism had been persistent organizational problems for nineteenth century Congresses, particularly for the Democrats, that disarray, when it appeared, tended to be the product of specific organizational weaknesses in the party itself. In the twentieth century on the other hand, the disarray was an increasing function of broad changes occurring in the underlying assumptions which shaped American politics.

These changes tended to add new obstacles to national party coherence, to mass political movements in general, and to accumulative political cleavages in society which in turn had a pronounced effect upon the patterns of conflict which emerged in the House of Representatives. The national integration of political goals (by parties or by other instruments of mass political action on the national level) and the unity which had characterized the Republican and to a much lesser extent the Democratic party organizations throughout the late nineteenth century, became much more difficult to sustain in the twentieth century. The constitutional constraints which existed on such unity of purpose in the nineteenth century -- constraints which reflected the founders' desire for a fragmented Federal system -- were in the twentieth century multiplied by anti-party reforms, negative public reactions to party rule, and the particularization of the national
political agenda. The fragmentation and disarray which had in other words characterized conflict in the House from time to time in the nineteenth century, became a routine pattern in the twentieth century.

The changes which occurred within the House of Representatives in the first decade of the twentieth century -- the assault on central control and the emergence of the Member of Congress as a more autonomous and independent legislative actor -- were thus tied primarily to broad changes in the American political system as a whole. To be sure, the most immediate source of the changing patterning of conflict within the House in 1908 to 1910 was the break-up of the once monolithic Republican party. This, however, was but a part of the broader fragmentation and particularization of the American political system which was occurring around this time.

As these changes, then, produced new patterns of conflict within the elective institutions of government, those institutions were forced to change in response. The disintegrating consensus which increasingly marked national politics during this time placed new pressures on the House of Representatives, in particular, to do itself what political parties, political interest groupings and other organized collectivities could not -- build policy-making coalitions. As new forms of dissensus appeared in Congress, the House was forced to accomplish this by adapting its internal structures of leadership, its bargaining system and its
formal procedures to meet the exigencies of those new, less unified, less cohesive and less coherent lines of conflict. The House of Representatives responded by redistributing and dispersing power, by weakening its structures of central control, by making its decision-making system more permeable and by generally accepting patterns of membership behavior which would have been discouraged in the past. As the following chapter will suggest, the House was also forced to establish a new role for itself in national policy-making, as this new conflict style became more entrenched.
The revolt against the strong speakership was the beginning of a broader movement to adapt the House of Representatives to the new needs of the post-1900 member of Congress and the peculiar demands of an increasingly pluralistic form of legislative conflict. By 1910, the centralized system of leadership had already become irrelevant to a legislative process functioning in an environment in which national party organizations were declining in strength and coherence; in which cumulative political divisions within the House and in society as a whole were becoming increasingly rare; and in which attachments to broadly defined issue agendas were giving way to specific and particularistic interests and demands on the part of both geographically and functionally defined constituencies.

Voters had begun to encourage individualism in the House by rewarding political independence at the polls. New electoral patterns tended to rivet the attention of Congressional candidates upon narrowly defined and often parochial issues to the detriment of the shared and more
broadly defined goals upon which the pre-1910 exercise of centralized power had been based in the House. In sum, new and heightened expectations on the part of constituents, and in turn on the part of Members of Congress themselves, created pressures within the House which the traditional legislative process was ultimately unable to accommodate.

The pressures which led to the dismantling of the centralized leadership system in the House worked, in the decade following the St. Patrick's Day revolt, to produce a new organizational style. It was thus during this period that the institutional consequences of the anti-Cannon and anti-centralization movement became apparent. The dispersion of decision-making responsibilities was accelerated between 1911 and 1921; the fragmentation of power and of the leadership structure was formalized during this time; and the House began to abandon its pretensions of primacy and legislative initiative in the national policy-making system, in favor of a more modest and clearly more appropriate (to its new fragmented system of decision-making) oversight and reactive role. In sum, the House process was remolded during this time to fit the interests of its increasingly distended and pluralistic constituency base which had itself created new electoral needs among members of Congress and thus dramatically altered patterns of conflict within the House.

This chapter, then, will be devoted to an examination
of the organizational adaptation process which occurred within the House between 1911 and 1921. It will first describe the manner in which both Democrats and Republicans redesigned the legislative process to accommodate the new stresses of the emergent pluralist order. It will suggest that while the response of both parties was slightly different, both reflected the central problems of producing legislative decisions in an institution increasingly devoid of the kinds of strong, coherent and enduring political coalitions which had so characterized Congresses (particularly Republican Congresses) in the nineteenth century. In the post-Cannon era, the House was forced to do what parties, ideologies, voters and broad electoral agendas had done in the past -- create a policy-making consensus. During this era, the House organization was forced to accommodate the diverse concerns of its members and their constituents by devising new methods of consensus-building, bargaining and decision-making, and by generally acceding to the new realities of pluralist conflict in which momentary coalitions, temporary political alignments and specific interests predominated.

As this adaptation process proceeded, the organizational consequences of the revolt against centralization became apparent. This chapter will examine these consequences by first describing the manner in which power and decision-making responsibilities were redistributed. In a sense, the 1911 to 1921 period demonstrates the extent to which the 1910 to
1911 revolt against the strong speakership was an unfinished revolution. This chapter will suggest, for example, that while there was a broad and increasingly powerful agreement among Members of Congress that centralization was inappropriate in the House, there was little agreement over viable alternatives. This uncertainty over alternative organizational forms, in turn, generally led to a de facto devolution of power and decision-making responsibility to a variety of party or quasi-party organizations within the House (the Committee on Committees, Steering Committees, Rules Committee, etc.) and to the House committees. While, however, this redistribution process was largely unforeseen by the original opponents of centralization, it did nevertheless represent a conscious movement toward the kind of organizational fragmentation and decision-making permeability which were consistent with the new patterns of conflict and the new individually-oriented needs of the post-1910 Member of Congress.

Finally, this chapter will argue that the evolution of a more distended (less centralized) and more plural legislative process had important consequences for the House of Representatives' role in national policy-making. The demise of central control over the legislative agenda and the decline of central coordination of the business of the House, led to a necessary redefinition of the House's place in the Federal political system. Democrats immediately retreated from the broad leadership role Cannon, for one, had so zealously
claimed for Congress in general and the House in particular during the first decade of the twentieth century, in favor of Presidential leadership. Yet, even the Republicans were gradually forced to recognize the limitations which had been imposed on Congressional power by the destruction of the centralized system of leadership. While neither party surrendered the prerogatives (as they were formally spelled out in the Constitution) of Congress, and while both at times proved to be equally jealous of executive encroachments upon the institutional rights of the House, neither party was ever able to halt the assumption by the Presidency, of much of the policy-making initiative (the agenda-setting, the policy design, etc.) which had in the past been exercised effectively by the Congress.

The 1910-1921 period was thus one of major change for the House. Not only did it depart from the specific organizational norms which had guided the Republican Congresses since the mid-1890's, but it also departed from the general philosophy with which most late nineteenth century Congresses had successfully or unsuccessfully approached the legislative task. Ineffective or divided leadership, internal political diversity, disarray, and the kind of fragmentation which had been regarded as a characteristic of institutional or partisan weakness in the nineteenth century were raised to positive political virtues in the years after 1911.

Again, this was largely a function of the new patterns and nature of the demands and interests which were at the
turn of the century transforming the idea of representation in general and the expectations of constituents on Members of Congress in particular. These new patterns of political behavior outside of Congress tended to encourage the House as a whole to abandon its traditional methods of legislating, and to assume the new approach and the new role it in fact adopted during the second decade of the twentieth century.

As this study has argued, the House is an adaptive body. Its history is essentially the story of a continuing evolutionary process. Thus, although the House has in the past, and continues to evolve in response to the changing demands of its political environment, the changes which occurred between 1911 and 1921 were part of a particularly important chapter in the story of that evolutionary process.

When the Democrats assumed control of the House in 1911, it was clear that the de-centralizing impulses which had first exhibited themselves during the anti-Cannon revolt, would be reinforced. The Democratic platform of 1908 had, of course, promised to reform the legislative process in ways which would enhance the rights of individual members to pursue their own, and their constituents' increasingly distinctive goals and needs. The "democratization" of the House, however, was also rooted in the Democratic party's coalitional weaknesses. As in the late nineteenth century,
the traditional regional and indeed ideological heterogeneity of the party continued to impose major constraints on unity and organizational coherence. Thus, to the growing influence of particularism on all Members of Congress (a particularism which led members of both parties to pursue new kinds of political goals, which tended to change the manner in which those members competed for preferred legislation, and which transformed the nature and patterns of political conflict in the House) was added in 1911 the typical Democratic divisiveness. Both of these forces in turn worked to reinforce the organizational and normative movement away from centralization in the legislative process.

The fragmentation (or incipient pluralization) of the lines of conflict within the House was formally recognized in the body of rules and procedures which the Democrats established at the beginning of the 62nd Congress. As we noted in the last chapter, the Calendar Wednesday Rule was strengthened, the Speaker's recognition powers were curtailed and the Rules Committee was enlarged. Beyond this, however, the Democrats also redistributed the powers which had allowed Republican Speakers since Reed to achieve virtually unfettered control over the legislative process, to other institutions and officers within the House and the party. A Committee on Committees was created, for example, to make committee appointments (or technically nominations) and essentially organize the House.
The committee itself consisted of the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, and its chairman was the member selected by the caucus to be floor leader. This post of Floor Leader was formally established as a distinct office by the Democrats of the 62nd Congress and represented a further fragmentation in theory of the leadership structure. In fact, however, Oscar Underwood who was named Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee was also elected Floor Leader -- a marriage of responsibilities and powers which in part offset (initially at least) the fragmenting impulses of the Democratic reform. Finally, the Caucus itself was resurrected and given a new formal salience in the legislative decision-making process. Democratic members were formally bound by caucus decisions and instructed to vote accordingly on the floor of the House. To a certain extent, this caucus rule placed important constraints on the freedom of individual Members of Congress, but it also gave each Democratic member a formal role in the party's decision-making process.

The Democratic floor leader quickly and somewhat uncharacteristically (at least for a Democratic Congress) emerged as the dominant political figure in the 62nd Congress. To a certain extent, this was the result of Oscar Underwood's simultaneous election to the Chairmanship of Ways and Means (which again also conferred upon him the position of Chairman of the Democratic Committee on
Committees) and to the Floor Leadership position. These three positions gave him an immense amount of influence with the other wielders of power and authority in the Democratic House and did much to negate the party's strong fragmentation ethos. Underwood's influence was also enhanced, however, by the force of his own ambition and by the personal reluctance of Speaker Champ Clark to exercise the still significant powers of his own office. Finally, the Rules Committee (yet another relatively autonomous competitor for power and influence in the House after 1911) had been somewhat weakened by its enlargement, by the careful selection of its members by Underwood and his colleagues on the Ways and Means Committee, and by the coincidental fact that its chairman (who owed his position to what was quickly becoming the inviolable principle of seniority) was politically out of touch with many of the Democratic Members of Congress. 2

The rapid rise of the Caucus and of Oscar Underwood to power in the 62nd Congress raised serious questions about the Democratic party's attachment to the cause of organizational "democracy" and to the rights of the individual Member of Congress. To many, Underwood was simply recreating the old "czarist" system many of his colleagues had fought so hard to dismantle. Early on in the 62nd Congress, George Norris argued, for example, that the "machine today seems to be on the Democratic side of the aisle. King Caucus seems
to be there in control." He added, "If you surrender your consciences to him you will be in as great a political slavery as though you were ruled by a Czar on the Speaker's throne." 3 Somewhat later, another observer suggested that,

If the country thinks that tyranny is dead in Congress, the country has fooled itself. It is not. The House . . . is still controlled by the caucus, which in turn can be controlled by a minority of the party holding the caucus, and this minority in turn can be controlled by half a dozen powerful men, who will usually be headed by Oscar W. Underwood. 4

While critics thus railed against what they regarded as a cynical, and rather hypocritical disregard of the principles of Congressional reform, Democrats assiduously defended their organizational form. Clearly pleased with his party's surprising unity, for example, Champ Clark confidently defended the caucus system in terms reminiscent of Reed's earlier defense of centralization. "I will tell you the whole truth about this caucus matter," he said on the floor of the House,

and this holy protestation that you folks are making. The people of the United States want to know what Congress does. They are much more interested in results than in the methods by which these results are worked out . . . They want results. 5

The press, meanwhile, was drawn to and evidently surprised by the apparent Democratic unity which seemed to
underlie this strong caucus system. As one writer observed, the House of Representatives was in 1911 and 1912 presenting the public with a "virtually unprecedented spectacle. A Democratic majority in the lower branch of Congress has become, for the first time in a generation, an effective, harmonious, smoothly working legislative machine." Indeed, for the first time in living memory, the Democratic party in the House found itself parrying public charges that it was resurrecting the idea of a legislative juggernaut.

Despite contemporary criticism and surprise, however, the caucus was neither as monolithic or as powerful as even modern Congressional historians have suggested, nor as significant a long-term departure from the fragmented traditions of Democratic leadership. Even in the 62nd Congress, where Democratic disarray was temporarily muted by the general harmony which surrounded the party's long awaited return to power, the Caucus' results were not as striking as subjective accounts tend to imply.

According to Clubb and Traugott, for example, 60 percent of the roll call votes in the 62nd Congress were party votes (i.e. where at least 50 percent of the Democratic members opposed at least 50 percent of the Republicans). On all roll call votes during this Congress, there was an average party unlikeness (dissimilarity) score of 53.0, and an association of vote with party of .42. Both figures are lower than those for the stormy 61st Congress and are in fact much lower than the average scores of the Republican Congresses through-
out the first decade of the twentieth century. Between 1895 and 1913, for example, there was only one Congress which registered a lower party unlikeliness score (the Republican 60th Congress) and none was lower in terms of party association with roll call vote. Finally, even these modest levels fell dramatically in subsequent Democratic Congresses. The marked decline of party dissimilarity and party association scores in Democratic Congresses after 1913 (even while Underwood served as floor leader and caucus chairman) suggests that the caucus' perceived effectiveness and initial success in introducing a measure of cohesiveness into the Democratic coalition during the 62nd Congress did not represent an enduring pattern. Clearly, then, the initial success of the caucus was little more than the product of a transitory, and quite fragile, period of Democratic party unity.

The relatively rapid decline of the caucus from even its modest position in the 62nd Congress was rooted in a number of factors at work within the Democratic party, the House itself, and the electorate at large. The temporary euphoria which followed the impressive Democratic victory in the 1910 Congressional elections, first of all, provided the caucus with a membership generally content to defer differences in favor of political harmony. The spirit of intra-party compromise was further encouraged by Republican control of both the Executive branch and the Senate. Even in 1911, Democrats could still produce a measure of unity from their
sense of shared opposition to what still remained of the conservative Republican politician agenda.

Secondly, the fact that the Democrats were organizing the House after such a long period as the minority party, conferred significant if once again temporary political resources upon the party leadership. The power to appoint committees, for example, was used creatively by Oscar Underwood who, as Chairman of the Democratic Committee on Committees and Floor Leader (and ex-officio Chairman of the Party caucus) was in a position to exercise immense leverage over his colleagues. The large number of Freshman members were particularly sensitive to the rewards and sanctions which Underwood and his Committee on Committees could apportion and the political careers which they could thus assist or thwart. Yet older members too were not immune from the requests of a man who could materially advance their own careers in the House. The large number of committee vacancies which had resulted from the Republican electoral debacle of 1910 therefore provided the Democratic leadership with a useful instrument for inducing party regularity. This temporary resource, dwindled rapidly after the 62nd Congress as committee vacancies declined with turnover, and member expectations rose.

Thirdly, the party rules themselves formally constrained the ability of the Caucus to induce party regularity. It took a two-thirds vote of the caucus, for example, to bind
members to a particular legislative position on a pending bill (not a simple majority, as had usually been the case with the Republican caucus), and no one member could ever be forced to cast a vote if it meant violating a constituency promise or a closely held deal. As Brown adds, the two-thirds rule was particularly beneficial to the Southern bloc which could thus exercise a veto on any measure brought before the caucus. As such, the caucus was really only able to exercise a decisive influence over the party if the relatively unified Southern delegation permitted. This decided Southern advantage tended in the long run to exacerbate differences and often widen the breach between factions within the party.²⁹

The political foundations of the caucus were also quite fragile indeed. The initial attempt to create a strong caucus by the Democratic leadership and its effort to install a measure of unity and discipline into the legislative party increasingly found itself at odds with both the character of its diverse constituent base and the electoral temper of the times. The heterogeneity of the Democratic constituency (indeed, as Burnham shows, the pervasiveness of constituency heterogeneity was problematic for both parties after the first decade of the twentieth century)¹⁰, for example, provided a major obstacle to party unity in 1911 as it had throughout the late nineteenth century. Even the effectiveness and creativity of the Democratic
House leadership in the 62nd Congress was routinely negated by the persistent strains produced by this problem of constituency heterogeneity. In the second decade of the twentieth century, in other words, the entire idea of party loyalty was becoming irrelevant to members who because of the fragmentation of the electorate represented increasingly distended and (within the same party) competing interests.

In effect, the problem was one of competing mandates. The fragmented Congressional constituency, and indeed the post-1896 American political culture as a whole had already begun to encourage Members of Congress to abandon traditional loyalties and norms of behavior and to discard outmoded forms of representation. In the era of declining competitiveness at the polls, decreasing levels of membership turnover in the House, increasing seat security, and accelerating party decay, constituents rewarded representatives for personal, visible and increasingly particularistic legislative achievements. Party loyalty, and attachments to broad issue clusters or ideologies were at a discount in the post-Cannon era and consequently the Democratic attempt to foster unity within the House tended to run against the prevailing political cultural grain.

Finally, the attempt to build a strong Caucus or party system in the House was hampered, from the 63rd Congress on, by Woodrow Wilson's efforts to establish executive hegemony over the national policy-making system. While his personal attempt to build a political consensus around his own issue
agenda did work (particularly in his first term) to enhance party unity, it tended to undermine the efficacy of the caucus by implicitly encouraging Democratic Members of Congress to look to the President and not the legislative party for political cues (and indeed often for rewards\textsuperscript{12}). While undermining the Caucus was clearly not Wilson's intent, his insistence between 1913 and 1917 that the executive design and coordinate the Democratic political program did little to enhance the strength or autonomy of the leadership structures within the House.

The Democratic Caucus then confronted many of the same obstacles which had destroyed the Republican system of centralized leadership. Despite modest early successes, it was ultimately no more able than the strong speakership to withstand the distended pressures or accommodate the fragmented and increasingly plural lines of conflict which emerged as central characteristics of House membership behavior from 1910 onwards. The initial unity which had predisposed members to abide by caucus decisions quickly faded as the particularism and heightened personal expectations of the new political age combined with traditional Democratic divisiveness to weaken the foundations of strong party rule within the House. The strong Caucus was therefore a temporary product of a transient political era which was already on its way to extinction in 1911. By the end of the Democratically controlled 64th Congress, it, like the strong speakership was an anachronism -- little more than an
in institutional reminder of an earlier political age.

For the Republicans, as well as the Democrats, the support for centralized control of the legislative process evaporated quite quickly in the early years of the second decade of the twentieth century. By the time the Republican party reassumed control of the House in the 66th Congress, it was no more able than the Democratic party had been to resurrect the instruments of party control. The leadership was clearly divided, still torn between the conflicting political goals which had undermined the cohesiveness of the party in 1910. Republican members were also increasingly committed to the pluralist (or individualist) prerogatives which had been won between 1909 and 1911. Both of these factors combined to produce a new Republican approach to legislative organization in the 66th and later Congresses.

The first of these forces which worked to sustain the fragmented approach to legislative organization in the Republican party was the manner in which the idea as well as the structure of leadership changed between 1911 and 1921. The collapse of the strong speakership in 1910 created a leadership vacuum in the Republican party. In subsequent Congresses this vacuum was largely filled by a number of claimants to portions of the power which the Speaker had in the past exercised, so that by the 66th Congress, leadership responsibilities had devolved to at least five formal
groups or offices within the Republican legislative party.

The Speaker still had a measure of influence, but his power to appoint committees had in the 66th Congress been lodged (as the Democrats had done earlier) in a Republican Committee on Committees which was composed of one member elected by each Republican state delegation to the House. The power to control the legislative agenda had been transferred from his office to the Rules Committee which since 1910 excluded him from membership. The control of the Caucus (or party conference) had been given to the floor leader and the Steering Committee which together played a role in coordinating the Republican legislative program. Finally, the Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees exercised, through their Chairmen, an independent power to design and enact their own legislative agendas.13

Of these, the Committee on Committees and the Steering Committee had perhaps the greatest potential for dominating the Republican legislative process. As Brown suggests, however, both were weakened from the outset by what must ultimately be seen as a fundamental and increasingly characteristic Congressional antagonism to central control of any kind. The Committee on Committees, for example, was viewed by a number of hopeful Republican leaders as a possible foundation for the resurrection of strong party rule in the 66th Congress. The judicious exercise of the power to appoint committees, they believed could be used to the
party's advantage. As Brown argues:

Those who were seeking to control the House in the interest of party discipline, intended to concentrate this power in the hands of a small committee, and the slate had been agreed upon, through understandings reached among members, in advance of the (party) conference. They would have substituted for the old system of the highly centralized oligarchy, a new oligarchy by no means so formidable as the old but possessing some of its attributes and in a position to acquire others gradually through the exercise of those powers thus conferred.14

As Brown continues, however, James Mann, the minority leader between 1911 and 1919, who had been denied the Speakership in the 66th Congress by the opposition of conservative party members, upset this plan by proposing in the conference that the Committee on Committees be enlarged. It was his suggestion that its members be recruited from each Republican state delegation in the House. Appealing as it did "with irresistible force to every one since it offered a place on the Committee on Committees to every state," Mann's proposal was adopted by the conference, and the attempt to build a new strong party organization in the House on the basis of the committee appointment power foundered.15

The other possible instrument of party rule, the Steering Committee, was also the victim of a surrender to the anti-centralist forces at work within the post-Cannon Republican legislative party. In the 66th Congress, the
Republican Steering Committee attempted to produce a legislative program which reflected the traditional partisan pattern of organizational behavior in the Republican Houses of the past (i.e. coordination of the design and enactment of a party political program). It became abundantly clear, however, that Republican party members were themselves increasingly hostile to such an approach. Their own personal goals and the diverse interests of their constituents had already become incompatible with a system of program design and decision-making which limited bargaining and coalition building to the party conference alone.

More and more, the influence of pluralist politics and pluralist conflict were becoming apparent in the House as voting coalitions and bargaining networks transcended party lines. In the 67th Congress, therefore, the Steering Committee attempted to reconcile these new influences by explicitly recognizing for the first time, the existence and significance of narrowly defined "interest groups" within the House. It did this by increasing its size in the 67th Congress, and by giving representation on the committee to the farm bloc and to the organized labor group. The result of acute pressure from the party rank and file to broaden the representativeness of leadership structures, these changes signalled a major shift in the structure of leadership in the House -- one which necessarily diluted the implicit strength of the party by its formal recognition
of discrete sub-groups and distinctive interests within the party. "It was indicative," Brown argues, "of an increasing tendency in the House toward the disintegration of party and the growth of the special class."17

This pluralization of the Steering Committee was also, however, an indication of the extent to which the whole idea of leadership in the House had changed between 1910 and 1921. This transformation was particularly startling and abrupt in the Republican party, but it was also apparent within the Democratic party. The centralized system of Thomas B. Reed and his followers, for example, had been based on the assumption that the majority party had been given a mandate by the voters to carry out a generally agreed upon political program. Republican leaders, aided by a general harmony within their party's legislative ranks, were given the responsibility for formulating the specific outlines of that program and the power to enforce compliance with that formulation. To this extent, leadership exercised an autonomous influence over legislative behavior, and played a dominant role in setting and pushing through the House agenda.

By 1921, House leaders (again Republican and Democrat alike) could no longer base their claims to power upon adherence to a party mandate. Members of Congress themselves were increasingly elected on the basis of issues and concerns which were either distinct and irrelevant to the broad formulations of national (e.g. Presidential) campaigns or which cleaved
across existing party lines. Legislative agendas and indeed political agendas as a whole were decreasingly defined in national terms -- broad alternatives were less and less a part of Congressional campaigns -- and increasingly defined within Congress by the specific interests of constituents whose representatives gathered together in Washington after each election.

The legislative agenda was thus shaped by the members themselves and not by the leadership. As a consequence, leaders were not judged on the basis of how well they did in pushing through a general legislative program, but rather on the basis of how well they did in catering to the particular concerns which the membership in each Congress represented and expressed. Leadership structures, similarly, were no longer designed to give leaders the means for defining and enforcing adherence to an agenda, but rather to give Members of Congress a broader access to the shaping of that agenda. In 1921, in other words, leadership was coming to be judged more and more by its representativeness and sensitivity to the increasingly diverse need of party members.

Coordinative and autonomous leadership declined then as a central political value in the legislative process after 1910. Subtle and gradual, the shift was nevertheless an important one. The Speaker, by virtue of his position and personal influence still retained a prominent position in House affairs, but increasingly the powers which his office
had once exercised and the control it had exerted over the legislative process was dispersed to a relatively wide variety of new offices, groups and committees. Perhaps the most visible beneficiary of this devolution of power and of the general fragmentation of decision-making responsibility in the legislative process were the standing committees. As Wilson had suggested in 1885, the committees had by then already begun to play a pivotal role in the legislative decision-making process. Yet, as we noted, the existence of a relatively strong Speakership stood as a countervailing force to the centrifugal tendencies of committee government. As long as the Speaker possessed and used the right to appoint committees, he also possessed the power to attenuate the autonomy and independence of those committees in the legislative process. The revolt against the strong Speaker, however, effectively removed this countervailing force from the legislative process; undermined the power of anyone to coordinate the committee decision-making process (although the newly formed, and itself increasingly autonomous, Rules Committee played an important veto role here); and consequently, implicitly conferred upon those committees a recognition of their autonomy and independence.

To a certain extent, this can be demonstrated by a cursory examination of the seniority principle. Clearly, seniority had for years served as an important guide for recruitment to leadership posts within committees (and indeed to a certain extent as a guide to recruitment of
members in general to committees). Indeed, in 1889 Henry Cabot Lodge had suggested to an acquaintance that "the custom of seniority is almost inviolable." Yet, it was also clear that seniority could be readily ignored by Speakers when the exigencies of coalition building or policy adherence demanded that other factors be considered. In 1895, for example, Thomas B. Reed violated the seniority guide in order to place Joseph Cannon at the head of the Appropriations Committee despite the fact that Henderson of Iowa was the ranking member. Reed preferred Cannon who, according to Hinds, had "made a good record as Chairman of the Committee in the 51st Congress" but who had been "defeated in the Waterloo of 1890 and so lost his place at the head of the Committee." Cannon, too, freely ignored seniority in the interests of policy as was the case in 1905 when Tawney of Minnesota whose tariff views the Speaker suspected, was transferred from the Ways and Means Committee to the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee. Finally, entire committees were consciously recruited on the basis of political beliefs and issue orientations. Randall carefully chose his Ways and Means Committee in the 46th Congress, for example, to ensure that the principle of protectionism would remain in force during his tenure as Speaker. Reed similarly chose his committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures in the 54th Congress to reflect his own sound money ideas. The seniority principle therefore survived at the pleasure of the
Figure 7: Total Violations of Seniority related to Turnover
Speaker whose discretionary appointment powers were rarely challenged up until the first decade of the twentieth century.

After the 1910 revolt against the centralized system of leadership in the House, however, violations of the seniority principle fell dramatically. To a certain extent this was the result of the reduction in membership turnover in the House, as Figure 7.1 shows. As the number of committee vacancies declined from Congress to Congress, the Speaker's flexibility in making new assignments also declined. To be sure, he still had the formal right to name committees up until 1911, but after 1900, exercising that right entailed confronting an increasingly entrenched committee membership. As Price suggests, too, seniority violations were always a normal consequence of a party's (or faction's) initial assumption of power in the House. In the nineteenth century, when party control of the House changed hands quite frequently, the seniority principle was often disregarded as "shadow cabinet" gave way to "cabinet." As party variation declined, however, one of the more potent reasons for reorganizing the committees also diminished as a factor.

The most significant reason for the rapid entrenchment of the seniority norm, however, was clearly the de-legitimization of centralized power in the House after 1910. In many ways, the same forces which worked to undermine the strong speakership also worked to destroy the right of any one individual or group to effectively manipulate the committee
assignments of the other Members of Congress. To a certain extent, this was the result of the growth in importance of the committee as a base of Congressional careers. In the era of pluralist conflict, individual committees, defined and organized along functionally specific lines clearly gained a relevance and a political significance which they had never before enjoyed (actually the nineteenth century Invalid Pensions Committee and the power and salience it had derived from its relationship with the G.A.R. -- an early and very successful interest group -- was an interesting, if somewhat isolated, example of how committees in general would gain strength as interest groups became central to the post-1910 American political system). The political fortunes of individual Members of Congress were thus increasingly tied to their association with the committee system rather than to the party. The demise of a discretionary appointment system (and the decline in the violations of seniority) was thus partially the result of the increasing importance of committee membership to member goals, ambitions and career options, and thus the result of the increasing stakes involved in the committee appointment decision itself.

As power in the House was dispersed, the leadership structures were rendered progressively less able to intervene actively in the committee selection process. As Polsby suggests, uncompensated violations of seniority -- an indication of the extent to which the leadership felt both compelled and able to intervene in the committee system's
recruitment process -- declined dramatically after 1911.\textsuperscript{24} The inability of the leadership to manipulate the recruitment process and the committee leadership selection process were but symptoms of the broader and more serious inability of party leaders to control or coordinate the committee based decision-making system in general. As support for an autonomous and coordinative leadership system evaporated in the House, the independent influence of the committees generally increased.

The assault on the strong Speakership in 1910 therefore had major consequences for the way power and decision-making responsibilities came to be distributed and exercised in the decade which followed. The formal leadership function filled by the Speaker before 1910 was divided among a number of alternative structures and offices in the House. Similarly, the coordination (at least by a central authority) also lapsed for the most part, although the Rules Committee did retain a pre-eminent if much reduced role in setting the legislative agenda. For the most part, legislative decisions after 1910 began to be achieved through the increasingly unfettered interplay of autonomous standing committees.

While the formal dispersion of power and decision-making represented significant consequences of the rising individualist ethos in Congress, the single most important transformation in Congressional behavior occurred in the limitations
such changes placed on the House's role in the national policy-making system. As this section will attempt to show, the devolution of power, and the disintegration of central coordination in the legislative process led to a dramatic redefinition of the part the House would play in shaping and initiating public policy. The fragmentation process which followed the St. Patrick's Day revolt generally left the House without the leadership structures it needed to initiate and set the Federal policy-making agenda.

That the rise of individualism in the House, the fragmentation of the lines of conflict and the consequent weakening of the structures of central control had significant implications for the House's role in national policy-making, was clearly not lost on the participants in the reform struggle. While some insurgents, for example, optimistically argued that the redistribution of power and the general democratization of the House would have a positive effect on Congressional power (Victor Murdock, for one, suggested that the overthrow of Cannonism would improve the tarnished reputation of Congress, and reverse its decline in relation to the executive25), many others were far less sanguine about the effects of the assault on centralized power in the House. "Weakness and incapacity," one Member argued:

either in its leadership or in the use of its powers by a large, representative body, would necessarily tend to invite invasion by more virile and centralized coordinate branches of the Government in order that the business of the country should be more speedily and
perhaps more acceptably done . . . The weakness and incapacity caused by scattering and dissipating its powers by a large assembly will grow worse with time. 26

Asher Hinds, the parliamentarian and later Member of Congress, agreed with this assessment, suggesting that the essential message of organizational reformers was that the House "should be relegated to desuetude; that its chief officer should be stripped of (his) authority . . . and that the President should be relied upon to express the popular will." 27 Even proponents of reform, who like William Cockran of New York were sensitive to this criticism of the anti-centralization movement, admitted that "this House might not become so important or as interesting" as the Congresses of the past if its members were "placed in control of (their) own procedure." 28

Clearly, in other words, the participants in the struggle to overthrow the strong speaker'ship system understood that the "democratization" of the House involved some important trade-offs. The trade-off between individual autonomy and institutional power in the national political system was the most prominent of these, but the ability of the House to perform its legislative function was also brought into question in the reform debate. Herbert Croly, for example, worried that the decentralization of the House of Representatives would have grave consequences for Congress' national perspective. In fragmenting power, Croly argued,
the House was also necessarily fragmenting its perspective.
National issues and truly national concerns, he feared, would give way to parochialism and particularism. "Both Representatives and Senators are at bottom district and State delegates in a national Legislature," he wrote shortly after the 1910 St. Patrick's Day revolt,

Congress has succeeded in passing national legislation hitherto partly by log-rolling, partly by party discipline and partly in virtue of the fact that the national interest has been conceived chiefly as a composite version of individual and local interests. But the newer national policy demands that certain individuals and localities shall submit to temporary losses for the benefit of the national economic system. . . . A Congress composed of district and state delegates must be coerced into the passage of the necessary legislation, and the necessary coercion can be exercised only by means of a stringent party discipline and the autocratic organization of both Congressional bodies.

In dismantling the structures of central control and of effective leadership, Croly and others therefore argued, the House was essentially stripping itself of the power to respond to the national needs of the emerging twentieth century society. It was also stripping itself of the power to make the redistributive decisions powerful and active national policy-making institutions must make. In effect, the retreat from centralization was a retreat from Congressional power.

That the adoption of the fragmented organizational system represented a surrender of sorts can be seen in the
way Members of Congress struggled to redefine the role of the House after 1910. In effect, the ultimate decision to retreat from the legislative initiative to an oversight role was forced upon the House members who found themselves trapped between the organizational consequences of their assault on central control and the demands which constituents and events increasingly placed on the Congress as an institutional whole. Nowhere is this clearer than in the decade-long struggle which occurred from 1910 to 1921 over the idea of a national budget. More than any other reform measure enacted during this period, the debate over the budget system demonstrated the limitations which Members of Congress were ultimately forced to impose upon the House (and themselves) as a consequence of the new patterns of plural conflict and the organizational norms and structures which emerged to manage that conflict after 1910.

The idea of a national budget system first began to emerge in the first decade of the twentieth century. Although the need to coordinate the allocation of federal funds had served as a periodic focus of debate since the 1865 fragmentation of the old Ways and Means Committee, it was not until 1909 that this debate became the center of the growing competition between Congress (particularly the House) and the Executive Branch. This competition for policy-making dominance came to center on the appropriations process at this time because of the enormous increase
in the demands made on the Federal treasury during the activist Roosevelt administration. The dramatic rise in Federal expenditures during this time prompted a growing interest in the manner in which those expenditures were appropriated and controlled.30

Yet the growing national interest in the budgetary process (or the lack thereof) was also given an additional urgency by the acute sensitivity of Speaker Cannon to the role and stature of the House in national affairs.31 Cannon tended to see the growing debate over the budgetary system as an implied threat to the pre-eminence of the House in the appropriations process. Since the power, and in the past, the dominance of the House, had been based on the power it held to initiate appropriations for the Federal government, any suggestion that the House was somewhat less than effective in carrying this responsibility was, so Cannon believed, a direct attack on the power and dominance of the House in national policy-making in general. In 1909, therefore, he suggested that the Congress "which alone exercises the function or duty of check upon public expenditures" begin the task of rationalizing its appropriations system.32 Although his recommendations were modest indeed, the speech did seem to reflect a growing concern that the stature of Congress, tied as it was to the ability to perform its appropriations task efficiently and effectively, was in jeopardy.
The growing public support for governmental efficiency in general, and the actual experiments in public management which had been implemented during Theodore Roosevelt's Presidency, however, were leading other proponents of budgetary reform to suggest that the executive branch take the initiative in coordinating the appropriations process. One of the most eloquent and clearly devoted spokesmen for the cause of Executive leadership in the coordination of Federal expenditures was F.A. Cleveland who in 1910 was named by Taft to rationalize the budgetary process as head of the newly created Commission on Economy and Efficiency.33

Cleveland, an almost dogmatic proponent of governmental systematization, was particularly outspoken on the need for a more effective and logical appropriations process. In his view, Congress, and particularly the House, was singularly responsible for the outmoded appropriations and budgetary system under which the Federal Government labored.34 In 1912, Cleveland's Commission presented as part of its report a paper entitled, "The Need for a National Budget" which essentially called for executive leadership in setting budgetary priorities and needs. The report decried existing procedures under which Executive Departments petitioned Congress independently of one another for funds and under which department heads were essentially "ministerial agents of Congress" rather than "subordinates to the President." Under the increasingly fragmented system of leadership and decision-
making within Congress (which was further fragmented by the reforms enacted in the House around the time Cleveland began his investigation in 1910), the lack of fiscal coordination by the President or any other officer in the Executive Branch was particularly conducive to massive inefficiency and financial irresponsibility. The Report suggested that this uncontrolled and, to Cleveland, increasingly uncontrollable system be replaced by one in which the department heads in the Executive Branch prepare "estimates for (Presidential) revision and review." Under Cleveland's plan, the President, not Congress, would set the budgetary agenda and determine federal needs.

The Report of the President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency posed a formal organizational challenge to Congress -- a challenge which was initially implicit in the Report but which was soon made explicit by Cleveland himself. On June 27, 1912, Taft formally approved the Report, sent it to Congress and proposed implementing its recommendations. On August 24, however, the House formally blocked Taft's initiative by prohibiting the use of Federal funds for the compilation of a unified Executive estimate of fiscal needs. John Fitzgerald, now Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the House, explained this prohibition a few days later, arguing that "it would not be wise for Congress to abdicate, even by implication, its prerogative in this matter." Nor would it be wise, he continued, to have
the time and energies of large numbers of the most capable persons in the several branches of public service diverted to transforming the entire estimates for the next fiscal year into this new and unauthorized plan of a so-called national budget to the neglect of their ordinary and pressing duties.\textsuperscript{37}

In the months which followed, proponents of the proposed budgetary system mounted a major public campaign to force Congress to reverse its decision. In a speech at the University of Illinois, for example, Cleveland suggested that the new problems facing the Federal Government in the twentieth century had already rendered the capricious Congressional appropriations system out of touch with fiscal and political reality. Excoriating the principle of Congressional dominance in the appropriations process, Cleveland argued that this dominance was the product of a laissez-faire ideology which was no longer appropriate in the management of public funds. As long as this laissez-faire ideology prevailed, Congress was, by default the dominant actor in the national political system. "Congress held the purse strings. Since we were without executive leadership, Congress came to decide all questions (regarding) appropriations."\textsuperscript{38}

Congressional dominance in the appropriations process, and indeed in other areas of policy-making in the past, Cleveland thus concluded, was the product of an evolutionary drift rather than one of a conscious application of the principles of scientific management. Likening the President,
in a later address, to a corporate executive (an increasingly routine and illustrative analogy in the progressive era) trying to function under a strong-willed board of directors, Cleveland told his audience to:

Imagine yourself in complete isolation, selecting heads of departments who are asked to confer with you about matters of current business, but who in fact are helpless because the board (i.e. the Congress), through its committees insists on directing the heads of bureaus and divisions what to do and how to do it ... Imagine yourself a weak sovereign with a nominal Kingship over a thousand feudal lords each well fortified behind his own walls and you have the picture of the chief executive of your corporation.39

Cleveland concluded his challenge to Congress by arguing that the central issue was "Will (Congress) recognize the increasing limitations of a practice that has already reduced that branch of the service to a headless, footless, spineless body which (only) makes progress by the momentum of mass weight?"40

Indeed, the House was acutely sensitive to the implications of Cleveland's arguments. The increasingly insistent and discordant demands for federal funds on the part of groups and individuals in the society were clearly placing a strain on the Congressional appropriations process. Shorn of centralized leadership in general and still functioning under an appropriations system which had been fragmented by the reforms of 1885, the House was peculiarly vulnerable on the one hand to particularistic demands for Federal funds by special interests, and thus, equally vulnerable to charges
to charges that it could not control or coordinate its authorization of public funds.

Yet, as inefficient as the system was, it was supported by a number of forces at work within the Federal Government. First, any attempt to reassert central control over the appropriations process within the House (by both reestablishing central legislative leadership, and by reunifying the Appropriations Committee) was blocked by the general antipathy which after 1910 existed in the House toward such an exercise of centralized authority as well as the regard each of the appropriating committees had for their own organizational prerogatives. Secondly, many department heads within the executive branch, jealous of the independence and autonomy which existing appropriations procedures gave them, also resisted change. Finally, the partisan differences between the House and the Presidency in 1912 exacerbated the institutional conflict between executive and legislative branches, and tended to discourage the type of cooperation implied in Cleveland's budget proposals.

Congress thus found itself locked onto the horns of a major and perplexing organizational dilemma -- one which tended to become more unresolvable as the demands for a resolution increased. On the one hand, rationalizing the appropriations system within Congress and placing it squarely under central control (including control of the
authorization process] was clearly untenable in the fragmented House. On the other hand, the alternative of capitulating to the demands of Cleveland and the proponents of an executive coordination of the budgetary process was also unpalatable to Members of Congress conscious of their prerogatives.

Yet, as Congress grappled with this dilemma, public impatience with Congressional extravagance and inefficiency mounted, as did demands that some systematic appropriations system be put into effect. As early as 1912, public support for a coordinated budget system had already begun to emerge. Officials were besieged by letters which both supported the budget idea and at the same time denounced Congressional vacillation and inaction.\footnote{A.B. Farquahr, Vice-President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a prominent citizen of York, Pennsylvania, summed up this growing public support for the budget idea in one such letter asserting that "Any member of Congress failing to support this measure, in my opinion would merit impeachment."} The election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency merely heightened this pressure on Congress for a budget solution. For one thing, Wilson's expansive view of the role of the Executive Branch in coordinating public policy-making implicitly prodded Congress toward acceding to both the abstract idea of Presidential leadership in general, as well as the concrete demands that the executive be given
the organizational resources for exercising that leadership. At the same time, Wilson evinced a special interest in creating a workable budget system. In a pre-inaugural letter to Senator Ben (Pitchfork) Tillman of South Carolina, Wilson had written:

One of the objects I shall have most in mind when I get to Washington will be conferences with my legislative colleagues there with a view to bringing some budget system into existence. This business of building up the expenses of the nation piece by piece will certainly lead us to error and perhaps embarrassment.

This rededication to a budget system, coming as it did from a Democratic President-elect, was still nevertheless received by Congress with a measure of coolness. The response of the House in particular was emphatically ambiguous, although it was clear that the need for a systematization of some sorts was generally recognized. In February of 1913, for example, Swager Sherley of Kentucky (a Democratic leader in the House), outlined a proposal for a modified budget system in Congress. Clearly intended to appeal to the Congressional reluctance to formally acknowledge a diminished institutional role in the appropriations process, Sherley suggested that the House, in conjunction with the Senate, organize a budget system which would be coordinated and dominated by Congress itself. To achieve (or to maintain) this dominance, Sherley argued, the House must reintroduce a measure of centralization into the legislative
process in general, and into the appropriations process in particular. "A lot of trouble in American public life," he argued,

is not so much that a combination of men have too much power, but that many individual men have so much hidden power that no party can be held responsible by the American people . . . One of the curious features of evolution in America is that everywhere else than upon the floor of this House the tendency has been more and more toward centralization of power and with it responsibility.46

Sherley, therefore, proposed to reinstate the idea of centralization through the creation of a budget committee which would be composed of the ranking majority and minority members of all the Appropriations Committees, Ways and Means Committee, and the Rules Committee, and which would essentially coordinate both the appropriations and authorization process. The plan went beyond the simple reunification of the appropriations committee which Sherley believed to be an "impossible task" anyway47 by effectively calling for the reestablishment of a new more comprehensive form of organizational centralization. Sherley believed that such a budget committee would become the focus of a resurrection of both party leadership, party rule, and through that, public accountability.
What I believe would happen is this, that the recommendations of the majority members of the budget committee would come before a caucus of that party and would be perfected and adopted in caucus, and that the minority proposals would come before the minority caucus and be approved there.48

The House would then essentially be presented with two concrete and comprehensive programmatic alternatives upon which it would vote and be held accountable to the public. More than a simple appropriations system, the Sherley plan represented a vehicle for the re-introduction of centralization and decision-making coordination into the national legislative process.

Sherley's proposal was received with little apparent enthusiasm from his House colleagues, some of whom retreated, predictably enough, to the by now traditional reformist refrain that the budget committee idea would place too much power in too few hands. Another equally predictable protest was that it would represent an unwarranted intrusion upon the prerogatives of the authorizing committees.49 The executive department, too, tended to respond with somewhat mixed emotions. Wilson's ideas about Presidential leadership were to a certain extent implicitly threatened by any organizational reform which would attempt to recentralize power in the House of Representatives, but it was also likely that the bargaining process between Executive and Legislative Branches would be simplified by such a
re-establishment of a clearly defined legislative leadership. Perhaps this latter consideration combined with a recognition of Congress' jealous regard for its own appropriations rights led Wilson to quash moves within the Executive Branch to develop its own system for coordinating departmental estimates, and encourage cooperation with Sherley in his efforts to establish a budgetary system largely coordinated by Congress. 50

Despite Wilson's apparent support, however, Congress resisted the implementation of the Sherley Plan. Cognizant of the need for a budget system, and clearly drawn to the idea of Congressional dominance of such a system, many Members of the House were nevertheless unwilling to surrender their individual prerogatives or the power of their committees in the policy-making and appropriations process. 51 Thus, although Sherley's efforts were politely received and to a modest extent encouraged by his colleagues, his plan was never able to overcome the fragmented perspectives and interests which had become so entrenched within the House. The discrete interests and goals which increasingly animated conflict in the House, and which produced the fragmented perspective of its membership, also produced an enduring antipathy to centralization.

As late as 1915, Sherley still believed his idea would be accepted, 52 but there is little indication that the House ever intended to make any serious attempt to implement
the substantive features of the Kentucky Democrat's budget system. In the fall of 1915, a budget committee did meet in the House to consider the appropriations for the coming year, but it never enjoyed the support of the full membership of the house nor the legitimacy it needed to serve as either a long-term solution to the problems inherent in existing appropriations procedures, or as a source of a major re-centralization of power and authority in the House. At the end of 1915, therefore, neither Congress nor the nation were any closer to a workable budget system than they had been in 1913.

Public attention, meanwhile, was becoming more highly focussed on the budget. One of the sources of this growing interest in the appropriations process was the persistent, and to many, alarming increase in Federal deficits after 1912. In 1913, expenditures exceeded revenues by $401,000 and in 1914 the deficit climbed slightly to $408,000. In 1915, however, this figure soared to over $62 Million. In and of itself, the existence of a Federal deficit was not particularly new to the American public. Indeed, the Federal deficit had already exceeded the 1915 levels twice between 1894 and 1915, and during that same period of time the Government had registered a deficit fourteen times. The public anxiety over Federal deficits was compounded after 1913, however, by a major change in the way the Government raised its revenues.
In the past, Federal revenues had largely been raised through indirect means. Indeed, for the most part, customs receipts and land sales and leases had been the major source of federal funds well into the first decade of the twentieth century. The indirect nature of this revenue raising system tended, therefore, to dampen to a certain extent public impatience with excessive spending, deficits and the system by which federal funds were appropriated. As John Fitzgerald argued in 1913:

While a Treasury surplus is maintained by a system of indirect taxation so ingeniously devised that individual burdens are not readily appreciated, but are assiduously proclaimed as blessings, it will be difficult to awaken the mass of the people to the importance of the (budget question).56

By 1914, however, Internal revenues (e.g. corporation excise taxes, occupational taxes, excise taxes and the personal income tax) had become the largest sources of Government funds. In other words, it was during this time that the more direct tax replaced the relatively indirect tax as the major source of revenues for the Federal Government.57 This general change in revenue patterns tended, as Fitzgerald had hinted it would, to rivet public attention on the means by which federal funds were appropriated. The growing propensity of that appropriations process, moreover, to expend more than it took in merely increased public impatience with the existing procedures.57A
In 1915, therefore, the already significant public debate over the fragmented and clearly unsystematic appropriations system -- a debate which had been largely carried on by special clusters of concerned academics, business groups, and municipal and civic reform groups -- quickly expanded to include people and interests of all stripes. Newspapers and magazines began directing their attention to the problem, and a host of stories about Federal extravagance, Congressional incompetence and fiscal mismanagement became the daily fare of American readers.

Arthur Page, editor of World's Work magazine, for example, commissioned the noted writer Burton Hendrick to do a series of articles on the need for a national budget. Page's campaign for a national budget evidently had the blessings of Woodrow Wilson who was himself becoming impatient with Congressional footdragging on the matter. In 1915, Wilson felt that while he was in a poor position to attempt to force Congress' hand, the time was right for a national public debate over the budget idea -- a debate he clearly hoped would result in a measurable growth in public pressure on a recalcitrant Congress.58

Many of the articles which were produced during this editorial campaign focussed on Pork Barrel Politics and some of the other more sensational and, to many, sordid aspects of the Congressional appropriations process. Hendrick's study for World's Work, for example, was one of
a spate of assaults on the abuses of the pension system. Provocatively sub-titled, "Why the United States is Spending 163 Million a Year to Pay for a War That Ended 50 Years Ago," Hendrick's article attacked the Congressional Appropriations system which led Democrats and Republicans alike to capitulate to the selfish wishes of special pension interests at the taxpayers' expense.\(^5^9\) The activity of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.) was specifically cited as but one insidious example of how existing appropriations procedures catered to narrow interests.\(^6^0\) The Independent, another popular magazine also attacked the distributive bias of the Congressional appropriations process by applauding the efforts of Woodrow Wilson to transfer the attention of Members of Congress from the pork barrel to pressing defense needs. This, the editors suggested, represented a tentative first step toward the abolition of a system which appropriated public money without taking anything but the Congressman's coming election into account.\(^6^1\) The ultimate step, these articles generally concluded, however, would not be taken until the Congress instituted a national budget system.\(^6^2\)

The growing public preoccupation with the national budget idea,\(^6^3\) based as it was on the changing system of taxation, was further encouraged by an equally pressing public regard for the issue of national defense. As the European War deepened, and as public concern for America's
own preparedness increased, support for a rationalization of the budgetary system grew. In 1916, for example, the city of Ripon, Wisconsin, gained a measure of national notoriety by refusing to accept federally appropriated funds for the construction of a public building. In rejecting the $75,000 proffered by Congress, the city council and other public groups in the area asked to have the money applied instead "to preparedness for national defense." An obvious part of the growing national disgust with what was seen as an appropriations system that encouraged pork-barreling, the renunciation of the Federal grant was accompanied by a petition from one of Ripon's civic organizations which argued that "private and local gain and enhancement should always be subservient to the common good."64 The implication was, of course, that Congress was much more sensitive to the former than to the latter.

Members of Congress were themselves beginning to question the extent to which they were capable of distinguishing local interests from pressing national needs. Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, for example, decried, in 1917, the "reign of localism in finance," which was reflected, he believed, in a $35,000,000 public buildings bill which "was prepared for the private interests of Congressmen" rather than for the public interest.65 Even Congressman Fitzgerald of New York, who had initially opposed the Taft attempt to reform the national appropriations process,
embraced the idea of a national budget as the inadequacies of the existing system were exposed by the new fiscal demands of national defense and war preparedness. 67

As early as 1915, Fitzgerald had suggested that the new needs of national defense had clearly overtaxed Congress' outmoded and inefficient appropriations system. The need for reform had already been pressing for several years, he conceded, "but it became acute as a result of the condition arising from the present war." 68 The war, as well as public pressure, in other words, seemed to press home the point that there was indeed a national interest which could not be served by the simple and uncoordinated competition of individual Congressmen and particularized interests for specific political prizes. Yet, if there did exist a separate "national" interest, who, or what group, or which office in the fragmented House spoke for (or who had the legitimacy to articulate) that national interest?

Two years later, Fitzgerald reiterated his support for a reform of the appropriations process, arguing that the need for a change had become even more pressing. Direct United States involvement in the war (from early 1917 on) and the exigencies of war financing made it imperative that the Congress systematize and coordinate its method of appropriating funds. In particular, he suggested that the time had come to halt the prevailing tendency toward fragmentation in the House and to re-introduce a measure of
centralization and coordination. Initially, this was to be accomplished by reconstituting the pre-1885 unified Appropriations Committee, but ultimately it would involve recentralizing power and authority in the legislative process as a whole. On the one hand, Fitzgerald argued, this would make the House more efficient in carrying out its political responsibilities. Centralization would also, however, have a positive impact on the stature and power of the House in national policy-making. "This House needs to concentrate power and responsibility if it is to maintain its unique and unrivaled position in our system of government," he argued.

We have emasculated the Speakership. That office . . . has been so stripped of its power in this body that the Speaker is not the important and influential factor he should be in our system of government. We so diffuse our power that we do not exercise the influence in the affairs of government we should exercise.

In general, Fitzgerald's calls for centralization fell on receptive if still confused ears. His House colleagues continued to be reluctant to accede to such an intrusion on their individual prerogatives and saw no one figure or political outlook which could adequately reflect the disjuncted and fragmented issue agendas and goals which Members of Congress in the post-partisan, plural House represented. Yet, by 1919, the growing public pressure for a budget system, and the acknowledgement within the House that such a
system was indeed necessary and probably inevitable were both creating new, if grudging converts to the budget idea among Members of Congress.

The Federal Deficit in 1919 has risen to an unprecedented $13 Billion\(^73\) and many Members of the House were fearful of the political impact this would have on their re-election chances. Indeed the Republicans had been returned to power in the 1918 Congressional elections in part because of the general dissatisfaction with the fiscal extravagance of the Democrats and their inability to make any progress on the budget system. The Republicans themselves had probably gained voter support, moreover, by promising action of the reform of the appropriations and budgetary process, and were thus able to ignore the public calls for action.\(^74\) As Representatives were uncomfortably aware in 1919, the public was in an economizing mood.\(^75\) One Republican thus advised his party colleagues, "unless this side of the House begins to retrench it will have a mighty poor excuse upon which to go to the country when we are charged with levying additional taxes upon the people."\(^76\)

In 1919, therefore, the House began the difficult search for a solution to the budget problem. The organizational dilemma this search posed, continued to cause a great deal of anguish among Members of Congress for whom solutions inevitably seemed to promise either a reduction of the power of the House as a whole or a full-scale surrender of individual rights and prerogatives in the legislative process.
On the one hand, in other words, the price of continued de-centralization of the legislative process and of the appropriations system was institutional ineffectiveness and public indignation, while the price of centralization on the other hand was a necessary diminution of individualism and a negation of the pluralist patterns of conflict which had by 1919 come to animate the House political process. The problem was compounded by the fact that there no longer existed the kind of consensus among party members, or among any other broad and encompassing blocs of Members, which were large enough or cohesive enough to constitute an enduring majority within the House. In the absence of such coherence, and in the face of such fragmentation, the re-introduction of central control over the legislative process as a whole was certain to be incompatible with political reality.

The search for a solution to the appropriations dilemma thus tended to focus on organizational compromises which neither called for the kind of full-scale centralization the likes of which Sherley and Fitzgerald had initially supported, nor the full-scale capitulation to executive dominance which many had argued would be the inevitable consequence of the failure to effect this kind of total centralization. Forced by the fragmented nature of conflict within the House to eschew full-scale centralization, and unable to avoid the political consequences of failing to implement this re-centralization, Members of Congress
eventually settled on a compromise which at once formally redefined Congress' role in Federal policy-making, and at the same time redistributed decision-making roles within the legislative process. 77

This compromise reform effort revolved around the reconstitution of the centralized Appropriations Committee, which would function, however, in a House which otherwise remained relatively free of central control. First suggested by Republican James Frear of Wisconsin in June of 1919, the plan initially called on the President or the Secretary of the Treasury to gather together and report aggregate executive department needs on a yearly basis. This report would then be sent to an Auditor-General, Comptroller-General or some other "agent of Congress, appointed by Congress, and acting independently of the administration" for a review. This agent would check the executive estimates, reduce them where possible or necessary and report his recommendations to the Congressional Budget Committee -- essentially a House-Senate Appropriations conference committee. 78

Even this moderate effort at organizational centralization, however, faced resistance, particularly "from those whose present position of influence, power and prestige, on appropriations committees would be radically affected." 79 Indeed, Frear's plan was rejected by the House, but to a large extent it did a great deal to set the terms of the
budget debate which ensued. In particular, it formally established the idea that the budget system involved unavoidable trade-offs, and produced a relatively clear idea of what those trade-offs in 1919 were.

As the debate proceeded over the following months, the alternatives never departed far from those first laid out by Frear. On the one hand, the Congress could minimize its appropriations role (and indeed its public policy role), retain its fragmented decision-making system, or it could effect a compromise whereby appropriations powers alone were centralized. The latter course, it became increasingly clear, would necessarily involve giving the executive branch the power to coordinate departmental requests for funds and implicitly give the President the power to set the budgetary agenda. At the same time, it would also give the House (through its appropriations committee and to a lesser extent the other standing committees) the specific responsibility for overseeing the spending of those Federal Funds.

In July of 1919, the House Rules Committee formally set the long-awaited debate in motion and throughout the months that followed, the terms and alternatives first set out by Freer were discussed at length. By October, the select budget committee, which had been authorized by the Rules Committee and the House to design a new appropriations system, made its report. It suggested first of all that the Executive Branch be responsible, through a budget office,
for coordinating the fiscal needs and estimates of the administrative agencies. This bureau would gather departmental estimates, and with the President's consent, present its unified appropriations requests to the Congress.

"Agency proposals were to be studied for their relationship to 'the President's financial program' and were to be sent on to Capitol Hill only if approved by the President."82 The Executive would essentially set the budgetary agenda, although Congress would have the right to modify or veto specific portions of that agenda.

To some, this continued to represent an institutional capitulation to Executive domination of the Federal policy-making process. Willis Hawley of Oregon, a Republican, argued, for example, that Congress might become a mere rubber stamp to the Executive if the budget system thus proposed were put into effect,83 and Champ Clark warned that although he favored a systematization of the appropriations process, "I do not want some office created up here in the administrative department that is going to bully and override the House of Representatives."84 As Evans of Nevada added, "You can not give away your authority and still have it . . . We can not delegate a duty to someone else and still have the same power and information that we would have if we performed it ourselves."85

Others, however, seemed to welcome the shift of responsibility to the executive branch, and argued that such a
shift would produce electoral dividends. The Bureau of the Budget would "serve as a buffer between the Members of Congress and their constituents," one Member argued, and suggested that in fact this was the primary appeal of the new budget idea. Since Congress had been blamed for fiscal mismanagement, he concluded, its members have been searching for ways of shifting responsibility to the executive branch. Meant in part to prick the consciences of his fellow members and to taunt them, the suggestion that Members of Congress were in fact looking to shift the burdens of fiscal management more squarely to the Executive Branch was not without a large measure of truth. Howard of Oklahoma agreed with this assessment and argued that such a shift was both good for Congress and good for the nation. "The Budget system," he suggested, "is a cure for unstable government. It means practical executive supervision; it means careful supervision of the public's money; . . . it means administrative preparedness." Many Members of Congress were, in other words, prepared to transfer responsibility and power to the executive branch by 1919, if public accountability and public pressure was also shifted.

The shift in public accountability was thus perhaps the key element in the willingness of Members of Congress to support a budget system which gave the Executive the right to set and, thus to a certain extent control, the appropriations agenda. As noted earlier, the Members of Congress had
become increasingly trapped between two poles of a major organizational and political dilemma between 1910 and 1919. On the one hand, the demise of the party in the electorate, the emergence of more pluralistic patterns of conflict in the House (as well as outside) had created an institution in which power was dispersed and responsibility for political (legislative) decisions distributed among a wide number of internal Congressional offices and individuals. To a certain extent, this had created an organization which was largely incapable of coordinating its own political agenda. For example, because of the fragmentation of authority, and the dynamics of the new post-1910 decision-making system, it was difficult to give legislative substance to the public mandate for fiscal economy or a reduction of Federal expenditures. While Members of Congress in general tended to voice support for retrenchment, the fragmented system of authorizations and appropriations tended to obstruct the kind of legislation needed to achieve such a reduction in federal spending. Conflicts between the general desire to reduce appropriations and the specific demands of interest groups, constituencies or departments for funds tended, in the absence of a central organ of control or coordination, to be resolved in favor of the latter. 88

To a certain extent, then, the apparent willingness to surrender a measure of authority (or discretion) to the
Executive Branch was a function of the growing awareness on the part of Members of Congress of the extent to which the fragmentation of power and decision-making responsibilities in the House had rendered that institution incapable of acceding to the popular demand for economy and coordination in the appropriations process. The lack of central control over the legislative process had effectively reduced the ability of the House to play a dominant role in the type of tightly organized and accountable budgetary system which constituents seemed to want. As a result, Representatives gradually, if reluctantly, began to accept the idea of Presidential leadership in the budgetary process.

By the end of May 20, 1920, the House and Senate came to an agreement over the specific terms of the new budget system. A Bureau of the Budget would be created in the Executive Branch and entrusted with the task of compiling and defining the fiscal needs of the Administration. Congress, in turn was given the right to veto, modify or accept the recommendations which that Bureau made. In addition, the Congress created the General Accounting Office, to be headed by the Comptroller-General who would be entrusted with the task of reviewing and auditing the Bureau's recommendations. Although technically independent of both Congress and the Executive Branch (organizational solutions for Congressional problems after 1910 always tended to include the creation of an independent agency), the G.A.O.
would be expected to provide the Congress with a means of overseeing the manner in which the Executive Budget was compiled. Thus, although Congress gave the initiative to the Executive Branch, it formally established for itself an oversight role in the budgetary process and reserved the right to make the final decision on the appropriations of funds. 91

On June 1, the House faced what was believed to be the last remaining hurdle to meaningful budgetary reform -- the recentralization of the Appropriations Committee. To this point, many Members of Congress had generally given support to the idea of a budget as an abstract or at least a separate issue. The idea that the budget system necessarily implied a recentralization of the Appropriations Committee, however, was still resisted by many. Gilbert Haugen, for example, had informed his colleagues in 1919 that "I am absolutely opposed to the concentration of power in one man or in one committee, thus curtailing the Member's rights and personal independence." 92 Another argued that the new committee would be unable to adequately represent either "the difference of opinion over a country as large as this" or the viewpoints of 435 members. 93

James Good, who was chairman of the Appropriations Committee, however, argued that the budgetary process would not work if the appropriations power in the House remained fragmented. He repeated the by now familiar argument that the
different committees which now held appropriations powers were too closely tied to their own departments' interests and too susceptible to the pressures of specific groups to serve as a force for economy. "This is not true of the Committee on Appropriations," he suggested,

*It has no particular department to defend, no particular project to advance. It stands as the impartial arbiter of all the legislative committees, so far as appropriations are concerned, and at a time when retrenchment is necessary can say to each that it is necessary to retrench, and can lay down the rule by which retrenchment shall be brought about.*

In the end, the House sided with Good and adopted the proposal to recentralize the Appropriations Committee. The closeness of the vote on the rule bringing the recentralization proposal to the floor, however, revealed the size of the opposition to the bill, and the extent to which many Members of Congress continued to resist even this partial decrease in their prerogatives. This resistance was particularly and predictably acute among members of the committees which were to be relieved of the appropriating powers they had held since 1885. Yet, the force of public pressure on Congress to accept the strengthened Appropriations Committee as a substantive move toward a budget system was also evident by the size of the vote on the final resolution. Where the vote on the rule (in effect a hidden vote on the appropriations recentralization measure) had been won by a
mere four votes (158 to 154), the resolution itself was subsequently passed by a fairly healthy 200 to 117 vote margin.96

On January 4, President Wilson surprised Congress by vetoing its budget bill because of the provision that dealt with the process by which the Comptroller-General was to be appointed or removed from office. Although Wilson was clearly "in entire sympathy with the objects of the bill," he nevertheless felt that this provision which made impeachment the only instrument for removing the Comptroller-General, represented an encroachment of the legislative branch upon executive prerogatives and constitutional rights.97 The House agonized over this veto briefly, some Members suggesting that Wilson's desire to establish Presidential control over the Comptroller-General was tantamount to permitting "the cashier of a bank to audit his own expenses or the books of his bank,"98 but the general sense of urgency which surrounded the budgetary system quickly led most Representatives to accede to Wilson's wishes. As Republican leader Mondell argued after the House had failed to override the Presidential veto, capitulating to the Executive on this matter

is a most unfortunate and regrettable weakening of the system we have so earnestly labored to perfect. But, gentlemen, it is a condition and not a theory that confronts us, and it is the duty of a legislative body when it can not do what it considers best, to do what it
believes is the best thing that is possible under the circumstances . . . We must meet (the President's) view or have no budget legislation. 99

The House then passed the revised budget bill in which the sections objectionable to the President had been eliminated. Sent to the Senate, it fell victim to a filibuster and languished. In the early months of the 67th Congress, the budget bill was reintroduced by Good in its original form (with the original removal clause intact), passed by both the House and the Senate, and on June 10, 1921, finally signed into law by President Harding. 100

The history of the Budget Act provides a useful view of the process by which the House of Representatives conformed itself to the broad implications of its dispersion of power and decision-making responsibilities between 1911 and 1921. It serves as a clear reflection of the broader changes through which Congress redefined its role in the national policy-making system, and the way that redefinition process was produced by the combination of external pressure and the exigencies of internal organizational change.

For the most part, the alteration of the role of the House in national policy-making was a consequence of the broad electoral changes which transformed the lines of
internal political conflict in the first decade of the twentieth century. Those changes in the role and strength of parties, decline of cumulative political cleavages, the fragmentation of the electoral will, and the resulting changes in the kinds of pressures which were brought to bear on individual Members of Congress led first to a restructuring of leadership within the House and a dispersion of power and decision-making responsibilities, and ultimately a redefinition of the role of the House in the national policy-making system. The creation of a budget system, and particularly the restructuring of the Appropriations Committee, were thus two notable and visible parts of this redefinition process whereby the House formally began to disavow its role as initiator of Federal Government policy. As James Good characterized the new Congressional role during the course of the final budget debate in 1921:

We do not appropriate money simply for the purpose of making appropriations; we appropriate money to carry out work planned for the Government. The President alone formulates this plan.\textsuperscript{101}

This abdication is perhaps clearest in the Budget Act itself which formally recognized the President's right to set the appropriations (and indeed much of the broader Federal public policy) agenda. While Congress retained the right to approve or modify this agenda, and oversee its
implementation, the acknowledgement of Executive responsibility for designing Federal policy represented a major concession to the idea of Presidential leadership. Indeed, as students of public policy in general tend to suggest, the right to set the policy agenda constitutes one of the most potent sources of Presidential power in the United States political system. Similarly, the prolonged struggle between the House and the Executive between 1911 and 1921 over the form of the national budget system, and the reluctance of many Members of Congress to grant formal recognition of the Executive's right to coordinate the Federal budget agenda, indicates that the participants in the struggle were themselves aware of the significant institutional implications of that struggle.

The role of the restructuring of the Appropriations Committee in reinforcing the trend toward Congressional oversight in the Federal policy-making process is perhaps less clear. On the one hand, it could be argued that this centralization of the appropriations function represented a reversal of the ten-year fragmentation of power and authority within the House of Representatives. The reconstitution of a centralized Appropriations Committee could also be said to have strengthened the House as a whole in its competition with the Executive Branch over the control of the Federal purse strings. As Brown suggests, for example, "In creating a single Committee on Appropriations . . . the
House had not weakened itself, but had very much strengthened itself, both in respect of its relationship with the President, and with the Senate. Yet, although the creation of a single Appropriations Committee did lend a measure of coherence to the budgetary process within the House, and while it did represent a rather uncharacteristic centralization of power, in a larger sense it also reinforced the idea of Presidential initiative, formalized the oversight role of Congress, and did little to affect the individual prerogatives of most Members of Congress.

The Appropriations Committee was first of all given a veto power over a portion of the legislative process, not the authority to coordinate or design the policy agenda (either within Congress or in the Federal policy-making system as a whole). Secondly, this veto was limited to bills which required an expenditure of Federal funds. This helps explain why this particular centralization measure passed the House. Since it did not affect the rights and powers of any but the six committees which held appropriations as well as authorization authority (since 1885), the reform of 1920 did not really affect the majority of the Members of the House. In effect, the reform of 1920 changed little (beyond perhaps equalizing the roles, powers and status of all authorizing committees) and in the relationship which already existed between most committees and the appropriations committee. Thirdly, the authorization powers remained intact in the authorizing committees. The central-
ization of the Appropriations Committee did little to alter the autonomy of these committees and thus added little to the coordination of the fragmented process by which these independent committees produced legislation. Fourth, the influence which the Appropriations Committee exercised over the legislative process (an influence which was already significant even before 1920) continued to be constrained by other sources of power and authority within the House. Unlike the Appropriations Committee of the 1880's or the Speakership between 1890 and 1910, for example, the post-1920 Appropriations Committee remained but one institutional competitor for leadership in the House (The Rules Committee was another, as were the Ways and Means Committee, the Steering Committee, the Committee on Committees, the Speakership and the Caucus). Thus, the fact that its power was largely negative (at least in the public policy-making process as a whole) and severely constrained, tended to preclude the Appropriations Committee from either re-establishing comprehensive control over the legislative process or from invading the rights and prerogatives already enjoyed by individual members.

The recentralization of the Appropriations Committee, finally, had a marked impact on formalizing Congress's oversight role in the Federal policy-making system. By giving the Appropriations Committee a decidedly negative or veto role in the appropriations process within Congress,
the reform of 1920 essentially locked the House into a negative or reactive role in the budgetary process. As Paul Hasbrouck suggested in 1927, for example, the net effect of the reforms of 1920 and 1921 were that "the real decisions on most matters of expenditure had passed from the Capitol to the Bureau of the Budget."104 The separation of appropriations and authorization functions in the House also tended to free (or perhaps even force) substantive committees to focus their energies more squarely on their control or oversight of the executive departments under their scrutiny.

The Budget Act of 1921 and the Appropriations Reform measure of 1920, therefore, tended to reaffirm in a most visible manner the transformation which had taken place in Congress' role in the Federal policy-making process since 1910. Stripped of its system of central control or strong leadership, the House was organizationally incapable of setting the national political agenda. With its decision-making system rooted in the actions of autonomous and to a certain (though not total) extent isolated committees, and devoid of central coordination, the legislative process was structurally handicapped in its efforts to continue defining (as it had often successfully tried to do before 1910) a comprehensive and consistent national political program. To be sure, Congress retained its institutional power to veto or modify Presidential initiatives, and in the 1920's and after, clearly demonstrated its willingness to use this power
to obstruct or change Presidential programs. Yet after 1910, the Congress and specifically the House also showed that it was increasingly unwilling or unable to play the same role it had played before that time in actually shaping and designing Federal policy.

Again, the Budget Act was but one visible part of this tendency within the House between 1911 and 1921 to abdicate its authority and pretensions of policy-making initiative to the Executive Branch or to quasi-independent agencies. As Oscar Underwood, who himself presided over part of that abdication process later noted, this decline of Congress in the agenda setting process was reflected in a broad number of policy areas. Citing the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Tariff Commission as but a few examples of this trend, he suggested that:

the legislation passed by Congress, transferring its powers to commissions and boards, was the real surrender of its control over many of the fundamental problems that were left in its keeping, and that thereby (it) deliberately gave to the President the exercise of the great powers of government that came in contact with the daily lives of the people.105

The Budget Act and the recentralization of the Appropriations Committee, then, reflected a broader series of what must be seen in hindsight as unavoidable changes, and indeed to a clear if indeterminable extent a reduction in
the role the House played in the National policy-making system. The emerging centrality of the oversight role, the essential surrender of legislative power and discretion to administrative agencies and commissions, and the adoption of a reactive or veto oriented policy-making outlook all served as major aspects of this redefinition process. For the most part, these new roles, like the internal organizational changes which preceded them, were consistent with the new more plural forms of conflict which emerged within the House, and with the new electoral rewards and the changed constituent expectations which so marked, and which to a progressively greater extent throughout the following decades, continued to characterize the twentieth century American political system.
Chapter VIII

Congressional Evolution:
The Changing Imperatives of Legislative Conflict

This study has attempted to identify the forces which have shaped the evolution of the United States House of Representatives, and which continue to sustain the existing patterns of Congressional behavior. It has suggested that the changing inner world of the House is primarily the product of variations in the form and scale of conflict which that institution must ultimately manage and resolve. The legislative process is consciously designed by its participants to fit the specific, and once again varying forms of dissensus which appears within Congress. The history of the House, therefore, and the explanation of the changes which have characterized that history -- changes in the distribution of power and authority, in the structuring and apportionment of decision-making roles, in the norms of membership behavior, and in the definition of the role of the House in the national policy-making system -- can be broadly viewed as facets of a continuing institutional attempt to resolve the problem of building agreement in a perennially though variously divided and conflict-ridden
Conflict within the House, we have suggested, occurs as competition among members over the scarce resources of the institution. It is, in other words, the product of the struggle for power, prestige and status, for access to the centers of decision-making, and ultimately for preferred legislative decisions (laws, policies, benefits). The disagreements and conflicts which the scramble for these preferred goals causes, serve as the central reality to which the House -- dedicated as it is to the resolution of conflict -- must respond. A conflict mode which is characterized by a fragmented (factional or plural) pursuit of preferred goals, for example, calls for a quite different system of conflict resolution than one characterized by broadly constituted, coherent and unified political coalitions.

The assumption is, therefore, that the House is an adaptive political institution. Its inner world is molded to fit the political needs, goals and perceptions of the Members who populate that inner world. The focus of this study has largely centered, then, upon both the Members who consciously make the rules, distribute power and decision-making responsibilities; who place limits on the institution's decisions; and who define the role of the House in the American political system, and upon the forces which constrain or encourage those Members of Congress to make the organizational decisions they in fact make. It has suggested that ultimately
the way Members of Congress approach the task of redesigning the internal world of the House is heavily conditioned by the manner in which the political demands and expectations of their constituents are organized and expressed, by the goals and expectations which the Members of Congress, in turn and as a result express, and finally by the patterns of conflict which the pursuit of these goals produce.

The varying goals of individual Members of Congress, in other words, do not emerge in a political or social vacuum. The external political environment of the House has a major influence on that institution's internal behavior. Clearly, the electoral link is the tie that binds these external conditions to the organizational decisions made within the House. As we have shown in Chapters II and III, for example, the re-election impulse among Members of Congress did not change markedly between 1880 and 1920. Controlled for competitiveness, nineteenth century Representatives' desire for re-election tended to be only slightly lower, and the propensity to abstain from seeking re-election only slightly higher than their twentieth century colleagues. Clearly, then, the electoral urge, and the need to cater to the needs and wishes of the constituents who sent them to the House was important throughout the period under study. The assumption is, therefore, that the individual Member of Congress of the late nineteenth century was as intent upon creating a House organization which maximized his electoral chances
as the Member of Congress of the twentieth century.

The differences between the late nineteenth century and twentieth century Houses, then, and indeed the differences between the Democratic and Republican Houses of the late nineteenth century, lay in differences in the manner in which each party's constituents (in the nineteenth century), and the constituents of both parties in the twentieth century expressed and organized their demands to their Representatives in Congress, and consequently in the criteria voters used to reward (vote for) or sanction those Members of Congress. The strong attachment of most late nineteenth century voters, for example, to the idea and the reality of political parties certainly played a major role in shaping the signals those voters sent to candidates for political office. As an abstract social norm, partisanship provided voting cues, defined a candidate's political stand (often in the broadest and yet concrete terms), and presented alternative policy agendas to the electorate in general and to the individual constituencies in particular. As an organizational reality in the political life of the late nineteenth century, moreover, parties also provided the forum in which political bargaining occurred, in which compromises were made, in which specific policy agendas were designed and constructed, and into which candidates and political office-holders were recruited.

The attachment to partisanship as a social norm, in
turn was based on, and in a large sense, a reflection of
broad ideological social and often economic allegiances
which late nineteenth century voters held. The Civil War,
for example, had reinforced and sharpened the intense re-
gionalism which had already served to animate much of the
political conflict which occurred throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century. The Civil War itself, then, and
the political agenda which the Republican party produced
during and after the war, reflected this regional conflict
and exploited it. The specific issues of the day were thus
ideally the individual components of a broadly defined (or
to a certain extent formally and consciously aggregated)
political and indeed social world view.

In reality, of course, both parties differed in the
extent to which their specific policy agendas adequately
reflected the particular views of their constituents (or
the extent to which aggregated party platforms masked major
contradictions or incompatibilities among the constituents
of that party). There were also, therefore, major differ-
ences between those parties as to how unified or divided
they were. Republican constituents were clearly more
unified over the specific details of their party's political
program throughout the late nineteenth century than the
Democrats, although neither party was ever fully free from
the strains of internal dissension. Still, the Democratic
party, which contained a number of discrete and heterogeneous
factions in the late nineteenth century, was most suscepti-
ble to the problems of coalitional disarray.

By the early years of the twentieth century, the unity, and indeed the relevance of national political parties to the specific concerns of the electorate, had begun to wane. Partisanship as a norm was attacked, and parties themselves were weakened by new regulations, laws, and formal limits on the scope of their political activity. Ironically, it was perhaps Warren G. Harding who best encapsulated the nature of the changes which had by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century transformed the American political system from its traditional paths, in his 1923 World Court speech:

A great change has taken place, vitally influenc-
ing the work of administrative and legislative fulfillment ... The great change has come about unawares ... It is the change in our political system, the rule of the primaries, the drift toward pure democracy, and the growing impotence of political parties. We have got away from the representative system; we have reached a point where the lack of party loyalty has made party sponsorship in government less effective than it was. We have come to the time when a party plat-
form is regarded by too many men in public life as even less important than a scrap of paper, and groups or blocs are turned to serve group interests, and many individuals serve their own, while contempt for party conference or caucus has sent party loyalty pretty much into the discard.¹

Clearly colored by his sympathy for the party government,

Harding's retrospective on the early twentieth century
transformation of American politics nevertheless accurately summed up the prevailing attitudes toward partisanship.

Nowadays, in many states, party adherence is flouted, loyalty is held to be contemptible and nominations for office are often influenced by voters enrolled under an opposing party banner, and platforms are sometimes the insincere utterances of expediency, influenced by nominees rather than by advocates of principle.²

As Harding correctly suggested, the weakening of the party and of partisanship in American political life, and the declining salience of broad and cumulative political cleavages and attachments which underwrote this decline, reflected a major and, as it turned out, enduring transformation of the nature of political demand-making in national politics. The emergence of a new particularism in American politics in the first decade of the twentieth century, produced a virtual disintegration of national party coalitions, and gave way to the emergence of a new more fragmented, more plural, system of political organization and demand-making.

The decline of national parties and the emergence of a particularized political agenda were also reflected and reinforced by changes in the dynamics of Congressional elections. Members of Congress, who had been dependent upon local party organizations for electoral success (for the nomination and for support in the actual electoral
campaigns were beginning to exercise a measure of autonomy in running for office after 1896. Primary election laws freed candidates of having to win the favor of the party organization in order to win its nomination for office. The emergence of split-ticket voting also tended to reflect the party's reduced role as a voting cue in Congressional elections, and the increased role of office-specific criteria. The twentieth century also saw a marked decline in electoral competitiveness in House elections. This decline tended to mirror the associated decline in membership turnover and the corresponding increase in the seat security of individual Members of Congress.

Finally, the party structure itself began to fragment after 1896. Local party organizations and to a certain extent state party organizations tended to take a more parochial and less national view of their goals and responsibilities. All of these changes tended to add to the independence and autonomy of the Member of Congress in the national legislature. Increasingly freed from the electoral sanctions of the party in general, and the national party in particular, the Representative was induced to focus his attention more squarely on the specific concerns of the constituents, in whose hands his political future now so uniformly lay.

These changes clearly produced new and distinctive patterns of political conflict in the nation at large. These
new patterns of conflict and these new patterns of demand-making in turn produced equally distinctive patterns of demand-making and conflict within the House. In the late nineteenth century, for example, differences in the strength or coherence of the national Republican and Democratic parties had been clearly reflected in the different styles of conflict each had brought to the House. The Republican legislative party had been more unified and cohesive than the Democrats who tended to be more fragmented and prone to often bitter factional disputes. Similarly, the changes in the twentieth-century political environment produced equally visible changes in the way Members of Congress pursued their legislative goals. Changes in the patterns of conflict in the American political system as a whole, then, were generally reflected by patterns of conflict within the House.

As these patterns of conflict within the House changed, the institution itself was forced to change in order to proceed with its task of making legislative decisions. Changes in the patterns of conflict in the House, in other words, necessarily produced changes in the kinds of obstacles which that body was forced to overcome in order to carry out its legislative duties. In the Republican Houses of the late nineteenth century, for example, the conflict over legislative goals was largely carried on within the party organization (national committee, conventions, the party caucus, and the leadership structures within Congress). Because of the
relatively cohesive and homogeneous (at least in terms of broad political goals) constituent base, and the Republican party's success in achieving a broad internal programmatic unity among its members in Congress, the House itself was to a large extent simply the forum where decisions and bargains made within the party were formally ratified. As such, the organization of the House played a rather passive role in actually overseeing the construction of a political consensus.

By contrast, the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century, and to an even greater extent the Houses after 1911, tended to confront patterns of conflict which were characterized by a lack of pre-determined consensus. Factionalism in the nineteenth century and a growing pluralism in the twentieth century were both expressions (if qualitatively different expressions) of this lack of internal accord among the majority of the Members who were elected to these Congresses. In these periods, therefore, the House organization was and continued to be forced to play a more active role in actually cultivating a practical consensus out of the specific and once again varying forms of dissensus it faced. In sum, the patterns of disagreement (the diversity or unity over views, goals, and ideals), and the way in which the pursuit of preferred goals is organized both outside and within the House, determines the magnitude and nature of the House's own consensus-building task, and thus the character
of its internal world. The rapidity with which the House changed the form and substance, the norms as well as the procedures of its internal world throughout the 1880 to 1921 period suggests that it was extremely responsive to shifts in the patterns of conflict, in the demands and in the organization of public political demands which worked beyond as well as within the halls of Congress.

The House responded to the changing patterns of conflict in three broad ways, this study has suggested. First of all, the House redistributed power and authority; secondly, it restructured from time to time its decision-making process; and thirdly, it placed varying limits on its decisions during the 1880 to 1921 period, or in effect re-defined its role in the National policy-making system. In a House dominated by a strong majority, united around a coherent political agenda, for example, the legislative process was oriented (for example, in the 51st Congress) toward promoting the ratification of that political agenda. Under Thomas B. Reed, the internal processes of the House were designed to fulfill the strategic needs of the majority Republican consensus which had been constructed, in effect, independently of Congress. In such a House, and indeed in that particular House, power was centralized (as it was in the 1860's and to a certain extent the 1830's); decision-making was largely coordinated by central authorities; and the House itself was able (and it was clearly willing) to
seek an active role for itself in enacting, and even enforcing the implementation of its will.

In a House dominated by a majority party in which, by contrast, such an allegiance to a coherent political program was absent -- a House in which, like the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century and the Houses of both parties after 1911 there was profound disagreement over political goals among those who actually organized and designed the legislative process (i.e. the majority party) -- the internal world of the House was far more preoccupied with the task of consensus building. In such Houses, the discord within the majority party (evident in factionalism as well as in the milder but equally distended pluralism of the twentieth century) was and is reflected by a legislative process which recognized the rights of each faction to participate in the decision-making process and particularly the right to veto legislation distasteful to their members. The central exercise of power was curbed; the decision-making system in both cases was dispersed and the House as a whole tended to take a veto-oriented approach to its policy-making role.

In effect, the legislative process was, in the 1880 to 1921 period -- and it could be argued that it remains today -- designed to suit the functional needs and political goals of those who have the right to organize the House. As these functional needs changed, the House, too, changed its shape.
In the Republican Houses of the nineteenth century, for example, the legislative process was designed to fit the needs of a majority which was determined to enact a specific policy program. Power was centralized in the Speaker-ship, and decision-making was largely coordinated by the leadership through both the Rules Committee and the Speaker himself. This was particularly so in the Republican Houses of the 1890's which were dominated by a majority party united around a broad political platform and intent on enacting that platform. The structure of the House met the needs of an activist and cohesive majority.

The Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century, on the other hand, and to a certain extent the Houses of the post-1911 period, tended to reflect quite another set of member needs and goals. The Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century on the one hand were marked by intense divisiveness within the majority party. There was no broad consensus over goals and indeed sharp conflicts over the details of the Democratic legislative program. The House process was thus designed to account for these internal Democratic differences and meet the needs of a membership which often found itself as divided over specific policy goals as it was united in its general opposition to Republican party programs. In such a House, there was little support for a centralized power structure or for a central coordination of the decision-making process. In the absence of a broad agreement over goals, power was distributed more
broadly (no one had the legitimacy to speak or act for the Democratic majority), the Speakership was weakened and the committees gained a new salience and a new power in effecting the legislative agenda.

The distribution of power and the dispersion of decision-making authority which characterized Democratic Houses in the late nineteenth century also characterized the House after 1911. Where factionalism had been the spur to such a redistribution in the nineteenth century, however, particularism was its source in the twentieth century. Increasingly freed of the constraints of national party discipline and of partisanship in general by the fragmentation of the electorate; increasingly tied to a more particularistic expression of constituent demands by the emergence of office-specific voting patterns after 1912; and increasingly secure from defeat in re-election campaigns, Members of Congress in the twentieth century generally sought to create a legislative process which maximized the distribution of power and access to the decision-making centers. In a House progressively dominated by particularistic concerns, by cross-cutting and fluid political alliances, and by a preoccupation with goals derived from a fragmented electorate, Members of Congress steered the legislative process away from rigid centralization and toward a more permeable and dispersed system which gave them the widest possible latitude in achieving their own particular legislative goals.
The movement away from centralization also, however, while it increased both the stature of the individual Member of Congress and placed him closer to the centers of power in the House, entailed a necessary redefinition of the role of the House in the national policy-making system. The fragmentation of authority and the weakening of the structures which had coordinated the legislative process in the nineteenth century, tended to diminish the extent to which the House could compete with other institutions of decision-making in the Federal Government in setting national priorities and in designing and initiating a comprehensive public policy agenda. That this redefinition and, to a certain extent, diminution of the role of the House in national policy-making was a necessary correlate of the fragmentation of power and decision-making, can be shown in a review of the debates which led up to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The ten-year struggle to reconcile the dispersed organizational style of the House to the increasingly urgent need for a budget system, and the reluctant acceptance on the part of Congress to a reactive (veto and oversight) role in the appropriations process, reveals the extent to which Members of Congress themselves saw an abdication of institutional power as the price of internal fragmentation. As the endless series of debates demonstrate, the House of Representatives was ultimately forced to concede both its inability to set the budgetary agenda and its apparent unwillingness to
take the organizational steps necessary to reassume the budgetary initiative.

Clearly, the fragmentation of the decision-making system within the House was an important source of this institutional abdication of power (equally evident in the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the grants of power and discretion to a host of other executive agencies and independent commissions in the years preceding and during World War I). Shorn of centralized leadership, the House also found itself unable to coordinate its own decision-making process or design a comprehensive national political agenda. Instead, the legislative agenda was set by increasingly autonomous committees competing with one another for the right to distribute Federal resources. This weakened the effectiveness of the House as the growing inability to reconcile Federal revenues and expenditures after 1913 demonstrates. Yet it also tended to weaken the House in its bargaining relationship with other actors in the Federal political system in general and the Presidency in particular. Increasingly after 1911, the House of Representatives spoke not with one voice, but with many.

This study, then, has attempted to show that in fact the norms and formal procedures which characterize the House, and the changes which have occurred in those aspects of Congress' internal world, are related to the forms of
conflict and dissensus which exist within each House. In general, it has tried to provide an analytic focus which bridges the theoretical gap between internalist and ecologist explanations of House behavior. On the one hand, the linkage of internal Congressional conflict to the external world provides a visible dynamic element which is largely missing in internalist explanations of Congressional change. It suggests that the changing patterns of conflict, which are themselves products of changes occurring in the political environment of the House, produce changes in the legislative process. The focus on conflict as a reflection of the complex interaction of personalities in Congress with this political environment on the other hand suggests that the process by which the House adapts to its changing environment is mediated by significant factors (personalities, goals of Members, and perceptions of constituent demands) which work within Congress.

Finally, this study has suggested that the turn of the century was a watershed in the evolution of the House -- not because the House embarked on any linear or deterministic development path at that time, but because the national political system underwent changes (which have either endured or accelerated since that time) to which the House was peculiarly vulnerable. The patterns of legislative conflict in the House were particularly sensitive to the types of changes which occurred during this time. It was, for example,
during this time that political parties declined as national organizers of political goals; that the national political agenda began to fragment; that the issue concerns articulated by the constituents of Members of Congress became less explicitly integrated with those concerns of other constituents and constituencies in the nation; that House elections began to reflect an institution-specific regard for interests, issues and political goals; that electoral competitiveness began its dramatic decline in Congressional elections; and that seat security increased. All of these factors tended to fragment the lines of conflict, decrease the relevance of rigid, formalized and comprehensive political coalitions within the House and encourage the creation of a more fluid bargaining and decision-making system.

In effect, then, the House of Representatives, far from being the isolated and autonomous institution described by the internalists, is (and during the turn of the century era, was) very much the creature of the wider political world in which it functions. The distinctive and changing forces which constitute that dynamic political environment create equally marked variations in the rewards and sanctions, the interests, and the demands which animate the scramble for preferred political prizes within the House. Changing constituent expectations, and the varying manner in which they are organized and articulated thus produce the patterns
of conflict to which the legislative process must be made to conform. In this sense, the political environment determines the scale and pattern of conflict which each House must confront, and thus also determines the norms, the procedures and the roles which Members of Congress must devise for handling that conflict.

The legislative process, in other words, is quite simply the product of the conscious and collective efforts of Members of Congress to design a system which best fits the conflict mode which their constituents have imposed upon them. As this study has attempted to show, the plural House of the twentieth century, no less than the factional Democratic Congresses or the partisan Republican legislatures which preceded it in the late nineteenth century, were all the products of the peculiar ecological forces which together defined and indeed explained the patterns of conflict each was forced to confront and manage.
Chapter I


22 The fundamental question structural-functionalism poses (and indeed the question which tends to interest contemporary scholars of Congressional behavior) is how Members of Congress adapt themselves to the Congressional social system. The focus on individual socialization involves a corresponding de-emphasis of change (i.e., institutional change). This denigration of change in Congress is mirrored in patterns of structural-functional analysis in general. As Wayne Held argues, "The subject of change as treated by Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton ... is defined as a by-product in the malfunctioning of social control or order. Though both theorists have made notable contributions to our understanding of the mechanisms involved in social control, their approach is similar to earlier anthropologists, Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, both of whom were primarily concerned with maintaining a stable, integrated and harmonious social equilibrium. By taking as their research problem the task of explaining how it is that various social institutions of pre-literate societies function interdependently in an integrated whole, these early anthropologists either neglected the question of change in direction or control of institutional structures or studied social change as evidence of breakdown in social control and consequently studied means by which control was restored. Thus in the study of certain laws and customs of these preliterate societies, attention was centered in the conditions leading to the perpetuation of codes of behavior ... Interest in the stability and order of such communities tended to preclude the study of social and political change, and particularly changes

24 Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislatures", op. cit. cf p. 32.
26 Ibid. p. 160.
27 Ibid. p. 168.
29 Polsby, "Institutionalization..." op. cit. p. 168.
30 Polsby, "Legislatures" op. cit. p. 54.
32 Robert L. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, op. cit. Although as Peabody demonstrates the internalist and largely time-bound focus of modern scholarship does not really take us very far, in many cases, toward an explanation of Congressional Behavior. The concentration on the individual Member (a major trait of the internalist approach) has tended to promote the idea that change, like many other aspects of Congressional behavior is largely determined by unpredictable and variable combinations of personalities within Congress. Thus Peabody is forced to conclude that after all, "The most pervasive and continuing influence upon leadership selection for party office has been exerted by the personality and skill of the candidates." (p. 498).
34 Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966) pp. 9-10. See also Jeffrey Pressman, "Congress: Institutionalization, Committee Autonomy and the Dispersion of Power", Draft (Cambridge: 1976) pp. 9-17. Studies like these tend to be among the best and most successful examples of the internalist approach to Congressional behavior because they focus on institutions which are highly insulated from the external political world, and which consequently exhibit many of the key qualities which characterize true "social systems." Although it is important to note that committees vary in the extent to which they approach the ideal-typical status of a discrete system. See, for example, Fenno's Congressmen in Committee, op. cit. p. xviii, and Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, "Shifting Forces, Changing Rules, and Political Outcomes: The Impact of


36 Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Representative and his District", in Peabody and Polsby (eds.) New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, op. cit. pp. 3-25, cf. particularly pp. 10 and 15-16.


41 Richard Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization", op. cit., p. 33.


44 Richard Sisson, op. cit., p. 22.


49 Polsby, "Institutionalization ..." op. cit., p. 145.

50 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 12.


Ibid., I am also indebted to G. Michael McGeary for ideas expressed in his M.I.T. seminar paper entitled "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives: Polsby vs. Huntington," (1974). That Polsby is himself aware of this possible contradiction between his own ideas of institutionalization and modernization, and more traditional ones, is made evident in his study of the Seniority System where he notes, "It is an interesting anomaly that these two phenomena, progressive decentralization of power and institutionalization are not normally associated, and that "ideal types" describing the natural history of organizational development typically presume a movement toward, rather than away from, concentration of power." He concludes by suggesting that "the House of Representatives may be the exception that proves the rule, or it may serve as an occasion for the reconsideration of at least one small branch of organization theory."


See for example Irving Louis Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation," in Demerath and Peterson, op. cit., pp.265-279. Horowitz argues that organizational theory, as it is expressed in large part in Weber's and his successors' view of bureaucratic development tends to emphasize the inevitability of
organizational modernization. (pp. 273-274).
63 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit. pp. 96-98.
66 Ibid., p. 133.
68 As Burnham shows, many of the patterns of development Polsby uses in his Institutionalization article display decidedly non-incremental qualities in their changes throughout the turn of the century period. See Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections ..., op. cit. pp. 67-69 and p. 124.
70 Ibid., p. 82.
71 See for example, P.E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate", in Angus Campbell and P.E. Converse (eds.), The Human Meaning of Social Change.
72 See Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, op. cit., and Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections..., op. cit., pp. 48-61, Of the rise of primaries, for example, Hofstadter argues, "It puts a new premium on publicity and promotion in nominating campaigns, and thus introduced into the political process another entering wedge for the power of money. Without seriously impairing the machines, it weakened party government and party responsibility." Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 265.
"House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation," 

76 Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the 
Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman (ed.), The 
Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
See page 10.

77 Nelson Polsby et al., "The Growth of the Seniority 
System...", op. cit., p. 188.

78 Ibid., p. 197.


80 Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the 
Twentieth Century," op. cit., 

81 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections..., op. cit., 


86 Although see Herbert B. Asher, "The Learning of Legislative Norms," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 2, (June, 1973), pp. 499-513, who argues that on the basis of research on the ninety-first Congress, the expectation that Freshmen underwent a learning and socialization process into the ways of the House of Representatives "is unwarranted." The suggestion is that the classic notion of a unified social system with 'insider-outsider' norms did not seem to apply to the 91st Congress.


89 Walter Dean Burnham, "Insolation and Responsiveness..." op. cit., pp. 432-435.

93 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections..., op. cit., pp. 108 (The case of Indiana).
97 Nelson Polsby, "Institutionalization ..." op. cit.
98 Richard Fenno makes this suggestion in his "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House", in David B. Truman (ed.) The Congress and America's Future, op. cit., pp. 63-90, where he argues that "The House must be capable of making decisions, but it must not tear itself apart in the process. It is in response to these twin problems -- decision-making and maintenance -- that the House's internal structure of influence has developed. And it is by focussing on these two problems that the structure can best be understood." p. 63.

Chapter II
1 See, for example, Polsby's view of the House during the nineteenth century as an "arena" in which forces organized and coordinated from outside Congress carried on their political conflicts within the House: Polsby, "Legislatures," Unpublished Manuscript (Mimeo), Berkeley, 1975. Both internalists and ecologists tend to agree that the nineteenth century House of Representatives was not insulated from its political environment. But, whereas the internalists ascribe this non-insularity
to weaknesses on the part of Congress (or malinstitutionalization), ecologists (and indeed this study) argue that it was rather a function of the strength and power of the national political system (parties, electoral system, cumulative voting and issue coalitions, etc). These were the forces, this latter group argues, which forcibly tied the internal Congressional process to the outside world.

7 See, for example, William Ralston Balch, The Life of James Abram Garfield (Philadelphia: J.C. McCurdy & Co., 1881). Balch, who was but one of the host of writers who wrote laudatory biographies of Garfield shortly after his assassination characteristically devotes as much space to Garfield's two years in the Union Army (He was discharged as a Brigadier General) as he does to his eighteen productive years as a Member of Congress.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 At least this was Henry Cabot Lodge's belief. Note included among the Adams Miscellaneous Papers, Mass. Historical Society.
15 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976) pp. 342-343 and pp. 213-243. On the Populist Party's 1892 campaign (for the Presidency -- James Weaver was the party's standard bearer) Goodwyn writes: "Generally speaking, only the strongest kind of leadership linked with cohesive organizations seemed to be able to challenge the emotional power of the inherited forms that shaped the way Southerners acted politically. As the full impact of sectional attacks fell upon Southern Populists in 1892, the farmers of that region found the pull of the old party (the Democratic party) harder to resist than did their counterparts in the West." p. 342.
16 H. Wayne Morgan, op. cit., p. 76.
17 Thomas V. Cooper, American Politics (Boston: B.A.Fowler & Co., 1888) p. 173. Cooper clearly considered this Senate speech as one of Blaine's finest. The inclusion of this speech in Cooper's compilation of what he viewed as the most important documents in the political history of the nation also indicates the extent to which the Army Appropriations fight in 1879 was considered a significant political event in the late nineteenth century.
18 Ibid., p. 176.
19 Ibid., p. 183.
20 Richard Vaux to Samuel J. Randall, April 22, 1879, Samuel J. Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.
21 Undated Boston Herald clipping included in a letter from J.F. Doherty to Samuel J. Randall, June 1, 1879, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.
23 One critic of the Republican party, for example, wrote in 1889 of the close relationship between the G.A.R. and the Republican Party that 'There is something humiliating in the spectacle of an American President and his cabinet (i.e. Harrison) cowering before this

24 Wilfred Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) pp. 309-310. This political sterility, Lord Bryce argued in the early 1890's, was the fault of the parties themselves which had erred "by clinging too long to outworn issues, and by neglecting to discover and work out new principles capable of solving the problems which now perplex the country." James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1895) Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 28.

25 Morgan suggests that the tariff began to emerge as a predominant national issue in the Presidential Election of 1880. He further argues that the Republicans were particularly keen on elevating the issue of protectionism to the national political stage. "Blaine was right," he claims, "in saying it (the tariff) could solidify the North and West to beat the South. Protection now began a long dominance in national politics, and the Republicans were far more adept at its use than were their opponents." Morgan, Op. Cit., p. 120.


27 Thomas Campbell-Copeland, Harrison and Reid: The Republican Campaign Book for 1892 (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1892) Part II, p. 35. This table appeared in the Republican Campaign Book of 1892 and suggests that the Republicans were aware of the partisan and tactical advantages which were to be gained by pushing the regional characteristics of the tariff question.

28 Washington Post, February 4, 1880, p. 1; and November 19, 1885, p. 1. In this latter article, for example, the Post reported that the National Cattle Growers' Association had met in Chicago on Nov. 18, 1885 and listed among their demands, one which called for the appropriation by Congress of "not less than $1,500,000 . . . to pay for diseased cattle slaughtered" and to pay for experts to appraise the value of such cattle.


30 Washington Post, November 14, 1885, p. 2


See, for example, various studies of the 1896 Presidential Elections which examine the importance of the free silver issue on the alterations which occurred in both parties during the mid-1890's. Lawrence Goodwyn, Op. Cit., pp. 426-514; George H. Mayer The Republican Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) briefly outlines the effects of free silver on the Republican Party in the 1890's, pp. 238-257; and a sympathetic view of the Democratic Party's attachment to the cause of free silver can be found in Harry Barnard, Eagle Forgotten: The Life of John Peter Altgeld (Secaucus: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1973) Reprint of the 1938 Bobbs-Merrill edition, pp. 345-389.


James G. Blaine, the Presidential nominee of the Republican party in 1884, for example, lost the Presidency to Grover Cleveland by losing New York State by a margin of only one thousand votes. In 1888, Harrison won the Presidency by taking Indiana (his home state) by a mere 2300 votes and New York by 14,000 votes. Ray Ginger Age of Excess: The United States from 1877-1914 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967) pp. 107-108 and p. 116.


For example, Tom Watson, the Georgia Populist Leader of the 1880's and 1890's, claimed that Populism, the reform spirit it engendered and perhaps the cynicism with the existing party system it produced (the result of the corrupt bargains, deals, and expediencies employed by the Democratic party to meet the populist challenge) "Has smashed party ties right and left ... It has well nigh abolished the party lash." C. Van Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1938) p. 333. The quote is taken from Watson's newspaper the People's Party Paper, Nov. 20, 1896. Indeed, the Farmer's Alliance swept elections in Georgia in 1890 as a faction of the Democratic Party. cf. pp. 161-162.
Thus voting in House elections tended to be strongly linked to and integrated with voting in Presidential elections. Voting was party-specific and not office-specific around the turn of the century. See, for example, Walter Dean Burnham's examination of the correlations between Congressional voting and Presidential voting between 1900 and 1972 in his article "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 3, Fall, 1975, p. 428.

For example, in 1893 it took one and a half days to travel from Washington to New Orleans: it took two and a half days to travel between Denver and the East Coast (New York) and five and a half days to traverse the continent from San Francisco. See Karl Baedeker, The United States: A Handbook for Travellers 1893 (Reprinted in 1971 by DA Capo Press, New York) pp. xxxiii and 334.

In the 1880's, Constance Green writes, "Some Congressmen still lived in boardinghouses, but more of them, unable to afford to bring their families with them, patronized hotels and ate at restaurants," Constance M. Green, Washington: Capital City, 1879-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 78. And, as Francis Carpenter notes "The prices at the Washington hotels are much higher than those for private board. It would take the best part of a Congressman's salary to pay his board and whiskey bills, if he did not take a room high up under the roof and leave his family at home." Frank G. Carpenter, Carp's Washington (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960) p.2. And, "in respect to the social relation," in Washington, Carpenter notes, "Washington is one of the wickedest cities of its size in the country. It is natural it should be so for the bulk of the population here are transients. They are away from home; most are far from their families; many have but few friends and acquaintances." p. 3.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

53 As Robinson claims "Reed and his Maine colleagues, Nelson Dingley, Seth L. Milliken and Charles A. Soutelle -- to say nothing of Senators Frye and Hale -- represented constituencies which believed in rewarding faithful servants with repeated terms in Washington, until even New York and Pennsylvania cast envious eyes at the authority wielded by the little delegation from the Pine Tree State." William Robinson, Op. Cit. pp. 37-38. James G. Blaine, it should also be noted, was a long term representative of Maine in both the House and the Senate.
54 B. A. Fryer, Congressional History of Berks District, 1789-1939, (Reading: 1939)
60 Ibid.
61 Letter from John G. Fitzgerald of Boston to Randall, June 30, 1879, Randall Papers. UPL
62 New York Herald, December 19, 1885, p. 3.
64 Ibid., p. 228.
65 Ibid., p. 229.
66 Letter from V.E. Piollet to Samuel Randall, October 10, 1879, Randall Papers, UPL.
68 Washington Post, November 23, 1885, p. 2. "There never has been," The Post editorialized, "and it is perfectly safe to now assume that there never will be again, so intolerant a party as that which took the name Republican."
Chapter III

1 By contrast, Parliamentary styles of government not only encourage the cumulative and aggregative tendencies of political parties but in effect mandate them. "The cabinet -- the simple, centralized party machinery -- must dominate, so long as it remains in power, the business of legislation, and at the same time carry on the administration of the government." Jesse Macy, Party Organization and Machinery (New York: The Century Co., 1904) p. 17. As Macy suggests, "In England, the unity which compact and effective party government seems to demand grows out of the character of the British Government itself, in which the cabinet constitutes, in effect, the national party committee and at the same time, in all matters political, the government as well. In America, on the contrary, great pains were taken to prevent the centralization of power in any one office or any one governmental area." pp. 19-20.

2 See, for example, The Federalist Papers, Numbers 10 and 51.


4 While party centralization has had some beneficial effects, Ostrogorski suggested in 1910, it has also had some harmful effects. "But there remains none the less the fact that with that wholesome centralization, the caucus has, on the other hand, brought about a harmful centralization, which by stifling self-regulated local life and by enfeebling men's initiative and volition dries up the sap of a political community and preys upon the very roots of its existence." M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926 abridged edition) p. 379.

5 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Garden City: Doubleday Page and Co., 1921) p. 93 "It is a misfortune that attends the party system," Wilson argued, "that in the heat of a campaign partisan passions are so aroused that we cannot have frank discussion."


12 For an excellent examination of this movement to restrict voting rights in the South see J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
13 The Constitutional Convention of New York State which met in 1894, for example, adopted relatively stringent voting regulations for New York City. In Pennsylvania, meanwhile, urban voting regulations proliferated around the turn of the century including the 1901 constitutional amendment which instituted voter registration in the major urban centers of the state. See Rosalind L. Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960) p. 128.
16 "Representing as they did the spirit and the desires of the middle class," Hofstadter suggests, "the Progressives stood for a dual program of economic remedies designed to minimize the dangers from the extreme left and right. On the one side they feared the power of the plutocracy, on the other the poverty and restlessness of the masses." Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) p. 236. See also page 262.
17 "To be a true Progressive," Charles A. Lindbergh said after the 1912 Presidential campaign, "it is not sufficient to stand up and say that one believes in what one has promulgated as progressive principles. One must be progressive in heart and active in promoting the progressive principles of today, tomorrow and always. There is no resting point, for humanity is ever ascending to a higher and better goal... Their (the progressives) aim is to take step after step toward higher and nobler purposes and the general elevation of mankind." quoted in Bruce L. Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1973) p. 145.


Of James and Dewey, Mowry argues, their idea of pragmatism "attacked the fundamental concepts of the nineteenth century mechanistic world in which man was a more or less controlled instrument of a Calvinist scheme of predestination, a Hegelian or a Marxist dialectic, a Darwinian process of selection or of Newtonian physics. Instead of this determined universe, the world was an open one of constant but uncertain change in which man thinking and man acting could leave his mark." Mowry, op. cit., p. 19.

21 Frederick Taylor, for example, revolutionized factory life with his time study experiments, which he asserted constituted "a system of genuinely 'scientific' management that substituted the 'government of fact and law' for the old rule of 'force and opinion'." Daniel T. Rogers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America: 1850-1920 (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978) p. 55. See also p. 25.

22 F.A. Cleveland was Chairman of The Commission of Economy and Efficiency which was set up by President Taft to search for ways of streamlining the governmental (particularly the appropriations and finance) process. In his view, Congress was a major impediment to efficiency in government. "Although the government is at present time employing thousands of technically trained administrative officers, it has, through its congressional committees, proceeded to handicap and limit these men in such a manner as to deprive the people of the benefits of an efficient service. Congress itself has gone over into the field of administration -- has attempted to decide practically every question involving administrative discretion, has restricted the use of judgment and training of experts who have been employed to manage the technical details of public business, with the result that the public funds are wasted and the people are thoroughly dissatisfied." Draft of paper prepared for the Efficiency Society of New York and enclosed in a letter to Joseph Tumulty, April 5, 1913. See also Gifford Pinchot, (Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1947) pp. 240-to 243.

23 Samuel P. Hayes makes use of this phrase in his superb treatment of the progressive approach to conservation and political administration. Samuel P. Hayes, The Gospel of Efficiency. One of the earliest invocations
of the idea, however, was in a book by Edward N. Hurley who was Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission during the Wilson era. In a tract aimed at private business and industry, Hurley exhorted entrepreneurs to "preach as well as practise the gospel of efficiency and to cooperate and work with others to raise the standards of producing and selling." Edward N. Hurley, Awakening of Business (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1917) p. 43.

C. Edward Merriam, Primary Elections, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909) p. 70. The idea that these electoral regulations were at least partially intended to circumvent the party and indeed the idea of partisanship is revealed by George Norris in an article written for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. CVI, (March, 1923) p. 23 where he asserts, "One of the most important objections that is always made to the direct primary is that it takes away party responsibility and breaks down party control . . . Politicians, political bosses, corporations and combinations seeking special privilege and exceptional favor at the hands of legislatures and executive officials, always urge this as the first reason why the direct primary should be abolished. But this objection thus given against the direct primary I frankly offer as one of the best reasons for its retention. The direct primary will lower party responsibility. In its stead it establishes individual responsibility. It does lessen allegiance to party and increase individual independence, both as to the public official and as to the private citizen. It takes away the power of the party leader or boss and replaces the responsibility for control upon the individual. It lessens party spirit and decreases partisanship." In "Why I Believe in the Direct Primary," quoted in Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, op. cit. p. 261 footnote.


Congressional Record, February 21, 1910, 61st Congress, second session, p. 2201.

See, for example, Henry George, *The Menace of Privilege*, op. cit., pp. 286-305.


See, however, Richard M. Abrams who to a certain extent disagrees with Mowry and Hofstadter that the Progressive movement was wholly middle class in its orientations and in its base of political support. He notes that the small progressive movement in Massachusetts, for example, grew out of the Irish-American and laboring sectors of the population. Richard M. Abrams, *Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics, 1900-1912*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) pp. 132-133.


See, for example, Claude Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era* (New York: The Literary Guild, 1932) p. 134. "It was at Columbus, Nebraska," Bowers notes, "that he (Beveridge) made his defense of trusts, anticipating the precise position Roosevelt would assume a little later. Bad trusts? Yes, and good ones, too. A good trust produces better goods at cheaper prices and delivers them to the consumers more conveniently than a dozen different concerns do."

Ibid., p. 254.

"This is an age of combination," Roosevelt argued in 1905, "and any effort to prevent combination will not only be useless, but in the end vicious, because of the contempt for law which the failure to enforce law inevitably produces . . . (What we need) is not sweeping prohibition or every arrangement good or bad, which may tend to restrict competition, but such adequate supervision and regulation as will prevent any restriction of competition from being to the detriment of the public." quoted in James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) p. 71. See also pp. 69-82 for an indication of the extent to which businessmen actually lent vigorous


43 *Outlook*, "Government by Oligarchy," May 2, 1908, Vol. 89, No. 89 p. 12. See also the rebuttal by D.S. Alexander where he contends, "If a majority of the House disagrees with the Committee's opinion (on the Appalachian-White Mountain Bill) it can overrule the Committee and act in accordance with its own judgment. The majority can do as it pleases whether the Speaker of a Committee wills it or not. Such a proposition is too self-evident to discuss." D.S. Alexander, Letter to *The Outlook* entitled "The Speaker, The Committees and the House," *The Outlook*, May 16, 1908, Vol. 89, No. 3. p. 130.

44 It was argued at the time that this heightened attention by the press on Joseph Cannon was partially the product of his failure or refusal to place newsprint and wood-pulp on the duty-free list. See, for example, "Speaker Cannon and the Complete Destruction of Popular Rule in the House of Representatives" in *The Arena*, Vol. 40, No. 224, July, 1908, pp. 89-90 and "His Methods as Speaker" in *The American Review of Reviews*, Vol. 41 No. 2, Feb., 1910. In any case, Cannonism had quickly moved to the forefront as a major national political issue.

45 "We demand that the House of Representatives shall again become a deliberative body, controlled by a majority of the people's representatives and not by the Speaker, and we pledge ourselves to adopt such rules and regulations to govern the House of Representatives as will enable a majority of its members to direct its deliberations and control legislation." Great Issues and National Leaders of 1908: The Voter's Non-Partisan Handbook and Campaign Guide, (Published by W.E. Scull, 1908) p. 183.


54 Unsigned typed memorandum to William Howard Taft, dated 1909 on the political situation in the Midwest, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.


55A Viewing the insurgency in the House, Herbert Croly suggested that "The insurgents are seeking to realize an essentially national program in at least a partially factional spirit." Their outlook was at once national and parochial. Thus, the reforms they pushed through Congress tended to fragment that institution among local delegations at a time when the reformers were speaking of national government. "Their insurrection," he concluded, "has been due as much to a solicitude for local as to a solicitude for national interests." Herbert Croly, "Democratic Factions and Insurgent Republicans," North American Review, Vol. CXCI, No. 654, May, 1910, p. 634.

56 Although Bryan did later support ratification of the Treaty of Paris on the grounds that "should the Republicans not give ... the Philippines their independence ... such a course would drive the Republicans from power." E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 189.

57 Ibid., p. 193.

58 Reed, for example, was a strong opponent of American expansionism. "The Herald had a very sensible article Saturday,' he wrote a friend in 1898, "comparing our hopes of money making in the south at the close of the
(Spanish-American) war and our failure to realize our hopes. It was an echo of my own thoughts. Perhaps the rich will make something but it seems certain that the poor will lose much. We can only wait and see."

Reed to W.M. Crane, August 14, 1898, in the Reed Papers, Bowdoin College Archives. Reed's dour outlook on the expansionist tide, was relieved by the occasional appearance of his irrepressible wit. "Isn't Puerto Rico and all this thing a mess?" he wrote Crane in another letter, "How can Puerto Rico help going Democratic?"

Reed to W.M. Crane, August 6, 1898 in the Reed Papers, Bowdoin College Archives.


62 Reed had devoted much of his energies and power to the task of stopping Congress' drift toward war. "Eventually, he grew tired of watching the House as it invariably approved the administration's expansionist measures. It galled him to see McKinley succeed in committing the nation step by step to the path of imperialism. Despite his formidable powers as Speaker, Reed felt hamstrung by his own scruples and rules." Beisner, Op. Cit., p. 209. His retirement from the House did not, however, keep him from participating, from time to time, in the ongoing debate over America's expansionist course. Nor did it mellow his wit, which remained as sharp and caustic as ever. To a friend who had sent him an outline of the expenditures made during the Spanish War, Reed replied, for example, "Thanks for the statistics which I hope to find use for. . . I have got to hunt all over your figures to even find out how much each yellow man cost us in the bush. As I make it out he has cost $30 per Malay and he is still in the bush.


Burnham, Critical Elections, Op. Cit., pp. 91-134, He suggests, "The interaction between changes in the rules of the game and substantive changes in voting behavior at the aggregate level ... produced both a quantitatively and qualitatively different electorate by 1920 than which had existed before 1900. The cumulative effect of these rule changes was, with few exceptions, heavily depoliticizing and anti-partisan." p. 93.


Figures are from Morris Fiorina, David Rohde, and Peter Wissel, "Historical Change in House Turnover," in Norman J. Ornstein (ed.), Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 29-31. The turnover figures of Fiorina et al. differ from those of Stuart Rice and Nelson Polsby (which appear in Polsby's "Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives") in that Polsby's figures include only those who are serving in the House for the very first time. Members who leave Congress and who are subsequently re-elected (after the lapse of one or more terms) are not considered Freshmen in the Polsby-Rice figures. Polsby also considers new states' representatives as Freshmen although Fiorina et al do not. The figures used here are Polsby's.


In the 61st Congress, for example, 24% of those who voluntarily retired after the expiration of their term had served five terms or more, while this figure rose to 32% by the 66th Congress.

Relationship Between Voluntary Retirements, Electoral Defeat, and Re-election in the 61st and 66th Congresses by Competitiveness (figures are percentages across).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margin of Victory</th>
<th>61st Congress</th>
<th></th>
<th>66th Congress</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%-5%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1%-10%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1%-20%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1%-30%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1%-40%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.1%-50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.1% and above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Voluntary Retirements at end of term
B = Unsuccessful Re-election or Re-nomination Attempts
C = Successful Re-election Attempt


Chapter IV


2 As Wilson suggested in his introduction to Congressional Government, "Any one who is unfamiliar with what Congress actually does and how it does it, with all its duties and all its occupations, with all its devices of management and resources of power, is very far from a knowledge of the constitutional system under which we live; and to every one who knows these things that knowledge is very near." Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1887) Fourth edition, p. 57.

3 Ibid. p. 112

4 Ibid. p. 103

5 Ibid. pp. 59-60 and p. 99

6 Ibid. p. 104

7 See, for example, A.M. Gibson, A Political Crime: The History of the Great Fraud (New York: William S. Gottsberger, 1885).


10 Letter from Richard Vaux to Randall, March 6, 1879. Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.

11 Letter from Daniel Ermentrout to Randall, March 22, 1879, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.


13 Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 1885, p. 1.

14 Letter from Henry Ward to Randall, December 29, 1885, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.

Congressional Record 46-2, January 6, 1880, pp. 198-199

Congressional Record 46-1, June 25, 1879, p. 2330

Charles Nordhoff to David A. Wells, January 4, 1880, Wells Papers, Library of Congress; New York World, February 10, 1880, p. 4; and Randall to Jeremiah Black, December 10, 1879, Black Papers, Library of Congress, where Randall vows to support Tilden at the convention but seems to hope for an open nominating process and a deadlocked convention from which he would presumably emerge as the party's choice.

Letter from James C. Furling to Randall, December 25, 1879, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.

Randall to Jeremiah Black, November 11, 1879, Black Papers, Library of Congress.


Congressional Record, 46-2, January 6, 1880, pp. 198-199.

See correspondence between Randall and his brother during the late spring and early summer of 1879, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.


See, for example, the Atlanta Constitution, February 10, 1880, p. 2; and The St. Louis Globe-Democrat, February 21, 1880, p. 4.


Atlanta Constitution, January 30, 1880, p. 2.


Letter from Perry Belmont to Thomas Bayard, March 4, 1880, Bayard Papers, Library of Congress.

As the Post argued, The present system invites delay, and stifles debate since the bulk of Appropriations Bills are usually brought before the House in a typically late session flood. "It is also degrading to the other committees of the House, as it strips them of their jurisdiction and concentrates it in the Committee on Appropriations and virtually makes it greater than the House itself." Washington Post, November 15, 1885, p.4.

See Abram Hewitt to Randall, March 26, 1879 (Randall Papers, UPL). Hewitt warns Randall that "The man who has been most opposed to you is Morrison."; H.Wayne Morgan From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics 1877-1896 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969) p. 184; and Letter from H. Clay Conde to Randall, December 18, 1885, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.

Washington Post, December 19, 1885, p. 4, and the New York Sun, December 16, 1885, p. 2, which characterized the Appropriations reform as "millions to the four winds of heaven in order to satisfy a debt of resentment against one man for his attitude last year on the tariff..."

See, for example, Champ Clark's comments in the Congressional Record, February 3, 1916, p. 2090. "For years," he recalled, "The Committee on Appropriations reported all the appropriations in this House, until the Carlisle wing of the Democratic party concluded they would clip the wings of Hon. Samuel J. Randall, who was chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, because he always moved to strike out the enacting clause of a Democratic tariff bill... They did not want to demote him in terms, so they simply resorted to the process of clipping his wings, by giving the Committee on Military Affairs, and other committees the right to bring in appropriations bills.


Morrison to Wells, December 14, 1884, Wells Papers, Library of Congress.

Morrison to Wells, March 2, 1884, Wells Papers, Library of Congress.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 18, 1885, p. 6.

Edward Atkinson to Sen. Thomas Bayard, March 9, 1884, Bayard Papers, Library of Congress.


Springer to Grover Cleveland, November 28, 1885, Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress.


Pittsburgh Daily Post, December 4, 1885, p. 2.


The Lancaster (Pa.) Intelligencer, November 12, 1885, editorial. and Letter from O.B. Potter to Randall, December 24, 1885, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.

Washington Post, December 6, 1885, p. 1; Atlanta Constitution, December 18, 1885, p. 4; Nashville Union November 21, 1885, editorial.
See Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 1885, p.1 on December 7, Speaker Carlisle had told reporters that he would not make committee selections "until the question of revising the rules had been settled." As the Herald suggested, "probably every member believes that if he votes against 'distribution' he may miss a desirable place on a committee." New York Herald, December 17, 1885, p. 6.

J.G. Cannon, "Dramatic Scenes in my Career in Congress," Harper's Magazine, Vol. CXL, No. 835, December, 1919, pp. 622-623; Although see William Springer to Grover Cleveland, November 28, 1885, where Springer asks the President to support the rules change. (No indication of ar reply by Cleveland to Springer in the former's copy book of outgoing letters; Vol. 6, October 16, 1885-January 4, 1886, and Vol. 29, August 1, 1885 - March 1, 1889) Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress. It appears that in fact Cleveland was not directly involved in the reform movement in the House. New York Times, November 19, 1885, p.1. Although it is quite possible that the anti-Randall faction did enjoy the support and encouragement of cabinet members like Treasury Secretary Manning.

See, for example, The Philadelphia Times, December 7, 1885, p.1, which argues that the House will henceforth be forced to rely on the voluntary restraint of Cabinet officers in setting the Appropriations agenda (i.e. in making appropriations requests and in setting departmental estimates).


Congressional Record, 46-1, June 25, 1879, pp.2329-2330; Thomas B. Reed to Andrew Hawes, June 15, 1884, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College Archives.


Tbid.
Ibid., pp. 70-71, Hinds provides an extreme example of the use of the Disappearing Quorum rule by Republicans in his Precedents. "An illustration of the extent to which obstruction went under the old theory that only those voting could be counted for the quorum was given on May 17, 1878 during a prolonged contest over a proposition to investigate the Presidential election of 1876. Mr. Eugene Hale of Maine was appointed a teller on a vote wherein the remaining members of the side which he represented were declining to vote. When the vote was announced, he was reported as casting the solitary negative vote. He protested that he did not vote, and the attempt to count him was given up. So he could not figure in making up the quorum although present, acting and protesting." Hinds, Vol. IV, p. 85ff.

Congressional Record, 46-2, January 27, 1880, p. 575.
Congressional Record, 46-2, January 28, 1880, p. 577.
Ibid., p. 576.
Ibid., p. 579. See also Garfield's comments on p. 576.
Ibid., p. 577.
Ibid., p. 576.
Congressional Record, 46-2, January 29, 1880.
Ibid., p. 353.
Congressional Record, May 29, 1882, p. 4307.
See, for example, Representative Gillett's remarks on the power of the Speaker where he argued that "The inevitable effect of these rules is to give the Speaker of the House almost unrestricted power. He may and will fill the few committees that control legislation with men who reflect his own views and wishes, and govern their action with undisputed sway, almost totally subverting the object of the annual gathering here of the so-called Representatives of the people." Congressional Record, 46-2, February 27, 1880, p. 1207; see also Acklen's proposal to make committee assignments and chairmanships dependent upon the rule of seniority. Congressional Record, 46-2, January 20, 1880, p. 428.
Congressional Record, 46-2, February 20, 1880, p. 1057.
Congressional Record, 46-2, February 24, 1880, p. 1085 and Congressional Record, 46-2, February 27, 1880, pp. 1199-1200.
Congressional Record, 46-2, February 27, 1880, p. 1201.

See James A. Garfield's personal diary, February 24, 1880 entry, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 24, 1880, p. 1087.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 24, 1880, p. 1088.

Ibid., pp. 1089-1090.

Congressional Record, 46-1, June 25, 1879, p. 2330.

Congressional Record, 46-2, January 22, 1880, p. 484.

See, for example, the account in the Nation of the power and agenda setting authority of the Appropriations Committee in 1880. "Rules of the House of Representatives," Nation, Vol. 30, No. 763, February 12, 1880, p. 111.

Congressional Record, 46-2, January 29, 1880, p. 613.

Congressional Record, 46-2, January 21, 1880, p. 453.


Congressional Record, 46-2, January 8, 1880, pp. 246-247.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 3, 1880.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 3, 1880.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 4, 1880, p. 708.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 5, 1880, pp. 728-729.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 11, 1880, p. 824.

Louisville Courier-Journal, November 11, 1885, pp. 5-6.

Ibid., See also The Washington Post, November 15, 1885, p. 4.

Washington Post, November 19, 1885, p. 2.

Washington Post, December 2, 1885, p. 5.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 15, 1885, pp. 205 and 207.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 14, 1885, pp. 168-169.

Ibid., p. 171.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 15, 1885, p. 201.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 17, 1885, p. 281.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 16, 1885, p. 236.

Congressional Record, 49-1, December 17, 1885, p. 291.

Washington Post, December 19, 1885, p. 4.

Ibid.

New York Sun, December 16, 1885, p. 2.


Congressional Record, 46-2, February 3, 1880, p. 688.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 12, 1880, p. 852.

Ibid., p. 857.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 2, 1880, p. 689.

Congressional Record, 46-2, February 12, 1880, p. 852.


Mary Follett seems to suggest that Carlisle was a relatively strong and effective Speaker. Follett, Op. Cit., p. 116. Although this suggestion finds little support from other observers of the late nineteenth century House of Representatives. Clubb and Traugott, for example, show that the correlation between roll call votes and party declined to the lowest levels of any House from the Civil War period to that time, Jerome Clubb and Santa Traugott, "Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, 1861-1974," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, VII: 3 Winter, 1977, p. 382. See also Cannon Op. Cit. and H. Wayne Morgan who adds, "The vacuum of Congressional leadership after 1886 further disorganized the diffuse sentiment around tariff reform, convincing Cleveland's advisors that he could use it as a unifying party issue." Morgan, Op. Cit., p. 272.


Chapter V


4 As Reed later noted of this absenteeism problem in the election cases in the early days of the 51st Congress: "Sickness and death and business crises do not spare even Congressmen. In the struggles over the election case of Jackson and Smith, two men were absent on account of causes utterly impossible to overcome; two

5 See, for example, Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Coming Congress," The North American Review, Vol. CXLIX, No. 394, September 1889, p. 293, where he discusses the procedural changes which were inevitable in the Republican dominated 51st Congress.

6 Washington Post, December 12, 1885, p. 5.


9 Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean, February 1, 1890, p. 4.

10 Congressional Record, January 4, 1889, 50-2, p. 541.

11 Ibid., p. 540.


19 Reed to Noyes, Letter (undated) among the Reed Papers (Kathryn B. Jenny Papers) Bowdoin Library.

20 J.J. McElrone (?) to Samuel Randall, December 4, 1889, Randall Papers, University of Pennsylvania Library.


22 On January 6, 1890 the Washington Post reported that Reed had finished work on a rough draft of the Rules although he had not yet shown it to either McKinley or Cannon. The Post suggested that the new rules would do away with the disappearing quorum at least and probably other aspects of the obstructionist (i.e. to the Democratic Post minority rights) preoccupation of the old House rules. See also the New York Times, which expressed a similar concern on January 7, 1890, p. 1.
Many Republican Members of the House in fact believed they had given Reed the right to take extraordinary measures with regard to the rules only in order to expedite the settlement of the pending election cases. They believed that after these cases were disposed of, a more moderate approach to the House rules would be drafted. See also Washington Post, January 28, 1890, p. 2, and the St. Louis Republic, January 29, 1890, p. 9.


39 Congressional Record, 51-1, January 29, 1890.

40 Ibid.

41 Atlanta Constitution, January 31, 1890, p. 1.


46 Thomas B. Reed to Theodore Roosevelt, November 21, 1890, T. Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. Reed's sense of humor and the equanimity with which he was able to view himself and his actions were both evident in a later letter to a colleague, written after Reed had lost a particularly frustrating campaign to win the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1896. To Robert Hitt, he confided, "I sometimes wish I was in Heaven to get
rid of somethings on this earth but as there would be much inconvenience there if I should go I shall remain and suffer the discomfort myself like the self-sacrificing patriot I am." Reed to Robert Hitt, October 3, 1896, Hitt Papers, Library of Congress. Indeed, humor was part of Reed's self-confidence -- a self-assurance which often allowed him to poke fun at himself. Asked to make a few remarks at the ceremony during which Sargent's portrait of the Speaker was unveiled, Reed noted, for example, that "When these pictures (i.e. of the Speakers) are dug out of the ruins of the Capitol 2000 years hence, they will pass by the portraits of Crisp, Randall and the others . . ., but when they come to Sargent's work and see all the features of your humble servant as there portrayed they will say 'Here was quite a fellow.'" Asher Hinds Diary, Hinds Papers, Library of Congress.

49 Boston Herald, February 3, 1890, p. 4.
50 Ibid., February 4, 1890, p. 4.
51 Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean, February 3, 1890, p. 1.
52A Atlanta Constitution, February 6, 1890, p. 1.
52 New York Times, February 6, 1890, p. 5.
54 The quorum in the Committee of the Whole was also reduced from a majority of the membership to one hundred members.
57 William Holman on Reed's Rules, Congressional Record, 51-1, February 11, 1890, p. 1213.
58 Congressional Record, 51-1, February 11, 1890, p. 1218.
60 Congressional Record, May 29, 1882, p. 4307.
As Hinds notes, a report from the Rules Committee has a special and high privilege and only one motion to adjourn (but no other dilatory motion) may be entertained during its consideration. This right was specifically granted in the 1890 Revision of the Rule, but this had been the general practice earlier, although it was rarely used.). Hinds, Op. Cit., Vol. IV p. 951.

Ibid., p. 191.
Ibid., p. 192.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Congressional Record, May 27, 1882, 47-1, pp. 4278 and May 29, 1882, 47-1, p. 4306.
Congressional Record, 51-1, February 10, 1890, p. 1172, Rule XVI, Clause 10.
Asher Hinds, Op. Cit., Vol. II, p. 918. See also Reed's comments in Congressional Record, 51-1, January 31, 1890, p. 99 where he states: "The object of a parliamentary body is action, and not stoppage of action. Hence, if any member or set of members undertakes to oppose the orderly progress of business, even by the use of the ordinarily recognized parliamentary motions, it is the right of the majority to refuse to have those motions entertained, and to cause the public business to proceed."
St. Louis Republic, January 25, 1890, p. 13.
Congressional Record, 51-1, pp. 1173, 1341 and 1347, February, 1890.
Congressional Record, 51-1, January 29, 1890, p. 958.
Congressional Record, 51-1, January 30, 1890, p. 992.
Congressional Record, 51-1, February 11, 1890, p. 1220.
In 1886, for example, Reed had indicated an interest in eventually becoming a Senator. See letter from Reed to William Pitt Fessenden, July 14, 1886, in the Fessenden Papers, Bowdoin College Library. And throughout the
1890's, he showed a marked desire, and ultimately ran for the Presidency. The extent to which he courted personal advancement, and the bitterness which occasionally surfaced when this advancement was denied is very clear in a letter from Reed to Theodore Roosevelt in 1896 in which he reviewed his past accomplishments and noted his disappointments. Reed to Theodore Roosevelt, May 29, 1896, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

81 See The Transcript (Boston), October 2, 1890. Reed and Harrison had a serious falling out over the question of an appointment to the Collectorship of the port of Portland, Maine. Since Portland was in Reed's own district, he believed Harrison should accede to his wishes in the matter. The President, however, evidently decided to name a man who had been recommended by the Secretary of States James G. Blaine who was interested in his own political base of support in his home state of Maine.


85 Henry Cabot Lodge, to W.E. Barret, February 1, 1890, Lodge Papers, Massachusetts State Historical Society.

86 The Nation suggested, for example, that Reed's Rules were instituted to enable the Republicans to push through the McKinley Bill, "A Word for Obstructionists," Op. Cit., p. 4; Henderson suggested that many Republican members supported Reed's Rules because of a desire to effect a broad new election law for the South. See Congressional Record, 51-1, February 12, 1890, p. 1248. Finally, others were keen to enact that portion of the Republican platform aimed at furthering business interests. "The business men of the country," Elijah Morse of Massachusetts argued in the House during the debate over Reed's Rules, "are demanding business legislation and that the 'do-nothing policy' of Congress for the last ten years shall change." Congressional Record, 51-1, February 11, 1890, p. 1225.

87 Letter from Henderson of Iowa to Reed, September 20, 1891, Reed Papers (Kathryn B. Jenny Papers), Bowdoin College Library. Henderson tells Reed that the central issues in the elections for the state legislatures then in progress in Iowa are "The tariff, the money question, the billion-dollar Congress, the czar ..."

88 Asher Hinds, Diary, Hinds Papers, Library of Congress.

89 T.H. Carter to Reed, November 16, 1891, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College Library.
91 He was bitterly opposed, for example, by many of the new Democratic members who had been elected with the help of (and who were clearly in sympathy with) the Farmer's Alliance. There were even many in Crisp's own Georgia delegation who, like Thomas Watson, opposed the new Speaker and his policy orientations. See, for example, C. Van Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1938) pp. 170-171.
94 J.C. Burrows to Reed, July 10, 1893, Reed Papers (Kathryn B. Jenny Papers) Bowdoin College Library.
95 Congressional Record, August 29, 1893, p. 1034.
96 Ibid., p. 1633.
97 Ibid., pp. 1107-1108.
98 Congressional Record, August 25, 1893, pp. 913-914.
100 Ibid.
101 Congressional Record, February 19, 1894, p. 2292.
103 Congressional Record, April 17, 1894 (Roll Call #33), p. 3792.
Chapter VI

1 Asher Hinds Diary, Entry of January 7, 1896, Hinds Papers, Library of Congress.
2 Ibid., Entry of January 13, 1896.
3 Ibid., Entry of January 7, 1896.
4 At the opening of the 56th Congress, for example, one Democratic member (Richardson of Tennessee) suggested that Hepburn of Iowa and his Republican friends were opposed to the re-adoption of Reed's Rules, but that they had been forced by the party leadership to support those rules much against their will. Hepburn responded, however, saying that while he did oppose certain sections of the rules code presented by the Republican leadership to the House, "when the majority of my own party so said, I yielded that implicit obedience that I hope I will always be able to yield." Congressional Record, 56-1, December 4, 1899, pp. 6 and 7.
5 Congressional Record, 59-1, December 4, 1905, pp. 42-43.
6 Congressional Record, January 14, 1924, p. 961.
7 Congressional Record, December 15, 1908, p. 275.
8 One gets the impression from the private papers of members of Congress during this period of time that constituency interest in the internal workings of the legislative process had never been higher (at least within the 1878-1921 period). While much of this interest was evinced by mid-Westerners, it is still apparent that the reform effort within the House had distinct and important external roots or ties, throughout the nation.
9 As Taft wrote his brother, for example, "It would seem as if the treatment that Congress gave (Roosevelt) after my election, and before my inauguration, had made him deeply regret that he had not accepted another term, because then...he found his power with Congress to have gone, and there were some very bitter attacks made on him in the House and in the Senate." Taft to Charles Taft, September 10, 1910, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.
10 Roosevelt was not only to interfere directly himself in the developing insurgency movement in the House, but also tried to persuade Taft to use caution in dealing with the problem. In particular, Roosevelt argued that Taft should not make an overt attempt to unseat Cannon from the Speakership (through the insurgents). George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 239-240.

Most incoming freshmen were non-committal, pleading ignorance of conditions in the House. As one wrote, "I fear I am not familiar enough with the present rules to be able to give an intelligent opinion on whether or not they should be changed." Charles A. Grow to Murdock, February 19, 1909, Murdock Papers, Library of Congress. See also letters to Murdock from Richard Young (February 16, 1909); William H. Wiley (February 15, 1909); John K. Tener (February 17, 1909); C.E. Creager (February 26, 1909); A.R. Johnson (February 15, 1909); William Paine Sheffield (February 16, 1909). At least one incoming Freshman did, however, claim opposition to the insurgent cause. As Hamilton Fish argued to Murdock in his letter, "I should have to have strong reasons advanced to convince me of the propriety of depriving the Speaker of the appointment of Committees. From my experience as Speaker of the N.Y. Assembly, I do not see where the power could be lodged to better advantage." Hamilton Fish to Murdock, February 14, 1909, Murdock Papers, Library of Congress.

See Arthur Kopp to Murdock (February 17, 1909) and Miles Poindexter to Murdock (February 20, 1909), Murdock Papers, Library of Congress.


Ibid., p. 21.

Most observers believed a deal had been made before the rules vote between the Cannon forces and the Fitzgerald Democrats. James Mann, however, claimed that there was in fact no arrangement between the two groups. "We were offered all kinds of Democratic support so far as the rules were concerned," the Republican leader later told reporters, "but we refused to countenance any offer that involved promises of reward or punishment of any kind." Chicago Record-Herald, November 20, 1909. The progressive periodical Outlook, however, argued that such a bargain had indeed been struck between the Cannon and Fitzgerald groups. "The interests which are referred to in Washington as the 'oil crowd' and the 'beer crowd' have had too much weight in the councils of Mr. Fitzgerald and his Democratic associates... It is a curious
coincidence that on Monday Mr. Fitzgerald aided Mr. Cannon in controlling legislation in the House, and that on Wednesday a Tariff Bill appeared which did not contain the expected and proper tax on beer and whiskey." Outlook, "The Failure to Reorganize the House," Vol. 91, No. 652*, March 27, 1909.

21 Congressional Record, 61-1, March 15, 1909, pp. 22-23.
22 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
24 As Norris noted, the Speaker "so shapes the legislation that he either prevents consideration entirely or he gets a particular bill before the House in such a way that members are not permitted to propose amendments and must either take the bill in its entirety or reject it in its entirety. The tariff bill was an illustration. We were only permitted to vote on a very few items out of several hundred." Norris to G.E. Hager, February 15, 1910, Norris Papers, Library of Congress.
26 "On the tariff, Mr. Cannon is positively delightful." The Nation noted, referring to a speech given by Speaker at Danville, Illinois, "Here at any rate, is one sincere believer in it as the source of every blessing. Others may hedge and blush and hem and haw, but your Uncle Joe roundly tells you that 'since the enactment of the first revenue law under Washington down to the present time, the periods of prosperity have been under protection, and the periods of adversity have been under the policy of free trade or tariff for revenue only.' This of course he devoutly believes." The Nation, "Flat-Footed Mr. Cannon," August 23, 1906, Vol. 83, No. 2147, p.156.
27 Norris to C.L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910, Norris Papers, Library of Congress.
29 As one student of the Taft Presidency suggests, "Taft remained prudently aloof from the Insurgent struggle against Cannon. Once the Speaker had agreed to support the President, Taft discovered that the centralized machinery of the House could be immensely useful in pushing Republican measures through." Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative's Conception of the Presidency. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) p. 126.
more sympathetic portrait of Taft's side of the question
33 George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography
p. 110.
34 Ibid., p. 112.
34A George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress
37 Congressional Quarterly, Origins and Development of
Congress, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1978) p. 113.
38 Congressional Record, 60-2, February 18, 1909, pp.2654-
2655; Congressional Record, March 5, 1911, p. 74 where
Oscar Underwood gives his explanation of the broader
goals of the movement against the Speaker.
39 Norris to Walter J. Locke, January 22, 1910, Norris
Papers, Library of Congress; See also Murdock to F.E.
Carr, February 27, 1909, Murdock Papers, Library of
Congress, where he suggests that the power to appoint
the committees is "the Speaker's chief power."
Chang-Wei Chiu, suggests further that Cannon himself
provoked the outcry over the committee appointment
powers by his disregard of the seniority "principle"
throughout his tenure as Speaker. See Chang-Wei Chiu,
The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since
40 Congressional Record, January 18, 1909, p. 1056.
41 Congressional Record, 61-1, March 15, 1909,p. 32.
42 Congressional Record, 62-1, April 5, 1911, p. 64.
43 Ibid., p. 77
44 Ibid., p. 64
The Independent, Vol. LXIV, No. 3093, March 12, 1908,
p. 581. Asher Hinds expressed much the same sentiments
in an article written two years later. Asher Hinds,
XXXV, No. 2, June, 1910, p. 201.
46 Robert Wickliffe Woolley, "Underwood of Alabama, Demo-
cracy's New Chieftan," The American Review of Reviews,
Vol. 44, No. 3, September 1911, p. 298.
48 Excerpts from a speech delivered by Irvine L. Lenroot
at Superior, Wisconsin, on July 29, 1908, I.L. Lenroot
Papers, Library of Congress.
49 An Old Member, "Under the Eye of the Speaker," Harper's
50 A. Maurice Low, "The House of Representatives and its
Rules," Harper's Weekly, Vol. LVI, No. 2880, March 2,
1912, p. 8.
Congressional Record, 62-1, April 5, 1911, p. 67.


Congressional Record, 60-2, March 1, 1909, p. 3568.

Congressional Record, 60-2, March 1, 1909, p. 3570.

The Fitzgerald Compromise included the following changes in the rules: "1. A Unanimous Consent Calendar was established, doing away with the necessity of consulting the Speaker before bills could be brought up for passage by common consent. 2. One Motion to recommit was to be allowed after the ordering of the previous question on any bill or resolution. 3. The requirement to set aside Calendar Wednesday was raised from a simple majority, as provided by the rule adopted on March 1, to a two-thirds vote, as had been proposed in the original form of the resolution as introduced by Mr. Townsend of Michigan." Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck, Party Government in the House of Representatives (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927) p. 5.

See Augustus Gardner's comments in Congressional Record, 61-1, March 15, 1909, p. 29.

Congressional Record, 61-2, March 17, 1910, p. 3300.

Congressional Record, 62-1, April 5, 1911, p. 78.


Congressional Record, 62-2, February 3, 1912, p. 1688.


Gifford Pinchot, for example, quite naturally suggested in his Autobiography that "Conservation is the heart of the Progressive Movement. You ask why? Because for one thing, Conservation is the most effective weapon against monopoly of natural resources, and monopoly of resources is the basis for the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few. In a Democracy that is a fundamental evil. That is what Progressives fight. Under T.R. and later under Taft the Conservation issue brought more Progressives together than any other issue -- more even than the Payne-Aldrich tariff." Pinchot, Op. Cit., p. 464. The movement was also, however, central to the Progressive sentiments of many others. Conservation, for example, was important to Charles Lindbergh of Minnesota. See Larson, Op. Cit., p. 76. It was also a major preoccupation of Robert LaFollette, who, as his wife and daughter argue in their biography of him, believed conservation to be a cornerstone of Progressivism. Belle Case LaFollette and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette, (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971) reprint of the 1953 edition 286 to 291.
Major controversies developed, for example, over the proper exploitation of water resources. Conservatives and Progressives tended to disagree over the manner in which the damming of rivers and streams should be regulated. See Pinchot, Op. Cit., pp. 326-339.

In his autobiography, Joseph Cannon suggests that Roosevelt refrained from pushing the tariff issue in Congress because "he saw tariff revision would provoke a long and acrimonious debate and interfere with other legislation in which he was interested." L. White Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon: The Story of a Pioneer American (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927) p. 213. See also the New York Times, January 11, 1905, p. 1.

Mowry, Op. Cit., p. 200; See also John Morton Blum's essay "Theodore Roosevelt and the Legislative Process: Tariff Revision and Railroad Regulation, 1904-1906," in Elting E. Morrison and John M. Blum (eds.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954). Cannon, however, maintains that there was no explicit deal between them over the tariff. In his ghost-written Autobiography, for example, Cannon argues that Roosevelt brought up the subject of tariff revision once (in February of 1905 at a White House meeting with Congressional leaders), and when he found that support for a revision among these men was somewhat less than unanimous, he decided against forcing the issue on his own. Busbey, Op.Cit., p. 214.


"If ever a convention showed its contempt for its master," William Allen White later wrote, "that convention (1908 Republican Convention) showed it for Theodore Roosevelt. ... All of the world of change that was abroad in the land, all the new spirit of revolt and liberalism, the Republican party that year rejected in scorn, with the Sherman (James Sherman for Vice President) nomination." William Allen White, Autobiography, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1946) p. 401.

In an editorial, in fact, the Independent argued that Cannon's personality was the preeminent issue at hand in the insurgency movement. "We are convinced that it was the man's (Cannon's) use, or abuse, of the system that made it intolerable to a majority of the Republicans who voted with the Democrats to exclude Mr. Cannon from the Rules Committee. If the late Mr. Reed were now Speaker, there would be no attempt by thirty or
forty members of his party not only to oust him from
the Rules Committee, but also to make a new Rules
Committee, in which he should have no voice." "The
Speaker and His Power," (Editorial), The Independent,

73 E.G. Lowry, "Norris -- and His Type," Colliers, July 18,

74 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 Vols.,)

75 Norris to J.G. Cannon, November 12, 1906, Norris Papers,
Library of Congress; and Cannon's non-committal reply
Cannon to Norris, November 14, 1906, Norris Papers,
Library of Congress.

76 Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Making of a
Progressive, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1963), p. 120.

77 Although Blair Bolles argues that Cannon's arrogance
was the product of a desire to win the Republican
presidential nomination in 1908. Part of Cannon's
strategy entailed destroying public confidence in
Roosevelt and his policies and establishing himself as
"the new leader who counted." Blair Bolles, Tyrant
from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with
Personal Power (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1951)
p. 88.

78 George Fitch, "A Survey and Diagnosis of Uncle Joe
Cannon," The American Magazine, Vol. LXV, No. 2,
December, 1907, p. 187.

79 In the closing days of the 58th Congress, for example,
Democratic and Republican members of the House all
joined together to pay public tribute to Speaker Cannon
with an outpouring of affection rarely seen in the House.
See Bolles, Op. cit., pp. 3-6; and New York Times,

80 Joseph G. Cannon, "Dramatic Scenes in My Career in Con-
gress," Harper's Magazine, Vol. CXL, No. 835,
December, 1919, p. 48.

81 Norris to George A. Nooshart, January 15, 1910, p. 4.,
Norris Papers, Library of Congress.

82 Letter from H.C. Miller to George Norris, September 23,
1908, Norris Papers, Library of Congress.

83 H.M. Grimes to Norris, January 11, 1910, Norris Papers,
Library of Congress.

84 Norris to Ray McCarl, June 15, 1910, Norris Papers,
Library of Congress.

84A Norris to J.J. McCarthy, January 17, 1910, Norris Papers,
Library of Congress.


86 From data in Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1971) and Robert A. Diamond
(ed.) Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly, Inc. 1976).
Chapter VII

1 See the Democratic Party Platform Adopted at Denver, July 9, 1908 in Great Issues and National Leaders of 1908 (Published by W.E. Scull, 1908) p. 183.

Congressional Record, 62-1, March 5, 1911, p. 65.


Congressional Record, 63-1, September 24, 1913, p. 5158.


As Burnham suggests, the declining competitiveness and the growing separateness between Congressional and Presidential elections both produced a House membership which was clearly fragmented in the goals it pursued and the interests and concerns it represented. See Walter Dean Burnham, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 3, Fall, 1975, pp. 423-430.

See, for example, Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947) pp. 202-215. Binkley quotes from Wilson's Constitutional Government in suggesting that Wilson himself saw the President as one "who will be and who will seem to the country: in some sort of embodiment of the character and purpose it wishes its government to have -- a man who understands his own day and the needs of the country, and who has the personality and the initiative to enforce his views upon both the people and upon Congress." p. 205 quote taken from Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: 1907) p. 65. See also of course, Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1954) pp. 34-35.

The 66th Congress, for example, saw the largest number of resignations from the House in the five Congresses surveyed in this study. Many of those resignations were due to the spate of appointments made by Wilson in the closing days of his Presidency.


Ibid., p. 193.

Ibid.
As Brown argues, "Psychologically a mistake was committed in thus increasing the membership since of the two additional members added one certainly was added because he represented, in the House, the class group in the country of organized labor, and it was a sign of weakness on the part of the Republican party which inherited from the Federalists and the Whigs the tradition of the party system of government thus to acknowledge the existence of the bloc as a factor to be reckoned with in American politics." Brown, Ibid., p. 215.

Ibid., p. 216.

Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge to C.A. Coffin, December 7, 1889, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, Massachusetts State Historical Society.


Congressional Record, January 7, 1909, p. 613.


See, for example, Congressional Record, January 7, 1909, p. 612 where one member argued, "The great business of legislative bodies -- the establishment of . . . equality -- has been accomplished. The function of legislation in the future must necessarily be less important. It must be confined largely to matters of administration and to problems purely economic." See

Cannon's sense of the pre-eminence of the House in national politics colored his activities in and outside of the House itself. See two articles on this subject by the *New York Times*, March 10, 1905, p.1 and December 12, 1904, p. 4.


Draft of Letter from Taft to the Secretary of the Treasury (actually drafted by Cleveland) September 5, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

Memo from Cleveland to W.H. Taft, September 19, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

See *Congressional Record*, August 27, 1912, p. 13142. As Henry Stimson later recalled, Taft was told by Congress in 1912 "that they did not propose to have any new fangled budget foisted upon them, and (directed) the President to send in the estimates in the old fashioned way." Taft decided to go ahead and send the estimates to Congress in both forms. "Immediately thereafter Congress abolished the President's Commission on Efficiency and Economy and thereby took away from the President all practical machinery to carry on the reform which Mr. Taft had begun," Henry L. Stimson, "Need of a National Budget System," *Current Opinion*, Vol. LXVII, No. 2, August 1919, p. 87.

Quote included in letter from President Taft to the Secretary of the Treasury, September 5, 1912. Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

Draft of a Speech delivered at the University of Illinois by F.A. Cleveland and enclosed in a note to Joseph Tumulty from Cleveland, April 10, 1913, in the Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.


Ibid.

See article by Harlan Updegraff for example where the Bureau of Education's funding problems are blamed on the Congressional appropriations process where, "the estimates for some departments are acted upon by their friends in course, while the estimates for other departments are passed on by a tribunal (the Appropriations Committee), whose main object is economy." He continues, "Had the estimates of the Commissioner of Education during the past forty years been referred in the House
to the Committee on Education ... there would undoubtedly be today a far different story to tell." Harlan Updegraff, "The United States Bureau of Education," School Board Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May, 1912, pp. 13-15 and 41.

See memo from Taft to Cabinet Members, October 20, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress, where he admonishes them: "I hope you will not allow your subordinates, through jealousy or any other motive, to criticize and interfere with the getting up of the data for such a budget." Taft's fears were evidently well founded. See letter from Secretary of the Treasury McVeigh to Taft, October 24, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

Letter from Nicholas Murray Butler to F.A. Cleveland, October 24, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

Ibid, and Letters from A.T. Hadley, Edmund James, Ernest Fox Nichols (President of Dartmouth College), A.B. Hart, C.E. Merriam, Edward T. Devine, and Mayo Fester to Cleveland, Between October 23 and October 26, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress. These supporters of the budget idea; however, were for the most part academics and civil reform officials, and did not represent a very broad cross-section of the American public.

Letter from A.B.Farquahr to F.A. Cleveland, August 1, 1912, Taft Papers, Library of Congress.


Congressional Record, February 28, 1913, p. 4352.

Ibid., 4351

Ibid., 4353

Ibid., p. 4352

See Memo from Lindley Garrison to Woodrow Wilson, April 22, 1913, and Wilson's reply June 17, 1913, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

Fitzgerald, for example, continued to shy away from any action on a budget system. When asked by a fellow New Yorker (and a pro-budget activist) why Congress was doing nothing on the matter, Fitzgerald "took the position . . . that it would be more appropriate for the President to undertake (an investigation of new budget procedures) than for Congress to do so at this time." Clearly Fitzgerald was saying that Congress had no interest whatsoever in a budget system at that time. This meaning was strengthened when he concluded his conversation with Henry Bruere by telling him that "Congress will not, in his judgment, provide a staff for this purpose." Henry Bruere to Woodrow Wilson, November 11, 1915. See also Wilson's memo to Tumulty, November 30, 1915. Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.


Ibid.

Congressional Record, June 24, 1913, 63-1, pp. 2154-2162. See also Medill McCormick, "The Task Before the Country" The Yale Review, July, 1917, where he argues, Until now there have been no budgets (in Washington), no careful and scientific methods of estimate and appropriation. With the growth of direct taxation there has come a sudden and inevitable interest in both." Quoted in the Congressional Record February 5, 1918, p. 1738.


"The War and the Budget System," The World's Work, Vol. 34, No. 3, July, 1917, p. 247. As World's Work argued in this editorial, "The American people, in the next two or three years, will have to submit to taxation upon an enormous scale -- a scale which, even a year ago, we would hardly have regarded as remotely possible. These taxes will be oppressive to most citizens, but upon certain elements in our population they will rest with almost crushing force. We shall pay them willingly, but we have at least the right to demand that the money shall be spent with economy and intelligence. But it cannot be so spent under the haphazard system which has prevailed in this country for the last fifty years."


Ibid., March, p. 525. "Congress has always recognized (the G.A.R. pension committee) as the real legislative power in pension matters. 'Does the bill in this form satisfy you?' Speaker Cannon asked the G.A.R. pension committee in 1907, when the age bill came up for passage. 'Yes.' Bang! went the gavel and the thing was a law."

"Oh Reform it Altogether," The Independent, Vol. 84, No. 3496, December 6, 1915, p. 375.


"In the last year, indeed, the pork barrel has become an everyday topic of conversation. The newspapers have discussed it in thousands of indignant editorials; they have found it a subject as popular and common as were municipal graft and corporation corruption a few years ago." Burton J. Hendrick, "The Last Word in Pork," World's Work, Vol. 33, No. 4, February, 1917, p. 446.


John J. Fitzgerald, "Financial Problems for Congress," North American Review, Vol. 202, No. 721, December, 1915, p. 825; and as James Good later suggested "Formerly the revenues flowed into the Treasury much more rapidly than did our expenditures flow from the Treasury . . . But these days of government financing are past, never to return. The war and the burden of debt left by it has brought us face to face with a new condition." Congressional Record, May 3, 1921, p. 980.

Congressional Record, July 14, 1917, p. 5111.

See Fitzgerald's comments in Congressional Record, December 14, 1917; as well as Borland's comments in Ibid, December 9, 1918, p. 215, and Mondell, Ibid., February 15, 1918, p. 2172.

Fitzgerald's Comments in the Congressional Record, December 14, 1917.


See, for example, Congressional Record, February 15, 1918, p. 2158 where Sherley acknowledges this public pressure: and Congressional Record, February 5, 1918, where Rep. Dyer introduces seven full pages of excerpts from leading periodicals and statements of prominent citizens from across the nation all of which call for the institution of a budget system.


1916 Republican Platform. This platform contained a promise of budgetary reform.

Stimson, Op. Cit., p. 85; Congressional Record, February 28, 1919, p. 4608; Congressional Record, October 17, 1919, pp. 7083. "Experience has shown," Byrns of Tennessee argued in 1919, "that after every great war the people -- at least for a time -- have given a closer scrutiny to their Government's expenditures. There has always been a huge war debt to pay, and the people are brought face to face with higher taxes. These conditions have been multiplied many times by the last war, and the people are turning their eyes on Washington in order to see just how their money
is being spent. It is this fact which makes it possible to do now what could not be done a few years ago -- that is, to secure the favorable consideration of a measure revising our appropriating and accounting system in the interest of economy and efficiency." Congressional Record, October 17, 1919, p. 1087.

76 Congressional Record, 66-1, May 28, 1919, p. 359. See also Frank Lowden, "The High Cost of Business Inefficiency in American Government," Current Opinion, Vol. 68, No. 5, May, 1920, p. 621 and passim. As Lowden, former member of the House and Governor of Illinois argued, "You can't reduce the high cost of living until you reduce the high cost of government." And to his mind, both would remain to haunt Congress until it "gave some attention to the public business" and systematized its budgetary process.

78 Congressional Record, June 24, 1919, pp. 1696-1697.
79 Congressional Record, 66-1, June 24, 1919, p. 1697.
83 Congressional Record, October 21, 1919, p. 7284.
84 Ibid., p. 7132. October 18, 1919.
85 Ibid., October 20, 1919, p. 7204.
86 Ibid., pp. 7205-7206.
87 Ibid., October 17, 1919, p. 7096.
88 See, for example, William Redfield, With Congress and Cabinet, (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1924) pp. 261-262.
89 This growing awareness, once again was a function of the extreme fiscal strains of the war.
90 Although there were some who, like Haugen, remained staunchly opposed to any budgetary reform. Haugen, for one, saw the proposed budget act and the recentralization of the Appropriations Committee as a "surrender" of the Congress' Constitutional authority "to the President and a committee of 35 members." Congressional Record, 66-2, May 29, 1920, p. 7949.
91 "We create this independent establishment," Good argued of the proposed G.A.O., "answerable to Congress, an establishment that has clerks and accountants, who will go through every department in the Government. When they find waste and inefficiency, when they find duplication in the service, they will come to the committee of Congress that has jurisdiction of appropriations and report that fact. The fact will also be communicated to the President of the United States.
With that system of checks and balances, it is believed this great overlapping of activities, this duplication that exists in every department of the Government, will cease, and that the Government of the United States will be placed upon a business basis." Congressional Record, 66-2, May 29, 1920, p. 7949.

92 Congressional Record, October 18, 1919, p. 7145.
93 Congressional Record, June 1, 1920, p. 8114.
94 Ibid., p. 8117.
96 Ibid.
97 Congressional Record, June 4, 1920, pp. 8609-8610 and Draft of Message dictated by Wilson and presumably written by Mrs. Wilson, December 2, 1919 (Wilson Papers, Library of Congress) which shows Wilson's support for the general idea of the budget. Wilson, however, continued to be sensitive to what he saw as legislative encroachment on the duties of the President and his constitutional rights. This sensitivity was clearly the product of his own expansive conception of the Presidency and of Presidential leadership in the Federal policy-making system. See Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, The House of Representatives (New York: David McKay Company, 1963) p. 32. See also Wilson's May, 1920 veto of the 1921 Legislative, Judicial and Executive Appropriations Bill (Draft of the veto message was actually prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury Houston on May 10, 1920; see also Meredith to W. Wilson, April 27, 1920. Both are in the Wilson Papers, Library of Congress. For a good, if somewhat biased explanation of Wilson's veto of the Budget Act of 1920, see David F. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1926) pp. 83-90.
98 Congressional Record, June 5, 1920, p. 8657.
99 Ibid., p. 8657.
100 Congressional Record, June 13, 1921, p. 2500. Announcement of the Presidential signing of the Budget Act (signing actually took place on June 10, 1921).
101 Congressional Record, 67-1, May 3, 1921, p. 980.
103 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
105 Oscar W. Underwood, Drifting Sands of Party Politics (New York: The Century Co., 1928) p. 120. See also Link's description of the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Bill (drafted by Louis Brandeis and George
Rublee and introduced by Representative Raymond B. Stevens of New Hampshire. Link notes that "The Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, William C. Adamson of Georgia, was aghast at the proposal, declaring it proposed giving an administrative agency the power to make law." He was correct, but the bill was nevertheless passed by both the House and the Senate and the strong Federal Trade Commission was established. Link, Op. Cit., pp. 71-72; See also the description of the discretionary powers the act gave the Federal Trade Commission, much against the advice of Congressional traditionalists, in Douglas Walter Jaenicke, "Herbert Croly, Progressive Ideology, and the F.T.C. Act," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 3, Fall, 1978, p. 488.

Chapter VIII


2. Ibid.
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Abbreviations Used

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LC - Library of Congress Manuscript Room
MHS - Massachusetts State Historical Society
USA - United States Archives
UPL - University of Pennsylvania Library

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