PLANNERS, ARCHITECTS AND LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS
DESIGNING NEW ORLEANS:
DISCIPLINARY DIFFERENCES IN DEVELOPING THE UNITED PLAN

by

Jessica Berman Boatright

BA, Public Policy Analysis and Anthropology
Pomona College
Claremont, California (1998)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2007

© 2007 Jessica Berman Boatright. All Rights Reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute
publicly paper and electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part.

Author

Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Certified by

Professor J. Mark Schuster
Professor of Urban Cultural Policy
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by

Professor Langley Keyes
Ford Professor of City and Regional Planning
Chair, MCP Committee
PLANNERS, ARCHITECTS AND LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS
DESIGNING NEW ORLEANS:
DISCIPLINARY DIFFERENCES IN DEVELOPING THE UNIFIED PLAN

by

Jessica Berman Boatright

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 24, 2007

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning

Abstract

Designing cities is a complex proposition. Planners, architects and landscape architects all center their practice on aspects of this proposition. As such, their respective disciplines share the realm of urban design. This thesis attempts to understand how professionals from these three groups work as urban designers by testing the hypothesis that professional training and affiliation dictates distinct differences in how urban plans are developed by planners, architects or landscape architects.

Relying on the American educational and professional associations for each discipline, the thesis proposes three spectra to contrast the disciplines: The Role of Process, Understanding of Physical Space, and Ultimate Goals. These spectra are applied to cases studies of Unified New Orleans Plan recovery plan development in three of New Orleans’ 13 planning districts. The cases focus on the professional staff for each district, which include one planning firm, one architecture firm and one landscape architecture firm.

The cases demonstrate predictive connections between planning training and concepts and the planning firm’s performance and architecture training and concepts and the architecture firm’s performance. There is less predictive evidence in the case of landscape architecture. The challenges of using a quasi-experimental design, coupled with the intensely complex nature of working in a post-disaster environment in New Orleans, limit the conclusive value of the findings. However, there is a strong enough apparent correlation between the initial predictions and what actually occurred in the cases to warrant further exploration of the hypothesis. As long as planners, architects and landscape architects continue to share the practice of urban design, increasing our understanding about their unique approaches to this work will support greater efficiencies in local projects and a more rigorous and fruitful tradition of city design overall.

Thesis Supervisor: J. Mark Schuster
Title: Professor of Urban Cultural Policy
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking my advising team, Larry Vale and Mark Schuster. Thank you to Larry for taking on a much more significant role than you originally signed up for, and for your personal interest in my research. Thank you to Mark for keeping up with my writing in the face of very difficult circumstances, and for your close and careful eye in reviewing my work. Thank you to Phil Thompson for supporting my work by always finding a way to help me be in New Orleans when I needed to be there.

Thank you to my New Orleans family—Jeff, John, Bobbie, Steven, Dee Dee, Jackie, Linda, Anya and Josephine—for always giving me the sense of home I needed to be productive and successful during this project. A special thanks to Bobbie for housing me, and for bringing me into the Unified New Orleans Plan process and giving me so much access to everything. Thank you to all of the professionals and residents in New Orleans who gave me their time and energy for interviews and conversations about this project. Your perseverance and spirit in taking on the many tasks of rebuilding not only your homes and lives, but also your neighborhoods and your city, never cease to amaze me. I hope that the readers of this thesis will use it as a reminder that that we all have a responsibility to support New Orleans’ rebirth and ensure that we don’t repeat or perpetuate the man-made circumstances that enabled Katrina to be so devastating on so many levels.

A special thank you to the three firms profiled in this thesis, Goody Clancy, Frederic Schwartz Architects and EDSA. Thanks to each of you for sharing your work and knowledge with me, and for giving me so much time in person, on the telephone and via both snail mail and email.

Thank you of course to my friends, those who listened to me as this thesis developed, and those that have not given up on me even as the process took over my every waking moment. Thank you to my family, who always believed I could do this more than I did myself. A special thanks to my Aunt Tina, whose challenges during these last few months have helped me put this work in perspective, and whose energy reminds me how to live each day.

Finally, thank you to the most compassionate and creative architect I will ever know, my husband Eric. I honestly could not have done this without you. Thank you for coming across the country because I thought it was a good idea. Thank you for always challenging me to be better than I think I can be, for being patient, for listening, for helping wherever you can and for always being there for me.
CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................10

Chapter 2: Learning by Comparison .................................................................19
Variations in Training and Key Concepts for the Three Disciplines

Chapter 3: Context .........................................................................................45
Planning in Post-Katrina New Orleans

Chapter 4: Standards for the UNOP Team .......................................................63
Shared Practice and Resources Leading up to the District Work

Chapter 5: Designers in Action ..................................................................74
Case Studies
   District 1 – Goody Clancy: The Planners ..............................................82
   District 12 – EDSA: The Landscape Architects ................................116

Chapter 6: Findings and Implications ..............................................................133

References .....................................................................................................140

Interviews ......................................................................................................147

Appendix ......................................................................................................149
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures
Figure 1.1: Case Study District Locations......................................................14
Figure 2.1: The Process Spectrum.................................................................41
Figure 2.2: The Physical Space Spectrum......................................................42
Figure 2.3: The Goal Spectrum......................................................................43
Figure 3.1: New Orleans Elevations...............................................................48
Figure 3.2: New Orleans Drainage Basin.......................................................49
Figure 3.3: Flood Extents from Hurricane Katrina and Resulting Levee Failures.................................................................55
Figure 4.1: UNOP Timeline.............................................................................69
Figure 5.1: District 1 Neighborhoods...............................................................82
Figure 5.2: Examples of Goody Clancy’s Graphic Representation Style – Rampart Street Corridor.................................................................97
Figure 5.3: District 3 Neighborhoods...............................................................99
Figure 5.4: Population Distribution and Flooding in District 3.....................100
Figure 5.5: District 3 Sectors..........................................................................106
Figure 5.6: Fred Schwartz Diagram...............................................................112
Figure 5.7: Examples of FSA’s Graphic Representation Style – South Carrollton and Claiborne Avenue Intersection Redevelopment (1)..113
Figure 5.8: Examples of FSA’s Graphic Representation Style – South Carrollton and Claiborne Avenue Intersection Redevelopment (2).114
Figure 5.9: District 12 Neighborhoods..............................................................116
Figure 5.10: Race and Class in District 12........................................................119
Figure 5.11: Examples of EDSA’s Graphic Representation Style – Newton Street/General Meyer Avenue Zone A.............................................130
Figure 5.11: Examples of EDSA’s Graphic Representation Style – District Recovery and Community Improvement Plan = Key Projects.....131
Figure 6.1: The Physical Space Spectrum......................................................134

Tables
Table 1.1: Interview Distributions.................................................................17
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the Goody Clancy Planning Districts.................79
Table 5.2: Characteristics of the FSA Planning Districts................................79
Table 5.3: Characteristics of the EDSA Planning Districts............................80
Table 5.4: Variations in District Characteristics.............................................81
Table 5.5: District 1 Stakeholder Organizations............................................84
1

Introduction

Designing cities is a complex proposition. Planners, architects and landscape architects all center their practice on aspects of this proposition. As such, their respective disciplines share the realm of urban design, a field that emerged as an independent academic and professional pursuit in the 1960s.¹ Urban design is an inter-disciplinary endeavor, continually re-shaped and re-directed by professionals trained in its three founding disciplines. In the United States, we do not train urban designers as independent practitioners. While urban design programs do exist, they are all grounded in programs of planning, architecture and landscape architecture.

Planning, architecture and landscape architecture are three distinct disciplines, whose unique understanding of cities and urban practice can be clearly derived from their professional associations and the philosophies underlying their educational programming. While practitioners from each field engage in urban design, the articulated differences between the fields imply that professionals from each field would approach the work differently. My hypothesis is that professional training and affiliation dictates distinct differences in how urban plans are developed by planners, architects or landscape architects. By analyzing the dominant characteristics of city design for each field, I hope to identify a set of planning methods and tools for urban design that combine the most effective elements of each fields’ practice.

There are two components for analysis of my central research question. The first is to create a set of expected differences for each professional group. To accomplish this, I will present a foundation for understanding each of the three fields as three separate schools of thought. In developing this foundation, I will explain how each one understands cities and approaches problem-solving. The second component requires a real urban design problem that allows me to test whether these differences are actually evident in the field. Applying the expectations developed in the initial analysis of the professions to case studies, I will be able to demonstrate what differences, if any; can be predicted from the professional training and affiliation for each field.

In order to accomplish this analysis, I set out to find a group of cases with the following elements:

1) The cases should involve a city design challenge for which practitioners from all three disciplines, planning, architecture and landscape architecture, would have the skills and qualifications to address.

2) The cases should involve professionals from all three disciplines. Individuals from each of these disciplines should have clear leadership roles in designing an approach for their work.

3) The basic elements of the project challenge, including context, timeline and expectations for final product, should be as similar as possible to allow for a depth of comparison between the cases.

New Orleans was a natural place to look for cases. As an MIT student, researcher and fellow, I had worked on a number of projects in or involving New Orleans since October, 2005, and was very familiar with ongoing planning and recovery activities. Moreover, rebuilding the city after Hurricane Katrina presented the largest and most urgent current city design challenge in the nation. The
concentration planning and design projects and practitioners working in the city made New Orleans a likely environment for identifying appropriate case studies.

The district planning activities of the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) presented a quasi-experimental design that fit the needs of my investigation. The UNOP, conducted between July 2006 and January 2007, was designed to be the final phase of Post-Hurricane Katrina recovery planning in New Orleans. The UNOP included two simultaneous planning activities. The first was the creation of a citywide plan that addressed cross-cutting issues, such as restoring city service provision and infrastructure, a proposal for the city’s rebuilding footprint and flood protection updates. The second was the district planning process. Following the 13 district boundaries established by the city planning commission, five different professional teams were selected to create local plans for each districts. These plans involved a higher level of specificity about neighborhood-level recovery needs and opportunities for redevelopment within the recovery process. This component of the process provided the best source for case studies. Selecting individual district planning processes as case studies, my initial requirements for cases were fulfilled as follows:

1) The dynamic nature of recovery planning in the UNOP would include redesigning structures, rebuilding neighborhoods, reinstating service delivery, policy review, environmental management and restoration, considerations of plan implementation and sustainability and considerable public participation. Each of the disciplines has expertise necessary to address these issues.

---

2 In order to apply for state and federal recovery funding, each Parish in Louisiana was required to submit a comprehensive recovery plan to the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA). The LRA had strict requirements for these plans, which incorporated specific levels of recovery information and community input. Previous plans done for New Orleans (or Orleans Parish, New Orleans’ Parish, whose boundaries are the same as the City of New Orleans) had failed to meet all of the LRA’s requirements for a parish recovery plan. The UNOP was designed to integrate the work of all of these previous efforts and employ a process that would satisfy the LRA. Please see Chapter 3 for more detail on New Orleans’ Post-Katrina planning history.
2) Five different professional teams were selected to carry out the District planning process. The teams were directed by five firms, each with a different field of specialization. One team was headed by a planning firm, one by an architecture firm, and one by a landscape architecture firm. The firm directing the fourth team was a partnership between an architect and an urban designer. The fifth team was led by a community organizing and housing rights agency.

3) The UNOP established the parameters for all district plans. These included a project schedule, objectives for each public meeting, and the format and required elements for the final plan.

The three specific case districts in my thesis are as follows:

- Planning District 1, which includes the French Quarter, the Warehouse District, and New Orleans’ Central Business District, led by Goody Clancy
- Planning District 3, which included a series of primarily residential neighborhoods along Carrollton Street, in addition to Broadmoor, Freret and Riverside, led by Fred Schwartz Architects
- District 12, on New Orleans’ West Bank, led by EDSA, Inc.
Methodology & Document Organization

To set the stage for analysis, I began my research by examining the academic and professional underpinnings of planning, architecture and landscape architecture. Using academic and professional associations as my guides, I create a basic outline of the interests and values of each field. From this platform, my literature review takes two directions. First, I explore previous scholarship about commonalities and differences between the disciplines. Second, I focus on urban design as the proposed intersection of the fields, and what existing literature about urban design might predict about the strengths of practitioners from each. Using this combination of association

---

descriptions and scholarly analysis, I outline the different practices and behaviors I anticipate to observe in the case studies.

Countless articles, books and films have been produced documenting the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, and it is not my intent to try to repackage this extensive body of research. For the purposes of this thesis, my contextual analysis focuses on the three strands of Pre- and Post-Katrina New Orleans that are essential for understanding the dynamics underlying the case studies. These strands, presented in Chapter 3, are natural systems, architectural heritage, and politics and planning.

The UNOP process was underway as my research began, which afforded me the unique opportunity to observe multiple aspects of the process first-hand. I drew on three sources for my case study research. The first was the extensive paper, sound and film documentation of the process, much of which was stored on the Unified New Orleans website. Second, I was able to attend multiple public and internal meetings as an observer. The meetings included at least one public meeting led by each of the case study firms, two Citywide public meetings, a Community Support Organization (citizen oversight) Board meeting, the district planning teams' weekly conference call, the UNOP Communications Staff meeting, and the UNOP Central Staff meeting. The third, and most extensive portion of my research, was individual interviews.

The goal of the interviewing process was to collect perspectives from the case study firms, process leadership, and participant viewpoints. My interviews were conducted in January, March, and April 2007, and lasted between 45 and 80 minutes each. My interview subjects were divided into three categories, as follows:
• Group 1: Members of the professional planning teams for each of the three selected districts. All the district planning teams had one principal firm (the “District Planner”) and a series of subcontractors. My focus in the interview process was on the principal firms, but I also interviewed representatives from at least one local (New Orleans) subcontracting firm for each team.

• Group 2: Community participants from each of the three case districts. The goal of interviewing participants was to understand how the firms worked with community and integrated their input into plan development. As discussed in Chapter 2, the role that community should play in the design process is a major point of deviation among the fields, and talking to participants was an important way to understand if this difference could be observed in practice. Given the time constraints of this thesis, I was able only able to conduct seven formal interviews with community participants from each district. In each district, I tried to select a geographically and socio-economically diverse group of individuals. I was referred to these individuals through the district planners, other district participants, other interview subjects or my own personal connections made at district meetings.

• Group 3: Citywide UNOP leadership. My purpose in interviewing citywide leadership was to solicit a more holistic impression of how the UNOP process worked, and how the district projects fit into the larger scheme of the UNOP process. My interview subjects in Group 3 included the Chair of the Community Support Organization (the citizen oversight group for the process), a representative from the Greater New Orleans Foundation (the primary funding agency), three members of the UNOP coordinating staff, a member of the

---

4 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Greater New Orleans Foundation hired Concordia, LLC, a New Orleans-based architecture and planning firm, early on in the process to act as the central facilitating team between process leadership, elected officials, public administrators, the Citywide Team and the district planning teams.
In all, the distribution of my interview subjects was, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1: Planning Team Members</th>
<th>Group 2: Community Participants</th>
<th>Group 3: Process and City-Wide Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A full discussion of the case studies can be found in Chapters 4 and 5.

Taking all of this research into consideration, Chapter 6 returns to the central hypothesis. Looking at the framework established by the literature and the evidence presented in the cases, I will discuss whether anticipated differences between the disciplines were demonstrated in the case studies. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these findings, and what they suggest about city design practice.
This thesis asks how planners, architects and landscape architects approach complex urban design projects differently, and what can be learned about effective participatory urban design from these three approaches. These fields are closely tied historically and ideologically, and the lines that separate these fields are not clean. As a result, it is difficult to find an actor in a single design discipline whose work in practice is unrelated to the others. Still, it is worth asking how the fundamental beliefs and training of each of these professions shape practitioners’ approaches to public design processes.

Before addressing specific case studies, it is crucial to establish an understanding of what drives each of the disciplines. Building on this, I will propose a similar explanation of urban design, the central practice that brings actors from all of these disciplines together. Through these discussions, I will be able to outline a set of theoretical expectations about how these professionals will execute their work in a project setting.

In order to gain a general perspective on the goals and ideologies of each field, I will look to the discipline’s American professional and educational associations. It is virtually impossible to identify a single “true” form of any of the disciplines, as each one is made up of multiple individual schools and firms more accurately characterized as a set of overlapping approaches. However, the professional and educational associations are membership-based organizations that still act as the largest unifying bodies within their respective fields, and they set the standards for professional

---

5 Discussions of the disciplines within this thesis are limited to education and practice in the United States.
certification and academic accreditation. For each discipline, I will briefly review the history of American educational thought, in the hopes of tracing their dominant theoretical strands. Pinpointing the exact origin of any of these disciplines is difficult, as they could arguably be traced back far before the advent of professional training programs or organizations. Given that the history of these fields is not the subject of this particular piece of research, I begin the historical discussion where it is most relevant to the discussion at hand, setting the starting point at the introduction of formal training in the United States. Looking beyond history, this section also discusses the fundamentals of academic training and education in each field, asks how the fields self-define, and explores the ethical standards of each profession.

Building on these definitions, I will make a few initial predictions about anticipated differences, and then turn to previous studies examining the differences between the three fields. Existing research is primarily focused on how academics and practitioners frame and structure their approach to urban design problems. A second set of literature, discussed at the end of this section, considers how the differences between the fields manifest when members of each field work with one another.

The third section of this chapter looks at urban design itself. My intent here is not to attempt an all-encompassing understanding of urban design. Rather, the discussion presents urban design as the shared arena of the three disciplines. To accomplish this, I will use the literature to define urban design as a practice area. Within these explanations is an ongoing conversation about urban design as a field that either links the disciplines or results from their separation from one another.

---

6 In 2004, the American Planning Association reported that its membership exceeded 34,000 (http://www.planning.org/25anniversary/achievements.htm). In 2007, the American Institute of Architects reported a membership of over 80,000 (http://www.aia.org/about_default). In 2007, the American Society of Landscape Architects reported over 11,000 members (http://host.asla.org/membership/MbrHndbk.htm).
Before moving on to the introduction of the case studies, I will review the research explored in this chapter. In the final section of the chapter, I will use this collective body of knowledge to build a set of expectations about professional behavior for each discipline. These expectations will then be used to test whether practitioners from each discipline behave differently in the cases, as predicted.

**Defining the Disciplines**

**Planning**

Planning was first formally taught in the US in the Landscape Architecture School at Harvard University in 1909. The University Of Illinois Department Of Horticulture was the first school to create an official chair in “Civic Design.” (1913). The American City Planning Institute, the precursor to today’s interrelated organizations, the American Planning Association (APA) and the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP), was founded in 1917. Planning as a profession began to gain recognition at the local government level in the 1910s, during which time it received a boost from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 1917 “Standard City Planning Enabling Act.”

Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, planners were primarily positioned not as government employees, but as members of public planning commissions and as private practitioners. The proliferation of independent academic planning programs during this time was slow, a factor that Albert Guttenberg and Louis Wetmore attribute to the limited employment opportunities for stand-alone planners (as opposed to planners who were also architects, engineers or landscape architects).

---

8 Ibid.
The post-World War II period served as a major boon to both planning practice and education, as a new tradition of federal investment in public works supported a number of jobs as local government administrators or government contractors in private practice.\(^{10}\)

During this period, planners advocated for (and were charged with executing) "comprehensive plans," masterplans or blueprints for cities that, in theory, used data and reason to create urban environments that supported better living for all citizens.\(^{11}\) In the late 1950s and early 1960s, planning's scope expanded to include professionals more attuned to social issues (as well as physical). In the following decade, planning became more deeply immersed in data and information management. In the 1980s, planning moved towards a focus on decision-making processes. More recently, these two approaches, the interest in data and information management from the 1970s and the collaborative decision-making pursuits of the 1980s, have been merged.\(^{12}\)

Planning does not have a single, distinct definition. Numerous articles argue over planning's distinctions as an academic discipline versus a practice, over the importance of the focus on urban environments as opposed to others, and as to planning as a trade of generalists or specialists. The Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP)'s Strategic Marketing Committee 1997 discussion article, "Anchor Points for Planning’s Identification," proposes an updated method to define planning. The committee's definition captures the key themes of the majority of existing definitions by focusing on generic cross-cutting themes that link late 20\(^{th}\) Century theory and practice. The use of themes, rather than a single definition, signaled an effort to recognize the

\(^{10}\) Ibid, 33.


\(^{12}\) Ibid.
diversity within the field of planning and highlight its connections rather than focus on its lack of clear boundaries. The proposed themes were as follows:

1) “A focus on improvement of human settlements…
2) A focus on interconnections among distinct community facets…
3) A focus on the future and pathways of change over time, encompassing…
4) A focus on identification of the diversity of needs and distributional consequences in human settlements…
5) A focus on open participation in decision-making, including…
6) A focus on linking knowledge and collective action…”

The use of “human settlements” as opposed to “cities” or “communities” appears to be particularly important in modern definitions of planning, as it encompasses the widest possible variety of places people live, both domestically and internationally. Interestingly, the Committee highlights Theme 6, “linking knowledge and collective action,” as planning’s most distinguishing characteristic. This is particularly important in terms of planning’s role as an academic discipline, as planners are more focused on action than some of their more research-oriented peers. If this is true, one could expect that a planner’s approach would be more likely than other disciplines to use scholarly information and past precedents as a way to support the creation of concrete implementation strategies, rather than for the generation of knowledge itself. This also implies a planner’s commitment to the strength of a “collective,” to some assembly of people that represent something much larger than the expertise of the individual planner. This perspective is quite different from that of architecture, discussed below, which places a strong value on the ability of an individual designer to general creative solutions independent of others.

Formal training for planners supports the pursuit of these themes by presenting a wide range of issues and experiences that train students to approach problems holistically. The Planning

Accreditation Board outlines four performance criteria for all accredited planning programs: the curricula must allow students to gain an understanding of human settlements; to learn about current and historical planning practice, history and process; to develop skills to practice in a variety of different settings; and to fully understand how to conduct oneself within the ethical standards of the profession. Planning education is a combination of classroom lectures, studio or practicum exercises and coursework, all focused on professional preparation.

Planners are governed by a Code of Ethics, first established in 1971. The American Institute of Certified Planner (AICP)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, revised and adopted in March, 2005, begins by stating the basic principles that are to guide planners. These principles are divided into three areas: “1. Our overall responsibility to the public,” “2. Our responsibility to our clients and employers,” and “3. Our responsibility to our profession and our colleagues.” Most notable in this code is the expression of the planner’s obligation to the public:

“We shall seek social justice by working to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of the disadvantaged and to promote racial and economic integration.”

This understanding sets planners apart, in that their professional obligation does not only demand allegiance to the public alone, but to a preference for a values-based obligation to social justice.

Architecture

Formal architectural training was not introduced in the United States until 1865. The Morrill Act (1862), which gave federal land grants to institutions that provided practical training for young

---

Americans, supported the proliferation of architectural programs. The first program was offered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, followed by the University of Illinois and Cornell, and then others. These American institutions were the beginning of an important tradition, but during this time most American architects still viewed the Ecole des Beaux Arts in Paris as the intellectual epicenter of architectural education. This is significant because the Beaux Arts model established architectural training's focus on the design studio as the central organizing and distinguishing experience of the educational program (something that continues to the present day). The Beaux Arts also championed architecture as an art form, judging student projects purely on the basis of preference and artistic quality.

A major shift in architectural education came in 1934, when American schools began to incorporate the German Bauhaus movement, brought to the US when Nazi Germany closed down the Dassau, Germany campus. The Bauhaus training model was largely oppositional to Beaux Arts. Instead of focusing simply on architectural drawing and modeling techniques, Bauhaus students worked on actual construction sites, replacing the studio setting with real world building experience. Moreover, the modernist Bauhaus movement placed architecture in the larger picture of technological advancements and new trends towards large-scale production. This movement integrated the practical into architectural education, and introduced a new focus on the building process into architecture programs.

Another noteworthy shift in architectural education took place in the 1960s, when architecture schools, influenced by the new societal focus on social awareness and community development,
began to engage in projects and establish programs devoted to pro-bono community service. These programs served the dual function of providing students with practical experience and simultaneously infusing a new tradition of social responsibility in architecture schools. The orientation of these efforts leans in the direction of planning education, exploring issues of social justice through design. These programs continue quite successfully in many schools, and their presence has been felt especially strongly in Post-Katrina recovery in New Orleans.

In the 1990s, architecture's role as an art form was reinvigorated, a movement that has been carried into the present day. Dagenhart and Sawicki argue that architecture has returned to its original focus on design of artifacts themselves.\(^{20}\) Ryan Wyatt argues that the prevalence of architecture in magazines and galleries embodies this broader-scale appreciation of architecture as art.\(^{21}\)

Architectural training is focused on developing the student as designer, and the majority of architecture programs require participation in a design studio of some kind in every semester of formal educational training. The studio has evolved over time to integrate both academic theory and practical training into one intensive activity, although there is tremendous variation in which one of these areas dominates at each school and within the various studios in any individual institution.

The Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture recommends that architectural training include architectural history and theory, behavioral sciences, structural and mechanical engineering, and economics (exposure to behavioral sciences and economics is probably more limited in some professional training programs than history, theory, and issues around structural and mechanical


\(^{21}\) Wyatt, 46.
Moreover, the intensive focus on the designer-architect has been brought into question in the last several years, as the profession increasingly demands technical-architects, facilitator-architects, project manager-architects, firm director-architects, and other roles essential to success in architecture today. Community-service related programs in architecture schools to address some of these limitations, but there is still a gap between architecture’s central training methodology and the small number of architects who are actually able to work as full-time designers in their professional careers. This issue appears to be more pronounced in architecture than in the other disciplines in my thesis.

The American Institute of Architects “2004 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct,” identifies four primary actors to whom architects are accountable to be help: the public, the client, the profession, and colleagues. The overarching General Obligations are stated as:

“Members should maintain and advance their knowledge of the art and science of architecture, respect the body of architectural accomplishment, contribute to its growth, thoughtfully consider the social and environmental impact of their professional activities, and exercise learned and uncompromised professional judgment.”

The architect’s obligation to the public is framed in two parts. First, the architect has a societal or political responsibility to adhere to all of the laws regarding practice. Second, the architect’s practice should “promote and serve the public interest.” In comparison with planning’s overarching ethical obligation to public and stated commitment to social justice, and the landscape architect’s entirely separate Code of Ethics for environmental responsibility, the role of public accountability in architectural ethics is not as prominent. To the architect, the advancement of architecture itself is the central focus of the Code of Ethics.

24 Ibid., 2.
American Landscape Architecture was born at the turn of the 20th Century, inspired in large part by the work of Frederick Law Olmsted, the "father" of the American practice. Early landscape architects grounded their work on the disciplines of agriculture, civil engineering and artistry. The first landscape architecture programs drew from both architecture and horticultural schools, and their early work was crucial in shaping (and planning) America's extensive parks system.

The landscape architect's central concern is the relationship between the built and natural environment. The American Society of Landscape Architecture (ASLA) states that landscape architecture is a profession "committed to creating healthy, enjoyable and secure places for the future." According to the ASLA, landscape architecture is not only about planning and design, but it also "encompasses the analysis...management, and stewardship of the natural and built environments." Landscape architecture places significant emphasis on the artistry of design practices, a focus derived from the discipline’s historic roots in architecture. However, the landscape architect has a special concern for the design and maintenance of natural environments, as opposed to man-made constructions (the traditional focus of architectural design).

---

The central themes of a landscape architecture education are design, construction techniques, art, history, and natural and social sciences. The ASLA states that a landscape architect needs the following skills:

- "Sensitivity to landscape quality
- Understanding of the arts and a humanistic approach to design
- Ability to analyze problems in terms of design and physical form
- Technical competence to translate a design into a built work
- Skills in all aspects of professional practice including management and professional ethics"

It is notable that, while all three disciplines establish professional ethical codes, planning and landscape architecture also prioritize ethical practice as a central theme of professional training.

The ASLA requires its members to adhere to two separate Codes of Professional Ethics. The first, the ASLA Code of Professional Ethics describes professional behaviors that support the profession’s key principles – “public health, safety, and welfare and recognition and protection of the land and its resources.” The ASLA Code of Environmental Ethics sets ethical standards in support of the profession’s central interest, the landscape. The tenets of this code focus on the integrity of biological systems in support of human well-being, protection of the environment for future generations, and the importance of a stable environment for economic stability. In contrast to planning, the landscape architect’s commitment to the public good is expressed through the environment people use, with a softer focus on the people themselves (the central focus of the planner’s ethical obligations).

---

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
Comparing the Professions

Preliminary Predictions

Simply looking at these individual descriptions of each field, a few distinct differences in behavior can already be predicted. These behaviors can be represented in terms of spectrums of difference for the purpose of testing the central research question.

Spectrum 1: The Role of Process

In terms of process, the discipline descriptions imply that planners will place more emphasis on a collaborative process as one of their key professional tools. Architects, on the other hand, are trained to understand process as the means to their actual skill, the design proposal. Landscape architects should be somewhere in the middle, probably leaning more towards architecture’s understanding than planning’s interpretation.

Spectrum 2: Understanding Physical Space

I anticipate that landscape architects will take the broadest view of physical space, seeing it as a broad mix of natural and built structures in a shared environment. The definitions so far suggest that planners have a broad lens on the urban environment, but understand physical space simply as a component of the social systems of a city. For architects, physical space is their canvas, the setting for their designs to be executed.

Spectrum 3: Ultimate Goal

The planner’s ideal result is a solution that allows them to integrate the expertise of their field with the will of the stakeholders with whom they collaborate. Principles of social justice should be represented within their final product. The landscape architect’s ideal is a creative solution that pays
utmost respect to the needs and value of the natural environment. The architect works to achieve a
creative solution that embodies their role as a design leader. Ideally, this product will also support
both public good and the exercise of architecture itself.

With these initial thoughts in mind, I will now turn to the scholarly literature about the three
disciplines, and then reflect on how the works of previous scholars inform my developing spectra.

*Literature*

While not extensive, there is some pre-existing scholarship comparing actors from these three
professions. What literature does exist is primarily concerned with contrasting architecture and
planning. I have presented some discussion of contrasts and similarities between landscape
architecture and planning in this section. Because of limitations in the literature, however, the
treatment of landscape architecture in this section is much more limited than the attention given to
the other two disciplines.

Planners’ current focus on problem-solving techniques and process emerged as planners re-
positioned themselves as professional decision-makers during the proliferation of public service
opportunities after World War II. Dagenhart and Sawicki, in their exploration of the split between
architecture and planning, point out that early in planning’s history, it was heavily influenced by the
scientific management ideal. Planners needed mathematical decision-making tools as they marketed
themselves as decision-making professionals, arguing that public agencies needed planners with
these specialized skills in urban leadership positions. In preparing themselves for these roles,
planning education also developed a stronger focus on urban policy analysis. This shift may have

---

31 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 11.
been as much an ideological interest in public administration as it was a marketing decision to ensure employment for planners.

In their exploration of the split between landscape architecture and planning as it occurred at the University of Illinois, Guttenberg and Wetmore point to the shift caused by the rise of zoning in the 1920s. Prior to this time, both landscape architects and planners considered the landscape to be of primary concern. After the introduction of zoning, however, planners narrowed their interest to land use as opposed to the landscape as a whole. This difference between approaches in landscape architecture and planning arose again in the 1950s, when two Illinois faculty, Stanley White (landscape architect) and Karl Lohmann (planner), lectured in opposition to one another about the two professions and the land. White argued that landscape architecture’s focus was on “the tension between man and the environment.” He taught students that they should take issues related to contemporary society into account, but that they should never compromise their ideas as designers focused on this central tension. Lohmann, on the other hand, taught planners that their central focus, land use, was entirely based on the practice of facilitating compromises within current society. In this debate, White was affirming the architectural roots of landscape architecture, affirming the landscape architect’s role as artist/designer above all else. In contrast, Lohmann’s argument grounded planners in practical applications as opposed to artistic design.

In a 1956 conference session of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, George Beal described how planners design in a way that is still relevant today. According to Beal, the planner’s practice of design involves “synthesizing of all elements into a well-coordinated plan which will

32 Guttenberg & Wetmore, 31.
33 Guttenberg & Wetmore, 31-32.
satisfy the determined objectives of the citizens as to the kind of community they desire.  

Similarly, Dagenhart and Sawicki argue that the space within which planners design is "social space," which considers the relationship between space and organizations or people.  

Planners' interest in space is primarily concerned with what happens where, demonstrated through the stress planners place on zoning and land use regulations.  

The literature is not decisive as to the importance of physical space in planning, and many historical accounts of the discipline argue that the physical emphasis of planning greatly diminished around the middle of the 20th Century. Instead, the literature argues that planners interested in 3-dimensional conceptions of space have deviated from planning and now identify as urban designers.

The original and newly-echoed trends in architecture enforce Wyatt’s argument that architecture is more theoretical and more subjective than planning. For architects, the practice of design is paramount. As artists, architects must be able to think, model and create concepts and designs independently. Thus, Wyatt argues, the architect can produce great designs without the need for public input. The central concerns of the architect, according to Dagenhart and Sawicki (who are planners), are the concepts of physical determinism and technological efficiency. Wyatt states that, for the architect, an intuitive sense of reason, as opposed to an empirical analysis of a specific context, is the preferred method for understanding the world. He proceeds to argue that, in order for the design process to be efficient, an architect must be able to focus on designing and not be distracted by other concerns.

---

35 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 2.
36 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 6-7.
37 Wyatt, 46.
38 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 6-7.
39 Wyatt, 50-51.
Dagenhart and Sawicki have spent considerable time investigating the placement of architecture and planning departments in universities throughout the country, using academic institutions as important indicators of the differences and affinities between the fields. Analyzing the relationship between the two programs and professions, they argue that the close academic relationship between the two professions is primarily determined by an administrative tradition. In their discussion, they acknowledge that the essential curriculum format, particularly in its reliance on a studio or similar practical experience, links the two disciplines. In spite of this, they argue that the actual educational content of the two programs are very different.  

Much of the literature agrees that the rise of the planner’s role as a local government employee, and increase in federal funding to support planners’ involvement in public works, marked the most important split between planning and architecture/landscape architecture. As a result, the planners’ focus on public interest and the architect’s focus on serving a client or simply on the project diverged further. Since the 1950s, the planner’s employer or client has typically been a public agency or a consulting firm working for a public agency. In contrast, the architect is more likely to have been in private practice, and most of the architect’s client base is in the private sector. Wyatt argues that these differences in clients have caused different traditions in terms of work ethics. Wyatt presents a study of planners’ loyalties showing a strong conflict amongst most planners between their loyalty to their client (the government agency) and their loyalty to the community they serve (residents, property owners and other private citizens). Architects do not seem to suffer from the same loyalty conflicts.  

40 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 1-3.  
41 Wyatt, 50.
Dagenhart and Sawicki propose an analogy of architects and planners as two sides of the same coin. One side, the planner side, represents “civitas” (the citizen), while the architect side represents “urbs” (stones). In their work, planners propose heterotopias, looking at cities as complex realities, and proposing solutions that can be implemented within the context of what is already happening in cities. Architects, on the other hand, are able to develop creative proposals that push thinking beyond current assumptions by develop proposals based on a utopian ideal city. Architects can do this because of their ability to think 3-dimensionally, without the constraints of scientific management and collaborative decision-making. The planner’s expertise in process and the architect’s in product, offer two complimentary, not competing, skills. Focusing on the modern trend of architects working even more with private developers, who often exercise more control over the built environment than other actors, Dagenhart and Sawicki present one additional pair of roles for the architect and planner—the architect as the developer and planner as the “guardian of the consequences” of development.\textsuperscript{42}

In his response to Dagenhart and Sawicki's article, Robert G. Dyck argues that there is an important commonality between architects and planners. Both fields, he points out, are interested in furthering knowledge in order to apply it, rather than simply for the advancement of knowledge itself. Seen in this way, the charge of both fields is “problem solving for future time.”\textsuperscript{43} This leads us into a discussion of urban design, where planners, landscape architects and architects all engage in this collective charge.

\textsuperscript{42} Dagenhart & Sawicki, 3.
\textsuperscript{43} Robert G. Dyck, 143.
The Shared Arena for Practice: Urban Design

Unlike planning, architecture and landscape architecture, there is no single unifying urban design professional or educational model in the United States. Masters degrees in urban design are offered as a secondary professional degree for students who have already completed training in one of the three disciplines already discussed. Alternatively, some design schools (including MIT) offer an “Urban Design Certificate” as a complement to planning, architecture or landscape architecture Masters Degrees. There is no accreditation process for any of these programs independent of the existing accreditation processes for the three other disciplines.

There is no common definition for “urban design.” The lack of organization or clear definition may be attributed in part to the field’s relative youth and its tremendously interdisciplinary nature. Some scholars argue that urban design formed out of the split between architecture and planning.⁴⁴ Within these conversations is an implication that the absence of a unifying urban design body may be the product of three disciplines that all want to claim urban design practice and have not yet determined how to share this claim.

Anne Vernez Moudon presents urban design as a young field that emerged in the 1960s. Urban design came out of “a search for quality urban form,” with a stronger focus on practicality as opposed to theory. Seminal works of the field can be attributed to a collection of planning, architecture and landscape architecture scholars.⁴⁵

Alan Kreditor builds on Moudon’s discussion, presenting urban design as the intersection of architecture and planning. Kreditor’s urban design is “concerned with pleasure as well as

⁴⁴ Dagenhart & Sawicki, Kreditor, Lang.  
⁴⁵ Moudon, 331-332.
performance...embracing traditional design paradigms with city building processes.” Moudon argues that urban design incorporates both architecture and planning in an effort to take each discipline farther than their individual charters allow. Underlining Moudon’s presentation of urban design is a fundamental central tension—that urban design tries to connect the substantive-descriptive pursuit of understanding cities and the normative-prescriptive endeavor of designing cities. She states that urban designers “imagine and execute schemes for the future.”

Dagenhart and Sawicki present urban design not as an intersection, but as the product of the void left between architecture and planning when planning began to de-emphasize physical space concerns in the 1960s and 1970s. In their discussion, the space left between the fields at this time allowed urban design to emerge as a field that “adopted the process orientation of planning while maintaining the product orientation of architecture.”

Lang has examined the challenges of how architects and planners take on different approaches to problem-solving. Lang uses the work of architectural scholar Colin Rowe to contrast the planner’s use of paradigms and the architect’s use of programs. According to Rowe, paradigms are statements of what should be done based on patterns of examples, whereas programs present a specific design for what could solve a problem. Lang argues for the need for collaboration, partly because, in his view, one needs both a paradigm and a program to address a problem. Similarly, he argues that planners are limited by their understanding of the built world, while architects are limited by their

---

46 Kreditor, 157.
47 Ibid.
48 Moudon, 332-334.
49 Dagenhart & Sawicki, 8.
understanding of people, so they need one another to be successful.\textsuperscript{50} Wyatt argues for a similar need to collaboration, stating that right-brained architects and left-brained planners need to recognize their differences and reach a common understanding to work together successfully.\textsuperscript{51}

Landscape architecture’s stake in urban design has been heightened recently with the development of Landscape Urbanism. Landscape Urbanism proposes that the natural landscape of an urban environment is the key to understanding the City, as opposed to the more popular focus on built form. Landscape Urbanism looks at the relationships between natural and built form. Focusing on abandoned and open spaces in the city, Landscape Urbanism aims to look at human organization as it relates to these common areas.

Regardless of whether urban design represents a convergence or divergence, each of these descriptions raise a series of questions about how architects and planners can act individually and still achieve holistic urban design solutions. Considering the discussion of each of the professions, architects and landscape architects, with their focus on the artistry of design, should excel at ensuring pleasure in the physical manifestations (products) of Urban Design. With architect’s historical ability to use design propositions as a tool for imagining ideas beyond what we see in practical application, they should be stronger in the first part of this endeavor. On the other hand, planners, whose training is focused much more on practical applications, public involvement and management, should demonstrate strength in both the process and the execution of urban design. Finally, in the context of a place like New Orleans, landscape architects’ strength in understanding the interplay between environment and cities is an essential piece of urban design. With reference to

\textsuperscript{51} Wyatt, 53.
these issues, Moudon argues that urban design is likely to remain an interdisciplinary field, as none of the pre-existing disciplines can independently address the depth of complexities within it. 

Reaching beyond the silos of each of the three disciplines in question, Aseem Inam's proposal for a new approach to urban design that provides a lens that will be useful in understanding the UNOP case studies. Inam sets out to define a “meaningful approach” to urban design, meaning a practice that is “truly consequential in improving quality of life.” To accomplish this, Inam outlines three dimensions that the practitioner's approach must fulfill. First, it must be teleological, meaning that the practice is motivated by its purpose as opposed to any disciplinary approach. The second dimension is that it is catalytic, meaning that the endeavor can further relate or continue socio-economic development. Finally, the approach must be relevant, meaning that it is grounded in the specific urban, social and environmental circumstances unique to a given problem.

What would Inam’s meaningful approach look like in the UNOP cases? Teleological urban design’s purpose is to improve quality of life in a given urban environment. The overarching goal is to make a community work better, and the built environment is an element to support this, rather than the primary focus. In New Orleans, then, a teleological urban design proposal would first articulate how a community will be improved through a given District Plan. It would propose physical changes, but these changes would be represented in terms of how they support community change.

52 Moudon, 337.
54 Ibid.
55 Inam, 38-39.
56 Inam, 48.
57 Inam, 38-39.
Catalytic urban design is not only about projects themselves, but about creating projects that will leverage greater opportunities for community, economic or international development. Inam’s international development proposal is that, in order to compete in a global economy, the urban design of individual places should stress their local culture and distinguish a place by what it has to offer to the world. Since the case studies follow a fairly short period of time, I cannot measure the specific catalytic value of the UNOP proposals. However, the practitioners’ awareness of the catalytic potential of proposals should be expressed in their personal presentations and in the plans themselves.

Relevant urban design will articulate the specific challenges of creating district-level recovery plans. The UNOP planner’s primary task was to propose a strategy for local rebuilding. Simultaneously, though, the planning process and final document should have used the unique opportunity to redevelop and better communities beyond basic recovery through the concentration of resources coming to New Orleans.

---

58 Inam, 38.
59 Inam, 45.
Summary of Expectations

Reflecting back to earlier in the chapter, the scholarly literature expands upon the proposed spectra in the following ways:

*Spectrum 1: The Role of Process*

The scholarship supports the idea that collaborative process is one of the planner's most important work products. The literature supplements this idea by noting that planners are not only skilled at support collaboration between people, but also at synthesizing the multiple ideas and concepts that arise in a collaborative process. The literature does not expand the initial understanding about the role of process for landscape architects in any considerable way. However, it does affirm the idea that the landscape architect's work is about striking a balance between the professional affinity for design and the existing needs of the natural environment in which the landscape architect works.

Finally, the literature expands upon the initial idea that the architect's process is what the architect must go through to achieve their goal—the process is a means to a product. Additionally, the architect's skill is dictated by their ability to be a creative actor on their own, and to be able to create designs that benefit others through an independent process. Therefore, they sit on the opposite end of the spectrum from planners in that their process is individual, rather than collaborative.

*Figure 2.1: The Process Spectrum*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative process is</td>
<td>Process is a balancing act</td>
<td>Process is a means to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a planner's expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td>an end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process is an exercise in</td>
<td></td>
<td>Process is an individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synthesizing ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td>exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spectrum 2: Understanding of Physical Space

In terms of landscape architecture, scholarship continues to support the earlier idea that physical space is shared by built and natural structures. With the introduction of Landscape Urbanism, the landscape architect also exercises their expertise in considering not just these two elements, but the fabric between them. In this way, the landscape architect should be trained to do their work based on the widest possible understanding of a given environment (or landscape). The literature provides planners a specific perspective on physical space, not only as an element of a social environment, as anticipated earlier, but also as a system of uses that create the urban environment (i.e., a matrix of uses and zoning types). The architect continues to focus on individual designs. Urban physical space, for the architect, is a collection of designed structures.

Figure 2.2: The Physical Space Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad landscape with many components, natural, built and in between</td>
<td>Physical space is a component of dynamic urban places</td>
<td>A canvas for design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical space is a system of uses that impact society</td>
<td>A collections of designs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spectrum 3: Ultimate Goal

From the literature, we learn that the planner’s goal is not only to integrate knowledge and collective action, but to do so in a way that is realistic. The planner’s charge is to propose solutions that will work within existing conditions. The scholarship serves to support the idea that landscape architects want to be creative and support the environment. In addition, as discussed on the process spectrum, the landscape architect needs to balance their creativity, the natural environment and the urban landscape. The balance concept seems to be central to the landscape architect’s practice. Finally, the scholarship expands on how the architect’s individual creativity can advance the public
good and the practice of architecture by defining a specific role for the architect. The architect works in the realm of utopian creations. This is not because of a singular commitment to artistic craft for its own benefit. Instead, the architect’s unique role is to propose ideas that force us to think beyond what it realistic today. In doing so, the architect’s designs allow for a new conception of a more advanced urban environment. In an ideal situation, then, the architect’s proposals pave the way for advancement towards a more utopian existence.

Figure 2.3: The Goal Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combine knowledge and collective action to create solutions that work within our current reality</td>
<td>Balance individual creativity with respect to the environment and a unique understanding of the tensions between natural and man-made urban elements</td>
<td>Creative idea push peers and e public-at-large to conceive of something better than our current understanding of what is possible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next chapter, I will lay the context for the three cases against which I will test the ideas within these spectra. Throughout the case discussions, I will process observations through these proposals. In the final chapter, I will directly compare the professional behavior from the cases with the predictions of these three proposed scales of practice.
3

Context:
Planning in Post-Katrina New Orleans

Before turning to the cases, it is important to set the context. There are three histories of New Orleans' that underlie the tragedies, opportunities, tensions and challenges of Post Katrina-Planning. These are: the environmental conditions that cause New Orleans vulnerability to natural disaster; the city's architectural heritage; and New Orleans' racial and political traditions. The first half of this chapter will briefly address each of these areas.

The Unified New Orleans Plan is the fourth official recovery plan for New Orleans. This fact both helped and hindered the UNOP. It helped in that many of New Orleans' residents have been educated in how to participate in planning through their experiences in other planning processes. Some neighborhoods, either through these other official plans, or through locally-based experts, had already completed well formulated plans that could be folded directly into the UNOP, shrinking the scope of their District Planner's task. On the other hand, however, many people were suffering from what New Orleans City Planning Director Yolanda Rodriguez called “planning fatigue.” They were tired of all of the effort required to imagine rebuilding, and were more interested in active rebuilding than having a say in their area’s recovery plan. In addition, the political squabbling and extended timelines surrounding the two previously conducted City-sanctioned plans had worn on the patience of many New Orleanians. To best understand the environment in which the UNOP began, the second half of this chapter describes the Post-Katrina planning efforts that came before the UNOP.
New Orleans' Natural Systems

Metropolitan New Orleans encompasses about 360 square miles, and includes Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parish. New Orleans itself measures 181 square miles. Pre-Katrina, the largest employment sectors were Hospitality & Tourism and Transportation & Logistics. This can be attributed to the New Orleans' popularity as a cultural tourism destination, and the Port of New Orleans, one of the largest ports in the United States.

The area that became New Orleans was chosen for its location on the Mississippi River Gulf, but even its first settlers knew that the low-lying land was a dangerous place to locate a City. The French Settlers who founded La Nouvelle-Orléans in 1718 had already attempted developing other locations near the Gulf. Eventually, these early New Orleanians decided that the advantage of building a city at the mouth of the Mississippi River, thereby controlling the economic channel between the Gulf of Mexico and the center of North America, outweighed the environmental risks.

The original settler's gamble, locating a city along a river that virtually relied on flooding to maintain the function of the region's natural systems, proved fruitful. New Orleans was a very wealthy city in the 19th Century because of the success of its port, particularly because of the cotton and tobacco trade. It also became a trade destination for island crops from the Caribbean.

---

63 Ibid.
Still, New Orleans has always walked a thin line between harnessing the benefits of nature (the tremendous value of the Mississippi as a commercial corridor) and the threats of flooding, tropical storms and the ability of disease to manifest itself in the City's climate of stagnant humidity. As University of California, Davis historian Ari Kelman describes, "New Orleans has a near-perfect situation [locational advantage relative to other cities] and an almost unimaginably bad site [the actual real estate it occupies]."  

Beginning in the post-Civil War period, New Orleans began developing flood control technologies in the form of canals, man-made levees and an elaborate pump system.\(^{65}\) Time has shown, however, that these mechanisms built to protect New Orleanians also cause considerable problems. Levee construction, which ultimately attempts to control water flow, has disrupted the Mississippi's natural pattern of rebuilding destroyed deltas, which is one of three key elements that are progressively destroying Louisiana's natural coastline, New Orleans' primary defense against tropical storms.\(^{66}\) Moreover, as the world witnessed after Hurricane Katrina, the barriers that are intended to keep water out of New Orleans can work against the city by holding water in, making it difficult to eliminate floodwaters in extreme situations.\(^{67}\)

\(^{65}\) Ibid.
\(^{67}\) Kelman.
The damage from Hurricane Katrina was not determined entirely by the elevation of each area of the city, although these certainly played a major role. New Orleans's network of canals, levees and pumps divide the city into five distinct drainage basins (Figure 3.2). These basins were created by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers after 1965's destructive Hurricane Betsy, and the levees separating them tend to run between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The most serious Katrina-related flooding occurred in the basins on the East Bank (1, 2, and 3). Flooding in Basin 1 was caused by failures in the floodwalls separating the Basin from the 17th Street and

---

68 Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
London Avenue Canals. In Basins 2 and 3, flooding resulted from water overtopping the levees. Basins 4 and 5 were not flooded in any significant way. However, residents in these areas are acutely aware that the West Bank levees have not been adequately updated or tested.\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Figure 3.2: New Orleans Drainage Basins}\textsuperscript{71}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure32.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{The City’s Architectural Heritage}

New Orleans, often referred to as America’s most “European” city, has long been a popular tourist attraction for history and architecture buffs. The National Trust for Historic Preservation calls New Orleans “peerless,” explaining how many of New Orleans’ housing types cannot be found anywhere else. Architecture critic Blain Kamin calls New Orleans an American masterpiece, “a delectable

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 35.
multicultural gumbo whose value is only more pronounced in a nation where the same stores, banks and malls make every place feel like every other place.”

The many cultures that passed through New Orleans’ port or city have all left a mark on this unique place. It is not only a tourist’s or architect’s treasure. New Orleanians strongly identify with the distinguishing elements of the culture that are expressed through their physical structures. New Orleans’ built heritage only begins with the well-preserved streets and homes of the French Quarter (which was influenced, incidentally, as much by early Spanish settlers and African craftsmen as it was by the French). New Orleans neighborhoods offer outstanding collections of specific architectural styles.73 The architectural history preserved in New Orleans not only reflects the wealth of the upper class, but also Creole cottages built by Caribbean immigrants, and the oldest black neighborhood in the United States (Tremé).74 Preservation in New Orleans spans the city’s entire history, as well. According to Reed Kroloff, Dean of the School of Architecture at Tulane University, "New Orleans -- along with San Francisco -- is the greatest collection of 18th-, 19th- and early-20th-century residential architecture in the United States."75

As in other cities, New Orleans’ preservationists have been at odds with advocates for the poor in the struggle to match preservation with issues of housing equity. New Orleans’ Preservation Resource Center (PRC) has tried to assuage some of this tension by offering special programs to help lower-income residents to purchase and renovate historic properties. The PRC has also taken a stance of trying to preserve neighborhood character as well as individual buildings, piloting

---

73 Ibid.
programs that give affordable housing developers or individual lower-income individuals to historically-appropriate blueprints for new construction. 76

Most recently, preservationists and affordable housing advocates are disputing over the future of New Orleans’ public housing projects, which have been unoccupied since Hurricane Katrina. Their struggle concerns how to weigh the time needed to execute the legal and design processes to keep historic structures with the need to provide housing for displaced residents as quickly as possible. This question about the value of preservation in the face of housing shortages and development pressures has been an area of frequent debate in post-Katrina planning at all levels of the housing market.

Race and Politics in New Orleans

New Orleans has a long legacy of cultural diversity under the shadow of inequality, which began during its early days as a powerful port city. At the turn of the 19th Century, New Orleans was the largest slave port in North America. After the Haitian revolution in 1804, New Orleans also became an attractive destination for so-called “free people of color,” who came in such large numbers that they doubled the city’s population. New Orleans at the time was one of the only places in the United States where free people of color or African slaves who had bought their emancipation could actually own land. 77 Despite these circumstances, white control over the city, and the city’s slave population, was heavily asserted. During the second half of the 19th Century, racial tensions between the free people of color and the white population escalated. The Jim Crow

laws enacted at the end of the 19th Century officially put the power in the hands of an elite white population who had no interest in equality with the black population.  

New Orleans' 18th and 19th Century prosperity began a decline during Civil War that continued into the 20th Century. New Orleans reached its low point during school integration in the 1960s, when a large percentage of the wealthier white population left the city in favor of new white suburbs. In a city where race and class are highly correlated, the decline of the white population also meant a decline in the city's economic prosperity. In of the 2000 US Census, the New Orleans Metropolitan area had a population of 1,170,000, and New Orleans itself had a population of 484,674. 72% of New Orleans residents were classified as minorities. 67% of New Orleanians were African American. Its unemployment rate was 10%, and 28% of its residents were living below the federal poverty level.

Adding to the challenges of racial discord and relatively high unemployment and poverty rates, 20th Century New Orleans politics have been characterized by a culture of patronage, control by elite political alliances and corruption. Mayors who were elected through campaigns for political reform rarely kept their commitments after elections. In a system with weak mayoral leadership, the two-term limit for the mayor's office has discouraged office-holders from looking beyond eight years and implementing programs that will not show benefits during their time in office. The lack

82 Ibid.
of forward-thinking, strong leadership in New Orleans has complicated all aspects of recovery since Katrina.

**Hurricane Katrina**

Hurricane Katrina was the 11th named tropical storm of the 2005 Hurricane Season. It was a slow moving storm that was declared a Category 1 Hurricane August 25th, the day that it first touched down on the Continental United States in South Florida. Still early in her progression, the storm’s first touchdown in Florida caused 9 deaths and caused major utility and physical damage.

On August 26th, Katrina was upgraded to a Category 2 Hurricane, and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a State of Emergency. In her Proclamation (No. 48 KBB), Governor Blanco stated that “Hurricane Katrina poses an imminent threat, carrying severe storms, high winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the citizens of the state of Louisiana.” The next day Katrina was upgraded to a Category 4 Hurricane, and President George W. Bush issued a State of Emergency for Louisiana. Residents of low-lying areas on Louisiana’s Gulf Coast were instructed to evacuate at this time. The next day, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the City.

Hurricane Katrina, by then a Category 4 storm, touched down on the Louisiana coast on the morning of August 29th. Within three hours, the storm was ravaging through New Orleans. Later

---

85 Ibid.
that day, catastrophic breaches occurred in New Orleans’ flood-control levees along the Industrial Canal, the 17th Street Levee, and the London Avenue Canal\textsuperscript{89}. By the end of the day, Katrina was downgraded to a tropical storm.

The majority of the damage from Hurricane Katrina came not from the storm itself, but from the combination of storm surges from the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) to the East and Lake Pontchartrain to the North and the ensuing failures at key points on the three levees. Severe flooding in New Orleans East can be credited, for the most part, to the overtopped flood walls protecting it from Lake Pontchartrain, which also caused major flooding in the lakefront communities on either side of city Park. Canal breaches and overflow from MR-GO caused the flooding in the center of the city.\textsuperscript{90} Major flooding began after Katrina left the city, and water continued to flow until September 1\textsuperscript{st}. In all, over three-quarters of the New Orleans was flooded to some extent. It took several weeks to drain the water from the City.

\textsuperscript{90} Citywide Strategic Recovery and Rebuilding Plan, 26.
**MULTIPLE FAILURES**

From poor design, to construction not matching plans, to levees not high enough to withstand the storms they were designed for, man-made weaknesses in the hurricane protection system failed metro New Orleans on August 29.

---

**Katrina’s Human Toll**

Approximately 80% of the city’s population was able to evacuate before the worst of Katrina struck.

Most of these people escaped via the crowded roads leading out. Although a small number of

---

91 Source: *The New Orleans Times-Picayune*
people chose not to leave, of their own volition, the majority of those who did not escape were among the city’s most vulnerable, the poor, sick, or elderly, many of whom lacked their own means of transportation out of the city.

On August 30th, FEMA and National Guard Teams descended on the city. Teams of rescuers set out to find stranded people and to transport them to the Louisiana Superdome. The Superdome swelled with people, and eventually people were also dropped off at the nearby Morial Convention Center, or, in some cases, directly onto abandoned stretches of Interstate 10. The same day, a rash of unrest broke out among stranded residents struggling to survive, and law enforcement teams were strained to control looting and violence. As the numbers in the Superdome grew, and water and utility damage infiltrated the space, horror stories of violence, mayhem, and death began to accumulate.

An estimated 24,000 people were evacuated from the Superdome.92 On September 1st, buses began evacuating people out of the city, with the majority of evacuees ending up in the Houston Astrodome, awaiting a second evacuation to a more permanent situation. On September 3rd, the last buses left the Superdome with 300 people on board, headed for Houston.93 For the next week, rescuers continued to struggle to find people stranded in the most deeply flooded areas of the city. Still other people remained in deserted neighborhoods, refusing to leave. In all, 1300 deaths were attributed directly to Katrina and its immediate aftermath.94 This number increased over the

---

93 Ibid
ensuing months as bodies were discovered and as evacuees suffered from disease, displacement, and insufficient health care.

Post-Katrina Planning Efforts Leading Up to the Unified Plan

The very first Post-Katrina plan made for New Orleans was the Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Support Function plan for New Orleans Parish, FEMA ESF # 14. FEMA released an Emergency Support Function plan for each of the 19 Louisiana Parishes hit by the Hurricane. Each plan was intended to provide guidance to state and local governments on recovery. The FEMA planning process for New Orleans began in October, 2005, and the final plan was released in April, 2006. The ESF plans were used to success in other parishes, but the New Orleans plan had little impact.\(^9^5\) In interviews with Jedediah Horne and Brendan Nee, FEMA employees indicated that the muted release of the ESF plan in Orleans Parrish may have been a deliberate attempt to not further confuse an already complicated planning scenario in the City of New Orleans.\(^9^6\)

The first major city-driven planning effort after the storm began in October, 2005, before many parts of the City had even been re-opened. The Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission was a 17-member panel conceived of and appointed by Mayor Ray Nagin. The majority of the members were from the private sector. The commission met publicly for the first time on October 10, 2005. Under the leadership of these 17 commissioners, the Commission had seven subcommittees, each with its own membership rosters. These committees each focused on one of the following issues: Land Use, Infrastructure, Culture, Education, Health & Social Services, Economic Development


\(^9^6\) Ibid.
and Government Effectiveness. The committees also received additional input from Stakeholder Advisory Committees, which were created to represent community input for the process.

BNOB presented its full report to Mayor Nagin on January 27, 2006. The plan recommended a four-month neighborhood planning period, during which time neighborhoods could engage planners to prove their neighborhood’s viability. This plan was never put into place. While the BNOB process brought forward a number of good ideas, a lack of political expertise in presenting the plan caused large-scale public rejection of the plan. The biggest fumble was the public presentation of a now infamous proposal for re-concentrating the population on high ground and replacing low-lying neighborhoods with new green space. Regardless of the logic associated with this proposal, the commission’s lack of sensitivity in presenting this plan, which proposed parkland on the current sites of many individual residential properties, spurred a backlash of popular opposition to the BNOB proposals as a whole. Ongoing tensions between the Mayor’s office and the City Council resulted in the City Council’s lack of interest in supporting the BNOB proposals. By the time the Mayor presented the final BNOB plan, anticipated public funding was unavailable to move the proposals forward.

Divisive city politics, fed by a contentious spring 2006 city election cycle and the intense pressure of the post-disaster environment, had resulted in a complete lack of cooperation between the Mayor’s office and the City Council. Instead of using the “Mayor’s” BNOB proposal, the City Council found a way to grant a “continuation” contract to Lambert Advisory using a Community Development Block Grant contract issued to Lambert before Katrina. The New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan was to address the 46 New Orleans neighborhoods impacted most heavily by Katrina. The Lambert Process was announced on April 7, 2006. Each of the 46
neighborhoods was assigned an individual architecture or planning firm to assist them with their plans. Only “wet” neighborhoods were included because the City Council understood that creating plans for these neighborhoods would fulfill the Louisiana Recovery Authority’s (LRA’s) requirements for a fundable parish plan (this proved to be a misunderstanding of the LRA’s requirements). Also, the Council was limited by the need to define a scope of work that would allow them to merely extend Lambert’s pre-existing contract and not be hindered by a public bidding process for a new contract. The process included 84 public meetings, many of which were conducted on the City Planning District level. The final Lambert Plan, presented as 46 separate neighborhood plans, was delivered on September 23rd, and approved unanimously by the New Orleans City Council on October 27, 2006. By the time the plan was presented, the LRA had announced that these plans were insufficient to fulfill their requirements for a parish plan, and the UNOP process was already underway. The Lambert Plan’s proposals were integrated into the overall UNOP plan.

In addition to these two government-sponsored planning processes, a number of individual neighborhoods took on planning processes of their own. Most notable among these were the Gentilly and Broadmoor neighborhoods. In partnership with their City Councilwoman, the Gentilly Civic Association invited Florida-based New Urbanist Andres Duany to complete a planning charrette with their neighborhood. The plan from this charrette provided the basis for the Gentilly Civic Association to make significant strides in neighborhood recovery. The BNOB’s “green dot” plan galvanized the Broadmoor neighborhood, a heavily flood-impacted community that the BNOB plan designated as an ideal place for new open space. Therefore, Broadmoor’s local improvement association raised funds independently to create the Broadmoor Improvement Association Plan. With assistance from local New Orleans architect Allen Eskew and students from Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government, Broadmoor was able to create a planning document with well-developed local recovery strategies. Since its July, 2006 release, Broadmoor has used the plan as fundraising and organizing tool, which has allowed the devastated neighborhood to return and rebuild at a much more rapid pace than any of its neighboring communities.

The Unified New Orleans Plan

The most recent plan, the Unified New Orleans Plan, came out of a series of conversations among the Rockefeller Foundation, the Greater New Orleans Foundation, the city, and the Louisiana Recovery Authority. The process was an offshoot of the BNOB’s community planning proposal, although it took an additional year, and the failures of the initial City Planning efforts, to come to fruition.

By the spring of 2006, it had become clear that both the BNOB and Lambert processes had significant shortfalls, especially in the areas of political support and community investment. The Louisiana Recovery Authority did not accept either the BNOB or Lambert plan as comprehensive or inclusive enough. The LRA requested that the City of New Orleans go through one final process to combine all of the planning to date and truly involve the community in an approval process. In July, the Mayor, City Council and LRA announced their combined support of the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) process.

The Rockefeller Foundation first became involved in New Orleans in September 2005, when they announced a $3 Million grant for housing and economic development. The money was given in a lump sum to the Greater New Orleans Foundation (GNOF) for distribution. The Greater New Orleans Foundation, in turn, established a separate New Orleans Recovery Fund for the Rockefeller
funding. On April 20, 2006, Rockefeller announced a second donation to support a unified planning process for New Orleans, again to be administered by the Greater New Orleans Foundation. This donation was supplemented by grants from the Greater New Orleans Foundation and the Bush Clinton Katrina Fund. The Greater New Orleans Foundation established a new oversight board, the New Orleans Community Support Foundation (the CSF), to oversee the planning funds. GNOF also contracted with Concordia, a local planning and architecture firm, to coordinate the UNOP.

With these contextual dimensions in mind, my thesis now shifts to focus on the specifics of the UNOP and the professionals selected to work on it. The next section will explain how planning teams were selected. The centralized coordination of the UNOP meant that certain procedures and activities were established at a citywide level, and were not determined by the actions of individual planning teams. The next chapter will outline these shared resources and guidelines before launching into the comparative aspects of the case studies.
Standards for UNOP Teams:  
Shared Practice & Resources Leading up to District Work

Planning Team Selection

In June 2006, the Greater New Orleans Foundation issued a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) for architecture and planning firms to work on the UNOP. Planning teams would be hired in three capacities. One team would be hired to do a citywide plan, which would deal with city-level infrastructure and recovery issues. Several teams would be hired to plan at the planning district level. Finally, district planning teams would be paired with neighborhood planners (teams specifically assigned to neighborhoods or communities with particularly complex local issues to address).

65 teams responded to the RFQ, 15 for the citywide position and 40 for the district or neighborhood assignments. The applications were reviewed by a national selection committee with four members: the Executive Director of the New Orleans Planning Commission, two former City planning directors from other cities (Pittsburgh and Los Angeles) and the former mayor of Berkeley, California. Concordia, the firm hired by the Community Support Foundation to manage the process, also participated in the selection process. On July 26th, the Community Support Foundation announced that the panel had selected 15 teams to work on the district and neighborhood-level components of the UNOP. The panel also specified 5 teams as either district or neighborhood planners and the remaining 10 as eligible to be neighborhood Planners only.

The panel did not assign any of the firms to specific planning districts. Instead, the CSF, CSO and Concordia planned a four-phased public education and input process to inform firm selection. The
public process, announced on July 21st, would begin with Concordia disseminating information about the 15 selected teams via internet and community-based organizations on July 24.

The following Sunday (July 30, 2006) the first of two citywide meetings would be held at New Orleans' City Park. In this meeting, attendees would be divided into their 13 planning districts. In facilitated discussions, each district would define neighborhood boundaries within their districts, address special areas of concern and develop criteria and questions for their district planning team. Two days later, on August 1st, community participants would be able to meet the planning teams through conversations at separate tables (each team had an information table) and ten minute presentations by all 15 firms. Following the meeting, participants would be able to vote for their top three team preferences for their district via email or fax. Voting was open from August 1st to August 7th.

Based on the public process, Concordia and the CSF would review community preferences in combination with each firm's capacity, expertise and cost. The original plan was to announce the teams for each district by August 14th, and to launch the district processes the week of the 14th. However, the Louisiana Recovery Foundation and the CSF did not want to announce district teams or launch the process until the Mayor and City Council officially endorsed the process. This happened on August 28, when the Mayor, City Council and Greater New Orleans Foundation signed a Memorandum of Understanding of support for the UNOP. At this time the UNOP announced the members of the New Orleans Community Support Organization (CSO), a citizen advisory committee established to oversee the UNOP process. The members of the CSO were selected through an interview process conducted by the City Council. The planning team assignments were also announced on this day. The Citywide Team would be headed by two local
firms, Villavaso and Associates and Henry Consulting. Five teams were selected to be district-level planners. These teams were led by EDSA, Acorn Housing, Fredric Schwartz Architects, Goody Clancy and H3 Studio, respectively. The remaining qualified firms were assigned as neighborhood planners and distributed amongst the 13 planning districts in support of district planning teams.

The Role of the City Park Process in Galvanizing Public Involvement

The City Park meetings were the first big experiment of the UNOP process. In an effort to begin the process with a spirit of democracy and inclusion, UNOP organizers attempted to stage the largest public hiring process that anyone involved had ever encountered. Public response to the meetings was mixed, for reasons described in the next paragraph. Regardless of individual perceptions of the meetings, however, these meetings ultimately built the energy needed to put the UNOP in the front of stakeholder’s minds.

The primary problems with the City Park meetings were logistical. City Park’s Pavilion of the Two Sisters, the site of the meeting, had a capacity of about 200. Organizers did not anticipate any space issue based on their original space projections, but at least twice that number came to both meetings. Because of this, materials, sound and screen technology and staff or volunteer support was inadequate. On top of these challenges, the room was poorly ventilated, and July 30th and August 1st ended up being two of the hottest days of the summer.

Publicity and scheduling were also criticized. By this time, New Orleans had developed a very strong community of political- or recovery-oriented bloggers who posted many complaints about the short lead time between the announcement of the July 30th meeting (on July 21st) and the meeting itself. The August 2nd meeting was scheduled from 4:00 – 9:00 pm, in direct conflict with
the National Night Out Against Crime, an important anti-crime event in which many New Orleans neighborhoods planned to participate. This was especially challenging given the post-Katrina escalation in crime rates, and the strong interest of community groups wanting to take a stand on this particularly crucial issue.

The public voting process proved to be another stumbling block for UNOP organizers. There was no specific requirement for who could vote, although voters were supposed to live in one of New Orleans’ 13 planning districts (voting was by district). Voters could collect information about the planning teams through information posted on the website, attendance at the meetings, and/or video clips from the team presentations on August 2nd. There was no clear way to track who voted and to ensure that everyone only voted once, because the only requirement for voting was to send in your vote via email or fax. In theory, only one vote could be cast from any given email, but this would not prevent a single person from voting from two different emails or voting once by email and another time by fax.

Finally, the selected planning teams did not have a clear idea of how to prepare for this kind of meeting. No one I interviewed reported having participated in anything like this before. Some interviewees were skeptical of how well they could have represented themselves in what ended-up feeling like a planning fair, where they had themselves on display at different booths. None of the professionals I interviewed stated a strong feeling about whether this format worked or not—most seemed to have both doubts and positive feedback from their experiences.

In spite of all of these issues, turnout for the two City Park meetings far exceeded any of the meeting planners’ expectations. For community members who did not come to the meetings, this
event put the UNOP front and center in the public eye, with coverage in the media, on blogs, and neighborhood-level publicity through neighborhood groups. The criticism of the public component of the selection process, while not intended by organizers, helped fuel the discussion, frustration, optimism and energy about the UNOP itself.

In actuality, the voting preference process did not end up being a major issue for any of the parties I interviewed. Interviewees reported that voting worked best for neighborhood groups, who were able to meet after August 1st to compare notes and decide on a collective prioritization for the three firms in their district. Given the length of the process, some level of reliance on these pre-existing groups was entirely necessary to move things forward, and it was positive that many neighborhood groups felt good about getting their first or second choices. Concordia did not report any suspicions and major fraud, and most community preferences lined up closely with specific district needs as Concordia interpreted them. All the district planning teams felt that their assignments were appropriate given their capacity and skills.

**Common Elements to Each District Process**

*Outreach*

The City Park meeting served as the biggest public outreach and announcement of the process leading up to the launch of the district projects. Beyond this individual meeting, the UNOP Coordinating Team had a central communications strategy to support all UNOP-related activities. This gave a significant boost to the local recruitment and organizing efforts of each Planning Team in its respective district. The UNOP Central Communications Team’s main tools were media placement (in print, radio and television) and an extensive website. Concordia, as the coordinating
firm, also acted as the political liaison between the CSF, CSO, and city and state government on behalf of the district planning teams.

**Scheduling**

The calendar for the process had the firms beginning work in September, and holding their first meetings at the end of October (Figures 4.). Each district was to have four district-wide meetings, held at monthly intervals. There would also be three Community Congresses, citywide meetings that would allow the entire community to come together and provide feedback on the citywide plan. The final Unified New Orleans Plan would be submitted to the City Planning Commission for review in January, 2007. The Planning Commission would need to approve the plan, and then submit it to the City Council for approval. Once the City Council accepted the plan, it could officially be presented to the Louisiana Recovery Authority for their approval and assistance in securing state and federal funds.
Templates and Deliverables

The Citywide Team and Concordia collaborated in creating a tight schedule of deliverables for the district planners to prepare, usually scheduled for the days directly following district meetings. These deliverables, usually in the form of white papers on the development of district planning scenarios, allowed the Citywide Team to align its efforts with district activities. It also allowed

97 Source: www.unifiedneworleansplan.com
Concordia to monitor progress and identify challenges in specific districts before they escalated. In interviews, Citywide Team members and Concordia staff reported that these deliverables were very helpful. District planners, however, did not feel that they benefited as much from this process. Because the district teams structured their work separately and had different priorities in each district, these deliverables did not always correspond to their individual processes, and thus created another layer of work.

The Citywide Team developed a single template for all of the district plans. Each district plan had the following chapter structure:

1) Introduction to the District
2) Explanation of the UNOP Planning Process
3) A District-Level Recovery Assessment
4) Definition of District’s Needs, Vision, and Goals
5) Three Prioritized Recovery Scenarios, classified as:
   a. REpair – This scenario anticipated resettlement to continue as it currently stands. In the REpair scenario, New Orleans would receive some outside funding and District would receive some additional resources, but not at Pre-Katrina Levels.
   b. REvision – The REvision scenario is the most robust proposal, assuming that New Orleans’ storm protection mechanisms could be restored to exceed Pre-Katrina standards, and reduce storms to a mere nuisance to daily life in New Orleans. This scenario assumes significant public and private investment, but requires a more centrally-coordinated decision-making strategy for resettling the City.
   c. REhabilitate - REhabilitate is the compromise scenario between REpair and REvision. Storm protection would be slightly higher than Pre-Katrina systems, but
resettlement would not be centrally controlled, so some areas would still bear considerable risk. Also, the investment strategy in REhabilitate relies on a few key catalytic public projects, but places the primary focus on individual investments.

6) Recovery Planning Projects, including an overview of all projects, a matrix that prioritized each project’s area of impact and what it needed for implementation and a separate project description sheet for each project.

7) Conclusion

At the end of the process, the Citywide Team was responsible for combining all of the plans and incorporating them into an overarching recovery strategy. By requiring the same format, the Citywide Team hoped to facilitate their ability to compile all of the recommendations in a relatively short period of time. This was complicated than they planned for two reasons. First, because of differences in each district planning process and the approach each district planning team took, the Citywide Team received significant pushback from firms, particularly about their format for recovery strategies. Ultimately, some of the firms (including Goody Clancy and Frederic Schwartz Architects) modified the Citywide Team’s format. The second problem with this strategy was that the volume of work at the end of the process, coupled with the proximity of the deadlines for the final district plans and the final citywide plan, prevented them from adequately incorporating the district plan recommendations in the plan they submitted to the City Planning Commission at the end of January.

Peer Learning

The short timelines for the UNOP process made most concerted efforts for cross-district information sharing very difficult. There were two district team in-person meetings, in which the
Team leaders from each district met to share progress, ideas and assist each other with problem-solving. Additionally, during the second half of the process the Citywide Team and Concordia hosted weekly conference calls in which representatives from all district teams participated. All of the professionals that I interviewed thought that they could have benefited from extended opportunities for peer learning during the process. Most also acknowledged the schedule as the primary obstacle to this kind of effort. In terms of my evaluation, the lack of information sharing does mean that no district team had a strong influence on the practices of any other.

**Final Thoughts on Shared Practice & Resources**

Every person that I interviewed agreed that the schedule for the Unified New Orleans Plan was incredibly fast for the amount of work that needed to be done. Because of this, the centralized outreach activities were helpful in increasing community input and awareness of the process. Acknowledging the time constraints, none of the district planners expressed particularly strong disappointment with the meeting schedule (as I mentioned above, some did object to the final plan template). As the cases in the next chapter demonstrate, even within the confines of the common standards, each team did to design a process and focus based on their professional opinions and the needs of their districts.
Case Selection

New Orleans has 13 Planning Districts, which were established by the City Planning Commission in the 1980s. These Districts were used as the organizing areas for the UNOP plan. Each District had a separate planning process, with the exception of Districts 9, 10 & 11, which were grouped together because of the lack of returning population in the New Orleans East area.

As I discussed in Chapter I, the UNOP process offered a quasi-experimental design, providing eleven separate planning projects, each of which had the same timeline and was charged with the same requirements for producing a plan. Moreover, four distinct firms were chosen to head these processes, each with a different professional focus and set of staff expertise. Because I had worked in both pre- and post-Katrina New Orleans, I had a background and network that allowed easy entry, and because the process was underway during my prescribed research period, I would be able to do in-person observations and follow the process in real time, which would help with the authenticity of my research process.

Still, UNOP was also a difficult subject of study, as New Orleans did not provide a “typical” planning situation. New Orleans had been torn apart by a natural disaster that exposed all of the inequalities, political ineptitude and racial strife of an urban American city. In the 18 months since Hurricane Katrina, people had evacuated and been displaced, and fewer than 50% had returned. Those who had returned were faced with the immediate challenges of finding housing and
employment, and the collective challenge of rebuilding the city. These individuals had experienced at least two different planning processes, in some cases many more. To make matters even more complicated, the city and its residents had become very popular study subjects for professionals and academics from around the world.

To focus my inquiry, I chose to pursue districts with uniquely low flood damage. In choosing districts with less flood damage, I would be able to concentrate on districts with higher rates of population return. These districts would have less of a problem with displaced community members who were not present to participate. A higher rate of population return would also allow me to better observe how the firms addressed and worked with community participants. Similarly, because public housing has been a major political controversy since Katrina, I chose districts without public housing projects in order to eliminate the influence of that polarizing political struggle within the planning process. Ultimately, I expected that by choosing district that had experienced the lowest levels of impact from Katrina, I would also be choosing cases with the highest potential for applicability outside of the New Orleans context.

*The District Planners*

In order to isolate disciplinary differences, I chose to focus on the three of the four district planning team lead firms, Goody Clancy (Planning), Fredric Schwartz Architects (Architecture), and EDSA
Landscape Architecture). I did not include H3 Studio because it was the most difficult to place on the disciplinary continuum.

Goody Clancy is a Boston-based firm whose work spans architecture, planning and preservation. The UNOP contract was with the planning practice within the firm. The firm houses over 110 employees in their Boston office. Their planning group has developed expertise in downtown and Main Street redevelopment, campus planning, urban water fronts, and community participation. The firm describes their specialties as housing, educational facilities, scientific research complexes, civic buildings and historic buildings, and planning and urban design. Goody Clancy’s expertise in preservation bolstered their ability to plan in some of New Orleans’ most historic neighborhoods. Their planning group is led by principals David Dixon and David Spillane. By academic training, the group is a mix of architects who have chosen to focus on planning, urban designers, and planners. Goody Clancy was assigned to Planning Districts 1, 6, and 7.

Frederic Schwartz Architects (FSA) is a small Manhattan-based architecture office headed by Fred Schwartz, an architect who teaches part-time at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design. The firm’s professional staff all have professional degrees in architecture. FSA’s website focuses on the firm’s expertise in urban revitalization and master planning. The firm classifies its specialization areas as planning, civic projects, transportation, residential, commercial and retail. Fred Schwartz, who has lived and worked in Lower Manhattan for many years, was deeply affected by the tragedy of September 11th. He became an active voice in the re-development efforts for Lower Manhattan, and...

---

98 Originally, five firms were chosen to lead district planning teams, Goody Clancy, Fredric Schwartz Architects, EDSA, H3 Studio, and ACORN Housing. In the Fall of 2006 ACORN Housing was removed from its two district projects (Districts 7 and 8) because of a conflict of interest in the agency’s mission. At this point, Goody Clancy took over District 7 and H3 Studio took over District 8.

99 The H3 Studio team was led by John Hoal, an urban designer who completed part of his professional training in South Africa. The UNOP project was managed by architect Derek Hoeferlin.
formed the THINK team, an international consortium of designers whose design in the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation’s Ground Zero competition received international acclaim.

Schwartz’s September 11th experiences fueled his interest in working in New Orleans. FSA was the District planner for Districts 3 and 4.

EDSA began in Florida shortly after World War II. It has five offices, four in the United States and one in China (Beijing). EDSA’s leadership, and the majority of their international staff of 220, are trained as landscape architects. The firm’s specialties are hotel & resorts, community planning, attractions & entertainment, urban design, campus & cultural, and environmental & ecotourism. EDSA’s Baltimore office, led by Henry Alinger and Keith Weaver, was selected as District Planner for Districts 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12. All of the staff in the Baltimore office have professional degrees in landscape architecture.

District Planning Firm vs. District Planning Team

Because of the complexity of the UNOP charge, all the district planning firms needed to assemble a dynamic team of subcontractors who could help them with issues outside of their firm’s expertise. These teams were assembled for the initial RFQ response. The types of subcontractors were generally similar, usually including an economic research firm, a local resident, and someone to provide additional assistance with outreach and facilitation skills. For the purposes of my analysis, what is important is that the district planning firms, the primary firm for each districts, directed all aspects of the process. These firms mapped out the district planning process, designed the objectives for community process, oversaw the production of all deliverables and produced the majority of the content in all of the plans. Therefore, while their work was supplemented by the subcontractors, the district work was led by one planning firm, one architecture firm and one
landscape architecture firm. In the case studies, these lead firms are referred to interchangeably as the *district planners* or *district planning firm*. *District planning team* refers to the lead firm and the group of subcontractors with whom they worked.

**The Districts**

In order to select my case districts, I needed to identify the districts by firm and then choose the districts that best fit my selection criteria. In order to control for potential confounding variables, for each firm I chose the district that had:

1) The lowest flooding depths
2) The highest percentage of returned residents
3) The lowest number of public housing projects

**District 1 - Goody Clancy: The Planners**

Goody Clancy was the District Planner for Districts 1, 6 and 7. District 1, which included New Orleans’ French Quarter, was among the least impacted areas of the City, and its flooding depths and population return were much higher than Districts 6 and 7. While the Iberville Housing project lay on the border of District 1, it had no public housing issues within its planning boundaries. Because of these factors, District 1 fit as the Goody Clancy Case Study District.
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the Goody Clancy Planning Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning District</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Residential Units</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Businesses</th>
<th>Population Return</th>
<th>Public Housing Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
<td>2 to 4 feet of water</td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
<td>2 to 4 feet of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95.06%</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
<td>73.38%</td>
<td>25.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
<td>12.31%</td>
<td>81.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38.90%</td>
<td>17.07%</td>
<td>44.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

District 3 - Frederic Schwartz Architects: The Architects

FSA’s two districts, 3 and 4, are contiguous districts in the heart of New Orleans. District 4, which contains 5 public housing projects, more than any other Districts, experiences one of the most politically contentious processes of all of the districts. District 3 had twice the population return and nearly half the flooding damage of District 4. Therefore, District 3 was a clear choice for the FSA case study.

Table 5.2: Characteristics of the FSA Planning Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning District</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Residential Units</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Businesses</th>
<th>Population Return</th>
<th>Public Housing Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
<td>2 to 4 feet of water</td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
<td>2 to 4 feet of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.95%</td>
<td>18.36%</td>
<td>44.95%</td>
<td>18.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.39%</td>
<td>30.54%</td>
<td>8.39%</td>
<td>30.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

District 12- EDSA: The Landscape Architects

EDSA was assigned to five districts, but they were actually responsible for three district processes, as Districts 9, 10, and 11 were combined into one process. These three Districts made up New Orleans East, and were combined largely because of the low numbers of population return due to
the extreme devastation in this area. District 12 is the larger of two districts on New Orleans' West Bank, which lies directly across the Mississippi from the French Quarter and Downtown. The West Bank was largely spared from water damage in Hurricane Katrina, and was the first area to be significantly repopulated after the storm. This District does have one housing project, the Fischer Development. Fischer was going through a renovation process that began before Katrina, and it was not the subject of political controversy to the same extent as other housing projects in the city. The advantages that District 12 had in low flood damage and high population made it my choice the EDSA Case Study (Table 5.3, below).

Table 5.3: Characteristics of the EDSA Planning Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning District</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Residential Units</th>
<th>Flooding Depth, Businesses</th>
<th>Population Return</th>
<th>Public Housing Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
<td>2 to 4 feet of water</td>
<td>More than 4 feet of water</td>
<td>Less than 2 feet of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
<td>20.82%</td>
<td>74.56%</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.12%</td>
<td>87.03%</td>
<td>8.85%</td>
<td>6.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
<td>95.90%</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variations between Cases

There are a few key differences between the districts that are helpful to understand the contexts of each case. Given my priorities, these elements are more interesting in terms of descriptive characteristics and potential planning issues than their impact on case selection.

Pre-Katrina, District 1’s population represented a much smaller percentage of the citywide population (1.4%) than Districts 3 (13.8%) and 12 (11.5%). All areas of the city have been
underserved by health facilities since the storm, but District 12 is particularly challenged, with no operating health facilities re-opened at the time that the UNOP began. As of July, 2006, the number of police service calls per resident in District 1 was nearly ten times the number in Districts 3 and 12. Finally, there is a large disparity between the number of designated or nominated historic properties in Districts 1 (72) and 3 (57) than 12.

Table 5.4: Variations in District Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Pre-Katrina Population</th>
<th>Percent of Total Population, Pre-Katrina</th>
<th>Number of Re-opened Health Facilities</th>
<th>Percent of District Health Facilities Re-opened</th>
<th>Police Service Calls per Resident, July 2006</th>
<th>Number of Nominated or Designated Historic Properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>0.4534</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>67,069</td>
<td>13.84%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>0.0494</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>55,635</td>
<td>11.48%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.0578</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{100}\) Includes health facilities that are only partially operational.
Planning District 1 surrounds New Orleans’ downtown. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the District 1 is comprised of 10 distinct subdistricts. It contains three historic residential neighborhoods -- French Quarter, Lafayette Square, and Picayune Place. In contains two key entertainment districts, the area

101 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 1
surrounding the New Orleans Superdome and the Warehouse District, a combination of artist’s studios, living spaces, museums and cultural centers. A commercial stretch of Canal Street separates the French Quarter from downtown’s economic centers: the Downtown Business District, the Financial District, the Civic Center and the Medical District. District 1 also contains the New Orleans’ Convention Center one of the largest convention centers in the United States. Finally, the Rampart Street Corridor, which separates the District’s east and west side, acts as an edge to the business core, and is dotted with parking structures that service users or the Business District and the Civic Center and Superdome on the other side.

District 1 contains two of New Orleans’ most economically and culturally significant areas, the historic French Quarter and the City’s downtown business district. Although the district is the city’s commercial center, it is the smallest area in terms of permanent residents (District 1 was home to 1.4% of the City’s residents before Katrina). The percentage of District 1’s population that is White nearly triples the percentage of White residents in the city as whole (73% as opposed to 17%). The average household income ($63,102) is $20,000 more than the citywide average of $43,176.

The combination of business and residential subdistricts is unique to the three cases, as are the relative size, affluence and homogeneity of the residential population. The mix of commercial and residential uses presents a distinct challenge toward cross-district collaboration, particularly because the concerns of commercial success must be balanced with maintenance of historic residential areas. Additionally, the presence of both the French Quarter and the Convention Center area means that many users of the areas are not only from other parts of the city, but also include tourists and business people from outside of New Orleans. Maintaining their presence is an important economic driver for District 1 and the city as a whole, but these users would not be directly involved in UNOP
planning. On the other hand, the population size and characteristics imply that building consensus within the residential community would be easier than in larger, more diverse districts.

**District Organization**

Before the storm, there were a number of strong organizations in District 1. These organizations are described in Table 5.6.

**Table 5.5: District 1 Stakeholder Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident Associations</th>
<th>Business Associations</th>
<th>Other Civic Associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vieux Carre Property Owners and Residents Association (VCPORA)</td>
<td>Downtown Development District (DDD)</td>
<td>Vieux Carre Commission (French Quarter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Quarter Citizens, Inc. (French Quarter)</td>
<td>Bourbon Street Merchants (informal network)</td>
<td>Preservation Resource Center (French Quarter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picayune Place Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Quarter Business Association (French Quarter)</td>
<td>Canal Street Development Corporation</td>
<td>National Trust for Historic Preservation, New Orleans Chapter (French Quarter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Quarter Business Association (French Quarter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the spring of 2006, the organizations on the French Quarter side of Canal came together under the umbrella of the French Quarter Recovery Coalition. This was a very special event, as it was the first time that both business and residents in District 1 had come together to discuss their collective future. Working with volunteer planner Karen Fernandez, the group held a planning charrette and began to formulate recommendations for their area. The organizations from the other side of District 1, particularly the DDD, heard about their French Quarter Recovery Coalition’s efforts, and joined in with their efforts. By the time the UNOP process began in District 1, these groups already had established a collective working relationship and a collective set of goals. Because of this relationship, the district was already engaged in cross-community collaboration before the UNOP
started. Building on the discussion above concerning the unique combination of subdistricts in District 1, the community-initiated planning activities that preceded the UNOP an event stronger level of understanding and collaborative practices in District 1 than the district profile might suggest. Therefore, stakeholders were very prepared to begin work with the district planners and the complications of managing a large, diverse territory (District 3) or facilitating disparate parties (District 12) did not exist.

Firm Selection for District 1

After meeting the planners at the summer UNOP kick-off event at City Park, the French Quarter Recovery Coalition met to debate which firm they would most like to work with so that they could all vote for the same firm through the electronic voting process. The group selected Duany Plater-Zyberk (DPZ), largely because of the resonance between DPZ’s form-based approach and the goals and process that the Coalition had already established. In the end, DPZ was assigned to the project as a neighborhood planner, a subcontractor to Goody Clancy, whose team was named as District Planners.

The District 1 Planning Team

Goody Clancy’s specializations in downtown planning and historic preservation made them a logical choice for this District. Their lead staff in District 1 were David Dixon, Principal-in-Charge, Ian Charie, Senior Project Manager, and Phil Goff, Urban Designer.

While the Goody Clancy team working in District 1 was from Goody Clancy’s planning group, the specific practitioners assigned to District 1 could not be classified as strictly planners. This team was the most complicated to classify of the three presented in my thesis. Originally, the team was led by
Charie, a planner by training. However, Charie was not able to manage the process to the standards of both Goody Clancy and the community,102 and his role gradually diminished. Dixon, who heads Goody Clancy's planning and urban design group, took over for Charie. Dixon has worked as a professional planner for at least 20 years. His professional degrees, however, are in Architecture and Urban Design. He is also a Fellow of the American Institute of Architects, and holds a number of leadership positions with the American Institute of Architects. The other lead staff member on the project, Phil Goff, has a Bachelors degree in Architecture and a Masters degree in Urban Planning, with a special focus on Urban Design.

It could be argued that the Goody Clancy team is actually the only district planner whose primary orientation is directly towards Urban Design as an independent discipline. With this in mind, however, Goody Clancy is the district planner most heavily-influenced by planning education and ideology, and I will classify it as planning-dominant for the purpose of my thesis. In support of this claim, it is important to note that of the two other senior members of Goody Clancy’s staff on the UNOP who supported the work in District 1, one holds AICP certification and the other is professionally trained as a planner.103

As mentioned above, Goody Clancy managed a group of subcontractors. The District 1 Team included:

- Perez, APC, one of New Orleans’ most prominent local architecture firms.
- Creative Industry, Inc., the consulting firm of New Orleans’ based urban planner and architect Robert Tannen and community activist and consultant Jeanne Nathan.

102 Anonymous.
103 Principal David Spillane and Senior Planner Ron Mallis, respectively, who shared management of the District 6 planning process.
• Reverend Dr. Marshall Truehill, Jr., a Pastor at the First United Baptist Church of New Orleans; Founder, the New Orleans Comprehensive Grassroots Disaster Plan; a member of Total Community Action in New Orleans; and Former Chair of the New Orleans City Planning Commission.

• Zimmerman Volk Associates, Inc., a market analysis firm that concentrates on projects related to mixed-use and New Urbanist concepts.

• Economics Research Associates (ERA), an economic analysis firm that specializes in the areas of the entertainment and leisure industry, real estate development, public-policy analysis, tourism, and economic development.

UNOP also selected Duany Plater-Zyberk & Company (DPZ) to work as District 1’s Neighborhood Planner. DPZ is led by Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, the founders of the Congress for the New Urbanism. Both Duany and Plater-Zyberk are trained as architects. DPZ uses a charrette model for soliciting public opinion around urban design issues, an intensive 5-day experience in which designers, locally-selected “experts,” and community members are invited to share in designing their neighborhood. The UNOP deemed the French Quarter as an area with special planning needs because of its many historical features and unique urban fabric. DPZ’s assignment in District 1 was to work with the District’s historic residential districts.

*How Goody Clancy Viewed Their Work*

In Goody Clancy’s presentation at City Park, David Dixon stressed his belief that Goody Clancy’s work “makes a difference.” He marketed Goody Clancy’s expertise in working in diverse communities and neighborhoods. He also discussed Goody Clancy’s interest in hearing from
community members, and using what they learn to make their final plan. The majority of his presentation focused on the process structure that Goody Clancy would use to engage residents and develop plans. The process Dixon presented clearly reflected a well-thought out and tested method based on Goody Clancy’s successes in other projects around the country.\(^{104}\) What was most striking about the process he presented was how efficient it appeared (and later proved to be). This attention to community process as a true deliverable, and a formalized part of the planning work, corresponds directly with the literature’s predictions about planners’ skills.

In my interview with him, Dixon repeatedly stressed his interest in urban design as an interdisciplinary endeavor that required weaving together expertise from multiple areas of thought. In discussing the challenges he’s experienced when trying to explain his work to his architect-colleagues, Dixon said:

> “In urban design, negotiation is critical. Urban Design is a constant negotiation of perspectives – political, community, etc. You are always trying to broker them into a physical solution that is good and right. This focus means that you need to really understand, be trusted by, and have good communication with all of these different perspectives. My partners [all architects, think] it should all be about putting out good ideas. [In urban design] People don’t need good ideas. They need their positions resolved so they could all move on.”\(^{105}\)

Dixon believes that in order to do neighborhood revitalization, you need planners, whose expertise is not on design but on how to “integrate the results of collaborative thinking.”\(^{106}\) In this statement, Dixon articulates the differing stresses of the professions, as proposed in the literature—that design for planners is about process (and negotiation between competing ideas, in particular), while design for architects is about product (or design ideas, more specifically).

---


\(^{105}\) David Dixon, personal interview, 9 Mar. 2007.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
Dixon's descriptions of Goody Clancy's work affirmed the proposition that planners are driven by a community-oriented value system. In making recommendations, Dixon described a "moral commitment" that he feels "to have a real dialogue and mutual education" through the community process. He also talked about the "mission" of the planning process, which was to help communities not only create a recovery plan but, in doing so, also to create a plan that would eliminate the obstacles to recovery that had prevented development long before Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans. 107

The Planning Process

Goody-Clancy was able to draw on the previous work of the French Quarter Recovery Coalition, and its various member organizations, in its initial outreach process. Given the short time frame, Goody Clancy depended heavily on these organizations, particularly the DDD and VCPORA, to help in assembling their leadership organization, which they called their "Sounding Board." The initial requirement for membership in this group was simply to attend all meetings, but, as long as individuals made an attendance commitment, anyone could participate. The DDD and its affiliates, however, requested the formation of a more formal "Steering Committee," and assisted Goody Clancy in assembling a representative body. Steering Committee membership included historic preservationists, community activists, developers, real estate professionals, members of the tourism, retail and hospitality sectors, university representatives and residents. It also included specific organizational representatives, including:

- The Downtown Development District
- The Vieux Carre Property Owners and Residents Association
- The Vieux Carre Commission
- The Chateau Sonesta Hotel, which hosted District 1 meetings
- Smart Growth for Louisiana

107 Ibid.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation
The Preservation Resource Center
The Lafayette Square Association
The Picayune Place Association
Harrah's Casino
The Maritime and Intermodal Transportation Center of the University of New Orleans

The Steering Committee met every two weeks, during the same period as the district meeting and also between district meetings. Their first meeting took place two weeks before the first district meeting, on September 28, 2006. Steering Committee members were charged with discussing and developing key issues and sharing this information with the larger community. Each of the Steering Committee meetings was attended by 20-25 people each time, and, consistent with the initial Sounding Board design, the meetings were always open to new, interested community members.

The DDD and VCPORA were the key organizations that assisted with outreach for the District-wide meetings. These meetings were focused on larger concepts and process themes. Most District meetings were formatted to include a formal presentation of findings to date and then discussion. The first two meetings included discussions in smaller break-out groups, facilitated by members of the District planning team. In the last two meetings, Goody-Clancy facilitated a single large-group discussion. District meetings were typically attended by 35-45 participants.

Many of Goody Clancy's projects require frequent travel. Goody Clancy did not establish an office in New Orleans, or have a staff person permanently stationed there. However, Goody Clancy had a strong local presence, with at least one staff person in New Orleans every two weeks for Steering Committee or District Planning team meetings, plus often times in between. Ian Charie and David Dixon were the primary facilitators of all meetings. Phil Goff was assigned to a leadership role on the project, and his work was largely focused on design and illustrations of the planning work. Various consultants were utilized at different meetings based on the prevalence of specific issues
relevant to their skill set. Angela O’Byrne, Jeanne Nathan (Creative Industries), and Marshall Truehill assisted with meeting facilitations and outreach throughout the process. The economic and market research consulting firms focused largely on specific studies in their areas of expertise. Goody Clancy facilitated discussions around these studies, incorporated community feedback, and integrated the reports into the final recommendations. The full reports produced by these firms were included as appendices.

As the neighborhood planners assigned to District 1, DPZ engaged local stakeholders in a third layer of community participation. DPZ held two week-long charrettes focused on District 1’s historic districts, dividing the District into two segments along Canal Street. Unlike in Districts 3 and 12, DPZ’s work occurred alongside, but not in direct coordination, with Goody Clancy’s work.

In my observation, DPZ’s assignment in District 1, and the way that they worked with the district planning team, was different from the other district staffing assignments. Long before the UNOP started, Andres Duany had been promoting his ideas and firm in New Orleans and the state, and had expressed a particular interest in the French Quarter. Despite the interest of the French Quarter Recovery Coalition, UNOP coordinators felt that DPZ lacked the capacity to manage a district planning process. However, once Goody Clancy was assigned to District 1, there was enough overlap between DPZ’s expertise and Goody Clancy’s expertise that the pairing seemed to duplicate certain skills within a relatively small district.

With this in mind, DPZ’s two charrettes produced handsome documents that were included in the final District 1 plan. However, neither the charrettes nor the final report seemed to have a large impact on the process itself. If anything, Duany’s more directive style of running meetings by
promoting his design solutions presented a stark contrast to Goody Clancy's more facilitative style of listening and developing ideas alongside community members, and made community participants feel more confident about Goody Clancy's ability as their district planner. This difference, between architect Duany's charrettes and Goody Clancy's district meetings again supports the literature's presentation of architects doing urban design by presenting ideas and planners doing urban design through collaborative decision-making processes.

The plan's recommendations were developed throughout the process in a constant cycle of review at Steering Committee and District Committee meetings. At the last district meeting, Goody Clancy presented their proposal for the final recommendations, and the discussion focused on adjusting the recommendations to meet community concerns. The concerns centered on the benefits and potential of mixed-use development in the central business core, how the community could provide feedback on the plan, and what the community would do after the process was complete in order to maintain momentum once the UNOP process was complete. After this meeting, Goody Clancy posted their working draft of the final report on their internal ftp website site, and all district participants were invited to view it and give feedback before it was submitted to the Citywide Team (on January 27th). Hard copies of the draft plan were also available at two locations in the neighborhood review. The ftp site access allowed the community to have more input and influence over the final draft than in any other case district.

How the Planning Team Worked with District Participants

Participants were very pleased, overall, with their relationships with Goody Clancy. As the level of professionalism and organization in the Steering Committee Meeting/District Meeting cycle certainly helped participants feel that their time was well-used and respected. In the meetings that I
listened to and attended, the planning team struck a good balance between facilitator and responder in both large-group and breakout group meetings. The use of the ftp site allowed for a formal feedback loop that exceeded the detail used by other planning teams.

Even though Goody Clancy never had a permanent physical location in the district (or the city), participants felt that the planners were very available to them. The final plan reflected many of the ideas from the French Quarter Recovery Coalition’s planning work. Residents appreciated the way that the planning team presented the ideas that came from the planning process and also used their planning and urban design expertise to add new details and elaborate on the concepts. Residents reported feeling that their input was reflected in the plan.108

Final Recommendations

Because the structure and basic outline of the final recommendations were provided to the planning teams, these aspects of the final plans are limited in terms of what they say about how the firms approached plan documentation. With an eye towards disciplinary comparison, however, there are three aspects of the final plans that are more telling. First, the types of projects that each firm proposed should tell us something about their interpretation of urban design. Second, their considerations as to what happens next should have some bearing on how they incorporate political and community processes into their thinking about their responsibilities as urban design professionals. Finally, a brief look at graphic representation in the plan should provide a base for understanding the role of artistry and visual thinking in their approach.

Projects and Proposals

The District 1 recommendations run the full gamut from specific site-based recommendations (reopen and rehabilitate Armstrong Park) to policy measures (increase enforcement of preservation methods), service delivery (improve trash collection and power supply issues), and infrastructure improvements (initiate comprehensive street repair program). Their plan has a strong emphasis on principles related to Smart Growth or New Urbanism, with a special focus on increasing public transportation, enhancing public corridors and street-level activity, infill development in downtown, and mixed-use projects. While these are popular concepts amongst planners, these were also key interests of the community participants. Goody Clancy was also able to contextualize the viability of these concepts in the context of New Orleans. For example, the interest in increased public transportation was not only driven by more generic concepts of environmental and socioeconomic benefits, but also the way that rail could bolster the city's evacuation capacity.

Recurring focus on design guidelines, zoning, historic preservation protections, and cultural amenities celebrating New Orleans' heritage reinforce a commitment to the unique atmosphere for which District 1 is most recognized. While not a dominant element of their proposals, the final recommendations do include a few studies for further exploration, where time did not permit a fully developed recommendation. Where possible, when presenting a new idea or concept, Goody Clancy provides models from other communities that can be used in developing these ideas for District 1.

Implementation and Next Steps

In their recommendation matrix, Goody Clancy has the most extensive classification system for understanding the kinds of support each project will need for implementation. In addition to the
Citywide Team's required classifications (recovery importance, community improvement importance, and scope of impact), the Goody Clancy matrix includes the following:

- Explanation of why each element is important in terms of fostering a vibrant city center, leading economic development, or preserving historic resources.
- Identification of the financial lead for each project (Public, private, institutional)
- Type of project sponsor to be sought (Government, institution, district or neighborhood, individual or private)
- Anticipated level of community involvement needed for project
- Locus of ongoing management responsibility (Government, institution, district or neighborhood, private)
- Timescale (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, greater than 5 years)

This classification system represents a higher level of implementation considerations than seen in the other district proposals. Additionally, it provides enough detail to help preserve the intent of the proposals as the planning document is passed through multiple layers of government and private bureaucracy.

Throughout the District 1 process, Goody Clancy was particularly focused on what would happen next, after the plan was submitted.\textsuperscript{109} This conversation was jumpstarted by the involvement of well-established community and business organization. The Downtown Development District, who had taken a strong role in the process from the very beginning, was a logical place to lean on for continuing some of this work, and they committed to doing so. The final plan proposed an expansion of the DDD's role, particularly in the areas of development, advocacy, maintenance and marketing, to continue the planning and implementation process. The designation of a specific

\textsuperscript{109} Dixon, Klein.
existing body to carry on District 1 planning efforts provides a strong tool for accountability and continuity extending beyond the UNOP plan.

**Plan Illustration**

Goody Clancy’s graphic presentation is the most comprehensive of all three case districts. Interestingly, the maps in the earlier portions of their plan, map illustrations represent information in terms of parcels more than other districts (something the literature would suggest, given planners’ expertise in zoning). To illustrate their proposals, they employ combinations of photographs of existing conditions, maps, massing models, perspectives, diagrams, and photographs of exemplary projects from other contexts. This multi-faceted approach may be a product of the firm’s overall capacity, giving the staff greater access to software and graphical talent than was available to other firms. My interviews with the firm, however, indicate that Phil Goff was responsible for the majority of the graphic work, so that this access to a larger talent base probably did not have a significant impact.\(^{110}\)

The graphic elements of the plan are easy to read and clearly presented. Perspectives of proposed development schemes are well detailed and employ strong artistry. What is most notable; however are not these individual elements themselves, but the way in which they are presented in groups of images to illustrate important concepts. Careful consideration went into grouping different image types to illustrate each specific project proposal. These combinations elaborate on ideas but also push the reader to think broadly and creatively about the given proposal, without enforcing any feeling of the designer dictating how the idea must look. Goody Clancy’s illustrative style adds depth and possibility to their proposals, and, as such, is employed very well.

\(^{110}\) Phil Goff, personal interview, 2 Mar. 2007.
Observations

In many ways, the District 1 case aligns directly with behaviors that we should expect from professionally-trained planners. Goody Clancy demonstrated a true ability as a process expert, gracefully integrating a community process with their professional expertise in neighborhood

111 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 1
revitalization, preservation, downtown development, urban policy, and zoning and land use. Their final plan represented an understanding of not only the need to make proposals that can be implemented, but also of how to actually craft ideas to support implementation.

Graphically, Goody Clancy paid more attention to physical illustrations than the literature would predict for a planning firm. Alternatively, their identification as urban designers does fit with the literature’s suggestion that planners interested in physical space become urban designers. The representation of parcels in maps is an interesting detail in alignment with scholarship on planners’ expertise, especially given how EDSA represented landscape in District 12.
District 3 is a 7.5 square mile area in New Orleans’ Uptown. Before Katrina, District 3 was home to 14% of New Orleans’ population. The District’s population was 54% African American and 40% White. District 3’s White population is concentrated around Tulane and Loyola Universities.

112 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3
(located in the Audubon/University Neighborhood in Figure 5.3) and along the bend in the river between West Riverside and Black Pearl. Pre-Katrina, 25% of the district lived below the poverty level. Although this was below the citywide rate of 28%, all of the majority African American neighborhoods in the district (Leonidas/West Carrollton, Hollygrove, Dixon, Broadmoor and Freret) exceeded the citywide rate as individual neighborhoods.¹¹³

Katrina flooded about half of District 3. The largest impact was concentrated in Broadmoor, Dixon and Hollygrove. Even before Katrina, the racial and class disparities between these neighborhoods and the rest of the District 3 neighborhoods dictated vastly different needs across the district. The severity of flooding in District 3’s poorer areas widened this gap (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Population Distribution and Flooding in District 3¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3
District Organization

By the time the UNOP started, neighborhood organizations in District 3 had been increasingly active in specific alliances throughout the district. The most active (and independent) area of the district was Broadmoor, where, as discussed in Chapter 4, the neighborhood had mobilized in response to the BNOB’s green dot proposal. Since the BNOB, Broadmoor had worked with students from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and local architect Allen Eskew to create a comprehensive plan for redeveloping their neighborhood. The Broadmoor Community Development Corporation, under the leadership of LaToya Cantrell and Hal Roark, was already pushing for implementation on projects from their plan when the UNOP began. Elsewhere in the district, the neighborhoods on and near Carrollton Avenue had formed the Carrollton Planning Network, a mutual support alliance to collaborate in advancing neighborhood-level initiatives.

Firm Selection for District 3

Voting in District 3 was not as unified as in District 1. Broadmoor, whose top priority was moving their planning efforts forward, favored the Fredric Schwartz Architects (FSA) team because Allen Eskew was a team member, which offered some level of continuity for their work. Neighboring communities viewed the Broadmoor group “the elephant in the room.” Residents outside of Broadmoor were most interested in choosing a firm that would protect them from being overshadowed by Broadmoor’s needs and organizational power.\(^{115}\) The Carrollton Planning Network voted for the Goody Clancy team, mostly as a vote against Eskew’s team (FSA), who they feared would prioritize Broadmoor over other neighborhoods because of their pre-existing relationship with Eskew. Ultimately, Frederic Schwartz’s team was assigned as District planners.

\(^{115}\) Anonymous.
The District 3 Planning Team

Fred Schwartz’s primary selling point was his involvement in, and commitment to, Post 9/11 Recovery in Lower Manhattan, where he lives and works. Schwartz’s passionate presentation about his understanding of the emotional and social despair associated with urban disaster made him an appealing choice for many New Orleanians, particularly those in heavily flooded areas.

Schwartz is trained as an architect and is still heavily engaged in academia as a member of the Visiting Faculty at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. Since 9/11, Schwartz has increasingly been involved in civic design projects and disaster recovery initiatives in Lower Manhattan. In addition to design projects in education, private industry and residential architecture, Schwartz’s office participates in a number of architectural competitions. All of his staff have professional training in architecture. For the UNOP projects, Schwartz opened a small office in New Orleans, and had two full-time staff living in New Orleans. He also had two to three staff members in New York working on the project.

Schwartz’s subcontractors were mainly local New Orleanians who could familiarize him with the local terrain and help run the planning process from the ground. One unique aspect of the FSA team was the number of academics on the team, which reflected Schwartz’s interest in the intellectual advancement of design through recognized scholars. The FSA team included:

- Allen Eskew (local New Orleans architect)
- Waggoner and Ball, a second local New Orleans architectural firm
- Wayne Troyer Architect, a third New Orleans Architecture firm
• ARUP, a transportation, hazard and sustainability consultant from New York, responsible for the recent disaster evacuation plan for Lower Manhattan

• Richard Campanella, a Tulane geographer and mapping scientist and one of New Orleans’ best recognized historians and geographers

• Dr. Robert Collins, Assistant Professor of Urban Studies at Dillard University and a private disaster recovery and real estate development planning consultant

• Full Spectrum NY, a Harlem-based real estate development firm that collaborated with FSA on housing work in Harlem

• William Moorish, Elwood R. Quesada Professor of Architecture, Landscape Architecture and Urban and Environmental Planning, University of Virginia

• Mark Schimmenti, Professor of Architecture, University of Tennessee

UNOP designated .now, a joint venture led by Eskew+Dumez+Ripple (EDR), Chan Krieger Sieniewicz and William Moorish, as the District 3 neighborhood planners. Because of the way that FSA eventually distributed work, and the overlap between team members, the FSA Team and .now members operated as one District Planning Team.

*How Frederic Schwartz Architects Viewed Their Work*

Frederic Schwartz’s presentation at City Park introduced Schwartz as a compassionate, empathic architect who knew what it felt like to be in the situation that New Orleanians were in after Katrina. Schwartz’s presentation was punctuated by his commitment to helping the city and its residents.
"We lead our lives," he stated, "in public service to help neighborhoods rebuild."\(^{116}\) His presentation of his firm's qualifications was based on projects (products) rather than process. He listed projects that they had completed in Manhattan and New Orleans, highlighting statistics such as how many people had been served by their work.

In our interview, Schwartz reiterated his passion for activism and helping people, and the great empathy he felt for the people of New Orleans. He explained that people chose him to be their planner because they thought that he would help them, and that participants had reached out since the project was completed to thank him for delivering on this (he also noted that he had received communication from "non-believers," who did not share the same sentiments). He said that his team's unique strength was their ability to reach out to any kind of neighborhood, regardless of their socioeconomic status or flood damage.\(^{117}\)

Schwartz stressed that he was an outsider, and that he could not have been a planner in New Orleans without the local partners on his team. His strength, as an outsider, was to "make [people] see the big picture and to get in some new ideas."\(^{118}\) This is aligned with scholarship about the importance that architecture training places on developing new ideas.

Schwartz described the selection process for what projects to include in the final plan as "total community decisions." The projects came either from sector level conversations or from the planning team based on the process. He credited his team with being critical about which projects


\(^{118}\) Schwartz.
were included in the final plan and making tough decisions. “That was part of the planning team’s job,” he explained, “[to] make some decisions about what projects were meaningful.”

In his presentation at City Park and our conversation in his office, Schwartz’s descriptions of public process success seemed to be based in large part on statistics. His team’s qualifications, or ability to truly engage the public, were gauged by the number of meetings either facilitated or attended. In his presentations, the content of meetings is not always explained in as great detail as are the number and kind of people who showed up at a given event. This quantitative measure of engagement seems to conflict with his stated empathic intentions for helping individuals. Alternatively, it may reflect a lack of experience with the content of public process, or a lack of focus on process as much as outcomes, which corresponds with the literature on architecture.

The Planning Process

In an effort to organize the process in such a way that all residents of both of FSA’s Districts (3 and 4) could receive full attention from Planning Team staff, the FSA team divided the districts into planning sectors. Before the first district meeting, the team created three sectors for district 3, attempting to draw boundaries that would group neighborhoods based on shared issues and demographics.

119 Schwartz.
The initially proposed boundaries proved problematic in District 3. The FSA Team used neighborhood boundaries on City of New Orleans maps to draw the proposed boundaries, and they turned out to be dramatically different that the actual neighborhood association boundaries. After a public outcry at District Meeting # 1, the Planning Team patiently spent nearly 45 minutes in a facilitated exercise to redraw the boundaries with community members. The final boundaries, and the sector approach more generally, were endorsed by the community by the end of this meeting.

---

120 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3
Rather than use the District-wide Steering Committee structure employed in Districts 1 and 12, District 3 had a leadership group for each sector. These groups met weekly. Each sector was assigned a local architect (Wayne Troyer for Sector A, Allen Eskew for Sector B, and Waggoner & Ball for Sector C). These architects acted as de facto neighborhood planners for their sectors, and were responsible for convening the weekly meetings.

Districtwide Meetings began with large-group report outs and then were divided into sector-based conversations. When possible, FSA had a local volunteer facilitate the large-group discussions. Given FSA’s areas of expertise (and lack of experience in running large public processes), the use of a process expert was a very efficient decision. In the last two meetings, the team conducted mini-poster sessions with proposed projects; using breakout time in the meetings for people to visit stations with individual project proposals and comment specifically on those projects (this exercise reflects a design studio review or charrette). The FSA Team recruited participants by networking through existing neighborhood organizations and, eventually, through sector committees. The team also attended 35 community meetings throughout the district. Phone calls, emails, flyers and signs in public spaces were all used to get people out to meetings.

*How the Planning Team Worked with District Participants*

Participants reported varying levels of satisfaction with the participation process. Individuals from all over the city appreciated the passion in Schwartz’s presentation, and did believe that he genuinely wanted to help him. The team was a very popular choice in the citywide voting program after the District 1 Meetings.
One Schwartz team member reflected that the most complicated part of the process was working with groups that did not already have plans. He noted that groups that had already participated in some sort of neighborhood recovery effort were trained to be a part of these community building processes. Others, however, were not as prepared, and the short time frame did not give the FSA Team a chance to train them adequately and produce a plan. This may have been a reference to the tension between Broadmoor and other neighborhoods throughout the District 3 process. It appears that, as the Carrollton Planning Network feared, the Broadmoor neighborhood fared best in the process.

One complaint from a neighborhood leader in the Carrollton area was that there was an uneven distribution of talent in terms of the local firms assigned to each sector. In his sector, Sector A, his committee usually met independently of their consultant (Architect Wayne Troyer). According to my interviewee, Troyer was rarely available to them. This comment is part of a larger story, not about a negligent consultant, but simply about process management, elaborated on in the next paragraph.

Feelings about how the FSA Team worked with community members are very polarized. People who worked well with Schwartz and his team members feel that he did a wonderful job of incorporating their ideas and listening to them. Those who found themselves on the other side of an issue, however, had the opposite experience. In comparison with other planning teams, I suspect that there were two issues at play in these circumstances. The first was most likely a personality issue. The second issue may have been the lack of emphasis on the importance of the process of negotiation, something that is not a great priority for architects, as David Dixon described.

121 Anonymous.
These comments about the inconsistent relationships between community participants and FSA may be attributed, in part, to an architect's view that process is the way to get to a design, rather than a product in and of itself. Additionally, of all three team leaders, FSA had the least experience managing a community process of this magnitude. A lack of experience in extensive public input processes could certainly lead to the polarizing explained above.

Final Recommendations

In the spirit of drawing parallels between the cases, I will examine the District 3 recommendations in the same categories as those in District 1: Projects and Proposals, Implementation and Next Steps, and Plan Illustration. Before I begin, however, there is one noteworthy aspect of District 3 plan that I have never seen in a community plan proposal before. Earlier in the case, I highlighted Schwartz's inclusion of a number of academics on his team. This unique aspect is reflected in the final plan itself. Rather than having a complete plan authored by the planning team, as is customary in these types of processes, expert authors wrote different chapters of the plan. In these chapters the authors are given specific bylines. For example, Chapter 1, Introduction to District 3, is written by Campanella, and goes into excessive detail about the political and geological history not only of District 3, but of the city as whole. Again, in the conclusion, implementation recommendations are given by academic experts in related areas. This is probably partially attributable to Schwartz's own intellectual inclinations. Reflecting back on architectural training and practice, this presentation, which goes beyond the required fundamentals of an easily implemented plan, reflects the architect's aspiration for all of their work to further knowledge, and reflects new innovations unique to the architect as a creator or designer.
Projects and Proposals

The District 3 plan presents 20 recovery planning projects. The Citywide Team requested that each planning firm separate their recommendations into “Recovery Projects” and “Community Improvement Projects.” Schwartz argued with the Citywide Team, stating that all of the projects that came out of the public process were essential components of District 3 and 4’s recovery. This disagreement was not settled, and the projects in the FSA plans are all listed as Recovery projects. The recommendations can be divided into two basic categories. The first set of projects are very specific, based on individual locations and/or projects (redevelop Carrollton Shopping Center; investigate and if required remediate Syncor Facility). A specific local focus is usually merited for catalytic projects, but the specificity of these proposals is unique. The second category is more broad-based, ranging from a Neighborhood Green Block and Housing Moving Program to developing a District-wide network of open spaces and bike paths. Only three proposals call for further study – all of the rest are very action, or at least project, oriented.

Implementation and Next Steps

Unlike Goody Clancy’s project matrix, the details for project execution and funding are much less detailed in the District 3 report. Some of these recommendations seem exceptionally underdeveloped for implementation, such as a proposal to create a new Community Development Corporation to support Affordable and Rental Housing Renovation Programs that does not name any specific potential host agency or group to start such a complex endeavor.

Looking forward overall, the plan proposes a set of five big ideas for implementation. The five concepts, “Project Bundling,” “Build Big by Aggregating Small Projects,” “Connect Systems of Infrastructure,” “Invest Across Public/Private Sectors,” and “Share the Wealth of Energy” do
illustrate innovative ideas for spurring development and consolidating public resources. However, they are not tied directly to the 20 Recovery Project proposals. Additionally, these ideas seem to transcend the district level, which opens the question of who the assumed reader is and how the plan delineates an implementation approach that leaves someone (or some group) accountable for continuity.

In the conclusion, the FSA Team proposes five far-reaching innovations to address housing, green building practices, funding for plan proposals, and continued community participation in public planning. Each of these proposals is written by one of the “guest authors” described in the beginning of this section. There are some wonderful, creative and well-supported ideas within these proposals. However, these proposals address what city; state and federal-level decision-makers can do to effect change in New Orleans. These proposals pass-by the neighborhood-level spirit of collective action and public responsibility for planning. Their departure from the actual content of the public planning process leaves the central proposals of the plan stranded without any structure for moving off of the pages of the printed plan. As Dagenhart and Sawicki discussed, architects are much more focused on presenting the ideas than managing their implementation, and orientation that may be driving the weaknesses in the implantation components of the plan.

Plan Illustration

The citywide plan format required one 8 ½” x 11” project sheet for each of the proposed projects. Expanding upon this, the District 3 project sheets consume one to three 11” x 17” sheets. Illustrations on these sheets include photographs, photo montages of future streetscapes, maps, diagrams, street sections, hand drawings, and, in some cases, building programs. The volume of physical detail on proposed projects is certainly impressive. Even with the advantage of at least five
firms with graphical and rendering capabilities, the level of effort put into these illustrations is clearly above and beyond what was required.

However, the excess of detail sometimes confuses the projects, or at least makes each one overwhelming enough that it is difficult to think of all the projects together as a cohesive plan. Goody Clancy’s integrated use of multiple graphic types worked well because their images were strong and carefully selected. In the FSA plan, more careful selection of the most powerful images would have been a stronger way to showcase the team’s design expertise.

FSA is the only team that includes conceptual sketches in the plan. Although some of them are interesting, this is done for purely illustrative purposes. The architectural inclinations discussed in Chapter 2 again support the idea of including a demonstration of the architect’s creative process as evidence of their work product.

Figure 5.6: Fred Schwartz Diagram¹²²

¹²² Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3
Figure 5.7: Examples of FSA's Graphic Representation Style – South Carrollton and Claiborne Avenue Intersection Redevelopment (1)

123 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3 (modifications made by author for image placement)
Figure 5.8: Examples of FSA's Graphic Representation Style – South Carrollton and Claiborne Avenue Intersection Redevelopment (2) 124

124 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 3 (modifications made by author for image placement)
Observations

While FSA’s process received mixed reviews from the people I interviewed, their final document was generally praised, particularly by UNOP leadership and members of the citywide team. This is not inconsistent with the projections about architects, with a stronger focus on the final product design than the process it takes to get to the product. In relation to my previous comment about experience, I would not attribute all of the issues about process management to an architecture background. In fairness, this was the biggest planning endeavor FSA had ever undertaken, and they were a relatively small firm managing two large districts. As mentioned earlier, in expressing his team’s commitment to the district planning work, Schwartz emphasized the number of meetings that they had, the amount of time spent in these meetings and the number of people who attended. In comparison, however, Goody Clancy and EDSA held fewer meetings, but demonstrated a higher level of collaborative decision-making within their districts. While FSA was clearly committed to trying to do the best job they could do, these extra meetings to not necessarily imply a greater commitment, but may instead be another reflection about the lack of process management experience.

In both final recommendations and illustrations, the FSA plan shows the strongest orientation towards site-specific projects and representation. Their plan demonstrates a range of graphic ability, but at times it seems it could be more efficient in highlighting key concepts as opposed to specific ideas. In all aspects of the plan, there is a clear commitment to artistry, something that the literature clearly supports.
District 12 – EDSA: The Landscape Architects

Understanding the Area

Figure 5.9: District 12 Neighborhoods

District 12 is one of two districts on New Orleans’ West Bank, which sits on the west side of the Mississippi River, directly across from downtown. The West Bank is connected to the central city by both bridge and ferry. District 12 is the more populated section of the West Bank, and it is closer to the center of New Orleans. The West Bank was divided into two districts because of their differences in density and nature conservancy (District 13 is primarily conservation land).

125 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 12
Algiers is the general term for the area of District 12. Its boundaries are the Mississippi River, the Intracoastal Waterway, and New Orleans’ southern border with neighboring Jefferson Parrish. Algiers’ neighborhoods, as identified by the District Planning Team, are: Algiers Point, McDonough, Algiers/Whitney, Fischer Housing Development, Behrman, Algiers Naval Station, Aurora/Huntlee Village/Walnut Bend, Tall Timbers/Brechtel, and River Park/Cutoff.126

The majority of the Algiers neighborhoods are middle-class, single family home communities. There are two unique communities, the first being the Fischer Public Housing Development and the second the US Naval Support Station. The Fischer Development is in the southern region of the district, while the Naval Support Station sits on the Mississippi River, just south of the historic Algiers Point neighborhood. The Fischer Public Housing Development was the site of New Orleans’ Hope VI initiative, and has been under physical conversion since before Katrina. Prior to the storm, Algiers Naval Station was a residential Navy base. Since Katrina, it has been used to house families displaced by damage to their homes. After these people are resettled, the base will have yet another use, as the site where the federal government plans to consolidate all of its military and civic installments from throughout Orleans Parrish. It will no longer be a residential base after this transition.

Because the West Bank received the least damage from Katrina, many families were able to return before those in other areas, and many New Orleanians displaced from East Bank homes chose to resettle on the West Bank. Because of this, District 12 is the only District that has seen a population increase from its Pre-Katrina population numbers. Because many people had limited repair to their

126 New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 12
homes, their ability and interest in participating offered opportunities and challenges similar to those in District 1.

**District Organization**

The two most prominent leadership groups in Algiers are the Algiers Economic Development Foundation (AEDF) and The Algiers Group (TAG). These groups are associated with two distinct constituencies—AEDF with the white business constituency and TAG with residential neighborhoods in the black community.

Interviewees related to the Algiers process reported historical tension across three lines. First, there was an ongoing tension around community leadership between AEDF and TAG. Also, communication or collaboration along racial lines and class lines was an ongoing issue (class was sited as a more significant issue).

The 2000 Census reported that District 12 is a majority African American District (65%), with the White population making up 24%. These numbers are within two percentage points of the Citywide African American and White population percentages. Poverty statistics for the district in 2000 were slightly higher than the City, with 35% of Algiers residents living below poverty, as opposed to the 28% Citywide. These district-wide numbers mask a considerable disparity among the Algiers neighborhoods, however. As the chart and map below demonstrate, distribution of racial groups and concentrations of poverty are quite uneven across Algiers.
According to a 2006 survey by City-Works, a New Orleans non-profit organization, Algiers had 30 neighborhood organizations. The 18 organizations that completed City-Works' full survey reported high levels of involvement before Katrina, and the majority of these showed strong membership after the storm, as well. 23 of these organizations belong to the Algiers Council of Neighborhood Presidents, a networking group for neighborhood leaders.

Just before the UNOP process began, AEDF oversaw the Algiers Towne Plan. This plan, initiated in January, 2006, was meant to be the official rebuilding plan for Districts 12 and 13, neither of which were included in the Lambert Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan. AEDF oversaw the plan with the support of their City Councilmen James Carter. Their local partners were the Algiers Charter Schools Association and the Council of Neighborhood Presidents. Support on the educational

---

**Figure 5.10: Race and Class in District 12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race Category</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black or African American</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Population (2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race categories</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate (over)</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
component of the planning came from the New Orleans Education Foundation, who brought Concordia to work on the plan. A team from Auburn University’s Center for Governmental Support provided facilitation and technical support for the plan. The plan focused on Education; Housing; Economic and Workforce Development; Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; and Building Codes, Design & Land Use, and Zoning. This plan was wrapping up just as the UNOP began, and the participants and recommendations were simply folded into the UNOP process. While this process was ongoing, TAG was simultaneously trying to put together its own plan for Algiers. This was also incorporated into the UNOP process.

Firm Selection for District 12

Unlike Districts 1 and 3, there was not a concerted effort to pick a particular team for this district. One reason for this was that very few District 12 representatives were able to attend the City Park meeting.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^3\) EDSA had E. Eean McNaughton on their team, a local architect who had worked with AEDF, and continuing to work with someone familiar with the area was appealing to some district residents. Considerable portions of the district were in vulnerable floodplains, so involving a district planner with landscape architecture expertise was a consideration of the UNOP team in assigning the planner for this district.

The District 12 Planning Team

The District 12 team was led by EDSA’s Columbia, Maryland office. Associate Principal Henry Alinger, who has a degree in Landscape Architecture, acted as Principal-in-Charge. Alinger has experience in both landscape and urban design projects. Alinger’s biographical statement highlights

his process-oriented approach, which was very evident throughout the planning process. Keith Weaver, Alinger’s co-manager in the Baltimore office, was also very involved in the district planning process, although he took a stronger role in other districts. Weaver is also a landscape architect, with a special interest in redevelopment, revitalization and conservation. Like Alinger, Weaver has a strong interest in process, and has been working on developing a methodology to map public input into strategic planning over time. The lead staff person working with Alinger and Weaver was Aspasia Xypolia, a landscape architect who completed both her Masters and Bachelors degrees in Louisiana.

EDSA’s subcontracting firms included:

- RKG Associates, Inc., an economic development and real estate consultant from Alexandria, Virginia
- Asset Property Disposition, Inc, a Jacksonville, Florida-based firm that assisted with expertise in public process and housing issues
- E. Eean McNaughton, a local architect previously employed with the AEDF
- Suzanne Turner Associates, a Baton-Rouge cultural and historic preservation firm

H3 Studio, the District planner in Districts 2 and 13, was assigned to District 12 as a neighborhood planner. EDSA relied on H3 to lead a series of 3 neighborhood meetings to supplement the District and Steering Committee meeting process.

---

129 Keith Weaver, personal interview, 14 Mar. 2007.
How EDSA Viewed Their Work

In their presentation at City Park, Alinger described EDSA’s approach as “very interactive.”

EDSA’s role as a district planner would be “to understand broad based issues and break them down to neighborhood issues.” Alinger stressed to the City Park audience that the plans they work on are “community-based, not consultant-based.” Ultimately, the community members, not the planners, are the ones left with the responsibility to carry it forward, and so EDSA’s role is to provide the community with all of the support they need to carry this forward.130

EDSA’s presentation focused primarily on their approach to community process as opposed to spending too much time on specific projects that qualified them to do the work of the UNOP. During the presentation, Alinger laid out EDSA’s intentions to create a community-based Steering Committee to be their primary liaison throughout the public process. By creating a structured and manageable group, EDSA would be able to create a manageable work-relationship to share ideas and develop a community plan alongside neighborhood partners.131

In our interview, Alinger repeated EDSA’s focus on process as a key product of EDSA’s planning work. He stressed the importance of public participation, not just for the sake of participation, but because if a consultant makes a plan, and it does not have community buy-in, it rarely moves off of the shelf to make change in a community. In Alinger’s view, the act of people working collectively on a plan is as important as the plan itself. Given this viewpoint, Alinger also acknowledged that it

131 Ibid.
was particularly difficult to harness the full power of participatory planning within the compressed timeline of the UNOP.  

Discussing EDSA's assets as a team of landscape architects, Alinger explained that landscape architects' strengths are in implementation and design. Landscape architects trained at EDSA are equipped to perform multiple urban design functions, ranging from planning, design, detailing and fieldwork. According to Alinger, the one capacity that EDSA lacks, and hopes to fill with staff trained specifically in city planning. He described planners' unique strengths as the abilities to write plans and to both understand and explain complex policy issues.

Like Schwartz, Alinger acknowledged the challenge of working as an “outsider” in New Orleans. He also acknowledged the tremendous and essential added value of having local partners on the EDSA team. Local partners were essential to guaranteeing an efficient process and assisting EDSA in fast-tracking their ability to build local credibility in the District. In opposition to Schwartz's proposal that the outside practitioner has the unique ability to bring in new ideas, Alinger explained his firm's assets as outsiders by stating: “We [EDSA] are planners. We deal with the process. It [planning] is all about the process.”

In line with my expectations from the literature, Alinger did speak briefly about the ability of landscape architects to comprehend and work with a broad view of the environment and design. However, his intensive focus on process and participation were more aligned with predictions about

---

133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
planners than landscape architects. He also did not place much import on the designer-orientation anticipated from the studio tradition of landscape architecture.

The Planning Process

"The basic principles of the public involvement process used by the EDSA Team are that more citizens will participate in the process if they understand the issues that influence decision making."

All of EDSA’s materials, both in their initial presentation at City Park and in their District 12 report, reinforce their commitment to public engagement and their orientation towards process. They describe their role as community facilitator with great seriousness, and they clearly see this role as essential to their success and as a distinct part of their professional approach. The one unique aspect of their outreach in contrast to the other firms was their use of “windshield surveys,” guided tours of the area with local residents. EDSA uses this method of familiarizing their team with a neighborhood because it allows them to “view different parts of the district through the eyes of stakeholders who represent different priorities and interests.” This interest in seeing the larger area (landscape) of the district through multiple lenses is certainly inline with a landscape architect’s training in how to interpret space.

When EDSA began its work in District 12, tensions between AEDF and TAG were very heated, and both groups were busy competing for control over an Algiers Recovery Plan. Because of this, EDSA had to spend a significant amount of time early in the process trying to build each group’s trust of them and establishing a strategy to ensure that they would work together. EDSA conducted a number of individual meetings with different stakeholders, and spent time getting tours of the

135 Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 12
136 Ibid.
District from different constituents. Ultimately, EDSA decided that one way to appease these conflicting groups would be to introduce a fairly structured format for their Steering Committee. This structure guaranteed a specific number of seats to representative from AEDF and TAG (four each) and gave the remaining seats to neighborhood organization leaders and key local non-neighborhood groups. This structured approach was a very effective strategy for appeasing both groups, and reflected skilled facilitation.

The Steering Committee had 24 members, most of whom attended all meetings. The Steering Committee met once a month, before each District-wide meeting. The Steering Committee’s charge was to help EDSA set the agenda for the District-wide meetings, and to help guide key priorities and decisions. In addition to AEDF and TAG, the following groups were represented on the Steering Committee:

- Lower Algiers Neighborhood Association
- Bocage Neighborhood Association
- The Algiers Council of Neighborhood Presidents
- Algiers Point Neighborhood Association
- Old Algiers Main Street Corporation
- Old Algiers Civic Association
- Real Timbers Homeowners Association
- Pine Timbers Neighborhood Improvement Association
- Algiers Concerned Ministers Association
- Algiers Riverview Neighborhood Association
- Steeple Chase/De Batista Neighborhood Association
- Desire NOLA

The first district meeting drew about 59 people. Subsequent meetings were smaller, although both the planning team and my interviewees seemed pleased, overall, with the turnout. Meetings 1 and 2 were conducted in the same format—presentations from the district planning team followed by a single large-group facilitated discussion. Discussion in the first meeting, which included an overall introduction of the process, focused on identifying key community concerns. Based on this
information, Steering Committee meetings, interviews and their own expertise, the district planning team introduced a series of potential recovery scenarios during the Second meeting, which were then discussed in a large group. In Meeting # 3, the post-presentation discussions took place in small groups. In Meeting # 4, EDSA presented a draft set of final recommendations, which were reviewed through a large-group discussion. In the last two meetings, colored dot voting on large-format versions of scenario matrices was an important tool for spurring discussion and giving both planners and community members a visual representation of participant’s top priorities.

*How the Planning Team Worked with District Participants*

Overall, community members reported a high level of satisfaction with the way that EDSA facilitated the UNOP process. As individuals, EDSA staff places a very strong value on public participation, and this showed through in the efforts they put into building trust throughout the community and in their facilitation style. In an area like Algiers, where the majority of activity is residential, networking through the residential organizations was a good methodology for building a reputation of inclusiveness in the District. At the end of the process, District 12 participants reported a new level of communication across race and class lines, and a commitment to continued collaboration to implement the ideas of the plan.

The main criticism from interviewees about the district planning team was not about inclusiveness or ability to listen. Instead, criticism focused on how much the district planning team refined the recommendations beyond the community’s proposals. Participants were very confident that EDSA heard them, but they wanted to see EDSA apply their professional expertise and to develop community members’ ideas beyond those of which they could conceive. There was a concern that
the plan is not developed enough, and that the planning team should have taken more of a lead in fleshing out the ideas in the final plan.

There are two possible explanations for this. The first, which relies on the literature, is that EDSA was outside of their expertise to some extent in their intensive focus on process and participation. Assuming that that is a central skill of planners, and not landscape architects, perhaps the EDSA staff is still developing that capacity, but do not yet have the expertise to do it with the ease of a firm like Goody Clancy.

Alternatively, District 12 participants, ESDA and UNOP staff all acknowledged that the tensions between AEDF and TAG derailed the process in the first several weeks, and the EDSA Team had to devote significant energy to remedying this situation so that the process could move forward. If this is the case, then the lack of idea development could also be attributed to a time setback because of pre-existing conditions. In addition, in my interview with Alinger, he indicated that EDSA was more overwhelmed by the scope of work required in such a short timeline than the other two firms.137

Final Recommendations

Projects and Proposals

District 12’s Recovery Projects include more recommendations for “further studies” than those of any other district. The time management issues, discussed above, may be why there is a larger focus on what is still left to be studied as opposed to what can be done immediately.

137 Alinger.
As the discussion on landscape architecture could predict, many of EDSA’s other recommendations are focused on improving systems, or areas of interaction, than site-based projects. Some examples of this are the prevalence of economic development projects aimed at corridor or District development and improvements to pre-existing but under-capacity public transportation systems. There recommendations do include some distinctly “planner-like” elements, such as zoning updates, development incentives, and basic infrastructure improvements.

Unfortunately, despite EDSA’s expertise in landscape architecture, which should equip them with additional expertise and creative strategies for environmental mitigation, there was not significant discussion about making changes to protect District 12 from future flooding. This was acknowledged as an issue, but the majority of the flood-related recommendations concerned updating existing systems. While this is certainly legitimate, it was disappointing that EDSA did not apply their knowledge about environmental design to this important issue for District 12.

Implementation and Next Steps

Although EDSA’s proposals are sometimes lacking in their efforts to push boundaries and outline a series of specific actions, EDSA’s project prioritization scheme does take into account the need for some early “wins” for the District to move the implementation process (a factor that Alinger stressed as very important in our interview). For example, the first three recommendations in the area of transportation and transit are a series of road and sidewalk repairs that could be completed quickly and within the scope of available city funds. These small improvements would be pervasive throughout the district, and would serve as visible evidence that the plan’s recommendations are

138 Ibid.
happening. Also, by keeping the final recommendations very close to the existing requests and projects of the Steering Committee, their overall outline for implementation provides clear and understandable explanations and resources that both formal and informal leadership can use to move forward.

*Plan Illustration*

EDSA primarily confines its illustrations to photographs, maps, and diagrams (there are a few landscape sections). Their plan does not suffer from the lack of complex renderings or models, however. Their diagrams are very effective at conveying multiple layers of information in a format that is easy to read and appropriately detailed. Re-using basemaps and placing new information on previously used diagrams, EDSA is able to easily communicate ideas in multiple stages of complexity. To the lay reader, EDSA’s simpler approach to illustrating their plan works just as well as Goody Clancy’s more complex approach, and is perhaps more appropriate to the specific recommendations of their plan. Also, in contrast with Goody Clancy’s orientation towards parcels and FSA’s interest in site-level proposals, EDSA’s maps are much more representative of a broader “landscape-level” perspective.
Figure 5.11: Examples of EDSA's Graphic Representation Style – Newton Street/General Meyer Avenue Zone A

Source: New Orleans Recovery Plan – District 12
Observations

In terms initial predictions, EDSA deviates the farthest from their discipline’s training and philosophy. There are certainly some aspects of their work, such as their interest in how residents see the district, and the visual representation focused on the district as a whole unit, or system, that are in line with landscape architecture training and principles. However, EDSA demonstrates a strong inclination towards a planning approach, which is seen partly in their work, and even more in their descriptions of how they see their work. Their ability to be effective in some planner-like activities, but challenges with other areas of this practice, still supports the hypothesis that disciplinary training is different in the three fields, and that the specific skills developed by individual training support different behaviors in practice.

\[140\] Ibid.
After both reviewing scholarship on the three disciplines and analyzing three cases that juxtapose the work of professional teams from each field, I return to my initial hypothesis, that professional training and affiliation dictates distinct differences in how urban plans are developed by planners, architects or landscape architects. To test this against the cases, I will use the three spectra derived from the literature. These continuums examine the three disciplines in terms of the role of process in their work, their approach to physical space, and the goal of their work.

**Spectrum 1: The Role of Process**

In Chapter 2, I presented the Process Spectrum as Figure 2.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative process is a planner's expertise</td>
<td>Process is a balancing act</td>
<td>Process is a means to an end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process is an exercise in synthesizing ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Process is an individual exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In District 1, the planner case, Goody Clancy was consistent with the predictions on the planner's side of the continuum. Goody Clancy demonstrated great agility as a true process expert. The process that they facilitated was characterized by an efficiency for engaging community members and soliciting and integrating input towards the development of ideas that addressed the interests of both the business community and the residential community. On the opposite end of the spectrum, FSA, the architect team, were challenged in managing the process, but, in the final product, produced a document that impressed many of their peers on the planning team. The expectations set by the literature for the landscape architect were not as detailed in the area of process as in they were in physical space. EDSA presented an interesting orientation. Their values and intentions...
leaned heavily towards the planner’s side of the spectrum. In the end, despite their intentions, they were unable to achieve the same level of success as Goody Clancy. This may be because they lacked the formal training in planning necessary to replicate the planner’s process expertise. While this is a possibility, the pressures of the process and confounding variables at play make it impossible to reach this conclusion from this particular study.

Spectrum 2: Understanding of Physical Space:

Figure 2.2: The Physical Space Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad landscape with many components, natural, built and in between</td>
<td>Physical space is a component of dynamic urban places</td>
<td>A canvas for design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical space is a system of uses that impact society</td>
<td>A collections of designs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of visual representation, the physical space continuum could also be simplified as:

Figure 6.1: The Physical Space Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landscape Architect</th>
<th>Planner</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Represent LANDSCAPE</td>
<td>Represent LAND USE</td>
<td>Represent SITE SPECIFIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the final documents, this representational orientation is reflected very clearly. As discussed and illustrated in Chapter 5, the majority of EDSA’s illustrations were maps of the entire district. EDSA frequently used an iterative pattern of overlaying multiple layers of information on the same initial map template, demonstrating the territory based on the multiple characteristics of a singular environment. Goody Clancy, who gave more consideration to zoning needs than the other firms, illustrated their concepts and maps at the parcel level. Finally, FSA’s detailed recommendations were much more focused on site specific recommendations and illustrations than their two other peers, reflecting a perception that a community plan is made up of a collection of site specific proposals.
In terms of the implied goals of their final plans, the Goody Clancy and FSA plans reflect opposing ends of the spectrum, as predicted. Goody Clancy’s proposals directly reflect community ideas, but also incorporate their expert knowledge of progressive planning and urban design concepts. Most importantly, Goody Clancy places more importance on detailed implementation strategies. Goody Clancy worked with the community to develop an agreed upon and feasible plan for the DDD to act as a central coordinating body for the recommendations, which greatly enhances the potential that the plan’s recommendations will come to fruition. FSA’s well-illustrated and very detailed plan is filled with proposals for new concepts that propose innovative strategies for funding, policy and neighborhood growth well beyond what currently exists in New Orleans or in other similar communities. For a second time, EDSA does not fulfill the predictions. Unfortunately, their plan does not demonstrate the creative approaches to remedying the real potential hazards between the built neighborhoods of Algiers and the natural threats of future flooding that the literature suggests. Also, their plans did not reflect a high level of the landscape architect’s creativity beyond what the community suggested.

In addition to understanding how professionals from the three disciplines behave, it is also necessary to reflect on what worked in the Case Studies. Looking at these two findings from the cases, I will be able to finally re-address my initial hypothesis, that no single field can offer everything necessary
to fulfill the many facets of an urban design challenge, but that the strongest approach to urban
design projects can be achieved through a hybrid of the greatest assets of each field. With this in
mind, I will outline what worked best in both the process and final products in different Districts.
As I propose, all three firms had certain practices that were essential to any eventual success.

Limitations of the Findings

The quasi-experimental design of the UNOP district planning processes provided a set of real world
cases that I could observe without being able to control or randomize specific conditions for the
experimental design on my own. Given my interest in how practitioners act in complex urban
design settings, it would be exceptionally difficult to create a research design over which I had
complete control. The UNOP appeared to provide the best alternative, since the UNOP’s
coordinators had considerable control in standardizing plan development. In my brief survey of
planning initiatives before embarking on my case studies, the UNOP was a particularly favorable
research opportunity because of the number of controls that did exist, including: a project shared
schedule, a central coordinating body, a standardized set of guidelines for plan development, and a
timeline that allowed me to study the process as it developed.

Unfortunately, my lack of control over the research design introduced a group of confounding and
external variables that challenge my findings. From a pure social science perspective, the most
significant limitation was that firm selection was not random. Therefore, the firms who worked in
the case study districts all self-identified as firms interested in city design and planning. These firms
also competed in a national selection process and were selected as those most qualified for the
district planning role by UNOP leadership and the New Orleans community.
Taking this into consideration, however, this limitation may also provide an opportunity in terms of the practical value of my observations. My interest in this thesis is about the differences between fields play out in professional settings in which all three disciplines regularly participate (principally in urban-design oriented setting). The study of firms independently inclined towards this work is much more likely to shed light on practical urban design projects than a purely random selection. In a random selection from the three disciplines, one could end up with three firms on extreme ends of their areas of practice, who are unlikely to work in the same arena. For example, a random selection could end up comparing an architecture firm who only designs high-rise buildings with a planning firm that only writes zoning code, or a landscape architecture firm solely focused on wetland reconstruction. Therefore, while it may through the academic purity of my study in question, a certain expressed inclination towards planning or large scale city design projects bears more practical relevancy to the actual situation in the field.

The role of experience in parallel types of projects impacted firm performance, and therefore calls some conclusions into question. This was particularly an issue in terms of process orientation for FSA. In my conversations with the planning team, they indicated a genuine interest in facilitating a community process to support the plan. However, as mentioned in earlier discussions, FSA had never managed a community process of this scope, and so trying to place them on a spectrum with a firm like Goody Clancy, who specializes in these types of projects, is a risky proposition.

The pre-existing neighborhood-level organization and involvement in post-Katrina planning efforts before the district planning process begin is the other external variable that interfered with the experimental design. This is especially evident in comparing District 1, a smaller district that had self-organized long before the UNOP to collaborate on recovery strategies, with District 12, a
community that was in the midst of a leadership struggle across lines of race and class when EDSA began their work. It is certainly likely that the limited development of EDSA’s final proposals was caused by the amount of energy that the firm had to spend mediating between AEDF and TAG (an effort in which they seem to have succeeded, based on feedback from District 12 participants and UNOP leaders).

Potential Implications

Unfortunately, the impact of outside forces on the quasi-experimental design of my thesis makes it impossible to declare that all of the differences observed between the firms concussively support my hypothesis. However, there is a considerable correlation between the initial predictions of differences in practice and what actually occurred in the Unified New Orleans Plan. This apparent correlation supports further study into this issue for two important reasons.

First, it appears that planners, architects and landscape architects will continue to share the practice of urban design. Understanding the tendencies and inclinations of these different practitioners would be a great help to municipal agencies, communities and other groups as they look to make choices between professionals for specific projects. If it is possible to more clearly delineate which the particular skills of these groups, it will be easier to match specific types of projects with specific practitioners, theoretically ensuring a higher level of individual project success. Additionally, in the spirit of a more rigorous and fruitful tradition of city design, all practitioners would benefit from better understanding what their peers have to offer, and how to supplement their own disciplinary orientation with complimentary elements from their sister disciplines.
REFERENCES


“Affordable Housing/Community Revitalization/Historic Preservation”
“The Economics of Green”
“Green Buildings and Sustainable Architecture”
“Healthy Community Design”
“Historic Preservation Tax Credits”
“Public Health and the Built Environment”


“Housing”
“Collaborative Planning”
“Sustainability”
“Security”
“Wetlands”


"Landscape Architecture: Educational Requirements"
"Landscape Architecture: History"
"Landscape Architecture: Practice"


INTERVIEWS

Dufour, Jay. Personal interview. 23 Mar. 2007.
Goff, Phil. Personal interview. 2 Mar. 2007.
Haggerty, Michael. Personal interview. 10 Jan. 2007.
Hebert, Jeff. Telephone interview. 14 Nov. 2006.
Johnson, Laurie. Personal interview. 15 Apr. 2007.
Klein, Sue. Telephone interview. 3 Apr. 2007.
Nagendra, H.V. Personal interview. 26 Mar. 2007.
Newport, Gus. Personal interview. 3 Apr. 2007.
Rabalais, Rafael. Personal interview. 23 Mar. 2007.
Triplett, Vera. Personal interview. 28 Mar. 2007.

Weaver, Keith. Personal interview. 14 Mar. 2007.

APPENDIX - SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

District Planners
Planning Process
1. Please describe the planning process you are using in your Planning District.

2. How does this process allow you to meet all of the requirements for the Unified New Orleans Plan final product?

3. What is unique about your process?

4. What have been the most successful components of your process?

5. What components have presented challenges? Were these challenges anticipated? How have you addressed them?

Relationships with Community Participants
6. How would you characterize your relationship/your firm’s relationship with the community participants from your District?

7. Who are the participants from your District?

8. How does your process allow them to formulate and express their ideas for their community’s design (and future)?

9. How will participants’ ideas be represented in your final plan?

Professional/academic training and approach
10. What is your professional background?

11. What is your educational background?

12. What previous projects are you most proud of? What are the defining characteristics of these projects?

13. What is the background of the other staff working with you on this project?

14. How is your staff structured to support this project?

15. Which staff are responsible for which specific roles?

16. What unique skills and knowledge does your firm bring to this project?

UNOP Leadership
Planning Process
1. What is your impression of the planning processes in each of the case Districts?
2. What have been the greatest accomplishments of these processes?

3. What challenges have you observed? How have they been dealt with?

4. What shortcomings have you observed?

5. What are you most impressed with from each of the case Districts?

6. What concerns you?

Community Participation
7. What is your overall impression of community participation in each of the case Districts?

8. Which Team(s) has/have been most successful in incorporating community interests into their work and their plans?

9. What has allowed for their success?

10. What kinds of struggles have you observed between the planning teams and community participants?

11. How do you think that the interactions between the teams and community participants will impact planning outcomes?

Team Composition
12. What do you think each team offers to the process?

13. How is each team unique?

14. How has the Team itself impacted the process?

Community Participants
Planning Process
1. How would you characterize your participation in the Unified New Orleans Plan process in your District?

2. How would you describe how the process has been executed in your District?

3. Do you believe that this process will result in a strong plan for your District? Why or why not?

Community Participation
4. How has the planning team engaged the local community in the process?

5. How successful has the team been in reflecting community ideas in the plan as it has evolved?

6. How would you characterize your neighbors’ and friends’ impressions of the planning team?
**Team Composition**

7. How would you describe the team’s professional approach to the process?

8. What specific tools, activities or techniques introduced by the planning teams have been particularly successful or meaningful?

9. What has been confusing about the team’s approach or presentation?

**Personal Background**

10. What is your personal and professional background?

11. What is your role as a constituent in this planning district?

12. What planning efforts have you been a part of since Hurricane Katrina? Before Hurricane Katrina?

13. How do those efforts compare to the Unified New Orleans Plan process?

14. How do you personally benefit from your participation in this process?