Destroying Old Myths while Building Development: Lessons from the Sisal Region

By

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ABSTRACT

In 1996, the Brazilian Government implemented the Child Labor Eradication Program – PETI, a conditional cash transfer program aimed at reducing child labor by paying a stipend to families who send their working children to an extended day program. After 12 years, PETI has had its most successful implementation in a poor semi-arid region of Brazil, the Sisal Region. The existence of an associational structure in which the federal, state and local government joined efforts with local civil society institutions, mainly a NGO and local rural labor unions, enabled each institution to contribute to the project in the best way possible. As a result the Sisal Region considerably reduced child labor, provided high quality extended day programs and assisted the families involved in PETI with projects aimed at their economic independence.
Acknowledgments

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**Acronyms**

Amopeti - Association of Social Educators of PETI (Associação dos Educadores Sociais do PETI)

APAEB – Small Farmers Agricultural Association (Associação dos Pequenos Agricultores do Estado da Bahia)

BCC – Citizen Child Grant (Bolsa Criança Cidadã)

CAT – To know, to analyze and to transform (Conhecer, Analizar e Transformar)

CGT – National Confederation of Workers (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores)

COMPETI/BA – State Commission of Child Labor Eradication of Bahia (Comissão Estadual de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil da Bahia)

CONTAG – National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Agricultura)

CUT – Workers Confederation (Central Única dos Trabalhadores)

DRT - State Office of Labor Inspection (Delegacia Regional do Trabalho)

Eletrobrás – Brazilian Eletric Company (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras)

FAPEX - Research and Extension Support Foundation (Fundação de Apoio à Pesquisa e à Extensão)

F.A.S.E – Social Assistance and Education Federation (Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional)

FATRES – The Foundation to Support Rural Labor in the Sisal Region (Fundação de Apoio aos Trabalhadores Rurais e Agricultores Familiares da Região do Sisal e Semi-Arido da Bahia)

FNAS - Social Assistance National Fund (Fundo Nacional de Assistência Social)

HDI – Human Development Index

IBGE – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística)

ICCLE - The International Center on Child Labor and Education

ICMS - Taxes on Goods and Services (Impostos Sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços)

ILO – International Labor Organization

IPEC – Elimination of Child Labor Program (Programa Internacional para Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil)

IRPAA – Regional Institute of Small Agriculture (Instituto Regional da Pequena Agropecuária Apropriada)
MDA – Ministry of Agrarian Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário)

MDS – Ministry of Social Development (Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome)

MEC - Ministry of Education (Ministério da Educação)

MOC – Community Organization Movement (Movimento de Organização Comunitária)

MPAS - Ministry of Social Insurance and Social Assistance  (Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social)

PAF - The Agent Family Project – Projeto Agente de Família

PBF – Bolsa Família Project (Projeto Bolsa Família)

PETI – Child Labor Eradication Program (Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil)

REDA – Special Contracting Regime (Regime Especial de Direito Administrativo)

SEAS - Social Assistance Department (Secretaria de Estado de Ação Social)

SDT - Department of Territorial Development (Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Territorial)

Secad – Department of Continued Education, Literacy and Diversity (Secretaria de Educação Continuada, Alfabetismo e Diversidade).

SEDES/BA - Department of Social Development (Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Pobreza do Estado da Bahia)

SERTA – Alternative Technology Service (Serviço de Tecnologia Alternativa)

SETRAS - Department of Labor and Social Action of Bahia (Secretaria de Trabalho e Ação Social do Estado da Bahia)

SNAS - The National Department of Social Assistance (Secretaria Nacional de Assistência Social)

STRAF - Local Union of Rural Workers and Family Farmers (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais e Agricultores Familiares)

TCM - Municipal Accounting Office (Tribunal de Contas Municipal)

TCU – General Accounting Office (Tribunal de Contas da União)

UEFS – State University of Feira de Santana (Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana)

UFBA - Federal University of Bahia (Universidade Federal da Bahia)

UJA – Extended Day Program (Unidade da Jornada Ampliada)

UNICEF – The United Nations Children’s Fund
1. Introduction

In June of 2007, while doing fieldwork for my master’s thesis, I interviewed a bright professor from the best university in the State of Bahia in Brazil. She was surprised when I told her that the semi-arid region in the Northeast of Brazil was an area where several successful socio-economic development projects have taken place. Her surprise was in part because she heard the following from technicians from the state institution that coordinates programs to fight rural poverty: “the semi-arid region is hopeless and only subsistence crops can come out of it.”

Throughout my fieldwork I heard several similar statements that were unanimous in asserting that the semi-arid region was characterized only by clientelist practices, by naïve peasants, by bad climate and poor soil and that no development whatsoever could happen there. It was clear to me that the semi-arid region of Brazil carried a negative stigma that reached all sectors of society and government. In fact the Northeast region as a whole carries that stigma. The belief that the Northeast region is less developed and less participative because of the cultural values of its population is part of the common sense of the Brazilian social science (Avritzer, 2007). The more I got to know the semi-arid region of Brazil, the more I realized that many of those assertions were based on prejudice against the region. I met many people who showed that the semi-arid region is inhabited by hard working people who do not want to leave the region. I also learned about powerful initiatives that were successful not only at improving socio-economic conditions in semi-arid zones but also increasing the level of mobilization and political awareness of poor communities. The initiative that impressed me the most was the implementation of a federal program to eradicate child labor in the Sisal Region. The Sisal Region is located in the semi-arid
region of the State of Bahia. It is an impoverished area where small farmers plant sisal and extract its fiber to make carpets, twine and ropes, among other things. Not only was I impressed by the good outcomes generated by the project in the region but also because the Sisal Region is considered a national model within the program, which exists in the 27 States of Brazil.

The Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) in the Sisal Region

The Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) is a conditional cash transfer program aimed at reducing child labor by paying a stipend to families who send their working children to an extended day program. It was created in 1996 by the Federal Government through its then Social Assistance Department (SEAS) of the former Ministry of Social Insurance and Social Assistance (MPAS). Currently, the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) finances most of the program and the municipalities implement it with the technical support of the states. The Sisal Region is a national model because it is one of the only regions where PETI was implemented through solid collaboration between the three levels of government and civil society institutions. Thousands of children have stopped working under distressed and hazardous conditions in the sisal fields since the program was implemented. The region is also one of the few in which extended day programs of municipalities adopt a pedagogical approach oriented to local realities. Finally, the region also has projects to educate and economically assist parents of the children benefitted by PETI.

Recognition of the success of the program in the region comes from all sorts of organizations. In the 10 year anniversary edition of the International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), from the International Labor Office (ILO), the effort in the Sisal Region was among the
10 best practices aimed at eradicating child labor in Brazil\(^1\). The quote below is from that report (IPEC, 2003, p. 122):

“The numbers that translate into success…are impressive: more than 80 thousand children in the Sisal Region are away from hazardous, distressed, degrading work\(^2\). All of those children are attending school and the extended day program assiduously…”

A report by the International Center on Child Labor and Education (ICCLE) also differentiates PETI in Bahia, particularly in its Sisal Region, from other States.

“It is important to observe that MOC (a NGO that is a main actor in the implementation of PETI in the Sisal Region) and its methodology transformed the implementation of PETI in Bahia in comparison with the other 26 states where the program is in operation. PETI is concerned with 800,000 children in Brazil but in most parts of the country it plays a merely supportive role: the families don’t know why they are receiving the money (the school grant) or who is giving them the help. They are not aware of the importance of education to their children as a fundamental tool to break the cycle of exclusion in which they are trapped. MOC is responsible for the significant difference in the way PETI is implemented in this region.”

National institutions also recognize the good performance of PETI in Bahia and in the Sisal Region which can be seen in national evaluation reports by the General Accounting Office (TCU) and by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), which coordinates the program at the national level (TCU, 2001; MDS, 2004).

An associational structure around PETI involving MDS, the State Government\(^3\), a local NGO called Community Organization Movement (MOC), local labor unions and the municipal governments was essential to the positive outcomes of the program in the region. Some decisions and activities undertaken by those actors, which went above and beyond programmatic

\(^{1}\) Other examples are the efforts to end child labor in the coal sector in Mato Grosso do Sul, in the leather-shoes sector in Franca-SP and Novo Hamburgo-RS; the experience to end children prostitution in Mato Grosso and; the fight to end child labor in drug trade in Rio de Janeiro (IPEC, 2003).

\(^{2}\) There is not an official number of child labor in the Sisal Region. Reduction estimates vary from 35 thousand children to 80 thousand children.

\(^{3}\) First through SETRAS/BA - Department of Labor and Social Action of Bahia and then through SEDES/BA – Department of Social Development of Bahia.
requirements, made PETI in the Sisal Region an exemplary case in Brazil. First, Bahia is the only State in Brazil that is a co-financer of PETI along with the Federal Government. The State took over responsibility for tasks originally assigned to the municipalities, specifically the selection of families to participate in the program and the payment of wages and training of the program’s monitors (educators). The State’s participation in the program resulted in a partnership with MOC that is responsible for the monitors’ training. Second, MOC and rural labor unions of the region also took over responsibility for tasks originally assigned to the municipalities. With the financial help of public and private institutions such as Federal and State Agencies, UNICEF and the Pharmaceutical Company Pfizer, they created projects to assist not only the children but also their families.

Overcoming Problems of Decentralization

Much has been said about how some decentralized or participatory projects are negatively influenced by rural communities’ imperfections such as elite capture. On one hand local communities have the advantage of knowing local conditions better than centralized authority. On the other hand, those advantages can be outweighed by the lack of accountability of local leaders to the community (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). Those concerns are also present in the Sisal Regions, however, PETI has suffered to a lesser degree from them. The associational structure created around PETI reduced the chance of municipalities to use the program for political reasons.

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4 CGU’s (Federal Comptroller-General's Office) evaluation reports have shown several irregularities in social programs implemented by the region’s local governments (CGU, 2005, 2006).
and for elite capture because of the financial re-centralization of activities formally assigned to the municipalities\(^5\).

Furthermore, the participation of the State Government as well as of local institutions in the program made PETI in the Sisal Region be implemented through a mix of centralized and decentralized actions. That mix of actions allowed actors to participate in the project according to their supposed comparative advantage: federal and state agencies and private companies financed the program; MOC trained and supervised monitors and; MOC and local rural labor unions implemented projects to assist the families.

*Shared Costs, Multiplied Gains*

An important incentive for increased support of State and municipalities to PETI was that they gained politically while sharing the costs of the program\(^6\). Municipalities did not have to worry about hiring, training or selecting families for the program, all tasks formally assigned to them. Because the Government of Bahia is the only one that co-finances PETI in Brazil, the Sisal Region PETI’s case is often referred to as the Bahia PETI’s case though most of the program’s best performance is in the Sisal Region (those experiences will be detailed throughout the thesis). The satisfaction of the State Government with the Sisal Region experience made it hire MOC and other institutions such as IRPPA (Regional Institute for Small Agriculture) to train monitors of municipalities from other regions to work in extended day programs.

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\(^5\) By financing hiring of monitors and selection of families, the State eliminated the risk of municipalities choosing monitors and families for political reasons.

\(^6\) Tendler (1997) presents a similar argument.
Institutional Support/Capacity

Finally, a common problem in the implementation of decentralized social programs is the lack of local institutional support (Tendler, 2002; Platteau and Abraham, 2002). One of the main advantages of the Sisal Region over others that received PETI was that, 40 years ago, MOC and priests from Liberation Theology started to build institutional capacity to improve political and socio-economic conditions of rural workers. In these 40 years, many new institutions were created in the region such as small farmers associations, credit unions\(^7\) and women and youth cooperatives. Also during the period, rural workers took control of all the region’s rural labor unions previously controlled by local elites. Common groundwork of MOC, local labor unions and other local institutions during the last decades strengthened the social fabric of the region and attracted resources from the government, from ILO, UNICEF and private companies to develop projects to assist the families included in the program\(^8\).

As a consequence of the institutional capacity of the Sisal Region to implement PETI, trust among actors was “built”\(^9\). This thesis agrees with Locke (2004) when he says that “societies with a previous history of civil and political conflict, underdevelopment, and exploitation have, over time and through the political construction of new coalitions and institutions, been able to develop trust-like behavior.” PETI in the Sisal Region is an example of Locke’s building trust possibility. MOC knew that failure to cooperate would undermine the gains of PETI as stated by one of its members:

\(^7\) Information about how credit unions were created in the Sisal Region can be found in Magalhaes and Abramovay (2007).

\(^8\) In Tendler’s paper (1993) about Rural Development projects, one aspect that differentiated good projects from bad ones was their capacity to attract additional resources.

\(^9\) Locke’s paper (2004), *Building Trust*, explain how trust was built in least expected places.
“MOC’s enrollment in a program that eradicated child labor… that implied to work together with clientelist municipalities and with the State Government, which were not a social movement’s sympathizer, meant a conversion to different styles and methods of action…It found out the possibility of a dialogue while keeping its own principles and identities.” (MOC, 2007b, p. 18).

In addition, municipalities and the State Government realized that it was in their self-interest\textsuperscript{10} to have MOC as a partner. In the case of local rural labor unions, they collaborate with MOC, but their relationship with municipal governments varies from city to city. However, in most of them, they are main watchdogs of the program. In conclusion, as a result of PETI, a collaboration network was created among actors from different backgrounds, sectors and political leanings.

\textit{Chapter Descriptions}

This thesis wants to join the efforts made by other authors (Tendler, 1993, 1997; Locke, 2004, Damiani, 1999; Schrank, 2005) who have shown cultural and social stigmas only contribute to perpetuate socio-economic inequalities among regions. As a result, these authors were able to show the real reasons for why and how development happens. In the first chapter, I will talk about how PETI was implemented in Brazil and in the Sisal Region. I will also provide some indicators that show variation in PETI’s implementation across municipalities of Brazil. In the second chapter, I will describe how institutions responsible for the implementation of PETI in the region were engaged in the fight against child labor. In the third chapter, I will describe main findings related to the unique aspects of PETI in the Sisal Region. Finally, in my last chapter, I summarize findings and conclude.

\textsuperscript{10} Self-interest is one of Locke’s ingredients to the building of trust along with government policy and self-governing mechanisms.
Methodology

In order to understand all nuances of the implementation of PETI in the region, I had 42 interviews with actors from state research institutions and universities, local labor unions, local cooperatives, NGOs, community radio, state and local governments, local educators, and local sisal industry. I was also lucky enough to participate in six meetings and workshops with professionals from governmental and non-governmental institutions associated with the education sector. Finally, I made 12 visits to sisal fields, cooperative industries, extended day programs, private sisal industries and rural schools. Most of my comprehension of the Sisal Region came from my fieldwork. However, documents collected from all organizations that I visited, as well as internet research, were essential in giving me the background necessary to understand the context of PETI in the Sisal Region.
2. Background and Some Context

In 1996, the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, made a formal commitment to eradicate child labor in Brazil. A document titled “Commitment Term” was the initial step of collaboration efforts between federal and state governments, civil society organizations, labor unions and the private sector to end child labor in Brazil (NEPP, 1999). In the same year, the Brazilian government through its Ministry of Social Insurance and Social Assistance (MPAS) created the Child Labor Eradication Program, commonly known as PETI.

2.1. PETI – The Child Labor Eradication Program

The Brazilian Government created PETI to eradicate child labor in dangerous, unhealthy and degrading activities in urban and rural zones (MDS, 2001). As a result of several denunciations by ILO, UNICEF, rural labor unions and NGOs, the first children who benefited from PETI worked in the coal kilns and in harvesting mate tea leaves in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul. In 1997, PETI was implemented in the sugar cane plantations of the State of Pernambuco and the sisal plantations of the State of Bahia. Nowadays, PETI is present in the 27 states of Brazil. By February 2008, 875,554 children were participating in the program in 3,381 municipalities throughout Brazil (61% of total municipalities of Brazil).

PETI’s methodology involves the following three elements:

- **Bolsa Criança Cidadã – BCC (Citizen Child Grant)**, a stipend given every month by the Federal Government to families under the condition that their children do not work. Parents receive the money at banks or post offices by using a magnetic card. For each
child, the monthly stipend is R$ 40.00 ($23.70) in urban areas and R$ 25.00 ($14.80) in rural areas. Families can enroll more than one child in the program.

- Unidade da Jornada Ampliada – UJA (extended day program). In order to receive BCC, students must attend UJAs a minimum of 85% of total school days. The idea is to occupy children the entire day so they do not go to work. Municipalities receive money through the National Social Assistance Fund (FNAS) to implement UJAs (see values on table 1), which includes the provision of material and food. The municipal governments are also responsible for hiring monitors (educators) to develop socio-educational activities for the students enrolled in UJAs. For monitors’ salaries, municipal governments are allowed to use up to 30% of the money provided by FNAS.

- Projects involving PETI’s families that relate to job creation, income stimulus and socio-educational activities.

### Table 1 – PETI’s transfers to families and municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Zone</th>
<th>Rural Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>40.00* ($23.7)</td>
<td>25.00 ($14.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>10.00/20.00** ($5.9/$11.8)</td>
<td>20.00 ($11.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Except for urban municipalities with population lower than 250,000 inhabitants. In this case families receive 25.00 reais.

** According to MDS website (www.mds.gov.br), since June/2006, all municipalities in which beneficiaries are registered in Cadastro Único (Family Registry) receives R$ 20.00 ($11.8) per capita.

***In 05/12/2008, the exchange rate real/dollar was 1.69.
Source: MDS in www.mds.gov.br.

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11 In 05/12/2008, the exchange rate of the dollar to real was 1.69 (according to the Central Bank of Brazil’s website).
12 Also known by after-school program.
13 In 2005, part of PETI’s beneficiaries was transferred to the Brazil’s largest social program called Bolsa Família (PBF). Families that received less than R$ 120 from the program migrated to Bolsa Família, while the rest of the families remained in PETI. The Bolsa Família Program transfers R$ 18 to R$ 112.00 (or the same amount received in PETI) to families. In order to be in the PBF, families need to make commitments related to health and education of the children. This aggregation of programs was made to increase the efficacy of social programs in Brazil and to avoid duplicity. It also had the goal of expanding PETI to all families that PBF benefits, as working children from those families now have to attend UJAs (provided that there are UJAs in their municipalities). As a result, the program now encompasses children that work in all activities (not necessarily distressed and hazardous ones).
14 In June/2007, The Federal Government through MDS implemented the Cadastro Único to subsidize federal social programs such as PBF and PETI by centralizing the identification of low income families in Brazil.
Several actors are involved in the execution of PETI. The National Department of Social Assistance (SNAS) of the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) is the national coordinator. At the state and municipal levels, the coordinators are the departments in charge of their social assistance programs, the names of which differ depending on the state. At the state and local level, there are also the Commissions of Child Labor Eradication which are responsible for overseeing the implementation of PETI in the municipalities and for identifying child labor and irregularities in the program. Those commissions should be composed of members of governmental institutions that work in the areas of social assistance, labor, health and education; social assistance councils, defense of child rights councils, tutelary council, state office of labor inspections (DRT), labor and business unions, research institutions, non-governmental organizations, and child labor eradication prevention institutes. As can be seen in Chart 1, the three levels of government are expected to participate in the program as well as civil society organizations through the Commissions.

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15 Many federal programs require municipalities to create community councils in order to receive financial resources. The 1988 Constitution has increased the possibility of grassroots movements to oversee public projects (Souza, 2005).
**Chart 1—Tasks by Organizations according to the Portaria (Order) no. 458, October 4, 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Commission of Child labor Eradication</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attribution</td>
<td>SNAS/MDS</td>
<td>Department of Social Assistance</td>
<td>Commission of Social Assistance</td>
<td>Commission of Child Labor Eradication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish and disseminate rules and norms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X (as a complement)</td>
<td>X (to suggest complementary procedures)</td>
<td>X (as a complement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To coordinate the program</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote discussions to sensitize and mobilized society and government around child labor issues</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish Plano Nacional de Ações Integradas (National Integrated Action Plan)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish Plano Estadual de Ações Integradas (State Integrated Action Plan)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish Plano Municipal de Ações Integradas (Municipal Integrated Action Plan)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote Pactos Estaduais pela Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (State Pacts for Child Labor Eradication)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create Pactos Estaduais pela Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (State Pacts for Child Labor Eradication)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encourage the expansion of the program in states that prioritize child labor eradication in their social agendas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To monitor and provide assistance to states or municipalities to implement the program</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To co-finance Bolsa Criança-Cidadã (stipend) and Jornada Ampliada (extended day program)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote programs of job creation and income stimulus for PETI’s families</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To coordinate and keep Sistema de Informações Gerenciais (information system)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To evaluate the program annually and publicize the results</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish criteria or mechanisms to identify target population</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create and support Comissões de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (Commissions of Child Labor Eradication)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 In Bahia, the State Government determined that municipalities should create the Grupo Gestor (management board) instead of municipal commissions. The Grupo Gestor, which is constituted by government and civil society representatives (or should be), is the manager of PETI at the local level, assuming roles of the Municipal Departments of Social Assistance and the Municipal Councils of Social Assistance (SETRE, 2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attribution</td>
<td>SNAS/MDS</td>
<td>Department of Social Assistance</td>
<td>Commission of Child labor Eradication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To define work activities to be prioritized and number of children that should be supported by each municipality and send it to SEAS (in the case of states) or the State (in the case of municipalities). To validate registration of PETI’s families</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To decentralize management of the stipends to the municipalities if they have the appropriate technical-managerial expertise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make socio-economic assessments of target areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To execute or subsidize payments of stipends (Bolsa Criança Cidadã)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To coordinate with governmental and nongovernmental institutions for provision of logistic support</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To recommend ways to sustain and monitor the program</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assist Commissions of Child Labor Eradication</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report the existence of child labor</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To register families in PETI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop socio-educational activities with families</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To execute, directly or indirectly UJAs</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assess the program each semester</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote or participate in inter-municipal meetings</td>
<td>X (to promote)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X (to participate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help collect and compile information about child labor</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To frequently publicize PETI’s results. To formally adopt PETI’s nomenclature and logo in all documents/activities related to the program</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To interact with governmental and non-governmental institutions to optimize PETI’s results.</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To receive and submit to the appropriate institution complaints related to PETI’s implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To (control) monitor or encourage? students’ attendance in UJAs</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create an annual report of the program and to frequently publicize PETI’s results in the municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table created by the author in accordance to the Order no. 458.
2.2. Variation in PETI’s Implementation across Municipalities in Brazil

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) shows that between 1996 (the year PETI started) and 2006, there was a reduction of 1,181,000 children, in the age range of 10 to 15 years old, in the Brazilian work force (IBGE/PNAD, 2007). Unfortunately, in 1996, IBGE did not collect data on child labor for the 5 to 9 year old age range (Table 2).

Table 2 - Number of Children Working in the Years of 1996 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (1,000 people)</td>
<td>Agriculture %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 9 years*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 15 years</td>
<td>3,662</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE/PNAD (2007)
* There is no available data for that age range in 1996
** Excluding rural population of the States of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá

Child labor eradication in Brazil is, however, a work in progress. As table 2 shows, in 2006, there were still 2.7 million children between the ages of 5 and 15 working in Brazil. According to IBGE/PNAD (2006a), in 2006, 4.5% of all Brazilian children between the ages of 5 and 13 were working. Among 14 and 15 years old, 19% of children were working. In the Northeast Region, which accounts for around 50% of total child labor in Brazil for children in the ages of 5 to 14, the States of Piauí and Bahia have reduced child labor the most. On the other hand, some other States have indicated an increase in total child labor between 2001 and 2006 (Table 3).
Table 3 - % Variation of Child Labor between 2001 and 2006 in the Northeast*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All activities</th>
<th>Only agricultural activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>- 10.0</td>
<td>- 7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td>- 14.9</td>
<td>- 14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piauí</td>
<td>- 29.8</td>
<td>- 26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>- 26.3</td>
<td>- 25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alagoas</td>
<td>- 21.8</td>
<td>- 14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>- 17.7</td>
<td>- 17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Norte</td>
<td>- 7.8</td>
<td>- 19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>- 5.9</td>
<td>- 14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceará</td>
<td>- 3.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraíba</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>- 16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergipe</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>- 10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE/PNAD (2006a)

* Age range: 5 to 14 years old

Two factors might be causing variation in the reduction of child labor among the Brazilian States. First, as said before, the program is only present in around 60% of municipalities of Brazil. Second, PETI allows for substantial flexibility in its implementation by the municipalities. There are few official evaluation documents of PETI (MDS, 2004; SNAS/MDS, 2005). However, by looking at those documents it is clear that there is considerable variation on PETI’s outcomes across the country. For instance, in a survey by MDS in all States of Brazil, when asked about the main reasons for why students stopped going to UJAs, 43% of municipalities’ answers were related to the non provision of material and food, 36% to the lack of students’ interest and 31% to the lack of transportation (MDS, 2004) ¹⁷.

Other reasons for why children stop going to UJAs are to help their families with household services (49%) and to work (39%). However, as seen above, the rest of the reasons (lack of

¹⁷ In 2004, MDS published an assessment of the program in 1,603 municipalities all over Brazil, which represents around 62% of total PETI municipalities. Among those municipalities 48% were in rural zones and 52% in urban zones. A total of 319,792 families and 500,663 children were interviewed (MDS, 2004).
transportation, interest, food and material) are directly related to how municipalities have been able to fulfill their role in the program. On the other hand, municipalities argue that the lack of financial resources is the main difficulty in running UJAs. For this and other reasons, by the time of the survey, only 52.8% of municipalities offered services to improve technical skills of the families, which is one of the pillars of the program. As a result of all problems, 69.49% of municipalities answered that child labor was not completely eradicated in their cities even after the implementation of PETI.

The way that municipalities choose to hire and train monitors to teach in the UJAs is one of the aspects that have impacted the outcomes of the program. As said before, a maximum of 30% of funds transferred to municipalities can be allocated to pay monitors. The program does not orient municipal governments to pay and train monitors. The same survey by MDS shows that monitors are not being trained enough nationwide. The report says that 32% of monitors do not have any training. Also, while in around 11% of municipalities NGOs and the state government hire

18 Only the Government of Bahia directly hires the monitors.
monitors, in around 89% of municipalities of Brazil, monitors are directly hired by municipalities (10% of the cases monitors are interns). As a consequence, after municipal elections, mayors fire many monitors so they can hire their own constituencies.

The TCU has also evaluated PETI (2001, 2002). TCU’s assessments show that there is no systematic way to select families to participate in the program. As a result, there is a risk that municipalities choose families for political reasons. The TCU evaluation (2001) shows that in some municipalities, there are children who have never worked in dangerous activities. TCU (2002) also states that the majority of municipalities have not allocated resources to PETI (counterpart funds) as required by the law. Therefore, in many municipalities UJAs work in buildings without electricity, water or restrooms (TCU, 2001).

Those and other variations in the way that PETI was implemented in the municipalities generated very diverse outcomes. However, some regions, through the collaboration of several institutions were able not only to reduce child labor significantly, but also to provide better education for PETI’s children and give socio-economic assistance to their families. One of these regions is the Sisal Region. The same official reports, mentioned before, that presented the main problems of PETI nationwide also mentioned the program’s implementation in Bahia and in the Sisal Region as an example to be followed (TCU, 2001; MDS, 2004). Before talking about PETI, I will describe some of the environmental and socio-economic settings existent in that region.
2.3. Bahia, the Semi-Arid Region and the Sisal Region

This paper investigates PETI in the Sisal Region of Bahia, which is a semi-arid region. Bahia is the fifth biggest state of Brazil with an area of 564,692.67 km\(^2\), which corresponds to 6.64% of Brazil’s total area (map 1). It has 417 municipalities and around 70% of its area is within the semi-arid region. According to IBGE (2007), Bahia has 14,080,654 inhabitants which accounts for 7.65% of Brazil’s population (183,987,291 inhabitants).

Map 1 – Brazil and Bahia

The Brazilian semi-arid region is characterized by high climate variability. Precipitation is highly concentrated in three months out of the year. Annual precipitation varies between 400 mm and

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19 The sisal plant gives name to the region because the area is the largest sisal producer in the world. The sisal or *Agave sisalana Perrine* is a plant extremely resistant to droughts and thermal stress. Sisal yields a stiff fiber that is used to make ropes, yarns, rugs, carpets, matting, among other things. The plant of sisal adapts well to the semi-arid region as it has preferences for average temperatures between 20° and 28° C and annual rainfall average between 600 to 1500 mm.
800 mm. Due to such concentrated precipitation, agriculture in the semi-arid region is a high risk activity. During the frequent droughts that affect the region, it is common that farmers lose their whole production (Magalhães et al., 1988). Around 43% of the population of the Brazilian northeast live in its semi-arid region (MI, 2005).

As the Sisal Region is not an official nomenclature, it is difficult to establish precise limits to the area. Around 40 municipalities, which are historically sisal producers, are part of the region. Recently, the Department of Territorial Development (SDT) divided rural areas into “territories of identity”\textsuperscript{20}. According to a socio-economic analyst from the Ministry of Agrarian Development – MDA, the attempt to group municipalities around a territorial council, taking into consideration more than the predominant productive system, resulted in the creation of the Sisal Territory constituted by 20 municipalities\textsuperscript{21}. Other sisal producers’ municipalities in Bahia are part of three other territories: Bacia do Jacuípe, Piemonte da Diamantina and Piemonte Norte do Itapicuru (see map 2)\textsuperscript{22}. Most of the Sisal Region became part of the “Sisal Territory”. The joint efforts of several institutions to make PETI successful in the region started in municipalities of the Sisal Territory and expanded to surrounding ones. Therefore, the examples used in this thesis will come mainly from that territory.

\textsuperscript{20} In 2003, the Ministry of Agrarian Development created the Department of Territorial Development, which is responsible for the promotion of rural territory development.

\textsuperscript{21} The division of areas into territories comes from the Brazilian government’s conception of dividing rural areas by “multidimensional criteria such as the environment, the economy, the society, the culture, politics, institutions and distinct social groups that interact through specific processes in which identity and social, cultural and territorial cohesion can be identified” (MDA, 2005, p. 7).

\textsuperscript{22} Personal communication with the author of this thesis.
The Sisal Region is considered one of the poorest in Brazil with a per capita average income of half the minimum wage (MOC, 2007a). Table 4 shows that socio-economic indicators for the Sisal Territory are much lower than the average of Brazil’s indicators. Its GNP per capita is only 21.5% of the Brazilian average GNP per capita and its HDI (Human Development Index) is much lower than the HDI of the Northeast region.
Table 4 – Socio-Economic Indicators - Brazil, the Northeast Region and the Sisal Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % of Brazil</td>
<td>Total TOT % of Brazil</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total % of Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Brazil</td>
<td>183,987,291</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>R$ 11,658</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Northeast</td>
<td>51,534,406</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>R$ 5,498</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State: Bahia</td>
<td>14,080,654</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>R$ 6,583</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory: Sisal</td>
<td>569,033</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>R$ 2,505*</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average of GNP per capita and HDI of municipalities in the Sisal Territory
** There are no more recent data for the Sisal municipalities
***In 05/12/2008, the exchange rate real/dollar was 1.69.
Sources: IBGE, SEFAZ/BA, SEI/BA

The Sisal Territory has 81.5% of farms with less than 20 hectares (Dias et al., 2005). In 93% of properties, there is a predominance of family agriculture. As a result the area has around 10% of all family farmers in Brazil (Carneiro, 2007). Among those ten percent, 68.5% are classified as having almost no income (Dias et al., 2005). In the Sisal Region, where many families do not have enough to even survive, exchanges of votes for food, clothes or even for a ride to the hospital are common23. Local corruption is an obstacle to the continuity of social programs financed by the federal and state government. In Brazil, if irregularities are found in any social program of a municipality, there is a suspension of federal transfers for all social programs for that municipality. However, despite problems with the public administration, local institutions such as rural unions and the Community Organization Movement (MOC), which will be described in the next chapter, have been able to develop initiatives that have fostered socio-economic development. Those institutions were also able to help federal and state government projects, such as PETI, to perform well.

23 Anecdotes from personal interviews.
In the Sisal Region, PETI succeeded in taking children away from the sisal fields. Working in sisal fields is a very dangerous work even for adults. Usually, a group of six people works cutting off leaves in the sisal fields, one person transports the leaves to an engine where two people work at shredding the leaves so they can separate the fiber from the leaves. Accidents are very common in all stages of this process. Children used to hurt themselves with the knives they used to cut the leaves; some were blinded by the sharp tip of the leaves and many were bitten by snakes and other animals. In the engine, many people, including teenagers were mutilated. Even without the accidents, it is a very strenuous work where people work for 8 or 10 hours under the sun, without socializing, and hearing the annoying, loud noise that the engine makes.

Unfortunately, there is no recent data on child labor per municipality. However, it is clear that the region succeeded in substantially reducing child labor. As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that 80,000 children stopped working in the Sisal Region. However, according to a UNICEF publication (2003), 60,000 children stopped working in the sisal fields. A more conservative estimate comes from local organizations such as MOC, which estimates that 35,000 stopped working with sisal. Currently, in the Sisal Territory, 21,545 children are included in PETI and not working anymore, which corresponds to 22.5% of all children assisted by PETI in Bahia (table 5).

| Table 5 – Children Assisted by PETI – Brazil, Bahia and Sisal Territory - 2008 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Brazil                     | 875,554                    | % of Bahia                  |
| Bahia                      | 95,736                     | 100                         |
| Sisal Territory            | 21,545                     | 22.5                        |
| Source: MDS (direct communication) |                    |                             |
The obstacles that the region faces such as poverty, inequality and corruption definitely shape
how programs and policies impact each municipality in the region. However, overall PETI in the
Sisal Region stands out for its good performance. In chapter 4, I will explain how PETI in the
Sisal Region differentiates itself from the program in other regions. Before that, I will describe, in
the next chapter, some of the main actors that contributed to the implementation of PETI in the
region.
3. Taking the Best of Collaboration: Engaging Actors through What They Do Best

In this chapter, I will describe the main actors that contribute to the implementation of PETI in the Sisal Region. The combined work of governmental institutions, non-profit institutions, private business and, international institutions seems to be one of the main strengths of the program in the region. In the chart below, there is a simplified summary of some of the main actors and their roles in PETI. The chart, however, does not show one of the most important elements of PETI in the region, which is the constant interaction and collaboration among institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MOC – Community Organization Movement (NGO) | • Monitors’ training  
• Creation of a pedagogical approach used in all UJAs of Sisal Region (CAT)  
• Partnership with rural labor unions, the State and Federal Government to assist PETI’s families with socio-economic projects |
| Local Rural Labor Unions of Familiar Agriculture (STRAFs) | • Watchdogs of how municipalities have managed social programs’ resources  
• Uncovering of child labor and irregularities in the program  
• Partnership with MOC to assist PETI’s families with socio-economic projects |
| Outside Organizations: ILO, Unicef, Pfizer Laboratory | • Technical and financial support to execution of socio-economic activities within PETI |
| Municipalities | • Transfer of resources received by the Federal Government to UJAs (food, materials)  
• Supplementation of financial resources to implement UJAs (provision of buildings, transportation, etc) |
| State Government | Co-finance of PETI:  
• Hiring of all monitors of the State of Bahia  
• Financing of survey made by the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) to identify families with child labor in the State of Bahia to be included in PETI |
| Small Farmer Association of Valente – APAEB | • Use of its political and economically power to make small farmers stop hiring children |
3.1. The Actors

MOC – Community Organization Movement

MOC or “Community Organization Movement” is a non-governmental organization that has worked in the Sisal Region for the past 40 years. MOC works with 60 municipalities of Bahia in several programs, though much of its work is concentrated in the Territories of Sisal and Bacia do Jacuípe (MOC, 2007a). The NGO has had a leading role in the implementation of PETI in the region since its inception. MOC showed the federal government that the region had the institutional capacity to be one of the first regions in Brazil to benefit from PETI. Since then, MOC has been very active in communicating with government and non-governmental institutions alike to improve PETI’s implementation. The NGO has also designed a pedagogical approach adapted to local realities that UJAs from the region adopt (explained in the next chapter). Furthermore, it has also implemented projects aimed at improving socio-economic conditions of the families assisted by PETI.

The ability of MOC to be an active participant in PETI’s implementation as well as in negotiations with different institutions is the result of 40 years of groundwork with communities in the Sisal Region. MOC was conceived in 1967 when its founder, Albertino Carneiro, at that time a priest, formed a group within the Catholic Church to develop community work in the city of Feira de Santana (MOC, 2007b). Out of that group, Albertino Carneiro officially created MOC as a non-profit entity in 1970. Its creation was right after the beginning of Medici’s dictatorship in 1969 considered the worst in terms of torture in Brazil. During that time, any gathering of people, apart from military gatherings, was considered subversive and associated with communism. As a
result, many foreign priests from the Liberation Theology that supported MOC were either expelled or isolated by the military\textsuperscript{24} (MOC, 2007b).

One could wonder how an organization aimed at mobilizing poor communities was able to remain open during the Brazilian dictatorship. Four interesting facts helped MOC in this regard. First, the NGO was linked to the church in the beginning which considerably helped it. Not only was MOC partially protected from persecution because it was under the church umbrella but it also took advantage of the mobilizing capacity of the Catholic Church\textsuperscript{25}:

\begin{quote}
“The Feira de Santana Parish (Diocese), as opposed to many others, at the time, assumed a conservative position and had good relations with the military regime. Probably that contributed to avoid direct interventions of the militaries in the initial work. However, the good relationship was not enough to prevent Father Albertino Carneiro from, informally, being called more than once by the militaries, to give ‘explanations’ about the work” (MOC, 2007, p. 7).
\end{quote}

Second, the founders of MOC were friends of a priest linked to the authoritarian regime. Therefore, at the same time that MOC’s leaders were interrogated for hours or had their houses raided, their connections and political skills made them able to remain open. Third, the organization was aware that it should not choose a political side. MOC declared itself as a non-political organization. Fourth, during the dictatorship, MOC was financially and technically supported by international and national organizations\textsuperscript{26}. Therefore, the government could not reduce their aid to MOC because at that time there was none\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{24} Isolation of progressive priest by the dictatorship happened all over Brazil (Houtzager, 2001).
\textsuperscript{25} During the dictatorship, the church shielded other groups, such as rural labor unions, from intervention and harassment (Houtzager, 2001).
\textsuperscript{26} In the beginning of its works, MOC was helped by the NGO F.A.S.E (The Social Assistance and Education Federation). F.A.S.E, which was linked to the Catholic Relief Service, not only provided technical support to MOC but helped it connect to other institutions for financial support.
\textsuperscript{27} With the arrival of democracy, the government became a main partner of MOC. According to a staff member of MOC, during the dictatorship, 95\% of MOC’s financial sources were from international organizations. After the transition, 70\% of its resources come from the government.
After the first phase of community organizing, MOC, which slowly distanced itself from the church, started to develop economic projects aimed at increasing the income of poor rural families. Table 6 shows the different stages of MOC’s work in the region. In order to implement its projects, the NGO was able to attract many partners to work in projects designed to improve socio-economic conditions in the region. These include public partners (such as Eletrobrás and Petrobrás), international (such as ILO and UNICEF), and private companies (Pfizer, Credicard and Omicron Electronics). MOC’s ability to involve several actors is essential to the good performance of PETI in the region.

Table 6 – Some of the Major Programs that MOC has been involved in the Sisal Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Main Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Mobilization of communities, community participation in debates about socio-economic problems. Project proposals always involving the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Projects: sewing class, vocational education, farm management (treinamento agrícolas), flour mill (casas de farinha), incipient revolving fund (fundo rotativo). Reflection with the community about local reality and ways to change it. Creation of first rural communities associations. Movements to strengthen labor unions. Discussion about economic problems of rural workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Small Farmers Associations (APAEBs), housing projects, typing classes, prevented health measures, debates about organic agriculture, revolving fund (fundo rotativo), gender debates, workers protests, search to increase public participation in the creation of public policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Incentive and instruction of civil society to participate in the elaboration of Municipal Laws (Leis Orgânicas Municipais). Projects oriented to the Semi-arid Ecosystem. Concrete work plans (planos de trabalho). Intensification of projects in rural areas. Rural education, communication (radio, tv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Programs: water and food safety, public policies, communication, child and teenager, rural education, gender.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the democratic regime, MOC’s skills in negotiating with governments from different political parties has been essential in a region where most of the municipalities are linked to right wing political parties associated with traditional elites. In fact, MOC received criticisms for sitting at a table with right wing politicians. Some of the critics argue that MOC should directly confront the political power and the government instead of trying to negotiate. One criticism relating to

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28 For a complete list of MOC’s sources of financial resources, please see its Annual Reports at www.moc.org.br
29 Since the Constitution of 1988, municipalities have their own laws elaborated by their city councils (Souza, 2005).
leadership training aimed at increasing civil society participation in the law making is expressed as follows:

“There was even training for city council members, which was a conflictive strategy, as there were few representatives that could be trusted by the popular movement. People said that MOC was spending time training the enemies.” (MOC, 2007b, p.16)

On the other hand, there were times that local elites called MOC the “Movement of Communist Organization” (MOC, 2007b). In the beginning of its rural education program, some cities retaliated against teachers that supported the NGO by sending them to work in distant rural areas. However, retaliation and resistance did not stop MOC from doing its work. PETI itself has made a significant impact in the relationship between MOC and the municipalities. In fact, the partnership of MOC and local municipalities is the result of a maturing process by the institution. MOC’s forty years of learning and working for change, in addition to its political skills and its flexibility to work with all sorts of actors have been essential to PETI’s success in the region.

**Local Rural Unions of Rural Workers and Family Farmers (STRAFs)**

In Brazil, the labor union movement had a main role in bringing the problem of child labor to the attention of society and the government. The book *Crianças de Fibras* (Children of Fiber) by Huzak and Azevedo (1994) sponsored by the Abrinq Foundation in 1994, was one of the first works that raised the problem of child labor. In their description of children working in semi-slave conditions, local labor unions were the only entities that had statistics about child labor.

In 1992, several agreements between the International Labor Organization, through its
Elimination of Child Labor Program (IPEC-ILO) and labor union confederations (CUT, CGT, CONTAG), were adopted to fight child labor. In 1993, ILO and CONTAG (The National Confederation of Agricultural Workers) coordinated several meetings and a seminar in the sisal city of Retirolândia. At the municipal level, the rural labor union of Retirolândia was the first organization to raise the issue of child labor in the Sisal Region (NEPP, 1999). Since those meetings in 1993, MOC, ILO and local rural labor unions in the region became partners with the goal of ending child labor in the Sisal Region. However, collaboration between MOC and local labor unions did not start there but arose out of a prior history of solid partnership and common groundwork.

In the 1970s, local oligarchies organized rural labor unions in the Sisal Region in order to manipulate the population through the provision of low quality health services and to request public social benefits to the government\(^{30}\) (Codes Sisal, 2008). In the same decade, foreign progressive priests and MOC started to foster social organization initiatives. In 1975, a rural worker was murdered over land conflicts on a farm in the village of Feira de Santana (MOC, 2007b). As a result, with the help of MOC, rural workers initiated efforts to get control of the labor unions\(^{31}\).

The fight for the control of the local unions was, however, long and difficult. In the municipality of Serrinha, it took twelve years of struggle for rural workers to win union elections and expel local elites from the leadership of the rural labor union. In the municipality of Monte Santo, local

\(^{30}\) The control of labor unions by local elites was not uncommon in the rest of Brazil (Pinhanez, 1997).

\(^{31}\) In the process of increasing the political awareness of rural workers, MOC went into a partnership with the former LBA – Brazilian Assistance Foundation (Legião Brasileira de Assistência), a federal charity institution. LBA and MOC distributed milk to poor communities. MOC used the milk distribution to promote debates and discussions about the unions’ situations, political and socio-economic reality and civil rights.
elites managed to expel the priest who was organizing rural workers. Now, local workers control all the rural labor unions of the region.

The relationship between STRAFs and the local government varies depending on the municipality. In the municipality of Itiúba, for instance, the mayor has a good relationship with the local union. In other municipalities, there is animosity. In the municipality of Candeal where the rural labor union uncovered several irregularities by municipal government in social programs like PETI, rural workers suffered physical aggression and death threats. In fact, most of the time, STRAFs are the first to report irregularities in the management of PETI by the local governments.

Since 1996, the rural unions of the Sisal Region have also been supported by the creation of FATRES – The Foundation to Support Rural Labor in the Sisal Region located in the sisal city of Valente. FATRES aims its work at strengthening the institutional capacity of rural labor unions. It also works toward mobilizing and organizing unions in an effort to solve local political and socio-economic issues that the region faces such as child labor.

Through monitoring and uncovering irregularities in PETI’s implementation, local rural labor unions have been the main watchdogs of PETI in the region. They have also helped to organize seminars and workshops about child labor and rural education programs. Some of them have also developed social and economic projects with families in an effort to reduce child labor in the region.
Outside Institutions

The support of international and national non-governmental institutions has been essential to the good performance of PETI in the region, details of which will be provided in the next chapter. From the beginning of PETI, ILO and UNICEF have been important actors, not only stimulating local initiatives, but also increasing awareness of the problem and giving financial and technical support for the implementation of projects complementing PETI in the region.

Private sector actors are also partners of MOC in the implementation of socio-economic projects. As it will be seen in the next chapter, Pfizer helped MOC to implement an economic project with PETI’s families called “The Cabra Escola Project” (She-Goat School Project). The financial support of those institutions is essential for PETI’s success in a region sorely in need of resources.

Municipalities

Not all municipalities in the Sisal Region have PETI, since the municipal government must ask MDS for the project. PETI is present in 18 municipalities of the Sisal Territory (table 7).
Table 7 – Municipalities from the Sisal Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Urban Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Rural Total Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Araci</td>
<td>51,898</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>1,954.89</td>
<td>57 1,794 1,851 1,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrocas</td>
<td>13,529</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,064.30</td>
<td>1 997 998 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biritinga</td>
<td>13,951</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>2,265.20</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candeal</td>
<td>9,022</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1,943.32</td>
<td>54 121 175 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cansanção</td>
<td>33,008</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>2,160.57</td>
<td>34 1,283 1,317 854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceição do Coité</td>
<td>60,467</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>3,569.46</td>
<td>87 2,483 2,570 1,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icui</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>3,303.27</td>
<td>71 423 494 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itiúba</td>
<td>35,134</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>1,830.57</td>
<td>185 1,381 1,566 948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamarão</td>
<td>10,533</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>1,579.73</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monte Santo</td>
<td>52,115</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>1,800.10</td>
<td>96 2,589 2,685 1,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordestina</td>
<td>12,171</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1,796.45</td>
<td>1 965 966 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queimadas</td>
<td>26,996</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>2,130.10</td>
<td>136 468 604 462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quilhângue</td>
<td>27,177</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>2,101.76</td>
<td>40 1,529 1,569 1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirolândia</td>
<td>11,960</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>3,176.95</td>
<td>104 621 725 519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santaluz</td>
<td>33,639</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>2,514.32</td>
<td>115 1,154 1,269 905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Domingos</td>
<td>8,952</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>3,162.39</td>
<td>132 577 709 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serrinha</td>
<td>71,367</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>3,262.36</td>
<td>182 783 965 595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teofilândia</td>
<td>20,751</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>2,313.05</td>
<td>10 1,165 1,175 749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucano</td>
<td>48,675</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>2,330.79</td>
<td>106 645 751 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valente</td>
<td>21,797</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>3,840.38</td>
<td>184 972 1,156 831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>569,033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,595 19,950 21,545 14,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only children/families registered in Cadastro Único (campo 270)

Source: IBGE, Seplan/BA, PNUD, MDS.

To correlate outcomes of PETI with local characteristics of municipalities would deserve a deeper analysis. However, if we compare performance of UJAs among municipalities, some broad conclusions can be made. Municipalities that have the mayor’s support, active civil society, and competent monitors and municipal coordinators have the best UJAs \(^{32}\). On the other hand, municipalities without any of those conditions have the worst UJAs. In between, there are municipalities where UJAs work fine without the mayor’s support but with good monitors and coordinators of PETI that somehow compensates for the lack of support. In some municipalities,

\(^{32}\) Mayor's support: provision of transportation, food and material for UJAs, active civil society: society that uncover irregularities in the program and demand better UJAs and, good UJAs: qualified monitors, appropriate material, etc.
civil society is not active but there is support from the city and the monitors are competent. In others, monitors are not as competent but the municipal coordinator is very good, resulting in good performance. In table 8, there is an exercise with MOC’s staff members from the Rural Education Program to assess those variables in the 18 municipalities of the Sisal Territory participants of PETI. Most municipalities have UJAs working well, most of the municipalities support the program and most of them do not have irregularities in the program. Also, in most of the municipalities the civil society is very active. Finally, most of the monitors and their coordinators are also competent. These results are somewhat striking because they show that to describe semi-arid regions only by its corrupt government and its passive and manipulated population is simplistic. More important, it shows that regions like the Sisal Region can make public projects work, sometimes even in a more complete way than other, richer regions in Brazil. Finally, the table below, as well as interviews with local actors, indicates that the public sector responds to pressure from the civil society and that the existence of an active civil society in the region is essential to the overall performance of PETI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>More or Less</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Very Much</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall, UJA works well in the municipality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The City supports PETI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregularities in PETI</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Civil Society</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent monitors*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent municipal coordinator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Because there are several monitors in each municipality there was more than one answer for some of the municipalities.
Source: Personal Interviews with MOC’s staff members from the Rural Education Program.
State Government

The Government of Bahia has a very active and unique role in the execution of PETI. It is the only State in Brazil that is a co-financer of the program together with the Federal Government. In almost every document about PETI in Brazil, the Bahia case is cited as a national model because of its voluntary role in financing part of PETI. In 2006, the State Government through SEDES, spent R$ 20 million ($ 12 million) with monitors and survey expenses. In an interview with a local newspaper of the Sisal Region, the Minister of Social Development, Patrus Ananias, said that Bahia is a national model not only to Brazil but also to the whole world (Giramundo, 2004). First with SETRAS and now with SEDES, the State Government has also worked with MOC, transferring resources for the NGO to train monitors. In fact, it is the State Government of Bahia that most closely follows the guidelines of the Federal Government to engage civil society in the program.

APAEB – Small Farmers Association of Valente

Though the Small Farmers Association of the municipality of Valente (APAEB) is not directly involved in PETI, it is worth telling its story because of its strong presence in the Sisal Region. APAEB was created in 1980 after rural workers realized that they needed to be organized to fight for their rights. In the 1970s, workers in the Sisal Region started to organize themselves to improve trade conditions. The problem was that when the farmers went to sell their products in the cities’ open markets, the tax system (fisco) was already waiting for them at the entrance of the cities. In addition to taxes, they charged a fine for illegal transportation in a value up to 150% of
ICMS (Taxes on Goods and Services) (MOC, 2007b). Therefore, often it was financially better to give the products away than to sell them. Farmers initiated a movement called the “ICMS movement” and in 1979, with the support of MOC, more than 400 people went to the State Capital Building to deliver a protest document to the governor, Antonio Carlos Magalhães. After that, the Government of Bahia published State Orders making ICMS charges to farmers more flexible (MOC, 2007b). After that mobilization, rural workers created five local farmers associations in five cities of the Sisal Region. One of these associations, The Small Farmers Association of the municipality of Valente (APAEB) is politically and economically influential in its home city and surrounding ones. Currently, APAEB has 730 members and buys products from 169 producers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Producers</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goat Milk</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: personal communication

Using its influence in the region, APAEB has been very active against child labor practices. The association has 10 written commitments against child labor including not buying sisal from farmers that hire children. APAEB also makes sure that children of their direct workers are enrolled in school and they also do not hire anyone under the age of 15.

**3.2. History Matters – Long-term Relationships**

All the institutions described above were fundamental to the implementation of PETI in the Sisal Region. In a region considered by the literature so unlikely to have any sort of social network, collaboration among institutions is the main factor of PETI’s success in the Sisal Region. The fact
that there has been an institution (MOC) working with local communities for four decades has served as a foundation for the work of other institutions in PETI. As it will be seen in the next chapter, several institutions joined the project through negotiations and projects coordinated by MOC. Local communities and unions are confident that MOC will not go away and they can always go to the NGO as a last resource. International institutions have also worked with MOC since its creation. Before PETI, ILO and UNICEF were already partners with MOC. When PETI came, they knew they could trust MOC. The State Government was also confident to be a co-financer of PETI and transfer money to MOC for training seminars. Therefore, the trust that other institutions had in MOC enabled them to be active participants in the implementation of PETI in the region.

An example of the good relationship among actors is the ability that MOC has to quickly bring together actors to discuss rural education programs. In January of this year, while I was doing my field work in the Sisal Region, I was faced with a major problem. The majority of the professionals that worked with education were on vacation because January is a school vacation month. Besides me, there was a professor from a foreign university who wanted to know more about the rural educational program existing in the Sisal Region. In two days, MOC put together three heads of departments of education or their representatives and 16 coordinators involved in rural education programs of several municipalities. The next day, two more heads of city departments and six other coordinators were available. In the meetings, I talked to people who were on vacation but agreed to meet for interviews. Suddenly, my whole interview agenda was set.
In March of the same year, in response to a request from a professor from a foreign university, MOC and UEFS (State University of Feira de Santana) organized a meeting with mayors and heads of the department of education of 16 municipalities of the Sisal and Bacia do Jacuípe Territories. As a result of this meeting, political leadership from the municipalities exchanged experiences and said they were going to use other municipalities’ successful experiences as models for their own work (MOC, 2008a).

The description of the institutions and how they have grown to relate to each other over time is not, however, to compare degrees of their importance in the implementation of PETI in the Sisal Region. The quote below describes how important the collaboration of all institutions in the implementation of PETI in the Sisal Region was:

“Everything could have been different if UFBA would not have taken care of surveys, if ILO and UNICEF had not offered unconditional technical support to MOC (followed by financial resources), if SETRAS did not have made itself available for the management structure of the program, if the Councils, the Labor Public Ministry, CONTAG, among other, had not given institutional support to the process” (IPEC, 2003, p. 128).
4. Building Development through Coordination

This chapter will describe the associational structure that made PETI in the Sisal Region a unique case. Good outcomes resulted from collaboration efforts among institutions that started before and after the implementation of PETI. This case shows that there is not a single way to promote development. It also shows the advantages of learning from past experiences. All efforts that are described in this chapter happened in a time sequence that allowed new initiatives to learn from past ones. In the next section, I will describe some of the old efforts in the fight to end child labor in the Sisal Region that made the region ready to receive PETI.

4.1. Building on old efforts and projects

In the Sisal Region, discussions about child labor started before the arrival of PETI in 1997. As mentioned in chapter 3, in 1994, the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) and ILO organized a series of meetings and a seminar held in the city of Retirolândia. Since then, MOC, ILO, UNICEF and STRAFs initiated a partnership to end child labor (IPEC, 2003).

According to IPEC (2003), in 1994, MOC, with the financial and technical support of IPEC, created a pilot project to enable local youth and leaders (multiplicadores) to educate people in the fight against child labor. MOC produced five booklets aimed at educators, labor union workers, women, men and municipal counselors to increase awareness about child labor issues. A local rural union leader interviewed by Souza and Souza (2003) also says that since 1993 the civil society has been involved in the fight to end child labor in the region. By then, STRAFs, with financial and technical support of MOC and the State Office of Labor Inspection (DRT), conducted a survey to identify all children working in distressed and hazardous activities in five
local municipalities. They were able to identify 600 families with working children. The union leader states that a child labor survey was never done before and that the federal government denied the existence of children working under severely distressed and hazardous conditions. Therefore, it was important to show to the government such a problematic situation (Souza and Souza, 2003). This mobilization occurred between 1993 and 1996. More interesting is that before the creation of PETI in 1997, local rural labor unions had already advocated for conditional cash transfers in order to keep children out of work. One of the most important consequences of this previous work was that when PETI arrived in the region, the families were not caught by surprise. The local unions had already talked to those families about the problems of child labor. Therefore, families were familiar with the project. Possible problems and resistance coming from the families were then reduced in comparison to other regions of Brazil (Souza and Souza, 2003).

4.1.1. The Bode Escola Project (Goat School Project)

Also before PETI, in 1993, the rural labor union of Retirolândia created a project named The Bode Escola Project and submitted it to ILO to obtain financial support. This project aimed at increasing economic independence of families with children. Families received one goat and one she-goat under the condition that they sent their children to school. Animals were kept until reproduction and then returned to the union. Farmers were allowed to keep the offspring. The project was one of the first concrete attempts in the region to reduce child labor. During an interview for the TV Cultura\textsuperscript{33}, in 2000, the president of the union explained that it was economically attractive to the families since children earned around R$ 2.5 ($1.5) in the sisal fields and the project returned around R$ 12 ($7) per day or almost 5 times more. During the four

\textsuperscript{33} The interview can be accessed in http://www.tvcultura.com.br/caminhos/11sisal/sisal1.htm
years of the existence of the project, 206 families were assisted. Families that had an income of less than the minimum wage had an income increase of 40%. For those families with an income of less than half minimum wage, the increase was up to 80% (IPEC, 2003).

As it will be seen below, based on this program, MOC implemented the Cabra Escola Project (She-Goat School Project) to assist PETI’s families. Implementation was much easier as there were already three years of experience with the Bode Escola Project. The program addresses one of main problems of PETI in Brazil, the lack of income generation projects to support families. The quote below from an interview with a MOC’s leader summarizes how initiatives, such as the Bode Escola Project, were important to make the region ready to receive PETI.

“The Sisal Region had a history of fight against child labor coming from the partnership with ILO, projects that created Children Councils, the Bode Escola Project and the child labor survey made by MOC, unions and DRT. MOC and the social movements pressured the government to be included in PETI, by doing surveys and big seminars. The (Federal) Government had a certain fear to come to the Sisal Region, because the region was mobilized and not a partisan of the government. UNICEF had an important role as it mediated the visits of Government to the region and talked to us about establishing a dialogue with the government.”

4.2. Looking out for New Responsibilities: Organizations Voluntarily Assuming New Roles

As explained in chapter 2, PETI has three elements: a stipend (BCC), the extended day program (UJAs) and projects aimed at giving economic independence to families. As it was also shown, in many regions of Brazil the extended day program has serious problems and families are not assisted by the program. Many of the problems are a result of bad management, insufficient financial resources, inadequate training and lack of participation of local non-governmental actors. In Bahia, and particularly in the Sisal Region, actors were able to join the program by
doing what they do best because of a re-division of tasks. As a consequence, the Sisal Region fulfilled the expectations of the Federal Government when it envisioned a project that would take children out of work, give them good education, provide alternative sources of income to their families and increase awareness of society as a whole for the negative impacts of child labor. The Chart below describes the structure of PETI in the Sisal Region that made it a unique case in the implementation of the program in Brazil.

Chart 3 – PETI’s Structure in the Sisal Region

[Diagram of PETI's Structure in the Sisal Region]
4.2.1. Recentralization of Activities from Municipalities to the State Level: The State taking an active role

Bahia is the only state that is a co-financer of PETI in Brazil. Originally a duty of the municipalities, the Bahia Government, initially through the Department of Labor and Social Action - SETRAS and then through the Department of Social Development - SEDES, pays the wages and the initial training of all monitors in the State. All monitors are from local communities and are selected through a written test and interview.

According to MOC’s staff members, the process that ended up in the monitors’ hiring through SETRAS began within the Child Labor Eradication Commission of Bahia (COMPETI). In the beginning of PETI, for three months, MOC trained monitors with financial resources from the program that the local governments received from PETI. Though that initial hiring form was a suggestion of the Commission, later it realized that monitors’ expenses were taking away important resources for buying of food and materials for the children. The debate to include the State Government started. “Pressures from the social movements and COMPETI made SETRAS agree to hire the monitors. The justification was clear: the municipal governments did not have the structure to provide a whole day education program (educação integral). Also, child labor was considered a State problem, considering the endemic situation in all municipalities of Bahia.

Initially, the state hired monitors through FAPEX (Research and Extension Support Foundation)

34 The law no. 10.549 of 12/28/2006 reorganized the structure of the public administration of the State of Bahia and created SEDES, which took responsibility for PETI’s management at the state level.
35 Members of COMPETI/BA are the Public Ministry of Labor, Public Ministry, MOC, UNICEF, Child and Teenager Rights Council, Agriculture Works Federation (FETAG), UFBA, among others.
and then through REDA (Special Contracting Regime). The coordination of PETI by SETRAS was essential to make the state have an active role in the program.\textsuperscript{36}

SETRAS also hired the Federal University of Bahia - UFBA to conduct a survey (pesquisa-cadastramento) to identify all families eligible to participate in PETI. The latter is also a responsibility of municipalities. According to TCU (2001), a problem of PETI nationwide is that there are no uniform criteria in the selection of children to be part of it. As a result, in some municipalities children who should not be included in the program were included. The TCU report mentions Bahia as the only State that has a strategy to eliminate the risk of improper selection\textsuperscript{37}.

The recentralization of some activities from the municipal to the state level solved a large problem of PETI’s implementation. It solved the problem of the low quality of UJAs due to insufficient and/or constant change of monitors according to political mandates. More important, as a result of centralized hiring, all monitors from the Sisal Region as well as other regions of Bahia received uniform training provided by MOC. The NGO taught monitors to implement in UJAs a pedagogical approach called CAT\textsuperscript{38} oriented to the local reality. In 2006, MOC

\textsuperscript{36} Source: personal communication with MOC’s staff members.

\textsuperscript{37} There is a fear from MOC’s staff that the incorporation of PETI in the Bolsa Familia Project (PBF) will reduce the quality of the program in the region because the municipalities choose the families to be included in Cadastro Único (when they register the families to be part of social programs they have a place where they indicate if there is child labor in the family or not). There is also the problem that with PBF there is no control of who is going or not to UJAs. So, there is the risk that families will receive money and not take the children to UJAs.

\textsuperscript{38} In 1994, MOC adapted a methodology developed by a local NGO of Pernambuco called SERTA, to the Sisal Region reality. This methodology named CAT consists of knowing, analyzing and transforming (conhecer, analisar, transformar) reality in rural areas. CAT’s methodology stimulates a school that gives different role for students, parents and the local community (MOC, SERTA, UEFS, 2005). It is a methodology that stimulates the construction of learning based on local knowledge; learning that will serve to promote development according to local culture and characteristics. CAT wants to increase the self-esteem of students, to make them proud of their roots and to show them that they can be empowered as citizens.
coordinated 21 courses of monitors’ training that lasted on average 52 hours and had around 50 participants, totaling 1,025 participants (MOC, 2006).

It is important to explain how CAT came to be implemented in UJAs. CAT’s methodology (explained in footnote no. 38), was originally implemented in rural elementary schools of the region. In 1994, 32 rural schools of three municipalities (Valente, Santa Luz and Santo Estevão) adopted CAT (Carneiro, 2007a). As CAT is not a public program, it is voluntarily adopted by the political leaders of the municipalities, schools and professors. This poses a challenge if one wants to scale up a project. However, in 2006, 19 municipalities voluntarily adopted the program, in which 1,521 teachers assisted 35,488 students (MOC, 2006). MOC provides training to all teachers that are adopting the CAT methodology. When CAT began to be implemented in UJAs, there was already 3 years’ experience in rural schools. It is important to mention the experience of CAT in regular schools as the students from UJAs also attend regular school. Much of the struggle of MOC in the area of education is to make municipalities implement a “educação integral” that not only teach students basic skills but also to “build values, citizenship, ethic, identity, culture” (Carneiro, 2007b).

A uniform training of monitors in an adequate pedagogy that emphasize civic education is one of the special features of PETI in the region. As mentioned before, there is no specification in PETI’s norms about the appropriate content of UJAs. Therefore, across UJAs in different states, methodologies vary from academic programs to intramural athletics (Yun, 2001).

As a follow up to the initial training provided to monitors, every three months MOC organizes
meetings with coordinators of monitors from the Sisal Region. Every four months, MOC also coordinates meetings with monitors of other regions that it trained. As a result, in 2006, there were 53 municipalities, 76 municipal coordinators, 1,646 monitors and 57,803 children assisted by MOC through UJAs (MOC, 2006).

Despite the fact that MOC also trained monitors of other regions of Bahia, monitors and professors (who adopt CAT methodology) of the Sisal Region benefit more from the program because MOC constantly monitors them and give them feedback. They also participate in meetings organized by MOC to debate municipal education plans. They have meetings to publicize artistic works done by children in UJAs and they also receive monitoring visits (MOC, 2006). The importance of regular meetings to the quality of UJAs can be perceived in a statement made by one of the monitors:

“There are so many difficulties that sometimes I want to give up. However, when I come to the meetings, I realize that I am not alone and we are doing wonderful things. I go back to the UJA with much more energy and hope.”

As a result of trained and fixed monitors and of good-quality UJAs, the pre-conditions were set for other projects implemented in UJAs. Since 1999, a new project called Baú de Leitura Project (Reading Box Project) was initiated within the UJAs of the Sisal Region. The Baú de Leitura Project was created after UNICEF convinced MOC that it should have readings projects within PETI that would make children have fun when reading books while also critically developing

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39 Monitors of each city chose their own coordinators among their peers. The coordinators, who are also paid by SEDES, go to the meetings with MOC and pass on to monitors what they learned. Every month coordinators get together with the monitors in their cities.

40 Statement made during a personal interview with a monitor in January/2008.
skills to reflect about their own reality\textsuperscript{41}. The project started in 1999 with 675 children having access to 27 boxes (baús). However, it was so successful that municipalities decided to voluntarily adopt this project in the municipal schools. In 2007, 52 municipalities distributed 452 baus through their Secretaries of Social Action and Education. Adding up UJAs and schools, in 2007, there were 28,539 children with access to 942 baús. Considering that each baú has approximately 50 books, the total number of books circulating in the region is around 47,100. Other institutions in Bahia and Sergipe took the project to 55 other municipalities (CDJBC et al., 2006)\textsuperscript{42} and in 2006, the Ministry of Education (MEC) through its Department of Continued Education, Literacy and Diversity (Secad) announced that MEC was going to implement Baú de Leitura nationwide (Brasil que Lê, 2007).

A research study assessing the impact of CAT and Baú de Leitura in students’ performance is still to be done. However, despite the lack of quantitative evidence, the positive impact of those projects, not only for students but also for all actors involved is evident. For instance, through the Baú de Leitura project, students and educators have sensitized the political power of the region. In one example in a municipality, children were not attending UJAs because of lack of public transportation. They went to the local council building and performed one of the stories they learned in the Baú de Leitura project. After that, transportation became available (CDJBC et al., 2006). In another example, by following the steps of the CAT methodology, students of 41 municipalities of the Sisal Region interviewed more than 28,000 households and identified that

\textsuperscript{41} The Baú de Leitura project consists of distributing boxes (baús) made of sisal to UJAs filled with books divided by 3 themes (motes) which are: i) personal, cultural and local identify; ii) relationship with the environment and, iii) relationship with the families, communities and society (CDJBC et al. 2006). After the children finish reading the books, they pass it further to another UJA.

\textsuperscript{42} In Bahia, IRPAA – Instituto Regional da Pequena Agropecuária Apropriada) and in Sergipe, CDJBC – Centro Dom José Brandão de Castro, Missão Criança Aracaju and UNDIME/SE – União Nacional de Dirigentes Municipais de Educação.
40% of them did not have filtered water. Since then, students are pressuring the public sector to improve the quality of water. As a result of the campaign, around nine thousand filters were acquired by the families (MOC, 2005). In another campaign, UJAs’ students planted 20,000 seedlings with the support of MOC and Eletrobrás.\footnote{This last example is to show that there are many partners involved in PETI, such as Eletrobrás, that are not being mentioned in this thesis.}

A qualitative evaluation of the program can also be made by analyzing statements made by local actors about PETI. The quote below shows how the educational projects complementary to PETI that were born in the Sisal Region have deeply impacted the self-esteem of the involved actors:

“My students were going to perform a book that they had just read. A little black student said she wanted to have the role of the princess, which immediately caused reactions from other students. They said: you cannot be a princess because you are not white. The little girl confidently answered: there is not a problem because in Baú de Leitura there are no differences and I can be whoever I want to be”\footnote{Statement made by a monitor during an interview with the author in January 2008.}

Monitors also describe a transformation in their lives. Some of the monitors have been in PETI for 10 years and their personal transformations can be seen in their statements collected by MOC (2008b). Most of them mention that they started to like to read only after the Baú de Leitura Project. Monitors are either attending colleges or are planning to. Finally, many mention that they learned how to be articulate through their work in UJAs. Some of the monitors’ statements are below (transcribed from MOC, 2008b):

“To talk about PETI is like talking about a non polished stone that slowly becomes a precious and valued stone. Before PETI, I was shy with no self-esteem, I was afraid to speak on public, did not like to read, was depressed. Today I am a completely different person from my inside and outside.”

“I learned how to value myself, to see the world in a broader way, to talk to people face to face, to have my own ideas, to be creative, to solve the problems that come up.”

“People were ashamed to say that they were from the countryside, now they are proud.”
Monitors’ statements also show how they acknowledge that several institutions participated in the process:

“Finally, I want to register the support I received from the families, monitors, children, MOC, SETRAS, SEDES, STR, Management Group (Grupo gestor)”.

“Everything and more I owe to PETI. Therefore, I take the opportunity to give my sincere thanks to God in the first place, to PETI, to the Baú de Leitura Project, MOC, SEDES, UNICEF, MDA, MDS, the city of Ituuba and, the rural labor union. In conclusion, for all the partners that made such an awesome program like PETI take place”.

To summarize, the main problems of PETI’s implementation throughout Brazil did not happen in the Sisal Region. This success results from the correct selection of children for the program, the hiring and training of monitors and the quality of UJAs. With that taken care of, local institutions such as MOC and STRAFs were able to take a further step and develop projects to assist families of children in the program. This is the subject of the next section.

4.2.2. Filling the Gap: Civil Society Helping the Government to Make PETI Successful

The Sisal Region stands out for being one of the few in Brazil that has projects aimed at promoting socio-economic independence of families, which is the third component of PETI. One of the projects is the Cabra Escola Project (She-Goat School Project) inspired by the Bode Escola Project (Goat School Project). Since 2002, the Pharmaceutical Company Pfizer finances this project, which is executed by MOC. Families receive one goat and three she-goat plus technical assistance. The project benefits 600 families in 10 municipalities of the Sisal Region. It has reduced malnutrition levels by 40% and increased families’ incomes by 35% (Boletim Informativo MOC, 2006).
The Prosperar Project is another project that was implemented in the Sisal Region. It was conceived by COMPETI (Commission of Child Labor Eradication of Bahia) to provide income for families so they would take their children to school regardless of any cash transfer program (MOC, 2003). The project began in 2001 and was implemented through a partnership of MOC, SETRAS and the Department of Social Action of the former Minister of Social Security (SEAS/MPS). The project provides training, technical assistance and credit. In 2007, the project benefited 12,800 families from 32 municipalities in the Sisal Region, through the technical assistance of 322 young people trained by MOC (MOC, 2007c). The project gives priority to hiring former PETI’s students. In 2006, MOC trained 46 former students from five municipalities of the Sisal Region45 (SEPLAN/BA, 2006). The Prosperar Project is an example of a successful partnership where the government delegated the implementation of a publicly financed program to the civil society. The level of trust between institutions is stated in a quote by the International Labor Organization:

“MOC has achieved such a consistent level of organization and excellence that it was asked by the Federal government to develop the Prosperar Project” (IPEC, 2003, p. 126).

The two projects described above, Cabra Escola and Prosperar, have a strong economic component. A third project, the Family Agent Project (PAF), was designed specifically to provide information and to close the gap between the families and PETI. In 1999, MOC created PAF with the support of UNICEF and STRAFS. The project consisted of 320 agents assisting families of 29 municipalities of the Sisal Region (MOC, 2007d). Between 30% and 80% of the total of families benefitting from PETI were assisted in the municipalities, according to a survey about PETI in the

45 The situation of the children that had to leave PETI because they reached the maximum age is an issue of concern all over Brazil.
Among other things, it is noteworthy that the project helped make parents realize that children who do not work are not necessarily lazy, selfish and useless.

That belief can be seen in the statement of a father given in 1994:

“If the dad does not take his children to work while they are young, what will happen when they are 18 years old? They will only want to work for themselves and I will have to kill myself to feed the others at home” (Huzak & Azevedo, 1994, p.3).

The project consisted of talking to the parents about the importance of sending their kids to UJAs, of making parents talk to monitors and to push their children to perform better at school. Agents also gave orientations about the importance of school attendance and basic notions of health, nutrition, and civil rights. In addition, agents encouraged families to look for economic activities to increase their income. Through that kind of information, family agents became a connection between families on one side and municipal services and unions on the other side. The families learned that they had individual rights and they knew where to go to access them (MOC, 2007d).

The Family Agent Project ended in 2005 except in one municipality, Riachão do Jacuípe, where 10 agents assist 10 communities (MOC, 2007d). The continuity of the project in this municipality was an initiative of the local STRAF that realized the importance of the project. Despite the fact that the program ended in the other municipalities, it generated several long term positive outcomes. According to Souza and Souza (2003), a survey of families shows that parents that were visited by agents have more consistent information about the program. Those parents also frequently visit schools and UJAs where their children go. As a result of the project, families assisted by the project were more aware of the importance of PETI and were better able to invest the stipend in economic projects (Souza and Souza, 2003).
Regardless if local institutions, the government or international institutions created the projects described above, all of them were implemented through a collaborative network among different institutions. Those projects also generated spillovers not predicted by its designers which will be seen in the next section.

4.3. A Virtuous Cycle - Creating Social Networks while Promoting Social Development

When PETI came to the Sisal Region it benefitted from previous collaborative efforts among institutions to fight child labor. However, many new networks were created because of PETI. For instance, monitors from all over Bahia mobilized to improve their working conditions and to fight for their jobs. In 2007 they created the State Association of Social Educators of PETI (Amopeti) whose first president is from the Sisal Region. With the association, monitors can now participate in the Commission to Eradicate Child Labor of Bahia (COMPETI) and in municipal and state councils of child labor eradication (MOC, 2007e). Former PETI students have also tried to organize. An example is a cooperative in a village of the region that makes regional products such as milk goat soap, sauces and liqueurs. Parents have also organized to protest or to help in UJAs. For instance, parents of one municipality mobilized to protest against irregularities in the program in front of the city council. In many cases, mothers have got together to help in UJAs, for example, by cooking for students. Finally, communities in general have also mobilized to fight irregularities in PETI as in the case of a city where 600 people gathered in front of the city council.

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46 With the transition of PETI' management from SETRAS to SEDES, some new people in the government have defended the idea of stop paying for the monitors’ wages. Some of them also defend the idea of hiring new monitors through state examinations (concursos). MOC fears that if SEDES stops paying for their wages, municipal governments will not be able to assume that tasks and almost 3,000 people will lose their jobs. Also, if SEDES hires monitors from outside the region, there is the risk that new monitors will not have a complete understanding of the importance of making students feel proud of their rural roots, so important to the increase of their self-esteem.
to contest the mayor’s interview for a radio station saying that there were no pending payments from the program. PETI has also made municipalities to collaborate. As a result of the adoption of the Baú de Leitura Project, some municipalities are not only circulating baús (boxes) around their schools, but also across municipalities as a collaborative effort among them to increase the numbers of baús to which children have access (MOC, 2008a).

The most interesting social networks created by PETI are, however, informal ones as a result of several actors attending PETI’s meetings. I was able to see those informal networks while I was in the region. For instance, after the end of a workshop with monitors and guests, I shared a cab for two hours with a rural labor union leader, a MOC staff member, and the coordinator of monitors of a municipality. As municipalities are spread out, sharing cars to go to meetings is common among actors from the same municipality or different ones. After another meeting, the head of the department of education shared a car with monitors. In fact, those informal interactions among different actors involved in PETI and CAT also often take place during meetings and workshops promoted by MOC, FATRES or the municipalities. Without a conscious purpose, PETI in the Sisal Region made public sector officials informally interact with monitors, MOC and other actors.

Also, throughout meetings, I was surprised by the fact that the power status of the participants did not affect the way they related. For example, heads of municipal departments of education and social assistance waited for their turn to speak. They listened to monitors and professors and behaved just like the other participants in the meetings. I did not see meetings where there was a feeling of superiority/inferiority coming from the participants due to their political positions. In
fact, all the meetings that I attended were initiated by MOC or by a monitor who performed a story from the Baú de Leitura Project. The fact that monitors and teachers are able to talk in an equal position with the local public officials, even if it is only in the meetings organized by MOC or in the shared rides, is counter evidence to critics that portray the semi-arid region in the permanent status of “submissive population versus corrupt governments” dichotomy.

Finally, not only new social networks were created but also several projects were strengthened by PETI. An example is the Giramundo newspaper, which is produced by a group of young people with the support of MOC and UNICEF. Giramundo, which has a circulation of 10,000 copies, is about PETI and other children related issues. Also born from PETI, MOC has a new program called Child and Teenager Program that aims at increasing awareness of the rights of the youth of the Sisal Region (MOC, 2007b).
5. Conclusion

A very successful implementation of the Brazilian Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) is found in a poor semi-arid region in the State of Bahia, the Sisal Region. PETI in the Sisal Region stands out because several agencies from the three levels of the government as well as international and national non-governmental institutions successfully coordinate tasks to improve PETI’s performance in the region. Essential to the good performance of the program is the participation of a State Agency that took over responsibilities originally assigned to municipalities (the selection of families to participate in the program and the hiring of monitors of the extended day programs). The financial stability that the participation of the State Agency gave PETI enabled the local NGO, MOC, to implement pedagogical approaches in the extended day programs that considerably improved the quality of those programs. With the educational part of PETI taken care of, MOC and local rural unions took a further step and developed projects to assist families of children in the program.

In order to develop those projects, technical and financial support of UNICEF and ILO and private organizations was essential. The Sisal Region’s ability to attract donors is the result of the region’s institutional capacity building that started 40 years ago with the community work of MOC and priests from the Liberation Theology. Throughout the years, several other institutions joined the region’s social network and the fight to end child labor, such as local rural unions and small farmers associations.

As a consequence of the active participation in PETI of the State of Bahia and local civil
organizations, the Sisal Region was one of the only ones that fulfilled the expectations of the Federal Government when it envisioned a project that would take children out of work, give them good education, provide alternative sources of income to their families and increase awareness of society as a whole for the negative impacts of child labor.

In regard to local governments in the Sisal Region, it is hard to talk about them as a whole because they are very heterogeneous within and across themselves. However, despite their different traits, many of them have embraced PETI’s cause not only by providing the necessary support to UJAs but also by buying books with their own funds. They also have the local rural unions as their main watchdogs. Since the beginning of the program, local rural unions have been active in reporting irregularities in the management of the project by municipalities.

To replicate the case of PETI in the Sisal Region is not easy. Many elements present in this case might not be present in most of other poor regions. This case, however, shows the importance of learning from past experiences to build better socio-economic projects. PETI in the Sisal Region benefitted from previous work from MOC, ILO, UNICEF and local unions to fight child labor in the region. Previous to PETI, those institutions made a survey to identify child labor in the region and trained local people to go in the communities to increase awareness about child labor issues. When the Federal University of Bahia (financed by the State Government) conducted the survey to identify families to be included in PETI, the idea of their children not working did not catch families by surprise. When MOC trained monitors to implement a pedagogical approach oriented to the local reality in the extended day programs, it already had experience training professors from local rural schools of the region. Somehow, all PETI’s projects in the region benefitted from
past experiences either from efforts fighting child labor in the region or from projects aimed to improve socio-economic conditions of rural communities.

This case also shows that it is possible to construct development in least expected places. This thesis seeks to reinforce Hirschman’s idea (1967) that development is much more related to good projects than social, political and cultural endowments of a given region:

“This analysis of likely behavior of projects possessed of different structural characteristics inevitably leads one to viewing the development experience of a country as importantly influenced by the kind of projects it finds-or places-in its path. Such a view stresses the importance for development of what a country does and of what it becomes as a result of what it does, and thereby contests the primacy of what it is, that is, of its geography-and history-determined endowment with natural resources, values, institutions, social and political structure, etc” (Hirschman, 1967, p. 5).

PETI in the Sisal Region is the perfect illustration of Hirschman’s words. Forty years ago, the Sisal Region was just like many other poor semi-arid areas without institutions that channeled the voice of the poor, without socio-economic projects oriented to improve life conditions of communities and with the belief that emigration was the only viable solution if locals wanted to make a decent living. As a result of projects like PETI, children of the Sisal Region are not ashamed of their rural origins anymore and monitors and professors are proud of their jobs. With the help of projects mentioned in this thesis, families are learning to earn a living without depending on cash transfers programs or the use of child labor. Most important, I found that many local residents do not wish to leave the region but want to find ways to make a living under the social, economic and environmental conditions that the region offers.
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