# The Periphery Within
Modern Architecture and the Making of the Third World

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Submitted to the Department of Architecture in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture: History and Theory of Architecture

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 2007

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Abstract:

This dissertation examines the critical role played by modern architecture and planning in shaping the discourse on Third World development after the Second World War. At stake here is an ignored dimension of the history of modern architecture and planning as well as that of the development discourse that sheds important light on the relationship of both these discourses to the trajectories of global domination and control. Critiques of development have largely focused on how the economic approaches proposed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN have favored the financial and political agendas of global industrial powers. This dissertation argues that design practices like architecture and planning—usually thought to be concerned only with shaping the physical environment—have also played a significant role in shaping the key assumptions of the development discourse, from the existence of urbanizing masses caught between demands of tradition and modernization to the exploding Third World city that is unable to manage its emergence into modernity.

After the Second World War, as modern architecture began to lose its disciplinary footings as a medium of social reform in the industrialized world, modern architects and planners found tremendous opportunities as "experts" in programs of Third World development. The United Nations Housing Town and Country Planning section (HTCP), headed by Ernest Weissmann, a member of *Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM), sent out hundreds of missions, featuring famous housing and planning names such as Charles Abrams, Otto

Koenigsberger, Catherine Bauer, and Jacob Crane, among others. These missions produced master plans for cities from Singapore (recounted most famously by Rem Koolhaas in *SMLXL*) to Kabul to Beirut to Lima to Lagos, organized numerous conferences, and set up planning and public administration bodies, building research centers, and schools of architecture all over the decolonizing world. This dissertation examines this wide range of activity to identify particular modes of social and economic intervention, such as self-help architecture, "core" housing, and regional planning, that were able to negotiate the demands of postcolonial nation-states, the Cold War geo-political context, and the agendas of institutions of international finance emerging after the war.

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This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of my teachers, colleagues, friends, and family. To this end, I owe many a tremendous debt. Indeed, I could not have asked for a more encouraging advisor than Mark Jarzombek, who always welcomed everyone with a smile no matter how busy he was and made my research topic sound much more intriguing than it would be in my head when I walked in through his door. Nor could one wish for a better mentor and friend than Arindam Dutta, whose intellectual expanse and insightful critiques have been a source of inspiration for me since he himself was a PhD student at Princeton. A paper co-authored with Arindam at Princeton was the beginning of this project. It was, indeed, my introduction to the argumentative pleasures of research. My gratitude to Christine Boyer also dates back to Princeton when I took classes with her as a Master of Architecture student. Her generosity with her time and careful readings of many an incomprehensible piece of my writing has only increased this debt further. In addition to my committee, I am grateful to Nasser Rabbat for his kind interest and insightful comments and advice that gave my thinking direction at key moments.

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1 Introduction

Modern architecture reached its symbolic apex in the spectacular postwar capital complexes of Le Corbusier's Chandigarh, Kahn's Dacca, and Niemeyer's Brasilia. From here on, its social aims were seen to be diminishing, till they were finally extinguished—as recounted most famously by Charles Jencks—with the destruction of Pruitt-Igoe in 1972. This dissertation challenges this mainstream narrative by claiming that modern architecture had a far more permanent and vital role to play in the postwar era in the making of the Third World.

To understand this history we have to look at the numerous "development missions" staffed by modern architects and planners that were sent to the emerging Third World by international agencies such as the UN, the Ford Foundation, and the USAID (FIG. 1). After the Second World War, as modern architecture began to lose its disciplinary footings as a medium of social reform in the industrialized world, modern architects and planners found tremendous opportunities as "experts" in programs of Third World development. The United Nations Housing Town and Country Planning section (HTCP), headed by Ernest Weissmann, a Yugoslavian architect and a member of *Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM), sent out hundreds of missions to the decolonizing world. Focused on the question of Third World urbanization, these missions produced master plans for cities from Singapore (recounted most famously by Rem Koolhaas in *SMLXL*) to Kabul to Beirut to Lima to Lagos, organized numerous conferences, set up planning and public administration bodies, building research

centers, demonstration projects, and schools of architecture all over the decolonizing world.

This dissertation argues that an account of this activity is crucial to the history of modern architecture in the postwar era—not only because modern architecture gained actual global dominance through its role in this sphere, but also because here it participated in shaping the very idea of Third World development that has inaugurated a new era of global dominance and control.

1.1 Significance:

In charting this sphere, this dissertation has a two-fold agenda: to map not only an important dimension of the history of postwar modern architecture and planning, but also of the development discourse itself to shed important light on how ideas of development have intersected with hidden trajectories of global domination and control after the war.

Critiques of development have largely focused on how the economic approaches proposed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN have favored the financial and political agendas of global industrial powers. The question of how this relationship was forged is either ignored or is based on a caricature of colonial governance—economic exploitation justified through the civilizational mission of bringing "primitive" people into the fold of modernity.

Challenging such linear and continuist narratives, this dissertation draws attention to precisely the enigmatic and diffused terrain where relations of power are secured at the intersection of humanistic, social, economic, nationalist, and aesthetic agendas. Our focus will be on identifying those new modes of socio-

economic intervention that are based on the idea of establishing programs of mutual participation and forging partnerships between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, where technical and administrative advice is claimed to be exchanged for lessons on how to recoup social and traditional values lost by the West during its course of industrialization.

Innocuous as the language of participation, cooperation, and mutual learning may seem, it has formed a critical part of a new discourse of managing the contours of the geopolitical arena after the Second World War. The image of native participation—of people learning to help themselves—has been a critical element of the World Bank's "structural adjustment programs" for developing market-economies. These and other Third World "development" projects, conceived to by-pass nation state protections, have subsequently opened up Third World economies to international trade for the benefit of multinational corporations, leaving the very populations the projects claimed to help more vulnerable to the fluctuations of global economy. Our purpose in this dissertation is not to recount the effect of these policies and development programs as there have been ample critiques of the idea of Third World development and its relationship to international finance and management of power in the postwar geopolitical arena. What remains generally absent in these critiques, however, is how the key assumptions of this discourse, such as the image of the participating native, are constructed and managed; assumptions that, to paraphrase Michel Foucault, "render intelligible" this discourse.[1]

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[1] Foucault's sentence reads as follows: "La condition de possibilité du pouvoir, en tout cas le point de vue qui permet de rendre intelligible son exercise...C'est le socle mouvant des

The emphasis on participation and partnership figures prominently in UN development projects, reflecting the organization's particular position in the postwar geo-political global arena. As Thomas Weiss et al. have argued, other specialized intergovernmental organizations – such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, of the World Bank), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – that were created during the first half of the twentieth century and continued in the postwar era, were created in large part to establish an international infrastructure for what is now often called the global liberal economic order.[2]

Funded directly by Allied members with stakes in creating global economic conditions necessary for the working of private markets, this system of organizations favored its major donors. It is not surprising that after the war most of the funding for these organizations came from countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a group that originally contained the benefactors of the US funded Marshall Plan.

At the time of its establishment, the UN format too was largely determined by the interests of the major Allied countries. From the location of its founding

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rapports de force qui induisent sans cesse, par leur inegalité, des états de pouvoir." Michel Foucault, *La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976) p. 122. The sentence is quoted by Gayatri Spivak, to draw attention to the unfortunate translation of "rendre intelligible" as "understanding" by Robert Hurley in the book's English edition, *The History of Sexuality*, trans., Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980). Spivak quotes the sentence in "More on Power/knowledge," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 30-31.

[2] Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsyth, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).

conference in San Francisco in 1945, to the location of its permanent headquarters in New York (now known to have constantly been under CIA surveillance), to the appointment of subsequent Secretary Generals that supported US foreign and economic policy positions, the UN was not as "free" a body as it was presented to be. Yet unlike the World Bank, or other Bretton Woods related organizations, the directives of the main UN assemblies (the General Assembly and the Security Council) and its specialized agencies were not determined by finance-related weighted voting that gave large donors more power over smaller ones. The UN platform was open to contestation by the communist bloc and the decolonized nation states seeking to protect their position in international markets. It is therefore not surprising that the enthusiasm for laissez-faire economics, private markets, and liberal trade shared by the United States and the OECD countries was often condemned on the UN platform.

These contestations, however, meant that the funding available to other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) was not easily forthcoming to the UN. Towards the end of the war in 1943, the US had helped fund the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) for assisting refugees. The UN Generally Assembly sought to extend this model of assistance by large donors beyond the European and Japanese postwar contexts by establishing the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1950. The EPTA was initiated as an outgrowth of President Truman's Point IV proposal and was designed to be largely funded by the US government through the 1949 Act for International Development. Yet, from the beginning, Washington insisted that given the open-ended geographical scope of the program, its funding should not be dominated by the US. The EPTA started

with a nominal operating fund of $20 million in 1951, whose growth was hampered when the United States reduced it contribution from 60 percent to 40 percent of the total in the coming years.[3]

The impasse over conditions of funding resulted in reorientation of the UN program, with greater emphasis on training, technical advice, and preference for promoting private investment and savings. Yet it is precisely in this separation between the UN and other IGO programs that a relationship of mutual legitimization begins to emerge. The emphasis on participation and private investment by the UN economic development programs was the primary "condition" demanded by the World Bank and IMF loans. Instead of undermining each other's scope, UN programs lent the latter with an air of legitimacy.

The lack of available funds was not only a consequence of the multilateral nature of the UN platform. The reluctance to form a centrally coordinated funding source also stemmed from the resistance of UN specialized agencies – such as the FAO, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – to a reduction of their relative autonomy. The emphasis on a language of participation without financial commitment that we see in financially deficient EPTA projects allowed this autonomy.[4]

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[3] The idea of regional commissions was raised and rejected at the founding San Francisco conference. Even though the regional Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) were established within ECOSOC to assist in the postwar recovery efforts there, it took much effort by Latin American countries to secure a similar body, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), in 1948. And it would take another decade to establish the regional commission for Africa, given the continuation of colonization in the continent.

[4] The limitations of the EPTA program led many developing countries to apply pressure in the early 1950s to create a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development

It would, however, be a mistake to see UN programs simply as an extension of, say, the World Bank agenda. The two organizations followed different directives, with the UN platform more open to challenges from aid-receiving countries. Yet to the degree that UN experts attested to the language of participation, savings, private investment, and partnership, their proposals intersected with the interests of the World Bank and other organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, with agendas that followed the line of Cold War politics.

It is against this background that this dissertation identifies architecture and planning in the development arena as a mutually legitimizing terrain where we see these differing agendas meet. Architecture and planning projects stressed the need for private investment, savings, and participation that satisfied both the UN and other IGOs' requirements. From the valorization of "traditional" building practices, the celebration of the ingenuity of "squatters," to the framing of urban migration as a demographic movement driven by the desire for modernization and urban life, architecture and planning practices constitute the field where development is

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(SUNFED) that could combine technical assistance with long-term low-interest loans. The United States, refusing to commit resources to a multilateral assistance fund over which it did not have control of disbursements, countered the majority opinion in the UN. The SUNFED too, like the EPTA was handicapped because of the lack of resources. As a result of these limitations, in 1958 the UN General Assembly approved to create a Special Fund that were to provide "preinvestment" capital to "stimulate" private investment that complimented the UNs' technical assistance program. The special fund was able to gain traction in the UN because allowed United States and other major donors to dictate the terms under which the funding they attributed would be distributed. In 1965, the General Assembly combined the Special Fund with EPTA into one entity, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Yet the divisions between different specialized agencies were reluctant to subscribe to the subordination that reduction of fiscal autonomy implicit in this arrangement. The desire for autonomy continued to undermine coordination efforts. For this reason, even though the new Special Fund was meant to be closely coordinated with EPTA projects, it operated quite independently even as it grew in size.

framed not as a project to modernize primitive populations, but as a representation of the demands and desires of populations already in transition to modernization. In this sphere, development is increasingly presented as a program of forging partnerships between the developed and underdeveloped worlds.

The primary form taken by modern architecture in this terrain is that of self-help projects, where the participants are enlisted under a variety of administrative arrangements to build their own houses. These self-help programs took many forms, beginning with institutionally provided housing to sites-and-services and "core" schemes that provided only minimal services to new or existing settlements, leaving all remaining construction to be done by the inhabitants over time according to their own prerogatives. In all these cases, we see architects and planners deemphasizing the centrality of formal design and emphasizing the importance of savings, investment, incremental construction, and inhabitants' participation.

This was indeed a disappointment for many modern architects seeking opportunities on the development platform. Key names of the prewar modern architectural movement, such as Sigfried Giedion, Jose Luis Sert, and Richard Neutra, were present at the founding UN conference in San Francisco. Giedion had been in touch with Unesco's fist Directory General, Julian Huxley, and had found their exchange encouraging.[5] Huxley, however, wrote soon afterwards to Giedion that architecture could not be treated as a special cultural activity under

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[5] The promise of this relationship can be seen in Giedion's enthusiastic letter to W. Wurster, December 19, 1946, announcing that "leading personalities of UNESCO, Huxley and Carter, are form of out ideas and of us" Cited by Jos Bosman in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *The Last CIAMs, Rassegna*, special issue, 52:4 (December 1992): p.14.

the Unesco umbrella. On the development platform, architecture appeared concomitant with planning as an instrument of guiding economic and social activity and was to be situated under the UN Social and Economic Affairs Division.

As a result, the opportunities presented here were to a cadre that was of a different background. It was Catherine Bauer, the famous American planner and housing activist who, in collaboration with CIAM secretary Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, proposed the formation of the UN Housing, Town, and Country Planning section at the 1946 Hastings Conference of the International Union of Architects (UIA), a European planning body that later provided many returning colonial planners as experts for UN missions. As mentioned above, the first chief of the UN HTCP was Ernest Weissmann. Though Weissmann was a CIAM member and attended the organization's initial meetings in New York after the war, along with Giedion, Sert, Walter Gropius and others, he was interested in seeking those figures for UN jobs who had a background in housing finance, legislation, and planning coordination. As a result the leading architectural and planning figures in the development context were figures such as Catherine Bauer, Charles Abrams, the prominent US housing activist and sometime Rent Commissioner of New York State, Otto Koenigsberger, the Director of the Department of Tropical Architecture at the Architectural Association (AA) in London in 1950s, who had also been the Chief planner of the State of Mysore in India, and Jacob Crane, the Assistant Director of the US Housing and Home Finance Agency, among others.

The housing and planning proposals by these figures and others, more than projects of shaping the physical environment, formed the discourse where the key fictions of the development discourse – including the idea of a participating and

consensual clientele – are staged. It is here that the Third World is presented as a sphere headed toward inevitable industrialization and urbanization. It is here that development appears as a discourse based on allocation of agency, rather than its denial, on recognition of economic and political demands and existing needs, rather than imposition of external ideals. It is here that development is transformed from a possibility to an inevitability. These projects constituted the terrain where the profile of the development subject in transition between tradition and modernity, partially *homo economicus*, partially *homo traditionalis*, is staged as a participant in the development enterprise

The primary contribution of this dissertation then is to identify the critical role of modern architectural and planning practice in the postwar development arena. With this focus, it does not claim to map a comprehensive field of activity of modern architects and planners within development institutions. Instead, it examines in detail particular ideas of Third World urbanization and modernization proposed by architects and planners and the impact of these agendas in molding the contours of the relationship between the so-called developed and underdeveloped worlds.

As mentioned above, the foremost idea studied in this dissertation is that of self-help architecture, that concept often commonly held as an axiom by architecture students volunteering for Habitat for Humanity and other similar organizations, that people are most effective when they are "empowered" to employ their own resources, make their own decisions, and use their own labor to house themselves or improve their living environments. This dissertation argues that self-help projects established the quintessential mode of development intervention that

bypassed restriction of capital investment while facilitating incorporation into circuits of global finance through land reform, property tenure, and loan mechanisms. This dissertation, thus, can be said to map a selective set of agendas where architecture and planning intersect with development to establish their contribution in the postwar geopolitical arena.

1.2 The Canon:

Why has this involvement been ignored by seminal histories of modern architecture and planning? This erasure, this dissertation maintains, stems from insistence on viewing the postwar architecture and planning production through the formal language of architecture and planning and through the conventional category of the avant-garde. The presence of modern architecture in the Third World in these accounts remains limited to the showcase example of capital cities or to the few houses for the wealthy designed by famous architects on their sojourns to the non-Western world. The role assigned to modern architecture and planning in this domain remains limited to negotiating postwar dilemmas of national identity formation. The question of how notions of national, regional, or cultural identities undergird the agendas of socio-economic reform and development remains unexamined.

For William Curtis, the history of modern architecture in the twentieth century is related to the migration of the "modern masters" from Europe to America (with the exception of Frank Lloyd Wright).[6] After the Second World War, this trend was

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[6] William J.R. Curtis, *Modern architecture since 1900* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983, c1982). Curtis' other books also approach the question of modern architecture outside of western context through the narrative of avant-garde and identity formation, i.e., famous modern architects, both western and non-western, struggling to resolve the conflict of modern and traditional identities faced by the decolonized nation State:

reversed as the current of avant-garde thought flowed back to England and Scandinavia. The presence of modern architecture in the Third World enters this narrative only under the "Problem of Regional Identity" in the 1960's. The latter features a discussion of formal references to the cultural stock of "local traditions" in the work of Luis Barragán and Oscar Niemeyer. This discussion ends with the example of Hassan Fathy's design for the New Gourna village near Luxor, Egypt. From the essentialist view of cultural identity taken by Curtis, the primary issue facing these architects working in the Third World was to carve out suitable images of contemporary national identity out of the "collision of the old and new."

Kenneth Frampton's view of Critical Regionalism in this regard is well known.[7] For Frampton too, the primary contribution of modern architecture to the international arena is in staging claims of cultural identity under the flux of globalization.[8] "The concept of a local or national culture is a paradoxical proposition," Frampton maintains, "not only because of the present obvious antithesis between rooted culture and universal civilization but also because all cultures, both ancient and

Balkrishna Doshi: *An Architecture for India* (New York : Rizzoli, 1988); *Le Corbusier: Ideas and Forms* (Oxford: Phaidon, 1986).

[7] "Prospects for a Critical Regionalism," in *Perspecta* 20 (1983): pp. 147-162; "Universalism and/or Regionalism: Untimely Reflections on the Future of the New," in *Domus*, 782 (May 1996): pp. 4-8.; and more recently, "Place, Form, Cultural Identity," in *Arcade*, 20:1 (Autumn 2001): pp. 16-17.

[8] Kenneth Frampton, Modern architecture: A Critical History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Also see, Frampton's essay in *Charles Correa* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1996); Kenneth Frampton, ed., *World architecture 1900-2000: A Critical Mosaic* (New York: Springer, c1999); Kenneth Frampton, Charles Correa, David Robson, *Modernity and Community: Architecture in the Islamic World* (New York: Thames & Hudson; Geneva: Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 2002); "The Jerusalem Seminars in Architecture" also situates identity formation as the primary role of architecture in the public domain. See, Kenneth Frampton, Arthur Spector and Lynne Reed Rosman, eds., *The Jerusalem Seminar in Architecture: Technology, Place & Architecture* (1996); *Technology, Place & Architecture* (1994); *Architecture, History & Memory: The Public Building, Form and Influence* (1992).

modern, seem to have depended for their intrinsic development on a certain cross-fertilization with other cultures."[9] In this terrain of conflicting yet unified cultural identities architecture again only occupies a secondary role, of re-presenting, in some desired balance, what is constantly being muddled up in cross disseminations of history. The notion of "critical" is limited to the ability of architects to achieve the mixture of "occidental" and "oriental" symbolic references appropriate to the location and the project at hand.

Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre also situate the idea of Critical Regionalism in a similar essentializing vein: a current of modern architecture at the periphery that resists homogenizing forces of globalization.[10] For the authors, this movement was sustained not only by the work of famous Western architects—such as Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew, Le Corbusier, Louise Kahn, and Neutra—in various non-Western contexts, but also by a range of Western-educated but non-Western architects and designers, such as Minette da Silva in Sri Lanka, Tay Kheng Soon and William Lim in Singapore, Mick Pearce in Zimbabwe, Lina Bo Bardi in Brazil, Oluwole Olumuyiwa in Nigeria, and Ricardo Porro in Cuba.[11] For Tzonis and Lefaivre, these figures were able to resolve, at different moments in the postwar era, the paradoxes of identity formation and cultural representation faced by the

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[9] Ibid., pp. 313-4.

[10] Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "Why Critical Regionalism Today?" in *Architecture and Urbanism* (May 1990): pp. 23-33; Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre, "Critica y regionalista," in *A & V*, 24 (1990): pp. 22-24, 1990; Alexander Tzonis, "Critical Regionalism: An Attitude, Not a Style," in *Architecture of Israel: AI*, 19 (August 1994): pp. 78-89.

[11] Alexander Tzonis, Liane Lefaivre and Bruno Stagno, eds., *Tropical Architecture: Critical Regionalism in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Wiley-Academic, 2001).

decolonizing world as it attempted to preserve "age-old traditions" while facing nationalist aspirations of modernization.

Tafuri and Dal Co's seminal history takes exception to the focus on identity formation and asks the question of the role of modern architecture and planning in the postwar era as it related to the changing political and economic terrain.[12] The answer they give, however, is the same as the one assumed by the others: the role was inconclusive and insubstantial.

Tafuri and Dal Co maintain that modern architects and planners only "marginally affect[ed] the global setup in the postwar era." Most of the projects proposed by the "neo-avant-garde," they insist, remained on paper. This "bankruptcy resulted from the quest to preserve [the] avant-garde autonomy after the war." The postwar projects, the authors stress, were informed by the prewar "utopian-futuristic...climate of technological vitalism," and were based on "[ideas of] traditional division of labor." As a result, these proposals remained oblivious to the "direct linkage between...new modes of production and institutional reforms" being forged by the postwar global "capitalist system." For Tafuri and Dal Co, the "neo-avant-garde" proposals within the postwar climate of "integrated" planning can at best be considered "mere decorative enhancement[s] of the metropolitan chaos [they] once aspired to dominate."[13]

Holding up a few selected Metabolist projects as examples of modern architects' disconnect from the ideological climate of the time, however, betrays a conceptual

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[12] Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, *Modern Architecture*, trans. Robert Erich Wolf (New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1986).

[13] Ibid., pp. 363-4.

myopia that is similar to the limited perspective taken by other prominent histories of modern architecture and planning. The insistence of these histories to view the postwar developments in architecture on the global stage through the traditional category of the avant-garde and their formal contributions ignores the crucial arena of development intervention where such categories did not hold. This dissertation draws attention to the postwar era which saw the emergence of a wave of architects and planners whose projects did not find a voice— couldn't have found a voice—within the formal architectural canon. These were figures whose training and experiences traversed conventional disciplinary boundaries: lawyers turned planners, planners turned economists, engineers turned architects, and architects turned urban designers, even sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Collectively they comprised the profile of the figure through which modern architecture gained global dominance: the development expert. These figures constituted the new face of modern architecture and planning in the postwar era, one that did not speak the traditional language of architectural form, but rehearsed a language of finance, statistics, project reports, programs of community development and social organization, proposals for savings and loan associations, and design of administrative and planning bodies. Often close associates of those recognized as avant-gardes by mainstream chronicles, these figures populated countless United Nations, Ford Foundation, and Unesco projects as well as various national institutions. There, they played a crucial role in establishing an international discourse of social reform that, to borrow Tafuri and Dal Co's phrase, blurred institutional boundaries, realigned existing divisions of labor, and established new modes of production. In short, as development experts, modern architects and planners exhibited precisely the characteristics whose absence

Tafuri and Dal Co proclaim as the chief cause of modern architecture's demise, and whose existence remains invisible in other histories of modern architecture and planning as well.

1.3 Structure:

The body of the dissertation is divided into three parts. The first section, "Committing Doubts: Self-Help Housing and the Question of Value," deals with the emergence of the idea of self-help in the development discourse. Here we encounter the multiple reiterations of this idea by different figures in a series of sub-sections, beginning with initial self-help missions to the "tropics" (including Jamiaca, Puerto Rico, Indonesia, and Philippines) headed by US housing activist and assistant director at the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Jacob Crane.

This section continues to situate this activity against the backdrop of changes in the geopolitical and economic systems, particularly the establishment of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the International Bank of Development and Reconstruction (later, the World Bank). Here we look at how the changes in global economy brought on by decolonization are managed in the Keynesian monetary system. We will trace how the first self-help projects in Puerto Rico reflect the positioning of the project of Third World development in the postwar political economy. This discussion also contains views and proposals of Crane's Puerto Rican counterparts such as Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board and Luis Rivera Santos, the Director of Puerto Rico's Social Program.

At this point in the first section, we will see how the conceptualization of "value" in Marx as a realm forever at the threshold of political economy can be instructive in understanding the relationship between tradition and modernization in development. We will then return to the historical analysis of self-help organizational techniques and procedures in various projects across the globe to identify the "coding" of socio-economic value in this realm.

The first section will end with a look at the broader field of UN experts' influence on the design of administrative and planning structures in various Latin American countries under the umbrella of self-help programs. Here we will argue that these transformations in the administrative and policy structures laid the fundamental ground work for imposing later World Bank adjustment programs.

After we have looked at the broader field of initial self-help programs, their scope, and their theoretical and geo-political foundations, the second section, "Core: the Tyranny of the Individual," narrows the discussion down to a particular trajectory of the self-help discourse: the idea of "core" housing introduced by the famous American housing advocate and development consultant, Charles Abrams, as a critique of the self-help approach, and coded into the technical vocabulary of climatology by Otto Koenigsberger, the former Chief Architect and Planner of the State of Mysore, India, and the Director of Development and Tropical Studies at the Architectural Association (AA), and later of the Development Planning Unit at the University College, London..

Abrams and Koenigsberger argued that the core approach replaced the "impossibly high building standards" and "administrative requirements" of previous

self-help schemes with elemental "core" construction and services that allowed immediate occupation of the site. This lowered the amount of loan needed as the occupants were to later finish the house according to their own requirements, with their own investment, and on their own time. In this section we will see how through this shift Abrams and Koenigsberger advocated instituting a legal structure of individuated property ownership which provided greater security for the lending institution while increasing the risk for the inhabitants who invested in and contributed to the construction of the core house asymmetrically along gender lines. This section explores how development operates by a mode of auto critique which extends its agenda precisely by claiming to recognize the agency and demands of the development subjects themselves.

We will conclude the second section by looking at the work of John Turner, the British architect who spent almost ten years in the squatter settlements of Peru as a advocate of funding squatter building practices before joining MIT and later returning to the AA in England. This section argues that all these proposals gain their significance in the context of a series of concerns raised by major theorists of development economics regarding the beginning and perpetuation of the development process in the Third World. Here architecture is seen as a critical corollary, both opening a space for and drawing on the propositions in development economics, supplying the latter with some of its founding assumptions regarding the presence of independent, self-motivated, yet uncompetitive and politically undemanding populations. Looking closely at the work of Abrams, Koenigsberger and Turner, we will not only map out the profile of the development subject but also a new profile of the development expert as an

advocate of the poor poised against the institutions he works for, and see how this combination precludes the possibility of situating discussion of land reform and housing as politically charged issues.

The third, and last, section, "Pushing Patterns: Planning the Third World City," looks at the how the self-helping development subject appears in the larger conceptualization of the process of Third World urbanization by planning figures such as Catherine Bauer, Martin Myerson, Lloyd Rodwin, Jacob Crane, sociologists like Philip Hauser, and anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, among others. These framing are contrasted with framings of the postwar European subject by Horkheimer and others involved with the UN project, Tensions Affecting International Understanding, concerned with promoting "peace and understanding" among postwar industrial powers. The primary question posed by this section is, how does the assumed difference between these two subject positions, one supposedly preceding the emergence of modernization and the modern nation state, and the other emerging from the crisis of modernity and the conflict of modern nation states, work to shape the "center" and the "periphery" in the image of the development analyses?

In conclusion we will discuss how the idea of agency, development, tradition and modernity staged by modern architects and planners in the development terrain are very much with us today in the discussions of land reform, housing, and globalization. We will identify the continuation and displacement of these ideas in the present through examples ranging from [projects of UN Habitat for Humanity, to] Rem Koolhaas' recent fascination with the "informal" modernism of Lagos to the Peruvian economists Hernando De Sotto's proposal for enabling the extra-legal

"assets" of the Third World poor as collateral for loans, a proposal that has been valorized as key to the crisis of Third World development by former president Bill Clinton and figures in the current US administration.

The primary archives for this inquiry have been the UN Archives in New York. This research was supplemented by material from Jacob Crane and Charles Abrams Papers at Cornell University, the Catherine Bauer Archives at Berkeley, as well as numerous reports and publications by the UN and the World Bank that were deposited at various libraries having the status of "UN depositories" at different times (The Firestone Library Princeton, the Lamont library at Harvard, Arthur W. Diamond Law Library at Columbia, and the Doe library at Berkeley).

This dissertation by no means claims to be an exhaustive history of self-help schemes or modern architects and planners' careers in development agencies. Rather it is an attempt to identify, though self-help, a dimension of modern architecture and planning and the development discourse that has had a critical role in the framing of power relations in the postwar geo-political arena, as well as in framing how we perceive and attempt to answer the key questions of Third World development and its role in the current configuration of globalization.

2 Committing Doubts: Self-Help Housing and the Question of Value

No "local center," "no pattern of transformation" could function if through a series of successive linkages, it were not eventually written into an over-all strategy... The [disciplinary] apparatus, precisely to the extent that it [is] insular and heteromorphous with respect to the other great "manoeuvres"...

Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*[14]

It [is] sheer madness to think the Empire can create a cave where we take in one another's washing and ignore the rest of the world!...The countries we sell to are not necessarily the countries from which we buy, and if we begin unilateral trading we return to barter, the survival of the fittest and more war.

John Maynard Keynes[15]

In a stratified society, discrimination of wages and jobs/occupation by caste and sex is not a feudal remnant but perfectly consistent with the play of market forces...If the wage-and-access differentials follow the lines of traditional privilege, then attention gets conveniently deflected from the adaptive dexterity of capitalist exploitation processes to the stubborness of feudal values, when it is actually a symbiotic relationship between the two.

Kalpana Bardhan[16]

2.1 Igloos in the Third World

On a pleasant January afternoon in New Delhi in 1954, images of arctic ice began

rolling on the screen of a large conference hall. The film titled, "How to Build an

Igloo," began with a voice-over, describing various construction techniques used

by the native population in the Arctic Circle to build elaborate structures out of

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[14] Michel Foucault *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, Robert Hurley trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 99.

[15] John Maynard Keynes, quoted in Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom (1937-1946)*, vol. 3 (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 331.

[16] Kalpana Bardhan, "Women's Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition and Change in India," in *South Asia Bulletin*, 6:1 (1986): pp. 3-16. The above quote is on p.5.

ice.[17] Yet, the building material under consideration did not seem out of place in the mild north Indian winter to the international crowd in attendance as they discussed their organized "expeditions" to the nearby villages and tours of the demonstration "village center" under construction—out of brick and mud—on a nearby site. Gathered to attend the two parallel running "seminars" of the United Nations' Social Affairs Division and the International Federation of Housing, Town, and Country Planning, the attendees had their eyes on a more abstract set of concerns that made ice commensurable with brick. These included: organization of "labor," distribution of "responsibility," and building of "community spirit," all summed up under the banner of "helping people to help themselves." The agenda at hand, reflected in the UN seminar's title, was "community improvement" through "self-help" schemes. Its key challenge: identifying moments when modernization projects could find resonating similarities in "traditional" practices, so that economic development could have a lasting socio-cultural effect.

The seminar audience included such well know names as Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, CIAM's secretary and director of the UN seminar; Constantine Doxiadis, who was working for the Ford Foundation missions in Calcutta and Karachi at the time;

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[17] The full title of the seminar was: United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954. A report on the proceedings was also published under the same name by the UN Technical Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1. UN Archives, New York.

The film titled, *How to Build an Igloo*, by the Canadian Film Board, was part of a film series that ran during the seminar and included other similarly "related" titles, including one by Disney: *Aided Self-Help House in Mexico* (UN Film Division); *Good Neighbors* (British Information Services); *A Plan to Work On* (British Council); *Tale of New Cities* (US Information Services); *TVA Town* (US Information Services); *Triumph in the Wilderness* (US Information Services); *Waters of Life, Ceylon* (British Information Services); *Beaver Valley* (Walt Disney), *Yellow Knife* (Canadian Film Board), among others. Ibid. Appendix 4, p. 73.

Michel Ecochard, CIAM member and director of the French Protectorate in Morocco, serving as "TAA advisor to the Government of Pakistan on Town Planning;" Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew and Pierre Jeanerette, in India at the time with Le Corbusier at Chandigarh.

Yet the debate was led by another set of figures. These included, Jacob Crane, Assistant to the Director of US Housing and Home Finance Agency; Ernest Weissmann, CIAM member and head of the UN Housing Section; Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board; Luis Rivera Santos, the Director of Puerto Rico's Social Program; F. J. Adams, professor of town planning at MIT and the Director of the Joint Center at Harvard and MIT; Charles Abrams, the famous US housing advocate and development consultant who was also teaching at MIT at the time. It was this groups that had led the way in defining the contours of the term self-help on the development platform.

At a general level, "self-help" was considered to describe those projects in which the "members of a community" themselves carry out the construction of houses and community facilities—schools, village-centers," and like—themselves under technical and administrative supervision. This labor was meant to bring down the cost of the resulting houses to the extent that the prospective inhabitants could then afford to purchase them on loan from the sponsoring agency. Yet the suitability of self-help for Third World development programs was seen to reside not just in its economic dimension, but in its promise to find the roots of the social and cultural transformations required by modernization in different traditional contexts. The aided self-help and mutual-aid approach, as it came to be known, represented a counter-current in the development discourse which, instead of

shunning tradition as a sphere of pre-modern practices that needed to be displaced by modernization, sought to reframe tradition as a necessary condition for any project of modernization in the Third World.

We see in self-help projects the emerging contours of a new model of social intervention that professes, not the urgency of modernization, but the necessity of its delay to discover the optimum and sustainable "pace" of historical change. In self-help we witness a systematic unfolding of top-down agendas of social organization and resource distribution though elaborate loan structures advanced by national governments and international organizations, all in the name of reflecting the conditions of the "poor." The emphasis on engaging the traditional social structures amounted to a particular mode of *partial* incorporation into the structures of global capital. With tradition as a gender-exclusive alibi, self-help programs set the stage for the next wave of market reforms that appealed to patriarchal social structures to construct flexible labor reserves and elaborate micro-credit schemes.

Self-help, by employing a language of cultural relativism, operates by establishing interstitial socio-cultural realms of partial incorporation and modernization that can be held at the threshold of the circuits of global capital. This reading affords a story of modern architecture and planning that is lost under the conventional historical emphasis on the material realm of built projects as "real" evidence of architectural modernism in the Third World. Entering the realm of reports, manuals, and surveys, we will see how modern architects and planners as self-help experts identified the historical constraints they imagined were faced by them and laid out strategies of organizing a broad set of financial, administrative, and

material conditions. Here, architecture and planning appear as texts that continuously permeate development at various levels of the discourse—material and discursive—and precede and proceed built form.

2.2 Design(ing) Intervention

2.2.1 *Delayed Development*

Even as propaganda—be it the latest brochure from UN-Habitat, or early UN funding proposals to the US Congressional Committees—self-help housing is not presented as a remedy but only as a palliative, and a perpetual one at that, to the rising world housing crisis it identifies.[18] It's the doctor telling the patient: take two tablets and every morning, keep taking two more.

Development's reservation about its own scope has been largely ignored by its critics. Development is usually seen as an overtly rationalist discourse; its strongest foothold, a universalist belief in "technological progress." For Arturo Escobar, the claims to truth and singular solutions represent development's primary *modus operandi* through which it discards contextual contingencies, conflicting arguments, and unsupportive evidence, rendering them irrelevant, outdated, and pre-modern.[19] For James Scott, institutional forms of power—from colonial governments, to nation states, to international organizations—regulate the domains

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[18] The examples are numerous: *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*, United Nations Human Settlements Programme; *Co-operative Housing: Experiences of Mutual Self-help*, UN-Habitat, 1989; *International Development Assistance Act of 1979: Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1979; *Study of International Housing*, United States Congress-Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Govt. Print Office, 1963; *Technical Cooperation in Latin America: Recommendations for the Future*, National Planning Association, 1956.

[19] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

they seek to govern by viewing the latter as standardizable and quantifiable concepts. Development institutions are no exception to this procedurality.[20] For Deepak Laal, to undo this developmental objectivism, we have to expose the analytical confusion and self-contradictions that underwrite economic and social theories taken as expositions of universal truths.[21] After all, Laal tells us, it was Keynes himself who had pointed out the fallibility of taking economics as an objective science rather than a collection of opinions.[22]

But in self-help schemes, we see developmental claims to social intervention written not only in a logic of standardization, universalism and objectivity, but also with an infinite penchant for variation in application, abolition of standards, and recognition of limitation and failure. Even though "practicality"—that pragmatic slogan ever stressing the instrumentality of thought as a mediating realm between organism and the environment—routinely appears in self-help rhetoric, it too is devoid of any positivist certainty. If development is a pragmatic discourse, it is John Dewey at his most pessimist moment, accepting the hopeless obscuring of concepts by environmental contingencies.[23] Self-doubt and revisionism permeates

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[20] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[21] Deepak Lal, *The Poverty of "Development Economics"* (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1983).

[22] "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madman in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler a few years back...soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interest, which are dangerous for good or ill." John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (Macmillan, 1936), pp. 383-4. Quoted in Lal, *The Poverty of Development Economics, op. cit.,* p. 1.

[23] This is the later Dewey of *Essays in Experimental Logic*, and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,* rather than the collaborator of William James in *Pragmatism* (1907).

the language of development, always anticipating the crisis it has yet to face; its

penchant for defeatism operating like perpetual hiccups in a utopian speech,

interrupting its own claims, expanding duration, and deferring comprehension.

Here, confusion manifests itself as a mode of operation; the tactics of self-doubt

reproduce themselves as strategic maneuvers. To recognize the modes of power

specific to the development discourse, we must take into account development

organizations' propensity to recognize crisis as a necessary element of their

operations. We must see in the intermittent cycle of self-doubt and assurance, of

defeatism and utopianism, a model of appropriating contingency and

accommodating commitment. Let us begin with the much common practice of

listing statistics on urbanization in self-help reports that announce both the

promise and the impossibility of development.

2.2.2 The "Magic Formula"

In 1950, soon after the establishment the UN's Housing, Town and Country

Planning Section (HTCP), its chief and CIAM member, Ernest Weissmann,

approached Jacob Crane, the well known American housing advocate and the

Assistant to the Administrator of the US Housing and Home Finance Agency, to

head a UN Mission on the housing conditions in the "tropics."[24] Between

December 1950 and January 1951, the "mission" traveled to India, Pakistan,

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[24] *Report of the Mission of Expert on Tropical Housing*, South and South-East Asia, December 1950 and January 1951. UN Document No. E/CN.5/251, UN Archives, NY. Hereafter cited as *Tropical Housing Mission Report*, 1951.

In addition to Crane, the mission included Jacobus P. Thijsse, a Dutch colonial planning official who had taken the post of a professor at the University of Indonesia after independence; Robert Gardner-Merwin, the Chief Architect and Planning Officer of the Department of Health for Scotland (also the mission's Rapporteur); and Antonio C. Kayanan, professor and chief planner of the National Urban Planning Commission of the Philippines, acting as the mission's secretary.

Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Indonesia, producing a report, published by the UN in 1951, that announced the discovery of a congested world:

> Prevailing conditions in [these areas represent] the greatest housing problems in the world...the Mission was informed that more than 100,000,000 Asian families (perhaps as many as 150,000,000) at present live in crowded, insanitary, substandard quarters, urban or rural.[25]

With time, the magnitude of this pending disaster increased. In 1964, the UN published a *Manual for Self-Help Housing*.[26] The manuals' opening line gives us an update on the statistics of crowding: "The United Nations estimated 'that over 1,000 million people in Africa, Asia and Latin America – about half the total population of these continents – live in housing which is a health hazard and an affront to human dignity.'"[27]

There should be nothing exceptional in these iterations. In social reform discourses, from the reconstruction of London after the Great Fire to New Deal urban renewal schemes in the US, statistics find their gravity within a moralist discourse around such anchors as "blight" and "congestion." Malthusian demographics too drew on the dialectic between statistics and moralism to argue

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[25] *Tropical Housing Mission Report*, 1951. p. 3.

[26] Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964. UN Document No. ST/SOA/53, United Nations Archives, New York. UN Publication Sales no. 64.IV.4. Hereafter cited as *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

[27] Ibid. p. 1.

that rising population figures result not only in famine and death but also erosion of social structures.[28]

Development, however, doesn't locate in this differential a promise of closure, but the announcement of its perpetuation and irresolution. The differential between quantity and quality reproduce itself into another differential, between the possibility and failure of all development approaches, leading to a perpetual subtext of non-commitment.

Jacob Crane had announced this impossibility of foreseeable resolution in the report of the mission to the tropics:

> "if all present knowledge in the housing field were systematically examined and applied, it would still not be possible at present for countries visited to bring the housing and community development up to the desired...standards...In other words...even while all useful experience is being drawn together, and while new experience is developing, still [a] degree of compromise with desirable standards seems inevitable."[29]

Crane's report, more than anything, presents itself as premonition of the "manner in which such [future] compromises [were to be] made..."[30]

The perpetuation of this relationship became most apparent in the 1964 "manual" on self-help mentioned earlier, which began by citing Crane's twelve year old report on the tropics:

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[28] For the preponderance of Malthusian assumptions in demographic studies in the development organizations, see Eric Ross' excellent study, *The Malthus Factor: Population, Poverty, and Politics in Capitalist Development* (London: Zed Books, 1998).

[29] *Tropical Housing Mission Report*, 1951. p6.

[30] Ibid.

In 1952 the United Nations study on 'Housing in the Tropics' stated '…it must be recognized that, even under the most favourable conditions, it may be a very long time before sufficient progress has been made to permit the use of adequate economic resources for such social goals as better housing and improved community facilities.'[31]

To this it adds: "After more than a decade, the situation appears to be alarmingly similar today."

In the face the Manichean demands of world housing, self-help is presented as a contingent solution, piecemeal and incremental, that is initiated "on the basis of…*present*…economy…without waiting for any great changes in [development] methods [emphasis added]"[32]

Shunning the promise of identifiable solutions, self-help emerges a discourse on reevaluation and variation. Crane, in another article published in HTCP's short-run bulletin on housing and planning asserted again: "No single formula is applicable to all tropical situations, but with *infinite modification and variation* certain principles can be widely adapted to tropical housing problems."[33] This continuous comparison and evaluation is the primary claim of the self-help manual as well:

"Relying, therefore, on a review of past failures.…this Manual on self-help housing has been prepared as a part of the continuing study of housing for the low-income groups. It is intended for the use of government services and private agencies that are considering low-cost, self-help housing programmes. It states in technical and

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[31] *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964, p. iii.

[32] Ibid. p. 11.

[33] Jacob Crane, *Huts and Houses in the Tropics*, *Unasylva*, 3:3 (May-June 1949): p. 103.

administrative terms the principles and techniques that have evolved from an evaluation of many projects throughout the world."[34]

Indeed the word "manual" here is a misnomer, for in accounting for falling development edifices, crumbling economic theories, dilapidating administrative strategies, the manual is forced to give up the claim to the most essential characteristic of a manual: standardization, that operational fulcrum of officialdom that keeps intact the relationship between the field and the office by outlining a set of institutional procedures that serve as a backdrop when negotiating with contextual contingencies. But here, in self-help logic, contextual contingencies are given, in official language, the same weight as any methods that might, in principle, be held constant. All procedures are set afloat and open to continuous reevaluation. Here, all aspirations for a rule are suspended, what's advanced as an administrative approach is only the principle of variation across time and space. All that the manual promises is a "continuing study" and a perpetual "evaluation" of its own principles as they meet varying circumstances and demands in different contexts. The subtext that binds this tendency in reports on world housing across two decades after the war can be summarized as follows: global urbanization is inevitable, and it is impossible to conjure up financial or even conceptual resources to address its Manichean pace and scale in the foreseeable future.

The fond shorthand in development rhetoric for this proclaimed impossibility of development itself is "no magic formula." We are reminded that "it has to be realized that *no magic formula exists*, and that the problem require continuous, painstaking effort along many lines to produce the best [possible] current results

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[34] *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964. p. iii.

[emphasis added]."[35] Report after report uses similar phrases, asserting the absence

of miracles, magic formulas and silver bullets. Anatole Solow, the chief of the

Inter-American Housing Center (CINVA), founded, on Crane's recommendation,

with the help of the UN Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA) in Bogota,

announced to the 1955 graduating class of Latin American planners' not to "naively

expect miracles."[36] It is as if only by magic and miracles could the "world housing

crisis" identified by international agencies find a probable cause and a solution.

The repudiations of standardizable solutions go on to undermine even the role of

the expert as an intervening agent. "Most often it is believed that somewhere a

single expert or agency has developed a house of such high standards and at such

low cost that no further research would be needed. Now such magic housing

formula exists in the world today."[37]

The inverse of magic, naiveté, and miracles, is planning: "None of these solutions

[which solutions?]…will take place automatically," Crane tells us. "This work must

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Anatole Solow, Message to Graduating Class of 1955 at the Inter-American Housing
Center (CINVA), December 1955. The document was given by Jacqueline Tyrwhitt as gift
to the Francis Loeb Library, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University in 1956. GSD
Vertical Files.

[37] *Tropics Mission Report*, 1951, p6. Later in the report, Crane and others expand on the
point: "The Mission found that many who are keenly interested in housing problems still
believe that a single expert or group of experts can now put on a demonstration in the
nature of a large or small project which will show conclusively they way to solve all the
problems. As already been pointed out, this is a fallacy; no total solutions are now known
for the problems of low income housing and community development, even in most of
the highly developed countries. What can and should be done, is to take the next steps
toward finding the best that can be done now in raising standards within presently
available resources." p. 42.

be planned and programmed..."[38] Planning in development emerges as a promise of its own reproduction.

In these denouncements, we begin to see the emergence of a mode of social intervention that operates via a curious displacement of the relationship between the expert and the subjects of expertise. The local technocrats demand standardizable solutions. The experts see their role as delaying the fulfillment of that goal. This perpetual delay is seen as a reflection of the "local" socio-cultural conditions themselves. The New Delhi seminar report asserted:

> Progress in housing types and standards is a continuum. It is necessary to guard against a *sudden break* which involves a wide discrepancy between old and new. Although it is essential to advance in the light of new knowledge and techniques, prevailing economic and social conditions will influence the *pace* [emphasis added].[39]

The manual on self-help also presented the idea of delaying socio-economic change as a requirement of local conditions:

> [T]he principles and methods of self-help housing...*must* be applied in accordance with local patterns of custom and culture. Local leaders, technicians and families, in turn, must apply these principles and methods in light of modern usage and of their own knowledge of community life, climate, geography, building materials and social values.[40]

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[38] Ibid. p.11.

[39] The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi, 1954. *op. cit.* p. 29.

[40] Manual on Self-help Housing, 1964. pp. 4-5. Quoting, *The United Nations Development Decade Proposals for Action*, UN Sales no. 62.II.B.2, UN Archives, New York. p. 59.

The "local"—composed of sub-categories of "leaders, technicians and families"—

becomes a euphemism for a strategy of non-commitment and variation.

Reading these pronouncements, we cannot but wonder, what is considered

"magic" in the variegating world of planning? At an exceptional moment in the

report on housing conditions in the tropics, Crane reveals the presumed answer,

the "magic formula" in fact demanded by the local technocrats from the mission

experts:

> Everywhere the Mission was told that the great impediment is lack of *money*: 'We
> know what and where and how to build. All we need is the money.' Statements to
> this extent were frequently made by spokesmen of governmental and non-
> governmental agencies at all levels, – national, provincial and local [emphasis
> added].[41]

Why is the request for more money dismissed as naïve and premature? Why are

perpetual planning and partial organization weighted more over infusion of money

into the Third World? Why are local demands acknowledged and dismissed in the

same breath? The suggestion that money can produce socio-economic change is

considered to be based on nothing short of magic because of the presumed

location of the Third World in the global political economy. The dismissal turns

on the distinction between "long-term" needs as opposed to the "short-term" goals.

Putting more money in the Third World economy, it is alleged, would only satisfy

immediate goals without changing its socio-economic conditions. The terrain of

"local culture" and its attendant categories of "local leader, technicians, and

families," embody a proposal for an alternative political economy that is supposed

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[41] *Tropics Mission Report*, 1951, p. 19.

to turn, however slowly, magic into reality. The expert's abdication of the claim to universal knowledge reflects the systematic re-appropriation of the local in another frame. This relativistic frame, based on the claim of representing the conditions on the ground, is only more transparent than a self-proclaimed top-down model of universal knowledge and expertise.

Before approaching the question of political economy of the categories of the local circulated in the self-help projects, let us pause for a moment and focus our lens on a different register: the economic negotiation of the immediate postwar era and the resulting emergence of a new system of monetary controls and trade regimes. Here too, the Third World is relegated to the boundaries of the global political economy around the question of money. This assertion enables the displacement of the bilateral structure of subjugation of colonized economies onto a dissembled structure of multilateral controls in the postwar era. The repudiation of the requests for money from the Third World in self-help projects both produces and reflects the contours of this broader politico-economic geography.

2.3   The Location of Money

The change in value of the money which has to be transformed into capital cannot take place in the money itself, since in its function as means of purchase and payment it does no more than realize [realisieren] the price of the commodity it buys or pays for, which, when it sticks to its own peculiar form, it petrifies into a mass of value of constant magnitude.
Karl Marx, *Capital*, volume 1[42].

You may turn and toss an ounce of gold in any way you like and it will never weigh ten ounces. But here in the process of circulation one ounce practically does weigh ten ounces.

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[42] Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1. (London: Penguin Books), p. 270.

2.3.1 *The Invisible (post)War Chest*

The question of money is particularly pertinent given the fact that with the arrival of the Marshall Plan in 1947, thirteen billion dollars were funneled into the European economy, financing the dollar deficit between 1948 and 1951.[44] This historical fact can be dismissed with a simple argument: the Marshall plan was intended to correct the trade deficit between the US and its continental trading partners, a problem which if left untreated would have affected the entire world economy. The colonized world was not part of this sphere and therefore had no leverage in negotiating trade and financial arrangements.[45]

Yet, if we look closely, the postwar financial and trade systems were subsidized through the particular position of the colonized and the decolonizing world in global economic arrangements.

Britain emerged from the war with a weakened political and financial position across the globe, a situation exacerbated by strong national movements in colonial territories. It had relied on the US to help fund the war, which had left it with

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[43] Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 108.

[44] The amount went up to seventeen billion by 1952. See, Michael, Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western* Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[45] This subtext underwrites the absence of colonized sphere in many studies of postwar trade and financial systems. See for example: W. Andy Knight, ed., *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Blanchard Jean-Marc, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman, eds., *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security* (London: F. Cass, 2000).

severe debt and a trade deficit.[46] Yet despite these difficulties it was regarded by

Henry Morgenthau (1891-1967), the US Secretary of the Treasury, and Harry

Dexter White (1892-1948), Director of Monetary Research at the US Treasury and

joint author with John Maynard Keynes (1892-1948) of the Bretton Woods system,

as a potential economic rival in the postwar era. This perception was based on

Britain's financial and trade relations with colonial territories which gave it a

monopoly over determining postwar trade access to the decolonizing world.

During the war, the British had tried to protect its overseas assets and trade

arrangements and the US tried to gain a share in them. American help during the

war had been based on slow and painful negotiation of access to these resources.

As Robert Skidelsky has argued, "the British believed that the USA was trying to

'strip them bare,' the Americans that the British were distinctly understating their

opulence."[47] These trade relations were seen as Britain's coveted "war chest" and a

promise of financial security after the war.

2.3.2 *"Imperial Preference"*

In the 1930's the Bank of England strongly favored the policy of maintaining

"sterling areas" of trade, politico-economic jurisdiction—composed largely of

Britain's dominions, protectorates, and colonies—which traded in sterling alone.

Under this system, the colonies where given access to the British market to sell

their natural materials on the condition that they would either receive payment in

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[46] See, Randall Hinshaw, Lloyd A. Metzler, "World Prosperity and the British Balance of Payments," in *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 27: 4 (Nov., 1945): pp. 156-170.

[47] Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom (1937-1946)*, vol. 3 (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 102. Robert Skidelsky is the author of a new three volume biography of Keynes, which extend the scope of previous studies on Keynes life by including a detail history of postwar financial negotiations. Skildelsky too, however, fails to account for the role of colonized and the decolonizing world in this picture.

the form of British exports, or use their credit to trade within the sterling area. This policy, dubbed the "imperial preference," had blocked US trade access to areas under British control and had been a major source of contention between the two countries during the 1930s.[48]

It was the incremental opening up of the sterling area to American trade that underwrote American loans and later grants for resolving the British balance of payments crisis.[49] In 1933 Britain had defaulted on its American war debt (related to the First World War) which had resulted in the passage of the Debt Default Act of 1934 forbidding loans to any country "delinquent in its war obligations." This condition was reproduced in a series of Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1937 that also restricted sales of arms, war materials, and loans to Britain. Yet in 1940,

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[48] See, Catherine Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area*. (New York: Routledge, 1994).

[49] As Britain resisted American access to its market areas, the US treasury and State advisors devised other plans to counter the possibility of British economic resurgence after the war. The US international financial policy was an integral part its foreign policy to secure political power in the postwar global arena. In this equation, US foreign aid was initially not directed to Western Europe, but primarily to the Soviet Union, Japan and Eastern Europe. Harry Dexter White (1892-1948), Director of monetary research at the US Treasury and joint author with John Maynard Keynes (1892-1948) of the Bretton Woods system, had envisaged a huge Marshall Aid program for the Soviet Union in 1945-6. White's goal was to establish a degree of political and economic control over Soviet economy by attaching it to the "restored" gold standard and though the instrument of large American loans. See, James M. Boughton, *Why White, Not Keynes?: Inventing the Postwar International Monetary System*, IMF Working Paper WP/02/52. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department, 2002. White's sensitivity to political dimensions of financial planning, however, hastened his downfall when he was accused of being a Soviet spy in McCarthy investigations. See, R. Bruce Craig, *Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Spy Case* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

The initial postwar Stabilization Funds for East Europe and the massive amount of aid and reconstruction effort for Japan proposed by White were part of a broad policy of global economic hegemony, counter-pressure directed at the Soviets. See, Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

with American public opinion still strongly against American involvement in the war, Britain was able to secure loans for war materials as tensions rose in Europe. At first, Britain had used the export surpluses of sterling area countries, kept in London, to draw two billion dollars for construction of military equipment factories in the US (which included a hefty $880 million payment in July, 1940, for the construction of aircraft factories).[50] With rising expenditure, American exporters expressed "doubts about [Britain's] ability to pay all the bills she was running up."[51] The US government officials like Morgenthau, however, were of the opinion that the "British will always find means of paying if they cannot get out of it."[52]

Part of this belief stemmed from American eyes on British assets in the colonial world. Roosevelt, on Morgenthau's advice, asked Churchill to send a cruiser to South Africa, still a British colonial possession, to ship •42 million to Washington. As Skidelsky notes, this proposal led Keynes to "remark that the Americans believed the British owned their empire 'lock, stock, and barrel'."[53] The major share of confidence in Britain's ability to pay, however, stemmed from its sterling area trade relations. The opulence of the fading Empire resided in the abstract.

Immediately after the war, the Bank of England wanted to pursue the policy of Imperial Preference. The Bank favored the view that Britain's economic problems lay on the "supply" and not the "demand" side. Hubert Henderson (1890-1952), the British Treasury Advisor, representing the Bank's view, argued that Britain

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[50] Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes*, p. 94.

[51] Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes*, p. 96.

[52] Ibid., p. 102.

[53] Ibid.

should guard as much of its colonial assets as possible and use them to find its way out of its deficit in the postwar era.[54] According to Keynes, Henderson and the Bank had a false view of Britain's trade assets and their role in the future of the global economy.

For Keynes the policy of a closed-off sterling area was unsustainable in the expanding world trading system. A staunch imperialist himself, Keynes' opposition did not stem from sympathy for decolonizing movements. Rather, it stemmed from his belief that the Bank's argument to maintain the sterling area in the postwar era betrayed a "barbaric" understanding of money, circulation, and capitalist relations.

Backing sterling area trade and the policy of Imperial Preference, Keynes argued, stemmed from a linear and reductive view of the economic cycle in which money represented gold and gold, economic value. From this perspective, money and capital were the same and capital was supposedly increased by buying cheap and selling dear. This led Keynes to conclude that

> [i]t [was] sheer madness to think the Empire can create a cave where we take in one another's washing and ignore the rest of the world!...The countries we sell to are not necessarily the countries from which we buy, and if we begin unilateral trading we return to *barter, the survival of the fittest* and *more war.*[55]

The Bank's approach, in principle was a return, according to Keynes, to the "practices of the seventeenth century goldsmiths (which we are still following in the international field) and forgoing the vast expansion of production which

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[54] Ibid. 201.

[55] Ibid, p. 331.

banking principles have made possible."[56] By focusing on accumulation of gold

reserves and greater supply-side controls, the Bank's overt economic nationalism

ignored the entire cycle of the production and creation of demand.

2.3.3 *Complex Money*

The "cave" practices of sterling banking of bilateral trade and payment clearing,

Keynes asserted, combined money circulation and trading cycle which he had

kept separate in his proposals for multilateral system of exchange rates and

balance of payments controls. For Keynes, money itself didn't possess any value

but only constituted a representative moment in a complex and open-ended chain

(we will look at the complexity of this chain as it appears in the context of self-

help projects later in the chapter).[57] Keynes' insight resided in realizing that money

only had meaning in relation to the complete and repeatable cycle of circulation,

from production to consumption, supply to demand.

For Keynes, money didn't equal trade. Accordingly, Britain, he argued, should not

attempt to align its money cycle with its trade circle. This perspective, however,

Keynes insisted, didn't mean that Britain should abandon its sterling area

advantage. It would be "madness," Keynes insisted, to not use Britain's position to

negotiate its emergence into a broader trading realm in a manner that secured it

against competitive disadvantage. Britain needed to re-establish "equilibrium," he

argued, before it could maintain it. In the immediate postwar era, Britain should,

Keynes held, maintain its quasi-monopsonist buying power in foodstuff and raw

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[56] Ibid. p. 247.

[57] Marx had identified this moment as the "negative relation [of money] to circulation," for "cut off from all relations to [circulation] it would not be money, but merely a simple natural object."

materials to maintain a preferential policy for its "manufactures exports" in sterling area markets.

Yet, Keynes argued, as Britain eroded its war time export deficits and built up foreign exchange reserves, it should simultaneously work towards establishing an "ideal" system of international monetary controls. This system would put in place formulaic agreements regarding multilateral adjustments in exchange rates whenever any country began to develop a trade surplus or deficit beyond a certain range, undermining discretionary variation and forced devaluations that characterized the economic crisis of the 1930's. With this system in place among major creditor nations, if Britain slowly opened up its trade realms to "dollar areas," on the basis of bilateral trade agreements, it would ensure that it would benefit from all the advantages of increased trade volume without suffering from any of its defects. With a system of balance in place, Britain could still maintain it superior position in relation to the sterling areas countries, as they did not gain any relative advantage by exporting to the "dollar area," while Britain benefited from the increase in trade magnitude and expansion of sterling markets.[58] The system, Keynes argued, allowed politics to co-exist with economics. It combined the geo-political realities of bilateral trading, with a mutually benefiting system of multilateral monetary controls.

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[58] The sterling areas countries were able to extend the scope of their trade, but this did not harm Britain or any creditor nation since the relative advantage between their currencies was insured. For example, if the US opened its market to a sterling country in exchange for securing preferential status for its exports, the dollar to sterling rate would be formulaically adjusted before the US developed a comparative trade surplus beyond a certain percentage. Unlike the rigidity of the gold standard, this security-net of mutual adjustment provided Britain with the option to adjust its currency to either eliminate US trade surplus or negotiate bilateral reduction in tariff in other areas with the US.

In light of later historical developments, it would however, be more accurate to see in this combination a system of perpetuating the separation between trading and monetary control, between money and politics. It is in this gap between money and trade, between economic and politics, we would argue, that capital*ism* locates the possibility of capital's emergence.

2.3.4 *Politics of Partial Economics*

Robert Skidelsky has argued that Keynes himself acknowledged that the Bretton Woods agreement was only possible because it was a consensus, although partial, on the postwar monetary system, not trade regulations. The process of trade liberalization as well as tariff controls continued on an asymmetric basis. This exclusion of the question of the trade imbalance with the decolonizing world is evident in the fact that the International Trade Organization (ITO), the third component of the Bretton Woods systems (in addition to the World Bank and the IMF), designed to correct trade imbalances over the long run, never materialized. Passed in Havana, the charter for ITO, known as the Havana Charter, was considered by the US Congress as a threat to its control over US trade policy. As a result, a separate General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by the US and twenty three other countries in 1947. As Chakravarthi Raghavan has argued,

> "[o]ne of the myths surrounding GATT is that its seven trade rounds brought about the liberalisation of trade and the expansion of world economy since 1945. It will perhaps be more correct to say that the post-war expansion of the world economy, the so-called Golden Age of the industrial world, has been the result of the operation of a number of macro-economic processes including the application of Keynesian economic and state intervention to promote expansion. The

expansion of trade was an *effect,* rather than the *cause,* of world economic expansion.[59]

Keynes seems to have had this metaleptic operation in sight when he insisted on the separation of trade and monetary controls in the Bretton Woods system. For, as Skidelsky argues, Keynes was very much aware, and comfortable with, the idea of partiality of the Bretton woods agreement as a tentative agreement on monetary control, without the establishment of ITO and an agreement on trade. The dimension of trade was to be managed at a different level of politics.

From this perspective, the separation of GATT from the Bretton Woods, and the latter's slow dissimulation, did more to advance the Keynesian model of politico-economic management than if it had been implemented as proposed. As it turned out, many previous colonies turned away from the meager concessions offered through sterling area trade, and pursued policies of import substitution (most notably, India). This allowed them in the immediate postwar years to trade on a bilateral basis while controlling inflation in the domestic market. These developments on a global scale, however, exaggerated the problem of trade imbalances beyond the limits of Keynesian controls and led to the abolishment of the Bretton Woods monetary controls in 1971, and the subsequent entrenchment of trade controls and tariffs though GATT, the most notorious of which would be the so-called Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1990.

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[59] Chakravarthi Raghavan's excellent study, *Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay Round & the Third World* (Zed Books, London; and Third World Network, Penang, 1990), takes into the opaque and secretive world of Gunboat Diplomacy that characterize GATT agreements. pp. 49-50.

Could the deferral of the political dimension of trade in Keynesian economics be seen as a model of managing the indefinable yet necessary *loose* calculus of the non-economic? Can we see in the metalepsis of effect and cause identified by Raghavan in GATT negotiations an *economy* of disavowal at work?

If we consider these possibilities, then the Third World technocrats' request for more money is not simply a *negation*—a request for money outside the circuits of circulation—as the self-help experts would have it. Rather it constitutes a negation of a negation, an interruption in the logic of disavowal that informs the political dimension of (non)-economic management. The demand for more money actually forms the demand for *access* to the circuits of money as a complex phenomenon. It is not surprising that self-help experts dismissed this request as being based on a belief in magic, relegating it to an understanding of capitalism at its boundaries.

If the Bank of England's reluctance to forgo the structure of Imperial Preference and sterling area economics betrayed a "barbaric" notion of money as a unified concept, then it also betrayed a unified concept of crisis-management, a concept which required a declaration of Imperial Preference and authority to displace the cost of war to the colonized territories. In the dissembled world of the Bretton Woods and GATT systems, the cost of war as well as of peace is written on a dissembled register of deferment and disavowal.

From the very beginning of the Bretton woods negotiation in 1941 to its signing in 1944, Keynes had insisted on the moral right of Britain to demand from the US the cost of the war as a *gift*, not as a loan. Pointing to Britain's heavy capital investments in the US defense industry during the war, assets which were later

"sold" to the US without a price, Keynes insisted that this was a question of "Justice." The US should pay for the war that Britain had fought and paid for on its behalf. In the dissembled economy of disavowal, in the loose calculus of demand and management of the non-economic, the question of Justice can only be asked asymmetrically on one side of the transparent, yet present, international division of finance capital.

2.4 The Location of Self-Help

The appearance of self-help as a model of social and economic "development" in the Third World immediately after the war is critical. It resonated and appealed to the importance attributed to the creation and management of socio-cultural demand. Self-help's appeal and currency in the economic circuits stemmed from its emphasis on locating economic growth as a phenomenon necessarily tied to socio-cultural transformation.

The management of the non-economic manifests itself in self-help projects as a question of relating quantity to quality. The question of quantity, of funding, must be deferred to raise the issue of quality, the socio-economic conditions surrounding money that makes money into capital. The expert's dismissal of the local official's demand is lodged in this relationship, one whose intricacies escape the local official and burden the expert. The local official wants more money, quantity alone, elusive to its relationship with the complex web of qualitative interruptions that absorb money in the calculus of accompanying social relations defining capitalist society as a whole. The development expert is not just concerned with reproducing quantity, in the form of houses or money, but with encouraging the emergence of a capitalist society which restores quality, by

preserving attributes of human dignity, etc. The demand for quantity may be deferred. Development must postpone its own fulfillment, for the circle of quality to emerge; for the Third World to produce and reproduce its own money and houses. This distinction separates "us" from "them" in Crane's shunning of the "local" demand for money.

Janet Abu-Lughod, in an early essay on writings on the city, argued that despite the emphasis on "complicating the lines of causality by substituting a circular for a linear model," the classical tradition of urban ecology at the at the so-called Chicago School (most notably Ernest Burgess, Robert Ezra Park, and later Louis Wirth), sought "universality not only in causes but [also] in consequences." Abu-Lughod speculates that "had the original influence been Weber's, or even Durkheim's...[c]ultural, institutional, and historical variations would doubtless have received the fuller attention."[60] Weber or Durkheim's qualitative "morphological predilections," however, did find their way into development sociology.

A prominent example of the emphasis on issue of quality is the work of Elizabath Hoyt (1893-1980), the famous sociologist, economist, and development consultant, who though herself taught at Iowa State University, was closely associated with, and instrumental in shaping, the series of publications on development sociology coming out of the University of Chicago in the nineteen fifties. In a paper titled, "Want Development, Hoyt differentiated between two curious terms, "want" and

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[60] See, Janet Abu-Lughod, *The City is Dead—Long Live the City* (Berkeley: Center for Planning and Development Research, University of California, Berkeley, 1969), p. 7, and n. 8.

"impulse."[61] Want results, Hoyt argued, when things becomes intrinsic to the "quality" of life itself, to the very condition of its reproduction. Impulse on the other hand, stems from the need for momentary gratification. Want is long-term. Impulse cannot be sustained. The question for development focused on the emergence of *want* in the Third World. For Hoyt and her associates at the University of Chicago, development of wants was critical to the implementation of Keynesian economic in the Third World, for an economy based on *impulses* cannot predict trends, leaving capitalist relations without the rudder of policy controls. For Hoyt and other sociologists and economists who found themselves at various joint conferences and seminars with architects, planners and administrators of self-help programs, Third World development was a question of developing a mature theory of qualitative "choice."[62]

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[61] Elizabeth Hoyt, "Want Development in Underdeveloped Areas," in *The Journal of Political Economy,* LIX:3 (June 1951): pp. 194-202.

[62] One of these occasions would be the Ford Foundation Conference on Urban Planning & Development, held at the foundation's headquarters in New York on October 10-11, 1956. The conference brought together "thirty-six specialists in problems of urbanization." These included, Frederick J. Adams and Robert Mitchell, and Lloyd Rodwin from the Dept. of City and Regional Planning at MIT; Charles Ascher, at the Institute of Public Administration in New York; Catherine Bauer, at Dept of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley; Kingley Davis, at the Advance Institute of Social Science at Stanford University; Philip Hauser, at the Dept of Sociology, University of Chicago; John Hyde, at the School of Architecture, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Albert Mayer, architect and independent consultant in New York; Martin Meyerson, consultant and Vice President of the Philadelphia based ACTION group; McKim Norton at the Regional Plan Association in New York; Perry Norton, Executive Director of the American Institute of Planners in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Dennis O'Harrow at the American Society of Planning Officials; Harvey Perloff at the Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C.; Ralph Pomerance, consultant and architect in New York; Hugh Pomeroy, Director of the Westchester County Dept. of Planning, New York; Anatole Solow at the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C.; Raymond Vernon, consultant and Director of the New York Metropolitan Region Study, Regional Planning Association, New York; Ernest Weissmann, Chief of the UN Section of Housing, Town and Country Planning; Coleman Woodbury at Dept. of City Planning at Yale University. In addition to numerous representative of the Overseas Development Program of the Ford Foundation; other officials of the Foundation include: Douglas Ensminger, Ford Foundation Representative in India; Kenneth Iverson, Ford

Hoyt's thesis is incredibly informative, not so much with regard to the socio-economic makeup of the areas of her interest—which, she still preferred to call, the "Orient," at moments in the text (betraying, might we say, a nostalgia for the discourse of Imperial Preference?)—but as a reflection of the social economy of development economics itself. Staying true to Marx's insights, for development theorists like Hoyt, economic value could not be separated from cultural values. Capital is located at the interaction of the economic and non-economic. Development seeks to harness this undefined realm.

The position of cultural value as a necessary foil to economic production slips the latter into the elusive realm of that political-economic concept whose seething traces formed the core of Marx's four volumes of *Capital*: value. As a theory of socio-economic reform, development locates itself at the intersection of (economic) value and (cultural) values. Development planning is the name, and the game, of setting this interaction into play.

The irresolvable metaphorics of development economics betray the impossibility of defining this complex relation. All the self-help planning reports we have encountered are forced to use an an irresolute language when it actually comes to lay out the methodology of implementing their stated goals: we must "encourage" "stimulate" "steer" economic growth, the creation of economic value in line with cultural values. Development as a sustainable phenomenon must locate itself beyond the economic. Yet, it is this relationship it fails to define. Or perhaps more accurately, refuses to define. For it is precisely in keeping open the relationship

between the economic and the cultural that an argument for the *makeablility* of society can be made as well as deferred.

Self-help is intentionally low-tech, not just because it costs less to make such houses, but because it seeks to meet the socio-cultural at its present moment, and identify in it the possibilities of choice that can generate *want* and *value*, rather than impulses and money. It is this calculus immediacy and delay that compelled Crane to declare that the "village improvement programme [should] be initiated on the basis of the *present* rural economy, without waiting for any great changes in agricultural methods."[63]

The two major anchors of this sphere are "tradition" and "modernity" and the subject treading between them is the "migrant." To understand how this interstitial space is mapped in the development discourse through the idea of self-help, and how it relates to the postwar geo-economic moment, we return to Jacob Crane who is credited with coining the term "self-help."

2.4.1 *Forming Subject, Deforming Agency: Puerto Rico*

Mapping the historical emergence of self-help schemes in the development discourse will take us first to the US and then to Puerto Rico. The term, "self-help," is attributed to Jacob Crane, the famous American housing activist, planner, and the Assistant to the Administrator of the US Housing and Home Finance Agency. During his tenure at the Agency, Crane had become well-know for being instrumental, together with other major figures of pre-war US planning, such as Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams, in the passing of such legislations as the

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[63] *Tropical Housing Mission Report*, 1951, *op. cit.*, p.11.

1943 Housing Act that resulted in the abolishment of segregation in subsidized housing.[64]

The self-help program was first conceived of in the US to extend the subsidized resources of the agency beyond urban areas, particularly to the rural American South. It was thought that if government provided the infrastructural elements, such as roads, sewerage and electricity, while the beneficiaries carried out most of the construction work themselves under proper technical supervision, the subsidy program would have the widest and the quickest impact in rural areas where higher poverty and unemployment rates, low-density, and decentralized settlements made it virtually impossible to carry out large-scale standardized housing program without exceptional costs.

Despite the high levels of unemployment catalogued in the rural south, the presumption of available labor proved to be ill-founded. We will look at this assumption in detail later in the section on self-help organization techniques. The program's self-labor approach proved to be too time consuming to be compatible with dispersed opportunities for informal employment and the busy American work week of formal employment. Aside from a few demonstration projects and pilot programs, the program failed to have the wider impact imagined by Crane and others at the agency.[65]

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[64] Crane's involvement in the American housing reform bills is documented alongside with that of Catherine Bauer in latter's biography by Peter Oberlander and Eva Newbrunher. See, *Houser* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999).

[65] After the limited success of self-help schemes beyond a few demonstration projects, the US HHFA, turned its attention back to the urban areas. From 1955 to 1960, it launched a project known as the Flanner House, a "settlement house" in Indianapolis composed of individual houses for the "urban Negro population." The inhabitants were trained in an on

Yet, at the same time, the program gained immense international appeal. One of the key reasons behind this renewal was Crane's appointment as a consultant with US Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA). In the immediate postwar era, the TCA programs focused primarily on Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1947, Crane arrived in Puerto Rico as a TCA consultant for the island's Social Program Division, a recently established planning body with a jurisdiction to both influence legislation at the national level and implementation at the local. Here in the Social Program of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Crane was joined by Luis Rivera-Santos, the executive director of the Social Program, and Rafael Pico, the chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board.[66]

The island appeared particularly appropriate for self-help's demographic demands. It was small enough to be defined as a self-contained region. Though it was supported by a primarily agrarian economy, it was also considered amongst the densest countries of the world, with a population density of 645 persons per mile. This demographic makeup, and a relatively small densely populated rural sector

sight workshop under seven "experienced craftsmen" and four "organizers." Despite the initial investment, the project demanded 5600 hours of the owners' time per house for the first 237 houses and kept running-up overhead construction and supervision fees. This led to the eventual contracting of a large number of the remaining houses. Charles Abrams describes the failure of the program in his book, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Cambridge, MA: The Joint Center for Urban Studies, MIT and Harvard, 1964), p. 170.

[66] Jacob Leslie Crane Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collection, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University, Series 1, Box 1, Folders, 3-4. Hereafter cited as *Jacob Crane Papers,* Cornell University.

appeared to bypass the shortcomings of rarefied population that self-help schemes had faced in the US.[67]

The apparent uniformity of population distribution, however, was carefully designed and had a long history of population resettlement schemes behind it. It was an extensive administrative network of local bodies governing this distributed population that made Puerto Rico an appropriate case-study for self-help schemes. As early as 1921, a land reform body, called the Homestead Commission, was established by the American Colonial government. The commission provided small farms and lots to rural peasantry as a way of controlling population movement and ensuring labor supply for sugarcane production. In 1945, the activities of the commission were turned over to the Land Authority, an interim planning body during the years of increasing demands for self-determination. After the accession of Partial Self-Government in 1947, the Land Authority was incorporated into the Department of Agriculture and land regulation procedures were given over to the Social Programs Administration as part of an extensive reorganization of the rural population to increase sugarcane production on large corporate farms. The Social Programs Administration provided rural lots varying from a quarter to three acres, and established the Farmer Housing Association. By early 1950s, 30,000 families were settled in 194 rural communities, with the goal of resettling another 30,000 by the middle of the decade. What emerged was a network of village settlements, each with 100 to 500 families that gave the island its unique characteristics of a

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[67] The suitability of the Puerto Rican demographic makeup is also emphasized by Rafael Corrada in *The Place of Self-help and Mutual Aid in the Total Housing Program, International Federation for Housing and Planning: Proceedings of the 1960 World Planning and Housing Congress, San Juan, May 28 – June 3, 1960,* p. 87-88; Also see, Vázquez Calcerrada, "Housing in Puerto Rico Under the Mutual Aid and Self-help Program," in Ibid.

uniform demographic distribution. The Administration also ran a family-farm resettlement program with larger lot of twenty acres.[68]

This extensive resettlement program, however, was not designed to provide a means of self-employment. Rather, it was meant as a temporary means of subsistence for labor between the harvests. In official language, however, this systematic production of labor reserves for seasonal employment is framed as a preliminary step towards the making of a modern citizenry. Rivera-Santos asserted that with their subsistence needs taken care of, the farmer was free to

> sell his labor in the open market without the limitation of dependency which characterized his life as a squatter (agregados). This feeling of freedom is a psychological restoration of man for his struggles. There is a *rebirth* of the powers and *potentialities* of a real citizen [emphasis added][69]

Rivera-Santos's remarks, made at the West Indies Conference on Housing in 1947, identify the particular employment of psychological individualism in nationalist and developmental rhetoric.[70] The framing of the laborer as an emerging subject of modernization marks the *potential* rather than a realization of modern citizenship. The not-yet individual, not yet fully engrossed in modern socio-economic relations, identifies an intermediary sphere of unrealized potential. This partiality is

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[68] These details are listed by Rivera-Santos himself in a "working paper" titled, "Housing Programmes in Puerto Rico with Special Emphasis on Aided Self-Help Activities," submitted to the panel of experts at the United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1, UN Archives, New York. The paper is a revised version of a presentation at the West Indies conference on Housing, 1947 sponsored by US Technical Cooperation Administration.

[69] Ibid. p. 5.

[70] Luis Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with Special Emphasis on Aided Self-help activities," Proceeding of West India Conference on Housing, 1947, UN Archives, New York.

a recurrent theme in development rhetoric. This framing of labor as an *untapped* site of potential modernization frames self-help and development as a problem not just of economics but one *necessarily* of social reform.

Joining Santos and Pico at the West Indies Conference, Crane, in his presentation titled "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," argued:

> In order to best serve the shelter *needs and aspirations* of the people, the housing programme must take into account the *attitudes of the people themselves*. It must be remembered that the *values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from local culture* and are deeply imbedded in the minds of the people [emphasis added] [71]

In this domain, "desire" and "attitude" form essential psychological vectors of modernization. We will look at how individual desire, family, and community form particular scales of psychological coding of economic value later in this chapter. Here it is important to note that framing is dependent on the coding of *tradition* as a collective and partially modern source of development. The individual as a potential citizen and a unit of the community constitutes the site where economic development is recast as social responsibility and is displaced outside a purely economic calculus into the realm of social reform. The psychological coordinates of not-yet-laborer locate the individual as a potential subject of modernization within traditional society. The idea of joint family as a state preceding the emergence of families and individuals, yet bearing their developmental imprint, is

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[71] Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West India Conference on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers by Crane distributed as corollary material at the conference: "Huts and Houses in the Tropics;" "The Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family Housebuilding – 'Aided Self-Help Housing;'" and "Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico (Brochure)," United States Housing and Home Finance Agency, Office of the Administrator; "Aided Self-help Shelter Improvement in Tropical Puerto Rico," (Washington, D.C.: The Agency, 1950).

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one of the necessary theoretical fictions constituting this interstitial, not-yet-modern

sphere.[72]

As Rivera-Santos argued, this displacement is essential to the functioning of

development:

> An aided self-help and mutual aid program requires understanding of problems
> and a desire to do something about them. The most important asset is not the cash
> on hand – though that is important – but the decision and the will to help
> themselves. This is the reason why education for the development of proper
> *attitudes* is of crucial importance in such programs.

> Our first experience points out clearly that the development of a proper attitude is
> the only reliable basis for the continuous effort necessary in a housing project and
> is the only *permanent* basis for any other general community improvement
> program [emphasis added].[73]

The coding of proper attitude and responsibility for modernization, however, is

itself a coding of the subject of development rather than evidence of agency. Here,

Mahmood Mamdani and Talal Asad's criticisms of certain works in African Studies

which, in their quest to restore agency to the colonized subject, disregard all

historical constraints, is invaluable for differentiating between the realms of subject

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[72] The breaking up of the "joint family" into nuclear families appears as the customary
explanation of rapid urbanization and social change in the Third World in a host of the
UN reports. The 1960 *UN Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New
and Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia* explained social change related to urbanization as
follows: "After migrating, the poorer classes stay on in towns even though they do not
find secure employment, because for them there is not much disparity in living conditions
between rural and urban areas. The decline of joint family responsibility has rendered
them as insecure in the rural areas as they are in the town though the precariousness of
city." See, Report of the Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New and
Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia, New York: The United Nations, 1960. UN Document
ST/TAO/M/18, UN Sales publication no. 62.II.H.1.

[73] Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico." *op. cit.*, p. 7.

and agency. Even slavery, Mamdani argues, is dismissed as not necessarily a condition to prevent the emergence of an "African-oriented culture."[74] Talal Asad has aptly responded to this tendency by remarking, that "[e]ven the inmates of a concentration camp are able, in this sense to live by their own cultural logic. But one may be forgiven for doubting that they are therefore 'making their own history'."[75] We must keep in mind that Pico and Rivera Santos' invocation of citizenship and responsibility is the unfolding of a top-down model of a dissembled loan structure.

It is important to note here that all these resettlement projects are not presented as strategies for ensuing radical breaks from the existing socio-cultural conditions, but as strategies of partial rearrangement and intervention. The "freeing" of labor is not described as emancipation from tradition, but as finding the ingredients of modernity in it. In the self-help context, tradition is not considered modern, or celebrated from the preservationist and nativist perspective of cultural relativism. Rather it is to be transformed, but according to its own inherently modern structure. Seen from the perspective of development institutions, "tradition," as a partly modern sphere, forms the most critical ingredient of modernization.

2.4.2 Community...Action!

Tradition as the retrospective source of modernization indeed forms one of the conditions of development. Rivera-Santos' statement identified the site of this partly-modern sphere in the nationalist/development rhetoric: community. It is

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[74] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 10.

[75] Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion, Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1993), p. 4. Quoted in Mamdani, ibid.

important to note that the term "community" rarely appears in the development

discourse without the terms "action," "planning," "development," or, as is the case

in Rivera-Santos' statement, "improvement," following it.

Rivera-Santos and Pico soon began a "Community Action Plan," in which the

network of rural settlements were presented as a basis for a broad "cooperative

education," "group action" and "self-improvement" program.[76] In these

formulations, community is not presented as a pre-existing traditional realm, rather

as the possibility of a seamless transition between tradition and modernization. It

identifies an arena which, with proper guidance, could find the contours of

modernity within tradition. Community in development discourse is the possibility

of immanent emergence of modernization. The idea of community development

presents a particularly digestible image of tradition at the root of modernity:

> The aided self-help housing program, as part of a broader community
> improvement program, is based on the proposition that democracy begins in the
> community. One of its purposes has been to discover methods and techniques
> whereby communities can be stimulated to help themselves through cooperation
> and group action...[E]ach individual affected must come better to understand his
> problems if he is to take part in evolving and execution of simple plans for the
> solution of those problems. Only as he assumes that part and that responsibility
> can we hope to create a permanent basis for our democratic order. It is the
> indeclinable responsibility of those who are in [a] position to do so, to help create
> a permanent basis for our democratic order. It is the indeclinable responsibility of

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[76] Here, a complex set of connections, from Crane to Catherine Bauer to Richard
Alexander—Richard Neutra's partner in his Los Angeles firm—would bring Neutra to
Puerto Rico to design a host of village and community centers that formed the focus of
the Community Action Plan.

those who are in position to do so, to help create the proper climate for this growth in citizenship to take place.[77]

Here we must remind ourselves of the long history of European community improvement discourse, particularly in France, as charted by Paul Rabinow's seminal study, *The French Modern*, to understand the particularities of the framing of community development in the development discourse.[78] As Rabinow has argued, for Le Play, family appeared as the fundamental unit of social relations after the individual, serving as its essential "milieu."[79] In the hand of Francis Galton seeking to systemize the notion of identity and identification through the science of fingerprinting in late nineteenth century, England, family appears as a basic unit of modern statistical systems. For Emile Cheysson in France, distancing himself from the new methods of statistical organization presented by Galton in England, family was not "one of the possible set of differentially distributed, structural variation...revealing an underlying unity...[in] the field of differences in which individual traits were distributed."[80] For Cheysson, family formed a unique "type," lodged in the social reality of each cultural setting, representing the "guiding norms against which social agglomeration could be evaluated and organized."[81] As Rabinow points out, the distinction between a quantitative and a qualitative approach to reading the social and devising methodologies of its management, is

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[77] Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[78] Paul Rabinow, *The French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

[79] Ibid. p. 172.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

lost in the next generation of sociological approaches that came after the First
World War.

What is important to note for our purposes is that despite the differences in the
approaches to understanding the social, both the British and the continental
models are mobilized by an underlying current: moving social reform away from
moralism to *welfare*. In the development arena, despite the influence of Western
approaches to social reform, the vector of social change pointed in the reverse
direction: away from welfare and into a discourse on moralism. Individual, family,
and community, while they are treated as units of formal organization of the
social, also are realms that must necessarily escape the formal definition of
economic and social planning and re-possess the extra-formal, moral, dimension
of communal and individual realization and responsibility. As the promise and
potential of modernization, community can bear the weight of being presented as
the untinted potential origin of modernization, modernization that can unfold
without repeating the moral crisis brought by the exploitative market mechanism
in the West. Family, individual, and community are markers of an alternative
project of modernization. To preserve its own possibility as an ethical project,
development must continuously construct its object and subject at the threshold of
modernity. It must delay its own fulfillment, and keep the vector of modernization
pointing toward the identification of a potentially modern and uncorrupted realm
of tradition.

2.4.3 *"Minimum Urbanization"*

The focus on the potency of tradition as the site of individual and collective
responsibility becomes apparent in the first self-help program designed by the

Puerto Rico Planning Board after Crane's arrival. The program, called *Minimum Urbanization*, sought to provide the incoming urban population with only minimum services that could serve as the necessary stepping stone in encouraging the inhabitants to construct the remaining facilities through their own effort, in a sense, constituting the socio-economic sphere of modernization between tradition and modernity in the process.[82] "The lots distributed," Rivera Santos explained,

> will [only] have access to minimum services and facilities e.g. water supply (not inside the house) and the necessary construction work to guarantee a healthy environment. No dwelling or streets will be provided to start with. The families are expected to move into the new lots with whatever house they can.[83]

Shifting away from colonial rural resettlement projects, in the "minimum urbanization" approach, the inhabitants arrived first, modernity was expected to arrive later. Proper planning and organization was deemed to guarantee this sequence:

> Of course, the new subdivisions will be carefully planned as the most progressive and modern developments. Community services and facilities are expected to be provided following aided self-help methods after the families have moved to their new lots. The program is conceived on the basis of a broad community improvement program though mutual aid on self-help and general community participation in the solution of their problems.[84]

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[82] *Jacob Crane Papers,* Cornell University. Series 1, Box 1, Folder 3-4.

[83] Rivera-Santos, "An Analysis of Existing Housing Programs in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[84] Ibid.

This framing is critical to the working of development. The lack of funding

appears as an advantage in harnessing *want* rather then *impulse* development by

"encouraging" the hidden potential of the individual in the community.

From the very beginning, it was clear to Pico and Rivera-Santos that any other

broad project of social reform was beyond the budgetary strength of the

government. "We have come to realize an unquestionable fact," Rivera-Santos

asserted, "In spite of the different housing programs and economic improvement,

we have not been able to cope effectively with the quality of our housing, housing

shortage, and the growth of slums."[85]

At the time of Crane's arrival, the Administration was under pressure to expand its

housing program while cutting down the costs. The project of minimum

urbanization solved neither of the requirements. While presented as the solution to

the Puerto Rico Planning Board's financial limitation, the Puerto Rican self-help

projects were underwritten by US private financing as part of a broader program

of corporate investment in the territory. While Puerto Rico is repeatedly cited as

the model case study of a successful self-help national program, it represented, as

Charles Abrams would later acknowledge, a special case in terms of its

relationship to the United States. Unlike any other "underdeveloped country, it

exercised a wide policy of tax exemption, mainland financing schemes, mainland

builders, and unrestricted immigration to the United States."[86] Home financing was

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[85] Ibid.

[86] See, Puerto Rico Planning Board, *A Proposal for a Low Cost Housing Program*, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Santurce, Puerto Rico: 1958? The presence of US subsidy of Puerto Rico's self-help project is also mentioned by Charles Abrams in *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964), p. 172.

undertaken partly though savings and loans associations whose "assets," it was claimed, increased with the purported rise in incomes. Yet what is seldom mentioned in the housing reports on Puerto Rico is how the mortgages advanced by these associations were insured by the US Federal Housing Authority and offered by US mainland or island lending institutions. The Puerto Rico government sold tax-exempt housing bonds in the US market to subsidize these mortgages. In addition, most of the inhabitants were those who could afford housing costing over $9000 in 1963. These subsidies played a significant role in the "success" of the Puerto Rural Housing programs vaunted by Crane, Pico and Rivera-Santos. The Puerto Rico Planning Board report, issued under Pico's supervision, claimed that the agency was successfully "enabling" the construction of an average of 3000 houses per year in 1958. Even though most of the houses, built with reinforced concrete, were small in size, only 18 X 18 feet and consisted of only one room which was designed to be divided later into a living-dining and two bedrooms, the costs were still well over the initially imagined limits of self-financing (FIG. 2).

Yet these exceptions are glossed over, dispelled and displaced, as Puerto Rico is presented as an example of self-help program's self-sustaining potential across the globe. There the US subsidy was not forthcoming. The unsubsidized loan programs were to be sustained by the "savings" alone. Holding Puerto Rico as an example, the 1954 New Delhi Seminar on Community Development would made this point clear: "The main source of funds for housing should be private savings and policies should be developed with this requirement in view."[87] This assertion

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[87] The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi, 1954. op. cit. p. 15.

formed the cornerstone of development economics. "This is indeed the principle," Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel-Laureate and development economist later remarked, "by which an underdeveloped country can hope to 'lift itself by its own bootstraps'."[88]

These policies of "encouraging" savings though, we will later see in the section on the "organization" of self-help projects, only amounted to the incorporation of urban migrants as flexible labor reserves managed through a top-down loan system that extended from international organizations to national governments to local municipalities.

The possibility of this system, we have argued here, is itself subsidized by the framing of "tradition" as a source of modernization, responsibility, and understanding. This *other* subsidy works to erase the exceptions of Puerto Rico self-help programs to establish a development norm.

2.4.4 *Displacing Precedence*

The notion of tradition as the potential sphere of modernization serves a particular role in settling the question of Western precedence—the First World claiming itself as a precedent for the Third. On the one hand, the idea of community is a framing of tradition in terms of the basic modern social unit of the individual. On the other, community is a re-writing of modernity in terms of certain collective ethics that are seen to have been lost in laissez-faire individualism of the market. Playing this duality, self-help proposals escape the limitation of outside imposition and

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[88] Myrdal here is quoting W.W. Rostow, the professor of international relations at MIT and Advisor to L.B. Johnson, from the his famous book, *Stages of Growth*. See, Gunnar Myrdal, "From Rich Lands and Poor," in *An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1944). Quoted in *The Essential Gunnar Myrdal*, Örjan Appelqvist and Stellan Andersson, eds. (New York: The New Press, 2005), p. 225.

Western precedence in national contexts. The Western nations can learn from the "balanced" modernization of self-help development in the Third World as the latter from the expert's guidance. Crane is in Puerto Rico not simply to reproduce the American model, but to help Puerto Rico discover one for itself. A direct claim of precedence would have highlighted the question of funding and subsidy that underwrote the American and Puerto Rican examples.

Local officials like Rivera Santos and Pico were adamant that self-help was to be implemented with particular attention to the socio-cultural parameters of Puerto Rico. Five year later in 1954, when Pico, Rivera-Santos and Crane found themselves at the UN Seminar on Community Improvement in New Delhi, they felt the need to clarify the question of precedence once again:

> Much has been said in recent years about adapting western techniques to the needs of the less developed areas of the world. But the particular circumstances and requirements of many less developed countries have forced [them] to invent rational approaches which depart from the policies and practices of the industrialized countries.[89]

The roots of this rational approach reside in the proto-rational sphere of tradition.

The positioning of tradition at the foundations of modernity is not simply an instance of applying cultural sheen on economic principles. Development identifies, indeed depends upon identifying, the interaction between the economic and the extra-economic. It asserts that each particular cultural setting bears within it a set of modernization principles. America and Puerto Rico are related to each other as two particular models of harnessing that possibility. One does not serve

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[89] The United Nations Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement, New Delhi, 1954. *op. cit.* p. ix.

as a model for the other but only as informant, or to use Gayatri Spivak's famous

term, *alibi*. The framing of tradition as the potential source of modernization

affords the much repeated argument that the United States can learn just as much

from the Puerto Rican experiments as the latter from the American examples.

Development cuts across the definition of tradition and modernity as separate and

sequential spheres and sets up a certain symmetry, an overlap, between the two.

This isomorphism, however, hides a discontinuous text, in which alibis and

exchanges draw focus away from the asymmetries underlying the comparisons.

The absence of subsidiaries and funding is one, the imbalance in the terms of

international trade and the question of access to world markets are others. The

idea of development as self-help is able to by-pass these questions altogether.

2.4.5 *Gendering Help*

All of these discontinuities are underwritten in terms of gender as well. While the

category of squatter labor, as the not-yet modern subject of this inversion is held

in abeyance, to sustain the possibility of development, another sphere is

simultaneously incorporated into the modernization project, the not-yet labor of

women. This incorporation, however, is silent and doesn't bear the mark of even a

partial recognition. Its presence can only be discerned from gender exclusive

profiles of community development programs such as the one laid out by Rivera-

Santos:

> One of [the] purposes [of the program] has been to discover methods and
> techniques whereby communities can be *stimulated* to help themselves through
> cooperative and group action. It has proceeded with the conviction that each
> individual affected must come to better understand *his* problems if *he* is to take

part in evolving and executing simple plans for the solutions of those problems [emphasis added].[90]

The term, "stimulated," here betrays the gendered profiles of tradition and community as they are (partially) incorporated into the circuits of national and international capital. The moral "responsibility" of modernization is borne asymmetrically in the traditional realm, an asymmetry that is betrayed by the gender-specific pronouns representing the subject of pending modernization. We will examine the mechanisms of this selective recognition as well as the aporias facing the strategies of recognizing women's labor in the development theater in the section on self-help organization. Yet, we must note here that it is the invisible category of "woman" that brings the different genres of the discourse together.[91]

Community development programs frequently draw upon the idea of the freedom of labor, which forms a prominent theme in various postwar national theaters. Independence is upheld as an unquestioned good that frees labor to enter wage employment on its own accord. Yet if we keep in mind the long history of the organization of the subsistence sphere as different forms of "free" labor (informal, reserved, seasonal), the post-independence framing of free labor under self-help programs appears as its displacement on yet another gender exclusive register.

2.5 Uses of Value

No discourse is possible...without the unity of something *being taken for granted.*

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[90] Ibid., p. 7.

[91] The category of "woman" can be seen to operate as a *differend*, to use Jean François Lyotad's famous term representing the improbable operative rule that can bring together different genres of a discourse without inflicting a "wrong [on] (at least) one of them." See Jean François Lyotad, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* (Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. xi.

If "marginality" is being constituted as an area of investigation, this is only because relations of power have established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power is able to take it as a target, this is because techniques of knowledge were capable of switching it on. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference...

Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*[93]

2.5.1 *A Linear Abbreviation of a Circularity*

The intertwined relationship between tradition and modernization blurs the supposed separation between culture and economics. Let us now turn to how the limits of political economy are blurred in the writing of Karl Marx through the relationship of use and exchange value, two moments in the capitalist chain that supposedly point to the sphere of tradition and capitalism respectively. This digression is important because it allows us to identify how the relationship between tradition and modernization articulated in early development schemes, such as those in Puerto Rico, sustain a system of unacknowledged appropriation of value critical to the logic of development.

Marx's dialectical thinking doesn't allow for a separation between use and exchange-value, a sequential before and after in the process of commodification. Gayatri Spivak has noted that the idea of use-value appears in Marx, not as an *apriori* origin, but only in a supplementary relationship to the circuit of exchange

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[92] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *In Other Worlds* (New York: Routledge), p. 76.

[93] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, pp. 98-99.

relations.[94] Use-value is not simply *subtracted* from the commodity to reveal its exchange-value. Rather, it can only make itself visible when set in relation to exchange-value.

Marx does equate value with exchange-value in the opening pages of the first volume of *Capital*, but that equation forever remains, to use a Derridian term, seething in the chain of *parasitic* relations:[95] "When, at the beginning of this chapter, we said in the customary manner that a commodity is both a use-value and an exchange-value," Marx tells us, "this was, strictly speaking, wrong...

> A commodity is a use-value or object of utility, and a "value." It appears as this double thing [*dies Doppelte*] that is, as soon as its value possesses its own form of appearance [*Erscheinungsform*], which is distinct from its natural form, and is that of exchange-value, and the commodity never possesses this considered in isolation, but only when it is in a value or exchange relation with a second commodity of a different kind. Once we know this, our manner of speaking does not harm; it serves, rather, as an *abbreviation* [emphasis added].[96]

A commodity appears as double things, marked by use and value, only *after* it is set in exchange relations. Yet the "after" here is only an explanatory instrument. It must be remembered that for the commodity to enter exchange relations, that distinction, between use-value and value, must already be *operative*. In other

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[94] Gayatri Spivak, in her reading of Derrida's *Economimesis* has elaborated in detail on this point. Derrida's reading of the political economy of Kant's third *Critique*, Spivak argues, is marked by an understanding of use and exchange-value as distinct mutually exclusive spheres. My description of inter-relationship of the two concepts in Marx is drawn from Spivak's corrective to Derrida. See Gayatri Spivak, "Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 97-119. See Derrida's reading in *Economimesis,* trans., Richard Klein, *Diacritics,* 2:2 (Summer 1981).

[95] Jacque Derrida, *Limited Inc.* pp. 99-100.

[96] Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books), p. 152. Hereafter noted in text as *C (volume number).*

words, the distinction between use-value and value is a circularity. Value appears when use-value is subtracted. But the possibility of use-value appears only with the emergence of value set in comparative relations of exchange-value. Spivak has describe these simultaneous irresolutions as follows: "Use makes 'value' vanish, yet without the moment of consumption of the commodity as use-value the value would not be 'real'-ized."[97]

Let us lay out this irresolvable chain as a linear abbreviation of a circularity: 1. "value" appears when use-value is subtracted. 2. But use-value is only comprehended when value has taken on a distinct form, (as exchange value, through a comparative process with other commodities of a different kind.). 3. But exchange value is only established when value's form has been established as separate from use-value, which takes us again to the "first" step.

Use-value has conventionally been taken to represent that quality according to which things are exchanged or utilized in a pre-capitalist society. The appearance of local culture in culturalist critiques above is characterized primarily by this divisive model of political economy. Marx's designation of a realm outside of circuits of exchange with the term, "use-value," however, denies all

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[97] Spivak, "Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, p. 106. Spivak has described this duality as a "parasitic" relationship where the "part-whole relationship is...turned inside out." This inversion, which Spivak relates to Derrida's "invagination," the "parasitic part (exchange-value) is also the species term of the whole, thus allowing use-value the normative inside place of the host as well as banishing it as that which must be subtracted so that Value can be defined." Ibid. p. 106.

characterizations of an orginary moment of capitalist political economy and is marked by an irresolvable duality at every moment.[98]

This qualitative exchange betrays its footprint in the quantitative exchange after the fact, when capitalism sets use-value and value in play. Marx's dialectical thinking does not allow for the mapping of a beginning and end of capitalism but presents us with an ever seething process of involution, an open-ended chain of transformation. This conception of the political economy is able to account for the dimension in which capitalism is continuously appropriating value by stepping outside the purely economic coding. For Marx, the teleological progression from use-value to value, and from value to exchange-value is a necessary methodological abbreviation to explain a concept that defies teleological modeling. These details were missed in the dogmatic imposition of Marx's idea on societies outside of the European context by Socialism, and are certainly set aside by cultural humanist readings of global capitalism seeking to distance themselves from Marx.

2.5.2 Labor: The Great "Manoeuvre"

Marx's insightfulness lay in identifying this open-ended chain of value formation to be at work at the moment when labor presents itself as a commodity to the

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[98] Spivak argues that this irresolution is present in Marx's characterization of even the supposed origin of special-life, the human being-in-nature. Use-value appears in a qualitative exchange with nature, which is inherent to the very condition of possibility of human-being in nature. Marx complicated the idea of nature as origin when he argued: "Labor, then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labor, a condition of existence of human beings, which is independent of all social forms, an eternal natural necessity for the mediation of the metabolism between human beings and nature, and thus human life itself." (C1, 133). Quoted in Spivak, ibid., p. 105.

capitalist. At the beginning of the chapter on "Value-Form" in the first volume of

Capital, Marx takes pains to point out the irresolute duality between use and value

as it manifests itself in the relation between labor and capital. Labor too appears as

a commodity written in the differential of use-value and exchange-value. On the

one hand, Marx argues, it has the "sensuous characteristics" of being "the labour of

the joiner, the mason, or the spinner, or any other particular kind of productive

labour." On the other hand, it simultaneously appears as an *abstract* activity

related to the *abstract* exchange relations of commodities:

> With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the
> useful character of the kind of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in
> turn entails the disappearance of the different, concrete forms of labour. They can
> no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of
> labour, human labour in the abstract. (*C1, 128*).

The capitalist, in signing a contract with labor, doesn't buy any particular kind of

labor, but rather wants to purchase the abstract quality of labor embodied in it. In

other words, the laborer sells his/her labor to the capitalist. What the capitalist

buys, however, is not labor, the ability of a particular laborer to make a particular

thing, but the general ability to work, *any* work, embodied by labor, the "human

labour in abstract," conventionally called "labor-power."

Useful labor, labor related to a particular object, doesn't have any value in

exchange relations and cannot be compensated accordingly. Only labor-power, as

the abstract measure of *average* labor in a particular social setup bears this

potential. This abstraction of labor-power takes place on a dual level: First, on the

shared level of labor as a physiological attribute: "On the one hand, all labor is an

expenditure of human labor-power in the physiological sense, and in this property

of being the same human or abstract human labor that it forms the value of commodities." *(CI, 137)*. Secondly, as a *rational* denominator:

> "While…with reference to use-value, the labour contained in a commodity counts only qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only quantitatively, once it has been reduced to human labour pure and simple. In the former case it was a matter of the 'how' and 'what' of labour, in the latter of the 'how much', of the temporal duration of labour." *(CI, 137)*.

It is in this abstract form, that labor can take on value in exchange relations.

This abstraction, however, doesn't separate labor-power *altogether* from the particular form of concrete labor, its useful form. Marx remind us that "[e]quality in the full sense between different kinds of labor can only consist in an abstraction from their real inequality, in their reduction to the common character that they possess as the expenditure of human labor-power, abstract labor" *(C1, 166)*.

Just as value cannot completely separate itself from "its form of appearance" in case of other commodities, the abstract-labor cannot be altogether separated from useful-labor. On the one hand, labor-power can only emerge as an abstraction from useful-labor when conceptualized in the relational field of commodity exchange. On the other hand, useful-labor makes its appearance as a theoretical fiction *after* abstract labor-power is established as a concept in capitalist relations. Its *subtraction* allows for labor-power to emerge. Useful labor cannot be taken as an originary moment in the emergence of labor-power. There is no "local" sphere outside the relations of power and exchange in Marx.

Foucault had warned us of the futility of assuming the "local" as a sphere disconnected from broader disciplinary apparatuses:

No "local center," "no pattern of transformation" could function if through a series of successive linkages, it were not eventually written into an over-all strategy...The [disciplinary] apparatus, precisely to the extent that it [is] insular and heteromorphous with respect to the other great "manoeuvres"...[99]

2.5.3 *Driving Surplus*

How does the inseparability of use-value and exchange-value inform the question of exploitation, the great "manoeuvre" of capitalism? To approach this question, let us now trace the role played by this differential in the emergence of another important concept in Marx's analyses: surplus-value. Labor-power measures a particular quality of human-labor: its super-adequation to itself. Here is the famous sentence from the first volume of Capital that describes this quality: "[Labor-power] distinguishes itself, form the ordinary crowd of commodities in that its use creates value, and a greater value than it costs itself." *(C1, 342)*.

For Marx,

> In order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, [the capitalist must] find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption is there itself an objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] of labour, hence a creation of value. The [capitalist] does find such a special commodity on the market: the capacity for labour [*Arbeitsvermögen*], in other words labour-power [*Arbeitskarft*]. We mean by labour-power, or labour-capacity, the aggregate of those mental and physical [attributes] existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human-being, capabilities which he set in motion wherever he produces a use-value of any kind *(C1, 270)*.

The capitalist is interested in forever extending surplus-value. According to Marx, there are two avenues available to the capitalist for this purpose: increase in

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[99] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, p. 99.

absolute and *relative* surplus-value. Absolute surplus-value is the amount of labor performed by the worker after s/he has compensated for the use-value of labor-power, dubbed "necessary-labor," the socially determined cost of "regeneration" of labor. Any amount of work done over the cost of that regeneration, over necessary-labor, is surplus-value for the capitalist.[100] Since it is in the interest of capitalism to preserve the long-term regeneration of labor-power, it can only increase surplus-value by increasing the amount of labor performed over that necessary labor (instead of reducing the costs of necessary labor by paying the worker less than s/he needs for sustenance). Yet the work day cannot be infinitely increased. Marx's detailed analyses of the historical debates on the length of the working day point to this limit.

The second avenue to increase surplus-value is by increasing relative surplus-value. In this scenario, the length of the working day is taken as constant at the beginning. The only ways to increase surplus-value is either to decrease necessary-labor, the use-value of labor, or to increase productivity. The former follows, Marx argues, a declining curve. The cost of necessary labor decreases as capitalism incorporates more and more productive activities related to supporting necessary

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[100] Marx describes this differential as follows: "That half a working day is necessary to keep the worker alive for 24 hours does not in any way prevent him from working a whole day. Thus the value of labour power, and valorization in the labour-process, are two different magnitudes. It is this value-difference that the capitalist had his eye on when he was purchasing labour-power" *(C1, 300)*.

labor—food, clothes, housing, etc.[101] But as more and more supporting activities enter the productive cycle the rate of increase of surplus-value declines.[102]

Similarly the increased productivity through technological innovation also points to a saturation point *(C1, 643-54)*. The lowering of necessary labor and increasing of productive efficiency necessarily demands increased incorporation of the worker into consumerist capitalism. This incorporation, however, decreases the rate of increase of surplus-value.

These limits to relative surplus-value introduce a contradictory trajectory in capitalism: to increase absolute surplus-value, by incorporating new areas into capitalism, or by excluding them from circuits of consumer capitalism through poor labor laws and environmental conditions across the international division of labor. In the development arena, the drive for increasing absolute surplus-labor can be seen to manifest itself in the tendency for partial or perpetually delayed incorporation in the name of tradition in circuits of capitalist production through strategies such as self-help.

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[101] For Marx, this was possible by seizing "upon those branches of industry whose products determine the value of labour-power, and consequently either belong to the category of normal means of subsistence, or are capable of replacing them." *C1, 432.*

[102] Marx defined the two spheres and their attending methodologies of increasing surplus-values as follows: "The prolongation of the working date beyond the point at which the worker would have produced an exact equivalent for the value of his labour-power, and the appropriation of that surplus labour by capital – this is the process which constitutes the production of absolute surplus-value. It forms the general foundation of the capitalist system, and the starting-point for the production of relative surplus-value. The latter presupposes that the working day is already divided into two parts, necessary labour and surplus labour, the necessary labour is shortened by methods for producing the equivalent of the wage labour in a shorter time." *C1, 645.*

2.5.4 *"Behind the Back of the Producers"*

For Marx, the irresolute relationship between use and exchange-value points to the diffused boundaries of capitalist exploitation. These diffused boundaries are apparent in Marx's framing of the process though which the cost of necessary labor, its use-value for the capitalist, is determined in capitalist relations:

> In contrast…with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value of labour-power, contains *a historical and moral element*. Nevertheless, in a given country at a given period, the average amount of the means of subsistence necessary for the worker is a known datum [emphasis added] *(C1, 275)*.

Not incidentally, the name of this diffused, shifting, and extra-economic "historical and moral" datum is *tradition*:

> The various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of measurement are established by *a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producer*, these proportions therefore *appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition* [emphasis mine] *(C1, 135)*.[103]

Tradition is a short-hand for a differential process between the social and economic that determines the most critical element of capitalist relations: the level of necessary labor, that crucial datum that determines the level of surplus-labor and magnitude of all exchange relations. Yet, this process "goes on behind the back of the producers," and cannot be determined from within the realm of exchange relations alone. The seat of value in capitalist relations resides in a process of *unacknowledged appropriation* of the value-differential between use and exchange-value of labor. It is critical that this process remains

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[103] Once again, Marx's irresolute dialectics do not allow tradition to appear as a unified phenomenon outside of capitalist relations. The quantity of necessary labor only *appears* to the producers to have been handed to them by tradition. This texuality is critical to Marx's understanding of limits of capitalism.

unacknowledged, and "appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition."

For Antonio Negri, use-value of labor also constitutes a curious presence in Marx's critique of political economy. Yet, Negri doesn't take the irreducible presence of use-value as a sign of an irreducible differential between exchange and non-exchange relations. Rather, for Negri, use-value represents an "outside" that allowed Marx to establish necessary labor as the unit of measurement of value. Negri holds that use-value represented an aporia in Marxist analyses, an aporia born out of Marx's failure to cast the material, qualitative, elements interrupting capitalism into a synchronic, analytic mold. For Negri, this failure holds the key, however, of leading *Marx beyond Marx*,[104] the Marx of classical economic theory and linear progression of capital from use to exchange-value. By identifying the key element of the value chain to be outside the disciplinary regime of capital, Marx's aporia, Negri argues, lets us identify a tendency in "capital" to subsume all use-value within exchange relations. For Negri, this is the sphere of total and *real-subsumption*.[105]

The separation of use-value and exchange value projected into Marx's analyses by Negri, however, cannot acknowledge the presence of the surplus army of women laborers, incorporated into the production cycle, yet maintained outside of consumerist relations, across the international division of labor identified by critics

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[104] This is the title of Negri's seminal book, *Marx Beyond Marx*, trans., H. Cleaver , M. Ryan and M. Viano (New York: Autonomedia, 1991, first edition, 1979).

[105] The idea of *real subsumption* is elaborated by Negri in "Value and Affect," *Boundary 2*, 26:2 (Summer 1999).

such as June Nash, and María Patricia Fernández-Kelly.[106] This interruption

necessarily leads us to acknowledge the difference between the tendencies of

capital and that of capital*ism* ignored by Negri's otherwise insightful readings.

Here, Deleuze and Guattari's framing of *desire* in *Anti-Oedipus* as a non-economic

coding of value through spectacularly interruptive and discontinuous circuits of

socialization is invaluable (we will return to the notion of *affective* coding of value

in the next section). Kalpana Bardhan points to this discontinuous text when she

reminds us that patriarchal and feudal social structures are "perfectly consistent"

with the requirements of capitalist market production:

> In a stratified society, discrimination of wages and jobs/occupation by caste and
> sex Is not a feudal remnant but perfectly consistent with the play of market
> forces...If the wage-and-access differentials follow the lines of traditional privilege,
> then attention gets conveniently deflected from the adaptive dexterity of capitalist
> exploitation processes to the stubborness of feudal values, when it is actually a
> symbiotic relationship between the two.[107]

Bardhan's caution constitutes a challenge to culturalist critics for whom market

relations and traditional social structures form polar opposites in the circuits of

global capital. It is the superimposition of these two spheres that we see at work

in the self-help projects. In the perpetuation of tradition as a potential sphere of

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[106] June Nash, and María Patricia Fernández-Kelly, eds., *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1983). For the separation between productive and consumerist cycles in capitalism, also see Bill Warren's *Imperialism: Pioneers of Capitalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1980).

[107] Kalpana Bardhan, "Women's Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition and Change in India," in *South Asia Bulletin*, 6:1 (1986): pp. 3-16. The above quote is on p.5. Quoted in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Women in Difference," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge), p. 86.

modernization, we witness the alignment of Marx's "historical and moral datum"

with the text of global economic production.

2.6   The Self-help Agenda: The Movement of Risk

2.6.1   *Project(ing) Self-help:*

Puerto Rico's demonstration projects had a global impact on models of housing for

"low-income groups." Its most repeated elements were not the house designs

themselves—which were supposed to change according to "local requirements"—

but the surrounding administrative, legislative and financial system (the hidden

subsidies from US institutions not withstanding). This expansive influence resulted

from self-help's capacity to absorb and reflect the broader development belief that

underdevelopment results from the lack of savings, investment and industrial

production. This developmental cycle was suppressed, development economists

argued, by the vast majority of the Third World "poor" being outside capitalist

relations.[108] Self-help satisfied all the elements of the bill. It saved public

expenditure, prompted savings from the "poor" that were simultaneously invested

into the development of a formal housing and land market, and encouraged

formation of a building and finance industry.

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[108] The most prominent of these theorists was perhaps Walter Rostow, an MIT professor of International Relations and an advisor to Lyndon Johnson and John F. Kennedy's governments. We will look at Rostow's theories in detail in later chapters of the dissertation. See, his *The Process of Economic Growth* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), and *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). For a critique of development model of savings, investment, industrial production, see, Arturo Escobar, "The Space of Development," in *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, op cit.*, pp. 55-101; For an early critique of mechanistically separating different economic aspects under the three partite model of development, see Antonio García, For a critique of the loan structure based on the savings, investment, industrialization from a contemporary perspective, see Cheryl Payer, *Lent and Lost: Foreign Credit and Third World Development* (London: Zed Books, 1991).

In this section, we'll see that self-help delivered more than it promised. On the one hand, it provided an alibi for subsidized public land supply for economic groups who were the more coveted clients of private financing, thereby further reducing available resources of those outside this sphere. Seen from this larger perspective, self-help appears to provide a mechanism to manage the need and the *risk* of encountering the "poor" as a category in development. On the other hand, self-help provided a justification for moving the processes of shaping public administration and planning legislation outside the realm of national political institutions and tied them with the prerogative of international development and loan agencies, such as the UN, USAID, IMF and the World Bank. It is in this dislocation that we see the development experts finding the possibility of their role and expertise.

We will begin by identifying the various institutions that made up the global self-help field. In this sphere, we'll look at an implicit strategy of risk management that used self-help to increase the scope and scale of land development and financial markets. We'll then use this point of entry to explore in further detail how the setting up of an administrative and legislative sphere around the self-help agenda in particular national contexts satisfied the politico-economic requirements of a broader international loan structure and sustained the particular mode of operation of development experts.

2.6.2 Credit Lines

Self-help programs formed an integral part of the initial loan packages offered by US development organizations such as the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA, later absorbed into the US Department of Housing and Urban

Development, HUD), the Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA). These agencies required that Third World governments adopt self-help as the primary national housing policy to receive their grants, loans, and expert assistance (FIG. 3). The model for this precondition was Puerto Rico's self-help program funded by the US. "To a large extent," declared a report of the Office of International Affairs at HUD, "most of the overseas organized aided self-help housing programs developed or supported by U.S. foreign aid organizations have been either modeled after or inspired by the Puerto Rican experience."[109] In the 1950's, it was standard training procedure for technicians recruited in international housing projects to visit the early "land and utility" projects in Puerto Rico such as "minimum urbanization."

The other major factor in self-help's global preponderance as a national policy approach was the parallel emphasis laid on it by the UN Social Affairs Division. The UN though, reflecting its diplomatic colors, only "recommended" self-help in its experts' mission reports. The net effect of these recommendations, however, was quite the same as the more direct demand of US organizations to implement self-help as precondition for loans. For, many international loan organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, weighed UN recommendations in judging a country's qualification to receive credit.

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[109] *Special Report on Techniques of Aided Self-help Housing: Some Examples of U.S. and Overseas Experience*, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of International Affairs (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p.5. The report was authored by Ervan Bueneman, a former US-AID technician who had led many Agency missions to Latin America, as well as UN and various European and multinational housing development agencies' projects across the globe, before becoming the Director of the Foundation of Cooperative Housing's Northeast Regional Office.

Both of these lines of dissemination, the US foreign aid organization and the UN, were instrumental in establishing various housing and planning centers across the world that played host to countless housing experts. The most prominent of these centers was the Inter-American Center of Housing and Planning (CINVA) in Bogotá, Colombia, established by the Organization of American States under Harry Truman's Point Four Program. The center held self-help as its primary housing approach and ran a prominent aided self-help training center for housing officials across Latin America. Later, the center was a regular recipient of funds from the Alliance for Progress under the Kennedy administration. Similar institutes were set up in Guatemala and Nicaragua, called the Inter-American Cooperative Housing Institute and the Institute of Housing (INVU), respectively. The latter was set up with the help of the United States Operations Mission.[110] These and other similar institutes (in Brazil, Ecuador and Costa Rica) were set up to provide future crops of trained housing personnel to substitute for US experts.

The UN also pursued the policy of setting up institutes and scholarship programs to establish the self-help doctrine. In 1953, the UN Social Affairs Division, sponsored extensive studies by Israel's Ministry of Labor on the use of "stabilized earth" as part of its plan to establish a regional housing and planning center in Israel. Subsequent contentions in the Middle East, however, prevented the realization of this proposal. Yet, similar regional institutes were later set up in Indonesia and Japan.

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[110] The Operations Mission was regularly sent by the US State Department to countries requesting credit to lay out policy and administration "conditions" needed to be in place in order to receive US treasury, and by proxy, IMF loans.

The US international housing program initially followed the lines of Cold War contestations. Its preliminary ventures remained focused in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. This field expanded in the 60s to include East Africa and the Middle East to counter rising Soviet influence in the region. In Latin America, the initial projects were in Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.[111] In the Caribbean, US housing experts advised on projects in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago with the Caribbean Commission. In the Middle East, similar projects were advanced in Turkey and Egypt. In Southeast Asia, projects were introduced in Indonesia, Korea, Burma, and Taiwan. As the US interest shifted to Africa in the 1960s, a host of demonstration projects and training course were inaugurated in Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mali, Zambia, and Liberia.[112]

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[111] In Latin America, the initial projects included, the "German Riesco" project in Chile, "Chacra La Palma," "San Gregorio," and "Clara Estrella," in Guatemala, and "Colonia Managua" in Nicaragua.

[112] Through out the 1950s and the 1960s, HUD published an "Ideas and Methods Exchange" Series (IMEs, as they came to called) on behalf of the USAID which contained description of aided self-help projects sponsored by the US agencies across the globe. These included:

IME # 1. *India*, November, 1952.
2. *Caribbean and Jamaica*, December, 1952.
3. *Puerto Rico*, 1953.
5. *Burma*, March, 1953.
7. *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions*, April, 1953.
8. *Egypt, Caribbean, Puerto Rico*, May, 1953.
9. *Land and Utilities*, May 1953.
11. *Indonesia*, September, 1953.
12. *Savings for Aided Self-Help Housing*, Kenya, November, 1953.
13. *Jamaica, Taiwan*, January, 1954.
14. *Alaska, Ceylon*, January, 1954.
15. *A Restatement of Self-Help In Housing Improvement In Puerto Rico*, 1954.
16. *Trinidad and Tobago*, July, 1954.
17. *Barbados*, August, 1954.
18. *Aided Self-Help in Housing Improvement*, January, 1954. Revised 1967.
19. *Martinique*, October, 1954.
21. *Land and Utilities, Honk Kong*, January, 1955.
23. *Land and Utilities, Puerto Rico*, 1955.

The UN field of activity was much more disseminated from the very beginning, covering almost the entire decolonizing world. In the 1950s alone, the UN sent missions to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Nicaragua in Latin America, and to Haiti, Puerto Rico, West Indies, and Jamaica in the Caribbean. Projects in the Middle East included Egypt, Jordon, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Libya, Iraq and Turkey. In South and West Asia, missions were sent to India, Iran, Pakistan, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Countries receiving missions in Southeast Asia included the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya (Malaysia).

Even though the trajectory of UN projects differed from that of US aid projects—which followed the contours of the congressional funding and US foreign policy—they were hard to distinguish from the latter in terms of either the nature of the projects or the set of people recruited to carry them out. The UN experts were often recruited by the HHFA, with the posts advertised regularly in the HHFA's international bulletin, and were often HHFA (and later HUD) staffers. Jacob Crane and Charles Abrams' presence on both UN and HHFA projects exemplifies this relationship.

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24. *Financing Aided Self-Help Housing,* May, 1955.
37. *Manual on Design of Low Cost Aided Self-Help Housing,* 1957.
46. *Urban Aided Self-Help Housing, Puerto Rico,* 1957.
50. *The Development of An Aided Self-Help Program, Guatemala.*
58. *Colonia Managua,* 1962.
63. *Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity,* 1966.
64. *Proposed Minimum Standards,* 1970.
65. *Village Housing in Africa.*
68. *Planning Sites and Services Programs,* 1971.

2.6.3 Saving Risk

The collective sphere of USAID and UN missions betrays the presumed necessity and the risk of encountering the "poor" as a development category. Risk is not a foreign concept to the self-help discourse. It was Charles Abrams who characterized the rapid urbanization in the Third World as the greatest risk faced by the future of capitalism.[2]

This risk is both political and economic. The incorporation of dislocated Third World urban populations into global capitalist structure is seen as an insurance against their economic insecurity and potential political volatility. Yet this enterprise is not without its own risks. The political and economic risks appear to be pitted against each other. The socio-economic makeup of the urbanization population represents a financial risk to any loans provided for development projects by the international financial institutions. This risk is further accentuated by the fact that national governments cannot provide any collateral guarantees for loans.

This dual political and economic risk is managed by pursuing an apparently contradictory approach: launching a host of self-help schemes, demonstration projects, and building research programs for the "low-income groups" which appear to be always beyond the targeted economic range. This approach is underscored by proposals for land delivery and financing for higher-income economic territories.

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[2] See Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, op. cit.,* p. 23. We see this sentiment expressed from the very first UN reports to later the World Bank Urbanization Sector Working Papers. See Banks' *Urbanization Sector Working Paper,* June, 1972; *Housing Sector Policy Paper,* May, 1972.

This contradiction, however, is continuously tolerated under the dogma that the development cycle would take root somewhere in the middle of two economic ranges, the desired sphere of impact and the actual beneficiaries of the self-help policy. While self-help techniques would bring down the cost of the projects, the policy of developing a broader land market, sphere of industrialization, and financial institutions would raise the effective demand (the ability to pay for the demand) of those outside the current range of the projects. To the extent that the two vectors never meet, it does not betray the failure of development but rather its ability to manage the risk of socio-economic intervention. It is our contention in this section that the self-help doctrine serves as an alibi to keep open the gap, rather than to close it. To the extent that the targeted groups are incorporated into the processes of industrial development, this incorporation is always tangential and partial.

One of the critical signposts of the text of risk management is the coding of "poor" as a collective subject that can pull themselves out of poverty with proper guidance. This coding is betrayed by the curious collateral that is established to justify the self-help regime: *responsibility*.

The immediacy of political and economic risk is countered by defining "poor" as a social mass that can be turned financially "responsible" through proper organization and guidance. Harold Robinson, the former Chief of the Housing and Urban Development branch of USAID Latin America Bureau and the author of the official HUD history of self-help, emphasized that "[t]he social values of aided self-help, particularly the mutual type, are not to be deprecated. Self-help imparts a sense of participation and *responsibility* that is lacking in low-income rental

housing or in housing bestowed by the state."[114] HUD and AID programs favored

mutual self-help projects, we are told, because of the "social cooperation that

accompanies that form."[115] Also, when self-help programs were set up in East

Africa (Southern Rhodesia and Zambia), the primary goal was the "training [of]

urban workers" in a way that "encourage[d] homeownership, with an increase in

communal stability and *responsibility*."[116] Similarly, when the Inter-American Bank

began its loan program, "[a]mong the advantages of self-help housing initially

recognized...were the social values of families cooperating with others in creating

housing with their own hands."[117] If we recall, the promise of imparting a sense of

"responsibility" in the participants was also identified by Rivera-Santos as key to

the future development in Puerto Rico.

In the broader discourse of international loan agencies, this social responsibility

represents the promise to *save* for collateral. When US AID loans were advanced

in Tanzania in the early 1950s, two primary agendas for the program were,

"[m]obilizing self-help housing efforts" and, through self-help, "[m]obilizing savings

for capital formation in housing." It was Ernest Weissmann who made this

relationship clear at a Ford Foundation conference in 1964, when he asserted that

> Housing is...deeply involved in the process of saving and investment. It is a type
> of capital formation that both encourages and strengthens long-term patterns of

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[114] Harold Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential*, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.

[115] Ibid. p. 5.

[116] Ibid. p 20.

[117] Ibid. p. 22.

savings. People will save for better housing who would not maker savings otherwise available for capital formation.[118]

It was precisely this relationship between capital formation and the self-help process where the latter defered the risk of the former, that Ervan Bueneman, a long time US-AID consultant stressed in his report on self-help:

> Improved housing provides both tangible current benefits and hope for a better future, which can provide *motivation* to the people to promote capital formation by contributing their labor, and by mobilizing savings which *otherwise would not grow into investment*. Housing programs, based on self-help and mutual aid, assisted by some outlay of cash from the public sector, will contribute to general development by imparting new skills and promoting savings and capital formation, while giving a personal meaning to economic progress [emphasis added].[119]

By defining "poor" as a viable financial category, a system of public land supply could be put into place. To the extent that the ultimate benefactors of this system would be higher-income groups and private developers would remain invisible in the development rhetoric under the fiction of responsibility, labor, and savings.

2.6.4 *Land and Seed*

Under the USAID and International Development Bank loan agreements, the recipient governments were compelled to develop a system of land development and mortgage financing. The self-help projects were to provide a "demonstration" of this larger set-up. A considerable part of the loans was earmarked as "seed" capital for setting up mortgage institutions in the individual countries. HUD official

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[118] Weissmann, Ford Conference, p. 11.

[119] Ervan Bueneman, *Special Report on Techniques of Self-Help Housing: Some Examples of U.S and Overseas Experience*, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 15.

stressed that this "'Seed' capital [was] needed for [a] new system of induced savings." It was declared that

> [s]uch loans were made available to saving and loan associations in twelve Latin American countries at concessional...rates and terms in order to cover the initial start-up costs, permit the creation of reserves, and contribute toward early lending on the theory that lending begets savings.[120]

The combination of seed capital and responsible clients was to rule out the question of long-term government subsidies as initial investments were recovered and expanded. As early as 1948, Guatemala had established saving and loans banks with USAID assistance. By 1961, these banks were supplanted with a mortgage insurance agency, *Fomento Hipotecas Aseguradas*, named and modeled after the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in the US. Similar savings and loans associations were put in place in additional countries. From the perspective of HUD, the system was working from the very beginning. Even though the "[m]atching hosts country contributions were generally grants" a HUD reports asserted, "no one raised the cry for subsidy."[121]

The "cry for subsidy," however, is preemptively silenced by the argument, "lending begets savings." The financing of self-help is never presented as a problem of welfare economics, but of increasing the market of private finance. It was acknowledged from the onset in no uncertain terms that the aided self help was designed to extend the reach of private financial institutions into an income stratum to which they otherwise did not have access:

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[120] Harold Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, op cit.*, p 13.

[121] Ibid.

The need is for continuous sources or private financing...Since private banking institutions will not lend at the income level contemplated by most self-help housing projects, the...savings of the potential beneficiaries of aided self-help housing must be tapped.[122]

Outside the realm of the demonstration project, however, the savings that were being "tapped" were of higher income groups, the clientele desired by private financial and loan institutions. From the very beginning, we see self-help projects missing their mark and justifying allocation of government subsidies and development of public land for private financial services for middle-income clientele.

2.6.5 Development by Proxy

Guatemala, again, is a clear example of this trend. In all the projects that were initially funded by UN and US loans we see a drift toward higher payments than initially proposed. In 1956, USAID advanced a 3.8 million grant which was matched by a 3.4 million grant from the Guatemalan government, to build 2,826 housing in 10 projects. Following the Puerto Rico model, the projects were designed with extensive labor requirements for the participants. Divided into groups of 30 to 50, the participants were required to contribute at least 20 hours a week, mostly in the evenings and over weekends, over a period of four to six months. Even in these demonstration projects, the supposed cost-saving measures began to prove insufficient. To counter the possible cry for subsidies, a stringent interview process for the next wave of houses was put in place that only accepted applicants within the appropriate income range. Additional requirements to save a certain amount of money during the construction period for future mortgage

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[122] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

payments were also implemented. American housing advisors on the project also proposed to introduce varying financial terms to include broader income groups. Even before the completion of the initial projects, however, up to 50% of the mortgages were in arrears in their payments over a month and 20% for over three months with 86 cases in court.

To counter the rate of default, the next phase of the Government Financed Housing Program (ICIV) focused on government workers such as railroad employees and teachers. By 1961, the terrain of self-help had shifted. The saving and loans associations, of which there were now three in Guatemala, targeted "middle income groups." The Bank of Guatemala declared proudly that saving increased from 9.2 million in 1956 to 23.5 million in 1962. USAID programs themselves acknowledged that "A.I.D Housing Advisors were instrumental in initiating [these] move[s] in an effort to attract additional private capital investment in medium-cost housing construction."

This approach resulted in the development of public infrastructure and land for private developers. In Guatemala, for example, leading among these was the American developer, William Luce, whose several hundred houses built on "inexpensive land" were reported in HUD international country series. "These houses were part of larger project, called 'El Milagro,'" we are told, "which will eventually contain 5,000 dwelling units." Even though the houses, "with cement

tile floor, a corrugated asbestos cement roof," were considered "primitive" by HUD reports, they nevertheless carried substantially higher mortgages.[123]

As HUD publications would acknowledge, the focus on development of private markets under the self-help agenda was part of US foreign policy. In 1961, John F. Kennedy affirmed this policy in his message to Congress on the activation of the Act of Bogotá when he stated that "the most promising means of improving mass housing is through aided self-help projects." This belief was supported by AID dollar loans, in addition to those made by the Inter-American Development Bank to Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.[124] "One of the four express purposes of the Fund," HUD publications acknowledge, "was low-interest loans to governments for...self-help housing and...institutions providing long term finance and engaged in mobilizing domestic resources for this purpose."[125]

It is not surprising then that from the outset, the US advisors focused on increasing the margin of return on the loans. The promise of an expanding system of savings led US AID experts in Latin America to even double the interest rates after a few years in Guatemala (from 2% to 4%) and introduce varying mortgage terms, to "insure a more economic return on the original [government] investment." US and

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[123] HUD report acknowledged the primary clients of these private endeavors: "Mr. Luce has developed tracts of land and built a considerable number of houses for middle and higher income groups in the capital city." William Luce was soon joined by Paul Burkhard, another American builder and financier from California that sought to put together a more ambitious project of combing several US and Guatemalan developers to create equity funds "for the purpose of making loans of construct large scale middle income housing projects." Housing in Guatemala: Country Report Series, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of International Affairs (Washington, D.C, 1967), p. 15.

[124] Harold Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential*, op cit., p 17.

[125] Ibid., p. 22.

Guatemala agreed to establish "a revolving fund, making it possible to build additional houses from the proceeds and with modest contributions over the next ten years (1960 to 1970) bringing the program to a point where it would be entirely self-supporting."[126]

These programs, however, still operate under the banner of self-help. The supposed saving in costs through participants' labor was to "increase...equity by the value of his labor."[127] Turning land into capital through self-help labor was still presented in official dogma as the very "bootstraps" through which the Third World was supposed to pick itself up and enter global capitalism. Yet, as we have seen, these programs actually targeted higher economic groups.[128] A cursory look at the HUD literature at the time reveals the optimism regarding the savings and market potential of the higher-income poor. This economic group, it was declared, after all had an effective demand (the ability to pay for the economic demand) of at least half the total housing markets in the Third World.[129]

2.6.6 Conditioning Power

The policy of using self-help and other low-income housing programs as an alibi for indirect public support of emerging financial markets in private housing for the middle and higher income groups would prove to miss the most lucrative major

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[126] Ibid. p. 13. It was stressed that the "income generated from the project was to funnel into a revolving fund so that the project would not result in a 'one-shot' effort." Ibid. p.19.

[127] Harold Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing: Its History and Potential, op cit.,* p 22.

[128] In 1957, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), later absorbed into USAID, stated in its Manual Order, that "use of self-help [both] reduced cost[s] and increased productivity." Self-help presented, another complementary Manual argued, "excellent opportunities in the development of human resources..." Ibid., p 16.

[129] *Housing in Guatemala: Country Report Series, op cit.,* p. 9.

capital market of the Third World: the "poor" as a credit market itself. This market would be central to the next wave of "sites and services" and "core" housing schemes and the accompanying aid programs, such as those of the World Bank, projects which, arguably, constitute the back bone of contemporary for-profit micro-credit banks. The initial programs of the 1950s, funded by the World Bank's precursor, the International Bank of Development and Reconstruction (IDB), and US AID, and managed through HHFA and UN experts, however, were instrumental in setting the fundamental terms of these later developments. The "meager resources of the potential beneficiaries of aided-self housing [that needed to] be tapped," sustained a broader system of capital markets of which they were an essential but marginal component. The most fundamental effect of aided self-help projects, we would argue, was the alignment of different national planning legislations and administrative mechanisms to serve the regional interest of international credit institutions. This relationship was explicitly acknowledged by US and UN self-help experts. The planning and administrative mechanisms proposed by self-help experts provided socio-economic justifications for the demands of international lending institutions. Let us briefly turn to the policy of the major loan institutions in the 1950s before we look at the policies of self-help experts themselves.

The IMF, as an international lending institution had been fairly dormant during the Marshall Plan years (1947-1951). In the first half of the 1950's, however, the IMF began dispensing considerable funds to Third World countries. With this turn, we see a new doctrine of "conditionality" attached to the loans also beginning to take

hold.[130] This dimension was a result of Washington's rising influence over the Bretton Woods institutions. At its inception, the Fund was established primarily to satisfy the demands of two major global powers, the US and UK, personified, as we saw earlier, in the figures of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, respectively. Britain's primary concern was to devise an international mechanism though which Britain could finance its postwar recovery without limiting "conditions" set by the creditors. Keynes' goal was to establish an international clearing union, an international central bank of sorts, with an international currency, called *bancor*, for countries with deficit. Access to financing within the broad flexible limits was to be automatic and repayments would have followed only after external imbalance had been reversed.

The US, seeing itself as the primary creditor of the postwar era, on the other hand, wanted precisely the possibility of such conditions written into the original treaty. Financing, White insisted should be conditional rather than automatic. As Benjamin Cohen has stated, the final form of the Bretton Wood institutions was a result of the compromise between Keynes' and White's positions, but "the compromise contained less of the Keynes and more of the White plans."[131] Britain, however, did not have to suffer the consequences of the compromise with the massive Marshall Plan aid pouring into postwar Europe. Yet, the conditionality doctrine was resurrected when the IMF began dispensing loans to the Third World.

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[130] For a history of IMF lending policies, see Benjamin J. Cohen, "Balance-of-Payments Financing: Evolution of a Regime," in *International Organization*, 36:2 (Spring, 1982): pp. 457-478.

[131] Ibid. Cohen is here quoting Sidney E. Rolfe from *Gold and World Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 78.

The reasons for conditionality were justified as follows: When a country develops a balance of payments deficit (a shortage of foreign exchange or internationally exchangeable currency required for trade) it has two options. It can either "finance" its deficit by borrowing foreign exchange from an external source, or it can "adjust" its current trading practices and spending programs that, directly or indirectly, use foreign exchange. Adjustments have more drastic political effects as it immediately passes the costs of the deficit on to the population. Governments are therefore always more inclined to delay adjustments and finance their deficits through more loans. The IMF, as a creditor agency, could not allow continuation of financing without requiring adjustment measure that guarantee recovery of its loans. Therefore it was obliged to attach adjustment conditions to its loans.

For economic sociologists such as Teivo Teivainen and Richard Swedberg this economic explanation represents the "politics of economic neutrality."[132] IMF economic demands for a particular policy behavior, Teivainen argues, mark the "politically crucial point of intersection between the globalizing system of governance and the working of disciplinary power."[133] Given the openly declared, "one dollar, one vote," approach of the IMF, Teivainen argument points to the forever open yet intrinsic relationship between the political and economic policies in the international loans arena. In the initial IMF years, the primary economic instrument of political pressure was the "standby loan" which required certain

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[132] Teivo Teivainen, *Enter Economism, Exit Politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), p. 41; R. Richard Swedberg "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank, *Journal of Peace Research*, 23 (4): 377-389. Also see, Swedberg's *Economics and Sociology: Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[133] Ibid.

conditions to be met before the funds were dispensed. "The exact demands," according to Teivainin, "were normally kept secret, and the wording of the stand-by agreements was not published."[134] The borrowing state had to send a letter of intent to the IMF agreeing on a "stabilization programme." As Manuel Pastor has noted in the context of early IMF loans to Latin America, the program typically required strengthening of the "private sector," funding of highways and irrigation projects benefiting export and commercial interests, cutting government price subsidies and tariff restrictions, granting concessions to US companies and direct investment, and discouraging public borrowing.[135]

Indeed, as Jon Kofas' historical analysis of IMF loans in Ecuador has shown, these requirements directly followed directives of the State Department, which saw IMF conditions as an tool not only to advance US corporate interests but also to sustain business and oligarchic parties in particular countries that could suppress the rise of "communist elements" in the region.[136] The consecutive Ecuadorian governments of José María Velasco Ibarra (1952-1956), and Camilo Ponce Enriquez (1956-60) had to face the threat of being overturned by the military or closely follow the "advice" of US Operations Mission (USOM) sent to Ecuador to lay out the required "adjustments" for receiving the IMF stand-by loans. Later governments had to

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[134] Ibid.

[135] Manuel Pastor, *The International Monetary Fund and Latin America: Economic Stabilization and Class Conflict* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Also see Pastor's *Inflation, Stabilization, and Debt: Macroeconomic Experiments in Peru and Bolivia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

[136] Jon V. Kofas, "The IMF, the World Bank, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Ecuador, 1956-1966," in *Latin American Perspectives* 28:5 (Sep., 2001): pp. 50-83.

abide by similar requirements to receive Kennedy's Alliance for Progress funds in the 1960's.

These initial IMF and State Department conditions resulted in a dual policy: on the one hand, encouraging financing of deficit, and on the other hand, imposing periodic adjustment conditions. This duality perpetuated a cycle of mounting debt and an increasingly stringent array of concomitant conditions.[137] This crisis was exacerbated with the abolition of the gold standard in 1970 and massive availability of so-called petro-dollars in Western Banks that Third World governments sought as an alternative source of financing.

Yet, as Benjamin Cohen has argued, the turn to private financing was only a change in appearance, not in kind, in the dialectic of crisis and control. The private institutions, eager to lend the accumulating capital from oil-exporting countries, did not have the legal or political muscle that guaranteed loan recovery for the IMF and the World Bank. To manage their risk, the private banks turned to the implementation of IMF and World Bank conditions as a prerequisite for receiving credit. This reciprocity restored the diminishing authority of the Bank and the Fund while increased the risk and interest for borrowing governments. The result was a cycle of mounting debt and an increasingly wider array of conditions which led to the so-called debt crisis of the 1980's, once again ushering

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[137] Ecuador had a loan of US $42 million from 1820 to 1950. By the end of the 1950s, the foreign debt was US $94 million. By end of 1970 it had increased to $241 million and it stood at US $6.1 billion at the eve of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982. Also, between 1952 and 1961, 40 percent of the foreign loans where used just for debt financing.

in a new wave of conditions and loans, the most notorious of which were the

Structure Adjustment Programs of the World Bank.[138]

2.6.7 *Planning Control, Designing Development*

The "intersection between the globalizing system of governance and the working

of disciplinary power" identified by Swedberg and Teivainen in the "politics of

economic neutrality," however cannot be accounted for without bringing into the

fold of the argument the structure of national planning and public administration

bodies set up under the various adjustment programs. More than any immediate

economic policy changes demanded from a national government under the

"politics of economic neutrality," the most critical were the changes instituted in

the re-structuring of national planning and public administration bodies. It is here

that we see architects and planners playing a critical role. In Latin America, as

elsewhere, UN and HHFA housing and planning consultants were instrumental in

setting up executive planning and administration bodies in particular ministries

that bypassed processes of democratic decision-making in land reform and

planning (as well as in the setting up of financial institutions) and were subject to

quick international directives. The primary vocation of these institutes was

research, training, publication, and advisory services that displaced the language of

politics into technical terms.

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[138] Indeed "conditions" on loans were seen as the most effective and "neutral" way to advance US foreign policy and trade interests. The World Bank's former president, Eugene Black, acknowledged in 1962 the political agenda behind the seemingly neutrality of economic conditions: "We ask a lot of question and attach a lot of conditions to our loans. I need hardly say that we would never get away with this if we did not bend every effort to render the language of economics as morally antiseptic as the language the weather forecaster uses in giving tomorrow's prediction. We look on ourselves as technicians or artisans." Quoted in Teivo Teivainen, *Enter Economism, Exit Politics, op cit.,* p. 42. Originally cited in R. Richard Swedberg "The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank," *op cit.,* p. 388.

The planning and housing institutions mentioned previously formed only one aspect of this broader project. We see in this architecture of public administration and policy-making the emergence of permanent yet flexible mechanisms of passing on the cost of adjustments. Self-help scheme—and the direct and indirect projects of land development, tenure allocation, and financial infrastructure around them—carried out through the various newly established planning and housing institutions constituted a major part of these administrative and policy initiatives. The self-help agenda was particularly conducive to the intersection of various national and international policy directives, fulfilling not only their politico-economic requirements but also providing the necessary socio-cultural translations.

The projects produced under the new planning, housing, and public administration bodies—be it the demonstration self-help housing schemes, building-research programs, land tenure schemes to organize rural labor, or development of large-scale real estate financial markets—translated international and national politico-economic agendas into the mundane language of public administration and policy making. This more transparent dimension of the politics of development neutrality is ignored if we keep our focus only on the gunboat economics of State Department policies and the IMF and World Bank loans.

Setting up planning institutions in particular countries and coordinating their policies on a regional scale formed the primary focus of USAID and UN experts.[139] In November 1954, the UN Housing Chief, Ernest Weissmann, called a joint

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[139] This coordination demanded active involvement on two fronts: The shaping of housing and planning legislations and the propagation of a regime of self-help pilot programs and demonstration projects. The latter not only framed development as an ongoing technical enterprise but also held the "lower income" groups as primary alibi for a regime of socio-economics projects whose focus was elsewhere.

meeting of various UN and non-UN organizations, concerned with economic, industrial, financial, housing and planning development in Latin America, to address the question of coordinating their project goals. On the economic and financial side, these included the UN Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLA), and the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C. The housing, planning, and technical assistance aspects were represented by the UN Social Affairs Division (SOA, which housed the Housing, Town, and Country Planning Section, HTCP, headed by Weissmann), the Inter-American Housing Center, also called *Center Interamericano de Vivienda* (CINVA), in Bogotá, Colombia, and the UN Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA).[140]

The meeting had a two fold agenda: to set up independent planning institutes at the highest government levels with legislative powers based on the model of CINVA, and to set up a system of training, publication, and advisory exchanges

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[140] *Meeting of UN/OAS Working Group on Cooperation and Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities in the Field of Housing, Building and Physical Planning in Latin America*, 16th, 17th November 1954. Meeting Minutes, File no. TAA 173/19/011, Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

The meeting was held in UN headquarters in New York on 16th, 17th November 1954 and attended, among others, by Anatole Solow, Chief, Division of Housing and Planning, Depart of the Economic and Social Affairs, Pan American Union, Washington D.C; Leonard Currie, Director, Inter-American Housing Center, Bogotá, Colombia; A. Oropoza-Castillo, Chief of the office of Latin America Programme Division, UN TAA; Ernest Weissmann, Chief of the UN HTCP; W. Malinowski, Chief Regional Commission Section, UN ECLA.

What is important to note in this event is the status of architecture and planning within the broader development discourse. It is taken for granted, assumed before hand, that architecture and planning form not only the mechanisms of delivering tangible benefits of development, but also constitute the very conditions of possibility of economic and social transformation. This is indeed a major achievement of HTCP under Weissmann's direction, something that stands out in contrast to the contemporary status of housing and planning in economic and social planning realms. Yet this status is achieved at a price. Architecture and planning are no longer defined as finished formed or mechanism of its delivery. Rather, they are positioned as a para-economic, social, and psychological gamefare, for lack of a better term, that allow these fields to reinforce each other toward desired ends.

mediated though the UN and other international technical agencies to coordinate their policies. "It is recommended," the attendees argued,

> that a meeting of the heads of national housing agencies be convened by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the earliest possible date...; that the United Nations should be invited to cooperate with and participate in this meeting, and that the meeting should also consider inter alia the manner in which CINVA's programme of training, publications, research and advisory services could be most effectively coordinated with those of other international technical and technical assistance bodies.[141]

The arrangement was intended to coordinate not only current planning, land development, and housing projects but also the ability to accommodate into law future transformations and agendas. Continued regional coordination was the keystone of this arrangement:

> The individual countries' technical assistance requests should be brought into balance with such assistance that can be more effectively rendered...*on a regional or sub-regional basis*. The experience already gathered in individual missions appears to fall into a pattern of regional significance and consistent efforts to establish a pool of technical knowledge could, therefore, benefit all Latin American countries [emphasis added].[142]

This regional coordination was to be achieved through intermittent dispatches of long-term and short-term missions:

> The specialist headquarter staffs of CINVA, the Pan American Union and the United Nations should be utilized when available for short term exploratory and survey missions before longer term missions are dispatched. The same permanent staffs should also be used for the follow-up and advice or implementation of the

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[141] Ibid., p. 3.

[142] Ibid.

recommendations formulated by longer term missions as well as for seminars and round table discussions for the benefit of national authorities dealing with housing, physical planning and building and with economic and social development in general.[143]

The establishment of a regional network of institutions was to be based on a regional network of parallel legislations, financial institutions, and industrial ventures. The UN and its allied agencies, it was stressed, should also focus on the "[e]nactment of national and local housing and planning legislation and the establishment of agencies required for the implementation of housing and community improvement programmes in urban and rural areas," the development of "building and building materials industries of sufficient capacity and high productivity and [on establishing sources of] financing from [both] domestic and external sources."[144]

The meeting's agenda of developing a multi-fork strategy to develop a regional network of coordinated legislations, building industry, housing and planning bodies, and financial institutions was an approach the UN housing and planning experts had already been pursuing across Latin America. A year ago in November 1953, Weissmann had traveled to Ecuador, where in a series of high level meetings, including several with the cabinet, Weissmann, had been able to finalize with the Ecuadorian officials the design of a UN TAA-approved centralized

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[143] Ibid. p. 4.

[144] Ibid. pp. 4-5. The most critical aspect of forging a relationship between architecture and finance was to be, one the one hand, the "Enactment of national and local housing and planning legislation and the establishment of agencies required for the implementation of housing and community improvement programmes in urban and rural areas." And on the other, the "Establishment and/or strengthening of research, education and training facilities for all phases of planning and execution of housing and community improvement programmes."

housing and planning organization directly under the legislative authority of the president (FIG. 4)[145]

Yet, when the TAA-proposed housing and planning legislation was finally signed into law during the summer of 1954, Weissmann thought it did not have the degree of centralization of power UN TAA considered necessary. In a letter to Warren Cornwell, the UN consultant in Ecuador at the time, Weissmann made his disappointment clear:

> On my return from home-leave I learned that the Government of Ecuador has now established the Housing Agency, and I want to congratulate you for the assiduous work you have done in this connection. I should, however, not want to hide my disappointment at finding that the [housing and planning] Institute's function are not as comprehensive as we had envisaged them in our discussion at Quito.[146]

Weissmann remained hopeful that the UN, through Cornwell's presence, would still be able to influence the direction of Ecuadorian policy. "Let us hope," Weissmann directed Cornwall, "that you will be able to overcome these initial shortcomings by recommending and helping to formulate supplementary legislation and appropriate by-laws."[147] For Weissmann and the UN, a housing agency was ineffective if it did not possess independent legislative powers. "You will recall that in our discussion last fall [November, 1953]," he reminded Cornwall, "we stressed the importance of giving to the Housing Agency *executive powers*

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[145] "Memorandum, of the visit of Mr. Ernest Weissmann, Chief of the Town and Country Planning Section of the Social Affairs Department, United Nations, (12 to 16 November 1953)," File no. TAA 173/19/011 x10, Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

[146] Ernest Weissmann to Warren Cornwell, 23 August, 1954, File no. SOA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

[147] Ibid.

enabling it to intervene directly in the production and financing of low-cost housing....[emphasis added]."[148]

Weissmann's sentiment was shared by others at the UN headquarters. J. B. Richardot, the Acting-Chief of the Office for Latin America at the TAA, argued when discussing with Weissmann's division the particulars of the Ecuadorian law mentioned in Cornwall Monthly Progress Report for June-July 1954, that the curtailing of the new Ecuadorian housing and planning agency's powers stemmed from the limited view of architecture and planning subscribed to by the experts themselves:

> We do not understand why the participation of the [Quito] University has been limited to engineering and architecture. There appears to be a tendency to overemphasize the engineering or architectural aspect of the problem, and not to give proper importance to economic and social implications of housing.[149]

To expand the scope of planning and architecture, Richardot stressed, Cornwell should direct his efforts in the future to establishing a direct link between the existing industrial policy institute and the new housing center:

> The Instituto de Fomento a la Producción is equally important as it is the agency through which the housing people will be able to finance and orient industrial developments toward the building material industry, and coordinate industrial developments with housing for workers.[150]

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[148] Ibid.

[149] J. B. Richardot to G. Duran, Acting-Director, Division of Social Welfare, SOA, 29 July 1954. File no. SOA 173/19/011, Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

[150] Ibid.

What Richardot wanted was architecture to extend its scale and forge connections on a regional basis that reflected the broader socio-economic development approach adopted by international agencies: "Due attention has not been paid to the consideration of physical planning on a regional level with that on a local level. What is more, it is not clear if any regional planning is contemplated."[151]

Cornwall had proposed a manual on standardization of self-help housing construction in rural areas in the Guayaquil coastal region. For the UN headquarters such standardizations were not productive if they did not take into account the broader development agenda, i.e architecture and planning's relationship to the promotion of industrialization and financing in the private sector desired by international development institutions. Self-help's location in this matrix was to extend the scope of the international loans, even if it meant continually lowering the "standards" of housing construction. The UN headquarters had proposed earlier in 1953, Richardot reminded Cornwell,

> the reduction of standards for housing in Tungurahau to be financed with the U.S Export-Bank loan..., advising that the possibility should be explored of applying self-help methods or designing expanding house as means for lowering initial costs...[152]

If the scope of loans were expanded by lowering the cost of public expenditure though self-help, then that increased sphere of influence could bring into the fold of development another enterprise: the private sector related to land development. It was Oropeza Castillo, the Chief of the Office for Latin America at the Program

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[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

Division of the UN Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) (whom Richardot was temporarily standing in for), who, in a letter to Cornwall before going on leave, had identified the missing link between the housing and planning legislation and the international loan structure—the missing link that prevented the new Ecuadorian housing agency from achieving the desired dimension of planning: the power to combine "private and public agencies, utilizing and encouraging those that exist and supplementing agencies where required to achieve comprehensive development."[153]

Here we see the chain of subsidizing connections coded in the proposals for regional coordination under the fetishistically repeated term, "comprehensive development," come full circle: Self-help acting as an alibi to coordinate legislation and administration structures on a regional basis that had, as Weissman put it, "executive powers" to respond to the conditioning agenda of international finance organizations.

Such an executive planning structure was successfully put in place in Costa Rica, the country of Cornwall's next assignment. But the credit for setting up that environment goes to the UN expert in residence before Cornwall's arrival in the country in the summer of 1955: Antonio Cruz Kayanan, the Planning Director of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment for San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is Kayanan's work, and personal history, though which we begin to see the fundamental characteristics of a coordinated legislative and administrative network,

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[153] Oropeza Castillo to Warren Cornwall, June 2, 1954. File no. TAA 173/19/011. Attached memo, p. 2, Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

one whose emergence can be traced back to the first UN and US AID experiments in Puerto Rico.

2.6.8 *Networking Comprehension:*

Kayanan's personal history reflects the interconnectedness of various administration networks in the postwar era. Born in the Philippines, Kayanan had been a professor and Chief Planner of the National Urban Planning Commission of the Philippines in the 1940s. He had studied at the School of Public Health at Harvard and had received a Masters of City Planning degree at MIT in 1942. At Harvard and MIT, Kayanan had studied with Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams, both of whom were Jacob Crane's close associates in the housing reform movement under way in the US. When Crane headed the first UN Housing Mission to the Tropics in 1950-51, which included, among other countries, a survey of housing conditions in the Philippines, he invited Kayanan to join him as mission's secretary. After the stint with the UN, Kayanan went on to join the World Bank (then the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) on an Economic Survey Mission to Iraq, writing a report on community planning and housing. After Iraq, Kayanan joined the UN Social Affairs Division under Ernest Weissmann in the UN headquarter in New York in 1951. Crane was also present at the headquarters at the time. Crane, as mentioned earlier, had been instrumental in establishing the first US sponsored self-help scheme in Puerto Rico. Through Crane, Kayanan became acquainted with Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board. Kayanan's previous experience on the World Bank and UN missions secured him the position of Planning consultant to Puerto Rico Planning Board in 1952, a position that was made permanent later when he was appointed

the Planning Director of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment of the Municipal Housing Authority of San Juan.

In 1955, Weissmann appointed Kayanan as the UN consultant to Costa Rica to advise on the Basic Planning Law for the country. Here, Kayanan expanded the model of regional and financial planning that Crane had recommended for Puerto Rico.[154] Keeping with the UN TAA approach of regional coordination, the central feature of the new law proposed by Kayanan was the centralization of legislative power in planning. Following the Puerto Rico model, Kayanan proposed a planning agency directly under the president, free from the influence of political branches of the government. "The planning agency," Kayanan stressed, "should be of high quality, close to the administration, separate from other government offices, and impartial. It membership shall be a mixture of top government officials and well-respected citizens, large enough to be representative and yet not too large to be cumbersome."[155] Other members of the planning commission consisted of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Works, the President of the League of Municipalities, and another member to be jointly appointed by the commission. The commission was to be supplemented by an advisory council and a planning directorate. The former, constituted of a host of ministries and private industrial interest groups. The planning directorate, whose primary staff constituted

[154] The appearance of Puerto Rico in Costa Rica's Planning Law points to a key element of development planning: the precedence for the Third World development projects are not drawn from the First, but from elsewhere in the Third World itself. The expert's authority does not reside in a claim to superior, universal, and Western models of knowledge. Instead it is claimed on the basis of having identified cases of successful development experiment in the Third World itself, experiments that can be repeated elsewhere. Development establishes itself as universal discourse by repeating the particular.

[155] Kayanan, *Proposed Elements of a Basic Planning Law for Costa Rica*, San José, Costa Rica, 30 March 1955, p. 4. Rag 2/173 – Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.

a Division of Urbanism, formed a technical body under the Planning Council (FIG. 5).[156]

The division between public and private positions, consistent with the UN regionalizing policy, was meant to "strike a pleasant balance between government and private interests."[157] This balance, as it would become apparent, however, was skewed. The third element in the design was the unmentioned international interest, marked in the organization chart by the position of the consultant to be received by the planning directorate. This consultant, carefully placed between the directorate and the council, would have the power to intervene with the decisions of both. In this arrangement, the advisory council, closely associated with the planning commission, would be able to pass directives to particular ministries without intervention from legislative bodies. This design allowed legislative changes in the shortest possible amount of time without the delays caused by the legislative process.

This arrangement was designed with the express purpose of correlating land development policies with regional economic policy suggestions of international organizations. When Kayanan was hired for the position by the UN, Arthur Goldshmidt, the Director of the Programme Division of the UN TAA, stressed that the UN required him to correlate his suggestions in Costa Rica with the UN planning directives for other countries in the region. To do so Kayanan was to seek help from the *Escuela Superior de Administración Pública América Central*

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[156] Ibid. Organization Chart of the "Proposed Planning Organization for Costa Rica."

[157] Ibid. p. 5.

(ESAPAC), the UN sponsored Advanced School of Public Administration for

Central America. "In carrying out your assignment," Goldshmidt stressed in the

statement of Kayanan's mission responsibilities, "we should like you to work

closely with....Director [of] ESAPAC and with experts employed by the United

Nations fields under the Central American Integration Programme."[158]

ESAPAC, established in 1954, was jointly maintained by five countries (Guatemala,

Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) and the United Nations Technical

Assistance Administration, and ran five-month training programs for "high-level

government officials" who after being ESAPAC students were deemed to "return to

their countries with a broadened base of understanding and desire to work

together."[159] The ESAPAC program, reflected the curricular requirements of

emerging public administration programs in the US, composed of formal lectures,

field trips, projects involving comparative analyses of budgetary processes and

allocations, and organization of Public Works departments. The end goal was to

fill the "statistical gaps" that were deemed as preventing "sound analysis of the

structure of the Central American economies."[160]

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[158] Ibid.

[159] ESAPAC's originary goals under its first director, Enrique Tejara-París (who was Kayanan's contact at the center), were described in the "Other Activities" section in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1955), pp. 617-622, p. 617.

[160] Ibid. "Typical professional groups studies and works projects have included a detailed comparative analyses of the budget process in each of the Central American countries; a study for model organization of a national public works department; a study to determine statistics needed for sound analysis of the structure of Central American economies; a study on the proper location of the planning function in national government structure." Ibid. p. 617.

The US-sponsored Central American Integration Programme mentioned by

Goldshmidt in outlining Kayanan's "mission responsibilities," was a precursor to

the Central American Common Market program of the sixties. The latter, pushed

by both US and European donor countries, was designed to collectively reduce

tariffs and open national economies to foreign investments under the banner of

"removal of obstacles to trade."[161]

What role does self-help play in this design? Self-help's particular rhetoric of social

welfare and logic of reduced government spending was particularly apposite to

serve as an alibi for building correlations between the public and private, and

national and international spheres. One of the first steps taken by Kayanan on

arrival in Costa Rica was to contact the ESAPAC director, Enrique Tejara-París, and

propose "a pilot scheme for an aided self-help housing development in a section

of the town [Desamparadon] where expansion looks so natural and appropriate."

The latter characteristics, "natural and appropriate," were a euphemism for a

strategy of developing a land market.

The pilot self-help project was directed as a criticism of the housing schemes

undertaken by the Costa Rican Housing Agency (INVU) at the time without an

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[161] Designed to increase trade, the consolidation of trade policies, however, worked against the interest of the Central American nations. Instead of mounting a collective body of negotiation, each country competed with others to lower obligations for foreign investments. The trend has arguably lead to in a series of contemporary regional integration programs. In the 90's, Central American Treaty on Investment and Trade in Services demanded coordination of not only customs and agriculture policies, but also financial integration through "measures to modernize and coordinate legislation on banks and financial institutions and establishment of regional stock market" as part of the foreign trade requirements. For collective trade agreements in the 90's between Central Latin American countries and the European Union see, Rolando A. Guevara Alvarado, "Central America: Integrating into the Future," in The Integration Process in Central America and the Role of the European Union, proceedings of the Central America Regional Integration and Institutional Reform, held in Brussels on 3 March 2003.

overall strategy of land classification. Attempting to impress Kayanan, his hosts took him to *Santa Eduvigiv*, a cooperative housing scheme recently funded by INVU. "Although it is quite an improvement over the usual type of...housing in this country," Kayanan stated in this monthly progress report to the UN headquarters,

> nevertheless I found it rather mediocre in its site layout and coverage standards. The most pressing problem of this cooperative, and others like it, is [not just] the inadequacy of funds and [but] the current difficulties in *obtaining favorable loans to continue and expand its activities* [emphasis added].[162]

For Kayanan, the limited resources of the housing agency stemmed directly from the role assigned to planning itself that prevented the INVU officials from extending the scope of their projects. "I am afraid that the real nature of planning," Kayanan wrote to Oropeza Castillo at the UN headquarters,

> is not fully understood here even among some of those who are supposed to be responsible for it. In the basic law which created [INVU], planning was attached to housing as a secondary...function. I think I understand the situation, for it may have been legislative strategy to launch planning in Costa Rica by attaching it to the more dramatic and accepted housing function. It is hoped, that after a reasonable time, planning will be able to justify its necessity and importance and henceforth establish and maintain itself as an independent, *comprehensive* and continuing function of the Government of this Republic [emphasis added].[163]

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[162] Kayanan to Oropeza-Castillo, January 15, 1955, "Letter no. X3 (Second Progress Report.,)" p. 5. File no. TAA 173/14/07. Rag 2/173 – Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York. Kayanan also offered a similar criticism for a "Multi-family housing" project in San Jose, and challenged "the appropriateness of such as expensive development as seen from the point of view of providing the most housing for as many people within a limited appropriation." Ibid. p. 7.

[163] Kayanan to Oropeza-Castillo, December 14, 1954, "Letter no. 12." File no. TAA 173/14/07. Rag 2/173 – Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.

By attaching planning as an appendage to architecture, the INVU officials missed the true potential of planning: its ability to construct formal relations between land development and broader economic policy under the banner of comprehensive planning. For Kayanan, the self-help agenda was the most efficient way of bringing about this translation because it edited architecture to its essential function in development: the identification of self-sustaining characteristics of new formal markets in land without all the "wasteful" construction resulting from the belief in the "drama" of finished form that characterized the conventional housing schemes run by the government. The primary means of efficiently translating informal relations in land into formal markets was the pre-project questionnaire:

> It may be advisable to undertake a survey of the people which are proposed to be rehoused by distributing a simplified questionaire [sic] which will furnish, among others, the following information: size of the family, age groups of member, income, cost or rental of dwelling, type and condition of houses, preference for ownership or rental dwelling, amount willing to pay for dwelling or its rental, *willingness* to build own house or transfer present structure, lot size preferred, etc. I shall be willing, if required, to assist in the preparation of such a questionaire [sic]."[164]

In self-help, architecture happens before the houses are built. The key element of this design is mapping the statistical profile of the willing inhabitants. This economically feasible profile becomes the representative profile of the "actual needs" of the people themselves, a move critical to managing the risk of establishing a regional financial and legislative sphere. This sleight of hand is betrayed in Kayanan's letter to Eduardo Jenkins Dobles, a planner at INVU. Writing under the regional authority of the ESAPAC letterhead, Kayanan stressed

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[164] Ibid.

the importance of establishing the socio-economic profile of the willing subject of development planning:

> In order to develop a community which will be adequate in size and character to meet the *actual needs* of its future residents, it will be necessary now to gather and analyze basic social and economic information concerning the people who *should be and are willing to be* displaced from existing residential pockets...Please note that I have included "willingness" to move as a factor in the success of any dislocation of people. This is quite important for the continuing welfare of the community in which they propose to live.[165]

This curious conflation of the logical and the willing subject of development, those "who *should be* and *are willing to* be displaced," betrays how one is made to stand in for the other in self-help schemes and the larger structure of formalization they seek to establish (we will look at the structural necessity of the desire for development shortly). Those who should be displaced are not necessarily those who are willing to be displaced and vice versa. The supposed willingness of the self-help participants also becomes an alibi for outlining their future "needs":

> Planning is the process of *anticipating* future *needs* and guiding development so that the right thing may be in the right place at the right time. In the case of public administration, planning should serve as an important aid in the making of wise and mutually consistent decisions through a workable teamwork of the Government and the people. This planning should not only contribute to advances in the standard of living of the people and their welfare, but also effect true economy in the use of public funds for accepted purpose of the government. This planning should be comprehensive and not piecemeal [emphasis added].[166]

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[165] Ibid.

[166] Kayanan, *Proposed Elements of a Basic Planning Law for Costa Rica, op cit.,* p. 13.

The conflation of policy and need forms the basis of claiming a partnership between the government and the people, and preemptively absorbing political demands into the frame of comprehensive planning. As midwife of this continuing displacement, architecture as self-help emerges as a new mode of social reform that approaches the para-formality of planning. It is this form that Kayanan, and the UN, wanted to generalize as the mode of development itself: a sphere between implementation and planning where a broader set of agendas can find the proof of their validity in the procured consent of the subject of development.[167]

2.6.9 *Bananas*

Kayanan's focus was on aligning the public agenda with private interests in the urban sphere. It was Warren Cornwall who provided the model for extending the UN regionalizing agenda of private sector development into the rural sphere. While Cornwall had not been successful in centralizing the Department of National Planning and Housing within the Ministry of Public Works in Ecuador, he was nevertheless quite successful in launching a broad rural housing program that, as he himself boasted in a "personal" letter to Oropeza-Castillo (Chief of UNTAA Latin

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[167] Warren Cornwall had also drawn on the profile of willing subject and the idea of the needs of the people in Ecuador. Even though Cornwall was not able to situate the self-help proposal in a regional frame, he had been able to align the self-help policy with the presumed "needs" of the people, even when they were not "willing." On June 1952, seven weeks after Cornwell's arrival in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian government began construction on a low-cost housing project in the city of Emeraldas. Cornwall proposed the relocation of inhabitants of the area into new houses through a self-help scheme on an adjacent piece of land. The Inhabitant of the slums, unsure of the Government's commitment to the project and allocation of tenure, wanted to remain close to the construction site to not loose their claim to residency. "This was," Cornwell wrote in his monthly report to the UN Headquarters, "contrary the advice of the UN Housing Expert [himself] who had advocated the use of adjacent vacant land for the new permanent housing, but the people are emotionally tied to the land and he was democratically over-rulled [sic] by the citizen s' [sic] committee representing the neighborhood." Warren Cornwall, Monthly Progress Report for June 1952, July, 6, 1952. p. 2. File no. TAA 173/19/011 – 5. Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York..

American Office), advanced the agenda and "economic activities of the World

Bank of Reconstruction."[168]

This apposite project was called, *Casas por Bananas* (Houses for Bananas), and

"proposed [a] barter arrangements for the exchange of pre-fabricated houses from

Sweden for surplus bananas from Ecuador."[169] The program was part of the

broader proposal for rural resettlement, called *Viviendas Para Trabajadores*

Agricolas (Houses for Farm Laborers), in the Guayaquil region, Ecuador's primary

banana producing region, where prefabricated houses were to be used in

combination with self-help standardized construction units in large farm estates.[170]

Bananas for Houses became the representative face of the program in the press.

Cornwall himself launched a public relations campaign by publishing brochures

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[168] Cornwall to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief of Latin American Office, UNTAA, May 26, 1954. File no. TAA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York. (Ecuador 647a). Cornwall's other achievements in this regard included the establishment of continuing UN fellowships associated with the new housing agency. Before Weissmann's arrival, Cornwell had set up a UN fellowship committee that had sent thirty three applicants to New York headquarters for training in 1952. The UN fellows were to be absorbed in the new housing agency upon their return from New York. UN had also launched similar fellowship programs in Costa Rica and Colombia. Cornwall also set up the criteria for appointment for the agency's key posts. These criteria resulted in the successful appointment of the first director of the housing institute, Leopoldo Moreno Loor, a graduate of Central University in Quito and a professor at the School of Architecture there, who, Cornwall declared, had "spent one year in London studying under Sir Patrick Abercrombie." Warren Cornwall, *Monthly Progress Report (Ecuador): December 1953-January 1954*, File no. TAA 173/19/011, UN Archives New York. (Ecuador 675b). Cornwell also recommended Charles Abrams and Rafael Pico as official UN advisors for future planning and housing legislations in Ecuador. Warren Cornwall to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief of Latin American Office, UNTAA, February 2, 1954. File no. TAA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

[169] G. Duran, Acting Director, UN Division of Social Affairs, to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief, Office for Latin America, UNTAA, July 22, 1954, discussing Corwall's Monthly Report for May 1954. File no. SOA 173/19/011. Rag 2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York. A few years later HUD expert, J. R. Dodge, also proposed a self-help project in Ecuador based on standardized construction. See J. R. Dodge, A Proposed Aided Self-Help Program for Urban Areas in Ecuador, (Washington, D.C.: 1960).

[170] Ibid.

and pamphlets on the scheme (FIG. 6). Soon, Cornwall announced that additional foreign firms in Spain, Finland, and Germany were eager to open similar negotiations with the Ecuadorian government on the idea of barter exchange.[171]

The most significant of these extended housing and planning programs. In 1954, when Cornwell wrote to the UN, the World Bank and IMF was pursuing a stringent policy of economic adjustment, requiring the Velasco Ibarra government to cut back on public spending and programs, tighten monetary control, and develop export and private sectors. Following the IMF initiative, the UN TAA was also inclined to cut back its aid to Ecuador if similar approaches were not taken in the housing and planning domain.[172] For Cornwall, the idea of barter exchange and self-help proposed in Bananas for Houses solved the dilemma of advancing the development agenda at the cost of valuable foreign exchange.

What, however, was framed as a rather unorthodox housing proposal had its footing in a series of orthodox land reform and economic policies that favored landed elite and commercial interest in the domestic context, and the IMF and World Bank agenda of conditional incorporation into the global economy in the international context. Both the latter institutions had sanctioned stand-by for Ecuador on the condition that it promote import substitution and cut back its foreign exchange and government spending. Cornwell's barter agreements were in line with these requirements. The program was also greatly favored by the

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[171] Warren Cornwall, *Monthly Progress Report (Ecuador): February 1954*, File no. TAA 173/19/011, Rag 2/173 – Box 69. UN Archives, New York.

[172] Ibid. "Undoubtedly from you better vantage point, Cornwall wrote to Oropeza-Castillo, "a number of possibilities will occur, but as I see it from here are now two principle alternatives; viz (A.) more aid or (B.) no more aid." The "no of possibilities" referred to by Cornwall will turn out to be more aid, but on certain "conditions."

commercial and coastal agrarian elites because it helped suppress rising demands for land reform through a language of social welfare, while favoring expansion of the export sector and tying labor with large farm holdings. For the IMF and the World Bank, the program's reliance on barter clearing and the self-help methodology helped draw attention away from an embarrassing fact: IMF was financing the construction of a large port in Guayaquil for banana exports while the "banana boom" of the early fifties was rapidly subsiding in the face of the declining terms of trade and limited market for Ecuador's raw exports, a trend betrayed by the very fact that there *was* a "surplus" of bananas to be exchanged for houses.

Cornwall's housing proposal was critical in drawing attention away from these developments because it shifted the focus back to the promise of developing internal private sectors rather than improving terms of trade. As such, it appealed to the fundamental development postulate that the Third World should come up with its own capital for development projects. Bananas for Houses, though unusual in the expansive public relations campaign around it, represents a typical instance when housing and planning, through a language of social welfare and development, were able to provide the critical alibi for the "adjustments" dictated by international financial institutions such the IMF and the World Bank even as they became outdated.[173]

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[173] IMF emphasis on import substitution would end up critically reducing the prospects of diversifying Ecuador's economy, increase sectorial disequilibrium, and furthering its reliance on foreign capital.

2.6.10 *Politics of Law*

Schemes such as *Bananas for Houses* were an outcome of, not an exception to, the policy of legislative nimbleness, centralization, and coordination that were being pursued by the UN and US development agencies. The agenda of regional coordination turns the question of land development in the Third World into a technical and legislative problem, rather than a political one. A host of political questions surrounding urban and rural land and tenure reform are preemptively silenced with this move: Do terms of tenure allocation privilege certain income and social groups over others? How do these allocations curtail and grant resources along, and within, gender domains when they define household, family, head of the household in legal terms? What effects would the establishment of regional land markets have when countries bidding for credit enter into a bidding war to grant donor countries greater and greater asymmetric access to local markets?

Instead of seeing land legislation and development as political processes that must aim at recognizing the various dimensions and actors related to the question of access to land and financing, development treats the absence of law and technique as the source of all political problems. For scholars of land legislation in Africa such as Ambreena Manji, this association of land tenure and development with law and technology has resulted in a systematic exclusion of groups raising political considerations from policy discussions.[174] This metalepsis, replacing cause for effect, draws attention away from the unavoidably political dimension of problems

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[174] Ambreena Manji, *The Politics of Land Reform in Africa* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2006).

of access to resources at various levels, from asymmetric access to land and property along gender and class lines, to asymmetric access to international trade along geo-political ones. Self-help turns the political question of resource allocation into a technical and legal problem.[175]

The countless aerial photographs of self-help schemes in development reports, juxtaposing the "organization" of the new with the "disorganization" of the old, are a testament to this text (FIG. 7). Beyond the few rows of neatly arranged self-help houses lies the untenured terrain of public land. The standardized construction and design, beyond even the economic reach of the few model inhabitants, betray the process of an ongoing development of this terrain.[176] The moral agenda of organization of slums into model houses serves the financial agenda of creating a centralized building and legislative system that is tied to the instrument of the loan.

2.6.11 Power of Comparison

Let us now turn to another critical dimension of this coordinating enterprise: the structure of the expert's power. The continuous repositioning of planning in the regional frame is central to the possibility of the expert's power as well. Cornwall

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[175] It was declared at the meeting of the heads of various UN divisions organized by Weissmann: "[P]hysical planning," it was declared, "reconciles requirements of economic development and human welfare and avoids the haphazard growth of slums accompanying intensive urbanization." *The Meeting of UN/OAS Working Group on Cooperation and Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities in the Field of Housing, Building and Physical Planning in Latin America*, 16th, 17th November 1954. *op cit.*

[176] In this move we witness a turn away from the logic of colonial reform that employed disciplines such as anthropology as the justifying texts for projects of purposeful social change. In project of development instead call forth a regime of technique, education, and administration as their medium as well justification. One of the primary requirements for regional coordination outlined in the meeting of the heads of various UN bodies mentioned earlier was: "Establishment and/or strengthening of research, education and training facilities for all phases of planning and execution of housing and community improvement programmes." Ibid.

and Kayanan's monthly progress reports betray the sweeping powers drawn from the emphasis on regional planning in the day to day dealing with national officials. Here we see how the short stay of the expert in a particular country is only a window into the dimension of long-term regional, comprehensive planning and thus cannot be legitimately challenged from any context framed as local.

Kayanan's mode of operation is particularly instructive in this regard. In the course of six months Kayanan stopped existing projects to revise construction details and site plans, went on field trips to evaluate the sites selected by INVU officials for new housing schemes, proposed new legislation and attended meetings with the President and the cabinet. These daily interruptions were not always appreciated and were often carried out despite the displeasure of the local technicians. The ultimate rapprochement for any resistance from the national officials was the framing of their opinions as shortsightedness in UN reports. Kayanan did just that when the "various mistakes" he pointed out in a large housing development, called the Hatillo Neighborhood Unit Project, carried out by INVU near San José, were not immediately accepted by the INVU team.[177] Writing to Richardot (Acting Chief of the Latin American Programme Division at the UN TAA in New York), Kayanan made a point of stressing that when he identified these "errors" to the "Board of Directors, the staff, and the architects, who were responsible for the project,…[t]he meeting, unfortunately, almost assumed the appearance of a debate." "Altho [sic]," Kaynan complained, "

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[177] The large project consisted of 590 dwelling units over 23 hecters of land south of San José.

I stated at the start and repeatedly mentioned that...[e]rrors were singled out [by me, Kayanan] on the basis of my actual practical experience in this particular field – not so much to criticize as to demonstrate more clearly the functional principles involved and thereby show the necessity of remedying these errors while there was still time to do so. As far as I can see, the Hatillo Project is still being constructed, unfortunately, in accordance with the old plans. Sets of the actual, revised and alternate plans and analyses of this Project will be included among the Annexes in my Final Report.[178]

Kayanan's claim to a broader comparative frame to dismiss the objections of national technicians is not unique, but is paradigmatic of the mode of operation of UN and US consultants. The emphasis on the need for a broader regional correlation between economic and legislative structures of countries "advised" by the UN and US experts cannot be separated from the structure of expertise itself, a structure that is reflected in the expert's long consultative itinerary. We would argue that the expert, by definition, cannot be local. An expert is an expert only inasmuch as he can put the local into the regional or the global context, inasmuch as he can *compare*. The necessary condition of expertise is reflected in the many failed applications of the "local" technicians for the title of the UN expert. Let us look at three examples of failed and successful appointments to identify the critical operational principles of international expertise.

2.6.12 *The Impossible Local Expert 1: Brazil*

In June of 1951, Ernest Weissmann approached Stephen Arneson, an architect and planner who had had a substantial career in Latin America with projects in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Panama, Panama Canal Zone, Venezuela, Burma and Haiti

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[178] Kayanan to J. B. Richardot, Acting Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme Division, UN TAA, March 12, 1955, "Letter No. X4 (Third Progress Report)," File no. TAA 173/14/07, Rag 2/173 – Box 57. United Nations Archives, New York.

and had worked for a brief period with the HHFA. Weissman's invitation was directed precisely at the comparative dimension emerging from this consultative itinerary.

Shortly before Weissmann sought out Arneson, Anatole Solow, the Chief of the Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C., had recommended an Argentinean planner, Hugo Efraín Pelliza for the job. When Pelliza had finished his course at CINVA in Bogotá, Solow stressed, he was "rated highest among all applicants who submitted the applications" and has a "special interest in rural housing."[179] The director of CINVA, Currie, had already recommended Pelliza for a UN mission position to Bolivia.

Despite these recommendations, however, Weissmann did not share Solow's excitement for Pelliza and responded with a letter that concluded with the line: "As you [Solow] must know, it is not our [UN] policy to borrow from Peter to pay Paul."[180] Weissmann's statement cannot be interpreted as discrimination along racial or nationalist lines, since many of the consultants employed by the UN, including Kayanan, were of Third World origins. Rather, it points to the curious necessity that the expert must not be associated with any particular national context. Such association allowed the expert's opinions to be perceived in a political light and diminished the aura and authority associated with belonging to an international sphere.

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[179] Anatole A. Solow to Ernest Weissmann, August 11, 1955. File no. SOA 173/7/02, Rag 2/173 – Box 35. United Nations Archives, New York. After CINVA, Pelliza had also worked for the City Planning Board of Cardoba.

[180] Ernest Weissmann to Anatole A. Solow, August 26, 1955, File no. SOA 173/7/02, Rag 2/173 – Box 35. United Nations Archives, New York.

These were indeed the reasons forwarded by Cornwell to Oropeza-Castillo (Chief of the Office for Latin America, UN TAA) when, at the end of his assignment, the Costa Rican government requested an extension of the mission. "All indications are that the Minister of Public Works will soon ask TAA for another extension of my time here for an additional year," Cornwall told Oropeza-Castillo, "I am [however] in principle," he continued, "against technicians remaining too long in any one country. The expert loses *perspective and status* and the country gains *only another civil servant* [emphasis added]."[181]

The "perspective" Cornwell feared loosing was the ability to situate national planning in a regional frame, a claim which constituted the very "status" of the expert and kept him from turning into "only another civil servant." These incidental exchanges at the margin of reports and surveys, the supposed real-business of the missions, point us to the very conditions of the possibility of the missions themselves. We witness in these exchanges a continuous management of a series of risks by the expert, from that of maintaining his own profile and authority, to sustaining the validity and authority of his advice, to managing the very validity of the project and the terms of the loan. These various discursive, legislative, and administrative strategies point to what Foucault has called necessary conflation of the techniques of knowledge and strategies of power in the functioning of a discourse.

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[181] Warren Corwall to Oropeza-Castillo, Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme Division, UN TAA, May 26, 1954. Letter marked "Personal," File no. TAA 172/19/011, Rag2/173 – Box 69. United Nations Archives, New York.

2.6.13 *Politics of Risk*

For national governments, self-help demonstration projects also formed a means to manage the political and financial risks of their policy and programs. Multiple national and international interests met in the self-help domain, producing many instances when the UN experts did not hesitate to support particular national political agendas inasmuch as they supported the UN emphasis on regional legislative and financial coordination. These instances are always presented as exceptions. Yet when seen as strategies for mutual hedging of risks, they appear to be an essential component of development in national and international theaters. Here we see how a short two-week demonstration project can serve the broader function of advancing development agendas in different domains.

An interesting example of the conflation of national and international interest is Robert Davison's short two-week mission to Guatemala City in June 1956 to "assist the government in the field of urbanization." Davison had worked on several UN and US AID projects and ran an independent consultancy firm in New York, advertising himself as a "regional housing consultant." His visit to Guatemala was part of larger itinerary, leading from Guatemala to Bolivia and Costa Rica in a similar advisory role.[182]

Davison's primary goal in Guatemala was to review the "pilot plan" on determining the "zoning [criteria] of existing districts...types of construction...and construction materials" by the Town Planning Department of the Municipal

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[182] In Bolivia, Davison was accompanied another expert, Rene Eyheralde from the Inter-American Housing Center (CINVA) in Bogotá. DSC01075

Engineers.[183] In Guatemala City, Davison was invited to a cocktail party given by the Cultural Attaché of the American Embassy in honor of Paul Weiner, Jose Luis Sert's partner in the Cuban projects, who, as Davison wrote back to the UN in New York, "was giving lectures in Guatemala City under the auspices of the State Department Point Four Program."[184] Davison's meeting with Weiner led to an introduction with the Director of Public Works and Mayor of the Guatemala City, officials who were not directly related to Davison's immediate mission. Learning of his itinerary, the city officials immediately sought Davison to attest that their recent and notoriously "minimum" self-help projects were a realistic confrontation of stupendous problems.

The next day Davison was taken on a tour of several of the housing projects around the city. Seeing the stripped down projects to be consistent with the policy of ensuing "responsibility" in the participants, realism in the administrators, and regionalism in the government, Davison was forthcoming with his seal of approval. "Upon my expressing admiration for his [the unnamed director of Public works] realistic approach to the problem of housing the very low-income families" Davison admitted to the UN Technical Assistance Administration in New York, "[the director of Public works, who remains unnamed] asked me if I would give him a written statement." The next day, Davison was invited to go with the Mayor "on [another] junket to Antigua in honor of Paul Weiner. "[There] the mayor read

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[183] Byron S. Hollinshead, Director, UN TAA to Hugh L. Keenleyside, Director General, UN TAA, August, 2, 1955. File no. TAA/550.643. Rag 3/173 – Box 98. United Nations Archives, New York. In addition, Davison was also to advise the faculty of Engineering at San Carlos University in Guatemala City.

[184] Davison's letter to J.B. Richardot, Acting Chief, Office for Latin America, Programme Division, UN TAA. February 17, 1956. File no. TAA 173/26/017. Rag 3/173 – Box 98. United Nations Archives, New York.

my statement on their minimal housing," Davison continued, "and said it was most timely and helpful as some people were criticizing their minimal housing as too minimal."[185]

The UN and Guatemalan officials' concerns of locating self-help housing somewhere between "minimum" and "too minimum" betrays the shared interest, as well as the political and financial risk of encountering the "poor" as a category in developing regional land markets and financial institutions. For international organizations and development experts, the primary strategy of managing this risk is the continuous realignment of different national planning and legislative terrains. It is in this alignment that development institutions as well as development experts find their possibility and security.

2.6.14 *The Impossible Local Expert 2: Egypt*

The opposition between national and international interest inherent in the idea of comprehensive planning reproduces itself in multiple interrelated concepts in the development discourse. One of these was the opposition between quantity and quality that we saw in Jacob Crane's repeated repudiation of the demand for money (quantity) in the interest of establishing capitalist circulation (quality) in the Third World. Another opposition is the opposing calculus of long-term and short-term planning. The national government, it is often repeated in the development reports, are pressed for short-term fixes and are unwilling to sacrifice immediate gratification for long-term solutions.

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[185] Ibid. The public works officials also informed Davison of their intention to hold a conference on the problem of sanitary facilities in areas of low water availability. Spotting an opportunity to level the field of favors between national and international bodies, Davison suggested to the Guatemalan officials to seek a WHO expert to advise them on the conference.

Though we have focused on Latin American so far, the expert's more of operation emerging from the management of these oppositions is not limited to that context. In 1955, Denis Winston, a planner at the Department of Town and Country Planning at the University of Sydney, arrived in Cairo as a UN planning expert to the Egyptian government. In his initial report to the UN, Winston's primary criticism regarding the existing planning approach in Cairo and Alexandria was the supposed inability of the Egyptian planners to carry out "comprehensive planning." "The Egyptians," Winston declared in a confidential letter to the Resident Representative of the UN in Egypt, "were not in the position to organize a regional planning scheme."[186]

Winston's evaluation opened the doors for sending a number of planning experts to the Middle East, prompting a visit from Ernest Weissmann as well Otto Koenigsberger, and inaugurated plans from FAO and MIT to establish a building center in Cairo with emphasis on regional planning. The inability of Third World planners to carry out comprehensive planning—i.e. to step beyond the short-term immediacy of their problems and place them in relations to the long-term trend of global economic development—would also expand the scope of the London based Regional Planning Center (ARPD), headed by Jacqueline Tyrwhitt during the war. The Center's staff would be recommended to Ernest Weissmann by Otto Koenigsberger, who himself headed the other imperial organ of colonial reform on its way to turning into a major consulting house, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

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[186] Denis Winston to the Office of the Resident Representative, December 30, 1955. File no. TAA 173/20/021. Rag2/173 – Box 81. United Nations Archives, New York.

From the perspective of the UN, the temporal and spatial myopia of the short-term did not just besiege the Egyptian planners but characterized Third World planners in general. Winston's assistant in Egypt was an Iranian planner, Abidi, a student of Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams who held a PhD in planning from Colombia. Abidi, Winston himself acknowledged in letters to the UN, carried out most of the research and report writing associated with the mission. When, on the basis of these contributions, however, Abidi tried to secure an independent consulting position with the UN at the end of his tenure in Egypt, he was perceived to not have the necessary experience for such an assignment.

It was Abidi, who was hired in the TAA headquarter in New York a month in advance of Winston's arrival to read up on the history of planning in Egypt before the mission. Yet Abidi's report is not published as a UN document, but only subsumed in Winston's' reiteration as a "background document." Contesting his due credit and the inexperience, or rather the inability, attributed to him, Abidi traveled to London to meet Koenigsberger at the APBR. Though Koenigsberger was himself on the way to Gold Coast with Charles Abrams on a UN mission, he was sympathetic to Abidi's plea and agreed to write him a recommendation and provide him with a training position at the ARPD. While these credentials earned Abidi a short stint at the UN headquarters in New York (and with substantial salary), his travels were not able to match Winston's itinerary (visiting sites and meeting other UN experts in Chandigarh, Beirut, and Damascus before arriving in Cairo).

In the game of regional, or comprehensive, planning, the Third World planner can never bluff. Though the Western expert is only in a particular country for the

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short-term, he is able to advise on the long-term. We would argue, he occupies a

different dimension of time, more abstract than the literal count of the duration of

his stay in a particular country. He collects the coordinates of this time on his hops

to the assignment (Chandigarh, Beirut, Damascus) that give a comparative

advantage over the local planner, and sets his advice in the abstract and qualitative

realm of the long-term. The time of expert opinion is not human-time, but rather,

to borrow from Marx, rational time, an averaged out comparative realm that

betrays to him the forces and crisis yet to reveal themselves to his local

counterparts.

2.7 Not-Yet-No-Longer Desire: The Affective Coding of Self-Help

How do self-help projects claim to create economic value? In its official dogma,

self-help is based on the assertion that the boundaries of economic activity can be

identified in time. Outside this realm is "extra" or "free" time. Self-help draws on

this untapped resource to create economic value. In the rural areas, this un-

expropriated temporal sphere is evidenced in rural idleness; in the urban areas, by

the time available outside of formal employment. By organizing consumers as

producers, this extra time can be utilized to create economic value.[187] Harold

Robinson, the former Chief of the Housing and Urban Development of the Latin

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[187] For architectural students, claiming their right of passage into the world of practice by helping "poor" build their own houses, self-help participants appears as innocuous as Ikea consumers, contributing their free time to reduce costs of production and assembly. Yet as Immanuel Wallerstein has argued regarding self-assembled consumer good, the free time is not free but only unacknowledged. We would argue that in the self-help domain this unacknowledgment is a structural necessity. See Immanuel Wallerstein and Joan Smith (eds.), *Creating and Transforming Households: The Constraints of the World-economy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

America Bureau at the Agency for International Development (US-AID), defended

the soundness of the initial self-help schemes on similar grounds:

> "As the name implies, aided self-help is a method to utilize the many man-hours
> that are available to the most areas in the form of unused leisure time – and to use
> this enormous reserve of manpower together with some form of aid from the
> community, others, so that man may, though his own efforts, using his own spare
> time, improve his shelter to an extent that he never could – alone and unaided."[188]

As we have seen, however, this process is perpetually delayed in the name of a

pending socio-cultural transformation. This delay, we will argue, is both the

product and condition of a text of *unacknowledged* appropriation of value that

continuously cuts across the upheld boundaries of economic and non-economic

and its socio-cultural markers of modernity and tradition. This shadowy space of

appropriation permeates self-help's text of value. The definitions of household,

family structure, income and gender division of labor upheld in self-help projects

erase from view the realm of labor that subsidizes the self-help activity. This

subsidizing activity cannot be accounted for in the logic of the project, yet its

contours and duration are managed in this realm.

Like all projects of social change, development is continuously producing this

residual sphere. What is unique to development approaches such as self-help,

however, is the propensity to acknowledge this realm, only to shift it to new

realms. It is this shifting mode of operation that is we will now try to identify as a

structural necessity.

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[188] Robinson is here citing from the HUD published IME. Cited in Harold Robinson, *Aided Self-Help Housing: It History and Potential* (Washington, D.C: US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the International Affairs, 1976), p. 3. Robinson was the former Chief of the Housing and Urban Development of the Latin America Bureau at the Agency for International Development (US-AID).

The traces of this shadowy sphere are visible in the organizational procedures preceding the beginning of a particular self-help project. By the 1960s, most of the international institutions involved had laid out detailed procedures for selection of inhabitants, administrative organization, training, land and legal agreements. These guidelines were incorporated into a series of Manuals for Self-Help, one of which we encountered earlier in the chapter.

These procedures constitute a strategy of risk management; one which is not directed towards allaying the risk of the inhabitants, but the risk of the contingency of the encounter in projects of social reform. The central socio-economic unit of this system of risk management is the eligible family. The framing of the family structure and roles of individual members in self-help projects plays a critical role in setting up the lens through which donor organizations and national governments allocate resources and carry out the broader comprehensive planning agenda.

We briefly looked at the idea of the family in the context of community development in Puerto Rico. There we argued that family in the development discourse is seen as a marker of a broader sphere of hallowed traditional values lost during Western modernization. The emphasis on delaying the pace of modernization to enable the inhabitants of this sphere can inculcate their own sense of modernization, serves as an alibi to postpone the political and representational questions associated with the development process while passing on its costs to those involved. We argued that family, and its concomitant sphere of community, is an instance of unacknowledged production and appropriation of value-form, the condition of the possibility of economic value in development.

The idea of unacknowledged production and appropriation of value-form has been the focus of many feminist critiques of development. These critiques, however, have largely approached the idea of the hidden economy of women's work as a source to sketch out alternatives to the socio-economic model of capitalist production. What is ignored in this approach is that unacknowledged work is not outside relationships of power. Women's labor in development is related as *differential* to the visible circuits of capitalist production and doesn't exist as an autonomous sphere. Attempts to bring it into "visibility" without attention to coding of value differential only shifts this differential to new registers.

A prominent example of this trend is the work of Maria Mies.[189] For Mies, development's privileging of the nuclear family structure and patriarchal communities renders women's roles and responsibilities invisible in the development discourse. Women's activities, Mies has famously argued, then form an "underground economy" that supports the functioning of development projects and hides their true costs. These moves result in systemic exploitation of women and consolidation of patriarchal power. For Mies (as well as for a large body of literature for which this perspective has become the staple feminist critique of development), identifying women's unacknowledged role in capitalist production can provide alternative social models to the one based on capitalist production, consumption and profit.

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[189] Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (London: Zed Books, 1986).

What is ignored in these redemptive proposals is that the very idea of an invisible margin is already written into the coding of value-form. Here Foucault's warning against imagining autonomous margins presents a challenge to Mies' critique:

> One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of "marginality" that would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms of exclusion brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power. If "marginality" is being constituted as an area of investigation, this is only because relations of power have established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power is able to take it as a target, this is because techniques of knowledge were capable of switching it on. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference...Not to look for who has the power in the order of marginality...and who is deprived of it...but to look rather for *the pattern of modifications* which the relationships of force imply by the very nature of their process."[190]

Foucault, reminds us that all distinctions between center and periphery are explanatory abbreviations (a principle we saw at work in Marx), that the presence of a possible margin outside capitalist relations can readily become a coding of value. The presumption of a unified margin ignores how this coding is not static, but always on the move across discontinuous and heterogeneous relations of power. Without attention to how social and economic value is coded in circuits of development, insisting on the acknowledgement of women's work as a collective category reproduces the coding of value-form that these critiques seek to displace. It is with attention to this coding of value differential on different levels of the development discourse that we now turn to the idea of the nuclear family in self-help programs.

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[190] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 98-99.

2.7.1 *Family Affection:*

Indeed, self-help defines family along patriarchal lines. The very idea of an "eligible family," as it is presented in the many "manuals" on self-help by international organizations, is a tautology. The ability to appear as a "family" is the criteria for eligibility itself. To be eligible, the applicants have to appear in the form of a nuclear, heterosexual, wage-earning household headed by a male member.[191] The series of interviews, application forms, follow-up visits by social workers, all force the applicants to present themselves in the official mold to be selected for the project (FIG. 8).[192] The appropriation of the extra-wage labor of women as a collective subject, inasmuch as it doesn't appear in this socio-economic web, however, is coded *affectively*, as work motivated by an emerging desire for development. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of desire as a generalized psychoanalytic mode of production of affective value on a sub-individual level, the desire for development is the disciplinary coding of affective value on a para-individual level. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we may call the mapping of these trajectories as the text of *affective* coding of the development

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[191] As the *UN Self-Help Manual* declares, the initial meeting and preliminary application is followed by a series of interviews where the applicants fill out detailed questionnaires. These questionnaires are intended "for the head of the family only," who is presumed to be invariably male, a condition apparent in such couplets as: "Marital status:", "Wife's name:" United Nations, *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, *op cit.*, 1964. p.16.

[192] Following initial presentations and filling out of application forms, a "staff member...[meets with the] head of each family, at home and at work..." to ask further questions and document the living condition of the applicants, particularly the number of kin living in the household. Here the applicants must again present themselves as a nucleated family. Deviations from the eligible household profile are seen as a sign of lack of understanding of the self-help structure and reduce the applicants' chances of being accepted in the program. "Nothing should be taken for granted...since a full response could still indicate a lack of understanding of the project even after the...presentations of the programme." Ibid. pp. 14-16.

discourse. In the self-help discourse, the degree to which the participants possess this desire is marked by the coordinates of their "attitude" toward development. *Attitude* locates not just visibility but also invisibility in development, and thus preemptively censors the emergence of any collective subject.

The question of the attitude of the applicants regularly appears in the organizational procedures of self-help. It is considered critical to the economic profile of the applicants. The *UN Manual on Self-help* lists questions directed for the applicant under the heading, "Attitudes, interests and participation of applicants." Consequently, the tripartite criteria for judging an applicant's eligibility is: "1) the ability of the families to contribute the necessary amount of self-help; 2) The ability of the family to repay the costs of the project; 3) The need of the families for this housing programme, based on their present living conditions and on their *attitude* toward the relief of those conditions."[193] Without proper attitude, the economic and physical ability is moot.

Attitude, the extra-economic variable in the self-help equation, provides the most accurate and reliable economic information. "Obviously," states the UN *Self-Help Manual* stressing the centrality of measuring the attitude of the applicants,

> the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it takes to build the house, and repayments in cash depends upon the cost of the house and the services. Not so obvious are the relationships between a person's needs and *attitudes*. The skill of the interviewer in really discussing the project instead of just asking superficial (or even misleading) questions, is important at this

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[193] Ibid. p. 19.

stage…Attitudes can change from one moment to the next, and gauging these changes is important.[194]

On the one hand, determining the attitude of the applicant is the moment when the self-help project—or more accurately, the self-help approach itself—is risked on the skill of the interviewer to decipher the intentions of the participants (FIG. 9). On the other, however, it is also the moment when that risk is preempted on a broader scale. The centrality attributed to the idea of attitude itself—the belief that the applicant possesses an un-reckoned economic potential despite themselves— passes the dissonance between expected results and available resources onto the applicants themselves, claiming the extra-wage activities as un-reckoned economic potential that can find its way into the economic calculus of development, if it were not for the *attitude* of the participants. In as much as the self-help approach itself professes delaying that incorporation, it sets up a system of value differential that though it remains unacknowledged, forms an integral part a multifarious system of value determination. It was Jacob Crane who argued for a delay in development based on the existing attitudes of the people. In his presentation, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment" at the West Indies Conference

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[194] Ibid. The time it takes to build the house, bears within it another time, the human time required to make the abstract time of building appear. In its official declarations, self-help assumes that the human time it draws on is equal to the abstract time of creation of economic value ("Obviously, the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it takes to build the house"). Yet, one is never subsumed in the other but related as a differential. Self-help calls forth the applicants to appear as a "family," an abstract sociological unit, while the discord of this framing with the actuality of the household's existence, the movement between the rural and the urban, between wage, extra-wage, and petty economic activities required for survival, is hidden, or rendered invisible. Attitude is the coding though which that differential is sustained and value form coded. It is the differential between the human time and abstract time which makes possible the unacknowledged appropriation of value

on Housing in 1947, Crane had presented attitude as both the promise of desire and indication of resistance to it:

> In order to best serves the shelter needs and aspirations of the people, the housing programme must take into account the attitudes of the people themselves. It must be remembered that the values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from local culture and are deeply imbedded in the minds of the people.[195]

In the *United Nations Development Decade Proposals for Action*, this pending and delayed desire is described as "the unutilized talents of [the] people [that] constitute the chief present waste and chief future hope of the developing countries. Only a small fraction of these populations participate actively in national life today."[196]

This dimension of value differential cannot find a place in the logic of the feminist critiques mentioned above. This limitation stems from a linear narrative of the labor-value-capital chain embedded in the idea of the underground economy of women's work, a narrative also shared by the self-help approach in its official declarations. In both the feminist approach and self-help rhetoric, non-wage labor is posited as the originary moment of the capitalist chain. "[L]abour that goes into the production of life," Mies has argued, "[is] *productive labour* in the broad sense

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[195] Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West Indies Conference on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers by Crane distributed as corollary material at the conference: Huts and Houses in the Tropics; The Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family Housebuilding – "Aided Self-Help Housing"; and Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico (Brochure).

[196] *The United Nations Development Decade Proposals for Action* (New York: United Nations, 1962?), p. vii. United Nations publication, sales no.: 62.II.B.2.

of producing use values for the satisfaction of human needs."[197] The argument

unfolds around the question of recognizing the proper use-value of this labor as it

is saved from being considered "natural activity": "[T]his *production of life* is a

perennial precondition of all other historical forms of productive labour, including

that under conditions of capitalist accumulation, it [therefore] has to be defined as

work and not as unconscious 'natural' activity."[198]

For the self-help organizations, the economic value created during the self-help

project already compensates for the non-wage activity of the participants

("Obviously, the amount of self-help required depends upon the time it takes to

build the house.") Both perspectives, however, maintain the binary opposition

between cultural and economic spheres, wage and non-wage labor. This stress on

good – use-value fit, as it distances women's work from nature, constitutes another

idealization of free labor outside capitalism:

> A feminist concept of labour has, therefore, to be oriented towards a *different*
> *concept of time*, in which time is not segregated into portions of burdensome
> labour and portions of supposed pleasure and leisure, but in which times of work
> and times of rest and enjoyment are alternating and interspersed. If such a concept
> and such an organization of time prevail, the length of the working-day is no

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[197] Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, op cit.*, p. 47. Mies
repeatedly makes the same differentiation between use and exchange values. An instance
towards the end of the book sounds like justification for self-help projects themselves: "A
feminist concept of labour has to maintain that work *retains its sense of purpose, its
character of being useful and necessary* for the people who do it and those around them.
This also means that the *products* of this labour are *useful and necessary*, ad not just some
luxuries or superfluous trash as are most of the handicrafts made today by women in
'income generating activities' in Third World countries." Ibid. p. 218.

[198] Ibid. p.47.

longer relevant. Thus, a long working-day and even a lifetime full of work, will not then be felt as a curse but as a source of human fulfillment and happiness.[199]

The attention paid to the question of attitude in self-help, however, discloses a different textuality of value that cuts across the separation between wage and non-wage labor. Self-help programs are particularly telling in exposing the limitation of the feminist perspective mentioned above, as it is precisely in the name of facilitating the good use-value fit that we see the coding of affective value. This dimension remains invisible in the feminist critiques of development that uphold use-value as the originary moment, and not a continuously produced and appropriated differential in exchange relations. The continuous affective coding of extra-wage labor in development renders indeterminate this orginary fiction. Following Marx, we argued earlier that use value is *differentially* related to exchange value—pointing to the complicity of cultural and economic value systems in capitalism—and cannot, except as explanatory abbreviation, be held as an originary step. Socially necessary labor, if we recall, is the amount of labor required for the worker to regenerate herself to remain optimally useful for capital in terms of current price structure. Emphasis on attitude and desire in the terrain of self-help and comprehensive planning betray that that price structure is not limited to the logic of capital alone.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari, argue that capital decodes and deterritorializes the socius by releasing the abstract as such. Capitalism must manage this crisis by continuous reterritorializations.[200] Among them is the

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[199] Ibid., p. 217.

[200] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Viking Press, 1977).

generalized psychoanalytic mode of production of affective value, a mode

spectacular in its discontinuities and complexity. Desire is the term designating this

mode at the sub-individual level, where value is coded in a series of affective and

social equivalences, *before* it gets fully coded in the economic system of

equivalences.[201] Value is not created by superadequation of capital, but by the

superadequation of subject. This superadequation is not simply calibrated and

organized by the logic of capital. Desire defines superadequation in terms of a

dimension of affective necessary labor, beyond the limited concept of socially

necessary labor. Following Spivak, however, we have to keep in mind that if "a

view of *affectively* necessary labor (as possible within the present state of

socialized consumer capitalism) as *labor* as such is proposed without careful

attention to the international division of labor, its fate may be mere political avant-

gardism."[202]

How then does attitude as a particular coding of desire in the development theater

betray the contours of the international division of labor?

2.7.2 Negative Affectivity:

For Marx, capital showed a tendency to subsume more and more areas related to

the reproduction of labor under its umbrella to lower the threshold of socially

necessary labor. Desire, as it was formulated by Deleuze and Guattari, was the

psychoanalytic value-form that also marked this increasing tendency of

subsumption. Attitude, as institutional coding of affect in development, however,

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[202] Gayatri Spivak, "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value," in *In Other Worlds* (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 162.

betrays a different tendency of subsumption, one based on delay and an interruption rather than increasing incorporation.

In the development theater, the affective value is coded negatively, in term of its absence, or its promise. Labor is socialized in terms of its pending desire for development. This negative coding allows the interruption of the absorption of segments of Third World labor into circuits of consumer capital while making it available to the circuits of usurer capital, the loan. This necessary tendency of value production is missing from Negri's idea of zero work, and introduces a breach in the spectacular realm of desire mapped out in *Anti-Oedipus*.[203]

As we have seen, development experts were careful to avoid the accusation that they were imposing Western precedence in a foreign context, a criticism often forthcoming from various national contexts. In this regard, development was always presented as a call from the ground, reflecting the "aspirations" and "desires" of the people themselves. Desire for development forms the condition of the possibility of the expert's presence in the Third World. Attitude, as the measure of that desire—its tendency to sway off course—assures the continuity of that presence. Attitude marks the coordinates of that threatening desire at any moment on the trajectory of development.

As mentioned earlier, in his presentation, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment" at the West Indies Conference on Housing in 1947, Jacob Crane had framed attitude as both the promise of desire and indication of resistance to it:

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[203] Antonio Negri "Value and Affect," *Boundary 2*, 26:2 (Summer 1999).

In order to best serve the shelter needs and aspirations of the people, the housing programme must take into account the attitudes of the people themselves. It must be remembered that the values, traditions, customs and living habits evolve from local culture and are deeply embedded in the minds of the people.[204]

Attitude is desire coded negatively. Desire in the Third World holds both the promise of, and threat to, development's success. Attitude measures that contradictory tendency. This contradiction constitutes the founding possibility of development intervention as well as the condition of its reproducibility.

2.7.3 *Positive Desire:*

This negative coding of development holds even when the affect in question is not the interrupting attitude but its supposed opposite: an immediate and overwhelming desire for development that cannot be absorbed by the foreseeable economic and technological capabilities. The paradox persists even in this case: development must delay its own emergence. Consider, for example the forewarning of increasing urbanization given in the *UN Manual on Self Help Housing*. The opening paragraph of the manual begins with the picture of a worsening situation that we are now familiar with:

> The world's housing situation is causing great concern, not only because too many in the developing areas are poorly housed, but also because the situation is worsening. Despite world advances in science, technology and know-how, the

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[204] Jacob Crane, "Improvement of Shelter and Home Environment," West India Conference on Housing, 1947. The presentation was supplemented by four other papers by Crane distributed as corollary material at the conference: Huts and Houses in the Tropics; The Governments and the Homes of the People; Programmes in Aid of Family Housebuilding – "Aided Self-Help Housing"; and Aided Self-Help in Puerto Rico (Brochure).

rates of population increase and of urbanization are accelerating faster than man's ability to resolve the problems of overcrowding and excess migration.[205]

The paragraph closes, however, by identifying an emerging desire for modernization as the driving force behind the crisis: "A *surging desire* by the world's populations for *higher and higher* standards of living also adds to the dynamic and flux of the situation."[206]

Just as attitude is an affective dimension of the economic calculus of self-help, this surging desire is an affective dimension of a threatening economic demand. Anatole A. Solow, Chief of the Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan American Union in Washington D.C. and Crane's co-sponsor on many Latin American missions, in his address to the graduating class of the Pan American Center in December 1955, had located the shortcomings of development in the increasing demand for development itself:

> Let us look for a moment at the conditions prevailing in the countries to which you [the graduates of the Inter-American Housing Center] are about to return. In spite of constantly increasing efforts by the governments the housing situation is getting worse rather than better. And this is quite understandable if you consider the tremendous increase in population, the extraordinary expansion of cities and the growing *demand* for better living conditions.[207]

It was Crane who in his tropics mission report had also identified the overflowing economic and affective coding as two sides of the same global phenomenon:

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[205] United Nations, *Manual on Self-Help Housing, op cit.,*1964. p. 1.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Anatole A. Solow, *A Message to the Graduating Class of 1955 at the Inter-American Housing Center* (Washington D.C.: The Pan American Union, 1955), pp. 2-3.

The *desire* for improved housing as one element of better living standards is being expressed by urban workers now, and, as education and incomes increase among farmers, they also *will demand* better housing and community development...Any evidence of apathy toward home improvement is due much more to ignorance, illness and fatigue than to lack of *aspiration*.[208]

Mirroring the text of delaying attitude and pending demand, the intertwined coding of overwhelming desire and immediate demand also point to the same aporia: an affective dimension of development that is always too much or too little, always off its mark. This, however, is an aporia that works toward introducing a perpetual and enabling delay in development.

2.7.4 Not-yet-no-longer:

Returning to the notion of attitude, we can perhaps now posit it as meta-term of affective coding in development, measuring both pending and premature desire, since each represents a different coding of the same tendency of delayed development. It is this negative coding that differentiates the affecting coding of value on different sides of the international division of labor. In the development theater, all desire bears the mark of attitude, of pending desire. From this perspective, attitude is, to borrow a term from Spivak, *not-yet-no-longer* desire, *not-yet-no-longer* demand. Attitude locates the Third World as a sphere both fully implicated in the mode of production narrative and yet distanced from it. Development as a strategy of socio-economic intervention based on the logic of perpetually delayed entry into consumerism finds its possibility within this system of connectedness and disconnectedness. Attitude displaces self-help from the sequential logic of conventional labor theory of value that sees labor increasingly

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[208] *UN Tropics Mission Report, op cit.,* 1951, p6.

subsumed into the circuits of consumerism and locates it in a sphere where labor is excluded from this tendency and its attending costs of increasing labor and environmental protection. This interruption locates the desire for development as a sphere located both outside the circuits of consumer capital yet implicated in the circuits of capitalist production. Attitude represents the deliberately imprecise measurements of a loose calculus, the hinge through which the text of economic coding is connected to the text of affective surplus, a relationship which is forever on the move and needs to be continuously calibrated.

2.7.5 *(Under)Ground of Value:*

Let us return to the question of the underground economy of women's labor in development. How are we to locate the space of women's labor in this field value coding? As we saw above, patriarchy itself emerges as a stratified and discontinuous sphere in self-help, where the "head of the family" is subsumed under the opinion of the group, the community leader, and so forth. Women's silence and invisibility is inscribed in this discontinuous field and is itself discontinuous and interrupted in the field of affective value.

If we are concerned with the question of *agency* (or its aporia in the realm of collective action), then woman as subject has her agency censored in development by the affective script of negative desire for modernization. In this context, raising the question of visibility of women as a unified subject in development is preemptively appropriated and echoes the agenda of the very forces that code her as a desiring subject of modernity. Without attention to the text of affective coding of value, women's visibility in development appears as an assumed good.

The access to agency and public space, in this context, has to expose the script of affective coding of value. As long as the battle lines have been drawn between erasure and visibility in development, development institutions and feminist critique function as clandestine cooperators. The question of unrecognized agency in development must interrupt the question of how the subject is staged with the text of how agency is scripted.

This complicity between external criticism of development and development organizations' own readjustments is visible in the periodic self-critique of development that reasserts the basic text of presumed unified desire on different registers. It is not surprising that as early as 1975 the UN and its attending institutions were keen on acknowledging the hidden economy of "women's work" at the First UN Conference on Women in Mexico City. In the realm of self-help projects, this revision appears in the form of "core" housing.

3 Core: The Tyranny of the Individual

In this section we will look at a particular variant of the self-help approach called "core" housing. The term was devised by Charles Abrams, the Chairman of the Urban Planning Program at Colombia and the sometime Rent Commissioner for the State of New York.[209] Abrams, who was instrumental in passing major anti-segregation housing laws in the US, consulted regularly for the UN and USAID in the 1950s and 1960s. He was joined on many missions by another prominent figure in the development planning arena, Otto Koenigsberger who, before becoming the Director of the Department of Tropical Architecture at the Architectural Association (AA) in London in the1950s, had spent considerable time in India as the Chief Architect and Planner of the state of Mysore before the country's independence in 1947.[210] Koenigberger, together with others at the AA

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[209] Abrams' US career is described in detail by Scott Henderson in, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

[210] Abrams and Koenigsberger went on joint missions to the Gold Coast (Ghana), Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore and Nigeria. The report for these missions were published by the UN as follows: *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast*, prepared for the government of the Gold Coast by Charles Abrams, Vladimir Bodiansky, Otto H.G. Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1956); *A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation*, prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, September 14, 1957 (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1957); *A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands*, by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1959).

authored the famous *Manual of Tropical Housing and Building* that is to this day

a central feature of curriculums in architecture schools across the Third World.[211]

According to Abrams and Koenigsberger, core housing differed from previous self-

help approaches such as "aided self-help" and "mutual-aid" in significant ways.[212]

Both of these approaches held onto a preconceived notion that a finished house

was required before occupation (FIG. 10, 11). In core housing, however, the

sponsoring agency developed lots and provided elemental services such as water,

sewage, and electricity connections so that sites were inhabitable before the

completion of houses. The inhabitants lived on the sites during the remaining

process of construction, putting up the walls, roof, and other enclosures as

resources and time permitted. Most of the time, the sponsoring agency only

provided loans for the roof, doors and windows, while holding the entire structure

as collateral. This reduced both the amount of the loan and the risk and for the

agency.

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[211] Otto H. Koenigsberger, *Manual of Tropical Housing and Building* (London: Longman, 1974-c1973).

[212] In "aided self-help," the future owners work on specific house they are to occupy. Their labor, however, is limited according to their construction experience. To avoid translating that inexperience into the house itself, the construction of an individual house inevitably requires supervision, and hiring "skilled craftsmen," increasing administrative costs. In the mutual-aid approach, the future occupants participate in the project as employed workers. Only, instead of being paid on a daily basis, they are offered the product of their labor, the finished houses, as compensation. During this employment, the workers are trained to perform specific jobs, moving from house to house. As Abrams himself explained in his seminal book on self-help housing, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World*, "The workers are usually not told which house they will own so they will not skimp or loaf on other houses and take special care with their own." See, Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1964), p. 171.

The idea of core housing takes the self-help idea to such an extreme that the architect looses all claims to composing form. It is the inhabitant who "designs" the house. Yet it is precisely by achieving this transparency that the core house is able to present the inhabitant as a participant in development, while keeping intact the framework of development, whether it is the qualification criteria for the loan associated with the house or the broader social and economic policy prescriptions. In this setting, the inhabitant of the core house appears as both the cause and the effect of the developmental process – both its agent and its subject. It is the open-endedness of core housing (reflective perhaps of the general open-endedness of architecture as a discipline), its ability to appear as an index of infinite concerns and to appear at the threshold of development, linking before and after, modern and pre-modern, professional and common, that allows it to carry out this inversion. Everyone needs to build shelter for themselves, or so we are told by Abrams and Koenigsberger. Core housing has connected this activity to the economic calculus of development, making the inhabitants, despite their intensions, participants in the development process.

3.1 A House Without a Core:

There is, however, a certain contradiction inherent in the central argument made by these contemporary schemes, one that was also present in Abrams and Koenigsberger's original proposals. In core housing, as well as its contemporary variants, the inhabitant is called forth to appear as a freely choosing, rational individual when the social welfare, economic, and legal institutions that enable and validate that role are missing in the context of development. The inhabitant of the core house therefore must find the social and economic guarantee of her

actions somewhere else, either in her "natural" ability as *homo economicus*, or in the very traditional social structures that development seeks to replace. The inhabitant thus must be positioned as both inside and outside the development process.

This chapter argues that it is in presenting this position as a necessary point of origin for development that core housing actually *maintains* the development subject at the threshold of the modernization project. This partial inclusion/exclusion serves to incorporate her into the circuits of the international financial markets, while keeping her outside the structure of welfare, labor, and environmental protection that is associated with the socialized growth of consumer capitalism.

This emphasis on locating the inhabitant at the threshold of modernization makes "core" appears as an ironic name for this approach to development. If we look at the photographs of core housing projects in Abrams' own writings as well in various UN manuals, we see that from the perspective of the Western architectural tradition, these houses do not have a core! (FIG. 12). There is no neo-traditionalist brick and stone hearth forming the infrastructural and spatial center and harnessing the fundamental domestic activities of cooking, heating, and congregation imagined by Frank Lloyd Wright and other organicists (FIG. 13).[213]
Nor is there an elemental utility core such the one found in the "environmental

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[213] The emphasis on the hearth and core as the elemental feature of "organic architecture" was a staple argument of not only Wright's own writings but also of the description of his work in canonical books of history of modern architecture. See, for example, Kenneth Frampton, *Modern Architecture: A Critical History*, chapter 3, "Frank Lloyd Wright and the myth of the Prairie 1890-1916," (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), pp. 57-63; and, William Curtis, *Modern Architecture, since 1900*, chapter 6, "The Architectural System of Frank Lloyd Wright," (Englewood cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 75-90.

bubble" for modern nomadic living presented in the writing of Reyner Banham and the architectural consortium, Archigram (FIG. 14.).[214] The core house in the Third World only has a void at the center through which one can see to the other side. It cannot harness the humanist gaze seeking to find in it the elemental existence of Western society, be it the traditional model of the family gathered around the hearth, or Banham's naked body representing the nomad of the future. The only presence in the image of the core house is of the laboring inhabitant, occupying the frame with a shovel in hand.

Yet the image of the laborer against the empty center of the core house doesn't point to its inhabitant's exclusion from the discourse of individuation and family. Rather, the presence of the Third World subject in the core house without a "core" points to a different entry into the project of modernization, one written not in the language of form, but rather in a process of formalization within the realm of policy and legislation. The core house in the Third World does not have a "core" because the minimum requirement for entry into the discourse of mortgage and property ownership is not providing a functional enclosure, but the structuring of an individuated claim to property ownership itself. In this regard, it is not the house that the core establishes, instead it establishes the individual as a legal entity. The core of the core house is the positing of the inhabitant as an individual even before there is an enclosure to house *him*.[215]

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[214] For a discussion of Banham's "standard-of-living package" see, Nigel Whiteley, *Reyner Banham: Historian of the Immediate Future* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 209.

[215] We use the pronoun here purposefully. For the individuated claim to property is indeed based on the asymmetric entry of women in the development process. We will return to

This reversal, if you will, betrays the critical difference between the location of architecture in projects of socio-economic reform in "developed" and "underdeveloped" contexts. The eighth CIAM conference in Hoddesdon in 1951, the second after the war, was organized under the title, *The Heart of the City*. Here the term "core" was deployed by Giedion and Sert, among others, to describe the depleting urban centers of Western cities. Sert, in his opening speech at the conference, described decentralization as a "social disease" threatening the heart of the city, its core, and the "health" of the civic culture it represented: "An essential feature of any true organism is the physical heart or nucleus, that we here call the Core."[216] We were reminded that "[t]he organized community meeting places could establish a frame where a new civic life and a healthy civic spirit could develop."[217]

Reflecting Cold War anxieties about the future of capitalism, this social disease of decentralization threatening the civic spirit of the modern city was seen to be driven by selfish individualism and unrestrained market capitalism. In this respect, CIAM members shared with prominent American theorists of the New Deal the belief that the unhindered pursuit of individual interests in an unregulated market economy resulted in social self-destruction.

> Our analytical surveys show the decay and blight of central areas and the disintegration of what was once the heart of the old cities, their Core...As life has been leaving the old Cores, business and commercial areas have developed spontaneously along the new roads and new main streets. These streets soon

this point towards the end of the chapter. For the moment, we'll focus on the terms of individuation being laid out in the core house.

[216] See J. Tyrwhitt, J.L. Sert, and E.N. Rogers, eds., *The Heart of the City: Towards the Humanisation of Urban Life* (London: Lund Humphries, 1952), p. 6.

[217] Ibid.

become congested and decay in their turn as blight continues to spread form the centre outwards. This process of constant and unchecked decentralization and land speculation is a real menace to all our cities and to the stability of civic values. It only works in the interests of a few against those of the citizenry in general. It brings in its trail municipal bankruptcy, and it must be stopped.[218]

To counter the process of decentralization, Core was a proposal of

recentralization:

> To put an end to this unplanned decentralization process we must reverse the trend, establishing what we many call a process of *recentralisation*. This recentralisation process demands the creation of new Cores that will replace the old ones that the unplanned growth has destroyed[219]

Keeping in tune with New Deal sensibilities, all speeches at the conference consistently argued that the only means for social reform is public financing and centralized government control:

> such civic centers would consolidate governments; for the lack of them and the dependence of the people on controlled means of information makes them more easily governable by the rule of the few. The creation of these centers is a government job (federal, state or municipal). These elements cannot be established on a business basis. They are necessary for the city as a whole and even for the nation, and they should be publicly financed.[220]

The idea of "organized growth" therefore translated into a publicly financed remodeling of the urban fabric into a consistent and unified expression:

> All the elements that commercial and business centers have banned from the city in their ruthless urge for speculation should be reinstated in these centres of

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[218] Ibid., p. 4.

[219] Ibid. p. 4.

[220] Ibid., p. 11.

community life. Harmony in such places is only possible when all parts are subject to a whole, and we should now recognize that nobody really benefits from individualism carried to extremes. Our shopping centres today are the expression of competitive individual business, and no architectural solution can be found for a whole district unless certain overall rules are imposed. If free competition is to exist in these centres, it will have to be subjected to a unified architectural frame[221]

These pronouncements on the need for public financing and centralized planning, took their cue from the massive public investments being made in the form of the Marshall Plan in Europe and the continuing New Deal and the emerging Urban Renewal projects in the United States. From its beginning in 1947 till 1951, the Marshall Plan had invested some thirteen billion dollars into the European economies, a figure that would rise to seventeen billion by 1953. CIAM's proposal to revitalize urban "cores" was, in this context, a project of changing the direction of existing urban planning projects away from decentralization – a direction emerging from postwar fears regarding the vurnerablity of urban centers to aerial bombing. As such they were projects that presumed the presence of an established modern welfare state. In all of these proposals, the emphasis was on re-vitalizing civic values in decline with decentralization. The armature of the welfare state had also surrounded Sert's and Giedion's polemic of urban centers as a new form of

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[221] Ibid. p. 11. In a similar spirit, Paul Weiner—Sert's associate and partner in various Latin American projects—would also claim that "[t]here is an ever-increasing trend toward effortless consumer satisfaction and passive spectator pastimes and amusements....we will be wise to prove facilities for greater and more numerous common meeting places, based on more and more leisure and upon a greater freedom from want. It is reasonable to anticipate planned land use of common ownership. Perhaps in the new chemical-atomic age the needs of men can for the first time be provided for in orderly fashion. The new sources of power will meet man's physical need and he will learn slowly to live without the age-old economic struggle and thereby discover his better self, his superior spiritual and moral qualities. The civic core should be the expression of this 'collective better self'; it should reflect the general forces and condition which I have defined as partly technological, biological, and ideological." Ibid. p.85.

modern monuments that replaced the classical idea of monumental form.[222] The

imagined client of these projects was already a citizen.

Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposals for core housing are presented as

proposals of *originating* development, not of calibrating the profile of an existing

socioeconomic system. The problem facing Abrams and Koenigsberger was not

one of creating room for strengthening civic values, but of implanting the seeds of

civil society. The most critical difference between CIAM's urban core and Abrams

and Koenigsberger's development core house, is not of scale, but the manner in

which the citizen of the European city and the inhabitant of the core house are

inscribed into the surrounding socio-economic context. It is in addressing the

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[222] The theme of designing "civic centers" had been raised before the war in the fourth and fifth congresses, in 1933 in Athens and in 1937 in Paris, respectively. But it was Jose Louis Sert, who first raised the idea of urban redevelopment and social reform in the United States in his first book, *Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their Solutions*, published soon after his arrival in America in 1942 by Harvard University Press. The book, however, was part of a joint effort to promote CIAM's urbanistic agenda in the US. The urban polemic was restated a year later in 1943 when Sert published a short manifesto on urban planning with artist Fernand Léger, and historian Sigfried Giedeon called, *The Nine points on Monumentality*. Here, the authors argued that the centers of civic and communal life constituted the new democratic monuments of modernization that replaced the classical emphasis on monumental form. Incorporating this new role, modern architecture would evolve beyond orthodox functionality that it embraced to break from the neo-classicism of the 19th century. As Joan Ockman has noted, even though *The Nine Points* remained unpublished till it was included by Giedion some fifteen years later in his *Architecture, You and Me: The Diary of a Development*, the individual articles by the three authors relating to the same argument appeared in different places. Giedion and Sert published "The Need for a New Monumentality," and "The Human Scale in City Planning," respectively, in Paul Zucker's 1944 collection of essays, *New Architecture and City Planning*. For a prehistory of Jose Louis Sert, Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion's *The Nine points on Monumentality*, dealing particularly with Sert's initial years in the United States and his involvement with émigré artists, see Joan Ockman, "The War Years in America: New York, New Monumentality," in Guido Hartray and Xavier Costa, eds., *Sert: Arquitecto en Nueva York* (Barcelona: Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona, ACTAR, 1997), pp. 22-45. Léger's version of the argument was published after the war under the title, "Modern Architecture and Color," in a volume by the informal association of émigré artists in the US, *The American Abstract Artists* (AAA).

problem of originating development that the core housing proposal stressed

locating the inhabitant at the threshold between tradition and modernity.

3.2 Circularity of Origin:

We see great emphasis being given to positioning the development subject at the

threshold of the project of modernization in Abrams and Koenigsberger's first joint

mission to the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1954.[223] For Abrams and Koenigsberger the

primary factor driving the Gold Coast's housing crisis was the presence of

"unmarketable," i.e. non-individualized, titles. "For a country with land that cannot

be used," declared the two experts,

> is as poor as a country without land; the landed wealth of a country is indeed
> measured by the quantity of land used or that can be brought into use. The
> existence of unmarketable titles has been holding back considerable land
> development and the development of mortgage financing mechanisms. It has been
> causing...prolonged and costly litigations and keeping land from being brought
> into use. Failure to remove the obstacles to land use has been impeding the
> operation of the building and loan programme, aggravating housing shortage, and

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[223] Keonigsberger was already in the Gold Coast advising on the planning of the Volta River Dam project when Abrams joined him there in late 1954. The third member of the mission was Vladimir Bodiansky, CIAM member and planner with the French protectorate in Morocco who had designed the now well known housing for the "Arab population" with Michel Ecochard, also a CIAM member and the Director of Planning in Morocco. Bodiansky's role in the mission report for the Gold Coast, however, is limited. While Abrams and Koenigsberger outlined the proposal for core housing and land reform, Bodiansky advised on setting up a Center of Design in Accra that was to hold competition for core houses and carry out building material research. In discussing core and land reform aspect of the report, therefore, we will refer to only Abrams and Koenigsberger as the primary authors of the mission report. Bodiansky had recently published report emphasizing the importance of including in architectural curriculums the design of social project such as mass-housing. See Vladimir Bodiansky, *Charte de l'habitat du Cercle d'etudes architecturales* (Paris: C.E.A. 1955); Bodiansky and Ecochard's Moroccan housing projects had also recently received immense exposure in architectural press. See, "Habitat pour le plus grand nombre: un exemple-type, l'habitat au Maroc," insert in *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui* (December 1953): 50-51.

inducing sporadic development of sites. It has also been affecting rural property adversely.[224]

This mission report is one of the first proposals that relates individualized ownership in housing as a precondition for development, making it one of the primary sites of establishing the individual as a legal economic category in development. Yet it is important to note that in the above statement the existing socio-economic structure of relations is defined as a *negation*—a lack and a hindrance—of the system of marketable tenure and individualized ownership. Had it not been for the lingering effects of existing hindrances, the authors argue, it would have been the individual, the modern figure of legal ownership, who would be the natural face of the development subject. This text of negation proliferates throughout the report, implying in every instance that if all existing hindrances were removed, marketable tenure would have existed as a self-sustaining system of "voluntary negotiation and acquisition":

> The uncertainties of tenure are accelerating the housing shortage…By *removing* large areas of land from the *possibility* of purchase, the supply of available land for housing is being *narrowed*. Not only are the opportunities for development and occupancy *withheld* from the people but the pressure for public intervention and acquisition is being *entrenched* when much of it might be the subject of *voluntary negotiation and acquisition* [emphasis added].[225]

In these statements, marketable tenure arrangements are presented as an *unrealized* quality of the traditional social realm. The absence of a marketable tenure structure, thus, indicates not the absence but the presence of an originary

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[224] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p. 16.

[225] Ibid. p. 65.

demand. Only this demand is *prevented* from being turned into an effective economic demand because of a stunted economic supply.

This emphasis on the presence of a pending demand in the traditional social context betrays a desire to break an inherent circularity in the argument. It is asserted that the supply of land is based on an economic demand, but that there can be no demand without the realization of supply. In other words, we are told that when land is made available, individual owners will emerge and finance it because there is *unrealized* demand for it.

The circularity of this logic, and the attempt to break it, emerges from a shortcoming in the Third World socio-economic structure which was commonly presumed in the development literature of the time: the absence of existing large-scale consumer markets for industrial production in most Third World countries. Due to this limitation, demand is not given the primacy that it holds in Keynesian economics as the engine of economic growth in a market economy. It must be remembered that this emphasis on supply precedes the rise of "supply-side" economics in the 1970s, which is commonly attributed to Robert Mundell.[226] In the development context of the 1950s, the emphasis on supply is underpinned not by the need to establish production (as opposed to demand in the Keynesian models) as the primary variable of a capitalist economy. Rather, the emphasis on supply in the early development context speaks to a different agenda: solving the problem of *inaugurating* broad national industrial production in the absence of consumer demand.

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[226] See Robert A. Mundell, *Man and Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

The curious status of demand in an argument giving primacy to supply that we see in Abrams and Koenigsberger's statements points to the circular relationship between demand and supply that haunts the scenarios of inaugurating development. Theories of capital investments in industry (architecture, equipment, machinery, labor costs) assume the presence of consumer markets, just as the building of consumer markets requires the presence of capital investments. This chicken and the egg paradox hinges on an economic axiom: there is no supply without demand and vice versa.

Why is this assumption necessary in the development arena? The circular relationship between demand and supply takes on critical importance when attempting to solve two important elements of the development puzzle: identifying the mechanism of self-aggregating growth and establishing the presence of the social welfare effects of that growth. After all, if modern industrial production took root as development advocates desired, the question of why the industrialists would pass on their profits for social welfare is left unanswered?

All prominent development theories argued that if all current production shifted to modern industrial methods and began production on a large enough scale, it would set up mutually cumulative benefits for all industries. Any industry producing on a substantial scale would generate demand for more industries to furnish its supply requirements, creating a cycle in which the resulting social welfare would outweigh private benefits.

This scenario of the large scale, self-reinforcing, socially beneficial aggregate effects of modern industrial production acquired the name of the Big Push. The

Big Push model demanded the presence of circular causalities in market behavior. Leading development economists such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, J. M. Fleming, and Albert Hirschman particularly argued that after a point of minimum working scale of economies, the division of labor was limited only by the extent of the market, and in turn the extent of the market was in turn determined by the division of labor.

This circular relationship between demand and supply stressed by Big Push theorists, however, assumes the very thing they want to answer: the process though which the required scale of production is reached. The problem of originating development is bound by a series of economic limitations and paradoxes: It is necessary for modern industry to operate on a large scale in a development context, not only to have cumulative social benefits, but also to be profitable. Modern industrial production requires more capital investment than existing traditional production methods. Consequently, it requires a bigger market to cover these additional investments and costs. A modern industry cannot produce commodities for the *existing* market and be competitive with existing methods of production. Production on a bigger scale is needed to match even the price of existing production, and on an even larger scale to produce at a lesser price.

Herein lies another paradox: given the burden of added costs and scale, an industry based on modern production methods cannot offer labor more wages than current production methods allow *and* begin production. But, if it doesn't offer labor competitive wages, it cannot attract labor from existing production processes to begin production. For modern industrial production to begin, take

hold and achieve a necessary minimum profitable scale, the industry must somehow be able to realize a contradictory scenario: it must offer labor lower or equal wages compared to existing methods of production to compete and yet continue to attract labor to grow.

This in turn lays out a contradictory profile of labor: the labor force must move toward new industrial production methods only *as if* motivated by the quintessential modern characteristics of personal interest and search for better wage opportunities, the fundamental trait of *Homo economicus*, and yet upon reaching the destination, not want these benefits.

It was Arthur Lewis' paper, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," (1954) that provided the most convincing way out of the paradox of originating development.[227] As evident in the title, Lewis' answer was to assume infinite "under-employment" in the rural production which would enable modern industry to draw labor out of the "traditional sectors" without added costs. Lewis was not the first to assume the presence of idle labor in the rural arena. This assumption is also present in Paul Rosenstein-Rodan's paper (1943).[228] Lewis was, however, the first to model this assumption as a plausible economic proposal. For

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[227] Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," in *The Manchester School* 22 (1954): 129-144.

[228] P. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe." *Economic Journal* 53 (1943): 202-211.

this reason, Lewis' paper is often regarded as one of the most influential papers in development economics.[229]

The cumulative development Big Push models rely crucially on the assumption of an infinite supply of labor. This assumption also formed the basis of prominent theories of economic geography. The very idea of a "regional growth" is based on the assumption that labor supply to any individual region can be elastic, i.e. can sustain itself increasing costs, because more labor can always come from *somewhere* else, enabling self-aggregating regional growth when a certain production scale is reached. This assumption persists in Walter Isard's magnum opus, *Location and Space-Economy*, inherited from Von Thünen's early analyses of land rent and land use in the latter's *Isolated State*.[230] It resurfaces in Alan Pred's work in the 1960s as well.

This assumption is usually explained, indeed explained away, as the lack of the availability of technical tools to model the complex "realities" of the market. As Paul Krugman has argued, economists since Ricardo had always used abstractions

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[229] For Paul Krugman, Lewis' paper represents "[p]robably the most famous paper in all of development economic…" See Paul Krugman, *Development, Geography and Economic Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 18.

[230] The cumulative development Big Push models mentioned earlier rely crucially on the assumption of an infinite supply of labor. This assumption also formed the basis of prominent theories of economic geography. The very idea of a "regional growth" is based on the assumption that labor supply to any individual region can be elastic, i.e. can continue without increasing costs, because it can always come from *somewhere* else, enabling self-aggregating regional growth when a certain production scale is reached. This assumption persists in Walter Isard's magnum opus, *Location and Space-Economy*, inherited from Von Thünen's early analyses of land rent and land use in the latter's *Isolated State*. The same can also be seen in Losch's *The Economics of Location,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. It resurfaces in Alan Pred's work in the 1960s as well.

to explain complex phenomena.[231] The economic world is modeled *as if* based on "perfect competition," the supposition that all firms have access to equal information and resources, and do not use their strategic position to influence pricing and stifle competition. Similarly, production is represented *as if* based on "constant returns," the supposition that increasing input by a certain amount also increases output by the same amount. Perfect competition and constant returns are seen to be tied together. Its typical milieu is agriculture production where the price of any crop is seen to be fixed.[232] Farmers do not have the power to influence the price of wheat and only receive profit by increasing production. In this setting, any attempt to artificially increase profits cannot be sustained and is corrected by the market competition.

The classical and neo-classical development economists knew very well, Krugman tells us, that the real world operates according to imperfect competition and increasing or decreasing returns with investment.[233] Firms compete, set prices, and stifle competition and opportunities. Greater production lowers the price of production and opens opportunities for monopoly and control of the market. Yet the use of a perfect competition and constant returns model is not seen as too severe a "judgment and compromise" to the "real" world where firms operated according to imperfect competition and increasing returns.[234] These abstractions, despite their reductionism, produce "rich insights," however limited, into the

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[231] Paul Krugman, *Development, Geography and Economic Theory*, *op cit.* p. 79.

[232] Ibid. p. 76.

[233] Ibid., p. 79-81.

[234] Ibid., 69.

"complexity of reality."[235] We may ask then, what allows the reductions to not be seen as an intolerable compromise with the way the "the vastly more complex real system behaves"?[236]

These compromises were tolerable, we would argue, because in the context of the developed world, it was possible to assume that modern industrial production and market structure exists and operates according to imperfect competition and increasing returns. In as much as neo-classical economists avoided the question of imperfect competition and couldn't explain the working of the market, it was seen as the limitation of the model, not "reality." In the development arena this assumption is moot. The development intervention is based on the assumption of the *absence* of the market. The limited scope of the model is not seen as a result of its inherent reductionism, but of the limitations of the development context itself. In the development theater, economic modeling is called upon to construct that which it assumes is well established in the developed world: a working market. Here, economic analyses must also simultaneously be a policy prescription. With this switch, the "judgment" of the model is displaced on a different register. The model is no longer a logical abstraction but a historical explanation. The economic models shed their claim to reductionism and take on historical and geographical specificity. What development economists offer are not just economic models, but also policy prescriptions tied to historical presumptions.

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[235] Ibid., 79.

[236] Ibid. 71.

Abrams and Koenigsberger's framing of the individual as an indeterminate transitory subject caught between tradition and modernity speaks to these dilemmas of originating and continuing development. Their delineation of the individual as a subject of the development that occupies the space between the modern and pre-modern satisfies the contradictory requirements of the analyses of originating development. Let us now look at this relationship more closely.

It must be noted that the development subject in Abrams and Koenigsberger's framing is, to borrow a phrase from Gayatri Spivak, *not-yet* an individual, only its negated possibility. Moreover, this not-yet-individual is also a no-longer-traditional being.[237] The indeterminate status of the development subject as an individual is paralleled by her equally indeterminate status as a traditional subject. "[T]he old mores are being challenged at many points," Abrams and Keonigsberger tell us,

> The biological family replaces the tribe as the new social unit and *individuation* supplants the communal group. The ways of the West are being exposed to the *hinterlander*, pressures to abandon older values manifest themselves; imports of consumer goods between 1938 and 1950 show the pressures of new demands – cigarette imports have trebled, wireless sets have gone up more than six fold and vast increases have occurred in the imports of bicycles, beer, boots and confections; dress, styles, modes of life, marriage, family customs and folkways are all *in transition* affecting housing needs, room sizes, housing design and materials. Pressure for the new sometimes tends to obscure some important values inherent in the old. Devices such as prefabrication which have not proven themselves even in the more developed countries assume a lure beyond the value; the thatched roof and concrete slab. Social pressure is converted into political pressure

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[237] Spivak uses the term, "not-yet-no-longer," to describe the peculiar status of woman's body as a site of productive labor in work of the writer, Mahasweta Devi. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Woman in Difference," in *Outside in the Teaching Machine, op cit.*, pp. 77-95.

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sometimes subordinating need to demand and wisdom to haste [emphasis added].[238]

Within the opposition set between tradition and modernity, the old and new, the development subject appears to be irresolutely located somewhere between the forces of individuation and the values of the hinterlander. It would not be incorrect to call this irresolution a certain sense of aporia – the impossibility to occupy or leave either the old or the new – that is projected onto the development subject. While the "pressures to abandoned older values manifest themselves," they leave traces that disrupt (with demand for whimsical consumer goods), the building of meaningful demand for industrial production. This is not the individual responsiveness that Abrams and Koenigsberger seem to have in mind as the desired vehicle for industrial growth. The absence of corrective social pressures and norms, we are told, leads to the building up of rudderless individual demands that counter, rather than strengthen, social goals.

It is this sense of aporia that we see being stressed repeatedly in the Abrams and Koenigsberger description of the clash between tradition and modernity:

> In the process of growth and change, old and new are highlighted, brought into contrast and often into conflict. There are contrasts or conflicts between the rural and tribal ways and the urban ways of life; between barter or trade-in-kind and money; between human co-operation in meeting life's trials and the more bureaucratic routines and specialization of function that come with industrialization; between the social customs of the West and of the Old World; between the British legal system and the customary law; between the old ethic and the new; between Christianity and fetish; between chief and Government.

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[238] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p. 4.

By describing changes induced by development in opposition to a preexisting "old," "customary," and "tribal" state of things, Abrams and Koenigsberger indeed dehistoricize the long colonial construction of "customary" and "tribal" laws as a strategy of indirect rule. In Africa in particular, British colonial government gave, in the name of preserving existing customary law, native chiefs immense powers to use brute force as a way to indirectly govern the native populations.[239] Yet we cannot limit our reading to the current of naturalization running through the text alone. How are the dehistoricised notions of tradition and modernity employed in the development discourse? What particular ends do they serve and what means do they satisfy in constructing the philosophical and logical basis for economic development? The summation of the African migrant's account under the dehistoriced banners of tradition and modernity supports the framing of the aporetic shuttling of the development subject between them.

This indeterminate, aporetic status of the development subject, not-yet-individual-no-longer-traditional, is summed up repeatedly, as it was done above, under the umbrella term, *transition*. The Gold Coast report begins with the heading, "The Gold Coast: A Country in Transition," and continues to outline the various facets of this transitory terrain: social, economic, and political. The clash between the old and the new results from the rapid pace of historical change being experienced by the Third World; something that was not seen in the Anglo-American context. For there, we are told, the speed and scale of transition was gradual:

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[239] For a detail account of British colonial strategies of governance in Africa, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject, op. cit.*

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In countries such as England and the United States which have experienced these transitions gradually and sequentially, time has afforded opportunity for experimentation and adjustment. Safeguards have been built against abuses by the private power on the public and the public on the private. In the Gold Coast, the transitions have come almost at once.[240]

On the one hand, the framing of the Third World subject as a sphere in a conflicting transition, caught in the aporia of choosing between tradition and modernity is held up as an alibi for a deteriorating traditional social structure that needs preservation:

The co-operative nature of operations and the community spirit which some of the more developed countries are trying hard to recapture still exists in many aspects of tribal life and the production of housing can be facilitated by utilizing existing practices and devices. In fact, one of the attainable frontiers would seem to be the grafting of the co-operative aspects of tribal and village life onto the more developed patterns without disrupting existing values as occurred in countries which experienced economic and social upheaval more and over a longer period.[241]

On the other hand, it was precisely this grafting of the "more developed patterns" on "village life" that was seen as the reason behind the formation of misdirected demands. Thus, as a transitory sphere, the Third World is described as charting a movement of both deteriorating social and improving economic and personal conditions.

These contradictions in the notion of transition emerge from the need to map historic change in terms that are consistent with the logic of development. The idea of the individual as a client of development validates the fiction of a self-

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[240] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast*, *op cit.*, p. 4.

[241] Ibid. p. 6.

conscious, independent subject responsible for self-perpetuating development. The notion of deteriorating social conditions allows seeing the absence of welfare effects of industrialization as a result of the move *away* from a traditional social structure, rather than the result of moves *towards* industrialization. Tradition, idealized as a basis for social welfare, serves to separate the push for industrialization from the problem of providing a welfare structure and constituting a middle class, the primary hindrance in the logic of development through industrialization.

It is this transitory subject that Abrams and Koenigsberger would hold up as an alibi in recommending "slum conservation" by using the core housing approach in Lagos in neighboring Nigeria.[242] The British and Nigerian officials manning the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), which included the city's public works department, focused on replacing illegal settlements with planned housing as their primary development approach. This costly program required interim settlements while new housing was constructed. Due to the lack of funds and the slow pace of the projects these settlements, such as the Sure-Lere scheme constructed at the outskirts of the city, acquired permanent character while what Abrams and Koenigsberger called the new "crops of entrepreneurs" dealing in illegal property moved into the vacated lots.

Countering the slum clearance approach, Abrams and Keonigsberger, accompanied in Nigeria by the Japanese traffic planner, Susumu Kobe, proposed

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[242] Otto Koenigsberger, Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe, Moshe Shapiro, and Michael Wheeler, *Metropolitan Lagos,* a report submitted to the Ministry of Lagos Affairs (New York: United Nations, 1962).

providing minimum services into existing settlement and giving them legal status, an argument that would later be adopted by architects turned squatter advocates such as John Turner. Yet as the project unfolded, these core "services" proved to be just as unforthcoming as the housing schemes they were supposed to replace and only extended the scope of government control on existing settlements through taxation, loan, and tenure allocation policies that favored the interests of newer "crops of entrepreneurs."[243]

The core approach, however, did something more. As opposed to the previous government strategy of development, in Abrams and Koenigsberger's conservation proposal, these displacements could now be absorbed under the logic of *transition* to development. "It may have to be conceded that in the formative years of the industrialization," asserted the experts, "the slum will be the *inevitable* by-product of urban development, like the abdominal distortion that precedes birth and growth. The trouble has been that reformers have always called the swelling a cancer to be excised wherever it appears."[244]

With core, the costs of development are deferred while its inevitability is naturalized and assured. This framing of squatter settlements as a necessary, and necessarily painful, step in the Third World's birth into the modern world works to advance a two-fold agenda. On the one hand, it helps secure the inhabitants' consent as unified participants in the development process. On the other, it

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[243] This State control is assured in the conservation process. We are reminded that all conservation efforts are tentative and temporary and may shift under future development policies: "At some future time...when the housing shortage in Lagos has been eased, slum clearance may be resumed." Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter, op cit.*, p. 125.

[244] Ibid., p. 125.

reasserts the presence of insolvable traditional communal structures that can absorb the pain of modernization:

> The combination of isolation, higher expenses, and lower incomes has threatened an established way of life and livelihood for many. Not only do the...occupants [of the new housing schemes] see less of their relatives, but the quality of the relationships has changed. In central Lagos, even though the communal family houses were gradually being broken up, the unity of the extended family had survived in day-to-day visits, in regular meetings, and in the *mutual-help* characteristic of these people. But the families in [new housing] have been finding it less and less easy to maintain these visits or to discharge their obligation. *Forced* into a self-sufficiency alien to their traditions and harassed by the demands on their overstretched resources, *once-unified* households have been shattered [emphasis added].[245]

The "communal family house" is made to stands in place of the missing modern social welfare structure. This positioning constructs a collective profile of slum dwellers as development subjects caught between the poles of tradition and modernity. On the one hand, they are participants in the modernization process: their communal family houses are in the city. On the other, they require the traditional social set up (evident in the description of the inhabitants as people with an "established way of life" who are being "forced" into "self-sufficiency"). The self-help process is then presented as a balancing act that allows the two conflicting yet simultaneous dimensions of tradition and modernity to find a tentative resolution. This is evident in the description of the social setup of the existing settlement in the language of the self-help discourse ("...and in the *mutual-help* characteristic of these people"). Core housing, as a modification of this exiting dialectic, is presented as a tool that can maintain this transitory

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[245] Ibid., p. 124.

resolution and defer the question of the economic and welfare costs of development.

Inherent in the notion of transition as a conflicting process is the contradictory claim that development is necessary but the welfare costs of development are to be provided by the very "traditional" socio-economic structures it constructs as replaceable. The logic of development demands that this contradiction never be resolved, that the tradition should always be held up to absorb the cost of welfare whereas the existence of the individual is positioned to pursue market oriented reform. These dualities are, therefore, projected as the inability of the development subject herself to find a place within the clash of modernity and tradition. The dialectic of tradition and modernity is presented as a reflection of the irresolvable dynamics of change in the Third World, rather than as a testimony to the aporia built in the logic of development itself: to keep the subject of development involved in market-driven production but outside the socialized growth of consumerism and its attendant capital expenditure.[246] Without the aporia of negotiating the demands of tradition and modernity projected onto the development subject, the logic of development cannot hold.

3.3 House Without a Plan:

One of the most striking differences between core and the earlier self-help schemes at the level of the individual house is what can be described as core's

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[246] This careful positioning of the modern and traditional dimensions of development subject under the umbrella of core points us to an important dimension of the critiques of development. The status of terms such as "tradition" and "native culture," must be interpreted in terms of the differential they set up with their supposed terms of opposition. If the critiques of the framing of tradition in development are limited to accusation of naturalization and dehistorisization, they end up reproducing the very differential that drives the development logic.

erasure of the plan. A core house doesn't have a plan, only a plinth and a roof (FIG. 12).[247] The plan is left to be filled in by the inhabitant over time. This de-emphasis, if you will, stands in contrast to the host of government sponsored self-help schemes and "finished" housing projects designed by famous modern architects for various Third World governments.

A critical example of earlier self-help projects revolving around the centrality of form is the development projects of Hassan Fathy and Constantine Doxiadis. As Panayiota Pyla has shown, both Fathy and Doxiadis sought to build a vocabulary of vernacular forms as a basis for mass housing.[248] For both Doxiadis and Fathy, "traditional forms" represented a storehouse of not only dormant social values and psychological preferences, but also principles of climatic design and efficient building techniques sedimented over generations through countless experiments, accidents, and errors.[249] The architects asserted that traditional building forms could provide guidance to modern building techniques and disclose principles of efficient organization as well as psychological wellbeing of the inhabitants.

Though Fathy's famous New Gourna project in Upper Egypt near Luxor (1945 to 1948) was not met with enthusiasm by it users, it was a project that launched a thousand papers in the Western architectural literature (FIG. 15). The inhabitants often associated the domes, vaults, and courtyards re-fabricated by Fathy from

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[247] This can be seen in the much repeated image of core housing in Ghana that we saw in the beginning.

[248] Panayiota I. Pyla, *Ekistics, Architecture and Environmental Politics, 1945-1976: A Prehistory of Sustainable Development*, PhD Dissertation, MIT, 2002.

[249] See Hassan Fathy, *Architecture for the Poor* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973).

distant references with mausoleums and tombs.[250] The architects and critics, however, saw the design as an experiment in combining "economic efficiency," "aesthetic fulfillment," and "psychological satisfaction" embedded in the "traditional" forms.[251]

When Fathy joined Doxiadis Associates for the Greater Mussayib housing project (for 3000 to 5000 households) in Iraq in 1957, he carried out extensive studies of vernacular building practices to the point of inviting criticism from Doxiadis for emphasizing tectonic details over mass production and standardization techniques demanded by the scale of the project. Both Fathy and Doxiadis, however, held the view that vernacular forms provided the opportunity to give universal principles of science and humanism local characteristics and vice versa.[252]

In both projects for Iraq and Pakistan, we see extensive studies of how "traditional empirical solutions," such as the *bagdir* (wind-catcher), loggias and courtyards responded to sun movements and prevailing winds to control temperature and created spaces suitable for use at different times of the day. These analyses, together with studies of brick-making techniques, laying patterns, and vernacular building equipment, were then weighted to formulate a vocabulary of design that

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[250] Fekri Hassan, and Christine Plimpton, "New Gourna: Vernacular Remodeling of Architectural Space," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Working Papers Series* XVI 49-77 (1989): 50-77. Qouoted by Pyla, op cit., p. 92.

[251] Fathy, *Architecture for the Poor, op cit*; also see, Raymond Mortimer, "A Model Village in Upper Egypt," in *Architectural Review* (September 1947): 97-99.

[252] Hassan Fathy, "Report on Egyptian Village Housing, Building Materials, and Methods of Construction to Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State" (Cambridge MA: Arthur Little,1952); Doxiadis Associates, "A Regional Development Program for Greater Mussayib, Iraq, 1958," *Ekistics* 5:33 (October 1958): 149-186. Quoted in Pyla, *op cit.*, p.95, 98.

could reproduce local climatological, aesthetic, social, and cultural requirements on a mass basis.[253]

What results from this approach is the coding of plan, elevation, and section as a complex socio-economic and aesthetico-technological calculus. Each arrangement—the location of family rooms and bedrooms around the courtyard, the location of guest rooms next to the entrance, loggias on the leeway side of the prevailing wind, the location of domes, vaults, and wind catchers—generated tables and charts of psychological, economic, and technological efficiencies. The organization of household activity around the central courtyard was a matter not only of natural illumination and ventilation to different spaces, but also allocation of serenity and privacy to reduce psychological stress.[254]

This centrality of form—form as the mediator of social, economic, and scientific forces—betrayed in the importance laid on the careful articulation of section, plan, and elevation—is absent in the core house. In the core house, the arrangement of walls is left to the discretion of the inhabitant. The possibilities of plan are only limited by external limitations such as height restriction, layout of the foundations, and party walls. The interior is emptied out of all design requirements. All administration and development prescriptions end at the envelope of site. Abrams

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[253] Fathy, Architecture of the Poor, op cit; Also see, James Steele, *An Architecture for the People: Tile Complete Works of Hassan Fathy* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1997); James Steele, Hassan Fathy, Architectural Monographs 13 (London: St. Marton's Press, 1988).

[254] For instance, Fathy adopted the idea of courtyard as "temperature regulator," from Daniel Dunham, a researcher at the Department of Tropical Architecture at the Architectural Association, London in the early 1960. A summary of Durnham's article also appeared in Ekistics (September 1, 1961). Daniel Dunham, article, "The Courtyard House as a Temperature Regulator," appeared in the *The New Scientist* in 1960 (Sept 8, 1960): 663-666.

and Koenigsberger stressed this differentiation during their mission to the Gold Coast. As part of their broad proposal that combined land reform (on which we say more later), legislative changes, and financial restructuring, they proposed core housing to be the primary government sponsored form of housing. As we saw earlier, the photographs of the project depict a core house without a "core" in the traditional Western neo-traditionalist sense. Though these particular houses were later "filled in" through standard designs on a self-help basis, they were to serve as a model of future core intervention in Bolivia, Nigeria, and Kenya in which the provision of governmental loans was limited to the construction of the plinth and the roof and, in some cases, windows and doors.[255]

This shift can be, and had been, explained as an economic response to the impossibility of funding a large number of finished houses on the model of early housing schemes. Yet that shift cannot occur without a shift in the idea of the development subject and the architectural object. The emptying out of the interior of the core house represents a shift in the framing of the role of the Third World subject in the development enterprise. The core house is proposed to acknowledge the necessity of recognizing the agency of the inhabitant.

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[255] See, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast*, prepared for the government of the Gold Coast by Charles Abrams, Vladimir Bodiansky, Otto H.G. Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1956); *Report on Housing Financing in Bolivia*, prepared for the government of Bolivia by Charles Abrams (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1959); *Metropolitan Lagos: Report Prepared for the Government of Nigeria under the United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance* (New York: United Nations, Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, 1964); *United Nations Mission to Kenya on Housing*, prepared for the Government of Kenya by Lawrence N. Bloomberg and Charles Abrams (Nairobi: United Nations, Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, 1965).

The focus on the agency of the development subject contrasts with the previous approaches that bound design and development. In both Fathy and Doxiadis' design proposals the interior was seen as a micro-cosmos of the larger socio-psychological terrain. The house was seen as the direct means of producing the worker, having a socializing function related to, yet outside, the economic complex. In this continuist narrative, the intersection of tradition and modernity so celebrated by the designers, nevertheless emphasized their separation. In this dialectic, tradition is framed as a natural and static sphere, while the inhabitant, its naturalized subject, ahistorical and unchanging. The extraction of modern scientific principles from traditional forms was described as the responsibility of the designer. It was important that to the inhabitant the house still appeared "traditional."

The emphasis on transition we observed earlier serves to assign historical agency to the development subject. As a subject in transition, the Third World subject is no longer unified with the traditional realm and the traditional object, the rural house. With the migrant's journey to the city, the house and the inhabitant are separated. As the future inhabitant of the core house, s/he has the ability to transform the object through conscious intervention guaging the economic and material resources of the new urban context.

"The Gold Coast," stressed Abrams and Koenigsberger

> is undergoing a period of social and economic *transition* which makes it
> extremely difficult, if not impossible, to set standards of minimum housing
> requirements that would be uniformly applicable or which would survive the

impacts of migration and other economic developments now unforeseen but inevitable [emphasis added].[256]

The shift to the envelope of the house makes itself apparent most strongly in the climatological calculations for core houses. In this arena, it is Koenigsberger, rather than Abrams who has the disciplinary authority. Koenigsberger's climatological calculations are not concerned with the architectural object, and therefore not focused on the manifestation of climatic calculations in the plan. For Koenigsberger, the architecture's connection to industrialization, and to socio-economic development in general, was cut off at the roof. In his famous book, *Roofs in the Warm and Humid Climates*, Koenigsberger argued that while cultural and climatic demands, and economic conditions in the west instituted the wall as the primary element of the house, in the context of the temperate, dry, and arid climate and limited capital resources of the Third World, it would be the roof that would have to serve as the engine of socio-economic transformation through housing.[257] This point is also stressed in the *UN Manual on Low Cost Housing* he prepared in collaboration with others at the Department of Development and Tropical Studies of the AA.[258] While the example of traditional houses are shown in

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[256] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p. 44.

[257] Otto Koenigsberger's *Roofs in the Warm and Humid Climates,* Architectural Association Papers; no. 1 (London: Lund, Humphries, 1965). p. 1. As the design of walls of the core house is given over to the occupant, standardization, that modernist dictum connecting architecture to industrial production, looses its position in the development equation. The discourse on standardization shifts from instituting standards of form—room number and sizes, standardized plans and sections—to is instituted not in the repetition of modular formal elements, but rather through setting standards of material properties and climatological performances.

[258] This emphasis on the roof can also be observed in Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney and Martin Evans, *Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971), UN Document ST/SOA/93.

detailed plans, the guidelines for new houses based on the lessons drawn from vernacular housing focus on laying out schematic sections. When plans are shown they are devoid of internal details (FIG. 16).

This can be seen as a reflection of climatology's focus on the envelope of the house most exposed to the elements. Yet, this shift is simultaneously tied to an alternative economic model of housing, its role in the development, and the role of the individual as the subject of development.

The process of constructing an interior in the core house is imagined to hold a different position in the economic equation than the one imagined by Fathy and Doxiadis (FIG. 17). The socio-economic relations manifesting themselves in the interior are considered too complex and too broad to be directly moldable through architecture. As Koenigsberger et al. stressed in the UN manual on the *Design of Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities*, one of the critical factors in any housing plan was the "time scale in house design – relating plan to changing social needs."[259]

In the core house, the individual cannot be approached through static architectural elements. Climatology of the core shell focuses on the dynamism of use in time, rather than static arrangements of the plan in space. Its focus is on the *range* of activity, not the efficiency of specific motions. All architectural configurations are limited to the threshold of the exterior. Their influence on the interior is mediated through formless phenomena, such as temperature, light, and wind, bodily sensations that influence the behavior of the inhabitant necessarily without form.

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[259] Otto Koenigsberger et al., *Climate and House Design, op cit.,* p. 7.

Following this unpredictability, Koenigsberger et al. suggested that

> even such commonly accepted space measures as "room" should be dropped from
> the vocabulary of space standards, since not all people live in rooms as do the
> typical city-dwellers of colder regions. In fact, in some climates 'space that can be
> covered and opened" and 'community space and private space' have more
> meaning than the traditional concept of rooms.[260]

With the core house, and Koenigsberger's brand of climatology, architecture gives up the pretense to climatological determinism: the idea of directly influencing the occupant's propensity for economic development and efficiency, something we witnessed in Doxiadis and Fathy's framing of the importance of standardization and traditionally inspired modernist design. In the core house, the role of architecture is limited to facilitating the tentative intersection of the socio-cultural and the economic. The climatological shell does not attempt to mold the socio-cultural values intersecting in the interior. The household is not imagined through the bounds of the interior, but as a field of behavior spread onto a broader socio-economic terrain.

This concern with the extended socio-economic terrain is betrayed in the comfort zone charts of the temperature analyses during the day (FIG. 18). The house is not seen to be limited to the interior but defined as a map of a broader field of activity, in which different occupants are likely to use the house at different times (during the day "men are out at work," "children are at school," and "women at home"). "No room or open space is used all the time by all members of a household," Koonigsberger asserted.[261] The core shell employs this concept of a

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[260] Ibid., p. 4.

[261] Ibid.

broader movement to present the limited provision of space and budget for the core house as adequate for the functioning of the household.

As opposed to the "traditionally inspired" climatic devices of Fathy and Doxiadis' designs, the climatological logic of the core house is not limited to the envelope of the house. The warm temperatures during the day demand thick walls to absorb heat. Yet the same walls generate heat during the night mandating the presence of outdoor sleeping space. Since all these requirements extend beyond the budget of the core house, the core shell is imagined on the presumption that the inhabitants would be able to organize the limited space of the interior around their different schedules—when they are off to work, school, doing errands outside the house— such that only a few spaces could satisfy the requirements of different activities at different times of the day. Responding to these budgetary and climatological requirements, the core house doesn't seek to plan an interior, only situate itself within the existing socio-economic terrain.

Consequently, the core house is not concerned with the shape of the house, but how it can relate the socio-cultural practices of the inhabitants with the larger economic field (FIG. 19). It is the opportunity of this interaction that Abrams and Koenigsberger saw being wasted when they saw building material lying fallow in the streets of Accra:

> [E]verywhere in the cities we saw people of small and moderate means saving
> building blocks and storing them in the areaways and in backyards...Block-savings
> has more implications than appear on the surface. Savings which normally might
> be channeled into long-term investments lie sterilized in blocks that will probably
> never see the mason's trowel or shelter an occupant. The cement used in the
> blocks is paid for with money that does out of the country but produces no wealth

within it. In that sense it is even less constructive than the purchase of local gems as a form of savings. The family foregoes purchase of other necessities in favour of the futile block and despite the need, the product rarely contributes to the production of the housing for which it was intended. Often the blocks are actually set up, but the house remains unfinished because of inability to finance the purchase of a roof or the other final elements of the structure.[262]

With the core house, the primary characteristic attributed to architecture in the development process changes from being its physical form to the specific economic form(ation) it enables. Architecture is no longer seen as a medium that controls the behavior of the inhabitants through design. Rather, it constitutes a process that requires the inhabitant to save and invest in a manner that relates to industrial production and circuits of finance.

It is this interaction that Abrams and Koenigsberger attempted to formalize through their proposal for the "roof loan" scheme for the core houses which, quite simply, provided a loan for just the roof and not the house itself. First proposed in the Gold Coast, the scheme was repeated by Abrams in Bolivia, and then later together by Abrams and Koenigsberger in Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, and Kenya in the following years. Koenigsberger had already described the roof as the most critical weather-related element of the house in the tropics in his climatological studies. With the roof loan, we see how those calculations become a vehicle to carry out the economic logic surrounding the core house.

The roof loan turns the architectural sequence of financing a building on its head. Though the house still began with foundations and walls, each building block put in place served as collateral to receive the loan for the roof, and "final elements of

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[262] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p. 21.

the structure," such as doors and windows, elements whose expense, according to Abrams and Keonigberger, prevented the assembly of blocks into a building before. The roof loan schemes would not only "ease the perplexing problem of the 'unfinished house,'" the authors asserted, "[but it would] even bring into being the 'unstarted house,' represented by the vast stocks of sterilized building blocks punctuating city streets."[263] The roof loan not only presumed consent even before the house began, but also translated that consent is into a logic of finance that inscribed the inhabitants' savings into the calculus of development at the least risk to the financial institutions and the greatest risk to the inhabitants.

This strategy risk management inherent in the roof loan scheme did not evade Abrams and Koenigsberger. Since the "[l]oans on the roof would be represented by the last section of the building," argued the authors, "[it] enable[d] the lending agency to be selective in its loans and reduce the danger of defaults in completion. The loans would be made only when, after inspection, the roofless building was found to have a good foundation and a solid wall structure."[264]

The emptying out of the building—the erasure of the plan, if you will—inscribed architecture into a broader economic field and a strategy of risk management by only dictating requirements for materials and specifications while avoiding the added cost and risk of controlling formal design and construction supervision.

A core house thus is simultaneously a spatial structure and a temporal infrastructure. It provides a node at which the unpredictable socio-cultural changes

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[263] Ibid. p. 77.

[264] Ibid.

are made to interact, through the mechanism of mortgage financing, tenure

allocation, employment of industrially produced building materials, into a larger

financial and industrial framework. Its function is not to mold the spatial form of

the socio-cultural terrain, but to tally the changes in that terrain over time. It is this

dual role, spatial and temporal, that Keonigsber would christen as "urban

infrastructure systems" later in *Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing*

Countries, a study carried out for the Ford Foundation:

> There is a need to design urban systems which respond both to the resources
> available in various countries and to the different time scales of potential change
> in these resources. That is: Urban infrastructure systems needs to be designed to fit
> the income levels of different countries, taking account of the ways in which
> incomes are likely to change over time.[265]

This status of the core house as a temporal infrastructure reduces the interior to a

schematic hollow, charting it only through schematic arrows representing air

movement and bouncing rays of light (FIG. 20). These abstractions represent its

status as a socio-cultural black-box. The socio-cultural terrain manifested in the

core house is seen to be too complex to be predictably modeled into economic

planning. The economy meets the socio-cultural terrain of the occupant at the

exterior of the house.[266]

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[265] Otto Koenigsberger et al., Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing Countries, International Urbanization Survey (Ford Foundation, 1973). p. 1. Koenigsberger here is citing David E. Bell, "Ekistics," 30: 179 (October 1970): p. 321-322.

[266] If the plan of the individual house leaves the interior to the unpredictable choices of the inhabitants, those sub-rational gestures are seen to begin to form a unified pattern at the scale of the site plan and at the larger scale of a region. The climatoloigcal shell provides only as a locational market at the level of the house. The logic and rational it seeks to construct is considered to make itself apparent at scale which is invisible to the inhabitant herself.

It is precisely this declared opacity of the socio-cultural complex to the economic calculations that allows it to be situated in that calculus as the engine of economic growth. This framing of the socio-cultural terrain as opaque to economic analyses, yet related to it, mapped by the core house, plays a critical role in the staging of policy intervention in cross-cultural contexts. Architecture allows development economics to enter the socio-cultural complex without staking any claims to changing it.

Yet, it is precisely in bracketing the development terrain as too diverse, complex, and shifting in its socio-cultural dimensions to be knowable through economic science, that architecture participates in setting up a more transparent set of legalistic and economic categories, such as the individual, with universally applicable traits, such as the drive for economic betterment, categories which act as economic "black boxes" in terms of their internal characteristics, yet provide critical alibi for setting up legal infrastructure and assuming consent. The agency of the development subject is recognized in terms of her ability to construct the core house, and in being in excess of any socio-cultural behavioral mold projected onto her. But that agency is recognized only as agency of the pending development subject.

This framing of economic behavior as a realm whose socio-cultural causes were opaque to economic analyses betrays a shift in development thinking, from a focus on identifying why (why people do what they do) to how (how does what they do affect economic growth). Economic growth, instead of being defined as a problem of constructing mutually reinforcing socio-cultural values and traits, is defined as a process of juxtaposing "contradictory" social practices as "pressure

points" against each other for generating economic activity. The latter, called disequilibrium analysis, begins to establish itself within international development institutions as a "realistic" approach that could provide immediate and concrete policy directions.

Let us return to the economic context surrounding the core house we looked at earlier, only this time to a different aspect of it. If the idea of a transitory individual made the idea of Big Push industrialization and "balanced" or "equilibrium" growth—the "macro" dimension of the development planning—plausible in the Third World, then in its "micro" dimension, development planning was driven by a different paradigm: "unbalanced" or "disequilibrium growth," which explicitly argued that contradictory socio-economic developments can not only be tolerated but have a rationale that could be harnessed for economic growth.

It was Arthur Lewis, whom we mentioned earlier, who occupied both sides of this micro and macro equation. Despite his neo-classical methodology of a balanced approach, Lewis recognized the limitation of classical modeling in development and advocated the virtues of unbalanced growth:

> The most difficult problem…is to explain why people hold the beliefs they do.
> Economic Growth depends on attitudes to work, to wealth, to thrift, to having
> children, to invention, to strangers, to adventure, and so on, and all these attitudes
> flow from deep springs in the human mind. There have been attempts to explain
> why these attitudes vary from one community to another. One can look to
> difference in religion, but this is merely to restate the problem…The experienced

sociologist knows that these questions are unanswerable, certainly in our present state of knowledge. And probably for all time....[267]

The two mutually opposing philosophies, balanced and unbalanced growth existed simultaneously in the development institutions and formed a unique productive combination, intersecting in the profile of the development subject. The core house, as an important site of this subject production, is a unique development instrument that is able to resolve the demands of both the micro and macro dimensions. Let us briefly look at some of the prominent features of disequilibrium analysis before we return to Abrams, Koenigsberger, and later to Turner, to see how their arguments of core housing both contribute to and draw on the space created by equilibrium and disequilibrium analyses.

3.4 Rational Distortions:

Walter Rostow, the MIT professor whose theory of socio-economic "stages" of development cast a major influence on World Bank policy during his tenure as an advisor to the Johnson and Kennedy governments, retrospectively argued in 1990 that ignoring the continuing presence of "disequilibrium" missed a major operating force in economic growth:

> the pain, complexity, and endless creativity inherent in the process of growth,
> including the strain, costs, and exhilaration of shifting from one set of leading
> sectors to another...Growth analysis inherently consists of such successive phases
> of irreversible dynamic disequilibrium, each solving a problem but creating new
> problems to solve.[268]

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[267] Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp. 14-16.

[268] Walter Rostow, *Theories of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 367.

Rostow reflected the dominant view in development economics when he argued that the theories of equilibrium in growth are misguided to seek systemic regularities where there is only a broad terrain of deviations: "practitioners of the craft of comparative structural analyses of economies fail to capture this process [of change] because the dynamic model implicit in their charting of transformation from poverty to affluence is one of general equilibrium."[269] For Rostow, economic theory had to acknowledge that development happens by exception and deviation from the averaged-out coefficients of the data that aims to define uniformities. These deviations, asserted Rostow, figure only as "residual black boxes" in equilibrium theory.[270]

The idea of modeling disequilibrium had preoccupied famous economists at least since Marshall and Paretto, both of whom strove to construct within the neo-classical economic tradition more nuanced and flexible economic models that could absorb "extra-economic" variables into growth calculations. Rostow's resurrection of this preoccupation betrays the centrality the idea occupied in development economics and policy debate. From Albert Hirschman to Simon Kuznet to Rostow, development economists described developed as an "endless succession of growth problems" via the pressures of disequilibrium.[271]

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[269] Ibid. p. 367.

[270] Ibid., p. 371.

[271] Ibid., p. 367. Also see Simon Kuznet, *Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business Cycles, National Income, and Economic Growth* (New York: Norton, 1953); Albert Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, Yale Studies in Economics v. 10. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

As opposed to disequilibrium analysis, theories of equilibrium in growth only

sought to map systemic regularities underlying a broad terrain of deviations.

Economists like Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, who favored comparative

statistical models that emphasized equilibrium growth, themselves acknowledged

that while equilibrium models such as theirs may well suggest "the interdependent

changes in resource allocation which underlie the major development patterns,"

they cannot explain the "erratic" course economic growth actually assumes.[272] Even

though the range of variation is wide in equilibrium analyses, Chenery argued,

they are underpinned by the "grand assertion of the ultimate imperatives of

balanced growth and dynamic equilibrium."[273] This sentiment was shared others

who favored balanced growth. For Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, whose seminal paper

we encountered earlier, the idea of equilibrium was counter-informative if it didn't

take into account "the pursuit curve which shows the dynamic path toward

equilibrium."[274]

For Rostow, this framing of development defined it as a set of problems attended

by chaos theorists, problems, that related to "a science of process rather than state,

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[272] Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, *Patterns of Development: 1950-1970*
(London: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1975), p. 10.

[273] Ibid.

[274] Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "Natura Facit Saltum," *in* Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers,
eds., *Pioneers in Development* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank,
1984), p. 208. Rodan explains the idea of "the pursuit curve" with the following analogy:
"A dog pursues a hare, without anticipation, along the shortest distance at which he sees
him (a straight line). Meanwhile the hare runs from point 1 to 2. When the dog sees him
again in this new position he again runs along the shortest distance (a straight line) in
which he sees him. Meanwhile the hare runs to point 3, and so on. The line along which
the dog runs is what we want to explain. It is determined by a straight-line distance
wherever the dog sees the hare. The overwhelming majority of the points of the pursuit
curve are disequilibrium points. It many be called "state of equilibrium" if the dog
ultimately catches the hare. (Pareto had mentioned it but never worked it out)."

of becoming rather than being...[where] the disorderly behavior of simple systems acted as a creative process [that] generated...richly organized patterns, sometime stable and sometime unstable..."[275]

For the proponent of disequilibrium analysis, economic theory had to acknowledge that economic growth happens by exception and deviation from the average behavior of the model that aimed to define uniformities. In statistical analysis those complexities were left out. This was the terrain of non-economic variables. These deviations, asserted Rostow, form "residual black boxes" that give the growth path a unique character.[276]

For Rostow and others favoring disequilibrium analysis, the unpredictability of economic growth did not strengthen the case for laissez-faire economics but hinted at a different methodology of economic planning. It was Albert Hirschman, economic advisor on one of the first World Bank development missions to Colombia, who stressed this point in particular. Commenting on his early proposals in the World Bank's volume on "pioneers of development economics", Hirschman argued that what may be regarded as elements of irrationality or distortion in a developing economy in fact provided a structure of powerful incentives to solve problems, and thus manifested themselves as elements of a "hidden rationality" on another scale.[277]

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[275] Rostow, *Theories of Economic Growth, op cit.*, p. 367.

[276] Ibid. p. 371.

[277] *Pioneers in Development, op cit.*, pp. 92, 96.

Shortages and bottlenecks, capital-intensive industrial processes in an apparently labor-surplus economy, pressures induced by inflation and balance-of-payment deficits, pressures created by commitments to produce finished manufactured products, were all mobilizing and productive forces in a developing economy. Unlike laissez-faire, disequilibrium analysis acknowledged the unpredictability of the market and yet used that unpredictability as a management tool in itself. These forces of disequilibrium could not be left on their own, as laissez-faire economists suggested. The invisible hand of the market identified by Adam Smith needed guidance. The ensuing disequilibrium in an economy was to be managed for productive ends through the logic of "pressure points":

> I now searched for a general economic principle that would tie [disequilibrium factors] together. To this end, I suggest that underdeveloped countries need 'pressure mechanisms' or 'pacing devices' to bring forth their potential. In my most general formulation I wrote: 'development depends not so much on finding optimal combinations for given resources and factors of production as on calling forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized.[278]

Disequilibrium analysis attempted to break open the arithmetic black-box with a series of non-economic factors, variables, race, class, philosophy, ethics that claimed to take into account the complexity of the socio-cultural terrain. With this turn, the economic calculus itself is made to move away from an arithmetic to a humanistic mold, from an emphasis on arithmetic modeling to preponderance of assertive arguments, from being based on the rigidity of the proof to malleability of rhetoric. It is this move away from modeling that is now recalled as the primary reason behind development economics' demise. Yet it was precisely this move that

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[278] Ibid., p. 94.

allowed development economics to negotiate the demands of accounting for cultural and geo-political differences in economic planning.

Yet in doing so, we see a different logic of "black-boxes" being set up. While we see the set of non-economic variables proliferate in disequilibrium analysis approaches, the separation between the internal logic of the socio-cultural phenomenon under consideration and its relationship to economic calculus remains intact. Keeping this division intact while creating a space for non-economic variables in economic calculations was, in a sense, the ingenuity of disequilibrium analysts (the very idea of the non-economic "variable" denotes this division). Under this division the socio-cultural phenomenon is held in a parenthesis, as a place holder, which is seen to have an internal logic of its own that can be measured only in terms of input and output in its interaction with the economic calculus. In this framing, the socio-cultural or geo-political complex is not so much dehistoricized as held in abeyance. There is an implicit acknowledgement of the historical complexity of the development terrain, yet at the same time that complexity is seen as an independent variable like any other. What emerges is a set of economic calculations seeped in a language of cultural relativism that both lay a claim to account for the "uniqueness" of a particular scenario and are able to hold that uniqueness in a form that is workable in economic calculations.[279]

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[279] This strategy of abeyance, however, still operated under the promise of full (en)closure with technical improvements in economic science. For advocates of disequilibrium analyses such as Rostow and Hirschman, the parenthetic presence of socio-cultural variables represented only a contingent arrangement until better or more technically nuance modeling techniques were able to account for the complexities that they held. In other words, disequilibrium analyses though acknowledged the unknowable character of socio-cultural complexities it encountered in economic calculations, this was only seen as

Disequilibrium analysis held the ability to bracket out the complexities of socio-cultural phenomena within economic calculations; both acknowledging their complexity and ignoring it, rather than ignoring their existence or claiming to account for them in their completeness. It is these qualities that gave disequilibrium theorists the advantage of operating in a development context where claims of economic precedence, models, and planning were pressed to address the question of geo-political and socio-cultural difference. It is therefore not surprising that while dynamic disequilibrium analysis took root in mainstream Anglo-American economics in the 60's, it emerged in the development arena.

3.5 The New Model of Expertise:

With the rise of disequilibrium analysis, we begin to see not only a new mode of economic planning but also a new profile of the development economist, one whose criticism of the agenda of the institution he operates within extends the scope of that institutional agenda instead of undermining it. When in 1983, the World Bank published a critical retrospective volume on the ten "pioneers of development," a majority of the authors, including those mentioned above, were described, either by themselves in new essays or introductions to their work by

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a technical limitation which would be solved with increasingly complex modeling techniques, a sentiment we still see shared by contemporary economists such as Paul Krugman when they attribute the demise of development theories in the late 70s and 80s to their lack of modeling techniques. Yet, even though the idea of black box is based on the promise of complete knowledge, that promise is always pending. Each new modeling techniques produces further unknown variable, more black boxes. The preponderance of disequilibrium analyses in development terrain point to the critical role that perpetuating cycle plays in economic planning. In the initial years of 1950s and 60s, because of, this promise of complete knowledge, the idea of black-box takes on a the character of a somewhat standardized modeling technique

the editors, as "dissenters" within the development arena.[280] This framing betrays the role of the disequilibrium analyst in the development apparatus: a self-critical figure who, in willing to acknowledging the "resourcefulness" of the "benefactors" of development, translates all demands and criticisms into vetted categories of the institutions he professes to challenge.

The "pioneers" of disequilibrium analysis such as Peter Bauer, Albert Hirschman, and Colin Clark, all used different variants of disequilibrium approaches to challenge what they called the economic orthodoxy of their times for ignoring socio-cultural particularities of the late colonial or newly decolonized context they operated within in their respective positions.

It was Albert Hirschman, whose description of "hidden rationality" of unbalanced growth and "pacing devices" of disequilibrium planning we saw earlier, who perhaps most strongly proclaimed this role. As mentioned earlier, Hirschman was one of the first economic experts sent abroad by the World Bank. Soon after arriving in Columbia on his first assignment, Hirschman turned against the development plan handed to him by the Bank:

> [W]ord came from World Bank headquarters that I was principally expected to take, as soon as possible, the initiative in formulating some ambitious economic development plan that would spell out investment, domestic savings growth, and foreign aid targets for the Colombian economy over the next few years. All of this was alleged to be quite simple for experts mastering the new programming technique: apparently there now existed adequate knowledge, even without close study of local surroundings, of the like ranges of savings and capital-output ratios, and those estimates, joined to the country's latest national income and balance of

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[280] Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., *Pioneers in Development* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1984).

payments accounts, would yield all the key figures needed. I resisted being relegated to this sort of programming activity.[281]

The primary focus of the "close study of local surroundings" flaunted by Hirshman as an alternative to the "sort of programming activity" advocated by the Bank headquarters was the emphasis on revision of economic projections:

> Because of the interdependence of the economy in the input-output sense, the expansion of one sector or subsector ahead of the other could be relied on to set forth in motion (relative price changes and public policies in response to complaints about shortages) that would tend to eliminate the initial imbalance.[282]

As Rostow later noted in his review of Hirschman's piece in the World Bank "pioneers" volume,

> in evoking his instruction from World Bank headquarters and the major battle he fought 'against the then widely alleged need for a 'balanced'…industrialization effort, Hirschman…[was] in indulging in a caricature….I have never known a serious development planner who didn't understand that a 5-year plan had to be revised every year at least in the light of unexpected distortions…[283]

Yet the caricature so vividly drawn up by Hirschman cannot be discarded so easily. Though there might have been in Hirschman's proposal, to use Rostow's words again, "an element of rediscovering the wheel [and of] shock at finding that history does not move forward along smooth paths with all sectors in dynamic equilibrium," the caricature allowed Hirschman to posit a new profile of the

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[281] Ibid., p. 90.

[282] Ibid., p. 105.

[283] Rostow, *Theories of Economic Growth, op cit.,* p. 391.

development planner as in the classic mold of the "man in the field" reacting against an ill-informed center.[284]

Hirschman's ingenuity lay in attempting to institute contingency planning, or crisis management, as the primary engine of the development proposals, rather than a supplementary mechanism. In the last measure, we are reminded, albeit unwittingly, by Hirschman himself that the emphasis on contingency works to abdicate responsibility implicit in a plan. The methods of this contingent approach were contingent at best:

> Would you actually advocate unbalanced growth, capital-intensive investment, inflation, and so on? The honest, if a bit unsatisfactory answer must be: yes, but of course within some fairly strict limits. There is no doubt that the unbalanced growth strategy can be overdone, with dire consequences...But is it not unreasonable to ask the inventor of the internal combustion engine to come up immediately with design for pollution control and airbags?[285]

The 5-year plan was to be revised every year in light of *unexpected* changes. With unbalance growth, Hirschman sought to purge development planning of its claim to a plan as its justifying logic, and have it legitimize itself on its readiness to revise its goals. With this turn, the expert is no longer a representative of the center but becomes an advocate of the periphery.

These characteristics take on an even starker tone in the work of Peter Bauer. Bauer, previously an economist of the British Colonial office, consulted widely for the World Bank. Yet, at the same time, he was a staunch opponent of centralized

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[284] Ibid., p. 392.

[285] *Pioneers of Development, op cit.*, p. 96.

planning and government intervention in the market advanced by the UN and the World Bank in the 1950s. Bauer situated his opposition on the basis of his early experience in studying the rubber industry in Malaya and cocoa and other cash crop trade in British West Africa in the 1940s. Bauer argued that the informal and traditional trade networks he witnessed showed a resilience and flexibility of the shrewd and quick responsiveness of local farmers to incentives and disincentives. The formal neo-classical analysis based on centralized planning and state intervention was unable to take into account these cultural and social qualities in predicting the behavior of the market.

Bauer's net of criticism was vast. During this period, he emerged as an ardent polemicist whose criticism not only targeted the World Bank's development approach, but also those of other advocates of centralized planning, including the policies of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, P. C. Mahalanobis at the Indian Statistical Institute, and the latter's contribution to the Indian Second Five Year Plan that emphasized expansion of the capital goods industries. The opposition to centralized planning led Bauer to also oppose the idea of the New International Economic Order put together by the consortium of Third World governments in response to the asymmetric trading practices of the Bretton Wood institutions.

Bauer's staging of a counter current to developing orthodoxy deliberately shies away from any attempt at modeling. Walter Rostow, whose *Stages of Growth* theory of development itself had been the target of Bauer's criticism, recounted Bauer's stance as a particular feature of the latter's argument: "Bauer never organized his more subtle perception about societies as a whole and related them systematically to the economic process. There is a gap between the market

economist and the wider but somewhat casual commentator on the human condition."[286] What Rostow ignores here is that Bauer and other disequilibrium theorists didn't feel the need to model their casual commentary on the human condition because it was precisely a mode of managed indeteminancy that they intended to outline, the arena where the arithmetic model reached its limits. In the name of flexibility of the market, and resourcefulness "on the ground," what is advanced is the possibility of the flexibility of the policy itself.

The increased emphasis on rhetoric and policy as a result of the indeterminate yet productive socio-cultural forces can also be seen in the work of another dissenter within the ranks, Colin Clark. Even though Clark emphasized increasing formalization in economic analysis and argued for extending the scope of contemporary statistical methods, in his famous two-volume work, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (1940, 1951), he sought to do so through propositions that situated him close to Bauer's rhetorical and informal stance within the institutional arena of development.[287]

In India, Clark began a comparative study of agriculture in developing countries that continued for 20 years and finally culminated in his famous book, an approach that shows his training and experience as welfare economist in the Cambridge tradition of Malthus and Keynes. He based the hypothesis drawn from the immense statistical data collected in the two editions of the book, however, on

[286] Rostow, *Theories of Economic Growth, op cit.*, p. 386.

[287] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: Macmillan, 1940, 1951).

what he called the inescapable hierarchy of values—philosophical and religious, ethical and political—that determined welfare consideration in all societies.

The result was a set of theoretical assertions that inverted the established conclusions at the World Bank regarding some of the fundamental postulates of development thinking such as population growth and idle agriculture labor. Reflecting on his earlier view of the 1940s that high population increase was "disadvantageous," Clark argued that "[n]early everyone then, as indeed now, tended to regard population growth as an adverse factor…But with growing population a mistaken piece of physical investment is much more likely to find an alternative use than in a state of stationary population."[288] Similarly, Clark challenged the view that "low productivity countries" have reserves of idle agriculture labor that could be employed in industrial production, except seasonally. "After all, to put it simply," he asserted, "if you are going to cultivate a country the size of China with hand hoes—very few draft animals and still fewer tractors were available—you are going to need the labor of something like 600 million people."[289]

In a manner similar to Bauer, Clark also targeted the centralizing policies of the Indian statistician and economic planner, P. C. Mahalanobis at the Indian Statistical Institute. To make his argument, however, he put forth Gandhi's support of the village industry movement as an attestation for free-market reform:

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[288] *Pioneers of development, op cit.*, pp. 75-76.

[289] Ibid., p. 65.

Gandhi (nobody would believe this)," he averred with evident relish, "proved to be a convinced free-market economist, strongly critical of the price controls, rationing, and compulsory purchase of farm crops which the Nehru government was then introducing. The right solution, he said, was to raise the price of food, then everyone would have to work harder. The source of India's troubles was that the people were thoroughly idle.[290]

It is important to note that what remains intact in these series of reversals of the development "status quo," is the breach between the socio-cultural and the economic in the development equation. The "values" employed to give hierarchy to statistical data are treated as self-contained entities with self-contained internal logic, the interaction of which with economic relations can be measured in terms of input and output alone. The fundamental parenthetic structure of this relationship allows the accommodation of any resistance to development projects within the marked out socio-cultural sphere. This accommodation preserves the logic of development, precluding the possibility of unraveling how particular socio-cultural framings, from the idea of the individual to tradition, shape the structure of the economic and make value exchange possible. What is advanced in the self-declared form of dissent within the ranks is a particular mechanism of absorbing resistance to development. Indeed in all of these examples of the dynamic disequilibrium approach, what is given up is the sanctity of the model. What is outlined is the limit of economic law. Gained in its place is the malleability of a different realm: policy.

Development is presented as a project not just of planning, but also of confronting the difficulties of implementation. The scope of economic theory is displaced from

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[290] Ibid., p. 63.

identifying the rules of economic behavior to correcting the inevitable

shortcomings of any economic projections. It is in this spirit that Hirschman

defended the theory of unbalanced growth with its "remarkable unintended

effects" in *The Passions and the Interests*.[291] These characteristics, the ideas of

hidden rationality, scale of association, sensitivity to cultural and social values,

recognizing the resourcefulness of the participants, allow the expert to stake out a

position as an advocate for the development subject against the development

institution.[292]

In all these dissenting voices, we see an emerging tendency toward describing

economic processes through non-mathematical relations, particularly when

identifying the influence of social and cultural forces. This tendency has often

been described as a result of the lack of modeling techniques available to

development economists in the '50s and the '60s. Yet, if we look at what role this

non-mathematical modeling plays in the overall argument being made, it does not

betray a shortcoming, but appears to serve a particular purpose in making a case

for a particular mode of development intervention. In Bauer, Clark, Hirschman,

and Lewis' arguments, we see a concerted effort to outline the limits of economic

modeling. It is at this limit, that a new space for contingent policy intervention is

carved out. Policy is defined as contingent intervention at the limit of economic

modeling, raising its status from a tool for implementing economic hypotheses to a

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[291] It is in this spirit that Hirschman defended the theory of unbalanced growth with its "remarkable unintended effects" in his *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[292] This position was mutually staked out and defended. It was Carlos Diaz Alejandro who defended Hirschman's dissent in Clark's book, *Condition of Economic Progress*, as a fight against, "vulgar recipes imposed on the weak or the vanquished." See *Pioneers of Development, op cit.,* p. 90.

mechanism of another sort of economic modeling, one that was necessarily incomplete and always operated in response to constant socio-cultural changes on the ground.

This muddling of the economic terrain, however, emphasizes the differentiation of the economic and the non-economic, as intermingled but separate spheres. While the socio-cultural is opaque to economic calculations, it permeates through the web of economic relations and can be measured, albeit partially and only intermittently, through the logic of input and output.

This diffused separation emphasizes that whatever appears irrational on the ground is rational at another level. It lays out the ground for a claim to universal human rationality through a certain logic of scale. This claim is *not* based on the assertion that this universal rational dimension is absent in certain populations and that it therefore needs to be introduced and cultivated through development schemes, that certain socio-cultural practices do not have modern economic consequences. Rather, it is asserted that the universal rational dimension already exists everywhere. We only need to read it at the right scale. Since, however, this scale is continuously shifting, we cannot predict the workings of this hidden rationality through economic calculations and standardized economic models alone. The path to growth is always going to be through disequilibrium, imbalance, and over- and underestimations.

This framing of the relationship between the economic and the socio-cultural has important repercussion in the framing of the development interventions. This

assertion that the development subjects are rational despite themselves, preempts all possibilities of resistance to prescribed development approaches.

This strategy of preempting resistance can also operate in reverse, positing the "rational" behavior of the third world subject to be *irrational* on another scale. We may remember that the example of sterilized savings blocks lying in the streets of Accra often repeated by Abrams, could be described as "sterilized" precisely because they could be framed as counter-productive and irrational at the scale of the "regional" economy.

Architecture functions as a critical element in the creation of a space between policy and model, socio-cultural and the economic, enabling this particular mode of reading the development terrain as an inevitably productive terrain despite itself. It is one of the unique development tools that indeterminately straddle the socio-cultural and economic dimensions, emphasizing their separation and intersection. It has a composite nature that can relate different dimensions in terms of input and output. And most importantly, in the mode of self-help, it undoes the sequentially of development as an intervention on a virgin *tabula rasa* that bears the burden of proving its effectiveness. All village housing is carried out, Abrams and Koenigsberger had reminded us in various contexts, on a self-help basis.[293] Architecture as self-help is simultaneously the evidence for and the result of the principles of unbalanced growth advocated by disequilibrium analysis.

It is this logic of preempting resistance that Abrams and Koenigsberger employ to confront the question of political demands of "squatters" on their missions to the

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[293] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p 6

Philippines and Pakistan, where they propose core housing as a strategy of relocation and land reform. Returning to Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Turner, we see how the core and "sites and services" schemes advocated by the trio contribute to and draw from the mode of development intervention set up by the proponents of disequilibrium analysis and unbalanced growth.

3.6 "Settlers Welcome": The Politics of Recognition

"In the long run…a sign on land made available which reads 'Settlers Welcome' will produce more acceptable, more durable and more morally-structured neighborhoods than the timid 'no trespass' sign that is respected more in the breach than in the observance."

Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for Pakistan*, (1957). [294]

More than a piece of land and a rudimentary structure, the core house is the conceptual site where the profile of the development subject is constructed as a conflicting negotiation between an innate, modern, individualistic realm and a traditional social realm. This profile would become instrumental in not only advancing the particular brand of partial incorporation into capitalist production we saw above, but also form the basis of censoring political demands from the discussions of development.

Very soon we see Abrams and Keonigsberger pushing the core housing approach to individual governments as an efficient strategy to not just provide housing, but

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[294] *A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation*, prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, September 14, 1957 (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1957), p. 19.

to tackle urgent political issues of land reform and legal status of "squatter" settlements. What is interesting in this realm is that this erasure is carried out not on the basis of categorically excluding political demands from development discussion, but laying out a field of protracted recognition of migrant politics, a strategy that would later take on the slogan of "empowering the poor." The core housing approach's strength lay in its apparent attempt to cater to the interest and political agency of its constituents.

We witness this strategy in Abrams and Koenigsberger's mission to Pakistan in 1957 and to the Philippines in 1959. When Koenigsberger and Abrams arrived in Pakistan, seventy five percent of the population of Karachi, then the country's capital, was housed in one or another squatter settlement. This was partly the result of the influx of refugees from India after the partition of the subcontinent at independence in 1947. Over the next decade, the situation had been exasperated by continuing migration to Karachi from other parts of Pakistan.

The logistics of the situation, however, were not the primary concern of the experts. Rather,

it was the political ramifications of the buildup of the squatter population in the city. "Mass squatting," Abrams and Keonigberger asserted,

> offers a formidable threat to...legal and property rights, and to community and national well-being. When the problem is ignored, illegal possession gradually develops a colour of right bringing with it increasing political pressure to protect the status quo or enforce excessive compensation for removal.[295]

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[295] *A Housing Program for Pakistan with Special Reference to Refugee Rehabilitation*, prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger,

For Abrams and Koenigberger, the key to solving the squatter problem was to

understand squatter "motivation" and to form a proper policy response to those

interests. Inattention to the squatter's motivation, the two argued, was one of the

fundamental causes of the irresolution of the squatting problem in Pakistan: "The

past policy of blindness to the motivating causes of population movements has

provided an open invitation to squatting."[296]

It is this emphasis on identifying squatters' interests that Koenigsberger would later

define in a report on land reform for the Ford Foundation as the most critical, as

well as the most uncertain, element of Third World urbanization:

> The clearance of squatters does not in any way extend the urban space. No net
> gain of space—or even land—is represented by the shifting of groups of
> populations from one place to another. This is obviously the case as, even if not
> officially rehoused, squatters must rehouse themselves.[297]

The emphasis on understanding squatter motivation represents a marked shift from

the focus on the provision of finished houses emphasized by the past

development missions to Pakistan headed by modern architects such as

Constantine Doxiadis (for the Ford Foundation) and Michel Ecochard (for the UN).

Though Abrams and Koenigsberger acknowledge the contribution of these

missions in their reports, for them, the institutionally provided housing didn't take

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September 14, 1957 (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance
Administration, 1957), p. 7.

[296] Ibid. p. 18.

[297] Otto Koenigsberger, Beverly Bernstein (ed.), Michael Foot, Judith Rees, Michael
Roberts, Michael Tyler, John C. Wylie, *Infrastructure Problems of the Cities of Developing
Countries: An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation* (New
York: International Urbanization Survey, Ford Foundation, 1971), p. 231.

into account the varied forces behind squatting. For Abrams and Koenigsberger, architecture in the development arena was not a problem of formal design. Rather it was fundamentally a tool of administrative policy that allowed aligning the varied terrain of squatters' interest with that of the state. In recognizing squatters' ability to house and rehouse themselves, the core housing approach acknowledged the varied interests and limitations defining squatter motivation. The core house gave squatters freedom to set their own schedule of work, the amount of investment, the form of the house and thus constituted an efficient and cost-effective solution to the housing crisis.

Implicit within the idea of legitimate squatter motivation, however, is it its opposite, the notion of illegitimate political demands: "As long as the towns grow," Abrams and Koenigsberger argued, "there will be newcomers, many of them penniless, in search of work and shelter. If no provision is made for them, they too many be forced to become squatters, flaunt the law and create slum settlements as in the past.[298] In this framing, the squatter always appear to be standing at the threshold of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Abrams and Koenigsberger also draw this distinction on their next mission to the Philippines as well. There, this distinction manifests itself in a curious mixed tone of sympathy and condemnation of squatting practices. The squatter appears as both a victim and an aggressor. On the one hand are the declarations that almost celebrate the unending variety of squatting as "a somber tribute to human ingenuity in the face

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[298] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for Pakistan, op cit.,* p. 18.

of privation."[299] Yet, on the other hand, squatting is described as a political "indulgence," more opportunistic then necessary.

We may ask then, what are the criteria for making this distinction? The squatters' demands are considered illegitimate when they take on a collective form. They have "dug in deeper," we are told, exploiting the sympathy felt for them after the war. Private owners have "often feared for their lives if they took summary action to evict them." This tactic of intimidation, the experts tell us, has resulted in further expansion of squatting: "Encouraged by their success, such squatters then moved on to the land of another owner in the hope of repeating the experience."[300] The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate demands in Pakistan was also drawn along the distinction of individual and collective politics. The newcomers were framed as non-political and lone transgressors who are forced, when faced with the impossible situations upon their arrival in the city, to become squatters – the despised collective political entity – and "flaunt the law and create slum settlements"[301]

As a collective tactic of exerting political pressure, squatting is seen as nothing short of a threat to the structure of state governance:

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[299] *A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands*, by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1959), p. 26.

[300] Ibid.

[301] The degradation of collective politics is continuously grounded in the urban reform discourse in the US. While there have been "admirable attempts to make homes out of remnants," Abrams and Koenigsberger acknowledged, squatter "colonies are generally safety and health hazards, and nests of crime or delinquency. They are dangers not only to their inhabitants but to the community." Ibid., p. 28.

[Squatting] symbolize[s], the general breakdown of civic responsibility and of respect for public law and private rights. People who get away with appropriating what is not their own, take a cynical view about paying rent and taxes, or about respecting contract or authority. Worse still, others are encouraged by their example, disrespect for law and government becomes epidemic and lawlessness leans upon lawlessness as the structure of the state sags under the challenge. When a program for re-settlement is under way, it suggests that the government is still sovereign; when none is in sight, it puts sovereignty in issue.[302]

Collective political opportunism is equated with economic opportunism. Soon the squatting begins to appear almost a highly profitable venture:

[S]quatting has often come to be an enterprise in itself, and poverty, guile and opportunism compete for the prizes that lawlessness offers. When squatters have begun to feel greater security in their possession, optimism vies with despair and odd evidences of affluence manifest themselves amid the squalor; speculation and turnover increase and as the vested illusion of right begins to ripen, it commands a cash price.[303]

Contrary to the hard line taken against the collective dimension of squatting – its political interest or demands, local as well as regional – is a sympathy of its effect at a personal level. Koenigsberger and Abrams express the two attitudes side by side in discussing the nature of the policy a government should adopt in dealing with squatting:

Solution of the squatting problem is not self-operating. It requires policy and program. It cannot be achieved by eloquence, persuasion, threats or recrimination. The policy must be both humane and firm, taking into account the *personal needs* and postures of the *individuals* affected as well as the larger requirements of the

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[302] Ibid., p. 29.

[303] Ibid., p. 30-31.

communities and the strained resources of the national economy [emphasis added].[304]

Here we have a model of developmental change similar to the one set up in the core program for the Gold Coast. The dialectical interaction between individual desires and social needs becomes a model of differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate political dimensions. In core housing approach, the squatter is acknowledged as a legitimate client of development only as a singular subject. Her demands are recognized by the development apparatus only as demands of an individual with personal needs; when the demand is cast as a reflection of the individual's innate, atomistic, economic, and rational behavior. When the demands take a collective form, it appears under the core lens as opportunism and irrationalism. In other words, whenever political demands are considered legitimate, the subject is singular: the squatter; whenever the political demands are considered illegitimate, the subject is plural: the squatters (FIG. 21, 22).

Through core, the Third World subject comes to be recognized as rationalistic economic agent, a legitimacy that would find much resonance in national political theaters and global multicultural framings. Yet this recognition operates precisely at the exclusion of all forms of collective politics other than those based as an extrusion of the legitimate subject of development, the individual (FIG. 23, 24).

This differentiation, the appropriation of squatter practices into a discourse of sympathy and admonition, is expanded to inform a policy model for allocating housing and carrying out land reform. In the Philippines, "[s]quatting (at least initially)," we are told,

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[304] Ibid. p. 30.

is caused by lack of housing for newcomers and by the absence of a rational land policy to accommodate newcomers. Unable to buy land, they trespass. Unable to afford the construction cost they build poorly. Unable to assert a legal claim to possession, they band together to assert a moral claim to it and to win its political recognition. As squatting is caused by lack of land and housing, it can be cured only by providing land and housing.[305]

Each step, or transgression, leading to squatting is described as a result of a dissatisfaction of an elementary human "need": the need for housing, rational understanding, availability of land, of material, of security. Even the last link in the chain, strongly repudiated before, when squatter's "band" together to claim "moral" legitimacy, is explained, and explained away, through a humanistic argument, as a result of a chain of fundamental wrongs.[306]

It is this division between fundamental human needs and collective political demands that allows the analyses of squatter practices in Pakistan to be applied in the Philippines without losing the claim to the specificity of the geopolitical situation in question. In Pakistan, attention to the specificity of the social and political situation was one of the fundamental points of Abrams and Koenigsberger's mission. "In recommending any programme or legislation," the

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[305] Ibid., p. 30.

[306] This framing defines squatting though a series of "lacks," and consequently through a logic of demand and supply, at the root of which lies the rational subject who can respond to the logic of demand and supply. Calculating from the number of building permits issued and census data (giving population and number of households), a rough estimate of in-migration, and rate of replacement of decrepit structures in and around Manila, Abrams and Koenigsberger conclude a "housing deficit" of 8,700 houses per year to "keep housing conditions in greater Manila at about their present condition." Ibid., p. 19. To improve conditions, if a "squatter replacement program" is to be carried out, another 3,300 houses would be needed, bringing the net total "target to 12,000 houses per annum for the next 6 years." These calculations, which were to become commonplace in every five-year plan in Third World countries, however, are based on the presumption of the rational individualistic subject who can respond to the logic of demand and supply.

two had asserted, "it must be emphasized that neither the character not the intensity of the problem is uniform throughout the country."[307] Yet, by mapping the "refugee" question onto the language of individual needs and collective demands of the core approach, Abrams and Koenigsberger translated it into a comparative problem of development change:

> The housing problem as such is therefore no longer purely a 'refugee problem'...If there had been no refugees from India, the problem would have confronted Pakistan, as indeed it confronts other developing countries to-day. Our first underlying recommendation is therefore that while certain aspects of the housing problem are emergency in nature, the problem as a whole must be viewed as long term, requiring long term programming and long term treatment.[308]

The core approach, by framing squatting as a practice of legitimate individual needs and illegitimate collective demands, turns what was a political crisis of governance into the language of "long-term" development. As such, core constitutes a strategy of managing the space of political discussion in the development discourse; a strategy that is able to both account for geo-political differences between contexts as well as dismiss them.[309]

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[307] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for Pakistan, op cit.,* p. 3.

[308] Ibid., p. 2.

[309] It is the same logic of displacing political threats through long-term development projects that Abrams would advance in Bolivia at the same time. When the International Cooperation Administration (later the Agency for International Development, USAID) rejected his proposal for a million dollar revolving fund for core houses on the argument that "if the Bolivian knows the money comes from the United States, he won't repay it," Abrams shot back with the argument of political pacification through development in the long term: "Cities like La Paz are nerve centers, and their slums are the festering places of revolt. Even if housing is not a prime factor in promoting productivity, a million dollars lent for housing in La Paz could have prevented incalculable losses over the longer run." See Abrams, *Report on Housing and Financing to the Government of Bolivia,* 1959. Quoted in *Man's Struggle for Shelter,* op cit. p. 193.

For the Pakistani government, this duality provided a critical alibi for its resettlement policies. For the international experts, it allowed the tying of the situation in Pakistan to the global pattern of Third World development, a connection without which their advice had no leverage:

> The squatting problem is not peculiar to Pakistan, but exists in Turkey, Iraq, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Algiers, Morocco, Uganda, India, Puerto Rico, Jamaica – in fact wherever there has been a mass movement of people to cities and an absence of shelter in which to house them.[310]

In the alignment of development and national policies, however, core gives the former the leading role. Only those national policies and interests that can be cast in terms of the market economy favored by international financial institutions find resonance in the core argument. In the Philippines, the landed elite with an interest in preserving their holdings found themselves at the shorter end of the stick under the core approach. There, the profile of the rational individualist subject outlined by Abrams and Koenigsberger not only stood in opposition to the opportunism of the squatters, but also stood in opposition to the irrational opportunism of the elite who refused to make their land available to the market. Their resistance too is described as a strategy of monopolistic corruption precisely in terms of deviating from the above signposts of rationalistic behavior:

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[310] Ibid., p. 6. The framing of the threat of a political breakdown in terms of individual and collective demands is repeated to frame the situation in Philippines as a near global phenomenon in the Third World: "Experience in other countries suggests that the threat to sovereignty is not an exaggerated possibility. In Jordan, disregard of property rights has led to the disregard of contracts and to breakdown of general order. In Pakistan, the squatters' political strength has intimidated officials and stayed their power. In Manila, the squatters have openly threatened bloodshed if any effort is made to remove them..." Abrams and Koenigsberger, *Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, op cit.*, p. 29.

The land problem in the Philippines is not one of land hunger, but land refrigeration – much of the land in the urban and urbanizing districts lies frozen in the hands of owners who have no present intention of developing it. Neither the magnetism of demand nor the temptations of profit nor the lure of liquidity seems to provoke them into putting their land into urban use or selling it to others who will.[311]

At the scale of the individual house, core housing provided the instrument to continuously turn squatters' assets into financial capital through incremental loans. Under the logic of the core approach, the practice of keeping their land outside capital markets made large-scale land holders strange bedfellows with squatters who didn't participate in the market process.

How are these curious conflations possible? They are possible, we'll contend by drawing on the point we made earlier, because of the erasure of the distinction between analyses and reality in the development context. The core is presented not as a model to understand the working of a complex reality, but as a tool to mold the periphery in terms of the analyses itself. It was Keynes who had posited "the three fundamental psychological factors," of individual behavior necessary to be presumed for economic analysis, "namely, the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude to liquidity and the psychological expectation of future yield from capital assets."[312] Keynes proposed this definition of "rational behavior," however, with an eye to the limit of its scope in reality. As Walter

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[311] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands*, 1959, *op cit.*, p. 104.

[312] Keynes, *General Theory, op cit.*, pp. 246-47. This is a well-known passage which was quoted by Pigou as containing "Keynes's main and very important contribution to economic analyses" in *Retrospective View*, p. 20. Walter Rostow also quotes the same passage in his *Theories of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present (with a Perspective on the Next century)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 280.

Rostow, a famous development consultant and an economic historian at MIT, later recalled, Keynes' postulation in the *General Theory* was "a self-conscious exercise in applying to complex reality his current theoretical system."[313] Paul Krugman, a strong proponent of modeling of economic arguments, justified this distinction as a methodological necessity:

> [Any] kind of model of a complex system...amounts to mak[ing] a set of clearly untrue simplifications to get the system down to something that you can handle; those simplifications are dictated partly by guesses about what is important, partly by the modeling techniques available. And the end result, if the model is a good one, it is an improved insight why the vastly more complex real system behaves the way it does.[314]

While Krugman's teleological belief in economic modeling would only compel him to assert that the "cycle of knowledge lost...can be regained [with better] formal model-building,"[315] many an economic theorist set aside this distinction completely as they explain the reality as a reflection of hidden economic phenomena. In Krugman's arguments too, the making of the model, though recognized as a simplification, is just that: a simplification that can be filled in with details to construct a fuller picture over time.[316]

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[313] Walter Rostow, *Theories of Economic Growth, op cit.,* p. 280

[314] Paul Krugman, *Development, Geography, and Economic Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 71.

[315] Ibid., p. 72

[316] While the construction of the model is recognized as a disciplinary tool, the historical specificity and ideological grounding of systemization as a model of thinking itself remains unacknowledged in this view.

This tendency to neglect the limitations of the model becomes a uniform occurrence in development economics. It is this distinction between model and reality that is erased when the psychological profile of the rational individual drawn from perfect competition models finds its way into Abrams and Koenigsberger's analysis as an explanation of the historical moment in Pakistan and the Philippines. The declaration of the limits of simplification, the lost details, that should supposedly accompany the construction of a model are missing in the Third World context. The refugee in Pakistan, or the migrant in the Philippines, is not an abstraction because the details and complexities of context from which s/he is abstracted are assumed to have not emerged yet. The rational individual in the Third World is not an abstraction from the past, or the present, but a projection into a totalizable future. The distinction between the collective irrationality of the squatters and rationality of the individual, instead of being a characteristic of the model of analyses, becomes the evidence of its accuracy. This displacement turns into a preemption of the possibility of a discourse on political negotiations inasmuch as it is continuously perpetuated under the rhetoric of progress.

This preemption is betrayed by the different role and status of policy vis-à-vis the model. In Abrams' own advocacy, policy is presented as a tool to address the limits of the model, to rule on the exceptions to the rule. This is also the case in Keynesian prescriptions. Policy is calibrating the economic model to the always exceptional and infinite complexity of reality. Under the foreclosed difference between the model and the real under core, policy's role is not to address exceptions but to dictate uniformity. "Sporadic concessions should not be made," stressed Abrams and Koenigsberger,

"to one group which cannot be matched by concessions to others. The isolated proposals to give the Tondo squatters land will inevitably lead to pressure for similar concessions to other groups. It will also encourage further squatting as a means of obtaining bonuses or valuable land cheaply."[317]

This uniform policy was to be based on the following principles:

a) bring land into use and create a free market in land at reasonable cost. b) permit the expropriation of such land when essential for development and resettlement and particularly for the housing of the lower income groups. c) recover for the public at least part of the costs of public improvements, the benefits of which have accrued to the owner without any exertions of his own. d) compel land owner to pay their fair share of the upkeep of government and its services.[318]

These were combined with proposals for legislation enabling the power of expropriation or eminent domain, the power to impose taxes on large land holdings, and extended police power to regulate allotment and redistribution. These element were proposed by Abrams and Koenigsberger on their mission to Pakistan as well. This "uniform" approach, however, presupposes a powerful, yet neutral and transparent state, whose interests, political and financial, are separate from the interest of the landed and industrial elite whom it is bound to affect with any redistribution measure.

In an exceptional report titled, *Diagnosis of India's Development Problems and Approaches to an Alternative Path*, written for the Indian Council of Social Science Research, development economist and later critic, Kalpana Bardhan, points out while speaking from "within" the development apparatus, how any claim to the

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[317] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands*, 1959, *op cit.*, p. 35.

[318] Ibid., p. 115.

neutrality of the state structure serves the interest of a disseminated network of those in power, and undermines the political organization of the "poor."[319]

For Bardhan, development is "essentially...a process of changing or evolving organization structures."[320] Representational politics do not translate "effective political power of the poor," rather only amount to "multiplying the components of a ruling coalition," though cooperation and cooption of "middle level political leaders," and "intermediaries," without any "base level," "hard-core organization of the poor." "Patronage management," Bardhan argued, "has been used as a substitute for hard core organization of amorphous poverty groups into classes with articulated interests that are coherently pursued."[321]

As Bardhan herself would later acknowledge, the idea of class organization is also simultaneously a ruse for covering the asymmetric participation of women in development. Projects of women empowerment deployed from within the State and development complex serve to rule out the possibility of subaltern resistance to economic and social development projects and give the lie to the idea of the neutrality of any organization project.

As Jan Van der Linden notes, though still in an effort to provide a "solution or stopgap to the Third World housing shortage," the preparation of master planning for New Delhi in the 1958, 1962, and later during the phase of "emergency" (1976-

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[319] Kalpana Bardhan, *Diagnosis of India's Development Problems and Approaches to an Alternative Path*, Occasional Monographs #1, Indian Council of Social Science Research (NewDelhi: Rakesh Press, 1977).

[320] Ibid., p. 19.

[321] Ibid.

77), resulted in a system in which the state emerged as the major instrument of speculation in land.[322]

The Delhi Development Authority was formed in 1957. In 1958 it hired Abrams' fellow housing activist and planner, Catherine Bauer, who was consulted on the master plan for Calcutta, to also help draw the first master plan for New Delhi (1961-1981). Echoing the proposal of Abrams and Keonigsberger, the two major tasks of the Bauer plan were: "(a) more efficient and equitable distribution of land, by making it available to everyone at reasonable prices; (b) controlling land prices and preventing speculation in land and its concentration in the hand of a small minority."[323]

The strategy outlined to carry out these tasks was to acquire a majority of the vacant land within the urban limits of the city through the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which stipulated that the land owner be paid 115 per cent of the market value of the land. After acquiring and developing the land on a sites and services model, the DDA was to supply plots and some housing units on a 99-year lease basis. This was thought to ensure a constant flow of revenue while leaving a degree a control to take back the land through eminent domain if needed.[324]

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[322] Jan Van Der Linden, *Sites and Services Approach Renewed: Solution or Stopgap to the Third World Housing Shortage?* (Hants, UK: Gower House, 1986).

[323] Jan van der Linden, *Land Delivery for Low Income Groups in Third World Cities* (Hant, UK: Avebury, 1992). p. 62.

[324] For details and history of the Delhi Plan, see, B. Misra's often quoted paper, "Public Intervention and Urban Land Management – Experience of Three Metro Cities of India," paper presented to the 9th EAROPH International Congress (Hong Kong: August, 1984), p. 24. Quoted in Ibid.

The primary target of this plan were the "low-income groups" who were to be resettled from squatter settlements throughout the city. It was thought that this transfer would allow the demolition of these settlements on a massive scale. In addition, the DDA was to regularize illegal land subdivision in these schemes and throughout the city.

One of the major strategies of saving costs over the long run proposed by Abrams and Koenigsberger in Pakistan and the Philippines was a similar policy of acquiring land on a large scale. Echoing this proposal, as early as 1959, the DDA too issued notifications for the acquisition of 27,520 ha. of vacant land which, at the time, constituted about 62% of the total urban area. Yet, due to limitation of funds, the DDA did not acquire the majority of the notified land. This limitation, rather than serving as a drawback in achieving the required goal of savings costs, positioned the Authority in the strategic position to influence the land market prices and increasing its revenue, into a monopolistic position of a "land bank."

With the initial notifications the value of the majority of the available land around New Delhi was frozen. This led to prices of the remaining "non-notified" land to rise dramatically. As Misra notes, "[i]n no part of the city [did] the land prices increase less than 25 times during the past two decades (1964-1984). Whereas, during the same period the average per capita income had increased by only about two times and the consumer price index of Delhi by only four times."[325] This switched the Authority's role from an instrument of public land supply to a political and commercial instrument of land acquisition and land auctioning.

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[325] Ibid., p. 28.

In the first decade after the implementation of the master plan (1961-71) some 78% of total residential land supply ended with relatively high income owners.[326] Though this was justified as a strategy of building up initial revenue reserves for cross-subsidizing land and housing development for low-income groups, a strategy endorsed by Abrams and Keogniberger elsewhere, it manifested itself more as a permanent approach. The proportion of land allocated to low-income groups fell from 55% in 1960-61 to 2% in 1970-71.[327] In the second decade (1971-1981) this situation appears to have improved substantially. This increase, however, was only an indication of the major relocation project underway at the time.[328] If the relocation land is excluded from this tally, then 58% of public supply of land was still marked for auctioning.[329] In addition, there developed a constant market in illegal transfer of low income plots and houses to higher income owners.

Furthermore, the general shortage and high price of land and housing supplied through formal channels encouraged the development of a parallel "illegal" market on the frozen land. Here too, as noted by Mitra, the Authority's power to tolerate or regularize illegal subdivisions positioned it as an instrument of financial gain for the owners of frozen-value land.[330] This dual involvement in both formal and

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[326] Ibid., p. 29.

[327] P. MacAuslan, *Urban Land and Shelter for the Poor* (London: Earthscan, 1985), p. 88.

[328] B. C. Mitra, "Land Supply for Low-Income Housing in Delhi," in P. Baróss and J. J. van der Linden (eds.), *The Transformation of Land Supply Systems in Third World Cities* (Hants: UK: Gower, 1990), p. 216.

[329] Misra, "Public Intervention and Urban Land Management," *op cit.*, p. 29.

[330] Mitra, "Land Supply for Low-Income Housing in Delhi," *op cit.*, p. 216. One of the most notorious, yet typical example of forced relocation and of eviction of squatter was the "juggi jhompri" scheme. The unattractive location of new plots caused allottees to sell

informal land markets provided the basis for effectively turning the DDA in part into a land bank and an instrument of speculation.

These developments are important to note in looking at Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposal of land acquisition and relocation since they are contemporaneous to their missions. Yet similar developments are dispelled by Abrams and Koenigsberger in the Philippines as a result of "corruption" in the state bureaucratic structure. It is precisely the framing of the planning structure as a response to the rationalized behavior of the depoliticized subject of development, the individual, that results in the political dimension of planning appearing *as* corruption. This exclusion of the political dimension, as we saw in the case of the DDA, help regularize the existing power and market relations. The strategies and legislative powers proposed by Keonigsberger and Abrams enable and provide a justification for this particular mode of (de)politicization of planning authorities. This mode of politicization betrays the complicity of the foreign consultants, the state and private elite interests in capitalization of land in different contexts.

Let us now turn to John Turner's argument of funding and legalizing squatter settlements as an alternative form of development strategy. Here we see a different structure of incorporation of squatter politics, one that results when the expert positions himself not as a representative of the state, but of the interests on the ground.

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their plots or refuse to pay monthly installments. The time-gap between clearance and relocation resulted in re-squatting of cleared sites. Ibid., p. 206.

3.7 John Turner: The Expert as Squatter

'Ingeniero, si nos habian dado las ayudas y orientaciones cuando las necessitabamos...' 'Mr. Engineer (or Architect) if only you had helped us when we most needed your knowledge...'

Colin Ward, editor, *Anarchy* [331]

For fulfillment there must be a resorption [sic] of government into the body of the community. How? By cultivating the habit of direct action instead of waiting upon representative agencies.

Patrick Geddes in 1912, Quote by John Turner in 1982 [332]

John Turner left Britain in 1957 with Kitty Turner and Pat Crooke to work for the

municipality of Lima, Peru, as one of the architects assigned to work with various

squatter associations in and around the city. Turner stayed in Peru for eight years,

before returning to the United States to join MIT for another eight. Turner was

followed to Latin America by a wave of his fellow former students at the

Architectural Association in London. Many of them had been associated with the

famous counter-culture magazine, *Anarchy*, published from London in the 1960s. [333]

Among them was William Mangin, who published case-histories of particular

Barrio dwellers in the magazine (January, 1964) as well as several other articles

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[331] Colin Ward, *Housing: An Anarchist Approach* (London: Freedom Press, 1976), p. 77.

[332] Patrick Geddes, Quoted by John Turner in "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," *op cit.*, p. 110. Geddes was originally quoted by Peter Cadogan, *Direct Democracy: the Case for an England of Sovereign Regional Republics, Extra-Parliamentary Democracy and a New Active Non-Violence of the Centre* (London: Direct Democracy, 1975).

[333] The first editor of the magazine was Colin Ward, who later wrote the introduction to Turner's famous book. A second series of the magazine was published in 1970s and 1980s. Anarchism was defined by Colin Ward as "the political philosophy of a non-governmental society of autonomous communities." Later editors included the pulp-fiction writer, and sub-culture historian, Stewart Home; and Martin Wright, the organizer of the antiroyalist, Movement Against the Monarchy (MA'M).

with Turner.[334] Also present in Lima at the time was Margaret Grenfell, an English architect "working privately for owner-builders in the barriadas of Lima."[335]

Turner's first assignment was to work with the association of the squatters of Arequipa, in the south of Peru, then a city of population around 100,000.[336] The work was part of an experimental office set up in 1955 to provide technical assistance to squatters in developing their settlements. This was largely seen as an ancillary activity. Major planning and other decisions were already controlled by a large and powerful federation, *Associación de Urbanizadores Populares de Arequipa* (AUPA), which was composed of different local sub-associations. AUPA had sanctioned the majority of the squatter growth since World War II, constituting about "one-third to two-fifth of the metropolitan area" of the capital. The official planning bodies had little control over this activity. Turner recalled that, "fresh

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[334] John Turner and William Mangin, Barriada Movement, *Progressive Architecture*, 5 (May, 1968): 154-62; John Turner and William Mangin, "Benavides and the Barriada movement," in P. Oliver, ed., *Shelter and Society* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1969), pp. 127-36. Also see, John Turner and William Mangin, "Urbanization case history in Peru, in Mangin, ed., *Peasants in Cities* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970). This volume also includes Turner's "Barriers and channels for housing development in modernizing cities," pp. 1-14. Versions of Turner's essay had appeared earlier with slightly different titles: "Barriers and channels for housing development in modernizing countries," in *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 33 (1967): 167-81; "Housing Priorities, settlement patterns and urban development in modernizing countries," in *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 34 (1968): 354-63.

[335] See Colin Ward, *Housing: An Anarchist Approach* (London: Freedom Press, 1976), p. 76.

[336] Turner gives further details of his assignment in chapter 6: "The Re-education of a Professional," in Tuner and R. Fichter, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

from England, [he was surprised] to be warned by strange characters that physical harm could come to be if [he] persisted in interfering with AUPA's activities."[337]

Yet, not surprisingly, Turner claimed that good relations were soon established between the AUPA and him and his colleagues. The reason for these amicable relations, according to Turner, was none other then his and his fellow young Britons' ability to identify with the interest of the "locals" in contrast to the local elites:

> Unlike the then owner of a principle national newspaper who visited the *urbanizaciones populares* at the time, we did not weep crocodile tears over their unfinished and often incipient conditions. *Like the people themselves* [emphasis added], we saw their settlements not as slums but as building sites. We shared their hopes and found the pity and despair of the occasional visits from elitists professionals and politicians quite comic and wholly absurd.[338]

The Turners lived among the squatters in a project house among the expanding settlements. This mode of operation afforded a claim to identification and transparency to the squatter psyche that was not available to the visiting experts.[339] Turner's claim to the position of the spokesperson for and advocate of the interests of the poor was based on positioning himself, in a manner much similar to disequilibrium analysts, against the authority of the institutions he was in contact with.

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[337] John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," in Peter Ward, ed., *Self-Help Housing: A Critique* (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1982), pp. 99-113. Above quote on pp. 100-101.

[338] Ibid., p. 101.

[339] A point emphasized by Turner and Fichter in chapter 6: "The Re-education of a Professional," in *Freedom to Build, op cit.*

The government self-help schemes were funded primarily on the model of aided self-help implemented by Jacob Crane and Rafael Pico in Puerto Rico. As Turner later recalled, the

> manual from Puerto Rico which we were using was...based on the assumption that, what the North Americans call 'sweat equity' is the key to self-help economies in housing, and that the self-helpers can therefore achieve economies by working in organized groups, and that an outside agency is needed to set up and administer such mutual self-help projects.[340]

For Turner, the model was not only unsuitable in Peru, it was unsuitable in Puerto Rico and everywhere else in the "developing" world as well.

> We quite failed to appreciate the nature and economy of direct action that people had been taking all along and, with enormous and unnecessary effort, introduced a far less efficient system which failed to make proper use of the resources with which the immense number of houses all around our own project dwellings were being built.[341]

In Peru, all that was needed, according to Turner, was to economically strengthen and legally sanction what was already an established practice: "In Arequipa...it was quite absurd to have introduced so many complications. All we really had to do was to approve simple sketch plans, and distribute cash in appropriate stages as each operation was completed satisfactorily."[342]

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[340] John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," *op cit.*, p. 102.

[341] Ibid.

[342] Tuner and Fichter, chapter 6: "The Re-education of a Professional," in *Freedom to Build, op cit.*

Quote from Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," *op cit.*, p. 102.

The force of Turner et al's proposals was based on the impossiby high figures of housing units required by regional housing organizations such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In the 1965, an ECLA study predicted that by 1975 Latin American countries would require an additional 1.5 million housing units in urban areas alone to keep up with the housing demand. Added to this were the substandard houses that needed to be replaced each year. Turner, as well as other critics of the institutionally provided housing such as Peter Ward, argued that in these estimates the standards of replacement "were often ridiculously high." One "survey in Mexico City in 1964," Ward describes, "classified over 90 per cent of the houses as substandard in some respect or other – even if it was only an unglazed window in a bathroom."[343]

Turner and Mangin's early writing established a new sociology of squatter settlement in the Western academic and development community. They challenged the assumption that "slums" were, as it had been asserted to be in the case in the history of Anglo-American cities, the site of incoming migration with little hope for advancement.[344] Rather, they were sites of upward economic mobility, social organization, and democratic participation. Mangin's paper, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," was particularly influential in this regard, the title of which was clearly influenced by Abrams' paper, "Squatter Settlement: The Problem and the Opportunity," published a year

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[343] Carreo Económico (1965) p. 62. Quoted in Peter Ward "Introduction and Purpose," in *Self-Help Housing: A Critique* (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1982), p. 13.

[344] John Turner and William Mangin, "Barriada Movement," *Progressive Architecture*, 5, (May, 1968): 154-62; John Turner, "Housing Priorities, settlement patterns and urban development in modernizing countries," in *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 34 (1968): 354-63.

earlier.[345] Mangin reviewed the existing literature and identified eight common

"myths" regarding the squatter settlements in the Third World:

> 1) The squatter settlements are formed by rural people (Indians where possible) coming directly from "their" farms. 2) They are chaotic and unorganized. 3) They are slums with the accompanying crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, family breakdown, illegitimacy, etc. 4) They represent an economic drain on the nation since unemployment is high and they are the lowest class economically, the hungriest and most poorly housed, and their labor might better be used back on the farms. 5) They do not participate in the life of the city, illiteracy is high and the education level low. 6) They are rural peasant villages (or Indian communities) reconstituted in the cities. 7) They are "breeding grounds for" or "festering sores of" radical political activity, particularly communism, because of resentment, ignorance, and a longing to be led. 8) There are two solutions to the problem: a) prevent migration by law or by making life in the provinces more attractive; or b) prevent the formation of new squatter settlements by law and "eradicate" (a favorite word among architects and planners) the existing ones, replacing them with housing projects.[346]

For Mangin, the squatter settlements were not a problem, but as the title of the paper indicated, already a solution to the cheap housing needed for the poor. Most households had a nuclear family structure and regular employment. They used the lots as means for economic advancement by slowly improving the structures on them, renting part of the house or subdividing the lot.

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[345] William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer, 1967): 65-98. Abrams paper was prepared for US AID's Department of Housing and Urban Development and was published as part of its Ideas and Methods Exchange series. Charles Abrams, *Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity*, Ideas and Methods Exchange #63 (Washington, D.C.: Division of International Affairs, Department of Housing and Urban Development, April 1966).

[346] Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements," *op cit.*, p. 66.

Turner similarly argued that squatter settlements improve over time. He documented the Pampa de Comas "squatter invasion" in a report that was later published in a special issue of *Architectural Design*.[347] The report was filled with photographs of the squatter settlement, which Turner called, the "un-aided self-help solution: a demonstration of the common people's initiative and the potential of their resources."[348] Here he showed the progress of individual families over the years. Even with small funds available, a structure was changed from a straw structure to block construction over time. Collectively squatters were able to negotiate paved streets and services from the government. Faced with limited opportunities of economic advancement elsewhere, the households invested in the house, improving it *in situ*, rather than moving to different class-divided neighborhoods as was the case in the Anglo-American cities.[349]

As we have seen in the context of Puerto Rico's self-help schemes and Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposals, the self-help discourse had already incorporated tradition and resourcefulness of the migrant as an important alibi of development.

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[347] John Turner, "Dwelling resources in South America," in *Architectural Design*, 37 (1963): 360-93. It is well known that Turner also situated his studies of the self-help housing as s critique of finished housing for the poor. His report laid out in detail what happened to the spectacular "superblocks" at Caracas which were built by the former Venezuelan government of Perez Jimenez between 1954 and 1958 to house 160,000 people. "By the time the dictatorship finally collapsed the superblocks were in social chaos which, even now, has only partially resolved. The incomplete and unoccupied apartments and many community buildings were invaded, controlled by gangs, the utilities and even the lifts broke down, the facilities were totally inadequate, the groups were isolated by difficult communications, from the rest of the city, and, on top of these and many other difficulties the political situation made it extremely difficult to do anything at all."

[348] Ibid. p. 375.

[349] A point Turner would later emphasize at a UN conference in, Pittsburgh in 1966. See John Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions," paper presented to United Nations Conference, Pittsburgh, 1966. Published in G. Breese, ed., *The City in Newly Developing Countries* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 507-34. The discussion of housing improvement on p. 510.

Nevertheless, Turner, Mangin, and others situated there assertions as radical challenges to the established developmental beliefs. The success of this positioning stemmed from Turner et al.'s ability to situate the squatter settlement phenomenon as a model for global human development. For Turner and his fellow counter-culture enthusiasts, the manifestations of "spontaneous" organization and action they witnessed in Peru's squatter settlements provided the perfect antidote to not only the bureaucratic and ceremonial culture of Britain, but also an answer to the alienation experienced by people in industrialized countries from mass produced and standardized consumer culture. The squatters' spontaneity, effort, hope, and ingenuity was not just a solution to the Third World's housing problem, but also a way out of the standardized solutions of social reform and social mobility offered in the developed world.

For Colin Ward, *Anarchy*'s first editor, these principles of "un-aided self-help," a term coined by Turner, held universal lessons of social reform that were just as applicable to housing problems in the First World. In his preface to Turner's second book, *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environment* (1976), Ward stressed that Turner

> evolved an ideology of housing applicable to the exploding cities of the Third World. But when he moved from South to North America...he found that the ideas he formulated in Peru were also true of the richest nation in the world, and when he returned to England...he found that the housing situation in Britain too fitted his formulation. He was perhaps to his surprise, expressing universal truths about housing.[350]

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[350] John Tuner, *Housing by People: Toward Autonomy in Building Environments* (London: Marion Boyars, 1976).

It is this dimension of global humanism that is also emphasized in Turner's first book with Fichter, *Freedom to Build.*[351] There Turner argued that the

> elementary resources for housing – land, materials, energy, tools and skills – can only be used properly and economically by the people and the local organizations that they can control personally, and that most plentiful and renewable resources are in any case possessed by people as users.[352]

Keeping with the libertarian aspirations of *Anarchy*, Turner associates *barriada* living as having the seed of three fundamental human freedoms: "The man who would be free must build his own life. The existential value of the barriada is the product of three freedoms: the freedom of community self-selection; the freedom to budget one's own resources and the freedom to shape one's own environment."[353]

These freedoms were to provide an antidote to the lack of hope permeating the standardized life offered to the poor in the Western consumer societies:

> the mass of the urban poor in cities like Lima are able to seek and find improvement through home-ownership (or *de facto* possession) when they are still very poor by modern standards is certainly the main reason for their optimism. If they were trapped in the inner cities, like so many of the North American poor, they too would be burning instead of building. The mass-designed, mass produced environments for an increasingly homogenized market of mass-consumers are not more than assemblies of material goods devoid of essential meaning. They are not the product of dialogue. Decisions are made for a producer's market by those themselves bound by highly institutionalized norms and procedures. The occupant

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[351] Tuner and R. Fichter, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, op cit.* p.

[352] Ibid.

[353] Ibid.

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buys or rents a ready-made unit in much the same way as he gets his motor car or tv set—and if it is a flat or in a tightly controlled subdivision, he can do little more with his house than he can with the other manufactured 'good' essential to his way of life. The intense dialogue that takes place between squatters planning an invasion, and the continuing dialogue of its development and administration are with rare exceptions, totally lacking in the modern housing process.[354]

This description of the *barriada* life provides an "anarchist" antidote to the deprivation of socio-cultural values faced by England and developed world in general with industrialization. It is a correlation that, once again, is established because the developing world is presented as in a transitional state between tradition and modernity: "The cities of the incipiently industrializing or transitional world, such as Lima, respond far more readily to the demands of the poor majority. Than cities of the industrial or postindustrial world, like Chicago or New York, respond to their poor minorities."[355]

This sense of freedom was the guarantee of the squatter self-formation and a model of proper entry into modernity missed out in the West:

> The squatter barriada-builder who chooses to invest his life's savings in an environment that he creates, forms himself in the process. The person, as the member of a family and of a local community, finds in the responsibilities and activities of home-building and local improvement the creative dialogue essential for self-discovery and growth. The barriada is ground for living that the housing units, marketed or allotted by mass-consumption society, does not provide.[356]

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[354] Ibid.

[355] Ibid.

[356] Ibid.

When *Architectural Design* devoted another issue on self-help in August 1968, the editors declared that in their previous study of the squatter settlements in the "developing" countries they found, "contrary to much popular opinion, that these serve a very positive function for their residents." The question then posed by the editors was also, "what lessons we can draw from this work which are relevant to the very different situation in which architects work in the developed nations?[357]

Turner's emphasis on individual participation does appear in stark contrast to the importance given to "supervision" in the earlier self-help schemes. The following remarks of Richard Margolis, who preceded Jacob Crane in organizing schemes in Puerto Rico and later competed with Turner for several project grants in the US, are a good example of this contrast: "Lower income groups do not understand or believe that anyone would want to help themselves. Worse, once being convinced of this point, they question the motive...what new scheme to exploit the poor is in the wind now?"[358]

If we recall, self-help schemes in Puerto Rico had been organized on the basis of "aided self-help" approach. When the programme began in 1949, it was organized through regular meetings with "interested" families who were divided into construction teams of thirty each who worked on each other's houses. The teams were supervised by a construction supervisor and "social orientation" staff. Even though a large number of houses (between 30,000 to 40,000) were built by the early 1960s on the basis of the core model that allowed expansion on "individual"

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[357] John Tuner, "The squatter settlement: architecture that works," in *Architectural Design*, 38 (1968): 355-60.

[358] Richard J. Margolis, *Something to Build On: the Future of Self-Help in the Struggle Poverty* (Washington D.C.: International Self-Help Associates, 1967), p. 36.

basis, restrictions were placed on the form and "standards" of construction. In the

rural areas, officials held meetings to create enthusiasm for the projects. "We want

them to want it, they must ask for it," said Rafael Pico, the Director of Social

Administration. It was deemed necessary for the organizers "to have social goals

firmly in mind" and "to combine community development with housing." In these

tasks, the foreman or supervisor had to be, Margolis later noted. "half-supervisor,

half-saint. He must cajole, teach, persuade, befriend, plead and organize...As the

participants often see it, the line between (organized) self-help and conscription is

extremely narrow."[359]

In contrast, Turner argued with Rolf Goertz that

> The principal resources for housing are those directly controlled by the people to
> be housed – their own savings, their initiatives, skills and spare-time...Housing
> cannot be provided on a significant scale without the voluntary contribution of the
> household concerns.[360]

This self-critical framing served the same function as the dissenting voices of

disequilibrium analysis in development economics. Turner's criticisms, though they

appear to maintain a radical air, represent the changes in the institutional climate

of development agencies from a state sponsored to a more "market oriented"

approach. It is not surprising that Turner was the one to negotiate one of the first

loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for housing aid to Peru

based on core-based revisions of the self-help approach.[361] By 1966, the arguments

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[359] Richard J. Margolis, *Something to Build On, op cit.,* p. 39, 44.

[360] Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions." *op cit.*

[361] Tuner and R. Fichter, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, op cit.*
p. 139.

of Turner and others, celebrating the squatters' role in the development process,

had staked out a position of radical critique of development within the

development establishment. The UN was particularly keen to have such voices in

the mix. In 1966, in the United Nations conference in Pittsburg, Turner presented

the key paper titled, "Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policies," that

criticized existing self-help policies in developing countries and proposed that

state and international support be limited mostly to water and sewage provision

for existing settlements and to sites and services schemes for the new ones.[362] As

Turner himself later recalled, it was Ernest Weissmann, who was one of the first to

visit Turner at Arequipa.[363]

Despite its opposition to the establishment, Turner's point of view continued to

find a secure place in the institutions he confounded. Soon, Turner was able to

secure a grant from HUD (US Agency of Housing and Urban Development) in

1968 to "study self-help in construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of housing

for low income families and for methods of selecting, involving and directing such

persons and families in self-help activities" in the US. For this grant, Tuner

competed, as mentioned earlier, with Richard Margolis, who had already worked

on housing in rural areas and on Indian reservations in US and Puerto Rico. In the

end, Turner and his organization, OSTI (Organization for Social and Technical

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[362] See John Turner, "Uncontrolled urban settlements: problems and solutions." Paper presented to United Nations Conference, Pittsburgh, 1966. Published in G. Breese, ed., *The City in Newly Developing Countries* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 507-34.

[363] John Turner, "Issues in Self-Help and Self-Managed Housing," *op cit.,* p. 111. It is also not surprising that to distinguish his agenda of individualized effort with Weissmann's institutional approach, Tuner would remember Weissmann as "the distinguished Yugoslav communist." Ibid.

Innovation) received the contract which resulted in the report, *"Self-help Housing in the U.S.A."* in 1969.[364]

3.7.1 *Critiques:*

Turner's work attracted a host of critiques on account of his assertion that self-help housing, as practiced by the squatter of Lima and elsewhere in the Third World, represented "human" values of freedom and hope because it was a practice that was shaped by factors outside of abstract market relations. This version of self-help was driven, Turner stressed, by the economy of directly satisfying individual "needs." For Tuner, it was this individualized dimension that gave squatter self-help operations a decisive advantage over institutionally provided housing that relied on averaged data and standards.

In his second book, *Housing by People*, Turner expanded on this point by differentiating between the notion of "market" and "human" value of housing.

> It is entirely reasonable to speak about the market value of houses. It is also entirely reasonable to speak about the human and social values of housing action or housing processes. But it is absurd to mix these sets of terms and their meaning. The performance of housing, i.e. what it does for people, is not described by housing standards, i.e. what *is* materially speaking.[365]

In Turner's formulation then, the "value" of the house could not be separated from its "meaning" for the inhabitant, and was not just determined by its "market

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[364] Hans Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help Housing," in Peter Ward, ed., *Self-Help Housing: A Critique, op cit.,* p 28.

[365] John Turner, *Housing by People: Toward Autonomy in Building Environments, op cit.,* pp. 60-1.

value."[366] For Turner, the priority to invest in housing, therefore, could only be best estimated by the users themselves:

> Only in an impossible world of limitless resources and perfect justice where people could have their cake and eat it too could there be a coincidence of human and material values. For the present we must accept that as long as there are unsatisfied desires for material goods and services people must choose between the cakes they can afford to eat. So long as this fact of life remains and as long as people's priorities vary, the usefulness of things will vary independently of their material standards or monetary value.[367]

Turner's valorization of squatter living as a model that spoke to basic human qualities received wide criticism, particularly from a Marxist perspective. For many critics, Turner's argument betrayed a belief in the possibility of a set of socio-cultural relations outside of capitalist economy. For Rod Burgess, who himself had extensive experience in Latin American housing programs, Turner's argument proceeds from a fundamental "confusion" regarding the definition of the commodity and the circulation of capital in capitalism.[368] Turner proceeded from the assumption, Burgess argued, that if the self-help house is only for self-use, "it is not a commodity." For Burgess, this is sign of a "classical error that equates use-

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[366] Ibid.

[367] John Turner, *Housing by the People, op cit.*, p. 61. Turner himself faults burgess for this continuist relation: "The primary question does not seem to be addressed directly in Marxist analysis, at lest not in Burgess' interpretation. The treatment of housing as a wholly dependent product of the socio-economic and political system that should be supplied to all citizens as a 'right' implies a very limited range of relations and uses, whether these are monetary or non-monetary. If housing is denied the status of an instrument, or a potential instrument at least, for action by people then, as far as local communities are concerned, housing is a product, not an activity."

[368] Rod Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy: A Curious Form of Radicalism. A Critique of the Work of John F. C. Turner," in Peter Ward, ed., *Self-Help Housing: A Critique, op cit.*, pp. 55-97.

value with total utility and identifies market-value [only] as the ratio of exchange."[369]

Burgess points to the "dialectical interaction" between use-value and exchange value emphasized by Marx to argue that what is deemed outside of the capitalist circuit by Turner is very much an integral part of it.

> The commodity is the direct unity of use and exchange value...The commodity is use-value but as a commodity it is simultaneously not a use-value. It would not be a commodity, if it were a use-value for its owner, that is a direct means for the satisfaction of his own needs...The commodity is a use-value for its owner only insofar as it is an exchange value. The commodity therefore still has to become a use-value...a use-value for others.[370]

The separation between use and exchange value imagined by Turner, Burgess argues, stems from a confusion regarding the

> particular characteristics of land and housing within capitalist society. First, both have always been an important method of storing actual and future use- and exchange-value. Second, in comparison with other goods and services they only rarely assume the commodity form because they enter relatively infrequently into the exchange process; and thirdly, the use-values that people find in them are highly variable...[371]

This point is also emphasized by Emilio Pradilla, a well known critic of Turner's work. For Pradilla, in seeing self-help housing as outside the relations of exchange, Turner ignores the distinction between housing as "real" commodity

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[369] Ibid. p. 59.

[370] Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 413. Quoted by Burgess in ibid., p. 60.

[371] Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.*, p. 60.

and housing as a "potential" commodity.[372] Indeed Turner, at moments, appears to validate these criticisms when he argues that "to treat housing as a commodity is silly enough but to assume that it must or should be supplied by ever-larger pyramidal structures and centralizing technologies is suicidal."[373] According to Burgess, to see self-help as part of the capitalist economy is not to argue for more centralized control: "[I]t is nonsense," Burgess stresses, "to look at low-income housing in terms of use-values alone particularly when its constituent elements have either already been given a value or are in the process of being valorized by the labour input."[374]

For other prominent Marxist critics of urbanization such as Harvey and Manuel Castells, Turner's insistence to see self-help in term of use-value alone stems from his preconception to see capitalism as a process typified by the production of commodities, from which one can voluntarily escape, and not as a generalized mode of socio-economic production which has "valorization" of capital as its end. Turner insists, these critics maintain, on seeing housing and urbanization as objects and processes respectively that, if taken out of circuits of commodity production, can be matched with user needs.[375] For Manuel Castells and Chris Pickvance, this

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[372] Emilio Pradilla and Carlos Jiménez, Notas acera del problema de la vivienda, *Ideologia y Sociedad* (Bogotá), 16 (Manuary/March): 70-108; Also see, Manuel Castells (ed.), *Estructura de Clases y Política Urbana en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones SIAP, 1974).

[373] John Turner, *Housing by the People, op cit.,* p. 37.

[374] Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.*

[375] See David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Manuel Castells, Clase, estado y marginalidad urbana, in Castells, ed., *Estructura de clase y política urbana en América Latina* (Buenes Aires: Ediciones SIAP, 1974); Manuel Castells, *City Class and Power* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

perspective results from the improbable conceptual position of seeing the city as a theoretical object in itself.[376][377]

In light of these criticisms, Burgess argues that

> it is fair ask if [for Turner] the cost of production of a house, the level of effective demand and the size of the housing problem are determined by technology and its managerial and legal organization *per se*; or whether it is the manipulation of these elements by the dominant capitalist mode of production that determines such considerations. This is, of course, a time-honoured argument and centres on the most important question that confronts the students of the Third World: can those problems that we are all so ready to identify be more correctly understood as properties of a specific mode of production, or as urban/industrial or technological *per se?*[378]

For these critics, Turner, despite his self-positioning as the advocate for the poor, performed a critical role containing political dissatisfaction and economic demands at minimum expense for the very institutions he so vehemently criticized. Turner de-politicised, the critiques maintained, the question of housing and purged it of issues of class struggle over the use and accessibility of resources. By presenting the poor as organized, self-disciplined and motivated groups, Turner ignored political paternalism and fractional infighting, as well as the negotiations with the police and authorities that accompany squatter invasions. Also ignored is the

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[376] Manuel Castells and Chris G. Pickvance, *Urban Sociology* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1976).

[377] For other authors such as Raymond Aron and Ralf Dahrendorg, writing from a similar Marxist perspective, the use-value and exchange value divide frames the housing as a primarily a technical and administrative issues and stems from seeing technological and administrative character of industrialization as the primary determinant of social forms. See, Raymond Aron, *18 Lectures on Industrial Society*, trans. M. K. Bottomore (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967); Ralf Dahrendorg, *Class and Class Conflict* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[378] Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.*, p. 64.

cynical manipulation of squatter groups for vote catching, land grapping, and financial gain by other political parties. For Castells, it is precisely through such manipulations that the "State becomes though its arrangement of space the real manager of everyday life."[379]

For Burgess, Turner sees

> the effects of urban policy on the structure of the Latin American city...as a distortion of the model. This is very dubious because a settlement model that is adequate for the Latin American reality must be able to unite conceptually the activities of the State and other interests involves in the housing and settlement process, for these are not distortions but rather integral processes in the evolution of the Latin American urban structure.[380]

Other acute critics of Turner, such as Hans Harms, go further to assert that the popularity of Turner's proposals stem from its cadence for the status quo.

> [G]overnments have become interested in self-help as a policy to avoid the distribution of surplus value; self-help processes are being used as a means of stimulating savings...from the poorest groups. This policy provides the dominant groups with a chance to appear liberal (not repressing self-initiatives but promoting them) and at the same time allocating very few resources to an operation in which the lower paid people had to pull themselves by their own bootstraps out of a situation of misery.[381]

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[379] Manuel Castells, *La Cuestion Urbana*, 2nd ed. (México DF: Siglo XXI, 1976), p. 80. Translated and quoted in by Rod Burgess in "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.*, p. 75.

[380] Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.*, p. 75.

[381] Hans Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help Housing," *op cit.*, p. 49. Hans argues further that "Self-help does not reduce the total 'socially necessary labour' for the production of housing. Rather it increases it, and moreover it shifts the responsibility from...State to the users. Self-help policies allow cost accounting in housing to be shifted from societal costs to individual and family costs...[resulting in] increase[ing] the overall amount of unpaid labour in society." Ibid., p. 20.

The brunt of this criticism falls on the insistence of Turner and others, such as Mangin and Colin Ward, on seeing self-help as a sphere separated from the capitalist mode of production. Yet the Marxist critics, in insisting on a dialectical relationship between use-value and exchange value, nevertheless maintain them as separate spheres as well. The dialectical relationship between use value and exchange value emphasized by Burgess, Harms, and Castells holds the socio-cultural sphere as a direct means of producing economic relations (i.e., the family as means to produce the worker). In this continuist relationship, feminist critiques of patriarchal relations can only enter the umbrella of Marxism under a paternalistic shadow of economic relations.

3.7.2 *Negation of a Negation:*

Imbued in economic relations or separated from them, for both Turner and his critics, the development subject is taken to be a given. The question of how this subject is constituted as a *differential* between the economic and socio-cultural notions of tradition and modernity, the individual and the social, development and underdevelopment, is ignored. If Turner imagines the development subject outside of capitalist relations then the Marxist critics operate a reversal, and imagine the development subject as completely determined by those relations.

In both the readings, the possibility of the development subject appearing as an *effect* of the unacknowledged appropriation of a shifting differential between these domains is precluded. It is not surprising that all the Marxist criticisms aimed at Turner's propositions remain silent regarding the subject of development. The

focus remains on the working of the socio-economic relations and the impossibility of independent agency within them. The presence of architecture in this domain, however, affords a different reading of the relationship between the socio-cultural and the economic that points to a necessarily ambiguous open ended textuality.

It is the constitution of this unacknowledged *unity* between subject and agency, marked by a *separation* between the individual and collective choice, that we have charted in the work of Abrams and Koenigsberger. There, it was the practice of building core houses that bestowed a sense of independence on the individual subject and tied it to a logic of collective rationality without undermining the notion of individual agency.

The Marxist critiques miss this textuality when they assert that Turner's most critical affront to his stated goals of social welfare is to emphasize privatization as the means to achieve them. For example for Harms, it is this emphasis that allows "Self-help housing [to be] used as an inexpensive policy for housing provision without changes in resource allocation or structural changes. The emphasis [has been] on privatizing the problem to the individual household away from collective action."[382] These assertions are based on a linear relationship between social formations and economic consequences: Privatization leads to economic exploitation by reducing the cost of reproducing labor.

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[382] Harms, "Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help Housing," *op cit.*, p. 23.

This linear logic is evident in Burgess' statements as well, who insists that self-help is part of "a constant expansion of the sphere of commodity production for capitalist exchange...[an] expansion is a necessary *condition* of capitalist development and not an *effect* of it."[383] If, however, we consider the relationship between the social and the economic as a continuous shifting differential then self-help appears irresolutely as both the condition and the effect of the circuit of capitalist expansion. The focus then shifts from just the notion of privatization to the *particular* form of privatization advanced through self help and how it allows unacknowledged appropriation of value in the differential between the notions of the private and the public.

In the specific form of privatization proposed by Turner, and Abrams and Koenigsberger before him, the individual agency, emphasized in the move towards private effort and resources, conforms to a rational logic only on a scale *beyond* the individual. The actions of the choosing individual fit into a rational mold *despite* him/herself. This positioning frames the rational behavior projected onto the development subject as an originary, quasi-natural sensibility. Consequently, this rational subject stands as the justification of the State, and not as its effect. The preservation or realization of his/her rational behavior is framed as a *human* right and not one that should be claimed as a *political* one against political interests.

This staging, however, does not answer the critical question: why architecture? Why does architecture, whether in the mode of earlier self-help schemes, the core

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[383] Burgess, "Self-Help Housing Advocacy," *op cit.,* p. 62.

house, or slum redevelopment advocated by Turner and others, form a critical aspect of this staging of subject and agency?

Architecture plays a critical role in this staging, for it is architecture *as activity* that posits the individual behavior as rational, yet maintains that rationality as originary, and not political. Abrams and Koenisgberger reminded us in the Philippines that development holds the desire for home ownership is a orginary *human* aspiration:

> Peoples' attitudes toward savings are one of the most important factors in the size of savings. Their attitudes are favourable toward savings when savings becomes a means of acquiring the commodity they yearn for most. A home on a piece of land they can call their own is one of the great *human* aspirations."[384]

Architecture is the terrain, the site of the constitution of the development subject, on which the subject appears rational, but rational in a way that *precedes* her constitution as a development subject. It is important to note that in the statement above, the propensity to build is not described as a phenomenological or a material need. It is the human *desire* for a home, and not the bodily need for shelter, that drives people to home ownership. It is this partially, this irresolute differential between the modern and premodern, attributed to architecture that allows it to stage *this* development subject. It is this irresolution that allows translating the building activity into circuits of finance and industrial production despite the individual builder and yet maintains it outside the realm of political demands and rights because of him/her.

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[384] Abrams and Koenigsberger, *A Housing Program for the Philippine Islands*, 1959, *op cit.*, p. 49.

The architect's role in this domain is not to design form—that much is guaranteed by the human desire for home—but to tie the inevitable realization of individual desire, the inevitable emergence of form, to industrial production and finance so that it matches the presumed social needs. It is this quality that Turner appeals to when he describes institutionally provided housing as "aesthetically hideous, socially alienating and technically incompetent architecture."[385]

Turner's critics miss his emphasis on the setting up a differential between tradition and modernity sustained by architecture when they take his statement that "to treat housing as a commodity is silly," as a declaration of the phenomenological and natural status of architecture outside the economic. For Turner, the promotion of use-value—or "human value," the term he'll use later—does not require the elimination of all relations to the logic of market economy. Only, he advocates relating "use-values" to circuits of exchange in a non-linear fashion.

This diffusion of the linear relationship between the social and the economic is evident in Turner's insistence that housing is not an object but a site of the constitution of the development subject, a point Turner had emphasized with Fichter in his book as well:

> if housing is perceived as functions of what housing does in the lives of its users – of the roles which the processes play in their life-history and not in the material qualities of the physical products, then the material worth of the objects and the manner of their production are entirely dependent on their highly variable uses.[386]

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[385] Turner, *Housing by People, op cit.*, p. 49.

[386] Turner and Fichter, *Freedom to Build, op cit.*, p. 159.

Turner sustains an irresolute differential between the "market" and "human aspirations," between tradition and modernity. Responding to Burgess' criticism Turner argues:

> The second of the three basic issues raised in *Housing by People* and discussed by Burgess, is that of *value.* The [question] as I put it is '*What it does versus what it is.*' Perhaps through lack of clarity on my part, Burgess has misinterpreted this as meaning 'use-values versus market-values.' The case that I am arguing is that values lie in the relationship between subjects and objects, and not in subjects and objects alone. It would be illogical and inconsistent of me to deny market-values, or to suppose that they could or should be eliminated – the secondary issue of use-value 'versus' market-value is a question of balance, not of exclusion.[387]

Turner's affront to his stated goals lies in not simply attributing a phenomenological need for human shelter to the squatters, casting them outside the circuits of capitalism into some natural state of use-values, but on arguing for the presence of a modern rationalistic quality in their behavior that precedes the emergence of law and politics.

In all of these formulations, the squatter, despite of all the resourcefulness and ingenuity attributed to him/her, constitutes a truncated subject of development, differentiated in a manner that allows only a promised, but perpetually delayed, entry into the discourse of political demands and labor rights. His/her rationality is one that is already assumed to precede development, not taken to emerge as an effect of an embattled and political process.

In Turner's framing, the form of the house is no longer necessary to map this truncated relation between the individual and the social. This difference results

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[387] Turner, "Issues in Self-help and Self-Managed Housing," *op cit.,* p. 105.

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from the shift in the terrain of development, from the field of industrial

production, to the field of finance capital. Yet, nevertheless, the idea of

architecture is crucial for implementing a similar logic of displaced rationality that

was operational in Abrams and Koenigsberger's proposals. Attempting to read

these displacements and value differentials set by them is a fundamental question

in our inquiry into the alternative and formless history of modern architecture and

planning in the development arena.

4   Pushing Patterns: Planning the Third World City

"This century has been a losing battle with the issue of quantity." This statement,

penned by Rem Koolhass in the section on urbanism in *SMLXL*, sums up the

relationship of modernization to the burgeoning Third World metropolis, a site

where, we are told, all logics of modern urban planning have been defeated.[388] In

the next few pages Koolhaas takes us to Singapore. Here, however, we learn that

not all battles are lost in the same way. Sometimes a winning battle can be an

ultimate defeat. In Singapore, modernism did not lose its struggle with the rising

urban population, but won it many times over. It is the horror of this victory that

Koolhaas narrates for us here. The Singapore Housing Development Board (HDB)

relentlessly pursued the modernist planning principles till it turned the entire

island into a constant "*tabula rasa*," forever caught in the process of destruction,

displacement, and redevelopment (FIG. 25). Koolhaas tells us, "The civil servant—

the bureaucracy of Singapore—are obsessively active. Like horsemen of the

Apocalypse, they will not rest before the entire island is plowed over, made utterly

unrecognizable."[389] The result is a city without a "songline," a tabula rasa gone

mad, a "Disneyland with a death sentence."[390]

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[388] Rem Koolhaas, and Bruce Mau, *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995). Hereafter cited as *SMLXL*.

[389] Ibid., p.1033.

[390] The section is called "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis...or Thirty Yeas of Tabula Rasa," ibid. pp. 1009-1089.

For Koolhaas, what is lost in the monotonous rows of the island's housing towers, marching down the landscape in militaristic formation, is *quality*—that elusive Other of quantity—the commitment to which can be witnessed in the ideological convictions of modernist manifestos in the West. Singapore, however, we are told, is "modernity stripped of ideology."[391] In Singapore, there is no embarrassment at a soulless modernism. In fact, "it is shown with pride," Koolhaas tells us. "They think there is no crime, we think there can be no pleasure."[392]

The seeds of Singapore's "Herculean" obsession with quantity, Koolhaas asserts, were planted by a UN mission composed of "American Charles Abrams, the then stateless and formerly-German Otto Koenigsberger, and the Japanese Susumu Kobe," that arrived in Singapore in 1963.[393] The UN experts argued, we are told, that to prepare for the onslaught of urban growth that was to accompany the pursuit of modernization, Singapore must create a comprehensive plan for the entire island. For the UN mission, the solution was to lay out a "cluster of cities" based on the Dutch model of "the Ring City," in which a group of major towns such as Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht, Delft, The Hague, Leiden, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam, formed a large circle around a central stretch of open country. It was a mistake, Koolhaas argues, to attempt to reproduce through planning what has been a self-evolving process in Europe.

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[391] Ibid., p. 1021.

[392] Ibid.

[393] Ibid., p 1024.

Yet, for Koolhaas, what sealed Singapore's fate was not just the idealism of the UN recommendation itself, but also the "inscrutable nature of the Asian mentality."[394] In the hands of Singapore's HDB, the UN report became a horror of modernity, destroying that curious balance between quantity and quality that the Ring City idea had achieved for the Dutch. Singapore was a network of clusters that kept growing till the distinction between cluster and open space was replaced by a monotonous infill of modernist blocks (FIG. 26). For Koolhaas, this incessant and incestuous reproduction of density on density, quantity on quantity, represents the quintessential condition of Third World urbanization, a condition that would reproduce the same sense of estrangement and fascination when Koolhaas and others would visit China's booming economic zone, the Pearl River Delta, for the Harvard Graduate School of Design's *Project on the City*.[395] For Koolhaas, the Asian mentality, bent on producing a "rogue Europe" in the heart of Asia, cannot discern the delicate balance between the essential conditions of modernism, the balance between quantity and quality, density and openness, mobility and settlement.

From the perspective of this dissertation, this irrecognition of Asia's modernism hides the long history of modern architects and planners' critical involvement with the Third World that we have sketched so far. As we have seen, UN missions such as Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Kobe's mentioned by Koolhaas were not bureaucratic nemeses of modernism, but the very mode through which the

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[394] Ibid., p. 1037.

[395] Rem Koolhaas, Jeffrey Inaba, et al., eds., *Project on the City: Harvard Design School* (Köln: Taschen, 2001).

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modern architects and planners sought to find opportunities in the decolonizing world after the Second World War.

The erasure of this history is betrayed in Koolhaas' description of the Singapore UN mission itself. Koolhaas describes Koenigsberger as a "stateless" bureaucrat on account of his being a refugee from Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Koenigsberger at the time, however, was neither stateless nor a bureaucrat in the conventional sense of being disconnected with the modernist movement implied by Koolhaas. Koenigsberger was closely related to the CIAM circle,[396] and had also established a formidable career in India where, in March 1950, he had become an Indian citizen on the special recommendation of Jawaharlal Nehru. Though he returned to the UK in 1951, he kept his citizenship until 1991, when he was forced to renounce it under duress from the British government.[397]

Geo-politically speaking, the phenomenon of Koolhaas and other architects on the global stage today is very different from that of the development expert in the 50s and the 60s. Yet, the contemporary architects' presence on the global stage is based on a set of assumptions regarding the Third World city that were shaped by modern architects and planners' earlier involvement with institutions of Third World development. It is precisely by ignoring this relationship with the history of Third World development planning—and the financial and economic space

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[396] As mentioned earlier, Koenigsberger had already been on a mission with Vladimir Bodiansky and Charles Abrams to the Gold Coast.

[397] In Britain, his activities as a pedagogue, planner, and expert on the Third World during the 1950's and the 60's cast a critical influence on the direction and curriculums of architectural academies in London, particularly the Architectural Association [AA] and the Barlett School [UCL]. It was in the AA of the 1960s that Koolhass received his formal education in architecture, a period that he would later describe as the coming to age of his generation.

opened by it—that modern architects' current global involvements, chasing the postwar flight of capital to new economic territories, can simply be described as following a self-perpetuating historical process of globalization, rather than part of a process with a particular history, one in which modern architecture has been critically involved.

One of the most pervasive of these shared assumptions has been the framing of the Third World city as an exploding demographic mass that is unable to formulate its own emergence into modernity. So far, we have seen how this inability is staged through the idea of self-help to legitimize various strategies and modes of direct and indirect socio-economic intervention.[398] In this section we will look at the idea of historical change inherent in arguments that describe this inability as an effect of the rapid pace of urbanization in the Third World. At the scale of the city, the operative term is not self-help or core, but *pattern*. The challenge for urban planners seeking to curb the flow of rural-urban migration is to identify patterns of social and cultural change, patterns of settlement, of displacement, patterns of economic investment, of physical resources, and somehow juxtapose all of them through comprehensive and regional planning so that they yield the desired pattern of development.

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[398] We have seen how this inability, manifests itself at various scales of development, from the core house to the squatter settlements. It is sometimes framed as a shortcoming, as was the case in the early self-help models, and sometimes it is celebrated as a sign of traditional resilience to mass produced modernization, as was done by Turner and later self-help advocates. Both the positions, however, share the idea of modernization as a process that looses its ethical and moral bearings with the speed of socio-cultural change. Moreover, this projected inability takes the effect, the socio-cultural conditions of the inhabitants, for the cause. What is excluded from this metalepsis, is how particular development and modernization policies dictated by the World Bank, the UN, and the Third World national governments themselves, actually produced these conditions.

The term pattern appears throughout urban planning literature on development. Its preponderance, we will argue in this section, stems from the need to find models of intervention that present development as a continuation of the existing socio-cultural structures rather than a rupture and an external imposition. The term patterns inheres a sense both of continuation and change and betrays a model of expertise and intervention based on ideas of cooperation and participation, a model that fulfills the requirement of the postwar geo-political arena, both past and present.

4.1 Changing Patterns:

Let us begin with one of the better known proposals of population movement and settlement in the postwar era, namely the "Cluster City" projects of Alison and Peter Smithson in the 1950s.[399] The so-called "clusters" were composed of interconnected housing, office, and commercial blocks that, in turn, were connected with similar clusters through a series of highways. The Smithsons, together with other future members of Team 10 such as Jaab Bakema and George Candillis, carried out a number of these studies throughout the fifties, beginning with more abstract proposals presented at CIAM meetings, to competition entries such as the Haupstadt Berlin Plan of 1957 (FIG. 27).[400]

What is of interest to us here is the relationship between stability and change that the Smithsons called the "patterns of associations."[401] These projects have been

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[399] See Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson, ed., "Urban infra-structure," in *Team 10 Primer* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), pp. 59-73.

[400] Included in the competition entries is a study of London Roads system in 1959. Ibid., pp., 42, 51, 56.

[401] Ibid., p. 55.

seen as examples of modern architects' fascination with technologies of movement and communication. Indeed, mobility formed a key component of the schemes, featuring the automobile as a democratic symbol of communication. The projects presented, according to the Smithsons, the "theme of the road system as the basis of the community structure."[402] Yet, there is another ingredient in the mix: density. Every cluster, the Smithsons stressed, was an equilibrium of the forces of mobility and density particular to that context. "To accept the dispersal implied in the concept of mobility," the Smithsons argued, also meant "...to re-think accepted density patterns and location of functions in relation to the new means of communication."[403] If mobility represented the freedom to communicate, then density represented the judgment to settle. Together they formed the vectors of a democratic society. One is inextricably tied to the other. Have only unconstrained mobility, and you have chaos. Let the forces of density rein uninterrupted, and you have congestion.

The Smithsons use of the term pattern to designate this shifting balance is important. Through the idea of pattern of associations, the Smithsons attempted to propose a model of urbanization that escaped the sequential linearity of master planning then in vogue in CIAM circles.[404] For the Smithsons, if the contemporary

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[402] Ibid., p. 52.

[403] Ibid. p. 58. Proper relationship of "[d]ensity and intensity," the Smithsons argued, "will [result] in communities of much greater genuine variation of living pattern." Ibid. p. 64.

[404] For example, when in 1943 Jose Luis Sert and Sigfried Giedeon published a short manifesto on urban planning with artist Fernand Léger called, *The Nine points on Monumentality*, the authors assigned the role of social change to the architect who designed the new democratic monuments of modernization such as the centers of civic and communal life. As Joan Ockman has noted, *The Nine Points* remained unpublished till it was included by Giedion some fifteen years later in his *Architecture, You and Me: The Diary of a Development*. The individual articles by the three authors, however, appeared

Western cities were given proper infrastructure, the society would transform itself according to the forces of mobility and density in the pattern of the clusters. In the Smithsons proposal, as well as in those of other members of the later Team 10, the architect, instead of claiming to be the sole agent of writing the script of stability and change, handed over the responsibility of urban change to the inhabitants of the city. The architect/planner only provided the framework of stability and change.

The active agent of negotiating the dynamic of urban life was the "changing man," the modern subject of the cluster city.[405] At present, the Smithsons argued, this changing man was repeatedly exposed to an outdated reality that provided no outlet for his stress and built up a sense of frustration.[406] All he could see from the window of his commuter train were the monotonous rows of backyard gardens. The changing man wanted to see the reality of his dynamic mode of living expressed aesthetically. He wanted to exercise the choices of mobility and settlement provided to him by the modern society. The pattern of clusters provided an opportunity to exercise this democratic choice.

Indeed it is this self-evolving "pattern of association" between the forces of mobility and density, movement and settlement that the Smithsons saw depicted in

in different places, assigning the same primary to the architect as the agent of socio-cultural change. Giedion and Sert published "The Need for a New Monumentality," and "The Human Scale in City Planning," respectively, in Paul Zucker's 1944 collection of essays, *New Architecture and City Planning*. See Joan Ockman, "The War Years in America: New York, New Monumentality," in Guido Hartray and Xavier Costa, eds., *Sert: Arquitecto en Nueva York* (Barcelona: Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona, ACTAR, 1997), pp. 22-45.

[405] *Team 10 Primer, op cit.*, p. 12.

[406] Ibid., pp. 66-68.

Geddes' famous "valley section" that formed the frontispiece of Team 10's 1954

Doorn manifesto (FIG. 28).[407] "To comprehend the pattern of human associations,"

it was declared, "we must consider every community in its particular

environment."[408]

Yet, the comparison of the logic of the clusters with that of Geddes' diagram is

made possible by a sleight of hand. In redrawing the Geddes section in the

manifesto, the Smithsons' created a mirroring by combining the original section

with its reflection. This doubling underplays the possibility of reading the original

diagram as a linear development. Like the Geddes diagram, the Smithsons' version

also seeks to highlight the relationship between different settlement types and

their environment. Yet, it attempts to do more. The new diagram is presented as a

negotiation between different settlements and the space between the settlements

marked as "field."[409] Each settlement stands as a precarious moment poised at the

possibility of expanding or shrinking toward the adjacent settlement. Instead of

depicting different settlements as benchmarks of socio-ecological development, the

Smithsons' diagram seeks to present them as an active negotiation between density

and mobility, or in other words, as a "pattern."

Ironically, for the Smithons, the prime examples of this self-evolving, democratic

expression of population movement and settlement were the colonial projects of

Atbat Afrique, CIAM's offshoot in the French Moroccan and Algerian protectorates.

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[407] Ibid. p. 57

[408] Ibid.

[409] The version of the Smithson's diagram with the word, "field" is shown by Jos Bosman in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *The Last CIAMs, Rassegna*, special issue 52:4 (December 1992).

When *Atbat* members, Shadrach Woods, George Candillis, and Michel Ecochard

presented their Moroccan housing projects at the outskirts of Casablanca—such as

the *Nid d'abeille* housing—at the 9th CIAM meeting in Aix en Provence in 1953, all

of the CIAM, older and younger members alike, saw them as evidence of the new

thinking on urban planning.[410] Indeed, *Atbat* emphasized density and mobility as

the primary forces shaping the traditional Moroccan *bidonville* (FIG. 29).[411] Yet, the

apparent contradiction of holding projects of colonial reform, carried out under a

colonial administration, as examples of democratic urbanization does not appear

as a contradiction at all, neither to the designers nor to the audience. The colonial

administrators appear transparent. This is stranger still since, at the time, Michel

Ecochard was the Director of Town Planning of the French Protectorate of

Morocco.

This apparent transparency, however, is based not on a belief in the benevolence

of the colonial civilizational mission. Rather, the late stages of French colonial

presence in Morocco are seen as something already beyond colonization. The

architects are seen as development experts, as transparent conduits, not fulfilling

the agenda of a particular colonial power, but helping different populations realize

the global aspirations of technological advancement. As the Smithsons put it:

> [we] believe that if so many architects are interested nowadays in the [settlements]
> of the Indian (the Pueblos) or in that of the Negroes in Africa, it is because here
> one may still recognize the spatial expression of the whole population. We should
> not forget, nevertheless that this population is *leading a fierce battle* in order to be

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[410] Vittorio Gregotti, "Editorial," *The Last CIAMs*, *op. cit.* p. 5.

[411] Jos Bosman "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *op cit.*

equipped with modern techniques which were developed in different countries of Europe, of America and Russia [emphasis added].[412]

The Smithsons' statement betrays a shift from the perspective of colonial anthropology and its focus on preservation that characterized the earlier avant-gardes' fascination with the "primitive" in colonial territories, to advocating technologically based change. There is an assertion of both sameness and difference in the statement above. On the one hand, the Pueblo Indian and the African Negroes are described as different from the Western civilization for having retained what has been lost in the West (the ability to represent the fundamental expressions of population as a whole). On the other hand, a certain parallel is constructed between the Western and non-Western worlds when they are described as developed and underdeveloped contexts. The populations of the underdeveloped world, leading a fierce battle for technological development, are presented as an extension of the subject of modernization in the developed world, the changing man of the Cluster City projects. The presumed desire of the changing man reflects the assumed consent to modernization in the Third World population. Both are seen as participants in the project of molding the pattern of historical forces that define them. To the extent that this dialectic of symmetry and asymmetry serves to hide the different underpinnings of socio-economic intervention in the two contexts, it betrays a new mode of participatory development. The plural subject of development planning in one context appears similar to the singular subject of the welfare-state in the other. Implicit in this

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[412] *Team 10 Primer, op cit.,* p. 28.

mode is the positioning of the expert as an aid in facilitating a historical change

that is already underway.

4.2 (Dis)Functions of Density:

The Smithsons' use of Ecochard's projects as an example of this model of change

becomes even more ironic in retrospect. The same year, in 1953, Ecochard secured

a consultancy position with the United Nations to design the refugee housing at

Landhi, near Karachi, the first federal capital of the newly established government

of Pakistan after the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947. The project

ignited a controversy around its usefulness and around the usefulness of its

designer that betrays the consequences of inattention to the language of

participatory development and historical continuation implicit in the term pattern.

In his application to the United Nations and the government of Pakistan, Ecochard

presented the Moroccan projects as a major credential of technological

development (FIG. 30).[413] For Ecochard, the refugee housing in Karachi presented

a similar problem of rural-urban migration that *Atbat* had resolved in Casablanca.[414]

If Karachi was mapped into sectors of varying densities, Ecochard agued, it

disclosed more than the geography of population concentration. The result was

also a map of needed population movement. The problem of Karachi's

modernization, according to Ecochard, was not just settling its refugee population,

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[413] Michel Ecochard, "Study of Satellite Cities for Refugees and Industrial Worker at Landhi," Karachi, Pakistan, File no. TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

[414] Michel Ecochard, "The Problem of Refugees in Karachi: 1st and 2nd Reports," December, 1953, File no. TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

but also resettling its congested areas (FIG. 31).[415] The city's refugee problem had

to be considered as part of a broader dynamic of density and mobility suitable for

modernization. The new refugee housing proposal did not just fulfill the

immediate need of providing shelter. Instead, it provided an evolving

"framework" in which the refugees kept moving into settlements of different

densities with increasing modernization and accompanied by a rise in the

"standards of living" (FIG. 32).[416]

For Echocard, the primary means for managing the dynamic of modernization was

housing based on CIAM's four functions, called "circulation," "living," "care of

body and spirit," and "working" as mentioned in Ecochard's UN report on

Pakistan.[417] Consequently, Ecochard designed site plans for housing of varying

densities that employed the language of four functions: each settlement was

composed of individual neighborhoods that surrounded schools, commercial

centers, and parks, and was connected to Karachi's industrial and business districts

through public transportation (FIG. 33).[418]

Ecochard argued that his proposal would bring the relationship of mobility and

settlement in Karachi in line with the patterns of association so admired by CIAM

members. Yet, the influx of refugees and migrants in Karachi refused to follow

Ecochard's appraisals. The reality of Karachi's changing environment proved to be

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[415] Michel Ecochard, "The Problem of Refugees in Karachi: 2nd Report," December, 1953, *op cit.*

[416] Ibid.

[417] Ibid. p. 12.

[418] Ibid.

quite different from the logic of four functions that assumed the presence of an established welfare state with investment in public infrastructure and ample employment opportunities.[419] Even before Ecochard had finished writing the final project report, it became obvious that the approach of providing "finished" housing could neither meet the calculated demand nor be furnished with the required investments in infrastructure.[420] Given the limited resources, only certain parts of the proposed plans could be approved. Karachi Improvement Trust, with which Ecochard was attached, disagreed with the scheduling of the tasks and objected to the extended "functions" attached to the plans.

Ecochard, in principle, should not have been there to answer these objections. Yet just as his contract with the UN was about to terminate, he had signed up for an independent commission with the Pakistan government to design the Karachi University campus. For Ecochard, the decision to put another development project on his resume culminated in a minor scandal. His extended stay in the city on another major project while the last one proposed by him was being contested raised a debate in the local government circles on the adequacy of his proposals.

Ecochard defended his decision to stay as well as his refugee housing proposal by arguing that all he wanted "to do [was] some useful work for the good of Pakistan

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[419] Ibid.

[420] These "difficulties" were acknowledged by Eleanor M. Hinder, Chief, Office for Asia and the Far East, Programme Division, UN Technical Assistance Administration, in a letter to Jean Louis Mandereau, Director, European Office, Technical Assistance Administration, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 30 November 1953. This exchange resulted in the drawing of a "supplement agreement" with the Government of Pakistan to allocate more funds to the Project. "We must do all we can," Hinder wrote to Mandereau, "to save his [Ecochard's] project." File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

before [his] departure."[421] Ecochard's motives were indeed more benevolent than financial. He had agreed to prepare the plans for the Karachi University in "his free time" without any "remuneration" from the Pakistani government in addition to what he was being paid as a UN consultant. Despite this explanation, however, the UN became concerned that its experts might appear opportunistic and had questioned Ecochard's decision, leading to an exchange on the ethics of securing independent projects while on UN missions.

To quell the controversy, in a long letter to M. Qureshi, the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Labor, Ecochard insisted that his refugee housing proposal only seemed out of place because it looked to the future "pattern" of the city and not its present conditions. The proposal was "conceived" Ecochard argued, "in such a manner that these new satellite towns become a consistent part of the expanding city of Karachi following the rise of the standard of living." This optimistic approach, Ecochard maintained, had a better chance of improving the city's conditions than the one taken by "the P.W.D. [Public Works Department, which has] built new colonies at Malir and Landhi in the same *pattern* as [the previously built] Drigh Road and Lalukhet colonies which can only become terrible slums in the future."[422] Talking with the self-assurance of an ex-colonial

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[421] Letter to Mohammad Akbar, the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Works (July 17, 1954). File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

[422] Michel Ecochard to M. Qureshi, The Joint Secretary of Ministry of Health and Labor, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 26 June, 1954. File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York. Ecochard supported his claim by pointing to his previous planning work in Syria: "Your Excellency has recently visited the city and museum of Damascus. May I mention that the planning of the city and the museum had been done by me when I was the Directory of Town Planning for the Government of Syria." Ibid. p 3.

administrator, Ecochard insisted that his "comprehensive" plans were what

Pakistan needed:

> It is still time to change this situation. These plans and reports I have made can be considered as a whole...Thus it will be seen that I have laid the foundations of all plans and recommendations, and unless Authorities now study them, there is no point in my continuing to follow them up.[423]

Ecochard's use of the term "pattern" above implies the conclusiveness of a

signature design, rather than the indeterminacy of approaches like the Smithsons'

cluster city or Abrams and Koenigsberger's core. Ecochard's design anticipated

growth and transformation by articulating the final outcome, leaving only room for

contributions of the inhabitants as well as the sponsoring national government to

appear as deviations from the original proposal. Though Ernest Weissmann at this

point supported Ecochard's proposal as well as his involvement with the Karachi

University project,[424] the exchange betrays the incongruence of "finished" housing

proposals, such as Ecochard's, with the trajectory of development intervention in

both the UN and national theaters. This incongruence would become apparent

when four years later in 1957 the UN would re-send its experts on housing, this

time Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger, to propose self-help and core

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[423] Ibid.

[424] Ecochard himself recounted Wessmann's support in a letter to Eleanor M. Hinder, Chief, Office for Asia and the Far East, Programme Division, UN Technical Assistance Administration, 14 January 1955. File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256.United Nations Archives, New York.

Ernest Weissmann to Syed Ali, Office for Asia and the Far East, TAA, 25 April 1955, "Comments on Plans for a New University of Karachi – Mr. Ecochard's Report." File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

housing approaches that presented the inhabitants as the principal agents of developmental change.[425]

The role of the development expert demanded avoiding accusations of not only the expert's irrelevance but also of the inadequacy of the national government to carry out the recommendations. More than any other shortcoming in the project design, this is where Ecochard had failed. In proposing finished housing based on the four-function approach, Ecochard did not consider how the discrepancy between the actual and projected fate of the project would figure in the development discourse, in both its national and international contexts. The UN's diplomatic footings demanded that the Smithsons' changing man and the Third World migrant must appear side by side, despite the absence of the welfare state in the context surrounding the latter. It also demanded that the UN and the national government involved appear as transparent conduits serving the interest of the masses, not parties with their own agendas. This required that the potential failure of development projects such as Ecochard's not be allowed to figure as a reflection of the incapacity of the local authorities or the migrant, but as a result of abstract contextual forces that displaced the migrant: the hardships of independence, the difficulties of the path to progress, and so forth. This frame is precisely what Abrams and Koenigsberger's core housing proposal would succeed in creating a few years later.

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[425] Even during Ecochard's presence in Pakistan, Weissmann stressed the importance of exploring "self-help housing" options in Pakistan. Ernest Weissmann's memo to S. Habib Ahmed, Chief, Office for Asia and Far East, Programme Division, TAA. File TAA 173/70/027, Rag 2/173 – Box 256. United Nations Archives, New York.

The controversy around Ecochard's projects betrays a turn in the logic of development intervention. The failure of the project could no longer be described as the "failure" of the inhabitants or even of the national governments. If the agency of the migrant is seen to be limited, the causes of those limitations must be identified in a larger frame that does not challenge the make up of the migrants' socio-cultural sphere. Though in the Smithsons' statement development was framed as a project that required *management*, that managerial role is taken to be limited to helping the Other survive modernization on her own terms. Herein lies a project of constructing logical symmetries between the projects of First World social reform and Third World development that hides the inherent asymmetries between the modes of socio-economic intervention in the two institutional contexts.

This is a hard case to make. In the development context, modern architecture has constituted a site that ironically makes this case in its supposed "failure," rather than in its claimed successes. In histories of architecture, in the photographs depicting the contemporary fate of Ecochard's *Nid d'abeille* housing, we are shown that the migrants, if left to their own devices, fill every nook and cranny of the architecture that was intended to reveal the patterns of modernity to them (FIG. 34).[426] Yet, these transformations are presented as a failure of modernism to understand the cultural dynamics of the contexts. Through the lens of cultural relativism, it is modern architecture that appears as too restrictive to the cultural

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[426] See Jos Bosman in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *The Last CIAMs, op cit.*; Also see Minique Eleb, "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Écochard, Candilis, and ATBAT-Afrique," in Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault, ed., *Anxious Modernisms* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 67.

demands and social requirements of the inhabitant. The inhabitant's agency is preserved to preserve the possibility of development as a mode of assistance rather than of external imposition. The image of the masses engaged in a ferocious battle for technological development outlined by the Smithsons serves to claim consent not at the expense but through acknowledging agency.

4.3 (A) Symmetrical World:

We see the apparatus of constructing this symmetry between the First and the Third World contexts being deployed under UN and Unesco social research projects in the postwar era. The ability to negotiate between stability and change under pressures of modernization was seen by the development organizations as an issue that affected both the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. The crises of the World Wars were seen to have stemmed directly from the failure of the European citizenry to negotiate the supposedly contradictory demands of modernity for cultural preservation and technological progress, a failure that was exploited by Fascism. The rapidly expanding Third World city appeared as the next site where such a crisis might repeat itself. To study this dual or shared problem, the organizations were in the process of setting up joint centers of urban and social planning and research all across the globe under the project title, Tensions Affecting International Understanding. As evident from the title, the underdeveloped world entered this international project as a function of the industrial powers' future in the emerging Cold War. Rapid and uncontrolled Third World urbanization was seen to generate political uncertainty that pointed to another geo-political crisis between industrial powers.

The Tensions Project, as it came to be known, was inaugurated at the second meeting of the Unesco's general assembly in Mexico City in 1948 under Unesco's first Director-General, Julian Huxley, the grandson of the famous English biologist, Thomas Huxley and the elder brother of the novelist, Aldous Huxley. As a Professor and Honorary Lecturer in Zoology at Kings College (1925-35), Huxley traveled widely throughout the British mandated territories, writing frequently in policy journals on the position of the British Empire in world politics, which gained him wide prominence as a public figure well before he was appointed Unesco's Director General in 1946.

Huxley had already expressed his views on how the relationships between European powers were tied to developments at the periphery, in no uncertain terms in a 1932 article, "Why is the White Man in Africa?" in the policy journal, *Fortnightly Review*. Arguing that the British Empire needed a decisive policy, to stay or to leave, in the face of rising nationalist movements in Africa, Huxley pointed to India to draw a lesson:

> We may gain some idea of the difficulties in the international sphere [resulting from the British policy in Africa] by thinking of India. Conditions are difficult enough in India to-day; but what would be happening there if the peninsula had not all fallen under the control of a single European power, but had remained divided between British, French, Dutch and Portuguese? As Western ideas and the spirit of nationalism filtered through to the Indians, there would have grown up the same difficulties between the native-born population and its white rulers. But events would have moved at a different *pace* and in different directions in the

different territories, and each change would have been the signal for the gravest international difficulties in Europe.[427]

In the postwar era, the question of the *pace* of postwar decolonization and Third World development posed a similar threat to the future of a collective European identity. The question of how the emerging populations absorbed capitalist values as part of their "own" socio-cultural setup was seen to be critical to the role they might play in the balance of powers in the emerging Cold War.

The tensions project's hides this underlying relationship by carrying out simultaneous programs of social and cultural change focused on European and Third world contexts. On the European side of the equation, the Tensions project had a particular psychological bent, which soon came to be known as "the minds of men doctrine" after the famous statement penned by American historian Archibald MacLeish in Unesco's founding charter: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."

Consequently, the first social scientists that Unesco turned to were those already involved in "character studies" in the different national contexts. This group included the anthropologists, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, and ethnologist Gregory Bateson, as well as Hadley Cantril, a psychologist who headed the Public Opinion Research Program at Princeton, and Otto Klineberg, the chair of the Social Science Program at Columbia.

Unesco's interest in this loosely connected group is not surprising. Benedict headed the Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures (RCC).[428] The

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[427] Julian Huxley, "Why is the White Man in Africa?" in *Fortnightly Review* (Jan. 1, 1932): 63-4.

institute had first carried out anthropological studies of "national character" for the

Committee for National Morale, a wartime body focused on employing social

science methods to map the enemy's social psyche.[429] During the war Benedict

joined the Office of War Information, producing similar studies of Romania,

Thailand, the Netherlands, Germany, and after the war, Japan. The last resulted in

her book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Behavior*

(1946).[430] Here Benedict applied culture and personality theory laid out in her

previous famous book, *Patterns of Culture*, to identify the aspects of upbringing

and social norms that contributed to supposed aggressiveness of the Japanese

national character. The book on Japanese character became one of RCC's major

credentials. Given the urgency of the war, it enabled Benedict to secure more

funding first from the Office of Naval Research, and later in 1948 from the RAND

Corporation for similar projects on other "national cultures." Prominent among

these were the studies of the "Russian personality," which soon received funds

from the Carnegie Foundation for a book on the topic.[431]

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[428] The research center had emerged out of The Council of International Relations, a small program founded in 1940, and renamed the Institute of Intercultural Studies, Inc. in 1944, by Mead, Bateson, Benedict, and sociologists Lawrence Frank, Harold Wolff, Lyman Bryson, and Edwin Embree

[429] See, Margaret Mead, "The Institute for Intercultural Studies and Japanese Studies," in *American Anthropologist*, New Series 63:1 (Feb., 1961): 136-7. One of the primary studies coming out of this contract was Geoffrey Gorer's "Japanese Character Structure." See Geoffrey Gorer, "Japanese Character Structure," in *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences Series II,* 5:(5): 106-124. During the war Gorer joined the Office of War Information producing similar studies of Burma before he was succeeded by Benedict.

[430] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Behavior* (New York: World Publishing, 1946).

[431] The book funded by the Carnegie Foundation did not materialize due to Benedict's sudden death. See, Margaret Mead, *An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict* (Boston, 1959).

With Benedict's ailing health at the time, however, the RAND Corporation project was transferred over to her famous student and anthropologist, Margaret Mead at the American Museum of National History. In addition to the contract with the RAND Corporation and the Office of Naval Research, Mead was also able to secure a contract with MIT, producing *Studies in Soviet Culture* and *Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda: A Preliminary Survey* (1942). Portions of the latter were also published in the book, *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, that Mead co-edited with her former student, Rhoda Métraux.[432]

It was against the background of these collective credentials, that Hadley Cantril, the psychology professor at Princeton, was appointed the fist director of the Tensions Project at Unesco's second meeting in Mexico City in 1948. Cantril's first initiative was to call a two-week conference in Paris during the summer of 1948.[433] He invited to the conference eight social scientists, including Max Horkheimer from the New Institute of Social Research established in New York after the exile of the Frankfurt School members to America, and Gordon Allport, a professor of Social Relations at Harvard who had become famous for his public opinion surveys showing the multi-sided *personae* of the modern man. The conference

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[432] Margaret Mead and Rhoda Métraux, eds., *The Study of Culture at a Distance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). At this point, the group also produced the report, *Suggested Materials for Training Regional Specialist*, for the Army Program in 1943. At the end of the war, RCC turned its attention towards producing manuals for sociologists headed to the previously occupied and axis territories. This included *The Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures: A Manual for Field Workers* (1947).

[433] The conference was organized in collaboration with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

resulted in a joint statement and individual papers that were later published in the book, *Tensions That Cause Wars* (1949) that Cantril edited. [434]

4.4 "Permanent Alibi":

This inaugurating moment is particularly important for us because it highlights the difference between the crisis of European identity and that of the exploding Third World which Unesco attempted to cover with the fig leaf of development. In the aforementioned essay in Cantril's book,[435] Horkheimer asked a question that loomed over Unesco's traumatized postwar Europe: how was it that such violence erupted in the heart of Europe during "a high stage of [its] cultural development"?[436] Horkheimer's answer was clear: Europe had lost the precarious balance between "public and private life" that was demanded by modernity. Horkheimer's word for this dynamic is also "pattern." "The task of the social and psychological research," Horkheimer asserted, "is to analyze the character traits that have emerged from this new social and cultural *pattern* and to investigate their relationship to fascist ideologies [emphasis added]."[437]

For Horkheimer, and for other Frankfurt-school members as well, fascism was not an exception to the logic of modernity, rather it was the logical conclusion of the increasing and non-reflective reliance on "reason" that characterized the history of

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[434] Hadley Cantril, ed., *Tensions that Cause Wars: Common Statement and Individual Papers by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together by UNESCO* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1950).

[435] Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," in *Tension that Cause Wars, op cit.* pp. 209-242.

[436] Ibid. p. 229

[437] Ibid.

modernity in the West. Horkheimer had laid out this argument in greater detail in 1941 in his now famous essay, "The End of Reason."[438] There, Horkheimer argued that the forms of modern life, tied to capitalist monopolies and industrial production, demanded "obeying and adapting to objective ends," the quest for "personal preservation" being the foremost among them.[439] The resulting separation between the individual and the social, however, was unthreatening and marked an underlying affinity, the "elimination of the conflict between individual and society."[440]

In the prevailing order of industrialism and capitalist monopolies, Horkheimer asserted, "the whole world was transformed into a mere 'material'..."[441] In this system, "The individual constricts himself. Without dream or history, he is always watchful and ready, always aiming at some immediate practical goal. His life falls into a sequence of data which fit in advance the questionnaires he had to answer."[442] In this context, Horkheimer argued, "[r]eflective thought and theory lose their meaning in the struggle for self-preservation."[443] Consequently, "[t]o be accepted, men must sound like the vocal chords of the radio, film and magazine. For in point of fact, no one seems to make his living by himself, and everyone is

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[438] Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, *The Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Continuum, 1993), pp. 26-48. First published in Philosophical and Social Sciences, vol. IX (1941).

[439] Ibid., p. 47

[440] Ibid., p. 42.

[441] Ibid., p. 34.

[442] Ibid., 37.

[443] Ibid., 38.

suspect in mass society. Everyone needs a permanent alibi...”[444] “With the decline

of...reflective reason,” Horkheimer argued, “human relationships tend to a point

wherein the rule of economy over all personal relationships, the universal control

of commodities over the totality of life, turns into a new and naked form of

command and obedience.”[445] This system of “integral self-preservation...,”

Horkheimer concluded, “is the death of the individual which is to be preserved.”[446]

Capitalism and modernity have turned the “rational form of self-preservation” into

“an obstinate compliance as such.”[447]

For Horkeheimer, the dissolution of the capacity of reflective reason and the

increasing need to conform to external ends for self-preservation, represented a

dialectical historical “process which originated in Renaissance and Reformation”

and “culminated into fascism,” tying in its wake transcendentalism to empiricism

and Protestantism to industrialism. Fascism, Horkheimer argued, was only an

extension of this trajectory. “In fascism, the autonomy of the individual [is]

developed into heteronomy.”[448] Horkheimer's term for this trajectory of dialectical

transformations in this early essay is “pattern” as well: “The totalitarian order marks

the leap from the indirect to direct form of domination, while still maintaining a

system of private enterprise. The National Socialists do not stand outside the

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[444] Ibid.

[445] Ibid. p. 39.

[446] Ibid., p. 32.

[447] Ibid., p. 34.

[448] Ibid.

pattern of economic trends."[449] Pattern for Horkheimer is the shorthand for the

dialectical process of continuity and interruption that linked different historical,

political, philosophical and sociological phenomena that characterized modernity

in the West. The "End of Reason" introduces some key concepts of critical theory,

such as immanent critique, which, as Horkheimer described it, sought to both

unravel the structures that produced social reality and the theories that sought to

explain it. It is from this perspective, that the term pattern in this earlier essay

describes the subsumption of self in society as an open-ended dialectical process

of continuity and interruption, affinity and distance.

In the Unesco study as well, Horkhiemer employed the term pattern as a

shorthand for the dialectical process that tied individual to society: "Modern

man...," Horkheimer asserted, "shows an authoritarian readiness to *pattern* his

way of thinking and his behavior after norms laid down for him from the

outside."[450] The use of the term "pattern" in the Unesco essay, however, betrays a

positivist turn from the open-ended approach of critical theory and immanent

critique and the dialectical treatment of the idea of individual and society in the

"End of Reason."[451] In the Unesco essay, the term pattern represents the possibility

of interrupting the continuous subsumption of self in a manner not available to the

rationalizing impetus of the capitalist order of modernity. Consequently, Fascism

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[449] Ibid.

[450] Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," in *Tension that Cause Wars, op cit.* p.228.

[451] See, Martin Jay, "Preface to the 1996 edition," in *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, first ed. 1973), pp. xi-xxiv.

constituted a form of "neurosis" that emerged from the discord between the poles

of "public and private life" that was treatable through therapy.[452]

It is from this perspective that defined modernity as an open-ended process that

could be held in check through positivist interventions that Horkheimer proposed

psychological therapy through "action research" as a solution to the crisis of

historical patterns in Europe (FIG):

> Thus, if a person who has mild prejudices against some minority group within his
> own country is asked a series of properly selected, pertinent questions on this
> point, he may, and in fact often does, examine the problem objectively and
> rationally for the first time. In a sense he is being appealed to as a kind of *expert*,
> and so he becomes our *collaborator*. The end product is not merely the collection
> of relevant data but also the exercise of a therapeutic influence on the subject.[453]

For Horkheimer neither the tradition of stoic individualism, nor the "mass-basis" of

enlightenment could rescue the fractured persona of the modern man as the

process of self-realization promised by action research. It was in this context that

Horkheimer turned to Unesco, imagining an international project in which,

through "the use of control groups, the investigators could determine the extent to

which the interviews introduce an element of rational deliberation in place of

emotionalism and stereotypy in the thinking on international relations."[454] Had the

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[452] Max Horkheimer, "The Lessons of Fascism," *op cit.* p. 229. This point was also stressed
by Gordon Allport's description of disintegrated modern *personae* arising from the
divisions of modern life in the Unesco study.

[453] Ibid., p. 239.

[454] Ibid. p. 240.

Germans taken on such a project before the war, Horkheimer argued, "they would have understood the ultimately destructive nature of [National Socialism]."[455]

Horkheimer's positivist optimism regarding the intensive interview is ironic considering his own experience with such a project in the recent past. When Adorno, Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock returned to Frankfurt in 1949, they continued the intensive interviews Adorno had carried at Berkeley during the American "exile" of the Frankfurt School. The supposedly therapeutic approach of the project, however, produced a grand-scale scandal: two thirds of the eighteen hundred people interviewed showed virulent signs of anti-Semitism and disturbing ambivalence towards any feelings of guilt about the Third Reich.

While this experience of collective "irrationalism" led the aging Horkheimer and Adorno to resign themselves to the destructive dialectics of capitalism, the Unesco cadre was not willing to subscribe to such a pessimist view. The aforementioned Gordon Allport, who had a paper in the same Unesco volume as Horkheimer, had developed with fellow psychologist Carl Rogers what they termed techniques of "non-directive therapy." "There is definite clinical evidence," Allport and Rogers asserted, "to indicate that when social tensions and inter-personal conflicts are handled non-directively in a group, the resulting process will be found to parallel closely the therapeutic process which takes place in resolving inter-personal conflicts through... therapy in individual cases."[456] In all these social psychological

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[455] Ibid.

[456] Carl R. Rogers, "The Implications of Non-directive Therapy for the Handling of Social Conflict." As early as 1933, Allport had first made this argument through what he called the Social Distance Scale. The greater the group's "social distance," Allport argued, the more distorted and stereotypical was its cultural perception. See "A Social Distance Scale," in *Sociology and Social Research* 17 (1933): 265-271. Similarly, social psychologist Kurt

studies, the emphasis remains on "self-realization." The subject is trusted as a "collaborator" and a fellow "expert" who can realize the cultural distortions of modernity.

What begins to unfold in these assertions is a model of expertise as collaboration and participation. Modernity is seen as a terrain that is both open-ended and susceptible to positivist intervention. The expert and subject work on molding this terrain together. This framing of collaborative transformation was critical for Unesco. One of the main goals of the Tensions Project was to formulate a "theory of non-conflict" regarding socio-cultural and economic changes in the postwar era. For the Allied-dominated UN and Unesco, the combination of modernity and capitalism had to be rescued from being considered a lethal mix that pointed its consumers down the path of destruction and conflict. Modernity, or at least its capitalist variant, had to emerge as a historical process that held the possibility of transformation without violence and rupture.

4.5 Patterns of Transition:

One of the first extensions of the Tensions Project into the Third World was a "manual" for "technical experts" titled, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, edited by Margaret Mead, and published jointly by Unesco and the World Federation of Mental Health.[457] Here, we see the term "pattern" representing not

Lewin had carried out several experiments targeted at eradicating racial prejudice in the American South through similar "intensive interview" techniques. See Kurt Lewin "Catharsis and the Reduction of Prejudice," in *Journal of Social Issues*, 1:3 (1945): 3-10.

[457] Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change: A Manual Prepared by The World Federation for Mental Health* (New York: Unesco and Mentor Books, 1955), pp. 294-5. The term "expert" here broadly included "policy-makers, specialists, technicians of all sorts, chiefs of missions and teams...[and] all those who are immediately concerned, at any level, with purposive technological change." Ibid. p. 16.

only the idea of historical continuity in particular cultural contexts, but also

representing the possibility of identifying continuity across cultural contexts.

It was Mead's teacher and then colleague, Ruth Benedict, who had first analogized

"culture" with "pattern" in her famous book, *Patterns of Culture*.[458] Following her

own mentor and teacher, Franz Boas' approach, Benedict had defined "culture" as

a sedimentary sphere of practices that determined the norms in each society.

Benedict and Boas had posited what later came to be known as "cultural

determinism," as a challenge to the biological evolutionism of the late nineteenth

century Victorian anthropology.[459]

In the opening pages of Mead's manual, however, we are reminded that unlike in

her previous work with Benedict we are not dealing with the well-being of small

"primitive" societies in the Third World context where the expert's role was limited

to *reading* the "ancient hallowed patterns" as possibilities of alternative social

norms in the West. In the development context, the expert's role was to bring

about "purposive technological change." Mead stressed that the idea of

development could only be communicated across cultural contexts by "stripping

each scientific technique to the bone, to the absolute essentials…[such that it] will

make it possible for other people to learn to use it…making [it] a new pattern

which is congenial and meaningful to them, as representative of their own

culture."[460] Even though the influence of cultural determinism is evident here on

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[458] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934).

[459] See, Louise M. Newman, "Coming of Age, but not in Samoa: Reflections on Margaret Mead's Legacy for Western Liberal Feminism," in *American Quarterly* 48.2 (1996): 233-272.

[460] Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, op cit.*, p. 16.

Mead's thinking, unlike in her earlier work with Benedict, the idea of cultural pattern is not foregrounded in sedimentary archeological metaphors, but in a participatory model of socio-cultural transformation sustained through a process of continuous "feedback."

Mead's use of the term "feedback" to describe the shift from the perspective of cultural determinism reflects the influence of the emerging field of "cybernetics" on the social and anthropological sciences. Cybernetics gained prominence with the publication in 1948 of a book by the same name by Norbert Wiener, the MIT professor and mathematician, that outlined a theory of communication in animals and machines by modeling their interaction as continuously changing systems with embedded "feedback" mechanisms. *Cybernetics*, immediately became renowned in urban defense planning circles for its application in enabling anti-aircraft guns to compute the trajectory of enemy aircraft during World War II by using vacuum tubes called *servomechanisms* connected in "feedback loops" that re-evaluated outputs with changing inputs. It was not long before the idea of feedback became attractive to a host of sociologists, anthropologists, economists, architects, and planners as a new basis for social intervention.

This was indeed an extension that Wiener himself did not approve of. Despite initial acknowledgments, Wiener remained skeptical regarding cybernetics' ability to model social phenomena.[461] For Wiener, such an application erased the relative distance between the observer and the observed, an abstraction required by cybernetics:

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[461] Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics, or, control and communication in the animal and the machine* (Cambridge, MA: Technology Press), p. 27.

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It is in the social sciences that the coupling between the observed phenomenon and the observer is hardest to minimize. One the one hand, the observer is able to exert a considerable influence on the phenomenon that came to his attention. With all respects to the intelligence, skill, and honesty of purpose of my anthropologist friends, I cannot think that any community which they have investigated will ever be quite the same afterwards...There is much in the social habits of a people which is dispersed and distorted by the mere act of making inquiries about it.[462]

Cybernetics required an object "relatively abstract from its surrounding." In observing social phenomena, the inability of the observer to separate himself from the observed precluded such an "abstraction," exaggerated "inconsistencies," and forced the scientist to resort to extended "generalizations" that undermined the predictive function of cybernetic feedback. In the absence of this relative distance, any attempt at measuring social change formed a tautological enterprise where the scientist became part of the experiment.[463]

As Wiener later elaborated in *Human Use of Human Beings* (1954), which explained the theory to a "non-specialized" audience, this methodological "confusion" was the most covert threat facing the scientist: "I have already pointed out that the devil whom the scientist is fighting is the devil of confusion, not of willful malice." This enemy within reflected an "entropic tendency in nature" itself, a tendency that Wiener famously dubbed, the "Augustinian devil." It is this specter

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[462] Ibid. p. 190.

[463] In an earlier paper—coauthored with his close collaborators, the physiologists, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Julian Bigelow—Wiener had also emphasized the need for this relative distance. See Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology," in *Philosophy of Science* 10 (1943): 18.

of randomness in nature that the social phenomena threatened to unleash on the cybernetic enterprise.[464]

If for Wiener, social application formed a limit case for cybernetics, for social scientists and anthropologists like Mead and Bateson, it was precisely this limit, at which the scientist became part of the experiment, that promised a new model of "participatory" social science across cultural boundaries. Their enthusiasm certainly overcame Wiener's reluctance when they were invited to the meeting of the cybernetic group at the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies in 1944 to explore the social implications of the theory.[465]

To Mead, Wiener's claim that all phenomena, in essence, are "messages [that] are...a form of pattern," presented the possibility of rethinking strategies of communicating technical knowledge across cultural barriers.[466] For Mead, the idea of "pattern" was not useful in the postwar era if it was continued to be used to present culture as sedimentary process. The promise of pattern as a conceptual tool in the development context lay in its potential to frame cultural formations through the revisionist logic of the feedback loop. The sociologist on the development mission was not concerned with the technical but with the abstract idea of "pattern" and "feedback" as intertwined methodologies of social intervention.

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[464] Norbert Wiener, *Human Use of Human Beings* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1954), pp. 19-20.

[465] Steve J. Heims, *John Von Neuman and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death,* Cambridge (MA: The MIT Press, 1980): pp. 202, 373.

[466] Wiener, *Human Use of Human Beings,* p. 31.

In the Unesco manual, Mead makes clear that the stakes for reframing pattern as a participatory process are high. The idea of Third World development could not quell the threat of "revolution, uprising, and war" amongst the increasingly nationalized masses by laying claim to scientific detachment or superiority. For Mead, if Unesco was to achieve its goals of global socio-cultural modernization without war, the expert had to consider development intervention as a process of "learning" from the ground. Here, what Wiener saw as confusion became a mode of "active" social intervention in which the development expert, in accepting his own cultural bias, uses the idea of "feedback" as a process of "learning" from the ground. The historical moment of decolonization demanded holding a dialogue with the Augustinian Devil.

Despite the focus on changing the role of the development expert, the point of presenting development as a shared project of making new patterns out of old is not lost on Mead. We are reminded that this participatory enterprise is concerned with the project of managing development, and in the case of the manual funded by the World Federation of Mental Health, managing the "mental health of...population[s] in transition." [467] The urbanizing Third World, in transition to modernity, figures as a participant in the project of managing the future of modernization. Yet this role serves as an alibi to launch a more transparent mode of expertise and to refigure the language of socio-economic intervention.

Mead establishes a similarity between the modernization process in the West and the non-West: both are driven by historical patterns, a continuous and slowly transforming process without historical rupture. This appears as a striking revision

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[467]Ibid., p. vii.

of the framing of the possibility of modernization in the non-West under the umbrella of cultural determinism. Modernization in a context such as Samoa, famously studied by Mead, for example, could only have been framed as an unavoidable rupture from the "ancient hallowed patterns."[468] In the development context, however, modernization is presented as a universal process that is just at home in the non-West as in its Euro-American provenance.

Yet, consistent with the logic of multiculturalism, there is also a sense of dissimilarity, a sense of fundamental difference, implied in the idea of shared universal patterns of modernization. Each pattern is unique to its historical background and therefore demands a different planning strategy. For Mead, the Third World migrant as a participant in the development project must chart her own emergence into modernity. The development intervention in the Third World is not a replication, but a unique enterprise particular to the requirements of the historical pattern of each context. Is this differentiation simply a reflection of the continuing vestiges of cultural determinism in the development context?

The dialectic of difference and similarity, affinity and distance, staged in Mead's manual points to a different logic of intervention inherent in the joint UN and Unesco efforts at curbing the possibility of aggression in non-European contexts. The validation of development planning is neither established through claiming direct precedence nor through asserting fundamental difference, but through claiming an ambiguous relationship on the more abstract level of changing historical patterns. It is here that pattern stands as a tool for censoring the terms of

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[468] Margaret Mead, *From the South Seas: Studies of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Societies* (New York: W. Morrow, 1939).

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difference in the modes of intervention in different contexts of the comparative framework of modernization. Patterns of modernization in the West and non-West were to be based on different strategies and modes of management.

4.6   The Mechanics of Modernity

Unesco's extended focus on the Third World resulted in setting up a number of major research centers throughout the world. One such center, called the Research Center on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, was established in Calcutta. In 1956, two years after Ecochard's stint in Karachi, the center held a joint conference with the UN and the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Bangkok, producing a report that outlined the scope of the Tensions Project in the global context.[469]

The possibility of a global civil society, we are told in Bangkok, depended upon managing not one, but two patterns of socio-cultural formation. If one was the pattern of fascism in Europe emerging from the internal discords of modernity, the other was the historical pattern driven by the rush of demographic movement in the non-West that threatened to produce similar effects.

A reversal has taken place in the transplantation of the project of securing modernity from one context to another: the transformation of historical patterns in the Euro-American world was posed as a problem that emerged *after* the onset of modernization. In the Third World, the dialectic of continuity and interruption implicit in the project of forming patterns of development is a project of

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[469] The conference proceedings were published in the UN report: *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East: A Joint UN/Unesco Seminar on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region*, Bangkok, 8-18 August, 1956 (Calcutta: UNESCO, 1957). Ernest Weissmann represented the UN Bureau of Social Affairs at the conference.

prevention that must be put in place *before* the onset of further effects of modernization.

For Horkheimer, the crisis of fascism—the imbalance between "public and private life"—was necessarily a crisis of civil society, a crisis that only unfolded when the process of differentiation between the political, economic, and social spheres of modernity had been established. The crisis of the modern man under fascism, then, was the crisis of the idea of modern citizenship itself. The modification of historic patterns was shorthand for the "faculty" of citizenship, if you will.

Indeed, in his 1935 article, "On the Problem of Truth," Horkheimer faulted Hegel for betraying the idea of civil society, the concept of irreducible play between the individual and the social, by introducing the idea of an overarching Spirit as the driving force of history.[470] This was a last ditch effort, Horkheimer asserted, at religious dogmatism to undermine the role of the citizen as the responsible agent of modernity, opening room for not only authoritarian nationalism but also bourgeois indifference that saw poverty and misery as inevitable steps in the march of the Spirit. For Horkheimer, the idea of the Spirit when applied to the interwar European context revealed that "[t]o the extent to which individual activity is circumscribed and the capacity for it eventually stunted, there exists the readiness to find security in the protective shelter of a faith or person taken as the vessel and incarnation of the truth."[471] In Hegel's idea of social change, Horkheimer maintained, the fate of human struggles, be it contingencies of

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[470] Max Horkheimer, "On the Problem of Truth" in *The Frankfurt School Reader, op cit.,* pp. 407-443. Originally published in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* vol. IV (1935).

[471] Ibid.

everyday life or revolutionary movements, was determined not in a struggle with social reality, but a priori by the idea of historical synthesis.

In Horkheimer's dialectical thinking, it was precisely the continuous threat of the emergence of Fascism that gave rise to the possibility of responsible modern citizenship. It was the "[e]limination of the conflict between individual and society," that turned modernity into Fascism.[472] Modern man found his role in history in resisting the historical pattern of modernity itself. The pattern of modernity, then, must essentially be a *mended* pattern. The uniform lines of historical trajectories do not betray the presence of democratic societies, but testify to the rise of fascism and totalitarianism.

The transformation of the modernization from a project of perpetual correction to one of prevention in development, however, takes us back to the Hegelian mold of historical synthesis. It is precisely the possibility of resistance that is denied to the Third World migrant. This includes resistance to development. If the Third World migrant is rescued from being cast into the mold of cultural determinism, and acknowledged as a participant in the modernization process, then s/he is only a passive participant. In being framed in transition to modernity, the third world migrant is seen to have not yet suffered the pains of modernity and is therefore deemed unable to recognize its threatening patterns. For Horkheimer too, modernity could avoid the pains of experiencing fascism, but only in constantly resisting the latter's temptation. The modern man could only postpone this pain if he is willing to take on another painful enterprise: engaging in the constant and

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[472] Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," *op cit.,* p. 42.

unending struggle to fight the tendency in the historical patterns of modernity to coalesce into forms of domination and exploitation.

For the development ideologues, this burden of struggle falls onto the shoulders of the development expert. The migrant is a participant in modernity, but only as one who does not know the pattern of modernity. The responsible agent of modernity in the transitory period must be the expert. This text is evident in the framing of the process of urbanization in the developed and underdeveloped context at the Bangkok conference, represented by the demographic "pull" and "push," respectively.

4.7 "Push" and "Pull":

As Phillip Hauser, the Bangkok conference's *rappateur*, and a professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, argued in his introduction, the process of urbanization in Asia was not simply an outcome of industrialization and modernization as it had been in the American and European contexts.[473] In Asia, what we were seeing was a process of "over-urbanization," where urbanization tended to move ahead of the social, cultural, and economic changes that accompanied modernization. This resulted from the socio-economic "push factor": the rural economy was unable to provide for the over-populated countryside, resulting in "pushing" the "redundant" population towards the cities in search for subsistence. In Europe as well as in America, the process of urbanization resulted not from the Malthusian pressures in the countryside, but from the attractions, the

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[473] As the sociology at the University of Chicago became heavily involved with UN and Unesco missions, Hauser became a major figure in development studies, chairing many conferences and missions, including the UN/Unesco conference on urbanization in Latin American in 1961.

"pull" of social and economic opportunities in the cities.[474] The push-factor resulted in squalid slums overflowing with population whose skills had no use in the city's economic structure. The masses attracted by the pull-factor, on the other hand, were continuously absorbed by the expanding economic base.

This difference opens a space for the need for development planning while still maintaining the structure of historical continuity established by the idea of patterns. After all, if urbanization in the Third World followed the self-evolving logic of "pull" factors, as was the case in the modernization process in the Euro-American contexts, then there would be no need for socio-economic planning.

Hauser was not the only one to characterize the urbanization process in this manner. The push-pull theory, if you will, gained immense currency as an explanation of demographic displacement and socio-cultural change, as if becoming an obligatory conclusion of all major reports, missions, and conferences. Bert Hoselitz, Hauser's colleague at the University of Chicago, published a series of studies that characterized the push-pull contrast under the title "Generative and Parasitic Cities" in the journal *Economic development and Cultural Change*.[475] The

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[474] Hauser reasserted the same argument in his, *Population Perspective* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960); as well as in "Urbanization: An Overview," in *The Study of Urbanization*, Phillip Hauser and Leo Schnore eds., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). For the preponderance of Malthusian perspective in development economics, see Eric Ross' excellent study of, *The Malthus Factor* (London: Zed Books, 1998).

[475] Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities, in *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3:3 (April 1955). For Hoselitz, ignoring the nature of urbanization was indeed a crisis: "Although there is much talk of the industrialization and urbanization as two processes which are apparently closely and necessarily related, the whole array of forces making for urbanization in developing countries is often left unexamined, various types of urban centre are left undistinguished, and the moral and social-psychological, as well as economic and political, consequences of urbanization are left unexplored." Bert H. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries," in *The Journal of Political Economy* (June 1953): 195.

United Nations' Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation also subscribed

to the same view when it argued that "migration of peasants unable to support

themselves on the land...have resulted in a mushroom-growth of city slums..."[476]

When the UN sent out a Mission of Experts to South and South-East Asia to survey

the possibility of low-cost housing in the region, their opinions painted a similar

picture of a paralyzing influx of a population destined to be marooned in the city:

"Despite the substantial efforts of improvement trusts in major Indian cities, at the

present rate of progress there is no hope of keeping pace with the increase in the

city population."[477] Richard L. Meier, an urban planner at Berkeley and author of

many UN reports, later made the same point to characterize the process of

urbanization in America: "The moves that people made... in the United States

were primarily attempts to optimize their own chances in life. They were not

pushed by distress and poverty, but were *pulled* by opportunity."[478]

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[476] United Nations Department of Social Affairs, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*. United Nations: New York, 1952.

[477] Department of Social Affairs, United Nations, *Low-cost Housing in South and South-East Asia: Report of a Mission of Experts*, New York: United Nations, July 1951. p. 68. The *American Journal of Sociology* also devoted an issue on "World Urbanism" that pressed the same qualitative difference. "World Urbanism," special issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* (Chicago), 60 (March 1955): 427-523.

[478] We may also recall here the 1925 urban ring diagrams of Ernest Burgess. Chicago's "stems of hobohemia," "zones of deterioration," "black belts with its free and disorderly life," appeared to Burgess nothing short of a "purgatory of lost souls." Yet, these lost souls were still able to chart their way through the economic landscape of the city, classified by the rings. For Burgess, writing in the interwar era, the engine of this socio-economic movement was the interaction of racial temperament with circumstance that allowed the inhabitants of Chicago to find their place in the circles of urban life. See Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, eds., *The City*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, first ed. 1925), pp 47-63. The aforementioned diagram is on p. 55 (FIG. 35). The postwar moment of European and third world development, however, is beyond the historical juncture when nineteenth century disciplines such as eugenics, racial studies and physiognomy, or evolutionary biology could provide narratives of socio-cultural change.

This exclusionary dimension of the project of global modernization is most evident in the statements of Meier's well-known colleague at Berkeley, the famous American housing activist and planner, Catherine Bauer. In addition to being involved with the Bangkok conference, Bauer was also the leading organizer of the next conference of the Tensions Project in Tokyo in 1958.[479]

Bauer had been an active advocate for housing reform in the '30s and '40s and had played a significant role in the passing of the 1937 United States Housing Act. She and other planners and attorneys, including Charles Abrams, became well-known by the self-proclaimed title, the *Housers*.[480] Often working in close association with urban sociologists and psychologists, Bauer was intimately involved with the emerging development discourse. In 1956, Ernest Weissmann, asked Bauer to write a report on the urbanization problem in Asia that could serve as a background paper for the upcoming Bangkok conference.[481] Bauer was part of the development scene from the beginning. As mentioned earlier, it was Bauer, who, in collaboration with CIAM secretary, Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, proposed the formation of the UN HTCP at the 1946 Hastings Conference of the International Union of Architects (UIA), a European planning body that later provided many of the returning colonial planners as experts for UN missions. In 1954 she organized

In the postwar era, these narratives were replaced by those seeped in the language of cultural relativism, as we saw in the case of Mead's manual.

[479] *United Nations Seminar on Regional Planning, Tokyo,* 28 July to 8 August 1958 (New York: United Nations, 1958).

[480] Bauer's early career as a housing advocate is documented in detail in her biography by Peter Oberlander and Eva Newbrunher. See *Houser, op. cit.*

[481] Catherine Bauer, *Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions: An Argument for Regional Planning, to Guide Community Growth.* 1956.

a major housing exhibit in New Delhi with Tyrwhitt under the auspices of UN

HTCP, inviting Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew, Pierre Jeanerette, and other members of

Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM), working with Le Corbusier

on Chandigarh at the time.[482] Her activities on the UN platform led the Ford

Foundation in 1958 to ask her to help draw a master plan for the greater Calcutta

region, as well as to participate in a similar project for Delhi.[483]

At the Tokyo conference Bauer presented a paper titled, "The Optimum Pattern of

Urbanization: Does Asia Need a New Type of Regional Planning?"[484] As was the

case with Mead's manual, the notion of pattern establishes a comparison with the

history of Western modernization, yet retains a commitment to the separate

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[482] We discussed this conference briefly in the first section of the dissertation.

[483] Bauer's presence in India itself betrays a larger "pattern" of First World experts' involvement in the country. Bauer had been invited to draw a master plan for Calcutta and also assist in the planning for a master plan for greater Delhi, already in progress under the supervision of architect Albert Mayer. Mayer had been hired by the Ford Foundation which also had a center in Delhi. The foundation head in India, Douglas Ensminger, was inspired by the logic of patterns as a conceptual device and had recently invited Charles and Ray Eames to Delhi to draw sample curricula based on their studies of infinite patterns for several architectural schools in India. Eames left just before Bauer's arrival after having been given a countrywide tour by the foundation. Complaining to Ensminger about the lack of comprehensive statistics needed for Calcutta's master planning, Bauer mentioned that she had sought the help of P. C. Mahalanobis, who headed the Indian Statistical Institute, to find not only more data, but also methods of interpreting patterns from limited data. The institute was housed in a Tagore-era mansion. Mahalanobis had himself been Tagore's secretary and later became Nehru's close associate as one of India's renowned economists and chief of the Indian Planning Commission. Yet for the Ford Foundation, entrenched in the Cold War anxieties, Mahalanobis' international reputation did not outweigh his socialist leanings. One of the main reasons for the urgency of Calcutta's planning laid out by the Foundation in its feasibility report was the immediate threat of the rise of communism in the region unless conditions were improved to gain the sympathy of the masses. When Bauer mentioned approaching Mahalanobis, it seemed a contradiction of the Foundations' argument. It is interesting to note that Bauer's students and biographers would also uncritically reiterate the Foundation's Cold War era view and describe Mahalanobis as an "avowed Communist." See Peter Oberlander and Eva Newbrunher, *Houser*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999). p. 280.

[484] Catherine Bauer, "The Optimum Pattern of Urbanization: Does Asia Need a New Type of Regional Planning?" Paper submitted to the UN Seminar on Regional Planning, Tokyo, July 1958.

historic pattern of Asian urbanization. This dual relationship is evident in the framing of development planning as a process of "optimization," bearing the mark of both a break and a continuation.

This ambiguous relationship between the processes of urbanization in the West and Asia reflect the agenda of the Tensions Project of managing modernization projects across the world by establishing a sense of complicity and participation. Bauer begins by establishing a sense of global political urgency with Asia's wayward urbanization. In Asia today, Bauer argued,

> ...physical living standard, worse than in many primitive villages;...crowded insanitary housing (or no shelter at all), plus inadequate urban services, tend to enhance ill health, social demoralization, broken families, unstable employment, productive inefficiency, and political unrest.[485]

For Bauer, the migrant, despite living in conditions "worse than many primitive villages," is still not a primitive. The migrant's forced presence in the city is a result of the pattern of demographic displacement emerging in the Third World. Though s/he has been "pushed" to the city despite his/her will, s/he is still a participant in the development project.

Yet once again, underlying this affinity is the assertion that the migrant in Asia is not familiar with the historical pattern of modernity. The real crisis in Asia was the inability of the migrant to discern the demands of modernization for s/he has not experienced the conflict-ridden patterns of modernity. Even though the "evils inherent in metropolitan congestions are widely recognized..." Bauer asserted "the

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[485] Ibid., p. 3.

growth of these swollen [Third World] centers continued unabated."[486]

Consequently, "[all] efforts to remedy present congestion are futile, unless and until the future flood [of migrants] can somehow be diverted." [487]

It is precisely in establishing this (dis)similarity, and opening up a space for the Third World migrant as a participant and a collaborator in development that a sense of fundamental difference is staged in the two processes of modernization. The key task at hand in Asia, thus, was not enabling the negotiation of the conflicting patterns of modernization, but "*planning* a pattern for urban development," one that is unencumbered by the broken lines of historical ruptures and conflict inherent in the historical pattern of modernity in the West.

It is a task that forever keeps open the role of the development expert. Asia cannot take on this responsibility itself. It cannot look towards the West for precedence because in the West urbanization was never planned. In the West, the "pull" toward urban areas was already driven by cultural sensibilities that could comprehend the terms of change. The First World "in-migrant," having gone through the pains of modernization in the countryside, was already a citizen when he arrived at the city gates. When he left his home in the countryside, he had

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[486] Bauer, *Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op. cit.* preface, i.

[487] It is important to pay attention to the nature of the metaphors used to describe this process. Bauer's fellow Houser, Jacob Crane, had also stressed the same point in similar language: uncontrolled influx "from the rural areas to the cities has swollen the urban population much faster than housing and community development could be provided...Industrialization and economic development have not produced the automatic improvement in housing that it is sometimes claimed will result; in fact, they have produced worse, the most appalling, housing condition in all but a few countries...." Jacob, Crane, *Draft Report on Preparing National Problems for Housing and Community Development.* Housing, Town and Country Planning Section, United Nations, December 1951.

already undergone the necessary transformation "in personal forms of thought and conduct" that enabled him to understand and avail the opportunities offered by metropolitan life.

Missing this experience, the Third World migrant therefore must be guided through a plan. This contrast is apparent in the employment of the term "pattern" in the description of Third World urbanization. "In developing countries," Bauer argued, "the critical problem is not so much the decongestion of existing cities (however obvious the need) but a rational pattern of urbanization for millions of additional people."[488] Instead of the therapist, it is the planner who becomes the agent of social intervention. This change betrays a switch in the nature of the subject as well. Instead of being a "collaborator," a fellow "expert," the unsuspecting migrant is to be directed into a "rational pattern." Is this pattern not the one which Horkheimer had so strongly warned against, the "authoritarian pattern" imposed from the outside?

What the Third World migrant seems to be lacking is the power of "self-realization" that the Western in-migrant had acquired through painful historical experiences. In the West, cities emerged through patterns of historical conflict, rupture, and transformation, weaving together a complex mix of economic, social and cultural forces. Bauer asserted that in the West urban planning, therefore, has not been a project of development, but only of re-development:

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[488] Bauer, *Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op cit*. p. 35. Bauer reference here is August Lösch, famous study, *The Economics of Location* (New Haven, 1954).

[C]ity planning only became a recognized profession and function of government in the Western world *after* the major urban centres had grown up. It has therefore been primarily concerned with reform within an established framework...rather than with the guidance of entirely new development in regions where the big push of urbanization is yet to come.[489]

For other development ideologues as well, modernization in the West, driven by the pull-factor, was an all-embracing process of autonomous differentiation. Demographers such as Philip Hauser would replace Horkheimer's model of modern civil society with the market as the engine of the conflict-ridden process of modernization. Cities emerged in "the Western countries," Hauser asserted, "[by] the play of the market mechanisms [that] obviate[ed] the need for central planning and broadly diffused the risks of decision making."[490]

In contrast, Bauer's Asia had to face its future under pressures of a modernizing push though it had not experienced the costs of conflict. This makeup of Third World urbanization, or "over-urbanization," is continuously reflected as the inability of the Third World migrant to discern the pattern of modernity. This inexperience becomes the migrant's *pharmakon*, a necessary poison.[491] On the one hand, entering the process of modernization without the experiences of violence and conflict holds the promise that such experiences can be bypassed. On the other hand, this tangential entry prevents the migrant from ever fully claiming a place in the process of modernization. For her, the journey to the city never ends,

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[489] Bauer, *Economic Development and Urban Living Conditions, op cit.* p. 22

[490] Hauser, "Introduction," in *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, op. cit.* p. 39.

[491] Derrida draws on Plato's use of the word, *pharmakon*, which in ancient Greek means both "remedy" and poison," to refer to writing. See, Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy" in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 63-171.

the city never arrives, and the village is never completely left behind. "From a relatively small and homogenous place of origin," Bauer reminded us, "the in-migrant is confronted in the city with a bewildering and almost incomprehensible vastness and heterogeneity." As opposed to the traumatized, yet discerning in-migrant of the First World, the Third World migrant is unable to read the patterns of metropolitan life. Having only partially seen the pattern of modernity, what is missing from the underdeveloped psyche is the ability to place change in its transforming design, to constantly break and mend the dynamic pattern of modernity.

The difference between the First and Third world migration patterns became the defining problem for the journal *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, edited by another University of Chicago sociologist, Bert Hoselitz, along with Philip Hauser. Since its beginning in 1952, the journal featured papers from leading development experts, including economists, anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists. Many of the contributors, including Hoselitz and Hauser, regularly served as experts on UN and Unesco missions throughout the '50 and '60s. In a paper titled, "Problems of Adapting and Communicating Modern Techniques to Less Developed Areas," Hoselitz argued that the greatest challenge facing the transfer of technology to the Third World was not technology itself, but the development of appropriate attitude toward technology.[492] This assertion is apparent in the curious replacement of the word "technology" with "technique" in the title. What the Third World needed was not technology, but *technocentricism*:

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[492] Bert Hoselitz, "Problems of Adapting and Communicating Modern Techniques to Less Developed Areas" in *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 2 (1953-54): 249-68.

"The transmission of the new technique," Hoselitz argued, "is incomplete unless persons can be found who clearly understand the long range implications of the innovation."[493] The Third World migrant lacks the ability to think in felicitous long term patterns.

The promotion of techocentricric attitudes in the Third World, however, cannot take the path it did in the West. The project of protecting the migrant from the rupture of modernization demands that all techniques be camouflaged in existing cultural patterns. This is, however, a contradictory goal. For if modernization is presented in existing traditional patterns then it hinders the migrant's entry into the arena of responsible citizenship.

Hoselitz was well aware of this counter implication of the nativization of development. For Hoselitz, the migrant's inability to think in shifting patterns of modernization stemmed from his/her refusal to complete the transition to urban values and life. The migrant, Hoselitz asserted, "often maintains contact with his place of origin through periodic visits which tend to disrupt the continuity of his contact with the city, including his employment."[494] The result is a population of "floating migrants," "of footloose refugee populations" forever "in transition."[495] Yet, isn't this transitory status, this incomplete entry into modernity, the very quality that the development planner is pressed to preserve to save the migrant the pains of rupture from the historical continuity of tradition?

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[493] Ibid. p. 253.

[494] Ibid. p. 15.

[495] Ibid.

This indeed was the task outlined by Mead for the Unesco expert. For Mead, the expert's primary responsibility was to protect the migrant from the ill-effects of "maladjustment" that might result if technological development was not couched in terms of native culture. "[W]ith slow and traditional introduction of small changes," Mead asserted,

> the side-effects of a change can be felt and responded to by the members of that society. When change is introduced by external forces, however beneficent in intent, these protective behaviours cannot operate, and changes may go much too far in some given direction before compensatory measures can be taken.[496]

In the European context, culture figured as a force that was incorporated by Fascism to corrupt the principles of change and transformation characterizing modernity, to stage its own interest in the form of the uniformity of cultural patterns. In the Third World, the relationship between culture and modernity is inverted. Culture palliates the corrupting effects of modernity. In the process, the subject's ability to negotiate the conflicts of agency and intention is also lost. The project of modernization must now be presented in cultural terms. The subject, instead of being trusted to overcome her cultural shortcomings by self-realizing the principles of modernity, must be duped into modernity.

This emphasis on culture as the necessary frame of modernization in the Third World also lets the expert actually avoid the responsibility of modernization taken

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[496] Ibid. p. 301. This sentiment was common in the postwar UN/Unesco expert cadre. For Gardner-Medwin, a member on the Mission of Experts to evaluate Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia headed by Bauer's fellow *Houser*, Jacob Crane, development schemes "can only operate successfully in openly planned communities where native traditions and native materials can be developed." See Gardner-Medwin, "Low Cost Housing in South and South-East Asia," p. 294. The report was republished under the title, "United Nations and resettlement in the Far East," in *Town Planning Review* (Liverpool) 22 (January 1952): 283-298.

away from the migrant. The expert only assists and manages the change that is already underway. The rational pattern planned for the migrant is only a rationalization of this process. If the plan falls short, it is the complexity of the cultural pattern that is to be blamed. On one end of the spectrum spanning this blame game are the diplomatic pronunciations of the UN expert, on the other, are the derisive conclusions of Koolhaas for whom Singapore's modernization was a reflection of "the inscrutable nature of the Asian mentality."

From this perspective, the architect/planner is the development expert/manager par excellence. Architecture, once again, is the medium that serves modernity in the required palatable form. It is one of the critical development tools that can promote technocentric attitude in a cultural garb. The primary benefit of housing in the Third World, Phillip Hauser argued, is that it "both encourages and strengthens long-term patterns of saving. People will save for better housing who would not make their savings automatically available for capital formation otherwise."[497] Architecture enables the migrant to negotiate the patterns of modernization despite him/herself.

Yet this denial of agency must not be seen in opposition to its recognition. The framing of the migrant as a subject in transition does not simply reflect a denial of agency, but the censoring inevitably inherent in the recognition of agency, in any form. The emphasis on participatory development is not a preliminary disclaimer that is set aside to carry out the business of development as an external imposition. The emphasis on participation accompanies all manifestation of

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[497] Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far-East, op. cit.* p. 25

development planning. The text of exclusion inherent in it reminds us of the need of the perpetual undoing of the opposition between recognition and un-recognition, between subject and agency, between agency and intention.

"At most, we are like dead parents," Koolhaas tells us, "deploring the mess our children have made of their inheritance."[498] In the narrative of patterns of modernity, the children are constantly presented as unqualified to receive the inheritance. In the development arena, the process of modernization is stretched out as an infinite reading of the will. The presumed inability of the Third World psyche to manage change has formed the very principle of technological, social, cultural, and political intervention in the postwar era. The problem of Third World development is never posed as a question of transfer of technology or capital, but as a problem of preparing proper attitudes toward their reception, a problem not of transferring technology, but developing technocentricism. The Smithsons' changing man, Horkheimer's citizen, Bauer's migrants, Echochard's refugees, and Koolhaas's apocalyptic bureaucrats, are figures in a theater of globalization that stages new narratives of socio-cultural difference and affinity to hide old and continuing patterns.

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[498] Koolhass, "Singapore Songlines," in *SMLXL, op cit.,* p. 1031.

5 Conclusion: Expertise that "Works"

We have argued in this dissertation that modern architecture and planning projects in the development arena form the terrain where key assumptions of the development discourse find credence. These include above all the idea of the Third World as a sphere in transition between the village and the city, between socially cohesive traditional rural societies and market-oriented modern urban centers, possessing qualities of both. This framing justifies, on the one hand, the implementation of market-oriented reforms and, on the other, allows ignoring the absence of social welfare structures and political processes that can attend to the asymmetric effects of those reforms. In this sphere, the development subject appears as a self-motivated, freely choosing, and politically passive being whose actions always have rational implications at another scale, foreclosing the possibility of staging resistance to development. This is the scale of regional planning patterns and global urban networks, where her proclaimed interests are coded into legal, administrative, and economic frameworks and her consent is secured as a participant in the development process despite herself.

These assumptions are very much with us today in the debates over how to shape the present and the future of the Third World city, spanning discussions from policy and planning circles to deliberations of "avant-garde" architects operating on the global stage. By way of conclusion to this dissertation, we will take the example of Rem Koolhaas' recent analysis of Lagos as a challenge to the logic of "traditional" modern urban planning. We will show how the terms of development

intervention are not undone in such readings but are reproduced in more transparent forms in line with the current configuration of globalization.

On November 22, 2006, Koolhaas' lecture at MIT was turned from slide show to a "conversation with faculty and students" when his Power Point presentation refused to work.[499] This change in strategy resulting from an unforeseen shortcoming of technology, however, turned out to be quite apposite to the topic Koolhaas intended to discuss: his eleven year study of Lagos, the city where, the architect maintains, nothing works as planned and everything is an exercise in constant re-strategizing. For these reasons, Lagos presents, Koolhaas argues, a model for the mega-cities of the future the world over where planning solutions will have to be improvised on the run.

Koolhaas' analysis of Lagos, however, has been criticized in a variety of circles. Recently a New Yorker article on Lagos by George Packer mentioned Koolhaas as part of the group of researchers who abstract away the difficulties of life in Lagos by framing it as a "hip icon of the latest global trends."[500] For Packer the most troubling facet of Koolhaas' attention on Lagos is the comforting distance of his research from the poverty on the ground, epitomized by the now notorious flight over the city in the helicopter of President Obasanjo with the long-time photographer of Africa, Edgar Cleyne. Packer recounts how in his essay

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[499] Reported by Stephanie Schorow for the MIT News Office in "Controversial architect Koolhaas discusses future of cities," November 22, 2006. See web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2006/koolhaas-1122.html

[500] George Packer, "The Megacity: Decoding the Chaos of Lagos," *The New Yorker* (November 13, 2006): 62-75.

"Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos,"[501] Koolhaas "described how his team, on its first visit to the city, was too intimidated to leave its car. Eventually, the group rented the Nigerian President's helicopter and was granted a more reassuring view."[502] This reassuring view was described by Koolhaas in the essay as follows:

> From the air, the apparently burning garbage heap turned out to be, in fact, a village, an urban phenomenon with a highly organized community living on its crust. . . . What seemed, on ground level, an accumulation of dysfunctional movements, seemed from above an impressive performance, evidence of how well Lagos might perform if it were the third largest city in the world.[503]

For Packer, this manner of looking is "not so different from the more common impulse not to look at all," to reiterate and reinforce the positioning of Lagos squatters as "superfluous" to globalization.

Evaluating the broad terrain of theoretical responses since the 80s to the direction of global urbanization, Matthew Gandy, an urban geographer by training, similarly accused Koolhaas of not dealing with the "substantiality" of life in Lagos.[504] "Chaos may also be characterized" Gandy writes,

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[501] Rem Koolhaas, "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," in O. Enwezor, C. Basualdo, U.M. Bauer, S. Ghez, S. Maharaj, M. Nash and O. Zaya, eds., *Undersiege: Four African Cities, Freetown, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos*, Documenta 11: Platform 4 (Hatje, Cantz: Ostfildern-Ruit, 2002).

[502] Packer, "The Megacity," *op cit.*, p. 10.

[503] Koolhaas, "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," *op. cit.*

[504] Matthew Gandy, "Cyborg Urbanization: Complexity and Monstrosity in the Contemporary City," in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29.1 (March 2005): 26–49.

as a more sophisticated, resilient and adaptable form of order as Rem Koolhaas has suggested with respect to the dynamics of West African urbanism. The theoretical novelty of such a perspective sits sharply at odds, however, with the capacity for what one might term 'avant-garde urbanism' to actually explicate any substantial dimensions to urban change.[505]

For Gandy, the most critical effect of the architectural avant-garde urbanism like Koolhaas' has been to draw attention away from the possibility of a "politically driven strategy for the creation of more socially inclusive cities."[506]

Indeed, Koolhaas himself has given fodder to these accusations of distance and abstraction. In an interview with Jennifer Sigler for *Index* magazine, in response to the comment that Lagos "must have been beautiful from a helicopter," Koolhaas remarked: "The city has these unbelievable — you can only call it *abstract* — compositions. Red turning into white turning into black. You've never seen geometry at that scale in the world [emphasis added]."[507]

What is not evaluated in these criticisms of Koolhaas' abstract thinking about urbanization at the periphery, however, is how the impulse to abstract intersects with broader discourses of access and intervention in the global context. For if the objections are limited to the question of abstraction and lack of substantiality, then it seems these concerns have already been answered by William Mangin and John Turner who, as we saw earlier in the dissertation, resided within the squatter

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[505] Ibid., p. 31. Gandy here refers to Koolhaas' "Fragments of a Lecture on Lagos," and the "Harvard Project on the City," in *Mutations* (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2001).

[506] Ibid., p. 42.

[507] See: http://www.indexmagazine.com/interviews/rem_koolhaas.shtml

settlements in Lima precisely to document the "material" and "substantial" experiences of the squatter. Turner and Mangin's reversal of earlier planning approaches was another abstraction itself that worked to incorporate squatter politics and practices into the development discourse under the guise of proclaimed intimacy. How then does the next wave of "abstractions" coming from architects (such as Koolhaas) operating on the global platform relate the periphery to the expanding circuits of globalization?

Here, Perry Anderson's recent critical view of the UN's function in the global geopolitical arena may be helpful.[508] Anderson re-evaluates the mounting praise of Kofi Annan's career as an independent figure that stood up to dominant political powers in the UN. Annan, Anderson argued, in appearing to stand independent, censored dissenting voices and legitimized the US political agenda, from the mode of intervention in Rwanda, to Kosovo, Iraq, and Darfur, and thus was far more associated, albeit transparently, with the dominant political agenda than the most ideologically motivated of previous Secretary Generals. Anderson's key point in mounting this critique is this: the role of the UN is not to secure action, political or military. Rather, the role of the UN is to create *legitimacy* for a particular path of action over others.

Modern architecture and planning's role in the postwar development arena can also be explained in a similar light. In the development discourse, architecture and planning constantly overstep their circumscription as tools of implementing particular development approaches and create legitimacy for economic and policy

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[508] Perry Anderson, "Our Man," in *London Review of Books* 29: 9 (10 May 2007): 9-12.

initiative. This legitimacy, however, is of different order than the diplomatic

negotiations and the resulting resolutions that legitimize political action.

Architecture and planning constitute the sites where legitimacy is secured before

negotiation, framing the possibility of what can be negotiated in the first place.

In both their abstract and intimate garbs, architecture and planning create

legitimacy for particular modes of access into the periphery, modes which, as we

have seen in this dissertation, are critical to the operation of the development

discourse.[509] The partial incorporation of the Third World into circuits of global

capital was advanced at first along national and regional lines, and nowadays, it is

incorporated along what can be called the disseminated, spectacular and

discontinuous field of cultural and economic globalization. The shifts from one

scale of intervention to another are not discontinuous but form a series of

displacements that betray Koolhaas' provocations to be standing in the same

trajectory of development that includes Abrams and Keonigsberger's development

reports.

Koolhaas' analyses of the rise of modern urban phenomena in different parts of

the world have curiously followed Abrams and Koenigsberger's development

missions. In *SMLXL*, we were given news of a "rogue" Europe rising in

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[509] These include, as we mentioned earlier, the positioning of the Third World as a sphere in transition to modernity, where traditional social structures can provide social welfare support while individual rational sensibility can be presented as an alibi for instituting market oriented industrialization. Inasmuch as the this sphere has remained in a perpetual transition to modernization over more than half a century, development has constituted a strategy of managing the partial or asymmetrical incorporation of different spheres of the decolonized world into circuits of capitalist production while keeping them outside the circuits of consumer capital and its attendant costs.

Singapore.[510] There, the hyper modernism of the Pacific Rim was blamed partly on the idealist suggestions of Abrams, Keonigsberger, and Susumu Kobe's UN mission that had visited the island in 1963. In 2001, Koolhaas appeared in Lagos, once again a city that had previously been exposed to the master planning approach of Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Kobe. Though, in Lagos, Koolhaas doesn't acknowledge this development precedence by name, he nevertheless situates his analyses as a challenge to the modernist master planning approach based on "ideas such as carrying capacity, stability, and even order, canonical concepts in the field of urban planning and related social sciences."[511] In light of the historical staging of the development subject that we have charted in this dissertation, these reversals and oppositions, however, tell a story of continuing thematics that tie Koolhaas to his precursors in the development arena.

Koolhaas reads Lagos as an interconnected and disseminated set of "ingenious, critical alternative systems," a non-linear and shifting arrangement that "resist[s] the notion that Lagos represents an African city en route to become modern." Here Koolhaas turns the modernizing, evolutionary narrative of development on its head. "We think it is possible to argue," Koolhaas asserts, "that Lagos represents a developed, extreme, paradigmatic case study of a city at the forefront of globalizing modernity." Saved from being an example of a primitive past in the present, Lagos is projected as being an element of the future of modernity: "This

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[510] Rem Koolhaas, "Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis...or Thirty Yeas of Tabula Rasa," in Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), pp. 1009-1089.

[511] Koolhaas, "Harvard Project on the City," in *Mutations, op cit.,* p. 652.

is to say that Lagos is not catching up with us. Rather, we may be catching up with Lagos."[512]

Despite its "non-linear" narrativization, Koolhaas' project of finding the "paradigm of the future" in Lagos cannot shake its developmental shadows. The opposition between Koolhaas' analyses and Abrams, Koenigsberger and Kobe's development planning approach can be challenged in light of the characteristics of development we have identified in the latter experts' work. For Abrams and Koenigsberger, specifically, development planning was never a project of simply outlining an evolutionary model of change from the primitive to the modern for the Third World. Their proposals, instead, cast development as a case study for identifying West's own desired future. Similarly, development was never presented as a project of implementing Western precedence in Third World contexts. Rather it was seen as a project of establishing a comparative framework of mutual learning. This comparative impulse to identify the future of modernity in the West through Third World development is not lost on Koolhaas either:

> The fact that many of the trends of modern, Western cities can be seen in hyperbolic guise in Lagos suggests that to write about the African city is to write about the terminal condition of Chicago, London, or Los Angeles. It is to examine the city elsewhere in the developing world.[513]

Yet perhaps the strongest affinity between Abrams and Koenigsberger's development planning approach and Koolhaas' analysis lies in the positioning of law, or its absence, as the engine of urbanization, a linear argument that underlies

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[512] Ibid. pp. 652-3.

[513] Ibid., p. 653.

the chronologic non-linearity projected by both analyses. For Koolhaas, the ingenuity of urban solutions in Lagos stem from the transforming boundaries of property and ownership, both spatially and legally. "Despite the presence of both land-use data collected at the regional scale and the national grid system," Koolhaas tells us,

> a boundary of Lagos has never been drawn or agreed upon...Property lines are continually reassessed and renegotiated in accordance with intersecting land law, taxes, claims, and interests. This structural skein camouflages its ordering system, but recognizes that one's right to reside and work in the city is flexible and mutable.[514]

This mutating topography of the city "works" and reworks, Koolhaas argues, the basic elements of modernist planning—such as the line, wall, and plot—on its own terms. The traffic "bottleneck," a negative phenomenon in the traditional logic of traffic planning, is described as urban presence that has its own economy of street vendors and other "entrepreneurial activity."[515] In the aerial photographs taken form the presidential helicopter, we see how Kobe's proposed highway intersections, flyovers, and exit ramps have turned into parking lots, vender markets, and cover for factories and other activities (FIG. 36, 37). This "illustrates" Koolhaas asserts, "the large-scale efficacy of systems and agents considered marginal, liminal, informal, or illegal according to traditional understandings of the city."[516]

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[514] Ibid., p. 661.

[515] Ibid., p. 685.

[516] Ibid., p. 652

This staging of negative terms of traditional urbanism as positive urban phenomena in their own right, however, keeps the logic of development intervention intact. The most critical aspect of Abrams and Koenigsberger's core housing and land reform proposals was the staging of the individual as an originary legal subject that preceded the political process surrounding the emergence of discourse of rights and citizenship. In this framing of development, it is law, and not politics, that constitutes the originary moment of development. The result is the axiom that if proper laws are instituted, development would happen by itself. Koolhaas transforming topography of urbanism is simply a reversal of this positioning of law as an originary moment before politics. For Koolhaas, it is the absence of law that gives Lagos its unique character of modernity. Both the positions argue for the presence of quasi-natural legal phenomena to draw attention away from the political dimensions of socio-economic change.

This view has recently been given renewed economic sanctity by the Peruvian economist and now a Nobel laureate, Hernando de Soto, in his book, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.*[517] De Soto claims that it is not that the poor do not have assets. Rather, "they hold these resources in defective forms."[518] De Soto proposes finding legal solutions to bring the land based assets of the poor into the legal system. There is "an implicit legal infrastructure," de Soto asserts, "hidden deep within their property system – of

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[517] Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (London: Black Swan, 2000).

[518] Ibid., p. 7.

which ownership is but the tip of the iceberg. The rest of the iceberg is an

intricate man-made process that can transform assets and labour into capital."[519]

This "iceberg" is none other than an expanded loan structure that could be based

on the legalized property as collateral. De Sotto argument shifts, once again, the

seat of value from labor to circulation of finance and commercial capital. In this

logic, if the poor could get capital through loans, that capital would simply grow

as it circulates.[520]

For development institutions, Third World policy-makers, and major First World

political figures alike, the translation of property into legal forms that can serve as

collateral for loans is nothing short of a miraculous solution to the crisis of Third

World development. In addressing the British Labor Party in 2002, the former US

President, Bill Clinton, described his recent African tour as follows:

> I have just come here from a trip to Africa which provided me with all kinds of
> fresh evidence of the importance of politics...In Ghana...a new President is

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[519] Ibid., p. 9. According to the Institute for Liberty and Democracy established and run be De Sotto, there are 9.3 trillion dollars in assets held by the poor in Third World to which they do not have legal titles.

[520] For De Soto, "law is the instrument that fixes and realizes capital." Ibid. p. 164. Developing countries therefore, de Soto argues, "shouldn't just focus on the macroeconomic side of the formula: stable money, fiscal equilibrium, and privatisation. The core of the capitalist system...is essentially a legal property system." See www.imf.org/external/pubs/tt/fandd/2003/12/pdf/people.pdf. Quoted by Ambreena Manji, *The Politics of Land Reform in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2006), p. 3. De Soto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) puts the centrality of law and circulation as follows: "Four billion people in developing and post-Soviet nations —two thirds of the world's population— have been locked out of the global economy: forced to operate outside the rule of law, they have no legal identity, no credit, no capital, and thus no way to prosper. The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), based in Lima, Peru, has created a key that can open the system to everyone — a time-tested strategy for legal reform that offers the majority of the world's people a stake in the market economy." See www.ild.org.pe/home.htm.

working with a great Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, to bring the assets of poor people in to the legal system so they can get collateral for loans.[521]

The president of Ghana, John Agyekum Kufuor, also reiterated the same line of thought when he described that with establishment of individualized tenure, land is transformed into "bankable property," giving title holders access to credit." "[T]his could prove," Kufour argued, "the vital part of the missing link that might help generate prosperity that we all yearn for."[522] Colin Powell similarly declared in 2002 that "the hidden architecture of sustainable development is the law. The law. The rule of law that permits wonderful things to happen."[523]

For legal academics, such as David Kennedy, the emphasis on law-making represents an unarticulated desire to skirt the "perplexing political and economic choices" entailed in projects of land reform. Development practitioners and scholars have tended, Kennedy has argued, to exclude political confrontations in favor of "law, legal institution building, the techniques of legal policy-making and implementation – the 'rule of law' broadly conceived – front and centre."[524] Kennedy points out that we must take into account that "the idea that building the rule of law might itself be a development strategy."[525] For other scholars of African

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[521] Cited in "Bill Clinton Helps Ghana's Poor Gain Property Titles," by the UNDP. See www. undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2002/October/7oct. Quoted by Ambreena Manji, *The Politics of Land Reform in Africa, op cit.,* p. 2.

[522] City by de Sotto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD). See www.ild.org.pe/home.htm. Quoted in Ibid. p. 11.

[523] We have argued in this dissertation that there is also a hidden history of architecture and planning in the positing of land, property, and house as credit. Quote in Ibid. p. 11.

[524] David Kennedy, "Laws and Developments," in Amanda Perry and John Hatchard, eds., *Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century* (London: Cavendish, 2003). Above quote from p. 18.

[525] Ibid., p. 17.

land reform such as Ambreena Manji and A. Claire Cutler, the interest in centrality of law cannot be separated from the gender and class divisions that permeate particular contexts. For Cutler, the emphasis on neutrality and centrality of law is supported from within particular national contexts by groups who stand to gain from the "particular legal culture informed by neo-liberal values and the privileging of private ordering as the most natural, efficient, consensual and just means of regulating commercial and productive relations."[526] For Ambreena Manji, "[l]and, as a social and economic asset, invites...contestation perhaps more than any other. How land may be dealt in, and by whom, is a question of social, political and economic importance."[527]

What role does architecture play in this domain? From the perspective of this dissertation, architecture as socio-economic activity not only constitutes the object of this legal debate, but also the site where the development subject who forms the possibility of this debate is staged. "Assets need," De Soto avers, "a formal property system that draws out the *abstract potential* from buildings and fixes it in representations that allow use to go beyond passively using buildings only as

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[526] See, A. Claire Cutler, "Historical Materialism, Globalization, and Law: Competing Conceptions of Property," in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith, eds., *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 230-56. Above quote from p. 231.

[527] Ambreena Manji, *The Politics of Land Reform in Africa, op cit.,* p. 12. Also see, Manji's "'The Beautyful Ones' of Law and Development," in Doris Buss and A. Manji,eds., *International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches* (Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2005), pp. 159-71. For Manji, deemphasizing the importance of politics results in exclusion of civil representative groups from policy and legislative discussions. The brunt of this exclusion falls, Manji argues, on women, whose chances of gaining access to land is further limited as land is individualized and held as collateral. Banks, seeking security for credit, favor individual ownership over joint ownership in a household. In a patriarchal system, this requirement results in exclusion of women from access to land, furthering the burden of household expenses and loan on them.

shelters [emphasis added]." [528] The "abstract potential" of Lagos drawn out by Koolhaas' analyses fulfills the requirements of this legalizing discourse even as it identifies the absence of legal relations in the malleable terrain of property in Lagos. It constitutes urbanization as a process that could be reduced to formal relations, legal or illegal, and thereby lays out new terms of access and intervention.

If there is a difference in Koenigsberger and Abrams' and Koolhaas' positioning of legal relations at the origin of modernization, it is in the profile of the subject of modernization on whom this positioning is based. This difference too, however, represents the displaced continuation of the development logic in the post-development era of free market reform rather than its undoing. For Abrams and Koenigsberger, the subject of the quasi-legal originary terrain was the inhabitant of the core house, the individual. The issue at stake for Koolhaas is not to unproblematize the absence of an established welfare state structure, but rather to unproblematize his own presence in Lagos as an observer of the process of globalization. The legitimacy of this position is based on the positioning of Lagos as a city that is one of many others in the cultural fabric of global modernity that are finding their own path to modernization, challenging in their own way the straightjacket of traditional modern urban planning. For this reason, it is not the individual that is called forth as an alibi in the form of the native informant. Rather it is the city itself that is staged as the subject of modernization.

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[528] De Sotto, *The Mystery of Capital, op cit.,* p. 60.

It is not surprising that in all of Koolhaas' discussion of Lagos and its

transformative topography, the individual is never presented as the agent of

change.[529] The title of Koolhaas' soon to be released book on Lagos also asserts

this point: "Lagos: The City that Works." It is Lagos itself that is the native

informant of Koolhaas' global(izing) maps. For Koolhaas, Lagos must be

positioned as part of one of many maps of global statistics in his writings, and not

as a site where those statistics are undone (FIG. 38). Koolhaas' presence in Lagos

is based on its framing as a global city. It is this framing that forms the possibility

of Koolhaas' flight in the presidential helicopter as an *observing* expert whose role

is to do just that: observe. Though, as UN consultants, Abrams and Koenigsberger

were only required to make "suggestions" in the mission report, that report

nevertheless cut both ways: while it gave the experts their comparative authority, it

also bound them within a certain discourse of "responsibility," however limited

and fleeting. Koolhaas' presence in Lagos bears no such burden. As the caption to

the DVD documenting Koolaas documenting Lagos (released as a companion to

the forthcoming book) states: "Koolhaas doesn't want to build or change, but aims

to learn from Lagos, fascinated by the energy of this city and his wish to

understand modernity in all its aspects."[530] It is the mutating city that is called forth

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[529] Koolhaas is not alone in this framing. Robyn Dixon, a staff writer of LA times and one of the few journalists who has described Koolhaas's excursion in a favorable light in an essay on Lagos, also describes the city as the subject of global modernity: "Papered all over walls and suspended from any pole," Dixon writes, "are advertising billboards and banners, as though the city were screaming out its own exuberant and often perplexing monologue." See Robyn Dixon, "Lagos: 'The New York of Nigeria,'" *LA Times* (June 25, 2007).

[530] *Lagos Wide and Close: Interactive Journey into an Exploding City*, Bregtje van der Haak (director). The DVD, as the name implies, not only shows the footage taken from helicopter but also while riding in car and on foot through city streets. The viewer has the "interactive" choice at any moment to zoom in or out to the "wide" or the "close" view. The expert's purpose in both the perspectives, however, is only to observe (FIG. 39).

as the native informant at the scale of globalization, attesting to the presence of an Other modernism growing in Africa.

The change in scale from the individual to the city, however, only displaces the project of situating law as the originary moment of development onto a different scale. For Abrams and Koenigsberger, the individual's actions were rational on another scale that was not available to her. This allowed the experts to employ the idea of the individual while bypassing the question of what the implications of that framing were for the inhabitant. For Koolhaas, it is Lagos that is rational and efficient at another scale, the scale of globalization, where the city can be seen to challenge the logic of traditional theories of urbanization and modernization.

What unfolds in Koolhaas' analysis of Lagos is a discourse on managing the terms of intervention into the development context that does away with the question of welfare and politics altogether. The restraints of operating in a national context, of staking a position in regards to instituting housing finance and mortgage structures, forced Abrams and Koenigsberger to situate their proposal around the idea of the individual. Their particular framing of the individual, as a rational subject who preceded the emergence of the welfare state apparatus and its attending political process, allowed them to negotiate the contradictions of this requirement. Unbound by such restrictions, Koolhaas can stage a reading that ignores the failure of the nation state, the absence of welfare structures, the asymmetrical access to resources, the quandary of politics at the national level altogether. For Koolhaas, the preponderance of law only needs to be managed at the global scale to earn him the right of access as an observer of globalization in Lagos.

Marx had identified "work" as a term whose fixed duration belies the social costs of regenerating the worker inherent in the remuneration received for the work day. For Marx, work and rest were inseparable terms woven together in the open-ended textuality of the chain of value production. Bypassing the calculus of work surrounding the category of the individual in development, Koolhaas asserts that it is Lagos, the city, and not its inhabitant, "that works" as a participant in the process of globalization. The notion of work belies the contradictions of asymmetrical modernization in Lagos and frames them as productive and positive negotiation of modernity at the global scale. Nothing in Lagos points to the undoing of the logic of globalization. It is the hidden rationality of a city that "works" that makes it available to the rationalizing gaze of the global observer.

With this framing, Koolhaas bypasses how the working of Lagos as a city is built upon a long history of successive development approaches, mobilized from both national and international theaters. When Lagos "works" as a global city, it is this dimension of globalization that is erased. Lagos then appears as a site of the process of global modernization that is operating on its own. Consequently, the expert in the presidential helicopter is a neutral observer following the unfolding of this process across the globe, and not as the latest chapter in the history of the new modes of socio-economic management that took hold in the postwar era with the idea of development.

Architecture and planning's primary role on the global platform has been to create terms of legitimacy and access that satisfy the requirements of partial incorporation

of the decolonizing world into the circuits of global capital.[531] Without this legitimacy, the logic of perpetuating intervention that characterizes the development discourse cannot be sustained. It is the transitory state of the decolonized world and the transitory state of the development subject that enables the staging of critical theories of development economics. If architecture and planning in the development arena draw on development economics, they also open the space for its possibility.

We have attempted to chart the broad contours of this critical involvement. The goal of this dissertation has been to open new domains of the history of modern architecture and planning and explore the possibility of a new interpretation of their role in the postwar geopolitical arena. This has involved looking at architecture and planning as mediums whose contribution and impact has not been limited to form alone but is irreducibly interwoven with the staging of new means of access, control, and domination. To negotiate the unfolding of the historical patterns of modernity, Horkheimer asserted, "[e]veryone needs a permanent alibi." For Horkheimer that alibi was the unreflective conformation of the modern man to the requirements of mass culture. In the postwar era, modern architecture and planning have provided such permanent alibis for the development discourse and its attending structures of power.

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[531] How the terms of this access are utilized by international institutions can be witnessed in the fact that Edgar Cleyne's photographs which constitute the centerpiece of Koolhaas' book and the DVD, have already graced the cover of World Bank reports on African urbanization. See, Christine Kessides, *The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Washington D.C.: The Cities Alliance and the World Bank, 2006).

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
(FIG. 1) Global map of "National and Regional Training Institutes or Seminars Assisted or organized by [the USAID and UN] International Experts in 1955." UN Archives, New York.

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
Temporary and permanent houses side by side (Puerto Rico)

Temporary materials added to permanent house

(FIG. 2) Before and After, side by side. Subsidized self-help housing in Puerto Rico presented as global housing model in the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

(FIG. 3) USAID Technical Assitance Programs across the globe in 1955. UN
Archives, New York.

(FIG. 4) Warren Cornwall (fourth left from center) and Ernest Weissmann (third left from center) in meeting with Ecuadorian officials, 1954. From United Nations Archives, New York.

(FIG. 5) The structure of planning organization for Costa Rica proposed by Antonio Kayanan in 1955. United Nations Archives, New York.

(FIG. 6) Brochure for Warren Cornwall's 1954 *Casas por Bananas* (Houses for Bananas) program, "proposed [a] barter arrangements for the exchange of pre-fabricated houses from Sweden for surplus bananas from Ecuador. United Nations Archives, New York.

Mass construction of low-cost housing (Morocco)

(FIG. 7) Low-cost self-help demonstration project in Morocco, with untenured public land in the background, from the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Interview with a self-help housing applicant

(FIG. 8) The self-help interview: family as the client of development. The map of Puerto Rico on the wall shows the preponderance of Puerto Rico schemes as the initial model of self-help housing in the development arena. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Group worker meeting with the self-help housing families

(FIG. 9) The next stage: self-help group organization, from the United Nations'
Manual on Self-Help Housing, 1964.

Mass construction and placing prefabricated roof elements

(FIG. 10) Mutual help self-help model where a group of inhabitants work on standardized houses without knowing which house is to assigned to each one of them at the end. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Organizational Chart for large scale programme

-51-

(FIG. 11) Chart of elaborate administrative set-up required by mutual and aided self-help models. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Core house in Ghana,
finished by self-help

(FIG. 12) Core housing without a "core" in the Gold Coast (Ghana), poposed by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

(FIG. 13) The neo-traditionalist hearth in Frank Lloyd Wright's Coonly House, 1908 (above). From William J.R. Curtis, *Modern architecture since 1900*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983, c1982).

(FIG. 14) Reyner Banham's "standard of living package" environmental bubble. From Nigel Whiteley, *Reyner Banham: Historian of the Immediate Future*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).

A row of houses
earth construction
H. Fathy (Egypt)

Open-air theatre
and village hall
earth construction
H. Fathy (Egypt)

(FIG. 15) Hassan Fathy's New Gourna project in Upper Egypt near Luxor (1945 to 1948), shown in UN publications as an example of standardized low-cost construction that drew on "traditional" building methods and forms. This model of institutionally provided "finished" houses was soon to be replaced with core housing and sites-and-services schemes. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

RIGHT WRONG

dead air
dead air

overhangs shade walls

screened openings on ends

light coloured roof surfaces (shiny aluminium may cause glaring reflection dangerous to drivers, if roads are nearby)

CHAWAMA SELF HELP HOUSING PROJECT

Kafue, Zambia

House design by Zambian
Housing Board is modified
core house with additions
outlined.

Bath

Kitchen

Bedroom

Porch

Core House

13'6"

21'6"

Sponsor: Government of Zambia
Date: 1969
Technical Assistance: American Friends Service Committee
Number of Units: 228
Type of Houses: Free standing, core housing designed for expansion,
using soil-cement blocks
Cost per Unit: $243.00
Financing: Government of Zambia grant and loan
Participants Labor: 1000 hours per unit

(FIG. 16) The house without an interior. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Figure XVIII. Living around the house. Plan of a typical low-income house in the new town of Tema, Ghana, showing the utilization of the space between house and street (from a survey of " 250 houses in use " by François Pfister, reproduced by permission of the Director, Housing Research Unit, Faculty of Architecture, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi)

This house, which is occupied by eight people, is owned by the occupant. The verandah is enclosed by a rubble-stone wall (built by the occupants) with a vent over. It is used as a supplementary bedroom. The rooms are crowded and the kitchen is congested. The back yard is not accessible from the house and therefore rarely used

(FIG. 17). Unlike Fathy and Doxiadis' framing, the traditional house for Abrams and Koenigsberger presents a model of "congested," and "crowded" living. From Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney and Martin Evans, *Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities,* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971).

385

Figure XXIV. Activity chart for Khartoum, Sudan, hot season, June

Notes

1. Men go to work at 07.30 and return at 14.30 (time spent at work is from 08.00 to 14.00 hours).

2. Children go to school at 07.30 and return at 14.30 (time spent at school is from 08.00 to 14.00 hours).

3. The verandah is used as a dining area at lunchtime and as a sleeping space during the afternoon siesta.

4. Courtyard 1 is used at night as a sleeping area by parents only.

5. Courtyard 2 is used to entertain male visitors in the evening. At night it is used as a sleeping space by the male members of the household.

6. Courtyard 3 is used to entertain female visitors. The whole family takes breakfast and dinner here. At night it is used as a sleeping space by the female members of the household.

(FIG. 18) Daily activity climatological chart, mapping the core house as part of the broader socio-economic activity. From Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney and Martin Evans, *Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities,* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971).

LIBERIA – PROPOSED

1. KITCHEN-DINING
2. BATH
3. LIVING-BEDROOM
4. BEDROOM

5. KITCHEN
6. LIVING-DINING
7. DINING
8. LIVING

HOUSING BUILT IN STAGES - SAN SEBASTIAN, COSTA RICA

PRIMERA ETAPA   SEGUNDA ETAPA   TERCERA ETAPA

CUARTA ETAPA

1. KITCHEN-DINING
2. BATH
3. LIVING-BEDROOM
4. BEDROOM

QUINTA ETAPA

5. KITCHEN
6. LIVING-DINING
7. DINING
8. LIVING

ZANZIBAR – PROPOSED

WALL OR FENCE

1. KITCHEN-DINING
2. BATH
3. LIVING-BEDROOM

4. BEDROOM
5. KITCHEN
6. LIVING-DINING

7.
8.
9. LAUNDRY

10. ROOMER-BEDROOM
11. BACK PATIO
12. FRONT PATIO

Examples of expandable self-help housing built in stages

(FIG. 19) The many possible forms of the incrementally constructed core house, with examples from Liberia and Costa Rica. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

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A. High inlet and outlet do not produce good air movement at body level

B. Low inlet and outlet produce a beneficial low-level wind pattern

C. Low inlet and high outlet produce a good pattern of air movement

D. The bad pattern caused by a high inlet is not corrected by a low outlet

E. Internal walls obstruct wind

A to E : Sections showing cross-ventilation patterns

F. Louvres can deflect the air stream up to the ceiling...

G. ...or down to the floor

H. Projecting sunshades produce a bad upward air flow...

I. ...this can be corrected by slots in the projection

F to I : Sections showing the effect of louvres and sunbreakers on air movement

J. Bushes and other external obstructions can reduce the air flow

K. Internal partitions and room dividers can create large still areas

L. Air flows differ on different levels

M. Clear-storey ventilation will not improve air movement at low level

J to M : Sections showing the effect of obstructions on air movement

Figure XXVII. Air flow patterns through single-banked rooms for various sizes and positions of openings and partitions

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(FIG. 20) The house without an interior: climatology established the exterior surfaces of the core house as its primary elements not only in relation to the weather, but also in relation to the surrounding socio-economic terrain From Otto Koenigsberger, Carl Mahoney and Martin Evans, *Climate and House Design: Design of Low-cost Housing and Community Facilities,* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971).

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Squatters in Manila – North Harbour. This area was cleared of squatters on January 17, 1964. (Courtesy of F. Abesamis)

Organized "Squatters" Area in Lima, Peru. (Note rights-of-way and wiring)

(FIG. 21) Squatter settlements in the Philippines (top), deemed politically unstable by Abrams and Koenigsberger. "Organized" squatters of Lima, Peru (bottom) who have been allotted individualized land tenure. From Charles Abrams, *Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: The Agency for International Development, 1966).

Disorganized
self-help housing

Well-planned project includ-
ing core self-help, row-houses
and multi-storey housing as
well as essential community
facilities (Madagascar)

(FIG. 22) The primary transformation from "disorganized" to "organized" core housing is the establishment of the individualized land tenure. Soon, the formal transformation accompanying this change will be discarded in favor allocating tenure to the "disorganized" squatter settlements themselves. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

Ridge capping

Truss

Ridgeboard

Eaves board

Step 11. Build roof. Ceiling can be 8'6" above floor level.

soil-cement

Step 5. · Fill floor area with 6" of earth and ram well to the outside ground level.

· Then fill floor area with soil-cement and ram to a depth of 4" (crushed stone and sand, well rammed to a depth of 4" can also be used).

6" layer of earth

(FIG. 23) Core house construction diagrams. The key elements of the core scheme are the roof, the foundation, and the transitory subject of development. From the United Nations' *Manual on Self-Help Housing*, 1964.

A whole family lives and works in this dress-maker's shop near San Salvador, El Salvador. (Courtesy of the United Nations)

(FIG. 24) The final form of core: home as the site of production. From Charles Abrams, *Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: The Agency for International Development, 1966).

(FIG. 25) Singapore Housing Developments (top) built on razed ground (bottom). Shown by Rem Koolhaas in *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture*, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).

FIG. 26) The housing blocks (top) constructed by the Singapore **Housing Development Board (HDB)** filled in the open space proposed by the Abrams, Koenigsberger, and Kobe's master plan. Shown by Rem Koolhaas in *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture*, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).

(FIG. 27) Smithsons' Haupstadt Berlin Plan of 1957 (top) and diagrammatic studies of clusters, from Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson (ed.), *Team 10 Primer*, "Urban infra-structure," (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).

MINER   WOODMAN   HUNTER   SHEPHERD   PEASANT   GARDENER   FISHER

1   2   3 (a)   4   3 or (b) (c)   2   1

ISOLATE VILLAGE TOWN CITY TOWN VILLAGE ISOLATE

SCALE OF ASSOCIATION

4   3   2   1   2   3   4

FIELD

(FIG. 28) Geddes' famous "valley section" (top), from Volker M. Welter, *Biopolis: Patrick Geddes and the City of Life*, (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2002). Smithsons reflected doubling of the diagram in Team 10's 1954 *Doorn manifesto* (middle) and the *Team 10 Primer* (bottom). Both images from Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson (ed.), *Team 10 Primer*, "Urban infra-structure," (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).

(FIG. 29) *Atbat's* density and movement studies, from Jos Bosman (top) in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *The Last CIAMs, Rassegna*, special issue, vol. 52 (4), December 1992.

(FIG. 30) Michel Ecochard, aerial photograph of low-cost housing designed by *Atbat* in Morocco, presented in Pakistan as evidence of previous experience in dealing with mass housing. From the UN Archives, New York.

(fig 1) Density in the present city

There are in the city, very crowded
Wards – 200.000 peoples must be remov-
-ded from these places – With the
350.000 refugees without houses, that
gives a total of 550.000 peoples who
need house, about half of the
city's population

(FIG. 31) Michel Ecochard analyses of Karachi's population density, from Michel Ecochard, *The Problem of Refugees in Karachi*, December 1953, United Nations Archives, New York.

(FIG. 32) Michel Echochard, "Evolutive principles," of the proposed refugee housing showing the movement of population to houses with higher "standard of living" and lower density arrangements over time. From Michel Ecochard, *The Problem of Refugees in Karachi*, December 1953, United Nations Archives, New York.

(FIG. 33) Michel Echochard, site plan for refugee housing in Karachi (top), with a study of the distribution of occupants density (bottom). From Michel Ecochard, *The Problem of Refugees in Karachi*, December 1953, United Nations Archives, New York.

(FIG. 34) Current state of the *Nid d'abeille* housing designed by *Atbat* members Shadrach Woods, George Candillis, and Michel Ecochard. Shown by Jos Bosman (top) in "CIAM After the War: a Balance of the Modern Movement," *The Last CIAMs, Rassegna*, special issue, vol. 52 (4), December 1992, and by Minique Eleb (bottom) in "An Alternative to Functionalist Universalism: Écochard, Candilis, and ATBAT-Afrique," in Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (ed.), *Anxious Modernisms*, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000).

CHART II. Urban Areas

(FIG. 35) Ernest Burgess, zone diagrams of Chicago's population distribution, with "stems of hobohemia," "zones of deterioration," "black belts with its free and disorderly life." From Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," in Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie (eds.), *The City*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, first ed. 1925).

(FIG. 36) The present state of highway ramps proposed by Abrams, Koenigberger, and Kobe in Lagos in 1957. Shown by Rem Koolhaas in *Mutations*, (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2001).

(FIG. 37) Koolhaas' sketch of the Lagos ramps. From *Mutations*, (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2001).

(FIG. 38) Urban population comparison chart. From *Small, Medium, Large, Extra-large: Office for Metropolitan Architecture*, (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).

(FIG. 39) Pre-release stills from DVD, *Lagos Wide and Close: Interactive Journey into an Exploding City*. Directed by Bregtje van der Haak. Produced by Sylvia Baan for Pieter van Huystee Film.