Chapter 4

Applications

4.1 Arrow-Debreu Markets and Consumption Smoothing

4.1.1 The Intertemporal Budget

- For any given sequence \( \{R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), pick an arbitrary \( q_0 > 0 \) and define \( q_t \) recursively by

\[
q_t = \frac{q_0}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)...(1 + R_t)}.
\]

\( q_t \) represents the price of period-\( t \) consumption relative to period-0 consumption.

- Multiplying the period-\( t \) budget by \( q_t \) and adding up over all \( t \), we get

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \cdot c_t^j \leq q_0 \cdot x_0^j
\]
where

\[ x_0^j \equiv (1 + R_0)a_0 + h_0^j, \]
\[ h_0^j \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_0} [w_t l_t^j - T_t^j]. \]

The above represents the intertemporal budget constraint. \((1 + R_0)a_0^j\) is the household’s \textit{financial wealth} as of period 0. \(T_t^j\) is a lump-sum tax obligation, which may depend on the identity of household but not on its choices. \(h_0^j\) is the present value of labor income as of period 0 net of taxes; we often call \(h_0^j\) the household’s \textit{human wealth} as of period 0. The sum \(x_0^j \equiv (1 + R_0)a_0^j + h_0^j\) represents the household’s \textit{effective wealth}.

- Note that the sequence of per-period budgets and the intertemporal budget constraint are equivalent.

We can then write household’s consumption problem as follows

\[ \max_{c} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t^j, z_t^j) \]
\[ s.t. \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \cdot c_t^j \leq q_0 \cdot x_0^j \]

4.1.2 Arrow-Debreu versus Radner

- We now introduce uncertainty...

- Let \(q(s^t)\) be the period-0 price of a unite of the consumable in period \(t\) and event \(s^t\) and \(w(s^t)\) the period-\(t\) wage rate in terms of period-\(t\) consumables for a given event \(s^t\). \(q(s^t)w(s^t)\) is then the period-\(t\) and event-\(s^t\) wage rate in terms of period-0 consumam-
bles. We can then write household’s consumption problem as follows

$$\max \sum_{t} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi(s^t) U\left(c^j(s^t), z^j(s^t)\right)$$

s.t. $$\sum_{t} \sum_{s^t} q(s^t) \cdot c^j(s^t) \leq q_0 \cdot x^j_0$$

where

$$x^j_0 \equiv (1 + R_0)a_0 + h^j_0,$$

$$h^j_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q(s^t)w(s^t)}{q_0} [\bar{c}^j(s^t) - T^j(s^t)].$$

$$(1 + R_0)a_0^j$$ is the household’s financial wealth as of period 0. $$T^j(s^t)$$ is a lump-sum tax obligation, which may depend on the identity of household but not on its choices. $$h^j_0$$ is the present value of labor income as of period 0 net of taxes; we often call $$h^j_0$$ the household’s human wealth as of period 0. The sum $$x^j_0 \equiv (1 + R_0) a_0^j + h^j_0$$ represents the household’s effective wealth.

### 4.1.3 The Consumption Problem with CEIS

- Suppose for a moment that preferences are separable between consumption and leisure and are homothetic with respect to consumption:

  $$U(c, z) = u(c) + v(z).$$

  $$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-1/\theta}}{1 - 1/\theta}$$

- Letting $\mu$ be the Lagrange multiplier for the intertemporal budget constraint, the FOCs imply

  $$\beta^t \pi(s^t) u'\left(c^j(s^t)\right) = \mu q(s^t)$$
for all \( t \geq 0 \). Evaluating this at \( t = 0 \), we infer \( \mu = u'(c^j_0) \). It follows that

\[
\frac{q(s^t)}{q_0} = \beta^t \pi(s^t) u'(c^j(s^t)) \left( \frac{c^j(s^t)}{c^j_0} \right)^{-1/\theta}.
\]

That is, the price of a consumable in period \( t \) relative to period 0 equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between 0 and \( t \).

- Solving \( q_t/q_0 = \beta^t \pi(s^t) \left( c^j(s^t)/c^j_0 \right)^{-1/\theta} \) for \( c^j(s^t) \) gives

\[
c^j(s^t) = c^j_0 \left( \beta^t \pi(s^t) \right)^{\theta} \left( \frac{q(s^t)}{q_0} \right)^{-\theta}.
\]

It follows that the present value of consumption is given by

\[
\sum_t \sum_{s^t} q(s^t) c^j(s^t) = q_0^{-\theta} c^j_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \beta^t \pi(s^t) \right)^{\theta} q(s^t)^{1-\theta}
\]

Substituting into the resource constraint, and solving for \( c_0 \), we conclude

\[
c^j_0 = m_0 \cdot x^j_0
\]

where

\[
m_0 \equiv \frac{1}{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \beta^t \pi(s^t) \right)^{\theta} q(s^t)^{1-\theta}}.
\]

Consumption is thus linear in effective wealth. \( m_0 \) represent the MPC out of effective wealth as of period 0.

### 4.1.4 Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing, with No Uncertainty

- Consider for a moment the case that there is no uncertainty, so that \( c^j(s^t) = c^j_t \) and \( q(s^t) = q_t \) for all \( s^t \).
• Then, the riskless bond and the Arrow securities satisfy the following arbitrage condition

$$q_t = \frac{q_0}{(1 + R_0)(1 + R_1)\ldots(1 + R_t)}.$$ 

Alternatively,

$$q_t = q_0 \left[ 1 + \tilde{R}_{0,t} \right]^{-t}$$

where $\tilde{R}_{0,t}$ represents the “average” interest rate between 0 and $t$. Next, note that $m_0$ is decreasing (increasing) in $q_t$ if and only if $\theta > 1$ ($\theta < 1$). It follows that the marginal propensity to save in period 0, which is simply $1 - m_0$, is decreasing (increasing) in $\tilde{R}_{0,t}$, for any $t \geq 0$, if and only if $\theta > 1$ ($\theta < 1$).

• A similar result applies for all $t \geq 0$. We conclude

**Proposition 20** Suppose preferences are separable between consumption and leisure and homothetic in consumption (CEIS). Then, the optimal consumption is linear in contemporaneous effective wealth:

$$c^j_t = m_t \cdot x^j_t$$

where

$$x^j_t \equiv (1 + R_t)a^j_t + h^j_t,$$

$$h^j_t \equiv \sum_{\tau = t}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_\tau} \left[ w_{\tau}l^j_\tau - T^j_\tau \right],$$

$$m_t \equiv \frac{1}{\sum_{\tau = t}^{\infty} \beta^{\theta(\tau - t)}(q_\tau / q_t)^{1-\theta}}.$$ 

$m_t$ is a decreasing (increasing) function of $q_\tau$ for any $\tau \geq t$ if and only $\theta > 1$ ($\theta < 1$). That is, the marginal propensity to save out of effective wealth is increasing (decreasing) in future interest rates if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher (lower).
than unit. Moreover, for given prices, the optimal consumption path is independent of the timing of either labor income or taxes.

- Obviously, a similar result holds with uncertainty, as long as there are complete Arrow-Debreu markets.

- Note that any expected change in income has no effect on consumption as long as it does not affect the present value of labor income. Also, if there is an innovation (unexpected change) in income, consumption will increase today and for ever by an amount proportional to the innovation in the annuity value of labor income.

- To see this more clearly, suppose that the interest rate is constant and equal to the discount rate: \( R_t = R = 1/\beta - 1 \) for all \( t \). Then, the marginal propensity to consume is

\[
m = 1 - \beta^\theta (1 + R)^{1-\theta} = 1 - \beta,
\]

the consumption rule in period 0 becomes

\[
c^*_0 = m \cdot [(1 + R)a_0 + h^0_o]
\]

and the Euler condition reduces to

\[
c^*_t = c^*_0
\]

Therefore, the consumer choose a totally flat consumption path, no matter what is the time variation in labor income. And any unexpected change in consumption leads to a parallel shift in the path of consumption by an amount equal to the annuity value of the change in labor income. This is the manifestation of *intertemporal consumption smoothing*. 
• More generally, if the interest rate is higher (lower) than the discount rate, the path of consumption is smooth but has a positive (negative) trend. To see this, note that the Euler condition is
\[
\log c_{t+1} \approx \theta[\beta(1 + R)]^\theta + \log c_t.
\]

4.1.5 Incomplete Markets and Self-Insurance

• The above analysis has assumed no uncertainty, or that markets are complete. Extending the model to introduce idiosyncratic uncertainty in labor income would imply an Euler condition of the form
\[
u'(c^j_t) = \beta(1 + R)E_t u'(c^j_{t+1})\]

Note that, because of the convexity of \(u'\), as long as \(Var_t[c^j_{t+1}] > 0\), we have \(E_t u'(c^j_{t+1}) > u'(E_t c^j_{t+1})\) and therefore
\[
\frac{E_t c^j_{t+1}}{c^j_t} > [\beta(1 + R)]^\theta
\]
This extra kick in consumption growth reflects the precautionary motive for savings. It remains true that transitory innovations in income result to persistent changes in consumption (because of consumption smoothing). At the same time, consumers find it optimal to accumulate a buffer stock, as a vehicle for self-insurance.

4.2 Aggregation and the Representative Consumer

• Consider a deterministic economy populated by many heterogeneous households. Households differ in their initial asset positions and (perhaps) their streams of labor income, but not in their preferences. They all have CEIS preferences, with identical \(\theta\).
Following the analysis of the previous section, consumption for individual $j$ is given by

$$c^j_t = m_t \cdot x^j_t.$$  

Note that individuals share the same MPC out of effective wealth because they have identical $\theta$.

Adding up across households, we infer that aggregate consumption is given by

$$c_t = m_t \cdot x_t$$  

where

$$x_t \equiv (1 + R_t)a_t + h_t,$$

$$h_t \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \frac{q_{\tau}}{q_t} [w_{\tau}l_{\tau} - T_{\tau}],$$

$$m_t \equiv \frac{1}{\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\theta(\tau-t)} (q_\tau/q_t)^{1-\theta}}.$$  

Next, recall that individual consumption growth satisfies

$$\frac{q_t}{q_0} = \frac{\beta^t u'(c^j_t)}{u'(c^j_0)} = \beta^t \left( \frac{c^j_t}{c^j_0} \right)^{-1/\theta},$$

for every $j$. But if all agents share the same consumption growth rate, this should be the aggregate one. Therefore, equilibrium prices and aggregate consumption growth satisfy

$$\frac{q_t}{q_0} = \beta^t \left( \frac{c_t}{c_0} \right)^{-1/\theta}.$$  

Equivalently,

$$\frac{q_t}{q_0} = \frac{\beta^t u'(c_t)}{u'(c_0)}.$$
Consider now an economy that has a single consumer, who is endowed with wealth $x_t$ and has preferences

$$U(c) = \frac{c^{1-1/\theta}}{1-1/\theta}$$

The Euler condition for this consumer will be

$$\frac{q_t}{q_0} = \beta u'(c_t) \frac{u'(c_0)}{u'(c_0)}.$$ 

Moreover, this consumer will find it optimal to choose consumption

$$c_t = m_t \cdot x_t.$$ 

But these are exactly the aggregative conditions we found in the economy with many agents.

That is, the two economies share exactly the same equilibrium prices and allocations. It is in this sense that we can think of the single agent of the second economy as the “representative” agent of the first multi-agent economy.

Note that here we got a stronger result than just the existence of a representative agent. Not only a representative agent existed, but he also had exactly the same preferences as each of the agents of the economy. This was true only because agents had identical preference to start with and their preferences were homothetic. If either condition fails, the preferences of the representative agent will be “weighted average” of the population preferences, with the weights depending on the wealth distribution.

Finally, note that these aggregation results extend easily to the case of uncertainty as long as markets are complete.
4.3 Fiscal Policy

4.3.1 Ricardian Equivalence

- The intertemporal budget for the representative household is given by

\[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t c_t \leq q_0 x_0 \]

where

\[ x_0 = (1 + R_0) a_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \left[ w_t l_t - T_t \right] \]

and \( a_0 = k_0 + b_0 \).

- On the other hand, the intertemporal budget constraint for the government is

\[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t g_t + q_0 (1 + R_0) b_0 = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t T_t \]

- Substituting the above into the formula for \( x_0 \), we infer

\[ x_0 = (1 + R_0) k_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_0} w_t l_t - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_0} g_t \]

That is, aggregate household wealth is independent of either the outstanding level of public debt or the timing of taxes.

- We can thus rewrite the representative household’s intertemporal budget as

\[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t [c_t + g_t] \leq q_0 (1 + R_0) k_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t w_t l_t \]

Since the representative agent’s budget constraint is independent of either \( b_0 \) or \( \{T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), his consumption and labor supply will also be independent. But then the resource constraint implies that aggregate investment will be unaffected as well. Therefore, the
aggregate path \( \{c_t, k_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) is independent of either \( b_0 \) or \( \{T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \). All that matter is the stream of government spending, not the way this is financed.

- More generally, consider now arbitrary preferences and endogenous labor supply, but suppose that the tax burden and public debt is uniformly distributed across households. Then, for every individual \( j \), effective wealth is independent of either the level of public debt or the timing of taxes:

\[
x^j_0 = (1 + R_0)k^j_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_0} w_t l^j_t - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{q_t}{q_0} g_t,
\]

Since the individual’s intertemporal budget is independent of either \( b_0 \) or \( \{T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), her optimal plan \( \{c^j_t, l^j_t, a^j_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) will also be independent of either \( b_0 \) or \( \{T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) for any given price path. But if individual behavior does not change for given prices, markets will continue to clear for the same prices. That is, equilibrium prices are indeed also independent of either \( b_0 \) or \( \{T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \). We conclude

**Proposition 21** Equilibrium prices and allocations are independent of either the initial level of public debt, or the mixture of deficits and (lump-sum) taxes that the government uses to finance government spending.

- **Remark:** For Ricardian equivalence to hold, it is critical both that markets are complete (so that agents can freely trade the riskless bond) and that horizons are infinite (so that the present value of taxes the household expects to pay just equals the amount of public debt it holds). If either condition fails, such as in OLG economies or economies with borrowing constraints, Ricardian equivalence will also fail. Ricardian equivalence may also fail if there are
4.3.2 Tax Smoothing and Debt Management

topic covered in class
notes to be completed

4.4 Risk Sharing and CCAPM

4.4.1 Risk Sharing

topic covered in class
notes to be completed

4.4.2 Asset Pricing and CCAPM

topic covered in class
notes to be completed

4.5 Ramsey Meets Tobin: Adjustment Costs and $q$

topic covered in recitation
notes to be completed

4.6 Ramsey Meets Laibson: Hyperbolic Discounting

4.6.1 Implications for Long-Run Savings

topic covered in class
4.6.2 Implications for Self-Insurance

topic covered in class

notes to be completed