

Table 1: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by village head Party membership: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Party membership of village head	1.57 (24.84)	-0.05 (0.063)	-0.046 (0.040)	0.015 (0.038)	3.60 (2.31)	-0.14** (0.063)	0.26
<i>R</i> ²	0.00	0.0021	0.0043	0.0005	0.0081	0.016	
<i>Number of villages</i>	298	298	298	298	298	298	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 2: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by Party membership of village head: SUR analysis with geographic, demographic, and economic controls

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Party membership of village head	-1.49 (26.12)	0.045 (0.059)	0.0033 (0.038)	-0.0090 (0.038)	2.42 (2.19)	0.048 (0.049)	0.83
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.29 (0.65)	-0.0050**** (0.0015)	-0.0029*** (0.00094)	-0.00018 (0.00095)	0.070 (0.054)	-0.0011 (0.0012)	
Number of natural villages	-1.81 (3.25)	-0.0030 (0.0074)	-0.0041 (0.0047)	0.0077 (0.0048)	0.11 (0.27)	-0.0039 (0.0061)	
Village terrain	-4.87 (35.67)	0.096 (0.081)	-0.000058 (0.052)	-0.017 (0.052)	-1.99 (2.99)	0.028 (0.067)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.015 (0.011)	0.000035 (0.000026)	0.000048*** (0.000017)	0.000007 (0.000017)	-0.0015 (0.0096)	0.000025 (0.000022)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.009 (0.011)	0.000045* (0.000024)	0.000045* (0.000024)	0.0000099 (0.000016)	0.00056 (0.00089)	-0.0000057 (0.000020)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000006 (0.000029)	0.000000004 (0.00000065)	0.000000004 (0.00000042)	0.0000000049 (0.00000042)	0.000000022 (0.00000024)	0.000000015*** (0.000000054)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.32 (0.46)	0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.0012* (0.00068)	-0.00073 (0.00068)	-0.0048 (0.039)	0.00076 (0.00087)	
R ²	0.09	0.26	0.23	0.05	0.23	0.49	
Number of villages	284	284	284	284	284	284	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 3: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by bureaucratic and democratic institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Bureaucratic institutions							
Party membership of village head	-3.63 (30.27)	-0.031 (0.068)	-0.00091 (0.045)	0.027 (0.041)	0.73 (2.46)	0.059 (0.052)	0.99
Party membership of village officials	-20.11 (77.55)	0.082 (0.17)	-0.074 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.97 (6.29)	0.26* (0.15)	0.51
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	30.15 (27.28)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.026 (0.04)	0.062* (0.037)	2.89 (2.21)	-0.05 (0.051)	0.11
Democratic institutions							
Democratization index	17.08 (13.58)	0.012 (0.03)	0.019 (0.02)	0.03 (0.018)	-1.22 (1.10)	0.028 (0.026)	0.34
Geographic and demographic controls							
Distance from county town	-0.38 (0.69)	-0.0052*** (0.0016)	-0.0025** (0.0010)	0.00073 (0.00094)	0.0941 (0.056)	-0.00062 (0.0013)	
Number of natural villages	0.78 (3.64)	-0.003 (0.0082)	-0.002 (0.0054)	0.008 (0.0049)	0.24 (0.30)	-0.0047 (0.0069)	
Village terrain	-11.26 (40.11)	0.12 (0.09)	0.012 (0.059)	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.79 (3.25)	-0.014 (0.076)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.019 (0.012)	0.000018 (0.000027)	0.000037** (0.000018)	0.0000096 (0.000016)	-0.0020* (0.00098)	0.000012 (0.000023)	
Surname fragmentation index	-84.85 (56.08)	0.20 (0.13)	-0.018 (0.083)	-0.13* (0.076)	-4.18 (4.55)	0.11 (0.11)	
Economic controls							
1997 income per capita	0.027 (0.02)	0.00009*** (0.000046)	0.000067** (0.00003)	0.0000044 (0.000028)	-0.0012 (0.0016)	0.0000031 (0.000038)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000013 (0.00003)	0.000000025 (0.000000067)	-0.000000019 (0.000000044)	-0.000000002 (0.000000004)	0.00000097 (0.0000024)	0.00000013** (0.00000056)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.49 (0.6)	-0.000387 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.00089)	-0.00015 (0.00081)	0.033 (0.049)	0.0015 (0.0011)	
Informal institutional controls							
Existence of a temple manager	60.79 (42.88)	0.13 (0.096)	0.14** (0.063)	0.16*** (0.058)	3.31 (3.48)	0.14* (0.081)	
Existence of a village-wide lineage group	7.42 (53.52)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.06 (0.079)	-0.06 (0.072)	-1.05 (4.34)	0.093 (0.10)	
R ²	0.12	0.29	0.24	0.11	0.25	0.5	
Number of villages	234	234	234	234	234	234	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 4: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by Party membership among village officials: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Party membership among village officials	58.89 (61.02)	0.14 (0.15)	-0.065 (0.098)	0.10 (0.091)	7.50 (5.58)	-0.25 (0.15)	0.15
<i>R</i> ²	0.0031	0.0029	0.0015	0.0044	0.0061	0.0086	
<i>Number of villages</i>	295	295	295	295	295	295	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 5: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by Party membership among village officials: SUR analysis with geographic, demographic, and economic controls

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Party membership among village officials	31.75 (65.59)	0.14 (0.15)	0.024 (0.094)	0.047 (0.096)	1.95 (5.38)	0.17 (0.12)	0.76
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.27 (0.65)	-0.0048**** (0.0015)	-0.0028*** (0.00093)	-0.00011 (0.00095)	0.064 (0.053)	-0.00090 (0.0012)	
Number of natural villages	-1.73 (3.28)	-0.0027 (0.0074)	-0.0036 (0.0047)	0.0083* (0.0048)	0.031 (0.27)	-0.0034 (0.0061)	
Village terrain	-3.12 (36.16)	0.11 (0.082)	0.016 (0.052)	-0.012 (0.053)	-2.63 (2.96)	0.042 (0.067)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.015 (0.012)	0.000031 (0.000026)	0.000046*** (0.000017)	0.00000063 (0.000017)	-0.0016* (0.00095)	0.000022 (0.000022)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.0097 (0.011)	0.000044* (0.000024)	0.000026* (0.000015)	0.0000096 (0.000016)	0.00054 (0.00087)	-0.0000064 (0.000020)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000007 (0.000029)	0.00000006 (0.00000065)	0.00000005 (0.00000042)	0.0000000026 (0.00000042)	0.00000012 (0.0000024)	0.00000014*** (0.00000054)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.36 (0.48)	0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.0011 (0.00067)	-0.00087 (0.00070)	0.010 (0.039)	0.00061 (0.00089)	
R ²	0.09	0.26	0.23	0.05	0.24	0.49	
Number of villages	282	282	282	282	282	282	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 6: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by performance contract: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Performance contract with public project targets	45.77** (22.77)	-0.097* (0.058)	-0.039 (0.037)	0.064* (0.035)	2.31 (2.13)	-0.15** (0.058)	0.009***
<i>R</i> ²	0.04	0.09	0.030	0.07	0.28	0.01	
<i>Number of villages</i>	298	298	298	298	298	298	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 7: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by performance contract: SUR analysis with geographic, demographic, and economic controls

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Performance contract with public project targets	42.93* (24.23)	-0.092* (0.055)	-0.031 (0.036)	0.048 (0.036)	1.37 (2.05)	-0.047 (0.046)	0.13
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.31 (0.64)	-0.0049*** (0.0015)	-0.0029*** (0.00094)	-0.0002 (0.00094)	0.072 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.0012)	
Number of natural villages	-1.5 (3.24)	-0.0037 (0.0073)	-0.0043 (0.0047)	0.008* (0.0048)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.0042 (0.0061)	
Village terrain	1.1 (35.61)	0.085 (0.081)	-0.0042 (0.052)	-0.011 (0.052)	-1.66 (3.01)	0.024 (0.067)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.016 (0.011)	0.000037 (0.000026)	0.000049*** (0.000017)	0.0000054 (0.000017)	-0.0016* (0.00097)	0.000026 (0.000022)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.0094 (0.011)	0.000046* (0.000024)	0.000026* (0.000015)	0.0000092 (0.000016)	0.00057 (0.00089)	-0.0000046 (0.00002)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.0000083 (0.000029)	0.00000007 (0.00000065)	0.0000000059 (0.000000042)	0.0000000018 (0.000000042)	0.000000017 (0.00000024)	0.000000015*** (0.000000054)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.39 (0.46)	0.0013 (0.001)	-0.0011* (0.00068)	-0.00082 (0.00068)	-0.0036 (0.039)	0.00089 (0.00087)	
R ²	0.09	0.26	0.23	0.05	0.24	0.49	
Number of villages	282	282	282	282	282	282	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 8: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of democratic reforms: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	18.72 (12.22)	0.034 (0.029)	0.0086 (0.019)	0.026 (0.016)	-1.30 (1.06)	-0.022 (0.029)	0.13
<i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.01	0.001	0.01	0.01	0.002	
<i>Number of villages</i>	255	255	255	255	255	255	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 9: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of democratic reforms with geographic, demographic, and economic controls

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	21.80 (14.10)	-0.0010 (0.03)	0.024 (0.020)	0.028 (0.018)	-1.37 (1.09)	0.015 (0.025)	0.03**
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.34 (0.74)	-0.0054**** (0.0016)	-0.0027*** (0.0010)	0.00065 (0.00094)	0.096* (0.057)	-0.00089 (0.0013)	
Number of natural villages	-2.78 (3.65)	-0.0027 (0.0079)	-0.0048 (0.0052)	0.0042 (0.0047)	0.030 (0.28)	-0.0037 (0.0065)	
Village terrain	-10.47 (41.66)	0.14 (0.09)	0.0039 (0.059)	-0.024 (0.053)	-0.33 (3.22)	-0.00025 (0.074)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.021* (0.013)	0.000021 (0.000027)	0.000038** (0.000018)	0.000012 (0.000016)	-0.0020** (0.00097)	0.000019 (0.000022)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.048 (0.020)	0.000011** (0.000044)	0.000087*** (0.000029)	0.000019 (0.000026)	-0.00016 (0.0016)	0.000015 (0.000037)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000026 (0.000032)	0.000000026 (0.00000068)	-0.000000034 (0.000000044)	-0.0000000097 (0.000000040)	0.000000049 (0.00000024)	0.00000014** (0.00000056)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.60 (0.62)	-0.00092 (0.0013)	-0.0017* (0.00089)	-0.000060 (0.00079)	0.015 (0.048)	0.0017 (0.0011)	
R ²	0.11	0.24	0.24	0.05	0.25	0.48	
Number of villages	243	243	243	243	243	243	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 10: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of democratic reforms: 2SLS analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	18.96 (25.41)	0.11 (0.062)	-0.058 (0.044)	0.028 (0.034)	2.02 (2.34)	-0.21 (0.067)
<i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
<i>Number of villages</i>	266	270	268	264	264	270
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 11: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of democratic reforms with geographic, demographic, and economic controls: 2SLS

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	-4.45 (32.24)	-0.029 (0.74)	-0.066 (0.053)	0.0055 (0.042)	4.92* (2.95)	-0.42*** (0.10)
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>						
Distance from county town	0.32 (0.69)	-0.0037** (0.0016)	-0.0016*** (0.0012)	0.00021 (0.00089)	0.21*** (0.061)	-0.0000086 (0.0021)
Number of natural villages	-4.33 (3.19)	-0.02*** (0.0072)	-0.0078 (0.0052)	0.0048 (0.0040)	0.22 (0.28)	-0.039*** (0.0099)
Village terrain	-23.10 (31.09)	0.091 (0.07)	-0.13*** (0.051)	0.024 (0.04)	-0.0024 (0.0012)	0.017 (0.096)
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village population	-0.010 (0.014)	0.000031 (0.000031)	0.000054** (0.000022)	0.000012 (0.000018)	-0.0020** (0.00097)	0.000044 (0.000042)
<i>Economic controls</i>						
2000 income per capita	0.075*** (0.026)	0.00012** (0.000059)	0.00011*** (0.000043)	0.000032 (0.000034)	0.0027 (0.0024)	-0.000062 (0.000081)
2000 per capita government assets	-0.00029 (0.00031)	0.00000038 (0.00000069)	-0.00000033 (0.00000051)	-0.000000076 (0.000000039)	-0.000022 (0.000027)	0.0000026*** (0.00000095)
2000 per capita village tax	-0.85 (0.61)	-0.0016 (0.0014)	-0.0028*** (0.00099)	0.00013 (0.00077)	-0.033 (0.053)	0.00099 (0.0019)
R ²	0.06	0.14	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.48
Number of villages	252	255	253	250	250	243
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 12: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of democratic reforms with geographic, demographic, economic, and institutional controls: 2SLS

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	28.37 (38.40)	0.2 (0.18)	0.032 (0.065)	-0.053 (0.056)	7.32** (3.70)	0.0066 (0.27)
<i>Geographic controls</i>						
Distance from county town	-0.21 (0.79)	-0.0032 (0.0036)	-0.0029 (0.0017)	0.00019 (0.0011)	0.14* (0.076)	0.00075 (0.0055)
Number of natural villages	-1.64 (3.88)	-0.0053 (0.017)	0.00037 (0.0063)	0.004 (0.0052)	0.55 (0.35)	-0.0034 (0.026)
Village terrain	5.45 (43.43)	0.057 (0.20)	-0.057 (0.073)	0.068 (0.059)	2.97 (4.47)	-0.34 (0.3)
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village population	-0.020 (0.015)	0.0000011 (0.000070)	0.000023 (0.000025)	0.0000043 (0.000021)	-0.0041*** (0.0015)	0.000045 (0.00011)
<i>Economic controls</i>						
2000 income per capita	-0.042 (0.050)	0.00010 (0.00022)	0.000025 (0.000078)	-0.000033 (0.000068)	-0.0027 (0.005)	0.00038 (0.00033)
2000 per capita government assets	-0.00015 (0.00032)	-0.00000048 (0.0000015)	0.00000016 (0.00000058)	0.00000011 (0.00000044)	-0.0000044 (0.000031)	0.0000025 (0.0000022)
2000 per capita village tax	-0.39 (0.98)	-0.0017 (0.0043)	-0.0016 (0.00017)	-0.00012 (0.0013)	-0.022 (0.092)	0.0061 (0.0065)
<i>Institutional controls</i>						
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	-14.05 (194.04)	-0.42 (0.88)	-0.11 (0.34)	0.26 (0.26)	11.05 (19.28)	-2.63* (1.34)
Existence of a temple manager	63.52 (344.35)	1.79 (1.47)	0.34 (0.61)	-0.14 (0.43)	27.55 (28.84)	-0.6 (2.24)
Existence of an operating church	-115.59 (109.06)	0.81 (0.50)	-0.18 (0.28)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.29 (10.76)	0.76 (0.76)
Existence of a single active lineage hall	326.09 (787.55)	-2.68 (3.48)	0.64 (1.52)	0.23 (1.02)	-0.97 (74.53)	2.81 (5.29)
<i>R</i> ²	--	--	--	--	--	--
Number of villages	229	237	227	225	224	229
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 13: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of pre-election institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of pre-election institutions	6.46 (7.55)	-0.0043 (0.019)	0.0065 (0.012)	0.032 (0.011)	-1.48 (0.68)	0.0045 (0.019)	0.04**
<i>R</i> ²	0.003	0.0002	0.001	0.03	0.02	0.0002	
<i>Number of villages</i>	281	281	281	281	281	281	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 14: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of pre-election institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of pre-election institutions	6.07 (7.46)	-0.019 (0.017)	0.0082 (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	-0.99 (0.63)	0.024* (0.015)	0.001***
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.38 (0.64)	-0.0053*** (0.0015)	-0.0027** (0.00095)	0.00042 (0.00096)	0.008 (0.054)	-0.00031 (0.0012)	
Number of natural villages	1.25 (3.36)	-0.0047 (0.0078)	-0.0018 (0.005)	0.0097* (0.005)	0.21 (0.29)	-0.003 (0.0065)	
Village terrain	-7.8 (36.1)	0.09 (0.083)	0.0085 (0.053)	0.023 (0.054)	-2.02 (3.06)	-0.0055 (0.07)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.016 (0.011)	0.000031 (0.000026)	0.00004** (0.000017)	0.0000027 (0.000017)	-0.0015* (0.00096)	0.000016 (0.000022)	
Surname fragmentation index	-75.33 (50.29)	0.21* (0.12)	-0.023 (0.075)	0.0084 (0.075)	-5.68 (4.27)	0.075 (0.098)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.028 (0.019)	0.000091** (0.000043)	0.000066** (0.000028)	0.0000023 (0.000028)	-0.0015 (0.0016)	0.0000043 (0.000036)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000011 (0.000028)	0.000000029 (0.00000065)	-0.000000014 (0.00000042)	-0.000000059 (0.000000042)	0.00000096 (0.0000024)	0.00000013** (0.00000056)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.42 (0.53)	-0.00061 (0.0012)	-0.0014* (0.00079)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	0.044 (0.045)	0.0014 (0.001)	
<i>Institutional controls</i>							
Party membership of village head	-5.37 (28.06)	-0.0014 (0.065)	0.0024 (0.042)	-0.0096 (0.042)	0.55 (2.38)	0.014 (0.055)	0.99
Party membership of village officials	-10.14 (69.59)	0.12 (0.16)	-0.073 (0.1)	0.023 (0.10)	0.90 (5.90)	0.21 (0.14)	0.51
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	27.02 (24.7)	-0.09* (0.06)	-0.029 (0.037)	0.055* (0.04)	2.66 (2.21)	-0.038 (0.048)	0.11
Existence of a temple manager	48.9 (39.17)	0.096 (0.09)	0.14** (0.058)	0.14** (0.059)	1.81 (3.32)	0.095 (0.076)	
Existence of a village-wide lineage group	11.18 (49.2)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.052 (0.073)	-0.051 (0.074)	-0.61 (4.17)	0.099 (0.096)	
<i>R</i> ²	0.12	0.29	0.24	0.11	0.25	0.5	
Number of villages	234	234	234	234	234	234	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 15: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of voting institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of voting institutions	8.13 *8.91)	0.058 (0.022)	-0.0036 (0.014)	0.0038 (0.013)	0.89 (0.82)	-0.025 (0.023)	0.04**
<i>R</i> ²	0.003	0.02	0.0002	0.0003	0.0004	0.004	
<i>Number of villages</i>	281	281	281	281	281	281	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 16: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of voting institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of voting institutions	7.74 (10.24)	0.025 (0.024)	-0.0014 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.93 (0.9)	-0.011 (0.021)	0.074
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.37 (0.61)	-0.0047*** (0.0014)	-0.0029*** (0.00093)	-0.00037 (0.00095)	0.071 (0.054)	-0.00085 (0.0012)	
Number of natural villages	1.26 (3.30)	-0.0022 (0.0078)	-0.0014 (0.005)	0.0095 (0.0051)	0.15 (0.29)	-0.0029 (0.0066)	
Village terrain	-9.65 (34.6)	0.089 (0.082)	-0.0015 (0.052)	-0.037* (0.054)	-2.27 (3.04)	-0.0029 (0.07)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.015 (0.011)	0.000025 (0.000026)	0.000046*** (0.000017)	0.0000097 (0.000017)	-0.0018* (0.00097)	0.000021 (0.000022)	
Surname fragmentation index	-72.50 (47.99)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.040 (0.073)	-0.066 (0.074)	-5.24 (4.22)	-0.011 (0.097)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.0026 (0.010)	0.000036 (0.000024)	0.000018 (0.000015)	0.0000042 (0.000016)	0.00059 (0.00088)	-0.0000061 (0.00002)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000017 (0.000027)	0.000000053 (0.000000064)	-0.000000014 (0.000000041)	0.0000000093 (0.000000042)	0.00000019 (0.0000024)	0.00000015** (0.00000055)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.28 (0.46)	-0.00061 (0.0012)	-0.00093 (0.0007)	-0.00044 (0.00071)	-0.0074 (0.04)	0.00063 (0.00092)	
<i>Institutional controls</i>							
Party membership of village head	-8.46 (26.77)	0.0094 (0.063)	0.00075 (0.041)	-0.0061 (0.042)	1.55 (2.35)	0.02 (0.054)	0.99
Party membership of village officials	-4.66 (66.71)	0.13 (0.16)	-0.053 (0.1)	0.033 (0.10)	0.19 (5.87)	0.19 (0.13)	0.51
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	33.56 (23.39)	-0.071 (0.055)	-0.025 (0.035)	0.06* (0.036)	0.77 (2.06)	-0.039 (0.047)	0.11
Existence of a temple manager	52.55 (36.10)	0.13 (0.085)	0.13** (0.055)	0.11** (0.056)	1.03 (3.18)	0.09 (0.073)	
Existence of a village-wide lineage group	16.63 (48.42)	0.37*** (0.11)	0.054 (0.073)	-0.077 (0.075)	-0.54 (4.26)	0.06 (0.097)	
<i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.3	0.24	0.08	0.24	0.49	
Number of villages	234	234	234	234	234	234	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 17: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of VRA institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of VRA institutions	9.47 (9.61)	0.011 (0.024)	0.029* (0.015)	0.024* (0.013)	-0.68 (0.86)	-0.023 (0.024)	0.11
<i>R</i> ²	0.004	0.0008	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.004	
<i>Number of villages</i>	269	269	269	269	269	269	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 18: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by implementation of VRA institutions: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Index of implementation of VRA institutions	5.39 (9.42)	0.016*** (0.022)	0.022 (0.014)	0.022 (0.013)	-0.76 (0.81)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.3
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.37 (0.67)	-0.0048 (0.0015)	-0.0026*** (0.00098)	0.00099 (0.00095)	0.059 (0.057)	-0.0013 (0.0013)	
Number of natural villages	0.57 (3.44)	-0.0045 (0.0079)	-0.0021 (0.0051)	0.0091* (0.0049)	0.12 (0.29)	-0.003 (0.0066)	
Village terrain	-9.19 (39.3)	0.1 (0.088)	0.0097 (0.057)	-0.017 (0.055)	-2.86 (3.27)	-0.012 (0.07)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.016 (0.012)	0.00002 (0.000027)	0.00004** (0.000017)	0.0000078 (0.000016)	-0.0015 (0.00099)	0.000016 (0.000022)	
Surname fragmentation index	-80.71 (52.98)	0.14* (0.12)	-0.048** (0.079)	-0.12* (0.075)	-6.38 (4.52)	0.029 (0.1)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.028 (0.019)	0.000086 (0.000044)	0.000069 (0.000029)	0.000018 (0.000027)	-0.0015 (0.0016)	-0.0000041*** (0.000037)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.0000096 (0.000029)	0.000000038 (0.000000066)	-0.000000082 (0.000000043)	0.0000000081 (0.000000041)	0.000000014 (0.00000025)	0.000000014 (0.000000055)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.31 (0.48)	0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.001 (0.0007)	-0.00063 (0.00069)	0.014 (0.041)	0.00061 (0.00093)	
<i>Institutional controls</i>							
Party membership of village head	-4.49 (29.2)	-0.013 (0.067)	0.0044 (0.044)	0.028 (0.042)	1.59 (2.49)	0.025 (0.056)	0.99
Party membership of village officials	-23.93 (74.55)	0.12 (0.17)	-0.082 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.83 (6.37)	0.24* (0.14)	0.51
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	26.001 (25.75)	-0.11* (0.059)	-0.034 (0.039)	0.045 (0.037)	2.54 (2.20)	-0.043 (0.05)	0.11
Existence of a temple manager	54.76 (40.2)	0.12 (0.093)	0.12** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.057)	3.001 (3.43)	0.14* (0.078)	
Existence of a village-wide lineage group	0.43 (51.78)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.053 (0.078)	-0.076 (0.074)	-1.24 (4.42)	0.069 (0.01)	
<i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.3	0.24	0.08	0.24	0.49	
Number of villages	234	234	234	234	234	234	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 19: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by village temple manager: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Existence of village temple manager	72.07** (30.77)	0.22*** (0.084)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.038 (0.88)	7.09** (3.08)	0.31*** (0.083)	0.06*
<i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.002	0.02	0.04	
<i>Number of villages</i>	293	293	293	293	293	293	
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 20: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by existence of temple manager: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Existence of temple manager	61.15 (42.8)	0.14 (0.098)	0.14** (0.063)	0.16*** (0.058)	3.26 (3.47)	0.15* (0.081)	0.001***
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.38 (0.69)	-0.0051*** (0.0016)	-0.0025** (0.001)	0.00071 (0.00094)	0.091 (0.056)	-0.00059 (0.0013)	
Number of natural villages	0.74 (3.63)	-0.0045 (0.0083)	-0.0022 (0.0054)	0.0082* (0.0049)	0.24 (0.29)	-0.0052 (0.0069)	
Village terrain	-11.2 (40.11)	0.12 (0.091)	0.012 (0.059)	-0.033 (0.054)	-0.80 (3.25)	-0.013 (0.076)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.018 (0.012)	0.000025 (0.000027)	0.000038** (0.000018)	0.0000083 (0.000016)	-0.002* (0.00098)	0.000014 (0.000023)	
Surname fragmentation index	-85.77 (55.69)	0.16 (0.13)	-0.025 (0.082)	-0.12 (0.075)	-4.05 (4.52)	0.096 (0.11)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.027 (0.02)	0.000098** (0.000046)	0.000069** (0.00003)	0.000003 (0.000028)	-0.0012 (0.0016)	-0.0000053 (0.000038)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000013 (0.00003)	0.000000026 (0.000000068)	-0.000000019 (0.000000044)	0.0000000018 (0.000000004)	0.000000096 (0.00000024)	0.00000013** (0.00000056)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.50 (0.60)	-0.0005 (0.0014)	-0.0015 (0.00089)	-0.00013 (0.00081)	0.033 (0.049)	0.0014 (0.0011)	
<i>Institutional controls</i>							
Party membership of village head	-3.62 (30.27)	-0.031 (0.069)	-0.00081 (0.045)	0.029 (0.041)	0.72 (2.46)	0.25 (0.15)	
Party membership of village officials	-20.64 (77.46)	0.058 (0.18)	-0.078 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.10)	1.04 (6.29)	0.026* (0.057)	
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	29.8 (27.16)	-0.13** (0.062)	-0.029 (0.04)	0.065* (0.037)	2.94 (2.20)	-0.055 (0.051)	
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	16.86 (13.48)	0.0013 (0.031)	0.017 (0.02)	0.031* (0.018)	-1.19 (1.09)	0.025 (0.025)	
R ²	0.12	0.26	0.24	0.10	0.25	0.50	
Number of villages	234	234	234	234	234	234	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 21: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by village temple manager: 2SLS regression

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Existence of village temple manager	330.65 (240.85)	0.60 (0.65)	0.13 (0.37)	-0.58 (0.44)	25.97 (22.44)	2.28** (1.05)
<i>R</i> ²	<0.001	<0.001	0.06	<0.001	0.25	<0.001
<i>Number of villages</i>	281	281	285	281	282	279
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Listwise deletion of missing data. Instrument for the 2SLS is the existence of temple activities at the start of the Communist period.

Table 22: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by existence of a temple manager with geographic, demographic, economic, and institutional controls: 2SLS

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Existence of temple manager	181.05* (92.82)	0.67** (0.26)	0.59*** (0.14)	-0.076 (0.12)	25.68*** (8.44)	0.76 (0.50)
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>						
Distance from county town	-0.22 (0.73)	-0.0043** (0.0021)	-0.0021* (0.0012)	-0.000063 (0.001)	0.00089* (0.0041)	0.00075 (0.0055)
Number of natural villages	0.041 (3.58)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.00038 (0.0058)	0.0054 (0.0048)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.0034 (0.026)
Village terrain	-3.88 (41.58)	0.022 (0.12)	-0.028 (0.068)	0.06 (0.056)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.34 (0.3)
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village population	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.0000016 (0.000043)	0.000021 (0.000024)	0.0000057 (0.00002)	-0.0039*** (0.0014)	0.000066 (0.000084)
Surname fragmentation index	-104.51 (70.10)	0.025 (0.21)	-0.037 (0.11)	-0.075 (0.095)	-0.096 (6.59)	-0.53 (0.40)
<i>Economic controls</i>						
2000 income per capita	-104.51 (70.10)	0.00015 (0.00011)	0.0000056 (0.000058)	-0.000017 (0.000051)	-0.0027 (0.0036)	0.00025 (0.00021)
2000 per capita government assets	-8.03 (34.36)	0.00000081 (0.00000089)	0.00000012 (0.00000055)	0.00000014 (0.00000041)	-0.0000046 (0.000029)	0.0000027 (0.0000017)
2000 per capita village tax	-0.5 (0.65)	0.00095 (0.0019)	-0.002* (0.00011)	-0.00017 (0.00089)	0.0015 (0.062)	0.004 (0.0037)
<i>Institutional controls</i>						
Party membership of village head	-8.03 (34.36)	-0.052 (0.098)	-0.066 (0.055)	0.0087 (0.047)	1.23 (3.19)	-0.13 (0.19)
Party membership of village officials	14.76 (91.78)	0.072 (0.26)	0.036 (0.14)	-0.041 (0.12)	0.82 (8.39)	0.34 (0.51)
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	-30.50 (134.26)	-0.81** (0.40)	0.023 (0.21)	0.21 (0.19)	11.41 (12.69)	-2.27*** (0.78)
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	16.61 (36.85)	0.17 (0.11)	0.025 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.052)	6.05* (3.51)	-0.13 (0.21))
Existence of village-wide lineage group	-24.32 (66.37)	0.24 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.015 (0.089)	2.52 (6.46)	1.17 (0.49)
<i>R</i> ²	0.05	--	0.05	--	--	--
Number of villages	225	227	225	223	222	227
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 23: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by village-wide lineage group: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Existence of village-wide lineage group	110.14** (43.96)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.29*** (0.07)	-0.095 (0.067)	10.66*** (4.10)	0.16 (0.11)
<i>R</i> ²	<0.001	<0.001	0.06	<0.001	0.25	<0.001
<i>Number of villages</i>	281	281	285	281	282	279
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Listwise deletion of missing data. Instrument for the 2SLS is the existence of temple activities at the start of the Communist period.

Table 24: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by existence of village-wide lineage group: SUR analysis

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water	H0: B=0, p-value (SUR)
Existence of village-wide lineage group	80.29 (54.54)	0.34*** (0.11)	0.14* (0.077)	-0.031 (0.07)	0.52 (4.12)	0.06 (0.096)	0.05**
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>							
Distance from county town	-0.39 (0.74)	-0.0053*** (0.0016)	-0.0027*** (0.001)	0.00054 (0.00094)	0.088 (0.056)	-0.00082 (0.0013)	
Number of natural villages	-0.81 (3.87)	-0.0043 (0.0081)	-0.0038 (0.0054)	0.0063 (0.0049)	0.19 (0.29)	-0.0054 (0.0069)	
Village terrain	-7.50 (42.61)	0.13 (0.089)	0.014 (0.06)	-0.022 (0.054)	-0.82 (3.22)	-0.003 (0.075)	
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Village population	-0.023* (0.013)	0.000019 (0.000027)	0.000036** (0.000018)	0.000012 (0.000016)	-0.002* (0.00096)	0.000019 (0.000023)	
Surname fragmentation index	-52.89 (58.72)	0.21* (0.12)	0.031 (0.082)	-0.10 (0.074)	-2.79 (4.44)	0.11 (0.10)	
<i>Economic controls</i>							
1997 income per capita	0.04* (0.021)	0.0001** (0.000044)	0.000088*** (0.00003)	0.00002 (0.000027)	-0.0007 (0.0016)	0.00001 (0.000038)	
1997 per capita government assets	-0.000023 (0.000032)	0.000000022 (0.00000067)	-0.000000031 (0.00000045)	0.000000005 (0.00000004)	0.00000069 (0.0000024)	0.00000013** (0.00000056)	
1997 per capita village tax	-0.63 (0.64)	-0.00037 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0009)	-0.00011 (0.00082)	0.033 (0.048)	0.0016 (0.0011)	
<i>Institutional controls</i>							
Party membership of village head	1.01 (32.33)	-0.025 (0.068)	-0.00081 (0.045)	0.03 (0.04)	0.84 (2.44)	0.025 (0.057)	
Party membership of village officials	23.01 (82.50)	0.072 (0.17)	-0.052 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)	1.37 (6.23)	0.22 (0.15)	
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	42.86 (28.86)	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.029 (0.041)	0.055 (0.037)	2.63 (2.18)	-0.07 (0.051)	
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	24.29* (14.26)	0.0069 (0.03)	0.024 (0.02)	0.027 (0.018)	-1.14 (1.08)	0.018 (0.025)	
<i>R</i> ²	0.13	0.29	0.25	0.07	0.26	0.49	
Number of villages	238	238	238	238	238	238	
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47	

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.

Table 25: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by village-wide lineage institutions: 2SLS regression

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Existence of village-wide lineage institutions	748.22* (410.01)	0.16 (0.80)	0.067 (0.54)	-0.048 (0.48)	78.39* (40.17)	0.088** (0.80)
<i>R</i> ²	<0.001	0.018	<0.001	0.048	<0.001	0.0006
<i>Number of villages</i>	308	311	307	306	304	311
<i>Mean dependent variable</i>	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Listwise deletion of missing data. Instrument for the 2SLS is an index of village surname diversity.

Table 26: Predicting 2000 village public goods provision by existence of village-wide lineage group with geographic, demographic, economic, and institutional controls: 2SLS

Explanatory variable	Investment per capita (yuan)	Probability paved roads	Probability paved paths	Percentage classrooms usable in rain	Newness of school	Probability running water
Existence of village-wide lineage group	389.66 (175.6)	1.32 (0.56)	1.24 (0.34)	-0.21 (0.23)	60.99 (18.83)	1.25 (0.95)
<i>Geographic and demographic controls</i>						
Distance from county town	-0.30 (0.82)	-0.0046 (0.0026)	-0.0035 (0.0016)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.09 (0.084)	0.00095 (0.0044)
Number of natural villages	-1.91 (3.76)	-0.0083 (0.012)	0.0014 (0.0071)	0.0034 (0.0047)	0.42 (0.38)	-0.027 (0.02)
Village terrain	-1.37 (42.12)	0.0075 (0.13)	-0.072 (0.08)	0.039 (0.052)	2.41 (4.40)	-0.28 (0.22)
Province / county dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village population	-0.019 (0.016)	0.000028 (0.00005)	0.000031 (0.00003)	0.000012 (0.00002)	-0.0039 (0.0016)	0.000079 (0.000084)
<i>Economic controls</i>						
2000 income per capita	0.058 (0.036)	0.00022 (0.00012)	0.000073 (0.000067)	0.000018 (0.000046)	-0.0017 (0.0039)	0.00024 (0.0002)
2000 per capita government assets	-0.00018 (0.00034)	0.00000048 (0.00000011)	0.000000039 (0.000000071)	0.00000011 (0.00000043)	0.0000063 (0.0000035)	0.0000023 (0.0000018)
2000 per capita village tax	-0.30 (0.74)	0.00015 (0.0024)	-0.00066 (0.00014)	-0.00043 (0.00094)	0.073 (0.076)	0.005 (0.004)
<i>Institutional controls</i>						
Party membership of village head	-8.05 (35.94)	-0.095 (0.11)	-0.046 (0.068)	0.029 (0.045)	-0.42 (3.56)	-0.10 (0.19)
Party membership of village officials	62.01 (92.99)	0.16 (0.29)	0.035 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.12)	5.93 (0.19)	0.22 (0.49)
Bureaucratic targets for public projects	-50.54 (145.47)	-1.10 (0.46)	-0.26 (0.26)	0.20 (0.18)	0.11 (14.38)	-2.38 (0.77)
Index of implementation of democratic reforms	23.5 (43.44)	0.21 (0.14)	0.049 (0.082)	-0.031 (0.057)	6.30 (4.41)	0.032 (0.24)
<i>R</i> ²	0.05	--	0.05	--	--	--
Number of villages	225	227	225	223	222	227
Mean dependent variable	66.76	0.5	0.13	0.89	60.74	0.47

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***). Errors across regressions are allowed to be correlated. Listwise deletion of missing data.