Constructing Community:
Class, Privatization and Social Life in a Boston Mixed Income Housing Development

By

Erin Michelle Graves

Bachelor of Arts, Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1998
Master in Urban Planning and Policy, University of Illinois, Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 2001

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology and Urban Planning

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

February 2008

© 2008 Erin Michelle Graves, All Rights Reserved

The author hereby grants to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology the permission to reproduce publicly paper and electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part.

Author

Department of Urban Studies and Planning
January 18, 2008

Certified by

Professor Lawrence J. Vale
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by

Professor Eran Ben-Joseph
Chair, Ph.D. Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Constructing Community: 
Class, Privatization and Social Life in a Boston Mixed Income Housing Development

By

Erin Michelle Graves

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on January 18, 2008
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology and Urban Planning

ABSTRACT

Social interaction among friends and neighbors is generally considered an informal process. Consequently, we often think of the structure of personal social networks as an expression of people’s individual preferences. The observed homogeneity within social networks is often treated as a near socio-biological fact: people, like “birds of a feather,” flock together.

This dissertation examines unexpected influences on cross-class interaction in a privatized mixed income housing development in Boston, Massachusetts. The research site Maverick Landing was constructed as an alternative to low-income public housing as part of the HOPE VI program funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Through research methods including fourteen months of residency and participant observation at Maverick Landing, semi-structured interviews and document analysis, this study shows how formal processes interacted with informal ones at the interpersonal level and impacted cross-class interaction. Management enforced a formal structure -- including rules and control of physical space, as well as more subtle measures such as information control and resource distribution -- that substantially negatively influenced interpersonal relations.

Larger structural realities too shaped the actions of the management company. Relative to their lower income neighbors, higher income residents had considerable leverage in the housing market, making them much harder to recruit and retain. Due to this structural disparity, management sought to satisfy the market rate residents over the subsidized ones, resulting in cross-class resentment.

Additionally, the social structure evident at Maverick Landing was in part the outcome of a chain of processes that began at the Federal level where the potential for privatization and income mixing was promoted through policy. Following the “implementation chain” from the federal level, to the local level, to the site of implementation, Maverick Landing and finally to residents’ actions and reactions, this research shows how social interaction is structured by public and private actors outside of the implementation site, Maverick Landing.
Privatized mixed income developments, many hoped, would reduce inequality between lower and higher income people. But in important ways, the intervention reproduced inequality. And it shows us how class is protected, not just by its members but also by institutions.

Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence J. Vale
Title: Professor and Department Head

Committee Members:
Professor Xavier de Souza Briggs, Associate Professor of Sociology and Urban Planning
Professor Roberto M. Fernandez, William F. Pounds Professor of Management
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my advisor, Professor Larry Vale, for his guidance from my very first days in the department and committee member Professor Roberto Fernandez for his support prior to even those first days. Professor Xav Briggs always offered useful and clarifying commentary for which I am deeply grateful. Other faculty, Diane Davis, Keith Hampton, Langley Keyes, Frank Levy, Richard Locke, Robert Putnam and J. Phillip Thompson among them, shared insights and encouragement alike.

Fellow doctoral students and friends Anna Brand, Lianne Fisman, Leigh Graham, LaTonya Green, Steve Moga, Erik Nielsen, Liz Reynolds, Francisca Rojas, Ryan Tam, Georgeta Vidacan, Gretchen Weisman and Annis Whitlow were model colleagues, offering constructive criticism and morale boosting in equal parts.

Others at MIT have offered crucial assistance. Janice O’Brien graciously accommodated last minute requests, Sandy Wellford magically kept everything on track, Duncan Kinkaid, Phil Thompson and Mike Enos tirelessly troubleshooting, Peter Cohn and all librarians at Rotch provided me (and Louis) with a place to almost call home.

Along the way Jessica Barness, Emily Barman, Peter Bearman, Berret Brooker, Jan and Bernie Carey, Pat Cerundolo, Julian Go, Jill Goldenzeil and Michael Pine, Jessica Berger and Neil Gross, Steve Kadish and Linda Snyder, Sonia Klemperer Johnson, Stephen Larson, Nonie Lesaux, Beth Lieberman, Luis Martos, Michael Olsen, Cristi Rinklin and Damion and Danielle Searls, provided much appreciated understanding and cheer.

But it is the ongoing and unconditional support of my immediate family, Mike, Bonnie and Julie Graves, and dearest friends Olivia White, Sarah Petersen, Laura Poppink, Maria Klemperer-Johnson and especially Brian Carey, that I recognize most of all.
TABLE OF CONTEXTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 8

A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES ............................................................................... 8
THE ORIGINS OF THE MIXED INCOME APPROACH .......................................................... 12
THE HOPE VI PROGRAM .................................................................................................. 15
MIXED INCOME ASPECT OF HOPE VI .......................................................................... 16
HOPE VI IMPLEMENTATION AT MAVERICK LANDING .......................................................... 20
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................................... 27
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE .............................................................................................. 30

CHAPTER 2: RECENT AND RELEVANT LITERATURE .............................................. 32

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 32
MIXED INCOME PROPOSITION 1: MECHANISMS FOR INTERACTION .................................. 33
MIXED INCOME PROPOSITION 2: OBSERVATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MECHANISMS ........................................... 44
MIXED INCOME PROPOSITION 3: MECHANISMS OF INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT .............. 49
MANAGEMENT AND MIXED INCOME DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................... 53
RULING OUT COMMUNITY? REMAINING QUESTIONS ......................................................................... 58
METHOD .................................................................................................................................. 63

CHAPTER 3: OUT OF THE GEMEINSCHAFT: HOW A COMMUNITY TRANSITIONS ........ 71

INTRODUCTION: THE URBAN VILLAGE AND ITS DISCONTENTS ......................................... 71
MAVERICK GARDENS: OLD WAYS OF LIFE IN A PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECT .......................... 76
THE OLD MAVERICK GARDENS: A WAY OF LIFE EXAMINED ............................................. 91
FROM URBAN VILLAGE TO COMMUNITY LOST: A COMMUNITY TRANSITIONS .................. 91
MAVERICK LANDING: NEW WAYS OF LIFE IN MIXED INCOME HOUSING ......................... 93
ORIGINS AND EXPECTATIONS OF MARKET RATE RESIDENTS ........................................... 97
CHAPTER CONCLUSION: INSTITUTING CHANGE .................................................................. 101

CHAPTER 4: BEHAVIOR IN PRIVATIZED PLACES .................................................... 104

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 104
PUBLIC-PRIVATE SPACES ............................................................................................... 105
RESIDENT IMPRESSIONS .................................................................................................... 120
INTRODUCING A CULTURE OF QUIETUDE ......................................................................... 131
CHAPTER SUMMARY: FROM PROJECT TO PRODUCT ........................................................ 147

CHAPTER 5: THE IMPLEMENTATION CHAIN: HOW FEDERAL AND REGIONAL ACTORS INFLUENCED SOCIAL RELATIONS AT MAVERICK LANDING .............................................. 150

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 150
THE NATIONAL LEVEL AGENDA FOR MIXED INCOME HOUSING ........................................ 152
NATIONAL LEVEL AGENDA: SUMMARY ................................................................................. 164
MID LEVEL AGENDAS FOR MIXED INCOME HOUSING .................................................... 166
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MID-LEVEL AGENDA: SUMMARY</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER CONCLUSION</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: ALONG THE IMPLEMENTATION CHAIN: WHERE PUBLIC POLICY INTERSECTS</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITH PRIVATE ACTORS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE LOCAL AGENDA FOR REDEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION: SUMMARY</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET RATE AND SUBSIDIZED RESIDENTS’ INTERPRETATIONS</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF RESIDENTS’ REACTIONS</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER CONCLUSION</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7: MIXED OUTCOME DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 1: CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 2: NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 3: INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 4: INCREASED SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR LOW-INCOME RESIDENTS</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER CONCLUSION</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 8: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL INTERERENCE</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW OF FINDINGS</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL INTERFERENCE</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWARD A JUST COMMUNITY</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 : Introduction

A Tale of Two Communities

Consider the following stylized accounts: First, the redevelopment of the housing community “Putnam’s Point” gave the disadvantaged residents living there access to new and enriching social networks. No longer socially isolated, the residents of Putnam’s Point became socially integrated as market rate residents moved into the formerly exclusively subsidized housing project. Over the picket fences, in the common courtyard, on the front stoops residents engaged in ongoing exchange – swapping stories, information and referrals. These relationships in particular bridged low-income residents to new social circles and consequently access to a better life.

In contrast, despite the addition of middle-income residents, the redevelopment of the housing project “McPherson Manor,” few meaningful cross-class relationships formed. While no longer physically isolated, the residents of McPherson Manor, the residents failed to socially integrate across class. Despite the attractive picket fences, the inviting common courtyard, the welcoming front stoops, residents showed no inclination to or interest in bridging the class divide, reflecting the truism “birds of a feather flock together,” most especially when it comes to class.

The two accounts above highlight and contrast two presumed outcomes of mixed income housing. The first, “Putnam’s Point” assumes that people are inherently gregarious, open to the free exchange of social capital. In this account one of the most important barriers to forming relationships is a spatial one. Consequently, removing the spatial boundaries between people of different classes will inevitably lead to interaction. The other account of
“McPherson’s Manor” assumes that people are hopelessly provincial, never venturing beyond the borders of class, race or other predetermined social constructs. Spatial division reflects the social distance people maintain between themselves and those of other classes.

Yet both fictive accounts are missing important factors: in contemporary communities there are formal rules (housing developments are regulated space); physical features shape opportunities for encounters as well as the nature of encounters. Whether gregarious or provincial, the residents of the actual redeveloped mixed income housing development and subject of this dissertation, “Maverick Landing” encountered institutional interference in the formation of cross-class relationships. A number of rules regulated social behavior and the use of physical space. These rules, however, didn’t reflect a personal or political agenda on the part of the local institutional actors. Those who created and enforced the social structure had no personal interest in shaping social relations. They were not in pursuit of some political agenda to keep people separate. Nor were they bureaucrats executing a state issued mandate. Rather, they were corporate actors working within, responding to and consequently reproducing a larger socio-economic structure.

My project in this dissertation was to move beyond the social and spatial mechanisms posited to influence neighborhood social relations. I wanted to understand why it was, or if it was, that cross class interaction is slow to develop in mixed income neighborhoods. I wanted to develop an understanding of the process by which individuals from different classes come to know one another in a mixed income context. More specifically, I wanted to know in new mixed income development how these processes have emerged. What kinds of expectations and demands did residents from each income group have for their community? What were group members’ attitudes about interaction? Why and how did these relationships form and,
more importantly, what thwarted them? Were spatial proximity and perceived similarity the only factors? What role did institutions have in not only planning for interaction but also promoting it?

I used ethnography, investigating a newly constructed mixed income community by living there as a resident, to take up the questions set out above. Participant observation was my method of choice since researchers knew so little about how these mixed income communities functioned. With so few theories or hypothesis about the mechanisms of cross class community relations available, my questions could not be answered through surveys or even interviews -- those methods are much more successful at testing existing theories rather than developing new ones.

What I found was that cross-class interaction at Maverick Landing (or a lack thereof) had as much to do with formal institutional processes as it did with informal interpersonal neighboring. Social relations in this setting reflected formal institutional intervention to a significant degree. Additionally, conventional wisdom in the housing industry held that the most effective means to maintain order was to promote a class culture of “peaceful enjoyment” of the development by prohibiting a variety of social behaviors – including gathering in the common areas or grilling in the back yards. But I discovered that prohibited behaviors impacted the enjoyment of the community for both income groups. Additionally, overlooked by policy makers was the fact that residents’ status within the development reflected their positions relative to the wider housing market. Moreover, the development’s physical and economic structured functioned to minimize cross class encounters and consequently maximize class resentment. Often architectural interventions did more to
separate people than to bring them together. Nonetheless, cross-class interaction did occasionally happen and suggested the power and potential of additional interactions.

The Maverick case suggests a need to consider the how institutional actors at the Federal, state and local level form a chain of implementation that ultimately influences social relations among the recipients of policy intervention. First, assumptions about lifestyle led policy makers to presume residential consensus about quality of life rather than developing it. Second, debates over social capital and social influence in these mixed-income housing developments have all but ignored what formal institutional rules and incentives do to shape interaction, sense of community, and relationship formation. Housing experts have long considered rules as management tools for curbing problem behavior to protect people and property. But little consideration to what effect rules has on that threesome sense of community, interaction patterns, and relationship formation. However, at Maverick it was clear that how the development was structured had much to do with why there was so little interaction. Rather than facilitating coordinated action, corporate actors dissuaded it.

Good institutions, others have found, are a tool of social reform. Civil society associations, schools and the workplace bring people with heterogeneous backgrounds together into productive, transformative interaction. From DeToqueville (1966) to Putnam (2000) authors have noted how cross cutting ties are formed, social capital is produced and the social structure is altered as people from different backgrounds introduce one another to new relationships and new opportunities. Briggs (2007) notes that “such cross cutting social ties derive their special significance from the fact that [people] bond on the social trait shared by the linked actors while bridging their social differences.” These ties have the potential to...
reduce inequality directly and are especially important for socioeconomic mobility for poor minorities living in inner cities (Briggs, 2007).

But the less positive institutional impacts observed at Maverick are not unlike those observed in certain other contexts. Many forms of constructed communities limit interaction. It is clear that in institutions as diverse as schools and prisons formal actors control the structure of interpersonal relationships in a way that prevents the formation of social capital. My thesis shows how in the mixed income housing context a private institutional actor too structured social interaction. Moreover, common to all these cases, the institutions reproduced the social order they (on some level) sought to redress: schooling intended to improve life chances for black students only further entrenched existing ones (Thomas, 1985); prisons, rather than reforming criminals reproduced a criminal substructure (Sykes, 1964). These institutions’ ambivalent relationship to tie formation among members led to unintended outcomes. An analogous dynamic played out at Maverick where the formal structure in important ways reflected the socioeconomic inequality among residents.

The Origins of the Mixed Income Approach

Widely viewed as a tool of urban social reform, the mixed income approach to housing development has been frequently employed in what has become the largest Federal housing redevelopment program in decades. Its origins can be traced to the influential work of William Julius Wilson. Widely read by both policy makers and sociologists, The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) attacked the “culture of poverty” stance and argued that the primary issue facing urban poor and especially black urban poor was "joblessness reinforced by an increasing social isolation in an impoverished neighborhood". He labeled those found in the

---

1Ryan et. al’s All in Together (1974), an evaluation of mixed income communities in the Boston, Massachusetts region, while well known was not widely distributed or cited.
situation the “truly disadvantaged” because they not only suffered from lower socioeconomic status, minimal education, and lack of economic opportunities, but were further disadvantaged by a lack of community resources or functional local institutions.

Wilson argued that social isolationism, or "the lack of contact or of sustained interaction with individuals and institutions that represent mainstream society", was not the result of culture but of isolation from community and necessary resources:

*The key theoretical concept, therefore, is not culture of poverty but social isolation. ...Social isolation...implies that contact between groups of different class and/or racial backgrounds is either lacking or has become increasingly intermittent but that the nature of this contact enhances the effects of living in a highly concentrated poverty area.* (4)

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* Wilson evoked a past in which African Americans of varied socioeconomic status and education levels lived in communities sharing dense, intimate, emotional bonds. However, contemporary community studies suggest that neighbors now share “weak ties” at best (Sampson, 2004). Regardless, the contemporary mixed income housing development movement was inspired by the promise of strong neighborhoods suggested in works like Wilson’s. Below I will focus on how a particularly ambitious and visible federal public housing renewal program, HOPE VI, emerged and how it reflects the mixed-income ideal.

Nowhere was institutionalized social isolation more apparent to policy makers and the public than in public housing. These facilities were seen as warehouses for the poor and breeding grounds for “social disease” (Popkin et al., 2000). As some public housing complexes aged, deferred maintenance, severe under-funding and management failures allowed them to become physically outdated and distressed (Vale, 2006). In these complexes eventually, only those without other housing options, the “least advantaged” remained. While

Graves
some argue that compared with family characteristics such as income or educational
attainment, the neighborhood has little influence over individual outcomes (Ellen and Turner,
1997), many scholars and policy makers argued that the concentration of the least advantaged
households exacerbated their condition (i.e. Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997, Massey and Denton,
1997, Wilson, 1987, Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002). Yet, the causal debate
continues: substantial disagreement persists about why and how context matters, as well as the
relative importance of social conditions such as crime and peer influence (Ellen and Turner,
1997). While such distress did not uniformly characterize public housing nation wide, these
trends and problems were clearest in urban public housing, especially in large complexes and
in the highest cost markets and where the gap between rents and wages grew in recent decades
(Levy, 1998).

Public housing was seen as a worse case of government sponsored social isolation.
Wilson, like others before him (Moore, 1969, Rainwater, 1970) argued that the poorly planned
and poorly maintained housing projects added to the burdens of the isolated African American
and Latino poor. William Moore’s *Vertical Ghetto* (1969) document how residents of housing
projects were living on segregated “islands of poverty.” Subsequent researchers found a
strong correlation between these neighborhoods of high poverty such as public housing and
social indicators which included a decline in school performance and relatively high rates of
criminal activity, higher incidences of substance abuse, breakdown of the family, and teenage

In 1989, as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act,
Congress created an independent National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing. This initiative reflected a concern about social and economic isolation, not just
physical deterioration (which had been the focus of much government inquiry into public housing in the 1970s and 1980s). In its Final Report the National Commission called the “social function of public housing” a “central question” (Spence, 358, 1993). And Harry Spence, former receiver for the Boston Housing Authority advocated altering “admission policies to reduce the aggregations of severe distress and thereby relieve isolation” (Spence, 1993, 363). In response to the Federal Commission, policy makers instituted HOPE VI.

The HOPE VI Program

With the HOPE VI program, policy makers tried this new approach to address the social and physical conditions of certain public housing developments. The 1993 Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) Program. With the fundamental goal of eliminating “severely distressed public housing” The U.S. Department of Housing (HUD) used HOPE VI to as a vehicle to encourage the reduction in the concentration of low income households and promote the construction of mixed income housing (Popkin, 2004). Moreover, HOPE VI sought to transform public housing management. (Popkin, 2004, 16) and consequently, HUD administrators encouraged housing authorities to subcontract on-site management to private firms. By the mid 1990s, HUD also advocated New Urbanist approaches to urban design. These interventions amounted to a social, architectural and managerial re-design: the social redesign meant the integration of subsidized households and marker rate ones, the architectural redesign included upgrading the housing using New Urbanist and defensible space ideals and a managerial redesign suggested that public housing authorities contract experienced private management companies to oversee day-to-day operations. Thus, HOPE VI recommendations encouraged housing authorities to use professional management companies to bring residents with different incomes together in an
architecturally inspired housing environment. The HOPE VI redevelopment program sought to eliminate some 100,000 “severely distressed” public housing units and provided up to $50 million in funds per project (Vale, 2006).

By 2003 Housing authorities had received federal money to redevelop specific housing developments, based on claims of “distress,” and almost all of the housing authorities introduced mixed income developments (CLPHA, 2004). In disbursing the funds, “HUD urged the housing authorities to ‘incorporate boldness and creativity’ in their plans which they assumed could address such difficult problems as high density, crime, poor original design, and oppressive social and economic conditions” (Holin and Amendolia, 2001, 8). In 2004, HUD had invested five billion dollars and leveraged an additional $10.8 billion in private investment.2

Distress manifested itself in several areas, and of most relevance to this project were the social isolation of residents, the physical distress of the developments, and the failure of local institutions -- both the management within the developments as well as the neighborhood institutions such as the police and local schools. As such, three aspects of the redevelopment plans become important, first, efforts to reduce isolation, second, initiatives to improve public housing residents’ culture and behavior and third efforts to strengthen local institutions.

**Mixed income aspect of HOPE VI**

As noted above, many believed that the spatial concentration of profoundly poor, nonworking households was a major cause of the social and physical distress of public housing and that one could reduce distress through mixed-income occupancy. Thus, to

---

improve the lives of public housing residents, policymakers placed priority on the need to
deconcentrate poverty and encourage local authorities to replace existing distressed public
housing with healthier, mixed-income communities (Popkin, 2004, p14). Building on
sociologist Mark Granovetter’s insight about the “strength of weak ties,” many researchers
brought the possibilities of mixing to the fore. Weak ties - ties between people who do not
know one another well introduce people to new social circles and thus link individuals to
information otherwise unavailable in their own circles. Such information should be useful to
socioeconomic attainment (Lin, 1989). Advocates suggested mixed income housing could
promote weak ties (Briggs, 1997; Elliott, 1999; Gittell and Vidal 1998, Joseph, 2006; Putnam,
1995).

Yet implicit too was an agenda to transform the class culture of public housing.
Housing authorities provided quality construction and amenities in the redeveloped parcels in
large part to attract higher-income households. Developers also redesigned developments to
conform to the surrounding private housing stock, reasoning that such an aesthetic would
remove the stigma of public housing. Certain developments also employed “income-blind”
design approaches: making all units identical inside and out, and lower-income residents can
occupy any unit in the development. Developers employed this strategy to avoid a
concentration of poorer residents in one part of a development and to encourage greater
interaction among residents with different income levels (Popkin, 2004, p 20). HUD
encouraged developers to redesign according to both New Urbanist and Defensible Space
ideals, explained below and published guidelines with leaders of both design movements
(Cisneros, 1995), though these design ideologies were sometimes at odds with one another.
These design standards represented the latest iteration in HUD’s longstanding concern with
design standards in public housing (Vale, 2005). So too did the emphasis on strict rules regulating behavior (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 1997).

**Ineffective Institutions**

Many maintained that the high levels of crime and disorder resulted not only from the over concentration of profoundly poor and troubled families, but also from ineffective management by local housing authorities (cf Vale, 2000, 2002; Venkatesh, 2000; Popkin et al, 2004). Frequently, housing authorities lacked accountability and performed poorly as real estate managers. Public housing managers often struggled to attend to typical management concerns such as maintenance and lease enforcement (Popkin, 2004). And aid to residents of housing communities usually stopped at bricks and mortar: few developments offered residents assistance with employment, childcare or health care, though efforts to do so in public housing date back to the War on Poverty in the 1960s. Housing authorities’ failure to manage housing projects generally reflected their institutional weakness. Historically, authorities had sited many high-density, multifamily public-housing developments in vulnerable neighborhoods -- ones that already had high levels of poverty, and thus further encouraged an influx of very-low-income tenants (Smith, 2002). Often residents from higher-income neighborhoods objected to authorities building public housing developments in their communities and consequently low-income neighborhoods were the only politically feasible sites to build the housing (Smith, 2002, Hirsch, 1998).

Consequently, policy makers also called for a transformation of public housing management and consequently, HOPE VI also represented a profound shift in the political economy of place. In HOPE VI, HUD deregulated public housing, seeking a more entrepreneurial, market-driven approach to public housing management and sought to
streamline and simplify the rules governing many aspects of public housing management. As one HUD document stated, “The concentration of the poorest families creates problems that predictably become unmanageable, and the larger the public housing development, the more complex the problems” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1995).

Further, in rewarding HOPE VI grants, “HUD placed substantial emphasis on subcontracting on-site management private firms” (Popkin et al., 2004). Yet as this data from this dissertation suggests, the consequences of bringing private market actors, who prize profit over other outcomes, were not fully considered. The program sought to bring mainstream institutions to marginalized members of society without fully considering how mainstream institutions may have functioned to marginalize them in the first place.

**Experimental Approach**

Unprecedented in its approach, HOPE VI was considered a “laboratory” (CLPHA, 2004) of public housing reform in its attempts to use innovative strategies to transform troubled public housing projects into mixed-income urban communities. From the start, it was roundly acknowledged that mixed income housing was a largely untested approach (Joseph, 2006).

HOPE VI did not arise from “pragmatic inquiry” (Hoch, 1996). The mixed income ideal was not derived from a “case” or the identification of a mixed income environment that seemed to provide an exceptionally good quality of life. While some promising studies of mixed income housing circulated (Ryan, et al, 1974) and models of mixed income housing informed the development of HOPE VI policy (Zhang, 2004) the focus on existing models was non systematic. The survey by Ryan, for example, found that residents were generally satisfied but “the study did not measure the impact of the mix on residents beyond their satisfaction” (Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn, 1998, 710). As Popkin notes, “there was little solid evidence that these new policies would brings about the desired changes but rather a sense that a new, radical approach was the only way to address
the problems of severely distressed public housing” (2004, 386). There also was little research on the effect of mixed-income housing on the problems associated with delivery of management services. Whether or not the introduction of more affluent households to a development led to improved management practices for all residents remained unknown. Rather, HOPE VI mixed income developments then were a first test of some of the social integration theories.

Moreover, the policy was vague about the implementation of mixing. As Spence noted, the National Commission recommended allowing higher income households into public housing but that it was “buried deep in the text” (Spence, 1993, 364). Despite adopting the ideology of bringing people of diverse backgrounds into “daily interaction” (Congress for the New Urbanism and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2000.). Policy makers and scholars were nonspecific about how these community interactions would take place or what the residents would make of socio economic integration. Policy makers assumed that through physical integration such developments could reduce social isolation. Yet there is a tension between the supply and demand in mixed income housing from a sociological perspective: mixed income developments supply opportunities for cross class contact despite people's apparent demand for homophily.

**HOPE VI Implementation at Maverick Landing**

The larger hopes and dilemmas born by HOPE VI frame my fieldwork in and around a Boston HOPE VI development. In 2001, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) received a $35 million HOPE VI grant for the redevelopment of the Maverick Gardens in the East Boston neighborhood (see Image 1: Ribbon Cutting). Initially an all-white settlement, through a court mandate Maverick Gardens began to diversify in the late 1970s. By the 1980s, the development housed whites, blacks, Asians and Latinos. More recently, the demographic make-up of Maverick Garden changed dramatically from 1990 to 2000. First, it lost whites
and gained Latinos during this period. Maverick changed from 55% white in 1990 to 25% white in 2000 and from 23% Latino in 1990 to 46% Latino in 2000. The black population grew some, from nine to 15 percent and the Asian population remained steady at 11 and 12% of the population (most Asians settled at Maverick in the 1980s) (Abt, 2005). Official statistics were not available on the demographics of the redeveloped housing, but in general white and Latinos shared a majority, with blacks and Asians a sizable minority.

Recalling Maverick’s past, Nadine Pressman, a resident of Maverick for 43 years said, “First [Maverick] was run by the Italians, then the blacks, then the Spanish, then the drug dealers.” Her succinct history of Maverick highlights two important themes: the growing diversity of Maverick and a decline in conditions. Diversity has characterized Maverick and the surrounding neighborhood of East Boston since their beginnings. East Boston is, to use the Chicago School language, a “zone of transition” (Park and Burgess, 1925), an urban area characterized by dilapidated residential property and the frequent succession of immigrant populations with little political capital. Evident distress in area of East Boston neighborhood enabled the Boston Housing Authority to build Maverick Gardens there in 1941 (Boston Housing Authority, 2002). Originally reserved for white war workers, the first minority families, African Americans, moved to Maverick Gardens in the mid-1960s. Longtime residents attempted to intimidate the blacks, resorting to fire-bombings and other forms of violence. Blacks stayed away: according to the BHA in the
late 1970s only 7% of the families living at Maverick Gardens were black. A court-mandated desegregation increased minority presence and by 1985, 23 percent of Maverick residents were black. Yet some Maverick residents said they were unaware of the racial imbalances in city projects and said that racial flare-ups were infrequent and therefore less important than long waiting lists, cramped space, lack of police protection and poor maintenance. By the 1990s, Maverick, like the rest of East Boston, housed immigrants from Latin America and Southeast Asia. Just prior to redevelopment, Maverick was one of the BHA's most diverse

Chapter 1 3 “Former BHA chief says base was laid for desegregation.” Peter J. Howe, Globe Staff 15 August 1988 The Boston Globe Third Section, page 23.

developments. Latinos made up the majority population (47%) followed by African American (26%) Asian (15%). By then only 12% of the residents of Maverick were white (Abt, 2001).

While the quality of life declined in the 1990s, one resident recalled the history of Maverick as “one big family. That's what it is” (Giannini, 2004). Just prior to redevelopment, residents who lived there recalled an area full of activity: neighbors gathering on stoops, frequent pick up basketball games in the center courtyard, an organized cheerleading squad to support them, summertime grill-outs, an active community center, a dedicated youth staff. But former residents could also recall Maverick’s troubled past, of the content of the stoop conversations, often loud and profane, barely hidden drug use, deep animosity of the English speakers toward Latinos, tolerance of domestic abuse, some families afraid to leave their homes at night, and some afraid to leave at all. The Maverick prior to redevelopment contained a multitude of histories, summarized colorfully by long time resident and author Peter Giannini, whose reaction to learning that the project had received the HOPE VI grant, “so it was official; they were tearing down this fortress, this sanctuary, this hellhole, this world of sadness, this insane little community” (Giannini, 2004, 93). See image 2, of the former Maverick Gardens.
Maverick received funding in a later generation of the program and aspects of the development are reflections of responses to the implementation challenges outlined above. To avoid displacement, Maverick designers planned for phased development -- demolishing and rebuilding Maverick one section at a time -- and a lower proportion of market rate residents. Thanks to the phasing, many residents remained at Maverick during reconstruction and moved into the new buildings as they were ready for occupancy.

In addition, to minimize displacement, while the replacement redevelopment, "Maverick Landing" was structured as mixed income development, 77% (177) of the units were allocated to households receiving a subsidy from the Boston Housing Authority (and 80% of these individuals were returning households from the former Maverick Gardens site). The remaining 23% (53) of the units were available to market rate tenants. The Maverick site
contained three distinct architectural components, two 6 story apartment buildings (known to management as “Midrise A” and “Midrise B”) and the town homes (Image 3, the site plan). With the redevelopment came a demographic shift: Latinos no longer make up the largest group. Thirty eight percent of the new subsidized households were white, 24 percent were Latino, 16 percent were Asian and 14 percent were black. This shift was likely because of the kinds of apartments built first (two more sets of townhouses are still under construction). The majority of the available
Maverick Site Plan Legend:

A: Mid Rise A
B: Townhomes
C: The "WaterPark"
D: The Courtyard
E: Phase III
F: Phase IV
G: Mid Rise B
H: Harbor
I: Subway Stop

Figure 1: The Site Plan shows Maverick Landing in its completed rendition: 230 units in Phases I and II Midrise A, MidRise B, the town houses completed prior to my stay. Phase 3 (92 units) was completed and occupied during my stay. Arrows also indicate the location of the courtyard, "water park" and management offices. The final Phase 4 (74 units) was completed and occupied after my departure.
units were one and two bedroom and the Latino families needed three and four bedroom
apartments. I do not have detailed demographic information such as race or occupation on the
market rate households, but only one had children.

**Methodological Considerations**

Attention to the cause and consequence of social relationships rather than simply the
fact of them, is only possible through in-depth and experiential research. I worked within the
community study tradition (cf Gans, 1962, 1967, Whyte, 1955), adopting a case study
approach and making use of qualitative methods (Lupton, 2003). As such, I sought to explore
the internal dynamics of Maverick Landing and to understand its place within wider social
and economic systems. As I detail below, much can be learned from this approach.

I chose this method because first, while there are many survey based studies on mixed
income developments and many studies of all varieties on low income communities including
survey studies of social relations, what is lacking is experiential inquiry into the mixed income
setting to further test these findings. For example, Popkin et. al. (2002) found that fewer
than half of HOPE VI residents reported having friends in their community prior to
redevelopment. At Maverick too, I found that residents were initially reluctant to identify
members of their social networks as “friends.” However, often after extensive conversations,
I found that often a resident who denied having any “friends” knew others in the community
upon whom he or she relied on socially or materially -- a relationship that qualifies as a
friendship. For reasons detailed in Chapter 4, a *friend* implies a kind of “enmeshment”
residents sought to avoid. The point here however, is only that survey methods can contain
assumptions that miss certain aspects of the lived experience that further inquiry can ammend.
Second, ethnography offers opportunity to study policy in action – unlike other methods which assume mechanisms, ethnography looks at the many aspects of social structure which may be important to social interaction attempts to remain agnostic with respect to which aspects are most important (cf. Becker, Gans, Newman and Vaughn, 2004; Briggs, 1997). Ethnography, as Gans notes, “can tell policy experts what the implications are of their policy on other people” (Becker, Gans, Newman and Vaughn, 2004, 265). In this study I employed several ethnographic techniques. I lived at Maverick Landing for fourteen months, forming relationships, attending community events and taking notes as a participant observer. I also conducted fifty one semi structured interviews with market rate residents, subsidized residents and institutional actors. Yet because of ethnography’s reputation as “soft science,” I will attempt to explain, defend and even champion my methodological choice. Consequently, in this section, I will try to ask and answer two important questions, what can a case prove and how can I prove my case?

How do I prove my case? Good case studies – like good social science analyses generally – are difficult to do. First, the adoption of the mixed income housing strategy follows a clear set of propositions (Joseph, 2006). I used the Maverick case to confirm, challenge and extend existing theory and to suggest additional explanations are relevant to understanding cross-class social relations.

Then I attempted to establish appropriate operational measures for studying the mechanisms involved in interaction by using multiple sources of evidence. I show how certain conditions inhibit interaction by considering rival explanations and noting points of convergence for the data.
Next, what can a case prove? In important ways, Maverick is a “revelatory case” (Yin, 1994): that is a subject previously inaccessible to investigation. Maverick was a good candidate for a research site precisely because it was new, giving me the unique opportunity to examine cross-class social relations of a community as it formed. This allowed me to observe social processes at their roots. By studying the community at its nascence, I could observe community dynamics as they developed, showing me the origins of relations rather than having to surmise them post hoc. As a revelatory case, the Maverick setting illuminates much about the social processes in mixed income settings. In short, there is no better way to see if the mechanisms operate in the way assumed that to observe them in operation.

Moreover, case can explain links in real life interventions that are too complex for single method approaches (Yin, 1994). Compared to other research strategies, ethnography offers an opportunity to employ multiple sources of evidence. This provides multiple measures of the same phenomenon.

Using a case, the Maverick case, I seek to expand and generalize theory (to achieve analytic generalization) rather than to enumerate frequency (statistical generalization). This analysis will not rely on frequency of responses – a survey is a much better measure of that – it will instead seek to describe how residents reacted and why this applies to general models of community and society. I seek to demonstrate that my findings are generalizable beyond the Maverick setting: my set of results apply to broader theories about interaction. Gans (1962), Stack, (1974), and Small, (2004), for example, each built social theory from a single case. My intent too is for this study to be a vehicle for examining other cases. Just as I found aspects of the case operated as others had previously theorized (cf Gans 1962; Stack, 1974; Merry, 1981; Pattillo-McCoy 2000; Small, 2004; Pattillo, 2007), my theories must hold true.
when applied to other settings. Ultimately, my research is theory generating, not theory testing. Subsequent not simultaneous research is needed to test my claims. However, just as a single method won’t work to understand interaction, neither will a single explanation suffice. I am not interested in overturning other explanations, only joining them. I seek to amend the list of causal mechanisms, as social scientists agree that interaction is a multi-causal phenomenon. And as I have suggested, in depth experiential research offers an opportunity to learn more about how mixed income communities function.

**Dissertation Structure**

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2, brings the literatures on social interaction, social cohesion and social isolation in conversation with the literatures on policy interventions, institutions and mixed income developments. Chapter 3, “Out of the Gemeinschaft”, chronicles the transition of the way of life for residents at the old Maverick Gardens to the new way of life at Maverick Landing. Chapter 4, “Behavior in Privatized Places” analyzes this new way of life further, focusing on how market rate and subsidized residents’ experience of place aligned and differed. Chapters 5 and 6, “The Implementation Chain” trace HOPE VI policy implementation from its inception at the Federal level to its reception among residents. Chapter 7, “Mixed Outcome Developments,” assesses the limited amount of interaction that occurred at Maverick. This thesis concludes with Chapter 8 “Institutional Impediments: Private Actors and Public Housing” which summarizes the findings and makes a theoretical argument about the influence of corporate actors on interaction between residents.

Having previewed the case for generalizing, I must also stress that we must keep in mind the uniqueness of this research site. Assessing a “housing community” at its inception...
necessarily invites the question of whether the dynamics will endure, and to that question I can only offer speculation. But my research seeks to understand dynamics that are integral to the policy of intentional income mixing through housing policy. On the other hand, this obstacle is also an opportunity. This study is both local and narrow its scope but hopefully what it loses in terms of breadth of perspective it gains in terms of specificity of insight.

I use ethnography to show that resident's personal attributes and the informal dynamics of interpersonal relations among residents are inadequate to explain the character of interaction within mixed income housing communities. That how these projects are implemented, in terms of physical and social management has a big effect on social interaction. At the same time, while grounding my research in the study of a single community, I hope to add to our understanding of the more general issue of cross class social interaction, insofar as that issue dovetails with my question of how in this setting cross class interactions were formed.
Chapter 2: Recent and Relevant Literature

Introduction

This chapter initiates a discussion about the prospects that cross-class social integration might lead to cross-class social interaction, changes to culture and behavior and improvements in local institutions. I will highlight general scholarship on cross-class integration and then focus specifically on mixed income environments suggesting what has yet to be understood about social integration in mixed income communities.

Reducing the social isolation of public housing residents was one of the major goals of HOPE VI. Policy makers and housing authorities sought to do this by transforming the social, architectural and managerial structure of the developments. Importantly, housing developments are an administratively and physically delineated community distinct from the wider neighborhood context in which the housing is sited. Several propositions drawn from social theory suggest how mixed-income neighborhoods might lead to improvements in low income families’ quality of life. First, a chief concern of Wilson’s and of this thesis was the potential impact of social integration. Wilson’s particular concern was with the effects of socio-economic integration on employment of the minority poor in cities, this thesis will not consider employment outcomes particularly, for reasons detailed below. Rather, it will look to social interaction of a more general sort, as exchanges of resources and information. Second, a body of research suggests that altering subsidized residents’ culture and behavior can reduce isolation. A third body of research suggests isolation can be reduced through improved formal institutions. Yet these arguments are less attentive to how institutional benefit may vary by class. As such, this review cautions about the prospects of interaction...
among income groups and seeks to critique policy makers’ non systematic focus on institutions.

In this section I would like to first illustrate a theoretical frame for tie formation. The literature detailed below suggests that actors form informal ties when 1) they perceive that they have something in common (affinity or mutuality derived from “homophily”), 2) they encounter one another in a bounded setting such as work, neighborhood or some other organization (“exposure”), 3) they share a common interest or goal (“equal status”) or there is a brokerage opportunity (“entrepreneurship”) (see Figure below). Without these mechanisms, tie formation is less likely.

I will review these models of tie formation below.

**Mixed Income Proposition 1: Mechanisms for Interaction**

A basic implication of mixing incomes then is that social interactions among neighbors will happen and, further, that this interaction will help to reduce social and economic isolation that some have documented in troubled public housing communities (Joseph, 2006). Yet except for family and small clusters of friends, most residents of urban neighborhoods do not know each other (Wellman and Gulia, 1999). Neighbors know one
another better in very stable and homogeneous places and immigrant ethnic enclaves, where people are sorted into the place by “referral chains” (aid networks of co-ethnics). When relationships do occur, ties between dissimilar individuals dissolve more quickly (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Wellman found that most people’s social networks, and especially their deepest friendships, are not neighborhood based and may depend on income (Wellman, 1979). The data indicate that such neighborhood ties are usually just one component of a more diverse set of relationships—or “personal communities” (Wellman, 1979). Thus, proximity alone does not promote interaction in contemporary geographic communities. Some studies indicate an appropriate space, such as a common area or community can promote interaction (Fleming et al. 1985). Kleit suggests that the physical integration of income groups may help to create neighbor relations among people of different incomes (Kleit, 2005). Others have shown that social proximity (such as friendships) developed from physical proximity (Burt, 1992), known to social relations and network formation students as propinquity effects.

Proximity and Interaction in Mixed Income Developments

Reports from mixed income developments suggest that proximity plays a small role in promoting interaction. In many mixed income communities, residents seemingly form two populations living side-by-side with little interaction (Brophy and Smith, 1997). For example, residents reported low levels of neighboring at Montgomery County’s Timberlawn Crescent and few, if any, knew their neighbors by name. Merry (1981) in her study of a mixed race, mixed income development in Boston found much propinquity without community: “Thus, although Dover Square residents pursue their distinct life styles in close proximity, their lives rarely intersect” (Merry, 1981, p.56). The mobile market-rate residents generally have little
time for, or interest in, significant neighboring activities. For them, the development’s attractions are its location, design quality, and price.

Shared Characteristics and Interaction

One of sociologists’ strongest findings is that shared characteristics promote interaction, and mixed housing communities in effect must work against this social grain. In fact, since the 1920s, urban sociologists have noted the homogeneity of social relationships such as when Park and Burgess’ portrayed the city as a “mosaic of social worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate” (Park and Burgess, 1925) In a review of the literature, McPherson et al. (2001) summarize, “similarity breeds connection.” What results from this principle—the homophily principle—is homogeneity in personal relationships with respect to many sociodemographic, behavioral, and intrapersonal characteristics. McPherson et al. argue that homophily limits the interactions people experience and finds that homophillic divisions by race and ethnicity form the strongest divides in people’s personal environments. Age, religion, education, occupation, and gender follow roughly that order. However, people possess multiple identities, creating opportunities to bridge one dimension if they can bond on another (and so form cross-cutting ties). As Simmel argued (1955), any individual’s network may reflect the multiple identities she bears which in addition to gender include race, class, religious affiliation. Thus there are many possible points of intersection.

Shared Characteristics and Interaction in Mixed Income Settings

Reports from mixed income developments also suggest the degree to which shared characteristics promote interaction. Merry (1981) in particular was sensitive to the role of homophily in mixed income housing. She found ethnic and class homophily and that “people are reluctant to initiate contacts with others who are culturally different and not connected to
their social network in any enduring way” (Merry, 1981, 121). Other research indicates that there is relatively little interaction between residents who do not share a common economic status and that the interactions that do occur are relatively superficial (Brophy and Smith 1997; A. Smith 2002, Popkin, 2004, 23, Kleit, 2006). As Gans found in 1960s suburban Levittown, Kleit (2005) found in twenty first century Seattle that residents at similar life-cycle stage, those who had children and co ethnics forged relationships. Thus “although residents may inhabit a shared world, their language and family differences, disparities in how they use the facilities and the variations in the meaning of proximity for their relationships imply that those worlds do not overlap greatly” (Kleit, 2005). Therefore, confirming Simmel’s concept, income was one of many characteristics that formed the basis for relationships but these relationships weren’t very deep. Kleit also found that shared language also played a role in the creation of neighborhood relationships (Kleit, 2006).

The notoriously dangerous and crime-ridden Columbia Point public housing development in Boston received HOPE VI funding as emerged as the redeveloped mixed income “Harbor Point.” Contrary to policy makers hopes, Johnson (1997) found for many, the diversity at Harbor Point discouraged the development of new relationships. In fact, racial tensions ran high at Harbor Point: One resident believed, ”if two people of two different races and two financial backgrounds meet, there is no basis for friendly relations. I always hear racial slurs.” Respondents, both African American and white, reported that they had been harassed by young African-American children or young adults from the development.

Homophily may have played a part in Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn’s (1998) findings of relatively high interaction at Lake Parc Place. Their survey revealed that a majority of residents from both income groups reported having a 10 minute or longer conversation with a
neighbor more than once a month though less than every week, lending items several times a year. Importantly, though these households varied by income, all of the residents of Lake Parc Place were African American and consequently identified with the same racial background. Moreover, none of them was high income. The richest occupant of Lake Parc place earned 80 percent of the area’s median income, making them “moderate income” in the language of housing policy. In addition to shared race and lower than average incomes, many had shared experiences with their lower income neighbors. Fifty nine percent of the moderate income residents had at some point in their lives lived in public housing. The perceived social distance between the project and non project households them then, was likely not vast, as they shared racial, economic and residential experiences. Moreover, most households from both income groups were families with children, providing another point of intersection for equal status contact. Thus, it seems that residents intersected on a variety of dimensions and these multiple intersections might account for interaction. Yet for most, these interactions did not imply deep relationships (Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn, 1998). As Vale (2006) notes, mixing may be better accomplished by mixing the working with the non working poor, as New York City has long done in its public housing (and unlike other big cities). Many mixed income projects include the working poor and so it may be worthwhile examining how the working poor mix with the non working poor.

**Interaction and Social Capital**

Another mechanism thought to produce interaction is the mutual need to share non-monetary resources. Coleman argues that exchanges “can constitute useful capital resources for individuals” (Coleman, 1988, p.102). These resources, sometime called social capital include favors people do for one another. Such exchanges both build and reflect trust. The
social relations in which the exchanges are embedded can be either homophilous or non-homophilous (otherwise known as bonding and bridging ties respectively. Many have observed the role of place-based bonding ties among low income individuals. Stack (1974) in her classic study of an impoverished black neighborhood found that the bonds between residents often worked to their own detriment. Neighbors exchanged resources so freely that they were unable to accumulate assets for themselves. That is people with fewer material resources look to their relationships, their “strong ties” to meet basic needs. But social capital also has a bridging function, that can be “utilized to get ahead” (Kato, 4). Granovetter (1973) noted the critical role “weak ties” played in bridging information access and aiding in socioeconomic attainment (strong ties can help a person get ahead, too, depending on where they are in the social structure). Thus both bridging and bonding social capital provide necessary and distinct resources, with bonding useful for coping and support and bridging aiding in socioeconomic mobility and attainment.

However, Briggs (1998b) examined social ties reported by white and minority tenants who had moved to scattered-site public housing in low poverty, mostly white neighborhoods of Yonkers, New York, comparing the make-up and contents of those ties to those of a matched control group who remained in segregated, high poverty neighborhoods of Yonkers, mainly in public housing. Briggs’ early evaluation, a few months to a few years after relocating, found few benefits in terms of access to new forms of social capital for the “mover” group. From this work, Briggs suggested that social capital outcomes housing mobility programs — where individual families are placed into higher income neighborhoods “may actually leave the poor with less of this support dimension of social capital—the kinds of social resources that help individuals and families get by or cope with chronic poverty.” These
programs, though, may endow the same people with more of other types of social capital, including "social leverage" — social resources that help change people’s life chances or help them get ahead. Briggs thus distinguished between support and leverage. While higher-status people can often get both support and leverage in the same relationships, for example from "well-placed" friends, lower resourced people often need bridges to get leverage, because their networks are otherwise too insular.

Yet, is low community participation particular to mixed income projects? Robert Putnam (2000) would likely say no. He found that regular contacts with friends and neighbors (especially among the young) and levels of trust have declined sharply since the mid 1960s. This suggests that low levels of neighboring observed in mixed income projects are hardly exceptional.

Other work considers the formation of networks rather than their function. Neighborhood social structure, in Burt’s formulation (1983, 1998) is one context where people cluster. People integrate “via bridges across clusters.” Because information (social capital) is concentrated within clusters, information flow is constrained by clustering. That is, “people focus on activities inside their own group, which creates holes in the information flow between groups, or more simply, ‘structural holes.’” When relations span structural holes between groups, new kinds of information can be accessed. Such theory further posits the brokerage opportunities inherent in structural holes. Mixed income social integration advocates are more interested in individual access to information, rather than the control of it. But control of information is important in mixed income communities, as I will elaborate in later sections.
Interaction and Social Capital in Mixed Income Developments

There is little data about the exchange of social capital in mixed income developments or its formation. However, there is some evidence that redeveloped mixed income developments erode some forms of social capital. As Briggs cautions, research from Mitchell (1969) to Fernandez and Harris (1992) demonstrates the importance of homophily in terms of ethnic and cultural ties in creating networks of social support. These social networks typically depend on being close and in everyday contact with individuals and families who share a similar culture (Fernandez and Harris 1992; Mitchell 1969). At the aforementioned Harbor Point, some original respondents felt that the new arrivals had encroached upon social values of the former project, leaving little memory of that community. Though the old project was in poor physical condition, residents remembered the development as a community where residents looked out for each other. While investigations involving people’s recollections of the past are subject to recall and other biases (as can people’s reports of the present), Maverick residents had both positive and negative memories of the former development, suggesting while their memories might have been biased, they were not simplistic or nostalgic. The community of former public housing residents and other subsidized renters continued to have a commitment to the project as a place to live and to neighbor. They had much more in common with one another—including children—than they did with the market-rate tenants. Yet it is unclear whether tenure or income influences the exchange of social capital. Because HOPE VI includes original residents and subsidized tenants who are new to the area, one can examine whether low income households seek the assistance of their neighbors more frequently than the higher income households.
However, while the exchange of social capital may be rare, Rosenbaum et al provide some evidence from Lake Parc Place of exchange between low and higher income residents. Lower income and higher income people reported interacting with one another, with high income people reportedly hiring low income residents for childcare help and other services, indicating that the new networks between high and low income residents were profitable, and imply the potential for bridging social capital.

**Interaction and Equal Status**

Others note that individual’s social networks are neither simple nor static. Simmel argues (1955) that individuals’ networks are diverse and thus there are many possible points of intersection. When memberships in two strata overlap, small groups form (Berelson, 1954). Pettigrew (1998) also finds that both individual differences and societal norms shape intergroup contact effects. This suggests that status equalizing contexts and actor’s individual attitudes can influence contact.

Alternately, some argue that situations in which unlike individuals experience equal status can produce interaction. This claim is based in social psychology’s contact theory, which suggests that interactions between people of different backgrounds will be more likely, and also lead to reduction in harmful attitudes toward the other, if the two groups have equal-status within an institutional setting, such as workplaces, schools or community centers. The equal status principle also operates when people work toward common goals, have intergroup cooperation, and have support from authority for positive contacts (Allport, 1979; Pettigrew, 1998). And Kleit suggests shared facilities not only provide a place for interaction but a status-equalizing context (Kleit, 2005). Neighbors of different races, for example, might get to know each other because they use the same Laundromat.
Interactions and Equal Status in Mixed Income Communities

Reports from mixed income developments also suggest infrequent occasions for equal status contact. Shared experiences are said to promote equal status contact. Most mixed income developments have some opportunity for equal status contact among residents – many developments have tenant councils, most have some facilities for children, such as playgrounds or day care centers, several have amenities for adults to take advantage of – tennis courts, gyms and swimming pools. Yet in her study in Seattle, Kleit found that using community facilities does not make residents more likely to connect with those of unlike themselves (Kleit, 2005). Lake Parc Place (Rosenbaum, 1998) appeared to be an exception. But again, most households from both income groups included children, providing another dimension of intersection for equal status contact. The facilities at the development also provided opportunities for parents to intersect. Lake Parc Place had both a playground and a day care center for parents of both groups to use.

Interaction and Children

Many anticipate that when children are present they may act to bridge individuals (a finding grounded in an earlier neighboring literature, which finds that neighborhood playmates may connect their parents, cf. Gans 1967, Briggs 1997; Kleit, 2005) Smith sees a greater chance of significant interaction and positive benefits for children for the same reason (Smith, 2002). Moreover, the concerns and challenges of parenting form another basis for equal status among parents. Ahlbrandt (1984) argues that having children influences the extent to which people become involved with their neighbors. Households with children tend to engage in neighboring relations more than do other types of households (Ahlbrandt, 1984, Kleit, 2005).
Interaction and Children in Mixed Income Developments: There are Fewer Children Here

At most mixed income developments, however, children were a source of friction rather than camaraderie. The social science literature has provided only weak support for the thesis that poor children benefit from growing up in a mixed-income environment (Susanna S.cks and Mayer, 1990; Rosenbaum, 1991; Duncan, 1994). Few market rate households in mixed income developments have children. For many childless, market-rate households, children were a nuisance. At Boston’s Tent City, many market rate tenants were students, and they complained of noisy children, particularly during examination times (Brophy and Smith). In many projects, managers found it difficult to attract and retain families with children to the upper tier of a mixed-income project. For example, at the San Francisco Bay area development Emory Club only 2 to 3 percent of the units had any children. Approximately 180 children lived in Boston Tent City but only one of whom lived in a market-rate unit. The poor reputation of the public schools of many urban areas likely detracts prospective market-rate tenants who have children (Khadduir and Martin, 1997). Thus, when children from both income groups are present they might act as bridges, but because fewer higher income households have children, they do not (Kleit, 2005).

Summary of Proposition 1: Increasing Interaction:

In summary a review of the literature suggests limited prospects for the possibility of social interaction in mixed income developments. Mixed income developments must in many ways work to hold together what social forces tend to drive apart. Most residents of urban neighborhoods do not know one another well. The rule of homophily suggests that it is similarity that breeds connection, making it unlikely that unlike—socially dissimilar—people will connect. Thus, people rarely build bridges to span the social divide. Mixed income
social environments remain under-studied, particularly in light of the public housing transformation. While local social relations among like individuals are well understood and findings are robust, the lack of empirical data from mixed income environments suggests researchers need to know more about how these social forces operate in mixed income settings. The case of mixed income neighborhoods, there is a need to both test extant theories in the mixed income context but also to build new theory.

**Mixed Income Proposition 2: Observational and Environmental Mechanisms**

Social interaction is not the only proposed means for social gains, so too is role modeling. The architects of mixed income housing also presume that low income people, by virtue of proximity to higher income neighbors will observe and adopt their lifestyles and habits. In addition, the standards in mixed income housing design suggest the assumptions about urban domestic life encoded in housing design. These standards reflect a long standing belief that design can determine behavior.

**Role Modeling**

Policy makers maintain that families with somewhat higher incomes will serve as models of mainstream values, demonstrating how work to support themselves, pursue education, maintain family structures, and support community institutions (Thompson, 1996, Khadduri and Martin, 1997 and Joseph, 2006). In role modeling theory, individuals consciously aspire to emulate those who are different from them. Advocates of this perspective believe children especially will benefit from living near people who are not poor. Exposure to the routines of working families, it is suggested, may make the children of poor families more likely to adopt the values, expectations, and behavior necessary for formal employment (Khadduri and 1997, Popkin, 2004, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 1997, Wilson,
Joseph (2006) suggests two possible mechanisms: first, direct interaction and “proximal” role modeling, relationship in which people discuss concerns and the dispensing of advice and second, observational or “distal” role modeling, where individuals display ideal behavior, such as going to work or school regularly; distal role modeling suggests that interaction, moreover, may not be essential to social learning. Modeling and learning might work through what Marta Tienda (1991) termed “demonstration effects.” People seek to emulate those seen as legitimate or admirable.

**Role Modeling in Mixed Income Settings**

The literature is thin with respect to role modeling in mixed income developments and how role modeling occurs is not well understood. As Joseph (2006) notes, “there is no evidence in the limited research about mixed-income developments as to whether role modeling is taking place and if so, what effect it has.” No one has systematically investigated whether role modeling is distal or proximal. Though interaction between income groups in mixed income developments may be infrequent, that does not mean that residents are not observing one another (Joseph, 2006). Yet perhaps legitimate concerns about a sense of “relative deprivation” from lower income residents (Susanna S.cks and Meyer1990) and a general interest in making the environment wholly appealing for market rate tenants has led to an ideology of “indistinguishability” asserting that mixed income units should be identical (Joseph, 2006). Thus, market rate renters appear no more materially well off than their subsidized neighbors, in terms of housing and the housing appeared to be allocating resources “fairly.” This convention makes role modeling difficult to study then because there is no relationship between behavior and housing quality.

**Environment and Behavior**
A long tradition in urban studies suggests not only social but physical traits of the environment influence behavior. In public housing, Vale finds a "whole history of attempts to use housing as a tool of reform and to see site planning as a means to achieve better citizenship (Vale, 2006). He traces how physical plans reflect moral, social, and increasingly, economic goals. Public housing began with a spirit of improving health but planners added to, and in some ways supplanted, the former goal by seeking into improve wealth – for both tenants and investors. Vale shows a history of planners changing designs and desired outcomes. While early public housing design sought to maximize features such as fresh air and light and consequently promote good health and cheer, contemporary public housing design seeks to mimic the private housing stock as to promote a sense of inclusion in mainstream society. Yet, these shifting design goals reflect an enduring belief in the power of architecture to influence residential behavior and culture.

A number of studies have produced empirical evidence that environmental design does, in fact, influence behavior. An early study by Festinger et al. (1950) found that the physical arrangement of houses and the access paths between them significantly determined of friendship patterns in married student housing (note however, the homophily among married students). Gans’ (1962) found that the structural features of buildings such as window and door placement were a factor in resident interaction. Michelson (1970) too demonstrated the role of architectural design in promoting or inhibiting social interaction. Like Gans he found that the spatial proximity of residents, based on the positioning of doors, determined the pattern of interaction. In studies of public housing, Yancey (1971) showed the effect of design on the formation of social relationships in the infamous Pruitt Igoe. Additionally, Amick and Kvic (1975) found that interaction greatly improved in low rise housing, in contrast to high
rise housing such as that found at Pruitt Igoe. Some studies, such as those by Newman (1972) showed how design can be used to influence behavior and consequently reduce crime. Finally, Fleming et al. (1985) concluded that common areas and other shared features had a strong impact on social contact. But these studies also demonstrate that in the architecture of interaction, the door swings both ways: architecture can be used to encourage or dissuade social relations.

**Environment and Behavior in Mixed Income Developments**

Two reigning design movements -- defensible space and new urbanism -- encapsulate contemporary efforts to influence residential behavior in mixed income developments. Vale sees design ideals in the HOPE VI redevelopment as representing “another incarnation in the intimate relationship between physical standards and social standards.” Drawing upon Oscar Newman’s notion of Defensible Space (developed in the 1970s), which convincingly demonstrated that introducing city streets into projects and providing residents with private outdoor space reduced crime, housing planners increasingly sought to incorporate these design elements in public housing. Eventually the Department of Housing and Urban Development commissioned Newman to author a guide relating his work to HUD’s mission to improve public housing environments (Cisneros, 1995). Recommendations for fewer common areas and more private and semiprivate space for residents resulted (Popkin, 2004, p20).

Additionally, HUD embraced the design ideals espoused in the urban design movement New Urbanism (Bohl, 2000), here too HUD commissioned leading thinkers to author a guide (Congress for the New Urbanism, 2000). These principles include building houses which face the streets, mixing housing types, prices, and sizes to attract a mix of
people. It also calls for shopping and parks accessible by footpaths and sidewalks and a
traditional grid of streets. Fainstein sees some promise in the application of the new urbanism
to mixed income settings. Only a publicly funded effort to combine social groups through
mixing differently priced housing with substantial subsidies for the low-income component
can produce such a result” (Fainstein, 2000). Together these two design movements have
“fundamentally altered” the kind of design undertaken in HOPE VI redevelopment. Yet New
Urbanism in particular has been the subject of much critique.

Critiques of New Urbanism as a viable means to promote integration abound. Some
question if new urbanism is a means to displace and exclude the most disadvantaged residents.
Pyatok wryly noted that higher income households rarely face a like threat of displacement.
“Does anyone seek to displace large concentrations of wealthy people to create a healthy mix
of incomes” (807) Both Day and Pyatok are critical of New Urbanism as enforcing a
dominant ideology of middle class norms. Pyatok finds that New Urbanism promotes a top
down design approach where “the style associated with the transformation is predetermined.”
Fainstein (2000) argues that the new urbanism emphasizing the substance of plans rather than
the method of achieving them, “displays little theoretical rigor.” Harvey (1997) also
cautions that emphasis new urbanist emphasis on community disregards its “darker side.” He
claimed that “‘community’ has ever been one of the key sites of social control and
surveillance bordering on overt social repression. . . . As a consequence, community has often
been a barrier to rather than facilitator of progressive social change” (p. 3). Thus, even more
than Day (2000), Harvey expressed misgivings that notions of community enforce conformity
and blocks creativity arising from diversity.
Some research on the application of New Urbanism bears out these negative predictions. Kleit looked at the use of community facilities and finds like Fleming (1985) that many are successful in promoting residential use, especially the public library but less successful in fostering mixed income interaction. Day’s research showed that New Urbanist design, despite its emphasis on diversity, did not support the diversity of lifestyles and reflects the design preferences and environmental habits of middle class residents.

Summary of Proposition 2: Observational and Environmental Mechanisms

The designers of mixed income housing believe that exposure to higher income neighbors will lead to a change in their lifestyles and habits. Policy makers maintain that higher income families will serve as models of mainstream values. Yet how role modeling occurs is not well understood and there is little documentation of role modeling in mixed income developments. Moreover, evidence suggests that additional social conditions must be present for meaningful interaction to occur. The architects of mixed income housing also hold that physical environments influence behavior. The design movements of defensible space and new urbanism reflect contemporary efforts to influence residential behavior in mixed income developments. Yet much commentary and some research shows that greater cross class interaction does not result from the application of new urbanist design features.

Mixed Income Proposition 3: Mechanisms of Institutional Improvement

Third, many propose that shared institutions can reduce social isolation. In the literature, institutions play a large role in facilitating neighborhood level and development specific improvement. Theoretically, institutional viability is of even greater importance in a mixed neighborhood than social relationships in a heterogeneous neighborhood setting.

According to Wilson (1987, 144):
the presence of stable working and middle-class families in the ghetto provides mainstream role models that reinforce mainstream values pertaining to employment, education and family structure. But, in the final analysis, a far more important effect is the institutional stability that these families are able to provide in their neighborhoods because of their greater economic and educational resources, especially during periods of economic downturn.

Policy makers anticipate that a chief means for improvements in redeveloped parcels is through improved institutions and in particular improved management. Policy makers anticipated replacing housing authorities with professional management companies would lead to improvements. Yet the literature takes us in opposite directions, noting the promise and peril of privatization.

Popkin et al. (2004) underscored the failure of public institutions to serve the public housing population. Examining the efforts of the Chicago Housing Authority to confront crime from the 1970s through the late 1990s, Popkin et al. found squandered resources, ineffectual law enforcement, and inept bureaucrats. Such work underscored the notion that public institutions and their attendant “street level bureaucrats” (Lipksy) were inadequate to the task of community improvement.

Thus, public housing provision took turn toward privatization and consequently isomorphism. Observers note the increasing market orientation of property management and a shift from public responsibility to privatization and an increasing independence with respect to public authorities (Priemus, Clapmham and Dieleman, 1999). By privatization I mean contracting with the private sector for the provision of public services (Donahue, 1989), in this case, mixed income housing. Professionalization often leads to homogenization or isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell (1987). Hupe and Meijs (2000) find that the management of housing organizations appears similar because operate in a context “where market is the main concept.” While researchers have produced no such studies in the context
of United States housing policy, there is good reason to assume such processes are occurring in HOPE VI as well. Indeed, in 1997 HUD published the guidebook, *Private Management of Public Housing: A Guidebook* (July 1997), which noted the trend of public housing agencies using private management and offered guidance on obtaining private management services. This places hopes for socioeconomic improvements into the invisible hands of the market.

As Hart (1984) noted, significant problems can accompany the assumption that all organizations, public and private are essentially similar and that administrative techniques can be unproblematically transferred from one sector to another. The use of private administrative techniques in public administration does a disservice to both enterprises.

Thus policy makers assumed that in mixed communities, low- resourced neighbors who share access to high quality institutions may benefit as much from spillover effects as they do from direct contact with high- resourced neighbors. Yet institutions operate within greater structural realities. The higher rents market rate residents can afford imply not only greater income but greater flexibility. Higher income residents have more choice in their housing options. Institutional response to resident demands may vary according further on the amount of leverage members can apply.

Two important structural factors handicap disadvantaged residents’ ability to demand institutional improvement. First is the absence of an exit option, and the second is “structural disparity.” As Hirschman theorizes, when members of an organization, such as residents of a housing development, perceive that the organization is reducing the quality or benefit to that member, members essentially have two possible responses. They can chose to exit (by withdrawing from the relationship); or, they can chose to voice (by attempt to improve the quality through communication of the complaint, grievance or proposal for change). First
then residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods lack exit options. Institutional failure is often framed ultimately as a failure of voice. In this view the police, public housing and schools fail because residents lack the interpersonal and political resources to campaign for institutional improvements. Disadvantaged individuals don’t know how to make demands of institutions and scholars have proffered “specific evidence of a cultural disconnect and of less efficacy when voice is exercised” (Briggs, 2007). However, as Hirschman (1970) theorizes, the benefit gained from institutions depends on individuals’ attachments to them. One of the most effective ways to get institutions to respond to demands is to threaten exit or to use an exit options as leverage. Thus, one must examine the nature of the organization with which disadvantaged individuals must interact. Many disadvantage residents can make few, if any, credible threats to exit; they are captive, giving institutions little incentive for improvement.

Second, mixed income neighborhoods introduce a case of entrapment. Residents without an exit option find themselves at a strategic disadvantage in negotiations both with the institution and relative to residents who can make a threat to exit. Institutions response then depends on the amount of leverage members can apply, with some members having greater leverage. Such a dynamic introduces a kind of “structural disparity.”

In contrast to contemporary planning practice, contemporary planning theory focused on the perils of privatization. From this standpoint, critics persistently inquired into who benefited from planning efforts (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Fainstein and others advocate for the “just city.” They caution that institutions may assume forms congruent with economic interests where the pursuit of profit becomes paramount. Consequently, their perspective envisions social reformers ever-present in the planning and implementation of a progressive urban agenda in an effort to counteract market forces and ensure “more equitable” outcomes.
(Fainstein, 2000). But their approach is not revolutionary: Fainstein suggests working within the existing social structure to reduce inequality. Krumholz (1999) identifies contemporary equitable economic development efforts. Looking at specific equity mechanisms – ones that succeeded and ones that failed – Krumholz demonstrates that progressive economic development is possible.

**Management and Mixed income developments**

Research of mixed income communities indeed suggests a structural disparity at play in these developments. As Joseph (2006) notes, “while certain improved community amenities may meet the needs of all residents, there may be important instances where the needs and priorities of low income resident differ from that of other residents. The unequal distribution of influence among residents may lead to community benefits that are not necessarily accessible or valuable to all residents” (Joseph, 2006, 11). This may in turn impact cross-class interaction.

Mixed income developments often employ different screening processes for the subsidized and market rate residents. For example, while in New Haven management initially conducted home visits for all applicants, it eliminated this practice for market rate applicants. Differential treatment extends to resident life as well. In Timberlawn Crescent, Maryland the manager reported that while he does not tell market rate applicants about the social structure of the development, he informs all the incoming subsidized tenants of the higher rents paid by some of their new neighbors. He believes that this emphasizes the “bargain” that the subsidized tenants have been fortunate enough to obtain and establishes the ground rules for subsidized tenants, putting them on notice that failure to pay rent or follow the development’s rules could result in the loss of a significant housing opportunity. At Harbor Point, subsidized...
residents felt that management did not treat all tenants equally, noting that some rules seem to be more enforced for some tenants rather than others (e.g. prohibiting pets). As one resident stated, “I believe in the rules, but I also believe that the rules must apply to all, not to a select few.” Moreover, some accused management of targeting low-income residents for suspicion of drugs in their possession. Respondents also believed that management provides better services to market rate residents than to subsidized residents (Johnson, 2002). Some African American and Hispanic respondents at Harbor Point reported that they have been harassed by security. And Johnson observed, African Americans felt singled out for identification checks and “interrogation of residents have become verbal and physical expressions of economic and racial divisions” (Johnson, 2002, 134).

Management’s response to the structural disparity inherent in mixed income communities may have important consequences for interaction. Thus far, mixed income housing scholarship has paid scant attention to this structural dynamic of mixed income housing and scholars have only speculated about how institutions impact social relations. A shift to private management usually accompanied the transformation of public housing projects into mixed income developments. Yet scholars have not considered how attentive these new institutions are to the wider goals set by HOPE VI.

Alternatively, Bratt (1996) finds non-profit housing providers to be very successful housing managers. Participants in the network of housing providers demonstrate flexibility and responsiveness to the changing demands of low-cost housing provision. Bratt concludes, “This creative and constructive infrastructure is one of our most versatile policy tools” (Bratt, 1996, 225). Moreover, community based housing providers they are committed to offering housing for the neediest households and have no explicit intention of reaping capital gains.
Community based housing providers are sometimes run like profit maximizing firms, however the ethos of progressive housing providers as well as formal structures mitigates against a push for profit: board governance is usually focused on more than minimizing costs and maximizing revenues. The same cannot be said for private market housing providers, who must balance social goals with the profit imperative. In fact, market based institutions can exacerbate inequality.

Social Control and Mixed Income Developments

The abstract notion of isomorphism manifests in the concrete daily operations in mixed income developments. While interaction among groups seems to vary across developments, reliance on rules is common to all developments. Conformity to the rules depends not just on residents obeying the rules but management commitment to rule making and enforcement. As noted above, management works not just to change behavior but to change the culture. Smith finds that in fact vigilant property management was more important for social control than residential action (2002). Brophy and Smith note, “Perhaps the biggest challenge is income integration in neighborhood settings where property management is not able to set behavioral norms (Brophy and Smith, 1997, 3). At one such project, researchers conclude that order is maintained because the “rules are clear and security is high.” These rules typically include a ban on illegal drugs and the consumption of alcohol in public spaces. Often residents must register overnight guests and management requires direct adult supervision of children in public areas. These rules ensure order, not sociability in the development, promoting peaceful enjoyment rather than community involvement. In some developments, the original residents and new management clashed over the stricter rules enforced in the new development. The use of rules has been a common tool for the
management of multifamily housing, yet little attention has been given to how the rule structure impacts the social structure.

Eventually, though, management in several cases seems to have succeeded in changing the norms. “Now seems to be an agreement over the fto evict those in rent arrears or whose behavior is outside the project’s norms or the project’s financial and social survival may be threatened” (Brophy and Smith, 1997). Yet such rules often represent a case of isomorphism.

Management and Interaction in Mixed Income Communities

As I have suggested in various places, local institutions appear to impact interaction. What do institutions do to encourage interaction in mixed income developments? Design innovations at some developments have not been successful. As noted above, the physical layout of Harbor Point in Boston, though unintentional, led to the spatial concentration of low income households. Moreover, Johnson found that architectural changes did not necessarily change resident’s perceptions of the resident population. When surveyed, 63% of the subsidized residents reported that the project still “seemed” like public housing. Twenty one percent of the non subsidized residents also felt that the development seemed like public housing. It seems that resident based their perception about the status of the development on their assessments of the residents, not just the architecture. As one resident stated, ”it still seems like the ‘Point’ because people from Columbia point still live here. Things they were trying to get rid of...like the drug dealers. To me it’s still the same old Columbia Point. The only things you really don’t see are...bodies floating in the water. That’s much different. Now we have 24 hour security. That’s made a big difference.” Johnson noted, “Physical redevelopment changed the face of Columbia, but the social dilemmas have not been resolved by several families” In a San Francisco HOPE VI project one police officer noted a
temporary reduction in crime. "But they've figured out where to hide again. They figured out where the cuts are through alcoves, garages and alleys and where the (security) cameras are." 5

Management can facilitate opportunities for equal status contact in mixed income developments. In many developments management schedules events which might foster a sense of community. Generally, attendance of community events is modest and composed largely of subsidized residents (Brophy and Smith, 1997). Only a few market-rate residents participated in Harbor Point's mentoring program. As Johnson reports, "Harbor Point residents seemed more interested in privacy and the project's amenities. Few knew about community groups such as the task force and were content to participate in the community by using the facilities, which included a gym and a tennis court. They reported more interest in keeping to themselves or maintaining relationships with those they already knew rather than building new long-term relationships within the development.

However, in certain developments, resident participation in community activities was relatively high. Lake Parc Place offered an on site volunteering program and about half of the low and moderate income residents participated on average about 8 hours a week. Management at Emory Bay in Oakland, California offers a monthly brunch which attracts about 100 participants from 260 units. Importantly, these two developments are some of the most homogeneous studied: all of the Lake Parc Place residents are African American and the great majority of the Emory Bay residents are professionals making higher than average incomes. However, this relatively high level of participation may suggest that the residential participation might differ by the kind of programming offered. Surely, within the

5 They don't call the project Outta Control anymore: Success of renewal using HOPE VI is evident all around. Ilene Lelchuk, Chronicle Staff Writer, Monday, March 28, 2005
development, participation varies by event. Many are skeptical of management’s community-building activities. As one local police officer at Harbor Point stated “To be honest, I think [that at] Harbor Point the current owners of management are not so much interested in mixing races and income. They want to get the highest market value for the property.” (134).

Community building events get pushed aside for seemingly more pressing demands: the main focus for many developments is on enforcing the rules in order to provide a desirable environment. The evidence suggests management plays a role in not only encouraging but discouraging interaction.

**Ruling out community? Remaining Questions**

Research to date suggests that mixed income housing offers residents a safe environment with little interaction. It may be that the developments are working at cross purposes, dooming these “housing communities” to be the proverbial mosaic of little social worlds across which people exchange little and even regard each other with suspicion, resentment, or worse. As Popkin observes, “while it is clearly feasible to create a healthy mixed-income development that will attract higher income residents and provide a pleasant and safe community for all residents, it remains less clear what conditions are required to ensure that living in these communities will have substantial payoffs for the social and economic status of low-income families over the long term” (Popkin, 2004, 23). Little had been documented about how residents from mixed income developments experience their communities or “how families have fared as public housing has been transformed” (2004, 391).

I do not know of any in-depth ethnographic work focused on mixed income housing communities. So far, researchers have used either survey research or formal, key informant
interviews to study mixed income housing developments (Kleit, 2006, Brophy and Smith, 1997). Ethnographic accounts of low income public housing communities abound (cf. Venkatesh, 2001, Suttles, 1967). These add direct observation of social phenomena and the unique power of informal or "naturalistic" interviewing. However, there are no sustained effort to know and understand the routines, norms and viewpoints of residents living in a mixed income community through ethnography. Making that effort was my aim.

**HOPE VI Implementation**

Despite a general commitment to redeveloping projects that reduce social isolation and increase resident safety, HOPE VI has not been "one program" with a clear set of consistent and abiding goals rather local housing authorities have had tremendous latitude in how they chose to design and implement their local HOPE VI initiatives. Moreover, HOPE VI implementation has encountered significant challenges. Some HOPE VI projects have been stalled by ineffective implementation on the part of the housing authority or conflict with city government. In others, developments were simply rehabilitated or rebuilt in the same distressed communities, with little attention paid to innovative design, effective services, or neighborhood revitalization (Brophy and Smith, 1998). Implementation challenges include relocation challenges, differences among developments regarding disclosure to the market rate residents about the structure of the development, debates about targeting populations and the objectives of public housing and macro-level limits to the strategy. As Zhang (2004) found, policy makers made many changes to HOPE VI policy in response to these challenges.

**Replacement and relocation challenges**

While there is sometimes residents involvement in the HOPE VI application process, once a development is slated for HOPE VI funding, relocation itself is involuntary.
Moreover, the call for a greater mix of incomes often meant the reducing the density of lower income households in the redeveloped parcel. This usually led to a net loss of low income units. While earlier redevelopment policies had called for a one-for-one replacement of low income units, during the HOPE VI era, policy makers gradually repealed the one-for-one replacement rule. Consequently, redeveloped housing often had fewer units available to low income households. Using housing vouchers, or “vouchering out” became the solution for some former residents who either had no option to return or decided, after moving, to keep moving on. Moreover, residents needed some place to live during the redevelopment process. While some authorities, such as Boston were careful to minimize displacement by redeveloping the projects in phases and carefully tracking displaced residents, other authorities paid less attention to resident relocation issues. For many displaced residents, a temporary relocation often became a permanent one. Some residents adjusted to life in their new neighborhoods and chose not to return. In other cases, housing authorities failed to keep track of residents and had no way of notifying them when the redeveloped buildings readied for occupancy (Popkin, 2004).

**Disclosure and marketing**

There are many approaches to the marketing of the mixed income aspect of the developments some of which are HOPE VI developments. At the mixed income Chicago development, Lake Parc Place, one of the chief roles of management was to “explain the goals and demands of mixed-income housing to residents, visitors and the media” (Rosenbaum, 1998, 716). Yet, at New Haven’s Ninth Square, management did not emphasize the mix of incomes in its marketing materials, thus market rate residents were not fully aware of the subsidized units. In some projects residents were aware of the mix, in others they were not. The literature seems
ambivalent about disclosure. Some view market rate ignorance about the mix as positive, assuming of market rate neighbors knew their neighbors were poor might scare them away. Other authors seem to suggest that without knowledge of residents economic status, low income residents won’t know who to emulate and higher income tenants won’t know who to instruct (Brophy and Smith). Thus in the implementation of mixed income developments it is unclear whether knowledge about a neighbor’s economic status detracts prospective market rate residents and conversely whether knowledge of the mix necessary for promoting interaction or guiding role modeling.

**Targeting and mixed objectives**

Finally, as noted earlier, the question of whether or how to serve the most troubled residents is a matter of debate. Some argue that scarce resources should be targeted to those willing and able to comply with rules and regulations, and others insisting that federal assistance must prioritize the neediest households including those most in need (Vale, 1998, Popkin, 2004). While policy labels the tenant selection process as targeting, the outcome can sometimes be “creaming”: without careful attention, housing authorities intentionally place only the most successful households into the improved housing environment, excluding those that might benefit the most. For others, such housing must, at a minimum, give poor children an opportunity to live close to working families with incomes above the poverty level. Housing that serves primarily the elderly or serves households without children does not fall within such definitions of mixed-income housing (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh, 1997).

Wyly and Hammel (1999), among others suggest that HOPE VI is simply a gentrification strategy, designed to improve neighborhoods without improving the lives of long-time neighbors. Issues of displacement and creaming concern many observers of the
HOPE VI program. Unfortunately, there is also considerable evidence that the original residents of HOPE VI projects have not always benefited from redevelopment, even in some sites that were otherwise successful (Popkin, 2004, 2). Such research suggests that the neediest residents aren’t necessarily served but simply relocated. These concerns recall debates over urban renewal, which some thought should have been called “negro removal.” And the debate is not so different from the one between Emil Sax and Frederick Engels at the end of the nineteenth century. Sax took the position that pestilent neighborhoods and lousy housing were a reflection of resident’s moral failings, not economic injustice and the poorly housed were in need of self help programs. Railing against this “bourgeois socialist” position, Engels argued that Sax’s self help schemes would remain but isolated experiments. He argued such schemes would do little to change the fundamental economic structure but rather ensured that these infamous that the hovels weren’t abolished: but “merely shifted elsewhere” (Engels, (1935)1872).

Moreover, differences abound in interpretation of what kind of population constitutes a “mixed income” community and what kind of mix might produce ideal outcomes. Developments vary from ones with primarily the working poor (Lake Parc Place) to ones where only a fifth of the residents make less than the area median income. Virtually all of the development’s tenants are employed and all residents have access to a health club with a year-round heated pool and spa (Brophy and Smith, 1997).

Additionally, displacement may lead to some self selection on the part of returning residents. A study of relocation preferences in Seattle’s High Point development revealed that older residents and immigrant families chose to return to public housing while younger, single mothers often choose vouchers (Kleit and Manzo 2006). Even if some these households are
choosing to relocate, rather than being denied return to a redeveloped housing community, the relocation patterns suggest a bias. If single mothers in fact systematically chose not to return to HOPE VI sites, they will not benefit from the anticipated improvements to the developments (Kleit, 2005).

**Limits to the Strategy**

Others argue that interventions such as HOPE VI cannot change macro structural forces. As Levy (1998) notes, the gap between rich and poor in the United States has grown significantly since the 1960s. Urban America’s poorest residents are relatively worse off than their mid century counterparts in terms of income and job prospects. As Rosenbaum notes, “The changes at Lake Park Place however, do not alter the economic picture of Chicago or the job market for low-skilled or unskilled workers. . . They do not pour money into the public schools. They do not change patterns of racial segregation . . . nor do they alter employers’ hiring practices.... the preponderance of structural factors. . . these innovations may not be enough to stem the poverty, joblessness, poor education, violence, and vandalism that characterize public housing in Chicago and the nation” (Rosenbaum, et al 1998, p712).

Gorham and Wright (2000) argue that housing should be only a component of a comprehensive welfare policy that includes the creation of living wage jobs, adequate benefits for those who cannot work, and access to affordable health care. Moreover, the question remains as to whether mixed income communities truly confront inequality at the residential level. The literature suggests something further: in some cases mixed income housing can reproduce macro structural forces.

**Method**

Graves
This section describes in detail my methods for discovering and testing the data.

Understanding the mechanics of cross-class social interaction in a mixed income development required a specific methodological approach, which I will describe below. Like any quality social science research design, the ethnographic case study must meet standards of validity and reliability. Given the diversity, social and physical structure of Maverick Landing, I used both ethnographic and semi-structured interviewing methods. I made these method choices for several reasons. I attempted to confront issues of validity by using multiple sources of evidence, creating a case study database and maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin, 1994)

Data Collection

I lived at Maverick for fourteen months, from June 2005 to August, 2006. Maverick Landing began its “lease up” (leasing units to market rate residents) of Phases I and II, in January 2005. The next Phases, Phases III and IV, would not be completed until the winter and spring of 2006, respectively. The redevelopment agency employed this “phased redevelopment” strategy in order to minimize displacement. Phased development enabled some residents (determined by lottery) to move directly from their apartments in old Maverick to units in the New Maverick across the street. Consequently, construction was incomplete during my stay at Maverick and not all the former residents had returned. This phased redevelopment compromised some aspects of my study, especially because phasing broke certain friendship networks within the development. However, phased redevelopment did not impact the development of new relationships between subsidized residents and new market rate residents, the focus of my dissertation. Thus, I concluded it was more useful to observe the community from the beginning of redevelopment, rather than wait for building to be completed. Perhaps the ideal arrangement would have been to live at the development until
Phases III and IV were integrated back into the community, but time and money did not allow for this.

Like previous ethnographies, I sought to capture certain aspects of life at Maverick Landing through participant observation. Like Gans (1962), Merry (1981), Anderson (1990) and Small (2002), I lived in the community. My residency allowed me access to residential life in a variety of ways, creating a variety of data sources. I observed encounters and events and had many spontaneous conversations. These conversations often took the form of informal interviewing and two advantages, trust and legitimacy. First, these conversations took place within an existing relationship, after I had known residents for some time. Through these repeated encounters I was able to build trust. Residents shared with me their experiences, interpretations and observations of events. I was fortunate to have variety among the few good friends at Maverick. In the appendix I have included short descriptions of most of the residents quoted in this dissertation.

Second, because these encounters took place in and around the development, it became clear to my fellow residents that I shared many residential experiences with them. By living as a member of the community, I increased my legitimacy.

Because of my residency I was also able to learn about and attend all of the meetings convened by both the management company, Roseville and the tenants’ organization, Maverick Tenants organization. I was also a member of the Tenants in Action committee, a voluntary group of residents interested in maintaining order and safety at Maverick.

My second research method then, was semi-structured interviews. I relied on this method for three reasons. The first is that I needed reach the non English speaking population, especially the Asian and Latino residents, who formed large minority groups in
the development. Because I am conversant in neither Spanish nor any Asian languages, I could not rely on traditional ethnographic field methods to help me reach the non English speaking residents. Two colleagues helped with interviewing these residents. Secondly, I used semi-structured interviews because I wanted to get a large sample that covers the major residential groups. Thirdly, semi-structured interviews gave me entrée into people’s lives. Few residents use the common areas or come to meetings. An interview was often the first substantial encounter with these residents and afterwards, the interview participants, once strangers became my casual friends. This included non-native English speakers. Fourth, I included some of Sampson’s questions about collective efficacy on the questionnaire, as well as additional questions probing for resident’s relationships in the development. The interview protocol for both subsidized and market rate residents can be found in Appendix A and B. Of course, the interview need not be semi-structured but I chose this structure for reasons identified above. In total, through observation and experience I probed how this new social physical and institutional environment impacted social relations among residents. In the body of the dissertation, when referring to residents by name, the last name initial refers to residential class, “S” for subsidized and “M” for market rate.

I recruited participants in several ways, which may be termed a “random snowball approach.” First, I tried to speak with people I encountered regularly at the development. Next I attempted to work through their networks. As I noted before, these residential networks tend to be small and tight and for the market rate residents, nonexistent. Several neighbors regarded me as their strongest tie (perhaps they are just being nice). Also, I attended meetings and I met people through these but the meetings were infrequent, and attendance was sparse. Additionally, I participated in the Maverick Tenants Organization.
This group is again another cluster, larger but still quite contained. The all female, all English speaking but not all white members of this organization have lived at Maverick for decades, sometimes their entire lives. The leaders of the organization have more connections and advocated for many residents during the transition.

Snowball and network sampling too had advantages and limitations and consequently I amended this approach. The first obvious advantage of snowball sampling was access. Residents knew many people in the community whereas I knew few, thus they could expand my universe of participants immensely. Also, an introduction by a fellow resident increased the perception of my legitimacy. When one resident introduced me to another, it signaled that the residents accepted my and implied that I was trustworthy.

The risk of bias using the snowball or network method is not inconsequential and in this case necessitated modification. Most obviously, relying on residents for referrals ran the risk that I would only be sampling from a cluster of residents who all knew one another. Ultimately, my data would reflect only a subset of the residents. Consequently, I used a “random/snowball” approach which sought to minimize bias by using a multi-mode recruitment strategy. I met interview participants in the hallways and at meetings. After interviewing this initial contact, I asked if he or she knew anyone else with whom I could speak. Thus, my interview participants originated from many nodes, not just one. The market rate residents were usually isolated nodes. The market rate residents knew very few people in the development and almost uniformly could not refer me to another potential participant. I recruited the market rate residents by consulting a list of available apartments that the leasing agent had given me when I was selecting my apartment.

Timeline

Graves
I lived at Maverick as a participant observer for fourteen months. Continually, I made many attempts to involve myself more deeply in community life. This was not easy. The strict rules enforced by management, low community participation in community-wide events, a lack of shared community facilities, deep social divides between English speakers and non-English speakers, near complete isolation of the market rate households and a disorganized tenant’s organization all crippled social life in the development. In the end, I interviewed 49 households: 11 market rate and 38 subsidized. The mixed race nature of both the subsidized residents and the market rate residents made race-based analysis difficult. Thus, while seeking to interview a balance of white, black, Asian and Latino residents, class, not race is the focus of my analysis.

Data Analysis

Ethnography, I have been arguing, is an appropriate tool to uncover some of the mechanisms of cross class interaction, because the task requires amassing multiple sources of evidence, detailed above for the reasons outlined below.

First, informal or ethnographic interviewing complements observation. Through observation, I could note events and the pattern among them. However, through informal interviewing I could “member check” my interpretations of events (Somekh and Lewin, 2005). With these more intimate relationships, I was able to check my observations and impressions of community meetings and spaces. Much of my field data triangulating my arguments come from these encounters. Thus, participants could validate or invalidate my observations (Somekh and Lewin, 2005).

Second these modes of data collection compensate for each other’s limitations. Formal interviewing, observation and use of records all become essential pieces to the
interaction puzzle. Together they give me a more robust, valid basis for making inferences as well as aid theory building by generating new, testable hypotheses (Richards, 2005).

Case Study Database

Utilizing multiple sources of evidence requires organization and documentation. To aid this, I created a "case study database" (Yin, 1994). I used this database to compose the chapters that follow. This database includes the 47 audio recordings of interviews, 47 transcripts of interviews and 2 annotated interviews (one participant did not consent to audio recording, in the other case the audio recording failed, 262 field note entries,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maverick Case Study Database Contents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audio recordings</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcripts</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated interviews</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field notes</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community meeting minutes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety committee meeting minutes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management flyers and communications</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident profiles</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News articles and other media</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVIVO database</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I entered transcripts, meeting minutes and annotated interviews into a qualitative software analysis database (NVIVO). I then coded twice. The first coding procedure yielded over 200 codes. During this first coding process I generated a number of memos which proposed relationships between the data or emerging themes. During the second coding, I reviewed the
data against the memos and checked for consistency, theoretical relevance as well as counter instances (Richards, 2005). In the end, only the strong survived: I eliminated many codes and reorganize relevant ones hierarchically. Ultimately, I used 7 codes with sub-codes beneath each. The seven codes correspond to each chapter.

**Chain of Evidence**

My methods also allow the reader to follow the derivation of evidence from the initial research questions to the conclusions and vice versa (Yin, 1994). I do this by citing relevant sources of evidence—citing specific documents, interviews or observations. Second, my database includes all the data—original recordings, transcripts etc. In aggregate, my chain of evidence allowed me to move from one data source to another.
Chapter 3 : Out of the Gemeinschaft: How a Community Transitions

Introduction: The Urban Village and its Discontents

Increasingly, it seems the residents of urban America have only limited interaction with neighbors. The urban village model, or Gemeinschaft, one which characterized communities as filled with dense social networks, as Sampson (2004) suggests, is an outmoded one. Characterizations of the social dynamics in poor urban neighborhoods have spanned a spectrum from the utopian “urban village” to the dystopian “urban jungle.” Today neighbors in non-poor neighborhoods do not know one another well and rarely rely on each other. Contemporary urban communities today have become “lost” – their social relations are replaced by weaker neighborhood ties and despatialized strong ties (Wellman, 1979). Yet how does a community become “lost?” Scholars have proposed a variety of mechanisms, among them culture, disruptive events such as slum clearance, technology and politics. My experiences with residents of a redeveloped public housing development suggest yet another mechanism for this transformation. In this case, a private organization organized a shift. The former public housing residents described below experienced a cultural transition, from an urban village environment, with distress and insecurity but also a kind of “Gemeinschaft” in its social relations, to a more impersonal urban association.

Below I will demonstrate the ways in which the community Maverick Gardens typified an urban village and how it transformed into the current Maverick Landing, a more impersonal urban “association” of people living in administratively unified place. Moreover, I will point out the mechanism governing the transition. I argue this mechanism was non ecological: it was neither gradual nor involved a significant shift in the population. Through
participant observation and interviews, the mechanics of transition emerged. It was organized, instituted by a formal authority. Importantly, I believe, this mechanism deserves attention because when the mechanism is an institution, this suggests an opportunity for intervention. The Maverick case suggests private organizations have something to contribute to social connectivity—and to isolation as well.

What is Gemeinschaft?

The urban village, perhaps first introduced in Tönnies idyllic notion of “Gemeinschaft”, is typified by a distinctive way of life, strong identification with the local community, emotionalism and traditionalism. Gemeinschaft, contrasts with “Gesellschaft” like relations, associations among neighbors which are rational, individualistic and emotionally disengaged (Lyon, 1987). As Sampson (2004) argues, residents’ interpersonal ties in contemporary neighborhoods are at best weak and neighbors must rely on more remote methods of social control. The urban community has become an urban association, relying on more impersonal means to achieve order and collective aims.

While certainly some contemporary urban dwellers do live in urban villages, especially in ethnic enclaves – such communities are treated as highly exceptional or highly problematic. Wilson (1987) argues that while poor neighborhoods are highly interconnected internally, these connections fail to lead to greater social control. Put differently, there is social organization of a kind but not the basis for effective social control. The reality of the urban village, especially contemporary communities in poverty, suggested a social structure much more complex in nature than the urban village model assumes. Stack (1974) observed how neighbors who shared intense, kin-like bonds struggled to accumulate resources. As Sampson noted, communities with dense ties “social networks can and often are put to use for
illegal purposes.” Venkatesh (2002) documented how when mainstream institutions abandoned residents of a public housing project, highly networked members of the drug economy filled the void. Rainwater (1970) showed how residents of public housing complexes lead “bounded” lives. While fear of crime led them to limit their routes and routines, some relationships flourished. Thus, even densely tied cohesive neighborhoods can be problematic ones. In some of urban America’s most troubled urban communities, public housing complexes, public institutions have proven ineffective in untangling the destructive dense ties (Popkin, 2000).

Thus, save for a few functioning enclaves, it seems residents of contemporary neighborhoods share few functional bonds. What are these “new urban realities” that gnaw at local networks? A number of mechanisms are thought to prevent or circumvent the development of the intense and functional local ties. In poor neighborhoods, contemporary structural forces such as the concentration of poverty, single parent families, and the racial segregation of minority groups have led to the breakdown of community (Wilson, 1987, Sampson, 2004). In more mainstream neighborhoods, increased residential mobility leads residents to rely on shared beliefs rather than private ties (Sampson, 2004). Gans (1962) demonstrated that community change through a population shift and therefore be ecological. In studying how the West End of Boston was razed and the population dispersed, he demonstrated that whole-scale destruction of community destroyed dense local ties. Putnam (1995) showed instead how the transformation can be a result of a cultural shift. As cultural practices change over time people lose some of their community connectivity. From the mid to late 20th century, people have lessened their organizational participation and lost their local social connections. More often than not, they are “bowling alone” rather than with teams or
neighbors and losing the sense of interdependence group participation engenders. Wellman (1979) demonstrated how the transformation can be a-ecological; people’s sense of community is no longer confined to geographic place. Through a structural shift, changes in technology and the workplace, for example, people’s social relations are structured embedded in non local social networks rather than locality. Thus local community is “liberated” and no longer located in place. Thus communities become in Wellman’s words “lost” because of population shifts or changes in culture, in the social structure, in technology.

But what if community remains in place, little time passes, and the structure of their lives remains relatively constant? Transformation can occur when residents remain but their way of life changes. Below I will try to demonstrate that change need not be ecological, cultural or structural, it can also be institutional, initiated through an organizational shift. Popkin (2004) found that public institutional incompetence --“bad management” -- failed to change behavior. Yet in the case described below, a formal private authority succeeded in instituting the change. I hesitate to label this management as “good” but they were effective in enforcing their regime. But with such a change comes loss, of ties, of support and of rituals. Such actions explain how a community the some ways becomes "lost.”

My interview transcripts and a review of historical materials suggest that the former Maverick Gardens in the years just prior to redevelopment had a distinctive but not necessarily in sociological terms positive way of life and one that shared much in common with the notion of an urban village. While the urban village concept could be more clearly defined, scholars to seem to consensus that 1) dense social ties, 2) distinct rituals and routines, 3) intense group solidarity and 4) informal social control mechanisms characterize urban village communities (Lyon, 1987). Below I will suggest how residents’ memories of the.
former Maverick suggest these characteristics. Memory makes for tricky empirics, however, residents’ positive and negative recollections suggest balanced accounts. I will also suggest that the density of the social ties coupled with economic desperation undermined the community. Moreover, as Brint (2001) noted, and Stack (1974), Venkatesh, Pattillo-McCoy (2000) and others demonstrated, these relations are also “rife with interest, power and division” (Brint, 2001). The negative aspects of community were apparent in residents’ accounts of the former Maverick, especially in regard to solidarity and race relations.

Before I present the data further, I would like to make a conceptual note. Following my semi-structured interview guide, I asked each resident participating in the interview if he or she had any “friends” in the development. Often, the participant would respond “no” and deny having any “friends” from Maverick. However, over the course of the interview, and detailed in the sections below, it became obvious participants shared many intense ties with neighbors. Over the course of many interviews and in casual conversation with participants it became clear to me why the participants avoided the label “friend.”

For residents at Maverick, the term “friend” suggested a relationship with wide-ranging ramifications. Similar to what Stack (1974) found among “kin” in an impoverished neighborhood, labeling an associate a “friend” entailed a significant commitment. Taking on a friend meant taking on an obligation to meet the person’s social and material needs. But additionally at Maverick, taking on a person as a “friend” meant taking on her enemies. The notion of a friend implied a relationship analogous to a social next of kin. That is, “friends” at Maverick inherited one another’s disputes, debts and vendettas. Residents believed, for example, that if a third party appeared looking for a neighbor but was unable to find the neighbor, then the third party would ask for the neighbors’ “friends.” The third party might
try to collect on a debt from the “friend” or simply as the friend to rely a “message.” Either way, the friend would then be drawn in to the neighbor’s relationship with the third party. I am labeling this intense involvement in people’s complicated lives “enmeshment.” Consequently, residents denied having “friends” in order to avoid enmeshment and trouble by association. Thus, when Popkin et. al. (2002) found that fewer than half of the residents living in developments slated for HOPE VI redevelopment, it is possible it was the kinds of enmeshed relationships described above that residents were attempting to disavow. But if by “friend” we mean an associate from whom we draw emotional, social and sometimes material support, then at Maverick most residents had “friends,” even if they were reticent to label them as such.

**Maverick Gardens: Old Ways of Life in a Public Housing Project**

The first feature of the urban village model, the density of social ties among neighbors, is one of the most striking aspects of the old Maverick in the years immediately preceding redevelopment. The frequency of material, social and emotional support residents provided one another suggest how the development typified an urban village. Familiarity also affected the social structure, leading residents to treat some neighbors as family and shun others. Yet the intensity of the bonds and the ease with which interpersonal information flowed through networks became costly for residents, as violence and mistrust also resulted from their way of life.

**Deep interpersonal connections at the former Maverick**

Residents maintained their ties through extensive social and material exchange. Repeatedly, residents told of the care giving relationships they engaged in that fulfilled their
emotional and physical needs. One resident recalled the care she received from her neighbors after an operation.

*I had a gallbladder taken out and they were like, “you don’t need a babysitter, your mother don’t have to take time off of work, we’ve got it handled.’ They made out a schedule and they took care of everything. They even cleaned my house.*

Nearly every resident remembered receiving some form of significant help from a neighbor. Young adults talked of being looked after or fed by fellow residents. Able bodied residents recounted running errands for handicapped neighbors, such as delivering their bills or going grocery shopping. Infirm residents recalled neighbors expressing concern for both their physical and emotional well being. Residents sought each other out as they struggled to remain sober and supported one another through grief.

Residents also maintained ties and supported each other in their attempts to meet each others’ material needs. Money being scarce, residents rarely purchased new items for neighbors. Rather, neighbors left cans outside the door for resident can collectors. Those fortunate enough to purchase new furniture tried to hand over the used items to neighbors. Many recalled sharing food and often they relied on each other for the proverbial cup of sugar or a ride.

*If we needed stuff, we’d go to our friends like can you help me with this, or, It was just... we sort of wanted like milk or some, hey, don’t feel like runnin’ to the store.*

Residents reported bringing left-overs to their neighbors or making contributions to collective courtyard cookouts. Residents shared clothes as well. Female residents remembered giving maternity clothes to pregnant neighbors (though others recalled enduring entire pregnancies making do with their existing wardrobes). However, the most significant exchange of goods occurred during the redevelopment. While the old Maverick Garden
apartments had washer dryer hook ups the many of the units in the new development would not. Despite the many years residents had spent years paying rent-to-own companies for the appliances, residents gave theirs away to neighbors who could use them.

In addition to care giving and material reliance, many residents secured their ties with one another through active social lives with their neighbors. Residents enjoyed visiting at coffee klatches, “grilling out”, playing basketball, watching television (especially Red Sox games and wrestling) together, running errands to the store or to church and even camping together. In evident in these recollections were the close ties many adults formed within the development.

True to emotionalism, which privileges empathy over calculated exchange, residents rarely expected reciprocity. Residents reported feeling compelled to give either by an obligation to community, a personal commitment to neighborliness a belief that their good will would be rewarded at some point in their uncertain futures, or that earthly behavior had a heavenly reward. However, for others these exchanges became a drain such as one woman who noted, “But the neighbors that I had, they just used and used and borrowed and borrowed, and... but I tried to help my neighbors out.” Thus a sense of obligation remained even when these obligations became exhausting.

The intensity with which residents of urban villages relied on each other could have other decidedly negative aspects: Bonding rituals could be violent. Project youth often challenged young newcomers to initiation fights. One resident recalled such a contest noting that he reluctantly accepted a challenge for a fight because he recognized that it was part of his introduction into Maverick Gardens. The tradition also crossed the gender barrier. A
young Latino woman described to me some of the fights she and her friends had witnessed in the development, including one involving her sister.

Yeah, there was problems... there was drama when you brought it... my sister had to fight her best friend for a couple of rounds to be down.

Project residents engaged in these fights not for sport or to resolve an immediate dispute but to establish order in the development.

Whether forged through violence or not, the intensity residents’ ties with one another affected social structure of the development, enabling residents to make familial-like alliances and make judgments about their neighbors character and trustworthiness. For example, the residents sometimes felt such intense bonds toward one another that, similar to the creation of fictive kin in the community Stack (1974) described, residents reported making neighbors honorary family members. Usually, extra familial residents achieved familial status by participating in child rearing. One young woman recalled a relationship with her “grandma.” Residents also considered one another family if the relationships were long standing and especially if they were established during formative years. Renee S. recalled of her sons, who became teenagers at the new Maverick, “They grew up together all their lives, so it’s like, they consider themselves family, that’s... that’s how it was at old Maverick.

Members’ familiarity with one another is also evident in their knowledge of one and other’s character and the notoriety some of them achieved. Some long-term residents obtained reputations as reliable community members but dangerous residents had the most salient reputations. Such reputations allowed residents to navigate around their more threatening neighbors. Residents often attributed their knowledge of who to avoid as a contributing to their relative feelings of safety. Consequently, familiarity sometimes led to a lack of trust.
Residents also indicated a wariness to extend friendship too broadly within the
development because residents were so interconnected. Gossip pervaded the development and
residents’ frequent references to the casual information networks also indicate the extent of
resident’s ties to one another. Many saw intimate conversations among groups as destructive
and sought to distance themselves from them.

But I’m not like, the gossip type. they’d get in the houses and start gossiping
about “oh, I’d seen her last night with this guy” or “what do I care if someone
went to bed with someone else? That’s none of my business [laughs] good luck
to them.

Some avoided intense interpersonal relations to create personal space in the fairly high
density development. Quite often, residents mistrusted one another to be discreet with
sensitive information.

The intensity of interpersonal networks was also a source of fear. Gossip, residents
found, could be dangerous since not all information that moved through interpersonal
networks was positive. Residents both young and old reported a fear of retaliation from their
trouble-making neighbors. One young resident taught me the phrase, “Snitches get stitches.”
Fear of retaliation stopped residents from discussing questionable behavior with their
neighbors but importantly, they avoided informing authorities about it as well.

In many ways then, life at the former Maverick Gardens seemingly conformed to the
urban village ideal, providing many residents with physical, social and material support. Most
reported offering help without an expectation of repayment. Neighbors’ demands for
assistance exhausted some but on the whole, goods and services flowed frequently along the
well worn paths that connected residents physically and socially to one another.

The residents of Maverick Gardens knew one another other well, many of them would
say too well. If the Maverick case is any demonstration, while one might believe that tightly
knit communities are necessarily places where residents trust one another, the Maverick residents who relied on each other so extensively only rarely trusted one another. Repeatedly, when asked whether their former neighbors could be trusted, residents’ responses indicated that they extended trust to their neighbors on a case-by-case basis. In that highly networked environment, it was impossible for an individual to control the flow of information and thus residents took care when sharing information.

Ritual and routine at the former Maverick

The second way life at Maverick operated in an urban village fashion was in its ritual occasions. Residents recalled many of these. Residents recalled “grilling out” as one of the most beloved practices in the former Maverick Gardens. Because none of the apartments had individual yards, residents grilled and recreated in the common spaces, especially the central courtyard. Sometimes the grill outs were collective affairs, with each resident contributing what food or equipment he or she could. Other residents recall pulling beach chairs outside and “simply talking.” In the courtyard and other public spaces, people dressed in a manner that might have been inappropriate outside the development,

Well they used to walk around with hardly nothin’ on. I mean, I mean women, like adults. Like they’d walk around in like skimpy clothes.

Residents even felt that they had a particular way of walking, “not afraid, big and bold.” The Maverick residents, then in some ways experienced an easy going, public rituals.

Kids and teens enjoyed a variety of activities, especially in summertime. The onsite community center provided them with activities as well as summertime breakfast, lunch and snack service. One resident offered swimming lessons every summer in the harbor and tried to make them open to all children, “all I wanted was permission from their mothers, that was
it.” He required no fees or liability waivers. For teens, certain houses were reliable hang-outs.

But teens also frequented the community center.

*Like all the kids that used to be in yo...everybody’s like, “yo, let’s hit the center.”...it was mad fun to be in there. And knowin that, you know what I’m saying, that you had somewhere to go after school.*

Teens recalled hanging out in the courtyard, even in the winter where they warmed themselves on the ventilation grates. However, many adults noted the prevalence of wayward teens. “*the teenagers, they got troubled.*” Teens enjoyed many of the freedoms and rituals that life at Maverick provided, though this often came without much formal structure.

**Informal social control at the former Maverick**

The third feature of urban villages evident at Maverick was residents’ attachment to the collective. At Maverick, many recalled their attachments to and involvements with the Maverick Gardens development itself. Most often this involved controlling crime and keeping public spaces clean. Yet attachment was also apparent in residents’ hostilities to newcomers, especially those from other ethnic groups.

Residents’ attachment to the Maverick community was especially pronounced in the extent to which residents worked against entropic forces attempting to keep their apartments and the development in general safe and clean. Almost all residents recalled disorder in the old Maverick, where both trash and trouble makers accumulated in the public spaces, both indoors and out. One resident remembered frequently “*going out at night and seeing strange faces in the hallway.*” However, residents took active roles in security. As one man explained to me, “*security was on your own.*” Many residents described their personal efforts to ensure security of at Maverick Gardens. One woman recalled her husband’s largely successful attempt to run drug users out of his hallway.
There was drug dealer which we had a 65 Grady Court on the third floor. [My husband] went up there and made his own vigilante to get them ... He went out with an axe handle ... And some of those people who he shooed out of the hallway with a baseball bat to this day, they say hello to them. Honest to god [laughs], they still say hello to him.

Yet, residents’ concern about their neighbors’ safety extended beyond a concern about crime. Residents also engaged in collective monitoring, making sure everyone was safe. For example, one resident recalled how residents sough to account for everyone, especially children, during fire alarms.

Further indication of residents’ attachment was their efforts to control the maintenance of the common spaces. Several residents recalled painting the building hallways themselves. They took pride in their work and expected their neighbors and their children to respect their efforts.

...then whoever wrote on the wall, we’d find out, and especially the kids in the building, if they wrote on the wall, out there washin’ the wall now. Frank My remembers cleanin’ the walls a couple a times.

Residents also collaborated on the more daily maintenance of the hallways and building exteriors, following a hallway cleaning schedule that rotated every three months. People also talked of cleaning up trash outside the buildings. At one point, residents commandeered the courtyard.

We used to lock the court up at 11 o’clock, we didn’t want every body out there... we kind of took control of the basketball court a little bit. We took control of the neighborhood a little bit too. Not took control but kind of told the kids, “This is how it’s going to be.”

Residents received no formal recognition from management but rather took action because of their positive regard for Maverick as one resident explained, “Well, [management] didn’t know that I did all those things I guess. But, but I did them, because I cared about the place.
Another indication of the importance of the Maverick identity to residents was how jealously they guarded it and this led to inter-ethnic conflict. While blacks, having lived in Maverick since the 1970s were relatively integrated, more newly arrived Asians and Latinos were not. Residents, protective of their group and way of life, reacted with hostility to their arrival. Management often failed to prevent the residents from expressing their hostility. Black Maverick residents recounted whites in the 1970s and 1980s harassing black children and breaking the windows in black occupied units. However, as new ethnic groups moved and filled the bottom of the status hierarchy, tensions between blacks and whites reduced, replaced with new tensions with the Latino and Asian populations.

Perhaps because Latinos (whom most everyone, including many Latinos themselves referred to as the “Spanish”) eventually became the numerical majority in the development, I rarely heard stories of open hostilities directed towards Latino households. Instead, Latinos were more often the targets of passive resistance, as both whites and blacks reported that the “Spanish are taking over.” These residents refused to shop in Latino owned stores or eat in Latino run restaurants; frequently pointing out that “the Spanish” monopolized the nearby park for soccer games. Residents also complained that they found the Latinos to be loud. Residents may have been more passive because they believed that Latinos were willing and able to wield considerable physical force. One neighbor told me that if a resident harmed one Latino person, then the whole group would retaliate.

The presence of the machete wielding Hispanic Street gang Mara Salvatrucha 13 (the “MS-13s”) in East Boston added to the Latinos forceful reputation, despite the fact that no known members lived in Maverick Gardens. The MS 13s are a Salvadorian gang, and very few Latinos at Maverick came from El Salvador. In fact, the Spanish-speaking residents at
Maverick came from, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Columbia, and the United States. While non-Latinos perceived the Spanish speaking population as a singular, highly networked and homogenous group, language was often the only common denominator among Latinos at Maverick Gardens.

Asians, however, enjoyed no such safe-guarding reputational effects. Unlike the Latinos, residents did not lump Asians under one moniker, referring to them (though usually not accurately) as “Vietnamese” “Chinese” and sometimes “Asian.” Asians remained the minority both in the development and the neighborhood. Additionally, non-Asian residents (white, black and Latino alike) claimed that they tolerated the Asians because they were quiet. As one Latino resident explained, “but the Chinese people, they don’t bother nobody. That’s why, you know, I don’t mind them. ...there was never no complaining, they stayed quiet cause they stayed to themselves.”

While many non-Latinos believed that the Latinos deserved their disdain for their boisterousness, the non-Asians felt the Asians should be praised for their silence. Though residents seemed to believe that timidity was some natural feature of Asian people, it is more likely that silence among Asians resulted from coercion. A young man of Chinese descent recounted to me the taunts he endured while walking through the courtyard. One Chinese woman talked about the intimidation teenagers subjected them to, repeatedly banging on the door and throwing smoke bombs into the window. Again, like the other kinds of crimes occurring at Maverick, residents relationships with one another complicated the conflict. One Asian woman told me of the racial harassment her Asian friend endured.

*And then you know, her car, the, the kids, picked a rock and they broken a window. So she unhappy, you know, she’s sad..., the big teenager around here, so make her scared. She know, she know that the, the big teenager. They look at, they – they look at them as, as she is the bad guy, so she feel sad.*

Graves
The woman felt not only victimized but betrayed since she considered the assailants as part of her community and had learned that they didn’t feel the same toward her.

Not all non-Asian residents tolerated the harassment of their neighbors. One African American woman recalled defending an Asian neighbor.

“I was in the old Maverick, there was a little Vietnamese woman that lived over top of my building, and... all the kids threw stones at her....Cause she looked different. ...and there is all these adults standin’ around, never said one word. So one day, I just got fed up. And I told them kids, ‘you know, don’t you do that. You know, she has feelings.’ How would you like somebody throwin’ stones at your grandmother? And it just aggravated me so bad. She used to come to the house, knock on my door, she couldn’t speak much English, but she would point, point, and I have to go out there, straighten them damn kids out. (Laugh) I had to straighten them damn kids out.

Sometimes Asian families took action against their aggressors. One woman recalled how teens continually harassed them. One day, however, her husband cornered the kids and told them he was going to call the police, “And then we say, we, we know where you live. And then you move, you got if you run, you got trouble.” Familiarity this time worked to the residents’ advantage, since they could threaten to identify the offenders. And as with other conflicts, Asian residents reported limited success when reporting these types of problems to management.

Many whites and even some blacks pointed to diversity as the source of distress in the community. Yet racial mixing did occur, especially among the children. Play at the parks tended to be interracial and a few adults made meaningful interracial friendships. But coupling may be the greatest indication of interracial mixing. Many Maverick children came from interracial relationships between the whites, blacks and Latinos. But I learned of no Asian interracial couplings.
Another feature of urban villages then, is exclusivity and Maverick residents were hostile to newcomers. Violent discrimination against blacks was rare but this didn’t mean an end to racial hostilities, only a shift. Whites and blacks began to resent the growing Latino population and saw opportunities for dominance with the Asian minority. Residents’ stories of racial conflict reveal another aspect of the community. A sense of ownership over Maverick Gardens, strong identification of racial identity and weak institutional oversight led to contests over membership.

Lack of Formal Social Control

The fourth feature of urban villages found at Maverick was an absence of formal control. The lack of authority contributed to racial tension. Additionally, despite the efforts of many to maintain control, coexisting with criminal activity was a way of life for many Maverick residents. Residents repeatedly referenced the absence of formal institutional support, another feature of many urban villages. One resident’s succinct history of social control, “First it was run by the Italians, then the blacks, then the Spanish, then the drug dealers.” – indicates that resident groups, not management wielded the most control. When I asked another resident how management responded to the lack of safety and sanitation at Maverick, she replied, “They didn’t have no control really at the old Maverick.”

Residents recalled that their failed attempts to get management to respond to their concerns and uneven enforcement of the rules. One woman recounted how she found a condom outside her front door and reported it to management. She recalled them responding, “Oh, well what can we do?” However, residents didn’t believe that management was indifferent to the situation but more helpless to deal with the problems at hand. Almost universally they reported that they liked the people in management roles. One resident recalled discussing problem tenants with the manager.
I would call her up, stop by, see her at the square. I would talk to her. She was nice, she would talk to ya. She tried to get things done. She knew who they were, she could tell you their names, you could give her the apartment, "oh that's so and so" You could tell them their name, I mean their nickname outside, she would know exactly who you’re talking about. It’s just that, I don’t know.

Management, residents seemed to believe, were as helpless as they were.

Management also rarely enforced rules, further indicating their lack of formal control. In addition to the obvious failure to enforce anti-drug and anti-loitering rules, other rules also went unobserved. Residents reported that management “understood” if rent was late. A lack of available parking spaces led residents to park their cars in the courtyard. As one resident explained, “Because the way the projects were set up so, they couldn’t enforce those things. Though management attempted to identify problem persons by prohibiting them from trespassing, they lacked follow-through. “But what happened is over there, if someone had a trespass, they would still get in, cause there was no security or nothing.” Maverick Gardens lacked any formal security staff, unless, as one resident joked “you can…the housing police security.”

Residents experienced institutional abandonment from the police as well. In part residents received fewer services from the Boston Police because the Boston Housing Authority employed its own beleaguered police force. The presence of two police forces created confusion about what authority ultimately patrolled the area. Residents seeking police attention vacillated on which force to call and generally only called the Boston Police to report what they perceived as serious crimes. Many saw the police seen as ineffectual, that is either unable to respond to complaints in a timely fashion, discriminating on which calls to respond to, or fundamentally incapable of addressing neighborhood issues.
Additionally, formal policing failed in the area because residents feared retaliation. Residents hesitated to call the police. They did not want to incriminate their friends or themselves. Possibly because of this, when police did patrol, residents preferred they did so casually. As one resident called, “There’s a lot of cops in this neighborhood that are the old time cops. You could go to them, you could talk to them, your secret was safe with them.” Thus, policing seemed to work best when residents trusted that the police weren’t going to press them to lodge a formal complaint. Residents’ enmeshment in each other’s lives, fear of retaliation and lack of confidence in the police meant they were often not contacted. Consequently, Maverick Gardens showed the less functional urban village features in part because uneven formal control resulted from both management and the police under-serving the area.

Conflicting Attachments

As found in so many previous studies of other communities of poverty, poverty clearly had a particular effect on the Maverick community and distinguished it from other places where residents could readily replace fiscal for social capital. Poverty made Maverick a magnet for crime but it was the intensity of the relationships between residents that made crime so intractable. Despite resident’s intense involvement in keeping the development clean and trouble-free, their conflicting attachments to the community also sometimes prevented them from taking action to the threats around them. In addition to a fear of retaliation, residents recalled a hesitancy to intervene because of their own personal relationships with trouble makers. One resident noted the contrast between a drug dealing son and his mother; “And the mother was a church going person and every Sunday she’d have her little church meetings.” Occasionally, residents reported such a conflict in their own households. When I
asked one resident about drug activity, she replied, “Well, I, I think my son was doin’ it....A long story. It’s very painful.” If not family, then friends or associates they were sympathetic to, in part because they’d known the offenders for many years. When I asked one resident why she didn’t report her neighbor’s poor behavior to management, she replied, “Well because I was sorta friendly with the people that... aggravated me, and I just didn’t feel right doin’ it.” One resident explained to me her allegiance to her friends.

*We’re not snitches, so we’re going to look out so the police is comin’ we’re going to let them know the police is coming. I’m saying, especially the dudes who seen me grow up...Cause you want your community to be safe but you also don’t want to mess with the other kids, like, it’s just like, it’s crazy.*

Repeatedly, then, residents underscored the conflict between their desire to establish social order and their need to protect and defend those they knew and loved. Residents objected to public drug use. Yet while residents attempted to take control of crime, many residents had ongoing relationships with troublemakers in the development. This kind of empathy and enmeshment, along with the limited capacity of the police and management often prevented residents from addressing threats effectively.

Though tenants sought to keep themselves afloat, their social relationships often pulled them back underwater. A kind of social undertow undermined social control at Maverick. For many outside observers, failure to intervene suggests indifference. Rather residents had different criteria for intervention. Residents had to calculate the risk to those involved as well as the risk to them. Some women especially felt that the risk of intervention was too high and consequently reduced their expectations about how safe they were entitled to feel in their own community. Many residents imagined that a formal security system, one that would relieve them of the responsibility of both of identifying crime and apprehending the criminals, would be ideal. When I asked one resident what she thought should have been done about crime in...
the development. She replied, “There should have been more security and someone to stop them. But there wasn’t really over there, you know.”

**The Old Maverick Gardens: A way of life examined**

While fear and lawlessness constrained residents, it did not immobilize them. Most compartmentalized the negative elements of project life and attempted to support and enjoy their friends in the development. But their deep interpersonal connections also undermined them. So when residents learned that the Boston Housing Authority had received a grant to redevelop, the reacted with a mixture of approval and trepidation. Some residents saw the need, but others, especially those who had lived at Maverick for many years, reported that their first reaction was fear; one former Maverick resident published a book himself to memorialize Maverick history. His reaction to whose reaction to learning that the project had received the HOPE VI grant, “so it was official; they were tearing down this fortress, this sanctuary, this hellhole, this world of sadness, this insane little community” (Giannini, 2004, 93). Through a shift in management as much as a shift in the population, the new Maverick Landing reduced resident’s societal isolation and provided them with formalized social control.

**From Urban Village to Community Lost: A Community Transitions**

While the former Maverick Gardens operated as sub-cultural enclave (a strong identification with the community, emotionalism and traditionalism), the redeveloped Maverick Landing operated much more like a Gesellschaft association (rational, individualistic and emotionally disengaged). Accounts of the transition expose its mechanics; a formal authority institutes and organizes it. New institutions can break an old way of life. Once HUD finalized the HOPE VI decision, the redevelopment team, which included The
Boston Housing Authority and leadership of the Maverick Tenants Association as well as the
development corporation, began circulating information regarding the redevelopment and
introducing them to a new way of life. Through flyers and at meetings residents learned that
redevelopment would mean a reshuffling. Those who wanted to stay on site would have to
submit to a screening process, which would evaluate both their public records and private
conduct. The screening might have changed the resident mix, introducing a selection bias but
it cannot account for residents’ reported change in their own behavior.

The management of the re-housing – exhaustive, impersonal, and indifferent to social
relations and complete with a screening and behavior modification program, was residents’
first indication that they were moving out of their urban village into a more contemporary
urban community, though one still administratively distinct from the rest of the neighborhood.
Everyone who wanted a place in the new Maverick would be screened, no one was above
suspicion. To pass the screening process, the redevelopment team required that residents
attend meetings to familiarize themselves with the new way of life at the new Maverick
Landing, such as how to conduct themselves in public. The screen also included criminal
record checks on all applicants and random housekeeping inspections. Some residents who
believed they had good reputations felt surprised or even offended by the scrutiny, “that was
like kind of odd to me. Like, I’ve lived on my own for like so long, I had to raise a family, I do
know how to clean.” Those who were failed the inspections were not rejected, just reformed:
The team required these residents to attend classes instructing them on the acceptable way to
clean their home and store their food. Passing the screening process did not ensure an
apartment, especially in the first phase which included just 177 units to Maverick Gardens’
409. Those who passed the screening were placed into a lottery. While a lottery is a random
and probabilistically rational method of allocating a scarce resource, not all residents saw it that way. Such a method conflicted with their urban village notions of social order. They noted that once a resident became a successful applicant, the reputations, good and bad, they had earned that in the old Maverick would be irrelevant. "They gave me a hard time coming in here. And I don't understand why because we lived there for many years, never caused trouble, we were never called to the office for us, our children, nothing. My husband was an asset, we were an asset." Moreover, the interpersonal networks that had at times supported and at others sabotaged residents too would be irrelevant in the lottery. Yet through these measures, the redevelopment team transformed not just place but people.

Once they moved into the new Maverick Landing, residents reported loosening some of their interpersonal connections in favor of individualistic behavior, learning that uniformity and rationality would override the traditions and conventions that had governed Maverick Gardens and familiarizing themselves with the formal authority that replaced informal order they had once relied on.

**Maverick Landing: New Ways of Life in Mixed Income Housing**

Thus, it was as much a shift in architecture and management that Maverick transformed from an urban village into an urban association. Twenty percent of the units were rented to middle class “market rate” tenants. Yet they had little directly to do with the way of life enforced at the new Maverick Landing. Eighty percent of the residents in the new development came from the former Maverick Gardens. A few of the most troublesome tenants were removed, to be sure. But many remained. While the returning residents maintained some bonds within the community they also reported more self reliance. For
example, the woman in the earlier quote recounted how she would borrow milk from neighbors explained how her behavior changed in the new Maverick,

*It’s like when you don’t have somethin’ it’s like, oh then you go without it. Uh, but I go out this way or when I go out, I’ll get it. (Laughs) Instead of goin’ around knockin’ on doors.*

They also reported that their relationships with their neighbors while friendly were less entwined. Residents visited one another less frequently and some residents had yet to see the inside of good friends’ apartments. While the new development contained a courtyard, it was much smaller and architects had provided first floor residents with private entrances. Some of these had lawns and porches and residents took pride in maintaining them. One resident proudly reported her request that a fence be erected to separate her front lawn from her neighbors.

By eliminating a centralizing courtyard, the community center and instituting several rules, the development team changed several of residents’ ritual and routines. Without an onsite basketball court, players competed at a nearby park but few residents attended the games. Air conditioners obviated the need for cooling harbor breezes and many residents chose to stay inside. A few residents socialized in the new courtyard, a 10 o’clock curfew gave the area a general unwelcome air. A secondary courtyard elsewhere in the development also decentralized socializing. And while at the old Maverick children played near the watchful eyes of parents and neighbors in the central courtyard, the new management prohibited play on-site, so children either went to the park with their parents or played indoors. However, grilling out appeared to be the most missed ritual. “*And if you wanna have a little cookout in the back with a small grill, I don’t see a problem with that,*” one resident questioned.
Routines at Maverick changed for teens especially and sometimes in a positive way. Without ready opportunities for hanging out, one young woman said she changed her routine. Instead of returning to the development to hang out in the courtyard, she claimed, “I’m either doin my homework or at the gym.” Another teen reported that management’s zero tolerance policy for violence dissuaded her from getting into a street fight. “If get into a fight and Maverick finds out, my family’s getting kicked out and we have 15 days to look for a new place.”

The new private management company formalized social control, contributing greatly to the impersonal environment. Where the residents had attempted to maintain the public spaces themselves at the old Maverick, a cleaning crew maintained the public spaces and courtyards at the new Maverick. Management also enforced their rules, showing zero tolerance for drugs and criminal behavior, hiring a security company to patrol the hallways and the grounds and monitor the lobbies. Because residents still subscribed to the idea “You can’t expect to be a rat and live comfortably!” Management provided residents with an anonymous complaint form in an attempt to help residents take action while avoiding retaliation. As a result of these and other measures, public drug use and other public illegal activity became exceedingly rare. As one resident explained, “I mean I get out... I don’t see [drug use].” They also installed security cameras, some of them hidden, throughout the development and residents often felt this relieved them of their responsibility of vigilance. When I asked a resident if he would intervene if he saw criminal activity he replied, “They’ve got security cameras for that.”

Management also mounted an aggressive campaign to collect rent receipts in a timely manner. Though residents disagreed with some of the restrictions the rules placed, “see they
put down a lot of strict rules” they supported others. Importantly, though residents reported being fearful of the rule structure, many reported they were able to comply, “I thought it was gonna be hard, but it’s, I seem to have adjusted to it.” Residents also noted that management demanded their rent within 5 days of the first of the month, “Uh, like they, they want their rent at a certain time.” Failure to pay resulted in a notice.

These changes in management introduced new routines. Whereas in the old Maverick residents had enjoyed continuous activity in public spaces from early morning to late night, a new rhythm typified the new Maverick. With so few diversions on-site and an explicit rule against loitering, the comings and goings of working people was more pronounced. Residents noted a critical mass of employed people, their numbers increased by the market rate renters, going to work in the morning and coming home in the evening. The professional grounds-keeping and security staff added to the new routine. Each morning a uniformed cleaning crew maintained the landscape, cleaned the lobby and swept the floor. In the evening a guard made regular walks around the development, as one noted, “They do their job thoroughly”. As had been their custom in the old Maverick, some of the ”old time ladies” no longer went down to the mailbox in their “night clothes,” as this was prohibited. The change in children’s play also resulted from the new regime. Formerly, childcare was integrated into other rituals of daily life. Whereas it had been collectivized and integrated, now adult supervision of play is individuated and segregated.

In addition, management collaborated with the Boston police and severed ties with the BHA police. The management team met with the police monthly and conducted a public safety meeting quarterly, to which the police and residents were both invited. One policeman commended management for collaboration with the police, “I haven’t worked with people like
this before. Hands up...hands down to these people.” Repeatedly at these meetings, police stressed to residents the importance of calling 911 at the slightest disturbance. Residents still mistrusted the system and as one frustrated officer said at a community meeting, “You folks need to start using 911.” Through the introduction of new institutions and formalized structures, slowly but surely residents began to change their way of life.

Moreover, race relations seemingly improved. None of the black, Asian or Latino residents I spoke with reported any incidents of racial harassment at the new Maverick, though relatively fewer Latinos lived at the new Maverick. Again, threat of formal sanction may have served to protect residents. They were informed that using racial epithets was grounds for eviction. The Asians expressly mentioned their relief. A young Asian man appreciated the removal of the courtyard, which was a “Big space for kids to kind of harass you, just [Maverick Landing] is more controlled.” Racist attitudes persisted, however. Residents often privately shared their negative attitudes toward other ethnic groups with me.

**Origins and Expectations of Market rate residents**

Was the Gesellschaft culture that management worked so hard to achieve what the market rate residents had experienced in their previous places of residence and expected from Maverick? In terms of their housing tenure history, the market rate residents could be categorized into three categories, what I will call, “urban samplers,” “transplants” and “neighborhood movers.” The majority of these tenants came from urban residential backgrounds. Yet despite the notion of urbanism as increasingly impersonal, many market rate tenants described living in communities with many urban village features.

While much literature suggests that market rate residents come from the available pool of college students, especially in the Boston region, the market rate residents could be
characterized as arriving from three types of housing tenures. The largest group of market rate residents, and the one that included students, could be categorized as “urban samplers” – because they seemed interested in trying out a variety of neighborhoods. These young people were experienced with living in diverse urban environments. Usually single and always childless, urban samplers often lived with roommates instead of romantic partners or spouses. Much more a feature of their place in the lifecycle rather than their place in the city, they did not plan to stay long at Maverick, expecting to try out another community in the near future.

The second group of residents could be characterized as “transplants.” Recently arriving to Boston from another city, urban transplants chose Maverick while professing to know little about the area. The leasing agent had developed a relationship with a relocation company. The transplants recalled touring the city with the relocation agent and choosing because it was newly built, located close to the subway and most importantly, well priced.

The “neighborhood movers” formed the third category. Several of the market rate residents relocated from within the neighborhood of East Boston. Aware of the stigmatized former Maverick Gardens, the neighborhood movers had witnessed the reconstruction and were excited about its renewal. Yet still some were unaware that old residents were going to live in the new Maverick and displeased with then learned of the tenure structure.

The market rate residents themselves comprised a diverse group, in terms of both their economic and ethnic origins. The majority of the market rate residents where white but African Americans and Latinos also signed leases. Also, while some residents came from middle class upbringings, others revealed familial and even personal experience with public housing. Steve M., an African American who had been raised in an “upper middle class” suburb, was raised by a mother who herself had grown up in public housing. Jeremy M, an
Anglo, had himself grown up in “government housing” in an upper-income suburb. Sean M., his high-school friend and now roommate at Maverick, also came from that suburb, but grew up in a comfortable, middle class home. Penny M., an African American who moved to Maverick landing in her mid 50s, herself had lived in public housing as a young woman.

Market rate residents arrived from neighborhoods which they described as ethnically, and to a lesser degree, economically diverse. Ethnic diversity was the rule rather than the exception to the market rate residents’ prior communities. Marie M. explained that in her experience, living in the city “you know it’s a big, you know mix and meltin’ pot, of, I guess, as you will.” Prior to moving into Maverick, Steve M. had lived in a “landominium” which he explained was structured as “a way to stabilize housing for middle income people so they could afford to buy houses in areas that were either up and coming or already been kind of gentrified. I wouldn’t say this area was gentrified. It was the kind of property where, it was on the border of a not-so-nice area.” Craig M. had previously lived in another HOPE VI mixed income community in another Boston neighborhood. Sean M. described his former neighborhood as a diverse mix of African-Americans, Latinos and Whites and of families and single people, professionals and drug dealers. Anna M., a Latino woman recalled very much enjoying living in her predominantly Jewish neighborhood.

Yet, within the residents’ diverse neighborhoods, residents’ recollections reveal communities with many aspects of urban villages. That is, many residents recalled experiencing dense social ties, distinct rituals and routines, intense group solidarity and informal social control.

Many market rate residents recalled dense social ties in their former neighborhood. Several residents developed close friendships in their former neighborhood. Mario M. met his
“best friend” in his apartment building. Similarly, Danny M. regularly attended dinner with his neighbors. Both Marie M. and Anna M. also recalled a sense of closeness with their neighbors, and which each attributed in part to the smaller size of their apartment buildings. Anna M. knew the she knew exactly, “it was only 64 units.” Of course, some market rate residents experienced alienating anonymity. Phillip M., new to the area, found himself living in a student neighborhood and felt like “the dorm master” chiding coeds to keep the noise down and the beer bottles off the front lawn. Steve M. recalled that he had only one neighbor he spoke with regularly, in other cases, “I could walk right by somebody and not say a word.”

Other market rate resident recalled distinct rituals and routines that they engaged in with their neighbors. Both Frank M. and Sean M. recalled neighbors gathering on the stoops in each of their neighborhoods. Sean M., a white professional man in his mid 20s recalled spending many evenings sitting on the stoop and talking with his neighbors. As he recalled, “Because downtown was two blocks away, everybody walked, you know in the winter, in the summer, it didn’t matter. I lived around a bunch of Mexican people and they would take walks religiously. The whole family would go out for a stroll. We would chat with them as they walked by.” Newlyweds Penny M. and Mario M. attended “parties every weekend” that their neighbors in the apartment organized. Anna M. lived in a complex, where, as she remembered, “I think there were only 2 Hispanic, uh, families, everybody else was Jewish there…You had a [mezuzah] at the entrance of every apartment, you have that thing that you touch when you enter.” While not practicing herself, Anna was aware and comfortable with her neighbors’ rituals.

In their former neighborhoods, along with social ties and routines, some residents recalled group solidarity. Anna M. described her neighbors as people that worked to keep
maintain the social environment of the community, as she described it, it was “in a way very homogenous, and, uh a person who would, who would not fit there, would not last there.... I remember there was a couple, uh, that lived on the first floor, and they were arguing very loud, one, one day and I think they didn’t last that long there. They were gone pretty fast.” Her neighbors complained to the management company and expedited the departure of the disruptive neighbors. Penny M. recalled that her neighbors showed a sense of solidarity in their collective efforts to keep the drug dealing in the neighborhood out of their building.

Surprisingly, however, residents had few recollections of engaging in informal social control, but instead relied on the formal authority of the local police or management companies to intervene. People would “hang out” in the parking lot next to Mario M.’s former apartment building. Instead of confronting the troublemakers himself, Mario M. explained that he wasn’t “shy about calling the cops.” Penny M. too noted how she would engage the police in response to potential neighborhood threats, “you call the police in [my former neighborhood] they come.”

Evidently, the notion of an impersonal urban association did not conform well to many market rate residents’ experiences. Many market rate residents came from neighborhoods where they enjoyed closed interactions. Perhaps reflecting a selection bias, that is that ethnic diversity was evident when prospective residents toured the development prior to signing leases, market rate residents were comfortable with diversity. Many portrayed their former neighborhoods as heterogeneous places. From these experiences, they did not report anomie resulting but a willingness to engage with diversity.

**Chapter Conclusion: Instituting Change**
Without relocating, the former public housing residents experienced more than a change in architecture; they experienced a profound shift in formal rules and informal expectations as well. The former Maverick Gardens residents lived in relative societal isolation and without formal social control, and thus experienced intense relationships and intense conflicts within the confines of the development. But while the former public housing functioned in many ways like an urban village, though redevelopment, Maverick Landing transformed into a place conforming much more to an impersonal residential association. I summarized these changes in Table 3.1. ‘Interpersonal connections’, ‘rituals’, ‘informal social control’ and ‘enmeshment’ or a sense of needing to protect their more problematic friends and family declined. But a new form association arose in its place. The high quality construction increased residents’ sense of efficacy. The expressed interest and confidence in ‘achieving mainstream norms.’ The private management company proved effective at achieving their stated aims (collecting rents, maintaining control, increasing security) and the local police engaged with the development.

Importantly, this change was non-ecological – it happened neither through a population change nor over some prolonged period of time. Rather, this change was managed and abrupt, orchestrated through architectural modification, training programs, the introduction of a private market institution and rule enforcement. So while much of the existing population remained, the way of life changed. Very few residents expressed nostalgia for their former way of life, yet at times they struggled to adjust to and to understand the new regime. The market rate residents too often recalled urban village features in their former neighborhoods and the impersonal association was a shift for them as well. The point of this chapter was to highlight three themes. First, I sought to describe life at the former

Graves
Maverick Gardens and to suggest the both positive and negative aspects of the way of life residents left behind. Second, I sought to identify a mechanism for change – including private actors in planning and implementation proved effective in areas where public institutions had failed. But third is to caution about the successes of the new regime. Private market solutions to public housing problems create new conflicts with the social rather than administrative aims of mixed income developments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Old Maverick</th>
<th>New Maverick</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Connections</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Casual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rituals</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Social Control</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Enmeshment”</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Policing</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Management – rule compliance</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations to mainstream norms</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Security</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Behavior in Privatized Places

Introduction

In the summer at Maverick Landing, a tidy hedge framed the impatiens painting the courtyard bright red, fuchsia and white. As fall peaked, the hedges changed colors, and their flaming red vied for attention while the impatiens faded. Later in the fall, the groundskeepers brought out potted mums, and when these became snow-covered, they hung fragrant pine holiday wreaths tied with cheery red bows on the front doors. A couple bleak months followed and the weather was hostile to either plant or human life. But then spring came and yellow daffodils pushed their way through wintry crust of ice and snow.

I begin with a description of the plant life of Maverick Landing because it was one of the few changes to the Maverick landscape that received universal approval. Beyond the flora, it is nearly impossible to accurately represent the physical environment the residents of Maverick Landing experienced because despite the uniformity of the appearance, as Small and Lamont (2000) observed, people's perceptions of the place were as varied as their experiences in it. While one resident might have described the yellow, sage or light blue clapboard townhouses as “nice,” another might have found them to be “too colorful.” Some found the passive courtyard peaceful while others were angered by the constraints on its use. Perhaps what frustrated residents and community building alike was that the top-down rules discussed below, not residents, often set the Maverick culture. While later chapters will be concerned with the interaction between people, this chapter looks first at the interactions between people and place. I will first discuss my own observations on whether or not Maverick was the kind of place where the mixed income ideal -- one in which higher income residents became allies of their neighbors and their neighborhood -- could flourish. I will next
describe the social atmosphere of the adjoining neighborhood, which New Urbanist ideals purport to integrate and emulate. I will then introduce residents’ observations about the built environment -- its appearance, its management, its impact on their lives and what that implied about the prospects for interaction. In the third section, I will suggest how interaction was impacted by assumptions about use-value and residential consensus about quality of life and the means to achieve this. I will also suggest how standardized approaches to formal social control impede innovation perhaps crucial to this experiment of mixed income housing. In a fourth section, I will address directly two themes, how institutional intervention influenced cross class interaction at Maverick and how institutional intervention impacted institutional improvements. As such, I will be particularly critical of private management as means to promote mixed income interaction.

**Public-Private Spaces**

This chapter starts with from my perspective, as a market rate resident and as an outsider very much trying to become an insider. Here I will start with some of my observations of the environment in which some hoped would foster positive cross-class social relations. I focus particularly on the “public-private” spaces – the spaces visible to all accessible to some and carefully controlled by management. Because physical change was essential to the redevelopment, so too is a description of Maverick Landing. In the welcoming courtyard, a large red, white and blue flag reading “Open” and, on the weekends, balloons attached to lawn sign stating, “Maverick Landing, Units Available,” tells prospective tenants they have arrived. On this half of the block stands a six story “mid rise” building made of brick and steel with many floor-to-ceiling windows [See Image 3: Maverick Landing Site Plan].
Management used one of the ground floor apartments as the leasing office. It was staffed by young, attractive and professional leasing agents, who for many market rate residents, were the only people in the development identifiable by name. Laura, a peppy woman in her mid 20s, enjoyed showing potential tenants around the development. “I love the product!” She said enthusiastically. In referring to people’s current and future homes as “product” – an item of exchange suggested that in her line of work, the community is a commodity. Her tour typically included a walk around the grounds, where she would point out the proximity to the harbor and the subway. She then took interested parties into a model unit decorated in an urban contemporary style with a set table and made bed. Clapboard-covered townhouses occupied the other half of the block. Though attached, the townhouses were painted individual colors, a light salmon pink, a pale grey blue or frosty lemon.

With cheery front stoops and nostalgic architecture, the townhouses had instant appeal. One day, while walking around the complex, another neighborhood woman and I watched the construction worker as he painted the trim on the new buildings. He nodded in acknowledgement of us. “Looks nice” I said, to both him and her. “I want me one of those” she said, “I’ve been livin’ in the neighborhood for a long time and watching them,” echoing the enthusiasm for the redevelopment heard from neighborhood residents in general.

Yet a number of rules detailed in this chapter succeeded tempering the sociability suggested by the new urbanist architecture of the public private outdoor spaces such as front porches, adjoining back yards and courtyard. White wooden rails framed the front stoops of the townhouses. However, management rules prohibited leaving a chair on the porch. The townhouses also had small planted front yards separated by simple wrought iron fences. They had backyards too with cement patios surrounded by grass and separated by chain link
fences, reflected the defensible space ideals (see Image 4). The fences prevented neighbors from sharing space, while other rules prevented neighbors from sharing conversations over the fences.
Figure 3.5: Block of single-family houses in which a common high fence, running along the front of the houses, defines the rear yard areas. An additional high fence has also been run across the block so as to further subdivide the number of families combined in a cluster.

Image 4: As seen from my apartment window, the fenced in yards are remarkably similar to those envisioned by Newman to achieve defensible space. The fenced in back yards in the picture of the townhouses were often left empty and infrequently used. Outdoor grills were banned as were any items not labeled for outdoor use.
Most of the back yards housed a picnic table or outdoor table with an umbrella but not the toys, grills, lawn chairs, wading pools or other backyard paraphernalia one might expect. As on the front porches, management didn’t allow such items. Such prohibition achieved a number of things. First, it prevented residents’ clutter but also prevented personalization, thwarting residents from signaling something about themselves to their neighbors as Harvey (1997) conjectured. Second, with nowhere to wade or grill, the rules cut down on use of the back yards, making the yards less lively than they might have been if management had permitted more uses.

In addition to these phase 1 or “Midrise A” apartments and townhouses, about a block away stood the phase II building, known as “Midrise B.” (see Images 5 and 6) As its name implied, Midrise B was in many ways a lower grade building despite identical management, age, tenant structure and construction quality. Built it seemed, to maximize square footage; it lacked the landscaped courtyard, decorated lobby, or celebrated townhouses of Phase I. There was in fact no landscaping at all around Midrise B.
Left: Image 5: Midrise B: Some thought it was built to resemble the grand ocean liners that once docked in East Boston. Built almost up to the lot line, the Midrise offered little social space.

Below: Image 6: Midrise A and Courtyard: Set back from the street behind a landscaped courtyard, Midrise A was a more appealing structure, though residents rarely sat in the courtyard.
The exterior wall of the building directly abutted the sidewalk and a resident living in the unit next to the sidewalk complained because people constantly tapped on her window glass to get the attention of her cat. And despite its name and a federal prohibition on high rise public housing, residents often referred Midrise B, a six story building as the “high rise” or “the tower.” Its problems extended beyond the aesthetic, these problems will be detailed in later chapters.

The stage was set at Maverick. It looked like a cheery, nostalgic newly urban every town. But the actors, both market rate and subsidized residents were asked to wait in the wings. That is while the physical design of Maverick suggested sociability; rules limited the use of public-private outdoor areas.

**Public-Private Spaces: Lobbies and Hallways**

The sociability of the common interior spaces felt similarly subdued. Management furnished the lobby to Midrise A with mahogany-look hallway tables. Atop one sat cloth covered books and a white orchid, until, it seemed, someone stole it. When a friend visited she commented to me, “Wow, this is fancy.” As Bearman (2005) notes “the lobby serves to signify specific values, its décor indicates something about the status of the residents—or their status aims, more accurately – and the nature of the building and the people who live there” (Bearman). Yet the representation of values depends on whether people live there by choice and it also assumes that all residents are of the same status. When residents are of different statuses, the décor of the lobby signifies the not the values that are predominant but the values that dominate. The lobby at Maverick had a distinctly middle class appeal and lacked elements that subsidized residents repeatedly requested that would have disrupted the aesthetic.
Yet even in the lobby, residents made fledgling attempts at fostering community. One table became an informal media exchange where residents placed unwanted magazines such as “Cottage Style”, or “TV Guide.” Here too one resident posted a handwritten sign, “Lost Cat” instructing the anxious owner about how to reach him. But the maintenance men quickly cleared such materials each morning.

Most evenings, a security guard occupied the lobby. Several employees held the post, alternating among four men and one woman. But all sat silently behind the security desk, never greeting residents and rarely engaging them. Since the lobby was neither designed nor programmed for interaction, few lingered there.

In contrast, the lobby to Midrise B was about half the size of that in Midrise A and the former lacked the decorative elements of the other lobby as well. There were no rugs, silk potted plants or entryway tables. In fact, even after repeated requests made at both a dedicated “safety committee” and in the general community-wide meetings, there was no table to house the security guard or the sign-in sheet.

Beyond the lobby, residents shared the private public spaces of including the hallways and laundry rooms. The designers selected to paint the hallways with muted colors from Benjamin Moore “Heritage lines” (Deborah Goddard). They hung framed and matted historical photographs of the neighborhood on each floor at each elevator landing. As Suttles (1967) observes, “most often, the symbolic paraphernalia that decorate an establishment are also ethnic-linked. Thus the “collective memory” of the local people need not always be transmitted in verbal form” (Suttles, 1968, 121). Yet in the hallways of Maverick landing one saw tasteful photographs of the neighborhood from the late 19th century neighborhood prior to Maverick Gardens – a nostalgic, impersonal past. This particular fashioning of collective

Graves 112
memory looked a lot like collective amnesia. As detailed in Chapter 3, Maverick had a more salient recent past as Maverick Gardens. In fact, at Maverick Gardens a community developer had created a somewhat celebrated program in which resident youth photographed their community. These pictures were well composed and meaningful. Yet the design and management teams chose not to display these photographs, which would have provided both new and former Maverick residents a visual link to Maverick’s past.

Public-Private Spaces: Rhythm and Routine

The uniformity of routine matched the uniformity of appearance of Maverick. Little disrupted a daily rhythm rarely punctuated by observable interaction. Despite the appealing appearance of the Phase I courtyard, front porches and back yards, people rarely used these spaces. Instead, the public-private spaces were occupied by institutional actors. Their presence influenced interaction among residents. Each weekday morning a uniformed crew of maintenance men cleaned the building, inside and out. Work began at 8am, with each man pushing a wheeled garbage can around while they swept up last night’s debris. Then they would divide their labor, one groundskeeper watering the plants or trimming the bushes. The other would clean the lobby, mopping the floors and wiping the fingerprints and grime from the glass doors. The rest of the building staff, managers, the receptionist and the leasing agent, all arrived between 8 and 8:30 am. Mike, a senior property manager, noted how the increased numbers of working people living at Maverick after redevelopment affected the rhythm of the place as a critical mass of people left the buildings between eight and nine am. People rarely lingered in the courtyard during these hours. There was a period of quietude until, according to Mike, the non-working people would rouse. In the early evening working people came home.
Between the hours of 5 and 8 pm, a few people congregated at the benches in the courtyard, mainly the residents whose apartments faced the space. A small group of people gathered outside townhouses and the corner of the development and beyond the management’s view. The management and maintenance staff left between five and five thirty, replaced by a security guard stationed in the lobby but instructed to circle the development every half an hour. Children snuck in to play during the guard’s rounds. One summer evening I walked by some girls and heard them discussing the security schedule. Then one girl told the others that she would follow the security guy to make sure the coast is clear. Gaming the guard became part of their play.

Winter further muted the routine at Maverick. Other than the occasional smoker, no one used the courtyard. Children, again, altered the rhythm when a snowstorm hit one winter weekend. Instead of removing the snow a crew piled it into an 8 foot high mound in the center of the courtyard. Temptation overpowered the children who soon brought out slides or used the management-supplied plastic garbage can lids as makeshift sleds. A cacophony of brightly colored jackets and delighted screams filled the courtyard that weekend but when they returned that Monday morning, management abruptly put an end to the play.

The staff frequently punctuated their daily routine with the distribution of informational flyers. During my 14-month stay, we received 145 different flyers, from both management and the Maverick Tenants’ Organization (MTO). I received the first of these flyers upon arriving at Maverick. The day I moved in I received a welcome basket, as did the other market rate residents. One resident described the basket, “Nick gave me a basket with soap and kitchen towel, flashlight, mug (my only beverage container for a long time), dish soap which I still have.” The promotional mug, like the pictures in the hallway, belied the
reality of Maverick as redeveloped public housing. The mug read “Maverick Landing: A New Community on the Harbor.” But an important element of Maverick was not new: the residents of the former Maverick Gardens. A more accurate mug might have stated, “A Renewed Community on the Harbor.” The basket also contained an accordion folded 8 by eleven and a half sheet of paper, which read as below:

“Guidelines/Expectations of Behavior in Our Community”

1) Pick up after pet
2) Wear Appropriate clothing
3) Excessive loud music and noise is not allowed
4) Bike riding, roller skating and skateboard riding is not allowed on the property for safety reasons
5) The use of handicap wheelchairs and scooters is allowed throughout the property
6) Loitering in common areas such as stairwells, hallways and lobbies is not permitted.

Other notices, printed on white, yellow, green, orange or salmon paper, followed. The notices alerted us of upcoming maintenance and admonished us for certain kinds of behavior (such as failure to promptly remove laundry from the shared laundry machines), altering us of opportunities for youth or adult programs or inviting us to meetings and community events. Many seemed in service of a quest for as management stated in one flyer “the peaceful enjoyment for all our neighbors,” peaceful enjoyment was hard won by management. Once a month, management also distributed a glossy-four color newsletter.

Keeping Up Appearances

Management attempted to enforce their rules directly by approaching residents, by issuing written citations and by calling violators into the office to be “private conferenced.” They also attempted to enforce their rules indirectly though flyers. In March, management circulated a flyer presumably encouraging residents to begin a spring cleaning. "Please remember it is springtime and it is very important that the building remain clean for all
Maverick residents." In July of '06, a management flyer alerted residents to tidy the exterior spaces, “Leaving bicycles, carts, chairs, strollers, carriages and toys outside not only takes away from the appearance of the property but becomes a hazard as well.” Through these flyers management was able to keep the entire Maverick Landing community aware of its aesthetic demands. Management opted to physically enforce one rule. Without notice or explanation, management installed stoppers on the windows which prevented residents from opening them more than six inches.

Whatever the cause of the installation, the effect of this and other anti-social interventions was more transparent. If one crossed over to the neighborhood on the other side of Maverick Station, one found a neighborhood similar in its building stock to Maverick (as per the conventions of new urbanism). But the adjoining neighborhood was wholly different in its vitality. There residents kept their second floor windows wide open, where the façade at Maverick stood lifeless. In the surrounding neighborhood, children often lingered in second floor windows, playing games with their friends on the street below or mothers might discipline her children from a second floor perch. On one particular day I watched a mother drop money to her child and instruct him in Spanish to buy some milk at the corner store. Older people, as Jacobs noted long ago, just leaned from open windows and observed. Groups of teen and preteen boys hung around half parked cars. The girls leaned against either the Laundromat or the corner store; the strength of their perfume was rivaled only by that of the boys’ cologne. As Image 7 shows, around Halloween residents created elaborate displays, filling their front porches.
Image 7: Neighborhood residents celebrated Halloween with many decorations and inviting displays.
Image 8: At Maverick, management asked residents to bring their jack o’ lanterns indoors.
and yards with festive seasonal items. In short, the spontaneous choreography in this part of the neighborhood seemed strikingly similar to the “street ballet” described by Whyte, Gans and Jacobs decades ago.

Thus, a visitor might make the mistake taking the conformity evident in the exterior spaces of Maverick Landing for consensus among residents. While management struggled to maintain the “product,” residents of both income groups attempted to personalize, or otherwise utilize their public private spaces, front doors, entry ways, back yards, hallways, and courtyard. As Suttles noted of the Chicago projects he studied in the 1960s, “Moreover, the standardization and restrictive rulings that govern the projects almost totally eliminate those overt signs that families customarily depend on to present themselves to the outer world. The Marie Addams Projects are a drab and uniform continuity. Undoubtedly, these apartments are fairly clean and roomy. However, they entirely lack most of the ordinary external embellishments, adornments and decorations that families use to notify others of their tastes, beliefs, income practices and background. Thus the first line of family impression management is lost and an outsider can only surmise that all the residents are alike” (Suttles, 1967, 122). “Impression management” appeared to be management’s intent. Departure from uniformity usually resulted in a round of fliering.

Management’s use of the model unit, described earlier in this chapter, revealed much about their intent. Spare, stylish and carefully arranged, the unit functioned as one aspect of the careful staging of Maverick Landing. The staging extended beyond the model unit’s walls out into the hallways, courtyards and even onto neighbors front porches. While the model unit ostensibly showed prospective tenants a representation of the kinds of apartments found in the development, it took on double meaning. The unit and the surroundings also modeled
certain way of life, reinforced by management’s actions. Yet this standard for imitation was one which few residents of either income group fully subscribed, as I will discuss detail below.

**Resident Impressions**

While the above section is intended to give the reader a sense for what Maverick was like for me as an outside observer, below is an attempt to recount the experience of Maverick Landing as seen by the many kinds of people who live there. Often in the social and behavioral sciences one might note that differences within groups in question are greater than the differences between them, and at Maverick this might certainly also be the case. Nonetheless, I will focus on difference between the market rate and subsidized groups, as it is this divide many seek to bridge. Here I will compare the influence on residents’ lives of the structure and management of the built environment and what that influence implied for interaction. Again, further chapters will consider interactions among people, this chapter focuses on people relationship with place and what that implies for interaction and institutional improvement (the two are obviously interconnected -- the opportunities and constraints authorities and the physical environment imposed on residents affected resident’s relations with one another). Here I will suggest what features of the place were most salient to residents and what that implied for cross class interaction. I will also note how design did achieve some externally imposed objectives such as fostering a sense of ownership and motivating some behavioral changes. However, residents had difficulty engaging management in discussions of change to their physical environment. Finally, I will note how Maverick matched the design of the surrounding neighborhood but functioned quite differently.
Subsidized Residents’ Impressions of the Exterior and Interior Space

I begin with a profile of the subsidized residents’ experiences and uses of the development and neighborhood, focusing first on the private spaces, then their impressions of the public spaces. The subsidized residents were critical of the redevelopment plans, and this suggested that they weren’t fully consulted on the redevelopment scheme. Additionally, residents felt frustrated by the constraints management put on the use of both their indoor and outdoor space. Yet they did approve of certain aspects of the redeveloped housing, noting especially the newness of the units and attributed some behavioral and aspirational changes to the redevelopment. In total, residents’ thoughtful but mixed reactions to the redevelopment suggests an under appreciated critical engagement with their community.

Some subsidized residents questioned the reasoning behind the wholesale redevelopment. To many the old Maverick was salvageable and in some ways superior. The Old Maverick, Randy S. argued, didn’t need to be torn down, “They could of invested and fixed up the place. ...Okay, they put a lot of new stuff in. I was talkin’ to one of the workers out there, and he told me he says, why are they knockin’ this place down? Why? He says, that these buildin’s can withhold a hurricane. .. A tornado. An earthquake, he says, that’s how strong they were. Okay, you know, and they come, they got rid of the roaches, great.” John S. too felt the old Maverick could have been rehabbed as he had seen done at another development, “I mean they’re nice. It’s good looking. But you could of saved yourself a lot of money, to make everything a lot safer. You could still keep some of these buildings.” These residents disagreed with need for whole sale reconstruction, arguing that durability and safety should have won out over aesthetics and the market rate neighbors the redevelopment.
attracted. In later Chapters I will discuss in greater depth the consequences that the lack of information about the benefits of redevelopment had on social relations.

Other residents felt the physical environment of the old Maverick was superior. Susanna S. reminisced, “And then the hot water. Come on. There really isn’t any hot water [at the new Maverick]. You had hot water all the time in the projects. You had steamin water that you can boil your eggs in there.” Others missed the layout of buildings in the old Maverick. Sandy remembered that, “I had a beautiful view of the ocean. Open up my windows and the ocean was right there. And right out on the first floor there were bushes and I used to love listening to the birds cheap. Can’t hear it here.” The layout of the former apartments facilitated airflow as well. Patty reminisced, “And, not only that, if it was so hot, where I lived, they had a tall, huge tree, and I’d open my livin’ room window, open my kitchen windows, and, I didn’t have to put my air conditioner on.” Dolores S. also noted this difference, remembering how in the Old Maverick “The breeze was a tremendous. Now you get nothing.” Residents found that their new apartments could get hot and stuffy. Even newcomers like Marie noted their poor ventilation, wishing that her apartment had a cross breeze. None of the residents seemed to be aware that that officials had found toxic levels of lead on site in the Old Maverick or that the foundations were deemed structurally unsound and so it remained unknown how these facts would have altered their assessments.

However, the subsidized residents had positive first impressions of the new development. After all of the anxiety of the redevelopment and lottery, for some, seeing their new unit was a joy and a relief. As Dave explained, “When I walked in this door, my face fell to the floor. I was a relief. It really was. “ Maria agreed, “You know it’s gorgeous. It’s just that, um... these apartment compared to those apartment, it’s a big difference, you know.”
Mellisa S. recalled, “And I was very happy to come back...I loved it. It was nice.”

Occasionally, the former Maverick residents’ had more expressive reactions. Sherry S. remembered seeing her townhouse for the first time, “Oh yeah, to tell you the truth when I came, when I came in here and I saw the place, un, I, I did kneel down, and thank the Lord, yeah.” Almost universally, residents relayed a positive first impression and optimism about their new life at Maverick.

Evident, too, were residents’ appreciation of the aesthetic and fiscal value of the view. Al described the view of the building, the waterfront as “a beautiful view of Boston, across the way and Rowe’s Wharf and to me, that’s a million dollar view.” Holly too surmised that, “a lot of people are attracted to this spot because of the view.” Many subsidized residents knew the market appeal of location of the development.

However, many subsidized residents felt constrained about use of outdoor space. Parents and even non parents puzzled over management’s rule against play in the courtyard. Amy was quite upset when she received a notice from management when her daughter was observed riding her bike across the courtyard. Some wanted to personalize their exterior space. Rachelle wanted to decorate “for the holidays and stuff. It makes you feel homey.” She looked forward to displaying Halloween decorations, as she related excitedly, “Oh you wait, my pumpkin. I’m getting two more pumpkins.” When she and other neighbors displayed jack-o-lanterns in their front yards, however, management asked to put them inside. So on Halloween, Rachelle and her neighbors’ pumpkins glowered through the window panes; their expressions taking on an extra degree of horror as they prematurely shriveled indoors (see Image 5). Management also asked Mellisa S. to remove the chair and table she’d purchased for her front stoop. Around the 4th of July, Randy S. recalled “I had an American flag, it was
a sticky one, I stuck it on the inside the door...They said take it off....And it was the 4th of July.”

However, Midrise B and especially its lobby were a notable exception to this approval. Al, described lobby to Midrise B this way, “And the front of it didn’t look too attractive. You know you figure a new opening looks like … you would see a security guard, and elevators to the right, elevators to the left with bathrooms, you know, and a beautiful lounge area, sitting room and um, and a beautiful opening. But they made it so dorky and so weird. It looks like you walked into the old housing residence, square, square with an elevator, it looked very, very ugly.” When asked to compare the lobby of Midrise A to Midrise B he replied, “The lobby of this one looks awesome. This is great, this is, looks awesome. At 44 Border, it’s 2 thumbs up, they did a great job.” Despite the similarities of the two lobbies in terms of age and architecture, they left distinctly different impressions.

Additionally, the private spaces of the interiors of the apartments themselves throughout the development received general approval from the subsidized residents. Residents especially appreciated the evident newness of the units, both as they compared to the Old Maverick and the average housing stock found in Boston. Lisee S. explained her approval, “Cause it’s more quiet, attractive, of course, its new. You know, the inside condition is excellent.” The condition of Maverick stood in contrast to other subsidized options. As Mellisa S. recalled, “But I also, well, they gave me Section 8 and I also looked for apartments around here. They’re dumps.”

Yet many subsidized residents also missed the opportunity to personalize their interior space. Cathy recalled, “In the Old Maverick if we didn’t like anything…they would change it. But we can’t put nails in the walls we can’t do nothing to the house. They should have made
something so we can put up curtains.” Christine on the fourth floor too placed a mat outside of her door. She worked construction on Phase III of the development, which was still underway across the street. Having both a pride of place from occupying the new unit as well as the additional respect that came from working on units in the development, Christine wanted to keep her muddy work boots and clean new apartment separate. But she also submitted to management’s request to remove the mat. Residents, especially older women, told me that they were not allowed to keep their doors open to have conversations across the hallway. Older women missed this tradition the most because they are less likely to want to leave the house and a conversation through an open door allowed them to be social from the safety of their own units. Nadine S. even drew a diagram for me contrasting the spacing of the doors in the New Maverick to that of the old.

Subsidized Residents’ Behavioral Responses to Change in Housing Environment

Yet design did achieve the externally imposed objective of fostering a sense of ownership. Despite the restrictions, many subsidized residents, especially the townhouse occupants, expressed a sense of pride over individualized space. John S. enjoyed watering his lawn describing to me his back yard “with the green chairs, that’s my, that’s my patio.” Nadine liked her front yard, especially the tree planted next to her walkway.

Moreover, a change in environment seemed to have changed the aesthetic valuations of some. While Patty didn’t like being prohibited from hanging pictures on the wall, she said that in the old Maverick she had “all the family pictures all over the walls.” But she wanted to keep her new unit “uncluttered” and display “just like one, two, three, pictures on a shelf.” Like Patty’s change in preference for interior décor, Mellisa S. expected resident’s treatment of the exterior space to change as well. So while Mellisa S. disagreed with the requested
removal of her front porch chairs and table, she objected to other, her opinion, more flagrant displays, “And there’s people openin’ their windows and puttin’ their sheets out there and their rugs to dry like it’s a old project. You don’t do that. This is a nice establishment.” Architectural transformation, it seemed, had produced attitudinal and behavioral change in some residents.

For other residents, the new surroundings inspired a desire for new furniture. Sherry S talked about her goal to get a job, one inspired in part by her surroundings. John S. too thought his furniture was a bit shabby for the new surroundings saying he’d have the furniture “too long.” One day when we were sitting in his living room he pointed to the overstuffed black leather sofas and said, “Yeah, this is, you know it’s getting old.” He wanted to replace it with furniture that fit better into the new apartment.

For Susanna S., a change in architecture seemed to produce a change in attitude; she was willing to forgo some forms of socializing in order to get along at the new Maverick. Susanna S. noted that, “there are some families that always want to be together and my family used to be one of those kinds, you know what I’m saying, when we had my stepfather here, we always had like, you know, little get togethers, we made mad food, we just ate, talked, chilled, I’m saying. Listened to music and all that. But, you know what I’m saying, we are willing to give up some of that to stay were, you know what I’m saying?” Redevelopment both inspired and enforced changes in residents’ behavior.

Residents were especially critical of the courtyard rules. Edna, whose unit faced the courtyard, recalled the day the kids played in the snow pile. “If kids aren’t supposed to play in the courtyard, then why did they plow a big pile of snow in the middle that is so tempting for kids to sled down?” She added that she and her adult son enjoyed watching the kids go
sledding. Christine reasoned that she was a “grown woman” and thus capable of determining appropriate public conduct without the sanctioning of management.

Sandy who contracted with a handicap accessible commuter van had asked management to create a handicapped parking space for the van. She recounted, “We do not have a handicapped sign outside, so when the van and everything pulls up, if we can park on the side of the building here, we’ve got those great big cement things we can’t drop the lift down. Then, if it’s all lined with cars, we have to go on the other side over there. Then the cars are trying to get by us and they’re cussing, they’re beeping the horn. I mean it’s, it’s bad.” After 10 months of effort, Sandy abandoned her campaign for handicapped parking.

For months Nadine appealed to management to replace her carpet with vinyl flooring. A medical necessity, Nadine had received assurances that her flooring would accommodate her health needs.

Little about the built environment suggested or encouraged community and when residents attempted to signal community, through modifying the décor and customizing use, they often found themselves discouraged.

Market Rate Impressions of the Exterior and Interior Space

Market rate residents too had positive first impressions of the new development and they initially reacted to the development’s appearance enthusiastically. Steve recalled, “Overall, I thought it looked like a building that was taken care of but it looked really nice outside. The architecture looked really nice.” Sean M. remembered that his first impression as, “a really nice looking hotel. You know that’s just the feeling that I got looking at the place for the first time.” Yet in likening Maverick Landing to a hotel, Sean M. also conveyed a certain kind of anonymity evident at Maverick.
However, market rate residents noted the inferiority of Midrise B and especially its lobby. Marie recalled: "I don’t, I didn’t like that building to be honest. It was like nothin’, well, it was, I mean it looked... more... I don’t know, there was no like lobby area, like this is kind of a nicer lobby area and everything else. It was just, you walked in Midrise B it was mailboxes and the elevators, that’s it.” Market rate residents especially liked the view. Frank M. too thought at, “The view is the best in Boston.” Rents reflected the value of the view, with upper level apartments and those facing the water commanding higher rents. Residents, like the leasing agent, noted that the location of Maverick Landing made it valuable.

However, the private spaces of the interiors of the apartments themselves throughout the development received approval too from market residents. From Mike’s perspective, “I mean the apartment, like I said when I was originally scouting out places to look at there were places that were just as much as this that were 40 year old buildings with breaking windows and creaky floors and the bathrooms were nasty and there were stains in the kitchen.” Marie shared this opinion, “you know, this is brand new, and so it’s cheaper than, you know, right downtown and everything.” Thus, for both income groups, the housing was in the best condition of housing options they considered.

So salient was newness to the market rate tenants that even when units had been previously occupied, management occasionally falsely represented them as unused. About half way through my stay, the market rate unit next to me turned over. Nick the leasing agent told the Sean M., the new occupant, that the previous occupant hadn’t lived there but used it as an office. Penny M. too was told that her apartment had not been previously occupied. She became suspicious, however, when “there was a blue hanger in the closet in my room.” This led her to conclude, “Somebody did live here before me, so he lied about that.” In this and
other situations it became clear that in order to sign leases, management displayed a willingness to be duplicitous. And significant too, is that one of the most salient features of Maverick was the lack of use. Instead of appealing because it seemed like a place reflecting generations of character and charm, residents noted the how pristine and untouched the development appeared.

Like their subsidized neighbors, market rate residents displayed a sense of pride and ownership. Mike M. and Sean M., made quite an earnest attempt at homemaking. In addition to painting the interior of their unit (also against the rules), they laid out a green and off-white mat outside their front door. Within a few days there were asked to remove it. Frank M. and Louise filled their backyard with potted impatiens, begonias and petunias.

Many of the market rate residents rented a parking space in the basement. An elevator took residents directly from the parking garage to their floor, allowing them to bypass the lobby. Steve believed that the parking garage was segregated by income. “I actually did see Nick’s [the leasing agent] paper. Some of those spaces are called subsidized and some are called unsubsidized. . Like I saw on his map, when he gave me, he said, ‘oh here, this parking space is available” Thus while entire complex could be considered the community, many residents’ had no opportunity or cause to use other parts of the development. For Anna both the architecture and their daily work routine affected her social connections in Maverick. Anna recounted, “Well, no, because you, I mean I get out of my apartment, take the elevator, and leave. Nobody’s leaving at the same time that I am leaving, I don’t see anybody.”

Moreover, residents’ use patterns, how much time they spent at the development and where they went in the development impacted who they encountered, evidencing the importance intermixing of the market rate and subsidized units for interaction.
Shared Impressions of the Exterior and Interior Space

As Fainstein (2000) had predicted New Urbanist approaches might, at Maverick, there was much to suggest and little done to encourage community. At Maverick Landing there were multiple and sometimes mutually exclusive interpretations of the purpose of place. Was it built for the social (as the front porches suggested) or only the physical integration of residents (as the rule against furniture on the front porch achieved)? Some of the most prized features of Maverick Landing were its placement and pristine units, not, in Rachelle’s words, because it felt “homey” or full of life.

Was this regime the kind of community residents desired? Though management asked residents to be compliant, discussions with residents reveal that residents of both income groups were critical. They thought that the development was beautiful, but questioned the expense. They appreciated efforts to keep the buildings looking respectable but objected to certain restrictions. They liked their new surroundings but missed their old ones. But these reactions were not a confused jumble of reactions but for many a critical engagement with community. As Margaret S. related, “like I said, I love my apartment, I love the building, I like the people, but some of the rules, I don’t approve of at all.” In the townhouses and apartments of Maverick Landing people engaged in private conversations about the appropriate use of public space. I have suggested a few possible reasons for these rules, most of which it seems are in service at least in part for of staging the development for potential new tenants. Regardless these rules are not designed for interaction and in many ways dissuade it making their effect on the social environment negative. Rule enforcement also
revealed management's priorities. They placed prospective tenants first, market rate residents second and subsidized residents third.

**Introducing a Culture of Quietude**

Thee designers of Maverick assumed that the use-value of the apartments was the same for all the residents, that is that everyone wanted and needed the same quality of life in their place of residence. Yet like the diversity of perspectives at Maverick, the uniformity of appearance of Maverick belied immense heterogeneity of experiences in Maverick. While, as management stated in one flyer they sought to ensure and enforce for residents the "peaceful enjoyment" of the development, for some residents peaceful enjoyment was not possible. Others disagreed about the definition. But variation depended not just on income group but on race, location in the development, position in the lifecycle, season or social style. Such diversity suggests that a standardized approach to community may not yield the best outcome. The market rate and subsidized groups too, varied on how much they relied on their unit and the neighborhood as places to have fun.

**Cross-Class Use of Place**

Occupants' experiences varied significantly by location within the development. As Susanna S. explained, sometimes troubling behavior was generated from neighbors the Clippership housing development, an adjoining public housing development. "Ever since we moved here, like we live right next to a project, Clippership is like a project, I mean, and we, and how you gonna have a project next to supposedly a high class place?" She attributed much disruptive behavior to the residents of Clippership. Danny M. recounted how his particular location at the edge of the development seemed to attract a noisy crowd after management left in the evening, "Cause we're right on the corner, so we hear it all. People..."
hang out on the corner.” Therefore, residents in different sections of the development reported different experiences and thus proximity is just one factor when considering how diverse residents in the same community encounter one another.

Phillip also noted the greater amount of social activity occurring around the townhouses and concluded that there were fewer market rate households living in that section, “there is a difference between Midrise A and the townhouses, at least that I’ve seen. Um, at Midrise A, I would say had more of your market people.” Phillip was wrong. A townhouse unit was no less likely to be market rate than a midrise one. Likely the greater sense of similarity in Midrise than in Townhouses could be attributed to the lesser amount of quasi public space such as front lawns and porches. Without use of quasi public space residents had fewer opportunities to observe their differences.

Location in the development also determined residents’ social connections. While most residents knew their next door neighbors, few new residents had acquaintances who did not live immediately nearby (which is also why the absence of the final phases makes less of a difference when studying social relations in the development). Candy S. recalled having close friendship with Grace S. when they were both neighbors in the Old Maverick. However, Candy S. moved to Midrise A while Grace moved to midrise B. Candy and Grace had seen each other just once in the year they had lived at the new Maverick. Frank M. noted that it was unlikely he’d meet anyone besides those living on his block on Sumner Street. Mellisa S. too explained that she rarely visited the other building, “ The only time I go over there is to pay my rent.” Thus, interaction between neighbors living in the same development but in different sections was unlikely. Chances for interaction were further constrained by the
interior architecture and resident’s schedules. With laundry areas on each floor and none with seating, residents didn’t mingle or linger.

Then, a greater amount of sociability was not a function of income or ethnicity but rather of age, as Amisha S. observed that Maverick was a lot like a public housing development she formerly lived in, “you got your young teens, on one side, then you got a whole heap of young you know young men, maybe from the age of 21 to like 25. Then you got, people like my age, 34, 36, that has their own group. You know in the development like this. They all have their own group.” Amisha S. found that as residents aged, they hung out and socialized less around the development.

At Maverick subsidized residents who preferred a more sociable development were outnumbered by those who simply wanted a safe and quiet place to live. And as Amisha S. predicted, desire for quietude correlated with age. Though known by a single name, life at Maverick Landing meant different things to different people depending not just on their income but on their race, position in the lifecycle, location in the development, and social style. Interaction, then depended further on the confluence of these factors.

Subsidized Residents’ Use of Place

Sometimes, in fact, what the subsidized neighbors observed of their market rate neighbors was how little they saw of them. Al described Steve, his market rate next door neighbor. “So um, the rich people, they’re very busy… So, I saw the guy probably twice in a year and three months.” According to Edna, peopled differed not by just where one walked but how. One day she explained, “Project people have their own walks. See that lady, that lady’s from the projects. We have our own walk. Way of walking. Big and bold. Not
afraid.” Al noted too that “because everybody comes home at different hours” it was hard for people to meet one another.

Groups varied too, in how they understood the locational advantages of Maverick. Unlike perceptions of life within Maverick Landing, the use of the neighborhood beyond the development varied most consistently by income class. Many low income people identified with East Boston and saw the neighborhood as convenient. They used their apartments and the surrounding area to meet their housing needs but also other basic needs for food, fun and friendship. Maria, a subsidized resident, recalled that she had the opportunity to leave but elected to stay, “I said let’s just stay here. We’ve been in, you know, we, our life has always been in East Boston, let’s just stay here. And we know the area, the school’s right there, the clinic’s right there, the -- right there, everything’s in walkin’ distance.” Lisee felt similarly, “Uh, I think it’s fine. It so nice to have a supermarket and pharmacy close. You know, it’s very convenient. That’s one reason why I stay in East Boston.” Many subsidized residents felt connected, comfortable and committed to the greater neighborhood of East Boston.

Most subsidized residents used local services to meet their basic personal and economic needs. For health care needs, many visited East Boston Health Care center, some enlisted a local human services organization for tax assistance, and others attended programs at the East Boston Cultural Center, met grocery gaps at the local food pantry, recreation at the Paris street gym. Maverick youth attended dozens of local programs. In addition to participating in activities at the Paris Street gym, Cultural Center and YMCA, as many adults did, youth also attended programs at a Zumix, a local performing arts organization, camp and summer programs through the public and Catholic schools in the neighborhood.
The subsidized residents relied on the neighborhood to meet their basic food needs. While nearly all agreed that the local Shaw's supermarket demanded high prices for low quality goods, many subsidized residents shopped there. As John bemoaned, "Well, that Shaw supermarket is a crazy supermarket. It's very, very, very expensive. I wish we could get some competition around here, you know...That's where I shop. I have no choice." Christine complained about the prices, "cause Shaw's is killing me. I spent over $100 the other day and now I don't see any meat in my freezer."

Resident with cars usually shopped elsewhere. Vernatta shopped at "Market Basket, 'cause it's cheaper. " And on occasion, Mellisa S. and Cathy would go Haymarket to the open air market in Boston to buy fruits, vegetables and meats. Sometimes, residents would pay cab fare to shop at a lower priced store. As Sherry S.explained, "Yeah, for my groceries, I'll, I... I... prefer to go to Save A Lot in Chelsea because the prices are cheaper...Yeah, their price. Like, say like if I have $150 to shop with, Um, and say like it came to $150 at Shaw's, it would probably only come to like maybe $115, $20, at, um, Save A Lot." But the cab fare ran about $10 each way, erasing much of the savings she had accumulated.

A public bus ran near the more affordable grocery store, but the schedule was erratic and it was a long walk to and from the bus, making it difficult for residents to buy more than two bag's full of groceries. Cab fare almost eliminated any savings residents enjoyed. Carmen, who had gotten a job as the driver of the Tenant Organization's van suggested organizing a monthly shopping trip. They planned on offering the service on the 1st or the 3rd of the month, because as Mellisa S. reasoned, "most everybody does their shopping on the 1st and the 3rd." By "most everybody" Mellisa S. certainly didn't mean the market rate residents who shopped not only where but when they pleased. But for the subsidized residents food

Graves
supplies dwindled at the end of the month and on the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 3\textsuperscript{rd}, Shaw’s crowded with residents anxious to restock their kitchens.

Unfortunately, while Patty, Rachel and a few other residents worked at Shaw’s, they didn’t offer an employee discount on food. Amy, who worked for bulk grocery chain did receive a discount. However, she doesn’t shop there. As she explained, “No, well, I don’t have a car. I can’t take it on the train.” Instead, like her low-resource neighbors, she shops at Shaw’s, though she too notes, “The prices there are outrageous though.”

In addition to the Shaw’s, many residents made use of local food pantries. Some made it a social event, pairing up with another resident. Some visited the large and well known Red Cross food pantry downtown, but the Holy Redeemer also ran a small food pantry. Consumers of the food pantry received a three-day supply of groceries once a month. Al described to me a typical bag of goods, “And they give you a bunch of canned goods, you know, apple sauce and this and that and pasta and beans and they throw in a little sweets, a little candy or cake and one meat, a fish, a small ham or um a turkey during Thanksgiving and some boxed goods, some dry goods. “ Food pantries provided residents with needed supplements to the food they purchased at for profit grocers.

The subsidized residents found a myriad of low cost and no cost amusements closer to home and at home. The market rate and subsidized groups too, varied on how much they relied on their unit and the neighborhood as places to have fun. Amy liked to take her girls to an ice-cream shop located in the rear of jewelry store. Paris Street gym, where teams drew crowds as large and passionate as those at high school games, the waterfront, watch the water, the sunset, the skyline and sometimes the massive oil tankers with an entourage of police helicopters and tugboats. Residents found one place, the local Dollar store, meant many of
their needs for, ritual, entertainment and leisure. The Family Dollar, located in the nearby shopping district is within easy walking distance from Maverick. Through the front door and beyond a line of cashiers stand dozens of poorly organized but heavily stocked shelves containing items as varied as auto supplies to women’s underwear. Not all items cost a dollar, rather prices are rounded to the dollar, sometimes to the buyers’ advantage but oftentimes to the stores’. Yet the pricing seemingly simplifies the purchasing process, especially for those who only have few dollars to spend. So for many Maverick residents, the Dollar store was a venue for inexpensive entertainment. One afternoon Al returned from the Dollar store with a hand held battery-powered fan that also sprayed water. People also used the dollar store their ritual needs. At just two for one dollar, Barbara liked to buy her greeting cards there. For Halloween, Sherry S. filled her living room with a talking Jack-o-Lantern, jointed paper skeleton and imitation cobwebs, all purchased at the Family dollar. Items from the Dollar Store also featured in residents’ daily routine. Carlotta and others bought cleaning supplies there, as the housing counselors had instructed. The dollar store also carried home decor items. Barbara bought placemats and a foot stool there and Mellisa S. recalled her attempts to display her dollar store purchases. “Like at the dollar store I bought a white chair and a coffee table, two white chairs, coffee table and a plant, and I had it right there on the porch, right.. Deidre [the manager]. called me and told me I gotta get rid of it, you’re not s’posed to have it. “

The “waterpark” provided recreation and relaxation for many residents. To a middle class person a “waterpark” is a commercial destination with multiple pools and a vertical maze of colored slides. However, to the residents of Maverick, the “water park” described its location rather than its function. For them, the water park was the park next to the Boston
Harbor. The water park was in many ways, a summer social center for Maverick residents and others living nearby (see Image 9). The two acre park, framed on two sides by the Boston Harbor contained a jungle gym, a basketball court, fields used for soccer and Maverick’s annual event, “Unity Day.”
Image 9: Maverick residents enjoyed active and passive recreation at Lopresti Park, known to many as the “water park.”
In the morning, Big Dave and a few other dog owners would bring their dogs there and on nice days, an older Asian couple practiced their Tai-Chi. By themselves or in small groups, park users sat on benches around the periphery alone or with friends provided for visitors. This in itself was entertainment, as Sherry S. saw it, “Well, we really don’t have many places to go out. We don’t have much money to do anything. But, um, my mother wants to start goin’ to sit over there in the park and watch the water, because it’s right there.” The water park offered residents and neighbors a setting for diverse pursuits.

Subsidized residents, too, attempted to have fun by hosting celebrations at the development. Dolores S. and Susanna S. told me of thwarted attempts to host parties at the development. Dolores S. remembered throwing a 9th birthday party for her daughter. “*It was just the kids, but I have a lot of nieces and nephews. My brother has 5, my sister has 3, my other sister has 3 and, so, I had all the kids here and we had a party and we played Pin the Tail on the Donkey, we had a piñata, we played the balloon with the poppin’ game the, the poppin’ balloon games that the kids have to sit on ‘em. It was 7:30 at night, and I had security bangin’ my door down tellin’ me that I was makin’ too much noise. And I didn’t even have the radio on. Okay, I didn’t have music on. I had the TV on, which was on cartoons for the kids, and we were playin’ games. And the kids were yellin’ of course but they’re kids. And it’s 7:30, you know. So I had security come to my door, and he was like well, you’re makin’ too much noise, I’m gonna have to ask you to, you know, to cut it down. And I was, I said, excuse me, but it’s my daughter’s birthday.*” Susanna S. too, threw a birthday party for a friend. The young woman was and long-time foster child and Susanna S. believed had never had a birthday party thrown in her honor before. Security broke up the party and this upset Susanna S.
Residents were often not only confined to Maverick but confined in their pursuits there. Rules around behavior and limited resources reduced the kinds of activities residents could engage in. As Sherry S. explained, her “weekend routine,” “If the kids are in the house, we, like watch movies together. And then, um... we'll come downstairs and play cards with the radio on, and all four of us will play cards. If my mother’s not up to it, then me and the kids will be sittin’ in the livin’ room talkin’. Somebody will play Snoon on the computer and, you know, we’ll just talk. It’s just that, um... typical weekend, you know.” Residents tried not to make noise. For many of the market rate residents, Maverick was simply a place to sleep. For the subsidized residents, it was a place to eat, entertain, make friends, celebrate and indeed, sleep. Subsidized residents’ reported feelings of constraint were partly due to the demands they made of their housing units and these demands made it difficult to conform to the “Guidelines/Expectations of Behavior in Our Community” outlined by management.

Subsidized residents thought of coffee drinking as a ritual practiced in one another’s’ homes. Nadine S. described her coffee klatch for the women, “you know they would feed their kids and stuff and then you go and you have coffee someone brings something and you clear the table and you either play games or you play cards and you chat, and, and, and, you know and then you would go home. But it wasn’t so much wanting to stay home as having to. Amisha S. imagined the fun they would have if they had a car, “That’s one thing that sucks with us, we don’t have a car, ‘cause we’d be out of here, you know, ridin’ around.”

**Market Rate Use of the Neighborhood**

While lack of resources limited the scope of subsidized residents’ pursuits, market rate residents had no such restraints. As such, they rejected the local grocery store and other
nor they often recreate at home or near home. Thus, they rarely
 demanded better neighborhood services, they simply went elsewhere.

Marker rate residents almost uniformly avoided the Shaws’ and other local grocers, choosing to shop in town or in the suburbs. These residents were willing to pay higher prices for higher quality stores. Anna “I shop in Whole Foods... even though I know there’s a Shaw Supermarket here.” Steve explained his preference for a grocery store in suburban location, “Cause I don’t like that Shaw’s. I think that um, I work with retail so I’ve got a good grasp of sort of the retail markets and, um, I know that in areas like this? They do not care about how stores look. Or a lot of retailers don’t. Some do, like, they do a great job of giving quality experiences in urban area, especially urban areas that aren’t like the Shaw’s down over there that’s part of the ‘Pru? But the Shaw’s over here seems very much in disarray, poorly laid out. So I drive to the Stop and Shop, which is ridiculously over expensive over on 28, it’s on the corner, its 24 hours.” Steve also echoed John’s point, blaming the poor quality on lack of local options, “but I think it’s a really poorly kept market and I think it’s because you have a captive audience. Um, so, yeah, so I drive to the supermarket..” Penny M. put her dissatisfaction a little more graphically, “No, the Shaw’s is disgusting store I think. That I mean it’s a bad, it’s a, it’s a dirty little supermarket and very high priced, for their rotten vegetables..”

Marie also found that, “Sometimes it’s hard to maneuver around Shaw’s, it’s, you know they got lines out to the thing and, it’s smaller isles. So, and it, and, and if I’m lookin’ for somethin’, uh like a, a variety of stuff, you know, sometimes you’ll find it at Stop and Shop. In the case of grocery stores, then, higher resourced neighbors can opt out of using poor quality services, they will.
Market rate residents were similarly selective about shopping at other local stores, though they didn’t reject them outright. As Phillip recounted of the local discount clothing store A.J. Wright, “I shop at A.J. Wright, oh, well, I go to A.J. Wright, and you know, but there’s a different thing goin’ to A.J. Wright to find a bargain, you know, or, to just, you know, try to find something nice so you don’t have to go someplace else. And, go in there for your entire wardrobe. You know because, you know, that is your neighborhood. ..That’s all you have. That’s the only option you have. “ Penny M. too would shop there for home decor items but refused to buy clothes there, “The only thing I buy out of A. J. Wright is like these pictures. I don’t buy clothes from there. ...Not even, not even, not even a pair of drawers.” But for many subsidized residents it offered acceptable and even desirable clothes. Christine S. and Rachel spoke enthusiastically about purchases they made there.

Maverick Landing and East Boston offered few amusements for the market rate residents Marie revealed, “I’m gone like a lot, in and out, you know what I’m sayin’?” Anna admitted, “And, to be honest, on weekends I go down to Boston. Because I like to go to the movies, so I go to, to the Boston Commons where they have the movie theater and they, basically, you pass, if, I, if you get off on State, you pass by Macy’s and Filene’s, and, and then if I have to do some shopping, I do there.” From Sean M.’s perspective “there’s nothing going on in East Boston, if you want to get anywhere, you’ve got to jump on the T. I’m not a big fan of, uh, hanging out in East Boston. For no particular reason other than there’s no place I’d want to hang out. I’ll eat here but I’m not going to go out at night here.”

While subsidized residents thought of coffee drinking as a ritual practiced in one another’s’ homes, the market rate residents longed for a commercial coffee establishment that they could frequent. Sean M. and Steve both lamented the lack of coffee shops and other
urban amenities, saying in other neighborhoods “there’s a bookstore, a coffee house, something.”

**Shared Experience of Place**

Residents of both income groups found it difficult to convince management to make alterations to the exterior and common spaces at their requests. Both market rate and subsidized stood outside the front doors to smoke. Residents requested ashtray be placed there, which management undoubtedly saw as an invitation to loiter. While initially refused to install receptacles, eventually some appeared. Residents had less success with other requests. Management located the community message board, placed around the corner in the lobby of Midrise A. Additionally, the message board was encased in glass and thus management needed to approve of any items posted there. During a community meeting, several subsidized residents, in vain, requested that the message board be relocated to a more visible location. At nearly every safety meeting multiple residents requested a table for the Mid-Rise B security guard. Despite acquiescence from Mike the manager, he never fulfilled the request.

Residents, in part, had such difficulty getting a response from management because of the high staff turnover, a pattern many subsidized residents pointed out to me. In addition, the management issued monthly flyers noted the departure of four employees in eight positions in fourteen months: a property manager, the senior maintenance manager, a leasing agent and a front office administrative aid. Many residents studied the staff list that appeared on the first page of the Management monthly flyer carefully. They also noted shifting titles and changes in the number of staff listed on the flyers. Carmen pointed out the change in the staff titles, as in one month an employee’s titled shifted from “administrative staff” to “housing
specialist” the next. Patty noted that the number of staff listed had declined from month to month. Aimee observed that a property manager welcomed in one month was missing from the staff list the next, indicating that his hire at Maverick had lasted less than a month.

Clearly, not everyone observed the rules because management employed the strategy of frequent flyering, distributing notices door to door, reminding residents of select regulations and potential sanctions, such as being “written up” or “private conferenced.” This form of notification has become such a successful communication tool it promoted renegade flyering by an unauthorized group. This group distributed a flyer warning residents of the impending “New Rules” which included additional rules and heightened consequences for violators. Management hastily issued a notice denouncing the “New Rules” flyer and announcing a meeting to resolve the controversy.

Despite being held at a school gymnasium many blocks from the development, the “New Rules” meeting was one of the best attended Maverick Landing community meetings. The community safety meetings, which took place at a community meeting room at most 3 blocks from the development (see the map), never attracted more than twenty five residents and often only a dozen or so. Management held five such meetings but only two market rate residents had ever attended. Neither were residents interested in local government meetings. Residents received two flyers notifying them about an upcoming debate among contestants for the local city council seat. The debate took place about three blocks from Maverick Landing, but no Maverick Landing resident attended.

In contrast, more than fifty residents, meeting including several market rate households, walked or carpooled the half mile to the school auditorium to attend the “new rules” meeting. Unfortunately, the new rules were not discussed at the meeting. Management
assumed responsibility for the agenda setting and residents received a type-written agenda, which listed a variety of concerns to be discussed, such as security, maintenance and laundry rooms, but made no mention of the rules. Management left after the first few minutes, leaving the meeting to be run exclusively by the president of the tenants’ organization. Lacking any skilled facilitation abilities, the president was unable to steer the conversation and several residents used the meeting as a forum to discuss specific concerns. Danny, a market rate resident recalled frustration with the proceedings and walking out early.

Yet, despite the failure to follow the agenda, the attendance at the meeting suggests that residents are interested in discussing residential governance. In contrast to community safety meetings, which were poorly attended, and city councilmen debates, which attracted no residents, many Maverick Landing residents attended the “new rules” meeting, suggesting a greater interest in discussing codified community conduct.

Thus, while many subscribed to the rather abstract ideal of peaceful enjoyment of their apartment home, a few questioned whether management’s rule structure the only way to achieve this aim. The rules of conduct at Maverick Landing are a case of what DiMaggio (1983) calls institutional isomorphism. “In Hawley’s (1968) description, isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.” The professional management company arrived with a top-down, standardized set of rules and operating procedures. As DiMaggio suggests, the conformity evident at Maverick reflects a tendency for organizations to mimic readily available models. The management staff implemented policies, procedures and structured which had been applied, successfully, they would argue, in other settings. The reasons for similarity in structure for this are two fold, one, as DiMaggio notes, isomorphism results from
managers with similar training and education tend to arrive at solutions in a similar fashion. Secondly, institutional actors in isomorphic models are easily interchangeable. Given the high level of turnover of staff turnover at Maverick, it was useful that the rules at Maverick were similar to the rules in other professionally managed communities. New actors did not need to be trained to perform unique duties at Maverick. As DiMaggio notes, “the advantages of mimetic behavior in the economy of human action are considerable; when an organization faces a problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, problemistic search may yield to a viable solution with little expense.”

However, as DiMaggio also notes, an organization that settles for conformity is less likely to innovate. That is, at best, the isomorphic organization will meet the level of success achieved by an existing model, but it will never exceed these successes, it can only be a facsimile of the original. An organization that only seeks to imitate will never innovate. Thus at Maverick, management imposed a rule structure which set to meet certain predetermined goals. Yet such a structure meant Maverick could be a decent place, but to be a better place probably required a break from the “iron cage” of isomorphism. Given the diversity of perspectives and pursuits, the “experimental” nature of mixed income communities, the ideal of interaction, a more creative, flexible and responsive approach could be taken. Moreover, the manifest willingness among residents to discuss residential governance revealed the capacity.

Chapter Summary: From Project to Product

This chapter looked at the interactions between people and place and the potential for social relations those relationships implied. While the physical design of Maverick suggested sociability, many constraints were placed on its use. Moreover, despite the economic
diversity of the development, the public-private spaces signaled middle class design ideals, previewing a structural disparity discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Moreover, rules prevented residents from personalizing their space, leaving them unable to signal class but also interest, beliefs or anything else to communicate their perspective their neighbors. The uniformity of appearance of Maverick was matched by a uniformity of routine. The public-private spaces were most often occupied by institutional actors and rarely punctuated by observable interaction. Thus while a visitor might mistake the conformity evident in the exterior spaces of Maverick Landing for a shared, informal code of conduct, this was not the case. It reflected a formal rule structure. Residents instead critically engaged with their surroundings, offering a variety of observations and assessments about the built environment – expressing views on its appearance, its management, its impact on their lives and what that implied about the prospects for interaction. But while Maverick matched the design of the surrounding neighborhood, it functioned quite differently. Moreover, while residents reported themselves changing, they had difficulty engaging management in discussions of change to their environment.

In addition, this chapter attempted to highlight the differences in use-value by class. Market rate residents found the guidelines easier to follow not just because they conformed to their cultural expectations of domestic conduct but because so many of their pursuits were conducted elsewhere. The grocery store was one of the starkest contrasts in how residents used neighborhood services. This suggests that high resourced residents are more likely to choose exit instead of voice when confronting substandard neighborhood services. Where the market rate residents made use of greater Boston’s restaurants, entertainment venues, shopping destinations and recreation facilities, the subsidized residents found a
myriad of low cost and no cost amusements closer to home and at home. So while market rate residents might be out and about, subsidized residents are likely to be found at or near home. The subsidized residents then needed their place of residents to accommodate a variety of uses.

In the third next section, I suggested that standardized approaches to enforcing quality of life impede innovation on how to improve quality of life. Residents, both in their private discussions and in public forums showed an active interest in discussing governance. Though management asked residents to be compliant, discussions with residents reveal that residents of both income groups were critical. Such attitudes suggest the possibility for engaging residents in discussions about community conduct and the opportunity for equal status contact, as will be discussed in my final chapter.
Chapter 5: The Implementation Chain: How Federal and Regional Actors Influenced Social Relations at Maverick Landing

Introduction

Before delving deeper into the relations among Maverick residents, recipients of policy intervention, a review of the actions and intentions of high-level policy makers is in order. Too often, analyses of social relations in mixed income developments have treated these developments as states of nature and without thoroughly examining the nature of the state. This analysis shares much in common with Pressman and Wildavsky’s approach to policy analysis, Implementation (1979) but differs distinctly three dimensions. First, this implementation analysis too reviews “long sequences of decisions involving multiple participants” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979, 142). However, Pressman and Wildavsky followed a trail from “glorious aims” to “ignoble results” of a first generation that ultimately failed. Much of HOPE VI was implemented. Consequently, I needed to extend my analysis. In the Maverick case, this trail takes me further along the implementation chain from the actions of high-level national actors, to mid-level administrators and corporate actors, to “street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1979) and “company men and women” to, most importantly here, the perspective of the actual individual recipients of the intervention: Maverick residents.

Second, Implementation focused on "problems with cooperation" in implementation, I focus more on issues of cooptation. Zhang (2004) shows where the HOPE VI policy is a reflection of “entrepreneurs” who see opportunities for policy making where their goals aligned. She thus foreshadowed a spirit of entrepreneurship that carried through to other levels. Others found this in the area of physical design.
Finally, this chapter and the one that follows look at decision making in implementation from the political economy perspective. This analysis suggests rather than powerful ideas (the utility of social capital), ideas of the powerful which were implemented. Discouraged from developing social capital, the residents of Maverick experienced few interpersonal gains from mixed-income developments. This fragmented social structure was not so much created by Maverick residents as for them.

I begin then, by suggesting how actions even at the highest level, the Federal government, impact or aim to impact social relations among local individual actors. In so doing, I suggest four areas where the actions and intentions of high-level actors may have affected interaction among subsidized and market rate residents. I include here high level actors who initiate or influence policy making. These include Federal policy makers as well as urban scholars and high profile practioners. The agendas of these actors particularly impacted interaction among the recipients of the policy by advocating particular physical forms, encouraging certain kinds of encounters, dispensing specific information and creating a specific social structure. After reviewing these impacts, I will then trace what aspects of the high level agenda appeared in the next link in the implementation chain – corporate, state and city actors.

While it is popular to point out how little of the intentions of high level policy makers appear at the implementation stage, here I seek to highlight how the often lower level administrators implemented the explicit directions of policymakers. On the obvious flipside, I trace how themes that policy makers left vague or implicit rarely appeared at the next link in the implementation chain. I call this next link in implementation the “mid level.” Mid-level agents receive and interpret high level policy, eventually handing it down to local level...
administrators or “street level bureaucrats” and “company men and women.” Mid level agents include those who planned for or developed anticipation of Maverick Landing. The planners include redevelopment team, including CEO of the Boston Housing Authority, the architecture firm and the national management corporation contracted to run daily operations. Through coverage of the redevelopment, local press created anticipation for the redevelopment.

In the second half of this chapter, I then trace how the high-level agenda reached the mid level actors, and then how mid level actors -- in the physical forms they advocated, in the encounters they encouraged, in the information they dispensed, and the social structure enforced -- potentially impacted interaction among income groups. Three themes from this analysis emerge, first how attentive mid level actors were to implementing the high-level agenda, second how high-level ambiguity was co-opted at the mid level and third how agenda-setting even at the most abstract level can influence how individuals regard one another in a concrete social setting.

The National Level Agenda for Mixed Income Housing

The Physical Form of Redeveloped Housing

As detailed in previous chapters, HUD administrators, housing policy makers and scholars placed emphasis on physical redevelopment. While HUD proffered “liberty” with respect to physical transformation, several consistent design themes emerged from these national level actors. Two core principles guided the physical design and their impact can be seen in how developments were built and experienced. The design movement, “New urbanism” neatly articulated most of the design ideals, which emphasized architecture that integrated the development into the neighborhood. Secondly, notions of defensible space
informed national actors' design principles. These used design to emphasize safety and an individualized sense of control over space. Yet neither of the design schemes focused particularly on using design to foster interaction.

HUD embraced New urbanist design principles, promoting redesigning housing projects into "integral parts of their broader community, indistinguishable from (or possibly better than) private development" (Zhang, 2004). The new urbanist design program explicitly stated that, “New Urbanism promotes the end of segregation between rich and poor” (The Congress for the New Urbanism 2002). HUD officials echoed this ideal, stating, “The goal of New Urbanism is to promote diverse and livable communities with a greater variety of housing types, land uses, and building densities—in other words, to develop and maintain a melting pot of neighborhood homes serving a wide range of household and family sizes, ages, cultures, and incomes.” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1996b, 5-6). The Congress for The New Urbanism recommended agents achieve this by “adopting a consistent and distinctive architectural style that draws on local history, culture, geography, and climate (Congress for the New Urbanism 2000).” Consequently, for high level actors, creating a ‘melting pot of neighborhood homes” meant designing public housing that integrated the housing into the neighborhoods’ evident architectural history.

In addition to reintegrating the development into the neighborhood, high level agents also advocated that the high and low income units integrate seamlessly with one another. In its publication "Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design” HUD promoted developing “housing units of various types that share similar design features, making affordable housing indistinguishable from other types” (Weiss 2000). Yet at both the neighborhood and housing development context, physical integration was treated as synonymous with social integration.
and agents supplied no further direction. As Bohl stated, "limited literature exists on these inner-city applications of new urbanism" (Bohl, 2000). Like mixing, there was little evidence that new Urbanism could achieve these goals.

Additionally, high level actors sought to upgrade the public housing stock. In the late 1990s, several senators issued a letter to HUD, writing, "We recognize that controlling costs and at the same time creating mixed income communities is extremely difficult to balance, but we are concerned that your proposed policy is too restrictive to achieve our mutual goals in redeveloping public and mixed income housing." Marketing to higher income residents would require higher cost construction. As HOPE VI chief Elinor Bacon stressed, HOPE VI developments, order to compete in the housing marketplace must "go beyond merely meeting functional standards of habitability and must instead provide amenities that families with choice typically demand" (Zhang, 2004, 159). In order to make marketable developments, designers needed not only to erase the stigma of poverty but also the impression of affordability New Urbanism, with its track record of attracting middle income households in greenfield developments and the suburbs met the marketable design criteria. Pressure to build projects appealing to more resourced households led high level actors to advocate physical designs which more than matched the surrounding housing conditions, they elevated them.

The secondary inspiration for urban design came from "defensible space." HOPE VI policy makers also aimed for the physical form to significantly improve the safety and security of the redeveloped projects. Newman (1972) identified "defensible space" a method of crime prevention through environmental design. "Fewer common areas and more private and semiprivate space for residents result (Popkin, 2004, p20)." Defensible space principles
did not attend to social interaction with the emphasis on individualized areas protecting residents from outsiders and possibly each other.

Yet several aspects of New Urbanist design principles sent a message about the dominance of middle class design preferences. First, New Urbanism was an elite generated, top down design ideology and second, critics noted that may not be suited to diversity. With a congress and a charter, New Urbanism is a centralized and singular enterprise. While the charter promotes that those executing plans incorporate local history and culture into their design, this bottom-up notion is generated from the top. This dictate demands local actors engage in a design provincialism which they may or may not support. It does not consider how tentative or ambivalent current residents’ connection to the past may be. Ironically, former public housing design ideology dictate that architecture be used to symbolically distance the development from the neighborhood (Vale, 2005). Whatever forms of historic dominance are reflected in architecture are brought into the present.

New Urbanism seeks to promote diversity by, “encouraging the provision of a range of housing prices and housing types in each community” and “attracting middle-income professionals to stigmatized and marginalized poor communities.”(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002), but the dominant sources of diversity in HOPE VI neighborhoods are middle income households (Day, 2003). The New Urbanist design vision chiefly supports the demands of middle-class professionals “by promoting safety, such as by carefully screening tenants and by adopting “defensible space” strategies (e.g., breaking up super blocks, assigning public space to individual households, etc.) (cf. Weiss 2000)…“absent is any discussion of group differences in culture, values, lifestyles, attitudes, and so on. In true “color-blindness” (Frankenberg 1993; Omi and Winant 1994; Shibley 1998), New Urbanist
design principles assume that, outside of disparities in income, different groups of residents are basically similar.” Day (2003) argues that ultimately New Urbanism achieves a sense of community through a “denial of difference” and thus represses social difference. In denying diversity, designs following New Urbanist principles, then, may not be supportive of interaction among diverse groups.

Rather than focusing on design to facilitate interaction in HOPE VI developments, the main national level agenda was to create good-looking (according to middle class sensibilities), safe neighborhoods. The imperative to recruit market rate households and destigmatize projects necessitated designers to rub out the appearance of affordability and allow middle class design preferences to dominate. This suggested a concern for the impression of the neighborhood but less attention to neighboring. High level actors placed their confidence in how design could facilitate neighborhood architectural integration and safety but not necessarily interaction.

**Encouraging Encounters in Redeveloped Housing**

High level actors also had an impact on interaction in the encounters they encouraged and discouraged. Actors at the national level enthusiastically endorsed the notion of income mixing. Yet, a lack of thought about how social encounters would be encouraged was evident. As noted in earlier chapters, Wilson's work on the impoverished social networks of the “truly disadvantaged,” Putnam’s analysis of the role of social capital in varying economic settings, Granovetter’s insight into how various types of ties benefit people in various spots in the social structure all led policymakers to place a priority on the need to deconcentrate poverty and encourage local authorities to replace existing distressed public housing with presumably healthier, mixed-income communities (Popkin, 2004, p14). Additionally, Zhang

Graves

156
(2004) noted, "by the time Wilson and Putnam became widely cited in academic journals, HUD and the PHAs had already pursued "dispersal strategies" and "mixed-income developments" to address poverty concentration through housing policy. Thus, high level actors intended for residents of different income levels to encounter one another.

While income mixing was strongly recommended, federal actors did not elaborate on how to encourage the social mixing necessary to produce social capital. In Housing Policy Debate, the Boston Housing Authority’s former receiver Harry Spence suggested that the benefits of economic integration would come in the form of social capital (Spence 1993). "For the past decade, the nation's public housing policy has systematically set about creating public housing neighborhoods that are utterly devoid of social capital." He advocated that agents should bring to developing social capital to the forefront of their agendas. Thus, high level officials, while subscribing to the notion of social capital, were less specific about how to encourage encounters among middle and low income residents.

Alternatively, national actors became increasingly attentive to assuring that low-income residents would continue to encounter one another. They placed focus on protecting subsidized residents from displacement, including residents in the planning process and assuring that subsidized residents have access to supportive services. Likening HOPE VI to urban renewal programs of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, critical publications such as "False HOPE: A Critical Assessment of the HOPE VI Public Housing Redevelopment Program" (2002) focused on the exclusion of public housing families from HOPE VI opportunities and the lack of resident participation in early incarnations of the program.

Some suggested that mixing should not be the primary motivation. Smith questioned the social utility of mixed-income strategies, especially on the ground of social equity (Smith
Vale suggested working with public housing residents through vigilant security provisions, diligent maintenance, and rule enforcement, "the more pressing public policy question is whether they should be reclaimed for continued occupancy by extremely low-income households" (2002). If well done, such measures might obviate the need for adding a tier or market rate residents. Retaining units for the truly disadvantaged does not respond to the sociological vision that residential mixing enables residents not just to thrive but flourish. But perhaps more importantly, retaining public housing for very poor people would do little to aid neighborhood economic development, another goal of the policy. Consequently Vale and Smith's unmasks the ambiguity as to whether the people or the place should be the beneficiaries of redevelopment.

Such critiques led to a subsequent push for resident empowerment and self-sufficiency. High level actors called for residents' inclusion in the redevelopment process and the provision of support residents would need to move toward financial independence (Zhang, 2004). HUD's General Guidelines for HOPE VI redevelopment (2001) stressed the participation of public housing residents living at HOPE VI sites, calling full resident involvement a "crucial element." HUD also called for the involvement of the "surrounding community." But again, no potential role is cited for incoming members of this community, the additional market rate households that the redevelopment aims to attract. Implementers could have achieved such a measure through focus groups or preconstruction leasing. In addition agents sought to raise the incomes and self sufficiency of existing public-housing tenants through a variety of services including job training, educational programs, health services, childcare services, and leadership development. High level actors the explicitly
encouraged bridge building between low income residents and the supportive services agents designated to aid them.

High level actors also envisioned the potentially positive encounters between market rate residents and the institutions responsible for serving them. Theoretically, institutional viability was of even greater importance in a mixed neighborhood than social relationships in a heterogeneous neighborhood setting. According to Wilson (1987), the "the presence of stable working and middle-class families in the ghetto provides mainstream role models that reinforce mainstream values pertaining to employment, education and family structure. But, in the final analysis, a far more important effect is the institutional stability that these families are able to provide in their neighborhoods because of their greater economic and educational resources, especially during periods of economic downturn" (Wilson, 1987, p144). National level observers assumed that in mixed communities, low- resourced neighbors would share access to high quality institutions.

Hope VI policy makers also stressed that they expected that the end the isolation of the public housing agencies by handing over day-to-day management operations to management companies familiar with operating in the private sector. High-level actors were eager to avail themselves of the solutions from experienced market-driven housing administrators, especially those familiar with mixed income developments (Zhang, 2004). Moreover, as Zhang noted, “At a time when the public sector was perceived as synonymous with incompetence and as part of the problem, not the solution, the politically popular choice turned out to be, not surprisingly, the private sector.” They then encouraged partnerships with actors from the broader housing community. Macro-level agents though focused on private agencies’ ability to build mixed income housing, rather than their ability to build community.
Providing Information about Income Mixing in Redeveloped Housing

High level actors also began to impact interaction in the information they suggested be dispensed and withheld regarding mixing. To begin, Federal policy never specified how information about mixing should be publicized to the residents leaving it ambiguous whether the mixed income structure was to be explicit or implicit to the population living in the redeveloped housing. Neither did policy makers indicate whether new neighbors should know that they were participating in a mixing scheme. Hence no theorizing occurred in the abstract as to whether knowledge of the mix would such enhance or detract from socializing.

However, Federal level planners placed much emphasis on keeping low-income residents informed and seeking their collaboration. HUD evaluated applications by existing resident groups’ level of participation and support for the redevelopment plan. The agency urged applicants to demonstrate to resident involvement both in the application phase as well as the redevelopment phase. As Jonathan Cohn of the New Republic noted, “Jack Kemp, the former secretary of housing and urban development … believed the way to save public housing was to make residents more responsible for their own communities by giving them incentives to take control…It's up to the tenants of the old projects, working with local housing authorities, to apply for that money” (Cohn, 2005). Yet high level actors encouraged no analogous collaboration from new resident groups. Federal authorities then urged grant applicants to plan for but not plan with incoming higher income residents.

Rather, the most readily available information about the role of middle income residents was their economic infusion. National actors linked stagnant local economic growth to the blighted state of public housing parcels. They cited HOPE VI redevelopment as a potential catalyst for neighborhood economic development. Actors further strengthened the
link between redevelopment funds and local economic growth by stipulating that local housing authorities use the HOPE grant to leveraging funds locally. Investments by private entities not only assured the project’s economic self sufficiency but also assured a vested interest from the private sector.

And Zhang (2004) suggests it was policy entrepreneurs who matched growth machine mentality to public outrage over substandard public housing. Advocates for mixed income housing saw an opportunity in the coupling public housing’s failures with economic growth. For example, in 1998 lawmakers noted the “mutual goals in redeveloping public and mixed income housing." They urged for an increase in per unit spending in order to attract middle income residents and achieve the mutual goals. Thus the information generated at the national level concerned the role market rate households would have in economic infusion. Adding the potential for growth to poverty alleviation and hinging it on the economic power of middle income residents made HOPE VI a viable policy.

The partnership most explicitly sought from market rate tenants and market forces was growth not just in the development but as a mechanism for neighborhood wide transformation. HOPE VI was framed an essential part in the growth machine (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Policymakers often seemed to suggest that it was the place as much as people that stood to benefit as they argued that a significant infusion of capital into public housing would be necessary to spur growth.

The Social Structure of Mixed Income Housing

A certain structural disparity was inherent too in high-level HOPE VI actors’ vision of mixed income developments. In seeking to incorporate former public housing residents and market rate residents, at its very foundation, mixed income developments house households
originating from different ends of the housing market spectrum. This leaves implementers needing to offer housing that competes in the middle income private marketplace and is financially accessible housing to those unable to afford housing in the private market. The market rate households can exit easily into similarly priced units throughout the private market. Even in the tightest rental market, the vacancy rate in the private housing market is never zero and averages about 5 percent. The subsidized households, however, have limited exit options because they have been priced out of the private market. Their exit options are confined to other subsidized housing opportunities. Historically, the demand for subsidized housing has far exceeded supply.

High level actors coupled this structural disparity with the mandate that housing be self sufficient, revenue generating and at least partially privately financed. Self sufficiency meant subsidized housing would no longer rely on public agencies for their administration. In the decision to encourage public housing authorities hand control over operations to private entities, they transferred authority to organizations who ultimately seek to generate profits. To that end, HUD permitted private entities to receive operating subsidies and certain capital dollars on public housing sites (Zhang, 2004). Also, not only did policy makers stipulate that HOPE VI projects should be operated by private sector agents but incorporate their financing models as well. Agents encouraged housing authorities to partner with private housing developers who had developed solutions using alternative housing finance which allowed them to serve very poor households while still generating profits. Thus, policy makers looked to models created by affordable housing developers and their alternative housing financing schemes. These schemes succeeded in profiting by combining groups with different amounts of leverage in the housing market.
However, high-level actors didn’t consider how groups’ varying leverage may impact social relations. As Hirschman (1970) theorizes, the benefit gained from organizations might depend on individuals’ attachments to them. He notes how unhappy consumers usually register their dissatisfaction with a firm or institution by abandoning it – exercising their “exit” option rather than “voice” (to signal dissatisfaction). “The presence of the exit option can sharply reduce the possibility that the voice option will be taken up widely and effectively... voice is likely to play an important role in organizations only on condition that exit is virtually ruled out (Hirschman, 77). Applying this logic to behavior in the mixed income housing market, one finds two sets of consumers: market rate households who can choose among many housing options and will exit mixed income housing (and perhaps local institutional attachments) if they are dissatisfied and subsidized households who have far fewer options must often remain in public housing despite their dissatisfaction. Additionally, higher-status people have more resources for exercising voice and higher expectations that they will be listened to when they use their voices. As Wilson noted, “At the present time many resident of isolated inner-city neighborhoods have no other option but to remain in those neighborhoods” (Wilson, 1997, 158). Hirschman would label this behavior as “loyalty,” although it is the compromised sort of captives. When residents bring complaints to management, they are exercising their “voice.” But residents’ attachments to the institution may affect their ability to exercise voice.

One of the most effective ways to get institutions to respond to demands is to threaten exit or to use an exit options as leverage. Clearly, then, one obvious “disadvantage” that the subsidized residents face is the disadvantage of having no exit option. While the market rate residents can make credible threats to exit to encourage institutions to meet their demands,
subsidized residents can make no similar threat. There are far fewer subsidized housing units than there are qualified households. The demand for subsidized units exceeds supply and this places workers at a structural disadvantage. The waiting list for public housing or for housing vouchers is years long in many big cities; demand dwarfs supply in tight housing markets, such as Boston, in particular. Those unhappy with the institution are easily replaced. Residents' awareness of their structural disadvantage minimizes voice.

In combining residents with different kinds of leverage, mixed income developments have inherent structural disparity. As Joseph notes, "while certain improved community amenities may meet the needs of all residents, there may be important instances where the needs and priorities of low income resident differ from that of other residents. The unequal distribution of influence among residents may lead to community benefits that are not necessarily accessible or valuable to all residents" (Joseph, 2006, 11). Joseph doesn't speculate on what these benefits might be. Additionally, by handing authority over to organizations that seek to operate independently and profitably, high level actors put middle income residents at a further advantage. Management’s response to the structural disparity inherent in mixed income communities may have important consequences for both interaction and safety in mixed income communities.

National Level Agenda: Summary

As detailed in previous chapters, HUD administrators, housing policy makers and scholars placed emphasis on physical redevelopment. HUD embraced New Urbanist design principles and those of “defensible space.” Rather than focusing on design to facilitate interaction in HOPE VI developments, the main high level agenda was to building good-looking, safe neighborhoods. High level actors placed their confidence in how design could
enhance neighborhood integration, aesthetics, investments and safety but not necessarily interaction.

High-level actors also began to have an impact on interaction in the encounters they encouraged and discouraged. The notion of income mixing appealed to those working at this level yet there was an evident a lack of thought about how social encounters would be encouraged. They were much more concerned with how to avoid negative encounters. Moreover, while strongly recommending bridging exchanges between income groups, federal officials did not elaborate. Rather they advanced a not very well examined assumption that proximity produces interaction.

Alternatively, high level actors became increasingly attentive to assuring that low-income residents continue to have bonding exchanges with one another and the supportive services agents designated to aid them. They also expressed confidence that encounters between market rate residents and the institutions responsible for serving them would have positive outcomes for all. High level actors, also placed confidence in private agencies’ ability to build mixed income housing, but placed less emphasis on their ability to build community.

No speculation occurred on this level as to whether residents’ knowledge of the mix would such enhance or detract from socializing. Yet Federal level planners placed much emphasis on keeping low-income residents informed and seeking their collaboration. High-level actors, then, did not foresee a role for the market rate residents for community building. Rather, the most readily available information about the role of middle income residents was their role in providing economic infusion. In incorporating the private sector into the
redevelopment plan, high level actors added profit-generation as a goal for mixed income communities.

A certain structural disparity was inherent too in high-level HOPE VI agents’ designs for mixed income developments. Policy makers coupled this structural disparity with the mandate that housing be self sufficient. Such schemes succeeded in profiting by combining groups with different amounts of leverage in the housing market. However, high level actors didn’t consider how groups’ varying leverage might impact social relations as the groups become aware of their differing levels of power within the same institution.

Thus, national actors approached HOPE VI with many agendas. They designed to serve the truly disadvantaged, to be an agent of the growth machine, and to promote of a progressive social vision of bringing residents who usually avoided each other in the housing setting. In this way HOPE VI not only wore many hats, but had many heads on which to wear them. To save public housing, it was this hydra HUD dispatched to public housing’s doorsteps.

**Mid Level Agendas for Mixed Income Housing**

Mid-level actors linked the high-level policy analysts, scholars and Federal administrators to the “street level” administrators and “company men and women” who actually intersected with recipients. Actors at this level represent the collaborators responsible for planning, publicizing and executing the redevelopment. In the Maverick context, the mid level agents include not only those holding positions at the Boston Housing Authority, but also private sector firms: the corporate actors including the development firm partner, Trinity Financial, ICON, the architecture firm selected to design the site and Roseville Development,
the firm contracted to manage the new Maverick Landing. The local press took on the role of disseminating the mid level actors’ messages.

Mid level actors rarely involved themselves directly in the daily lives of residents of the new Maverick. In fact, most of their work took place in the pre-construction planning stages. Nonetheless, their actions affected the residents’ daily lives and their social relations. Mid level agents received and reinterpreted the agenda for redevelopment conceived at the national level as well as taking on an entrepreneurial role by introducing new agendas themselves. Here, I trace the impact of their perspective had on the physical forms constructed, the encounters they encouraged and discouraged, the information they dispensed and withheld and the social structure they created and enforced.

As Zhang (2004) noted,” local housing authorities emerged as new policy entrepreneurs, supplying their own solutions.” Officials at the Boston Housing Authority echoed Zhang’s observation as they made explicit the ad hoc nature of implementation, writing they “must think ‘outside the box’ because [HOPE VI] is a new way of doing business or ‘invent as you go’” (Boston Housing Authority, 2005). The high level emphasis on creativity and autonomy not only anticipated but expected that local implementers would enact alternative interventions to the ones conceived at the Federal level.

In the Maverick context, mid-level actors focused on physical redevelopment and the potential for the redevelopment to spark economic development in the neighborhood. Mid level actors made much of the potential relationship between the development and the larger neighborhood while indicating little about potential social relations among residents within the development. As such, discussions of the redevelopment plan featured the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), Trinity Financial and Icon Architecture. Yet mid level actors
offered very little information about the intended role of the management corporation who they were entrusting with the ongoing oversight of the development. The firm they selected was experienced at managing both conventional market rate developments as well as mixed income development.

**Mid Level Plans for Physical form**

Like those at the national level, at the mid level, actors placed much emphasis on physical redevelopment. In a memo, a BHA employee summarized the objectives of the HOPE VI program. The first objective was to “change the physical shape of public housing” (Boston Housing Authority, 2005). As such, plans for the development incorporated many of the new urbanist and defensible space ideals. Mid level actors were attentive to new urbanist mandates about the aesthetic quality of the new development that had given it much middle class appeal and the reincorporated the city streets into the public housing parcel. They also observed the conventions of defensible space, especially emphasizing the individuation of the new units. Yet like the high-level actors, little in their plans suggested how design could encourage interaction.

For mid level actors, emphasis on new urbanist aesthetics belied the image of Maverick as an affordable community. As a representative of Trinity stated, “the design has to be top notch to attract people that have other housing choices.” A news article describing the new development suggested that Trinity succeeded in offering that attraction. The design earned approval from the local observers and design professionals. “The new development includes many colorful three-story clapboard buildings. The complex was designed by ICON Architecture Inc. of Boston. Last year, Affordable Housing Finance Magazine deemed it the best project in the country.” (Globe, May 15, 2007). And as Boston Housing Authority CEO Graves
Sandra Henriquez explained, the units matched middle class aesthetics and each other, “the only way someone would know how much a neighbor made would be to speak with them” (New Boston Conference, June 2007). As advocated at the Federal level, the design conceived at the mid level did not distinguish the units.

However, mid level actors often noted the reclaimed streets, echoing high-level new urbanist design guidelines. The housing authority sought generally to redesign the development to “provide an increased sense of community and interconnectedness,” (BHA, 2005) yet to achieve this interconnectedness, “the fundamental urban design concept is to remove the monolithic super-block of the existing Maverick site and restore the historic neighborhood street pattern, reconnecting the site to the surrounding community.” The integration of the public housing parcel and city streets too became an often cited innovation by the press. In an early article the Boston Globe detailed, “In phase one, with its 150 units in a six-story mid-rise and four town houses, three city streets that were cut off to build a public housing super-block are being rebuilt. Border, Liverpool, and London streets will reconnect Maverick to the rest of East Boston behind it and to the water in front of it, with stunning views of the harbor and the skyline that include the USS Constitution in Charlestown and the new convention center in South Boston.” (Diesenhouse, 2004) Later, the Boston Globe lauded the “reclaimed streets eliminated by the previous project” (Palmer, 2007). The press, the housing authority and development architects favored the ideal of connecting Maverick with the neighborhood. Yet they made few if any reference to how the new design facilitated connecting Maverick neighbors to each other.

Mid-level actors also realized high-level defensible space ideals, creating fewer common areas and more private and semiprivate space for residents. Architectural efforts to
individualize the exteriors of the units also received media attention. The lead architect from ICON on the project, Nancy Ludwig explained, “And as much as you can, you want everyone to have their own front stoop or patio so that each resident can put an individual mark on where they live” (Boston Herald, November 1, 2002). In a later presentation Ludwig noted that she designed the development so that Maverick residents could have individualized units, distinguished from neighbors by unique address and color. They also designed them so that residents would be responsible for bringing their personalized trash barrels to the curb and maintaining their own front stoop (Henriquez, New Boston Conference, 2007). ICON, then conceived of architectural design as facilitating individual expression. Again, Trinity, the private developer, underscored the importance of individuation, remarking, “through design you create a community that’s more marketable, more secure and creates a strong sense of individual homes that residents can be proud to live in” (Boston Herald, November 1, 2002).

For the redevelopment team, a sense of individuality and security define good physical design. Importantly, too, as the Trinity agent suggested, good design is distinguished by its marketability.

Over an eighteen-month period, mid-level officials including Boston’s Mayor and both Massachusetts outgoing and incoming Governors appeared at Maverick to conduct four press conferences. Each time they pointed to Maverick’s brightly painted townhouses, remarked on the lovely landscaping and noted the enviable views. They toured the development, inspected the model unit and said a few words. Repeatedly, mid level actors focused on the observable, visual experience, Representative Anthony Petruccelli liked Maverick for its looks, “Now, this is a model of what public housing should look like across Massachusetts." Form, not
function received fanfare while potential for Maverick as a social environment received little focus.

Few noted the “mid-rise” at either end of the development, despite the fact that they housed the majority of the Maverick residents. This likely pleased the redevelopment agents who had disregarded Federal guidelines when constructing them. As a former housing authority official recalled, “One of the things we were dealing with at the time was that HUD had this no mid-rise rule, just no mid-rise.” HUD objected to high rises because they too supported entryways for each unit. The local housing authority agent, however, believed, “if you manage it well, you do the evictions you should do, keep the elevators running, keep your hallways lit, it works in many cities all over the world, including New York.” But the official further reasoned that mid-rise were necessary to maximize resident retention.

Given HUD’s explicit restrictions on building with elevators, the housing authority agent planned to deceive the Federal agency. “So actually worked with the community to get to the point where they knew we had two plans. We had the plan we had to submit to score OK and we had the plan we all wanted to do. And the community and the neighbors were really supportive. They knew, it was commonsense that they would get some of the water views and everything but they knew what we were doing. SO we submitted the plan without the mid-rises and then we went for the waiver and got the OK to do the mid-rise after we were all in the door.” Thus it was in the physical design that some of the most innovative strategizing was made by local implementers. The incident too, indicates that mid level agents had not achieved consensus about the physical design. For some, mid-rise they did not conform to their ideal of individuation. Yet others saw them as necessary not just for aesthetic integrity but to serve the population. Thus, such “outside the box” thinking by
“policy entrepreneurs” included circumventing Federal guidelines. This selective approach conforms to what Elliot, Gotham and Milligan (2004) observed in the creative application of New Urbanism in a HOPE VI development in their study.

Careful design planning, much of it responding to high-level directives, allowed the physical design of Maverick to receive significant attention at the mid level. The design functioned as something identifiable to a market rate population as appealing and attractive, if, as the housing authority agent noted it was a stylized version of housing that gave the units a full scale look of dollhouses (Goddard, 2006). Secondly, mid level actors focused on the efforts to reunite the public housing parcel with the city streets and thus the development to the neighborhood. Finally, many mid level actors stressed the importance of individuation and reducing the amount of shared spaced. As with the high-level actors, mid level actors said little about how the physical design could achieve uniting residents with one another.

**Mid Level Plans for Resident Interaction**

At the highest level, HOPE VI planners envisioned not just physical but social integration yet said little about how this could be achieved. Mid level agents responded to this ambiguity with ambiguity of their own. In the grant application HUD accepted from the Boston Housing made no mention of the purpose of mixing in the proposed Maverick Landing. The single detail about income mixing came in the form of the planned percentage, 80% subsidized and 20% market rate. The grant application did not make explicit why or to what ends they proposed this particular mix, which could have financial or social motivations. One or two assumptions emerge from this omission, and mid level agents held differing assumptions. The first was that social connectivity is synonymous with physical connectivity. Neighbors living next door to one another necessarily socialize with one another. Reiterating...
high-level ideals, the CEO of the Boston Housing authority explained that one of the purposes of income mixing was to break isolation, provide residents and especially youth to additional role models, create opportunities for connections, and add to residents’ social networks. She even added, that “neighbors talk over the fence might learn about job opportunities” (New Boston Conference, June 2007). This perspective reflects the assumption that social connectivity would result from physical connectivity.

The other mid level agent’s assumption was that physical connectivity is unrelated to social connectivity. As an author of the grant application stated, “I actually would argue against what I think is a small sense of community. There is no other neighborhood in Boston where you go in and you make a circle around a certain set of streets and you say, ‘there should be a community.’ And in fact if it is working, that blends such that you don’t say that. And I also think in 2000 you have to think about what community means. If parents are working or otherwise in job training, and their kids are, particularly in Boston, not going to neighborhood schools, and then going to after school programs, and then going to after school program, this thought that the neighbor that borrows the cup of sugar or the kids play together is really outdated” (Goddard, 2006) Consequently, mid level agents never explicitly stated the purpose of mixing and carried differing assumptions, some that interaction was inevitable and others that it was unlikely. None suggested it needed formal intervention.

Following high-level emphasis, mid level agents engaged in intense planning to provide for the community of subsidized residents of Maverick Landing. First, mid level planner sought to retain former residents. Literature on the redevelopment from the BHA stated, “The construction of the new Maverick Landing was phased so as to minimize the disruption to residents’ lives during the redevelopment process.” In first phase, residents
lived in the old buildings on North side of the development while the developers completed construction of the new buildings on the south side of the parcel. The Maverick Gardens Relocation plan followed Federal stipulations and mid level agents made many efforts to retain residents. While required to attend meetings and sign new leases, residents who were in good standing with the Housing Authority were encouraged to remain.

The Boston Housing Authority also procured Housing Opportunities Unlimited (HOU), a local relocation firm with extensive experience nationally, to aid residents in this process. Authorities were extremely careful and quite successful at retaining residents. Eighty percent of the subsidized households living at the new Maverick came from Maverick Gardens. These interventions assured that former residents would continue to encounter one another.

Finally, as Federal decision makers had encouraged, mid level agents envisioned a "services rich programming site." Mid level administrators sought to promote supportive services for the needs of the residents that also ensured continued interactions among residents in need. They planned for major programmatic components and these included case management services, adult learning opportunities, youth programs and employment programs. A chart distributed at an affordable housing conference detailed 37 intended services such as relocation and re-occupancy assistance and teen programming, to be provided by 13 different organizations including the Tenants Organization and local community organizations. Intent on retaining existing residents, including them in the planning process and providing for their needs once taking up residency, the redevelopment team engaged in earnest intense planning for social services for the low-income group. These efforts contrasted to the absence of planning for social interaction among the market rate and low
income groups. While administrators placed much emphasis on retaining the former community members, they failed to mention about how to integrate new ones.

Federal Hope VI policy makers also stressed that program was expected to produce “models for ending the isolation of the public housing agency” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1996). Paralleling high-level patterns, the role the private management company would play in fostering interaction received little attention at the mid level. The firm ultimately contracted to manage both the market rate and subsidized units at Maverick was seasoned in the field of management and neighborhood revitalization. Speaking from experience, a vice president of the corporation observed low levels of interaction among residents in what he called “pure” market rate developments, “I don’t think people in market rate communities really wanna mix, generally. They have their lives, market people, they have, they work their lives, and they have their girlfriend, they have their boyfriend, and they have their family, they have their family structure. They’re not looking to come home necessarily and go down the hall and shoot the breeze with somebody.”

The vice president of the management corporation was even more pessimistic about the possibility of interaction between income groups. “I don’t believe that the market rate people and the affordable people are gonna walk over and go isn’t this great, let’s all mix and have that. It’s not gonna happen. Forget it. It doesn’t happen in the pure market rate…people inherently just don’t wanna walk up and down the hall and be best friends with everybody.” The management corporation, experienced in both market rate and mixed communities, didn’t foresee interaction. Yet having only observed developments managed by his organization, he couldn’t illuminate whether those dynamics were a result of the firm’s particular management style. Yet it was this firm, the firm with a record of little interaction...
that received the contract, suggesting mid level agents did not consider on-site management’s role in fostering interaction.6

While mid level agents differed over the potential for direct interaction among residents, they did share high level notions about the potential for market rate households to advocate for better resources. According to the Henriquez, “the higher income people are presumed to be more active, and the more active, the more vocal, the more management pays attention. Mixing brings focus on the community and gets people involved in the civic process.” The Boston housing authority then shared the high-level sociological vision that the middle income residents would bring more resources to the development. The vice president of the management corporation’s experience at other rental situations confirmed this, “You typically hear the market rate people when there is an issue. Or a problem, or, or whatever it is. When they have to get in contact with management...they want it resolved.” Most mid level agents anticipated that the market rate residents would demand higher quality residential services.

Thus, though mid agents planned for the social lives of poor residents, they made few plans for integrating low resourced residents with their better off neighbors. The management company, which would overtake the daily implementation of the policy perceived social integration among middle income groups as rare, even among one another. And both high

---

6 The vice president of the management corporation could also anticipate why market rate residents would prize the individuation promoted by mid level designers. They found that market rate residents other developments avoided connectivity in order to keep their personal struggles private, while people living in subsidized housing tend to allow their struggles to be visible, “Take my word for it. In $3,000 apartments generally speaking, you have... society issues...you have a zillion issues, probably equal in magnitude but they’re hidden. It’s not hidden as much here because people tell me they don’t hide as much. But it could be that in the suburbs the lady next door’s a total drunk. You’re not gonna see (inaudible words) had a horrible divorce, the kid just you know, smashed a stolen car, you’re not gonna hear all that. Nor are they gonna tell you, nor is the whole neighborhood.” But these observations suggest that middle class households are also in need of social services but possess a cultural preference not to avail themselves of them.
and mid level actors were united in their optimism that market rate residents would successfully place pressure toward improving institutions.

**Mid-level Plans for marketing and disclosure**

At the mid level then, agents disseminated no plans for how HOPE VI income mixing would be managed. Yet they did release information about the planned development. This information focused on two aspects of the development. First, the program’s potential to promote economic growth for the neighborhood. Second, mid level agents disseminated information about planned economic restructuring in the development itself.

Like high-level actors, those at the mid level also stressed the growth potential of HOPE VI. In an op ed, Henriquez took on the role of the mid level policy entrepreneur, making an appeal for the continued funding of public housing by linking it to neighborhood economic growth, “The developments will remain distressed, likely falling slowly into further disrepair if the financial picture doesn't improve. HOPE VI redevelopments spur investment in their surrounding neighborhoods; new stores open, MBTA stations get revamped, new schools are built and more housing for all income levels is created. These programs do not just support the poor. Housing authorities contribute significantly to the economy.” A representative of the development company backed up the statement, noting how Maverick Landing would anchor the mixed-income neighborhood, stating, somewhat quixotically. "It will lock in a footprint of affordable luxury homes that will be the engine to rebuild the whole waterfront."

Many publications noted the economic injection the development could bring. “The financing for Maverick Gardens comes from several public and private sources, including $10 million from the state and $15.4 million from the city. Trinity is raising $48 million in low-
income housing tax credits, and $35 million from the federal Hope VI program. Housing
authority representative Deborah Morse noted that HOPE VI differed from other HUD
programs because it can stimulate neighborhood revitalization” (HOPE VI Program
Summary, Morse, April 2005). Morse also recognizes that “With its proximity to downtown
and access to rapid transit, its historic waterfront with spectacular views back to Boston, and its
active commercial core, East Boston is under development pressure from all sides. Maverick
Gardens sits squarely at the heart of the redevelopment opportunities in East Boston.”

Calling the neighborhood, “One of the largest undeveloped areas of the waterfront,”
the press too, highlighted the economic potential of the redevelopment, “East Boston may
boast unmatched views of the city’s skyline, but it has remained largely ignored by developers
over the years. Until now.” Bursting with boosterism, the Boston Herald announced, “But
what is truly a potential money machine is the East Boston waterfront” (Boston Herald,
January 6, 2005). They did mention income mixing as part of the structure, “brand new
and beautifully done, a mixed-income development that opened two weeks ago, where
residents get to see the morning sun dance alone the financial district across the harbor”
(Boston Herald, January 6, 2005) but again made no suggestion as to the purpose of the
income mixing.

Additional developers too began disseminating big plans, “Currently, more than 1,400
units of luxury condominiums and apartments re planned at several waterfront parcels.”
(August 31, 2003, Boston Globe)…” These would include “condominiums, a café, and a
marina …add about 1,000 upscale apartments and condominiums to the working class
neighborhood.” One developer envisioned a ground-floor atrium, underground parking and a
bed and breakfast. Local academics too, commented on the growth potential of the area,
“Charles C. Euchner, executive director of the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, said East Boston has all the ingredients for dynamic waterfront revitalization.”

Another Housing authority official acknowledged the ubiquity of the growth machine mentality but expressed doubt, “Who knows what’s going to go up at this point, since it hasn’t started. Everyone was so sure that once Maverick went these for-profit developments would go up. We’ll see.” Occasionally, then, mid level agents left open the possibility that the logic of the growth machine was sometimes false. Nonetheless, a sizable amount of information offered at the mid level focused more on mixing as an economic good than a social one.

Yet as some high-level scholars such as Vale and Smith had foreseen, mid level officials envisioned growth both for the neighborhood and the development itself. Agents restructured the redevelopment would still have affordable units, but over time the number of units reserved for the very poor would be reduced. The Boston Housing Authority on its website detailed the “Target Mix of Incomes: All former tenants of Maverick Gardens in good standing will be eligible to return to the Project and occupy a public housing unit, regardless of Income Tier or desired Target Mix of Incomes. After initial occupancy, the target mix of incomes will be 29% at 0-10% of AMI, 34% at 11-30% of AMI, 14% at 31-60% of AMI and 23% at market rates” (BHA, 2005). Mid level agents made it explicitly clear that this development would not remain for the very poor very long. And as Morse explained, “Everyone who had lived there had a right to return and fill up that 80% first and then on turnover… those other tiers would get filled in upon turnover.” Because most of the former Maverick residents had incomes in the bottom tier, management would select a turnover population from the higher AMI level. To achieve the balance of tiers, a sizable percentage of
the low income residents would need to either increase their incomes and move up the income
ladder or move out of the development.

In addition to working to retain residents, echoing Federal expectations, mid level
agents envisioned a role for residents. Following high-level guidelines, mid level worked to
keep low-income residents informed. They anticipated that residents would be involved in
“collaboration, inclusion, communication and participation.” (HOPE VI Program Summary,
Morse, April 2005). As a result, agents conducted and required residents to attend planning
meetings. The Maverick HOPE VI application included tenant meeting sign-in sheets as
testimony that the planners were keeping residents included and informed. As one planner
recalled, the meetings were unusually well attended and “people were generally happy”
(Goddard, 2005). The tenants’ organization took an ongoing and active role in the
redevelopment process. Following Federal agents’ guidelines, mid level agents sought to
keep the low income residents informed, yet once again, no role was envisioned to recruit,
collaborate or communicate redevelopment plans to potential market rate residents.

Mid Level Plans for the Social Structure

While structural disparity may have been inherent to all HOPE VI mixed income
developments, the financial structure of Maverick Landing made pleasing market rate
residents especially paramount. As in other areas, the local housing market underscored
structural disparity at Maverick Landing. At Maverick, mid level actors promoted a mix of
80% subsidized and 20% market rate. As testimony to their general successes, the applicants
to the Boston Housing Authority could expect to wait several years for a unit. Conversely, the
rental vacancy rate in Boston in 2005 was 5.1% (U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and
Household Economic Statistics Division Last Revised: March 01, 2006).
The structure of Maverick Landing then would be that eighty percent of the residents
would be those unable to afford housing in the private market and with very few other
publicly subsidized housing options. Twenty percent of the residents would be able to find an
ample supply of comparable housing in the Boston Housing market. The subsidized residents
then had limited leverage in comparison to the market rate residents.

In addition to the structural disparity resulting from residents’ leverage, the financial
structure of Maverick Landing gave market rate residents further leverage. The vice president
of the management corporation indicated that the monthly operating costs for each unit at
Maverick were $600. Management received half of that in a $300 subsidy or “fixed contract
rent” for each low income unit. They made up the difference in rents collected. The low
income residents paid a third of their income in rent. However, vice president explains that if
“these folks are recertifying, and losing jobs and what not” the resident’s portion decreases.
He noted that “if [the revenue from the resident] declines over time, and there’s a recession
and loss of jobs” then that would potentially reduce the resident’s supplement to the $300
subsidy.

The manager believed that he has little control over the vagaries of the job market and
subsidized residents lives. Seasoned in the field of property management, he felt much more
confident that he could market and manage property, “If the property’s well managed and all
rent’s paid, units are occupied, it can maximize the market rents.” Theoretically they could
achieve this by growing the incomes of their lower income tenants (or replacing them with
upper-tier subsidized residents). But since they had little control over the macro-economic
conditions, it became paramount to maximize rent receipts from market rate units by offering
the most appealing units possible to that demographic.
The vice president of the management corporation revealed the importance to the success of the development of collecting high rents from market rate households. “However, we’re doin’ a really good job and we have good marketing, and it’s getting rented for higher rent, we, we’re gonna get more revenue... Because the money we get form the affordable ones, isn’t gonna generate any real more revenue.” Thus, from a revenue standpoint, profitability resulted from creating high demand for market rate units.

Furthermore, the vice president explained, that rents collected from the market rate units compensate for the affordable units. “The market pays picks up, the shortfall on the affordable side, which because the affordable side can’t pay.... but the point is the market rent is far greater than the operating costs. And the affordable rents fall short of the operating costs with the principal and interest.” It became clear then that management needed to please the market rate residents who not only paid more in rent but directly subsidize the affordable units. Not only in the abstract do market rate resident have more leverage but in the finances structured for Maverick Landing, management was literally counting on the rent receipts from the market rate residents to pay for operating costs and debt service. As the vice president concluded, “The only way to have the job work is in a strong market, have the market rate apartment rent, not only meet the operating costs per unit, it’s your principal and interest, but to have extra to pay the shortfall on the affordable side, their debt.” And as a private company, the management was interested in more than breaking even and paying their staff. They would, of course, like to make a profit.

The vice president also explained that as a part of their business plan, they intended to reinvest some revenue into the development to maintain its appeal. As he noted, “you gotta make the certain level of cash flow to pay for improvements to the property. Maintenance
included keeping the property in working order and highly attractive. Using garden mulch as an example, he stated he wanted his management to be able to be able for pay for change the mulch used in the landscaping to keep the development looking well manicured and tasteful. For the private management company maintaining the development’s appearance was a priority for reinvestment dollars.

Drawing from previous experience, while management anticipated that market rate residents would demand a certain level of service, he assumed that subsidized residents would not. “Whether it’s at Maverick or just a pure market rate, um, apartment like Roseland or some of the other properties. You know they expect . . . [management to] make sure that people aren’t congregating. And, and aren’t, the kids aren’t ridin’ their bikes up and down the hall.” In management’s experience, their failure to supply the find of environment that fulfilled market rate resident’s expectations earned market rate residents’ ire. “They get mad at us, ‘cause we’re not enforcing the rules . . . Well, they, they expect that there are, you know, that their car won’t get vandalized, they’ll have a parking spot, and when they come home, it’ll, you know, it’ll be peace and quiet. And that they can study or do homework or whatever it is. Without being harassed or, uh, when they get home, feel like they’re bein’ intimidated by a group of people, standing in front of the building.” For the management corporation, market rate residents expressed a certain set of expectations and anticipated that people would use their leverage as a point of argumentation.

Yet the vice president did not expect low income residents to demand high levels of service from them. In their view, similar to the views of high level actors, low income residents were often not self advocates. The vice presidents blamed this on the previous institution. “The old Maverick people probably have things, if anything goes wrong in their
unit, some of them may not call it in. they’re not even thinkin’ they have an expectation level. Or a right of entitlement. Because, no one fixed it before. They didn’t know it was s’posed to be fixed. Because, they weren’t properly educated, no one cared about ‘em, so they go, uh, this broke, I’m not gonna, they don’t even call in.” Basing his views on previous experience, leadership from the management corporation expected that the market rate residents would demand a certain environment and assumed that lower income neighbors would have lower expectations. And with management’s structured reliance on revenue from the market rate residents, they prepared to meet the market rate tenants’ specific and unrelenting demands.

Yet, the management corporation did espouse the ideal of equal treatment, “they should get the same service, the same exceptional service. Okay, whether you pay $8 a month or you pay $800 or $3,000. Every resident here, should get all the same service, you know.” Moreover, the management corporation wasn’t against integration. “I think that is good though…If you’re gonna use federal funds, and you’re gonna create a concept, I think it’s good for society. To… not widen the gap, with only affordable people or people who don’t work and make less than $20,000 should live together. It’s horrible. I think it’s horrible. Mix it up.” Rather, the management corporation wasn’t expected to promote interaction. The management corporation, experienced in administering mixed income developments elsewhere sought to reproduce what for them, as private sector agents, had been a successful model.

**Mid-Level Agenda: Summary**

Like those at the Federal level, at the mid level, actors placed much emphasis on physical redevelopment. Yet like those working at the high-level, little in their plans suggested how design could encourage interaction. Similar to Elliot, Gotham and Milligan’s
findings (2004) moreover, mid agents selectively applied the desigfn frameworks which they found politically and economically expedient. For mid level agents, the emphasis on new urbanist aesthetics belied the image of Maverick as an affordable community. As advocated at the Federal-level, the design conceived at the mid level did not distinguish the units. Though some saw identical design as a sign of equality, others suggested that such singularity could lead residents to deny rather than bridge their difference. And while mid level agents, designers, administrators and the press, often noted the reclaimed streets, they made few if any reference to how the new design facilitated connecting Maverick neighbors to each other. Mid-level actors also realized high-level defensible space ideals, creating fewer common areas and more private and semiprivate space for residents and thus fewer spaces for group exchange and interaction.

At the Federal level, HOPE VI planners envisioned not just physical but social integration yet said little about how this could be achieved. Mid level agents responded to this ambiguity with their own. Some assumed that social connectivity would result from physical connectivity while others assumed that physical connectivity is unrelated to social connectivity. Few considered the role institutions could have to facilitate interaction. Following high-level emphasis, mid level agents engaged in intense planning to provide for the community of subsidized residents of Maverick Landing, assuring that former residents would continue to encounter one another. The redevelopment team placed much emphasis on retaining the former community members, yet made no mention how to integrate new ones.

Hope VI agenda setters also encouraged recipients to allow non governmental organizations to oversee management. In doing so, mid level actors expected the management organizations to provide subsidized residents with the same kinds of services found in the
general housing market. Such firms were evaluated on their ability to maintain law and order, not to connect residents. Moreover, while mid level administrators disagreed about the potential for direct interaction among residents, they did share high-level notions about the potential for market rate households to advocate for better resources. Most mid level actors anticipated that the market rate residents would demand higher quality residential services.

Like high-level actors, mid level actors also stressed the growth potential of HOPE VI. Many publications noted the economic injection the development could bring. A sizable amount of information offered at the mid level focused more on mixing as an economic good than a social one. Mid level officials envisioned growth not only for the neighborhood but the development itself. As such, agents restructured a redevelopment that would still have affordable units, but over time the number of units reserved for the very poor would be reduced. While the redevelopment program did include creating employment opportunities targeted to growing the incomes of the very poor, ultimately, the very poor would be a minority at Maverick and a sizable percentage of the low income residents would either be moving up or moving out.

While structural disparity may have been inherent to all HOPE VI mixed income developments, the financial structure of Maverick Landing made pleasing market rate residents especially paramount. As in other areas, the local housing market underscored structural disparity at Maverick Landing. The conditions of the Boston Housing market in particular meant the subsidized residents could make few credible threats to exit and thus had limited leverage. The market rate residents had many alternative housing options and thus significant leverage.
In addition to the structural disparity resulting from residents' leverage, the financial structure of Maverick Landing gave market rate residents further leverage. Having little control over the macro-economic conditions, it was paramount for management to maximize rent receipts from market rate units. From a revenue standpoint, profitability resulted from creating high demand for market rate units. For management, that meant offering a development that met their aesthetic and cultural expectations.

Like the high level actors, management concluded that market rate residents would demand a certain level of service, while subsidized residents would not, though their conclusions were based on previous experience. Management further anticipated that that people will use their structural position as a point of argumentation.

Chapter conclusion

While the intentions and directions of policymakers does not explain everything that happens during the implementation process, it explains some of what occurs. Local agents can and do succeed at implementing high-level agendas but where there is no effort, there is no success. The grantors did not demand evidence of an interaction agenda in mid level implementation plans. Often, evaluators took look at low levels of interaction in mixed income development as a social not an administrative outcome, inviting the conclusion that “people just aren’t like that.” Yet, mid level actors successfully initiate many socially sanctioned agendas; fostering interaction just wasn’t among them. In the following chapter, I will continue to track implementation, documenting how on-site actors -- “street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980) and company men and women implemented policy generated at the Federal level.
Chapter 6: Along the Implementation Chain: Where Public Policy Intersects with Private Actors

Introduction

While high and mid level actors conceived and initiated the implementation of HOPE VI, the public policy intersected with recipients – in this case Maverick residents – at the Maverick site. The residents experienced implementation most directly from actors at the local level – property managers and others entrusted to execute the mixing scheme. Most of these actors were not “street level bureaucrats” – those who enforce and oversee the will of the state. Rather, some of the most important actors at this level were “company men and women” – personnel assigned to enforce and oversee management of the development. These local actors influenced cross class social relations in a number of ways. This chapter explores how local level actors impacted interaction with the messages they sent regarding physical form, the encounters they encouraged and discouraged, the information they dispensed and withheld and the social structure they inherited and enforced. The chapter then turns to the reactions of the residents. It outlines how at this individual level, residents began to re-interpret the messages of those higher up the implementation chain and explain some of the residents’ seemingly surprising interpretations of the policy.

The Local Agenda for Redevelopment

Local Level Implementation of the Physical form

Little in high and mid level actors’ plans suggested how physical design could encourage social relations among diverse groups. Consequently, local level management began operating Maverick in an environment not particularly designed to facilitate interaction. Local level actors did follow the agenda for physical redevelopment set earlier on in the implementation chain. Company men and women worked to secure the New Maverick’s
image as a middle class community, promoting a marketable combination of aesthetics and individuation. Local level actors also realized high-level defensible space ideals. The new Maverick had few common areas and much private and semiprivate space for residents. While mid level designers had created a common courtyard encircled with benches, local Maverick management limited its use. Fenced back and front yards were subject to rules and use restrictions as well. Moreover, local management sought to increase residents’ sense of safety by employing a high-tech security system.

While mid level planners intended to create a development where residents would have a sense of individual ownership, as noted in Chapter 3, local management prohibited residents from personalizing their exteriors, barred residents from placing chairs or other furniture on their front porches, banners or flags or other forms of decoration were also disallowed. Residents with back yards were permitted to place only certain approved lawn furniture. One on site manager explained efforts to delineate for residents the difference between indoor furniture from outdoor furniture. “No, that is a couch; it belongs inside, not outside. How do I explain to someone that a Kitchen set is not to be used as patio furniture?” But even she vacillated, “But really, who am I so say?” acknowledging that the difference between kitchen furniture and patio furniture was in many ways an aesthetic one, “In the end, they’re all table and chairs. Finally, I decided to say that the furniture must be designed for outdoor use. So you know, it’s a learning process for everyone.” Rather than individuality for the residents’ units, management strove to achieve conformity.

Also as noted before, management prohibited the use of outdoor grills. This rule violated the norms for both income groups, leaving both groups sensing local-level management and not they, controlled the outdoor space. Thus, while mid level actors sought
to provide residents with individualized space over which they could feel a sense of ownership, they failed to explicate the intended uses of these spaces and allowing local management to restrict use.

Local-level actors too sought to manage the design by curtailing sociability in the common spaces. Residents rarely used the courtyard, a space that mid-level designers created to, at the very least, evoke sociability. Restrictions on its use developed from both the objections of residents whose apartments abutted the courtyard and possibly more importantly, from management, whose offices also faced the courtyard. Soon after moving in, residents received a notice that they not permitted to use the courtyard after 10pm. Often, management asked residents to vacate the courtyard at other times -- if there were thought to be loud or violating a number of restrictions. As the property manager explained, “Well, the courtyard curfew spurred out of, you know, that was after the fact...we'd be working and, and people'd be tryin’ to sleep whether it was affordable or market. And, you know, you got all these people on benches out here, and, um, you know, people would congregate. We don’t want people out here, it echoes.” The managers comments suggest that the disturbances were not confined to late night hours since he related noise occurred when “We’d be working” indicating that the socializing in the courtyard disturbed not just residents but management. Also, the manager did not suggest that residents were excessively loud, but that the disturbance was partially a result of acoustics, noise in the courtyard echoed. This oversight at the mid level affected local level dynamics. Thus, though conceived at the mid level as a social space, its proximity to management’s offices and some residents’ the apartments led to enforcing late-night vacancy and working-hour quietude.
In addition to prohibitions set by management around the use of observable space, security modifications to the physical structure also affected social relations. As highlighted in their marketing brochures, management had installed a number of “state of the art” security systems. These included security cameras in the lobbies. Residents could view the feed on their home televisions and management could monitor the feed in a number of ways, including in the control room as well as using laptop computers. Residents gained access to the mid-rises by using an electronic entry key. A security company had wired the townhouses with an electronic security system. When the security agents made their rounds, they registered electronically at checkpoints. And management employed a mobile hidden security camera. Residents approved of the numerous forms of surveillance. But residents also began to defer responsibility for collective monitoring to the security system.

Residents generally approved of the new security system. When asked what made them feel safe, residents from both income groups cited the security system, rather than each other. Danny M. said, “The alarm makes me feel safe” or Sherry S. who felt safe because “we have the security system.” Lisee S. liked living at Maverick because “it’s safe and you have security and I can monitor who is entering the building.”

But residents thought of the security system as offering more than passive protection. They imagined the system could not only deter crimes but reduce their obligation for collective monitoring. When asked about her responses to suspicious activity around the building, Sandy S. responded, “They’ve got cameras, so they can see a lot of stuff themselves.” For John S., cameras provided crucial information, “There’s no cameras in the building. They have no cameras in the back door so you don’t know what’s goin’ on.”

Frustrated with the graffiti Midrise B Marie S. said, “I can’t get over the vandalism on the

Graves
Cameras did not just aid in crime prevention but obviated resident of their responsibility toward collective monitoring.

Residents also held that the system could function to aid in maintenance as well as security. As Penny M. proposed to management, "you have your camera; you should notice all the trash that's in front of the bell sometimes back that, that, those 2 newspapers's been there since Thursday." And Al S. wanted management to use the security system to target residents who were allowing off-lease associates to live in their apartments. "When I went to the neighborhood meeting, I heard about 2 or 3 tenants that are using the system that have 18 tenants in a three bedroom and that to me is not right and why does it take, don't you just film them one day and say "Well you have all these people coming in and you're not having a graduation every day." Many residents held that the security system could double as a tool for monitoring the development in general and thus further relieving them of their social responsibility to maintain order.

Yet the reliance on technology was often misplaced. The security systems were far less effective than people imagined. At a meeting, the manager explained that they did not have the capacity to review all of the tapes. Moreover, they didn't have cameras covering the entire footprint of the development. Residents, he stressed, still needed to be involved. They would need to provide approximate times incidences occurred. In addition, images can reveal someone's face but not their identity. Again, residents would have to help assist identifying offenders captured on security equipment. Finally, the images were not always high quality. Carlotta S. related a conversation with the security guard where she learned that the cameras didn't capture facial features well, "what she said, uh, she said, it doesn't come clear on the
TV. You can’t really tell...And you can’t tell there’s someone doin’ somethin’, beat the hell out of somebody in the hallway, and you can’t tell nothin’? “ A manager reminded residents that a videotape does not give names and addresses.

**Local Implementation of Interaction**

While at the high and mid levels, actors anticipated interaction, they did not advocate recruiting local managers committed to facilitating this. Free to promote the environment they found most effective, management made explicit the ideal social culture for the development. The distribution of flyers was one of the primary mechanisms management used for cultural reinforcement. A flyer from 2005 stated, "We seek to ensure peaceful enjoyment for all our neighbors." The image of a hippo, mouth open wide, appeared on several fliers. Inside the hippo’s mouth read the words, “quiet.” Management’s campaign for quietude continued, with a new message appearing almost every month. A September 2005 flier read, "A Good Neighbor is someone who "remembers that people living nearby need their quiet time too". In August a flier stressed, “Keeping the noise level down will help all of our residents awaken with a smile... Kindly lower your voices” In November, management reminded residents, “Silence is Golden: we’re not asking you to be mum, just lower your volume to a respectable hum" The campaign continued over the winter with management disseminating notices with titles such as, “It's Loud Enough.” Management discouraged sociability in their fliers by making it clear residents should keep quiet and to themselves.

Other notices indicated that management would prefer residents interact with them, rather than their neighbors. One flyer informed residents, “"one important purpose of this newsletter is to keep our residents in touch with each other and we welcome you to be part of the front page headlines....you’d like to shout from the rooftops, save yourself the climb by visiting the office." Management made it explicit that they would prefer that residents route
communications through them, rather than directly through one another. Repeatedly, the
fliers reinforced a culture of quietude (see Image 10).

As the mid-level vice president of the management corporation had detailed, he
believed that market rate tenants expected a quiet residential environment. However, it was
not only the market rate residents who appreciated quiet, Mellisa S. related that, “I don’t know
people next door is [making noise] ... But every time if I hear too much runnin’ around and
stuff, I call the office, and then she said she’ll put a flier out, and tell ‘em and she did. Took
care of that. I don’t hear it anymore.” Mellisa S. and several other residents, then,
appreciated and enforced management’s code of conduct. However broad-based the support,
management’s encouraging quietude discouraged interaction.

Residents noted that management discouraged sociability in the development in other
ways as well. I asked, in Maverick do you see people hanging out? Dolores S. attributed the
reduced sociability at the new Maverick “With all the, umn new rules, you can’t [hang out].”
Sandy S. imagined that fewer people hung out on the site because “Because I think the business office, would, would do something.” Residents understood that management curtailed socializing among people they know but also worked to prevent residents from making contact with residents unfamiliar to them. When Danny M. had an exchange with his neighbor, who he thought was being noisy too late in the evening, the manager told him, “He said, well we met with him later and he said, not in a rude way or anything but “don’t ever to that again, either let the police deal with it or we’ll deal with it.” The manager further warned Danny that attempts to engage with his neighbor could lead to retaliation. Instead the manager instructed him to make an anonymous call to the police, “Cause that way, she doesn’t know where it’s coming from. But now she knows its coming from your apartment and you never know what’s going to happen.” While residents showed some tendency toward direct exchange, local managements’ reaction suggests that they felt this was too risky. Rather than encouraging residents to resolve their differences interpersonally, management warned residents to be wary of their neighbors.

Additionally, management preferred a private method to maintain public order. Management frequently called residents into the office for a “private conference.” In private conferences, residents were often instructed to keep their household and their children orderly. Management employed this strategy frequently, even congregating the noun phrase “private conference” into a verb. As one manager noted, “I’m, like, private conferencing people very day.” Notices sent out to residents admonished them to be quiet and orderly, advising them that failure to do so would result in a private conference between the resident and management.
Management, then, sent many messages discouraging contact. In many cases, they received much support from residents for promoting a culture of quietude. Yet this preferred mode of neighboring discouraged interaction since quietude works against sociability. On occasion, management even more explicitly instructed residents not to engage with their neighbors. Yet this mode of implementation didn’t violate the vision set at the national or mid level. Management’s charge was to maintain order, collect rents and retain a market rate population. They received no explicit instructions to foster sociability. Roseville made no misrepresentations to the BHA. They operated a Maverick to lease market rate units and make a profit. That to them was a successful mixed income development. Many residents of both income groups considered quietude an amenity. Seeing no profit in encouraging social relations, they didn’t do so.

True to the intentions of high and mid level actors, Maverick Landing implemented a “services rich programming site“ (Boston Housing Authority, 2005). While encounters between neighbors were discouraged, local administrators ran many of the programs envisioned at the mid level. In the first year, service providers offered almost ¾ of the programs planned and eleven of the thirteen organizations recruited at the planning stages participated. Mainly through continual flyers, residents were asked to participate in youth employment and social programs, toys for tots giveaways, art, music and dance programs, job counseling and training. While some programs never took place, organizations developed others. In the case of the tenants’ organization attempted to use their passenger van to conduct monthly shopping trips.

Management too, became significant providers of direct assistance to residents. As noted in Chapter 3, many residents were employed by the management company. As one
manager explained, “We hire residents to work with us. Uh, the program, people that may never have gotten a job in their whole life. What can possibly be wrong with that? Nothing.”

While they found interaction unmanageable, management supported, both in theory and in practice, parts of the progressive social vision articulated by high and mid level actors.

In addition to direct assistance from management, residents received support services from on-site social workers. Two social workers, an employment counselor and a psychologist were assigned to the Maverick Landing community. They assisted not only adults but teens as well. One mother recalled how a social worker helped her daughter find a volunteer position at an animal shelter. The mother recalled the agent told the mother, “It’ll be good for her resume.” A formal service provider then stepped in and successfully performed a mentoring role that high level actors imagined might be filled by a neighbor. On-site social workers offered adults social capital as well. Lisee S. appreciated the support services she received. One agent let her “know that there was a computer class, things like that, they called me to see if I was interested.”

Social workers also provided social support, a function appreciated by many residents. One young woman whose mother had medical problems told me that she admired the social workers because, “they come and visit my mom and they ask, do you need this or that. Because they know that she is sick and they ask if she needs any help with anything.” This young woman and others admired the workers and in some ways considered these institutional agents as role models.

Local Implementation of Marketing and Disclosure

High and mid level actors’ lack of specificity about how information about mixing scheme should be shared with the residents carried through to the local level. Lacking explicit
guidelines, local leasing agents elected to omit or distort the mixed income nature of the development. Most market rate residents recalled that the leasing agent, Nick, recruited them while omitting that Maverick Landing was a HOPE VI development. Steve M recalled, “‘He didn’t talk about it at all.” Both Steve M. and Marie M. learned that Maverick Landing was mixed income from reading about the development on the internet.

Danny M. too discovered from mid level actors – the media -- about the mixed income structure after moving in. He recalled “I mean we were never told what the demographic was.” He learned of the scheme from reading a newspaper article, “In the article, that’s when I realized that out of like 397 units are however many are here, 320 of them are affordable.” He recalled feeling, “totally deceived, umm, not well, we didn’t ask questions and he didn’t offer the information...[We] wrote an email straight out that said, ‘we want to meet with you next week, we want discuss what’s going on. Either we want to get out of this lease without penalty or we want something else. Cause we were totally deceived.” For some, Nick didn’t omit the presence of subsidized residents but minimized their numbers. Nick told Mike M, “Cause he mentioned it, initially he said there’s a certain, there’s a small amount. This is what he said, he said there’s a small amount of um, affordable housing here.” Nick’s duplicity upset some residents. Penny M. maintained, “if you, if you’re gonna be in a management company, tell your tenants the truth. Cause sooner or later they will find out you are lying.”

Despite feeling “deceived” by the leasing agent, resident interviews revealed that Nick was one of the most well liked figures in the development. As Anna M. related, “Yeah, he, he’s very, very nice.” Penny M. who was quiet angry that management, “lied to us” about the subsidized nature of the project, volunteered, “I like Nick. Everybody likes Nick.” Danny too
who upon reading the newspaper article was so displeased he intended to terminate his lease, harbored no ill feelings for the leasing agent, "we like Nick, Nick is great to us and super helpful, we didn’t want it to sound like he deceived us." It appears that the very same residents who felt deceived by the leasing agent also held him in high regard. Mandy M. and Danny M. liked Nick in particular because he had provided them a bridge loan. Why did they have positive feelings for the agent of their deception? Steve’s explanation offers some insight, "I just assumed that he wasn’t allowed to tell me unless I asked, because of all the fair housing stuff, I assume that was it." Steve M. believed that Nick was simply following protocol, and therefore was not personally responsible for his actions. Yet Nick had a changed his representation of the income structure, suggesting he did use his discretion.

Several residents likened Nick to a used car salesmen. As Sean M., explained, "He’s a salesman....Like buying a used car." John S. too used the analogy, "Once you, once you sign the lease with ‘em, and you leave paperwork, it’s like a used car salesman. See you later. I got you!" Yet no one expressed any ill-will toward Nick, again indicating that residents accepted that if not outright deception, then omission was simply part of his role as an institutional actor. Residents were upset about being lied to but continued to have positive regard for Nick. This might have been due to an assumption that decision-making occurred at a level up from the institutional agents they encountered. There are no guidelines about disclosing that Maverick Landing was a HOPE VI redevelopment. Nick elected to omit the detail because he believed it would adversely affect his ability to get market rate tenants to sign leases.

Just as Federal level planners placed much emphasis on keeping low-income residents informed and seeking their collaboration, and was carried through to the local level. True to
the mid level vision that residents would be involved in “collaboration, inclusion, communication and participation” (BHA, 2005), the Maverick Tenants’ Organization remained an active and powerful advocate for subsidized residents in the development. Like management, they primarily communicated through flyers. The tenants’ organization sent out two monthly calendars, one for adults and one for youth, alerting them to social support programs occurring in the development and neighborhood.

Other “street level bureaucrats” offered programs including computer training classes, ESL classes and job counseling classes. In addition to calendars, residents received almost weekly flyers alerting them to East Boston camps and a variety of programs including summer lunch career training, shopping shuttles. Residents were invited to weekend Teen Nights, encouraged to apply for medical insurance. Flyers queried residents “Interested in Skilled Trades?” and were invited to learn about “Careers in Painting Trades.” The flyers didn’t explicitly exclude market rate residents and a few market rate residents responded to a few flyers, especially those recruiting residents to safety meetings. Yet well over half of the flyers distributed by the tenants’ organization offered services exclusive to the subsidized residents. This gave the message that the residents at Maverick were in need of assistance but not necessarily neighboring.

And while Maverick was designed to be affordable for all, according to their income, for most residents, the electric bill came as an unexpected and paralyzing shock for some. All residents, subsidized and market rate, were told that heat and air conditioning were included in the bill. However Randy S. recalled the planning meetings, which he called a “bunch of lies.” In particular he recalled being misled about the utility costs. “This is straight from the horse’s mouth...Heat and air conditioning included in your rent. But, the kickback was,
what? The fan.” While residents weren’t required to pay for heat or air conditioning (in the mid-rises), they would have to pay for the electric fan that directed it into the unit. For the market rate residents, this added expense was an annoyance and indicative of management’s sometimes duplicitous marketing style. For the subsidized residents, finding the money to pay the electric bill was a source of stress.

Resident’s electric debts began to accumulate, with residents contributing a portion of the bill, paying perhaps $50 toward a $150 bill, but never able to erase the debt and watching it accumulate. And for residents whose monthly income ranged from $300 to $1000. Margaret S. reviewed her budget, "Like my rent ain’t that bad, cause it’s the same as I was paying, but now I’ve got an extra, my light bill is between 50 and 60 dollars a month, plus washing, that’s an 100 and something dollars a month that’s coming out of one check."

Cheryl’s accumulated electric bill topped $800. "I am up there counting pennies." And when I saw the figures scribbled on a piece of paper or when we went grocery shopping and she returned a box of grits costing less than two dollars, I saw she meant this literally.

In addition, while former Maverick residents usually owned their own washer and dryers, the now townhouse dwellers had to pay for laundry. Margaret S. explained, "The other day I, it was Friday; I used 21 dollars in one day. I did my sheets and my blankets, you know. Mellisa S.ie was trying to get them to get it down, cause that's a lot of money. Especially if you're, I'm on a fixed income. I get a check once a month, social security and it's not a lot of money, believe me." They objected not only to the cost but the quality of the washer dryers.

Some of the most readily available information about the role of middle income residents was their capacity to encourage economic growth. Federal level actors linked
stagnant local economic growth to the blighted state of public housing parcels. Mid level actors too publicized the potential for Maverick Landing to promote economic growth for the neighborhood and the planned economic restructuring in the development itself. Local actors also informed residents about the growth plans for the neighborhood and the development.

Local level actors included plans for neighborhood growth in their marketing materials. Nick, the leasing agent, gave prospective tenants a folder with information about Maverick Landing. Calling Maverick Landing a “New Neighborhood on the Harbor” the materials included a short narrative of the “history” of Maverick. This slogan emphasized the newness of Maverick and its desirable location. The history made no mention of the former Maverick Gardens. Management reinforced the slogan on a coffee mug given to incoming Market rate tenants. A plan for a new luxury development, “Hodge Boiler Works” was also including the Maverick Landing marketing package. Sketches of the “this new waterfront development features a mix of 116 luxury condominiums, an 8 unit bed & breakfast inn, a cafe and a 100 slip marina” (Richard D. Kimball Company, Inc., 2004) appeared on glossy, four color paper. Yet the logic of the growth machine can sometimes prove false. While in 2002 Boston Mayor Menino pronounced, “"People don't want to live there now, but within five years there will be lots of demand for that waterfront neighborhood."” Yet five years later, in 2007, after having been “been beset by years of false starts” the developers sold the Carleton Wharf site, noting that the luxury condominium “corner of the residential market has gone soft.”

In addition to hopes for neighborhood growth, local level actors began to inform low income residents of their plan for reducing the number of units available to the very poor. As Sherry S. recalled, "then we was told that people ... like rich people were gonna move in. And, and but it was just different stories. We really didn’t know.” Local management also informed market rate residents of the planned changes to the income structure, suggesting certain neighbors were unwelcome. As Danny M. recalled, “they said, well, you’re weathering the worst of it because you are brand new. You’re like the pilot people to move in” And of course they want us to stay but they said, ‘if you move out, you’ve weathered the bad storm and you’re going to bring in the people and they’re just going to reap the benefits of what you had to weather.” Management not only discouraged interaction among groups but signaled certain low income residents were unwelcome even to them.

Local Implementation and the social structure.

The structural disparity inherent in policy makers’ designs for mixed income developments carried through to the mid level. High level actors coupled this structural disparity with the mandate that housing be self sufficient. Such schemes succeeded in profiting by combining groups with different amounts of leverage in the housing market. However, high-level actors didn’t consider how groups’ varying leverage might impact social relations as the groups become aware of their differing levels of power within the same institution. Drawing from previous experience, mid level agents anticipated that market rate residents would demand a certain level of service, but assumed that subsidized residents would not.

Management’s awareness of the disparate leverage of the groups motivated them to privilege the market rate residents’ demands for rule structure over the subsidized residents

Graves
demands. The manager at Maverick Landing acknowledged that some of the rules existed to support the expectations of the market rate residents. The manager explained that the market rate and subsidized residents have different expectations about cultural expressions in public space, a kind of “public culture.” He noted that “Hispanic culture is very big on the stoop sitting and the outside gatherings, with socialization and all that.” The manager contrasted this to “the market people who may come from backgrounds that are different. Where they’re a little more oriented, and they’re expecting, ‘I don’t want people sittin’ on the stairs smokin’ and drinkin.’” In the new Maverick Landing he acknowledged that the subsidized residents were no longer permitted to pursue some of the particulars of their way of life, “You wanna talk about that now. No, you can’t throw the laundry out the window, no you can’t do this, no you can’t do that. Can’t do this, and no you can’t put your grill on the sidewalk and cook out…”

Yet the manager acknowledged the arbitrary nature of rules, such as not allowing dogs, in the development, “when you were here you get to keep it, but if you move here and you don’t have a dog, as a point in time, you can’t go get a dog. That’s a rule. It’s a rule. It’s not bad. It’s not good, it just is.” And he noted that these changes came as a surprise for the low income residents, “They don’t expect that. But the people that came from the housing prior, expect it and lived it, and now they’re bein’ told they can’t do what they used to do.” And as previous chapter suggested, such behavior might not be only a function of culture but also economics. Lower income people lack the resources to drink, dine and socialize away from home.

An earlier management firm had been even more explicit about their plans. Margaret S. recalled them “saying, all right, they were saying that the market rate people, they were
supposed have more privileges than us low income people or whatever.” While that firm was ultimately removed in favor of Roseville, they had given the impression that inequality would be enforced.

In small ways, management did introduce inequalities. Market rate residents received perks their subsidized neighbors did not. During the holiday season management gave each market rate resident a tray of cookies. They distributed the cookies inconspicuously, either inviting residents to come pick them up in the office or placing them inside the residents’ units. They also permitted market rate residents to keep pets, where low income residents were asked to abandon pets that had not lived with them at the old Maverick and were therefore not “grandfathered in.” The market rate residents also had a separate parking area. But the subsidized residents noted this occasional preferential treatment of market rate households.

Finally, management offered market rate residents free air conditioners, while they required the subsidized residents to pay for theirs. As Sean M. recalled, “And they did give us 2 AC’s, ‘cause there’s no central A here, so they gave us 2 AC’s.” Citing Federal regulations, management told residents that the window air conditioners they already own were disallowed. Many people had previously paid for their own air conditioners but were asked to throw them out. I asked Sandy S. what she had done with the air conditioner she had purchased for her unit in the Old Maverick. She recalled, “Air conditions, gave everything away.” Officially, in a July 2005 flyer, management announced, "No window air conditioners are allowed...town home residents may purchase an inside A/C unit” Thus, while market rate residents received the units for free, subsidized residents were required to buy them. And the units were quite expensive. As Maria S. explained, “in order to have AC you had to buy their
AC which is $600, each AC, you imagine that?” Many subsidized residents knew that management provided the units to their market rate at no cost.

Market rate residents were also able to take advantage of recruiting incentives. Residents were offered their first 2 month rent free. As Sean M. recalled, “the free months are really nice.” Market rate residents also received a referral bonus -- $1000 or about half the months’ rent on a unit. With a ready supply, subsidized residents were not offered similar incentives. Thus, because the recruitment mechanisms for the two groups was different, management offered cash and savings to one group but not to the other. While entirely economically rational, such proffers functioned only to widen economic differences between the two groups.

In small but significant ways, company men and women reacted to structural disparity by treating the subsidized and market rate residents differently. Management made special concessions to market rate residents regarding pets, outdoor grills and guests. Also, market-rate residents received gifts from management that the subsidized residents did not. Subsidized residents, in turn, reacted to this unequal treatment by distancing themselves from their market rate neighbors. Resident did not see company men and women as ultimately responsible for the regime when in fact they were. High and mid level actors, in the decision to give local level actors flexibility, had also given local level actors power.

Local Implementation: Summary

Given the institutional history of their management style, the skilled self advocacy of the market rate population, a fiscal structure which led management to accommodate market rate residents’ demands and no direction from mid level agents to foster interaction, company
men and women did little to encourage relationships between groups. If actors aren’t aiding interaction, what are they doing? Helping residents directly, rather than facilitating assistance. In offering assistance directly actors formalized what some hoped would occur on the informal level.

**Market Rate and Subsidized Residents’ Interpretations**

Moreover, it was not only explicit messages from local level actors which impacted interaction, residents interpretations of implementers’ actions also hampered cross class social relations. Residents imagined that management endeavored to curtail the use of outdoor areas and this led them to believe management and their neighbors would prefer residents to maintain social distance. Residents too, began to reinterpret the physical systems, giving them powers of omniscience and more than a few residents likened the constraints to incarceration. Some subsidized residents, unaware of the potentially positive outcomes from cross-class interaction felt so discouraged that they recommended class resegregation. In electing to omit the mixing scheme from the recruitment plan, local level managers perpetuated market rate residents’ notions about the undeserving poor allowing them to make negative assumptions about their less well off neighbors. Such notions were, at the very least, counterproductive to cross-class interaction. For some residents, both market rate and subsidized believed that the mixed nature of Maverick was temporary and as rents escalated, low income tenants would ultimately be replaced by market rate residents. Such suspicions had a negative effect on community building. Pressure to recruit, retain and appease market rate tenants led residents of both income groups to remark on the inequality around them, and to object to it as well.
Resident interpretations of the physical form

Residents of both income groups interpreted management’s explicit rules around use of space as anti-social. The tenets of new urbanism embraced by national actors called for a reduction in common areas. While mid level design did include one common area, the courtyard, local level managers restricted its use. Such restrictions led residents to imagine additional ones. Some residents falsely believed that the curfew extended to their individualized front porches. But as the manager explained, “curfew really didn’t affect the stoops, their own porches. It’s really the courtyard.” Additionally, people misinterpreted the curfew to be mean that management was requiring residents to return home by late evening, “I know when we did this people thought that we meant that they had to be home by 10:00 and if they weren’t home by 10:00 they weren’t gonna be able to get in their house.” Some residents not only reacted to local-level rules but went a step further, interpreting the rules as more draconian than intended. Such interpretations dampened social relations, as residents interpreted socializing around the development as unacceptable. As noted in chapter 4, a renegade flyering campaign warned residents about impending “new rules” which involved stricter codes of conduct and stiffer penalties. The flyer proved so inflammatory, management held a community meeting ostensibly to react to the flyer.

Residents of both income groups reinterpreted multiple messages from management regarding maintenance and design. They were particularly suspicious of managements’ rules against outdoor grills and window air conditioners as having an antisocial subtext. John S. suspected management’s prohibition of outdoor grills served to control the population. “You know, they say it’s a fire code, a fire issue, but, that’s baloney.” Rather, John S. interpreted the rule to be an uncongenial one. “They just don’t want people to be, you know, goin’ crazy...
in the back yard, you know. You’re not gonna be up there every day grilling.” While management claimed that a HUD rule barred the use of window air conditions, Sean M. noted an underlying meaning in the rule. He believed it related more to a general campaign to achieve aesthetic uniformity. “No, I bet, I bet they’re sayin’ safety, but I think they have a double meaning to it.” Residents sensed duplicity on the part of management and this led them to believe management and their neighbors would prefer residents to maintain physical distance.

However, while high and mid level actors had stressed individuation, occasionally, residents engaged in cooperation. Mid level designers had provided each town home with trash barrels and anticipated that each resident would individually bring the barrels to the curb for weekly trash pick up. Company men and women reinforced this, circulating a number of flyers about the appropriate hours and etiquette of trash pick up. However, residents began to collaborate on trash day, taking turns bringing each other’s barrels out to the curb. As Danny explained, “downstairs, we helped them take out the garbage. Well we, it’s odd, what’s happened. In the back, we sort of share garbage pails now. For some reason, I brought them out and he brought them in one time. Right now we have two and we tend to share them.”

High level actors envisioned new design conventions that would increase residents’ sense of safety. Mid level actors responded with technical modifications to secure the development. As management featured these security systems in their advertisements and conversations with residents, residents then felt relieved of the responsibility toward engaging with one another for collective monitoring. Residents too, began to reinterpret the physical systems designed to enhance their sense of safety. Over time, it became clear that residents internalized the presence of the hi-tech security system, giving it powers far beyond its reach. For them it functioned as a kind of technological panopticon, a “technopticon,” if you will,

Graves 209
able to observe residents at all times, apprehend violators and even change behavior. Like Jerem}

Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, a theoretical prison that allowed wardens to observe any

inmate at any time, without his being aware when it was actually happening, the state of the art security system resulted in sense of “invisible omniscience.”

Residents reported feeling monitored and thus a sense of hyper-vigilance around their own behavior. As Margaret S. related, “Then they check the cameras everyday. I hope they don’t catch me doing anything...one day I was going out the door and just before I went out the door I lit a cigarette. I said, I hope that’s not on camera. But I wasn’t in the building, I was outside.” Not only did residents believe the technopiticon had the power to observe behavior, they thought the camera’s reproachful gaze could change behavior as well. A lens on the street had replaced Jacobs’ collective “eyes on the street.” Barbara S. purposed that a solution to residents’ failure to properly clean the laundry machines was to “Put a camera in there that would make people clean their lint thing.” Thus she sought a technological solution to resource sharing rather than an interpersonal one. Repeatedly, residents believed that the solution to controlling incidents of vandalism, prostitution and trespassing was to place cameras in the locations where the offenses occurred. Residents believed in technology, even more than people, had power to control and coerce residents. It became an electronic third eye watching over themselves, their neighbors and threats from the outside.

For some residents, hyper-vigilance around physical and social order made them feel the security was too much of a priority and described their residency using metaphors of incarceration when talking about the development. Dolores S. explained, “Oh, I call this a minimum security prison, because here you have to come downstairs, show an ID, sign in. Only two people at a time can come up, and if you go visit somebody in jail, that’s how it is.”
[In the old Maverick] it was a community. This isn’t a community. This is a minimum security prison.” Patty S. felt similarly, “To me, it feels like... confinement. The old Maverick I had more freedom let’s say.” No market rate resident used the prison analogy so frequently used by the subsidized residents.

Susanna S. believed that people were unhappy because of restrictions “there’s some Spanish that do stuff, but it’s just like, when you put, like OK, I think the reason they’re like that is because they don’t have no freedom. Like when we’re in here, they don’t have no freedom. Cause they’re in their house, OK, they have their kids playin’, they have their music pumpin why? Cause they can’t have their kids outside or whatever. I don’t even know. This, this place over here. It’s just, I don’t feel right living livin here.” Yet no market rate person expressed a similar feeling of constraint, suggesting the rules constrained (any maybe even applied to) one population more than the other. Some began to sense that new Maverick is constructed more for the new residents than the old ones. Feeling constricted in their use of outdoor space, monitored and constrained, residents interpreted modifications to the physical design in ways that made Maverick feel un-neighborly.

Resident Interpretations of the encounters encouraged and discouraged

While at the high and middle levels, actors anticipated interaction, they did not advocate recruiting local level managers to facilitate this. Instead, company men and women discouraged sociability in their fliers by making it clear residents should keep quiet and to themselves. Residents also began to interpret the new emphasis on quietude as a code for class. Exaggerated or not, many residents felt so discouraged from interacting with their higher income neighbors, it contributed to the suggestion by some of segregating the buildings by income. While in the former Maverick Dolores S. had been able to listen to music and
entertain family and friends without incident, she received numerous requests from management at the New Maverick to keep quiet. She interpreted management’s behavior as advocating on the market rate residents’ behalf. Referring to subsidized units as “housing market rate as “leasing”, Dolores S. explained, “They should of kept housing and, and leasing separate... they should of made that apartment, them buildin’s over there leasing, and they should of made these housing. . Because, you can’t mix the two together, you know what I mean? People that pay, regular market rent, don’t wanna associate with people that pay low rent, in fact they’re just two totally different people, you know what I Mean? People that live in low income housing are people that need help. People that pay regular base income don’t want help and don’t wanna be bothered by anybody. Especially up the next thing that’s gonna think, can I have some sugar?” Dolores S. avoided interacting with her higher income neighbors, believing they would be hostile to her expressions of need, even a request for a cup of sugar.

Amisha S. too suggested a solution to complaints about subsidized residents congregating in common spaces was to, “build another buildin’ for nothin’ but market tenants.” As Susanna S. recommended, “It’s like this, if they wanted to have the project people there, they should have put a building for project people and they should have built another building with the market rate people.” Penny M, a market rate resident, confirmed their suspicions, “if I was management, I would not move market rent people in the same with the subsidy because it doesn’t work... Why couldn’t you, why couldn’t you put them all on the same floor? Why should everybody else that goes to work and has to get up early in the mornin’, have to deal with the foolishness?” While macro and mid level agents envisioned interaction, they gave no instructions about how this goal should be articulated to the
Residents. Rather, management was free to promote an environment dissuasive to interaction. Some subsidized residents, unaware of the potentially positive outcomes from cross-class interaction felt so discouraged that they recommended resegregation.

**Resident interpretations of the marketing and disclosure**

High and mid level actors’ lack of specificity about how information about mixing scheme should be shared with the residents carried through to the local level. Lacking explicit guidelines, company men and women elected to omit or distort the mixed income nature of the development. Moreover, hiding the income structure and the theoretical ideals behind the mixing scheme led resident to draw their own conclusions about their neighbors. Such reactions were occasionally hostile. Danny M. suggested that the difference in rent conferred a difference in respect for the property, “I’m obviously a little educated, have a good job, can afford to pay 1700 dollars to live in an apartment, verses somebody who’s paying 100 dollars. It’s their lifestyle is obviously different than mine, their upbringing is obviously different, their job, if they have one, is different...I’m saying, you know, if I paid 100 dollars for this place, I could really care less if I banged into the wall....but if I had money coming in from the government every week, I think that my lifestyle would be a little different, too. Maybe a little lazier,” Had he been aware of his neighbors’ histories or commitments, he might have been more understanding, or chosen to live elsewhere. Jeremy M. imagined that his subsidized neighbors resented him for his relative wealth, “there are people that are like, look at me like I’m fricken Daddy Warbucks or something and I’m like, “no, I’m not, I just manage my money well and I work towards it you know, and now I’m going to go out and enjoy it.” And they’re like, “I’m going to go buy some crack.”
Such attitudes confirmed Sherry S.'s fears. Prior to the development’s completion a construction worker had told her that he resented working hard to build nice buildings for poor people. This suggested to her that she would encounter resentment from her market rate neighbors. "And it's the ignorance like that, that I was afraid that was gonna happen if we moved here." In electing to omit the mixing scheme from the recruitment plan, local level managers perpetuated market rate residents' "ignorance" allowing them to make negative assumptions about their less well off neighbors. Thus, residents continued with their mutual assumed resentment (or M.A.R. in future chapters). M.A.R. was, at the very least, counterproductive to cross-class interaction.

Residents' beliefs that mid level actors sought to make Maverick Landing an engine in the East Boston growth machine also was impacted social relations in the development. Jeremy M. and Sean M. saw Maverick as a potential sight for growth "you know the yuppification, for no better term of Boston will probably eventually expand out here." They likened the development to Cabrini Green, the notorious Chicago public housing development that also received HOPE VI funding. Jeremy M. related how, "one of the worst parts of Chicago, Cabrini Green used to be a big housing project, a huge gang area, you know....And a couple of years ago I drove through it when I went to go visit my family, there was Starbucks and it was like town homes and everything." Sean M. recalled that redevelopment in Chicago meant serious displacement for the public housing population, "Well, you know what they did there? They shipped everybody out and bulldozed Cabrini Green to the ground." Sean M. suggested that while growth might be the goal for both Boston and Chicago, it was more easily achieved in Chicago. "That's prime real estate. This isn't so prime real estate. I mean maybe along this stretch here."
Phillip M. believed that the development functioned poorly as a mixed income development. Its shortcomings were so foreseeable, he believed, that mid level actors must have engineered them. "I refuse to believe that people... these higher echelon thinkers, that such leaders, would go into this thing, half assed." Rather, he believed that the mixing was so poorly administered that, "That is the purpose of it. It is to allow it to fail." That would allow developers to "then, sell 'em all condos. Like hotcakes they would apply. It's a beautiful area. You built up that whole East Boston, push everybody a little further out...This is politics. This is just a set up. It's a clear..." Residents, like others up the implementation chain speculated about the growth potential for the neighborhood and further believed that coexisting or cooperating with low income households was contrary to the overall goal of growth.

Dolores S. suggested that many she knew also feared that mid level actors intended for Maverick Landing to become a market rate development, "Um, just, just, you know, people talking in general. Um, they say that they're tryin' to make this a money area because of the fact that you got the waterfront, and the view." A lot of people say... that they're taking preference. That they're trying to take this whole waterfront side and make it an all White community." Such a perspective made her feel unwelcome and a bit victimized, "I... definitely think it's not fair to everybody that has lived out here, and everybody that, you know, is just used to being here, you know what I mean, for them to just get booted out like that." For some residents, both market rate and subsidized believed that the mixed nature of Maverick was temporary and as rents escalated, low income tenants would ultimately be replaced by market rate residents. Such suspicions had a negative effect on community building.
Resident Interpretations of the social structure

Pressure to recruit, retain and appease market rate tenants led residents of both income groups to remark on the inequality around them, and to object to it as well. Some subsidized residents began to report that the market rate tenants were receiving preferential treatment. Susanna S. speculated that management was more tolerant of behavior from market rate tenants. She related the revelry her market rate neighbors engaged in around the New Year. “But you know what I’m saying, they’re the ones, the market rate people round my way, they’re the ones that be partying all the time, they’re the college kids there be out New Years with beers and things. And talking about “Happy New Year!” I’m like, you know what I’m saying, if we would have done some shit like that, the police would have came around, like, you know what I’m saying, you would have gotten arrested for bringing drinks outside or whatever but it’s just like. It’s crazy yo, it’s just like.” In subtle ways residents sensed a lack of fairness and market rate dominance.

Other residents noted how their market rate neighbors were neither screened nor asked to follow the rules. Margaret S. pointed out, “People in the houses, if you notice, most of them are on the market rate and they get away with doing a lot of things that we don’t get away with doing.” Mellisa S. noted that, “I don’t understand what the hell’s the problem. They have new people that’s movin in here...They’re not interviewin them. What’s up with that?” Al S. too noted uneven expectations from management regarding rule compliance, “Now, I’ve been here a year and three months and I’ve seen, uh, let me see, trouble, trouble, um, just the bending the rules, like ball playing in the court when it’s not allowed and I mean, what’s that, what kind of violation is that. But still, they shouldn’t be ball playing cause if they can play
ball, then I want to play basketball too, you know. It's not fair.” Subjected to scrutiny and constraints, subsidized residents expected the same treatment of all their neighbors.

Occasionally, subsidized residents overestimated the special treatment their neighbors received. John S. believed that management provided an exclusive office to market rate residents. “They got the offices for the people that come over here, and they got the office for the, uh... the regular.” However, management maintained a single office for both income groups. Nika S. believed that her market rate neighbors were permitted to keep a small wading pool, “they have a pool back there. Now if I was to put a pool, a pool up here.” She argued that if she used a wading pool in her back yard, management would ask her to remove it. However, the market rate neighbor later reported that management in fact did request that he remove the pool. Others wondered if all burdens were shared equally. As Randy S. questioned whether market rate neighbors had to pay the electric bill. “And can I ask you a question, not to be nosey. Alright we, you leased, right. Now was your... rent... was your rent included with your electric? In other words did you, did you pay electric bill? “ While management treated both groups of residents similarly in many ways, the evident unequal treatment led residents to suspect favoritism.

More than simply noting unequal treatment, residents objected to it. Frequently, they called the social structure unfair. Rather than accepting unequal treatment as a part of a stratified development, residents believed they were entitled to more. “It’s very unfair. Why treat us that way? [They] should of just kept us wherever the hell, you know, just, get out of here, you know, that’s it. If it’s only for, for rich people that have money. They should of never done that.”
Residents of both groups subscribed to the ideal of equal treatment. John S. explained his view that all tenants should be offered the same level service. “It doesn’t matter where you come from. You all gonna live in the same neighborhood. You all live in the same development. It should be equal opportunity for everybody. Just because I’m maybe that’s one of the subsidized tenants doesn’t make me a nice person. “ Angie S., upset over the unequal distribution of air conditioners believed, “it was a a bit discrimination. Why can’t low income get it. Uh, so, so what, we suffocate because we’re low income, and we can’t afford it? You know what I’m tryin’ to say?” While subsidized residents, as the losing recipients of unequal treatment noted and objected to the practice more often, the market rate also noted unfairness. Regarding the air conditioners Marie M. found “they’re not getting’ treated fairly you know.” People don’t just object to unequal treatment on material but moral grounds and on this point, their market rate neighbors agree. This sense of unfairness and inequality dampened social relations.

**Summary of Residents’ Reactions**

I will summarize by working backward through the implementation chain. Discussions with residents reveal some surprising and occasionally strange ideas. Residents saw systematic favoritism of market rate tenants, they prescribed class resegregation, believed rumors about heightened rules, employed metaphors of incarceration and assumed income mixing was phased gentrification. Where did these ideas come from? As I have tried to demonstrate in these two chapters and summarize in Table 6.1, these ideas can be linked to actions of actors higher up on the implementation chain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Management Response</td>
<td>Gave market rate tenants exclusive perks and incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Level actions</td>
<td>Reliance on market rate tenants for revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Level Agenda</td>
<td>Mandated developments be financially self-sufficient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graves 219
Residents “prescribed resegregation” in part because the culture of quietude was incompatible with their lifestyles and preferences. Management was able to enforce that culture because of ambiguities at the mid level. Mid level agents provided no mandate or even direction to management to promote mixing. These directives were absent in part because high level actors provided neither empirics nor examples of how economic mixing could lead to social mixing. Similarly, residents assumed a curfew because management imposed restrictions on use of space. Company men and women placed these restrictions because they used the design to signal social order rather than social connectivity. Mid level agents enabled this use of design by emphasizing the marketing potential of the physical redevelopment. High level actors allowed for the use of design as a marketing tool because they failed to foresee how marketing and mixing could be at odds. Thus, residents not only absorbed the messages management directed toward them, they also used the information to develop interpretations on their own. Based on communications from local level actors and those higher up the implementation chain, residents developed a series of assumptions about the meaning and intent of implementers. Sometime this led them to withdraw their support of the mixing scheme. However, while mid and high level actors advocated equality of design, residents sought equality of treatment. Additionally, while mid and local level actors had stressed individuation, occasionally residents engaged in cooperation. Where mid and high level actors structured inequality, residents demanded parity. As McPherson et al. note (2002), “Birds of a feather flock together,” meaning people prefer to be with others like themselves. Yet what I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter and the previous one is that low interaction is not only an outcome of people’s preferences, but of poor policy implementation.
Chapter Conclusion

Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) first observed the inverse relationship between the number of transactions required to implement a decision and the likelihood that an effect, any effect, would result. Even with a high probability at each step of a favorable result, the cumulative product of a large number of transactions leads to an extraordinarily low probability of success. "These notions have now become part of the standard repertoire of explanations for why policies fail." (608) Yet I have tried to demonstrate that a portion of the HOPE VI policy failed not because the number of transactions but the kinds of transactions. Promoting interaction among income groups was according to Joseph (2006) among HOPE VI’s most challenging goals. As such it might have involved the greatest effort. Instead it received the least. The aims of mixed income schemes are not self executing. They must buck the socio-ecological trend and work to hold together what social forces tend to drive apart. Like safety, like ensuring old residents receive places in the new development, like providing these tenants with social services, successful income mixing must be managed. Or put another way, this analysis aimed to show that in addition to maintaining order and collecting rents, agents did manage social relations, just in a way that led to less than ideal outcomes.
Chapter 7: Mixed Outcome Developments

Introduction

Previous chapters suggested that low levels of interaction might be, among other things, a product of institutional implementation. This chapter in contrast focuses on the occasional interaction among income groups, the infrequent but nonetheless illuminating occasions and opportunities for improved interaction and institutional implementation. Several theoretical propositions form the foundation of the strategy of using mixed income developments as a strategy to confront urban poverty. Scholars maintain that the presence of higher-income residents provides (1) increased social capital for low-income residents, (2) informal social control leading to safer and more orderly communities for everyone, (3) direct or indirect role modeling of social norms for work and behavior, and (4) gains for the broader community through enhanced engagement of political and market forces. Looking across four categories, Joseph et. al. (2006) conclude that greater informal social control and access to higher quality services are the most compelling propositions for benefits of income mixing for low income residents, where this is much less evidence to support the other claims.

As Vale notes, “the inconclusive endorsement for mixed-income housing proffered by Joseph’s analysis suggests the need for further ethnographic research on these communities” (Vale, 2006). Below I examine the Maverick case using ethnographic data to assess whether with respect to social capital, social control, role-modeling and concerns of political economy the Maverick case supports these propositions. I also suggest how evidence from Maverick further informs these propositions, noting especially how institutions, and management in particular, are imprecated in social relations among residents. It is fitting and important that some of the most meaningful alliances were conceived or occurred in opposition to the local
institution. As with the previous chapters, I draw from interview and observational material, using a first name for each resident as well as a second initial, “S” indicating the resident is subsidized and “M” indicating that the identified resident is market rate.

**Evaluation of Proposition 1: Culture and behavior**

The first set of propositions concerns the effects of higher income individuals on the cultures and behaviors of lower income people. A set of existing propositions from the social scientific community holds that low-income families have adopted antisocial behaviors such as drug abuse and other kinds of lawless behaviors, which reduce their well being and chances for upward mobility (Joseph et al. 2006, Susanna S.cks and Peterson 1991, Kasarda 1990, Lewis 1969, Wilson 1987). The antidote to antisocial behavior includes exposing these low functioning families to high functioning ones, thus enabling the high-income group to presumably serve as role-models for the low income group. Two assumptions -- one, that a “culture of poverty” (Lewis, 1969) is the cause of negative outcomes and, two, that higher income households are a fair proxy for high functioning households (Sampson, 2004) -- led some to conjecture that “the presence of higher-income residents in mixed-income developments will lead other families to adapt more socially acceptable and constructive behavior, including seeking regular work, showing respect for property, and abiding by other social norms” (Joseph, 2006, 215). To the extent that role-modeling does occur, it could take two different forms, distal or proximal. Distal role modeling is that in which an individual changes his or her behavior based on observing, from some distance, another person. Proximal role modeling is that in which an individual changes his or her behavior based on direct interaction and discussions another person.
There is little evidence for the "culture and behavior" proposition (Joseph, 2006). The strongest research findings document little adult-to-adult influence but some influence of higher-affluence adults on lower-income children and adolescents. This leaves the greatest promise of influence of mixed-income developments on the relations between adults and children (Ellen and Turner 1997; Khadduri and Martin 1997). Assessing the literature, the Joseph et. al. also note that the effect of role modeling on behavior is difficult to measure empirically. Rather, "there is no evidence in the limited research on mixed-income developments as to whether role-modeling is taking place and, if so, what effect it has" (Joseph et. al, 2006, 220). The weakness of this claim suggests that is it more an assertion than a hypothesis. And the distribution of attitudes, behaviors and aspirations might not vary across income as much as some assume. In a study of mixed income developments in the Boston area, undertaken more than three decades ago Ryan et al. found that residents of different income levels "display pretty much the same distribution of values, social attitudes, and lifestyles" (1974, 22).

Confounding such findings is the obvious fact that interpersonal relations are hardly the only influence over residents' lives. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, a significant barrier to work for many residents was a macro-structural issue not simply a motivational one (Susanna S.cks and Meyer, 1990, Kasarda 1990, Venkatesh, 2000, Wilson, 1987). As Valentine (1968) observed it may be less that inner-city residents are isolated from mainstream values than from mainstream opportunities. Additionally, as previous chapters have indicated, the principal local institution, the management company, actively enforces social norms and facilitates job seeking. Through rule enforcement and screening management cultivates a particular culture. The effects of formalized behavior modification mandated by management
may be difficult to separate from the effect of informal behavior modification initiated by interpersonal relations with fellow tenants. Moreover, as noted, on-site institutions did much to encourage employment for local residents. One must be cautious when finding improvements in employment or changes in behavior detected by surveys. These could be attributed as much to the institution as to interpersonal relations.

Evidence from the Maverick case provides some very limited yet direct support for the culture and behavior proposition that residents can influence one another’s behavior and aspirations, yet the kind of influence is not confined to cross-class. Occasionally, residents recounted examples of neighborly social influence, mostly of the distal type. Several residents (among them a few young people) reported observed neighbors’ behavior. As Mica S., an 18 year old African American female recounted, “Sometimes. Like, I don’t know, it’s like you see that person, you know that they’re about to do like, work or somethin’, and you feel like, like whoever it is, maybe they could inspire me to do the same thing with my life.” In another incidence of cross-class distal role modeling, Amisha S. also explained that she tried to keep the noise level in her apartment down out of respect for her neighbors. “Right, just like this lady and man here. I don’t be no loud at all...these people workin’ every day.” Yet such reports were rare, with many more residents speaking of a sort of tolerance for their higher income neighbors.

Proximal role modeling occurred too, again in limited instances between income groups. But proximal role modeling happened most often within income groups. Here youth recounted many cases of peer-to-peer role modeling. Peter S. recounted how his neighbor, Dwayne S. taught him to play chess, leading him to start a chess club at East Boston High. Van S. recalled how his friends taught him to be less shy and more assertive. Among older
adults, Carmen S. looked to Sharon S., employed at the county courthouse, for motivation. Jamil S. looked to his peers and even his grandfather for direction. Very often however, subsidized residents with jobs and those in successful recovery or estranged from dysfunctional family dynamics named only themselves as their own role models. As Barbara S. stated proudly, “I inspire my own self”, indicating her and other residents’ historic and ongoing isolation. A calmer and more ordered environment had more influence than role models.

Yet frequently residents reported changes in their behavior because they were observing the rules, not necessarily their more affluent neighbors. Eighteen year-old LaShonda S. explained that in the neighborhood there were other girls who “basically, they are looking for a fight.” She explained further.

I’ve never been in a fight...but this has been happening for 4 years and it’s getting worse but it’s the fact that if like something to the extreme happened, and I get into a fight and I get into a fight and Maverick finds out, my family’s getting kicked out and we have 15 days to look for a new place. And we’re not going to find a new place that’s you know, is gonna be as affordable for us as Maverick cause we having nothing.

Thus, LaShonda S. avoided violent conflict because such conflict would violate the rules at Maverick and lead to her family’s expulsion. However, she explained that she had a change in behavior, not a change in heart. She still subscribed to physical self-defense and believed her mother did as well. “So it’s the fact that I’m totally against fighting but if it’s in self defense, I don’t think I should get in trouble. Especially, I mean my mother wouldn’t yell at me.”

And occasionally, as noted in chapter 4, residents attributed aspirational changes to the environment itself. Sherry S. wanted to get a job so she could purchase new furniture. As she explained “I’m gonna go back to work too, because ...I want, I, you know, we need the money,
and, you know there’s... we got this beautiful house, and that’s all we talk about is wantin’ to fix this, fix it up and, you know... we just wanna get new things.” John S. too was saving up for new couches because he thought the new surroundings made his old sofas look out of place. Clearly, residents attributed their employment and financial goals to their new setting. Observing their surroundings, residents engaged in efforts to make the inside of their homes, a largely private expression of their lives, match the high-end appearance of their upgraded setting.

However, because the rules didn’t always meet either groups’ cultural standards, they changed behavior in ways both groups resented. Residents of both income classes objected to some rules, set by the managers, especially the prohibition against use of an outdoor grill. One market rate resident, Craig M. revealed his plan to flout the rules. Antonio S. had a more collective action solution to the rule against grilling out -- a grill in. “And if you wanna have a little cookout in the back with a small grill, I don’t see a problem with that. And that’s when it’s gonna start. They all gonna come together. And what are they gonna do about it? Evict everybody?” Antonio envisioned organizing the development so that everyone would grill out simultaneously, realizing the power of collective action. Yet management successfully forestalled action in part by sending out a series of flyers reminding residents of the rule against grilling, thus preventing interaction through collective action or conversations over the proverbial back fence.

In summary, then, some notable changes in culture and behavior occurred at Maverick, suggesting groups’ culture and behavior can be influenced, though perhaps not always from the sources proposed. While middle-income residents had some demonstrable influence on residents aspiring to mainstream norms, much influence arose from the management
institution. As noted in earlier chapters many of managements rules served the profit agenda better than the resident relations agenda. Regardless, residents modified their behavior in response to the design itself as well as formal rules. Yet, the institution influenced behavior in some ways that met neither groups approval and prevented potential interaction.

**Evaluation of Proposition 2: Neighborhood Services**

A second proposition of the impact of mixed income communities suggests the potential impact of higher income households to strengthen the services found in the community. This suggests that the influence of higher-income residents will create new market demand and exert political pressure that will motivate external political and economic actors to respond. For example, this dynamic will lead to higher quality police services as well as goods and services, presumably available to all in the community. Yet this proposition favors the agency of homeowners over other kinds of tenure, such as rental. Homeowners “have a greater vested interest in soliciting public and private investment in the community, and higher-income families will demand better performance from neighborhood schools and other local institutions (Khadduri 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).

Additionally, the higher income households with their greater spending power will make the neighborhood more attractive to retailers and commercial development.

Again, the literature shows little evidence for the neighborhood services proposition. Finding no available research in the literature documenting higher income residents exerting political pressure for the provision of shared resources, Joseph (2006) concludes, “no research on mixed-income developments examines the role of higher income residents in leveraging external resources.” This may be because the scale of the housing development is just too small to have an impact on larger patterns of neighborhood investment. Another possibility is
that the gains are not distributed equally. Regardless, changes to the neighborhood services are one of the most under-examined phenomena in mixed-income developments.

Evidence from the Maverick case provides some indication of where high resourced residents place their advocacy skills, where they do not and where management places them in their stead. While some suggest that residents seek to improve local conditions, as Chapter 3 identified, many market rate residents, rather than push for better local goods and services simply take their business elsewhere, choosing exit rather than voice when dissatisfied with neighborhood level services. Disappointed with the local grocery store, pharmacy, fitness center, and retailers, market rate residents reported leaving the neighborhood to obtain desired items and experiences. No resident reported engaging with the providers of the sub-par services and making their demands known.

Unlike shops or restaurants, local policing is a service that resident cannot obtain elsewhere. Market rate residents did place pressure for improved police services. As discussed in earlier chapters, the lower-income residents felt reticent to contact the police. Market rate residents expressed far less hesitation about involving the authorities. In fact a market rate resident, Mark M. at a community meeting offered to contact the police on behalf of intimidated residents. “You’ve got a problem with somebody? Secretly take their picture, if you’ve got a problem showing the picture, I’ll go to the police station and press charges on these people.” Market rate residents, then, expressed willingness to form alliances with subsidized residents in order to achieve the common goal of greater local social control.

But again, it was the management company that placed significant pressure for improvement in police services. Management conducted monthly meetings with the local police precinct officers. Additionally, management invited residents and the police to semi-
regular community safety meetings. The police reacted favorably to these interventions. As one police officer declared at a community meeting, “I haven't worked with people like this before...hands up...hands down to these people.” Thus, in a rental community, property managers proxy as property owners, which as explained below reduces conflict and increases opportunity for collaborative contact.

In summary, evidence at Maverick in support of improvements to the neighborhood services is scant, as Joseph et al. (2006) predicted. But this is, possibly, not for the reasons assumed. Most often, resourced residents chose to exit rather than exert the voice option when confronting substandard community services. Perhaps residents had not lived there long enough for such changes to take effect. However, in the case of police protection, a non-substitutable commodity, the market rate residents placed increased pressure. Yet again, the influence of institutions again confounds resident influence on the political economy of place at Maverick. The management company, which had the greatest vested interest in Maverick, placed the heaviest pressure on the police. Improvements to neighborhood safety, then must be at least partially attributed to institutional influence, rather than direct pressure placed by market rate tenants.

**Evaluation of Proposition 3: Informal Social control**

A third set of the propositions for the impact of higher income household in mixed income neighborhoods center around social control. Some suggest that higher resourced individuals can more successfully promote informal community safety control measures. The breakdown in social control in inner city communities is often tied to the absence of stable, working families. These families are more likely to exert pressure within the community for
order and safety (Sampson, 2004, Wilson, 1987). The introduction of households with the resources to exert pressure on their neighbors for order and safety would benefit all. The existing evidence about the extent or the source of social control is inconclusive (Joseph, 2006).

Evidence from the Maverick site suggests that increases in informal social control come from two sources. First, it comes from residents directly intervening. But second it comes from residents setting and enforcing expectations for the governing institution.

Market rate residents sought to enforce social control in many ways. When Mandy M. saw kids fighting in the courtyard, she sent her husband out to respond to the matter, “even though the security was there.” Phillip M. kept his eyes and ears out for “conversations that let you know that people are interested in what someone else has.” Jeremy M. objected to his neighbor leaving a bag of garbage outside his door and wrote a note, telling the neighbor that he wouldn’t tolerate the abandoned garbage. Gary M. saw a teen throw a soda can into his yard. Gary ran out and yelled at the young man to pick it up, saying, “how would you like it if I dumped trash in your yard?” He recalled that the kid seemed “shocked.”

Subsidized residents too often intervened personally when trying control crime and disorder. When John S. observed the occupants of a car parked on the opposite side of the street from his unit engaged in prostitution, he walked over to the car, knocked on the windows and told them to leave. Patricia S. noted with anger some graffiti marks in the stairwell and spent an hour washing the walls clean. Rachelle S., like Gary M. refused to tolerate children littering in the development, recalling saying to ones who dropped trash, “excuse me, there’s a bucket right there, go pick it up.”
As Barbara S. predicted, market rate residents played both primary role in social order and a secondary one as well. Barbara S. echoed the theoretical proposition that market rate people were likely to demand higher quality housing, “People aren’t going to want to live in a shaggy place. They’re going to put pressure on management to keep it clean.” Market rate residents then were willing to contribute some effort to maintain safety in the development by expected management to provide it as well. Thus, when management asked residents to provide police with a description, time of day and location of suspect activity, Frank M., though an active member of the community, felt this was management’s responsibility, not his. As he explained, “I’m paying full rent, it is not my responsibility to stay up with binoculars and keep a log. I’m retired.”

Formal authorities too, encouraged residents to engage in informal social control. A community police liaison often attended the safety meetings. He commended residents for joining the meeting, saying “participation like yours is what is necessary to maintain a safe community.” He encouraged them to “invite friends” to future meeting. His training reflected current understanding about collective efficacy (Sampson, 2004) as he encouraged residents to walk around and sit on benches and “be a presence.”

Many subsidized residents too shared market rate residents’ concern with maintaining community safety. In fact, when provided with an institutional means to ensure safety, subsidized residents gathered greater numbers than their market rate neighbors. The tenant’s association formed a “floor captains” group and sent out fliers recruiting participants. Only low income residents (plus this author) participated. Moreover, a far greater proportion of subsidized residents than market rate residents attended the public safety meetings, demonstrating residents were eager to participate in organized efforts to maintain order,
though perhaps with slightly less success, especially when it came to placing pressure on management, as I will illustrate below.

Occasionally, too, market rate and subsidized residents collaborated to confront disorder in the development. These encounters too highlight the residents’ different styles for securing social control. Susanna S. recalled an event on Thanksgiving Day. Thanksgiving afternoon a man, quite clearly drunk and apparently homeless, came to her door and rattled at the doorknob to get inside. When he couldn’t open the door, he tried to enter through the window. Susanna S. went outside to chase him away and watched as he moved to the neighbor’s door. The drunk then moved onto a third unit, this one belonging to a market rate resident Ken M. Ken M. emerged from his unit and started talking to the drunk man. Ken M.’s approach impressed Susanna S.. First, Susanna S. recalled, Ken M. joked with the drunk saying that the drunk must be looking for a Thanksgiving dinner. Second, Ken M. told the drunk he had to leave the property so that the residents at Maverick could have a peaceful Thanksgiving. He told the drunk that he had a “choice” – he could either leave now on his own recognizance or Ken M. would call the police. Apparently, the drunk decided to leave. Susanna S. found Ken M.’s handling of the matter quite remarkable – both because of the joking about Thanksgiving dinner as well as the tenant’s bargaining with the drunk. She had never before seen such a response to threats to community order. This episode evokes Bandura’s notions of “social learning” (1977) in which individuals learn behavior by observing and then coding and retaining behavior modeled by others. The episode also illustrates how social relations among residents can both fulfill both the social control function and the role modeling described in the previous section.
Market rate and subsidized residents also made informal coalitions in order to place pressure on the management company for enhanced services. This was especially notable at one meeting where residents joined together in their complaints that the private security agents were not adequately performing their services. The meeting took place in July, with its long, hot days that enabled lots of outdoor activity. Residents of both income groups began to sense that the management’s security agents were not performing adequately. Their complained that the security company’s personnel were poorly trained. About two dozen residents (but just one market rate household) attended a “community safety meeting” held by the management firm and the tenants’ association president.

John S. raised number of complaints, chiefly a broken entry door and a lack a visible security agents, “I have not seen a security guard for months!” Other residents voiced agreement with him. Yet Mike the manager flatly denied the residents’ assertions about the lack of security, replying, “That’s fine. Because, well there are.” Frustrated, John S. attempted to restate his complaint about the lack of security agents by polling the other residents about their observations, “Can anybody put up their hand, please?” But the manager ignored this tactic, turning to another resident. “Sir, in the back,” pointing to Bruce S. However, Bruce S. too complained about the lack of visible security patrols, “What you’re talking about, about security. I stayed outside one day for five hours and I didn’t see not one person.”

At this point, the market rate resident Frank M. joined in the discussion, initially offering verbal support, “Right.” Unable to deflect the complaints, the manager attempted to hedge, refusing to either agree or disagree with the residents’ assertions, “I hear what you’re
saying. I’m not disagreeing with you or agreeing with you.” Instead he attempted to place the responsibility back on the residents, asking if they had called to report the lack of security.

Yet here was where Frank M.’s advocacy skills began to take effect, “I told you. I told you.” Frank M. said, “And you told me Mike just last week that you were going to have a private security starting last Friday.” In this sentence, Frank M. reminded the manager that he, unlike Bruce had contacted the manager and his requests have not been answered. Mike again attempted to hedge, offering a noncommittal suggestion of further action, “We’re working on that.”

However, Frank M. was not satisfied with this response and held the manager personally accountable for pervious statements, invoking the manager’s first name, “We need security during the Summer, Mike, really.” Mike, the manager again responded for a third time with a noncommittal suggestion of further action, “We are waiting for a contract from them.” But Frank M. refused to accept this. “Well waiting, it, it’s not happening... I’m upset because I’ve come over to you many a time, many a time.” Forced to acknowledge the history of negotiations with Frank M., Mike attempted to minimize the issue, “You have a specific problem with a specific individual.” However, Frank M. refused to accept the minimization, creating an alliance with his other neighbors. “No, it’s a lot. Look, there’s a lot happening out there. Your security is a joke.” Bruce S. concurred, “It is!”

Realizing that Frank M. will not accept his non-committal responses, Mike was forced to concede something. He attempted to suggest he had already assented to the residents’ demands, “We’ve talked in the past and in the past we’ve provided some additional security.” Yet again, Frank M. was not satisfied with this partial response, demanding specifics,
“Where? Give me an answer?” Mike then attempts to displace responsibility, “The problem with that as I explained to you, is the company that was doing that is not longer in business.”

But Frank M. responds indicates that he still holds the manager accountable for failure to hire an adequate security company. Then he made an alliance with his neighbors by invoking the collective “we”, “Look, the security that you have. We’re trying to tell you.” Mike the manager again attempted to displace responsibility onto the residents once again, demanding, “I need to know times and hours.” Frank M. again sent responsibility squarely back in the manager’s hands, replying “Times and hours? I’m just, I’ve told you before and I’m telling you again now, they are not there.” At this point, Frank M. hit the table for emphasis. Again, Frank M. refers to his similarly aggrieved neighbors, referencing Bruce S. “He’s in a different section, I’m out front. He doesn’t see them, I don’t see them.”

This episode suggested a number of important dynamics. First, Frank M. uses his neighbors’ complaints to bolster his own, demonstrating how collaborative contact can help all residents. This positive relationship mirrors Allport’s (1954) findings on factors that can promote relationships between individuals of different backgrounds. He found that “equal status contact” in which individuals shared common goals and interest lead to positive relationships. Second, Frank M. revealed his exhaustive and unrelenting standard of service. At the public meeting he demonstrates for his neighbors and the manager that he holds Maverick management accountable to this standard. This stands in contrast with his subsidized neighbors’ strategies, which tend to be more plaintive or disruptive. Frank M. does not accept the managers’ noncommittal responses and he reminds the manager of previous encounters, he uses his neighbors’ accounts to bolster his argument, he addresses the manager by his first name to indicate familiarity and rank. Again, evincing Bandura’s social learning,
Frank M., witnessed by all the residents at the meeting, demonstrates to Mike (and to the residents at the meeting), that he knows Mike, he has expectations of Mike as the manager, and Mike works for him. The next day additional security forces patrolled the development.

It is important to note that while John S, Bruce S and Frank M. all sought to make the same point to the manager, it appears that management was most attentive to the market rate resident, Frank M.’s, complaints. Too often, low income residents were thwarted in their attempts to participate in securing social control. At one safety meeting, Christine S. reported an incident in which she saw “some young kids bringing in a mega, mega big television in a box.” She called security “but I didn’t see nobody come and do something.” The manager and the police officer dismissed her comments. The manager initially suggested that surely the security responded, Christine just didn’t see them. Second, the police officer noted that the adolescents were seen entering rather than exiting the development with the possibly stolen items. Christine tried to respond that whether the items were coming or going, she believed she saw evidence of potential criminal activity. Neither the police officer or the manager responded to her clarification and turned the discussion to other topics.

In another community meeting, a somewhat similar incident occurred. A group of Latino women sat in a corner, with one woman whispering a translation of the proceedings. The police officer, interpreting the translation as a disruptive side conversation, spoke to the women in a stern voice, “Excuse me,” suggesting that their conversation is an interruption. The woman continued with her translation. The officer then again, said to them, this time with heightened impatience, “Excuse me, do you have something to say?” Several of the people in attendance at the meeting people, quite attuned to the residents’ actions, told the officer, “She’s translating.” While the officer seemed somewhat embarrassed by the
The management company at Maverick took responsibility for safety and social control with a professional security agency and formalized rules. Yet neither market rate residents nor the subsidized residents abdicated their roles to enforce social control entirely, especially when they believed that management was not performing their roles adequately.

Again, provided with viable means of participation, low-income residents participated in greater numbers than their market rate neighbors in community safety events. Yet as meeting data shows, market rate residents were more likely to be successful advocates for improved social control as they applied their mainstream argumentation style and their market
leverage toward improved services. Market rate residents were superior negotiators because of both their skills and leverage. Yet market rate residents’ demonstrably successful approaches might also serve to expand subsidized residents’ repertoire of intervention strategies.

Evaluation of Proposition 4: Increased social capital for low-income residents

The fourth and most contested of the propositions for mixed income developments is the notion that residents of different income classes will form useful social connections with one another, thereby gaining social capital. Sampson clarifies, “Social capital is typically conceptualized as being embodied in the social ties among persons” (Sampson, Network Logic) Connectivity among people, especially “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) or “bridging social capital” (cf Burt, 1992, Briggs, 1997)— provide people with access to resources beyond their networks of close association. This is thought to be especially advantageous for those with lower socioeconomic status. If mixed incomes are present in a community, lower-income residents may be able to build weak ties with affluent neighbors and thereby improve access to employment networks and other resources.

Existing evidence about the prospect of forming of social networks across income levels is limited and inconclusive. Joseph grimly concludes, “Most studies have found little interaction across income levels, and those that have found such interaction have not been able to demonstrate that it has led to information about jobs or other resources (Brophy and Smith 1997; Smith 2002).” Yet as Rosenblum (1998) suggested and Chapter 3 demonstrated, often the barriers to employment occur at the individual and structural level, rather than at the interpersonal level. Many individuals face multiple personal barriers to employment.
including poor physical, psychological and cognitive functioning. Moreover, the urban labor market has little to offer those seeking employment at the lowest levels. Bridging those gaps may be beyond the scope of interpersonal social relations.

Importantly then, it is the local institutions that show the most success making bridges between jobs seekers and viable job opportunities. On-site social workers became clearinghouses for youth employment opportunities offering resume assistance and identifying summer work programs in the neighborhood and around the city. They made outreach efforts to adults as well. Flyers circulated at least bi-monthly encouraging residents to attend training programs for various trades. And as stated earlier, the development itself became a significant source of employment. Maverick residents worked at the management office, the maintenance staff and the security crew. What then did market rate residents contribute to the employment environment? Market rate resident Phillip M. grasped the networking potential policy makers proposed for mixed income communities, “If you wanna try to help people out and give them, you know somethin’ to change toward, … give ‘em a better chance to run into the people in the hallway who have jobs and who are market, or, you know have this or have that, and will run into them and say ‘Hey, I own a company that does that. Why don’t you come see me sometime. Here’s my card.’” When posed with the hypothetical of whether he personally would offer someone a job, Phillip M. was ambivalent about trying to secure employment for his subsidized neighbors. Phillip seemed open to the hypothetical of offering one resident, Frank M.y S. job, but flatly rejected the notion of offering a job to another resident, Orlando, known throughout the development for his 1994 Honda civic retrofitted with a booming stereo system and expensive tire rims. “Would I hire Orlando. No….But that’s just because he’s too far gone. If I’d met him earlier when he wasn’t so far down the
wrong way, yeah, I probably would.” However, he was again more positive about another resident, Frank M.y S., an opportunity, “Absolutely. Uh... would I give somebody like... I would give him a better shot, absolutely. I would give him a better option. Oh, I would definitely be more apt to, to do somebody like him...Just because he doesn’t have a, have a degree, or you don’t, have a real nice job, or you know, you’re on this, you’re in this system, doesn’t mean you’re gonna be, you know, Orlando.” Only one subsidized resident actually reported a market rate neighbor providing networking job assistance. Angie S. related that her neighbors Frank M. and Louise M. had been trying to find work for her husband. As she recalled, “they try to see if they can help my husband get out uh, see what kind of programs they have, to see, where he could get a job. Because I mean, getting’ laid off here, getting’ laid off there, that’s not workin’. ” Angie’s comments too suggest the employment challenges posed by the economic structure, one in which her husband found himself repeatedly laid-off.

Social Networks and Social Exchanges at Maverick

Additional events suggested exchanges of other useful resources between market rate and subsidized residents. For some, interaction was limited to greeting, Sean M. observed, “I run into people in the elevators, parking garage, checking the mail, but there’s not interaction. It’s hi, bye, you smile.” Steve M. had a slightly different interpretation of these encounters, “I see [people greeting one another] on the elevator, right out front. Maybe not, maybe not a whole lot, but probably more than I would have expected. Um, definitely. There’s some people who are super friendly. Like, I mean before I even had a chance to part my lips or even look up, like “hello.” For Margaret S., relations were uniformly cordial, “So far everybody I’ve met in this building, like on elevators, they all say “good morning, hello” and I
say “hello how are you? Have a nice day. “So far they’re all friendly, no matter what race they are.” As these residents’ comments indicate, many of the interactions occurred in the elevator, a space discouraged by Federal housing administrators.

The parking lot provided another point of intersection. Brandee M. and Danny M., who asked to choose the location of their parking space (and unwittingly chose a spot in the subsidized residents’ area of the income segregated lot), knew both of the individuals who parked on either side of them. Steve M. also recalled meeting “a Latino gentleman” who parked in the subsidized part of the parking lot. “I was going to the garage, and someone said, “that’s your Landrover?”, and I was like, “yeah it is,” and he was like “how do you like it?” And its funny because I don’t like it. I think it wastes too much gas and its stupid to get one. And I was kind of expressing disdain for it but he was kind of like, you know he just kind of liked the car. But he had sort of pegged me as, oh that’s the kid with the Land Rover.” For this neighbor, then Steve, whose success enabled him to buy an expensive car, personified an aspirational ideal. Such an incidents evoke notions of modeling.

Overlapping social circles also facilitated cross-market relationships. Marie S., who worked at a nearby convenience store, recalled recognizing a market rate resident from her job. As she recounted, “And I, I looked at one girl, she was movin’ in downstairs, and I says to her, are you movin’ in here? She said, yeah. She was my customer. From my work!” And Theresa S. approached Marie M. in yet another interaction stemming from the parking lot. As Marie, who came from New Orleans explained, “She saw my plates in the, the garage. And we were talkin’ for a while and she was tellin’ me she was from Shreveport. As noted in earlier chapters, the parking lot was segregated by income, suggesting the possibility that a desegregated parking lot would have yielded more interactions.
On occasion, market rate and low income neighbors knew one another by name. Brandee M. got on a first name basis with her neighbor, Theresa S.'s when Theresa left her mobile phone behind in the laundry room. Brandee picked it up, saw that it belonged to “Theresa” and returned it to her the next time she saw her in the hallway. However, many market rate residents could identify no neighbors by name. Anna M.’s response to my question, do you know anyone in the development by name, “No, just you“ was typical. Such isolation was not evident with the subsidized residents. Even the subsidized residents who were newly arrived could name at least two other residents by name and some could recall market rate residents by name, as About half of the market rate residents could identify a neighbor by name. Sherry S. both knew and liked her market rate neighbors, “their names Frank M. and Lou, they’re very nice.” The subsidized residents succeeded in building more interpersonal bridges, with and cross-class, than their market rate neighbors.

Social Networks and Material Exchange at Maverick

Market rate and subsidized residents engaged in material exchange with some frequency. Some market rate residents forged bonds with their neighbor and identified their specific material needs. Phillip M., upon moving out gave much of his furniture and kitchen items to Frankie S., a young man he met in the development who was just moving in. And Frank M. gave many of the items his 10 year old daughter no longer needed. As Angie recalled, “Lou and Frank M. They’re wonderful. They, you know, um... they gave us a play pen. They gave me a bike for my daughter.” Market rate residents, sought to enhance their neighbors material comfort, though always with items they viewed as unwanted. Exchange
didn’t always involve interpersonal contact. Market rate newlyweds Brandee and Danny M. often placed unwanted gifts outside the trash chute, an impersonal form of resource exchange.

Social Networks and Information Exchange at Maverick

While material exchange was helpful to residents, information was most valuable resource exchanged between market rate and subsidized residents. As Amisha S. said of her friendship with Penny M., “I choose to be around Penny M. too because...she gives me knowledge.” Other instances of neighbors “giving knowledge” occurred. Phillip M. recalled helping a subsidized neighbor fill “out the rent check, and apparently she had just gotten a checking account for the first time in her life.” She approached him in the elevator and, as Phillip recounted, “she asked me ‘hey, you know, is this right? Did I do this right, if you don’t mind?’ And she was real sweet.” Phillip noted that she had already filled out the check correctly and Phillip remembered adding “I said, you didn’t do anything wrong, but you might wanna, it’s kinda common to draw the line out so that no one else can put more money on.” She also asked Phillip how to use a automatic teller machine card. Later Phillip helped her move some new furniture into her apartment. He remembered that she was “real appreciative, and, you know, and, she’s a church goin’ lady, she’s like I’m gonna pray for you, and I was like good enough lady, that’s good enough.” The most striking exchange of expertise came between Victor M., an attorney and his neighbor Eleanor S. Eleanor S. had recounted to Victor M. that several neighbors were upset because management wouldn’t allow her to use a window air conditioner. Management had informed tenants that window air conditioners were prohibited by Federal HUD regulations. Victor M. offered to read Eleanor S.’s lease and Eleanor S. recalled, he “reviewed some of the, the laws and went to the police and, and
advised us that, there’s nothing in the lease that says you can’t have air conditioning in the windows."

While both material and informational exchanges were both useful to residents, the informational exchanges went beyond the simple charity of material gifts. Market rate resident’s, such as Victor M., attempts to enrich resident’s knowledge base represented a kind of empowerment. The market rate neighbors imparted their less resourced neighbors with rights and skills, enabling them to be more effective self advocates.

Information exchanges also occurred from subsidized residents to market rate ones. Sean M. recalled, “Mick told like he, he first told us when to move our cars for street cleanin’, which is nice, to avoid a ticket. And he told us about like the construction, and told me where there’s like pavement in the road and, so stuff like that. He’s mainly kept up on that kind a stuff, and trash day and, yeah.” Sean M. liked to talk to his other neighbor, John S. about cars and sports. Sean M. occasionally sought John S.’s counsel regarding car issues, as John S. was a car enthusiast.

Social Networks and Organizations

The organizational infrastructure affected the development of cross-class social networks. Some residents welcomed the prospect of interaction and envisioned the assistance of the management company. Few market rate residents participated in the community safety meetings held by management. However, other forms of organized interaction did appeal to them. Anna M. suggested that management offer movie nights in the courtyard. Sean M. misunderstood a flyer for a safety meeting, believing instead that it was alerting residents to a sidewalk sale. Market rate residents expressed some willingness to participate Maverick
Landing community building activities, but the single form of community participation – “safety meetings” – held limited appeal. Some of the low engagement of market rate households is a failure for institutions to generate interest.

In summary, tenancy in Maverick Landing development itself organized some limited interaction. Residents formed limited social bridges while sharing hallways, sidewalks, an elevator and the parking lot. Since Michelson (1976) found that spatial proximity promotes social interaction in situations of real or perceived homogeneity, it seems that shared tenancy of Maverick Landing provided a sense of similarity. Yet as important as showing why interaction happened is why not. As Joseph notes promoting interaction may be possible through such mechanisms as planned community events and designed opportunities for informal interaction. Management made no such efforts at Maverick. In fact, as other chapters indicated, instead the management encouraging cross-class interaction, they discouraged it.

**Chapter Conclusion**

The sum of evidence at Maverick suggests that there is some data to support each of the propositions. Some of the most enduring and controversial propositions regarding social influence are those surrounding the effects of higher income individuals on the cultures and behaviors pursued by lower income people. Evidence from the Maverick case provides some very limited yet direct support for the culture and behavior proposition that residents can influence one another’s behavior and aspirations-- yet the kind of influence is not confined to cross-class. Moreover, residents reported behavioral changes because they were observing the rules, not necessarily their neighbors. And the new living environment itself was source of
motivation for the residents. The second set of propositions, what Joseph et. al (2006) called “the political economy of place” focused on how higher resourced households could improve the quality of a range of neighborhood services from the police to local shopping. Yet evidence at Maverick pointed to limited areas market rate residents worked to improve services, perhaps because they were in the minority as higher income residents in the neighborhood. Instead of lobbying for other improved neighborhood services, residents went elsewhere. Market rate residents expected improved police service. But rather than make these demands directly, management actively engaged the police, making the market rate residents’ influence only secondary.

The third set of propositions held that higher resourced individuals could promote a greater sense of informal control. Evidence suggests that both market rate and subsidized residents actively engage in informal social control. But again, the presence of the management company complicates this analysis. Residents expect management to be the primary agent of control, and as such they place significant time and effort placing pressure on management to perform their duties. Thus, part of the informal social control involves coalition building among market rate and subsidized residents to ensure that management meets resident demands. This occurred at Maverick as residents came together and collectively campaigned for improved security at community safety meetings.

The final set of propositions for mixed income developments examined in this chapter suggests that residents will benefit in status attainment or getting ahead from interpersonal interaction with residents of different income classes. At Maverick, cross-class interaction did not lead to increased employment opportunities for the subsidized residents. Yet residents did exchange other useful resources. Often the exchange was material but on occasion market
rate resident offered their subsidized neighbors advice, assistance and advocacy. Most residents expressed a willingness to participate in organized social events, but management provided none, so this expressed willingness could not be tested.

However, though the evidence for the propositions shows limited success, the propositions were not mutually exclusive. Market rate residents pursued multiple pathways to neighboring. Frank M. who advocated for residents at the meeting (social control) also tried to help Maria S.’s husband get a job (social interaction). Phillip S., who offered technical assistance to his neighbor with her first checking account (social networking) never called the police (political economy of place). And Victor M., who advised residents on the terms of their lease never once attended a community meeting. Gary M. who offered to contact the police on behalf of intimidated neighbors (political economy of place) also confronted a neighbor who littered outside his door (social control).

Additionally, this analysis suggests how and why institutions are a confounding factor in promoting interaction. My research demonstrates limited interaction does occur but more importantly identifies confounding mechanism, institutional intervention. Changes in culture and behavior could be caused by role modeling and environmental interventions or by the imposed formal rules structure. Improvement in neighborhood services such as policing could

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1</th>
<th>Proposition 1: Culture and behavior</th>
<th>Proposition 2: Neighborhood Services</th>
<th>Proposition 3: Informal Social Control</th>
<th>Proposition 4: Increased social capital for low-income residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confounding Factor</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Monthly Police Meetings</td>
<td>Internal Security Company</td>
<td>Institutional Interference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graves
result from increased demands by market rate households or by management coordinating with the police. Impacts on informal social control similarly are difficult to trace. A private security company patrolled the development, easing residents of their sense of responsibility. Yet residents collaborated with one another when they deemed this service inadequate. Finally, proposed increases in information exchange and social capital flow were hampered in part by institutional interference. Residents engaged in cross-class collaborative contact in opposition to the management company in three key accounts. Antonio S. envisioned collective action with his neighbors in the form of a “grill in” to protest the prohibition against grilling out which both income groups disliked. Frank M. collaborated with Bruce S. and others for increased security personnel. And Victor M. worked with Eleanor S. to advise her about her tenant’s rights. Each of these bridging events was potentially costly to the management company, who subtly sought to discourage them. I will explain this concept in Chapter 8.
Chapter 8 : Interpersonal Relations and Institutional Interference

Introduction

This final chapter will serve three functions. First I will briefly review of the findings detailed in the previous chapters. While readers should not have been surprised to learn little cross class interaction occurred at Maverick Landing, some of the reasons why might be less obvious. Low interaction can be attributed in part to poor policy implementation rather than simply people’s predetermined preferences. Secondly, I will suggest a theoretical frame about how institutions structure interaction in other kinds of constructed communities. As the Maverick case indicates, interpersonal mechanisms were not the only ones governing social capital formation in this mixed income development. An institutional mechanism operated as well. The local management company ran “institutional interference” which dissuaded low resource residents from bridging to higher resourced ones and succeeded in undermining a social objective to fulfill a corporate one. Such institutional interference operates elsewhere such as in schools, prisons and trade centers. The third function is to outline some recommendations for future implementation of mixed income developments. Mixed income developments need ongoing advocacy to achieve a “just community”

Review of Findings

This thesis began with a literature review which examined the motivations for, research on, and expectations of mixed income developments. In it, I further attempted to highlight the institutional influence on interaction inherent in the mixed income scheme and evident in some existing research on mixed income developments. Finally, I tried to suggest
how one institutional innovation, inviting private corporations to manage public housing, might impact the goal of decreasing inequality in residential settings.

In next chapter, “Out of the Gemeinschaft,” I attempted to demonstrate that rather than changing residents, changing their administration altered the public culture at Maverick Landing. First, I sought to describe life at the former Maverick Gardens and to suggest the both positive and negative aspects in the way of life that residents left behind. Second, I sought to identify a mechanism for change – including private actors in the planning and implementation of subsidized housing proved effective in areas where public institutions had failed. But third, I attempted to caution about the successes of the new privatized regime. Private market solutions to public housing problems create new conflicts with the social rather than administrative aims of mixed income developments. Popkin (2004) identifies “bad management” as the culprit in public housing provision. “Good” management in this sense is measured by an ability to maintain order and collect rents. This model also relies on “good” tenants: those from whom managers can reliably collect rents and that don’t interfere with the collection of rents from other tenants by interfering with the presumed expectations of higher rent paying tenants.

In Chapter 4, “Behavior in Privatized Places” I related residential behavior in the development to some of the stated goals of mixed income developments, namely those of increased cross-class interaction and the potential direct impacts on institutional improvements. I showed how much of the seemingly orderly and subdued environment at Maverick developed in response to formal rules. Moreover, rules such as anti-loitering and anti-personalization had a negative impact on interaction. Most obviously, the anti-loitering rules discouraged residents from engaging in spontaneous encounters in public space. 

Graves 251
Management’s prohibition on loitering, of course, is not baseless. Similarly, the anti-personalization rules had an anti-social effect. Residents could not signal their interests and customs and therefore discover if they shared something in common with a neighbor. Moreover, as residents expressed, the rules made them feel as though their belief and rituals had no place in the development. Thus, much of the evident “culture” of Maverick reflected a formal rules mandated by management rather than informal rules developed by residents.

By taking this standardized approach to governance, management foreclosed opportunities to develop customized solutions to the unique problems of the mixed income housing site and this had a negative impact on interaction and institutional improvements. Residents of both income groups attended the meeting on governance and potentially could have deliberated together on the rules that regulated their housing. Institutional improvements could have followed, as resident input would have identified solutions to the specific problems.

As detailed in the chapter, Maverick Landing was a “high value housing site.” Residents of Maverick enjoyed a premier location in the city. The aesthetic qualities of this location facilitated recruiting higher income households necessary for mixed income interaction. The location also potentially spurred institutional improvements because motivated managers could capitalize on the location to maximize rents. Yet managers took this capitalization too far and their aim at maintaining a profitable product crowded out other goals.

Another aspect of Maverick Landing, the “high value build out,” also had a potentially positive impact on both interpersonal relations and institutions. This status equalizing measure gave subsidized residents and market rate residents a level platform on which to
engage with one another. It also motivated institutional improvements because the higher quality construction made the development easier to maintain.

Class-integrated units also likely improved interaction and institutional property management. Moreover, many of the market rate residents reported coming from economically and racially diverse neighborhoods, suggesting that they were familiar and comfortable with diversity. Also, the interspersed units likely improved the management, because if the subsidized units were clustered, they would likely be ghettoized. Management’s emphasis on marketing the units for market rate residents and the subsidized residents had spillover benefits as management was motivated to keep all units looking well-maintained.

Chapters 5 and 6 followed the HOPE VI policy along the “implementation chain” from the creation of the policy to its reception to demonstrate how social interaction is structured by actors outside of the housing development such as Federal and private forces. I reviewed the actions and intentions of HOPE VI Federal policy makers as well as urban scholars and high profile practitioners, suggesting how actions even at the highest level impacted social relations among local individual actors. I then traced the high level agenda down to the mid level, the next link in the implementation chain.

High level agents placed much emphasis on physical redevelopment but provided little direction on the design of interaction. Little in higher level actors’ plans suggested how design could encourage interaction. Consequently, mid level actors planned marketable designs rather than sociable ones. Hope VI Federal policy makers also encouraged recipients to allow private firms to oversee management. In doing so, high level actors expected the management organizations to provide subsidized residents with the same kinds of services
found in the general housing market. Most mid level agents anticipated that the market rate residents would demand higher quality residential services than their subsidized neighbors and this expectation influenced the kind of services they planned to deliver.

High level and mid level actors also stressed the economic growth potential of HOPE VI neighborhoods. Mid level officials envisioned growth not only for the neighborhood but the within the development itself. Actors restructured the redevelopment so that it would still have affordable units, but over time the number of units reserved for the very poor would be reduced.

I also noted that a particular structural disparity inherent to all HOPE VI mixed income developments. Moreover the financial structure of Maverick Landing conceived at the mid level made pleasing market rate residents paramount. As in other areas, the local housing market underscored structural disparity at Maverick Landing. From a revenue standpoint, profitability resulted from creating high demand for market rate units. For management, that meant offering a development that met the market rate residents’ aesthetic and cultural expectations and promoting a “culture of quietude.” Catering to market rate residents responded to an economic necessity, not necessarily a social one.

Chapter 6, “Along the Implementation Chain: Where Public Policy Intersects with Private Actors” then linked up some of the reactions of the Maverick Landing residents to actions taken at the regional and Federal level. My conversations with residents revealed some surprising and seemingly unusual ideas. Residents saw systematic favoritism of market rate tenants, they prescribed class resegregation, believed rumors about heightened rules, employed metaphors of incarceration and assumed income mixing was phased gentrification. These ideas are related to the actions of actors higher up on the implementation chain.
Residents prescribed “resegregation” partially because of an enforced “culture of quietude” incompatible with their lifestyle needs and preferences. Local management could enforce such a culture because of ambiguities at the mid level and top level. Mid level agents provided no mandate or even direction to management to promote mixing. Such directives were absent because national level actors provided neither examples nor empirics linking economic mixing to social mixing. Similarly, residents believed management imposed a building-wide curfew because of other restrictions management placed on use of space. Local level actors placed these restrictions because they used the design to signal social order rather than social connectivity. Mid level agents enabled this use of design by emphasizing the marketing potential of the redevelopment. Because, few policy makers ever think about class cultures, high-level actors failed to foresee how marketing toward market rate residents and the mixing of multiple lifestyles could be at odds. Thus, residents not only absorbed the messages management directed toward them, they also used the information to develop interpretations on their own. Based on communications from local level actors and those higher up the implementation chain, residents developed a series of assumptions about the meaning and intent of implementers that negatively impacted cross class interaction.

Chapter 7, “Mixed Outcome Developments” in contrast, focused on the occasional interactions among income groups. Residents interacted infrequently but nonetheless these were illuminating about the occasions and opportunities for improved interaction and institutional implementation. Several theoretical propositions form the foundation of the mixed income strategy to confront urban poverty (Joseph, 2006). The sum of evidence at Maverick suggests that aspects of each of the propositions bore out at Maverick. Details from the Maverick case provided some direct but very limited support for the culture and behavior
proposition that residents can influence one another's behavior and aspirations--yet residents also reported behavioral changes because they were observing the formal rule structure not just the informal behavior of their neighbors. The second set of theoretical propositions suggested how higher resourced households could improve the quality of a range of neighborhood services. Yet in the Maverick case, market rate residents rarely worked to improve services. With the exception of demanding improved police services, instead of campaigning for other improved neighborhood services, residents simply went elsewhere. Management too actively engaged the police, diluting the market rate residents’ influence.

The third set of propositions maintained that the market rate residents would promote a greater sense of informal control. In the Maverick case, both the market rate and subsidized residents actively engage in informal social control. But again, the presence of the management company complicated the analysis. Residents expected management primarily to maintain control, and as such residents placed significant time and effort placing pressure on management to perform their duties. Consequently, part of the informal social control involved coalition building among market rate and subsidized residents to ensure that management meets resident demands.

The final set of propositions for mixed income developments examined suggested that residents would benefit from interpersonal interaction with residents of different income classes. On occasion, residents did exchange useful resources. Sometimes the exchange was material but on occasion market rate resident offered their subsidized neighbors advice, assistance and advocacy. Most residents expressed a willingness to participate in organized social events, but management provided none, so this expressed willingness could not be tested. Additionally, the analysis sought to suggests how and why institutions were a
confounding factor in promoting interaction. Bridging was potentially costly to the management company.

In sum, state sponsored income mixing was not a failure. The new Maverick Landing was cleaner and safer than the old Maverick Gardens. The stigma of public housing was erased, as subsidized residents reported the new Maverick Landing was more “respectable.” As one interviewee of another HOPE VI development said, redevelopment “Made me feel like a part of mainstream society.” While not denying the accomplishments implied in that statement, I argue that the woman hedged in this statement, couching her assessment in emotional language, rather than reporting concrete outcomes. Rather than reporting that the redevelopment, “made me a part of mainstream society” She noted how redevelopment, made her "feel like a part of mainstream society" What is the hope of HOPE VI for disadvantaged people, to make them feel like members of mainstream society or to actually bring them into the ranks?

**Institutional Interference**

In this section I would like to offer a theoretical frame for interpreting some of the findings in the Maverick case. Institutions impact social interaction and much of this thesis focused on how institutions structure social interaction in mixed income housing development. The literature outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that actors form informal ties when 1) they perceive that they have something in common (affinity or mutuality derived from “homophily”), 2) they encounter one another in a bounded setting such as work, neighborhood or some other organization (“exposure”), 3 )they share a common interest or goal (“equal
status”) or there is a brokerage opportunity (“entrepreneurship”) (see Figure below). Without these mechanisms, tie formation is less likely.

Yet actors in the Maverick setting failed to come together for an additional reason: Formal management dissuaded low resourced neighbors from making contact with their higher resourced ones. The company men and women dissuaded people generally from interacting through rules and notices. Additionally, they instituted specific sanctions – written citations and summons to “private conferences”, both which were noted on tenant’s records and placed the resident’s tenancy at risk.

Graves 258
The threat of private conferences and citations hindered residents from making social connections, creating a kind of "institutional interference." Many subsidized residents made reference to their anxiety about receiving citations and summons for private conferences. As Eleanor S. explained for households displaying unruly behavior, "Roseville does the private conference." With being cited came with the fear of eviction. As Susanna S. recalled in Chapter 4 how her household had been cited because children were playing outside her unit, "they write up, like our number and then we get the slip and ... you don’t wanna always get complaints from your house cause then you’re gonna evicted like they say, you only get a certain amount of chances in here." Interaction wasn’t the only or even the primary behavior the citation system sought to control. The use of citations and private conferences was an

---

9 Leeson (2005) also used the term "institutional interference" in a seemingly different context. In colonial Africa, too, institutions dissuaded the formation of social capital. Leeson found "institutional interference" which hindered trade among heterogeneous peoples. In pre-colonial Africa people from different tribes and regions had made trade possible by relying on social distancing mechanisms, such as displaying religious symbols or practicing witchcraft. The effect of adopting these practices was to develop trust. These measures allowed socially distant people to signal credibility and enabled "extensive credit arrangements between total strangers of different tribes." However, in post-colonial Africa, colonial authorities banned these informal, voluntary practices, citing them as 'subversive.' The prohibitions negatively effected the ability of diverse individuals to signal credibility to one another. Thus, the impact of formal sanctions was to reduce the development trust between unlike individuals and hamper trade.
effective means of social control generally and many subsidized residents of Maverick approved of their use to combat undesirable conduct. But the system had secondary negative effects on the cross-class flow of social capital.

As the tenant rules outlined and ongoing written communication underscored, management discouraged interaction. Residents understood that disturbing their neighbor was a reasonable cause for complaint. Dolores S. recalled getting a complaint about noise, and explained, “And once they complain about you I think it’s two, three times, that’s it, you are you’re getting’ an eviction notice.”

Thus, in the Maverick case one sees how the mandates of formal corporate actors hinder relationship formation between residents. Such interference has predictable consequences for informal network formation and social capital flow. Despite the fact that a market rate resident may have useful information or access to resources, subsidized residents efforts at tie formation and bridging were hindered by culture of quietude, the threat written violations on their records or summons to the management office. Such explicit threats were coupled with, as highlighted in earlier chapters, the mutual assumed class resentment management perpetuated.

But the Maverick case suggests not only how institutions structure interaction in mixed income housing but why private market actors are motivated to promote such a structure. Management did not run institutional interference to prevent relationships or thwart economic mobility for residents generally, that is, they didn’t object to the formation of informal networks for all of their presumed socioeconomic benefits. They sought to prevent certain kinds of information – that the market rate resident will discover her neighbor receives a subsidy or that the subsidized resident will discover that his market rate receives more
latitude. Because management cannot control the kind of information, they sought to block information flow generally. Residents who bridge could discover the structural disparity inherent in the development.

Occasionally, however, bridge formation occurred, making the consequences of cross class networks clear. Let me return to the air conditioning example. First, consider when Eleanor S. who consulted with Victor M. about the contents of her lease. Many residents desired to use a window air conditioner but were told by management that it was prohibited in the lease. Victor M., a market rate resident reviewed the lease for Eleanor S., a member of the tenant’s organization, and informed her that it placed no such constraint. Eleanor S. stood in a brokerage position, as she could distribute the information to the rest of the tenant’s organization, who could in turn inform their friends and associates. Management would then face an air conditioning problem as unsightly window air conditioners would disrupt the orderly façade. Potential market rate tenants could reject the development based on its disorderly appearance. The presence of the air conditioners could also suggest more structural problems, such as the inadequacy of the central air conditioning system. Thus we see why formal actors may want to interfere with informal processes.

In the mixed income housing context, one expects to see in simplified form, a social structure, a sociogram where, “people are dots. relationships are lines.” (Burt, 2001). The limits of such a representation for studying the mechanisms of interaction quickly become apparent. It cannot tell us how lines form (or fail to form) between the dots. But more importantly, it assumes that a formal structure supports or, at the very least is indifferent to, the outcomes of informal relations. Yet in the Maverick case, formal constraints thwarted informal processes of relationship formation because such relationships threatened the
organizations' functioning. The organization did not stand to benefit from modifications to the social structure arising from the formation of new ties. Company men and women were, in a sense, structural custodians. They did not creating inequality. They simply maintained it. Thus, the formal structure, which benefited from stasis in the social structure, and the informal substructure, which potentially benefited from changes to the social structure, were at odds.

Missing then from the vocabulary of social capital formation is a representation of the role of such “company men and women.” They are not bureaucrats, street level or otherwise. For all their reputed drudgery, bureaucrats maintain a noble ideal, engage in a kind of “moral endeavor” where they safeguard America’s founding values such as equality (Hart, 1984). Company men and women, however, maintain other ideals, chief among them profit. Given authority over formal structure, their actions will orient toward this ideal.

As I noted in the introduction, formal actors structure social interaction in other forms of constructed communities. Among the many settings, studies of schools and prisons have shown us how institutions impact the formation of informal ties. These efforts to manage these heterogeneous and potentially unruly populations bear some relevance to managing mixed income housing. In the sociology of education, for example, Thomas (1985) traced how 1920s school administrators in Buffalo, New York influenced the social structure among students. During that period the black population in Buffalo increased greatly, leading to a significant increase in the numbers of black students enrolled in schools. In response to this influx of African American students, rather than using education to “teach academic and vocational skills for the economic survival of all,” school officials employed measures such as intelligence testing and tracking to achieve social control. School children were subjected to mental testing and tracked into classes and schools “‘befitting’ their mental capacities.”
Institutional actors consequently reduced the potential encounters between black migrant school children and their white peers by placing students in special classes and alternative schools. This system ultimately affected the life chances of students after leaving school. The author notes too how “the case demonstrates the inextricable link between the sociology of schools and the society that sustains them” (Thomas, 1985, 581).

Literature from criminology tracks institutional attempts at social control of interpersonal relations in the prison setting. Sykes (1964), for example, observed how formal actors interfere with the formation of informal ties amongst prison inmates. In prisons, interpersonal exchange had potentially serious consequences – the loss of physical control over prisoners. Sykes noted that while prison guards’ principal concern was physical control – preventing inmate fighting, escape or riots – the guards’ ability to maintain social control through physical measures alone was limited, leading the guards to employ more social measures to prevent the loss of control. Seemingly inconsequential social relations within the prison such as gambling, note writing or loitering allow inmates the opportunity for social exchange. Such minor exchanges can “prepare the ground for far more serious situations” like escape or riot. As such they were prohibited. In Zimbardo’s (1974) experimental simulation, “prison staff” in response to a rumored escape plot used sophisticated psychological techniques to break the solidarity among the inmates and to create a sense of distrust among them. A similar tactic is used by real guards in real prisons to break prisoner alliances. For example, guards exploit notions of racism to pit Blacks, Chicanos, and Anglos against each other (Zimbardo, 2008).

Detailed exploration of these other contexts is beyond the scope of this dissertation but reviewing these instances of institutional interference reminds us of the importance of the role
of formal actions in the formation of informal relations in organizational contexts, especially heterogeneous ones. Of course, not all interpersonal relations occur within the institutional fold. But when people enter into organizations or become the objects of planning or policy implementation, those institutions have the power to structure their social relations. The power wielded varies. As Thomas notes social control tends to be more intensive “in established institutions when there is less control over who gains access and entry into them” (Thomas, 1985). Thus in open, heterogeneous settings, one should expect to observe a greater amount of institutional interference.

**Toward a Just Community**

In this final section I move away from theory and toward practice. Understanding inequality is an academic pursuit, but reducing it is a normative one. In its most idealistic incarnation, HOPE VI aimed to reduce social isolation and inequality. In some important ways, Maverick Landing moved toward this ideal. Is there future hope in HOPE VI? I think so. I place mine two areas: First, in the evident power of institutions to shape social relations, second in the power social relations to shape material conditions.

What can institutions do to encourage cross-class exchange? Institutions do have the power to shape social relations. Institutions actors can influence network formation. While private corporate actors may impede the exchange of social capital, I do not think it unreasonable to suggest that other actors can encourage it. Management practices are not the sole cause of low cross-class interaction. Yet they are a cause and one which policy makers can control. To that end, I suggest first, that implementers make the mixed income structure clear to prospective tenants and frame the mix as a positive element.
In addition, to develop social capital, mixed income developments need social capitalists. Implementation of the mixing must be ongoing and involve dedicated personnel who make bridging their business. Many potential institutional actors could fill this role. Vale (2002) identified “Integration Coordinator,” on staff in a Boston public housing development whose work was crucial for racial social integration. Questions of equity are all aspects to the professional training of social workers, employment counselors and community liaisons, all of whom appeared in this dissertation serving the Maverick community in some capacity. These “street level bureaucrats” are in a position to enforce American regime values. Policy makers need to empower these professionals to put the social justice training they receive into practice.

Second, social relations can shape material conditions. Market rate residents provided their subsidized neighbors with advice and advocacy that improved their quality of life. Their behavior reveals that market rate residents were willing to interact with their subsidized neighbors individually and collectively, such as their willingness to discuss issues of community governance. Despite management’s efforts to conceal and control subsidized structure, market rate residents seem to tolerate the inclusion of subsidized neighbors — a tolerance they expressed in words and actions. Many market rate residents re-signed their leases. A few provided material and social resources to their subsidized neighbors.

Capitalistic logic held the administration, but not the residents of Maverick, captive. Some residents’ responses to structural disparity differed remarkably, almost diametrically from the institutional response. Relieved of the anxieties of ownership, renters could focus on human concerns rather than economic ones. No longer interested in protecting their investments, some residents sought to protect and advance other ideals: equality and
tolerance and show a distinct advantage to not having a home ownership component to mixed income developments. Yet more can be done. Policy makers should engage residents, the recipients of policy interventions in the process of policy implementation.

There are two strategic advantages of mixed income developments such as Maverick over policies that exclusively target the disadvantaged. First, places like Maverick can ensure greater equality while also offering improved circumstances for all residents. The locational advantages of Maverick advance this ideal. With striking views and proximity to public transportation, market residents can also appreciate what Maverick has to offer. Secondly, urban denizens support and even promote policies that combat inequality and show interest in cross-class ideals such as environmentalism. They respond, for example, to a mayor such as Thomas Menino who campaigns for a better society, “Not for some of us, but for all of us.”

These suggestions seem idealistic or provincial. One might argue that local change is impossible in the larger context of “a global capitalist political economy.” But such statements only serve to reify the tyranny of the political economy. The capitalist structure is not so absolute. Europeans business executives, for example, are much more accepting of state leadership than their American counterparts. This “indicates the extent to which interpretations of interest by groups in similar structural positions can vary” (Fainstein, 2000). Yet one does not even need to look abroad to see the contours of the political economy. Municipalities in the Bay Area, Minneapolis and Seattle consistently pass progressive policies. Others may argue that macro structural forces undermine improvements at the community level. But evidence is needed to back this claim. It is true however, as Fainstein (2000) notes that, ”City building for the benefit of non-elite groups requires empowering those who are excluded not just from discussions but from structural positions that allow them
genuine influence.” Mixed income communities, even in their most ideal form, cannot offer residents position of influence outside the development.

Moreover, I am not insisting that my suggestions will work, only that they might. Just as policy makers considered HOPE VI a “laboratory,” this conclusion calls not just for further study but also further experimentation. In mixed income developments, implementers need to put greater transparency and greater advocacy of the just community to the test. Not everyone will respond favorably, but some will. Those who live in a just community can perhaps take steps toward creating a just city. In such experiments, biases are inevitable, so the progressive policy advocate might as well let her conscience be among them.
Bibliography


Goddard, Deborah. 2006. Director of real estate development for the Boston Housing Authority.


Kleit, Rachel Garshick, and Lynn C. Manzo. 2006. To move or not to move: Relationships to place and relocation choices in HOPE VI. *Housing Policy Debate* 17, (2): 211.


Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron B. Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the economic development administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes*. Oakland project series. Berkeley: University of California Press.


*Cityscape* 3, (2): 71.


———. 1995. *HOPE VI - urban revitalization demonstration (HOPE VI) program notice*.

Vale, Lawrence J. 2006. Comment on mark joseph's "is mixed-income development an antidote to urban poverty?". *Housing Policy Debate* 17, (2): 259.


APPENDIX A

Maverick Landing – Subsidized Residential Interview

Residential history

1. How did you come to live in Maverick Landing? If it is helpful, you can answer this question in story form – thinking about the beginning of the story, a middle part and an end.

2. What is your role in the story you told above?

3. Were you involved in the redevelopment?

4. Where did you live during the redevelopment?

Personal Relationships

5. Who is your closest friend and where does that person live?
   a. How often do you see that person?
   b. How often do you speak with that person?
   c. Do you communicate with that person through letters or email?

6. Is it harder or easier to see your friends in the New Maverick?
   a. Who are they?
   b. How does your closeness with these friends compare to your closeness to (BLANK – person named in question 6)

7. Are there residents of Maverick Landing who you like?
   a. Why do you like them?
   b. Do you interact with that person, if so, how?

8. Are there residents of Maverick Landing who you dislike?
   a. Why do you dislike them?
   b. Do you interact with that person, how?

9. How do you feel about Maverick Landing?
   a. Is it safe?
   b. Do you feel a sense of belonging/community with the neighborhood

10. Do you know anyone in the neighborhood beyond the development?
11. How do you feel about the neighborhood?
   a. Is it safe?
   b. Do you feel a sense of belonging/community with the neighborhood?

12. How many people do you know in the neighborhood?

**Efficacy**

13. Did you feel safe in the old projects?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?
   b. What did you do when you saw trouble?
   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?
   d. Was management responsive?
   e. Were the police responsive?

14. Describe your old neighborhood – and geographically how would you define it?

15. Did you feel safe in your old neighborhood?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?
   b. What did you do when you saw trouble?
   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?
   d. Was management responsive?
   e. Were the police responsive?

16. Social disorder –
   a. Did you see people selling drugs in the old neighborhood
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
   b. Did you see people using drugs in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
   c. Did you see groups of people just hanging out in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
   d. Did you hear of people being attacked or robbed?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
   e. Did you see shootings or violence?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
   f. Did you know of rapes or other sexual attacks?
(1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

13. How likely is it that your old neighbors would do something if they saw...

Children skipping school or hanging out on street corners?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5;

Children spraying graffiti on a building?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

Children showing disrespect to an adult?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

People fighting in front of their home?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

What would they do?

17. Do you feel safe in the new Maverick here?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?
   b. What do you do when you see trouble?
   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?
   d. Is management responsive?
   e. Are the police responsive?

18. Do you feel safe in the new Maverick here?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?
   b. What do you do when you see trouble?
   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?
   d. Is management responsive?
   e. Are the police responsive?

19. How likely is it that your new Maverick neighbors would do something if they saw...

Children skipping school or hanging out on street corners?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

Children spraying graffiti on a building?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

Children showing disrespect to an adult?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

People fighting in front of their home?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5
What would they do?

20. Social disorder – in Maverick
   a. Did you see people selling drugs at Maverick?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   b. Did you see people using drugs in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   c. Did you see groups of people just hanging out in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   d. Did you hear of people being attacked or robbed?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   e. Did you see shootings or violence?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   f. Did you know of rapes or other sexual attacks?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

21. What do you think the biggest threat to community safety is?
   a. Who do you think is causing it?
   b. What should happen to those people?

Community

22. Do you feel like you are a part of this community?
   a. What makes you feel that way?
   b. What would make you feel more a part of the community?
   c.

23. Does Maverick Landing feel like it has more, less or about the same level of
   community as your previous residence?

24. Which of the residents in the old Maverick did you admire?

25. Which of the residents here at the New Maverick do you admire?

26. Did you feel intimidated by anyone in the old Maverick?
   a. What made you feel uneasy?
   b. What do you think should be done about that?
   c.

27. Do you feel intimidated by anyone in the new Maverick?
   a. Who makes you feel uneasy?
b. What do you think should be done about that?

28. Did you know that there is a hotline you can call if you see trouble? If so, have you ever called it? Why? Was the matter resolved?

29. Have you ever called the police? If so, why? Was the matter resolved?

30. Did you know that there are violations and fines handed to rule violators?
   a. Have you ever received a violation or a fine?
   b. If so, what was that like?

**Neighboring**

31. Do you know your next door neighbors?
   a. Describe the people who live to the left of you
   b. Describe the people who live to the right of you

32. Can you name all of the people you know in the development?

33. How you visited any resident in their homes, if so who and when?

34. In the last month, have you done anyone a favor? If so, what was it?

35. Has anyone done a favor for you? If so, what was it?
APPENDIX B

Maverick Landing – Unsubsidized Residential Interview

Residential history

36. How did you come to live in Maverick Landing? If it is helpful, you can answer this question in story form – thinking about the beginning of the story, a middle part and an end.

37. What did management tell you about the other types of people who live here?

38. What do is your impression of the population that lives here?

Personal Relationships

39. Who is the person you are closest to your life (beyond your partner)? Where does that person live?

40. Do you have any friends in the development?
   a. Who are they?
   b. How does your closeness with these friends compare to your closeness to (BLANK – person named in question 6)

41. Are there residents of Maverick Landing who you dislike?
   a. Why do you dislike them?
   b. How do you interact with that person?

42. How do you feel about Maverick Landing?
   a. Is it safe?
   b. Do you feel a sense of belonging/community with the neighborhood?

43. Do you know anyone in the neighborhood beyond the development?

44. How do you feel about the neighborhood?
   a. Is it safe?
   b. Do you feel a sense of belonging/community with the neighborhood?

45. How many people do you know in the neighborhood?
Efficacy

46. Describe your old neighborhood – and geographically how would you define it?

47. Did you feel safe in your old neighborhood?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?
   b. What did you do when you saw trouble?
   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?
   d. Was management responsive?

   e. Were the police responsive?

48. Social disorder –
   a. Did you see people selling drugs in the old neighborhood
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   b. Did you see people using drugs in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   c. Did you see groups of people just hanging out in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   d. Did you hear of people being attacked or robbed?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   e. Did you see shootings or violence?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   f. Did you know of rapes or other sexual attacks?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

13. How likely is it that your old neighbors would do something if they saw...

   Children skipping school or hanging out on street corners?
   Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5;

   Children spraying graffiti on a building?
   Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

   Children showing disrespect to an adult?
   Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

   People fighting in front of their home?
Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

What would they do?
14. How likely is it that your Maverick neighbors would do something if they saw...

- Children skipping school or hanging out on street corners?
  Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

- Children spraying graffiti on a building?
  Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

- Children showing disrespect to an adult?
  Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

- People fighting in front of their home?
  Very unlikely = 1—Very likely = 5

What would they do?

49. Do you feel safe here?
   a. What kinds of things made you feel safe/unsafe?

   b. What do you do when you see trouble?

   c. What did you do when you felt unsafe?

   d. Is management responsive?

   e. Are the police responsive?

50. Social disorder – in Maverick
   a. Did you see people selling drugs at Maverick?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   b. Did you see people using drugs in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   c. Did you see groups of people just hanging out in the old neighborhood?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   d. Did you hear of people being attacked or robbed?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

   e. Did you see shootings or violence?
      (1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)
f. Did you know of rapes or other sexual attacks?  
(1 = none of the time; 5 = all of the time)

51. What do you think the biggest threat to community safety is?  
   a. Who do you think is causing it?  
   b. What should happen to those people?

52. Do you feel like you are a part of this community?  
   a. What makes you feel that way?  
   b. What would make you feel more a part of the community?

18. Does Maverick Landing feel like it has more, less or about the same level of  
   community as your previous residence?

19. Do you feel intimidated by anyone in the development?  
   c. Who makes you feel uneasy?  
   d. What do you think should be done about that?

20. Did you know that there is a hotline you can call if you see trouble? If so, have you  
   ever called it? Why? Was the matter resolved?  
   c. Have you ever called the police? If so, why? Was the matter resolved?  
   d. Did you know that there are violations and fines handed to rule violators?  
      a. Have you ever received a violation or a fine?  
      b. If so, what was that like?  
      e. Do you feel safe here?  
         a. How does your feelings of safety here compare to where you last lived?

Neighboring – Former Neighborhood

21. People were willing to help neighbors: (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)

22. People in the neighborhood shared the same values: (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)

23. It was a close-knit neighborhood: (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
24. People in the neighborhood could be trusted: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
25. People in the neighborhood got along with each other (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)

Neighboring – Maverick Landing

26. People at Maverick are willing to help neighbors: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
27. People at Maverick share the same values: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
28. Maverick is a close-knit neighborhood: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
29. People at Maverick can be trusted: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
30. People at Maverick get along with each other: (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree)
31. Do you know your next door neighbors?
   a. Describe the people who live to the left of you
   b. Describe the people who live to the below you
32. Can you name all of the people you know in the development?
33. How you visited any resident in their homes, if so who and when?
34. In the last month, have you done anyone a favor? If so, what was it?
35. Has anyone done a favor for you? If so, what was it?
36. Would you recommend living here to a friend?
37. Have any of your habits changed since you came here?
38. Do you think that any of your neighbors’ habits have changed as a result of knowing you?