MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

by

MYRON ALFRED LEVINE

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ABSTRACT

This study shows that mayors can lead. After the limitations of the reigning "broker/entrepreneur" model are discussed, a nine-type classification of leadership styles is presented. Three Madison, Wisconsin, mayors are studied to determine the causation of style adoption and the possibilities of effective leadership: Otto Festge (1965-69) shows the situational limitations to "Entrepreneurship" as well as the complexity of style; William Dyke (1969-73) shows both the potential policy impact and the potential manifest polarizaton which can result from unrestrained "Ideological" leadership; Paul Soglin (1973- ) shows the effectiveness of the pragmatic, conflict-oriented "Partisan" style--yet the limits to the change "radical pragmatism" can bring is also noted. Suggestions for the study of leadership and for effective urban governance are presented.

Thesis Supervisor: MICHAEL LIPSKY
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
It is customary for the author of a major work such as a doctoral dissertation to acknowledge the research support he received, finishing with a graceful note of thanks to his ever devoted and patient wife. This cannot be done here. Nancy L. Braithwaite Levine was a full partner in the writing of this thesis; she has done so much to help bring this dissertation to completion that recognition of her efforts cannot wait until the end. Not only did Nancy help me overcome my many fits of anxiety, but she took on much of the burdensome work of thesis writing herself. No words can ever fully repay a person who typed two drafts of the manuscript, did every boring clerical task associated with thesis preparation, and even spent an entire summer in the "tombs" of the Wisconsin Historical Society reading and "note-carding" ten years of one of Madison's newspapers. Nancy knows more about Madison politics than anyone would ever want to know. This dissertation is dedicated to her.

In the academic realm I owe my major debt to the members of my thesis committee--Michael Lipsky, Jeffrey Pressman, and Walter Dean Burnham. I am especially appreciative of these people, not just for their intellectual guidance, but for their understanding and patience in allowing me to complete this project "long-distance." Sadly, Jeffrey
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Outside the MIT community, I am indebted to Charles Levine and Raymond Wolfinger for their helpful comments on specific chapters. J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson also courteously extended me a draft copy of a very useful article of theirs.

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CHAPTER ONE: MAYORAL LEADERSHIP STYLES

The nation's cities are again in severe straits. Faced with an exodus of both middle-class homeowners and industrial taxpayers they lack the tax base to provide social services to a population increasingly needy of such services. And more recently, confronted by the ravages of inflation, recession and increasing producer-group demands, some major cities have even had severe trouble in providing an adequate level of such basic municipal services as sanitation and police protection. Massive transfusions of federal and state aid would go a long way to alleviating the cities' ills; so would the redrawing of municipal boundaries to allow one unit to govern and thereby tax the entire integrated economic region.

But such solutions represent, in reality, a deus ex machina; they represent the benevolence of outside forces which is not necessarily forthcoming in any substantial degree no matter how deserving of such "aid" a city, in the name of equity, might be. Hence, our cities must do all they can themselves to both alleviate the social ills of their populace and, in the name of productivity and efficiency, more tightly control the administration of municipal services. Despite possible increments in aid from the federal government, it is each city's government that primarily decides how each new urban crisis is handled.
Creative, innovative leadership is one within-system factor that will help determine just how well our cities meet the challenges they face. The mayoralty in those cities where the office exists, is the obvious place to look for the possibilities of such leadership. But the question is: Can the mayoralty be expected to provide such leadership?

The answer from the literature on urban politics has for the most part been "No!" Edward Banfield believes that as a result of the formal decentralization of power in both the public and private sector, the capable mayor must be satisfied with merely reacting to the desires of others. These others have the power the mayor needs. Less capable mayors do not even effectively perform this "broker" function. Marilyn Gittell sees the mayor's office to be a "dead end" job incapable of attracting talented persons. Raymond Wolfinger believes the effective, innovative mayor to be the exception, not the rule.

This thesis will attempt to re-examine this "common wisdom" regarding mayoral leadership. But any study of the possibilities of mayoral leadership must focus not so much on the formal prerogatives of the office but the orientation of the person who occupies it.

**STYLE AND STYLE ADOPTION**

A "style" can be defined as "the manner in which an individual adopts to a role." For an office-holder such as a
mayor, style can be viewed even more simply as the "habitual way" he "goes about doing what the office demands of him." When the occupant of an office is expected to exert some direction over a group's affairs, the manner in which he adopts to his role can be termed his "leadership style."

But leadership does not come easy; a mayor seeking to move his city in a certain policy direction will have to deal with influentials both in and out of city government who may or may not prove receptive to the mayor's initiatives. The mayor's style, then, becomes the way he interacts with the constraints imposed on him by the formal and informal structures in the city. Faced with these constraints, a mayor may, for example, be either active or passive, engage in or withdraw from conflict, organize a coalition that embraces all the important elements or only a portion of the elements in a community's politically active strata.

A mayor's general leadership style may be seen to emerge in the general manner by which he, as a result of both conscious and subconscious processes, selects and chooses to pursue, or even not to pursue, goals.

The process of style adoption is analogous to the manner in which an individual chooses a piece of clothing. A person in selecting his fashion of dress consciously makes a decision. He might, for example, be dressing in such a way as to achieve a goal--to minimize cost, gain employment, or even impress women. Yet, even the choice of these goals, and hence
the choice of fashion, might also be the result of certain personality forces which demand to be expressed, yet, of which he is less than totally aware. Similarly, a political actor's leadership style, too, can be profitably viewed as the product of both rational and irrational forces.

The choice of ends that a mayor makes is itself the result of psychological factors; mayors with different personality dynamics will differ as to the extent of both their programmatic and personal ambitions. Similarly the means by which a mayor will choose to seek an end, too, is the result of personality dynamics. One mayor may seek to go things alone; another may search for consensual solutions. One mayor may seek to avoid situations entailing heated conflict; another mayor with a different personality make-up may better be able to handle and enjoy such fighting. The conscious and subconscious elements of style adoption are intricately intertwined.

THE CLASSIC VIEW OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

There exist many possible ways by which mayors can adapt to the duties of their office. Yet, for the most part, the literature on mayoral leadership has focused around two styles, that of Edward Banfield's "broker" 6 and Robert Dahl's "entrepreneur." 7 Despite the differences between the broker and the entrepreneur, the two can be seen to be variants of one larger model emphasizing the virtues of consensual
leadership. The "good" mayor according to the Banfield/Dahl model, acts to either build or to maintain a broad-based overarching coalition within the city; he will take little, if any action unacceptable to any of the major elements in this coalition.

The broker is so concerned with protecting his power position that he will act only if a program proposal has first gained the endorsement of a consensus of the community groups directly concerned. He will not advance programs of his own for to do so would only leave him open to the possibility of having committed himself to a power costly situation. Hence, according to Banfield, the political head will be receptive, particularly, to proposals from people who are in a position to guarantee that successful action will win a "seal of approval" from some of the "good government" groups...

For this reason, he will not create a strong staff of policy advisors or a strong planning agency. The preparation of policies and plans will be done mainly within those private organizations having some special stake in the matters involved and by the civic associations. Quite possibly, the political head might, if he wished, assemble a technical staff of first-rate ability and, working closely with it, produce a plan far superior to anything that might be done by the private organizations and civic associations. But a plan made in this way would have one fatal defect: its makers could not supply the "seal of approval" which is, from the political head's standpoint, its chief reason for being.9

The political head, therefore, neither fights for a program of his own making nor endeavors to find a "solution" to the conflicts that are brought before him. Instead, he waits for the community to agree upon a project. When agreement is reached, or when the process of controversy has gone as far as it can, he ratifies the agreement and carries it into effect.10
In abetting the achievement of the program desires of other actors, the mayor earns their friendships and obligations—a sort of broker's fee. He can then use this new found influence to expedite other programs and thereby gain more obligations and influence. Hence, acting in broker-like fashion, a mayor builds his power and risks nothing.

The sole concern of the broker, then, is power. He has no policy goals of his own; his sole orientation is to maximize and preserve the influence of either himself or the party organization. Yet, this might prove to be a somewhat simplistic notion. Surely there exists mayors in a number of cities who are so failing in vision that they have no program of their own which they wish to enact or directions in which they wish to move their city. And surely there must also exist a number of political heads whose sole preoccupation is to maximize their ability to remain in office in order to disburse the perquisites of office among themselves and their followers.

Yet, it would seem that once a person garners power in at least moderate quantities he would be increasingly tempted to employ at least part of it in the pursuit of his own policy objectives. As the political head gains power, he is increasingly likely to use it to advance policy desires of his own in resource consuming situations where no community consensus exists. As he does so, he abandons the broker concept of leadership.
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley may not have been the prototype broker that Banfield describes. It seems incredible that a person with Daley's extensive power would refrain from using it to move the city in the directions he sees as desirable, even in the absence of any pre-existing community consensus.

It would seem unbelievable if Daley did not attempt to advance any of his own ideas as to what makes a better Chicago. Robert Salisbury was one of the first to question whether or not Banfield had painted an accurate picture of Daley. Salisbury noted that as the cases studied by Banfield "fall far short of representing the range of major resource decisions for Chicago," it is still quite conceivable "that Daley initiates or actively participates in the process involved in making other decisions." And there further exists the possibility that Banfield's observations are time-restricted. Even if it does provide accurate descriptions of Daley's approach to his job in his earlier years, it is fairly clear that the broker model does not adequately describe Daley's leadership style in his later years. Daley had clear policy preferences in the areas of public works, highway construction, and urban renewal on which he acted without awaiting the prior crystallization of public opinion.

Daley's actions concerning the construction of the University of Illinois at Chicago campus and the 1975 development of plans for a crosstown expressway underscore his program orientations. The mayor's resolution of the campus
issue, as described by Mike Royko, stands in marked contrast to his action, or more appropriately his lack of action, during the early years of the problem: 14

While the people in the neighborhood spent and rebuilt, City Hall proceeded with its secret plan. Quietly, the power groups in the community were persuaded to go along. The archdiocese, which had its big new school and its churches, agreed. The ward boss and party hacks were given their orders. That took care of the established leaders of any community resistance. There was nobody to lead them but themselves. Only then was the plan announced. 15

In the expressway case, Daley vehemently and publicly fought for the proposed project despite the strident opposition of local environmentalist groups and Governor Walker. In both cases, the mayor did not act like the prototype broker, reflexively awaiting the establishment of community consensus. Daley took the quite "unbrokerlike" action of trying to shape and otherwise manipulate group and public opinion in the city.

How can we account for the change in Daley's orientations over the years? It seems quite plausible that as his tenure in office increased his stock of influence rose to the point that he no longer felt as constrained to refrain from policy-oriented behavior in order to guard his power resources. Brokership is a leadership style likely to be utilized by mayors whose power resource balance is so precarious that they cannot afford the risk of a power drain. Mayors who have built up a fairly large stock of influence can better bear the
consequences of power costly action and will be more inclined to enter controversial situations. Similarly, mayors with strong goal orientations will be disinclined to adopt a broker style.

The political entrepreneur, like the broker, avoids controversial situations that might pose a threat to his stock of power resources. But unlike the broker, he is not content to simply endorse those policies which have received the endorsement of a consensus of the community elements directly affected. The entrepreneur has definite policy desires; instead of waiting for the automatic formation of a community consensus, he tries to mold a consensus behind his programs. The entrepreneur is something more than a facilitator of the wishes of others. The entrepreneur must be a skilled bargainer and salesman who can actively "pyramid" the resources available to him and thereby assemble a programmatic "executive-centered coalition."

Initially the new mayor had access to no greater resources than his predecessor, but with superb skill he exploited them to the limit. In this way, he managed to accumulate new resources; he rose to new heights of popularity, for example, and found it increasingly easy to tap the business community for campaign contributions. His new resources in turn made it easier for him to secure the compliance of officials in city agencies, enlarge his staff, appoint to office the kinds of people he wanted, obtain the cooperation of the Boards of Finance and Aldermen, and gain widespread support for his policies. Thus the resources available to the mayor grew by comparison with those available to other officials. He could now increase his influence over the various officials of local government by using these resources fully and skillfully. An executive-centered order gradually emerged.
By using slack resources with higher efficiency the new mayor moved his actual influence closer to his potential influence. Then because of his greater influence he was able to improve his access to resources. In this fashion he pyramided both his resources and his influence. He was, in short, a highly successful political entrepreneur.

It would be a mistake from the above description to infer that the difference between entrepreneurship and brokering is simply a matter of the degree of activity of the entrepreneur. Both the broker and the entrepreneur are active. No one yet has accused Mayor Daley, even during his early years in office, of being a passive political executive. The maintenance of Chicago's political machine is a monumental task requiring much of the mayor's time and energy. The difference between entrepreneurship and brokering is not the degree of executive activism, but whether or not the activism has a policy or program purpose. The entrepreneur provides direction for the city; the broker simply reacts.

Still, whatever differences exist between entrepreneurship and brokering models should not obscure the basic assumption both share: the good mayor undertakes only those actions that will maintain, or at least not threaten, a broad-based coalition. Mayoral observers Banfield and Dahl--Robert Salisbury, Raymond Wolfinger, James Cunningham, Alexander George, Anne Greer, and Andrew McFarland—all shared this assumption. Even as late as 1972, the dominance of the consensual model as a guide for mayoral leadership remained:
Thus, effective political leadership in a fragmented system is proclaimed a necessity in American cities. And political scientists have proclaimed a model of the broker-entrepreneur who can fill that need.\(^25\)

Only in the final paragraph of this article in the political science profession's most prestigious journal did Jeffrey Pressman recognize that other desirable "kinds of leadership" in the city are possible.\(^26\)

THE LIMITATIONS OF BROKER/ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP

Mayors have been implicitly measured by the standards of the broker-entrepreneur model.\(^27\) Yet, for the most part, the values and assumptions underlying this model remain unelaborated.\(^28\) A normative judgment has in effect been made in the emphasis placed on the maintenance of a broad over-arching coalition. To maintain this coalition, the modern mayor must not only dispense specific distributional benefits\(^29\) but he must also "do big things"\(^30\)--to provide "collective goods"\(^31\) or policies, such as urban redevelopment, that provide "shared benefits" which cut across ethnic and class lines.\(^32\) There is no place in this scheme of things for either the fiscally conservative executive who wants to keep the city essentially as it is, or the mayor who desires such comprehensive changes in the resource allocations made by city government as to risk community disensus by their implementation.

A conservative mayor, concerned with the impact the provision of new services would have on the city's tax rate,
would be unwilling to launch new and innovative programs as would the entrepreneur or to otherwise "do big things" as would the broker. He would even object to programs that built coalitions by dispensing distributional benefits to various groups as these, too, burden the taxpayer. Yet even if this mayor succeeded in providing the economical and efficient delivery of traditional city services, he would be judged by the standards of brokership and entrepreneurship to be a failure. The real failure, though, is not with this mayor, but with the use of a measuring instrument that contains an implicit anti-conservative bias.

Likewise, a mayor who attempts fundamental change which can be secured only at the cost of making community tensions manifest would also be judged a failure by the standards of the broker/entrepreneurial model. The broker/entrepreneur model values only that change which can be achieved through consensual politics. A consensus-oriented mayor would not push for such broad-scale changes as they will only serve to antagonize some of the major groups in the coalition. The consensus mayor thus allows each major member of his coalition a virtual veto over all policy initiatives; redistributional or "zero-sum" issues are consequently ignored.

Even New Haven entrepreneur Richard Lee, despite his liberal stand on most racial matters, found it necessary "not to display his racial policies too openly," and hence abstained from any public action during the city's 1964 school
busing controversy. His electoral position was preserved. A mayor more committed to the school integration, though, would have accepted the vocal dissensus if such be the cost of goal achievement.

Andrew McFarland insightfully underscored the leadership opportunities available to the entrepreneurial mayor:

In a pluralist society, the "institutionalized mediator" "with an autonomous range of power" can be a certain type of politician who is sensitive to multilateral conflict and accordingly redefines particular, limited situations to resolve conflict, satisfying the majority of conflicting interests involved, and enhance his own popularity...

Another case, more directly involving task expansion and political innovation, is that of the outstanding urban renewal program of New Haven's Mayor Richard Lee. (Robert) Dahl reports that Lee's unusual political success has been based to a great extent on his creation of an urban renewal program that unified otherwise conflicting interests. Lee's response to multi-lateral political conflict led to a partial redefinition of the political situation, an upgrading of the common interest, dynamic political mediation satisfying the majority of otherwise contending interests, and an increase in the popularity of a political leader. (emphasis added).36

Yet, McFarland's observations also point to the ideological restrictedness of the entrepreneurial model. "(P)artial" redefinitions of "particular, limited situations" which satisfy the "majority" are not likely to be those outcomes which best represent the interests of disadvantaged minorities. Innovations which advance a "unified" "common" interest do not represent a fundamental or radical assault on the distribution of resources in a city.
The relative "antiquity" of the broker/entrepreneur model is the result of two separate causes. First, it is the product of the time in which the model was developed. Both Banfield and Dahl wrote about politics in the 1950's--before the racial clashes of the 1960's developed a new sensitivity to the need for more fundamental social redistribution and before the swelling of the black population in the northern urban centers led to a polarization of the population along racial lines. Developed during relatively quiescent times, the broker/entrepreneur model cannot be expected to have developed sensitivities to the major social questions of another era.

Second, the broker/entrepreneur model is closely tied to the concept of pluralism; both Banfield and Dahl's works were statements of pluralism. The broker/entrepreneur model thus reflects a leadership style suitable for pluralist systems—a fact noted above by McFarland. To the extent that the pluralist view of political systems dominated the thought of the political science profession in the early 1960's, the leadership model implicit in that school of thought dominated the study of mayoral influence. Only when the polarized racial settings of the major cities were recognized was the pluralist bias of the broker/entrepreneur model challenged.

Brokership/entrepreneurship, then, falls as a normative leadership model as it does not provide a suitable style for the leader who wishes to have an impact beyond what
consensual-based policy initiatives can accomplish—if indeed such leaders exist.

A TYPOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP STYLES

As noted previously, brokering and entrepreneurship are only two of the possible ways by which a mayor can approach a situation. Alternative leadership styles can also be identified.

The study of political behavior necessitates the reduction of the idiosyncratic into fewer but more understandable types of categories. James David Barber, for example, has reduced Presidential character to four basic types to better understand the personality influences on executive decision-making.39

Typologies serve as a sort of perceptual lens. They help an observer focus his attention on potentially significant distinguishing elements of behavior. Typologies thus serve to reduce the complex causation of real world events to a reduced number of forces. Types, then, must not be mistaken for the "real thing;" they are merely simplified more comprehensible schematics of the real world. No simple type will likely be able to totally explain the behavior of any political head; all we can ask is that a type give us substantial insight into his actions.

Along just what dimensions mayoral leadership orientations should be typed is the question that must be answered.
The concept of "leadership" poses many operational difficulties and has been used in a multitude of ways, there still has emerged, nonetheless, "a widely shared view that 'effective leadership' should be associated with the attainment of goals and the exercise of influence." Leadership is "social causation."

The basic constructs of leadership, then, are the having of goals and the "following through" in the pursuit of these goals. Leadership can even be manifested in the pursuit of negative goals, as, for instance, in a leader's vetoing certain alternatives. Mayors who have specific policy goals and act to pursue them can be said to provide direction for the city, and can be profitably distinguished from those mayors who lack such goals or who fail to effectively identify possible paths of action by which these goals can be pursued. The degree of direction a mayor provides for his city constitutes the first dimension along which mayoral leadership styles can be categorized.

Direction is a "multiplicative" concept. Both goals and task accomplishment must be present for effective direction to be provided. If a mayor is either lacking goals or incapable of identifying paths toward the attainment of the goals he has set forth, the city is deprived of leadership from its chief executive. Just as in mathematics, if any of the multipliers in a multiplication equation is near zero, the product is near zero:
\[ x = \text{the presence of mayoral goals} \]
\[ y = \text{effective task accomplishment} \]

\[ x \cdot y = \text{mayoral direction} \]

(1) if goals are lacking, \( x = 0 \)

\[ 0 \cdot y = \text{zero direction}; \]

(2) if task accomplishment is lacking, \( y = 0 \):

\[ x \cdot 0 = \text{zero direction}; \]

(3) if both goals and task accomplishment are present, \( x \neq 0, y \neq 0 \):

\[ x \cdot y = \text{mayoral direction}. \]

The second baseline along which mayors can be profitably typed is the extensiveness of the coalition or network that a mayor seeks to form or maintain in the pursuit of his policy goals. The basic questions here are: does the mayor essentially operate as a solo actor, refraining from actively seeking support of others? does he seek to act from the vantage point of community consensus? or, does he seek to form or reward a coalition that embraces only a portion of the entire community spectrum?

By trichotomizing both the direction and the coalition dimensions, a nine-type classificatory scheme of basic alternative leadership styles is produced. (see Table 1). This typology has the further advantage in that eight of its nine cells correspond to leadership styles already identified in the literature on mayoral action.
Table 1

A TYPOLOGY OF MAYORAL STYLES

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<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td>Perspectiv</td>
<td>Broker</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Caretaker</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
<td>Personality/Individualist</td>
<td>Ideologue</td>
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</table>
The Ceremonial Mayor. This mayor has no goals of his own nor does he attempt to systematically identify problem areas in which the city could be turning its attention. Whatever network or coalition building he undertakes is done via personal appeals. He tends to ignore his authority over the city bureaucracy; likewise, he makes little attempt to mobilize other city actors in both the public and private sector.

The Ceremonial mayor derives his name from his tendency to define his job in terms of the ceremonial duties of his office. He attempts little of substance beyond the public and social functions he routinely performs. He may be an active mayor; but his activity is limited to ceremonial, not policy, matters. Of all mayors he has the least impact on the functioning of his city.

The Caretaker. Like the Ceremonial mayor, the Caretaker too entertains a very short-range agenda choosing to deal with what "comes up" rather than initiating new programs of his own. But the Caretaker goes beyond the Ceremonial mayor in developing and modifying his network to maintain the status quo; he may even restructure city departments to facilitate the efficient management of city operations. Rather than acting solely as an individual, the Caretaker makes some use of the bureaucratic authority he is formally allowed. His impact on the city, though far greater than that of the Ceremonial mayor, is still for the most part
incremental in nature.

The **Personality/Individualist**.46 This mayor has a somewhat broader agenda, or more sharply defined idea of what he wants to get done, than the two mayors previously described. He directs appeals to other public and private sector actors; he might, for example, establish a close relationship with the business community. Still, for the most part, this mayor chooses to "go it alone;" he approaches goals from a heightened individualistic task accomplishment orientation. As John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence note, in many ways the Personality/Individualist is a Ceremonial mayor who has become more aggressive and enlarged his conception of his job.47

The Individualistic style of this mayor has its roots in the mayor's personality factors—and hence this style's name. This mayor maintains a "negative" orientation towards politics which limits the maneuverings he is willing to undertake as mayor. This sort of mayor seeks office only out of civic obligation; he feels the call from the community. Once in office he attempts to run the city in a business-like manner in the "public interest."48

The **Executive**.49 This mayor has the same moderate-in-scope agenda as has the Personality-Individualist. This type of mayor employs all types of network building processes to a certain degree; yet for the most part he relies on his control over the city bureaucracy for task accomplishment. He relies heavily on his formal authority as the city's chief executive
--and, hence, his name. The Executive can be simply viewed as a Caretaker who has had to become more aggressive as a result of his expanded "domain" or area of intended impact on city affairs.50

The Broker. This style, elaborated on in the work of Edward Banfield, has already received detailed comment in this thesis. As the Broker initiates no programs of his own to avoid risking his political neck, he can not be seen to provide much direction for his city's affairs. He has no agenda of his own. Rather, he will advance any program that has received the backing of all substantially powerful groups directly affected. The Broker's perspective is thus consensual; to advance non-consensual policy solutions is to risk disintegrative conflict.

The Integrationist. Like the Broker, the Integrationist realizes the possible "power costliness" of a general activist programmatic posture, and consequently prefers to refrain from introducing any new policies on his own. However, unlike the Broker, he does not believe that total mayoral restraint provides the maximal protection of his power position. For if a conflict flares up in the wake of mayoral inaction, the mayor may yet find himself caught between conflicting demands.

The Integrationist mayor seeks to keep potential power-costly situations from worsening. He initiates solutions of his own that integrate diverse community elements and thereby protect his position by averting dissensus:
The politician can prevent controversy if he can anticipate points of friction and minimize them by finding a common ground where action is not a flat acceptance or rejection of one or another position. If he can define the issue in such a way that the goals of various groups do not appear to be strictly inconsistent, he can head off controversy. If the issue is not settled in its early stages and factions turn for support to the general populace, controversy may cause the politician to fear any action and to lose all control over outcome.\(^1\)

Waukegan's Robert Sabonjian is the prototype Integrationist mayor.\(^5\) Anne Greer observes that to a great extent Sabonjian is a prototype Broker who takes a "stand-off position" in any matter where a community consensus can not be obtained.\(^5\) But she also notes, quite correctly, that in Sabonjian's willingness to take action to avert major controversy, "there is evidence of behavior inconsistent with Banfield's generalization."\(^5\) Such "unbroker-like" behavior is apparent in Sabonjian's actions in the 1968 controversy which stemmed from the refusal of certain landlords who rented to military families in the area to sign a Navy pledge of nondiscriminatory rental practices. Sabonjian reassured landlords that as only about half a dozen black families from the Great Lakes Naval Training Center were renting in Waukegan, housing arrangements could be made without forcing any hostile landlord to rent to the families concerned. With this assurance, the pledges were signed. By providing direction during the early phases of the dispute, Sabonjian prevented its flare-up into a possible major controversy that could have resulted in a drain on his power.
The costs of the Integrationist approach are the same as those of the other consensus-oriented leadership styles. If an overarching coalition is to be maintained, demands for broad-scale or redistributive change will be ignored. For the most part, only incremental change will be feasible; or as Greer puts it, "Under the mayor's supervision, the equilibrium "moves" but does not leap." In the example mentioned above, all Sabonjian gained was a reaffirmation of the status quo—the housing of a half dozen black families in places they would have otherwise been housed had there been no mayoral intervention. Community harmony was maintained at the price of avoiding any firm commitment by the city to fair housing.

The Entrepreneur. This is the last of the three consensus-oriented mayoral types. This mayor has a fairly long-range agenda; he has specific programs that he wants accomplished that transcend the immediate time frame. This mayoral type engages skillfully in coalition building and network modification; he bargains, threatens, appeals to city pride and financial self-interest and does whatever else it legally takes to form his executive-centered coalition. This mayor gets his name from his ability to utilize the "entrepreneurial" task accomplishment process—the actions he takes to create relationships that increase his influence beyond that formally accorded to the office.

The engagement in coalition maintenance and the building of the broad overarching executive-coalition, as reported
earlier in this chapter, are essential elements in the style of the Entrepreneur. Too often, Entrepreneurship has been defined solely in terms mayoral innovations or action characterized by "originality, risk-taking, initiative, energy, openness, organizational ability, and promotional ingenuity." Though these are essential elements of Entrepreneurship, they are not style characteristics that by themselves provide a good basis for distinguishing between mayors.

Kotter and Lawrence, for example, relying on the work of James Cunningham, define the "Public Entrepreneur" as "a bold problem solver" whose "two most important characteristics are originality and the willingness to take risks." Yet under this definition both New Haven Mayor Richard Lee and New York Mayor John Lindsay would both be considered Entrepreneurs as both actively initiated major and oftentimes quite innovative programs in an attempt to deal with the major social problems facing their cities. Yet, the basic leadership patterns exhibited by Lee and Lindsay are, along a different evaluative dimension, quite different.

Lee, governing from the perspective of maintaining his executive-centered coalition, built his administration around such issues as urban renewal, that broad-based or near consensual support could be obtained. Lee avoided those issues, such as school busing, around which such support could not be mustered. Lindsay, in contrast, actively pursued divisive programs, such as open enrollment at the city's university,
scatter-site public housing, community control of schools, and civilian review of the police.

A definition of Entrepreneurship that embraces only such characteristics as activism, risk-taking, and innovativeness does not adequately separate between Lee and Lindsay, two mayors who had quite different leadership styles. Broad-based coalition building is an intrinsic part of the Entrepreneurial approach. Richard Lee with his near-consensus orientation, was the true Entrepreneur; John Lindsay, the goal-oriented mayor who guided by the strength of his ideological convictions did not attempt to limit his program pursuits to consensual solutions, must be classified elsewhere.

The Partisan. The Partisan, like the Entrepreneur, is a goal-oriented mayor who employs all possible network building and task accomplishment techniques. Yet, the Partisan differs from the Entrepreneur in that the former does not seek to govern from the perspective of a coalition which spans the breadth of all concerned community elements. The Partisan identifies with only a portion of the community; he defines his constituency not in terms of the people of the entire city or even of all concerned power groups but in terms of the members of his own group, however he may define his "group." Community-wide integration is not one of his goals.

Charles Levine has noted the tendency of both black and white mayors to adopt a Partisan leadership approach in cities marred by intense racial conflict. Instead of adopting a
general "booster" orientation towards the city as a whole, these mayors define their jobs as the advancement or maintenance of the position of their particular racial group in the city.

Levine distinguishes those styles of mayoral leadership, such as Entrepreneurship and Brokership, which emerge in pluralist communities from those, such as Partisanship, which emerge in polarized settings. Yet, this differentiation is unnecessary. Even if a particular mayoral style proves more productive in one setting, there is nothing that precludes a mayor from adopting the same style in a less appropriate setting. Mayors, like all political officials, live in a world of imperfect information. Consequently, they will not always adopt a leadership style compatible with the environmental context in which they must work. Similarly, a mayor's own goals may be inconsistent with the character of conflict he finds in his city. A mayor, for example, who desires a return to political quiescence could attempt to adopt an Entrepreneurial approach even in a polarized community. Similarly, a mayor may consciously transform a quiescent community into a polarized community by introducing consideration of redistributional programs which advance the cause of a city's minority residents.

Levine, in his study of mayoral styles in polarized communities, has identified a "hegemonic" style of leadership. The hegemonic mayor, though, can be viewed as a
Partisan whose faction has gained political predominance in the community. The hegemonic mayor is free to reward members of his faction without having to necessarily adopt a combative orientation.

Contextual variables, such as the degree of power of the mayor's faction, only impose the setting in which a mayor must govern and do not of themselves constitute distinct leadership styles. The orientations of the hegemonic and Partisan mayor are essentially the same. Both head medium-range coalitions which differentially incorporate majority and minority elements; both seek to dispense political rewards exclusively to members of their own faction. Hegemonyship, hence, is a "form of partisan posture," not a leadership style to be differentiated from Partisanship.

The Ideologue. Only for one cell in the typology, that of the high direction/solo actor, is there no corresponding style recognized anywhere in the literature on mayoral leadership. This sort of mayor can be viewed as a Personality/Individualist mayor who has broadened his agenda and possesses an extremely strong policy orientation. He has definite program objectives which he pursues basically on his own, without enlisting the cooperation of others. This mayor embodies what Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky have called the "purist" style in American politics. As his crusades are rooted in his own sense of morality or ideology, he earns the appellation "Ideologue." This sort of mayor will continue even with a
power costly action--action which alienates others--just so long as in his heart he knows he is right. The Ideologue differs from the high direction mayor closest to him, the Partisan, in that the latter has a sense of political realism. The Partisan surveys the political terrain beforehand and chooses the battles he will fight; he takes only those actions that will advance, not undermine, the cause of his faction. The Ideologue, in contrast, has no such coalitional perspective. He is driven solely by the dictates of his conscience, and armed with his convictions will plunge head down into a political storm, even to the point of undertaking counterproductive actions.

As each of the baselines in the above typology are ordinal scales, exact equivalencies are not necessarily implied by giving two or more styles the same rank on a scale. For example, the intermediate coalition ranking is a broad category embracing all mayors who cultivate some network support, but not to the point that they will refrain from action if a community near-consensus cannot be obtained. Similarly, the classification of the Broker, Caretaker, and Ceremonial mayors as low direction types is not meant to imply that each style affords the exact same degree of direction for a city. Both the Broker, who aids in task accomplishment by implementing those programs which receive the endorsement of important community groups, and the Caretaker, who has chosen the limited goal of maintaining those services that
the city already provides, afford somewhat more direction for a city's affairs than the Ceremonial mayor, who abstains from most policy-related action.

The typology is also for the most part non-normative. No one or two types are held out as the best or ideal mayoral leadership style. Different styles will best suit different mayors, depending on their personalities, their policy goals, and the different political settings in which they must work. It is the task of the mayoral analyst to ascertain the relative advantages and limitations in the employment of each of the styles.

This thesis will begin an intensive investigation of the strengths and weaknesses, both as regards a mayor's ability to achieve his goals and the impact of his actions on the city's polity, of the three high direction mayoral styles. The focus of this study will be on the three mayors of Madison, Wisconsin, who served from 1965 through 1975, and each of whose style, by fortunate circumstance, at least in part corresponds to a different high direction mayoral leadership type.

In addition to identifying the advantages and problems associated with various leadership approaches, this dissertation will attempt to judge each mayor according to his ability to reach his own stated goals. As each mayor entertained a different agenda, each will necessarily be assessed on different policy lines.
Each mayor will be evaluated on his performance in both major city controversies and those issue areas which never flared into public conflict but in which the mayor still expressed a policy orientation. Major controversies do not constitute the entire range of affairs with which a mayor must deal. A mayor who wishes to maximize his impact must concern himself not only with the more visible allocative disputes but with those innumerable routine functionings of city hall which never command great public attention.

METHODOLOGY

Analysts of mayoral leadership have never made explicit what constitutes evidence that a mayor has adopted a particular leadership style. This lack of scrupulousness has resulted in some confusion. For example, both Charles Levine and Kotter and Lawrence have studied Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher (1962-67). But whereas Kotter and Lawrence consider Locher to be a Caretaker, Levine sees him in the much different light of the Partisan.72

Similarly, Levine's typing of Birmingham's George Seibels as a hegemonic mayor remains suspect.73 Levine supports his classification as the "Birmingham remained a white hegemony" throughout Seibels' first six years in office, and that the mayor "contributes to its maintenance by successfully communicating a different image of the city."74 Yet, Levine's history of the Seibels' administration can be reinterpreted
with a quite different conclusion. Much of the evidence Levine presents can be used to support the thesis that Seibels' style was that of Caretakership—with its distaste for political conflict, relative lack of network building, short-range agenda setting, and reliance on the individualistic task accomplishment process—rather than the hegemonic variety of Partisanship:

"His approach to politics tended to be based on boosterism and the naive view that changes could be made without confrontation or bargaining, even when entrenched interests were adversely affected." (distaste for political conflict, and reliance only on purposive appeals in network building).

"He tried to do too much himself and failed to build a first-rate staff which could augment his administrative and political weaknesses." (individualistic task accomplishment process and lack of long-range agenda setting).

"Because he abhorred conflict and criticism, he avoided being forceful when dealing with department heads and state, county, and local officials." (distaste for political conflict and low usage of task accomplishment processes).

"He led such a frantic pace attending meetings, cutting ribbons and giving speeches that he wasn't able to focus on specific problems or conduct systematic evaluation of the implementation of his policies by city departments." (lack of long-range agenda setting or strong goal orientations as indicated by his tendency to define his job in terms of the ceremonial duties of his office).

"He often failed to consult with the city council before proposing major programs that the council would have to approve and the departments would have to eventually implement." (lack of network building and reliance on the individualistic task accomplishment process).75

Seibels' willingness to submit to the desires of local business groups, a pattern which "relegated Birmingham's mayor to
the role of a secondary policy-maker,76 is also indicative of a lack of direction from the mayor's office. A hegemonic or Partisan mayor would not have been content to play such a secondary role, but would have been a primary force in moving his city in the direction he desired—which in Seibels' case would still have been towards the interest of the city's business community. The role of a secondary policy-maker, rather than being evidence of high direction hegemonic leadership, is consonant with the style of the low direction city heads—the Ceremonial, Caretaker, and Broker mayors—who defer the making of major policy decisions to other officials and groups in the city.

Was Seibels a hegemonic (or Partisan) mayor or a Caretaker? Was Locher a Caretaker or a Partisan? The evidence presented by the authors in each case is inadequate to permit such precise classifications. Yet, means of studying mayoral leadership must be developed which will enable such precise classifications. For only after such classifications are made with confidence can the actions of an individual mayor be better understood and comparisons between mayors at various times and in various cities be undertaken to ascertain the advantages and limitations of particular leadership styles.

The absence of quantitative indicators as to a mayor's style does not preclude a disciplined study of the field. Steps can and must be taken to minimize the subjectivity of the classificatory process. The following steps constitute
the basic elements of a more "scientific" and accurate investigation of leadership styles:

1. **Using Detailed Histories and Case Studies as Evidence.** The mayoral analyst must present the reader with the evidence he has mustered to support his typing of a particular mayor. As no synoptic indicator of a mayor's leadership style exists, the researcher has no alternative but to draw elaborate histories of his mayor in action. One or two case studies of a mayor dealing with specific problems will not suffice as there is no way to assure how representative the mayor's approach to these problems is of his approach to his job in general. After the researcher has described the mayor's style in general, focusing on his goals, utilization of task accomplishment processes, and the degree of his willingness to engage in coalition formation, then it is desirable that the generalizations made be further illustrated by the elaboration of specific case studies. These detailed histories and case studies of a mayor in office constitute the "data" the researcher uses in the typing process.

This seemingly simplistic piece of advice--that the researcher should present the evidence upon which his determinations are made--was for the most part ignored by one mayoral action study, that conducted by Kotter and Lawrence, probably as a result of the voluminous output that would have been required in a study of twenty mayors. Only in one instance, in their classification of Atlanta mayor Ivan Allen
as an Entrepreneur, was a detailed history introduced as supporting evidence. The brief glimpses offered into the behavior of the other nineteen mayors are simply too fragmentary to permit generalizations as to a mayor's style with any degree of certainty. As in their classification of Ralph Locher as a Caretaker, the reader has no way to ascertain whether the conclusions Kotter and Lawrence arrive at are warranted by the evidence or whether the authors have simply misread their data.

2. Getting at the Intentions of the Political Head. Charles Levine presented a lengthy history of Seibels' administration, and yet it remained unclear exactly what leadership style the Birmingham mayor had really adopted. What additional evidence and observations could Levine have presented to provide useful support for his interpretations of Seibels' actions?

A mayor's style is for the most part a reflection of his own orientations and intentions. It thus becomes crucial that a researcher tap these orientations if he is to fully understand a mayor's leadership style. For example, Seibels was a Caretaker if he had a personality which did not permit him to engage in conflictual activity, thus requiring that he let others make important policy decisions for the city. On the other hand, Seibels was a hegemonic or Partisan mayor if he viewed his job to be that of advancing or maintaining as best as possible the dominant position of Birmingham's white
community. As in this specific instance the consequences of political withdrawal and hegemonic activity are the same—the preservation of the status quo and white dominance—it is impossible to clearly discern exactly what style the mayor had adopted by the researcher's focusing solely on the outcome of political activity in Birmingham. It is necessary for the researcher to get at the intentions of the city's chief executive.

A similar observation can be made concerning the political style of Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher. Locher was a Caretaker if he defined his job solely in terms of the efficient provision of services; he was a Partisan if he identified with and sought to preserve the position of the city's white community. The mayor's intentions must be made known before any definite statement as to his style can be made. The researcher must thus "get inside the mayor's head" in order to gain a true picture of what a mayor's goals, task accomplishment and network building orientations are. The histories and case studies of a mayor's term in office must be constructed with this necessity in mind.

In reconstructing the events of an administration, the analyst must consequently pay close attention to any indicators as to what the mayor was thinking at the time. One good, though less than perfect, source of information on this point are newspaper accounts. The analyst must look for the words of the mayor, his aides, or any other participants in a
dispute, even to the point of paying particularly close attention to the words of participants underscoring why a mayor chose the path of action (or even inaction) he did in a particular controversy.

This approach has two possible drawbacks. First of all, newspaper coverage of city hall in many American cities is so inadequate as to make unprofitable the search for mayoral intentions through the examination of his words or the words of his close associates in the printed media. This was not the case in Madison, Wisconsin, however, as the two local newspapers paid unusually close, if somewhat biased, attention to city politics. Even more fortunately, as the morning Wisconsin State Journal was generally conservative Republican, and the evening Capital Times leaned in a very liberal Democratic direction, a researcher can obtain a fairly balanced view of Madison politics by reading the contrasting portrayals in both newspapers.

The second drawback to this approach is that a mayor skilled at public relations might be able to manipulate press coverage so the media would convey only the image he wants, rather than a picture of his intentions and events as they really are. Such was the case in New Haven where Richard Lee was able to make it appear that the business "muscles" of the Citizens Action Commission, and not his administration, were the prime movers behind that city's massive urban redevelopment program. 77
Direct observation and participant observation, whereby the observer cannot be screened from the real decision-making process, is obviously a desirable means of penetrating this possible charade. However, where direct observation is impossible, as where events are already past history or access to decision-making circles is denied, secondary sources must be relied upon in the reconstruction of events. Interviews with the mayor, members of his staff, administrative officials, city councilmen and others active in or knowledgeable about the city's affairs can help flesh out the reconstruction of events. Hopefully, if a broad range of participants and observers are interviewed, someone with inside knowledge of what really took place during the administration will reveal the truth, if in fact the truth had been hidden behind a public relations screen.

3. Separating the Hypotheses and Interpretations from the Observational Data. In reporting events the researcher might inadvertently succumb to the temptation to present his data in such a light as to support whatever point he is trying to make. This danger is especially ominous when interpretations are intertwined with the presentation of the detail case studies. Fred Greenstein's advice for the "objectifying" of the study of personality in politics applies equally to the study of executive leadership styles:

So far as possible the hypotheses and interpretations (the latter being hypotheses that have been provisionally accepted) should be kept distinct from the
observational data upon which the hypotheses and interpretations are based. A common fault of the single-case clinical psychological reports is that the processes of observation and interpretation are not sufficiently differentiated from each other. The reader cannot himself examine the materials upon which the interpretations are based. He cannot reconstruct and, therefore, cannot assess the steps by which the analyst has arrived at an interpretation, and he does not have the raw materials with which to advance alternative interpretations of his own.78 (emphasis in original).

4. Removing the Researcher's Subjectivity. In classifying a mayor's style, a process that has the potential for contamination by the researcher's own political feelings and prejudices, the researcher has two aids in attempting to maintain his objectivity. First, the researcher must constantly be aware of his own ideological orientation and he must always be on guard against the subjective feelings he might harbor concerning the person he is studying. By constantly reminding himself of the disparity between his own ideology and the ideology of the person under study, the researcher will be sufficiently reminded of the necessity to evaluate his mayors according to their ability to obtain their goals, and not simply advance those values appreciated by the researcher.

Second, the researcher must seek interviews with people from all sides of the various disputes in the city and from people who occupy all portions of the political spectrum. The researcher has to be on guard against selectively interviewing only those with whom he might agree and with whom he might be
most comfortable. In addition to helping reconstruct events, these respondents will help make the researcher aware of alternative explanations as to why a mayor behaved as he did. The researcher treads on very thin ice here, however, as he must be able to discern the truth from the cover stories, while at the same time being quite careful so as not to dismiss, out of hand, interpretations he receives which are not consonant with his initial dispositions.

These four guidelines have been followed to the extent possible in the investigation of the leadership styles of the three mayors of Madison, Wisconsin, during the 1965 to 1975 period. An introductory section on each mayor entails an overview of the mayor's general orientations, the actions he took in office, and the categorizing of his leadership style. The style of each mayor emerges with more detail in the case studies which follow. As much as possible, the presentation of interpretations has been meticulously kept separate from that of the observational data.

It is in these case studies that the costs, benefits, and limitations of a particular mayoral style become apparent. These case studies were reconstructed from a number of sources, including the author's experience of having lived in Madison for over six of the ten years studied; a search through the daily newspaper accounts of this period with close attention paid to the statements made by the mayor, his administrative aides, and other political actors; an examination of relevant
city records and files; and interviews conducted in the Summer of 1975 with fifty-six persons knowledgeable about Madison politics. Among those interviewed were the three mayors themselves, their close aides, members of the City Council of various political outlooks, city administrative officials, members of various city commissions including the Board of Education, journalists, and spokesmen for the city's business and minority communities.

THE SETTING OF MADISON POLITICS

Madison is a moderately large-sized city. Its population grew sharply from 96,000 in 1950 to nearly 127,000 in 1960, and to more than 171,000 in 1970. Only in the mid-1970's did the long period of growth finally come to an end; by 1976, Madison's population rested below its 1970 level at 168,400. Part of the reasons for this reversal lay in the decline in the city's birthrate in the 1960's and 1970's—a trend which had the effect of thinning enrollment levels in some Madison classrooms as the new schools built during the "boom" period were no longer all needed.

Downtown schools especially faced the prospects of closing as families moved to the city's newer East and West sides. Central city housing in the 1960's came to be occupied only by the city's student community and the poorer elements of the city's population. As customers moved to the outer areas, so did business. As new shopping centers and enclosed
malls opened in the city's East and West sides in the 1960's and early 1970's the economic position of the downtown worsened severely.

Madison's politics has to a great extent been shaped by the fact that as the seat of both the state capitol and the University of Wisconsin, the city's economy is heavily service-oriented. Figures for 1977, for example, show that nine of Madison's top ten employers had a service-orientation (Table 2). The State of Wisconsin and the University of Wisconsin were clearly the city's most dominant employers. Only one manufacturing firm, the Oscar Mayer meatpacking company, can be found in Madison's top ten.

As a result of Madison's primarily service-oriented population, as Robert Alford notes, "class issues have not been important and have not carried over into local politics" in Madison. Yet whatever divisions there have been in Madison politics over the year have reflected the geographic concentration of different occupational groupings. The near East side, in close proximity to the Oscar Mayer plant, is heavily working class in character. The city's middle and professional class population has located for the most part in the expanding areas of the city's West and far East sides. Conservative candidates in city, state and national elections have traditionally fared better in these outer city wards.

Madison, as a result of its population make-up, is also a
Table 2

LARGEST EMPLOYERS IN MADISON, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of Wisconsin</td>
<td>19,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Mayer and Company</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison Public Schools</td>
<td>2,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Madison</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison General Hospital</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dane County</td>
<td>1,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Mary's Hospital</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Telephone Company</td>
<td>1,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

highly educated community. In 1960, the median number of school years completed in Madison was 12.5 as compared with the national median of 10.6. The result of this highly educated professional population was a local concern for questions evolving around the amenities of life and aesthetics, such as the building of an auditorium and the preservation of Madison's natural scenic beauty, rather than economic issues. 81 This high level of education also helps account for the level of polarization this city witnessed during the student-activist-anti-Vietnam protest days of the late 1960's and early 1970's. 82 If Madison's education and professionalism permitted the potential mobilization of both liberal and conservative forces, its impact was particularly strong on the city's reformist tradition; the city was a center of Wisconsin Progressivism, and in the 1950's remained a bastion of Democratic strength when the rest of Wisconsin voted regularly for conservative Republican candidates. In 1960, 18,800 students, excluding dissertators, were enrolled at the University of Wisconsin campus at Madison. By 1965, this number had grown by a full 55 per cent to 29,300; for 1970 and 1975, enrollments increased even further to 34,400 and 38,100 respectively. 83 The timing of this sharp increase in enrollment during the 1960's helps to explain why, though the University itself at times attempted to influence city hall, the student population itself was not a significant political force until the late 1960's.
In fact, it was not until 1968 that the first young, student-oriented alderman, Paul Soglin, was elected to the City Council. He was soon followed by three others: Eugene Parks, Dennis McGilligan, and Susan Kay Phillips. Until that late date, the predominantly student downtown wards continued to be represented by establishment-oriented older representatives. Only with the growth in size of the student community did this begin to change. It took the pressures of Vietnam-related civic concern and a Supreme Court ruling which struck down restrictions on student voting for the student vote and representatives who had their roots in the student constituency to become important factors in Madison's politics. The regimes of Mayors Otto Festge (1965-69) and William Dyke (1969-73), then, mark an abrupt transition in the style of Madison politics.

Madison is an extremely "white" community; non-whites constituted only about 2 per cent of the city's population in 1968. Madison contained no large predominantly black area of the city; its only major pocket of black concentration was dispersed throughout the city as a result of an urban renewal clearance project in 1963. Madison, as a result of its homogeneous population structure, was spared the racial convulsions that gripped other cities in the 1960's. This is not to say, however, that Madison was not without convulsions of its own. The city's participant elements divided themselves into enemy camps over the question of the Monona Terrace
auditorium—a dispute characterized by extreme rancor. This division was reinforced by the generally polar oriented positions of its two newspapers—the crusading liberal Capital Times and the conservative, generally Republican Wisconsin State Journal. And in the 1960's, Madison suffered more than its share of student demonstrations and riots. The city's population was severely traumatized in 1971 by the death of a researcher as the result of the bombing of the University's physics building by a fringe anti-war group.

Though elections in Madison are formally nonpartisan, the working of party activists and the often competing endorsement of the two newspapers give campaigns a submerged partisanship. Formal party machinery, however, for the most part abstains from operating in city elections. The mayor and the 22-member City Council, are elected for two-year terms. The mayor serves as presiding officer of the Council and votes only in case of a tie. A three-fourths Council vote is required to override a mayoral veto of Council action.

Madison's system approaches the weak mayor form of government. The appointment of department heads requires Council approval. Commissions composed of citizens and aldermen appointed by the mayor for fixed terms are also responsible for the direction of many of the departments; such authority further insulates departmental operations from direct control by the mayor.

The mayor lacks any significant patronage of which to
speak. Only the mayor's assistant, and starting in the 1970's the three executives of the new City Manpower Office, serves at the pleasure of the mayor. Even the position in the mayor's office most responsible for the workings of the bureaucracy, the city administrator, was a career position.

One further item must be noted to complete this brief overview of the Madison setting. Madison is a physically beautiful city and a highly desirable place to live in. Persons who visit or go to school there have a tendency not to leave. Madisonians take a great deal of pride in their city and the "good life" they believe they enjoy. Being physically situated between two lakes is not without its disadvantages, however, as the lakes act to both limit the space available for residential and commercial development in the downtown area as well as the number of potential commuter routes to the city's central business district.

Madison is by no means the typical American city. In using Madison as a laboratory for urban leadership nationwide, special care has to be taken to account for influences on the Madison scene that may not always be present elsewhere --in particular its large student community and its service-oriented, well-educated professional population. Even Madison's form of government is not typical of that found in medium-size cities; cities in the 100,000 to 250,000 population range tend more to have the council-manager form of government. Madison's mayor-council government is the form
that tends to be found in larger cities.

But, as Raymond Wolfinger notes, no truly typical American city can be found. New York is atypical because of its size; Chicago because of the strength of its machine; Philadelphia because of its aristocratic tradition. Yet, the discipline of urban politics would suffer greatly if each city was looked upon as a unique political system. Analysis of one city's politics can provide important lessons for other cities just so long as care is taken to point out the contextual constraints of any observation.
The matter of building an auditorium and civic center has been the longest standing question on Madison's political agenda. It is a question that has resulted in emotional, heated argument, so much so that it has even helped polarize Madison residents on issues that were not related to the construction of such a facility. Yet it was just into this dispute that Otto Festge plunged when he became mayor in 1965. More than any other goal he had, Festge wanted to give Madison an auditorium.

Any understanding of the auditorium controversy in Madison must begin with a summary of the dispute in its early years—if for no other reason than to give the reader a fuller appreciation of the intensity that such a seemingly unideological matter could engender. The thesis of this chapter is that Otto Festge approached the matter of building an auditorium from the perspective of the Entrepreneur. Festge attempted to find some grounds for mutual accommodation; he sought to initiate a process through which an auditorium proposal which would satisfy all factors concerned would emerge. Yet, for reasons to be discussed later, such consensual leadership efforts failed.

The Pre-1965 Years. In 1954 Madison voters approved three referenda authorizing a four million dollar bond issue
to finance the building of a Frank Lloyd Wright-designed auditorium at Monona Terrace. An additional 1.5 million dollars for the construction of parking facilities for the project was authorized in a later referendum.

Wright, a native son of Madison, sought to take advantage of the aesthetic view offered from the downtown terrace site by extending his auditorium out from the end of Monona Avenue, over the railroad tracks running parallel to the shoreline, and into Lake Monona itself. Wright's quite elaborate plans envisioned a project eventually costing 17 million dollars. The three thousand seat auditorium, an exhibition arena and parking facilities were to be built with the bond money available only as the first stage of construction. Opponents of the plan claimed the true cost would be somewhere around 30 million dollars.

The auditorium immediately ran into its first obstacle when Republican State Attorney General Vernon Thomson declared the project to be unconstitutional as the city did not own the entire site of the project. The city surmounted this hurdle by negotiating with the Milwaukee Railroad for the air rights over its tracks. Then, in 1957, the project was again stalled when a resolution sponsored by Madison Republican Assemblyman Carroll Metzner, an auditorium opponent, limited the height of construction at Monona Terrace to twenty feet.

Much, if not most, of the opposition to the project in the early years was the product of conservative reaction to
the abrasive personality, unorthodox lifestyle and supposed Communist sympathies of Frank Lloyd Wright. As one commentator on the early years of the dispute noted:

The dynamics of the Monona Terrace controversy cannot be understood without knowing the personal dynamics of Frank Lloyd Wright...His actions and those of his followers were extremely important; perhaps the most important single force in the initial stage of the controversy.2

Personal objections to Wright helped motivate two of the most prominent anti-Terrace leaders during this time period--Carroll Metzner and Colonel Joseph Jackson. Jackson, in an appearance before a state hearing considering the repeal of the "Metzner Law," called Wright "a Communist or a Communist fellow-traveler" and detailed the architect's membership in a list of supposed Communist front organizations.3

No recounting of the auditorium dispute would be complete without noting the key role played by the city's two daily newspapers. The morning paper, long noted for its Republican sympathies--the Wisconsin State Journal--opposed construction at Monona Terrace and labeled the Metzner Law a "mercy death" for the project. The complete opposite stance was taken by the city's progressive, generally Democratic evening newspaper--The Capital Times. The Times took an unabashedly pro-Terrace stance, often in its news stories as well as on its editorial pages.

The two newspapers soon occupied central positions in the auditorium debate. The polarization could not have reached
the level it did for as long as it did had it not been for the influence of the two dailies.

In 1959 the barrier to construction imposed by the Metzner Law was finally repealed. Wright's death later that year, though, brought no mitigation of the conflict. The architect for the project would now be the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation under the direction of Wright's son-in-law, William Wesley Peters. The personal level of the controversy continued with the Terrace opponents referring to the site's supporters as "Wright Worshippers," "Wright cultists," and "Bill Evjue's (the publisher of The Capital Times) Boys," and The Capital Times and Mayor Ivan Nestingen lashing back at the anti-Terrace forces for being "obstructionists."  

The final dismissal in 1961 of a suit brought by Colonel Jackson seemingly cleared the last major obstacle to construction. Nestingen resigned to serve in the Kennedy administration in Washington, leaving his former administrative assistant and new Mayor Robert Nuckles with the unenviable task of opening bids from prospective contractors on the project totalling over thirteen million dollars—6.6 million dollars more than what was available in the auditorium bond account. The opening of the bids became a turning point in the controversy as the City Council, for the first time refusing to express its support of the project, turned down a resolution requesting a new bond referendum to cover the difference between the amount bid and the money available.
The mayoral election the next spring saw Terrace opponent and State Journal endorsee Henry Reynolds defeat Nuckles.

The Council in 1962 authorized a new referendum to ascertain the desirability of selecting a new site and architect for the proposed auditorium and civic center. After a heavy campaign between pro- and anti-Terrace forces, the Wright-designed Terrace facility was defeated by a 19,056 to 16,369 vote. Mayor Reynolds announced that as a facility had not been designed within the bond limits, the contract with the Wright Foundation had "been terminated by the architect," and the city was not obligated to the Foundation for past services rendered. The Wright Foundation supporters charged that the city never gave the Foundation a fair opportunity to modify its designs to bring the plans within the cost limitations of the contract.6

It was in the midst of the arbitration proceedings over the fee dispute with the prospects for an auditorium seemingly stalled, that Otto Festge became mayor in 1965.

The Fee Dispute--Getting the Project Moving Again. In his inauguration address Festge re-emphasized his campaign position—that he believed Monona Terrace was the most logical place to build an auditorium, but that he was not committed to any particular site for the project. A resolution was introduced in the Council at Festge's request suspending arbitration proceedings while negotiations with the Wright Foundation were started anew.6
But Edwin Cushman, the city's special counsel in the fee matter appointed by Reynolds, pleaded scheduling conflicts and refused Festge's and the City Council's special committee's directives to meet with attorneys of the Wright Foundation. The Foundation, in turn, refused to meet with city officials until Cushman was present.

Through Festge's continued urgings, a meeting with the Wright Foundation was finally arranged despite Cushman's continued absence. The Mayor invited noted labor mediator and University of Wisconsin Law Professor Nathan Feinsinger to attend the negotiations between the Foundation and the city. 7

The Foundation claimed it could charge the city anywhere from $190,000, based on the original cost estimates, to $800,000, based on the architect's standard fee of fifteen dollars per hour. Negotiations continued at "extreme arms length." 8 By 5:30 PM the parties were still quite far apart, with the city offering $100,000 and the Foundation asking for $225,000. Festge asked Professor Feinsinger to assist in the negotiations.

At 12:35 AM, after fifteen hours of intermittent negotiation, a settlement was reached. The city would pay the Wright Foundation $150,000 above the $122,500 in fees already paid. The Mayor's maneuverings had succeeded in clearing the first obstacle blocking the building of an auditorium and civic center complex.

Attempts at Consensus and Shifting Sites. As part of his
strategy to overcome the past polarizations that plagued the auditorium issue, Mayor Festge appointed an Auditorium Committee composed of members reflecting all sides of the controversy to find a new approach to the project. The Mayor himself served as chairman. Of the Mayor's initial eleven appointments, at least two were outspoken Terrace opponents. The City Council added three new seats. Two were to be reserved for representatives of the building industry and the business community, while the third was to be filled, according to The Capital Times, by "someone who could be identified with the anti-Wright-Monona Terrace group"--a concession which was made to quiet objections to the seeming pro-Terrace balance of the committee. To this seat, Festge appointed former mayor and adamant Terrace-opponent George Forster, with the hope that his presence would add to the legitimacy of the committee's recommendations.

Festge charged the committee with the task of selecting "the finest facilities, at the best location, designed by an outstanding architect." But in further qualifying that he would like to see an auditorium that would be located in the central part of the city, that made good use of Madison's lakes, and that was designed by an architect who would lend stature to the project, Festge was again expressing his personal desire for the Wright-designed Terrace facility.

The Auditorium Committee decided that the basic facilities for the civic center would consist of a 2,000 to 2,500
seat auditorium and a 900 to 1,100 seat theater for smaller productions. Festge had even more grand designs for the project; he saw the two buildings only as the project's first stage, to which, later, the city would add a recital hall, banquet hall, exhibition space, art galleries and additional parking.

By the end of the year the committee had cut the list of fourteen possible sites to three--Law Park (part of the original Monona Terrace site), Olin Park, and James Madison Park. The latter, though, was never given any real consideration as an auditorium located there would have a general adverse effect on the surrounding residential area.

A new twist in the controversy was introduced into the controversy in the beginning of 1966 when the City Plan Department proposed a new site--East Wilson Street--for the civic center. Though the East Wilson site was actually contiguous to the location Wright proposed--the design differed from Wright's concept in that the complex would not extend over the railroad tracks, North Shore Drive, Law Park and into the lake. Although Monona Terrace offered most of the same advantages as did East Wilson, the Department recommended that if land acquisition costs for the newly proposed site proved to be too expensive, Olin Park would then be the Department's choice.

The Plan Department's proposal drew immediate objections from both The Capital Times, who still favored a Wright-
designed facility,¹¹ and George Forster, who referred to the
plan as "the Frank Lloyd Wright proposal with more cost."¹²
Despite these objections, Festge saw East Wilson as offering
an opportunity to build a consensus around a downtown audi-
torium by circumventing the emotions associated with the
Wright-designed Terrace facility.

The Mayor announced that he considered East Wilson to be
an acceptable alternative to Monona Terrace, his first choice
during the campaign. Festge took the floor before the Audi-
torium Committee to explain East Wilson's advantages of a
downtown location, lake view, accessibility, and conformance
to the concept of a civic center. He opposed Olin Park, as an
auditorium there would be "strictly an event facility" which
"would not get the day-to-day use as would a downtown loca-
tion."¹³

As witness to his conversion, Festge even voted against
Monona Terrace when that proposed site came before the com-
mittee for a vote. The Mayor hedged only to the extent that
he believed the city should "take a real careful look at the
Monona Terrace plans" if East Wilson were rejected.¹⁴ Each
of the sites competing with East Wilson--Monona Terrace,
James Madison, and Olin Park--lost on four to eleven votes.
And despite Festge's maneuverings and pleadings, East Wilson
was also rejected, by a seven to eight vote.

Festge blamed his defeat on those committee members who
were apparently swayed by the threat made by the General
Casualty Company to move outside the city, with a resulting loss in the city's tax base, if the company would be forced to move from its East Wilson location to make way for the auditorium. Nevertheless the compromise he had sought to engineer had failed.

Festge reaffirmed his commitment to a downtown civic center in the firm response he took against a suggestion by the State Journal that the project be split into two phases—that an auditorium and theater to be constructed at Olin Park on the city's East side as the first stage, to be later followed by the construction of a downtown community center and convention facilities. Festge voted against Olin when the site again came before the Auditorium Committee, but later cast the deciding ballot for a compromise plan recommending an Olin Park auditorium, Law Park civic center, and the hiring of Peters as the architect. Festge reasoned that no auditorium had been built so far because "no one has been willing to accept anything less than one hundred per cent of what he thought was best, and that poisoned too many attempts at rational discussion." He saw the two-site plan as "the vehicle to end the factionalism that has torn Madison over the past dozen years."

The Mayor then took it upon himself to try to guide passage of the two-site plan. His first concern was to steer the plan through a Parks Commission whose members had expressed the concern that an Olin auditorium and accompanying
parking facilities would destroy valuable park land:

An unhappy Park Commission voted Wednesday night to recommend City Council approval of the Auditorium Committee's two-site proposal for an auditorium and civic center...The proceedings were carried out under the watchful eyes of Mayor Otto Festge.

But Festge could not exert similar influence over the City Plan Commission which voted to recommend rejection of the plan "from a planning standpoint" as it did not provide for the consolidation of facilities in the downtown area. The Mayor himself noted that although the splitting of sites was not the most desirable decision "from a planning standpoint," at least it was a decision that would get something built.

Festge, though, did succeed in getting the City Council to approve the proposal two days later. The Mayor had earlier refused to break a tie vote to refer the auditorium question back to committee with instructions to select a downtown site for a joint auditorium-civic center complex.

Though the State Journal was pleased with Festge's "leadership and dedication" in backing the two-site proposal, the Capital Times' anger was apparent in its headlines:

FESTGE SCUTTLES TERRACE;
Who is Mayor--Festge or Rohr?;
Mayor Could Have Cast Vote to Keep His Promise.

In a front page editorial, the evening paper further made known its dissatisfaction with the role the Mayor had chosen to play:
The Mayor's responsibility could not be more clear. Without his support, Rohr and the Obstructionists could not have succeeded. He not only organized the effort to put the proposal over. He refused to break a critical tie vote that would have sent the proposal back to the Auditorium Committee.24

Wesley Peters, too, expressed hostility to a decision which, he believed, for "political expediency," divorced the auditorium from the city's downtown area.25 Festge knew that continued objections by the architect would shatter any consensus behind the project he was trying to build.26 The Mayor sought a meeting with the architect to iron out the dispute: "By persuasion, patient understanding of opposing viewpoints and mutual respect we can accomplish our common goals."27

In June the Mayor broke another tie, this time defeating a Council resolution to have the Council determine the final location of all buildings in the Monona Basin area—the portion of the lakeshore extending from Law Park to Olin Park—after receipt of the master plan for the area from the architect. Festge professed to believe that Council determination of the site would put the city "back where we were before with arguments between the two forces interested in either Monona Terrace or Olin Park."28

But in commenting on the leeway he preferred the architect would be given in developing the plan, Festge further noted, "Peters may come back with a recommendation that the auditorium be located in Law Park or he may recommend that it be located in Olin Park. He needs a free hand."29 Despite
all his efforts to gain acceptance of an Olin auditorium, the Mayor still had not abandoned his hopes for a Wright Foundation designed downtown auditorium.

On a fifteen to seven vote in October the Council accepted the contract with the Wright Foundation to develop a master plan for the Monona Basin area. However, the project soon stalled again as Carroll Metzner challenged the validity of the contract in court.

Festge's re-election and nearly ten months passed before the Circuit Court dismissed Metzner's charges that the city had abused its discretion, both in the level of the design fees it set and in the negotiation of a contract for an entire master plan rather than a single building.

**Full Circle--Return to Law Park and Failure.** With the removal of the obstacle imposed by the lawsuit, attention turned to Peters' master plan for the Basin. Peters proposed that the auditorium be built at Law Park (the area below the Terrace), and that such other cultural buildings as a recital hall, small theater and art center be constructed at Olin Park. The auditorium bore striking similarity to Wright's original design.

Carroll Metzner attacked the plan for being "the Monona Terrace Project all over again," and the Wisconsin State Journal, taking the same objection, decried that the project had come "full circle." But Festge, who had always believed a downtown auditorium was vital to the future development of
Madison, said the proposal was "the master plan to greatness for our city" which even put "William Wesley Peters in the same plane with the great Frank Lloyd Wright." \(^{32}\)

A mid-February meeting of the Auditorium Committee brought sharp exchanges between Festge and the Law Park opponents but resulted in the committee’s approval of construction of the Law Park auditorium as the first stage of the Monona Basin Project. Auditorium opponents attributed the margin of victory by the Mayor to an intense week-end of lobbying which "brought in East side aldermen." \(^{33}\)

The City Council, including Alderman Rohr, voted its approval of the committee’s recommendations. The only hurdles that remained were Council acceptance of the detailed plans, cost estimates and final bids on the auditorium.

The dispute subsided for a year as the city awaited detailed working drawings as a prelude to bidding. Festge, who had very narrowly won re-election two years earlier, was not seeking a third term. He now had only a few months left if he was to successfully guide his project through the bidding stage.

Informed by Peters that the final bids would exceed the funds available, Festge persuaded the Board of Estimates to recommend the borrowing of an additional $560,000. The Mayor justified the request by viewing the suggested appropriation as repayment to the auditorium account of interest on the bonds the city in previous years had spent for other
purposes. 34

New problems arose at this time as the result of a report leaked by City Traffic Engineer John Bunch. Bunch declared that the auditorium had originally stuck out thirty-eight feet over the dockline, and the necessary redesign to bring the building within the dockline had eaten up so much of the surrounding area as to make parking at the proposed facility less than adequate. In addition to parking, Bunch also scored as inadequate both vehicular and pedestrian access to the facility. 35 The State Journal seized Bunch's objections as the basis for questioning whether the revised designs were really ready for bidding. 36

Both Peters and Festge quickly reacted to the report. The architect Peters countered that the auditorium had been moved only about one foot and that he did not know where Bunch's thirty-eight foot figure had come from. 37 Festge lashed out at Bunch's motives and reports were to come through Public Works Director Edwin Duszynski or himself. Bunch, though, continued to make his objections public.

The City Council, at Festge's prompting, finally voted to submit the project for bidding, but decided against the Mayor's wishes to wait until the bids were in to determine the necessity of borrowing the additional 560,000 dollars Festge had requested. Bids on the auditorium totalling $6,232,216--$877,604 more than the amount remaining in the bond account--were opened two weeks before Festge was to leave office. 38
The actual difference between the amount bid and the funds available was really closer to 1.5 million dollars as Peters used only about half the 1.5 million dollar bond money which could be spent only for parking. The Capital Times and Peters blamed the high bidding on the relative lack of competition in the bidding process as a number of auditorium foes had told prospective contractors that submitting bids was a waste of time as the facility would never get built.

Festge argued that if the interest earned on the auditorium bonds and spent elsewhere were returned to the account, private cultural groups could raise between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand dollars, leaving the city with the necessity of raising only an additional $170,000 to $270,000 to meet the bids. But the Council refused Festge's final suggestion and instead directed that the Wright Foundation modify its drawings for rebidding.

The decision on the fate of the auditorium was now in the hands of Mayor-elect William Dyke. Four years of compromise, consensus-building and attempts at mayoral direction were in the end fruitless.

The Failure of Entrepreneurial Leadership. By providing a sense of general direction and attempting to assemble a community-wide coalition, Festge clearly adopted an Entrepreneurial leadership approach to the auditorium problem:

Mayor Otto Festge played the role of the competent politician. (Former Mayor Henry) Reynolds' weaknesses became his strengths. He worked towards his
goals by utilizing the bureaucratic resources available, by operating with committees, and by personal contacts with the business and government power structures. His Terrace position was one of firmness mixed with flexibility; extending whenever possible; compromising as necessary. This approach tended to reduce personal tensions and bring about a reassessment of the basic issues of the controversy. His strategy was one of methodical problem solving geared toward breaking seemingly insurmountable problems into several small ones; then attacking each in turn.42

Festge did not await the achievement of a consensus of important political actors before acting; rather Festge attempted to engineer the building of such a consensus. He was an Entrepreneur, not a Broker.

Renewed mayoral direction re-energized the drive for the auditorium. The fee dispute arbitration was suspended and meetings arranged with the Wright Foundation despite the obstinate absence of the city's special legal counsel only as a result of the continued proddings of the new mayor. Successful mediation ended the fee dispute only because Festge had the foresight to arrange in advance for the presence of Law Professor Nathan Feinsinger at the negotiation sessions.

The Auditorium Committee was another vehicle created by the Mayor to keep the prospects of an auditorium alive. Festge's willingness to compromise with his opponents in a search for a "fresh approach" to a major problem is typical of Entrepreneurial mayors. Robert Dahl observed that bargaining was one of the keys to the ability of New Haven Mayor Richard Lee to assemble an effective executive-centered coalition:
The mayor was not at the peak of a pyramid but rather at the center of intersecting circles. He rarely commanded. He negotiated, cajoled, exhorted, beguiled, charmed, pressed, appealed, reasoned, promised, insisted, demanded, even threatened, but he most needed support and acquiescence from other leaders who simply could not be commanded. Because the mayor could not command, he had to bargain. Festge, too, operated "at the center of competing circles."

His active attempts at influence were apparent during the fee negotiation sessions and meetings of the Auditorium Committee, City Council and any city agency whose recommendation might possibly determine the fate of the auditorium.

Festge's shifts in support from Monona Terrace, his personal preference, to East Wilson and then to Olin Park can be viewed as an attempt to find an auditorium which would be politically acceptable to a wide range of elements in the community. These attempts at compromise could be misinterpreted as manifestations of Brokerage rather than Entrepreneurial leadership except for one important difference—Festge was not acting upon a pre-existing consensus as to the project but instead was actively attempting to create such a consensus. The provision of mayoral direction in the dispute becomes even more apparent when Festge, who believed that an auditorium built outside the central city would hasten the decline of the downtown area, allowed the reintroduction of the Law Park site despite the renewed opposition this move brought from the anti-Terrace forces.

If we note the general success enjoyed by Richard Lee,
the Entrepreneurial mayor of New Haven, Connecticut, we must now explain why the same leadership style which proved to be so effective in New Haven was such a failure when tried as an approach to the auditorium issue in Madison. The answer can be found by comparing the different environmental contexts in which Mayors Lee and Festge operated.

A TALE OF TWO CITIES

The Partisan Preconditions of Entrepreneurial Leadership in a Weak Mayor City. Throughout the auditorium dispute key governmental officials thwarted Festge's attempts to build a Madison civic center. Of crucial importance was Festge's inability to command the support of city aldermen both in committee and on the City Council itself. The Council members of the Auditorium Committee continually fanned the flames of the dispute in public, rejected the Mayor's East Wilson Street proposal, and even helped to finally defeat Festge's final plan by discouraging the submission of bids thus inflating the costs of the project. As concerns the City Council itself, Festge found himself hard pressed to beat back attempts to sabotage the two-site plan compromise. He further proved totally unable to persuade the Council either to restore the interest spent elsewhere to the auditorium account or to otherwise appropriate the difference between the funds available for the Law Park project and the amount bid.

Richard Lee had little similar trouble in getting
New Haven's Board of Aldermen to follow his initiatives. The Board perfunctorally approved the Mayor's urban redevelopment plans, the high school sale, and even the 1958 draft of a new city charter—the latter by a twenty-nine to four vote despite the fact that scarcely any aldermen favored the revised document. 45

The explanation for the difference between the two cities is simple. Festge lacked the extensive incentives and sanctions which Lee used to control his aldermen. Elections in Madison, first of all, are nonpartisan affairs, in contrast to New Haven where the party column ballot and a party lever are employed. Aldermanic candidates in Madison are not dependent, as are their counterparts in New Haven, on the popularity of their party's mayoral candidate; in fact, in Madison parties in city-wide elections do not exist. Also, half of the Council in Madison was then elected during the off-mayoral year, removing the mayor's influence over these candidates one step further. Once elected, members are as independent of the mayor on the Council as they had been from him during the campaign.

Similarly, Lee was advantaged in his ability to use his connections with New Haven's Democratic organization to deny renomination to irreconcilable aldermen. 46 Governing in a non-partisan setting with only an extremely weak behind-the-scenes party organization, Festge could not depend on the party for assistance with his Council relations, as had Lee.
Madison mayors have to live with dissident aldermen.

Mayors in Madison further lack most of the bargaining leverage which Lee and any mayor of New Haven could derive from the skillful manipulation of the limited patronage at his disposal:

A new administration taking over New Haven's city hall had at its immediate disposal about 75 politically-appointed, non-civil service, policy-making positions; about 300 lower-level patronage jobs; and about the same number of appointments to various citizen boards and commissions. The latter positions varied in importance; some of them included stipends ranging up to $25 per meeting or several hundred dollars a year, and they all conferred "recognition." Summer employment was an additional source of patronage. Every year the city hired 100 to 150 young men for unskilled labor at outside jobs, mainly with the Parks, Public Works, and Parking Departments.47

In addition to government controlled jobs, patronage in New Haven also included "government contracts, court appointments and other spoils" of which dispensation was not greatly constrained by competitive bidding or civil service requirements.48 Lee took good advantage of these resources in furthering his own policy desires:

Lee was perfectly comfortable with patronage, but he did not, like conventional machine politicians, value it for its own sake, or merely to maintain his own party position. While his decisions about patronage recognized the maintenance needs of the Democratic organization (and were generally made in concert with party leaders/Golden and Barbieri), Lee also used his patronage resources in pursuit of policy goals that were more congenial to liberals than to ward bosses. (His administration has been called "New Frontier policies on a Last Hurrah foundation.")49

Lee's ability to use this patronage to shape his relations with the Board of Aldermen is quite explicit:
...the fact is that most aldermen were dependent for their livelihood, wholly or in part, on the good wishes of the mayor. In 1958 eleven aldermen were full-time employees of the city or the court system, and three others had close relatives so employed. Five more aldermen did business with the city or worked for concerns which did; at least two of these considered the city their best customer. Thus nineteen aldermen were vulnerable to the mayor's ability to influence their central economic interests or those of close relatives. Four more aldermen received appreciable sums of money as compensation for part-time service on municipal boards or as party registrars; another had a relative receiving such benefits, which in most cases amounted to about $500 a year. Five additional members were appointed to the board by Lee to fill vacancies. Thus twenty-nine of the thirty-three aldermen were under considerable obligation to the mayor for past or present favors.50

Lee's command of these resources was so complete that he did not often have to employ them as sanctions. As long as he continued to make clear his intentions to use them in case a situation ever arose, he could influence the actions of aldermen without explicitly deploying his sanctions in each specific case.51

Madison mayors have few of the patronage resources commanded by Lee; thus aldermen in Madison are not subject to having their central economic interests influenced by the mayor; nor are they "under considerable obligation" to him for past or present favors. Fewer than five positions in the city are filled directly by the mayor.52 Nearly all the bureaucratic jobs, including those of the department heads, are protected by civil service.53 No members of the City Council were full-time employees of the city or the court system; and even if they had been, civil service protection and the
independence of the county court system would have insulated them from any influence by the mayor.

In further contrast to New Haven, all major expenditures in Madison must be approved by the City Council. Aldermen are not financially dependent on the mayor's consequently meager stock of patronage. Nor do aldermen in Madison, as they do in New Haven, receive additional compensation for serving as municipal board members or party registrars. And, furthermore, in Madison the Council itself, not the mayor, appoints a new member in the case of a vacant Council seat.

Festge had no more success with the members of Madison's unpaid boards and commissions and the city bureaucracy than he had with the Council. As citizen appointees to these boards and commissions for the most part served without compensation in positions that often placed considerable demands on their time, any obligations they felt to the mayor were quite limited. The members of the city bureaucracy were not necessarily loyal, either. The City Plan Department helped torpedo Festge's two-site proposal; and City Traffic Director John Bunch helped fuel the antagonisms to Festge's final auditorium proposal.

When Richard Lee confronted a similar situation, he succeeded in forcing the recalcitrant department head, Redevelopment Agency executive director Samuel Spielvogel, to resign his position. Festge lacked the informal power Lee used to control officials who were formally insulated
from his control by civil service.  

Whatever influence Festge did have was personalized. It was the result of his Entrepreneurial personality rather than any formal or informal powers at his command. This personalized influence was sufficient to induce a reluctant Parks Commission to approve the Olin auditorium proposal, but it proved insufficient in persuading the Plan Department to do likewise. Festge lacked the informal powers necessary to battle the Plan Department which Lee found useful in his challenge to New Haven's Board of Zoning Appeals.  

As the members of most of Madison's boards serve staggered three to five year terms, a new mayor finds himself usually dealing with bodies the majority of whose members he did not appoint. Mayors in Madison must be re-elected before they can be assured that the majority of any board will be sympathetic to their program desires.  

In Madison, politics are non-partisan, and parties normally play only a small behind-the-scenes role at election time. The absence of a strong party organization deprived Festge of a reliable base of support for any plan he might propose. Lee, in contrast, could usually depend on the Democratic organization in New Haven to help build public support behind a proposal independent of the merits of the proposal:  

Perhaps the most important extrinsic part of the project coalition was the Democratic organization.
While the machine's support produced the aldermanic majorities that were essential to the project, this support was not induced by favorable attitudes towards Church Street redevelopment. Within very broad limits the organization supported Lee's policies almost irrespective of their substantive content. Many party figures were indifferent to the mayor's policies and at least a few were opposed to the scope of his urban renewal program. But policy was far less important than patronage.58

The importance of party organization to Lee is further underscored by the fact that the only major issue he lost was the only one in which he was not given the party's full support. The Democratic Party would have been so adversely affected by Lee's proposed charter revision that it contributed to its defeat by failing to work for it and sometimes even actively opposing it during the referendum.59

The Situational Preconditions of Entrepreneurial Leadership. The possibilities of mayoral influence are not constrained solely by the partisan nature of a city's politics or the relative control of patronage resources available to the mayor. The actions a mayor will be successful in taking are also a function of the predispositions of the other political actors in the community. Dahl himself noted that access to a sufficient amount of resources which a mayor could pyramid to enhance his influence is only the first precondition to the formation of an executive-centered coalition. The second necessary condition for success, according to Dahl, is that, "The policies of the political entrepreneur must not provoke so strong a countermobilization that he exhausts his
resources with no substantial increase in his influence." 60
There must be a level of political quiescence in the community which will allow a mayor to operate without having to face strident opposition. An Entrepreneur can profitably maximize the use of the resources available to him only if others are not provoked to make better use of their "slack" resources in opposition to his proposals. 61

Lee succeeded in his redevelopment program only because a latent agreement existed in New Haven among the persons affected concerning the desirability of redevelopment. 62 The complete domination which Lee exhibited in the politics of redevelopment could not be tried in other areas, such as school affairs, where the degree of consensus was much weaker:

In urban redevelopment, the constraints on centralization were weak. In public education, they were much stronger; the area of latent agreement was less inclusive, the opposition was more powerful, and decisions were marked by extensive negotiation, conciliation, and bargaining. 63

The Entrepreneurial approach to leadership proved a failure in the only major issue Lee faced--the charter revision--where latent agreement was totally lacking.

The situational necessities for successful Entrepreneurial leadership were lacking in Madison on the auditorium issue. Rather than being quiescent, other key political actors pulled in the slack in the use of their resources. The Wisconsin State Journal, Joe Jackson, Carroll Metzner, George Forster,
Harold Rohr and others seized every opportunity to block a downtown auditorium; *The Capital Times*, Wesley Peters and pro-Terrace aldermen vociferously objected to the building of the facility anywhere else. Festge could take no move without it resulting in the countermobilization of one of the camps. In such a polarized situation, bargaining could not produce a broad enough consensus to establish a winning executive-centered coalition.

The differences in the situational context between New Haven redevelopment politics and the Madison auditorium issue also helps explain why Festge could not use the Auditorium Committee to legitimize his program as Lee had used the Citizens' Action Commission (CAC). The CAC was used as a "selling organization" by Lee to both generate and bear witness to the public support for his redevelopment plans. As Dahl further notes:

> The importance of the CAC in assuring acceptability for the redevelopment program can hardly be overestimated. The mere fact that the CAC existed and regularly endorsed the proposals of the city administration made the program appear nonpartisan, virtually nullified the effectiveness of partisan attacks, presented to the public an appearance of power and responsibility diffused among a representative group of community notables, and inhibited criticisms of even the most daring and ambitious parts of the program as "unrealistic" or "unbusinesslike." Indeed, by creating the CAC the Mayor virtually decapitated the opposition. Though the members of the CAC represented the major centers of influence and status in the community, they "never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought
before them by the Mayor and his Development Administrator," except for a few trivial instances. 66

Lee was fortunate in that he was able to appoint a group that would appear representative but which would still maintain a consensus as to the need for urban renewal. The members of the CAC "genuinely believed in the value of redevelopment; they believed in it on grounds that made sense according to their own predispositions." 67 Thus, Lee, despite the appearance of mayoral dominance over the CAC, was never really put in the position of having had to persuade the commission to take any action with which it was not already in fundamental agreement:

There is no indication in the interviews that the Mayor and the redevelopment officials significantly altered or even tried to alter the kinds of criteria the men on the CAC brought to their judgments; probably the most the Mayor and the redevelopment officials could do was to show how, given these criteria, the proposal made sense. 68

In addition to lending prestige to Lee's redevelopment plans, the CAC acted as a sounding board for the Mayor's redevelopment initiatives. The commission was a valuable mechanism not for settling disputes but for avoiding them altogether. The Mayor and the Development Administrator believed that whatever received the full assent of the CAC would not strongly be opposed by other elements in the community. Their estimate proved to be correct. And the reason was probably not so much the direct influence over public opinion of the CAC collectively or its members individually, as it was that the CAC was public opinion; that is, its members represented and reflected the main sources of articulate opinion in the political stratum of New Haven. The Mayor and the Development Administrator used the
CAC to test the acceptability of their proposals to the political stratum; in fact, the very existence of the CAC and the seemingly ritualistic process of justifying all proposals to its members meant that members of the administration shaped their proposals according to what they expected would receive the full support of the CAC and therefore of the political stratum.59

Because of the different situational context of the Madison auditorium dispute, Festge could not create an Auditorium Committee whose members he could be assured would be favorable to his initiatives. Festge further sought to create a committee whose purpose was to settle a decade long dispute, and in the process legitimize the committee's recommended proposal among all segments of the Madison community. But the extreme conflict over the auditorium meant that if the committee was to be truly representative of all sides in the dispute--and this was a necessity if its recommendation was to have widespread validity throughout the community--it would itself be composed of members identified with all sides, and as a result would become highly factionalized.

The Auditorium Committee members were not about to "routinely" approve any of Festge's requests. And the Mayor could not afford to take the tact of only submitting those proposals on which he could be assured of the committee's support; such a strategy in a highly charged controversy would only have resulted in the complete immobilization of the Mayor. In the absence of any latent agreement, the Auditorium Committee members and the city's political stratum could not find the basis for a consensual approach to an auditorium.
CONCLUSION

Jeffrey Pressman in his article "The Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership"70 called for an elaboration of the personality and environmental prerequisites of effective leadership. This chapter has made use of a comparative case study approach in an attempt to more clearly isolate the pre-conditions of success of one mayoral style—-that of the Entrepreneur. Both Richard Lee and Otto Festge had the personal dispositions for the extensive bargaining and general level of activity which are characteristics of the Entrepreneurial leader. Similarly, both mayors attempted to reach their goals by assembling a broad-based community coalition in support of their program.

Both executives also operated in "weak-mayor" cities. In both New Haven and Madison, city departments are run by boards whose members are appointed to overlapping fixed terms; control over the city bureaucracies is thus one step removed from the mayor's office. As the formal structure of municipal government is essentially the same in the two cities, differences here do not explain Lee's relative degree of success as compared to Festge's.

We might be tempted to find the explanation for the differences in success enjoyed by the two mayors in the differences in tenure of their administrations. Festge's short four years in office, as compared to Lee's phenomenal sixteen,
meant that like most mayors he lacked the tenure to see his projects through their completion. But this explanation is too simple; whereas Lee made demonstrable progress on his redevelopment plans in his early years, Festge in two terms could bring Madison's auditorium no closer to realization than it was when he first took office.

Lee enjoyed one clear advantage over Festge in assembling overarching coalitions in that his program, urban renewal, brought money into New Haven and hence was not seen to threaten the average citizen. Festge's auditorium required the spending of large sums of money--all to be reflected in the local tax rate. Lee's program was a virtual gift-horse; the costs of Festge's project only served to nurture the opposition.

This chapter has shown that the differences in the degrees of success experienced by Festge and Lee can further be attributed to differences in the environment in which each operated. Two environmental conditions appear essential for Entrepreneurial success: (1) a partisan system which affords a mayor the influence which accompanies sufficient patronage, a strong party organization, and the ability to campaign as the head of a party ticket, and (2) the absence of severe community conflict.

The bargaining advantages "partisan" resources afford may be crucial to the success of the Entrepreneurial leadership style. Without them a mayor becomes one among equals; without
them he cannot place himself at the center of intersecting circles; without them he cannot be assured that a coalition, if one forms, will be executive-centered. In the absence of these partisan resources Entrepreneurship becomes an inadequate approach to leadership.

The assembly of an executive-centered coalition also becomes an impossibility in an issue marked by severe community polarization. The Entrepreneurial model is appropriate only when conditions make bargaining a feasible strategy. The "situation-restrictedness" of the Entrepreneurial model was duly noted by Charles Levine and Clifford Kaufman:

> It is unreasonable to expect a leadership structure, such as an executive-centered coalition, that is appropriate and effective in one context (in this case, pluralist systems) to be feasible in all contexts. By failing to differentiate between contexts and assuming a pluralist environment, the literature on mayoral leadership has tended to promote one model of mayoral leadership as preferable for all communities: the executive-centered coalition. Mayors have been ranked--explicitly or implicitly--on a scale that assumes the conflict patterns of all communities are similar and that similar strategies should be equally effective...74

> In the absence of sufficient mayoral resources or in contexts marked by rancorous conflict,75 leadership strategies other than the Entrepreneurial approach are called for.
CHAPTER THREE: THE MIXING OF LEADERSHIP STYLES

FESTGE THE ENTREPRENEUR

The picture of Festge as an Entrepreneur is reaffirmed by the observations of two members of the mayor's office:

Now he (Festge) knew how far he could go. He has political philosophies as strong as anybody. But he never pushed those philosophies after they became unrealistic. He was never one of those guys who would say "I'd rather go down losing and fight a good fight..." Otto would take half a loaf and then come back next year and get another quarter of the loaf, and then the third year he'd come back and get the last quarter and end up with the whole loaf.

There was the auditorium issue. Take that as an example, although he wound up losing all of it...Otto turned it around, settled an outstanding lawsuit...set up a new auditorium committee, negotiated a new contract with the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation and got that contract through the City Council over the most vehement opposition. It was almost an unbelievable bit of maneuvering...And he had to compromise from here to hell and back to work that thing through. That was probably the biggest problem in the first year of his second term. It was a day to day thing keeping shaky conditions together. Accommodating here, accommodating there; gain a foot and lose six inches; gain another foot and lose six inches. He was the absolute master.¹

He had the ability to bring people together and resolve issues very often coming up with what most people would consider a compromise. He did through this device get things done. His natural bent was to try to convince the Council rather than use a steamroller tactic to try to get items through. Briefly, he was a negotiator, a conciliator. He was a leader. But, he very often, using the committee system and using Council meetings as his method of accomplishing something, would spend a lot of time in that way, rather than making a public pronouncement of as to what his position was...

So I would typify him as being a very good conciliator, a person who was able to bring opposing
forces together to get action out, resulting in a com-
promise of what he wanted in the end. He was a prac-
tical mayor in that regard.\(^2\)

Negotiation, conciliation, and a consensual goal orientation
were hallmarks of the Festge style.

Festge further fits the Entrepreneurial mold in
"pyramiding" his resources. He depended on his personal
relations with other city actors in an effort to surmount the
paucity of power formally given him under Madison's weak
mayor charter. To this extent Festge established extremely
close relationships with the members of the City Council. He
not only left his door open to all aldermen but constantly
sought out meetings with both aldermen and city department
heads to iron out any differences between them that might have
arisen. To earn the obligations of the Council, the mayor
also gave each alderman the courtesy of being told whenever
any administrative action would affect their wards. To trans-
cend the formal limits to his powers, Festge also found it to
his advantage to engage in what Jeffrey Pressman has called
"social lobbying."\(^3\) The mayor would often adjourn with both
aldermen and newspaper reporters after Council meetings to a
nearby restaurant for an evening of pizza, card-playing, beer,
and gentle political discussion.

Festge, in short, was a political person. As with his
social appearances he was also quite assiduous in his homework,
and used this control over information, too, to his political
advantage, as one conservative alderman noted:

He (Festge) never went anywhere without his two administrative assistants... He had full support and lots of back-up information wherever he was and whenever he made a presentation... Otto was very thorough as far as detailing the impact of a budget and where the money was coming from and where it was going to be spent on.4

Festge's activism was not confined solely to the home front. He was primarily responsible for the creation of the Wisconsin Alliance of the Cities; and as the Alliance's president he served actively in the campaign to get municipal tax relief from the state government. He was also instrumental in appealing to higher levels of governments for parks, housing, and auditorium money for Madison.

Festge pursued certain program objectives; but in pursuing his priorities he sought to avoid or at least minimize disintegrative conflict. Capital Times reporter and later-to-be Festge aide Owen Coyle called Festge "Madison's Consensus Mayor."5 Coalition-building through compromise was Festge's basic tactic; and to this extent the creation of committees was a hallmark of the Festge strategy. Committees were set up to consider the questions of an auditorium, an East Side Hospital, reform of the city's administrative structure, reorganization of the finance area, and the length of bond issues and city insurance practices.

Very often, Otto sold an idea through a committee—whether it be a special committee he had appointed or whether it be an existing regular committee. And very often the public never knew if it was basically
Otto's idea or if it came from a committee. But he did have a lot of influence. He had been county clerk for many years and had become accustomed to the committee system. It was his way of operating.\textsuperscript{6}

With a personal distaste for "strong-arm" tactics, Festge rarely forced his will on a committee. He believed that such imposition "only breeds trouble,"\textsuperscript{7} as direct mayoral involvement would only serve to impede the committee's ability to serve as a consensus builder. But this restraint on direct mayoral intervention did not mean that Festge refrained from paving the way for a committee, ascertaining whether or not he had a majority on the committee sympathetic to his desires, and through formal presentations, social lobbying, and press statements otherwise making his committee members aware of his desires.

Festge's actions concerning the length of the city bond issue and the creation of a finance department are instructive. The mayor's major concern in the former area was that if the city continued to issue twenty-year bonds, it would soon reach its debt ceiling and would be unable to borrow for future exigencies. Festge believed the problem could be resolved by the speeded repayment of the loans--a process which also had the additional advantage of reducing the total amount the city had to pay in interest. These advantages, Festge felt, outweighed the argument that people who used improved facilities in the future should help bear the cost of their improvement via the repayment of borrowed funds.
A recommendation on the bond terms was to be made by the Board of Estimates, a permanent city committee. Stories concerning the mayor's interest in reducing the term of the bond issues to ten years began appearing in the newspapers soon after Festge took office. On June 1, 1965, a report prepared by Festge aide Robert Corcoran showed that during the 1959-63 period, Madison's debt increased over 80% as compared to only a 35% average increase for Wisconsin's ten other largest cities. Corcoran commented that the report should also "serve as a warning that the establishment of a city finance department was the only logical method of supervising the city's expenditure and revenue programs." Three days later the Board of Estimates recommended the shortening of the bond term in order to reduce interest payments, despite the immediate impact such speeded up payment would have in raising property taxes. Festge noted that new construction and annexation would help offset the resulting mill rate increases.

At the same Council meeting that the bond term reduction was approved, a special committee consisting of city department heads, aldermen, business officials, and university experts was charged with the task of recommending desirable changes in city operations in the finance area. Under the then existing system, nineteen separate divisions reported directly to the mayor. Festge sought to combine eight of them--assessor, auditor, city clerk, civil defense, personnel, purchasing, treasurer, and public welfare--under the
direction of a director of finances. Again Festge aide Corcoran publicly mentioned the desirability of the move, noting that the proposed reorganization would "provide for tighter administrative control." Corcoran also observed that although Festge was awaiting the report of his finance committee before taking any action, the mayor had given no indication of being unreceptive to the reorganization proposal. The new Finance Department was created early in Festge's first term.

The cases just cited showed how Festge effectively used committees to gather support behind innovations he saw as desirable. In one case a permanent Council committee and in the other a specially established committee recommended what the mayor wanted. Though the mayor avoided overt manipulation of the committees, the way was paved for the desired committee recommendation through both his own statements and those of a member of his office.

The strategic use of committees is not the only evidence of Festge's consensual leadership orientation. Festge had to deal with an experienced City Council which was not amenable to blindly following the mayor's policy leads. As a result, both Festge and his aides informally polled the Council to see what chances he had of getting his projects approved; proposals were shaped to accommodate the prevailing will of the city legislature:
Festge held meetings, informal luncheon sessions, once a week before Council meetings where he tried to sound out the Council to see whether a particular issue would sail. If it wasn't going to go it wouldn't be brought up. If the opposition was implacable, what was the use of having a fight on the Council floor... If it was an issue of some importance, pull it back six months and see if you can't work out a compromise. 10

Festge was a creature of consensus. He would feel out the Council. He would know where the Council was going before he would go... He would count the vote and he would alter his proposals to conform with the Council. 11

Festge was thus a pragmatic mayor who sought goal attainment by finding a common ground on which all factions could agree:

My recollection is that he (Festge) was always continually working for the compromise--the thing that would not only pull a slim majority but a sizeable majority--with the assumption being that if a thing goes through the Council with a one-vote majority, that's not really consensus. The split is still bad then. What you ought to do is shoot for the majority of six or seven. 12

A MORE COMPLEX MAYOR

To leave the picture of Festge here would be to distort things as they really were. Too many respondents in the interviews, even Festge supporters, gave responses such as the following, which, though reaffirming the picture of Festge's consensual orientation, simply did not describe the mayor in terms denoting Entrepreneurial direction:

A conservative alderman:
"I think he tried to be too much of a compromiser. He tried to be friends with everybody. And I don't think when you are at the top of city or national or state government you're going to be friends with everybody."

A moderate-liberal alderman:
"I think his weak point was his inability to make
a decision and stick by it... When things got a little hairy he would turn to compromise instead of making a decision."

A conservative alderman:
"Probably his strong points and weak points will be the same. I mean he operated by consensus and he liked to see everybody happy. And it's great to operate by consensus, but everybody can't be happy... At times you have to be willing to take an unpopular position."

A moderate-liberal alderman:
"His weaknesses were caving into pressure. You see he was first a Democrat and then a mayor... He did cave in several times to pressure from above and from below, and he tried to be all things to all people."

A moderate alderman:
"His weakness would be was that he just didn't know how to say, 'No!'" 

This lack of a firm mayoral direction is also evident in that a number of those persons interviewed felt that Festge had no specific goals other than the building of an auditorium and the smoothing over the abrupt relations between the mayor and the Council which marked the terms of his predecessor. From this point of view, Festge's reliance on committees was not part of any grand strategy designed to sell the mayor's policies, but was more an expression of the mayor's inability to take a decisive stand on any matter.

Festge's Entrepreneurial failings can also be seen in his disinclination to establish the same degree of control over the city's administrative departments as had New Haven's Richard Lee, as indicated by the comments of one department head, a Festge supporter:
He himself (Festge) did not profess to be an expert on transportation movement. He felt that as mayor, --the political leader of the community--he would be more prudent, wise, politically safe perhaps, to follow the advice and counsel of those employed in salaried as well as citizens advisory positions...

Perhaps Mayor Festge was the last in a chain of four mayors I served under who gave a great deal of responsibility--to his administrators... Up until that time everyone believed that the mayor was to also ask for advice (from), rather than give advice or too strong direction to city administrators.15

Festge was quite dependent on his department heads; he was more inclined to seek advice from and delegate responsibility to the city's administrators rather than attempt to establish his clear authority over these civil-service protected officials. This is not to say that Festge provided absolutely no direction for the city's department heads, but simply that his respect for their expertise, coupled with a general unwillingness to force his policy views on anyone, led him not to exert the potential control he could have over the affairs of the various departments. He did not pyramid his power in this regard to the maximum extent possible:

He (Festge) did not pressure them (city department heads). He disagreed with them, but it was up to them to make their own recommendations and to stand up for what they thought was right--even though he might be awfully upset about it and use his own means to show his dissatisfaction. He expected every man or woman would be their own (man or woman). This is not to say that his administrative assistants over a number of years...did not lever or push a number of department heads.16

How can these contradictory interpretations of Festge's style--as both Entrepreneur and as something less than an
Entrepreneur--be accounted for? One possible explanation is that the views of one of these camps is misleading. Either Festge's staff was too close to, or his critics were too distant from, the mayor to see the real Otto Festge.

But yet, the argument advanced by both views can be seen to be partially correct; Festge exhibited Entrepreneurial leadership, but only inconsistently.

To more accurately determine Festge's general leadership style, then, it becomes necessary to examine his actions as mayor in a broader range of issues. Festge's Entrepreneurial behavior on a number of matters has already been demonstrated. Yet, if issues can be produced where Festge did not exhibit Entrepreneurial behavior, it can be conclusively demonstrated that Festge was not totally an Entrepreneur.

Festge's handling of two major issues--the 1968 school budget and the demands of Madison's firefighters for wage parity with the police--as well as his role in a less salient matter--the building of the Murray Mall renewal project--will be examined for the further insights they can give to Festge's leadership behavior. The evidence, as will later be noted, details a pattern of behavior that, while consensual in nature, fails to exhibit the clearness of policy direction characteristic of the Entrepreneur. The argument of a great part of this chapter is that Entrepreneurship is an extremely arduous and demanding style, and as such, a mayor will adopt the style of Entrepreneurship only when his goals are so clear that he
becomes willing to spend his resources on such a leadership approach.

**Otto Festge and the 1968 School Budget.** School politics in Madison is almost totally divorced from the rest of city politics. As the Madison Board of Education is elected, not appointed, its members are not beholden to the mayor or any other political official for their jobs. Their positions being unsalaried provide few financial inducements; school board members in Madison serve from a sense of civic responsibility.

All educational matters are the sole province of the school board save one: the total size of the school budget. The total size of the school budget, but not the determination of line by line appropriations, must be reviewed by the Madison Board of Estimates and finally passed on by the Joint Fiscal Control Group. Madison aldermen constitute 22 of the 28 person membership of this fiscal authority; the Group's other six members represent the smaller neighboring communities that join with Madison to make up school districts.

Board of Education members have not looked kindly upon city interference in the operation of Madison's schools, with the result being that, other than at budget time, mayors have for the most part found it politically expedient to stay out of school matters. Otto Festge did not attempt to extend his influence to educational matters other than the budget. He remained, for example, totally uninvolved in such matters as
the closing of Central High School—despite a petition with over 1,000 signatures asking him to appoint a committee to study the matter—and the appointment of a new school superintendent.

As a former teacher, Festge was basically a pro-education person inclined to look quite favorably on spending for educational purposes. Most respondents saw Festge generally as a defender of school budget requests. The only qualification that must be made is that Festge’s long experience as county clerk also gave the mayor an awareness of the political saliency of taxes and the need for fiscal responsibility at budget time. Whatever control over school spending was to take place was to be accomplished by the mayor or his finance department’s getting a handle on the preparation of the school budget—a tactic ignored in previous administrations—not by public confrontations with the school board. On the whole, though, Festge was more pro- than anti-school spending.

One other item necessary to explain Festge’s position on school spending is an understanding as to the relative condition of educational programs and city services at the time Festge took office. Festge’s conservative predecessor had avoided tax increases by severely curtailing city services; he did not, though, similarly challenge the educational budget due to the popularity of the programs entailed in the latter. If Festge was to revitalize traditional services while at the
same time keeping mill rate raises to a minimum, large increases in the school budget could not be tolerated.

In the 1966 budget Festge was able to keep the overall property tax increase to three mills without making major cuts in the school budget. With an estimated overall eight mill increase needed to cover the 1967 budget requests Festge noted, "There will have to be major cuts." The increase was kept to two mills overall, with, once again, no major chunk taken out of the school budget. Meetings between the Board of Estimates and the Board of Education resulted in a cut in the proposed tax increase for educational purposes by only 0.3 mills--from 1.8 to 1.5 mills.

Rising city taxes were obviously on Festge's mind at the beginning of his second term. The "fiscal irresponsibility" of the five mill increase of his first two years was the dominant, if not the only, issue of the 1969 mayoral election which Festge narrowly survived by only 62 votes (a victory margin of less than 0.5%). Festge readily admitted that increasing taxes led to his declining popularity, and in a speech to the incoming City Council vowed to hold the line on taxes. With spending for education accounting for 26 of the 47 mills in 1967, the school budget was a likely candidate for new economies for 1968.

The problem Festge faced was that spending controls in the educational area could not be unilaterally imposed by the city as the Joint Fiscal Control Group could only set the
absolute size of the school budget. As the Board of Education
determines where the cuts would come from, there was no assur-
ance that the Board of Education would chop the budget in the
places the Joint Fiscal Control Group desired. Cooperation
between city and school officials was a necessity if a
mutually acceptable budget was to be formulated. In the
spirit of cooperation, a member of the city's finance depart-
ment was allowed to attend budget preparation sessions by the
school board in order to improve the city's understanding of a
document that for the most part remained obscure to city offi-
cials.

At the end of October 1967 Festge publicly announced that
he would recommend acceptance of a $25.4 million school budget
worked out with the Board of Education which reflected
increases resulting only from inflation, increased teachers
salaries, and a larger school population. No new educational
programs were asked for. The mayor acknowledged that he was
impressed with the thought that went into the preparation of
the budget and the cooperation between city and school offi-
cials on the matter.19

But within two weeks Festge reversed his position, as a
unanimous Board of Estimates, with Festge as its nonvoting
chairman, proposed cuts in the school budget totalling
$500,000. The total tax increase for 1968 would be kept to
one mill with the increase resulting for areas (county, voca-
tional school, and sewerage district levies) over which the
The school board's reaction was predictably furious. One board member attacked the mayor for talking "out of both sides of his mouth," and another threatened to take steps to establish a fiscally independent school district. School Superintendent Douglas Ritchie responded, as any politically sophisticated school official would have, by indicating that the cuts would have to be made by curtailing such visible and popular programs as summer sessions, lunch monitoring, school crossing supervision, and adult recreation activities—as well as by closing all schools at 4:30 PM daily. An extensive lobbying effort was initiated; every attempt was made to gather citizen support and to turn out large numbers of both angry teachers and parents before the Joint Fiscal Control Group's budget meeting.

Public sentiment had been aroused to restore the money cut from the school budget. Before what The Capital Times then reported to be the largest crowd ever to attend a Council meeting, the city restored the funds. Festge hoped to cover the higher level of spending and still hold the line on property taxes by enacting two new taxes—the room tax and wheel tax—the state allowed the city.

But Festge's problems did not end here as the State Attorney General ruled the city did not have the authority to enact Festge's proposed nine dollar auto tax until the first of the new year. Festge tried to circumvent this new tangle
by calling a special Council meeting for the purpose of adopting a resolution of intent to adopt the auto fee. But the Council refused either to support the regressive wheel tax or to raise property taxes any further and instead, faced with a $550,000 deficit, rescinded its previous budget action. Festge vetoed the rescission in order to insure that city employees would continue to receive their paychecks during the first weeks of the new year. The budget crisis was finally resolved when a change in garbage collection procedures enabled a budget reduction of the $550,000 in question.

The vacillation the mayor showed on the school budget--first backing the proposed budget, then acquiescing to the Board of Estimates' cuts, and finally searching for new sources of finance to support the restoration of the funds--is inconsistent with the firmness of direction that is characteristic of the Entrepreneur. Two not completely alternative explanations of Festge's actions can be offered. The first is given by the mayor himself.

This was the first year that I prepared an executive budget. In other years, the requests would come in, the Board of Estimates would meet and morning after morning the good citizens of Madison would pick up the newspapers and see "Board of Estimates slashes $100,000"...and everybody would think, "Say, those aldermen are great guys. Think of what they're saving the city..."

We prepared an executive budget and when it went to the Finance Committee (Board of Estimates) it was already down to bare bones...Budget after budget I would have to say, "Look, fellows. You can't cut this because it's been cut down. And here we are--this is the bare bones. And if you're going to cut
anything, you're going to have to cut staff; you'll have to cut out programs." And I could see they were just frustrated over the prospects of having no news stories the next morning on how much they had cut the budget.

So when we got to the Board of Education budget and somebody made the motion that we cut $500,000 of the Board of Education budget, I didn't argue, of course, because I had felt there were sufficient votes to sustain it (to keep the budget at the level previously agreed upon). That was one time I guessed wrong. 23

According to this view, then, Festge supported the budget worked out with School Superintendent Ritchie, and the negative vote of the board of Estimates was the result of simple mayoral miscalculation. But this explanation seems to be less than complete. If as Festge has noted the aldermen were "frustrated" at the prospect of having no budget cuts to make, an attempt at Council budget cutting should have been anticipated. Furthermore it seems implausible that a mayor who continually sounded out the attitudes of his Council members would be unaware of their feelings toward such an important issue as the school budget. The Board of Estimates' vote could not have been the surprise that Festge in retrospect would have us believe.

The second, and to a great extent complementary, view also sees the $500,000 to be more the Board of Estimates' rather than Festge's doing. But according to this view Festge's short-live acquiescence to the cuts is not simply the result of miscalculation but the caving in of the mayor to a board composed of a number of strong-willed aldermen. The
mayor simply "could not say no"; he was trying to keep everybody happy. And as a result, for a short period of time, his policy preferences were supplanted by those of the Board of Estimates. Such action is more consistent with a low-direction mayoral style rather than Entrepreneurship. Only after Festge's pro-school orientation re-emerged did the mayor join in the lobby effort for the restoration of the cuts.

One final observation concerning the mayor's role in the budget crisis can also be made. The Entrepreneur avoids power costly conflict by advancing only those proposals behind which a consensus can be mobilized. Festge's attempt to enact the wheel tax—a move so unpopular it drew the fire of the morning paper and could not gain Council acceptance—is atypical of Entrepreneurship.

Festge's approach in the final stages of the controversy, was more Integrationist than Entrepreneurial. Even if the presence of a consensus could not be ascertained in advance, it was necessary for the mayor to take action to prevent any further expansion of the conflict and the costs that it might impose on his power. The crisis of being unable to pay city employees in the absence of a budget had to be avoided. Yet a cut in the school budget or any major program would result in a loss of part of the mayor's constituency. The search for new sources of funds was an attempt to integrate the community by finding some ground which would satisfy both the school spending backers and the mill rate watchers. Even if advocacy
of the wheel tax was power costly in the short run, it might prevent the further drain on the mayor's power that a bitter budget fight in the new year might produce. When the wheel tax failed to be the successful middle ground, the savings from modified garbage collection procedures proved to be the magic stone that ended the conflict.

The Mayor and the Murray Mall Renewal Project. Festge's adoption of the Integrationist style apparent in the latter stages of the 1968 school budget controversy is also evident in his handling of the dispute over the proposed Murray Mall project. The University of Wisconsin, in a period of growth in the 1960's, found itself expanding to the south of its previous border, University Avenue. The University wanted the 700 and 800 blocks of University Avenue for the construction of a communications arts center, student dormitories, and a shopping mall. The only problem with the vision was that the merchants on these blocks did not want to be relocated to make way for the project. The businessmen, fearing they would not be able to return to their former locations under the University proposal, petitioned the city to help develop a project where they could be part owners, not just tenants. Festge revitalized the dormant City/University Coordinating Committee to hash out the problems. Both the city and the University needed the cooperation of one another if any plan was to succeed: the city could not get federal funds for redevelopment of the area without University approval; the
University needed the city not only to buy and clear the land for them at a written down cost but also to vacate the intervening street, Murray Street.

Some very hard negotiations between the city and University began in May of 1965. A compromise was finally constructed a half year later when the project was expanded to include the 600 and 900 blocks of University Avenue as well. The University was to get the 800 block for the site of the proposed communication arts building--its major interest in the area--and the 900 block; the other two blocks would be the province of the private businesses. The shopping center in the 700 block was to be developed by a corporation formed by the area businessmen, not the University. The mayor then met with the businessmen concerned to sell them on the idea.

Festge's approach to the controversy was clearly Integrationist. Instead of acting on his own goals, he reacted to the pressure from others--in this case the merchants--and effected a workable compromise for everyone concerned. As a result of this "pre-emptive" action the merchant's fears were qualified, the mayor's standing with the University was preserved and the controversy over the area never blossomed into the disintegrative struggle that was so characteristic of the city's attempt during his predecessor's term to cope with University expansion.

Festge and the Parity Issue. During Otto Festge's administration major steps were taken to professionalize the
city's police department. Under an agreement negotiated by nationally known mediator Nathan Feinsinger, various incentives were built into the pay structure to encourage policemen to take advantage of the various training and educational opportunities available to them.

As is the case in most major American cities, and Madison was no exception, city firemen argue that as their work is no less hazardous than a policeman's job they deserve parity with the wages given the police. In October of 1968, late in Festge's second term, the city's firemen began a call-in-sick move to enhance their bargaining position in contract talks with the city. The firemen were seeking parity with the police who had received an increase of slightly over $100 a month under Feinsinger's recommendation. The Council Bargaining Team countered with an offer of salary and retirement fund increases totalling to a $68 package. With a work slowdown in progress and Firefighters Local President Ed Durkin hinting at the possibility of strike action--illegal under state law--the two sides met continuously until a settlement could be reached. The firefighters voted to strike on November 15 if the city did not increase its offer by that time.

As the sick-in continued, Festge called an emergency Council meeting to get authority to "take the necessary legal action" to stop the slowdown. The authorization was attained, and a court order was served on the city's 262 firemen
prohibiting them from striking in any guise, including absenteeism or a sick-in. The reaction of Captain Durkin to the mayor's move was predictable: "Nothing done by the mayor is inducive to creating pride, dedication, or self-respect in any firefighter." In spurning the city's offer to submit the dispute to fact finding, Durkin made clear what he saw the mayor's position to be: "The mayor and bargaining committee have taken a stand to create unequal pay between firemen and policemen." Durkin announced his intention to strike despite the injunction.

Festge introduced one compromise wage proposal which was accepted by the union but rejected by the city bargaining team. A wage agreement was finally reached on October 9 which added $30 to the city's original offer in the form of a $70 a month wage hike, a 2.25% retirement fund increase and job reclassification--giving firemen virtually the equivalent of the police package, but not formal parity.

The proposal still had to be ratified by the City Council in the beginning of the next year. The week after the firefighter agreement had been negotiated, two-thirds of Madison's street, sanitation, garage, and engineering employees called their own sick-in as a means of gaining leverage in their own contract negotiations. The disruption of the city's services due to increased labor militancy and the inflationary effect it had on the city's tax rate, coupled with a remembrance of how narrowly he had won the past
election, led Festge to decide not to run for a third term in the spring election.

In the meantime Festge sought and received Council authorization to dock the salaries of all firefighters who participated in the sick-in. Durkin was outraged at what he saw to be "retaliatory action... a very regressive move" by the mayor, and he threatened a strike if contract negotiations were not reopened to settle the matter. But Festge insisted that bargaining with the firefighters was "through" and that disciplinary action was solely an administrative matter. A court order refraining Madison from docking the salaries of the firemen in question kept the controversy from evolving to the strike stage.

But it seemed that there had never really been a clear understanding as to what was negotiated in October. At the end of February of 1969, the Council narrowly turned down a new move recommending parity—a resolution which had Festge's strong support—choosing to back the bargaining team's version instead. Durkin accused the head of the city bargaining team of going back on the verbal deal made the previous November. With less than three weeks to go in Festge's administration, the firemen struck, forcing the closing of Madison's schools as a safety precaution.

An emergency meeting of the City Council authorized the mayor to seek an injunction against the strike. But Festge at first refused, choosing instead to continue bargaining
sessions throughout the day. A court order was finally obtained the next day; but despite the action the firemen remained off the job. The dispute was finally settled the day before the city election by presenting the firemen an offer under which they received only one cent an hour less than the police.

Firemen in Madison are far better organized than the police. The firefighters not only turned out in number for the Council meetings of concern to them but made a continuous, concentrated effort to lobby individual aldermen at their homes. The one cent difference was merely a sop thrown to the police who had put some pressure on the Council to oppose the parity move.

Two fairly satisfactory explanations of Festge's behavior on the parity issue can be deduced. Both, though, present Festge as taking courses of action inconsistent with the style of the Entrepreneur. The first explanation of Festge's behavior is offered by two Councilmen directly involved in the controversy:

In characteristic fashion, he (Festge) initially backed up the recommendation of the bargaining committee that the police be paid a substantial amount more than the firemen, but that we should upgrade immeasurably the standards of the police department... That was his initial recommendation. However, as he got more and more pressure from Durkin and the labor union he started to dwindle. The Council was initially behind the bargaining committee and (alderman and union representative) Leo Cooper was added to the bargaining committee to put another labor vote in there... Festge was getting so much pressure from the Democratic party
to grant parity due to the strenuous lobby and public efforts of the firefighters...

That was his chief problem. He wanted to be all things to all men... He would say (to the city's bargaining committee), "Be as tough as you can! Get in there and fight!"... Then he would get the pressure from the other side and say, "Give in to them (the firefighters)." 34

When it came to difficult decisions, he (Festge) tended to take the line of where the most pressure (was coming from) rather than what is right.

I can give you an example... I think it was on the contract negotiations with the police and the firemen which resulted in a strike—the first and only strike by firemen in the city of Madison... They (the firemen) couldn't get it (the desired contract) by negotiations, so they brought it right on the Council floor, which we thought was wrong. But the mayor permitted that. Negotiations were right on the Council floor, which I thought was wrong and silly. And negotiations dragged on and on.

There were 200 firemen up there. I don't know who was manning the stations... I recall there were verbal brickbats thrown at me and other councilmen who opposed the increase in wages to what they wanted... at least until that time a majority of the Council felt the demands exceeded what the Council wanted to give.

So at twelve o'clock noon, they announced they had gone on strike. So at the time the mayor—at least before that time, the mayor—was reasonably with the Council in trying to prevent that. But all of a sudden the pressure was on. "We can't have a strike," (said Festge). And I said, "Why can't we." And he said, "We can't have one. Think of what will happen if we had a major fire."

... the pressure then came to give in, to vote for the contract. I guess the Mayor bit the bullet there; but he bit it the wrong way... That pressure would produce that sort of result. 35

The picture of Otto Festge in this case is that of a mayor who had no clear policy preferences of his own and who thus
caved into pressure—tendencies quite uncharacteristic of Entrepreneurship. Despite his pro-labor attitudes in general, Festge was not initially inclined to acquiesce to all the firefighters' demands. The mayor even attempted to discipline those firemen who participated in the sick-in, despite the possibility of a strike such a move might bring. But when the pressure from the firemen got too great, Festge ignored any doubts he had concerning parity. The one cent difference in wages was kept only as the result of the lobbying action on behalf of the police. Festge acted as a weathervane responding to the prevailing political wind. In the parity debate, he exhibited elements of both Brokership and Caretakership.

The second explanation of Festge's actions basically rises from the beliefs of many of the respondents that Festge was essentially pro-parity. But parity was not the only goal the mayor valued; he also desired a stable tax rate. Festge was caught between and immobilized by his holding of goals which were at least partially contradictory. Faced with this sort of conflict, Festge, rather than choosing his preferred solution and attempting to construct a coalition behind it, merely sought to find some middle ground where the parties concerned could come to an agreement.

This failure to resolve incongruous goals can account for the inconsistencies in the mayor's actions. When his tax consciousness prevailed the mayor's line on bargaining was much
harder, and little sympathy was shown to labor; the sick-in-caller were punished despite the union's protests. But when this value receded under the pressure of the firefighter's lobbying power, the mayor's labor sympathies re-emerged and he became a parity proponent.

THE COMPLEXITIES OF STYLE AND THE MISUSES OF TYPOLOGIES

Otto Festge's political style thus appears to be quite a bit more complex than a review of his actions in the previous chapter seemed to have indicated. Rather than being totally the Entrepreneur, Festge also appears to be quite a bit the Broker and Integrationist. This sort of mixing of leadership styles should have been reasonably expected. Real human beings are a composite of many different and often conflicting motivations and drives. Erwin Hargrove essentially makes this point in his critique of James David Barber's use of psychological-based types to classify presidential character:

These are ideal types and, as such, seldom fit individuals in their richness. Since we are all creatures of mixed feelings and uneven development, it is likely that many of us, including politicians, are some combination of positive and negative attitudes towards the self.36

If individuals are a repository of complex factors, the use of ideal-types to represent a political actor's style is a distortion of reality. Typologies serve useful purposes in aiding our understanding by specifying what elements of a
complex reality are of consequence enough deserving of special focus. But in selecting certain elements which become the focus of analysis, other elements, possibly also important, are ignored. The danger here is two-fold. First, the analyst in his enthusiasm or naivety might mistake the ideal-type for reality, and as a result slight other possible interpretations as to why an actor behaved as he did, simply because the facts necessary to the alternative interpretation were not highlighted by the typology. The theory underlying the typology is not the only or total theory of human behavior. Second, the analyst blinded by ideal-types might mistakenly force actors into types when a thorough awareness of and investigation of the complex characteristics of their behavior might cast doubt as to whether they should have been classified as they had been.

Barber, it appears, has committed just the latter mistake. By fitting his subjects into certain types in his enthusiasm for demonstrating the explanatory power of his typology, he has oversimplified and consequently misperceived their actions. Hargrove again observes:

In my judgment neither Coolidge nor Eisenhower belongs here (in the passive-negative type). Both were much more politically ambitious than Barber admits. Coolidge in particular was possessed by political ambition. His passivity seems to have been a deliberate style of leadership designed to draw support. Eisenhower actually seems very close to an active-positive. His personality was much freer of kinks than that of Truman; one can find in him no lack of self-esteem and very few, if any, instances of ego-defensive behavior. He was certainly not as
active and energetic a political leader as the active-positive Presidents described by Barber, but this may have been due to Eisenhower's conception of the office, a role requiring restraint, rather than of basic personality. Barber frankly admits that Eisenhower is the most difficult of Presidents to classify, but we are left with his feet dangling over several boxes in the typology. 37

Barber's typing of John Kennedy as an active-positive is a blatant distortion of reality in its simplification. Bruce Miroff takes offense to Barber's notions of Kennedy's healthy personality; 38 Miroff provides much documentation as to Kennedy's narrowness of world-view, his desire for greatness, and his consequent need to move from crisis to crisis—a pattern which Barber insists is characteristic of the active-negative.

The active-positive is supposed to learn from his experiences, avoiding "rigidity" in thinking. Yet there is doubt as to how much Kennedy really learned from the Bay of Pigs as seen in his handling of the Cuban missile crisis. 39 The option of a non-response, that is taking no action against the missiles, was almost totally ruled out from the start. 40 Kennedy's preoccupation with action, vigor, toughness, pragmatism, and America's mission in the cold war 41 is inconsistent with the open-mindedness and lack of rigidity that is expected of an active-positive.

Barber's reliance on private statements by Kennedy indicating his intentions to de-escalate the war after the 1964 election is a strained effort to explain away Kennedy's
Southeast Asian commitment. The fact is that Kennedy helped escalate military action there and took few, if any, actions to reverse this commitment.

And even if Kennedy had been fairly serious about his intent to withdraw there would have been little to differentiate him from other presidents, such as Johnson and Nixon, on this score. As Daniel Ellsberg has so poignantly shown, all presidents believed that "Now is not the right time to withdraw;" there was always another election to wait for. And on one final score Kennedy's promise must be criticized: if he saw the war as a mistake, how moral was it to allow more and more Asians and Americans to die while he waited out the next election? Yet, Barber has ignored all this evidence in shoe-horning a real Kennedy into an ideal-type.

The mistake that Barber has made with Kennedy, Coolidge, and Eisenhower—and the mistake that all typologists must avoid—lay with his failure to constantly realize that ideal-types, despite their neuristic value, are only a simplified version of reality. Hargrove again comments:

Perhaps the point is that "ideal types" must never be confused with individuals. We must pick and choose from the theory implicit in a typology as we seek to explain an individual, but he must be explained ultimately in his own unique terms. This is not to say that the propositions derived from an abstract typology and grouping of individuals are not helpful. They permit us to see common threads in different persons...

The great risk in a typology is that we will be lazy, relying on the type to explain the individual thereby distorting individuality...In fact, a typology is not a substitute for the very hard task of trying
to understand an individual and in the process trying to explain historical causation.43

We must be cautious, then, in how we use typologies. Recognizing the possibility of individuality, an actor should not be classified as fitting a general type unless the overwhelming direction of the evidence gathered is such that it mandates such action. In the case of Otto Festge, this clearly was not the case. Festge, as noted at the beginning of this section has behaved as an Entrepreneur, Integrationist, and Broker.

Festge's goal-oriented consensual approach in seeking to build an auditorium and in the matter of the finance department and the shortened bond terms fits nicely the Entrepreneur model. The lack of direction and the waffling the mayor exhibited on the 1968 school budget and parity matters would seem to indicate the presence of Brokerage and even Caretaker elements in his leadership style. And in acting to avert the city's 1969 budget crisis and in finding a solution to the Murray Mall project acceptable to both area businessmen and the University, Festge took the Integrationist course of heading off exacerbative conflict that might lead to dissatisfaction with his role from developing. It is thus impossible to speak of one general Festge style; his approach varied with the issue.

The Festge case, as analyzed here, then, represents one possible way of avoiding the possible misuse of typologies.
Individuals, being complex creatures, are likely to have differing dispositions towards different issues. If such is the case, their means of approaching each issue can vary with the issue. As a political actor may fall into a different cell of a typology depending on what issue he is dealing with, it consequently makes sense to first type these actors on an issue by issue basis. Types describing an actor's style in general should be avoided unless the case by case analysis indicates a constant tendency for an actor to adopt one distinct political style.

The possibilities of case by case variation must be recognized. To observe an actor's general style is not to have discovered how this actor has approached or will approach each unique political situation.

THE CAUSATION OF STYLE ADOPTION

If a political actor's style can vary from issue to issue, how can we explain why the actor adopts a particular style on one issue and a different style on another issue? Otto Festge's adoption of his various styles can be explained by two factors: his different levels of goal orientations in each situation.

Entrepreneurship emerges only in situations where a mayor has definite objectives in mind. The mayor must have a clear policy or program goal before assembling a broad overarching coalition becomes a sensible strategy. Brokership would be a
less time and energy consuming consensual strategy for maintaining a mayor's standing than is Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is worth the additional costs to a mayor only if he is not content to pursue only those policies that have pre-existing consensual backing.

Festge had specific policy objectives in mind in three of the issues previously discussed—he wanted a Wright auditorium, preferably at Monona Terrace; he wanted the terms of city bonds reduced from twenty to ten years; and he wanted rationalized the structure of the city departments concerned with finances. And it was in each of these that an Entrepreneurial approach emerged. In each situation Festge used whatever formal and informal resources were at his disposal to try to establish the broadest support for each of these projects and programs.

When a mayor's goal orientation subsides, so correspondingly does his tendency to adopt the Entrepreneurial approach. Such is the case where a mayor must choose between conflicting goals. If the mayor cannot choose he either becomes immobilized and lets other actors determine the outcome of events, or, alternatively, he starts rolling with the punches with whichever side happens to be exerting the strongest influence at the moment. The latter was the case in the 1968 school budget, where Festge "flip-flopped" his positions at one point as a result of the tensions between his tax suppressant and educational advocacy orientation.
The East Side Hospital case is another example of where conflicting mayoral goals inhibited the mayor from taking any clear action. Festge was at once both sympathetic to East Siders, who demanded the construction of a hospital on their side of town, and aware of the possibility that existing hospitals in the central city and near West Side could adequately continue to serve the East Side making the construction of a new facility an expensive luxury. Festge's mixed feelings on the subject was seen in his desire to have a private or religious organization build the facility, rather than having the city get involved in hospital construction. When the unlikelihood of private action became apparent, Festge appointed a committee of hospital administrators and doctors to choose an appropriate site—and apparent Entrepreneurial means of gaining public legitimacy for the project. Festge's leadership even extended to the actual acquisition of a site. But it was here in the latter part of his first term that the project stalled as Festge began to look upon finances as the city's number one problem—a problem which adversely affected the city's ability to build a new hospital.

The Murray Mall controversy is still another instance where Festge's approach was non-entrepreneurial as he lacked specific objectives of his own. His intervention in the matter was a response to the demands of the area merchants; the mayor was reactive. Acting in Integrationist fashion, the mayor sought a solution—the expansion of the scope of the
project—that was fairly satisfactory to both sides, and would thus prevent the exacerbation of disintegrative conflict. In order to maintain his standing with both University officials and the local businessmen, a way had to be found to allow University expansion without freezing the merchants out of the area. Such prophylactic action helped preserve the mayor's stock of influence.

The second condition leading to a mayor's tendency to stray from the Entrepreneurial pattern of leadership—the presence of conflict and pressure—is most clearly seen in Festge's action in the school budget and parity issues; the mayor wavered when the pressure was on. Even in the auditorium issue where Festge's general approach was Entrepreneurial, elements of Brokership still emerge. Thus at one point Festge is willing to allow the auditorium committee to select a site outside Monona Terrace. Though Festge may have temporarily abdicated giving direction in the selection of a site, the mayor never abandoned his primary goal—the building of a Wright designed facility somewhere. And Festge's personal commitment on this issue was so strong that action in pursuit of his original goal—the construction of a Wright auditorium at Monona Terrace—was soon reasserted.

If conflict and pressure lead to a disinclination to employ the Entrepreneurial style, how can we explain why Festge generally adopted such an approach to the auditorium issue, where community polarization was quite evident? The
reason simply is that Festge's goal orientation was so strong that he continued to pursue his goal despite the political pressures he was subjected to. In determining when an actor will employ the Entrepreneurial style, then, well-defined goal orientations take precedence over the degree of conflict present. A motivated mayor will not be defrayed from pursuing his goal by countervailing forces; the mayor with doubt or insufficient motivation, however, will falter.

No political actor, it appears, can adopt an Entrepreneurial approach to all issues. The Entrepreneurial approach to an issue requires a definite sense of purpose as well as the commitment of a good deal of the politician's time, energy, and other power resources in the pursuit of the desired goal. But a mayor, as is true of all politicians, has only a limited "stock" of time, energy, and other power resources. All issues cannot be given Entrepreneurial attention and investment of resources. With his major efforts concentrated in these select areas, other issues will be subjected to relatively less initiative, supervision and mayoral direction. Consequently it is a misnomer to describe a politician as an Entrepreneur. A meticulously correct description must be much more limited; a politician is an Entrepreneur only so far as issues X, Y, and Z are concerned. Issues A, B, and C are of less personal interest to him, and Entrepreneurship fades.
TYPOLOGIES AS PERCEPTUAL LENSES

If a misrepresentation of reality results when we try to force the individual into the ideal-type, how then should typologies be properly used? One way, which has already been pointed out, is to type an individual according to his actions and orientations in each separate issue area. Only if a pattern of action is repeated across a number of areas can a type be reasonably applied to describe an actor's general leadership style.

One other proper employment of a typology would be in its use as a perceptual lens. In a typology of leadership styles the ideal types represent model strategies which an actor might possibly adopt in particular cases. The different types then give the analyst different frameworks by which to order into a sensible pattern the actions he actually observes. There is no necessarily one "right" lens to be used to explain each particular case. The use of different lenses puts the actions of the individual in different lights; alternative—sometimes competing, sometimes complementary—plausible explanations of behavior can then be established.

Types then should be used as a means of gaining insight into a person's actions in a particular case; the different types can be employed or discarded in each separate issue area according to their apparent ability or inability to explain observed events. No attempt should be made to force the
individual to "fit" a particular lens; his actions may better be explained by the use of another type. Very seldom, if ever, will the use of any type of lens totally explain an individual's behavior in all instances.

Graham Allison has successfully employed three different perceptual models to explain the actions of both the Soviets and the Americans during the Cuban missile crisis. Similarly, Theodore Marmor has relied upon Allison's models in order to derive explanations of why Medicare took the shape it did. None of the three models provides the definitive answer to the question as to why the Soviets or Americans acted as they did, or why Medicare took the final shape it did when it did; but each of the models does make its own contribution to explanation and analysis:

The three models are obviously not exclusive alternatives. Indeed, the paradigms highlight the partial emphasis of each framework—what each magnifies and what it leaves out. Each concentrates on one class of variables, in effect, relegating other important factors to a ceteris paribus clause. The models can therefore be understood as building blocks in a larger model of the determinants of outcomes.

Just as Allison used three models to build an understanding of international relations, the nine types entailed in the typology of mayoral styles listed in Chapter One (Table 1) can be used as perceptual lenses in aiding our comprehension of mayoral actions. Each of the ideal types represents a simplified model of mayoral action; each assumes that a mayor will act consistent with assumptions concerning a certain level of
goal orientation, task accomplishment and coalition maintenance. All that remains is focusing each model on actual events and determining how well it orders the actions observed.

A political head's actions must be viewed through all the lenses in order to see what contribution each can make—or, to put it another way, what fragments from each style a mayor has fused together in his own particular style. Festge's actions on the auditorium controversy will serve as a brief case in point. Four models—the Ceremonial, Caretaker, Personality/Individualist, and Ideologue—clearly provide little clue to Festge's behavior as concerns the auditorium issue. Festge clearly did not confine his activities to ceremonial duties on the provision of basic city service. Furthermore, Festge's willingness to compromise and to work with committees is inconsistent with the "lone-wolf" style of operations of the maverick or Ideologue.

The use of the Executive model focuses on the mayor's reliance on his formal powers to control the city bureaucracy. This model would tend to focus on the tactics Festge used to control the Parks Commission, Plan Commission, and the Public Works Department. It underscores a valuable but only a partial approach that Festge took to the auditorium issue; his means of gathering support far surpassed the simple mobilization of his executive resources.

The Partisan is willing to do battle for his cause. But
as Festge exhibited a great unwillingness to do battle, always choosing to compromise to gain consensual action instead, the Partisan model has limited applicability here. Only in the final days of his administration, when he finally realized that he either had to fight or lose his last chance to get the project through, did Festge start to battle for his auditorium. But with only so few days left in office, Festge lacked the ability to apply sanctions on the aldermen on behalf of his auditorium.

It is two of the broad based coalition models that best explain Festge's actions on the auditorium issue as Festge operated almost totally from the perspective of consensus. When this concern for consensus was accompanied by strong goal orientations the result was Entrepreneurship. When in the midst of constant political difficulty, the mayor's will sometimes faltered the result was a temporary emergence of Brokership, with the initiative passing to others. There did not seem to be any particular instance where Festge clearly offered an Integrationist solution to avoid disintegrative conflict--the reason for this was that the mayor was not content to act to simply preserve his power, but had a definite project goal in the building of an auditorium which determined his course of action.

The spurious depiction of Festge generally as a political Entrepreneur was avoided by examining his actions in a number of issue areas through the careful application of each of the
perceptual models. If the analyst carefully transposes each of the ideal types on the reality, he cannot but note the possible variations in an actor's style, not only from one issue area to another, but even within a particular issue area.
William Dyke and Otto Festge were two totally different types of mayors. Festge was a liberal, long-time Democrat, who came to the mayoralty only after considerable executive experience in county government. Dyke, in contrast, was an attorney active in conservative Republican circles; the mayoralty was the first really important public office Dyke held. Whereas Festge had the image of being an "old pol," Dyke gave the appearance of being a citizen in politics.

In 1965 Dyke sprang out of virtual obscurity on the Madison scene by finishing third in the mayoral primary. Two years later, "Dyke plunged into the race at the last minute noting that no one else had come forward"¹ to take on incumbent Otto Festge. This time Dyke sharply defined his image, making Festge's tax raises the major issue of the campaign. To the surprise of most Madison observers, Dyke almost won—he missed by a bare 62 votes!

In 1969, with Festge stepping down under the pressure of the tax issue, Dyke took on liberal Alderman and prominent local Democrat Robert (Toby) Reynolds, Jr. Again the issue was taxes, with Dyke relentlessly attacking the Festge administration as "the four most expensive years in Madison's history."² Though formally nonpartisan, Madison's elections have exhibited a fair degree of bifactionalism. Dyke had Republican support and the endorsement of the conservative
Reynolds countered with the support of Democratic and labor groups and the endorsement of the liberal *Capital Times*, but he also bore the onus of the taxpayer's reaction to Festge. Dyke won easily, with his best support coming from the city's wealthier areas on the West and far East sides.

The new mayor's major assets were his good looks, speaking ability (he had once hosted a children's television show), and a personality with which he could charm anyone if he chose to do so. Dyke was also a man of great political ambitions who had his eye on the governorship—he eventually received the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1974, despite his defeat a year and a half earlier in his bid for a third mayoral term.

Dyke saw his term in office as a chance to make Madison "unique among cities." His overall policy preferences were strongly conservative. He sought to run city government as efficiently as possible, to impose a tight management system on municipal operations, to restrain the city from engaging in costly activities which he saw to be clearly in the domain of the private sector, and to make Madison a morally decent place in which to live—the latter priority as born witness to his highly visible actions directed against the city's "go-go" joints. Dyke envisioned Madison, with its physical beauty and government and university resources, becoming a very special model city—"a city of culture, and not culture from the
standpoint of being willing to call 'garbage-can-art' art." Dyke was not a passive executive content simply to run what existed in Madison as efficiently as possible; he was an active mayor who sought to reorient the functionings of city hall in a manner consistent with his conservative policy preferences.

But just as important as his policy orientations was the mode of operation Dyke sought to bring to the mayor's office. Dyke rejected what he labeled Festge's "government by good guy" style of governing:

My motivation was that I felt Otto Festge was an inept administrator as county clerk...and while he was effectively functioning (as mayor) in the old-fashioned county manner—that is of basically secret meetings, connivances, log-rolling, and so on—he had an almost total inability to move a community in almost any political direction at all. Dyke, in contrast, would not try to be everybody's friend. Instead, he ran the city in a very business-like hierarchical manner with the mayor clearly established at the top—not at the center of intersecting circles of competing groups. Bill Dyke was not a compromiser or negotiator; he was not this sort of "professional" politician.

Bill Dyke's term as mayor, 1969-73, spanned some very tense and difficult years for Madison—the days of the student turbulence in the University community which had its roots in the growing dissatisfaction with the American course of action in Southeast Asia. The turbulence was a nation-wide phenomenon that Madison began to suffer before Bill Dyke
became mayor. Yet, as will be shown throughout the chapters on Dyke, the mayor by his actions did much to add to the atmosphere which prevailed in Madison during this period. And in two instances in particular (the Mifflin Street disorders discussed in Chapter Six), it was the mayor himself who chose a course of action that could only have increased the likelihood of precipitating disorder.

Some observers of Madison politics attribute the mayor's actions totally to his supposed "malevolence." Bill Dyke was vehemently detested not just by Madison's sizeable leftist and student community but by many of Madison's traditional liberal Democratic elements as well. Yet, it is too simple a theory to blame Bill Dyke's actions on his being "evil." Such an interpretation of Dyke's actions must rest on detailed psychohistory to establish the personality roots of his self-righteous, combative style.

Such psychological theorizing will not be attempted here. Rather an alternative, somewhat complementary, explanation of Dyke's actions will be offered--namely, that Dyke was a person who reduced government to a set of fundamental beliefs; he ordered all his actions strictly according to these beliefs. Dyke very "puristically" would not compromise his principles to gain support of others. In short, Dyke was an Ideologue.

This chapter begins with a recounting of the mayor's actions as pertains to the city's acquisition of the bus company. Dyke, it will be observed, was a mayor with well
defined goals who, reluctant to compromise his beliefs, avoided almost every measure of coalition building.

The latter section of this chapter will more fully detail Dyke's ideology and then use this ideology to explain his actions in the bus controversy. The chapter will conclude with some observations on the sources of political purism and the necessity of positing an ideological analytical framework.

HOW TO ENTER THE BUS BUSINESS?

The initial moves by the city to purchase the privately owned Madison Bus Company came during Otto Festge's term in office. A 62-day bus driver's strike in 1967 was ended only after the negotiation of a new wage pact which included a promised $65,000 subsidy from local merchants to cover one year's cost of the new agreement. With the bus company, which during the strike had threatened to dissolve itself, apparently nearing the end of private operations, the city began preparations for its entrance into the bus business.

Two referenda in the spring of 1968 authorized the city to buy and operate a public bus system and to issue bonds for that purpose. In June, the city secured an option to buy the company by November of the next year at a cost not exceeding $910,000. The city chose the option route rather than immediate purchase in order to gain the time necessary to obtain federal aid to defray the costs of both acquiring the system and the purchase of much needed modern equipment. To keep the
buses running in the meantime, the city agreed to subsidize the costs of service until the time it actually took over operation.

When Bill Dyke assumed the mayoralty, he saw the matter of the bus system purchase as a question of prudent economics:

I didn't want to buy it. Period...No governmental function has ever been carried out as well or as economically as that function, if possible to be carried out in the private sphere, is carried out in the private sphere of enterprise...And I think it's being proven true in the bus system (in Madison) today (1975).

This jerk from the University (Professor William Dodge, Festge's chairman of the City Bus Utility Commission and a municipal bus ownership proponent) had the colossal deceit to stand in front of the Council on television in Madison and tell the people that if they would buy the bus system, the deficits will shortly disappear...That was not true then and he knew it. And it's been proven not to be true.

Dyke's clashes with Dodge were quite public at the time of the controversy. The mayor once even walked out of a public hearing just as the professor was about to speak.9

One of the conditions for receiving federal funds was the requirement that the bus company employees be no worse off as a result of city acquisition of the company. But negotiations of the necessary agreement between the city and the Teamsters local were halted for the three months after the mayor took office.10

In mid-August, Dyke touched off a furor in the City Council by announcing his intention to "split" the city's federal aid application into two parts. The mayor proposed
submitting an aid application for the purchase of thirty-six new buses which would then be leased by the city to the company, while detaining action on the application for the funds for city acquisition of the company. Dyke's motives behind the move were two-fold. First, he saw the purchase of the thirty-six buses to be a matter of basic management principles:

In management you don't let yourself be faced with the possibility of having all your equipment going out of date at the same time. And that's what this company was faced with...Let's say seventy-five per cent of their equipment was out of date. If we had followed the purchase outlines of Otto (Festge) and then (Acting) Traffic Director John Bunch...we would have found by buying all the new equipment at once that it all would have been phased out at once. And that's a situation you want to avoid.11

And second, there was a matter of economics. Dyke wanted to "buy the city time--cheap time--to explore the alternatives which the previous city administration refused to admit even existed."12

And furthermore, I was still hopeful...that we would be permitted by the federals to acquire it (the bus company) in an alternate fashion...You see, this was a distress sale...You don't pay top dollar in a distress market. You don't pay top dollar in liquidation. They didn't have any other buyer...That's ridiculous!13

Among the alternatives which Dyke was then considering were the establishment of a multi-year subsidy arrangement to the Madison Bus Company, and the bringing to the city of another bus company to provide service to Madison.14 And if Madison was to be eventually forced into the bus business the mayor hoped the possible availability of alternative providers of
mass transit would at least give the city the bargaining leverage to buy out the private company at the lowest price possible.

The mayor's attempt to split the aid application effectively killed any chance by the city to purchase the bus system during that calendar year. The Council's liberals reacted with outrage, not only to the details of the proposal, but to the mayor's apparent unilateral decision on the matter—the setting of a course of action without first asking Council approval. Already estranged from Dyke as a result of his handling of the Mifflin Street disorders in the University area, the Council liberals felt no real need to constrain their fury on the bus situation. Newspaper stories intimating that Dyke would not comply with Council resolutions directing him to pursue all elements of the application and apply for a letter of non-prejudice—which, though it did not commit the city to the purchase, would still reserve federal money for the city even if the city purchased the bus company before the grant was approved—brought the mayor the appellations of "Great White Father," and "Big Daddy" from anti-Dyke alderman Harold Klubertanz.¹⁵

Dyke soon relented on the matter of the letter of non-prejudice. In the intervening week, the stockholders in the bus company voted to dissolve the company by November.

At the end of August, Dyke proposed to keep the company in business by offering a new three-year subsidy—with a
guarantee $1040 instead of the existing $1050 in revenue for every $1000 in expenses of the bus company, city purchase of thirty-six new buses to be leased to the company, and the placement of one city representative on the Bus Company's five man Board of Directors. The Council modified the Dyke proposal significantly, limiting the subsidy to one year and giving the city the option to buy the company at any time during the year. The Council, in contrast to Dyke, had chosen to keep the door open to immediate acquisition of the system upon receipt of federal funds. The Bus Company rejected the modified proposal.

On a fifteen to five vote the Council directed the mayor to negotiate a six month continuation of the subsidy arrangement to be followed by city purchase contingent upon approval of the federal aid application. Articles in both the city's newspapers reported that Dyke by this time had finally accepted the inevitability of the city going into the bus business. But the mayor was still searching for alternatives to outright city acquisition of the system as he felt the company was not worth $910,000, the top price the Council authorized. In order to increase his bargaining leverage over the price, the mayor consequently raised the possibility of the city buying its own buses and setting up its own transport system. But this option was soon foreclosed, not only by the Council's refusal to go along, but by the conditions of the letter of no-prejudice which specified that federal funds
could only be used for the purchase of the existing bus company and not for the starting of a totally new municipal bus system.\textsuperscript{18}

Haggling over the purchase price began. The company asked for $860,000, and eventually the city countered by offering $775,000. The mayor, then, chose a totally new tactic. Rather than continuing to bargain over outright purchase, Dyke advocated the city's purchase of merely a controlling interest in the company from its stockholders:

And if it fell to circumstances at a future time that the government should acquire the (bus) system, then there was a better way to do it than we did, and one that could have been accomplished from one-third to one-half less than what we paid. And that would have been through acquiring it in a freely traded manner by buying stock in the thing until we had fifty-one per cent—which was effective operational control. And that could have been accomplished for from $350,000 to $500,000. I was, at the time the Council stampeded the purchase, in court to force the company to give me the names of the owners of shares so the city could put together a tender offer to acquire the shares at a stated dollar price so that we could have controlled what we paid for that monstrosity... (But) the court refused to order, in timely fashion, the company to disclose to us the names of its shareholders so that we could make tender for purpose of purchasing the shares. The court was wrong and we were prepared to appeal it... (But) the Council was stampeding the purchase.\textsuperscript{19}

Not only would the tender offer have likely saved the city money on the purchase price, but by keeping the company private, it would have eliminated the necessity under federal purchase regulations of the city's negotiating an agreement with the Teamsters union—a labor agreement whose advantageous terms would likely have escalated the demands of other
municipal labor unions.

In November of 1969 the Council voted to offer $820,000 for purchase of the bus company, at the same time averting a threatened driver's strike by underwriting a new wage agreement for the next six months. In April of the new year, the bus company exercised the option given under the pact thereby committing the city to the purchase of the system. In order for the city to be eligible for federal funds the position of the bus system's employees could not be worsened as a result of municipal takeover. Federal regulations thus required the negotiation of a new agreement between the city and labor specifying the exact wages and benefits of the drivers. Only negotiation of this "section 13-C" agreement between the city and the bus drivers stood as a final obstacle to city acquisition of the system. As noted by Dyke assistant and city bargaining team member Peter Dohr, the negotiations centered essentially around the question of driver's benefits:

"13-C" effectively meant that we had to obtain the consent of the local union, the Teamsters Union, which was run at that time by Donald Eaton. If the application by the city was not agreed to by the labor union, then the Department of Labor would not be able to get public funding...There was a lot of discussion as to whether they (the bus company employees) would be worse off after take-over. Then you get into a lot of discussion about trade-offs. If they had to drop the private pension plan, what do you equalize that with?...Don Eaton (the Teamsters negotiator) of course took the position that it (the city's pension plan) was not as good as the private plan. Our position was "of course it's as good. In fact it's better. So you aren't any worse off." But they had the ultimate say--"they" being Don Eaton and the Department of Labor. And of
course the Department of Labor is not a disinterested party. They are not going to support the city of Madison which was in the management position.\textsuperscript{20}

The Teamsters and the city bargaining team had already reached a tentative agreement with the help of federal mediation in Washington. But despite Dohr's recommendation, Dyke refused to support it.

Dyke's objections to the agreement primarily concerned two provisions.\textsuperscript{21} First, the mayor objected to the "New Orleans Clause" which obligated the city to pay four year's salary to any driver terminated by the city. Dyke believed the clause severely restricted the city's ability to manage the system. The necessity of paying four year's wages to terminated employees effectively foreclosed the alternative of the city's leaving the bus business altogether--a route Dyke felt to be a future possibility--if bus operations proved too heavy a burden on the tax rate. The mayor further felt the clause both laid the city open to unknown possible costs and set a precedent for other municipal unions to demand equivalent job security. Second, Dyke believed that the agency shop and right-to-strike provisions of the agreement were actions forbidden to municipal employees under state law--despite the requirement of Federal regulations that the position of the drivers not be worsened by the take-over.

The mayor's strategy at this point was to avoid signing 13-C until he could obtain a ruling from the Secretary of Labor of the United States that the city had bargained away
more than it had to in the agreement, thereby opening the door to a modification of the pact. Considering the uncertainty of receiving federal bus aid at that point, the mayor's move in bypassing an agreement already negotiated ran the risk of jeopardizing the city's hopes of receiving any bus aid at all.

On May 1 the city formally purchased the bus company, making special note that the bus drivers would still be considered private workers. The next week the labor agreement was approved by the Council. All that was left was for the mayor to sign 13-C and federal funds would be on the way.

But Dyke refused. City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled that Dyke's signature was in effect "largely a ministerial act" as the mayor had lost his chance to veto the agreement when he signed the Council minutes which included a resolution ordering him to sign.\textsuperscript{22} Dyke still refused to sign--a move which brought the charge from the Council's pro-bus faction that he was playing "a risky game of brinksmanship" with federal funds.\textsuperscript{23}

The dispute dragged on. In October, a communication from the Department of Labor recommended that the mayor give "strong consideration" to signing the agreement.\textsuperscript{24} Yet, Dyke remained adamant, not only in refusing to sign 13-C but also in refusing to approve the purchase of thirty-six new buses in the interim, two-thirds of which cost was to be paid by the federal government.

The period was one of "undisguised hostility"\textsuperscript{25} between
the Council and the mayor, marked by vitriolic Council meetings filled with shouting and sarcasm, threats by individual aldermen as well as by the Teamsters to launch legal action against the mayor, and even momentary moves to have the Council President sign the agreement in his capacity as acting mayor whenever Dyke left the city's limits. Many Council members, including Mifflin area Alderman Paul Soglin, believed the mayor's stall on 13-C to be an attempt "to do everything he could to tie up successful purchase of the bus company."26

Finally, in January of 1971, Dyke was able to announce he had at last succeeded in receiving word from the Department of Labor that the labor agreement the city had negotiated was indeed "excessive:"27 "It wasn't until last week that the department owned up to the fact that we gave away more than we had to."28 But the impact of Dyke's coup was mitigated by the almost simultaneous revelation that the city, as a result of the prolonged delay in submitting an application, had been taken off the priority list of potential bus aid recipients. The city as a result of the mayor's delay, it appeared, had lost any chance of getting aid until the next fiscal year, if then, at the earliest.

The day after the city's loss of priority status, acting Transportation Director John Bunch, a man who entertained a long-standing feud with Dyke, revealed that Department of Treasury officials in Washington privately admitted they could find the money if only the mayor would sign 13-C.29
Dyke, for his part, dispatched two representatives to Washington to find out both exactly where the agreement had exceeded the guarantees that had to be given to the bus drivers and whether or not federal funding was still somehow available.

The next day, the conservative Wisconsin State Journal, which until that point had been for the most part supportive of Dyke, ran an editorial urging the mayor to sign 13-C. The editorial noted the mayor's reasons "have not been convincing," citing specifically his objections to the New Orleans clause: "The mayor has reservations about the clause which protects the jobs of bus employees in the event that the city goes out of the bus business, which is highly unlikely--Madison needs a bus system." 30

Finally on January 19, nearly eight months after the city officially purchased the bus system, Dyke signed a revised 13-C agreement worked out in Washington; the city was at last eligible to receive $1.4 million in aid for the purchase of the bus company and new equipment. Though the mayor claimed that the "new" agreement eliminated "key obstacles," 31 only three changes had actually been made. 32 The provisions of the agreement were limited to employees hired not more than one year after final delivery of the buses procured under the federal grant. This provision drastically reduced the city's potential liability, as the previous agreement covered employees hired at any time in the future. Second, the city
was explicitly given the right to lay off workers for economic reasons, such as a decline in ridership. The anti-Dyke *Capital Times* claimed the Teamsters made no objection to this provision as it was already written into another part of the agreement.\(^3\) Third, the revised agreement added a clause guaranteeing the Teamster "the maximum form of union security (not to exceed the union shop presently existing) permitted by state or federal law."

The changes, with the possible exception of the first, were quite minor. Teamsters leader Donald Eaton even claimed that the "maximum job security" provision left the union better off than under the original agreement. Referring to the spring mayoral primary, which was only six weeks off, Eaton also freely gave his opinion as to why Dyke finally signed: "But I think the fact that he's decided to run again must have something to do with that."\(^3\)\(^4\) By signing, Dyke had defused his opponent's most potent campaign issue.

Postscript. Three days before the spring election, Dyke's campaign manager revealed that he had received word "on good authority" that the city's application for bus aid would be fully funded. The announcement received front page newspaper coverage, with *The Capital Times* running it under the sarcastic headline "U.S. Bus Aid News 'Arrives' In The Nick of Time."\(^3\)\(^5\) Dyke's opponent charged the mayor with using "shoddy political tactics in now trying to take credit for something he's fought against during his entire term in
office." Dyke easily won the election.

THE IDEOLOGY OF AN IDEOLOGUE

Separation of Powers. As was typical of his leadership style in general, William Dyke was extremely goal-oriented in his handling of the bus issue. Dyke's antagonism to municipal acquisition of the bus system was the product of both his conservative philosophical belief in limited government, and his view of the unsuitability of mass transit systems in general for cities like Madison:

We still have systems on a national level which are center-focused. In other words, riders get on at the edge of town and ride to the center...of the city. If you know anything about the topography of Madison, this is not a center-focused employment city. We have at least five destinations which are the primary work destinations. And...the private sector has already made the decisions that affect the functioning of our municipalities--and that is to decentralize.

Our cities are in the main, nationally, dispersed and decentralized. You will not effectively serve a city like Los Angeles and Madison, Wisconsin, with a pattern of center-focused transportation...

The people opted for low density building...Now you don't effectively serve that low density population with buses on static runs--lumbering, overblown dinosaurs which wander through our streets, and which really, for the most part, operate with maybe one or two passengers over several miles of route...

Now, our choice today is should we deny people other alternatives for whatever name or reason, and thereby become a more oppressive governmental system, even though in the process we say we are serving a desirable end? All tyrants say they serve a desirable end. And my fear is the fear of government and the tyranny of it.
Dyke attempted to delay as long as possible city purchase of the system and tried to gain consideration of such alternatives to municipal acquisition as the city's leasing of new buses to the then operating company or the city's bringing in a new private firm to operate a transit system. When municipal ownership became inevitable, the mayor sought to acquire controlling interest through a stock tender rather than outright purchase to keep the city's transit costs to a minimum. He delayed signing the 13-C agreement, if not to jeopardize the purchase entirely, to attempt to keep the city's liability to a minimum and maintain its management prerogatives in the future should the city decide to terminate or severely restrict a fiscally burdensome service.

But a paradox must here be explained. On the one hand, Dyke took many extreme goal-oriented actions, such as his refusal to sign an agreement he would not formally veto which miffed his opponents. Yet, he also refused to take many of the relatively costless actions which most political actors engage in to build support for their programs. Dyke frequently absented himself from, or walked out of, City Council meetings. He refrained from any sort of social lobbying. Dyke simply refused to engage in coalition building. In part this was the result of personal distaste for such "political" activity. But a more complete understanding of why he chose to take the actions he did and spurn others in the pursuit of his policy goals requires an understanding of
his view of government—his political ideology.

Dyke held an adamant view of separation of powers. He ordered all his actions as mayor according to his belief that the most strict distinction between the functions of the executive and the legislative must be observed if government is to avoid unwise action. Dyke in essence was a believer in a most extreme form of Madisonian democracy—a separation of powers so complete that it allowed no cooperation between the various branches of government:

I had a continual battle with the City Council, by both accident and perhaps by design. But I frankly committed very little to the process of log-rolling or the playing of the legislative game. And I want to add this degree of explanation.

I believe I understand the checks and balances system of government. And I believe that under this model of government the executive should stay out of the legislative function. I tried to permit myself a doorway out of the legislative function. The mayor has a responsibility to initiate and reflect upon legislation that has been passed. I do not believe that can be done effectively when you are part of the legislative process. I think the initiation end of it can be done without much damage, because I think that is part of an executive responsibility—to propose. But I do not feel that when the executive participates in the debate, participates in the compromise, participates in all the events that lead to the compromise, can he then responsibly exercise the veto extensively. And I should have used it more often.

But I do not think it is consistent with a system of government that I understand that the legislative function be comingled with the executive function in a municipality the size of Madison... I think it's poor process and I tried to change it. I did it in a less than tactful fashion perhaps, but nevertheless there are times when a job in my opinion should be done and the tactics left to somebody else to interpret, maybe left to somebody else to evaluate. But I think that frankly there has been too much
temporizing in government, and I was more inclined to take the action necessary and worry about the consequences later in that particular frame. And the consequences...were harmful in the election (referring to his defeat in 1973 in a bid for a third term) and I'd do it again.38

The purist element of Dyke's style expressed by the mayor in the above quotation--his emphasis on moral duty, his disdain for compromise, and his choice of moral correctness over electoral victory--will be explored in a later section of this chapter. It is the rigidity of Dyke's self-imposed divorce from the legislative function--a philosophy which was never quite understood by the aldermen and which consequently only served to increase friction in an already polarized community--that is of immediate concern to us here.

Dyke's aloofness from the City Council--as witnessed by his constant absences and early departures from Council meetings--infuriated both members of the Council and others who expected the usual pattern of mayor-council cooperation in resolving problems on the city's behalf. One city hall reporter summed up Dyke's action as it appeared to him and most city hall observers, including members of the Council:

He (Dyke) stopped attending the (Council) meetings because he really thought they were a waste of time. The meetings were long (and)...emotional...(with) lots of arguments. I think his not attending was a way of saying, "I got a lot of better things to do than to go to these City Council meetings. I've got to run the city. I've got to be up in my office." Sometimes he would come down, show his head, and then go back up to his office--in the evening (during a Council meeting). You know, "I'm upstairs working on city business while the Council is fiddling."
That whole kind of approach was a calculated sort of technique.39

Dyke's divorce from Council proceedings was also quite evident in areas other than the bus controversy, as witnessed by the limited role he would allow for himself in the formulation of the school budget.

I attempted to provide information in a very limited fashion (to the Board of Estimates and the Joint Fiscal Control Group). In other words I did not sponsor forums for the aldermen. I did not call them in...I did not lobby it. I didn't try to and I would not again. That is a legislative function, and I accept it. But I spoke against it. And I tried to utilize the powers which I felt were within the executive range of powers to inveigh against it. And I did use the powers available to me on the Board of Estimates to cause the Board of Education to be put through its paces and to be questioned as closely as possible on some of the budgeting amounts...

It would not be consistent in my opinion with what my responsibilities were to bring aldermen in and sit with them in closed door sessions and lobby against the education budget. I did talk with aldermen and I never refused counsel with an alderman who sought to come in and talk about it. But I did very, very limited amount of initiating of any meetings on the education budget. I felt then and I feel now that those things are properly public discussions. And I caused them as much as possible to be public discussions...40

In the matter of school budgets, just as in the case of 13-C, Dyke extensively used only those "powers" such as public invective which he assumed to be the mayor's; he ignored those he saw to be the province of the legislature. Not administering his signature to an agreement, constant use of the veto (see Table 1), vehement questioning of the school superintendent, the use of public pronouncements to try to mobilize
### Table 1

Mayoral Use of the Veto in Madison  
(number of mayoral vetoes in four years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Number of Vetoes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Reynolds (conservative)</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>18 in four years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto Festge (liberal)</td>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>16 in four years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Dyke (conservative)</td>
<td>1969-73</td>
<td>47 in four years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the City Clerk  
Madison, Wisconsin
opinion—all these were part of a mayor's prerogative. But to work with the aldermen—that was another matter.

Dyke's self-imposed separation from the legislature meant that he made no attempt to pyramid his influence with that body. This failure is readily noticeable in the mayor's refusal to aid a conservative alderman friendly to Dyke in securing a desired project for his district:

Bill (Dyke) knew that I wanted that very bad...Bill knew the plan; he supported it; it would have been very easy for that to be in the budget when it comes out of the mayor's office. But his philosophy was, "If you want it, you can fight for it." So the budget came with a moratorium on it and I had to get the money...from the Board of Estimates and fight for it.

Politically, it would have been very easy for him (Dyke) to put the money in that time and get me beholden to him. That's just not the way he worked. Dyke was very moralistic. Council conservatives were not rewarded for being part of the team, but were expected to back the mayor solely because of the merits of his stance. Dyke was even-handed—politicising with the aldermen was avoided with both conservatives and liberals alike.

As would readily be expected, the mayor's conscious choice not to maximize his power potential with the Council at times wound up impeding his ability to gain the actions he desired. Even simple things could wind up backfiring, as the following recounting by a liberal alderman of a Council decision to reject the mayor's proposal to transfer the city parks system to the county underscores:
Dyke fancied himself as a strong executive. He had the idea that if he ran things with an iron hand that things would get done. And he forgot, I think, that he had to have vote on the Council. For example, he wanted to consolidate the parks systems in Dane County. He went around and discussed this with the chairmen of the other boards of the other municipalities and the village presidents. But when he introduced it to the Council, it was a bolt out of the blue. And of course the whole thing fell apart... If we had been able to lay some groundwork, the job could have been done.42

A simple failure to "lay some groundwork" with the Council, a process Dyke saw clearly not to be part of the executive function, led to a defeat which Dyke saw to be one of the major failures of his four years in office.43 And, as the mayor himself freely admits, public weariness over the constant intra-city governmental battles helps account for the city's turning him out after two terms in office.

But perhaps it is unfair to equate success with an electoral victory for Bill Dyke. Bill Dyke was not interested solely, or even primarily, in winning an electoral majority; he was more interested in issues. And even when it came to issues, he was willing to sacrifice winning if it meant foresaking his conception of democracy. Any theory that attempts to explain the actions of political heads solely in terms of a maximizing vote or any other benefit calculus will be totally unable to account for actors such as William Dyke. Bill Dyke's actions can only be understood by recognizing the ideology which underlay them.

Maximization of the Executive Function. The other side of the coin of Dyke's belief in the strict separation of the
powers of the legislature and the executive was the emphasis he placed on internal administration and management:

I early chose not to seek the bricks and mortar monuments to an administration. Otto Festge had no management concept at all. He didn't understand, or, if he did, chose not to utilize management systems...The debt had grown in similar fashion. And getting down to the base of all of it, the (number of) city employees grew from 1400 in his administration when he came in to 1800 when he was leaving.

So these are things I felt had to be controlled (by) developing a management system.44

In the concept of management, Dyke's ideology of separation of power and his belief in fiscal conservatism became fused. Dyke's management perspective was so all-embracing that by the end of his second term he even advocated that Madison return to a city manager form of government--a form which Madison briefly introduced in 1947 only to be repealed by a referendum four years later. The task of the executive, according to Dyke, was to be an administrator, not a politician.

The mayor's enthusiasm for management led to his support for the introduction of a Management by Objectives (MBO) program:

There was no management system at all prior to that (MBO). To me a system cannot function unless you know where you are and you know where you want to be. And in essence that's what MBO is. It gives those charged with management responsibility the opportunity to state their goals and compare them with the goals of elected officials, in this instance. It's an adaptation from private industry. It gives the elected official the opportunity to present his objectives--those things which he wishes to be filled...to those department heads responsible for carrying them out, and (to)
match them up with whatever department goals and responsibility might be.45

In his enthusiasm for MBO, Dyke's private sector perspective on the job of the mayor becomes readily apparent.46 Dyke tried to run the city just as any manager would run a business. Compromise and coalition-building were ignored.

Dyke's management orientation was not limited to his instituting of the MBO system. In fact, in contrast to the pattern of self-denial of powers that characterized the mayor's relationship with the legislature, Dyke aggressively utilized any power that he saw to be even marginally within the executive realm:

I believe very much in a strong mayor system...I think we have to understand that the American system is based on a very real jealousy of the power we extend to the executive. However, when one occupies the executive office and when one recognizes the job that has to be done, you do have that very human and very realistic need to utilize that power which in a gray area may or may not be yours...

What I am talking about in a philosophical or academic sense is the same pattern that is the argument between the strict construction of the Constitution and the more liberal construction of the Constitution...And I think an executive in government...has a tendency to use which powers are yours realizing in some areas there are some powers which are not well defined but which conceivably are part of and proper to the executive functioning. And in some cases they are utilized even though they may not be clear.47

Dyke's actions in the bus controversy can well be understood in light of his conception of management and "the executive functioning." It was his job as the chief executive of the city to, unilaterally if necessary, keep the city from
purchasing a bus system that would require future subsidization, or when that failed to acquire it in an alternate manner than that advocated by the Council. The timing of the purchase of the thirty-six new buses similarly was seen by Dyke to be a question of management—a good manager does not let all his stock go out of date at once. Likewise, the mayor saw 13-C to be a question of management "prerogative" and the powers allowed an executive in a democratic system:

The commitments 13-C carried with it were so, that you gave away...some very important prerogatives. You give away, as an example, powers over your employee workforce, so you were severely limiting your latitude of management to manage. You were also faced with vesting rights in the employee organization which continue for time immemorial and which I felt were properly subject to bargaining, but which were not properly subject of a condition to get federal funds.

Now it's a very wise move on the part of the Teamsters to have that included in the federal funding provisions and give them the right to veto any money that comes to your community. But it's damn poor systeming for government to give away those powers. And I believe it's an improper delegation as well. You can't give away to somebody else the powers which you are elected to fulfill...It isn't some employee organization which is accountable; it's the elected official. And if you're going to have a system of accountability in government, you can't give those powers away. And increasingly those powers are being given away. So you end up with this hydra-headed monster that we call government today, where no one is accountable for anything...

The ability to utilize equipment can be affected by that (13-C): the ability to terminate the system; the ability to terminate employees—all of these things are affected through 13-C.48

Dyke saw his refusal to sign the 13-C agreement to be one of those "powers" which falls in that "gray area" which a wise
mayor has a right to utilize. To Dyke, the power to withhold his signature from 13-C was similar to his prerogative to prepare an executive budget; these were prerogatives common to all executives that he had the right to utilize despite the fact that no mayor before him had done so:

All executives in government have the duty to sign the minutes and the right to call for them at the time they choose to sign them. So, I used a power which is inherent in the office. And simply because it was inherent in the office and they (the Council) couldn't get at it, it infuriated them. But that's what the governor does all time...49

Dyke chose the route of "non-signing" as opposed to the simpler option of a veto as the latter might have been over-ridden by a Council seemingly committed to the transit system purchase.50

In still another matter, and again to the outrage of Council members, Dyke saw it as his prerogative to order all city departments to keep secret all information concerning the preparation of the budget and to clear with him all requests they received for information—even those coming from councilmen.52 Dyke saw his attempt to "limit the dissipation of departmental activities" to be an administrative act which lay beyond the Council's domain.53 The mayor's efforts to run the city were put almost solely on administration: relations with the Council were consciously sacrificed.

Dyke sought to "start constructing those units which form the chain of command" which would report to the mayor.54 Management groups were developed which, according to the mayor,
met with him on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Yet, one city
department head, antipathetic to Dyke, observed:

We used to have staff meetings every week under
Mayor Dyke...Everybody was organized into groups
and we met all week long. The only common thread
throughout that whole thing was that the mayor was
never at any of them. They were always run by
somebody from his office. Staff meetings with top
level people without the mayor being there...they're
useless.55

The mayor's personal absences at these meetings represents a
failure on his part to maximize his influence even in the
realm of internal administrative matters. To this extent, the
mayor exhibited the Ideologue's lack of coalition building
even in the area of administration. Convinced of the correct-
ness of his own course of action, the Ideologue feels no need
to convince others to go along. He feels the merits of the
issue or the situation to be clear enough to insure coopera-
tion.

Occupying the top of the city's administrative hierarchy,
did not mean that Dyke interested himself in every problem.
In typical business fashion, he felt only issues of policy
deserved his attention: "I don't pay a guy $25,000 a year for
me to make their decisions."56 Thus, Dyke tried to a great
degree to make starkly clear who had responsibility for
handling what matters, as reported by one of the members of
his office:

He (Dyke) formalized relationships with department
heads. And I think, to his credit, he did a lot of
work in the area of driving down decisions to
departments--technical decisions which should have
really been made at the department level, which Otto (Festge) was more inclined to take on as his own responsibility. Bill did a lot more delegating than Otto had done...Something would come in (such) as a letter of complaint from a citizen and Bill would just buck it right down to the department head and make the department head make the decision.57

The contrast with Festge, who personally handled such citizen complaints, is evident. Dyke, for the sake of rationalizing the decision-making process in Madison, chose to forego the virtually "costless" opportunities to increase his stock of influence that handling of citizen complaints allowed.

Even in the way he ran his office, Dyke's managerial orientation is evident--this time in the adoption of "block time scheduling" from the private business world:

If you had asked me what my biggest problem was in office, my biggest problem was in controlling my schedule. You see, I believe in block time scheduling. I believe that the day can be divided... And during the course of my day I had certain times which were open times and certain times which were closed times (times in which the mayor was in conference or working by himself and not to be disturbed)...

But because I believed in block time scheduling, I tried to live by it. I tried to say, "Okay, if I'm in conference that means I don't take phone calls." I used to tell Time magazine, Newsweek, and all the rest of them to stuff it in their pipe, because I had time for them: "You could come to the press conference. It's Wednesday afternoon. I'll see you then. So long."

You see, if you can't control your schedule, you are not going to get your work done. Whether it's a conference or time for research or developing position papers--whatever it is I have to have time to do that. And when I'm working on those things, I can't get interrupted and get my job done. So on that basis, there was a stopper in the front hall.58
Once more, in typical purist fashion, it is the "style" that is important to Dyke. He "believes" in block time scheduling and this belief cannot be compromised. All interferences with the mayor's schedule, even those that would have built public or aldermanic support for his administration, were given the same amount of consideration—little.

This is not to say that people with problems could not see the mayor. Anyone, even many of the more liberal members of the Council, could. Arrangements, though, had to be made in advance. Nobody, but nobody simply dropped in on the mayor. From Dyke's point of view, this again was simply another of the prerogatives that any executive was entitled to:

And people also, after a few times, realized that it wasn't a matter of just strolling down the hall. We tried to run it how an office should be run. You don't expect to stroll down the hall into the governor's office...60

Other than complaints about not being able to immediately see the mayor, complaints about accessibility came mainly from a small group of the city's more liberal aldermen:

I couldn't have gotten no more through Bill Dyke's door unless I had a tank (sic). By the time I headed for his corridor, you had thirteen people jumping up and down saying, "Hey, you can't do that," and somebody on the phone saying, "Hey, somebody's coming in your office," and he'd be out the back door.61

Though a great deal of the blame for this breakdown of communication can be placed on Dyke's shoulders, a major part of it also belongs to the few aldermen who found this
polarization either ego-gratifying or constituent-satisfying the highly charged politics of the Vietnam era. Polarization is by definition a two-way street. As Dyke himself observed: "Most of those people were so tightly drawn, and they were pretty uptight about one, that I don't think they really wanted to talk with me. And frankly I preferred not to waste my time with them because they were timewasters." 62

Some readers may be misled by the mayor's emphasis of internal administration to conclude that Dyke's leadership style was that of an Executive, not an Ideologue. Yet, Dyke does not fit the description of the Executive in two important ways. First, he was not willing to engage in even the moderate degree coalition-building activity, both inside and outside administration, which characterizes the Executive. And second, the degree of Dyke's goal orientation was much greater than that expected of the Executive, who possesses a more limited sense of direction for his city.

Dyke's concentration on management activities springs from a conception of separation of powers which guided his actions in almost every area. Bill Dyke was not an Executive mayor, but an Ideologue who made management part of his ideology. 63
IDEOLOGUE AS PURIST

In their book *Presidential Elections*, Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky summed up the purist style as representing:

> a virtually complete privatization of politics. The private conscience of the leader—rather than his public responsibilities—becomes the focal point of politics. Internal criteria—possession of, devotion to, and standing up for private principles—becomes the standards of political judgment. Constituents disappear, and we are left with a political leader determining policy on the basis of compatibility with his private principles.64

The Ideologue, strongly motivated by his faith in his own convictions clearly privatizes politics. Coalition building by means other than exhortation and appeal to the correctness of the desired goal is spurned as a sacrifice of purity.

The following observations all underscore the purist elements of Bill Dyke's style:

Staunch pro-Dyke alderman:
"He (Dyke) had a very unpolitical attitude...He took his viewpoint as being the only correct viewpoint... He felt it was his job to exercise strong leadership and he wasn't going to obtain a consensus at all. If his position, he felt, was correct, he wasn't as concerned in bending it to make sure it would prevail..."

Member of the mayor's office:
"...he as an individual was convinced of the correctness of some of his concepts and his ability to stay by those, and that permeated all of his activities as mayor..."

City Hall reporter:
"Dyke was a very rigid, moralistic guy. One guy described him to me as an Old Testament Christian...He had really kind of structured view as to what was literally good for the city and what was bad...This vision of right and wrong, of black and white, pervaded everything he did."
Liberal alderman:
"His beliefs were very adamant...Unfortunately he just had no means to bend."

Moderate alderman:
"It had to be his idea his way...There was no compromising with Bill Dyke...He had 'I-itis'--I, I, I, I,--and the inability to compromise."

Dyke himself recognized that with his almost obsessive management orientation, he had passed up whatever opportunities might have existed to broaden his political base:

Certainly a major part of my responsibility as mayor was to install a management system where there was none. I wish it hadn't been so. I would have liked to have been...a mayor who had the opportunity and the time to really get out with the people in an on the job situation and be an effective communicator of what government is and what it can be. But this was not my privilege.

I could have played that game. And I think I could have played that game as well as anyone who occupied the office. But this was not my job as I saw it. I would have liked to have been that, as the communications aspect I permitted to go by by forfeiture. (sic)

In other words, I didn't even hire a PR man. My assistant (Bob Heck) was not a classical press secretary. The man before me had a press secretary from the day he went in and he had one the whole time he was there. The man after me had a press secretary. The man I hired as my assistant was a state trooper from Massachusetts whom I hired as a specialist in the criminal justice system, who didn't know zip about press relations, who was a good man.

Dyke's lack of orientation towards the press was seen not only in the appointment of an assistant with no prior experience, but also at one point during his administration, in his discontinuance of the holding of weekly press conferences. The mayor, though well at home with the televised
media, simply refused to maximize the influence such communications channels offered him.

Dyke's purity of belief, coupled with the polarized setting at the time, led the mayor to view his antagonists in the Council as a disreputable enemy and to even enjoy the conflict he engaged in:

I look back and have a feeling that by your enemies you shall be known. And I don't mind having the enemies I do...I believe that there are certain powers in the office which are there without definition (referring to his refusal to sign 13-C), and the fact that I saw some of them and utilized them to the advantage of the situation frustrated some of my opponents. They did plenty to frustrate me. And I look back on it and I'm not sorry I used that device.67

The combat between mayor and Council was conducted on a highly personal level. Instead of muting antagonisms with the Council and recouping some possible influence with the city's legislature Dyke moralistically chose to enflame the situation. Not only did Dyke publicly call some Council members a bunch of "dingalings," but he further insisted that his past experience as host on a children's television show had helped prepare him for his duties as presiding officer at Council meetings.68 Dyke's clashes with Council liberals, especially the four aldermen who had their roots in the student community, were particularly vehement, with the mayor even asserting at one point that Alderman Paul Soglin had "lost his mantle" as the "extremist leader" of the Council.69 Liberals returned the fire in kind with such jabs as labeling the mayor "Captain Kangaroo of City Hall."70
Dyke's purism is most evident in his unsuccessful bid for a third term, running against his primary antagonist, Paul Soglin. Refusing to campaign extensively and refusing to even show up at candidate forums until the closing weeks of the campaign, Dyke seemed to view the race not simply as an election to be won but a test of his personal beliefs:

You see, I felt this way, and this is dumb, and I know it, but it's (an election is) a test also of a political system. And I wanted to do that...One who's written a record...should be able...to stand for re-election without intensive campaigning. I found you can't. But I wanted to know. I happened to believe that should be the case.71

Even more than that, Dyke saw the election as representing the ultimate test--between good and evil, between the ideals represented by himself and those represented by Paul Soglin:

The basic question of this campaign is about the kind of community we want this city to be. I don't want to just let it fold into the mold of Berkeley (where a radical group had recently been victorious in local elections) or of the other cities that can't keep up with the 70's.72

I think what was at stake then was some of the questions of what will be the direction of the city. Shall we seek to impose by the actions of the people through government some standard which is simply above the lowest common denominator. That's what's involved.73

For Dyke the choice was self-evident on the merits of the case. Faced with a choice between right and wrong, people would choose the right way. Or, as he put it in his first campaign forum appearance in a remark which touched off a public furor, "I think there are enough decent people in this city, concerned with our future, that our campaign has a real
The oft-repeated "decent people" remark which alienated many undecided voters helped to defeat Dyke. Other factors at work were the dissatisfaction of many voters with the toll the polarization of Dyke's four years in office had taken, the fact that the mayor had reached the third term juncture, and the fortuitous inheritance by Soglin of an existing McGovern campaign organization looking for a new cause to fight.

Even in defeat, Dyke was typically purist: "We probably could have won if we'd been willing to change our beliefs. But I'd rather go down proudly fighting for what we believe." Having been rejected by the city on a pristine clear question, Dyke absented himself from the final Council meeting of his term from City Hall during the period between the election and Soglin's inauguration, and even from the inauguration ceremonies themselves.

Postscript. In 1976, conservatives upset at the lack of principled choice offered by the candidacies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter met in Chicago. Lester Maddox was chosen as the American Independent Party's presidential candidate; Bill Dyke was chosen as the vice-presidential candidate. Dyke's willingness to join this nascent issue-oriented party, stands as yet further testimony to his purist adherence to his beliefs and his ignoring of any pragmatic considerations.

Goal-Oriented Purism. While all Ideologues are purists not all purists are Ideologues. Jeffrey Pressman has
identified a mayor, Oakland's John Reading, who was purist without being goal oriented, at least in those areas that involved potential conflict. Reading's leadership style, as described by Pressman, appears to be that of Caretakership. But other than Reading's lack of a clear sense of direction and his distaste for conflict, his orientation toward politics is essentially that of Bill Dyke. Both mayors privatized politics, tending to "deal with problems in a moralistic way." Both were "private men in public office" who tended to take a "businessman's approach to politics," seeing problems in terms of "economics" and bringing "private and business standards" to city hall rather than as the interaction of competing groups within the city. Both also failed to pyramid whatever power resources they had available to them.

Both Reading and Dyke were purists. Yet only Dyke was sufficiently goal-oriented to be categorized an "Ideologue." Reading adept at conflict avoidance, was a Caretaker who provided his city with only limited policy direction.

THE NEED FOR AN IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

It is evident that the standard models of mayoral influence discussed in Chapter One, Brokership and Entrepreneurship, are totally incapable of explaining the actions of a political head such as Bill Dyke. The failure is not simply a matter that Dyke chose a non-consensual approach toward achieving his objective; there is a more basic failure in the
assumptions implicit in this framework. The Broker-Entrepreneur framework suffers from two major deficiencies, first, in its assumption that a political actor behaves "rationally," and second, in its definition of "rationality." As far as the first objection is concerned, many political actors do not behave rationally. People bring their psychic predispositions to their job with them. To fully understand their actions it becomes necessary to understand their personalities. Actors responding to their personality needs may act in a manner inconsistent with their attainment of any specific policy goal. A political head lacking self-assurance may refrain from engaging in any actions involving conflict whereas another may be compelled to take immediate action, even self-defeating action, in order to cover his own inner anxieties. The actions of mayors acting on such impulses cannot be accounted for by the Broker/Entrepreneur framework.

Though the Ideologue may have its roots in such psychological factors, no attempt has been made to explain in this chapter the actions of Bill Dyke in these terms. The author has chosen to forego this route as a matter of both personal disposition and a lack of psychological training. Consequently, it is the second objection that will be dealt with in the remainder of this chapter.

The Broker/Entrepreneur approach defines rationality in terms of re-election and power maintenance. The wise mayor chooses a consensual approach simply as the best means of
insuring his re-election. The Broker initiates no programs of his own as they might arouse hostile factions. The Integrationist proposes solutions only when necessary to head off exacerbated conflict which can potentially endanger his job or his influence. The Entrepreneur advances only those "safe" projects capable of gaining community-wide support.

But mayors such as Bill Dyke and New York's John Lindsay are not concerned solely with re-election. Though re-election is certainly of a high priority to them, they have other goals which cannot be sacrificed to the pragmatic necessities of electoral politics.

As such, any theory which seeks to explain political action in terms of a rational vote-getting calculus—whether it be winning re-election, or maximizing an electoral margin—cannot be applied to all political actors. Political actors who are willing to subordinate electability to an intense goal or issue orientation must be explained in other terms. An ideological alternative to the electability framework is needed.

In identifying an ideology, an analyst cannot simply label the actor's goals his ideology and use them to explain themselves. The actor's ideology must first be identified from other sources. Only then can it be adequately used to explain a specific course of action.

William Dyke's political ideology embraced three basic elements: political conservatism, a strict interpretation of
the separation of powers doctrine, and an aggressive manager's view of politics. Dyke's conservatism can be established by looking at his policy views across a wide range of issues. Dyke's activity in conservative Republican circles would also tend to support the placement of the mayor along the liberal/conservative dimension. Only then could Dyke's conservative impulse be used to explain his actions on the bus controversy. Similarly, the other components of Dyke's ideology—his belief in the strict separation of powers and the active aggrandizement of executive powers—had to be independently established both through the mayor's detailed elaboration of his own political philosophy and his actions in other areas before it could be used to explain his motives in the bus controversy.

Thus in modifying the rationality model, it must be realized that political actors can have goals other than winning or simple vote maximization. This has already been done to some extent in the dichotomization of purists and professionals. It has also been done to the extent that there has been the realization that "benefit seekers" might seek a "minimal winning coalition" rather than vote maximization in order to maximize their program claims on an office-holder. The motivations of "benefit-seekers" cannot be explained in the same terms appropriate to "office-seekers."

In searching for ideologies which explain political behavior it is blatantly necessary to go beyond the usual left/right, conservative/liberal dimension. An ideology might
be organized around different, and even more limited, themes than the role of government. Bill Dyke's ideology, for example, was not so much concerned with the outputs of government or the role of government, but with a principle of operation of government. Researchers seeking to explain actions in ideological terms must be open to the many different forms that an ideology can take and not restrict themselves searching only for standard conceptions of what constitutes an ideology.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEOLOGICAL LEADER

The mayor achieved very little of what he wanted in the bus controversy. Not only was the bus system purchased despite the mayor's objections, but the system was acquired in a manner--outright purchase--the mayor did not approve. Dyke's nine-month battle over 13-C gained only relatively minor changes in the agreement at the high cost of further estranging his relationship with the City Council.

Yet, the relative degree of success Dyke had moving a city in the direction he desired, though, cannot be judged solely from this one case study. This chapter will look at a broader spectrum of issues in order to attempt a more general evaluation of the impact of the Ideological leadership of Bill Dyke. To anticipate the findings, though the evidence is somewhat murky, Dyke through his Ideological approach appears to have succeeded in putting the imprint of his conservative preferences on Madison.

THE FISCAL IMPACT OF WILLIAM DYKE

**Long-Term Debt.** The elaboration of case studies suffers serious deficiencies as a tool for analyzing mayoral impact. One deficiency is that determination of mayoral success or failure in the case study approach winds up being nothing more than a subjective reading of purely qualitative evidence. Where at all possible case studies must be supplemented with
quantitative measures of mayoral impact. If a mayor's goals can be put forth in measurable terms, changes in such indicators can provide a relatively "hard" peg on which conclusions as to mayoral effectiveness can be hung. As many of Dyke's major priorities centered around notions of fiscal conservatism, changes in Madison's budget in that direction during his years in office can serve as confirmation of mayoral impact.

One such indicator of Dyke's performance is the degree of change in Madison's debt situation during the four budget years of his administration. In order to help restore a sense of fiscal responsibility to the city through tightened management systems, Dyke felt it necessary to establish some sort of control over what he saw to be an alarming growth in the city debt. The city, in Dyke's eyes, was imprudently too near the bonding limit allowed under state law.

As Table 1 unambiguously shows, Dyke succeeded in markedly improving the city's debt situation. By the end of his last budget year, December, 1973, Madison's outstanding General Obligation debt for both city and educational purposes were returned, in absolute dollar terms, to approximately their December, 1968 levels. Even more clear, and possibly even more important, the debt in terms of percentage of the statutory allowable ceiling was reduced from sixty-eight per cent at the end of Festge's last budget year to forty-one per cent by the end of Dyke's last budget year. Dyke's success in the bonding area was so evident that in 1973, Moody's raised
### Table 1

Outstanding Long-Term Debt, Madison, Wisconsin 1967-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (As of Dec. 31)</th>
<th>Outstanding General Obligation Debt</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>% of Outstanding over PreVIOUS Debt*</th>
<th>Debt for City Purposes</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Debt for Education Purposes</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$35,010,000</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>$30,061,000</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39,231,000</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>27,602,500</td>
<td>-10.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>42,890,000</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32,013,000</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Festge Budget Years (last three):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Outstanding Debt</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>% of Outstanding over PreVIOUS Debt*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$42,416,000</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>44,546,000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>43,143,000</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>36,363,000</td>
<td>-15.7%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dyke Budget Years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Outstanding Debt</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>% of Outstanding over PreVIOUS Debt*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>$40,294,500</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>36,940,000</td>
<td>-8.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>33,715,000</td>
<td>-8.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30,495,000</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NC—not calculated

*State statutes limit the allowable debt for city purposes, excluding education, to 5 per cent of the value of property located within the city as equalized for state purposes.

SOURCE: 1967-71 debt figures obtained from statement of "Outstanding Long-Term Indebtedness" found in the 1971 Budget, adopted by the Common Council, December 9, 1970.

Madison's bond rating from AA to AAA.

One small qualification in regards to this picture of mayoral success must be made. Part of the difficulty in using quantitative indicators of mayoral impact is in the problem in deciding what part of the change in the indicator can be attributed to a mayor's leadership and what part of the change should be considered the result of situational factors beyond the mayor's control. Though Dyke's anti-spending orientation towards education helped account for the decline in the school debt in his latter budget years, the necessity for extensive borrowing during these years was also mitigated by the huge eleven million dollar school bond issue of September, 1970. As one anti-Dyke school board member noted in regards to the process of school expansion: "We were just about over that hump when we got to Dyke."¹

Budget Size and Priorities. When the focus of analysis is shifted from debt control to control over the city's overall spending (Table 2), the pattern of mayoral success is much less clear. Though spending under Dyke increased at a lower average annual rate (11.66 per cent per year) than under Festge (14.10 per cent per year), it still increased at a rate beyond that which can be accounted for by inflation. Furthermore, if the exhorbitant increase of the first Festge budget is discounted—an increase which many observers felt was forthcoming after the "tight-fistedness" of the previous administration—² total city spending increased at a faster
Table 2

Actual Spending for City Purposes, Madison, Wisconsin, 1965-1973*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last Reynolds Budget Year:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$15,544,592</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festge Budget Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$20,514,916</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>21,895,364</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>23,673,037</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>25,941,881</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyke Budget Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$28,568,277</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>30,989,755</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>32,650,498</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>38,042,842</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean yearly increase, Festge = 14.1%
Mean yearly increase, Dyke = 11.7%

NC—not calculated

*included in the classification of "spending for city purposes" are the following areas: general government, public safety, health, streets and sanitation, public welfare, recreation, debt service, capital budget, and miscellaneous expenditures. Library and education expenditures, supported through separate property taxes, are not included here.

annual rate during the Dyke administration than during the last three years of Festge's term in office! Despite Dyke's attempt to put a lid on city budgets, spending continued to increase substantially during his time in office.

Even if Dyke's influence is not readily perceptible in regards to overall budget size, perhaps it can be noticed in a shift in the allocation of budget funds in accordance with the mayor's conception of priorities. To examine this possibility, it is necessary to identify those specific policy areas where the mayor had unambiguous pro- or anti-spending orientations. As regards to Dyke, only three such areas—welfare, police, and data processing—can be readily identified.

Dyke was definitely anti-welfare spending. He saw city welfare to be an emergency program in the strictest sense, and did not believe that the program should be a "giveaway" to people who would not take care of themselves:³

First of all, city welfare is not designed to be the continuing welfare program. City welfare is designed by law to be only a temporary stop-gap form of welfare assistance. The continuing programs are administered by the county and the state...Yet, throughout the four year term I had, we had people on the Council who were trying to turn city welfare into a parallel agency with the county, state, and federal assistance programs.⁴

Being a relatively minor emergency assistance program, then, city welfare occupied only a very small portion (approximately two per cent) of general fund expenditures. Nonetheless, the amount of money spent in this area increased greatly during Dyke's first term, before stabilizing in his latter two
years in office (Table 3). The growth in welfare spending during Dyke's first term would on the surface indicate that the mayor "lost" the welfare game during this period. But as Dyke himself commented, "The question is where would it (the welfare budget) have been without the controls we did apply."\(^5\)

Dyke's assertion is not without validity. The major part of the jump in welfare spending during Dyke's first term was the direct result of declining national economic conditions coupled with the impact of extreme state welfare budget cuts. Liberals on the Council failed in a move to get the city to add an additional $300,000 to the welfare budget to supplement AFDC recipients for the recent state cutback—a move Dyke actively opposed. The Council finally wound up allocating an additional $178,200 for welfare—a figure which matched the amount just added to the police budget for riot control.\(^6\) But the conservative-dominated Welfare Board in mid-year cut off the eight dollar per person per month grant the city was giving AFDC recipients. The mayor vetoed a unanimous Council resolution restoring the cuts. Only after a sit-in by welfare rights people at the mayor's office, did Dyke compromise with a four dollar to eleven dollar per family per month supplemental schedule with the rate depending on family size. Most families received less under the Dyke plan than under the previous plan.\(^7\)

Thus, Dyke's effectiveness in the area is a matter of interpretation. The welfare budget grew, but to a great
### Table 3
Spending for City Welfare, Police, and Data Processing, Madison, Wisconsin, 1966-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Welfare Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Police Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Data Processing Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$357,040</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>$2,216,995</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>$28,926</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>339,931</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
<td>2,370,296</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>47,525</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>323,989</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
<td>2,588,774</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>105,282</td>
<td>121.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>441,908</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>3,272,952</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>230,283</td>
<td>118.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Festge Budget Years:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Welfare Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Police Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Data Processing Amount Spent</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>653,441</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>4,037,839</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>287,362</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>797,363</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>4,372,073</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>375,310</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>765,134</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
<td>4,679,025</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>529,456</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>802,157</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6,305,909</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>1,020,290**</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data processing expenditures listed here are pre-inter-agency billing.*

**The 1973 data processing expenditure is the budget estimate. All other figures represent actual expenditures. The jump in the expenditures for data processing in 1973 is the result of the department's offering of new and expanded services, and is not the product of the different basis of that year's figure.**

**SOURCE:** Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968-1975.
degree this growth was the result of environmental factors. But the mayor effectively helped keep it from growing any further than it did.

Dyke was very much pro-police. As noted in the last chapter, Dyke appointed a former Massachusetts state trooper to be his mayoral assistant as a result of his strong concern with police matters. As a consequence Dyke supported increases in police spending for additional personnel and various other purposes, such as the procurement of special riot equipment. Under Dyke the number of authorized positions in the police department grew from 381 in 1969 to 439 in 1973—an increase of 15.2 per cent, as compared to a 5.2 per cent increase in the total number of all city positions during the same time period. As Table 3 shows, there were non-incremental jumps in the police budget during the first and fourth Dyke budget years. Yet, as with the welfare budget, these jumps in the police "indicator" represent a response to more than simple mayoral influence. Situational factors also help to account for the non-incremental growth in police spending. As the figures show, the first major jump in the police budget came in 1969—the last Festge budget year. Budget increases during this period, then, are clearly the product of something more than Dyke's influence—and that "something else" was the necessity of the city's handling of the university student disorders of the period. In other words, Dyke's pro-police orientation was only one of the two major factors accounting...
for the expansion of that department's budget.

Finally, Dyke was very much behind the continued development of data processing services, which he saw to be a valuable management device, not merely an accounting tool. Dyke saw Madison's development of a computer assistant capability for law enforcement to be one of the major achievements of his terms in office. Computers were to be used to "institutionalize planning." Crime patterns were geographically coded in order to help allocate manpower in anticipation of crime patterns. Records of stolen property were computerized, and a forty-five second response to police calls on automobile license verifications was developed. Outside of the law enforcement field, Dyke hoped eventually to develop computerized annual reassessment of all property, to avoid the inequities and sporadic jumps in the tax bills which outraged homeowners.

The number of authorized positions in the data processing department expanded from twenty-one in 1969 to forty-four in 1973. Total spending for data processing expanded sharply during the Dyke years, when the costs of service provided to other departments, such as the police department, are included in the figures. Once again, though a great deal of credit for the expanded use of computer services must be placed with Dyke, the modernization of the city's record keeping was begun before Dyke (note the growth in the data processing budget in Table 3 prior to 1970). It is in the expansion of computer
usage to more management/planning activities that Dyke deserves the most credit.

In summary, then, although Dyke clearly brought Madison's debt situation under control, his impact in other areas is somewhat more ambiguous. Overall city spending and welfare spending continued to increase despite Dyke's objections, but would probably have increased further had it not been for the active opposition of the mayor. City spending reflected the mayor's police and data processing priorities; but the presence of situational variables clouds the picture of just how important mayoral influence was in the growth of these budget areas.

**Taxes and School Spending.** If William Dyke had any success in impressing his fiscal conservative philosophy on Madison, the results should be apparent in the area of his number one policy concern--taxes. If Dyke is to be considered successful in terms of his own goals, then he must have succeeded in reversing, or at least in slowing, the rate of increase in the city's property tax rate.

Three figures are relevant to a mayor concerned with taxes. First, there is the Total General Property Tax rate, or the total rate of all property tax levies. This is the most politically salient tax figure, as a mayor will likely be blamed for a rise in property tax, even if much of the increase is mandated by bodies not directly under his control. Thus a tax conscious mayor will try to adjust the rate of city and
school taxes in order to keep the total tax bill under control.

Second is the tax rate for the General Fund--those revenues which constitute the city's operating funds. As the mayor in Madison partakes in both the revenue-producing and spending decisions in this area, it is the General Fund over which the mayor has the most direct influence. Finally, there is the separate tax allocated for educational purposes--a tax which comprises over half of the total levy. The mayor's influence in the area is less than in the general fund area, as the Joint Fiscal Control Group (of which the mayor is a member) has control only over the absolute size of the education budget. Decisions concerning the actual allocation of these funds for specific programs remain solely the province of the Board of Education, and as such are beyond the mayor's direct reach. The mayor and the Fiscal Control Group threaten cuts, but cannot be sure that the Board of Education will make them in the places they desire. The setting of the school budget and tax rate for educational purposes thus winds up being an annual bargaining game between the mayor and the Joint Fiscal Control Group on the one hand and the Board of Education on the other.

Which service areas will suffer the most under a tax conscious mayor's demand for economy will depend on his priorities. Bill Dyke's spending priorities were clear. The city government part of the budget provided the funds for much
needed basic services. Any radical belt-tightening that was needed would be done primarily in the area of education, where, according to the mayor, no solid justification could be found for continued increases in spending. Dyke, in fact, was quite hostile to how he saw the school budget being spent:

In my opinion, the education budget is so badly warped, it's not a matter of cutting fat out. It goes beyond that.

The problem of education today, in my opinion, is that most educators...in fact so far as I know there isn't a qualified national point of view nor is there qualified national discussion, as to the learning process (sic). We go on talking about quality in education, but we never get to what quality means. That's that undefinable lovely word that we use as a label every time an educator's budget is in jeopardy...

I believe it would have served the community very well had we caused the Superintendent of Schools to have retrenched and retreated from some grandiose notions of education and get to what causes a child to learn. If you are acquainted with the Moynihan Report...we found, as an example, that the most important factors on why children learn and why they don't learn are things like home life--and they are not teachers' numbers.

We have spent so much time looking at the physical structure of our schools, that we have not permitted ourselves enough time to look at what's going on inside them. We've now almost gone full circle. We're back now in one room schools...That's nonsense.

Looking at actual tax rates in Table 4, it would appear that Dyke had a measure of success as far as school taxes were concerned. In his first two years, the tax rate for educational purposes increased at a lesser rate than it did under the Festge administration; and in his latter two budget years, the actual tax rate for educational purposes actually dipped.
### Table 4

**Actual Property Tax Rates (in mills), Madison, Wisconsin, 1966-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Education Mill Rate</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>General Fund Mill Rate</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Total General Mill Rate</th>
<th>% Increase Over Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Festge Budget Years:***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25.01</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>26.44</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>29.13</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>53.00</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyke Budget Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30.17</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>56.36</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31.34</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>13.99</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>56.83</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>31.16</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>54.70</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total General Property Tax includes state, county, sewer district, board of education, vocational school, library, and general fund taxes.

***Tax levied at end of previous calendar year.

Taxing for General Fund revenues increased during the first three years of Dyke's term, before declining sharply in his last term. The total General Property Tax increased at a moderate rate during the off-year budgets, while either decreasing are exhibiting little change for the budgets passed immediately prior to the spring mayoral elections. The data presented in Table 4 would thus seem to indicate general Dyke success—stabilization of the overall property tax rate primarily via controlled taxation for educational purposes.

Actual rates are important areas of mayoral impact as these are the rates property owners react to on election day. However, actual tax rates do not tell the complete tax burden story. Increases in property valuation may allow a mayor to increase his tax revenue without raising tax rates. As a comparison of Tables 2 and 4 show, this indeed, did happen—overall spending for city purposes increased while increased valuation allowed the rate to remain relatively stable.

Similarly, a mayor may be able to cut local property taxes only because of the fortuitous intervention of increases in state and federal aid. The extent of the 1973 tax cuts to a great extent reflects the use of federal revenue sharing funds into Madison's budget for the first time. In fact, the City Council used 1973 revenue sharing funds in addition to 1972 revenue sharing money to gain an immediate drop in the tax rate, despite Dyke's argument that the 1973 funds should be used to defray the tax burden of the 1974 budget.
The influence of such situational factors can be controlled if we compare the changes on Madison's tax rate to those in other cities in Wisconsin. Only the deviation from the statewide trend or the "unexplained variance" can be attributed to city decisions in Madison. Because of variations in the percentage of full-value that property in each jurisdiction is taxed, the only appropriate figures for cross-municipal comparison are those calculated at full-value rates.

The annual changes in property tax rates for Madison and Wisconsin's 12 other cities are listed in Table 5. As far as the most potentially salient tax figure, the Total General Property tax, is concerned the evidence as to the possibility of any unusual mayoral impact is quite mixed. Changes in Madison's total tax bill are more conservative than those by Wisconsin's other large cities only for those budgets which were set in the months preceding the spring municipal elections. In the two off-year budgets, 1970 and 1971, Dyke's conservative tendencies are not apparent as the increase in Madison's total tax levy outdistanced that of the state's other cities. Only a tax/election year cycle, not a markedly conservative overall taxing pattern, is apparent during Dyke's term in office.¹²

As far as control of taxing for local purposes is concerned, the impact of Dyke's conservative fiscal orientation is even less apparent. In only one of the four budget years is the trend on local taxes in Madison more conservative than
### Table 5
Annual Change in Full Value Rate Property Taxes, Madison and Other Wisconsin Cities 1965-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Years</th>
<th>Educationa</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Total Generalb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>Madison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>largest cities</td>
<td>largest cities</td>
<td>cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festge Budget Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dyke Budget Years: |
| 1970 | -2.2% | -0.5% | 5.3% | 9.3% | 7.9% | 1.4% | 1.7% |
| 1971 | 7.3  | 4.0  | 5.1  | 1.4% | 3.6  | 2.3  | 3.6  |
| 1972 | 0.5  | 2.0  | 17.1 | 11.3  | 8.6  | 4.1  | 7.1  |
| 1973 | -3.5 | -2.7j | -9.8 | -10.3k | -10.3 | -5.3 | -5.1 |

- a-Education tax includes vocational as well as public education taxes. The public education component, however, is by far the more sizeable.
- b-Total General Property Tax includes only state, county, local and school taxes. It does not include special assessments.
- c-This is the mean Total General Property Tax Rate for all 200 or so jurisdictions in Wisconsin classified as cities.
- d-The twelve largest cities in Wisconsin, other than Madison, are Milwaukee, West Allis, Eau Claire, LaCrosse, Sheboygan, Appleton, Green Bay, Oshkosh, Racine, Kenosha, Wauwatosa, and Janesville: for Appleton, Eau Claire, and Milwaukee, cities located in more than one taxing district, computations in this table were based on rates to the district in which the major part of the city's people reside.
- e-Tax levied at end of preceding calendar year.
- f-In order to avoid distorting the significance of the mean for a sample size as small as twelve, deviant cases were eliminated from the computation. "Deviance" was arbitrarily defined as any city which experienced a greater than
100% increase or decrease in its tax rate. The figure here, consequently, is an 11-city average, as Green Bay experienced a 137% increase in its equalized local property tax rate and was excluded from the analysis.

- 11-city average as Janesville experienced a 435% increase in its local property tax rate and was excluded from the analysis.
- 11-city average as no figures were available for Racine.
- 9-city average; no figures available for Racine; Sheboygan with a 122% increase and Wauwatosa with a 128% increase in their local property tax rates were excluded from the analysis.
- 11-city average as no figures were available for Racine.

**SOURCE:** Figures computed from data provided by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, "Town, Village and City Taxes," 1965 through 1973 issues.
that experienced by Wisconsin's other large cities. Madison taxpayers even faced a large 17 per cent increase in local taxes, in terms of full-value rates, in the third Dyke budget year. The large decrease in taxing for local purposes exhibited during Dyke's final budget year is consonant with the state-wide city trend. Madison's tax cuts for 1973 thus reflect the introduction of revenue sharing funds more so than the impact of mayoral leadership.

As Dyke believed general fund services were important enough to permit controlled expansion of taxing for these purposes, moderate increases in general fund tax rates, then, do not really provide evidence that disconfirms the picture of effective Dyke leadership. Madison's taxes for local purposes do not appear to be out of line with those experienced by Wisconsin's large cities.

If Dyke was not against all the growth in taxing for general fund services, he was, as has already been detailed, totally hostile to increases in taxes for education. Tax changes for education in Madison during Dyke's term in office are for the most part consistent with Dyke's anti-school spending practice. In three of the four Dyke budget years, school taxes in Madison grew at a slower rate than in Wisconsin's other major cities. Yet, the differences between Madison and the other cities is not overwhelming; in fact, the two years that saw a reduction in full-value tax rates for education in Madison also saw a similar state-wide city trend.
Though Madison shows some conservative tendencies during these years, its school tax rates are not so different as to hint at the possibility of some unique factor at work on the Madison political scene.

An evaluation of Dyke's impact on taxes on the whole, then, is again a bit ambiguous. In terms of actual rates Dyke was fairly successful. But when put in comparative perspective with other cities in the state to control for statewide trends, no unique pattern of tax-restraint emerges. The full-value comparisons do not show any clear evidence of effective mayoral leadership. Increases in property valuation coupled with changes in state and federal aid for the most part, enabled a stabilization of actual tax rates during the Dyke administration.

But even the full-value rate comparisons, however, do not tell the whole story. These tax figures represent only summary outcomes. They can tell whether changes in Madison's tax levies were more conservative or liberal than the statewide trend. They cannot, however, tell what the mayor's impact was in setting the tax rate. The relevant question is: what would the tax rates and the spending levels have been had Dyke not been present? The quantitative indicators cannot give the answer to this question and must be supplemented by a brief description of Dyke's actions on each year's budget.

The 1970 Budget. In October of 1969 homeowners in Madison faced the possibility of a property tax hike somewhere
in the ten mill range. The proposed school budget entailed a 2.32 mill increase, the county budget a 1.5 mill increase. The proposed 6.4 mill raise in the city budget prepared by the City Finance Department reflected increased capital improvement, debt service, welfare, and employee salary costs.13

Dyke responded to this apparent forthcoming tax jump by immediately handing the city finance director a list of places where he wanted cuts. The move, if followed, would have eliminated the entire mill rise in the city side of the budget. The cuts were fairly extensive. The proposed welfare supplement to recipients facing state welfare cutbacks was eliminated in its entirety. Capital improvements in the area of parks and streets were curtailed, as were lakeweed harvesting, snow removal, and street salting. A reduction in the number of lifeguards at the city's beaches as well as the closing of one firestation with the elimination of twenty-four firefighter positions were also proposed. The police department was the only major department not subjected to the mayor's cutting knife. The mayor even supported the addition of ten new policemen to the force.14 Most of the money Dyke cut was never restored by the Council.

Dyke then turned his attention to the education budget. The conservative-dominated Dyke appointed Board of Estimates reduced the proposed mill rate increase for education from 2.32 to one mill by cutting the education budget $1,250,000.
Two thirds of this cut, the Board of Estimates suggested, could be effected without reducing the quality of education in Madison if the $850,000 received in the sale of school property would be reallocated from the school construction account to the operating budget. Members of the Board of Education called the cuts "a staggering blow to education in this community" and accused Dyke of "playing a little game at the expense of the kids." Despite the vociferous objections of school officials that the $850,000 transfer as directed was illegal, City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled with the mayor and the Board of Estimates. The cuts then received the approval of the Joint Fiscal Control Group, the final authority on the overall size of the education budget.

The budget produced a series of small aftershocks. The Board of Education, outraged over the cuts, publicly mulled over the possibilities that it should both hire its own legal counsel and seek the establishment of a fiscally independent school district whose budget would not be dependent on the Council-dominated Fiscal Control Group. In December three hundred people jammed a Board of Education meeting to protest the closing of two schools and the Madison community center—a meeting place for the elderly financed out of the school budget. The closings were averted only by the school board's raising of student fees, the elimination of some summer programs, and the deferring of a computer purchase. The fee increase was labeled by one school board member as a disguised
mill rate increase for families with children. 17

Dissatisfied with the school board's having taken opposition to his cuts, the new year saw Dyke endorse the proposal of sympathetic Alderman James Gill to expand the composition of the Board of Education from seven to nine members, with the mayor appointing the two new members to serve a year and a half term until the next election. This "stacking" move, though, was rejected by the Council.

The final budget included a 3.36 mill increase for Madison homeowners. The 1.35 mill increase in the city service side of the budget represented Council restoration of some Dyke cuts--primarily the keeping open of the university area fire station, the restoration of $178,200 to the welfare budget, and increases in the areas of lifeguards and snow removal--as well as a rejection of the mayor's proposed nine dollar wheel tax. 18

On the whole the 1970 budget was a Dyke victory. Though taxes rose, they did so at a moderate rate. As a result of constant mayoral pressure, an imminent drastic rise in taxes for city services was averted and the proposed tax increase for education was more than halved. Backed by the apparent anti-tax mandate in his election, Dyke proved capable of cowing spending proponents on both the Council and the School Board.

The 1971 Budget. Passage of the 1971 budget was a relatively quiet affair. In an attempt to prevent a repeat
public outcry over cuts in such popular services as lifeguards. Dyke labeled all departmental budget requests for 1971 "top secret." Both the public and the aldermen were to be allowed little input into the budget until after the document was formally presented by the mayor.

Dyke's budget required no mill rate rise in the city share of the property tax. Increased city spending would be covered by the rise in property valuation. According to the mayor the budget "carefully equates the growth in tax base with growth in city expenditures." Major cuts were proposed in the health, welfare, and capital budget areas while a $138,000 increase was recommended in regards to police expenditures.

Dyke's hopes for a no-tax increase were soon dashed as the result of a $300,000 drop in expected state aid (seven million dollars from the state had been expected). The tax line received a second jolt when the Board of Estimates recommended a $480,000 increase over Dyke's budget to cover the hiring of thirty police officers, increased payroll insurance for city employees, and increased aid to the bus system. Consistent with his views on the distinction between executive and legislative functions, Dyke absented himself from the Board of Estimates meetings.

The education budget as submitted by the school administration required a 1.67 mill increase. Acting on the recommendation of Dyke and the Board of Estimates, the Joint
Fiscal Control Group ordered a modest $381,026 or one per cent cut in school spending. Though school officials claimed the cuts seriously hurt, even such liberal aldermen as Paul Soglin and William Offerdahl, who in the past had supported increased school spending, now were in the lead in the fight to make cuts. Soglin was not the only one who saw the budget to be "padded," as witnessed by the comments of the following school board member:

By that time (the 1970 budget) we had learned to budget long.

(Question: In other words you were padding the budget?)

That's what I say. Up until then I know I for one had been demanding a clean budget...At one point I was naive in saying, "Give them a clean budget. Let's give them one in which there's nothing to take out"...We did and it caused a lot of consternation in the ranks (as a result of the cuts which followed)... So I'm confident that the professional staff was sliding in a little lard in every item.

The process of "sliding in a little lard," according to this board member, had begun during the Festge administration and continued through the Dyke years.

Dyke remained dissatisfied with the remaining 1.3 education mill rate increase. According to the mayor the Board of Education budget was forcing any reduction in taxes "to come out of the hide of city services." "How long," the mayor objected, "can we continue to dilute city services in order to provide broadened educational services to our children." But in contrast to the previous year and despite his concerns,
Dyke seldom raised his objections in public.

The 1971 budget, then, was a mixed outcome for Dyke. The Board of Estimates spent more than Dyke recommended and the school budget increase counterbalanced tax cuts effected elsewhere. Still the total actual mill rate was quite moderate as the result of the relatively low level of his own proposed budget for city services as well as his successful exhortation to the county cut its own budget.\(^{27}\) The mayor accepted the resulting .5 mill increase in the total tax rate, noting that "further limitations on the budget would impose severe hardship on service levels."\(^{28}\) On the whole, the 1971 budget would have to be considered a Dyke victory as it is reflected in his anti-tax increase orientation.

The 1972 Budget. As he did with the previous year's budget, Dyke sought to impose a five per cent ceiling on the increase in any portion of city spending. This year, though, the county refused to acquiesce to Dyke's wishes in regard to its tax rates. With a raise in the county budget of about eleven per cent and nearly a two mill increase expected in the tax rate for Madison homeowners, it was clear that any effort to hold the line on taxes would have to come in the city and school budgets.

Dyke immediately ran into problems with School Superintendent Douglas Ritchie as the education budget, though it provided for no increase in tax rates, called for a 7.7 per cent increase in spending. Ritchie warned that a cut down to
the five per cent level might force school closings and reductions in teaching staff.\textsuperscript{29}

Dyke soon began to talk in terms of a one million dollar cut in the proposed $40.7 million education budget. Later, though, he scaled the figure down to $500,000.\textsuperscript{30} Reflecting Dyke's self-imposed divorce from formal legislative proceedings, it was conservative aldermen and not the mayor himself who formally proposed the cuts. The Board of Estimates, with fiscal conservatives occupying four of the five seats on the Board, repeated its routine of the previous year, again recommending a budget cut of one per cent ($407,000). Such a cut represented a .4 mill reduction in a budget that already called for no tax increases. At the conclusion of one Board of Estimates meeting, an outraged Ritchie demanded of Dyke "Which is more important, city services or education?" "City services, there's no question at all," Dyke responded.\textsuperscript{31}

In contrast to the previous year, though, the school board and Ritchie were ready to fight and pleaded for citizen support of their stance. Citizen mobilization was abetted by speculation over a list of likely service cuts that would follow if Dyke's proposed education budget would be implemented: lunch room supervisors would be cut in half, study halls eliminated, text book fees would be increased, high schools would be closed at six o'clock, one or more elementary schools would face closing, health services would be curtailed, and the number of crossing guards would be reduced.\textsuperscript{32}
At a meeting before which 250 people registered to speak, the Joint Fiscal Control Group voted to reduce the education budget by $120,000 (or .2 mills) instead of the $407,000 recommended. The mayor researched the possibility of using his veto, but found that as the school district included areas outside the city's limits he lacked the prerogative. The restoration of most of the school money cut represented a defeat for Dyke.

To complete the analysis of the 1972 budget two questions must be answered: why did Madison's school board choose to fight back in this third Dyke budget year and not before? and why did Dyke lose on this issue? The various school officials interviewed answered the first question by referring to the surplus from previous years, the presence of some "padding" in the initial reports, and the lateral transfer of surpluses from one account to other areas of need—all of which helped to mitigate the actual impact of the mayor's cuts in his first two budgets. One school board member even felt the Dyke proposed cuts were "token" in that "one per cent of any budget can be cut." This was especially true of an education budget where salaries are usually overbudgeted due to the inability to see in advance just how experienced, and thus well paid, new teachers will be. But perhaps even more importantly, the seeming anti-tax mandate of Dyke's election and the support he found among tax-conscious Council members which had made the school board reluctant to take the mayor
head on in his first year in office, was now beginning to wear off.

By the third year, school officials were beginning to feel that Dyke was beginning to establish adverse precedents. This pattern of school budget cutting had to be stopped before it really hurt:

We thought we had things pretty well in hand, frankly (during the first two Dyke budget years). And when we became aware that maybe this budget cutting was going to become a pretty popular sort of thing, we went out after it.34

We thought we could counteract it (Dyke's proposed cuts in the second budget) with the good thinking of people in the City Council and the Joint Fiscal Control Group. And quite frankly you don't like to go to war...But by the third year, we decided that's enough of that...So we declared war.35

Paradoxically, Dyke's success in his first two budget years seems also to help explain his defeat in the third. The effect of school budget cuts on the first two years helped raise public dissatisfaction with the level of education services provided in the community. This growing dissatisfaction provided the fertile ground which the school board effectively tapped in its countermobilization.

But shifting public concern and effective lobbying by pro-school spending groups still do not explain all the factors that helped defeat Dyke in regards to the 1972 budget. The attitudes of Madison's aldermen, who comprised twenty-two of the twenty-eight votes on the Joint Fiscal Control Group, also changed, to the disadvantage of Dyke's potential
influence. For one thing, as a consequence of an extreme Council turnover in the 1970 and 1971 elections, where 14 new aldermen were elected to a possible 22 seats, Dyke was confronting a more liberal council than he had immediately after his first election. But even beyond that, the polarized atmosphere that Dyke to a great extent helped to create also took its toll on the mayor's potential influence. One school official remembered the reaction of Council members to the undisguised hostility that Dyke confronted educational spokesmen with that year:

He'd (Dyke) fly all over the place at you at a meeting. You'd never know where he was coming from. And he'd ask the same questions over and over again. And that exasperated me. And the aldermen in that Fiscal Control Group meeting that year...when he kept up that inquisition, several of the aldermen lashed back at him.36

Dyke's strength in his convictions and unwavering goal determination, which were so important in explaining his first year's budget success, were thus somewhat counter-productive in this third year of confrontations.

In regards to the city budget, Dyke's proposed wheel tax, which he hoped would be used to finance the bus subsidy, was again defeated. As money for this purpose now had to come from the general fund, even spending for city purposes now exceeded the five per cent increase ceiling Dyke originally proposed as a guideline. The final addition of $145,000 by the Board of Estimates over the mayor's recommendation for the Parks Department budget further prompted Dyke to comment,
"I can't help but believe that it looks like Christmas came today." 37

The 1973 Budget. Despite Dyke's insistence that each year's funds from the newly enacted federal revenue sharing be used to defray the following year's expenditures, both the county and city legislatures applied the 1973 as well as the 1972 shared monies to the 1973 budget to get a big immediate "splash!" The introduction of all this new found money into the city arena permitted the city simultaneously to cut taxes while expanding spending for services (note the 1972-1973 changes in Tables 2 and 4). As revenue sharing increased the total amount of rewards to be distributed, most groups in the city were satisfied to the point that no major controversy developed during the budget period. The 1973 budget thus proves to be an inadequate test of the impact of William Dyke's leadership style. The mayor's only salient action concerning the city part of the budget was to reduce the number of authorized new buses from twenty-eight to ten.

Dyke's major run-in during 1972 was not the result of next year's budget deliberation, but of his refusal to sign or veto the placement of a $6.4 million dollar school bond referendum in the November ballot. Dyke believed both that the referendum was far too much money and that a November ballot insulated the school board members, who are elected in the spring, from public accountability for their spending. 38

Dyke refrained from taking any action on the proposal
until after the November ballots were printed, thus making a fall referendum an impossibility. Just as he did with 13-C, Dyke was denying the City Council any opportunity to reverse his decision. When the deadline passed and the mayor finally chose to act, he mustered enough votes on the Council to sustain his veto.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEOLOGICAL LEADER

A fair interpretation of all this evidence is that Dyke did have impact. He put the city debt under control; he increased city spending for police and data processing services; he acted to suppress tax increases and city spending, particularly in the areas of education and welfare. Dyke generally moved Madison closer to his view of fiscally responsible government--which is not to say, however, that Dyke won every one of his budget battles. The 1972 education budget, the city's acquisition of the bus system, and the restoration of some of the welfare cuts are blatant instances where the mayor's priorities were for the most part pushed aside.

Dyke's success was to a great degree dependent on the leadership style he utilized. Dyke was an extremely goal-oriented mayor; he had definite directions in which he wanted to lead Madison. Even Entrepreneurship, one of the three high direction styles identified in Chapter One, could not provide Dyke with the policy impact he sought. The Entrepreneur seeks
to put his imprint in the city domain without jeopardizing his power position. He attempts to do so by structuring broad overarching coalitions behind policy initiatives which embrace a latent consensus. But Dyke was not content to confine his influence to solely those areas where a latent consensus existed. Dyke's anti-school spending preferences were so strong that he sought to adopt budgets that were nowhere acceptable to the school board and its allies. Dyke's goals could not accommodate his playing of consensus politics. Dyke's definite conservative policy preferences precluded the construction of a broad overarching coalition.

Only two styles, then, the Partisan and the Ideologue, allowed Dyke the opportunity to pursue his goals in situations where a latent consensus was lacking. The Partisan style, whereby a conflict-oriented mayor seeks to mobilize only a portion of the community behind his goals, will be discussed in detail in the later chapters of this dissertation regarding Paul Soglin, Dyke's successor. It is to the advantage of Dyke's solo-action, high direction style—the Ideologue—that the discussion is now directed.

The foremost advantage of the Ideologue is that it is the most goal-oriented of all leadership styles. The Entrepreneur as already noted, can only act in those areas where the potential for consensus politics exists. The Partisan, as will be shown in the Soglin chapters, will not act if such intervention adversely affects his long-term power position.
The Partisan, like the Entrepreneur, is restrained by practical considerations.

The Ideologue, in contrast, is not constrained by any coalition maintenance or power conservation considerations. The result of such unfettered action is an impressive consistency in effort that can achieve results in areas where "wiser" leaders might refrain from action.

Bill Dyke reaped just such benefits from his ideological approach. No matter what the political opposition—be it from Council liberals, welfare recipients, outraged school board members, or citizens concerned with maintaining service levels—Dyke could not be deterred from his individualistically established goal of fiscal responsibility. The result of such uncompromising sense of purpose was that Madison, with few exceptions, continued to move only in the direction Dyke desired. This control over direction that resulted from the Ideological leadership of Bill Dyke stands in sharp contrast to the lapses in guidance which resulted from his predecessor Otto Festge's vacillation during the 1968 education budget and the police/fire wage parity controversies.39

One further advantage of the Ideological approach is seen in that other actors, faced with the unrestrained fervor with which the mayor pursued his fiscal goals, became uncertain how to respond. As one school board member explained during his first term, "I think we were just all sort of feeling our way."40 Dyke's refusal to bargain like a politician, thus,
had the advantages of disorienting and intimidating his opponents. Only after budget cutting in successive years had produced public dissatisfaction with the level of education-related services provided did the school establishment feel confident enough to seriously challenge the mayor's initiatives. Obstinancy, or the refusal to play the political game the way others expect can at times be a very important resource. And Dyke used these tactics to the maximum extent possible.

Finally, Dyke almost virtually by himself created a "political atmosphere" during his first term which was conducive to budget cutting and tax control. In both his election campaigns and his public actions in office, Dyke helped raise the tax-consciousness of the Madison community to the point where it became a potent political force. Dyke expressly tried to cause the questions of taxes and budgets "as much as possible to be public discussions." The impact of this consciousness-raising was clearly noted by at least one of the city reporters interviewed:

Dyke was running on the heels of a big tax increase and said, "I'll put a stop to that." And that's why he was elected.

And so the momentum...and so the school board people and administration and elected officials would perceive the current mood of the voters was not to have school taxes go up so much...People who are affected by that are going to say, "This really is not the year. We're going to have to tolerate some tax cuts. We're going to have to make some cuts. We're going to have to accept some cuts because that is the political climate in town."
So, I think, Dyke can get credit. If he had not been mayor it is conceivable that taxes would have been higher than it otherwise happened.42

STYLE AS STRATEGY AND PERSONALITY RESPONSE

The next chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to the identification of the costs of the Ideological leadership approach. Yet, from the evidence presented in this chapter, the primary drawback to the Ideological leadership approach can already be identified. The Ideologue so alienates other political actors with his individualistic issue-orientations that he jeopardizes his power standing, and hence possibly with it the position of the causes for which he is fighting, in the long run.

Bill Dyke's Ideological combat with the school board proved productive from the mayor's standpoint during his first two years. Yet in his purist actions, Dyke had so alienated some aldermen, school board members, and Madison citizens that he paved the way for the school board's successful counter-mobilization against his proposed third budget year education cuts. Dyke's Ideological approach on the school issue also helped exacerbate the community antagonisms which denied him a third term as mayor. The Ideologue, while a potentially potent strategy in certain contexts in the short-run, runs the risk of being a self-defeating approach in the long-run.

Bill Dyke's failure to fully recognize the possible dangers inherent in the Ideological leadership approach helps
underscore the complex determinants of style adoption. Style can be treated as conscious strategy; it can be viewed as the means which a political head chooses to his goals. Yet, the degree to which a political head really can exert his "choice" of style is a matter of question. Personality factors influence both the choice of goals a mayor makes and the inclination of a mayor to "go it alone" or seek the cooperation of others in attempting to reach these goals. The process of style adoption is not totally rational.

Yet individuals will not admit such a lack of free will as overstress on personality theory might imply. Bill Dyke, for example, would argue that he chose to pursue his goals as a solo actor. Similarly, the name "Ideologue" has been used to identify the sources of such extreme goal-oriented individualistic behavior. The mayor who disdains compromise and network building in pursuit of such definite goals does so in the name of some higher truth or ideology. Perhaps the more correct name for this mayoral type should be "Ideological/Individualist." Such a name, though too awkward to use, would avoid the unnecessary implication that this is the only mayor who can possess a fixed all-consuming truth. The Ideologue is not simply anyone with an ideology: he is a purist whose faith in his ideology mandates his acting as a loner.
CHAPTER SIX: THE COSTS OF IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP

As the preceding chapter has shown, the Ideologue can be an effective goal oriented leadership style. The Ideological approach, however, is not without its costs. Dyke's purist adherence to his principles, for example, alienated members of the Board of Education, the City Council, and the general public. The mayor's incessant questioning of one school official only served to antagonize some Fiscal Control Group members. On the Council, votes reportedly were often cast against a proposal simply because the mayor supported it.

Dyke's Ideological style also proved inefficient to the extent that the mayor ignored all possible coalition-building opportunities. Conflict-oriented leadership is appropriate in situations where broad overarching community coalitions cannot be built. But to discard any coalition approach to all policy areas is to forego opportunities for influence where such an approach might prove effective.

Dyke's failure to get elected to a third term is the most conspicuous evidence of the "failure" of his conflict style. Had Dyke not by his own actions helped add to the polarization and the "combat fatigue" of Madison in the Vietnam era, he would have, faced with an opponent as far to the "left" as Paul Soglin, likely been elected to another term in office. Dyke's Ideological orientations achieved short-run success, in areas such as in the school budget battles, which could not
have been won with a consensus style. But in the long-run the style took its toll in denying Dyke another two years to impress his sense of direction in the City of Madison.

This chapter will attempt to further evaluate the Ideological leadership approach. Of particular focus will be the impact that William Dyke had on the level of polarization of Madison given the contextual situation that existed there in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

STUDENT RIOTS IN THE VIETNAM YEARS

The period of student unrest that plagued Madison actually began before Dyke assumed office. The blame for the wave of student unrest cannot be placed at the mayor's feet. Madison first began to witness student demonstrations in 1967--two years before Dyke's election. In February, anti-Vietnam students attempted to block the on-campus recruiting at the University of Wisconsin by the Dow Chemical Corporation. Dow, as the producer of napalm, merited a special animosity from students who opposed American intervention in Vietnam. Dow was seen to be an immoral corporation acting in support of an immoral war. When the police attempted to clear the demonstrators from the building where the recruiting was taking place, a clash ensued between the police and the students. Seventeen persons were arrested by the police in the first day of rioting.

The politicized atmosphere created by student antagonism
to America's Vietnam policy spilled over to issues that had nothing to directly do with the war. Under Madison's new traffic plan, University Avenue, the main thoroughfare through the campus area, was converted into a one-way street; four lanes of traffic flowed out of town. A separate lane for buses, however, went in the opposite direction. Students crossing the street tended to look in the direction of major traffic flow and remained insensitive to the danger of the occasional bus that approached from the other direction. In May, student dissatisfaction peaked after the crippling of a female student who proved unaware of the oncoming bus and was hit by it. An estimated 2,000 students gathered as some blocked the bus lane and jostled buses, demanding that the wrong-way lane be converted into a bicycle path. Twenty-five students were arrested.¹

In October 1967, major disruption flared again as personnel recruiting for the Dow Chemical Corporation returned to campus. Seventy persons were injured as helmeted, club-wielding police attempted to clear the demonstrators from the building; tear gas was used to clear the crowd outside. Students responded with verbal indignities and rock-throwing.²

In 1969, students occupied the University's administration building to protest the University's holding of securities in financial institutions that provided support to the white regime in South Africa. The protestors also demanded the establishment of a black studies program and other efforts
to make education more responsive to the needs of blacks. The usual pattern of setting up barricades and police dismantling them and firing tear gas ensued.

Madison, as a result of student reaction to the war, was a city in the late 1960's and 1970's where politics was characterized by bitterness, manifest hostility, paranoia, and fear--by both anti-war and establishment elements. Tensions were taut; persons were polarized into competing camps according to their perspectives on the Vietnam war and the growth of the student counterculture. All issues--race, welfare, civil rights, student rights, and even pornography--became politicized. As a result of the anti-war "trashings" where more extreme anti-war elements broke the windows of downtown businesses, State Street began to take on the look of a battle-worn city. Broken windows were boarded up with plywood; renovated stores presented primarily brick facades with only the smallest of windows to serve as targets for possible rock-throwing.

It was into such an atmosphere that William Dyke stepped as mayor. Politics during his terms continued to be dramatic. In May of 1969, only eighteen days after Dyke took office, the predominantly student Mifflin Street neighborhood, the counter-culture center of the University community, erupted over the question of a "block party." The next year welfare demonstrators occupied the state capitol. A major riot was precipitated in May 1970 by the American incursion into
Cambodia and the killing of the four students at Kent State. The violence of this period seemed to culminate in the August 1970 Sterling Hall bombing where one University physics researcher, Robert Fassnacht, was killed in a blast so large that it blew many windows out of the building. Major outbreaks of violence declined in the post-Sterling Hall spectre. Nonetheless a second riot in Mifflin (or "Miffland" as it came to be called) capped Dyke's first term, and street skirmishes continued to blot Dyke's second term in office.

Politics in such an atmosphere were quite strained. Resolutions concerning the war, themselves a sign of polici-zation, often brought packed Council chambers, with some spectators vocally intruding on Council proceedings whenever they saw fit. Meetings were sporadically disrupted by the necessity of clearing the chambers as the result of bomb threats. The life of Bill Dyke, a firm supporter of Nixon's Vietnam policies, as well as the lives of members of his immediate family, were continually threatened. Police routinely checked the mayor's car for the presence of explo-sives.

It is the two major incidents with their direct roots in city affairs, the Mifflin riots of 1969 and 1971, that will be of most concern to this study. As both incidents were a direct response to the actions of city officials, as well as being indirectly a reaction to the tensions of the Vietnam era, these are the areas of violence in which the impact of
mayoral action can be expected to be most apparent. The thesis of this chapter is that the style of the Ideologue not only added to the polarizations that plagued Madison during this era, but was responsible for the level of disorder during the two Miffland outbursts—conflicts which might have been minimized if not avoided had the mayor not viewed politics in an unbending moralistic manner.

The 1969 Mifflin Riot. The Mifflin area of Madison is a mix of young and old. Located between the University and the state capitol, the area consists of old, somewhat deteriorated housing predominantly occupied by students. Mifflin Street, with the Mifflin "Co-op" (an alternative-style grocery store) as its symbolic center, became a center of anti-Vietnam sentiment and an anti-establishment life-style. Mifflin, however, is not entirely a student area. Mixed in among the students are a number of elderly residents who have lived in the area a good portion of their lives and who refused to move when the complexion of the neighborhood changed from its family to student character.

With the coming of warm spring weather, student residents of Mifflin announced that a block party would be held in the street on May 3. The block party was to be an expression of a freedom of spirit, openness of the community, and inter-human feeling—values which Mifflin residents saw to be lacking in a dominant society engaged in extensive military operations in Southeast Asia.
On the Saturday of the block party, two police officers were sent to Mifflin Street in response to a telephoned complaint by "a sickly, elderly woman" that a stereo was being played excessively loud (more than likely the music was being blasted from a porch into the street to help provide music for the "party"). Relations between the students and Madison's police force, which for the most part at that time was still dominated by "old guard" officers, were already strained as a result of previous street confrontations.

A back-up police team approached the people on the porch, an argument ensued, and a crowd of block party participants gathered. The police proceeded to bolster their strength according to their automatic procedures for such incidents. The incident touched off a three day riot marked (as were almost all such episodes during this period) by rock-throwing by students and the use of clubs and tear gas by the police.

Mayor Dyke was out of town with his son when the precipitating incident and the immediate escalation occurred. Police Chief Wilbur Emery and County Sheriff Jack Leslie made the decision to declare the block party an unlawful assembly as no permit to close off the street had been secured. According to Dyke the decision to call for help to disperse the crowd was made by the officer in charge of the scene. Whether Dyke had actually been involved in the decision to disperse the party lies in the realm of conflicting testimony.
By the second day of the disturbance, eighty arrests had been made. Among those arrested were two aldermen with student constituencies: Paul Soglin (arrested twice, once for obstructing an officer and once for unlawful assembly) who resided in and represented the Mifflin area, and Eugene Parks. Dyke made a brief day-time visit to the Mifflin community where he spoke via bullhorn to a large assembled crowd before the Mifflin Street Co-op. According to both the mayor and the students, little, if any, actual communication took place. The mayor refused to concede to the student demands that all charges against those arrested be dropped and that a block party permit be immediately issued. Dyke's view of the meeting was that only "total capitulation" would satisfy the rioters and "it was obvious there were no negotiations possible." 9

Dyke saw the whole question as a matter of principle and law: "We can't let any group set up a no-man's land with a different code, different morals, and different responsibilities which are entirely outside the total community." 10 In the mayor's eyes there was simply "no provision in the city ordinance for the type of block party" 11 the students had in mind. Dyke's objections failed to mollify the block party proponents who pointed out that streets had been routinely closed in the past for American Legion parties, "soap box derbies, sledding, carnivals, and parades." 12 That Monday, though the mayor expressed his willingness to support an
ordinance generally providing for street-closing for block parties, he still refused to grant an immediate permit. The student-police street clashes continued for a third night. Tuesday saw calm finally return to the Mifflin community as Soglin and Parks made pleas to keep the scene quiet and Dyke withdrew the police from the area.

Dyke was conciliatory at a Council Committee of the Whole meeting acknowledging Park's and Soglin's concern over the situation and asking Council members to support Soglin's motion authorizing a street dance the following week-end. But in an emotionally charged meeting two days later before an overflow crowd, the Council refused the permit by a lopsided seventeen to three vote. Dyke said if a confrontation erupted the upcoming weekend it would be "because the students chose to force it." But the week-end, when it came, remained calm as four hundred students "partied" instead at the farm of Fire Captain Ed Durkin, who had helped arrange Soglin's bail. Dyke even helped arrange bus transportation to the farm in order to avoid the outbreak of new trouble.

Under Dyke's instructions three city department heads began drafting a stringent block party ordinance. Block parties would be permitted only between eight A.M. and sunset upon application by seventy-five per cent of the residents over twenty-one in the affected area and the posting of $10,000 bond for possible damages. The age and bond requirements gave the proposed ordinance a definite anti-student
flavor. But the question of even such an ordinance soon became somewhat clouded as the result of a ruling by city Attorney Edwin Conrad that the closing of streets for purposes of "adult recreation" was in violation of state law. The Council consequently passed the buck to the state legislature to enact the appropriate enabling legislation.

The 1969 Mifflin controversy came to an end when on Sunday, May 25, less than three weeks after the initial outburst, two block parties were held in town under "parade" permits. One was for a Shriners parade around Capitol Square which concluded with a block party-type event in front of the Masonic Temple. The other was for a one-block "parade" along Mifflin Street. The latter "parade" lasted until five P.M., when the permit expired and people went home without disturbance. Consistent with his managerial view of delegation, Dyke did not partake in the actual making of the decision to allow the parties, but merely backed up the advice of his subordinate, Police Chief, Wilbur Emery. As Emery had already granted the Shriners permission for a parade, a permit for a similar event on Mifflin Street could not at that point be reasonably denied, as one member of the City Attorney's office observed:

I believe he (Dyke) had nothing to say about it. Emery had put himself in a box...The mayor was not involved in that at all.

The Intervening Period. In January, 1970, the City Council approved a block party ordinance, specifying that
applications for such parties be filed with the city clerk, and that the mayor, police chief, fire chief, and public works director give their recommendations to the Council before the Council itself would make a decision.

April of the year saw an outbreak of anti-war "trashing" in the campus area with the necessity of police having to overturn student erected barricades on Mifflin Street and in the surrounding area. Damage totalled $100,000 and twenty arrests were made. Dyke reacted by proposing a thirty day moratorium on parades and street demonstrations be enacted, and that sponsors of demonstrations be required to post bond to cover possible damages.

Two weeks after these incidents students in Madison, as in other college communities, spasmodically exhibited their outraged reaction to the Cambodia invasion and the Kent State shootings. A local supermarket was firebombed, street action commenced and the National Guard was called in. At the request of his police chief, Dyke submitted his resolution banning parades on State Street (the University business district) and requiring the posting of bond for all demonstrations. The Council spurned the bond requirement, but accepted the parade ban in light of the damage "trashing" inflicted on businesses in the campus area.

August brought with it the Sterling Hall bombing. Two Mifflin block party permits were also approved that summer.

The 1971 Mifflin Riot. In October of 1970 the State
Supreme Court ruled against the city's granting to the Bus Utility exclusive use of the "wrong-way" lane on University Avenue on the basis that all city streets must be kept open to all traffic unless otherwise provided for under state law. City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled the decision voided Madison's block party ordinance as such closing of streets was not specified in the state statutes.21

The spring 1971 mayoral primaries showed the shakiness of Dyke's electoral position as the result of the turbulence of his first term in office. Though the mayor led the field with nearly forty-three per cent of the March primary vote, he was outpolled by the combined vote of his two liberal opponents, Leo Cooper and Paul Soglin. His opponent for the April election was Cooper, who actually finished only 520 votes, or one percentage point, off the lead.

With less than a week to go to the election, Dyke, citing Conrad's opinion, vetoed a permit granted by the City Council for a Mifflin Street block party to be held the week-end preceding the spring election. Also taken into consideration by Dyke was Police Chief Emery's view that the holding of a block party would be imprudent in light of his estimate that a thousand radicals would be coming to Madison as part of an announced "New Nation Conference."22 The conference was in fact more public relations on the part of some elements of the left than substance. Other than the tacking of wall posters publicizing the event, the conference never materialized.
Dyke's opponents considered the mayor's action to be politically motivated. A Capital Times editorial called the veto "a coldly calculated political act deliberately designed to provoke a response from sponsors of the party in order to bolster the mayor's flagging re-election campaign." The anti-Dyke newspaper further proclaimed that, "Instead of trying to conciliate and defuse a situation that has the potential for disaster, he (Dyke) is deliberately set upon a collision course."  

With aldermen, fearing possible political repercussions of being identified with Mifflin Street violence, the Council reversed its previous fifteen to five vote granting the permit. Some sort of a confrontation appeared inevitable. Emery cancelled all days off for city police and asked the assistance of other law enforcement units in the area.

April 5, the date of the scheduled illegal block party, was a strange day indeed. Police lined Mifflin in order to keep the street "open." Yet, because of the danger potential of the situation and the presence of an extraordinarily large number of law enforcement officials, no traffic actually went through Mifflin. Meanwhile a large crowd of students watched from and danced on the sidewalks throughout the day. Dyke in the meantime remained at what he called "command headquarters" in the City-County building.

The day was tense but peaceful. At nightfall, however, after the crowd had thinned and the music stopped, the
disorder finally happened. Compared to the level of violence Madison experienced in similar situations in the past, the disruption and especially the precipitating incidents were of a relatively minor nature. Some students engaged in rock throwing; the police commenced a steady barrage of tear gas. The usual "hit and run" situation followed.

To Dyke the responsibility for the incident was clear:

The confrontation was caused by a small group of willful people who were determined to subject the city to a bad day in the streets, permit or not... This type of planned coercion and willful confrontation cannot be condoned, nor can it be the basis of city acquiescence.

Two days later Dyke won re-election with fifty-three percent of the vote. According to both The Capital Times and Cooper supporters, the Mifflin incident was an important factor contributing to Dyke's unexpected strength in the blue-collar near east side of Madison. Dyke campaign workers even hastily distributed a pre-election brochure on the East Side underlining Cooper's role in supporting the block party. Dyke carried four of these "industrial" wards which had eluded him in the previous election.

THE VIEW FROM THE MAYOR'S OFFICE AND THE SPECIAL COSTS OF IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP

To Dyke the riots on Mifflin Street were not simple disturbances but rather were the expression of a more far-reaching "attitude" which could not be tolerated:
What happens is an attitude develops and then you test it...And you find out whether you have reason to believe what your senses and your information indicates to you to be the case. In the first case (referring to the first Mifflin incident), what (it) seemed to me (to be) was a simple, almost family-type disturbance...We simply had a disorderly scene, Period. A disorderly scene is something that should be wrapped up without additional difficulty...But what happened here was that we found that this was not just an incident but was a pattern of repeated incidents and a commitment to repetition.31

To put this in the context of the times, we had in Madison simply one chapter of a volume of national character which was almost in a sense like guerrilla theater.32

Dyke is certainly correct in his assessment that the fundamental cause of the Mifflin riots were then to be found in the national arena.

But the existence of a powderkeg is not a sufficient condition for a riot. There must be a "triggering incident"33 or a fuse. And the fuse in both Mifflin incidents was within the reach of the mayor. With advance knowledge of the 1969 block party, the mayor, had he wished, could have issued instructions to the police which might have minimized the chances of a major incident. The 1971 riot itself was the direct result of mayoral action. Had Dyke not chosen to veto a Council-passed block party permit or had he shown restraint in reacting to the rock throwing incidents in the thinning evening crowd, the disruption would have never taken place. Both riots, then, might have been avoided. But instead of trying to avoid confrontation, Dyke almost sought it out.
To Dyke a simple question of respect for the law and authority was at stake. In the first incident, as the block party participants had not sought formal permission for the event from the streets or police departments, the gathering could not be tolerated. As far as the second incident was concerned, a major factor in Dyke's decision to veto was his belief that the Mifflin people "don't end their parties when they say they are going to." The mayor thus felt that not only did students disturb their elderly neighbors by continuing their parties into the evening, but they showed an intolerable disrespect for authority by doing so. In the eyes of the mayor, respect for the authority had to be maintained even if the enforcement of this respect led to a disorderly scene. Thus when asked in the interview why he chose not to follow a course of action which would have diffused a potentially violent situation, Dyke concluded:

I knew I had potential conflict if the permit was granted. I knew I had potential conflict if the permit was not granted. But must we presume we live in a society where (if) people don't get their way they will, like little children, throw a tantrum in the streets.

Dyke demanded of himself the same respect for the law that he demanded of others. Dyke's reliance upon the City Attorney's voiding the city's block party ordinance is thus crucial to understanding his 1971 Mifflin veto:

If I choose to participate in an action that I know to be against the law, then am I upholding what I swore to uphold? I think what it gets to then is could I knowingly, after I had been advised that it
was unlawful, acquiesce to the granting? And I believe I don't have the power to do that...we are talking a little bit about Watergate (if) you know what the law is and don't abide by it...36

Dyke might have used his discretion to underenforce the law (or to ignore the City Attorney's ruling) had he believed that the Mifflin residents were an integral part of the Madison community. But to Dyke they were outsiders. According to one member of the mayor's office the Mifflin students were seen as a "minority" which was "not generally looked upon with favor in the city."37 Other block parties in the city had been carried out by respectable segment elements of the community. But to Dyke the Mifflin Street happenings were not real parties, but were events which "were simply planned as a method of causing confrontations."38

Dyke, then, can be seen to be a man guided by principle. Just as his separation of powers ideology structured all his dealings within the city government, his firm commitment to respect for law and authority structured his response to the Mifflin situation. Dyke is once more the purist whose actions are individualistically determined. The Mifflin riots could have been avoided. But Dyke's purist adherence to his principles not only precluded his taking any action to defuse a potentially violent situation but led the mayor to take actions which helped precipitate the confrontations.

Even Dyke's appearance before the Mifflin Co-op during the 1969 incident was no real attempt at compromise. Dyke saw
the demands for his appearance to be simply a test of his
determination:

They (the rioters) had asked me to come down there. It was a test of whether or not I would. It was a test to see whether I had the courage to go in there...

It was designed to bring me out there, perhaps in a show of force maybe to force me to my knees and cause them to be able to have their demands acceded to--which wasn't going to be the case.39

With the mayor refusing to consider demands concerning amnesty for rioters or the immediate issuance of a block party permit, the riots continued for a second and third night.

Dyke's actions in the Mifflin riots, then, can be successfully explained by the principles to which he adhered. Such an explanation does not necessarily compete with the alternative view that Dyke sought the 1971 confrontation in order to further his election chances. Mayors, like all men, are complex creatures who act as they do for complex reasons. It is conceivable that Dyke acted as he did in 1971 to force the confrontation both as a matter of principle and as a means of advancing his electoral chances. The evidence on this score is not clear enough to allow any observer an accurate view as to just what the mix of motives was behind Dyke's 1971 approach to the Mifflin "party."

Yet, only the "principles" theory can explain Dyke's attitude toward both the 1969 and 1971 Mifflin outbreaks. Confronting the Mifflin problem the week just before the spring election, Dyke could conceivably have sought to shore
up a shaky electoral position in 1971. But in 1969, Dyke approached the Mifflin riots only eighteen days after he had won a fairly easy election. With the next election still two years away, he had no immediate need to adopt a tough law and order posture.

Using the typology of mayoral leadership styles presented in Chapter One as a perceptual lens, it appears Dyke's actions can fit the requirements of both the Ideologue and the Partisan. Dyke's actions fit the model of the Ideologue to the extent that they were the result of his individualistically established views of the Mifflin community and his belief in the principle of obedience to authority. But Dyke can also be viewed as a Partisan leader in that he advanced the law enforcement goals of the more conservative elements of the Madison community. According to the Partisan perspective, Dyke simply defined his constituency, which was less than city-wide, and continued to advance its interests, no matter what dissensus might be the result.

No matter which is the correct description of Dyke's style in the Mifflin incidents, Ideologue or Partisan, the important factor to note is that his actions served to increase the conflict. Whether Dyke's goal orientation was individualistically determined or rooted in a sense of constituency which constituted only a partial segment of the local community, his actions helped induce violent confrontations where such occurrences might have been avoided. And
once these outbreaks occurred, attempts to mitigate their extent were for the most part subordinated to a law enforce-
ment approach.

Dyke was successful in terms of his own goals; he established a law enforcement, no-nonsense attitude towards dissident elements of the Madison community. In terms of his own priorities, Dyke gained what he sought in the handling of the Mifflin disturbances; a tough law and order orientation toward the Mifflin community was maintained. Yet, Dyke's conflict-oriented leadership style had the consequences of increasing the levels of both tension and explicit violence witnessed by Madison. To Bill Dyke and his supporters the benefits of instilling of respect for authority among members of the student community outweighed whatever costs in terms of an increased level of polarization might have occurred. Still, Dyke's action brought with it the costs of so increas-
ing the polarization of the city that it must be noted. And as far as the mayor's long-term influence was concerned, as one member of the mayor's office recognized, Dyke's Mifflin actions helped create an image of the mayor as a "divisive person" which severely plagued him throughout his four years in office.\[40\]
A leadership style, such as that of the Partisan or the Ideologue, which does not require the assembling of a community-wide coalition may be the only way to advance a political actor's goals in a conflict setting. A mayor who achieves his goals through such an approach must be judged a success. However, as this analysis of the Mifflin Street riots and the previous description of events surrounding the 13-C bus controversy make clear, such leadership also has a potential for greatly increasing the level of polarization in the community. Whether or not the benefits derived from such action are desirable in light of the polarization which might result is a subjective judgment dependent upon an observer's weighing of the relative costs and benefits which result from the specific actions undertaken.

But the potential for rancorous conflict in a community is not determined solely by the style of leadership a city's political head chooses. The potential for conflict is also to a great degree dependent on the nature of the issue in question. Issues can be seen to occupy a place along a continuum ranging from those which involve only divisible rewards to those which involve only indivisible rewards. When a divisible policy is at stake, benefits can be apportioned among the competing political groups in such a manner that each group
can be made to feel that it has achieved its objectives to a certain degree. The apportionment of some "piece of the pie" to every group concerned thus lessens the degree of grievance a group suffers when it is denied any success in the political arena. An indivisible policy involves an "all or nothing" benefit; either a group gets the total rewards it sought or nothing at all.

The divisible/indivisible dimension presented here is not the equivalent of the famous "distributive"/"redistributive" typology formulated by Theodore Lowi.\textsuperscript{41} According to Lowi, as distributive policies are "made without regard to limited resources,"\textsuperscript{42} there is no necessity for one group to directly confront another in order to secure its share of political rewards. Redistributive policies, on the other hand, involve a limited universe of political rewards, thereby creating a zero-sum game in which each group advances its interests only to the disadvantage of another group. But a policy can be divisible and distributive on one level without being divisible on another level. A "pork barrel" harbors program, for example, can be considered distributive on the national level. But as a specific harbor proposal cannot satisfy both constituents who want something for their district and environmentalists who may oppose it because of its adverse ecological impact, the program's benefits can be viewed for the most part as indivisible on the local level.

Similarly, divisible policy can be, but does not
necessarily have to be, distributive in nature. The setting of Madison's school budget provides an example of a policy that is simultaneously divisible and redistributive. The issue was redistributive in the sense that two groups saw their interests in mutually exclusive policies—increasing or decreasing proposed school expenditures. However, as the dispute involved dollar and cent figures which can be fairly easily manipulated, the budget was marginally adjusted so that everyone was able to walk away with something. The school board and its supporters, for example, received an increase over the previous year's appropriations; the mayor and tax-conscious citizens were able to point with satisfaction to the cuts in the proposed programs which were effected. Despite the redistributive nature of the budget controversy, then, "benefits" were successfully "divvied" out to the competing groups.

Where benefits can more easily be divided among competing groups, the potential for exacerbated conflict is minimized. A mayor with a conflict-oriented style runs less of the risk that his actions will lead to prolonged exacerbated conflict when the issue he is acting on is divisible by nature. The divisibility of benefits of the issue tends to act as a sort of safety valve; every group can be somewhat mollified by being granted part of the policies they desire. A mayor then can follow the conflict-oriented strategy in regards to such divisible issues without his actions necessarily engendering
divisive rancor.

No such hope can be taken by a mayor who adopts an Ideological or Partisan approach in an indivisible issue arena. When such an issue is at stake, the community is likely already polarized into competing groups. Bitter antagonisms likely prevail as each group recognizes the possibility that it may be the one whose wishes are for the most part ignored when the issue is finally resolved. The mayor who adopts a conflict approach in this situation is only likely to heighten already existing antagonisms. The conflict will become even more severe as the mayor personalizes the dispute. The camp which opposes the mayor's objectives may see him as the personification of evil. He may become an easy figure to hate, and the conflict may shift from the level of issues to the level of personality. The mayor's conflict style then will only serve to throw gasoline on an already potentially inflammatory situation. The potential for all-engulfing, community polarization a conflict style engenders when indivisible policies are at stake cannot be overstated.

This is not to say that the approaches of the Ideologue and the Partisan are suited only to policies that can be considered to be part of the divisible, not the indivisible, type. A mayor may choose to adopt a conflict style in an indivisible arena when issues such as busing, for example, are of such concern to him that he will not accept the immobilism a consensual leadership strategy will likely produce.
Conflict in a community can be engendered by a leader's style. A mayor who wished, for example, might take such a staunch moralistic stand against welfare patronage practices, that sectors of the public become embittered from the defenders of these operations; he would have, then by his style alone have generated a good measure of community conflicts on issues which are not indivisible by nature.

Yet, as has been theorized in this section of this chapter, the deployment of a conflict style is more likely to risk bringing latent or manifest tensions in a community to an intolerable level when the issue approached tends more toward the indivisible end of the divisibility continuum. Whether the specific goals a mayor is trying to achieve are worth risking such a danger is a matter for individual value judgment. But the danger is there nonetheless; it constitutes an extra cost that a mayor must consider when he is calculating the costs and benefits of any action insofar as both community harmony and his own political future are concerned.

Of the three major issues--budgets and taxes, the acquisition of the bus company, and the Mifflin block parties--William Dyke confronted as mayor, only one, budget and taxes, was easily divisible by its nature. Even when Dyke's severe cutting of the school budget became the center of city focus, the total fate of the program was not at hand. There was no either/or question concerning the fate of education in Madison. The process of education would continue more or less as it
always had. What was being debated was the less potent question of how large a marginal adjustment in appropriations should be. And this margin was manipulated in such a manner so that all parties involved could claim at least a partial victory.

The questions over acquisition of the bus system and the proper reaction to the Mifflin block parties could not as easily be adjusted at the margins to everyone's partial satisfaction. On the major question, there simply were no margins. Either the city bought the bus system or it did not; either the city permitted the block parties or it did not. Any attempt to resolve the dispute would leave one side outraged as it perceived that its major interests were being ignored.

Yet, even these issues were not totally indivisible. Though the major question could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all factions, the issues could still be approached in such a manner as to attempt to give something to everybody concerned. If Madison had entered the bus business via the contracting out of service or through a stock option tender as opposed to outright purchase, both sides could have claimed limited victory; the city would have bought the system over the mayor's objections but yet have done so in a manner Dyke preferred. Similarly, the granting of permission for student block parties upon the enactment of a city ordinance and the receipt of an application for a permit would have
given both sides claim to victory—the students would have their party, and the anti-student faction could claim a victory for respect for the law.

From his own perspective, Dyke's leadership must be judged a success—the city did not bow to the demands of the students. Yet the impact that his conflict oriented approach had on escalating the hostilities of that period must also be noted. The determination as to whether the policy outcomes achieved were worth the costs of increased community polarization remains a value judgment. The matter of engendered rancorous conflict, though, is less likely to become a negative factor in assessing the Ideological or Partisan styles when the issues approached are more easily divisible by nature.

A NOTE ON DECISION-MAKING MODELS IN URBAN POLITICS

Paul Schulman has perceptively noted that there exists a whole range of issues that because of the "indivisibility in the political commitment and resources they require for success" do not fall within the decision-making paradigms of incrementalism or the divisibility of public goods,44 (emphasis in original). Schulman points out that the initiation of an entirely new program sometimes entails such great "start-up" costs or that the expansion of a program might sometime be "beset by organizational thresholds or 'critical mass' points"45 that initiation or expansion must

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either be approved or denied en toto and are not subject to adjustment at the margins. Two cases Schulman cites as examples are the initiation of the Kennedy space program and the redevelopment of the inner city. 46

In addition to programs with great start-up costs or critical mass points, one further category of indivisible policies had been noted in this chapter--policies which entail benefits--whether they be tangible or symbolic 47--which by their nature cannot be "divided up" to keep everyone totally happy. There is just no simple way to enact half a school busing, police review or open enrollment plan or to permit half a block party to take place. The major stakes in the program are for the most part indivisible; limited busing and police review represents not so much the distribution of benefits to both sides but the loss by one of the factions in the dispute disguised by symbolic rhetoric.

More and more it is these indivisible issues--whether the issue be indivisible as a result of its start up costs or by its nature--which are beginning to dominate the arena of urban politics. The major issues which consumed Madison in the 1965-1973 years were for the most part indivisible. Both the building of an auditorium and the purchase and operation of a bus system entailed huge start up costs. The auditorium issue also tended to be indivisible by its nature as a result of the extreme polarization between the Monona Terrace and anti-Terrace factions. The Mifflin Street issue exhibited a
similar indivisibility as did the question of tolerance of pornography in Madison (a question which was not dwelt upon in this thesis).

Models of decision-making such as incrementalism and the pluralist bargaining over distributional benefits have only limited applicability to arenas characterized by the indivisibility of the policies at stake. Incrementalism and pluralist decision-making do not adequately describe policy making across the whole range of urban issues and should not be taken as the descriptive or behavioral norm. The limits to the applicability of these models must be recognized. Much more systematic work is needed in the field to understand how policies which entail large start-up expansion costs or principles which do not lend themselves to easy compromise get enacted.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PARTISAN LEADERSHIP OF A MELLOWED RADICAL

A FORMER STUDENT-ACTIVIST COMES TO POWER

In 1968 Paul Soglin, elected from the Mifflin Street neighborhood, was the first of what was to be a series of Madison aldermen who had their roots in the University student community. Soglin clearly saw himself as something other than a traditional politician:

"What extra income I need comes from driving (taxi)," says Paul. "I can't take a job that would co-opt me--make me an accomplice of the system." 1

It was this sort of self-conception as well as an outspoken style which separated Soglin from the city's more established liberal elements.

As alderman, Soglin seemed more often than not to be at the center of controversy. He actively participated in anti-Vietnam and anti-racism demonstrations and advanced resolutions concerning these topics at Council meetings--despite the outcries by Council conservatives that these matters were irrelevant to city business. As a result of constant verbal jostling with Mayor William Dyke both on and off the Council floor, Soglin gained the image of being the mayor's chief antagonist on the Council.

Soglin was arrested twice during the Mifflin disturbances. He sponsored a community meeting which featured speakers from the infamous Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society, a leftist student group of the
1960's, which resulted in some damage to the school administration building in which it was held. When he felt Madison police officials were preoccupied with arresting users of soft drugs instead of pursuing the purveyors of harder narcotics, he publicly released the names of nineteen city undercover narcotics agents. As a result of these and other similar actions, Paul Soglin to many Madison citizens became the symbol of the leftist leaning student constituency of the city.

Thus it is somewhat amazing that despite this radical background, Paul Soglin in the spring of 1973 was, at the age of 27, elected mayor of Madison. To a great extent Soglin's election was a lucky shot—"lucky" that four fortuitous forces came together to create a brief moment that allowed this alderman with a "downtown" (as student-inner city roots are referred to in Madison) background to assume the mayoralty.

First of all, only a three-way split in the liberal vote allowed Soglin to squeak through Madison's three-way primary. Dyke garnered 16,243 votes to lead the primary field, while Soglin and two more traditional liberal candidates, David Stewart and Leo Cooper, gained 11,485, 10,350 and 6,150 votes respectively. Considering the narrowness of Soglin's margin over Stewart, it seems likely that had Cooper not been in the race, Stewart, not Soglin, would have gained the ballot spot against Dyke in the general election.²

Second, in the primary and especially in the election,
Soglin benefitted from the efforts of what had been George McGovern's efficient Madison 1972 campaign organization. Only five months previous to the mayoral election, the McGovern people had turned out a 50,137 to 30,931 vote landslide in Madison for their candidate. This organization of skilled electoral practitioners divided among the three liberal candidates in the primary but pulled behind Soglin in the general election.3

Soglin's 1973 victory was also the result of the lopsided general election margins Soglin rolled up in the downtown student districts. While lagging approximately 5,500 votes behind his opponent in the 18 districts of the rest of the city, Soglin blasted Dyke by nearly a 9,000 vote margin in the four downtown predominantly student districts. Recently relaxed resident requirements as well as newly enfranchised 18-year old voters were likely contributors to Soglin's margin in these areas.

Finally, Soglin won the final election because, amazingly enough, the issue of the election was not Soglin. The issue was Bill Dyke. As has been pointed out in previous chapters, Dyke's Ideological governing style had so contributed to the polarized nature of Madison politics that many non-radicals were willing to vote for Soglin as the only alternative to Dyke. Dyke's "decent citizens" comments and the spectre of Berkeley-type radicalism he invoked during the campaign only served to fuel the emotionalism of the campaign
and further keep himself, and not Soglin, the center of controversy during the election. Had a more moderate, less ideological or less controversial mayor been Soglin's opponent, it seems fair to say that Soglin's radical roots would have lost him enough centrist voters to have precluded his election.

Soglin's election, then, occurred only because of the "uniqueness" of Madison's electoral situation in the Spring of 1973. But the question after Soglin's election was how true to his radical roots would he be as mayor. Some of Soglin's more ideological supporters expected radical change. Similarly many of the city's more conservative spokesmen saw Soglin to be the same person he was when he first came to the Council; and they expected the worst.

But the Soglin campaign effort perhaps belied something a little different. Though Soglin is a self-styled political independent who has refused to identify with either of the two major political parties as neither seems to express his political philosophy, Soglin's campaign promises differed little from what would have been expected from a traditional liberal Democrat. No outlines of specific radical programs were given. Soglin's promise to represent the "whole city" and not just his downtown student constituency was possibly something more than simple campaign rhetoric:

I've mellowed over the past five years. I'm more patient. I've seen that people are really scared--
soared of change and what's going to happen to them. They've got their homes and their families and they don't know what the future will bring.⁵

Some members of Madison's left remained skeptical. Ken Mate, writing a pre-election staff column for the University's leftist leaning newspaper, The Daily Cardinal, criticized:

Paul Soglin is in reality and has always been an opportunist. He's a left-winger, don't get me wrong; he's generally come out on the right side of issues, and he's defended our interests well in the city council. He's done this not because he holds a principled position, but because he knows we elected him, and he's beholden to us.⁶

After excoriating Soglin for having crossed the community by advocating non-violence during the Mifflin riots and for failing to speak to such radical concerns as "the connections between...high rise apartment development in the central city and the real estate companies that control that development" or the defense of Karleton Armstrong, accused of the bombing of Sterling Hall, Mate concluded:

Paul's stand is really immaterial. It is we who must take a principled stand and go to the polls with our eyes open. Paul Soglin is the best candidate for us, not because he can lead us, but because we can exert the most control over him--which is the way it should be.⁷

At his inaugural ball, the new mayor removed his dress shirt to reveal a T-shirt bearing the inscription "Mellow Man." The act was clearly something that a traditional politician would never have done. But the substance of the message on the shirt seemed to contradict the symbolism of the act.
The purpose of this chapter will be to identify the governing style of Paul Soglin and to begin to determine just how "radical" his orientations and actions have been as mayor. The focus of this analysis will be on the mayor's handling of the four major controversies of his first term in office—the building of the Atwood Bypass, the construction of public housing in the Triangle redevelopment area, the settlement of the auditorium dispute, and the defense of Police Chief David Couper. In each case the same basic pattern emerges; the mayor exhibits extremely strong action orientations which are moderated by pragmatic concerns for the enactment of his programs and the protection of his own power position. The general argument of this chapter will be that, in terms of the typology presented in Chapter One, Paul Soglin's actions are consistent with those of the high direction, conflict-oriented Partisan leadership approach.

THE ATWOOD AVENUE BYPASS CONTROVERSY

The downtown area of Madison is located on an isthmus between two fairly large lakes—a topographic situation which acts to restrict the number of street approaches to the city's central business district from the residential centers on the East and West Sides. Atwood Avenue is the major thoroughfare to the downtown area for residents of the city's far East Side and the neighboring town of Monona. By the time Paul Soglin took office in 1973, the city had developed plans, awaiting
only final City Council approval, for the construction of a four-lane bypass to relieve the rush-hour traffic bottleneck which formed at the intersection of Atwood Avenue and Winnebago, commonly known as Schenk's Corner. The mayor's decision on the project precipitated the first crisis of his administration.

Reflecting his leftist student roots, Soglin was personally committed to an environmentalist viewpoint which emphasized the development of mass transit as opposed to the building of new roads, which were seen to compound the air pollution and traffic problems experienced by downtown residential neighborhoods. Soglin was thus personally inclined against the Atwood project as it would, in his words, "hurt mass transit." 8

But Soglin was hesitant to veto the project if it gained Council approval, fearing that such a move on his part would jeopardize the good working relationship with the City Council he had been working so hard to establish. Soglin was well aware of the fervent desire for the project by East Side aldermen who felt that the transportation needs of their constituents had been routinely ignored while the city had built new highway projects on the city's West Side one after another.

Soglin was also reluctant to use his veto as he wished to avoid the divisiveness, especially the polarization between the Council and the mayor's office, which plagued his
Soglin saw his approach to governing to be totally different from that of William Dyke: "You will not see me using the veto 4 times." Soglin thus decided to shelve his environmental concerns in favor of his desire to maintain rapport with the Council, and announced in advance of the Council vote that he would abide by whatever decision on the project the Council reached.

When the Council at last finally approved the construction of the bypass, the mayor once again found himself torn between his environmentalist views and his desire to maintain a harmonious working relationship with the city's legislature. This time his leftist instincts won out. One day he suddenly emerged from his office and announced to the surprise of his office members that despite his earlier statement he had now decided to veto the bypass. The process by which he reached this decision was totally individualistic; members of Madison's left were not even informed of the decision in advance in order to have them organize expressions of public support for the mayor's action.

The veto, in light of the mayor's previous promise to abide by the Council's action, took most city hall observers by surprise. East Side aldermen were intensely bitter; one member of this bloc observed, "The honeymoon is over between the mayor and the Council." The move to override the mayor's veto fell only two votes short of the necessary three-fourths Council vote.
But the mayor's victory was short-lived as East Side aldermen threatened to hold Soglin's major project hostage if the Atwood decision was not somehow reversed:

It was made quite clear that if I wanted to get anything done as far as major things I was interested in the next two years, the Capital Concourse, the State Street Mall, some of the planning things, the Atwood Avenue Bypass couldn't be totally junked. That message got to me loud and clear.12

It wasn't just the Mall, though. It was two years that was at stake...a working relationship between the Council and the mayor's office.13

Under the threat of this severe sanction, Soglin abandoned his purist environmentalist stance and formulated a compromise; a two-lane bypass would be constructed instead of the previously approved four-lane project. In the words of some city political wags, Soglin had with the wisdom of Solomon split the baby in two. In order to gain approval of the compromise "halfpass," though, Soglin was put in the very strange position of urging the City Council to reconsider their previous failure to override his veto. This was accomplished when one previously absent alderman and one close aldermanic friend of the mayor were convinced to vote for the override.

Soglin's compromise, though successfully instituted, alienated many of the city's leftist activists, including one alderman who caustically observed, "Put a little heat on a politician and he'll fold up--to hell with principles."14

East Side aldermen, still fuming over Soglin's initial veto,
were at least propitiated enough by the halfpass proposal to refrain from severing cooperative relationships with the mayor. Said one East Side alderman, "We showed we're willing to work with him, and he showed he's willing to work with us."15

The bypass consisted of only two lanes, both going outbound from the downtown area. Soglin took satisfaction that by not adding a traffic lane inbound to the city, he had done little to add to the traffic flow downtown and had secured the best feasible arrangement considering the circumstances. East Side aldermen took satisfaction in that, at last, something had been done for their side of town. Evening rush hour congestion was relieved, and a re-timing of the traffic signal at Schenk's corner in light of the reduced volume of outbound traffic at the intersection as a result of the bypass, had had even eased the flow of morning traffic into the city as well. They considered the two-lane project the most that they could obtain, considering Soglin's continued staunch opposition to any four-lane proposal.

Doctrinaire environmentalists remained unappeased by the mayor's actions. They believed the mayor had abandoned his principles and had gained little in return. What sense did it make, they pointed out, to improve the downtown environment by building the Mall and Concourse if projects like the Atwood Bypass brought more traffic to the inner city? Furthermore, they pointed, that the path cleared for the bypass was wide
enough to accommodate possible expansion of the roadway to
four lanes some time in the future.

The mayor's action in this first controversy he faced in
office offers us insights into the two major elements of his
political style--his sense of direction and his pragmatism.
Soglin had a definite commitment to those leftist/liberal
principles he brought with him to office. His environmental-
ist goal orientations finally overwhelmed his initial
inclination to, in Broker-like fashion, simply reaffirm what-
ever consensus the City Council reached on the project. The
totally dissimilar views of the environmentalists and the East
Side aldermen, foreclosed any mayoral attempt to build an
overarching consensus behind a possible solution. Soglin
clearly understood that any action he took would only serve to
embroil him in conflict: "From a political standpoint the
most foolish thing I could have done was veto these bids. It
would have been easier to let it roll merrily along."16 Paul
Soglin's goal orientations led him to seek, not avoid,
conflict.

But despite the mayor's environmentalist outlook, he was
a political realist. He had other programs and goals which he
wanted to achieve which he was unwilling to sacrifice for the
sake of an ideologically correct stance on the Atwood ques-
tion. He also wanted to maintain a good working relationship
with the Council. Consequently, when the resolve of the pro-
bypass aldermen was made blatantly apparent to him, he sought
a compromise—a compromise which he felt achieved as much of his environmentalist goals as possible without sacrificing his concerns in other areas.

It is in his willingness to compromise when he recognized the power realities of a situation that distinguishes Soglin's governing style from that of the Ideologue. The Ideologue, concerned only with his purist commitment to his principles, would have rigidly persisted with what he saw to be the "correct" stance, despite however strident the opposition became. Paul Soglin definitely did not show this purist rigidity in his handling of the Atwood matter. But it is for this ability to be flexible that Soglin is attacked for by members of the city's left who see only the mayor's sacrifice of principles.

THE TRIANGLE REDEVELOPMENT CONTROVERSY

The question of the Triangle redevelopment project is the second longest running controversy in Madison, ranking only behind the decision concerning an auditorium for duration on the city's political agenda. In 1954 renewal of the "Bush" neighborhood, an area slightly south of the University, was begun when 7.5 acres of land and forty housing units were cleared for the construction of a housing project.17 In 1963 the entire Bush neighborhood was raised in a massive land clearance program, with the area's predominantly Italian and minority population dispersed through the rest of the city.
The project in destroying an entire neighborhood and letting most of the land remain vacant represented the worst of urban renewal. The project engendered such hostility among displaced residents and people of other areas who feared that their neighborhoods might be targeted next that a citizen's initiated referendum banning future redevelopment projects was only quite narrowly defeated at the polls.

Of particular concern to city officials was the question as to what exactly should be done with the remaining piece of triangular-shaped land which remained vacant. Former residents of the neighborhood believed that the city had promised that housing would be constructed on the site and that all former residents who wished would be allowed to return to their old neighborhood. Though as the years passed few, if any, of these citizens exhibited any desire to return to the area, they still believed that the city had made a moral commitment to them that it ought to fulfill. As the question of the Triangle dragged on through the 1960's and early 1970's, members of Madison's left also chimed in with the demand that people would best be served if low-income and elderly housing were to be constructed on the site.

Inflation, a tight money market, and the drying up of federal housing funds during the Nixon administration made housing plans for the area less and less feasible. Low-income housing simply could not be constructed with the fiscal constraints of the time. And Mayor William Dyke was less
than enthusiastic for housing which he feared would soon be occupied by university students—a group whose costs of education he felt should not be subsidized by city taxpayers. Still Dyke was insistent that something be built in the area in order to return the land to the city tax rolls. Thus in 1972, much to the outrage of the housing proponents, a section of the Triangle was designated by the City Council as a site for a "hotel or motel and unified grouping of retail stores, shops and businesses which are compatible with the Triangle area's functions as a major medical center and urban living area." Backers of the plan felt that a hotel built across the street from Madison General Hospital would accommodate people from outside the city who came to visit their relatives in the hospital.

The actual question of rezoning the parcel from residential to commercial use came to the City Council's agenda a half year after Paul Soglin became mayor. Soglin, true to his leftist/liberal principles, had fervently opposed the hotel project as alderman. Now, members of Madison's left expected the mayor to veto the rezoning and put an end to the much hated hotel plan.

But despite his own convictions for housing and despite the constant pressure he received from the left, Soglin expressed concern for the "very serious legal problems" city rejection of the Holiday Inn proposal would incur. The major problem, as the mayor saw it, concerned developer's
rights over the land:

We could have terminated it (the hotel plan)...But the important point was to make the developer waive the right as a private developer to change the use of the land. We could have cut the developer off and taken the site from them so that they could not have developed it. But because the site was designated for a hotel—once that happens any person who has once been a developer on a project can change the proposed use of the land; so that if they lost the land, the rights to develop it, it still would be designated a hotel site.

The only way you could change it from a hotel site to, say, housing, would be to get the permission of everyone who had developer's rights to the parcel. I felt it wouldn't do much good to take the land away from them if it still had to be a hotel...

The mayor also feared that a veto would bring court action which would tie up the parcel in question foreclosing any opportunity to build housing during his term in office.

Hence, much to the outrage of the city's left, Soglin refused to veto the rezoning. Instead, he sought to manipulate the matter in such a way as to insure that it would be the developer, and not the city, who failed to meet its legal obligations. In the words of Madison Redevelopment Agency Director Sol Levin, the city had to "get around to the position where we (the city) were the injured party and not the 'injurers.'"20

The city granted the rezoning, which Soglin and the city attorney had felt they were obligated to do by past actions, only after the developers agreed to a June 30, 1974, deadline by which they would have to have their financing for the project in order. According to the signed agreement, if
financing was not obtained by the specified date, the developer would surrender all rights over the parcel in question. As the city could have legally taken the land away without the agreement (though the developer would still retain controlling say over the designated use of the land), the developer, believing that financing could be obtained, acquiesced to the mayor's proposal.

Soglin believed that in light of both the tight money market and the recent construction of other hotels in the city, there was little chance that financing would be arranged by the date specified. As one member of the mayor's office explained the strategy:

We knew that the hotel business in this city was overbuilt...The Sheraton was about to go into bankruptcy...The Hilton was about to be finished and everybody knew that the Hilton was going to be empty...We knew that Opitz (the developer) could not raise the money to build the hotel, because we knew there had been a study showing the hotel industry had been overbuilt in this town. And we knew that if we found out about this study, the chances were better than ever that Holiday Inn Corporation probably knew the results of that study too...

There's no way that Holiday Inn is going to lay out that kind of cash at steep interest rates to build a hotel that's going to be empty.21

To Soglin, the agreement was a "gamble;"22 construction of the hotel would continue if financing would be arranged by the date certain. But in the mayor's words the path he chose was also the surest way "to make sure we'd be able to stop the project."23

The strategy proved to be a total success. The developer
failed to produce final plans and financing details by the June deadline, and control over the property reverted without a court fight to the city. Soglin immediately announced his recommendation that plans be commenced for the construction of low-cost housing, preferably for the elderly, on the site of the ill-fated hotel. Within two months plans for 175 units of elderly housing and 20 units for persons with spinal cord disabilities were revealed. Housing now occupies the once controversial parcel.

Faced with the results of the mayor's actions, Madison's left, which had been quite sharp in its criticism of Soglin for not vetoing the project, admitted the strategy to be a success. But despite their overall satisfaction with the results of the mayor's actions, members of the left still expressed their dissatisfaction with the way Soglin handled the matter. The University student newspaper, The Daily Cardinal, ambiguously titled its article on the outcome of the Triangle controversy "Soglin's Kindest Cut of All?"

The Daily Cardinal article: "Since last September he (Soglin) had staunchly and stubbornly defended the Council's rezoning on moral and legal grounds. The city is committed, he said, because of its original agreement with the developers and therefore I cannot veto the zoning change."

"Well, there weren't many who were impressed with the moral weight of that argument. Not Kay Phillips (the alderman leading the anti-hotel fight), not the vast majority of Paul's left constituency, and not the old and tired people of the Bush, displaced by the city over 12 years ago on the promise they could return to their land and live in new, better homes someday." (emphasis my own).
An aldermanic member of the left: "I felt it (Soglin's strategy) was a ridiculous chance to take. It was a matter of principle."\(^{26}\) (emphasis my own).

Another aldermanic member of the left, who, in retrospect, admits that Soglin's strategy succeeded: "But he didn't make his reasoning clear...He developed his reasoning after he did it. Again, that's the stylistic thing I object to."\(^{27}\) (emphasis my own).

The left's objections to Soglin, then, even in victory, was with the mayor's lack of principle. They felt he had a moral obligation to veto a proposal which was against their "people's" philosophy. But this Soglin refused to do.

According to one member of the mayor's office, Soglin's refusal to veto the rezoning "was an example of (the mayor's) not taking a symbolic act which was going to end up being detrimental to the city, and detrimental politically."\(^{28}\)

In the Triangle redevelopment controversy, then, Paul Soglin saw himself as a leader of the faction which wanted the city to develop "people's" programs. The path of action that the mayor finally chose to take was individualistic to the extent that it alienated even members of the coalition who had the same program goals as he. But this is not to say that Soglin was an Ideologue who acting on the basis of his own principles spurns possible coalition-building. He was not blinded by his own values, but merely was reacting to the legal realities of the situation. Refusing an expression of his purist commitment to correct principles, he chose instead a strategy with greater chances of obtaining tangible success.
The Mayor Backs Law Park. The building of an auditorium and civic center does not as clearly deserve to be labeled a "people's" program as does the building of low-income housing or the furthering of mass transit. Still Paul Soglin was a strong proponent of bringing an auditorium to Madison. Soglin believed that "the arts play a very important part not only in the social but the political development of a community." 29

Soglin revived the auditorium controversy when, two months after his election, he announced the formation of an Auditorium Committee. At the same time that the mayor announced his support for a facility at Law Park (the now more common name for the area below Monona Terrace), he also expressed his willingness to listen to other alternatives, including the possibility of the city's acquiring and totally renovating the old Capitol Theater on State Street—a proposal which had the strong backing of the Central Madison Committee, an offshoot of the Chamber of Commerce, as well as a number of aldermen. The chief advantage of the State Street proposal was one of greatly reduced costs. Acquisition and renovation of the Capitol Theater was estimated at a $3.6 million to $6.8 million cost; 30 construction of a Law Park facility, still the goal of the proponents of the old controversial Monona Terrace proposal, was estimated at a cost of at least a whopping $10.6 million. 31
Still, Soglin, albeit with some reservation, supported Law Park: "If I see that the Law Park site isn't feasible, I'll make a commitment to the State Street site." According to the mayor, Law Park offered "much more in the way of esthetics and simply more in the way of tangible, physical assets." When the City Council deadlocked on an 11-11 vote, the choice of site selection rested solely on the shoulders of the mayor. Soglin broke the tie in favor of Law Park.

An $8.5 million auditorium bond referendum was placed on the April 1974 ballot to finance the additional costs of building the Law Park project. Together with the $5.5 million the city still had available in the old auditorium and parking fund accounts, passage of the new referendum would ensure that the city could construct a facility for as much as $14 million. Soglin admitted the figure was inflated and that the full amount of the money requested was not likely going to be needed for the project; he just wanted the flexibility the margin allowed. In light of the rancorous controversy the question of funding an auditorium always provoked in Madison, Soglin simply wanted to avoid the difficult task of requesting additional funds if the initial bond request came up short of covering the actual costs of the project.

Immediately, the old factional lines in the controversy were re-energized. Former Mayor Otto Festge was granted use of Soglin's office to announce the formation of a citizen's group urging a "yes" vote in the referendum. The Capital Times
joined in the campaign with its constant editorial bombardment behind its pet project. The leaders of the anti-Terrace faction in the past--Henry Reynolds, George Forster, Carrol Metzner, and Harold "Babe" Rohr--once more led the fight against the facility, urging with bumperstickers that citizens "Vote No on the $14 Million Blunder." And the Wisconsin State Journal, too, eventually resumed its position against the project.

The only new addition to these old factional lines in the age-old dispute was the entrance of a group of "downtown" leaders who organized "Central City People for a No Vote." This element of Madison's left believed that an auditorium would benefit residents of Madison's wealthier suburbs who were not even contributing toward the costs of the facility's construction. They wanted the money which the city was proposing be spent on the project used for more people-oriented priorities. Soglin's response to this criticism was that Madison's citizens were not going to raise $8.5 million for other purposes if the auditorium was not built. Soglin, for his part, believed the money would be available for the auditorium and for nothing else.

Just before the referendum, Soglin requested that the Council obtain a second cost estimate of the Law Park facility. Leftist alderman Ray Davis, representing Soglin's old Eighth Ward student constituency, charged the securing of a second estimate was a "set-up" designed to obtain a lower cost figure
in order to gain voter approval. The new estimate put a final tab on cost at $12.4 million--$1.6 million less than what would be available if the bond referendum passed.

After a much heated campaign, the bond referendum received an almost two to one drubbing at the polls. Madison's East and West Sides voted overwhelmingly against the project; the central city split with only the three predominantly student districts approving the referendum. Madisonians, concerned with troubled national economic conditions, were unwilling to make the huge tax commitment the bond referendum called for. The old polarizations which had re-emerged during the campaign also took their toll.

Mary Lescohier, long-time supporter of a Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation designed facility, blamed Soglin for the defeat: "Mayor Soglin supported it, but not actively. He let it fall on its face." According to Lescohier, Soglin "never attempted to articulate support for it in any definite way, outside of saying that this was a majestic project." Soglin himself admitted to a lack of full-fledged enthusiasm on his part for the project:

I don't think I was as enthusiastic as some people who looked at it as an all-or-nothing proposition, and still today are looking for some sort of Law Park facility.

But despite whatever reservations he had that tempered his enthusiasm, Soglin did take those actions which were necessary to the advancement of the project. It was he that re-awakened
the possibility of a Law Park auditorium. It was he who cast the tie-breaking vote for Law Park instead of killing the proposal then and there. And in his public statements and the obtaining of a second cost estimate, it was he who tried to gain voter support for the referendum.

Still, Soglin, it appears, was aware of the political difficulties of the Law Park proposal and did not give it the energetic, day-to-day public backing he could have had it been his number one priority. But given the margin of the anti-Law Park vote, it is unfair to place the major responsibility for the failure of the referendum on the mayor's shoulders. As Soglin is quick to point out, the anti-Law Park atmosphere and the tight economic times, rather than his alleged lack of enthusiasm, were the primary determinants of the project's defeat.41

The Mayor Shifts Position and Madison Finally Gets an Auditorium. With the Law Park site repudiated at the polls, the State Street theater became the only game in town if Madison were to have any civic auditorium at all. Still somewhat shell-shocked by his defeat on the Law Park question, Soglin tried to keep his distance from tying himself to any further auditorium commitment.

But with City Council support mounting behind the Capitol Theater proposal, Soglin within a month became a backer of the State Street site. The Council passed a resolution, co-sponsored by Soglin, endorsing the concept of a State Street
auditorium. The mayor then flew to New York to begin purchase talks with RKO, owners of the Capitol Theater.

Two independent appraisals of the property were obtained, but were not publicly released as, the mayor admitted, they differed incredibly by more than 100 per cent. After a bitter dispute, the Council on a 12–8 vote, authorized, on Soglin's recommendation that the city pay up to $650,000 for purchase of the theater. Supporters of the move pointed out how a State Street auditorium would add to both the vitality of the downtown business district and the atmosphere that would be created by the State Street Mall. Opponents of the purchase objected that the city would be overpaying for an "old, ugly building" that had no prospective buyers other than the city. Furthermore, they pointed out that costs for acquisition and renovation were underestimated and would, in their minds, likely run "as much if not more than" costs for a Law Park facility. As an example, they cited that the purchase price did not include the title to the land under the theater's entrance which RKO did not even own. Under the Soglin proposal, the city would take over the 99-year lease for the land under the theater lobby with an eye to exercising the option to buy the land after the remaining fifty-one years of the lease expired, if not sometime sooner.

The Capital Times, still fervent in its support of Law Park, revealed the estimates Soglin had kept from the public in a front-page article headlined "Capitol Theater Worth
$280,000" and subtitled "Much Less Than City's Offer 'Secret' Appraisal Says."**44** Only deeply imbedded in the text of the article was there any mention of the second $800,000 appraisal figure—a valuation higher than the purchase price authorized by the city. Soglin claimed the differences in the appraisals resulted primarily from the different estimates that had been placed on the depreciation and income-generating potential of the property. He also cited that the higher appraisal was closer to the $695,000 valuation the city had placed on the property for tax purposes.

The mayor also lashed out at the *Times* and central city Alderman Eugene Parks, who had given the figures to the newspaper, for the difficulty the release would bring the city in negotiations over the property as, according to Soglin, RKO now knew it could get $800,000, the higher figure being the price the city would have to pay if it acquired the property through condemnation proceedings. Parks was quick to note how Soglin had seemed to have lost at least one of the radical principles he had held as alderman:

Soglin is the same guy who two years ago released pictures of undercover agents because he said the public had a right to know who they were. Now here he has been refusing to release information the public had to pay for.**45**

The mayor finally negotiated a purchase price of $600,000 for the theater; the city would actually pay $650,000 for the property, but RKO's Matthew Polon would buy two $25,000 tickets to the auditorium’s inaugural performance. Despite
the vehement objections of opponents of the purchase, the City Council approved the agreement.

But the celebration proved short-lived when Circuit Court Judge William Jackman issued an order restraining the purchase in order to hear the suit brought by Alderman Thomas George which claimed that the bond money which the city had used for the purchase was tied by the wording of the original 1954 referendum to Law Park. RKO, upset at the antics of the city, withdrew its offer to sell the building. Soglin again met with RKO officials and came back from the meeting with the belief that the theater would still be for sale only if the city moved quickly enough. 46

With seven of the twenty-two aldermen firmly set against the theater purchase, there appeared little chance of the mayor's getting the three-fourths Council vote to make the purchase out of general funds not specifically appropriated in the budget. Soglin, in consultation with Department of Administration Director Andre Blum, then hit on a scheme that would circumvent the George lawsuit. The city would take $200,000 from its land acquisition account and pay it to RKO as "earnest money" in a "land contract." The remainder of the originally negotiated price plus interest would be paid the next year when, twenty years after the 1954 bond referendum, the money presently in the auditorium account reverted back to general funds and was no longer subject to the restrictions of the original referendum. And as the $200,000 downpayment
260
came from existing account, only a simple majority vote of the Council was needed to approve the move. Despite the howls of some theater opponents who objected that under the mayor's "devious" scheme money intended for the purchase of other property was being "illegally" used for the acquisition of the theater, the Council approved the land contract on a twelve to nine vote.47

Madison's longest running controversy had at last been resolved. Madison finally had its auditorium—not the prestigious facility envisioned in the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation proposals, but an auditorium nevertheless.

Soglin's Style. Paul Soglin's approach to the auditorium is essentially that with which he approached the two controversies previously discussed in this chapter. He had a goal-orientation which precluded his adopting a bystandership approach to the dispute. He wanted an auditorium, preferably a Law Park, built. And because of this goal he entered into an issue area which in the conflict it entailed had swallowed up previous mayors in Madison since 1954.

Just as in his handling of the Atwood and Triangle disputes, Soglin again showed flexibility. Once Law Park was defeated, Soglin shifted his support to a State Street civic center. He did not in Broker-like fashion await the building of a consensus but instead provided direction in the dispute as the Partisan leader of one of the factions—first the Law Park faction, and later the State Street faction.
As in the two previous controversies, the mayor again drew a lot of flak from his erstwhile supporters. Some of the activist leaders split with Soglin claiming the auditorium was not a people's project. Downtown alderman Eugene Parks, a supporter of the Law Park auditorium, was enraged by the move of the theater to State Street. Similarly, Soglin severely strained his relationship with The Capital Times by shifting his support to the State Street theater. Once again, Soglin had alienated members of his coalition in refusing to exhibit a rigid, puristic commitment to goals.

But it was this same lack of rigidity that enabled the mayor to become a State Street auditorium supporter and use his leadership for the purchase and "recycling" of the old Capitol Theater. Had Soglin been ideologically committed only to what the left considered to be "people's" programs or had he been inflexible in his pursuit of the Law Park auditorium dream, Madison would still not have an auditorium today.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER MADISON'S POLICE CHIEF

The Mayor's Goals and the Charges Against Chief Couper. Soglin as mayor intended to establish a Police Department more civil than the one that had confronted students during the Vietnam protests and the Mifflin Street disturbances. More generally, his goals as far as the city's police were concerned were to
end any taints of discrimination in law enforcement, which is not to eliminate discretion. To eliminate any validity to the charges of harassment of any special groups or individuals. To make sure that there is even-handed law enforcement.48

Under the direction of newly hired Police Chief David Couper Soglin saw the possibility that his hopes would be generally achieved.

David Couper had been hired as police chief during the waning days of William Dyke's administration by the city's Police and Fire Commission (commonly referred to as the PFC) despite the strenuous objections of the then mayor to the liberal reputation Couper had earned as chief of the Burnsville, Minnesota, Police Department. But under Madison's weak mayor form of government, the mayor had little to say in the hiring process. All personnel matters concerning the police department, including the hiring of the chief, were placed by state statute in the hands of the PFC, whose five members were appointed to staggered five-year terms. Couper was hired on a three to two vote; two of Dyke's appointees, much like Supreme Court justices exerting their independence from the executive who appointed them, voted with the sole remaining Otto Festge appointee to hire Couper.

Couper's management of the Department upset many of the officers who liked the way things had been run prior to the new chief's arrival. The primary source of dissatisfaction was Couper's revised promotional procedures which emphasized "merit" rather than seniority as had been done in the past.49
The new chief's promotional tests, which emphasized subjective essays and oral examinations, resulted in several more experienced officers being bypassed for promotion in favor of younger, more community-relations oriented officers. Officers critical of the examination procedure charged that as objective measures of performance were lacking, the revised evaluation process allowed the chief to handpick promotions from his "inner clique" of officers who agreed with the David Couper philosophy of law enforcement.

Couper's reorganization of the Department, which involved both the reassignment of duties and a rescheduling of shifts to put more policemen in contact with the public, rankled those officers who over the years had worked themselves into positions they found to their liking. Of particular relevance in this regards was Couper's termination of the distinction between traffic and patrol duties; now personnel from what was the traffic department found themselves on patrol duty, and officers on patrol duty found themselves handling traffic matters.

Couper also removed the two full-time officers that had been serving with the County Drug Abuse Program. Publicly, the chief's rationale was that as no studies had shown the need for police officers on a drug abuse team the personnel that had been assigned there could be better utilized for other purposes. Though one officer was later assigned as liaison to the program on a part-time basis, Couper had
effectively killed the "baby" of Detective Roth Watson, head of the Metropolitan Drug Commission, with whom he apparently had a recent falling out. Watson soon became one of the more vocal anti-Couper leaders. The shake-up here had the full support of Mayor Soglin who viewed the police's presence in the program essentially as a "good PR job" by his predecessor, William Dyke, who had sought to make a name for himself in the area of drug abuse treatment.

Further dissatisfaction with Couper also resulted from the feeling of some officers that the chief could not be trusted. This credibility gap in part emerged as the by-product of "bitch sessions" the new chief held with the rank and file, in which some officers felt the chief would promise them to do one thing and then later would proceed to do the exact opposite. Many officers also felt that Couper had shown a lack of faith in them by ordering that they no longer carry an additional weapon, which he feared could be misused as a "drop gun."

Finally, many of the old guard officers were also wary of the new directions in which Couper seemed to be leading the Department. The new chief sought an approach to law enforcement "based strongly upon a human relations model rather than a military model." Of particular concern was the chief's soft line in handling student demonstrations. Furthermore, Couper, with his mustache and quite casual style of dress which sometimes included blue-jeans and overalls, did
not fit their picture as to what a police officer should look like. This wariness on the part of old guard officers was only increased by the apparent chumminess they saw between the new police chief and the new mayor (the two and their wives had even had a midnight supper together the night Soglin was elected); these officers still saw Soglin as the radical of the Mifflin riot days.

Couper was still serving his one-year probationary period when in August 1973, four months after Soglin's election, 103 of the 272 members of Madison's police force presented the PFC with a petition charging that "serious morale problems" and "serious rumors about fraud, mistrust, and mismanagement" had plagued the Department since Couper assumed control.58 No allegations more specific were given at the time.

The Mayor Intervenes and the Dispute Drags On. Firm expressions of support for Couper came from the mayor's office. Soglin said he saw no legitimacy to the charges against the chief, and put the matter quite succinctly when he said he'll "be damned" if he was "going to see a decent police chief run out of town."59 Citing Couper's admirable goals, Soglin swore that any move to oust the chief would be "fought with all the resources" he had.60

As three of the five PFC members were still Dyke appointees—including the two who had originally voted against hiring Couper, and one who, though she had voted for Couper, was now dissatisfied with the turn of events in the Police
Department—Soglin believed that in order to defend the chief he had to put jurisdiction over the complaints before a body that was more likely to be sympathetic to Couper than was the PFC. Soglin consequently informed the PFC that the mayor as the administrative head of the city's departments under state statutes, and not the PFC, had the responsibility for investigating charges of "mismanagement" levied against a department head. The PFC, according to Soglin, was charged with investigating only specific charges brought against specific officers—and, as he pointed out, no formal "verified complaint" had been filed against Couper.

But PFC President Andrew Somers believed that as the Commission had the right under state law to hire the chief then it also had the obligation to investigate any charges bearing on his retention during the probationary period. Consequently, in one of the long series of three to two votes which marked the controversy, with the Dyke appointees aligned against the Soglin appointees, the PFC voted to hire an investigator to probe the validity of the allegations contained in the petition.

But the City Council, with most aldermen apparently supportive of the type of change Couper seemed to be bringing to the Police Department, refused the PFC funds for the investigation. The mayor even tried to put some heat of his own on the PFC by publicly mulling over the possibility of bringing charges against the three Dyke appointees on the Commission
for having engaged in possible "influence peddling:"

I've heard that the chief has been told by commissioners that certain groups of promotions could go through the PFC easier if certain people were to be included.61

Somers responded to the influence peddling charges by filing a $1.5 million libel suit against the mayor—a suit which was eventually dismissed in court.

Ignoring both the seeming intent of the Council vote and the city attorney's ruling that the Commission lacked authority over the Couper matter, the PFC proceeded to act. In an incredible move, the PFC accepted the volunteer investigative services of former county judge Russell Mittelstadt. A Republican, super-patriotic, hard-line judge, Mittelstadt had a record number of "affadavits of prejudice"—one hundred times more than the number filed against any other Dane County judge62—brought against him by defendants who felt they could not obtain a fair trial before him. Mittelstadt as judge had sternly moralized defendants who had shown disrespect for such patriotic symbols as the American flag. And it was he who had found Soglin guilty of obstructing justice during the 1969 Mifflin Street riot and had shown the then-alderman little sympathy when Soglin complained that the police had unnecessarily cut his long hair during his quite short stay in jail.63 In light of his background no investigation conducted by Mittelstadt could likely have been accepted by a broad spectrum of the Madison community as unbiased.
Soglin countered the PFC probe and the Commission's consequent hearings by appointing his own investigatory panel of three reserve judges. The City Council then gave the mayor two overwhelming votes of confidence authorizing the formation of the panel and the mayor's hiring of legal counsel in the Somers libel suit. At the same time, the Council slapped the PFC by refusing to authorize funds for either the Mittelstadt probe or legal counsel for the PFC in its dealings with the three-judge panel and the courts.

The Mittelstadt report, released in December, contained a series of potentially damaging charges against Couper. The report pointed to Couper's promotional policy changes as the largest single source of the morale problems, and also underscored the concerns older officers had in regards to the chief's "mod" look, his disregard for the rights of Madison's citizens as exhibited in his soft response to student demonstrations, and his "being overly solicitous of the ultra-liberal elements of the Madison community." The report also contained a series of charges against the chief's personal conduct, including: that he swore at police officers, even calling one a "Nazi" and another an "asshole;" that he engaged in nude swimming at a party; that while "half in the bag" he had tried to pull up a girl's sweater at a party; that he had taken his wife and two guests who engaged in caressing activity for a ride on a police boat; that he filed improper moving expenses; that he discriminated in hiring against
officers with military reserve affiliations; and that he showed favoritism towards friends in hiring.

Couper blasted the report as "defamatory" and criticized Mittelstadt for failing to make a substantial effort to determine the validity of the charges. The chief denied most of charges outright. To the others he responded: the nude swimming incident occurred with the husband of a married couple behind a high fence while the women remained inside the house; his brother and sister-in-law engaged in no improper personal conduct when they accompanied him when he was unexpectantly needed for lake patrol duty; he used "colorful" language with officers only in private; and the lack of violence resulting from student demonstrations served as a testimonial to his proper handling of those incidents. Even the Wisconsin State Journal, which had and would continue to criticize Soglin's meddling into the Couper probe, denounced the Mittelstadt report:

It contains second-hand, hearsay allegations, not cross-checked. It contains vicious rumors and statements which have since been repudiated by the persons who reportedly made them.65

At the end of the year, seven members of the Police Department finally filed a verified complaint, along the lines of the allegations contained in the Mittelstadt report, against Chief Couper. With a verified complaint finally levied, jurisdiction over the matter, as decided by a local court ruling, now clearly rested with the PFC and not Soglin's three-judge panel.
Still, political support for the Commission remained weak. The City Council not only continued to refuse legal counsel for the Commission, but at one point even directed the city attorney to prepare a report on "the procedure and method for removing members of the Police and Fire Commission."

The PFC hearings were only a rehashing and fleshing out of the allegations contained in the Mittelstadt report. In May, the ninth month of the controversy, several of the minor charges against Couper were dropped.

The Soglin-appointed three-judge panel, when it finally released its findings, "totally exonerated" Couper; no impropriety was found in the chief's promotional procedures or in his personal conduct, except for his use of indiscreet language toward subordinates. But the report meant little as resolution of the matter now legally lay with the PFC.67

The Waters Muddy and Then Clear. Only one of the five PFC members had ever received Council confirmation of his appointment to the commission. Mayor William Dyke had experienced continual problems in getting the City Council to approve his list of appointments to Madison's many boards and commissions. When the Council rejected his appointment of Andrew Somers to the PFC, Dyke informed the city's legislature that a section of the state statutes had exempted PFC appointments from the requirement of Council confirmation. Dyke had set the precedent, and since then PFC appointments
were no longer submitted to the Council for its review.

In June of 1974, Circuit Court Judge W. L. Jackman ruled, in response to a suit brought by three citizens upset at the PFC's actions in the Couper case, that all nominations to the PFC required Council confirmation. That ruling clouded the status of the four members who had never received such confirmation.

Soglin believed that PFC appointments were exempted from the confirmation requirement. Still, he had to act within the constraints imposed by Jackman's ruling until the court's action could be appealed. Somehow, the status of the four PFC members in question had to be solidified if the Commission's investigation into the charges against Couper—a quasi-judicial matter which necessitated that any commissioner listen to the full range of testimony presented to the Commission in its hearings—was not to be begun anew in its entirety. Soglin thus ordered that the city appeal Jackman's ruling. In the meantime, Soglin urged that the Commission continue to meet despite its befuddled status.

Soglin did not want to go the route of submitting the names of the four disputed commissioners to the City Council. He feared that in light of the Council's past hostility towards the actions of the Dyke appointees that one or both of these people would not receive the vote of Council support and the prolonged Couper hearings would have to be begun anew.

But PFC President Somers, who wanted the status of the
four members in question cleared by Council action, forced
Soglin's hand. Somers refused to convene the PFC for the
hiring of twenty-seven new firefighters, a necessary move as
the city had reduced the work week of the firefighters from
56 to 48 hours, until the legitimacy of the Commission's
actions was determined. If the new firefighters were not
hired within a week, the city would be forced to pay about
$1800 a day in overtime to existing personnel; a two-month
delay in the hiring process would cost the city a net $70,000
in extra wages. Soglin looked at the finances of the matter
and commented: "Somers has got me in a box--he's got me over
a barrel. It's a damned shame that he's got this kind of
attitude, playing these kinds of politics."71

Soglin consequently submitted the names of all four per-
sons in question for Council confirmation. Strictly political
reasons kept the mayor from taking the opportunity of "dump-
ing" the two Dyke appointees:

A member of the mayor's office: "You had to have one
sort of standard. It would have looked a little
too heavy-handed to say, 'Look, I'll remove the two
others (the Dyke appointees) by not sending their
names down (to the Council)."72

Soglin: "From that point on, if I had refused (to submit
the names of the Dyke appointees for confirmation),
it would have been construed as my trying to stack
the Commission on behalf of Couper."73

Still, the mayor took great pains in the memorandum he sent to
the Council to point out that he submitted the names "under
great duress and (that) the submission of such names should
not be taken to imply support for any individual commis-
sioner." 74

The mayor was less than clear regarding the outcome he desired. Publicly he mulled over the possible legal morass that would result if any of the names were rejected. But behind the scenes he did nothing to garner Council votes behind the submissions; nor did he actively discourage such a vote.

Capital Times correspondent Rosemary Kendrick described the Council meeting:

The scene was among the most tense in recent Council history. One by one, the aldermen rose to bitterly chastise the PFC for its alleged abuse of power and flaunting of the public will. 75

The two Soglin appointees, who had generally dissented from the actions of the PFC majority, were overwhelmingly approved by 20-0 and 19-1 votes; the two Dyke appointees in question were rejected on 9-11 and 8-12 votes.

Conservative Alderman Michael Ley, who had urged "statesmanship" and had voted for the confirmation of all four nominees, apparently expressed the view of many of the aldermen when he noted that he was less than happy with "the power play thrown at the mayor" by the PFC majority. 76 But Ley was also incisive in his pointing to Soglin's ducking from having to make a politically difficult decision as to the composition of the PFC: "In turn, the mayor is putting the monkey on the back of the Council." 77

With the balance of political forces now clear, Soglin
escalated his attacks on the Dyke appointees. Though all the commissioners were still legally serving unless a definitive court ruling against the city's appeal of the Jackman order was handed down, Soglin suggested that the resignations by the two commissioners in question was "one way the air could be cleared." Mayoral Assistant James Rowen noted that even if only the three remaining commissioners continued to meet, there would be enough members present to constitute a quorum in order to continue business.

Somers handed the presidency of the Commission to Soglin appointee Melvin Greenberg and announced that he was now ready to resume attending meetings, despite the fact that nothing had been done to dispel the clouds over his legal status on the commission. Soglin bitterly attacked Somers:

He (Somers) owes the community an explanation for what he's put the City Council and the city through the past three months. If he's now ready to resume meeting, he's got to explain what happened last month.

When the hearings were reconvened, Somers was now, according to The Capital Times, lauded by reporters covering the final stages of the hearings for his "even-handed" and "fair" handling of the proceedings.

In September of 1974, the thirteen-month controversy came to an end when the PFC on a series of three to two votes, with Somers voting with the two Soglin appointees, cleared David Couper of eighteen of the charges against him and retained him as chief. Couper was unanimously reprimanded for four minor
violations regarding his use of profane language towards subordinates, his use of a patrol car after engaging in drinking at a local bar, and his allowing members of his family to accompany him on lake patrol. Somers, reflecting his background as an attorney, had decided the case on the merits of, or rather the lack of, the evidence. Somers insisted that he had allowed the PFC's investigation to continue as this was the only way he believed the evidence in the case could be amassed. Within two months, Somers and the other Dyke appointee in question resigned from the Commission.

The controversy for Soglin lasted a little bit beyond the date of the decision when it was finally revealed that Soglin had, without obtaining Council approval, authorized the attorney for the three-judge panel to continue with his investigations, despite the fact that the $5000 spending limit the Council had placed on the probe had already been reached. Soglin admitted the move was a "political mistake" and offered a tortuous explanation for his action. He insisted that no laws were violated as no funds were actually dispensed; he had, in his eyes, only promised to give his full support to the counsel's bills when they would finally be submitted to the Council. The mayor had feared that the Council, already upset at the vast amounts being spent on legal action in the Couper matter, might disrupt the work of the three-judge panel.

The Council, upset at Soglin's "high-handed" handling of
the matter, initially rejected the legal bill when it was finally submitted to it. However, after the protest was registered, payment of the fees was ultimately authorized.

Soglin's Style. Soglin's entrance into the Couper matter was determined by the strength of his goal orientations. The reform of the police department was an essential element of his liberal/left philosophy; and David Couper was the man whom he believed could produce such reform. Not having had appointed a majority of the members of Madison's police and Fire Commission, Soglin faced the possibility that if Couper were dismissed, another chief less to the mayor's liking might be appointed in his place. Soglin consequently publicly plunged to the defense of Couper and even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to bring review of the charges within his, and not the PFC's, jurisdiction.

The Wisconsin State Journal accused the mayor in taking these actions of abrogating the domain of the PFC, of attempting to interfere in the operations of the Police Department; and in immaturity messying what should have been a quite orderly process of reviewing the complaints against the chief. Soglin's entrance into the dispute clearly posed potential dangers to his public standing and his influence on future issues. But his strong goal orientation in regards to the policies of the Police Department precluded his taking the safest response to the dispute—nonintervention.

But Soglin's commitment was tempered by pragmatic
political concerns; the actions he was willing to take in defense of Couper were subject to an outer limit posed by the mayor's concern for the legal and personal political consequences of his actions. In most all his actions he had the support of both a majority of the City Council and the City Attorney's Office. Had this support been lacking, Soglin might possibly have exhibited more caution in the actions he took to protect Couper.

Soglin's sensitivity to the legal and political constraints of a situation also helps explain the leadership, or rather the lack of leadership, he showed when a local court ruling clouded the status of the four PFC members who had never received Council confirmation of their appointments. An Ideologue, subject solely to his goal orientation, might have seized the opportunity to remove the two commissioners in question who had kept the PFC probe alive despite the mayor's wishes. But Soglin feared taking such action would both befuddle the legal status of the hearings and open himself to charges of unprincipled partisanship. A scathing Capital Times editorial after the City Council vote rejecting confirmation for the two Dyke appointees chided Soglin for the sudden trepidation he showed:

It (the Council vote) also indicated dissatisfaction with Mayor Soglin's role in the legal challenge. Soglin, who fancies himself a smart politician, misjudged the depth of resentment against the anti-Couper campaign. His tippy-toe attitude was emphasized when he turned down an invitation to
become a party in the court challenge (to the status of the unconfirmed commissioners). His hesitancy in waiting until the last minute to send up the PFC names for Council action also indicated his timidity. We suspect that Soglin was amazed as anyone at the Council vote.84

A "smart politician," Soglin restrained his purist urges.

In his handling of the Couper case, as in his actions in the Atwood Bypass, the Triangle redevelopment, and the auditorium matters, Soglin again did not ideologically adhere to the views of some of the leaders of Madison's left, and he suffered their criticism. These leaders saw Couper as a traditional cop with the usual policeman's biases, who, by his liberal veneer had hoodwinked Soglin and Madison's liberal community.85 The chief, in their view, had simply demonstrated no respect for citizens' rights. Takeover, an "underground" Madison newspaper, even drew a caustic front-page editorial cartoon showing the mayor and police chief engaging in a quite compromising sexual act.

Soglin, thus, as a result of his goal orientations entered into a conflictual situation that posed possible threats to his long-term influence. He saw himself as the self-appointed leader of the pro-Couper faction of the community. His leadership, though, was not ideological; he showed pragmatic political concerns that demonstrated that his frame of reference was broader than his own philosophical principles.

Paul Soglin, by his actions, did not determine the
outcome of the Couper question. No direct connection can be drawn between the mayor's actions and the PPC vote that finally produced the action he wanted—clearing Chief Couper.

But the question of ascertaining mayoral impact is a distinct question from determining a mayor's leadership style towards an issue. Goal-oriented, conflict-oriented, his advocacy restrained only in the outer limits by an unwillingness to totally jeopardize his coalitional support in the city, Paul Soglin once more exhibited the leadership style of a Partisan mayor.

CONCLUSION: RADICAL PRAGMATISM

As seen in the four case studies cited in this chapter, Paul Soglin was a conflict-oriented mayor who pursued objectives designed to make Madison a more humanistic place in which to live. He took the environmentalist position in opposing the construction of the Atwood Avenue Bypass; he took the "people's" position in favoring the building of low- and moderate-income housing instead of a hotel in the Triangle area; he sought a Police Department more concerned with citizen rights under the direction of Chief David Couper. And he even justified the funding of an auditorium and civic center as a means of enabling all people to have access to and the opportunity to express themselves through the arts. As will become even more clear in the following chapter, Paul Soglin was a Partisan mayor who sought to advance the position
of generally disadvantaged groups in Madison.

Still, despite the actions that Soglin took toward the realization of these generally liberal/leftist goals, the mayor drew the fire from elements of Madison's left in each of the cases cited in this chapter. In two of the cases, these elements of the city's left even doubted the "radicalness" of Soglin's goals. They believed that the money which the mayor proposed be spent on building an auditorium could better be spent in areas dealing with more basic human needs than the arts. And in the Couper controversy, this part of Madison's left believed that Soglin had misplaced his faith in a police chief who, despite his progressive rhetoric, was, to their mind, obstructing instead of furthering the major redirection of priorities they believed was needed in the police department.

But even more significant than any disagreement between Soglin and these elements of Madison's left over specific objectives was the distance between the mayor and these critics as regards the question of proper political style. They thought that Soglin did not approach his humanistic goal orientations--inclinations with which they basically agreed--from the perspective of possessing a correct ideology. Soglin was no Ideologue; he had no absolute principles so important that they could not be compromised in some part if situational constraints so demanded. As the mayor himself admitted he was not "dogmatic:" "I don't see the world in terms like
'monolithic.' That's where the radicals and I have separated." Soglin was flexible; and it was just this flexibility that outraged those elements of Madison's left that demanded rigid ideological purity.

Thus the primary objection of this part of Madison's left to Soglin's performance in office concerned the mayor's apparent abandonment of leftist principles which they felt should have guided his actions. These concerns were for the most part stylistic. In the Atwood case, they not only criticized Soglin for his abandonment of the environmentalist cause; but, even more important they excoriated the mayor for behaving like just another politician who covered his own rear end whenever the heat became too severe. In the Triangle case they again believed Soglin took the politician's way out, taking a secretive, behind-the-scenes politician's route to the problem rather than the forthright principled approach of vetoing the hotel rezoning as simply not being in the people's interests. And they also objected to the manner by which Soglin rushed through the purchase of the Capitol Theater without giving the public adequate time to register its feelings on the matter.

In all three cases just cited, this faction of Madison's left objected to Soglin's individualistic style of governing. In each case they believed that the mayor took the expedient rather than the principled "leftist" approach to the resolution of the problem.
But these criticisms go too far if they define "politician" as a person concerned solely with the health of his own political standing. For Soglin had only tempered his goal orientations as far as required by the pragmatics of a situation; he had not simply sacrificed his goal orientations to protect his own stock of influence. Soglin still possessed a vision as to which direction he should move the city. He proposed realistic strategies for attaining these goals and spurned courses of action which would have served only as visible expression of his purist faith.

The flexibility Soglin exhibited in each of the four controversies of his first term was not an abandonment of a leadership role. Rather than representing a withdrawal on the mayor's behalf from situations that had become potentially too power-costly, Soglin's shifts represented an easing away from idealistic solutions, which had proved to be unfeasible in light of the way events evolved, to goals which he thought were more attainable.

In only one of the four cases reported did Soglin ever forego a leadership role out of concern for the political repercussions of his actions. Only when a local court ruling threw the status of four members of the PFC into question did Soglin momentarily let a dispute drift without direction from his office. But this one instance aside, Soglin did not otherwise shrink from conflict in the rest of the Couper controversy or in any of the other situations described in
this chapter. His flexibility in each case was not a simple strategy devised to protect his power situation. Rather than an abandonment of mayoral direction, such flexibility represented a pragmatic attempt to maximize goal attainment.

Soglin's conflict-oriented, goal-oriented leadership style fits almost exactly the model which Saul Alinsky has termed "radical pragmatism." Soglin's behavior as mayor is consonant with the outlook Alinsky has prescribed as essential for community organizing success:

As an organizer I start from where the world is, as it is, not as I would like it to be. That we accept the world as it is does not in any sense weaken our desire to change it into what we believe it should be--it is necessary to begin where the world is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be. That means working in the system.

Soglin's statement of his own approach is strikingly close to that of the Alinsky philosophy:

I dropped the luxury of being able to pontificate about desirable societal goals. There are worthwhile things that can be done that are better than chasing after windmills.

In Alinsky's terms by launching a "pragmatic attack on the system," Soglin has shown himself to be a "realistic radical" as opposed to a "rhetorical radical." And it was from the rhetorical radicals of Madison who saw Soglin's realism only to be evidence of a sellout of principles that Soglin drew his most criticism.

Soglin is an example of Alinsky's "political relativist" who lacks a "fixed truth" but who "has a far greater sense of
direction and compass than the "closed-society" leader "with his rigid political ideology." Soglin chose to forego playing the role of the Ideologue, and like Alinsky's organizer, "free from the shackles of dogma" he could "respond to the realities of the widely different situations our society presents." But just how radical can any form of relativism and pragmatism be? One critic, Charles F. Levine, has even charged Alinsky with being a "conservative" in that his method lacks "plans for the transformation of the American system in any important sense..." Rather than seeking a fundamental restructuring of society, Alinsky only sought to incrementally improve the positions of "the Have-Not" and the "Have-a-little, Want Mores" at the expense of "the Haves." This criticism is just as applicable to Soglin as to Alinsky. Soglin's critics on the left felt the mayor was lacking a guiding ideology which would have kept him going in the right direction in such difficult situations as the Atwood controversy. They also felt that the mayor was not attempting the total systems change they desired. Radical pragmatism does not involve changing society in any comprehensive manner. As one leftist alderman observed dryly: "If you apply the standards of a good liberal Democrat, he's a good liberal Democrat, which I suppose is not the most evil thing in the world." But Soglin chose to forego idealistic radical solutions
for programs which, though far less comprehensive in their impact, proved more attainable and still represented measurable improvements in the lives of people whose causes he identified with. A realistic, balanced street construction and mass transit policy would be implemented; more housing would be built for the elderly and low-income groups; the arts would be brought to the people; and the police would be more respectful of the rights of citizens.

Paul Soglin was a "radical" mayor only in the Alinsky-defined sense of the word. Just how much of an impact this pragmatic radical had as mayor will be further discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE IMPACT OF A PARTISAN MAYOR

In the preceding chapter, the four major controversies of Paul Soglin's first term in office were analyzed both to identify the mayor's leadership style and to begin to assess the impact of his administration on policy outcomes in Madison. As noted in the first chapter, a mayor who wishes to bring effective change to a city must be concerned not only with the more visible allocative disputes but with the innumerable routine functionings of city hall which never command great public attention.

This chapter will attempt a more complete portrait of Soglin's leadership approach and impact by concentrating on the mayor's actions in policy areas which were of interest to him but yet never developed into large-scale public controversy. The changes brought to six areas in which the mayor expressed desire for change—housing code administration, housing assistance, the development of "human resources," affirmative action, mass transit, and the restraining of the police—will be surveyed.

The first part of this chapter will outline the successes of Paul Soglin's leadership in each of the policy areas, and as will be readily apparent, those successes were considerable. The second part of this chapter, however, will point out the limits to Soglin's success, especially as viewed by persons who for the most part shared the mayor's "people's"
and social service orientations--Madison's left. Their argument, put simply, is that Paul Soglin, the "liberal," did not attempt all the change he could have. Also, as will become apparent, the mayor suffered from a personal distaste for the managerial side of city politics which helped make his administrative leadership intermittent.

**SOGLIN'S IMPACT**

**Housing Code Enforcement.** Inspections to insure that Madison's residential housing is up to code standards is the work of the city's Building Inspection Division. Upon finding that a building is substandard, the department issues a work order which usually requires that the property be repaired within thirty days. Enforcement of lapsed work orders is the job of the City Attorney's Office.

Table 1 details the monthly referrals made to the Attorney's office for the 1973-75 period. Most readily observable from the table is the fact that for the months preceding Soglin's ascension to the mayoralty in April of 1973, monthly figures on code referrals are not even available. Code enforcement prior to Soglin's election was simply not a major priority. As one member of the City Attorney's Office readily admitted, Madison landlords "got away with a lot."² Not only were referrals of lapsed work orders not always forthcoming, but not many of those which had been referred were even prosecuted. The prosecution of housing
Table 1
Number of Housing Work Orders Referred by the Buildings Inspections Department to the City Attorney's Office for Legal Action, 1975-76

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<th>1973</th>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td></td>
<td>301**</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>461</td>
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Important Dates:

April 15, 1973--Soglin assumes the mayoralty;
July 1973--Building Inspections Department implements new procedure for dealing with lapsed work orders;
November 30, 1973--Soglin delivers his memorandum concerning the referral and prosecution of lapsed work orders.

*Monthly records regarding the referral of lapsed work orders were not kept by either the Buildings Inspections Department nor the City Attorney's Office during the Dyke administration.

**The Buildings Inspections Department lists 301 referrals for the year 1973. The April to December figures listed in this table for 1973 total only 255. It is possible that the three months for which figures are not available may account for the 46 missing referrals. Such confusion is indicative to the lack of precise record-keeping in the housing code area prior to Soglin's taking office.

code violations was a relatively time-consuming job which the Attorney's Office did not consider high status legal work. Soglin, reflecting his "downtown" background, had made code enforcement an issue in his mayoralty campaign. He particularly blamed the City Attorney's Office for delays in prosecution. Soglin's election reportedly filled the Attorney's Office, and the Buildings Inspection Divisions as well, with an attitude that bordered on "terror." Anticipating the new urgency that they expected the new mayor to communicate in this area, the Attorney's Office began to elevate the priority of code enforcement. No longer were housing code violations routinely put in the bottom desk drawer of the assistant city attorney assigned to the area, where, except for the sending of a threatening letter, they received only that action allowed by the time constraints imposed by the attorney's other assigned duties. Accurate record-keeping regarding case referrals from the Inspections Department was begun almost immediately.

Soglin's first real move in the code area came in June, just two months after his election. The new mayor met with officials from the Building Inspections Division, the City Attorney's Office, and the Health Department for the purpose of bringing about, in his own words, "sharp improvement" in the enforcement of the housing code. No longer was the Inspections Division to send two or three intermediary warning letters in the case of outstanding violations--a past
procedure which not only tied up the Division's limited manpower with the constant need to reinspect the same property but allowed recalcitrant landlords time for delay. Now, one and only one official notice of a code violation was to be sent. If corrective action was not gained within the usual thirty days allotted in the work order, the file of the case in question was to be immediately forwarded to the Attorney's Office for action.

These procedural reforms instituted the next month, had their effect. As Table 1 shows, the monthly referral rate from July to November of 1973 was double and triple that of the two months previous to the change. The total number of referrals, 301, made during 1973 was up over 43 per cent over the previous year. Soglin's guidance was beginning to bridge the breakdown in communications between the Inspections Division and the City Attorney's Office which greatly impaired the city's ability to take legal action against code violators.

Still, Soglin was not totally satisfied that the June conference had removed all the slack in the code enforcement process. He wanted a virtually automatic system whereby property owners would know that the ignoring city work orders would with certainty result in court action. Any discretion in the referral process undermined the automatic nature of the system and thus had to be eliminated.

Soglin was also concerned with the large backlog of
lapsed work orders which had not yet been forwarded to the City Attorney's Office for action. Consequently, Soglin issued the following November 30 memorandum to the City Attorney, Public Works Director, and Building Inspections Superintendent:

Attached you will find a list of properties as prepared for my office on August 24, 1973. The list comprises buildings which, as of that date, had work orders that were more than 30 days old. Without exception every property on this list which is still in violation and has not yet been sent to the City Attorney's Office for prosecution is to be forwarded to the City Attorney's Office no later than Monday, December 10, 1973. Every property on the list, without exception, is to be prepared for prosecution. Prosecution on all violations is to be commenced no later than Monday, December 24, 1973. All cases are to be actively pursued. The city will not agree to a dismissal of charges simply because the long-standing violations have been corrected prior to the final determination by the Court.

VIOLATORS OF CITY BUILDING CODE ORDINANCES ARE BEING PROSECUTED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN WORK ORDERS WRITTEN BY THE BUILDING INSPECTION DIVISION. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF THE VIOLATIONS ARE CORRECTED AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE WORK ORDER DATE. (Emphasis Soglin's).

The last paragraph underscored Soglin's employment of code enforcement as a deterrent strategy. As court action would continue even if properties were repaired sometime after a work order expired, landlords would now find delay costly. No longer could they without cost wait until court action was imminent before deciding to make repairs. Both the referral of work orders and the commencement of legal action was to be automatic.

The immediate impact of Soglin's directive on referrals,
as seen in Table 1, was dramatic. The Inspections and Attorney's Offices worked at almost a crisis pace as a result of the clearly demarcated deadline the mayor had set; 73 work orders were referred in December alone!

The degree of Soglin's impact on code enforcement in the long-term can also be seen in the monthly rate of referrals of lapsed work orders to the City Attorney's Office. In the first three months of Soglin's term, referrals averaged only 9.7 per month. The July 1973 conference raised the rate dramatically to 30.6 over the next five months. For the 25 month period following the mayor's November 30 directive, the monthly rate increased slightly more to 36.8.

These figures seem to indicate Soglin's major impact on the referral process came with the July 1973 conference. The long-term impact of the edict was much less than the huge number of referrals, 73, for December 1973 would seem to indicate. The huge December output included many referrals that would have likely been made during the new year had the crisis routine not been invoked, as witnessed by the extremely low number of referrals for the first three months of 1974. The importance of the November 30 edict, though, was two-fold; it sped up the code enforcement process and it helped remind landlords of the tough and automatic nature that housing code enforcement in Madison was now taking.

In response to the mayor's priorities, City Attorney Edwin Conrad assigned Assistant City Attorney Robert Olsen
full-time to the code enforcement area. The "hard-nosed" approach which Olsen had earned as a traffic violation prose-
cutor was carried to the housing code enforcement area:

Upon re-referral of a file from the Building Inspections Department, suit is instituted. It is my policy, and it has been from the time I first began handling any of these cases, that once a case is commenced it is not dismissed simply because compliance is had at any stage of the court proceedings.7

Olsen, like Soglin, did not believe landlords who delayed compliance should be let off with the same work required of those who readily obeyed a work order. The city's policy was now to seek monetary forfeitures in each judgment of conviction—even if the property was finally repaired by the date of trial.

As court prosecution and the imposition of fines was nearly automatically forthcoming, it was no longer profitable for landlords to ignore the directives of the city's code enforcement personnel. Soglin's revitalized program likely resulted in the increased willingness of some landlords to fix up their property without awaiting city action. Concentration solely on the referral and prosecution rates in code enforcement as a result, then, likely underestimates the true extent of the mayor's impact in this area.

Initially, Soglin, trusted the Attorney's Office in the code area little, if at all. City Administrator Robert Corcoran, working out of the mayor's office, was assigned to "watchdog" the code program. Monthly reports to the mayor
from the Attorney's Office on the status of all cases concerning lapsed work orders were mandated. And still Soglin held one more "club" to ensure that the Attorney's Office cooperated with his directives:

...several months ago a vacancy was created in the City Attorney's Office. I refused to have that vacancy filled because I did not feel that city priorities were being met, namely that insufficient attention was being given to building code violations. After consultations with the City Attorney's Office I have allowed that position to be filled on a temporary full-time basis. At the end of six months, I will examine the City Attorney's Office work in the area of building code violations. If building code violations are given the attention I think they deserve, then I will allow that to become a permanent position. I am not really concerned whether the new person hired handles building code violations or whether it is somebody else in the City Attorney's Office, as long as the work is done.8

Despite his initial reservations, Soglin came to appreciate Assistant City Attorney Robert Olsen's work in the code enforcement area. The mayor even proved receptive to Olsen's modification of his November 30 directive. According to Olsen, Soglin's "meat-axe" approach of the November 30 memo had to be avoided. The courts simply were not in the habit of imposing forfeitures on landlords if the property was repaired by trial date. Olsen had to "sell" the judges on the deterrent capacity of the revised code enforcement procedure. Attempts to secure large forfeitures and indiscriminate prosecution of all 150 or so outstanding violations would only confirm fears that Soglin was out to get the landlords and thereby destroy the city's credibility in court. Olsen, with Soglin's consent, hence decided both to ask only for reasonable
fines and to act only on those "decent" cases necessary to build the city's credibility. Olsen chose to forego prosecution where city administrative foul-ups, the trivial nature of the violation, or the financial hardship of the home-owner made a sympathetic court verdict improbable.

The Building Inspections Division felt that with its closer knowledge of the condition of the property in question, it, and not the Attorney's Office, should have the discretion of determining when a case mandated prosecution. But the general suspicion among Madison's left was that the Inspections Division had built up too comfortable a relationship with certain landlords over the years. Soglin soon came to trust more the judgment of the Attorney's Office, as Olsen not only dedicatedly pursued court action but routinely sent the mayor the reasons underlying any decisions he had made not to commence legal action in specific cases. Soglin, quite satisfied with Olsen's performance, made it clear that it was the Assistant City Attorney, not the Inspections Division, who was to decide when circumstances exempted a case from legal action.

Table 2 bears witness to Soglin's impact on the resolution of housing code cases once they reached the City Attorney's Office. Again the lack of record-keeping in this area prior to Soglin's administration stands as testimony to the lack of attention paid to this activity before Soglin's election. Accurate record-keeping was really begun only
Table 2
Status of Housing Code Violations Referred to the
City Attorney's Office*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Cases Commenced</th>
<th>Cases Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly Total</td>
<td>Monthly Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-December 1973 (6 months)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-Dec. 1974 (12 months)</td>
<td>175***</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-June 1975 (6 months)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA——not available.

*No figures were kept by the City Attorney's Office concerning the status of housing code cases prior to June 1973.

**As no cases were closed after Soglin's November 30 memorandum, this figure represents the state of code enforcement prior to Soglin's action.

***This figure is accurate within five cases due to the impossibility the Attorney's Office had in discerning whether a few cases were commenced at the end of 1973 or the beginning of 1974.

starting with 1970. As Table 2 makes clear, the monthly rate of commencement and closing of code cases linearly increased during Soglin's first years in office. The figures for the first half of 1975 serve as evidence of Soglin's continued impact in the housing area--the number of cases commenced and closed in that half year nearly equalled the number of cases commenced and closed during the entire previous year of Soglin's term!

On the input side of the code enforcement program, Soglin's impact was equally impressive. The mayor was able to staff three new housing code inspector positions for 1975. The result was the per cent of the Building Division's time spent on housing code enforcement rose to 54% in 1975 from 43% the previous year. The number of units inspected, likewise, jumped from 6,891 in 1974 to 9,381 in 1975--an increase of 36 per cent.\(^\text{10}\)

**Housing Assistance.** If attention is focused beyond the inspection area to the area of housing in general, the Soglin record is even more impressive. For the year 1975 alone a $4 million commitment, through both direct appropriation and the city's bonding power, was made for public housing.\(^\text{11}\)

Though most of the approximately 400 planned housing units were targeted for the Triangle, fifty new or rehabilitated units scattered throughout the city were also to be sold or leased to low-income families.\(^\text{12}\)

Soglin's first budget also contained the city's first
allocation for housing counseling. Under this service the city was now to assist in landlord-tenant disputes, provide information on tenants' rights, aid in making emergency housing repairs, help locate rentals, and otherwise abet home ownership. Soglin's concern in the area of tenants' rights was further seen in his human resources budget allocation to the Madison Tenants' Union.

The matter of improved housing rehabilitation also showed Soglin's imprints. In February 1974, at the mayor's request, Madison set up a totally locally funded $225,000 low-interest revolving loan fund for homeowners of one-to-four unit structures who lacked the money to make basic repairs. The funds were to be loaned at a low 6 1/2 per cent interest rate to homeowners in declining areas who either could not afford the 9 to 12 per cent interest rates of private loans or who were not considered good risks by private lending institutions. The program was the first of its kind in the nation.

Madison's actions in housing rehabilitation were advanced the next year when Madison Redevelopment Authority Director Sol Levin informed the mayor that a federal home rehabilitation program thought to be dead was suddenly revived. Levin advised that if the city acted fast enough, Madison residents could receive a good share of the federal money to be loaned at three per cent interest. Soglin immediately gave Levin the use of the mayor's office to announce to homeowners the deadline for filing applications for the
funds. By the end of the year, the city had distributed to more than 65 homeowners the approximately $350,000 received under the program.\(^{13}\)

Soglin's actions in the housing rehabilitation area did not stop here. As one member of the City's Department of Housing and Community Development observed, "We ran into a lot of people who could not afford to pay back 6\(\frac{2}{3}\) per cent loans, or 3 per cent loans, or anything."\(^{14}\) To help alleviate this problem, in the spring of 1976, the beginning of Soglin's fourth year in office, the city allocated $80,000 of its community development block grant funds to be dispensed as no-interest loans to low-income homeowners who otherwise could not finance much needed repairs. Recipients of these loans were not even obligated to repay the principle, except at the date the house was ever sold.

**Human Resources and Day Care.** Paul Soglin wanted two items more than anything else in his 1975 budget.\(^{15}\) First, Soglin wanted the city to enter the day care field by both subsidizing the costs of day care for low income families and by monitoring the quality of day care services. Second, he sought to allocate money to certain private groups and agencies whom he saw to be providing "human resource services" consistent with the public's and therefore the city's interest. As both programs represented entirely new municipal intrusions into the social welfare domain they mobilized the opposition of fiscal conservatives concerned with limiting
the scope of government activity, and soon came to occupy the center of the 1975 budget battle.

In November of 1974 Soglin submitted to the City Council a $50.8 million budget which included a recommendation for $198,000 to start up a city day care program. The day care request had been drawn up in consultations between the mayor's office and a day care committee previously set up. The request included $117,000 to be given as direct subsidies on a sliding scale basis to low and moderate income families. The rest of the money was to go for administration, including the establishment of the necessary administrative machinery to certify which day care facilities were of sufficient quality to be eligible to receive the city vouchers.

If such transfers for day care were controversial, the human resources budget was even more so. The budget was the result of a Soglin-appointed task force which had sifted through the numerous pleas for aid which were annually made to the city. They recommended that the city allocate nearly $354,000 for the purchase and evaluation of services consistent with the public interest from private independent agencies.

Both the day care and human resources proposals were slashed drastically by the Board of Estimates. The $117,000 in direct day care subsidies was kept, but the $81,000 for administration of the program, including the certification process, was cut. Nine of the proposed fifteen human
resources grants were deleted entirely, including the grants to four agencies dealing with problems of the elderly ($25,900), the Madison Tenants' Union ($10,000), the Spanish American Organization ($14,000), and the Executive Agency for Cultural Awareness ($41,000). Two other recommended grants were reduced slightly. Finally, the $100,000 Human Relations Contingency fund was eliminated. This last action, if sustained by the City Council, would mean that proposed new additions to the human needs area made during the forthcoming year would not be provided for by the budget and would thus require a three-fourths rather than a simple majority City Council vote.

Soglin had misread the social and fiscal orientations of one, and possibly two, members of this important Board of Estimates. After the forthcoming spring elections, Soglin would change the composition of the Board of Estimates to be more consistent with his own priorities. But the more pressing question at the time for the mayor and the human resources and day care proponents was how to get the monies back into the budget. An intensive mayoral and citizen lobbying effort was directed at the entire City Council to restore the cuts.

The results on the Council floor were a major victory for Soglin. The full $198,000 day care budget was approved, and over $150,000 of the $197,000 cut by the Board of Estimates from the human resources budget was also restored. Only the
proposed $41,000 allocation for the Executive Council for Awareness, "a self-help plan for minority groups," was not approved as being too "vague"--and even then this money was placed in the contingency fund. 16

The exact nature of the successful lobbying effort merits closer attention. Constituents favoring the programs in each aldermanic district communicated the urgency of their desires in each of the program areas to their representatives. This grass-roots constituency campaign proved productive. One day care proponent guessed that the organized phone campaign to aldermen turned around at least three votes on day care. 17

And as one mayoral aide further relates:

I know that there were aldermen who voted for day care only because they could not take the pressure any longer...they were people who were philosophically (opposed) to day care...These are people who just to literally get out from under the barrage of phone calls and personal contact from people throughout the city--groups, organizations, coalitions, individual parents, users of day care--that they literally just threw their hands up and said, "All right! Enough! If everybody wants day care this badly it's fine with me." 18

Soglin himself talked to nearly every alderman regarding the day care and human resources budgets. 19 And as Wisconsin State Journal reporter Michael Baumann noted the campaign was put together with a great deal of sophistication:

Tactics were orchestrated carefully, to the point of deciding which council member would introduce proposals to achieve the greatest impact.

In the case of day care, Alderman Betty Smith, Dist. 19, took the lead because of her support of the program combined with her generally moderate politics
figured to give the issue credibility.

The result was a series of delicate coalitions that shifted slightly from vote to vote, but which always gave Soglin a minimum of 11 votes to work with.20

One mayoral aide even further details the delicacy with which the mayor's victory was put together; Soglin's strategy:

...on the Council floor the night of the budget was to put together coalition after coalition after coalition as each item came down. And we knew in advance if there was an alderman that was a swing vote we would not ask him or her to be a swing vote more than once...We would sort of spread out for that group of aldermen and women --we spread out what they would see to be the political difficulty for supporting part of the mayor's budget. So we didn't ask anybody or expect anybody to take all of the heat.21

The success of this coalition juggling act was apparent on the votes concerning the three most controversial items--the Tenants' Union, Spanish American Organization, and human reserve funds. On each of these issues Soglin managed to muster exactly half the votes of the entire Council. He, himself, then, cast the tie-breaking vote to restore the items to the budget.

The creation of the day care and human resources budgets was one of Soglin's most satisfying victories, as again noted by reporter Baumann:

These restored programs were crucial for Soglin because they were the type of "people" programs he pushed in the 1973 mayoral campaign. The budget victory showed he could deliver, and he accepted the council gift gratefully.

"In terms of, if you don't like the way a vote goes it's a loss, and if you like the way a vote goes it's a win, we had a lot of wins," a smiling Soglin said Tuesday.22
Affirmative Action. One of Paul Soglin's major goals as mayor was to "open up" city hall. In contrast to his predecessor's reclusiveness, Soglin readily availed himself to City Council members--liberal and conservatives alike--the press and even citizens desiring to see the mayor. In fact, Soglin was so open to all comers that a number of persons interviewed in this study felt the mayor's schedule was so clogged that he could not always be reached by city officials as problems arose.

But Soglin's promise to open up city government transcended the style of operation he brought to the mayor's office itself. Soglin wanted increased direct citizen participation in government affairs, and he created five districts with nine citizen-member planning boards to this purpose. Even more specifically, Soglin further wanted to open up city government to groups--women, racial minorities, inner city people--he felt were unfairly denied representation in the past.

In the area of citizen appointments to various city committees and commissions, Soglin accomplished just what he promised. As Table 3 shows, Soglin appointed a disproportionate number of members of racial minorities to these commissions. Women, who constituted only one-fifth of his predecessor's appointments, comprised nearly half of Soglin's appointments.

Geographically, Soglin's appointments approach proportional representation. The disproportionate representation of
Table 3
Breakdown of City Committee and Commission Appointments (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Population in General Work Area</th>
<th>Mayor Making Appointments (Committee Status as of: Month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Women</td>
<td>Dyke (March 1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Racial Minorities</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% West Side</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Central City</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% East Side</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% South Side</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA--not ascertained

the West Side, the city's relatively more affluent area, under Mayor Dyke receded under Soglin. Central City people, who were not part of Dyke's constituency, were severely under-represented during the latter days of the Dyke administration—and half of these appointments can even be accounted for by the membership composition of the one committee dealing exclusively with a central city project, the proposed State Street Mall.23

Soglin's commitment to the women's cause is underscored even further by his actions in two specific instances. Despite the fact that upon his election only five women served on Madison's 22-member City Council, the new mayor appointed three to the six-person powerful Board of Estimates—the first time in history of the city that this board had been sexually balanced. The sexual balance, though, was not to last through Soglin's entire tenure as mayor. As a result of the retirement of one of the Board's female members, and another, Pat Zimmerman, proving more conservative than anticipated, Soglin proved unable to find three women with both the necessary expertise and liberal credentials to maintain the three-to-three balance. Soglin accepted a four-to-two male-to-female ratio.

Even more demonstrative of Soglin's commitment was his appointment of women's rights activist Judith Pederson to the Police and Fire Commission. This appointment received opposition from two quarters—the local firefighters' union
who feared Pederson would push for the hiring of female firefighters, and a group of leftist aldermen who, concerned with police matters, wanted a person of substantial leftist credentials appointed to the Commission. To the latter group, Soglin pointed out that as the Police and Fire Commission’s jurisdiction was only over personnel, and not policy matters, placing a member of the left on the Commission was not all that urgent. When the Council referred the Pederson appointment back to the mayor, Soglin made clear his intention of sticking by Pederson. The appointment was soon thereafter approved.

The area of municipal hiring also reflects Soglin's equal opportunity orientation. The city's affirmative action ordinance, adopted only months after Soglin's election, was reaffirmed by a strongly worded statement of policy issued by the mayor at the close of 1973. As seen in Tables 4 and 5, the numbers of women and members of racial minorities in Madison's municipal work force increased markedly—by 19 per cent and 75 per cent respectively over their previous levels—during Soglin's first term in office. The mayor's hiring policy, it can be deduced, was responsible for this—from September 1973 to July 1974, half of all hires were female, and another 19% were members of racial minorities (Table 6). Particularly noteworthy was the entrance of women into the protective service field.

Yet, as Tables 4 and 5 also show, and as was noted by the
### Table 4
Analysis of Madison's Full-Time Work Force by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Female Employees</th>
<th>Number of Males</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/30/73</td>
<td>6/1/74</td>
<td>4/30/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials/Administrative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraprofessional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office/Clerical</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Craft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/Maintenance</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** "Affirmative Action Plan for Equal Employment Opportunity, 1974," City of Madison Mayor's Office, and other information provided through the courtesy of the affirmative action office.
Table 5
Analysis of Madison's Full-Time Work Force by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>%Minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White June 1, 1974</td>
<td>Minority June 1, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Service</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraprofessional</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office/Clerical</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Craft</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/Maintenance</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Minorities:

- August 30, 1973 29
- June 1, 1974 42
- April 30, 1975 51

Table 6
Hires to Madison's Full-Time Work Force, By Sex and Race,
September 1, 1973 to July 1, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Surname</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total % Hires Minority: 13.7%
Total % Hires Female: 50.4%

City's Affirmative Action Report for 1974, Madison's municipal work force still could not be said to be well-balanced.

There are no females in the official administrative category; nor is this category likely to change in the next six months as there is little turnover and those eligible for promotion are all white men.

Women, for the most part, are under-represented in all of the categories except in the office, clerical and paraprofessional areas where traditionally they have always been accepted. The professional category in which they seem fairly well represented (33%), it must be noted that this includes nurses, social workers and librarians, low paying professions which traditionally have been attractive for women (sic). In total, women constitute 19.1% of the City's work force, a figure which is far below their representation in the Madison area work force which is 40%. It should also be noted that there are a negligible number of women in decision-making positions.

The overall statistics with respect to minorities is (sic) also misleading. Again it is essential to look at the compositional breakdown. Minorities now constitute 2.4% of the total work force of the City as compared to their representation in the larger Madison area of 2.9%. It should be noted that they still appear disproportionately at the low skill and wage end of the spectrum. The situation has improved somewhat with respect to the professional category...24

Specific goals were set to try to improve female and racial minority representation in the higher level job categories.

In April of 1974 the city enacted a contract compliance ordinance. All contractors, vendors, and suppliers who employed 10 or more people and who contracted with the city for $5,000 or more business annually had to submit for city approval affirmative action programs of their own.25

For these achievements, Madison was name the 1974 Wisconsin Equal Employment Opportunity Association City of the
Year. Among the achievements cited in the reward presentation were the city's hiring of three black and one Spanish-surnamed firefighter where none had been hired previously, the city's attempt to recruit female firefighters, and the city's hiring of its first six female police officers.

Only one qualification may be made concerning Soglin's impact in this area. As by the 1970's, affirmative action had become a national movement, gains in Madison may not simply represent the result of the mayor's initiatives but a secular trend. Yet Tables 3 and 6 underscore that Soglin within one year did much to change the sexual and racial composition of Madison's commissions and full-time work force. Such quickened change clearly reflects the impact of a unique factor on the Madison scene—mayoral direction.

**Mass Transit.** As observed in the Atwood Avenue Bypass controversy Soglin brought to the mayorality a strong environmentalist commitment, including a belief in the desirability of mass transportation as opposed to automatic transit. With this orientation it was no surprise that Soglin cited as one of his most prized achievements of his first term in office, his laying of the groundwork for a light rail system as a result of a city study of the possible uses of existing railroad corridors and the beginning development of a comprehensive land use plan.26

Of a more immediate nature was Soglin's impact on the vitality of Madison's bus system. As Table 7 demonstrates,
### Table 7
Gross Operating Expenditure for Transit Related Activities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Madison Metro</th>
<th>% Increase Streets</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$2,164,362</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,984,572</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,270,037</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>3,541,715</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,575,315</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>3,906,959</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,828,989</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>4,643,561</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dyke Budget Years:**

**Soglin Budget Years:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Madison Metro</th>
<th>% Increase Streets</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$3,459,474</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>5,008,074</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,207,570</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>5,669,180</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,869,360</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>5,963,540</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for 1976 represent budgeted amounts. Figures for 1975 represent estimated spending based on budget and actual expenditures for first half of 1975. All other figures represent actual expenditures.

**As Madison first took over the bus utility in 1970, there exists no equivalent city expenditures for the previous year upon which to base a meaningful measure of increase in spending.

NC--not calculated.

SOURCE: Annual city budgets, 1972-76.
appropriations for operating funding of the Madison Metro not only increased at a greater annual rate than they did during the Dyke budget years, but they increased at a proportionately greater rate than spending for streets and sanitation and traffic engineering (the automobile-related categories of the city budget).

A number of innovations were introduced to increase bus ridership. At the mayor's initiative, the rates of the city's five and ten hour meters were doubled and day-long parking on private lots and ramps by non-downtown residents was banned in order to discourage automobile commuting by workers to the city's business district. Also to encourage bus ridership the city purchased a large number of new buses (68 in the 1974-76 period) changed route lengths and frequencies, established a downtown transit information center and introduced such reduced fare promotions as senior citizen bus cards, a five-cent downtown shuttle and a 55-cent shopper's pass. Coupled with the effects of the nation-wide energy crunch, these innovations resulted in a marked increase in both ridership and operating revenue during Soglin's administration (Table 8). The extent of this somewhat unanticipated increase in passenger revenue coupled with continued federal aid even allowed the city to reduce its subsidy to the system without curtailing service. The budgeted subsidy for 1976 was even below that given for 1971 (Table 8). All the signs pointed to the operation of a healthy bus system during Soglin's term
### Table 8
The Health of Madison's Bus Utility

| Year | Passengers (In Thousands) | In-crease | Operating Revenue Over and Inter- | In-crease | City Over | Agency Pre- | In-crease | Subsidy Pre- | Year Bill-ing | Year |
|------|---------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|----------|------|
| 1970 | 5,798                     | NC        | $1,585,051                       | NC        | $498,947 | NC        | $1,560,931 | -1.5%     | 709,106     | 1971      | 9.9  |
| 1971 | 5,962                     | 2.8%      | 1,585,051                        | 0.9       | 823,054  | 16.1      | 919,298   | 11.7      | 1972      | 9.7  |
| 1972 | 6,551                     | 9.9       | 1,752,601                        | 12.3      | 919,298  | 11.7      | 919,298   | 11.7      | 1973      | 9.7  |
| 1973 | 7,187                     | 9.7       | 1,909,688                        | 9.0       | 919,298  | 11.7      | 919,298   | 11.7      | 1974      | 9.7  |
| 1974 | 8,152                     | 13.4%     | $2,961,401                       | 55.1%     | $498,073 | -45.8%    | $4,318,610 | 16.5      | 1975      | 16.5 |
| 1975 | 8,912                     | 9.3       | 3,707,590                        | 25.2      | 499,680  | 0.3       | 4,318,610 | 16.5      | 1976      | 16.5 |

*Figures for 1976 represent budgeted amounts. Figures for 1975 represent estimated spending based on budget and actual expenditures for first half of 1975. All other figures represent actual expenditures.

NC—not calculated as Madison did not own the bus utility the previous year.

**SOURCE:** Annual city budgets, 1973-76, and Madison City Planning Department, "Planning Profile 34," 1975.
as mayor.

The Police. As already observed in the account in the preceding chapter of the controversy over the status of Chief David Couper, Paul Soglin desired a police department more respectful of citizen rights. One specific area of concern which resulted from Soglin's ties to the Mifflin community was the matter of drug law enforcement. As one member of the mayor's office observed:

I know that one of the biggest problems he (Soglin) had, and other people had, when he was representing the old eighth ward—which is a "downtown" ward—was that the police department was putting a tremendous amount of time and money into trying to control the use of marijuana for what were essentially private purposes. It meant that there was a tremendous police presence in the form of undercover agents in the community. And it meant that there wasn't a great deal amount of work going on trying to stop the flow of hard drugs, especially heroin, into the city.

I don't have the statistics at my fingertips but I know there has been a dramatic reversal of these two activities. And that's been the result of a special instruction from the mayor's office to the police chief that their first priority as far as drug investigation goes was to be investigation of the heroin traffic, and that it was not to be a high priority to investigate and arrest people for the possession of marijuana for private purposes.28

The statistics, presented in Table 9, basically confirm this interpretation of events. Soglin's first year in office, 1975, witnessed a drop in all categories of drug arrests by the city. Though arrests for hard narcotic offenses exhibit an increase over the next two years, the number of marijuana arrests still continued to decline. Though the decline of marijuana arrests in Madison was not precipitous, the
### Table 9

**Drug Law Arrests in Madison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Opium*</th>
<th>Marijuana</th>
<th>DNND**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dyke Years:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37 -- 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>105 -- 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>91 -- 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>176 -- 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soglin Years:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>88 -- 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>54 -- 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>62 -- 202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The opium category includes arrests for opium, cocaine and its derivatives—morphine, heroin, codeine.

**Dangerous Non-Narcotic Drugs.** As of July 1, 1972, arrests for glue-sniffing were officially listed under the DNND, not the opium, category. For the sake of cross-time comparisons, in this table all glue-sniffing arrests are listed under the DNND category. The number of glue cases recategorized are 25 (1969); 11 (1970); 3 (1971); and 12 (1972).

**SOURCE:** Annual Report of the Madison Police Department and other information provided courtesy of the Police Department. As there existed some small discrepancy between the Annual Reports and the mimeographed handouts, and the number of arrests for glue-sniffing was contained only in the handouts, the total number of yearly DNND arrests listed in this table may be very slightly off.
direction was counter to the increased arrest activity in this area exhibited by police nationwide (Table 10).Apparently, Madison's de-emphasis on marijuana possession is the product of some city systems characteristic and not the result of a nationwide secular trend. The mayor's priorities in the drug enforcement area--continued emphasis on narcotic enforcement, decreased concern with soft drugs--apparently was implemented, though, it must be noted, that in each of the Soglin years for which figures are available, the number of marijuana arrests still vastly outstrips the number of heroin related arrests. The enforcement of laws against pot-smokers quite apparently was not totally overlooked by the police despite the mayor's priorities.29

Still, it is problematical to what extent Soglin merits credit for the reordering of the priorities of drug law enforcement. The revised priorities also reflect the directions in which new Chief David Couper desired to take the police department. The resulting policy change is likely the work of both the chief and a mayor who clearly communicated his wishes to him. To the extent the work is that of Couper, Soglin still merits credit for his actions in the controversy over the chief's status which helped to keep a person of such conviction in the chief's position.

One other specific change in police operations brought about during Soglin's term in office concerned the handling of rape victims to decrease women's inhibitions in reporting
Table 10
Trends in Marijuana Arrests, Madison and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Madison</th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>-22.8%</td>
<td>+43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>-23.9%</td>
<td>+ 5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA--not ascertained.

rapes. Under the new intake procedure, female officers were assigned the task of interviewing rape victims, who were immediately afterwards taken to a local hospital for care.

Soglin's general desires in the police area extended far beyond the style of narcotics policing and the processing of rape victims. However, judgments as to the mayor's success in these other areas is much less certain. The mayor's further actions in the police area will be detailed later in this chapter.

THE LIMITS OF SOGLIN'S LEADERSHIP

Reviewing the evidence presented in both this and the preceding chapter, Paul Soglin's influence on the outcome of Madison's politics has been considerable. Yet, it must be asked: did Soglin achieve all that he could in terms of his own priorities? But the answer to this question is tautological; Soglin achieved what he wanted and did not go any further as he did not want to go further.

Such an answer is not very illuminating. Soglin's actions in each instance would be used to explain themselves. Hence, it becomes necessary to find other standards by which to evaluate Soglin's policy performance.

One such standard is posed by the views of those persons who shared with Soglin a basic "people's" orientation. Criticism of the mayor by this group should underscore any instances where Soglin by his actions, for whatever reasons,
deviated from a strict "people's" program. Yet, the evaluative standards implicit in the "yardstick" must be made clear—they are not strictly the values of the mayor (otherwise we would be back to unrevealing tautological explanation) but the values of others which the mayor, as seen in his past statements, seems generally to share. It is to the sources of dissatisfaction among this group of people that this chapter will now turn.

**Housing Code Enforcement.** Despite the changes brought about in the housing code area during Soglin's term in office, some insiders in the code area insist that much of the credit for the change rests not with the mayor but with leftist Alderman Michael Sack. Sack was a fanatic when it came to making the city bureaucracy perform, and code enforcement was one of his particular areas of interest. Sack used his City Council position to obtain information on the status of inspections and prosecutions of lapsed work orders and to publicly lambast the appropriate department for whatever laxness in enforcement arose. Sack, more than the mayor, rode herd over the bureaucracies charged with housing code enforcement.

The problem was neither with Soglin's inclinations nor with the direction of his initiatives in the area, rather it stemmed from his failure to fully supervise the day-to-day administrative working of code enforcement. Sack constantly had to bring notice of bureaucratic failings in the area to
the mayor's attention, something the alderman felt he should not have had to do: "I had to push him (Soglin). He just doesn't do things on his own. You have to push him."\textsuperscript{30}

According to Sack, the mayor would respond to his requests in the area "fifty percent" of the time without Sack's having to threaten to call a press conference.\textsuperscript{31}

The difference between Sack and Soglin stemmed essentially from the different perspectives each had on the bureaucracy problem in general. Sack saw bureaucracies as slow, self-interested organizations which had to be constantly pushed. "Sack," city hall reporter Michael Baumann observes, "has built a reputation by attacking the city bureaucracy and Mayor Paul Soglin's relationship to it."\textsuperscript{32}

According to Sack and other critics of the mayor, Soglin, while comfortable with symbolic issues, was simply not interested enough in the necessary supervision of daily departmental workings to insure effective program operation.

Soglin saw the bureaucratic problem differently—in personal and political terms. According to Soglin, the differences that developed between himself and Sack were the product of the alderman's failure to recognize what had to be done to bring about effective administrative change:

Maybe that (the conflict between himself and Sack) is because Mike Sack doesn't get what he wants all the time and does not understand the process completely... For one thing, you're dealing with human beings; you're dealing with people. And for another thing, some of the decisions are political and you have to have support
to implement them. We've got a weak mayor, strong council form of government.33

The mayor, then, took a more pragmatic view of bureaucratic relationships that emphasized developing personal networks and building political support behind desired change. Soglin's critics saw such reasoning only to be a rationalization for the mayor's reticence to confront bureaucrats head-on for their lack of performance.

Criticism of Soglin's unwillingness to demand stricter standards of bureaucratic performance became particularly apparent in the dispute over the status of the city's 1974 ordinance mandating the annual inspection of all non-owner occupied rental housing in certain inner city preservation districts. The program, which was passed with the strong support of the mayor's office, could have been the "cap" to Soglin's initiatives in the inspection area. However, as the Building Inspections Department freely admitted, the law was never fully implemented:

As predicted in the 1974 (Building Inspections Department) report, difficulties were experienced in completing the annual inspection of property in preservation districts due to a shortage of help. About 2,000 of the estimated 8,000 units were inspected and orders written on the majority. Because it was impossible to complete all, the inspectors were instructed to take what appeared to be the "worst" first, accounting for the high percentage of orders.34

Sack found intolerable the mayor's inability to lean on the Department and gain full compliance with the unanimously passed city ordinance. Soglin's inability to bring about
total inspections of preservation district housing despite a clear Council mandate must be counted as a mayoral failure.

One other program is worth recounting to underscore both the innovativeness of the mayor and the limits to his action in the code enforcement area. The mayor worked hard to negotiate a three-way agreement between the University of Wisconsin, the Inner City Action Program (ICAP) and the city under which ICAP volunteers would assist the city's building inspectors by checking out the condition of all housing listed with the University's Campus Assistance Center. The ICAP volunteers were taught the basic rudiments of housing inspection but were given no official powers to their own; they were only to refer observed code violations to official city inspectors for further inspection and the writing of work orders.

However, the program ran into serious trouble before it even really began. During the 1974 student pre-registration period, the ICAP team placed an advertisement in the campus newspaper intimating that violations could be found in all rental units if tenants would only look hard enough. An ICAP poster tacked up around campus even caricatured a landlord holding a machine-gun, and was captioned, "The landlords are ready, why aren't you?"

Skeptics of the volunteer inspector concept charged the ICAP people had "politicized" the program and that their objectivity could no longer be counted on. The University
quickly withdrew its sanction. Without access to the housing listed with the University, the program proved ineffective and fell apart.

Soglin had few public words to say in defense of this pet program of his; the program had simply gotten too hot for this politically pragmatic mayor to be publicly associated with. Thus effectively ended one unique approach to housing code enforcement. Though ICAP was not in any sense a major program, its death must also be counted as a Soglin failure in the code area.

Housing Assistance. It would seem that with all his achievements in the housing area, Soglin could not run into criticism from people who generally shared his priorities in this area. Yet, amazingly enough, he did—and the problem was basically of his own making. The rift that developed was between Soglin on the one hand, and on the other Madison Housing Authority chairperson Nancy Kelley (a Soglin appointee) and some members of Madison's left. Kelley, whom Soglin had asked in February of 1974, in Kelley's words, "to develop a clear set of goals and program directions for publicly-sponsored and funded housing activity," 35 bitterly declared that Soglin had done more than anyone else to hurt the cause of public housing in Madison. She further accused Soglin of a "lack of sophistication, non-decision, and refusal to provide leadership." 36 The source of Kelley's rage was the absence in the mayor's 1975 budget of the housing expediter
position and the various leasing programs the MHA plan had proposed. Kelly fumed:

The 1975 Soglin-style budget makes it abundantly clear that he not only has no commitment to low-income people, but that he condones manipulation of city employees by (Director of Administration Andre) Blum and that he immorally violates agreements with his own political appointees.37

The mayor was not that disinclined to make the moves Kelley advocated. The desired budget changes were almost immediately announced, including a provision of $1.5 million to be financed by mortgage revenue bonds for the purchase and rehabilitation of 50 units of scatter site housing to be eventually sold or leased to low-income families.38 With the budget additions the criticism quickly abated. But what made it necessary, as one member of the left put it, "to politically push him (Soglin) to the wall?"39 Capital Times reporter Rosemary Kendrick explains how the dispute began:

What happened was that somewhere during the review of departmental requests by the Department of Administration, certain proposals contained in the housing work plan got left by the wayside.40

One Soglin critic elaborates further:

I think what happened was first he (Soglin) administratively did not follow through on what he said he would do. He had to make sure those items were not cut from the budget by his analysts. He did not do this.

This indicates he has a lack of concentration. He doesn't follow through on things administratively. He doesn't have a sense on how details are supposed to get done or how administratively when you are dealing with a lot of organizations in city government you have to stay on top of it...he's not interested in that kind of thing...He won't do the necessary kind of pushing of budget
analysts to make sure the things get in there.\textsuperscript{41}

The problem then lies not so much with Soglin's inclinations in the housing area but with his failings as an administrator. The 1975 housing dispute would never have flared had the mayor both fully understood the concerns of his task force and stayed on top of the development of the city budget. A simple lack of administrative attention by the mayor was the precipitant of this short-lived dispute.

\textbf{Human Resources.} Soglin was generally commended by members of the left for his actions on his human resources budget, especially his willingness to stand firmly behind the controversial proposed disbursements to the Madison Tenants' Union and the Spanish-American Organization. The only source of dissatisfaction in this area among liberals was with the delay in disbursing the vouchers as a result of the time required to hire a program director and establish the standards that day care centers would have to meet to be eligible to receive the city money.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Affirmative Action.} Soglin's opening of city commissions and city employment to minority group members and women received the near unanimous acclaim of Madison's liberal and left-leaning communities. Still, despite the mayor's clear success in this area he was not without his detractors.

Of particular note was Soglin's failure to appoint a minority group member as director of the city's Manpower Office or as Contract Compliance Officer. Soglin insisted
that Rick Petri, a young white male, had been given the contract compliance appointment as a result of the speed with which the city had to act in order not to jeopardize federal funds. Others, though, criticized the mayor for not instituting a truly open hiring process in the Petri case; they saw Petri's transfer to be a convenient way out for the mayor to end the friction between Petri and the Director of Personnel, under whom he had been serving. Black Alderman Eugene Parks labeled the Petri appointment "a racist ripoff."⁴³

Parks leveled similar criticism against Soglin for allowing, in the alderman's view, Chief David Couper to appoint a handpicked friend for a high police post without giving minorities an equal chance for the job:

When you have people like (former Mayor) Dyke, then you can criticize and castigate. But if you have somebody who's called a liberal, a progressive, and the same thing happens, then nobody says anything. And that's wrong.⁴⁴

Soglin further earned the ire of some of Madison's black community when he bypassed Kwame Salter and selected soft-spoken Bettye Latimer, a black woman, to fill the vacancy as the city's Affirmative Action Officer. Salter, who as the former head of the University of Wisconsin's Afro-American Center carried a somewhat militant tag for his outspokenness, was the number one choice of a panel set up to screen the applicants for the position.⁴⁵ Yet the mayor chose to bypass Salter. Salter charged that he was "politically mugged" in that he believed prospects of his appointment were
used only to round up votes for Latimer.\textsuperscript{46}

One black leader saw the Salter incident to be particularly indicative of the limits to Soglin's perspective on minority rights:

He (Soglin) goes about choosing minorities in a very racist fashion. He deliberately looks for minorities that meet his white perceptions as to what minorities ought to be.

I'll take a classic example. He discriminated against Kwame Salter in the appointment of the Affirmative Action Officer...It was political discrimination on racial grounds because he didn't want a black in that job who was politically aware, politically aggressive, and community oriented. That was the last thing he wanted...

What he wanted was somebody whom he thought was easily handled, politically immature...not community directed and (with) no concept of community organization. That was Bettye Latimer. Kwame Salter ranked at the top of every step. Kwame Salter was in fact an activist.\textsuperscript{47}

This search for soft-spokenness did not extend to Soglin's white appointments. The mayor's assistant, James Rowen, was a person with strong credentials among the city's left who continued his quite individualistic course of political action while serving in the mayor's office.

Finally, Soglin's lack of decisive action regarding the alleged discriminatory use of a polygraph test in pre-employment screening by the police department is one last mark in his affirmative action record. Though Soglin was disappointed in the manner in which the polygraph was used,\textsuperscript{48} he expressed no firm conviction on the matter. Initially he did little more than to order an investigation into the
problem. It was not until six months later, and then only after City Council action, that Soglin ordered the discontinuation of the polygraph's use by the department.

Alderman Parks, the mayor's severest critic on the polygraph matter, had constantly kept the question of the propriety of the polygraph's use before the Council. But the Council received no firm guidance from the mayor. Parks particularly accused the mayor of "footdragging" in the matter of resolving the grievance of the five black police applicants who had filed an unfair employment practice suit against the city:

Soglin would not take a vocal stand either in favor or against that damned thing (the use of the polygraph)...Soglin's got the power to end that controversy and won't...Soglin's got the power to offer the people who were discriminated against the job...That's the kind of issue where he just "cops-out."

Mass Transit. Soglin's record in promoting mass transit in Madison is undeniable. Still when it came to the matter of impeding the flow of automobiles into the city, Soglin showed the same ambivalence he exhibited in the Atwood Avenue Bypass controversy. The Marquette area traffic plan raised one of the same basic questions that the Atwood controversy did: through whose neighborhood should traffic be routed? The mayor refused to take a public position on the Marquette plan:

I didn't take one (a stand) because I live smack, dab, right in the middle between the two areas (where traffic could be routed). And no matter what I had done, somebody would have accused me of doing it for personal reasons...If it had been another neighborhood I would have certainly said something.
Soglin refrained from a leadership role in this controversy from fear that his entrance into the matter would only jeopardize his power position. Pragmatic concerns dominated; the mayor had learned well the lesson from the Atwood fiasco.

Soglin showed a similar passivity on the question of broadening the South Beltline to a multi-lane highway. Though the existing road was already the site of heavy traffic congestion and would clearly be incapable of meeting traffic needs in the near future, environmentalists opposed the road's expansion as it would abet automobile usage and would have an undesirable ecological impact on bordering wetlands.

The project originally envisioned a six-lane highway with six additional collector-distributor lanes at major interchanges. The South Beltline Study Committee eventually modified the original plan by eliminating the collector-distributor lanes. Opponents of the compromise plan felt the acquisition of the road corridor as originally proposed and accepted by the study group would still allow the future expansion of the highway to full twelve lanes when projected traffic increases would finally occur.

Though Soglin's inclination was to be against the proposal, he admitted he was "not going to take a leadership role fighting it." The mayor, looking at all sides of the matter, simply did not find the six-lane compromise to be all that objectionable: "I don't like it. But I don't consider it to
Soglin was not a reflex environmentalist. He believed a person could be an environmentalist without opposing every new piece of road construction. For him, it was a "question of absolutes" and the absolute here did not exist. In the matter of highway construction, Soglin did not possess any overriding ideological conviction to spur him to action. This lack of moral vision allowed him to sit on the sidelines and allow others to determine the fate of the South Beltline.

One other brief flurry in the area of highway development occurred when the Traffic Department embraced plans for a new Highway Q, a project opposed by area residents and environmentalists as well as the mayor. The project was finally killed by the Mayor's Public Works Improvement Committee. As with the 1975 housing budget, Highway Q represented a controversy that could have been avoided had the mayor overseen the actions of the staff of the relevant city department.

The Police. As already noted, under the direction of Paul Soglin and Chief David Couper, Madison's Police Department developed a less militaristic, more community relations, style of law enforcement. Specific changes were also made in the pursuit of drug law violations and in the processing of rape victims. Yet, the actions of the police department were constantly made a bone of contention by much of Madison's left community. These critics questioned whether any real reform had been brought to the police department; they questioned the
extent of both Soglin's and Couper's reformist intentions.

The mayor refused to automatically take certain of the actions in the police area members of the left expected of a person of principle. The more extreme members of the left were disappointed that the mayor had not even attempted to disarm the police. The disappointment of other members of the left had to do with the mayor's lack of decisive action in policy matters far less radical than stripping officers of their weapons.

Soglin did not take the "reflex" positions of the left in police matters. As previously noted, he was somewhat ambivalent about the use of a polygraph in employment screening and did not immediately order the termination of its use. The fate of the Police Department's SWAT squad also became a source of difficulty.

The existence of a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) was not even known by the mayor until the heavily armed team charged the apartment of innocent students upon receiving information, which proved to be unfounded, that members of the Symbionese Lyberation Army, the group which had gained national attention in the Patricia Hearst case, were holding hostages at that address. Despite the outcries of Madison's left in the wake of the raid, Soglin refused to disband the SWAT team. He sent Chief Couper a detailed list of questions concerning the set-up, funding, operations, and guidelines of the SWAT team. Soglin for the most part was convinced by the
chief's reply that the squad was needed and that sufficient bureaucratic protection existed to prevent general misuse:

> I don't know if it ought to be put out of business... The obvious abuses with a SWAT squad (are apparent)... (But) I still got a question as to what do you do if, say, you get a situation like a Texas tower (a mass sniping incident) or something of that sort. Well, you say we don't have a SWAT squad, but we just happen to bring in four or five officers heavily equipped—the equipment is probably the same as a SWAT squad. And in effect, even though you have discontinued the SWAT team, then you've got it but without a name.55

During one budget hearing, the mayor mused over the possibility that the squad should change its name because of the over-dramatization of the SWAT squad of television fame. He did not, however, suggest that the SWAT funds be removed from the budget.56

Soglin thus saw the SWAT question in more complex terms than did the liberal left. Again, for the mayor, there were no absolutes to guide his actions.

The same pattern repeated itself on the question of the use of hollow point, or "dum-dum," ammunition by the police. Though the mayor retained a "gut feeling that hollow-point bullets are an extra-deadly weapon,"57 he refused to immediately post a ban on their use. Soglin pondered whether the impact of a hollow point was that more lethal than that of a solid point bullet. He also noted that the pattern in other cities was that where the police had been denied "dum-dum" ammunition they had usually successfully campaigned for the use of .357 magnum ammunition with its increased stopping
Members of the left criticized the mayor for being overly involved with the technicalities of the debate, especially with the ballistics of the matter. Soglin, lacking an ideology to guide his actions, lost sight of the broader question as to whether or not the police should deploy guns to kill people.

The mayor once more saw both sides to the issue—a "liberal" trait often criticized for leading to paralysis instead of action—when two visible members of the left, Alderman Ray Davis and former Daily Cardinal editor Patrick McGilligan, were arrested at a demonstration for Karleton Armstrong of the Sterling Hall bombing infamy. Members of the left charged that the police department, and Chief Couper in particular, overreacted to the disruptive situation. The mayor's view of the incident clearly did not satisfy the left:

I was generally pretty happy with how they (the police department) handled the demonstration. There's some disagreement obviously between Davis and McGilligan and the Department as to what they were doing. I don't know what I would've done if I was sitting on the jury listening to both sides. . .

Soglin's estrangement from the purged left in the police area, though, goes beyond his unwillingness to see total justice lying with the views of the left. Even where the mayor's inclinations did lead him to question policy, he still refused to take the action his critics demanded if he felt it would prove counterproductive in gaining results.
Just as with his action in the Triangle Hotel controversy, Soglin resisted pressure to take the purist stance as he felt a different approach would be more likely to gain results. Soglin was interested in pragmatic change, not action which would serve only to testify to his purity of faith.

When the SWAT squad was still a question in the mayor's mind, power realities helped dictate mayoral inaction, as one member of the mayor's office recounts:

I think he's (Soglin) still kind of leery of the concept, and there really hasn't been any decision yet whether to proceed with the dismantling of the SWAT squad or its fundamental reorganization. We're trying to see what the City Council thinks of this. I think we know that if we sent a resolution down to the Council suggesting that the SWAT squad be dismantled, that it would fail. So what we have to find out is what the rest of the Council wants to do with this before any kind of political move is made. If we don't do it and don't have the political support, it will fall flat.61

The same sort of political considerations led to the mayor's strategy for banning hollow-point bullets. The assessment of the mayor's office was that the City Council would likely overturn a mayoral ban on hollow-points if handed down as an edict. Consequently, Soglin set up a study group on the matter hoping that the report would add a degree of legitimacy to the anti-hollow-point position.62 The mayor's faith that any "rational" group upon reviewing the evidence would conclude that the dum-dums were extra-deadly, however, proved unfounded. After a year's study, the commission split four-to-three in recommending the ban of the
hollow-points. The City Council "filed" the commission's report on a fifteen-to-six vote. Soglin's indirect commission strategy had failed.

The purified lefts' dissatisfaction with Soglin was rooted not only in what they perceived to be the mayor's lack of an ideological approach to police reform but in the mayor's reticence to confront the city's police chief. According to many of Madison's left, Chief David Couper, despite his reformist appearances, was just not all that progressive. One left spokesman observed:

Couper is far more professional than he is political. He sees his job more as a police chief and not as someone who is here to rock the boat and make major changes.63

One other leftist spokesman was even far less charitable:

I think the left is way ahead of the rest of the city and The Capital Times, particularly, in judging Chief Couper for what he is--which is (as) damned near a fascist as you want to get.64

According to this latter critic, the chief in his actions exhibited "a clear pattern of what I would consider a police-state mentality, except it's masked in a lot of good P R (sic) rhetoric."65

The left's irritation with Couper stemmed from many sources, among them the chief's refusal to immediately make public the reports of past undercover operations conducted against the anti-war movement (the "affinity files"), his ordering the use of hollow-point ammunition, his defense of the SWAT team, his continued employment of the polygraph test,
his handling of the Karl Armstrong demonstration, his refusal to crack down on automobile speeding through residential neighborhoods, and his endorsement of the stationing of police in the public schools. Also a particular object of scorn was the department's indiscriminate interrogation of all black males near the Capital Square area after a downtown bank robbery. Local civil rights groups were outraged, but the chief defended the questioning of all persons who came close to fitting the description the police had of the supposed robbers. Soglin, upon learning of the incident, ordered the discontinuation of the practice, warning the police that they did not possess "carte blanche authority" to stop and frisk anyone just because he "happens to be a member of a minority group." 66

Couper's professional police orientation even led him to oppose the mayor on two specific issues—the removal of the shotgun mounts from the front seat of patrol cars and the creation of a citizen Police Policy Advisory Committee. 67 From the perspective of Madison's left, these latter two incidents were exceptional for the mayor's degree of action. To members of Madison's left, the mayor just did not appear to be all that interested in reviewing the operations of the city's police department and in battling the department's chief.
THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM

As has been pointed out in both this and the previous chapter, Paul Soglin proved capable of implementing an impressive degree of policy change. However, as the second part of this chapter underscores, there were also limits to the change he was willing to strive for. Soglin's successes in office can be accounted for by the strong sense of goal orientation he possessed in general. Though Soglin's Partisan posture accounts for his successes, it is the pragmatic orientation of that style that also helps to account for the limits to his achievements.

Soglin as mayor did not pursue radical policy changes; instead he attempted only those changes which he thought politically feasible. It was just this sense of political realism that the more experienced Soglin sounded at the beginning of his campaign for a third term:

A lot of times in campaigns, candidates raise expectations and they go beyond the realm of reality. I think we should have very high expectations. But I also think it's a very cruel deception to give people the impression that within a given period of time certain things can be done when it's literally impossible to do them in that period of time.68

It was with this "realistic" attitude that he approached the workings of city hall. Rather than battling bureaucrats, Soglin, as already noted, saw city officials as "human beings" whose support he had to obtain. According to one member of the mayor's office, Soglin saw the "civil service bureaucracy"
to be "so strong" that if he spent all his time fighting it he would lack the time to develop innovative policies. 69

The perceived strength of the bureaucracy then posed the boundaries within which the mayor chose to work. He accepted the assistant city attorney's view that forfeitures had to be small if the court was to accept Madison's code enforcement program; critics saw the size of these forfeitures to be too small to act as a deterrent to recalcitrant landlords. The mayor accepted the Building Inspections Division claim that they lacked sufficient manpower to annually inspect all housing in the city preservation districts; Alderman Michael Sack viewed it simply as the Division's refusal to fully carry out the new program. The mayor accepted the view that complete change could not be brought to the police department as long as many of the "old guard" officers remained, 70 and chose to focus on the successes of Chief Couper's community relations approach; members of the left attacked what they perceived to be the mayor's reticence to make the department even more respectful of civil rights and liberties.

This reticence to take on the bureaucracy was also apparent in the mayor's handling of complaints concerning Welfare Director Lowell Messerschmidt, a Dyke appointee. The City Welfare Board complained that Messerschmidt was simply incompetent--that he could not develop a policy manual, provide the Board with information it requested or otherwise run the department. The attacks on Messerschmidt for the most
part concerned his administrative capacity and transcended ideological lines. Messerschmidt, from his viewpoint, viewed that the Board was illegally traversing from what was their area, policy, to what under statute was his, administration.

Despite constant requests from members of the Welfare Board, Soglin time and again refused to dismiss Messerschmidt. The mayor, well aware of the problems entailed in firing a civil servant, refrained from action until he had built a case he felt would be beyond challenge. Only when the case was in hand, and the spring 1975 elections had passed, did Soglin dismiss Messerschmidt. Messerschmidt immediately appealed the dismissal.

Soglin's sense of political realism also embraced a concern for his own electoral position. As just noted, the Messerschmidt firing was delayed until after the mayoral election had passed so it would not be an issue. Two other instances of such pragmatic politics have also been observed in this chapter. The mayor let his support for the ICAP inspection program slide not only because the University had withdrawn its cooperation but because as a result of the program's politicization it had become an embarrassment. Similarly, the mayor sat out the Marquette traffic plan dispute for fear of getting embroiled in another Atwood-type controversy.

If Soglin's pragmatism—his willingness to compromise and
his reticence to jeopardize his long-term power position—proved the foundation of his success, it also provided the self-imposed limits to his action. Soglin's critics from the left felt such limits precluded Soglin from obtaining the full measure of results that he could have. Had Soglin possessed a true vision rather than a sense of limits he would have pressed for even more reform in such areas as housing code enforcement and police policy. Had Soglin been an ideological environmentalist, he would have helped lead the fight against the South Beltline. Had he possessed what the left saw to be a sense of "class politics," he would have intervened in the Marquette area traffic dispute to prevent the funneling of traffic through Williamson Street—which the left perceived to be the poorer of the two neighborhoods.

The area of affirmative action, an area of notable Soglin success, is also an area which shows the limits to Soglin's actions resulting from his lack of ideological perspective. Rick Petri, a white, was made Contract Compliance Officer to end a dispute between Petri and his former boss in the Personnel Department; the city did not go through an open recruitment process to identify qualified minority applicants. Similarly, Soglin chose to appoint a soft-spoken black woman rather than black activist Kwame Salter to the Affirmative Action Director position. And finally, for a long time, the mayor refrained from any attempt to end the police department's use of the polygraph in pre-employment screening.
Consequently, despite the achievements obtained by Soglin's pragmatic approach, Soglin's sense of pragmatism can also be seen to be, in a sense, a conservative influence on Madison's politics. Madison is an unusual city—a city in the 1970's which, as a result of its Progressive heritage, large population of students and well educated government employees, and the legacy of the activism of the 1960's and early 1970's, was receptive to policy initiatives which would have been anathema in most other cities across the country. Madison proved receptive to many of Soglin's changes. Yet by the mid-1970's Soglin was no longer even the spokesman for the most socially-liberal change-demanding groups in the city. In the 1977 primary, Soglin was challenged from the left by his vocal critic, Michael Sack.

Whether Soglin had accurately read the mood of Madison and initiated only as much change as the city would accept remains unclear. To the extent that his pragmatic orientation accepted a large measure of bureaucratic inertia and to the extent that he himself limited his policy initiatives, the full measure of change that possibly could have been was not brought to Madison. To the degree that Soglin accurately read his environment, his style represents a successful matching of executive action with the context in which a mayor must operate.
PERSONALITY AND STYLE

Soglin's administrative failings represent not so much a failure of his general Partisan orientation as they do a personal incapacity. Soglin did not reap the full benefits of his general Partisan approach as his personality precluded his total deployment of this style in certain contexts.

Many of the persons interviewed, Soglin supporters and opponents alike and even members of the mayor's office, recognized that the mayor did not enjoy supervising the details of program implementation:

Member of the mayor's office:
"He does not take care of the day to day business of city hall. He doesn't like to meddle in the affairs of the departments."72

Member of the mayor's office:
"I think the mayor is not the best administrator. A good administrator has to make decisions. At some point he has to make a decision and move on it. And I think the mayor has a problem in making decisions."73

Liberal alderman:
"Paul, I think, works very well with people. But his problem is, I think, that he is not a strong enough administrator. He is not on top of everything all the time. I don't know whether it's a lack of attention or a lack of interest."74

City department head:
"Paul Soglin is definitely not an administrator. He doesn't like administration. He avoids it. He delegates it...to everybody."75

Soglin's limitations as an administrator are in part the result of his dislike for interpersonal conflict. Soglin could enjoy conflict, to the point of even at times deliberately choosing a path of action that would precipitate rather than mitigate conflict.76 In each of the major issues of his
first term in office—the Atwood Avenue Bypass, the redevelopment of the Triangle, the building of an auditorium and the defense of the status of Chief Couper—Soglin willingly entered into combat. This combative orientation was also apparent in the mayor's strong defense of the more controversial items in his human resources budget.

But all these instances in which Soglin willingly entered into conflict were the more public of the controversies of his term in office. It was in approaching these major issues that the combative style of the Partisan emerged. But on less salient issues, on administrative matters that did not clearly contain symbolic overtones, the mayor was less inclined to combat. In the administrative sphere, rather than seeking conflict, Soglin often avoided it. The less visible, less symbolic duties of the mayorly just did not engage the mayor as did major controversies or symbolic gestures.

When it came to administrative matters, both aldermen and department heads observed that the mayor simply could not say "no." City officials reported meeting with Soglin and receiving the impression that he agreed with their proposals only later to learn that the mayor never committed himself to a course of action. As one alderman observed: "He says things that he doesn't follow through on."  

Soglin's unwillingness to directly confront bureaucratic problems is exemplified by the approach he took to administrators who had become problems. Soglin chose to deal with such
problems by establishing a system under which the mayor would grade the performances of the various department heads and recommend appropriate pay raises for each. By recommending only the most minimal salary hikes for the forthcoming year, Soglin could punish those administrators with whose performance he was less than satisfied.

But Soglin could not dismiss administrators who clearly proved incapable of performing their duties. Instead of dismissing these administrators, Soglin chose to go the route of lateral transfers by which these persons could be eased into less responsible positions. The parks director and city administrator were both given less demanding assignments. Rick Petri was made contract compliance officer in order to alleviate conflicts in the Personnel Department. Such lateral transfers, in essence, then, amounted to an "end run" by the mayor around having to make the hard decisions concerning an administrator's tenure or prerogatives. Soglin simply was reluctant to directly confront administrators on a personal level. Only Welfare Director Lowell Messerschmidt, whom Soglin saw as particularly inept, received constant rebukes from the mayor's office; but even then, Soglin proved reticent in dismissing Messerschmidt despite the heavy pressure from the City Welfare Board to do so.

Soglin's inability to perform with excellence as an administrator stems not just from his disdain for interpersonal conflict but also from his general disinterest in
the detailed workings of the city's administrative machinery. A number of the persons interviewed in this study reported feeling that the mayor appeared bored with the more routine responsibilities of his office. Paul Soglin was much more comfortable in his role as the public mayor, not the administrative manager. His interests lay with symbolic issues; the managerial duties of his office, lacking such clear symbolic overtones, could not always command his attention.

In the housing code area, then, Alderman Michael Sack had to constantly bring to the mayor's attention the presence of certain bureaucratic problems. A more managerial-oriented mayor would not have needed such reminders. Similarly, had Soglin been more intent in supervising the city's departments, the unnecessary Highway Q and 1975 housing budget flare-ups could have been avoided.

Soglin's disinclination in the managerial area meant that, for the most part, the operations of the city departments were free from mayoral interference. The mayor's appointment of a Director of Transportation from with the ranks of the Department, despite the many criticisms from Soglin and the left that the Department had been too automobile-oriented, is evidence of the relative free reign that the mayor gave the departments, as noted by one department head:

What that showed, I think, more than anything else, was in the end even though he (Soglin) might have some problems in the way some of these people were coming about
the issues, in the end he wanted somebody to administer because he couldn't. He wasn't going to sit on top of that issue (transportation) forever.

So, transportation was going to be run by the Transportation Department, public works by the Public Works Department--police, fire, and administration down the line. So he was going to count on those people getting the job done. He would stay on top for whatever policy issues (there were).79

One department head whose influence particularly grew under Soglin was Finance Director, and later to be Director of Administration, Andre Blum. The close working relationship between the two began with the director's befriending the newly elected mayor--giving Soglin the assistance during the transition that the outgoing mayor refused. As preparer of the city budget, Blum also knew more than any other city official about the workings of the various city departments. Blum's managerial influence under Soglin was formalized and extended into even further areas, including personnel, by the creation of a new Department of Administration in the place of the old Finance Department.

Madison's left was generally critical of the growth of Blum's influence under Soglin who, as seen in the preparation of the 1975 housing budget, had no roots in the left. Soglin, from his perspective, though, was well served by the advice he received from Blum and grew to lean on his Director of Administration beyond administrative matters for policy advice in general. The use of the city's land acquisition account to circumvent budget restrictions in purchasing the Capitol
Theater, for example, was Blum's idea.

The reasons behind the growth of Andre Blum's power during the Soglin administration, then, are two-fold. First, as one city hall reporter noted, Blum has served Soglin well:

I can point to people like Blum—who has really prospered under his (Soglin's) administration; who has worked well with him; who has developed kind of an independent fiefdom over there in Administration under Soglin because he has done the job very responsibly. He has done what Soglin has asked of him. He has given him good advice. Soglin's been able to lean on him...(Blum's) a real partner in running the city.60

But equally as important is the impact of Soglin's personality. Soglin had to lean on someone for administrative matters; neither his background nor his interests lay in the area of administration. The City Administrator did not, in the mayor's eyes, seem capable of handling the job. Andre Blum, as a result of his command over the city budget and his compatibility with the mayor, filled the void.

Soglin's reliance on Blum can, in part, then, be seen to be the product of the mayor's own administrative failings. Such failings were the result of both the mayor's disinterest with the administrative details of policy formulation and execution and his inability to make tough decisions and otherwise directly confront administrators.

Such personal failings unnecessarily constricted the impact of Paul Soglin's more general Partisan posture. Administrative matters lacked the symbolism which both sustained his interest and compensated him for whatever ill
feelings he felt as the result of engaging in interpersonal conflict.

The mayor's personal disinclination to strict bureaucratic oversight, then, imposed limits to the changes the mayor was able to bring to the areas of police policy, housing code enforcement, transportation and affirmative action. Soglin provided optimal leadership only at the adoption stage of the policy-making process. Lacking a taste for bureaucratic supervision, Soglin at times failed to do all he could to ensure that policy formulation and administration would be consonant with his own policy goals. Soglin's guidance at the administrative level was intermittent—sometimes it was there, sometimes it required a push from other political actors, and sometimes, as in the case of police policy, it was noticeably absent.

TWO LESSONS

Two lessons to improve the study of political leadership emerge from this chapter. First, the over-generalization of an actor's style must be avoided. Much insight into a political leader can be obtained by categorizing him in general as fitting one or another type. Yet, the style with which a leader approaches one problem may not be that with which he approaches another problem. Otto Festge, as noted in Chapter 3, played the role of the Entrepreneur on the finance reform and auditorium matters, but was something less than an
Entrepreneur in his approach to the school budget and firefighter-policemen pay parity matters. Paul Soglin, though generally a Partisan in advancing his "people's" goal orientations, did not in administrative matters always provide the firm program direction characteristic of that style. The style a political head exhibits generally is not the style he will exhibit universally.

Students of the field of political leadership, then, must maintain a vigilance to the possible variations in style an actor may exhibit from one problem to another. General observations as to an actor's style can profitably provide clues as to what to focus on when studying the making of a particular decision. Such general observations, however, must not be uncritically accepted as an accurate portrait of the leader's approach to any particular case unless confirmed by by further analysis.

Second, students of political leadership must become more sophisticated in their assessment of the impact of an actor's predispositions on his actions. Too often the recognition of the impact of personality has gone no further than the documentation of how an actor's general style has been determined by psychological forces. But just as a leader's style may vary from case to case, so may the impact of the dynamics of his personality.81

Different personality factors can emerge as important in different contexts. Whatever personality attributes led
Paul Soglin to develop an aggressive, combative stance on major policy questions were to a certain degree submerged in his approach to administrative matters. Studies which do no more than identify a political actor's general personality approach the problem of the impact of personality only at the most broad level. More thorough personality analysis requires both a recognition and explanation of an actor's changing personality dynamics in different situations.
CHAPTER NINE: THE MAYOR AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY: SUBSTANCE, SYMBOLS AND COALITIONS

In this chapter, many of the "loose ends" concerning the Paul Soglin mayoralty not covered in the preceding chapters will be tied together. First, trends in local property tax rates during the Soglin years will be analyzed, with the conclusion dispelling any notion that the mayor was a "free-wheeling" spender in the pursuit of his social visions. Yet, as will then be noted, many in Madison's business community continued to view Soglin with great suspicion despite the mayor's fiscal moderation, the roots of this distance between the mayor and the business community will then be laid clear. Finally the concluding words of this chapter will be devoted to the much broader question of clarifying the concepts of personality and leadership style.

SOGLIN'S FISCAL CONCERN

Taxes. An examination of the trends in local taxes during Paul Soglin's term in office will provide quantitative data to further assess the degree of Soglin's "radicalness." Major tax increases during his term in office would paint the picture of a mayor willing to spend in a free-wheeling manner in pursuit of his social programs; a pattern of tax decreases or moderate increases during his term would paint the picture of a mayor who felt the need to exhibit fiscal restraint
despite his avowed "people's" orientations.

If actual tax rates are used as a measure of the mayor's commitment (Table 1), the pattern is clearly one of moderation. By Soglin's third budget year, actual tax rates in Madison were all below those of the last year of his tax-conscious predecessor, William Dyke. Only tax rates for the general fund (city operations excluding education and the library services) exhibited a rise in as many as two of the three years included in this table; and even these rate increases were counterbalanced by the large 12 per cent decrease in Soglin's second budget year—despite the funding of the mayor's new human resources and day care programs for the first time in this budget!

The mayor's generally moderate spending proclivities were recognized by some City Hall observers. Soglin's first budget, with its 1.7 per cent decrease in the total property tax rate despite the near 5 per cent increase in taxing for general fund services, was labeled by one city hall reporter a "cautious approach."\(^1\) One antagonist of the mayor on the City Council noting that the mayor's proposed first budget contained little to criticize even claimed it to be "basically the same kind of budget as Dyke put out."\(^2\)

The only sources of criticism to be found in the mayor's second budget were his human resource and day care proposals. Despite these programs this budget was otherwise so tight that despite their funding the actual tax rate for general fund
Table 1
Actual Property Tax Rates (in mills),
Madison, Wisconsin, 1974-1976,
Soglin Budget Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Education % Increase</th>
<th>General Fund % Increase</th>
<th>Total General % Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mill Rate</td>
<td>Over Previous Year</td>
<td>Mill Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>15.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>13.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>29.44</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>14.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total General Property Tax includes state, county, sewer district, board of education, vocational school, library and general fund levies on property.

**Taxes for the new budget year are levied at the end of the preceding calendar year. For example, taxes for the 1974 budget year were levied in December of 1973—the first budget proceedings to take place during Soglin's mayoralty.

SOURCE: Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin.
spending was substantially decreased from the preceding year.

Only Soglin's third budget provoked any major public outcry that the mayor was spending too much. Though Soglin had proposed only a 2 per cent increase in city spending for that year, a large 2.7 mill increase was required to finance city services as a result of a drop in the surplus, especially when contrasted to the five million dollars applied to the previous year's budget. Faced with the citizens' furor at the spectre of such a tax raise, Soglin proposed about a million dollars in spending reductions. The Board of Estimates and City Council chopped city spending by over two-and-one-half times the amount Soglin suggested, reducing even police and fire service levels below those which Soglin desired. Still the mayor's pet projects—including funding for the auditorium, day care, and human resources (with the exception of funding for the Spanish-American Organization) survived essentially unscathed.

Soglin resisted the temptation to use revenue sharing funds to reduce the third year tax levy as he believed such a move under the state's new levy limit law would lessen the city's ability to raise needed tax revenues in the future. Soglin also preferred that revenue sharing be used for capital outlays rather than operating expenses, thereby lessening the city's need to borrow money and saving on interest charges. The mayor was disappointed in this matter, however, as the City Council used one million dollars in revenue sharing funds
to lower the tax levy then under consideration. Only for this third budget year, then, can the pattern of tax moderation apparent in Table 1 be viewed to more the product of Council as opposed to mayoral influence.

Critics of the mayor charge, however, that Soglin's tax concern is more apparent than real in that the decreases in the actual tax rates of his first two budgets were more than offset by increases in property valuation. A comparison of valuation increases with the changes in actual tax rates confirms this charge (Table 2). Soglin was able to increase city spending while lowering actual tax rates only because of fortunate increases in property valuation; the result was still a real tax boost for the homeowner.

Still, the question that must be answered is whether or not these real tax increases were mandated or were excessive to the point of indicating a lack of fiscal constraint on the part of the mayor. Considering that nation-wide inflation continued at annual rates of 6 per cent, 11 per cent and 9 per cent for 1973, 1974 and 1975, respectively, much of Soglin's real tax increases during his term did not go to fund new city spending but was required to maintain city services at the previous year's level. In fact, in 1975 the combined actual tax rate reduction and inflation rate outweighed any growth in Madison's tax base; Soglin is in fact spending less in constant dollar terms for this year than he had the previous year!
Table 2
Property Valuation and Actual Rate Tax Increases,
Paul Soglin's First Three Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Total Assessed Valuation (in millions)</th>
<th>Increase in Valuation Over Previous Year</th>
<th>Change Over Previous Year, TGPT**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$1,100</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Budget and tax rates adopted at the end of the preceding calendar year. The 1974 budget, hence, was adopted at the end of calendar year 1973 and represents the first budget set during Paul Soglin's term in office.

**Total General Property Tax is expressed in the actual rate of the levy, not full-value rates.

NC—not calculated.

Table 3 further provides evidence as to Soglin's fiscal restraint; whenever taxes did increase during Soglin's term in office, they did so only quite moderately. Changes in Madison's full value tax rates (the only rates that can be used for comparisons between jurisdictions) during Soglin's term in office do not appear to be out of line with those exhibited by Wisconsin's other large cities. For the 1974 and 1975 budget years, changes in Madison's local tax rates—those over which the mayor has most control—were even more conservative than the average change exhibited by the twelve other largest Wisconsin cities. And as Table 2 also shows, taxes in Madison for each of the categories—local, educational, and total general revenue—increased at a lower annual rate during the first three years of the Soglin administration than they had during the administration of his tax-conscious predecessor.

The overall picture of Paul Soglin then is that of a mayor who had reconciled his social priorities with a concern for taxes. Soglin's own words, as he discussed his plans for his second budget, show just such a balancing of priorities:

The target, the goal I have set for next year's budget at this time is a no-mill increase. That I think I can realistically work for 1975 and still institute a number of programs in 1975. The secondary goal would be—and this would then depend a good deal upon what the county, the school board and so on do—would be to have a mill decrease sufficient to offset any increase in assessed valuation so that net taxes that people would pay in 1975 would be the same or at least no higher than what they paid in 1974.7
Table 3
Annual Changes in Full Value Rate Property Taxes, Madison and Other Wisconsin Cities, 1970-1976
(expressed as per cent increase over previous year's full value tax rate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Educationa</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Total Generalb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>12 largest Cities</td>
<td>Madison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyke Budget Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>-9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soglin Budget Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>-10.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a-The Education category here includes levies for vocational education as well as for local education. Consequently, this category differs somewhat from the category in Table 1 which only included the levy for local education. The more traditional education component, however, far outstrips the vocational levy.

b-The Total General Property Tax rate includes state, county, city and school levies. It does not include special assessments.
c- Taxes for the new budget year are levied at the end of the preceding calendar year. For example, taxes for the 1973 budget year were levied in December of 1973—the time of the last budget proceedings to take place under the Dyke regime.

d-The twelve largest cities in Wisconsin according to population, other than Madison, are Milwaukee, West Allis, Eau Claire, La Crosse, Sheboygan, Appleton, Green Bay, Oshkosh, Racine, Kenosha, Wauwatosa and Janesville. As Appleton, Eau Claire and Milwaukee each embraced more than one taxing district, the computations in this table were based on the rates levied in the district in which the far major portion of each city's population resided.

e-This the mean Total General Property Tax Rate for all 200 or so jurisdictions in Wisconsin classified as cities.

f-11-city average; Janesville experienced a 435% increase in its local full value property tax rate and was excluded from the analysis.

g-11-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine.

h-9-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine; Sheboygan with a 122% increase and Wauwatosa with a 128% increase in their local property tax rates were excluded from the analysis.

i-11-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine.

j-10-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine; LaCrosse with a 101% increase in its local property tax rate was excluded from the analysis.

SOURCE: Figures computed from data provided by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, "Town, Village and City Taxes," 1969 through 1975 issues.
For Soglin there was no necessary choice to be made between his "people's" priorities and his concern for taxes. He did not see them as exclusive. He believed he could have both: "I believe it is possible to do things we've been talking about and still have no increase in the budget."  

Paul Soglin, then, was extremely tax conscious. This tax-consciousness, though, was not so all pervasive that it required the sacrificing his human resource programs or his applying funds in the old auditorium accounts to city operating expenditures to reduce the tax levy. Still it was a general tax-consciousness on the part of the mayor that restrained spending during his first two terms in office and gave his administration a liberal as opposed to an unrestrained radical tone.

Labor and the Taxpayer. Soglin's new found tax consciousness as mayor and the resulting "moderateness" of his orientations readily surfaces in a review of his dealings with organized labor. One might have predicted that Soglin, with his "people's" orientation, would idealize to working man and act to facilitate the wage desires of the municipal unions in Madison. As a City Council member, Soglin was clearly in the pro-labor camp. He urged municipal takeover of the bus utility to raise the wages paid drivers; he supported parity in the wages between firefighters and policemen. In fact, it was as a result of the bond that developed between himself and the firefighters that the local firefighters' union posted
bail for Soglin after the alderman's arrest during the Mifflin Street disorders.

When the issue was symbolic, and not one that directly affected the Madison taxpayers, Soglin as mayor was still vehemently pro-labor. When Hortonville, Wisconsin, dismissed its striking school teachers, Mayor Soglin walked a picket line in their support—despite the outcry he knew it would bring from certain elements of Madison's population, including the more conservative members of Madison's own Board of Education. Yet, when it came to dealing with the city's own unions and therefore the money of Madison's taxpayers Soglin was not reflexively pro-union.

In 1974, the Teamsters' local authorized a bus drivers' walk-out if their demands for an 11.3 per cent wage increase (51 cents an hour) were not met. Soglin stood by the city's 6.9 per cent (31 cents an hour) offer, despite the strike threat and the criticism of leftist aldermen that the city's proposal did not even provide wage boosts that equal the rise in the cost of living. Soglin's concerns in the controversy are underscored in the following report by Capital Times reporter Tom Foley of an exchange between Soglin and Alderman Michael Sack at what was supposed to be a secret City Council meeting:

At one point, Sack shouted, "Then what you're doing is giving the workers (bus drivers) a pay cut. If they don't get it (a cost of living boost), then they get a pay cut."

"What about the (expletive deleted) $3 million to the taxpayers. That's a pay cut to them," Soglin replied.
Soglin's "$3 million" referred to an estimate by the city's labor negotiator, Barry Ott, that any pay boost of 10 per cent or more to the bus personnel would set a guideline for labor agreements for all the 1,800 city employees next year, requiring a $3 million increase in property taxes. 9

The mayor was not adamant in his position, noting the city's offer could be improved in mediation, as long as the union did not "continue to insist on 51 cents or nothing." 10 Though Soglin insisted that his position was "definitely not anti-labor," he was quick to add, "If we simply accept their demand, with the magnitude of its effect on next year's mill rate, then all Madison workers would have to pay." 11 When asked about the possibilities of a strike, Soglin quipped, "I've got my bike and I got my license." 12

A strike was finally averted when the union, on the day the strike was to begin, accepted a 9 per cent (37 cents an hour) increase with the addition of an additional floating holiday. Wages were to be raised another 14 cents an hour with the beginning of the new year, still over six months away. Union spokesman Donald Eaton insisted the new offer was accepted despite the fact that he did not see it as that substantially better than the city's previous offer. 13

The next year, though, a strike was not averted. The Teamsters demanded an immediate 8 per cent wage increase to be followed by another 10 per cent increase the second year. The city responded with an offer of only a 5 per cent (25 cents an hour) increase coupled with increased health benefits.
Again some aldermen criticized that the city's offer did not even keep up with the eight per cent annual inflation rate. The mayor responded by noting that in light of the recently imposed levy limits by the state, the city could not raise the taxes to cover too high a settlement. For the first time in eight years, Madison's bus drivers walked off the job.

Despite the mayor's warning of the likelihood of a prolonged strike, the strike was settled the next day with the union accepting a two-stage wage raise totalling 6.3 per cent (30 cents an hour) coupled with increases in its health benefit package. Soglin expressed satisfaction that the 4.7 per cent increase the settlement entailed for the first year remained within the stringent five per cent ceiling he had mandated for all city wage bargaining that year.

Soglin's stance on the matter of bus driver negotiations was tougher than what should have been expected based on his past labor sympathies. As mayor he had tax and service concerns which mitigated whatever sympathies he felt toward bus drivers. Soglin's attitude was heavily criticized by Madison's liberal evening newspaper, The Capital Times:

Evidently, he is not the fast friend of labor he was before his re-election...

...the mayor allowed the bus drivers to go on strike with only a 5 per cent offer from the city on the table!
Soglin clearly empathized with the middle-class resident who had a hard time meeting the mortgage. "Putting" money in citizens' hands by not raising taxes became a new brand of "people's" program for Mayor Soglin; service programs were selectively advocated so as not to overly burden the Madison homeowner.

THE MAYOR AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

The moderation Soglin showed in the pursuit of his social priorities was not generally recognized by Madison's business community. More than any element in the Madison community, except perhaps the purified left, members of the business community looked askance at the Soglin mayoralty. Members of the business community felt simply that they did not have a friend in city hall.18 As Soglin's taxing and spending programs were not all that extravagant, the strained relationship between the mayor and the business community cannot be accounted for direct impact Soglin's program had on the tax bill of business.

To a great extent the mayor was the victim of his past reputation. No matter how moderate or reserved he in substance proved to be as mayor, a number of businessmen still persisted in perceiving Soglin as the student radical of old.

If the spillover of the mayor's past actions hurt him with Madison leaders, this radical reputation hurt even more when to attract new industry to Madison Soglin found it
necessary to deal with businessmen from outside the Madison area. Business decision-makers from outside of Madison had little opportunity to view the transformed or mellowed Soglin. Rather, their view of the mayor continued to be shaped more by the sporadic stories which appeared in such business publications as *The Wall Street Journal* and *The U.S. News and World Report* which continued to play up the theme of the radical coming to power. In one particular instance, Soglin's past haunted him even more directly; Dow Chemical Corporation refused to consider Madison as a potential development location as the result of the mayor's past anti-Dow actions during the Vietnam activism days.¹⁹

But if the impact of the mayor's past was beyond his ability to correct, there were still other actions which the mayor took in office which only served to reinforce the business community's suspicions of him. A prime irritant to business leaders was what they saw to be unsympathetic staffing of the mayor's office itself, as one business leader scored:

Phil Ball (the mayor's committee coordinator) has no credibility at all with the private sector. (James) Rowen (the mayor's administrative assistant) has very little...He (Soglin) doesn't have anyone on his staff who relates to or understands (business). (He needs) to find somebody with good credibility with the private sector and who could be a spokesman for him.²⁰

Both Rowen and Ball had solid credentials with the city's left, and both continued with their outspoken advocacy of leftist causes while serving in their new positions. As a
result, neither was able to serve as an effective staff link between the mayor and the city's business community.

Similarly, business leaders felt shut out of the appointments made to the various city committees and commissions. Soglin, as previously noted, had opened up these committees to persons whom he felt had previously been excluded from the city's policy-making councils. But in doing so he also failed to give adequate representation to the city's more traditional business leaders. One business leader, a former alderman, complained that he hardly knew a person serving on the committees:

I think they're too young, and they're way too liberal, and they are not capable of reflecting and maintaining differing views...They are not balanced in representing the differing views of this community.21

If Soglin's appointments did not generate any confidence in Madison's business community, the problem was only aggravated by certain specific actions the mayor took which were perceived by some to be blatantly hostile to business. The mayor's stepped up housing inspections program and land use policies were seen to be evidence of his general suspicion of and his willingness to limit free enterprise. Particularly irritating to businessmen, also, was Soglin's attempt to block the construction of a high-rise condominium on the Mendota lakeshore--despite the fact that the building had already been cleared by the City Planning Commission, legally the final city authority on such matters, and that the developer had
made a number of concessions to the city concerning public
access. Businessmen felt their needs were being subordinated
to whatever environmental or other policy concerns the mayor
had.

The deteriorating relationship between the city and
Oscar Mayer and Company, the city's largest private employer,
only served to underscore the private sector's lack of faith
in Soglin. In 1973 the city revised its sewage billing rates,
eliminating the volume discounts formerly given to large
effluent producers. The meat-packing company called the new
rates "unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory" in that it
took no notice of the company's pre-treatment of its wastes.
The stakes involved in the dispute were substantial. Under
the old sewage rates in 1973, Oscar Mayer paid $128,464; had
the new rates been in effect, the company would have been
charged $271,432. In 1974 the City Council in approving a
10 per cent increase in city sewer rates, defeated a motion to
exempt Oscar Mayer from the new increase, despite Alderman
Thomas Parker's complaint that the city was not giving indus-
try any incentive to locate in Madison.

The sewage rate increases had their consequences. The
president of Oscar Mayer called the city "unfriendly;" but
even more important, the company announced that its new
$8 million subsidiary plant, employing 75 to 100 persons with
future employment possibly reaching as high as 400, would be
constructed only three miles north of Madison. WISM radio
commentator Wayne Wallace without reservation pointed his finger toward the mayor's office:

He was obviously reluctant to say it, but Oscar Mayer and Company president Robert Bowles has been the latest and most important business leader to question the city of Madison's approach to the business community...The firm was announcing its plan for its big subsidiary plant in Waunakee. Oscar Mayer rejected Madison as a site for the plant and we asked why. Reluctantly, Bowles said it was because Waunakee made the firm feel welcome. Madison did not.

This is not the first time someone in the business community has questioned whether Mayor Soglin and the city bureaucrats really want business in the city. But it's the first time that someone of the unquestioned stature of the president of the city's largest industry had made the charge. And we think it is serious...we are concerned that there really is an attitude towards business in city hall that drives companies away...27

Soglin also earned the suspicion of Madison's private sector in his, and his assistant Rowen's, constant calls for municipal takeover of the Madison Gas and Electric Company. As one business official noted, "that really shakes them (businessmen) up."28 Not only did businessmen fear that the price of takeover would be reflected in increased taxes, but they saw the mayor's calls for MGE ownership to be another philosophical statement of his lack of faith in the private sector. The mayor, in his calls for municipal takeover to a number of businessmen sounded "more and more like a socialist."29

Tax-conscious businessmen were also fearful of the burden they would have to bear for Soglin's spending--despite the fact, as has already been shown, that taxes were not raised
excessively during the mayor's first years in office. The human resources and day care budgets particularly weighed heavily on their minds as a cause of these anxieties as these businessmen objected to being taxed for increasing city social services.

Even Soglin's auditorium proposals drew fire from parts of Madison's business community. The Chamber of Commerce had attacked the original Law Park plan, which the mayor backed, as being both too costly and too physically removed from the State Street business area. But the mayor's move behind the State Street (Capitol Theater) plan did not mollify all his critics. The business community split, with the Chamber and downtown merchants for the most part backing the proposal, and with some non-downtown businessmen still fearing the impact on taxes the conversion of such a facility would bring.

Still, all that has been said thus far regarding Soglin's business policies does not fully explain the suspicions of many members of Madison's business community regarding Soglin. A great deal of their distance from Soglin rested on their reaction to mayoral actions which had nothing at all to directly do with questions of business.

Paul Soglin often took symbolic actions that quite upset Madison conservatives. Most of such actions expressed his opposition to the Vietnam war. He refused to attend traditional Memorial Day observances, choosing to attend anti-war activities instead. He permitted anti-war activists to use
his office to publicize their report concerning the Army Math Research Center at the University. He spoke at a rally for the defense fund for Karleton Armstrong, who was on trial for the bombing of Sterling Hall. He readily proffered the key of the city to anti-war activists Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, but refused to tender it to hawkish announcer Paul Harvey. He refused a routine request to receive a representative of the South Vietnamese government. Beyond the war, the mayor's symbolic activities extended to such things as walking a picket line to support the striking Hortonville teachers and sponsoring a resolution endorsing the boycott of non-United-Farm Worker's lettuce and grapes.

The major controversies of Soglin's second-term centered not so much around his programs as around the more symbolic actions of both himself and his administrative assistant. First of all was the public's reaction to his assistant James Rowen's defense of David Fine, another of the accused Sterling Hall bombers. Rowen gave Fine great assistance during the latter's trial, including housing the accused while out on bail. Capital Times reporter Rosemary Kendrick surveyed the reactions of a number of city hall observers:

A city labor leader said he feels Rowen "has hurt Soglin real bad politically. I think he did the mayor an injustice."

Except for a couple of persons who said the Fine incident is irrelevant to Soglin's performance as mayor, all of those interviewed felt it would take Houdini-like skills for Soglin to escape from severe political consequences as a result of Rowen's actions. "There's
Soglin did not choose to cut his losses on the Fine affair. To him it was simply a matter of principle:

I've basically got a rule I've made for myself up here: I'm not going to interfere with the personal or political beliefs of anybody in the office. As long as they're doing their job as an employe, they're free to do as they want.31

The second major incident of Soglin's second term as far as public reaction was concerned had to do with the mayor's trip to Cuba. Rowen, George McGovern's son-in-law, had previously visited Cuba with the Senator and laid the groundwork for a visit by Soglin—the first by any American mayor to the island under Castro's regime. Soglin's trip drew flak from members of both Madison's left and right who charged the whole thing was nothing more than a Soglin publicity coup.32 Under public criticism, the mayor termed the trip a "non-official fact-finding visit."33 The City Council adopted a resolution specifying that such international trips by the mayor were not official. The Council also rejected a Soglin sponsored resolution authorizing him to discuss "Madison's social, political and economic life" with Cuban officials.

Soglin's symbolic stances undercut whatever initiatives he had made with the business community. As one business official observed, "Every time he makes some progress, something like this (in this particular case, Rowen's public support for Karleton Armstrong) happens."34 This official
further noted that such symbolic actions as giving the key to the city to Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden were covered by *The Wall Street Journal* and only helped to further estrange businessmen outside the city: "But you can't take a step this way and then cover your flank by taking two steps back."

A MATTER OF COALITIONS AND PERSONALITY

Much of Soglin's alleged estrangement from the business community, it should be apparent from this chapter, was a "bad rap." Paul Soglin was not a big spender. The sums spent for his human resources and day care programs were relatively small, totalling only one per cent of the city's 1976 budget (1.3 per cent if expenditures for debt service and capital outlays are excluded). City taxing and expenditure policies under Soglin showed no radical departure from past patterns—a fact that often brought sharp criticisms from those members of Madison's left seeking more fundamental change. To this extent, then, the adverse reaction of Madison's business community to Soglin was based not on an evaluation as to what the mayor had actually done, but on fear—fear based on his past reputation and fear as to where the mayor was taking the city and what he might do in the future. The mayor's human resources and day care programs, for example, became "condensation symbols" on which the business community displaced their anxieties. Hence, the business community itself must bear part of the responsibility for whatever gulf existed
between itself and the mayor.

Still Soglin took a number of actions that showed him to be less than a close friend of business. The fight against the lakeshore condominium, the revision of the sewage rates, the step-up of housing code enforcement, the call for the municipal take-over of Madison Gas and Electric—all represented an attitude that clearly cannot be labeled pro-business. To the extent that he adopted the policies and to the extent that he manipulated symbols that made it easy for businessmen, both in and outside of Madison, to perceive him as anti-business, Soglin too must bear part of the responsibility for the breach that developed between himself and business leaders.

Before evaluating Paul Soglin's failure to satisfy the needs of Madison's business community it is fruitful to first look at Charles Levine's observations on the style and impact of Gary, Indiana, Mayor Richard Hatcher:

The leadership behavior of Richard Hatcher resulted in the centralization of politics, the mobilization of community resources, and substantial innovation. However, Hatcher's coalition did not include whites on equal terms with blacks. Instead, the mayor developed a coalition that differentially incorporated whites as minority participants and recipients of political rewards and benefits. From a pluralist perspective, Hatcher's failure to integrate white interest groups and institutions into a biracial coalition would be an indicator of the mayor's ineffective leadership. However, a conflict orientation would regard his ability to activate innovative programs and exclude these groups and institutions as a sign of effective mayoral leadership (emphasis original).36

Richard Hatcher's relationship to Gary's white population is
closely paralleled by Paul Soglin's relationship to Madison's private sector. Soglin's failure to satisfy business demands is a failure only from an integrationist or pluralist framework. But Soglin consciously chose to spurn such a framework and adopted a conflict orientation instead. Soglin viewed business interests as hostile to the "people's" oriented innovations he desired. To effectively pursue his new programs he had to both consciously exclude businessmen from the power positions on city commissions and committees and to subordinate their interests to those of the disadvantaged groups for whom he believed he was fighting.

Paul Soglin, then, like Richard Hatcher, was a true Partisan. He perceived that the interests of the group he represented could not be advanced while integrating the interests of Madison's business community. Paul Soglin saw himself as the leader of a coalition that differentially incorporated various city groups; rewards were to be dispensed primarily to the city's disadvantaged and central residents. The business community's clear second-class status in this coalition was a necessity for effective program initiatives in such a conflict context.

The only amendment to this position that must be made concerns whether or not Soglin denied the business community rewards to a greater degree than even his conflict orientation required. If Paul Soglin, for whatever reasons, denied the business community benefits which did not jeopardize the
status of his policy initiatives in other areas--this can be taken as evidence of mayoral failure.

The record, to a certain extent, supports just such a claim regarding Soglin. According to one business leader, Soglin simply did not expose himself enough to the business community. Intermingling with business leaders would have been a relatively costless act; surely it would not jeopardize any of his specific programs. Yet he apparently did not do this simple, costless act often enough and he reportedly felt uneasy when talking to corporate officials in their offices.

To the extent that the mayor's own disinclinations helped to maintain the lack of confidence the business sector had in Soglin, the mayor himself must bear responsibility.

Business' suspicions of Soglin, as has been seen in this chapter, were reinforced by their adverse reactions to the symbols--Hortonville, Cuba, Karleton Armstrong, Jane Fonda, etc.--which the mayor constantly threw at them and the general public. To the extent that these symbols were unnecessary for coalitional maintenance, Soglin again can be seen to have unnecessarily alienated members of the business community. It is to the explanation of Soglin's constant engagement of symbols, and the determination as to what extent they were really necessary, that this chapter now turns.

To a certain extent, Soglin found the dispensation of symbols necessary to the maintenance of his popular support. Soglin, as a mellowed radical coming to power, found himself
in a precarious position. To maintain his electoral position, he now needed the support of a constituency larger than the student left; and he found such a constituency ready to be tapped in the city's liberal Democratic elements. Soglin then could not afford to adopt a purist leftist approach to issues if he was to solidify his standing among these more traditional liberal voters. The fact that he saw politics in pragmatic rather than ideological terms only helped abet the moderation of his policy approach that was required to maintain his electoral position.

But in broadening his appeal to the liberal center, the mayor still faced the problem of maintaining the allegiance of at least a good part of the city's left, for to gain new supporters only at the price of losing many of his former supporters could still cost him the margin needed to win the next election. In the dispensation of symbolic rewards, Soglin found the answer to his constituency cross-pressure problem. Soglin could satisfy the city's liberal elements with his pragmatic innovations and still "prove" to many of the city's left that he was still their type of radical by taking the proper symbolic stance to which they readily reacted.

Soglin, then, became a master juggler; his coalition act was kept together by giving the liberals substantive policies and the left symbolic rewards. Not all the members of the left bought Soglin's act; a number of visible spokesmen of the left charged that Soglin as mayor had not gone beyond what
could be expected of any good liberal Democratic politician. Yet the voting left, the student wards, responded quite positively to Soglin's mixture of pragmatic tangible programs and symbolic rewards.

Still, were Soglin's symbolic actions rooted solely in his need to maintain the votes of Madison's voting left? An alternative explanation is that Soglin himself had a felt need to dispense symbols. Soglin, ever the self-styled radical, had to constantly prove to himself that despite his pragmatic compromises he was still a true radical. He used radical symbols to assuage any fears that he entertained that he had indeed deteriorated into only a liberal politician.

There exists no possible way to determine to what extent Soglin's actions were determined by value-expressive personality factors as opposed to his need to maintain the diverse elements of his coalition. But to the extent that symbols were dispensed beyond what was needed to balance his constituencies, Soglin's radical gestures were unnecessary sources of aggravation to the city's business community. Soglin's failure to warm up to business leaders and his constant dispensation of symbols, then, were both rooted to a great degree in his personality. Soglin's failure to incorporate the business community into his coalition was not totally dictated by the conflict approach of his Partisan style.

As should be apparent by now from the preceding discussion of Paul Soglin's relationship with Madison's private
sector, personality can act as an influence on a political head's actions independent of its impact on the adoption of a general leadership style. Even after a general leadership approach is settled upon, personality forces still exert an influence on a political head's actions. Such personality factors may deter a political head from deploying his general leadership style in a specific instance; in some circumstances, personality factors may induce a leader to a course of action at variance with his more generally characteristic leadership approach.

Paul Soglin's leadership style was generally that of the Partisan. Whatever psychological forces led him to adopt the goal-oriented, conflict-oriented style of leadership is beyond the scope of this study; only a clear precise psycho-biography can give us insight here. However, Soglin's personality further affected his actions independent of the influence they had on his general style determination. Soglin's Partisanship necessitated the subordination of the interests of the business community to advance his "people's" causes. Yet, Soglin in his affinity for the symbolic gesture and his discomfort in traditional business situations alienated the business community beyond what was seemingly necessitated by even his coalitional outlook. Soglin's need for symbols, his concern for his privacy and his unwillingness to make himself more available to the business community were all rooted in his personality; and none of these were necessarily dictated by
his Partisan posture.

Researchers in the area of political leadership will do well to keep aware of the different impact of personality and style. Personality must be studied not just to explain a political actor's general style adoption but also to explain an actor's deviation from his general style and even his inabilities to employ his general style to its maximum impact.

Postscript. In the spring of 1977, Paul Soglin survived the "third-term crisis" gaining 63 per cent of the vote to easily beat back the mayoral bid of doctrinaire conservative Alderman Anthony Amato. Such a victory stands as testimony to the popular success of Soglin's governing style. Yet, Soglin finished only second behind Amato in the primary where Soglin critic Michael Sack and moderate Michael Duffy also garnered part of the vote. Though it is difficult to translate election results, such a second-place finish by Soglin likely underscores the tensions resulting from the mayor's tangible and symbolic postures and the limits to the extent of change that would be accepted in Madison.
CHAPTER TEN: THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

THE IMPORTANCE OF MAYORS

Are mayors capable of leading? The answer to this question based on the results of this study of Madison politics in the late 1960's and early 1970's must be a qualified "yes." Two of the three mayors in this study succeeded markedly in putting their imprint on Madison's domain. Under William Dyke, Madison's politics for the most part reflected his conservative orientations—the general obligation debt was reduced, tax increases were moderate, management and data processing systems were implemented, and the police force was strengthened. Under Dyke's successor, Paul Soglin, Madison's programs were reoriented in a manner consistent with the new mayor's "people's" orientations—housing code enforcement was stepped up, public housing was built, mass transit was expanded, the downtown State Street Mall and Capitol Concourse projects were moved ahead, human resources and day care programs were funded, and even a civic auditorium was finally acquired. The successes of these two men were not universal. Each mayor suffered his defeats. Yet, on the whole, it would be fair to say that both Dyke and Soglin succeeded markedly in pushing the city in the directions each desired as mayor.

Even Madison's third mayor during the time period covered by this study made some attempts at leadership. Otto Festge attempted in an Entrepreneurial manner to mobilize a
consensus behind the construction of an auditorium and civic center. Festge failed, though, as he utilized a style inappropriate to a setting marked by a high level of community polarization and a paucity of formal mayoral powers. Still, Festge had the personal inclination to act and must be considered a mayor who attempted leadership—and in the creation of a Finance Department and the shortening of the bond terms, Festge's leadership efforts brought success. It is only when the focus of analysis is placed beyond these few issues that Festge's failure to provide general policy direction becomes apparent.

Perhaps the presence of goal-oriented leadership in Madison is a result of the city's atypicality. Both Madison's large university population and her large population of well-educated professionals working in Wisconsin's capitol for the state government have acted to produce a polity and hence a government with an unusual degree of civic awareness. This seems to be the conclusion of one study of Madison's politics:

Two characteristics of Madison public life seemed to be connected to domination by the educated middle-class and public norms stressing both bureaucracy and participation. These were a pervasive moralism and a concern with aesthetics and public amenities. Middle-class political activism was usually connected with moralist politics. The city reform movements, like the temperance movements, had a vision of cities purified of dirty politics and corrupt parties, replaced by upright, efficient men devoted to civic responsibility and the public interest. Madison's culture, then, may have acted to generate a series of mayors concerned with pursuing their own moralist
conservative or liberal visions of the public interest rather than simply preserving their own electoral position.

An observer might also tend to advance the proposition that as Madison's population was quite homogeneous—only about three per cent of the city's population is black—the severe fractionalization and polarization which might cause a mayor in larger heterogeneous cities to be cautious, were absent in Madison. But this argument is fallacious to the extent that it assumes severe factionalism arises only in cities with a racially and ethnically diverse population. Despite Madison's demographic homogeneity, the city was constantly plagued by severe polarization during the time period of this study—and still Madison's mayors attempted leadership. Otto Festge pursued his dream of an auditorium despite the rancorous conflict which surrounded this issue. William Dyke pursued his policy orientations despite the stringent and emotional opposition of the city's more liberal elements. And Paul Soglin, in his attempts to handle the four major controversies of his first term, faced active and impassioned resistance from a combination of factions on both the left and the right in each instance. Thus, though Madison was fortunate enough not to have been embroiled by racial issues, it still experienced severe polarization. The presence of goal-oriented mayoral leadership cannot be explained by the absence of rancorous conflict.

An alternative view is that the degree of goal-oriented
leadership that characterized Madison in the 1965 to 1975 period is not that atypical of that which has characterized other cities. According to this perspective, mayoral action in Madison can be seen to a greater degree to be representative of the leadership attempted in other cities.

The high direction mayor, then, may not be that rare a species. Many mayors have goals. The generally celebrated "innovative" mayors--Richard Lee, Richard Daley, Joseph Clark, Richardson Dilworth, Jerome Cavanagh, John Lindsay\(^2\)--may be more typical than unique. Recent studies by Charles Levine\(^3\) and Paul Peterson and J. David Greenstone\(^4\) have identified a number of major cities where the sense of direction of and actions taken by the mayor explain much of the outcome of political conflict.

Though only systematic study of a large population of mayors can determine with any certainty whether leadership is the exception or the rule, it appears that there exists a number of mayors willing to push their own agenda and lead their cities. The failure of the literature to recognize the presence of mayors who do lead can be accounted for by: (1) the insensitivity of researchers to differing leadership styles, (2) the unquestioned acceptance by researchers as to the dominance of the mayor's electoral concerns, and (3) the exaggerated picture drawn in the field as to the "dead end" nature of the mayor's job.
NEED #1: AN INTELLECTUAL OPENNESS

As already observed in Chapter Four, researchers have too often judged political officials solely according to the sense of goal direction and values preferred by the researcher. Mayors who did not maximize the researcher's preconceived subjective notions of leadership were classified too easily as low direction Caretakers--mayors who attempt little more than to maintain what exists. These researchers have not readily recognized an alternative definition of leadership effectiveness--the ability of the mayors to maximize their own values and not those of the researcher.

This lack of cognizance by mayoral analysts is probably to a great extent the results of their social liberal attitudes. Mayors with social liberal orientation were easily recognized as having a strong sense of direction; the equally strong conservative goal orientation of other mayors, however, which did not conform to the researcher's notions concerning innovation went ignored. Instead of recognizing the possibility that these mayors were political activists trying to impose conservative policy on a city, such political heads were only considered to be "passive" ministers afraid of doing anything which would upset the status quo. Little awareness was given to the possibility that the preservation of the status quo might become a goal in and of itself.

Such a failure to recognize the status quo goal-
orientation of a mayor accounts in one instance for the mis-
taken classification of Cleveland's Ralph Locher as a
"Caretaker" mayor. According to Kotter and Lawrence, Locher
tended to create only short-run agendas by choosing
among the initiatives made by others. He dealt with
what "came up." He did not initiate changes or
projects but tried to effectively maintain, or take
care of, that which existed.

Yet the totally different picture of a high direction mayor is
given by another analyst, Charles Levine:

Civil-rights activism raised tensions between Cleveland's
ethnic or "cosmo" (or cosmopolitan) population and the
city's blacks. In response, Mayor Ralph Locher adopted
a partisan posture, favoring white demands that he resist
black pressure for school integration, greater partici-
pation in the local OEO funded poverty program, and more
and better city services. In the summer of 1966, riot-
ing broke out in the Hough section, one of the city's
four black ghetto areas. Locher adopted a "get tough"
policy toward all black protestors, including nonviolent
protestors, offending many white liberals and blacks.

The picture Levine paints is that of a Partisan mayor who as
a result of his conservative goal orientations spurned liberal
innovations. Locher did have goals of his own that the ana-
esty can recognize. To the extent that other mayors like
Locher have been approached from a liberal-based analytical
framework, a re-evaluation of their styles may be in order.

The failure to recognize goal-oriented leadership,
though, is not totally the result of the liberal biases of
some of the researchers. Mayoral researchers in the 1960's
were enthralled by the Broker/Entrepreneur model. Socialized
by the acclaimed writings of Edward Banfield and Robert
Dahl, mayoral analysts were blinded by the Broker/
Entrepreneur ideal and were insensitive to the existence of other effective leadership approaches. Mayors were measured according to how well they stacked up to standards of Entrepreneur/Brokership. Mayors who did not fit this model were not judged to be leaders.

Both the liberal bias of researchers and the unquestioned acceptance of one general leadership model, then, can help account for the apparent dearth of mayors considered to be genuine leaders rather than figureheads or Caretakers. The alleged general lack of leadership orientation by modern mayors, however, may be more the product of the faulty perceptions and inadequate analytical tools of city hall observers than reflections on the personal failings of the mayors themselves.

NEED #2: AN ALTERNATIVE PERCEPTUAL MODEL

The key assumption of Banfield and Dahl which mayoral researchers blindly accepted was that mayors were primarily motivated by concern for their own political power—that they would do nothing to adversely affect either their electoral position or their stock of influence. The Broker advanced no policy initiatives of his own, and chose instead to expedite only those program desires approved by a consensus of all concerned. By this reactive style, the Broker hoped never by his own volition to offend any political actor of power. The Entrepreneur, in contrast, did advance policy initiatives of
his own—but only if those initiatives were capable of gaining the support of a broad overarching coalition of community groups. Only those programs which tapped a latent consensus were considered safe enough for the Entrepreneur to advance.

Peterson and Greenstone have labeled this model of policy formation the "electoral/organizational model."¹¹ According to the authors

This familiar model sees public policy as the product of influence exchanges among organized groups and ambitious politicians seeking to maximize their own political interests.¹²

Yet, in their study of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit and Philadelphia, Peterson and Greenstone found that the electoral/organizational could not by itself adequately explain mayoral behavior in the Community Action Program of Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty. Hence, Peterson and Greenstone generated "an alternative model—one that views actors as if they were making choices in order to maximize ideologically determined goals."¹³

This study of Madison mayors supports Peterson and Greenstone's contention that neither the electoral/organizational model nor the ideology model adequately explains the behavior of all political actors; rather a combination of the two models is required. William Dyke, for example, was so committed to his strict separation of powers and conservative fiscal philosophies that they virtually dictated his style of operation. Dyke recognized and accepted the possible costs of
his strict ideological commitment. He lost standing not just with the City Council, but ultimately even with Madison's voters. Yet for Bill Dyke this purist adherence to principle was more important than the maintenance of his power or electoral position.

Paul Soglin, too, proceeded with actions that clearly antagonized a number of the city's legislators and voters. His people's orientations mandated that he veto the Atwood Avenue Bypass, that he refrain from vetoing the much-hated Triangle Hotel plan, that he give his full support to Police Chief David Couper, and that he push for city provision of "human resources" and day care services. Soglin's self-styled radicalism even led to his constant dispensing of symbols--Cuba, Jane Fonda, Hortonville, David Fine--which he knew would still further arouse the wrath of certain segments of the City Council and the electorate.

Yet the ideological model does not totally explain Paul Soglin's actions, for Soglin did entertain pragmatic power considerations which tempered his ideological impulses. In the Atwood Avenue controversy it was the mayor himself who urged the override of his veto and the adoption of the "half-pass" compromise. The mayor was willing to moderate his strong environmentalist concerns in order to maintain his standing with the city's East Side aldermen--a group whose vote he would need to get many of the other key programs of his agenda passed. It was this concern for his power and
electoral position that also led Soglin to sit out the controversy over the Marquette Area Traffic Plan.

Similarly, as a result of his concern for his standing with the voters Soglin momentarily refrained from leadership in the dispute over the status of Chief Couper. When the status of the four Police and Fire Commissioners was cast in doubt, Soglin submitted the names of the two commissioners with whom he had problems for Council approval. He feared being viewed as arbitrary if he submitted the names of his appointees for confirmation and not those of Mayor Dyke. And even when the list of names was given to the Council, the mayor provided no indication of how he wanted the Council to vote. He was afraid of the political repercussions of becoming entangled any further in this legal morass.

Paul Soglin, then, represents a fusing of Peterson and Greenstone's two models. He is primarily motivated by his people's-oriented ideology, yet his actions are tempered by power and electability concerns.

Political scientists must recognize that their ingrained "rationality" assumptions are not all determinative. Ideological concern also dictates a political actor's actions. A sensitivity to the possible forms that ideology can take is necessary if the power of this model as an explanatory tool is ever to be fully realized. Ideologies do not have to fall simply along the conservative/liberal dimension. William Dyke's style of governing, for example, was determined more
than anything else by his purist adherence to a strict separation of powers philosophy. Peterson and Greenstone have even identified the ideology of the machine politician in the 1960's--an ideology which seeks "to maintain the pluralist bargaining principle"\(^{14}\) which produced "a viable urban policy that respected a diversity of important interests:"\(^{15}\)

In defending themselves against the reformers' outraged moral indictments, the machine politicians acquired an ideological commitment, just as previously an ideological conservative such as Edmund Burke articulated an ideology in self-defense against liberal-rationalist critiques. By the 1960's the machine politicians came to believe that attacks on, or even disregard for, pluralist bargaining procedures should be resisted as a matter of principle, even at the expense of one's immediate electoral interests, because they threatened the stability of the regime itself.\(^{16}\)

Machine politicians, then, were devoted to the maintenance of power via the dispensation of divisible benefits. They resisted demands by minority groups on redistributive issues as these would eventually threaten the machine. Machine politicians, consequently, acted not just out of concern for their immediate power position, but out of an ideological defense of the machine. As Peterson and Greenstone observe, "their pragmatism had become principled."\(^{17}\)

**NEED #3: A REVISED VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE MAYOR'S JOB**

Mayors, it appears, may often be leaders. In Madison, both William Dyke and Paul Soglin not only provided a clear sense of direction but succeeded fairly much in putting their
stamp on the city's functionings. Even Otto Festge attempted leadership on the one issue of utmost importance to him--the building of an auditorium. And as Charles Levine and Paul Peterson and J. David Greenstone have observed, mayors in this nation's larger cities can be seen to have acted on the basis of their ideological orientations even in situations marred by potentially debilitating conflict.

The fact that many mayors have attempted to be leaders and that a number have even succeeded in terms of achieving a number of their own ideological goals is at variance with the generally accepted view of the mayor and the mayor's job, as expressed by Marilyn Gittell and Raymond Wolfinger. The mayor's job has been traditionally assumed to be incapable of generally attracting persons of vision, talent, and ambition. The nature of the job is supposedly such that not only does it attract persons of lesser capability, but that the web of forces placed on any mayor once in office induces him to act with only the utmost caution. A leader in the mayor's office is seen to be more the exception than the rule.

According to this view, the mayor's job is an unattractive one. Citizens are always nagging him with complaints about such mundane matters as garbage collection, snow removal, street repair, and so on. He is held responsible for municipal performance, and yet is given inadequate authority to control that performance. Consequently, the resulting tenure of the average mayor is quite brief as citizens blame him
for the inadequacy of policies he has no means to correct. The mayoralty hence is not likely to provide the ambitious person with a record which will serve as a springboard to higher office. And as the mayor's constituency is likely to be "blacker and poorer" than that of any constituency to which he would have to appeal to run for higher office, initiatives of his that benefit city residents would only serve to thwart his electoral ambitions.21 Thus, according to Wolfinger:

Because the mayoralty typically is a brief, unrewarding, dead-end job, it is unlikely to attract the ablest men aspiring to political careers or to motivate incumbents to develop strategies of urban improvement that will help them on to higher office. Such strategies are unnecessary and unwise for most mayors.22

Yet, as noted, the mayoralty does seem to be able to attract a fair number of persons possessing firm policy direction and talent to the office. A reassessment of the conventional picture as to the desirability of the mayor's job appears to be in order. The mayor's office, despite all the travails its occupant faces, still contains all the ego boosts and trappings of power that politically ambitious people find rewarding. Only very few elected offices--President, Governor, Senator, and in smaller cities maybe Congressman--can be ranked higher in prestige than the mayor's office. And if a person wants to put his personal imprint on civic affairs, he will find the mayoralty a more rewarding career than serving in the House of Representatives where he will initially be only one of the 435 voices with little influence,
even on committee.

The mayoralty attracts politically ambitious persons. Two of the three Madison mayors studied in this thesis, Otto Festge and Paul Soglin, were rumored to have their eyes set on Congress; and the third, William Dyke, actually ran as the Republican candidate for governor in 1974. These mayors, as well as mayors and prospective mayors in other cities, do not view the mayoralty as an undesirable job; rather they see the office both as a large enough goal in itself and a position from which they can constantly keep their names before the public and build a record which would help propel them to higher office. Few other political offices offer them as much public recognition as the mayoralty. The fact that a mayor's chances for higher office are likely lessened by his inability to solve city problems is a risk that persons seeking the mayor's office either choose to suffer or simply do not recognize.

Finally, Marilyn Gittell too narrowly defines career patterns when she examines the lack of success for mayors in terms of seeking higher elected office. As James Q. Wilson points out, mayors may have open to them prestigious opportunities in private industry and with public-service oriented foundations. Mayors like John Lindsay and Carl Stokes may have had no realistic prospects for third terms or higher office, but they did have attractive opportunities open to them in the television, cinema, and literary fields upon
completion of their public career. Less glamorous personalities than a Lindsay or Stokes, though, will likely find their post-mayoral jobs in positions of importance but much decreased visibility.

The mayoralty is an office with sufficient perquisites and career opportunities to attract talented and ambitious persons. Some persons may view the mayoralty as a stepping stone to higher office. Others may see it as a big enough "plum" in itself to merit their attention. The call to the mayor's office can be powerful and seductive.

The mayoralty despite these afore mentioned observations will not always be occupied by persons capable of exerting effective leadership. The relatively low salary of the office in some cities may deter qualified persons who can find more profitable jobs in the private sector. Similarly local recruitment patterns in some cities tend to filter out the more mobile, cosmopolitan type leader and reward the strict organizational loyalist.

Still, despite this qualm, there is no doubt that the dead-end nature of the mayor's job has been greatly exaggerated. The mayoralty, as it can potentially attract talented and ambitious persons, can potentially be a source of policy program initiatives in a city. The realization of this leadership potential depends both on the person who occupies the office and the situational context in which he must govern.
LESSONS FOR LEADERSHIP

What has been observed in this and other studies of recent mayors is that despite the shortage of formal power resources allocated the mayor, mayors still can lead. How a mayor approaches his job will do much to determine whether or not he is to be truly influential.

Contained in the analysis of the actions of the three Madison mayors studied in this thesis are certain "lessons" for mayors who wish to maximize their impact on the city domain. It is with the hope of somewhat bridging the worlds of the academic and the administrator that these lessons will now be made more clear.

First, though, one qualification must be made concerning the causation of style adoption. As has been observed throughout this thesis, much of the roots of style adoption are to be found in an individual's personality needs. A person's psychological make-up to a great extent determines whether or not he will be a proactive or reactive policy maker, whether he will rely on his ideology or the advice of others as a cue to action, and whether he will seek to maintain community harmony or pursue a course of action that will invite conflict.

Yet, leadership is of such importance that effective policy initiatives cannot be allowed to flounder on these rocks of subconscious forces. Even though much of a person's
style is determined by his personality needs, it is indeed possible a person can be made more sensitive to the importance of style adoption and the dangers of letting this process be overly determined by psychological factors. The following bits of advice are put forth with the hope that they will help leaders more rationally choose their leadership approaches within whatever constraints are imposed by each individual's core personality.

These recommendations also contain an implicit bias—a bias in favor of a strong, active executive who can "energize" a city's political system and provide the necessary initiation and coordination for comprehensive policy-making and program implementation.

1. Have a well-defined sense of direction. To have a maximal impact on the city domain, a mayor must first establish a clear set of priorities which he wants to see implemented. Without an agenda for action, a mayor risks being swamped by the various competing pressures that are placed upon him when he reaches office. It is only a definite sense of direction that keeps the mayor from succumbing to the pressures of his job and acting in such a way as to merely maintain his electoral position. The most important question that any new mayor should ask himself is: "What do I want to accomplish or get done now that I am mayor?"

Instead of being a true leader, the mayor lacking a sense of direction only reacts as a weathervane, or Broker,
to the forces placed upon him. Only a definite sense of mission can keep a mayor from being reduced by the difficulties of governing a city to the passive style of Caretakership.

The importance of a sense of direction to mayors has been seen throughout this thesis. Otto Festge had it in regards to the building of an auditorium, and it spurred him to action despite the continued recalcitrance and obstructionism of the opposition. In most areas other than the auditorium, though, Festge lacked such orientation and floundered with no apparent purpose. Festge's successors, William Dyke and Paul Soglin, both possessed an extremely well defined sense of mission which helped keep them action oriented despite facing a level of community polarization that might have worn down less committed mayors.

2. **Operationalize the Agenda.** This second piece of advice is a corollary of the first. A mayor's general set of goals for his city will remain nothing but dreams unless he knows how to make them materialize. Mayors cannot afford to be merely pursuers of policies in the ideal; they must be tacticians and technicians capable of translating their lofty rhetorical goals into specific programs. The construction of housing for low and moderate income people, for example, might be part of a mayor's general sense of direction. But such housing will not automatically sprout up simply because a mayor with such a sense of direction has been elected.
Specific plans for the construction of such housing must be developed, and then they must be steered through the appropriate authoritative bodies and then implemented by the appropriate city bureaucracy or private developer.

Thus, possessing a general goal orientation is not enough; the mayor must have some idea how to translate his ideality into a specific program or policy and thereby make it a reality. Goals must be taken down from the lofty plane of ideals and translated into concrete programs. It is only when a mayor starts thinking in terms of concrete action will he begin to realize just whose cooperation he is going to require if he is to have any real impact on his city.

A mayor with goals of better housing for his city must transform that goal into an agenda of specific proposals dealing with housing code inspection and enforcement, housing rehabilitation, the construction of public housing, and the development of a turn-key approach to housing construction. And for each of these proposals he must determine exactly and in detail what must be done and whose cooperation he must secure. For example, in the area of housing code inspections and enforcement, the mayor's general goal orientation becomes operationalized as he calls for an increase in both the number of inspections and the number of prosecutions of code violations. By mentally foreseeing what is needed to implement his program, he will be prepared to vigilantly oversee the operation of the city's building inspectors and legal
departments. And if more inspection or legal staff or a change in city ordinance are needed to bring about the performance the mayor desires, then he will be prepared to guide the appropriate budgeting and legislative matters through the city council.

By "thinking out" in advance the entire process which must be undertaken to effect desired changes, a mayor will be able to note whenever a necessary link in the process of change is missing requiring action on his part to correct it. A mayor who fails to map out in advance the specific policies and actions he desires will likely find his lofty goals stuck on the rocks of committee or bureaucratic inertia. The mayor who knows in advance exactly what actions on the behalf of other officials the implementation of his policy desires require will act to ensure the necessary action of these officials.

3. **Employ the Entrepreneurial Style When Possible.**

No one mayoral style can be said to be the "best" leadership style; the approach a mayor will choose will depend to a great extent on his goal orientations, the situational context in which he must operate, and, on a less conscious level, his own psychological predispositions. Still Entrepreneurship offers the goal oriented mayor certain advantages which other high direction leadership styles lack. Entrepreneurship is a virtually "costless" leadership style. In engaging in coalition building and Entrepreneurial bargaining and pyramiding
of resources, a mayor, under appropriate circumstances, can achieve his purposes without running the risks to his own power position that the non-consensual high-direction approaches might incur.

The goal-oriented mayor must thus be an effective booster, promoter, backslapper, cajoler, and bargainer; he must constantly take advantage of opportunities to build coalitions behind his programs. This was Madison Mayor William Dyke's chief failing: his ideologically-dictated leadership style led him to ignore those instances where his goals could be achieved through a more traditional, less purist, leadership approach. Dyke's pure management conception of the mayor's office and his strict adherence to his separation of powers doctrine precluded his attempting to mobilize any such coalitions behind his objective. Opportunities which availed themselves to possible coalition building, even with aldermen of a conservative philosophy similar to that of the mayor, were squandered.

4. Know the Limits of Entrepreneurship. But to say that a goal-oriented mayor may profitably utilize the Entrepreneurial approach in certain cases does not mean that the mayor should limit his activity to that of consensual coalition building. The mayor who wishes to act must be aware of the limits to the effective use of Entrepreneurship. As Charles Levine has cogently observed, and as the study of Otto Festge's approach to the auditorium has reaffirmed, attempts at
broad-scale coalition construction are likely to be aborted in situations involving community polarization. When groups are at each other's throats, consensus behind the mayor's program cannot possibly be secured. In such situations only nonconsensual leadership approaches can have any success.

Similarly, to be an effective Entrepreneur a mayor must have certain resources which, if not at his immediate disposal, must be at least within his ready reach when necessary. The mayor cannot bargain effectively if he lacks important bargaining resources; he cannot pyramid his power resources if he lacks control over the favors desired by others or if others simply refuse to bargain with him. The Entrepreneur is essentially a poker player; to pyramid his chips he must first have a sufficiently large amount to enter the game; and he can potentially gain access to the other players' chips only if they are willing to play with him. Effective Entrepreneurship requires that a mayor have sufficient powers at his disposal as well as the opportunity to access the influence of other key political actors.

But in reformed cities the mayor is often denied these "chips" of power that he needs for effective Entrepreneurship. Civil service has not only denied him the patronage to dangle in front of others, it has also denied him the ability to dismiss less than fully cooperative city employees. In a system of nonpartisan elections, the mayor does not run as the head of a city council ticket; not dependent on the mayor for
their election, these aldermen are under no special obligation to the mayor after the election. Lacking access to a political party in a nonpartisan system, the mayor is denied both control over aldermanic nominations and access to party organization for the purpose of building public support behind his programs. New Haven Mayor Richard Lee, the prototype Entrepreneur, governed in a partisan setting. Mayors who are denied the party ties and Council influence Lee was accorded will not always find Entrepreneurship as fruitful a strategy as did Lee.

Entrepreneurship, then, proves a profitable leadership style only in situations where low conflict and the mayor's access to certain key resources allow the building of overarching coalitions to take place. The environmental limitations of the approach does not bode well for the deployment of strategies by black mayors. Black mayors often find themselves governing cities sharply divided along racial lines. In such situations not only is it impossible to build a coalition that embraces both camps, but even the more limited deployment of Entrepreneurial tactics will likely meet with failure. A white mayor may resort to "booster" appeals, emphasizing city pride, to gather community wide support behind a project; such appeals by a black mayor are only likely to be viewed with great cynicism by the white community.

Similarly, a white mayor may be able in a less polarized
setting to appoint a "blue ribbon" study group or a committee of the city's prestigious "big mules" to front those proposals behind which he is trying to garner public acceptance. The black mayor will find such a tactic of limited value. The white community, sensitive to issues with any racial conflict overtones, will not accept the recommendations of any group that is clearly not adequately representative of their viewpoint. And if the black mayor appoints a truly representative study group, he loses control over their recommendations; rather than being able to manipulate them to front his programs, the black mayor will find he has created a Frankenstein—a committee truly independent of him. Rather than promoting community consensus, the study committee will often serve as an arena for the playing out of the passions of divisiveness.

Black mayors in such a setting will often find themselves cut off from some of the resources necessary for the effective utilization of Entrepreneurship. Aldermen from primarily white constituencies will not look to the mayor as the head of a party ticket. Their election chances often even depend on their active opposition to the more redistributive items of the black mayor's agenda. If the local party organization is still white-dominated, whatever patronage resources it controls will likely be denied the black mayor. Similarly, if controlled by members of the opposing faction the party will not serve the black mayor as a potential vehicle for mobilizing community support.
The black mayor must develop his own alternative sources of patronage and community organization. But the advantages to be gained from building overarching coalitions are quite limited. If the black mayor decides to give whatever jobs and favors are at his disposal to help the long-neglected black community, he will have little left with which to bargain with white aldermen and other influencers. If the black mayor successfully builds a community organization as an alternative to the local party, it likely will be on racial lines and will not extend into the white community. City-wide mobilization on any important issue for the black mayor is nearly an impossibility.

According to the language of "contingency theory" a leader's style will usually tend toward either the "expressive"—concern for the maintenance of the social/emotional feeling of the group—or the "instrumental"—concern for getting things done even if the means to such task accomplishment results in the alienated feelings among co-workers. As Charles Levine observes, expressive or consensus oriented leadership just does not work in situations that can be categorized as generally unfavorable to mayoral leadership:

In the least favorable situation—when a community is polarized, tasks are unstructured, and mayoral power is weak—a mayor with an instrumentally oriented leadership style can be a welcome relief from immobilism. Under these conditions, an expressively oriented mayor may spend all his time building a consensus and reacting to conflict rather than manipulating his environment. An instrumentally oriented mayor, on the other hand,
will often push ahead toward a goal regardless of the impact of his actions on his popularity. He will do something even if he excludes some interests and even if he makes enemies. (emphasis in original)26

Under such disadvantageous conditions, attempts at consensus leadership are little likely to meet with success. Otto Festge's failed Entrepreneurial initiatives on the question of the auditorium only serve to underscore this lesson. Black mayors denied access to key power resources and working in a polarized setting are only too likely to meet with the same lack of results when employing Entrepreneurial strategies.

In such situations the black mayor's attempt at Entrepreneurship will only likely result in failure. Alternative high-direction leadership styles must be identified which do not depend on the existence of latent community consensus or the mayor's control over or ability to access the bits of influence required by Entrepreneurship.

6. Employ the Non-Consensual, Combative Leadership Approaches When Necessary. When either a polarized environment or the lack of access to potential political resources precludes the effective employment of Entrepreneurial strategies the goal oriented mayor must find a leadership approach more suitable to his situation. Two such styles, Partisan-ship and Ideological leadership, have been discussed in detail in this thesis.

The Ideologue and the Partisan do not approach problems from a consensual perspective; rather they seek to advance
those programs that they or their limited constituency identify with—even if it means only giving secondary considerations to the desires of elements outside the mayor's self-defined constituency. The limited resources are not deployed in an ineffectual attempt to build an overarching executive-centered coalition. Rather these two types of mayors use their resources in a manner consistent with a combative orientation. They may choose a course of action that even purposely brings community dissensus. They may even threaten those who will not cooperate; they hold the pet projects of others hostage; they veto the initiatives of others—all with the goal of inducing action among political actors who would not otherwise be amenable to the mayor's wishes. Their orientation is with program achievement, not consensus maintenance.

These mayors are not satisfied with limiting their initiatives solely to those areas where their power resources can be invested wisely in the long-term. Rather, these mayors are conscious "spenders" of influence; they are willing to use their limited resources in an effort to ensure the passage and implementation of their programs. As more and more of the mayor's resources are spent, he faces the problem of depletion of his stock of influence. To this extent he has not invested wisely; but he at least has made headway in problem areas which the Entrepreneur would have avoided.

The difference between the Partisan and the Ideologue
is that the former understands the potential dangers of an unstopped long-term power drain; the Ideologue, blinded by his principles, follows his conscience, and ignores both the power realities of a situation and the impact his own actions have on his own future influence. Despite his combative orientation, the Partisan mayor is above all else a pragmatic politician. The Partisan mayor is flexible; he not only can adjust his strategy to that course of action most likely to attain his policy goals, but he can retreat from those actions which he sees to be too power costly. The Partisan mayor thus tempers his programmatic goals with some concern as to his political future. There are still some areas which are too power costly for him to enter, but his threshold is at a higher level than that of the Entrepreneur.

The Ideologue has no such pragmatic program or long-term power consideration. The virtue and the weakness of this style is that he will fight on all issues that he considers important. The Ideologue will thus rush into even the most potentially explosive situations which "wiser" mayors would not dare to enter. And sometimes the Ideologue's stock of influence will be enough to win the short-term conflict. Thus he can get results when other mayors defer from action.

But the costs of such a leadership approach is that it is insensitive to the reactions of other political actors. Actions which produce short-term victories may alienate enough people in each instance so that the mayor's power position is
jeopardized in the long-run. Such was the case with Madison's Ideologue, Mayor William Dyke. Dyke in the short-term proved successful in transfusing city hall with his management/separation of powers philosophy; he was also successful in establishing a law and order approach to the student demonstrations. But the cumulative impact of these actions and Dyke's inflexibility was to produce an adverse reaction among the citizenry that denied him a third term in office and resulted in a reversal of his policy desires by his successor, Paul Soglin.

6. **Choose the Style that Best Fits Each Situation.** To speak of style adoption as if it were solely a matter of rational choice is obviously an oversimplification. As already noted personality factors to a great extent dictate the choice of leadership approach. Yet, to whatever extent style adoption can be made the product of rational choice, it must be made to be so. Policies and programs for dealing with our city's problems are simply too important to have their enactment and implementation dependent on idiosyncratic personality factors. To be truly effective mayors and other political heads must be aware of how their approach to problems ultimately influence their chances for success.

The successful mayor must be flexible in his leadership approach; to maximize policy achievement he must adopt a leadership approach that fits the specific situational constraints. A consensual strategy, for example, will likely
produce only immobilism if deployed in a conflict setting.

Yet, a mayor whose personality demands a consistency of approach will prove unable to vary his style as the situation demands. Only the mayor who is deeply aware of the need to adopt a style that fits each situation will be able to transcend to dictates of personality and begin to make the process of style adoption more rational.

**URBAN LEADERSHIP: FROM WHERE WILL IT COME?**

According to Raymond Wolfinger, "Because able, innovative mayors have been not only scarce, nor stirred by ambitions that are neither commonplace nor generally realistic, it becomes important to consider possible substitutes for mayoral leadership." Wolfinger sees this substitute for mayoral leadership to be coming from "cosmopolitan professionals"—those "(p)rofessional municipal officials, ranging from city managers to city planners" who have become "an increasingly independent element in local political systems."27

Yet, as we have already seen earlier in this chapter, the picture of the dead-end constrained mayors has been greatly overplayed. For this reason Wolfinger is perhaps a bit premature in his call for alternative sources of leadership.

Yet, Wolfinger has observed a significant trend—the growth in influence of appointed professional municipal officials. To the extent that they act as a source of influence that competes with the influence of a city's elected
officials, the desirability of this shift in power in the urban arena must be analyzed. The rest of this dissertation will attempt to explore the relative desirability or undesirability of having a city's policy direction determined by its professional rather than its elected officials.

The benefits of such professional policy-making are insightfully detailed by Wolfinger:

Because these officials are oriented toward goals, norms, and publics beyond their city of current employment, and because they have skills needed by other actors in local politics, they can bring to bear resources of power somewhat independent of the contending local interests that often stymie progress. It is unlikely that such officials will be able to build the political base and master the autonomous political support necessary to execute massive, coordinated programs of the kind typical of New Haven. But they can produce a number of substantial segmental innovations which add up to a considerable improvement over the status quo. Indeed, professional influence from "outside" the city has proved to be a progressive force leading to "innovation and expansion of public programs" in such areas as urban renewal and anti-poverty action. Though Wolfinger observes that cosmopolitan professionals will not always be "necessarily progressive or sympathetic to the real or the attributed wishes of the poor," he believes that on the whole the incentive structure in these professions emphasizes not jealous defense of routine but a rather venturesome ambition. As is usually the case, these officials have a vested interest in maximizing the programs for which they are responsible and therefore want to expand their domains, if necessary by appealing to their constituents in the local community. The likelihood is that such
expansion will be in the direction of more services to the poor, improvement of the social and physical environment, and attempts to impose a greater degree of rationality and coordination on market processes.  

Wolfinger's assessment is correct as far as program expansion is concerned. Yet, the beneficence of direction of such from-the-top-down innovation is somewhat overstated. The solutions the professional will pose to problems will reflect those values emphasized in his professional training as well as his own self-interest—and will not necessarily be in the interest of the general public or the city's relatively powerless citizenry. For example, highway planners have often ignored mass transit for the sake of fiscal integrity. Urban renewal officials have replaced habitable dwelling units with an expanded business district or college campus. Public housing officials have regulated the lifestyles of their clients. Even Community Action Program officials have "benignly" but deliberately sought to limit the extent of citizen participation.

Neither the mayor, then, nor the cosmopolitan professional is necessarily always going to be "progressive" in his policy orientations. Both are often the victims of narrow perspectives and self-interest. Yet, if such be the case, in whose hands is the public's authority "best" vested?

One of the major problems facing cities today is that of "governance"—whether or not city government is capable of acting both effectively and in a manner responsible to its
citizens. According to Theodore Lowi, though, such responsibility is no longer forthcoming, for "The modern city has become well-run but ungoverned..."39 In destroying "the party foundations of the mayoralty" the reform movement has "also destroyed the basis for sustained, central popularly-based action."40 The transferring of power from the mayoralty to the professionalized agencies has not been entirely functional, for, as Lowi observes: "bureaucratic agencies are not neutral; they are only independent."41 As a result of both civil service protection and extensive municipal unionization, officials in city bureaucracies do not have to be responsive to anyone's but their own definition of desirable policy; they constitute "relatively irresponsible structures of power."42

The first advantage of having the mayor rather than the professional bureaucracy make policy decisions then becomes clear. The mayor is involved in the political process. His re-election chances depend on his ability to keep a majority of the city's voters satisfied or at least quiescent. The voter's "indirect influence" over the mayor's actions is, in a sense, more "direct" than their influence over the actions of lesser visible, unelected officials.

The professional bureaucracy, more insulated from political currents, has no such need to be similarly responsive to the public's wishes. Bureaucratic policy-making removes the determination of value combinations to be achieved from the
political realm. Bureaucratic norms and self-interest become the primary determinants of policy formation if power is given to these professionals. The result is interest group self-regulation with, in this case, the interest group being the professional bureaucracy.

Similarly, mayoral influence can be seen to be preferable to professional influence in that career bureaucrats tend to take only a fragmented view of city problems. As Lowi delineates:

The decentralization of city government toward its career bureaucracies has resulted in great efficiency for the activities around which each bureaucracy was organized. The city is indeed well-run. But what of those activities around which bureaucracies are not organized, or those which fall between or among agencies' jurisdiction? For these...the cities are suffering either stalemate or elephantitis—an affliction whereby a particular activity, say, urban renewal or parkways, gets pushed to its ultimate "success" totally without regard to its importance compared to the mission of other agencies. In these as well as other senses, the cities are ungoverned.44

The professional bureaucracies are parochial in their concerns. Looking toward bureaucracies as the initiator of policies in the future will only serve to exaggerate the excesses of this functional parochialism.

The mayor, in contrast, is not concerned with one particular policy area; he is a generalist. All city policies and constituencies are of concern to him. He has a perspective which counters the tendencies toward stalemate and elephantitis. His concern is not the advancement of one particular area of concern, but the balance of all areas of concern.
The only professional with a similar overview of the political situation is the city manager. But even here, as a result of his training, the city manager will likely value efficiency in service delivery over increased responsiveness to the demands of various groups in the population. Yet efficiency is only one possible definition of the public good.

As today's urban bureaucracies already comprise "islands of functional power before which the modern mayor stands impoverished," public acceptance of the professional claims to having exclusive jurisdiction can only serve to further aggravate the problem of irresponsible government. The mayoralty with its powers offers the primary counterbalance to bureaucratic power. If the problem has been that the modern mayor lacks sufficient authority to exert his influence over the municipal bureaucracies, it is desirable that he be given whatever formal authority he requires. Only a strengthened mayoralty can produce a coordinated, responsive urban policy-making process.

This leads us to the final reason for having mayors rather than cosmopolitan professionals take the primary role in urban leadership. Leadership can only come about if the potential leader has the powers with which to lead. The mayor is relatively advantaged in this area; he has powers which city managers and professional administrators are unlikely to accumulate. The only consistent advantage that cosmopolitan professionals possess relative to the mayor is that they can
cloak their policy recommendations under the guise of professional expertise. The claim helps to legitimize their policy proposals in the eyes of the public and political elite.

But this source of influence pales when compared to the opportunities for power the mayor possesses which cosmopolitan professionals lack. Most obvious is the role the mayor plays as the personalized head of city government. He can command constant news media attention and public interest where the low salience professionals can not. The mayor has the opportunity to amass public support behind his programs which low visibility officials can only envy.

Similarly, depending on the structure of city government, the mayor may be able to mobilize support behind his programs by other means which are not available to cosmopolitan professionals. In a partisan setting he can use the party organization to garner support at the grass roots. He can gain legislative votes by wisely dispensing patronage and runnings as the head of a party ticket. And further still, he has a superior bargaining position in that he can threaten to veto or exclude from the executive budget the pet projects of uncooperative aldermen.

As Jeffrey Pressman has noted, even New Haven "Mayor Lee was helped enormously by his deep roots in the community, his control of a political party, and his impressive electoral success--resources which would be less available to a city manager."46 City managers and professional bureaucrats are
lacking the tools for leadership which the mayor potentially has at his disposal.

STRENGTHENING THE MAYOR

The mayoralty, as a result of the responsibility of the office, the generalist orientation of the person who occupies it, and the potential means of influence already accorded it, is the proper executive site in which power can be centralized if our cities are to indeed once more be governed. Yet, as Lowi has pointed out, the legacy of the reform movement is for the most a mayoralty incapable of effective governing. The opportunities for power that are afforded a mayor vary from city to city, depending on the city's formal governmental structure and the public's acceptance of his utilization of patronage and his accessing the local party organization. What is needed is a restructuring of our city governments to enable the mayor to govern.

The following recommendations perhaps represent only ideals as they will prove extremely difficult to effect change in the basic structure of most city governments. Yet if these suggestions are indeed somehow implemented they can do much to reassert the governing capacity of the modern mayor:

1. **Give the Mayor the Power to Control the Municipal Bureaucracy.** Mayors are held responsible by the electorate for the functioning of the city, and yet they are not given the formal powers necessary for the effective governing of the
city. The mayor must share decision-making in the executive branch with unelected officials who are not necessarily amenable to the policy directives of the mayor. The professional orientations of department heads may conflict with the policy direction desired by the mayor. The mayor may even appear to some career administrators to be a mere amateur as far as the running of their departments go. Mayors come and go, but the civil-service department head remains a fixture at city hall to be removed only by retirement or death in office.

All three Madison mayors in this study encountered department heads who acted as often to contradict as to expedite their policy initiatives. Otto Festge was thwarted by John Bunch, the independent City Traffic Director who attempted to subvert the mayor's plans for a Law Park auditorium. William Dyke could not easily get the action he desired from Madison Redevelopment Authority Director Sol Levin. Nor could he get all department heads to fully cooperate with his Management By Objectives Program. Paul Soglin anxiously awaited the retirement of City Attorney Edwin Conrad, a man who saw his job to be the legal representative not of the mayor but of the city. Soglin also waited two full years to build a solid case before he fired City Welfare Director Lowell Messerschmidt, a man whose professional competence the mayor little respected. Even then, the Messerschmidt firing wound up being dragged out through civil service appeal.
The mayor, then, finds himself to be only a bargainer in, rather than the head of, city administration. He has to constantly cajole, plead, and threaten to get the more obstinate administrators to follow his course of action. And even then he is bargaining at a disadvantage; he lacks the ultimate sanction to fire any but the most utterly incompetent administrator.

What is needed then is some way for the mayor to get a handle on his bureaucracy. One viable means of organization would be to remove the top administrative officials from the umbrella of civil service protection. If the fallacy of the "neutral specialist" argument is recognized, the removal of civil service protection for department heads will be seen as a step designed to make policy making by municipal executives more responsive to the people's will, as expressed by their agent, the mayor.

A cabinet form of government, where the mayor appoints each of the department heads with city council confirmation, can replace the present civil service dominated system. Departmental intransigence would be supplanted by responsiveness to the mayor's initiatives. The shift to the cabinet form of government would once more make our cities governable.

Opponents of the cabinet proposal say such a system gives too much power to the mayor. Just as "presidential government" leads to abuse of executive power at the national level, some critics fear that unrestrained mayoral government will
produce similar abuses at the local level. "One-man" government will not, to their way of thinking, necessarily produce the wisest course of action. A second criticism concerns the possible introduction of blatantly partisan considerations into personnel decisions in the absence of civil service protection. A third criticism levied at the cabinet proposal is that talented persons would no longer be attracted to the city's administrative hierarchy, as a result of the unstable tenure of their positions, as each new mayor might choose to exert his prerogative of naming new department heads.

It was in the light of such criticisms that a variant of the cabinet approach was instituted in Madison when City Attorney Edwin Conrad retired. Rather than serving for life, the new city attorney, nominated by the mayor and confirmed by the City Council, was appointed for only a five-year term. Such an official would have to be responsive to the sentiments of the incumbent mayor and Council if he desired reappointment. Still, the official appointed on such a basis would be accorded a modicum amount of insulation from the city's political head as he does not serve exactly at the pleasure of the mayor. The five-year term for city department heads is consequently a compromise proposal which seeks to promote increased bureaucratic responsiveness to mayoral policy direction without totally sacrificing the advantages of bureaucratic independence.

The cabinet and five-year plans, like the abolition of
civil service, are "radical" proposals not likely to be readily accepted by those self-professed "good government" forces who still value "professional" judgment and distrust partisan politics. These forces, firm in their sense of the correctness in their beliefs, will not be easily budged. Hence a far less comprehensive proposal, merit raises dispensed at the discretion of the mayor (and if "one-man" government is distrusted, provisions for council confirmation can be added) also deserves serious attention. Under this proposal the mayor evaluates the performance of the city's department heads; the size of the salary increase each administrator receives is dependent on these evaluations. To advance their own pecuniary interest, department heads would have to be more amenable to the wishes of the mayor.

Though viewed with suspicion by department heads, the merit raise proposal, being far less comprehensive in nature than the restructuring of city government along the lines of the cabinet model, is still the more politically feasible reform. Members of the city council often are just as unhappy as the mayor with bureaucratic performance; yet they are less than willing to run the risk of possible mayoral absolutism. In Madison, the City Council gave Paul Soglin the authority to implement a merit raise plan but remained intransigent on the question of cabinet government.48

Savas and Ginsburg have effectively catalogued the dysfunctions of the present civil service system and have
suggested a number of "reforms" designed to reintroduce merit and bureaucratic responsiveness. The arguments of this thesis support their conclusions recommending the selective weakening of civil service:

The argument for reform is overwhelming. The potential future imperfections of a revitalized personnel system are small and distant compared to the actual weaknesses, large and immediate, of today's illusory merit system. Undoubtedly, the prescription should be applied selectively. Some states and cities are still suffering under a corrupt spoils system and can benefit from the kinds of changes introduced long ago by the first wave of civil service reform. By far the most common affliction, however, is the rigor mortis of over-developed and regressive civil service systems.

2. Give the Mayor Adequate Staff. This is a small but important point. Most mayors are extremely busy officials. Just their ceremonial duties occupy an enormous part of their time. If the mayor is to adequately act as a governing official, he is going to need capable staff assistance.

The mayor is going to need a staff person to help research issues and to serve as a liaison with the city council. Possibly another person will be needed if the mayor is going to maintain maximum accessibility with community groups. And finally the mayor is going to need a staff person to help with his toughest job—riding herd over the bureaucracy. The mayor, with his ceremonial, legislative, constituent service and city emissary duties, simply lacks the time to be able to pay constant attention to the inner-workings of city hall; he needs another set of eyes and ears to ensure that administrators are acting in accord with his
intentions to the maximum extent possible.

It is in this regard that the office of the City Administrative Officer (CAO) deserves special attention. The CAO is supposed to be that official who, operating under the mayor's direction, supervises the bureaucratic workings of city hall. The question which must be answered is whether or not the CAO should be a career official.

Those who advocate having a career official as CAO emphasize the need of having someone with administrative experience in the mayor's office. They point out that the mayor is often new to city politics; even if he previously held city office, the new mayor is likely to have only limited experience with the complexities of city bureaucracy. Accordingly, then, a career CAO helps to provide a measure of continuity between administrations. The career CAO gives the new mayor a knowledgeable, experienced person in his office—someone who can aid the new mayor in running the city while he is still learning the ropes of his office.

But the career CAO is likely to be of limited use for the new mayor. As an important official in the previous administration, the new CAO will likely be regarded with suspicion by the city's new political head and his allies. Unsure of the CAO's policy preferences and loyalties, the new mayor will likely little entrust this official with handling important matters. Madison's career city administrator, Robert Corcoran, was just so mistrusted. William Dyke saw Corcoran
to be a Festge man and only learned to value his assistance when Corcoran demonstrated his capacity to act according to the wishes of the present mayor. When Paul Soglin came to power, Corcoran was similarly distrusted as he was now closely identified with the Dyke administration. In addition to the loyalty question, Soglin had doubts as to Corcoran's ability to adequately perform his job, and for the most part bypassed his career administrator when important bureaucratic matters were at hand.

For the CAO to be truly of value to the mayor, the mayor must have total faith in his loyalty and abilities. This mandates mayoral appointment of the CAO. To the extent that continuity in knowledge between administrations is deemed desirable, perhaps a bifurcation of responsibilities is required; the ideal solution would be for the mayor to have one career and one appointed administrative officer. But the drawbacks of such a proposal are the blurring of lines of responsibility between two such officials and the double salary that such an arrangement necessitates.

The problem of mayoral staff is probably more severe in smaller cities. In large cities, problems are recognized to be complex, and the mayor is consequently more likely to be given adequate staff. No one suggests, for example, that the mayor of New York or Chicago attempt to govern without adequate staff assistance. But in small cities any attempt to increase the size of the mayor's office will likely be met
with charges from the opposition party and the local newspapers that the mayor is unnecessarily expanding his office. Why, they will argue, should we hire another official at a decent salary to do the job that the mayor is already being paid to do? Such an attitude can only impede the mayor's governing ability. These objections might also constitute a "false economy" as adequate staff research and preparation of grant proposals and freeing the mayor to attend regional and national conferences might enhance the city's ability to procure federal project monies.

3. Put the Mayor Back into Politics. In cities where the reform ideology prevailed, the mayoralty and the city council were removed from the realm of partisan politics. The resolution of municipal affairs according to the reformers required only the application of professional expertise against increasingly technological problems. Cities were to be governed with business-like efficiency in the public interest; conflicting partisan perspectives were seen to be irrelevant to municipal affairs. Hence, in reformed cities, the governing of the municipality was placed in either the hands of a neutral manager or a non-partisan mayor.

The criticisms of the reform ideology are well known. First, the notion of a common public interest is untenable. In a pluralist society, different groups have different perspectives how problems are to be solved. Even decisions concerning the paving of streets and the collection of garbage
involves choices which will not necessarily be consensual in nature. Should money be spent on the facilitation of automobile or mass transit? Through whose neighborhood should traffic be funnelled? Whose streets should be paved first? Whose garbage should be picked up in the early morning hours to the annoyance of late sleepers?

A second set of general criticisms concerns the class bias of the reformist ideology. If there exists no common public interest, then reformist institutions benefit some groups to the disadvantage of others. Lineberry and Fowler demonstrate that the impact of social cleavages on city outputs are muted by reformist institutions. Nonpartisans and at-large electoral systems as well as managerial government all act to reduce the political clout of lower class and minority groups.

But it is a third consequence of the reform movement, the ability of elected officials to govern a city, that is of most concern to us here. The reform ideology by removing partisan politics from the realm of city politics, has stripped the mayor of certain opportunities for influence. The mayor in a partisan electoral system has certain potential resources at his command which the nonpartisan mayor can only desire.

In a partisan setting, the mayor runs as the head of a party ticket. To the extent that the mayoral election exerts a coattail effect on city council races, aldermen will find
themselves more amenable to the mayor's policy desires. If the aldermanic candidates of the mayor's party are elected as a result of the mayor's popularity, they owe a debt the city head can collect later in office. To the extent that their re-election chances are dependent on the popularity of their mayor, aldermanic members of the mayor's party will likely do little to embarrass or frustrate the mayor in office. As members of the same party, the mayor's record becomes their record as well. Party ties, then, not only afford the mayor a common bond with aldermanic members of his party, but it induces them, from their own electoral self-interest, to follow the mayor's policy leads.

The mayor with access to a party organization also possesses a number of opportunities for influence that the nonpartisan mayor is denied. The mayor, if he is indeed fortunate, can depend on the party organization to help mobilize public opinion behind his programs. A cooperative relationship with party leaders can also result in tight mayoral control over the aldermanic nominations process; renegade party members can be denied slating for city council seats. Similarly, the mayor who can access the patronage controlled by a party organization finds that he has appreciably increased the stock of inducements he can offer council members and other political actors for their support. It is in this light that we can see the contribution that Richard Daley's chairmanship of the Cook County Democrats Central
Committee, with his resulting control over fifteen thousand Cook County jobs\textsuperscript{54} and other county patronage, made to his power. Similarly, New Haven Mayor Richard Lee's power was advanced by his access to patronage voting registrar and county courthouse positions.\textsuperscript{55}

Reformed institutions, including nonpartisanship, are based on fallacious, class-biased philosophy. What nonpartisanship has succeeded in doing, though, is to insulate the modern mayor from possible avenues of influence that he might find necessary to the governing of the city. If the modern city is to be truly governable again, the people's representatives must be given the resources they need to command the responsiveness of other members of the city's government. It thus becomes necessary that politics be put back into the city, and that the mayor be put back into politics.

4. \textbf{Restructure the Terms of Other City Policy-Makers to Make Them More Amenable to Mayoral Influence}. In reformed cities the mayor often finds many policy-making areas to be the realm of citizen boards and commissions. Often these boards and commissions are structured in such a way so as not to be directly subject to mayoral influence. It is commonplace for members of these boards to serve terms longer than that of the mayor, and the terms are staggered so that the mayor has no opportunity to re-make the board to his liking in one felt-swoop. These boards, then, sometimes represent the philosophy of the previous not the present, mayoral
administration. Such was the bind in which Madison Mayor Paul Soglin found himself in trying to deal with a Police and Fire Commission dominated by his predecessor's appointments.

Similar insulation from mayoral influence is also found on the City Council in cities where half the membership of that body is elected on the off-mayoral year. In such a situation the mayor is deprived of whatever influence comes from running as the head of a ticket.

Such situations can be corrected to afford maximal mayoral influence if the terms of board and commission members and aldermen are made coterminous with that of the mayor. In such a system the mayor can assure that policy orientations of citizen board and commission members are in accord with the desires of the citizenry as expressed by his election. With the seats of all council members at stake at the same time as the mayoral election, issues from the mayoral contest can be expected to pervade and help determine aldermanic elections. To the extent that this happens, the voters in the city will tend to elect a city council with the same policy orientations as their mayor. And as has already been noted, the coterminous timing of the elections for mayor and council enable the mayor to run as the head of a ticket, bringing members of his ticket to office and collecting obligations from them once they reach the council. The only drawback of this proposal is that it would likely result in a large turnover in council seats at one time, thus denying the council
possession of a sufficient number of experienced members necessary for an independent and informed legislative functioning.

Making the councilman's job a full-time one with a full-time salary will also increase his amenability to mayoral influence. Though part-time aldermen are more likely than full-time aldermen to be dependent on the mayor's superior information, the former are not as dependent on the mayor for their pecuniary self-interest. The major source of income for part-timers lies outside their council position; to a great extent the time and effort they put in their official capacities is not nearly adequately compensated by the meager salary which they are given.

Denial of their public position consequently does not threaten the part-timer as much as it does the full-timer. The full-timer has to take more seriously a mayor who can possibly deny him re-election and the financial rewards his position brings. The part-timer, not financially dependent on his council position unless it serves as a conduit of mayoral or party patronage, can afford much more the luxury of being a maverick.

5. Increase the Mayor's Term to Four Years. In many cities mayors, like Congressmen, serve two year terms. Consequently, they are always running for re-election and their full energy cannot be devoted to the governing of the city.

But even more important is the fact that most mayors do
not serve enough time in office to get anything accomplished. This is just the point that Wolfinger makes when he cites the advantages that Richard Lee had over most mayors. Lee served a very long time—sixteen years—in office. Most mayors do not serve nearly as long due to the incommeasurability of the responsibilities and the power of the office and the salience of their positions.

If the mayor is to get things done, he must have time. If mayors indeed face something on the order of a two-term crisis—after two terms the public becomes so bored with the mayor's performance that they will not re-elect him—then the mayor who serves two-year terms likely has only four years to put his imprint on city affairs; the mayor who serves four-year terms, though, has eight years to accomplish what he wants.

Only one of the three mayors in this study, Paul Soglin, was able to win a third term in office, and he even suffered a second-place finish in that year's primary—surely an indicator of some voter restiveness, Otto Festge and William Dyke could not win a third term. Festge, faced with the foregone conclusion decided not to run; Dyke was beat by a mellowed student radical. To the extent that elections help to focus public dissatisfaction on the mayor and thus contribute to the public's growing tired of him, the two year term is a definite handicap to a mayor's ability to deliver major programs requiring a number of years to enact and
THE CHOICE

The proposals listed above suggest a radical restructuring of many of our urban governments away from the institutions dictated by the ideology of the reform movement. But nothing less will do. Mayors vary in their effectiveness according to the leadership styles they adopt. But no matter what style a mayor employs, his impact on city affairs will be less than what it could potentially be if the city charter denies him certain opportunities for influence.

Raymond Wolfinger has identified an alternative model of urban leadership as embodied by the city manager and professional bureaucrat. Wolfinger observes what the impact of these officials will likely be:

The trend toward greater influence by cosmopolitan professionals is not a "solution to the urban crisis," but rather a contribution to the development of discrete programs for particular needs. It will be felt in limited but consequential ways, in programs for job training or neighborhood parks, for example, rather than in sweeping root-and-branch attacks on urban decline. This is not to deny that experts are influential in the grander forms of policy, à la Lee, but only that these forms require such unusual accumulations of political power and talent that--impressive as they may be--they are not a model with very much direct and total applicability.  

Yet, "the development of discrete programs" by professional bureaucrats is often as much part of the problem as the cure. Power in the city is already too decentralized in the hands of the bureaucracy; no inter-agency coordinative authority
exists. The strengthening of agency professionals will only reinforce the power of each bureaucratic fiefdom. Only the mayor has both the power potential and generalist view to counteract the effects of exaggerated bureaucratic parochialism in policy-making.

In the final analysis, the choice between managerial and mayoral leadership comes down to a matter of political philosophy. Proponents of an elitist theory of democracy distrust the popular will and put their faith instead in the wisdom of trained unelected officials.

Advocates of populist democracy, in contrast, doubt that any such neutral interest is observable and prefer instead that policy-makers be as directly responsible to the electorate as possible. Only by such means can the people be protected against arbitrary or tyrannical government. As Gerald Pomper observes, such concerns for responsible government dominates over any concerns for technically perfect policy:

Elections are highly evaluated because they are effective means of providing protection for society and control over government. Decisions might be better or worse in content, but this consideration is not central.

The advantages of elections have been seen in their indirect effects, particularly the protection of the voters, not in the wisdom of their decisions.

Urban governance by unelected officials, then, risks the grave danger of irresponsible government. The career bureaucrat, protected by civil service, municipal unionism and even his sense of professional obligation, is very much removed
from popular control. Even the city manager is one-step removed from the people; voters do not exert direct control over his fate. The manager is even protected further as the city council may be hesitant to remove a manager from the fear of being unable to attract a good replacement to a city that offers little in terms of job security.

Democratic theory provides that conflicts of values be resolved by the political system. Managerial government goes a long way to insulate the decision-making process from effective citizen input. Managerial government sees such input as "private-regarding" and denies its legitimacy. Yet, for all the rhetoric, the biases of the "professional" remain. According to populist democratic theory, the choice between managerial and mayoral government is clear; it is the choice between government by unelected officials who tend to be responsive to their own self-defined values or government by elected officials more responsible to the people.
NOTES

CHAPTER ONE:


8. This observation is also made by Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor*, pp. 11 and 14. Levine observes that "the earlier studies of mayoral leadership and the more recent additions have
produced a framework that has been accepted as a paradigm for the study of mayoral leadership."
Levine particularly scores the "integrationist and order biases of some interpretations."


10. Ibid., p. 253.

11. This point is also made by John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in Action (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 19-21.


Daley described by Banfield and the "partisan"
Daley described by Royko has also been recently
noted by Paul E. Peterson, School Politics, Chicago
Style (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976).

14. Banfield, Political Influence, pp. 159-89, presents
a description of Daley's action, or rather lack of
action, during the early years of the Chicago campus
issue.

15. Royko, Boss, p. 127. Daley's action orientation
in the face of opposition by long-time residents is
also noted by O'Connor, Clout, p. 187.

Mayor Richard Lee's establishment of an executive-
centered coalition.


18. Kotter and Lawrence, Mayors in Action, pp. 21-22,
mistakenly equate entrepreneurship with simple
mayoral activism and innovativeness.

19. Salisbury, "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of


22. George, "Political Leadership and Social Change in American Cities."


26. Ibid., p. 524.

27. Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 22, basically makes the same point in noting that mayoral performance has been evaluated against the standards of the executive-centered coalition.

28. The pluralistic, integrationist assumptions underlying theses models is underscored by Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor. A good summary of most of Levine's themes is presented in Charles H. Levine and Clifford Kaufman, "Urban Conflict as a
Constraint on Mayoral Leadership: Lessons from Gary and Cleveland," *American Politics Quarterly* 2 (January 1974): 78-106. These assumptions are discussed further in Chapter Two of this thesis.


32. Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 60-62. Dahl fails to note, however, the costs that urban redevelopment placed on certain groups, such as residents who did not desire to be relocated or persons who did not wish to see their neighborhood disrupted.


37. I am indebted to Michael Lipsky for this insight.

38. See particularly Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor.

39. Barber, Presidential Character.

40. Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 12.


43. Kotter and Lawrence, Mayors in Action, pp. 106-09, present a description of the Ceremonial mayor.

44. Ibid., pp. 107-08, classify Cincinnati's Walton Bachrach as a Ceremonial mayor, but still note Bachrach devoted considerable time and energy to the performance of his ceremonial duties.


48. These "negative" orientations of the Personality/Individualist as I have described them go beyond anything that Kotter and Lawrence have attributed to this mayor. To a certain extent, the Personality/Individualist is a citizen called to political service, and as such shares some of the attributes of the "passive-negative" character described by Barber, *Presidential Character*, pp. 13 and 145-73.

49. Kotter and Lawrence, *Mayors in Action*, pp. 115-17, present a description of the Executive mayor.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 39, define "domain" as "That subpart of the total city in which the mayor consciously tries to have an impact."


52. The name "Integrationist" has been derived from Ann Greer, *The Mayor's Mandate*, pp. 89-93 and 106-10, in her use of the term to describe the actions of Sabonjian.

54. Ibid., p. 107. The housing controversy detailed in the following paragraph is described by Greer on pp. 107-08.

55. Ibid., p. 90.

56. Kotter and Lawrence, Mayors in Action, pp. 117-19, observe the long-term agenda-setting process of the Entrepreneur.

57. Cunningham, Urban Leadership in the Sixties.

58. Kotter and Lawrence, Mayors in Action, p. 21.


62. Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor. According to Levine, Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher took a partisan posture favoring the city's whites,
as did Gary Mayor Richard Hatcher and, in his later years, Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes favoring blacks. See particularly, pp. 54-81.

63. Ibid., p. 41. Levine also identifies three other mayoral styles. His "bystander" and "figurehead" appear to be other names for the low direction Caretaker and Ceremonial mayors identified here. Levine's third model, hegemonyship, is really a variant of partisanship, as will be discussed in the next few pages of this chapter.

64. Levine believes that the immobilism of Stokes' early years as mayor was the result of his attempt to employ the executive-centered coalition approach, a style more suitable to pluralized settings, to racially polarized Cleveland. See Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, pp. 53-65.

65. This could also describe New York Mayor John Lindsay who pursued redistributive policies which favored the city's disadvantaged and minority residents and which earned the antipathy of many of the city's white residents as a result.

66. Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, pp. 41-43.
67. Ibid., p. 103.

68. Ibid., p. 43.

69. Ibid.

70. Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1968), p. 180. Pressman, "Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership," notes that a privatization of politics, or purist style, characterized the administration of Oakland Mayor John Reading—a mayor who, according to Pressman's description clearly belongs to the Caretaker category. The Caretaker, Personality/Individualist and Ideologue all privatize politics to a certain degree. It is only an extremely strong goal orientation that distinguishes the Ideologue from the other two privatized styles.


73. Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor*. 
74. Ibid., p. 103.

75. All quotations are taken from Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor*, p. 96.


79. Population trends presented in this section are detailed in "City Development 1975," a pamphlet prepared by the City Planning Department, Madison, Wisconsin (March 1976).


81. Alford, p. 97. Education figures presented here are detailed further in "Madison at Your Service," a pamphlet prepared by The League of Women Voters of Madison (April 1968).

82. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in


85. Pressman, "Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership," p. 516, reports that of the 93 cities reporting in this population range, 33 had the mayor-council, 50 had the council-manager, and 10 had the commission form of government in 1968.

86. Woflinger, The Politics of Progress, p. 29.
CHAPTER TWO:


7. Details of the June 10 negotiation session have been taken from The Capital Times, June 11, 1965.


14. Ibid.

15. Mayor Otto Festge, as reported by The Capital Times, May 10, 1966.


21. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

26. Mayor Otto Festge, as reported by *The Capital Times*, June 14, 1966.


29. *Ibid.*. According to *The Capital Times*, July 2, 1966, Festge, in a report from the Auditorium Committee, recommended that "to obtain fullest advantages of the services of the architect" it is necessary for the city "to reserve the decisions on the location and priorities of the auditorium and all other facilities until the study has been completed."


33. This observation was made by Law Park opponent Harold Rohr after the Auditorium Committee's December 14, 1968 meeting. See *The Capital Times*, February 15, 1968. *The Wisconsin State Journal*, February 19, 1968, also criticized the mayor for having had applied "pressures" at that meeting.

34. Festge's views on the bond interest matter are
detailed in both the *Wisconsin State Journal* and *The Capital Times*, January 31, 1969.

35. Bunch's objections are detailed in both the *Wisconsin State Journal* and *The Capital Times*, February 4, 1969. Festge's reaction to Bunch's move is reported by the *Times*, February 4, 1969; and the *Journal*, February 4, 5 and 11, 1969.


38. These figures were obtained from *The Capital Times*, April 4, 1969.

39. This objection was voiced by Harold Rohr and reported in *The Capital Times*, April 4, 1969. The estimate of a $1.5 million difference was also given by the *Wisconsin State Journal*, April 5 and 11, 1969, and by Festge himself, as reported by the *Times*, April 11, 1969.


42. Hilfiker, "The Madison Auditorium Issue and Coleman's
Conflict Framework," pp. 54-55.


45. The reactions of New Haven aldermen to the draft charter are detailed by Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, pp. 367-73. Lee's ability to get what he wanted from the Board in urban renewal and other policy areas is discussed by Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 204-11.


47. Ibid., p. 207.

48. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

49. Ibid., p. 168.

50. Ibid., p. 208.

51. Lee's implicit threat to use the sanctions available to him is reported by Wolfinger, The Politics of
Progress, p. 209. Richard E. Neustadt makes basically the same observation for another executive, the President, in noting that a properly guarded "professional reputation" is one of the keys to a President's power; see Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960 and 1976), chapter 4. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz observe that this ability to influence action through reputation is part of the "nondecision" face of power; see Bachrach and Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 57 (September 1963): 632-42.


53. Madison General Ordinance 3.35(1) as of 1974 lists the following as the only important exceptions from civil service: (1) members of boards and commissions; (2) police and fire personnel subject to state statutes; (3) Mayor's administrative assistant; (4) executive director of the Madison Redevelopment Authority; (5) executive director of the Madison Housing Authority; (6) director of the Equal Opportunity Commission; and (7) school crossing guards under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education.

54. A minor furor erupted during the administration of
Paul Soglin when the mayor apparently gave his consent without Council approval to expenditures beyond what the Council had authorized for the city board investigating the charges levied against Police Chief David Couper. See Chapter Eight of this dissertation for details.


56. The inability of mayors in general to control civil service protected bureaucrats is detailed by Theodore J. Lowi, "Machine Politics--Old and New," *The Public Interest* 9 (Fall 1967).

57. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress*, pp. 218-20, details Lee's attempts to establish control over the Board of Zoning Appeals.


62. Ibid., pp. 202 and 310, asserts there was a consensus in New Haven on redevelopment.

63. Ibid., p. 203.

64. These are the words of one CAC member, as reported by Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 131.


67. Ibid., p. 135.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., pp. 136-37.


71. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress*, pp. 393-95, underscores the importance of long tenure to mayoral success.
72. Lee's progress on urban redevelopment during his first four years, including his procuring the Oak Street connector and beginning the nation's second largest redevelopment project, are detailed by Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress*, pp. 173-81.

73. I am indebted to Michael Lipsky for this insight.


75. The term "rancorous" has been borrowed from William A. Gamson, "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," *American Sociological Review* 31 (January 1966).

CHAPTER THREE:

1. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 3, 1975.


4. Interview with conservative alderman, June 11, 1975.

5. The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin),
   November 25, 1965.

6. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 16, 1975.

7. Mayor Festge, as reported by The Capital Times,
   November 25, 1965.

8. The Capital Times, June 1, 1965.


10. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 3, 1975.


12. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 3, 1975.

13. Interviews conducted June 6, 1975; June 6, 1975;
    June 11, 1975; May 27, 1975; and June 4, 1975,
    respectively.

14. The establishment of Lee's control over New Haven's
    department structure, especially in the area of
    urban redevelopment, is detailed by Allan R. Talbot,
    The Mayor's Game (New York: Praeger, 1970),
    pp. 29-45.

15. Interview with Madison department head, June 2, 1975.
16. Ibid.


18. Ibid., November 1, 1966.


22. A non-systematic write-in poll to The Capital Times showed a 312 to 94 vote of Madison citizens in favor of restoring the funds. See the Times, November 18, 1967.


24. It took nine years to build a shopping mall on the 700 block of University Avenue. The delay was the result of both inflationary cost factors and the undesirability of the location as a commercial site as a result of the student riots and "trashings" of the late 1960's. The project which finally emerged was much smaller in scope than the one originally conceived. Only two of the indigenous businesses
set up shop in the mall after it was completed; the others had either relocated to other sites or had failed in the prolonged intervening period that saw the site remain vacant.


27. Ibid., November 4, 1968.


32. Ibid., March 29, 1969.

March 31, 1969, for details of the strike settlement.

34. Interview with moderate alderman, May 27, 1975.

35. Interview with conservative alderman, June 6, 1975.


37. Ibid., p. 832.


39. Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Revisionist Views of the Presidency," p. 826, also makes this point.

40. For a discussion concerning the limits to the lesson Kennedy learned from the Bay of Pigs affair as well as three alternative explanations as to why the "non-response" option was ruled out during the missile crisis, see Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), particularly pp. 58, 123-25, and 194-200.

41. This side of Kennedy is presenty by Miroff, Pragmatic
Illusions; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972); and Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973). This point is also made by Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Revisionist Views of the Presidency."

42. Daniel Ellsberg, "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine," in Papers on the War, ed. Ellsberg (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 93-99, presents an incisive look as to how "now" was never the right time for a President to get out of Vietnam.


44. Interview with Otto Festge, June 17, 1975.


46. Ibid., January 2, 1967.

47. Allison, The Essence of Decision.


CHAPTER FOUR:

1. The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), January 28, 1973. This rather lengthy article presents a decent overview of Dyke's background and his history as mayor from a newspaper that remained quite antagonistic to the mayor during his four years in office.

2. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


9. Instances of the mayor's hostility toward Dodge are reported in the Wisconsin State Journal and The Capital Times, May 2 and August 22, 1969.

10. According to City Personnel Director Charles Reott,
part of the delay in negotiations was the result of Teamster representative Donald Eaton's having been on vacation for part of this period. See The Capital Times, August 15, 1969.


14. Dyke's consideration of these alternatives is reported by both the Wisconsin State Journal and The Capital Times, August 19, 1969.


16. For indications of the mayor's change in attitude, see the Wisconsin State Journal, September 20 and 30, 1969; and The Capital Times, September 30, 1969.


20. Interview with mayoral assistant Peter Dohr.


24. The Department of Labor's recommendation is reported in The Capital Times, November 17, 1970.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


32. Details of the revisions made in 13-C were obtained from The Capital Times, January 20, 1971.


34. Ibid., January 19, 1971.


36. Mayoral candidate Leo Cooper, quoted in the Wisconsin


38. Ibid. Though Dyke's strong separation of powers view of government was not generally recognized at the time, it was detailed by The Capital Times, April 11, 1970; January 2, 1971; and March 28, 1973. One city department head, interviewed June 26, 1975, also identified this belief of the mayor.

39. Interview with city hall reporter, July 2, 1975. Dyke viewed this report as being hostile to the mayor's attempts to run Madison according to a conservative philosophy.


41. Interview with conservative alderman, June 19, 1975.

42. Interview with liberal alderman, June 19, 1975.

43. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.

44. Ibid., July 4, 1975.

45. Ibid.

46. MBO proved to be only a quite limited success in Madison as a number of department heads resisted the
introduction of a management tool which they felt to have only limited applicability in the public sector. Furthermore, objectives for such departments as the City Attorney's Office could only be stated in the vaguest of terms, and hence provided little guidelines for action.

47. Interview with William Dyke, July 4, 1975.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Interview with mayoral assistant Peter Dohr.


52. Ibid., February 29 and March 1, 1972.


55. Interview with city department head, July 3, 1975.

56. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.

57. Interview with member of the mayor's office, June 16, 1975.

59. The "purist" style of politics is identified by Polsby and Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, p. 173.

60. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.

61. Interview with liberal alderman, June 3, 1975.


63. The idea of a person making an ideology out of something that does not initially appear to constitute an ideology has also been seized upon by Paul E. Peterson and J. David Greenstone, "The Community Action Controversy as an Empirical Test of Two Competing Models of the Policy-Making Process," in *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics*, eds. Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976). According to Peterson and Greenstone, by refusing to confer even the symbolic rewards of CAP upon minority groups, Mayors Richard Daley and Robert Wagner had acted from an ideological defense of machine-style pluralist bargaining. I am indebted to these authors for their courtesy in having extended me a draft copy of their manuscript.

65. Interviews conducted June 11, June 4, July 17, June 3 and July 18, 1975, respectively.


67. Ibid.

68. These comments were reported by The Capital Times, September 11 and October 16, 1970.


70. Alderman Leo Cooper, reported by The Capital Times, September 11, 1970.

71. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.


73. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.


75. For a discussion of the electoral vulnerability of mayors--in particular, the lack of prospects for higher elected office--see Marilyn Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End," Public Administration Review 23 (March 1963).

76. Dyke's headquarters speech to his campaign supporters
is reported by The Capital Times, April 4, 1973.


78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 518, claims that Reading was a "private man in public office." The phrase used in this thesis is a paraphrase of Pressman's.

80. Ibid., p. 518.

81. Ibid., pp. 516-17.

82. See Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Dover, 1964), for a particularly compelling argument that Wilson's actions as President were to a great extent determined by personality factors shaped as far back as his early youth.

83. Peterson and Greenstone, "The Community Action Controversy as an Empirical Test of Two Competing Models of the Policy-Making Process," identify the "electoral/organizational interest model" and the "ideology model." These models are discussed further
in Chapter Ten of this thesis.

84. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), for an example of the application of rational choice theory to the study of both voting behavior and the issue space location of political parties.


CHAPTER FIVE:

1. Interview with member of the Board of Education, June 11, 1975.

2. According to one top city executive, interviewed July 2, 1975:

   He (Festge) inherited a deficit situation—deficit from anything from the condition of the trucks in the Parks Department and Streets Department on through. There had been so much tight-fistedness with the city budget over several years, he inherited a situation where things were in a bad state of repair, operation, maintenance, or what-
ever. And so, I think, he had to spend more money to get things back running smoothly.

One person interviewed, a liberal, even reported that city trucks during Henry Reynolds' administration were in such a state of disrepair that drivers organized a betting pool to see who would break down first. No effort was made in the interviews to confirm or disconfirm this story.


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


7. The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), July 23 and 24, 1970. The state attorney general eventually ruled that city supplemental aid was to be counted as income for AFDC recipients. State grants were thus reduced by an amount equivalent to the supplemental grants. City supplementation thus proved to be of no advantage and was temporarily suspended in April of 1971. See the 1971 "Report of the Welfare Department" and the welfare section of the 1971 and 1972 Madison City Budgets for further details.
8. Figures compiled from the annual Madison City Budgets and the 1969 and 1973 City Fiscal Reports for Madison.

9. Details of Dyke's views concerning data processing were taken from the July 5, 1975, interview with Dyke.


11. A tax/election cycle was not evident during Otto Festge's second term as mayor. Madison cut local taxes 11 per cent (in terms of full value rates) for the 1968 budget. Such austerity, though, mandated a 39 per cent increase in full value rates to finance the next year's budget—a factor which contributed a few months later to Festge's decision not to seek a third term in office.


13. Details regarding the likely impending tax rise are taken from The Capital Times, October 7 and 16, 1969, and the Wisconsin State Journal, October 1, 1969.

14. A detailed account of Dyke's proposed cuts can be found in The Capital Times, October 21, 27, 29 and November 5, 1969.

15. UnNamed school board member and board member Robert
DeZonia, respectively, quoted by The Capital Times, November 22, 1969.

16. The Capital Times, December 16, 1969. The closing of the two schools was again announced in the April of the next year; see the Times, April 21, 1970.


19. See The Capital Times, May 18, 1970, and the Wisconsin State Journal, June 10, 1970, for accounts of Dyke's motives in labeling the budget preparation process "secret." According to the mayor, these requests constituted only preliminary "working papers" and were not formal budgets, and as such were not appropriate for Council or press review.


24. Interview with Board of Education member, June 11, 1975.


26. Ibid.

27. Dyke's successful exhortation to the county to hold the line on the 1971 budget was noted a year later by The Capital Times, October 2, 1971. The county mill rate was 7.54 for the 1971 budget year as contrasted with 8.83 for the preceding budget year.


32. This list of likely education service cuts appeared in The Capital Times, editorial, November 22, 1971.

33. Interview with Board of Education member, June 11, 1975.

34. Ibid.
35. Interview with Madison school official, July 2, 1975.

36. Ibid.


39. See Chapter Three of this dissertation for further details concerning Festge's lack of command in these areas.

40. Interview with Board of Education member, June 24, 1975.

41. Interview with William Dyke, July 4, 1975.

42. Interview with city hall reporter, July 2, 1975.

CHAPTER SIX:

1. See The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin) and the Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin), May 18-21, 1967, for coverage of the bus-lane disturbances.

2. Ibid., October 18-20, 1967, for coverage of this emotional confrontation.

3. These are the words of "old guard" Police Chief
Wilbur Emery, as reported by The Capital Times. May 22, 1969.


5. Dyke's absence from the city at the beginning of the riot was reported by the newspapers and confirmed in the interviews conducted with Dyke himself, a member of the mayor's office, and a member of the police department directly involved in the incident. Yet, one witness who appeared before the three-member commission Dyke set up to investigate the incident testified that he reached Dyke by telephone at his home at 5:30 P. M., less than two hours after the trouble had begun. See The Capital Times, June 18, 1969.


8. According to one person involved in the incident, interviewed June 10, 1975, Dyke made no advance decision to intervene in the Mifflin event. However, one member of the mayor's office, interviewed June 4, 1975,
responded affirmatively to the question: "He (Dyke) was aware that the police were going to be sent in before they were sent in?"


11. *Ibid*.


15. Soglin had gained the support and friendship of the firefighters as a result of his strong support of parity in the wages paid to firemen and policemen.


19. Interview with member of the City Attorney’s Office, June 26, 1969.


25. The description of the day's events is based on *The Capital Times* report, April 5, 1971, as well as my own memory as an observer of the day's events.


27. *Ibid*.


29. *Ibid*.


32. *Ibid*.

volume is commonly referred to as the report of the Kerner Commission.

34. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Interview with member of the mayor's office, June 4, 1975.


39. Ibid.

40. Interview with member of the mayor's office, June 4, 1975.


42. Ibid., p. 245.

43. I am indebted to Michael Lipsky for this insight.


47. See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964), for a description of the difference between symbolic and tangible (or material) benefits and the dispensation of these benefits in the regulatory process.


**CHAPTER SEVEN:**


2. Cooper, a veteran City Councilman and former mayoral
candidate, ran in the primary on the strength of his labor ties and name recognition. Despite his disdain for Dyke and the move of most of his supporters to the Soglin camp, Cooper, in the final election, still refused to endorse Soglin. Cooper was eventually appointed by Soglin to the powerful Police and Fire Commission—a move which demonstrated Soglin's ability to forget old frictions as well as his willingness to appeal to more traditional liberal votes in Madison.

3. The McGovern organization soon dissolved after the 1973 election as American involvement in Vietnam and the accompanying social frictions receded. The remnants of this organization were nowhere near as visible in Soglin's 1975 re-election campaign as they had been in 1973.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. The description as to how Soglin finally decided to veto the bypass was related in an interview with a member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.


18. Paul Soglin, quoted in The Capital Times, September


20. Interview with Madison Redevelopment Authority Director Sol Levin.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. Interview with leftist alderman, June 30, 1975.

28. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 15, 1975.


30. Cost estimates given at the time for the State Street auditorium proposal broke down as follows:
   $2.5 million for renovation of a 1908-seat theater;
   $1.1 million for the remodeling of the next door
Montgomery Ward building to serve as an art center; and $3.2 million for the construction of two smaller 700- and 300-seat halls. Opponents felt these figures to be underestimates of the likely renovation costs. The actual costs for the project did eventually exceed these figures. See *The Capital Times*, November 16, 1973, for further details on the original estimate.

31. The $10.6 million figure was provided by a Chicago consulting firm. Wesley Peters of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation estimated costs for a Law Park facility to be in the $10-11 million range. As the final cost estimate obtained just before the bond referendum revealed, even these figures were underestimates.


33. Ibid., October 18, 1973.


37. See *The Capital Times*, April 3, 1974, for details of
the referendum vote.


41. Ibid.

42. The remarks are those of downtown representative Eugene Parks, a vehement opponent of the Capitol Theater purchase, as quoted in The Capital Times, June 26, 1974. The auditorium differences widened the gap between Parks and Soglin which first ruptured over the question of which of the two would be the left's candidate for mayor in 1973.

43. The city agreed to pay $15,000 a year for 51 years, and an additional $275,000 to buy the land when the lease at last expired. See The Capital Times, June 25, 1974, for the details of this arrangement.

44. The Capital Times, July 9, 1974.


46. Soglin's view that the attitudes of RKO's officials
mandated speedy action by the city if the purchase were ever to be consummated was expressed by the mayor in *The Capital Times*, July 25, 1974, as well as in his July 15, 1975 interview. Soglin believed that the RKO officials were so highly emotional that they would have withdrawn the offer if the city debated and dallied. Soglin's critics charged that RKO knew that it had a "white elephant" in a losing theater operation and would have been glad to unload the building on the only prospective buyer, the city, at any time.

47. Details of Soglin's maneuverings, aldermanic objections, and final Council approval can be found in the Wisconsin State Journal, July 27 and August 2, 15 and 20, 1974; and *The Capital Times*, July 27 (editorial) and August 7 and 20, 1974.


49. Couper believed that:

seniority ought not to be a consideration for promotion other than X number of years service, which was decided to be after three years...And it's true that seniority did not enter into all the promotions, and neither was it intended to.


Police Patrolman's Association President, Detective Roth Watson, one of the chief instigators of the charges against Couper, charged Couper with "absolute fraud" in his promotional policies. According to Watson, Couper never even gave an examination when he made his first promotions as chief; see the "Monday" section of the Times, January 28, 1974. See also the report of Watson's testimony before the Police and Fire Commission, the Times, April 11, 1974.

51. Wisconsin State Journal, September 5, 1974

52. According to one newspaper reporter, interviewed July 10, 1975, Couper's termination of police involvement in the Drug Abuse Program and the chief's removal of Watson from his position as head of the Department's Special Operations Section ended a comfortable position where Watson worked on his own, without constant supervision or having to do any detective work.


55. See the report of the testimony of Officer Richard J.

56. David Couper, in an article he wrote for *The Progressive*, July 1974 said his new directions in "leadership and administration have been challenged by an internal band of discontented police officers who professionally, and ideologically, do not accept our current orientation of peacekeeping, community relations, policy development and affirmative action."


60. Ibid.


63. One of the members of the PFC interviewed claimed Mittelstadt's critics never understood the nature of Mittelstadt's assigned task. According to this commissioner, as Mittelstadt lacked subpoena power,
there was no possible way for him to discern the truth. Rather, he was charged simply with the task of compiling the allegations against Couper so the Commission would have someplace from where to start.

64. Details of the Mittelstadt report and Couper's reply can be found in the Wisconsin State Journal and The Capital Times, December 15-17, 1973.


67. One of the PFC members, interviewed July 18, 1975, labeled the three-judge panel's hearings a "circus" and dismissed its findings as a "political report."

68. After the Couper matter was at long last resolved, it was determined that PFC appointments did not require Council confirmation.

69. Soglin estimate, reported by the Wisconsin State Journal, June 27, 1974.

70. The $70,000 figure represents the supplemental appropriation requested by the mayor and approved by the Council. See The Capital Times, June 28, 1974, for further details.

72. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.

73. Interview with Paul Soglin, July 15, 1975.


77. Ibid.


82. This explanation for Somers' vote was given general credence by the newspaper accounts at the time. Somers himself expressed this view when interviewed, and other person interviewed also supported this interpretation.


85. A more detailed account of Couper's suspect status with Madison's left appears in the following chapter.


88. Ibid., p. xix.


91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

93. Ibid., p. 11.


95. This trilogy is presented by Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals*, p. 18; the criticism is expressed by Levine,

96. Interview with leftist alderman, June 30, 1975.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

1. Interview with Paul Soglin, July 1, 1975.

2. Interview with member of the City Attorney's Office, July 1, 1975.

3. Ibid.

4. During the campaign Soglin declared: "More often than not, violators are given six months to a year to correct defects because of a delay in the city attorney's office to prosecute." See The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), February 13, 1973.

5. Interview with member of the City Attorney's Office, July 1, 1975.


7. December 4, 1973 memorandum from Assistant City Attorney Robert Olsen to City Administrator Robert Corcoran.

9. According to The Daily Cardinal (Madison, Wisconsin), September 19, 1974:

A lot of people feel that building inspection is not adequate. Michael Sack: "There are too few inspections and they are too irregular." Sack feels that (Assistant Building Inspector William) Bakken and (Building Inspections Superintendent Paul) Freiss have a chummy relationship with landlords. "We are at war," he said.

Bakken and Freiss point out that the department is there to defend both tenants and landlords..."We depend on cooperation from both tenants and landlords. To lose half of that spectrum can make it very difficult," said Bakken.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 15, 1975.
16. See the Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin), for details on the Council vote on the human resources budget.

17. Interview with day care supporter, June 27, 1975.

18. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 15, 1975.


20. Ibid.

21. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 15, 1975. This report was confirmed in the interview with a city hall reporter, July 17, 1975.

22. Interpretative report by Michael Baumann, the Wisconsin State Journal, December 4, 1974. The mayor's success in the human resources area continued through the next year, with proposed funding for the Spanish-American Organization the only casualty of the budget process. Funds for the Madison Tenants' Union escaped being cut by one vote. For details of that year's human resources budget fight, see The Capital Times, November 3 and 26, 1975.


25. The city's contract compliance program eventually ran into heated opposition from both contractors and labor unions. The city's Affirmative Action Commission had originally drawn up a "kit" for contractors calling for 12 per cent minority and 10 per cent female hiring. The Commission, under great pressure, eventually compromised, accepting hiring figures of 4 per cent minority, 4 per cent women, and one per cent handicapped. Of even greater sacrifice was the fact that the revised plan applied the hiring goals only to those projects being done for the city; the original kit had required that the goals be met for all work done by the contractor, whether for the city or not. See the Wisconsin State Journal, March 6, 1976, for details.


27. Madison Annual Budgets, 1974-76.

28. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.

29. It is unlikely that the entire gap between the number of heroine and marijuana arrests can be accounted for
by the arrest of known hard drug dealers on marijuana charges. Marijuana arrests do not constitute a "good pinch" as they will not likely keep offenders of the street for very long.

30. Interview with Michael Sack.

31. Ibid.


35. The Capital Times, November 9, 1976, recalls Keely's verbal barrage against Soglin.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


41. Interview with leftist alderman, June 30, 1975.

42. Interview with day care supporter, June 27, 1975.

44. Interview with Eugene Parks.


47. Interview with black leader, July 24, 1975.

48. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.


50. Interview with Eugene Parks.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

57. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.

58. Ibid.


60. Interview with Paul Soglin, July 15, 1975.

61. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 14, 1975.

62. Ibid.

63. Interview with leftist activist, July 9, 1975.

64. Interview with leftist activist, June 30, 1975.

65. Ibid.


67. The question of the shotguns was settled by the discovery of a labor agreement provision requiring that they be mounted inside the patrol cars. Soglin gained only a minor symbolic concession in changing the mounts to make the guns less visible to the public, but still readily accessible to police officers.

Chief Couper's opposition helped defeat Soglin's
proposed Police Policy Advisery Commission in January 1975. However, a similar committee was finally approved by the City Council thirteen months later. Couper had voiced his opposition to the plan intimating that it contained "hidden agendas." Though the board was comprised of six citizens, two alderman, and the police chief or his representative, it was only advisery in capacity and a far cry from Soglin's original intention of establishing a civilian board capable of reviewing police activity. See The Capital Times, March 31, 1976.


69. Interview with member of the mayor's office, July 9, 1975.

70. Ibid.

71. This view was generally expressed in the interviews, by conservative, liberals and members of the left alike.

72. Interview, July 9, 1975.

73. Interview, July 14, 1975.

74. Interview, July 10, 1975.

75. Interview, July 3, 1975.
76. Interview with Paul Soglin, January 7, 1975.

77. Interview with Madison alderman, June 30, 1975.


79. Interview with city department head, July 3, 1975.

80. Interview with city hall reporter, July 17, 1975.

81. For examples of the overgeneralization of a leader's style, see Charles H. Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath, 1974); and John L. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, Mayors in Action (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).

CHAPTER NINE:


3. See The Capital Times, November 18 and 26, 1975, for the details of Soglin's 1976 budget proposal and a description of the cuts made by the Board of Estimates and the City Council.


10. *Ibid*.

11. *Ibid*.


19. Interview with business leader, June 23, 1975. The Dow story was made public in a press conference held by Soglin critic Thomas T. George. Charges that Soglin failed to attract business to Madison were hurled against the mayor by his opponents in both the 1975 primary, Douglas Onsager and Henry Reynolds, and the 1977 election, Anthony Amato. See The Capital Times, February 14, 1975, for details of the 1975 charges that the business community was influenced by Soglin's radical past.

20. Interview with business leader, June 23, 1975. This point was also made by a conservative alderman, interviewed July 3, 1975.

21. Interview with business leader, June 6, 1975. This point was also brought up in interviews with another business spokesman, June 23, 1975, and a conservative alderman, July 3, 1975. Douglas Onsager, a Soglin opponent in the 1975 primary, also charged that of Soglin's 350 or so appointments "very few represent the conservative point of view;" see The Capital Times, July 16, 1975.

22. The Capital Times, August 23, 1974. See also the Times, July 4, 1975, for a fuller description of the breakdown in harmony between the city and Oscar Mayer
and Company.


24. Ibid., October 9, 1974.


27. WISM radio (Madison, Wisconsin) editorial, "Oscar Mayer Comment," exact date of broadcast uncertain; probably broadcast during the latter part of April 1975.


29. Ibid.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid., July 22, 1975.

34. Interview with business leader, June 23, 1975.

35. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964), p. 6, discusses the differences between "condensation" and "referential"
symbols.


37. Interview with business leader, June 23, 1975.

38. Ibid.

39. A large number of the persons interviewed, both Soglin supporters and opponents alike, reported that Soglin was a very "private" individual who often found himself uncomfortable in public situations. According to this viewpoint, no one ever got a glimpse at the "real" inner Paul Soglin.

CHAPTER TEN:


2. This list is provided by Alexander L. George, "Political Leadership and Social Change in American Cities," *Daedalus* 97 (Fall 1968): 1194-1217. This list is cited by Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:


12. Ibid., p. 67.

13. Ibid., pp. 70-71

14. Ibid., p. 76.

15. Ibid., p. 77.


17. Ibid., p. 116.


20. Ibid., p. 401.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End."

24. James Q. Wilson, "The Mayors vs. The Cities," The


28. Ibid., p. 402. Also, see pp. 402-07 for Wolfinger's account of the emergence of the cosmopolitan professional.

29. Ibid., p. 402.

30. Ibid.


34. Ibid.


37. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing, pp. 139-46.


40. Ibid., pp. ix-x.

41. Ibid., p. x.

42. Ibid.

43. The concept of "indirect influence" is postulated by Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 163-65.

44. Lowi, "Gosnell's Chicago Revisited Via Lindsay's New York," p. xiii.

45. Ibid., pp. x-xi.


47. See *The Capital Times* (Madison, Wisconsin), October 18, 1974, for details of Soglin's request to have the City Personnel Board study possible alternatives to civil service for department heads, including possible cabinet government.
48. Soglin's merit pay raise recommendations and the City Council reaction are discussed in The Capital Times, December 12, 1974 and January 24, 1975; and the Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin), December 17, 1974.


50. Ibid., p. 85.


53. Ibid.


55. Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, pp. 77-83 and
168-69, describes the patronage resources available in New Haven and Lee's use of these resources.

56. Ibid., p. 407.

57. The debate between populist and elitist conceptions of democracy is one that has dominated the theoretical writings in the field of electoral politics. The elitist view, for example, is presented capably by Bernard R. Berelson, Paul R. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1954) chapter 14. James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), chapter 14, in contrast, believes in "the power in the people" and advocates strong leadership and a partisan political setting to better allow the implementation of the majority's will. Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968), chapter 2, capably analyzes both arguments before coming down on the side of the "people."


59. Ibid., p. 38.

60. The irresponsibility of urban bureaucracies in the policy-making process has been vigorously attacked by such writers as Lowi, "Gosnell's Chicago Revisited Via