REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
ASEAN in a New Perspective

by

Susumu Yamakage

B.A., the University of Tokyo (1972)
M.A., the University of Tokyo (1974)

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April 30, 1982

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Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by
Myron Weiner
Chairman, Departmental Graduate Committee

Archives

13 June 1982
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Abstract

ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) is
an intergovernmental organization for regional cooperation
and integration. Created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, it is currently regarded
as the most successfully operating regional group outside the
industrial world. Like many other regional organizations in
the developing world, ASEAN faces the external and internal
political insecurity, the external economic dependence, the
internal economic vulnerability, divergent nationalisms, etc.
Why has ASEAN exceptionally succeeded?

Contrary to the conventional view of ASEAN, it was
created for mutual security, rather than functional socio-
economic cooperation; it has been active since its creation,
rather than since the 1975 communist victory in Indochina
shocked the region; and it has been governed by the internal
necessity, rather than by the external pressure.

ASEAN's unusual success resulted most fundamentally from
its participants' comprehensive orientation toward not only
economy but also security and community. Starting from their
general but vague commitment, the ASEAN governments gradually
increased their mutual responsiveness to their own need for
cooperation through a flexible use of their informal regional
organization. ASEAN became a vehicle for its participants'
mutual security-seeking combined with their collective
adaptation to a fluid international political and economic
environment.

The experience of ASEAN illustrates that the study of
regional integration in the developing world needs an
alternative perspective to existing theories. The domain of
regional integration should include not only the community-
economy linkage but also the economy-security linkage as well
as the community-security linkage. The theory of regional
organizations should be applicable not only to functional
organizations with specific goals but also to loosely-
structured informal and flexible ones. The collective
adaptation of a group of developing countries may be carried
out through the epigenesis of its organization.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
Title: Professor of Political Science
Acknowledgements

My greatest debt by far is to Hayward R. Alker, Jr. Since I started to study at M.I.T. in 1974, he has been a great teacher in stimulating, criticising and expanding my interests and viewpoints. In recent months, his critical reading of and extensive, and often provocative, suggestions on earlier drafts of this thesis invaluably helped me revise it with respect to both substance and expression. Without his advice, this work would have never taken the shape it does here. Lincoln P. Bloomfield helped widen my perspective on regional security and politics. Nazli Choucri reminded me often that this work could be more than a case study of ASEAN, and that it could make a theoretical and comparative contribution as well. I am deeply grateful to each of the above three professors who composed my thesis committee.

The seven-month writing of this thesis was based on the same number of years of my interest in the subject, an interest stimulated and supported by many others as well. The foremost influence was Karl W. Deutsch. In fact, I had started to learn international relations in Tokyo through his textbook several years before I started to study ASEAN in his seminar at Harvard in 1975. He convinced me that study of ASEAN is critically important. Shin'ichi Ichimura (the then director) of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University provided me with invaluable opportunities to conduct research as a research associate of the center for more than three years, including a one-month visit and a one-year stay in Southeast Asia. I benefited enormously from my association with professors and colleagues at the center, besides Ichimura, political scientist Toru Yano and economist Yasukichi Yasuba (now at Osaka University) in particular. Discussions with Bernard K. Gordon of the University of New Hampshire, both in Kyoto and in Durham, were helpful to me to conceive this work. By luck, Lau Teik Soon of the National University of Singapore and Amado A. Castro of the University of the Philippines attended my thesis colloquium, and their comments were helpful to revise this work.

My research in Southeast Asia was facilitated by generous institutional help in each of the ASEAN countries. In particular, I would like to thank the Board of National Unity in the Prime Minister's Department of Malaysia, the Faculty of Economics and Administration and the Library of the University of Malaya, and the libraries of the National University of Singapore and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. This institutional help was but a part of the broad personal assistance I received from scholars, librarians, government officials, diplomats, journalists, and neighbors, over forty of whom I formally interviewed. I am grateful to them not only for their cooperation but also for their kindness and hospitality.
My research in Southeast Asia was made possible by a grant from the Memorial Fund of the Seventieth Anniversary of Kyoto University and by the Overseas Research Fund of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University. The fellowship from the Japanese Society for Asian Studies partly supported my return to Cambridge to complete this work.

I also thank the faculty of the Department of International Relations at the University of Tokyo. Since I joined them in 1980, they have exhibited the flexibility in reducing my teaching load and in allowing a full-year study leave. I owe much more to them because I spent my undergraduate and postgraduate years in the department. Shinkichi Eto deserves my most profound gratitude. In the midst of the campus dispute in the late 1960's, he taught me the importance of international relations, and since then, he has always generously given me chances to pursue the study of international relations in various forms.

My last, but not least, thanks are to my family. My wife, Airi, and our son, Subaru, who was born in Malaysia during my research there, have been with me ever since I started this work. They shared my anxiety, frustration and recreation with me in Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States. My cheerful wife and my jolly (although I must confess sometimes annoying) son always reminded me that I was not living for this work alone. I am sure they are as happy as I am to complete this work.

Susumu Yamakage
April 1982
Cambridge, Massachusetts
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ASEAN Brussells Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCRRIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochina States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Arab Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Asian Clearing Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGC</td>
<td>ASEAN Geneva Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALADI</td>
<td>Latin American Association of Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMDA</td>
<td>Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOM</td>
<td>Andean Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANRPC</td>
<td>Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>ASEAN Council of Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEANTTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Tours and Travel Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-CCI</td>
<td>Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPAC</td>
<td>Asian and Pacific Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACM</td>
<td>Central American Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community/Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFTA</td>
<td>Caribbean Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Council of Entente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>West African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCM</td>
<td>Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EACSO</td>
<td>East African Common Service Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAFE</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Committee for Asia and Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASC</td>
<td>Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEFC</td>
<td>Far East Freight Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>Latin American Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODECA</td>
<td>Organization of Central American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECA</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCAN</td>
<td>Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAARC</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>South Pacific Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDE</td>
<td>Equatorial Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Central African Customs and Economic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAO</td>
<td>Customs Union of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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The ASEAN Region in the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>ASEAN total</th>
<th>% in South-</th>
<th>% in the Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land area (1980)</td>
<td>3,048.7x10^3 km^2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>2.2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,177.1x10^3 mi^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (1979)</td>
<td>258.0 billion</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>6.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product (1978)</td>
<td>$104.4 billion</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1976) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (1976)</td>
<td>$26.3 billion</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1976) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (1976)</td>
<td>$26.0 billion</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>2.6 (2)</td>
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<td>Natural rubber export (1975)</td>
<td>1,819 million tons</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>82.9 (3)</td>
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<td>Palm oil export (1975)</td>
<td>820 million tons</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>83.6 (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tin metal export (1975)</td>
<td>110 million tons</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>72.8 (3)</td>
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<td>DAC bilateral ODA (1978)</td>
<td>$926.8 million</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>7.1 (4)</td>
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Note: Southeast Asia includes the five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma.
### A Profile of the ASEAN Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Land area (1,000km²)</th>
<th>Population (1979) in million</th>
<th>Major religious groups (in %)</th>
<th>Largest three ethnic groups (in %)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (1978) in dollars</th>
<th>Imports (1976) in $ million</th>
<th>Largest three partners (in %)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1919.3</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>Moslem 94 (1961)</td>
<td>Javanese 45, Sundanese 14, Madurese 7 (1961)</td>
<td>3490</td>
<td>5673</td>
<td>Japan 26, USA 17, Singapore 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>329.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>Moslem 50 (1971)</td>
<td>Malay 47, Chinese 34, Tagalog 21 (1973)</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>3921</td>
<td>Japan 24, USA 13, Singapore 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Philippin.</td>
<td>300*</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>Christian 85 (1975)</td>
<td>Cebuano 24, Chinese 21, Malay 15 (1977)</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>3950</td>
<td>Japan 22, USA 17, Singapore 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Buddhist 26 (1970)</td>
<td>Malay 7, Indian 5, Hindu 9 (1970)</td>
<td>3490</td>
<td>9067</td>
<td>Japan 27, USA 22, Saudi Arab. 16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>514.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Moslem 6 (1961)</td>
<td>Malay 15, Chinese 18, Moslem 4 (1961)</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>3644</td>
<td>Japan 16, USA 13, Saudi Arab. 8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>the Philippin.</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>Export(1976)</td>
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<td>in $ million</td>
<td>8547</td>
<td>5288</td>
<td>2511</td>
<td>6583</td>
<td>3040</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Largest three</td>
<td>crude oil</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>rubber</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>commodities (in %)</td>
<td>timber</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>timber</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>coconut</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>rubber</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>crude oil</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>copper</td>
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<td></td>
<td>rubber</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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Notes: *rough estimate. **the multiplier of the minimal figure.
Chapter 1. ASEAN and Regional Integration in the Developing World

1.1 Problems of Regional Integration in the Developing World

Regional Integration in the North-South Perspective

The North-South problem is doubtlessly one of the most salient issues in the latter half of this century. Development of the South, the most fundamental aspect of the problem, is not merely a domestic concern by each developing country, but a question of both global and regional politics and economy. In order to enhance individual economic development and to pursue collective self-reliance, economic cooperation and integration at the regional level has been regarded as not only desirable, but practical.

By the early 1960's, regional organizations for economic cooperation and integration had already emerged in Asia and Africa as well as Latin America. In 1970, there were a dozen of such regional organizations in the developing world. The number of organizations continued to increase throughout the 1970's. Although some turned out dissolved or stagnated, there are at least thirteen regional organizations operating in the developing world.

The Success of Earlier Theory in Predicting the Failure of Integrative Practice in the Developing World

Those organizations were created in the hope of over-
coming difficulties which had left developing countries underdeveloped. Despite a great hope, those which accomplished respective goals are—so far very few. A latest comparative study of regional economic integration programs in the developing world was based on the recognition that "most of the integration arrangements in the so-called third world are in a state of crisis, or indeed in disarray."³ If considered desirable, such a regional self-reliance scheme turned out empirically unsuccessful in many occasions.

However, repeated failures of regional economic integration were not unanticipated. Already in the mid 1960's, many unfavorable conditions for regional integration in the developing world were identified.⁴ Even the much criticized original version of neo-functional theory regarded the success of regional economic integration among developing countries as highly unlikely.

Subsequently, based on his investigation of East Africa and Central America, Nye called attention to the difficulty of reconciling the politics of developing countries with the practice of functional integration.⁵ According to original or revised neo-functional theory of regional integration, economic integration would fail in the developing world. In this sense, the neo-functional theory was not falsified by most subsequent experiences.⁶ It has been quite successful in explaining and predicting the failure of regional integration in the developing world.
1.2 ASEAN: a Case of Unusual Success

As a regional organization of developing countries, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in the year when it was pointed out that "many of the general characteristics of politics in less developed countries are difficult to reconcile with quiet functionalism." In the early 1970's that organization was assessed to be at the lowest level of integration among those in the developing world. However, that organization is now, in many eyes, "currently perhaps the most successfully operating regional group outside the industrial world."

ASEAN was established in August 1967 by five countries in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. However, there was no formal treaty or charter to specify the goal, the program or the membership of the organization. The establishment of ASEAN was proclaimed by the declaration of the foreign ministers of the above five countries. Thus, ASEAN's legal foundation was surprisingly informal in comparison with similar organizations in Latin American and in Africa.

Even in the founding declaration, neither specific goals, concrete projects, nor the time table of achievement were specified. Such vagueness of the organizational objective made ASEAN appear a more dubious integrative effort. What was worse, ASEAN neither set up nor announced any plan for the specific machinery of regional integration. The intent to establish functional committees in the future was declared, but
no concrete specification was given. Thus, with respect to such vital aspects as its stated objectives and its organizational basis, ASEAN was obviously inferior to other similar regional organizations in the developing world, not to mention EEC.

Moreover, the politico-security factor prevented ASEAN from looking genuine. For all the five countries of ASEAN were anti-communist, pro-Western, and deeply concerned with common external threats. External threats could make the ASEAN countries cohesive temporarily, but internal integrative forces were regarded to be negligible if not absent.

Since its creation, the association has experienced considerable changes in its activities as well as in its organizational structure. Such changes will be thoroughly delineated later in this work, but a short concise summary will be helpful at this point. The following quotation typically represents the capsule assessment of ASEAN.

ASEAN's progress toward closer economic cooperation during the organization's first eight years (1967-75) was disappointing. ASEAN activities during this period emphasized the numerous differences between the five members, and most analyses of ASEAN's integration efforts pointed to the countless obstacles likely to stymie any attempt to achieve the integration goal. Prompted by the communist takeovers in Indochina plus the 1974-75 world economic recession, however, the pace of ASEAN integration accelerated encouragingly during the last three years. These external economic and political threats do not guarantee a sustained drive to integration. Should ASEAN's relations with its communist neighbors improve, dissipating the five members' fears of communist aggression, and should the world economy steadily recover, ASEAN may lose the motivation to maintain its current drive. Even if the motivation can be sustained, the problems that have plagued practically every other regional integration movement - economic
nationalism, divergent interests, and conflicting goals - threaten to reduce ASEAN integration efforts to little more than rhetoric and a plethora of committees, experts groups, subcommittees, and working groups.

In the above quoted paragraph, all the salient factors that explain the nature of ASEAN are mentioned. In short, the salient factors widely regarded to have influenced ASEAN and its members are as follows:
1. The external political threat,
2. the external economic threat, and
3. the internal divergence of interests.

As long as the first and second factors are strong enough to cancel out the last factor, the above quotation suggests, ASEAN may continue to pursue integration programs.

Those factors are, in a sense, descriptions of the situation which the ASEAN countries are still faced with, and in which ASEAN is now operating. Namely, the ASEAN countries are anti-communist, and hence they feel threatened by the neighbor region of Indochina. ASEAN economies are highly dependent on world market conditions because of their export concentration on one of a few primary goods. Finally, partly due to the problems of statecraft associated with their somewhat artificial colonial boundaries, and partly due to more common problems of nation-building, differences of interests among the member countries were difficult to harmonize.
1.3. ASEAN's Widespread Image and Need for its Reexamination

A Convergent View of ASEAN from Divergent Viewpoints

As may have been realized, the above three categories of formative influences are partly a reflection of the division of labor, so to speak, in the study of international relations. The first category - external political threats - has been studied mainly by those political scientists who have the traditional view of the political realm, or the classical theory concerning the national interest, military strategy and security. Soon after the creation of ASEAN, the common anti-communist stance of the member governments was pointed out as a source of their cohesion.\textsuperscript{14} The ASEAN region's peculiar position in the global strategic triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union and China was extensively discussed in relation to the ASEAN countries' attempt to adapt changing international environment.\textsuperscript{15} As for the achievement of ASEAN, many believed that politico-security cooperation among the ASEAN countries was by far the most significant.\textsuperscript{16}

The second category of problems ASEAN has been faced with - external economic threats - suggests the field of international political economy. The economic dependence of developing countries upon developed ones is an oft-told story. As for the ASEAN countries' economies, "one could gain considerable insight into the external operations of these economies by simply viewing them without the 'dependency framework':"\textsuperscript{17} Although dominant partners have changed since the 1950's, the ASEAN countries have invariably depended on Western industrial
countries. The activities of ASEAN to cope with economic dependence began to draw scholarly attention recently.

Finally, the third category - internal divergence of interests - has been studied by students of regional integration and interdependence. As a regional economic organization, ASEAN was treated very lightly in a comparative perspective. As a region, the ASEAN countries had not revealed evidence of increasing interdependence until the beginning 1970's. While "policy externalization" was pointed out, many expressed pessimism about the possibility of regional community-building.

Thus, the regional problems of the ASEAN countries have been studied from different perspectives. Nevertheless, those preceding studies have produced convergent almost identical assessments of the organization. Namely, ASEAN was created as an organization for primarily functional cooperation. Interestingly, those who argue for the importance of ASEAN's politico-security aspects share such a viewpoint. Another prevailing view of ASEAN is that the organization had been inactive since its creation, and that communist victory in Indochina in 1975 had so strong an impact on it as to activate it. Another popular view of the nature of ASEAN is that the organization's first summit meeting in 1976, which was in response to the emergence of communist Indochina, redefined ASEAN as a political as well as socio-economically functional organization. Although there were some dissenting views, the abovementioned assessment of ASEAN during its first decade has become substantially a consensus among students of South-
east Asian affairs. Consequently, such experts' views have been widely accepted by non-specialists. 27 Cooperation among the ASEAN countries in the last few years has been obviously much more wide-ranging than the sporadic cooperation of ten years before. ASEAN's conspicuous activities have begun to call attention to its regional integration possibilities. 28 Once the majority opinion, a pessimistic view ruling out such possibilities has lost its persuasiveness. 29 Under such circumstances, it is little wonder that scholarly interests in ASEAN have grown rapidly.

Need for the Reexamination of ASEAN

In August 1982, ASEAN will be fifteen years old. It was quite recently, at most six years ago, that ASEAN began to evoke scholarly interests outside the domain of a few South-east Asian regional specialists. However, since then, the attention to ASEAN has been increasing rapidly. It is largely focused on current affairs, such as the treatment of boat people from Vietnam, the insecurities caused by the Cambodian civil war, on-going trade liberalization, Japanese sponsored industrial projects, etc. 30

The increasing interests in ASEAN's current activities, both political and economic, are by and large based on the background knowledge of ASEAN provided by the abovementioned widespread image of the first decade of the organization. However, that image suffers from severe shortcomings. Specifically, it cannot explain the dynamic process of ASEAN's development satisfactorily. For instance, why could ASEAN
have been able to survive if it was inactive? Why could an inactive ASEAN have been so dramatically activated as to start immediately a number of substantial cooperation efforts? If the widely accepted image of ASEAN's experience in the first decade, then the understanding of its current performance based on that image may also turn out to be incorrect. It is definitely necessary to reexamine ASEAN's history with care.

ASEAN was full of political and economic conditions unfavorable for regional integration. Nonetheless, its started integrating, and is so far remarkably successful. It is of course too hasty to conclude at this point that the success of ASEAN means the failure of the neo-functional theory. It can be said, however, that ASEAN needs to be for better understanding and reconsideration of regional integration theory as well as ASEAN in itself.

1.4 The Theoretical and Comparative Significance of the Experience of ASEAN

That ASEAN's image was distorted is not unrelated to the epistemological shortcoming of the study of regional organizations and regional integration. The experience of ASEAN strongly suggests that the three major problems pointed out in Section 1.2 are interrelated with one another. Nevertheless, an epistemological division of labor has caused many scholars and commentators to make analytically divided assessments of ASEAN. The employment of one of the three theoretical frameworks discussed in the last section is insufficient to understand ASEAN
in its entirety. In order to understand ASEAN holistically, one needs intimate interfaces among those three distinctive frameworks of analysis.

In short, the comprehensive study of ASEAN require a new comprehensive perspective of regional integration that contains those three existing analytical frameworks as its parts. Such an alternative perspective will shed light on the reality of ASEAN holistically.

The problems with which the ASEAN countries are faced, namely (1) regional security from external threat, (2) economic development vis-a-vis external dependence, and (3) community building despite internal conflict, are not the idiosyncracies for the ASEAN region, but more or less shared by other developing regions. The strategies which the ASEAN countries are taking, namely (1) mutual collaboration in security issues, (2) collective bargaining action against the developed world, and (3) regional economic integration, are not ASEAN's peculiarity either. Those rationales are in fact adopted, or are regarded to be desirable by most of the developing countries. But why do they work so well in the case of ASEAN, and not in others?

It is doubtlessly true that one can learn much from experiences of failure. One can draw many lessons by examining cases that result in failure. Unfortunately, it seems also true that lessons from failure tend to be negative heuristics rather than positive ones. The examination of rarer successful cases such as ASEAN to date should be at least as important as, and probably more important for other developing regions.
than, the examination of failed cases. The study of ASEAN should delineate the conditions and processes that would lead integration efforts to successful consequences.

As elaborated in Chapter 2, an alternative perspective of regional integration proposed in this study has two aspects. One is the comprehensive domain of regional integration on which a group of countries defines goals, and create and operate its regional organization. The other aspect is the characteristics of the organization that directly carries out integration programs. This perspective is constructed generally enough to be applicable not only to ASEAN but to other regional organizations for regional cooperation and integration.

From the alternative perspective, ASEAN will be analyzed in Chapter 3 through 6 with respect to ASEAN's formation process, its organizational transformations, its changing performance, and its limits and contributions to regional integration. While rectifying the conventional view of ASEAN, this study reveals the comprehensive orientation toward regional integration shared by the ASEAN countries and the multi-faceted development of the organization.

Finally, in Chapter 7, the study of ASEAN is generalized, and the perspective applied in this work is assessed in comparison with other integrative attempts as well as existing theories of regional integration. Thus, this work is aimed at reconstructing regional integration theory so as to be better applicable to the developing world on the one hand, and at studying ASEAN's exemplary case retrospectively on the other.
Notes for Chapter 1

1. In Asia, there was the Association of Southeast Asia---ASA---(established in 1961); in Africa, the Equatorial Customs Union---UDE---(1959), the Council of Entente---CE---(1959), and the Customs Union of West African States---UDEAO---(1959); in Latin America, the Latin American Free Trade Association---LAFTA---(1961), and the Central American Common Market---CACM---(1961).

2. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asain Clearance Union (ACU); in Africa, CE, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) succeeding UDE, the West African Economic Community (CEAO) succeeding UDEAO, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); in Latin American, the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI) succeeding LAFTA, CACM, and the Andean Common Market (ANCOM); in the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Caribbean Community/Common Market (CARICOM) and the South Pacific Forum (SPF). Dissolved or defunct organizations include the East African Community (EAC), the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and the Arab Common Market (ACM).

3. (Pañaherrera 1978: 73.)

4. (Haas and Schmitter 1964)

5. (Nye 1966; 1967; 1971)

6. (Haas 1971)

7. (Nye 1967)

8. (Sidjanski 1974)


10. The aforementioned Pañaherrera (1978) did not include ASEAN in his comparative study for the reason that it was not based on the treaty for economic integration.

11. According to the neofunctional theory of regional integration, an important condition for the success in integration is the strong authority legally granted to its central institutions (Haas 1958; 1968).

12. Early defense burdens and security concerns often result in the failure of integration efforts (Deutsch et al. 1957).

13. (Business International 1979:1)
14. (Pollard 1970)


16. (Shee 1977; Wanandi 1977; Mansback 1978; Fifield 1979; etc.)

17. (Wong 1979: 14)

18. (Yamakage 1977a)

19. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Arndt and Gardaut 1979)

20. (Sidjanski 1974)

21. (Yamakage 1977b; Hill 1978.) Attempting to extract common components of interdependence among East Asian, South-east Asian, and Oceanic countries, (Kegly and Howell 1975) is not quite relevant to the discussion on the interdependence of the ASEAN region.

22. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Arndt and Garnaut 1979)

23. (Enloe 1977; Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; etc.)

24. (Leifer 1972; Shee 1977; Fifield 1979; etc.)

25. (Jorgensen-Dahl 1976; Shee 1977; Fifield 1979; etc.)

26. (Shee 1977; Jorgensen-Dahl 1978; Fifield 1979; etc.)

27. Noteworthy exceptions include(Solidum 1974) which emphasized the possibility of community formation,(Gordon 1966; 1969) which spelled out internal forces for integration, and(Leu 1976) which ruled out the anti-communist stance as the source of regional cohesion.

28. Among recent works, (Michael Haas 1979) is most directly related to this trend.

29. (Leifer 1978; Boyd 1980: 220-223)

30. See each issue of Asia-Pacific Community, the journal that deals most with ASEAN. There are several articles on ASEAN in each issue. Also, the Social Science Citation Index provides information on what are discussed in the scholarly world.

31. Recently, the study of regional integration regained some scholarly interests such as'(Duffy and Feld 1980) and Puchala 1981). This work is another attempt to reconstruct regional integration theory in the course of the study of ASEAN.
Chapter 2. A New Perspective on Regional Integration

2.1 Beyond Existing Theories of Regional Integration

Regional economic cooperation and integration among developing countries most of which were not successful, have been studied mainly from the perspective of neo-functional integration theory. Such integration schemes as CACM, LAFTA, ANCOM, CARIFTA-CARICOM in the Western Hemisphere, and as CEA0, UDE-UDEAC, EACSO-EAC, ACM, RCD in Asia and Africa were examined in the form of both case study and comparative study.

As a result of criticism from outside as well as inside that paradigm, neo-functional theory has experienced considerable modifications. Efforts to revise the theory in order to better fit the developing world eventually led to the inclusion of many political and economic factors found to impair quasi-automatic integration processes. They also took seriously the literature on the political economy of dependence and the need to de-link regional development from dependence.

The linkage between inward-looking regional economic integration and outward-looking dependence rectification was an important theoretical step. Attention to factors impeding, rather than promoting integration, viz., a number of political, economic and social problems which most of developing countries are suffering from, was important too. In this sense, the theory of integration became more realistic.

However, there is still a missing link between the theory and regional security. ASEAN's success story cannot
be told without serious attention to regional security matters. Immediately, those who are familiar with the scholarly controversy between integration theorists and so-called political realists may quite appropriately ask whether the reconciliation of regional integration and collective security seeking is possible at all. If possible, which is the case to be argued in this work, regional integration theory may need again to be reconstructed.

Originally, neofunctional theory paid much attention to the central authorities of intergovernmental or supranationality nor technocratic incrementalism were found to guarantee integrative spill-overs. The revision of theory was directed toward the focus on the political process of inter-participant bargaining.

Another departure, in this work, from existing theories concerns the role of international organizations. Regional integration efforts which I am concerned with are not a mere process of (dis-) integration, but the directional collective behavior. They are being carried out by some form of international organization. It should be taken seriously again. In the case of ASEAN, there has been no substantial central bureaucracy, not to mention supranational authorities. Moreover, the organization seems the arena of the Lindberg type of collective decision-making process. In the needed perspective of regional integration, the organizational viewpoint and the intergovernmental policies viewpoint should be combined together, rather than contrasted.

Figure 2.1 schematically summarizes the change of
The Original Version of Neofunctional Theory (the late 1950's - the mid 1960's)
"semi-automatic spill-over of integration incremented by supranational authorities"

- Internality irreversibility
- Externality reversibility

- Dependence upon external economic conditions
- Integration vis-à-vis external environment (externalization)

- Political intergovernmental bargaining which does not guarantee integration process

**Criticism and self-criticism**

The Revised Versions of Neofunctional Theory (the late 1960's - the late 1970's)
"internally and externally dependent (dis-)integration process of inter-participant politics"

- The Deutshean Social Communication Theory
- Security communication responsive/adaptive efforts and orientation organization as a vehicle of integration

**Criticism and synthesis in this work**

An Alternative Perspective on Regional Integration (proposed in this work)
"integration efforts responsive/adaptive to extra- and intra-regional economic, security and community issues carried out by the organization governed by participants' mutual communications"

Figure 2.1. The Pedigree of Regional Integration Theory
major theses from earlier neofunctional theory to the perspective to be developed in this chapter.

2.2 The Complex of Community, Economy and Security: the Domain of Regional Integration

Three Basic Orientations

Regional integration can be described as process or condition or both.\textsuperscript{10} And one can ask on the phenomenon, how high (or low), and how fast (or slow). However, it does not necessarily take place as functional economic integration in the beginning, and as political unification ultimately. Therefore, most fundamentally and most importantly, one has to ask whither.

Integration attempts or efforts imply the consciousness of direction. If failed, such a behavior pursues a certain goal defined in advance. Therefore, the intended direction of regional integration depends upon the goal setting. The orientation of integration is thus contingent. With particular respect to the integration attempts in the developing world, three basic orientations should be concerned. They are community, economy and security.\textsuperscript{11}

First of all, the community is, in a purely abstract sense, the group of people(s) who understand each other through communication among themselves.\textsuperscript{12} People(s) who belong to, or who think they do, a certain community share common identities as a core of the sense of belonging. The community is not only based on such a symbolic bond among
people(s). It is also characterized by a certain way of life. The orientation toward the creation of a community means, deliberatively or not, the creation and renewal of common identities and a certain way of life to be shared by the people(s) in question.

Such a group of people(s) typically interact among themselves for the betterment of their living conditions. They produce and consume goods and service; they exploit and spend resources. They also transact with people(s) outside the group for the same purpose. In general, those activities constitute an economy. When an economy is based on a common foundation of transactions, it can be distinguished from other groups outside of it by a certain boundary. As a unit, a regional economy is sometimes called a common market. The orientation toward the creation, renewal and expansion of a regional economy involves, therefore, the common foundation of transactions, e.g. trade liberalization within the group, common tariff against people(s) outside, common currency, etc. This orientation can be directed by some form of synoptic rationality, or by decentralized cost-benefit calculation of alternatives.

Both community and economy need to be defended from fundamental disturbances of any kind. In other words, they need security: the sense of safety and the promise of well-being when security is pursued collectively among the group of people(s) in question, the typical procedure involves defense against people(s) outside the group. It is directed toward a common enemy, whether actual or potential. Such
external defense, presumably linked with military arrange-
ment, is not the only form of the orientation toward security. Security can be enhanced mutually be the avoidance of heavily coercive means of conflict resolution within the group. It may be also enhanced by the invulnerability of the group against economic disruptions. In other words, threats to security may exist internally as well as externally, and economically as well as politically. This point is especially important to the analysis of the developing world. For security problems in developing countries often involve internal threats to political legitimacy, insurgency, economic underdevelopment, and other internally-rooted factors. Thinking of security as identical with external defense is at most a useful fiction for the developed world.

The group of people(s) can pursue one of three goals without being based on or pursuing the other two. In practice, however, some combination of the three basic orientations is often set up as the goal of regional integration. Communal identities can be built up around economic bases or military safeguards. The former can in turn help constitute the latter.

As the three primary colors can generate the infinite variety of colors, the three basic integrative orientations can generate the innumerable types of integration programs. Analytically, a certain integration program can be located somewhere on the spectrum whose extreme ends correspond to a particular combination of three basic orientations. The spectrum may be community——economy, economy——security,
or security—community. Although a general theoretical spectrum is not identical with a specific literature of integration studies or a specific group of developing countries, it may be related to the existing literature of international relations studies. Certainly, it is helpful to connect the theoretical spectrum with both exemplary programs and the literature.

The Combined Orientations (1): Community—Economy

Regional integration attempts are particularly conspicuous along with the spectrum of community—economy. In fact, most, if not all, of the literature that refers to regional integration fall onto some points on this spectrum.

Regional community-building is materialized by the changing pattern of socio-economic and political transaction and communication among people(s) in question. It is the central concern of the social communication/control approach pioneered by Deutsch (1953: 1954) with his associates (1957). This cybernetic theory of integration primarily deals with the emergence and maintenance of security-community of people(s). Because few regional integration schemes pursue political unification, or the amalgamation of states, in the contemporary world, the notion of the pluralistic security-community is more widely applicable than the amalgamated counterpart. A pluralistic security-community is subtler to create and easy to maintain, whose conditions depend largely on inter-governmental relations. High volume transactions are not
necessary conditions for its creation. The creation of regional economy, the other end of the spectrum, involves the abolition of barriers of economic transactions across national borders. Economic integration means the involvement of people(s) in the common foundation of transactions. Governmental measures to promote integration allow each countries' market economy to perform more freely and actively within the region. The theory of economic integration concerns, therefore, the maximization of economic gains, the highest of which is often development for developing countries, at the regional level. Governments in the region are expected to reduce intra-regional discrimination, and to regulate respective economies individually and regional economy collectively for better performance. In order to enhance economic integration, governments and people(s) have only to agree to follow economic rationality. Theoretically, the existence of community in advance is not the necessary condition for the creation of economy.

However, in practice, the creation of a cohesive community and that of a common economy are often pursued together. As the phrase, socio-economic integration, suggests, community formation and economic integration are closely correlated. At least for developed capitalist countries, the bridge between economic integration and community building is sometimes constructed. It is thoroughly delineated by the neofunctional theory of regional integration. The theory's kernal, the concept of spill-over, can be interpreted as a semi-automatic mechanism for shift from the orientation
toward economy to that toward community.

The mechanism did not work for developing countries.\textsuperscript{21} It was also challenged even in Western European experience.\textsuperscript{22} In the course of midification, the theory began to emphasize positive and negative contributions of external factors as well as internal political obstacles.\textsuperscript{23} The original emphasis on inward-looking integration changed to more outward-looking externalization.\textsuperscript{24} Originally aimed to explain the political community building with economic bases, the neofunctional theory was revised continuously until it came to negate the original premise.

**The Combined Orientations (2): Economy—Security**

The continuum between economy and security may seem irrelevant in the study of regional integration, but it corresponds to a number of practices as will be delineated below.\textsuperscript{25}

First of all, it should be recalled that the objective of economic integration among developing countries typically is not trade expansion per se, but the development of individual economy. The creation of regional economy is not the government's response to private sector's demands to larger economy, but their initiatives for economic development, including industrialization. Economic integration in the developing world is connected primarily with economic development problems.\textsuperscript{26}

In the above context, economic integration is closely related to the secure expectation of future well-being of
people(s), i.e., security vis-à-vis the prospect of continued or future economic disaster or marginalization. Here we find quite different connotations than those of the previous discussion of the spectrum of community—economy. Economic integration and development is a security concern for most of developing countries.

The need for development is synonymous with the overcoming of underdevelopment. Because underdevelopment is regarded as the result of the past colonial rule that imposed monoculture economy, and of the current dependence upon and vulnerability vis-à-vis economic performance in the developed world, economic development cannot be separate from the world economy. In fact, as opposed to individual plannings for economic development, regional strategy is often adopted. Such concepts as collective economic security and collective self-reliance are the thematic mixture of the orientation toward economy and that toward security. Regional integration aiming to reduce dependence and vulnerability has practical meanings for developing countries. In this regard, it is worth noting that neofunctional theory transformed itself into a theory deeply concerning collective action and self-reliance.

Approaching further to the extreme of security or external defense, one must realize that the issue of anti-imperialism is coming up. Threats to the economic security for the group of people(s) particularly in the developing world is called variously such as imperialism, economic imperialism, neo-colonialism, etc. The essence of threats is the domination
by the developed world, not only by those governments but also by those capitals. Towards the extreme of security, the vocabulary and rhetoric becomes all-the-more political so as to refer to independence, sovereignty, puppet government, revolution, and so on.

Above discussions on the spectrum of economy—security has been devoted to the developing world and its relations with the developed world. However moderate in the expression, the analogous discussion can be applied to the developed world. Here the issue is the recently politicized problem of interdependence. Its significance is perceived as undesirable sensitivity and vulnerability of the group of people(s) vis-à-vis the outside environment. Coordination among developed countries as illustrated by regularized summit meetings is another manifest testimony of international relations concerned with the spectrum of economy—security.

The Combined Orientations (3): Security—Community

The central theme along with the spectrum of security—community is conflict control, or more precisely, the attempts to control conflict, externally as well as internally. The long established practice of such an attempt is military alliance formation among states. In the traditional balance of power system, it was believed to be the most important scheme to prevent attack and to take advantage of power and security enhancement possibilities. Because foreign threats are contingent in nature, the effect of alliance is necessarily
contingent too. In the context of regional integration, the foreign threat and the alliance against it have temporary impact at best, and sometimes work disintegratively.\textsuperscript{32}

Integrative orientation toward security necessitates more permanent forms of collaboration for security-seeking. The collective defense arrangement that emerged after World War II suffice that condition. Like alliance, collective defense arrangement is directed against the threat from outside the region, whether actual or potential, whether present or future. But it involves regular collaboration among the participant governments and military forces.\textsuperscript{33}

Another form of collective defense is the anti-guerilla joint operation arrangement. It may be irregular, but is certainly important for the government of developing countries. In this case, the external threat exists within the region. When governments in the region are faced with anti-governmental forces, they may mutually collaborate to cope with such disturbances. The neutralization at the regional level may be included in the category of orientation toward security. Although it is in non-military terms, it may be assured by major powers' commitment to non-intervention and the prevention of attack by other states.

Closer to the community end of the spectrum is collective security arrangement. It seeks broader security than that against external threats which is sought by collective defense arrangement. It prepares against both external and internal threats. As expected in the United Nations Charter, conflict control through collective security arrangements
includes the possibility of sanctions directed to any member country.\textsuperscript{34}

Although the collective security arrangement in the sense of the United Nations Charter is primarily based on the military principle to sanction "aggressor" members, orientation toward regional integration may be also directed to the pacific settlement of conflict before it escalates to military hostilities. The pacific settlement of internal conflicts and the military defense against external threats are certainly compatible. In fact, there are some instances in the developing world.\textsuperscript{35}

Compared with collective defense, the pacific settlement of internal conflicts is inward-looking and mutually attentive. It requires the higher degree of mutual understanding. Now the starting point: orientation toward community. Conflict management without resort of large scale violence such as war is the core concept of security-community.\textsuperscript{36} The sense of mutual security is the expectation of peaceful conflict resolution within the group of people(s). The expectation should be based on past experience and present likeliness. In order to create and maintain an internally secure community, the institutionalization of "peaceful change" is necessary.

The Domain of Regional Integration: an Overview

Three basic orientations and their combined orientations constitute the domain of regional integration. The practice, goal and possibility of regional integration can be identified on the domain. With respect to the entity in which
Figure 2.2. The Domain of Regional Integration and Some Examples of Orientation
integration is conceived, pursued or attained, the domain may be divided into three sub-domains: within a participant country, within a group of countries/people(s), and outside the group. With this geographical distiction, the entire domain of regional integration is charted in Figure 2.2. The three basic orientations extend, in the Figure, to three different directions. Various combined orientations are located in between. The closer to either axis of the basic orientations is a certain combined orientation, the more conspicuously does it include the component of the closer basic orientation. The location of concrete integrative programs is approximate. This schematization recapitulates many of the themes, i.e., interests, concerns, goals, practices, or possibilities, that are the focus of our concern with regional integration.

2.3 The Organization: a Vehicle of Regional Organization

Integrative processes may take place without formal organization. However, much of the contemporary practice of regional integration we have been observing since World War II has been facilitated by inter- or supra-national organization. Based on fundamental agreements among the participants, the organization plays an important role as a vehicle for regional integration. In analyzing the regional integration attempts, no matter if successful or failed, its organizational framework cannot be ignored.37

On the other hand, political processes taking place among the countries participating in the organization can neither be
ignored. In fact, except for the supranational body with a strong central authority and capability, the collectivity of the participant countries can control their organization. The needed perspective on regional integration is to treat the organization in the framework of the inter-participant relationship. In this sense, the central question is who steers it in what way, for what?

The Power Structure

Who steers the organization? On the international scene, it hardly happens that either the central machinery or the few privileged participants control the rest. Usually, the participant countries want to, and in most cases do, control their organization. They are also reluctant to be controlled. It is particularly so for new developing countries which are very sensitive to sovereignty. And we are going to study an organization consisting of new states.

In analyzing an organization's power structure, the notion of the collective decision-making system is helpful. Although different in context, the Lasswell-Lindberg postulate of decision states (Lindber 1971) provides a classificatory criterion of international organizations. Problem recognition is the prerequisite of decision. Both the problem recognition and decision stages are, in turn, prerequisites of application. Thus, these three distinctive stages of a decision-making process take the shape of an hierarchical order.

The lowest of hierarchy is the non-existence of organi-
zation. Under this circumstance, countries communicate and interact with one another at their own discretion. Such a situation can be called "unstructured diplomacy."

An organization being assumed to exist, the lowest level of its activities is merely information transmission. The participant countries may mutually consult so as to define and expand the collective problem-recognition. They may exchange their views on and may discuss on intra- and/or extra- regional issues. However, in this type of organization, they will not make any decisions collectively.

The organization with decision-making function is the second level. Based on the collective problem recognition, the participant countries commit themselves to making collective decisions in the framework of their organization. Decisions may be expressed in various forms such as treaty, agreement, resolution, declaration, etc. This type of organization can thus produce decision, but cannot materialize them. The participant countries are still in charge of implementation.

Once the participants agree to collectively implement their decisions, it becomes a unit of action. Within the regional scene, the organization performs some tasks independently of its participants. Externally, it provides its members with a unit for collective actions vis-à-vis third parties. Even at this level, the participants are still in control of organizational performance. In this sense, the organization is the agent rather than the actor.

Up to the above third level, the organization is fully
controlled by its participants. If it is facilitated with some form of central machinery, this is not provided with any autonomous power to control it. As ASEAN has illustrated, integration efforts can be taken, and concrete measure can be carried out at this level or even below.

In neofunctional theory, both earlier and later, the lack of central authority was one of the important obstacles to regional integration. Inter-participant political processes were later emphasized to explain the failure of integration. It is important to recall that such processes taking place in the framework of organization can successfully carry out integrative efforts without substantial central authority.

If our purpose is only the analysis of ASEAN, then the above classification is sufficient. However, many intergovernmental organizations have their central machinery. Supranational organizations have it by definition. Because such types of organizations are engaged in regional integration efforts, it must be useful to expand further the classificatory hierarchical order of international organization.

From the viewpoint of the power relationship between the organization and its participants, the supranational organization can be typologized in terms of the internalization of power. Although it can take place before the organization becomes able to perform its actions, such cases are indeed rare. Therefore, it can be said that the organization acquires the capability of controlling performance by and large after the capability of its performance. In other words, the types of supranational organization come above the hierarchical
order of the aforementioned three types of intergovernmental organization.

It is also important to distinguish two types of power: power to control itself, and power to control its participants. Because the latter necessitates the former, they take the shape of an hierarchical order, too.

Thus, the fourth level of organization carries out its tasks assigned by its participants, but it has the power of controlling itself. In may not be independent of its participants, but it is autonomous at this level. It can act in international scene not as the collectivity of its participants, but as a genuine actor distinguishable from them. As the organization begins to internalize power, its participants begin to lose their collective power to control it.

At the fifth level, the organization can control not only itself but also its participants. Its performance has an element of sanction and enforcement vis-à-vis them. In other words, they start losing their power of self-control, i.e., their own individual autonomy. Now, the supranationality of organization is conspicuous.

Finally, the participants abandon their status as the sovereign state. Their organization represents them in the international arena. As individuals and corporations can, the participants can act internationally. But they are compared to the local government while their organization is to the sovereign state. According to the Deutshean terminology, the amalgamation took place although the process was not the direct merger of sovereign states, but the transfer of power
Table 2.1  A Hierarchical Typology of International Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Level of Organization</th>
<th>Participant's Point of View</th>
<th>Organization's Point of View</th>
<th>Nomenclature of Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>New identity with the collectivity</td>
<td>Externally recognized self-governing entity</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gaining new collectivity at the expense of independence</td>
<td>Capable of sanctioning and controlling participants</td>
<td>Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Losing control of organization</td>
<td>Acquisition of self-control</td>
<td>Autonomy (Self-government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The internalization of power begins to take place in the organization above this level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Collective action on common problems</td>
<td>Capable of unified action on the agreed problem</td>
<td>Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Collective decision-making on the common problem</td>
<td>Decision-making as the aggregate of participants' standpoints</td>
<td>Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mutual consultation on the common problem</td>
<td>Information transmission between participants</td>
<td>Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Discretion based on sovereignty</td>
<td>Non-existence</td>
<td>Emptiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from the participant governments to their supranational organization.

The six forms of international organization briefly spelled out above can be hierarchically summarized as shown in Table 2.1. In analyzing ASEAN, we will be concerned with the lower three levels.

Operational Code

In what way is the organization steered? In particular, what is the mode of collective decision-making? What is the conflict resolution procedure that is normatively accepted and actually applied? This was treated in the literature of neo-functional theory, from the pioneer Haas (1964) to the revisionist Lindberg (1971), as one of the indicators of integration level. Among the alternative modes of the interplay between the participants, at some times including the central machinery, according to the theory, there is a mode suitable to integration process.41 Their thesis implies that for a successful integration the integrative mode of decision-making should be adopted. But the adoption of it neither guarantee the success nor is desirable in all the cases.

The imposition of collective decision-making is, even the stage of common problem-recognition, the burden for the participants. Their individual commitment to integrative efforts means commitment to bear the burden. Needless to say, the weight of the burden depends on the mode of collective decision-making. The simplest mode of it, i.e., diplomatic
negotiation, must be least burdensome. The independent state is assumed to bear this burden.

With special reference to the developing world, our major theoretical concern is to find a way, if any, that makes possible to carry out integrative efforts successfully within the limit of the tolerable burden for each participant country. In other words, how can the interplay of the participants that may not be highly integrated produce the decisions that will lead them to further integration in other respects? Empirically, the case of ASEAN is quite appropriate to analyse because its integrative success resulted from exclusively inter-governmental bargaining mode of collective decision-making.

Why, as in ASEAN, was the least promising mode of collective decision-making able to promote integration in the region? What was wrong in the theoretical argument of neofunctional theory? In some cases, ordinary diplomatic negotiation governed by a rule of consensus may be the only alternative acceptable to all. How can it realize regional integration?

The more integrative the mode becomes, the heavier the burden on the participant. Therefore, in general, the participant government hesitates to commit itself to more integrative modes of collective decision-making. Nevertheless, its burden may be bearable if it brings in comparable or exceeding rewards, in other respects. When they create a supranational organization, its participant governments individually accept the burden which it will impose on them, i.e., the consent to obey its sanctions.
However, new states in the developing world are particularly sensitive to retain independence and sovereignty, and consequently they are reluctant to bear the burden of collective decision-making. Hoping to obtain rewards from regional integration, developing countries ambitiously attempted to stand its burden. Many integrative schemes failed because each one contained at least one participant that could not afford to bear the burden, and the others were not prepared to share it.44

Contrary to the neo-functionalist argument, compromise on the basis of the greatest common divisor can work well to enhance integration.45 This is more or less the egalitarian mode of consensus-building. In another respect, it is the unit veto system of collective decision-making. For if one participant strongly objects to a certain point, it will never be adopted. Based on this rule, the participants finally compromise with one another with a minimal commitment to joint operations on each point in question.

Admittedly, this mode of collective decision-making has shortcomings vis-à-vis smooth and efficient integration.46 Nonetheless, it contains elements favorable to regional integration. And they are particularly important to the integrative efforts taken by developing countries.

First of all, countries do not have to fear the infringement of their respective sovereignty by other participants of the organization. It is relatively easy for them to participate in it. The practical right of veto diminishes, if not completely wipes out, the fear of being dominated by other
participants. Hence, the strong objection to integrative efforts is unlikely to rise. In the initial years, the pace of integration must be very slow due to the lack of strong commitment to it. At the same time, however, tension and disintegration are unlikely to overwhelm inter-participant relations. The more or less voluntary commitment to integrative efforts, which is protected by the right of veto, will have the learning effect of making the participants feel more at ease in collective decision-making, with more trust of their respective partners, and more benefits from cooperation.

Goal Definition and Redefinition

The last question: for what is the organization steered? "International organizations... have formal objectives: these are invariably spelled out in some detail in the opening paragraphs of their constitutions, charters or constituent treaties. Usually these objectives violate the postulate of flexibility—or vagueness—because national states do not readily participate in agencies whose goals are not clearly defined." This view of organizational goals is exactly what I will reject in this work. In corollary, I will also reject the explanatory significance of the concept of redefining formal goals, i.e., spill-over and its auxiliary concepts of politicization and externalization.

The reason is two-fold. Empirically, the sketch of the organizational characteristics of ASEAN in the introductory chapter is clear enough to point out that it does not fit the
the view quoted above. Theoretically, the rejection is also suggested by our discussion in the preceding few pages. Heavily dependent upon the inter-participant political process to characterize its goals, programs, and structure, such organizations can be called "organizations lacking clear goals." 48

The following propositions delineate how goals are defined or redefined in our perspective of organization. First, the goal may not be clearly specified. Because the goal is to be set as a result of inter-participant relations, which does not assure to assign any specific goals to the organization. The creation, existence and survival of the organization as such may be more important to the participants than goal attainment.

Secondly, if the goal is specified, the program to implement in pursuit of the goal may not be clearly specified for reasons similar to those mentioned above. Setting up the goal in principle is one matter; listing concrete programs in practice is another.

Thirdly, the goal and the program, or their non-existence are subject to change over time. The environment changes in itself; the existence and/or performance of an organization may change it; changes in the environment may cause changes in the interests and goals of participants.

Fourthly, the goal and program, if specified, may be implemented not by the formal structure but by less visible informal structures. More interestingly, some programs may be implemented by structures, whether formal or informal, which are designed to or used to implement other programs. 49 When a new goal or a new program is added, and the new structure
is yet to be set up for that particular purpose, such a phenomenon may occur. In any case, a priori assumptions on structure-function conjunction should be avoided.

Fifthly, in a changeable nature of organization, the creation of organization is of vital importance to initialize not only the major characteristics of organization such as goal and structure, but also behavioral codes and relational rules of participants. Namely, during the formation process where prospective participants, not all of which may participate though, are interacting with one another, precedents are being gradually established so that they may be referred to after the organization is founded. If there is discrepancy between the ostensible goal and the real goal, the formation process must be most informative to investigate what the organization is really expected to do by its participants.

The Epigenesis of Organization

The formation and operation of an organization can be thus understood as the interrelationship between the organization and its participants on the one hand, and between its participants themselves on the other. The organization is not necessarily created as a complete whole, an entity which is already constructed with certain specific goals, functions and structures. Instead, it may be created as a potential whole, an entity which entails the possibility of future development in terms of goal, function and/or structure. In other words, the organization may be analyzed not only from the performist viewpoint, but from the epigenetic viewpoint.
As argued earlier, international organizations, especially those which are created by governments in the developing world, may be functionally and/or structurally unspecific, and may change, whether develop or involute, their own functional and/or structural characteristics. Such organizations are presumably better understood from the epigenetic viewpoint. The formation of an organization with relatively unspecific characteristics, and its development in some way or another is, in a word, the epigenesis of organization.

2.4 Looking at ASEAN from a New Perspective: Research Guideline and Working Hypotheses

A Guideline of the Study of Regional Organization for Regional Integration

To see the regional integration effort more clearly, the new perspective of regional integration elaborated in this chapter provides a comprehensive research guideline of the regional organization for regional integration and/or cooperation.

First of all, formation process of organization should be the starting point of analysis. The purpose for which the organization in question was created should be carefully delineated on the basis of background and intention of each participant, which tends to diverge from one to another participant, as opposed to the final compromise as expressed goal of organization.

After the creation, as the second point, the organiza-
tion is still subject to the relationship among participants. With or without changing the formality, the goal of organization is changeable provided participants agree. Therefore, the transformation of organization with respect to both goal and formal structure should be analyzed as the resultant of inter-participant relations.

Third, the activities of organizations should not be mixed up between different level of characteristics. The information transmission function and the collective action function may be based on completely different need and intention of participants as well as different goal and structure of organization.

Finally, the consequence of organization's activities, i.e., the changing level of regional integration should be analyzed separately from the activities as such. Being a vehicle, the organization's performance is not the end, but the means for the pursuit of participant's interests. The level and pace of integration should be assessed against the intention of participants.

Because of its exemplary successful experience in the developing world, ASEAN is to be analyzed from that perspective. The research guideline described above provides a quadri-fold strategy of analyzing ASEAN. Namely, the analysis strategy consists of (1) the formation process of ASEAN (Chapter 3), (2) the structural transformation of ASEAN (Chapter 4), (3) multi-faceted activity of ASEAN (Chapter 5), and (4) ASEAN’s impact on the level of regional integration (Chapter 6).
The Antithesis of ASEAN's Conventional Image

Aside from detailed differences, ASEAN's prevailing image surveyed in Section 1.3 can be summarized into the following elements almost completely:

(1) ASEAN was created as a functional organization for socio-economic cooperation, the goal of which was a selective, partial integration as opposed to general economic integration such as the formation of free trade area;

(2) ASEAN had been inactive in the sense that its activity had been discerned only in insignificant fields, and had provided none of the concrete accomplishments;

(3) ASEAN became active in the mid 1970's, and it not only externalized but also politicized to start substantially its original goal as well as newly proclaimed goal, which included conflict management system among the ASEAN countries;

(4) The most influential cause of ASEAN's activities was the sweeping take-over of Indochina by communist governments in 1975, as it forced the ASEAN countries to cope with worsening environments.

In the course of the analysis of ASEAN from Chapter 3 through 6 following the abovementioned guideline, such a prevailing image of ASEAN will be necessarily re-examined for the purpose of obtaining its more realistic image. To state in a simplest way, working hypotheses throughout the analysis will be the negation of the prevailing image, and at replacing
it with an alternative view derived from the analysis to follow. More specifically, they are as follows:

1. ASEAN was not created as a functional organization for socio-economic cooperation;
2. ASEAN had not been inactive since its creation;
3. ASEAN did not become active in the mid 1970's; and
4. Indochina's fall into communism was not the most influential cause of ASEAN's development after 1975.

The above hypotheses, or the counter-view of the widespread image of ASEAN, may be paraphrased so as to be more informative in terms of the reality of ASEAN.

The positively specified working hypotheses are as follows:

1. ASEAN was created as a regional organization for potentially general purposes which would include not only socio-economic functional cooperation, but also political cooperation on such fields as security and external economic relations;
2. ASEAN had been active since its creation not only in functional cooperation but also political cooperation, and the emphasis was more on the latter than on the former type of cooperation;
3. ASEAN became increasingly active in the mid 1970's, with economic cooperation becoming more important, while the association kept cooperating in the security field;
(4) The communist take-over of Indochina did help accelerate ASEAN's cooperation, but it was not the cause. These working hypotheses are summarized as contrasted against the widespread image of ASEAN in Table 2.2. I shall attempt to corroborate the above alternative views of ASEAN in the following four chapters.

ASEAN in a New Perspective

While aiming to rectify ASEAN's image as hypothesizing above, this work also intends to specify ASEAN's significance in the perspective elaborated in the preceding two sections. In other words, in terms of the ASEAN countries' common orientation toward regional integration and ASEAN's organizational development, the experience of ASEAN and its participants during its first decade will be explained by the following set of causal-theoretic hypotheses.

(1) The ASEAN countries had acquired the common orientations toward not only economy but security and community before they created the Association. Their orientation toward regional integration was not functionally specific but comprehensive. They were concerned with their collective adaptation to a rapidly changing international environment on which they vulnerably depended.

(2) ASEAN's organizational characteristics were those which are suitable to a group of developing countries, viz., relatively informal, flexible and egalitarian. Provided such characteristics, the ASEAN countries were able to transform ASEAN's general but potential repertoire into concrete programs.
Table 2.2. The Contrasting Views of ASEAN: the Widespread Image vs. the Hypothesized Reality

**WIDESPREAD IMAGE OF ASEAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organizational nature</th>
<th>Socio-economic cooperation</th>
<th>Political and economic cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact of communist victory in Indochina

**HYPOTHESIZED REALITY OF ASEAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organizational nature</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968-71</th>
<th>1974-75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political and economic cooperation</td>
<td>Political as well as economic cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td>Augmentatively active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concretization in response to participant's need

Internal development
The ASEAN countries' vulnerability vis-à-vis the outside world directed ASEAN externally. At the same time, their orientation toward community directed it internally so as to accommodate internal differences. Corresponding to its participants' comprehensive orientation, ASEAN's activities were also comprehensive in the domain of regional integration.

ASEAN expanded its integrative repertoire because its participants made commitment increasingly to mutual collaboration in the framework of ASEAN. In turn, they committed themselves to the expansion of ASEAN's repertoire because they were relatively satisfied with ASEAN's performance, and recognized its utility for them to adapt themselves to unfavorable international and regional environments.

To summarize, ASEAN's development in its first decade can be explained by the comprehensive orientation in the domain of regional integration, the suitable organizational characteristics of ASEAN, and the reinforcing internal logic between its performance and its participants' commitment to the organization. In short, ASEAN seems a good example of the epigenetic development of an international organization.

To date, ASEAN is one of the few successful cases of regional integration efforts in the developing world. The study of ASEAN from the new perspective will not only delineate its developmental process that would replace its conventional image, but also will clarify the significance of integrative orientations in the domain of regional integration and of constructing
the suitable organizational structure for groups of countries in the developing world to succeed in regional integration. The perspective proposed in this Chapter will be a useful one to understand regional integration efforts in the developing world and to predict their future.
Notes for Chapter 2

1. One of the outstanding exceptions is (Foltz 1965) on West Africa.
2. See bibliography in (Lindberg and Scheingold (Eds.) 1971) 8).
3. (e.g., Nye 1971)
4. (e.g., Schmitter 1972; Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979)
5. In this regard, see (Deutsch et al. 1957; Hoffman 1966; Hansen 1969; Kechane and Nye 1977; Alker and Sherman 1980)
6. (e.g., Haas 1964)
7. (Newhouse 1967; Camps 1967)
8. (e.g., Lindberg 1971)
9. (Lindber 1971)
10. (Haas 1964: 26)

1. Although this work is devoted to the analysis of regional integration in the developing world, the relevance of three basic orientations is not limited to it. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, they can be straightly applied to regional integration in the developed world, EC in particular.

2. (Deutsch 1953)

3. Theoretically conceivable is the combination of all the three orientations. The well integrated nation-state is expected to attain it. The integration attempt to create a nation-state can be analyzed as the attempt that includes a number of programs covering all the three spectrums. Therefore, the investigation of those three spectrums suffices our foal to present the perspective of integrations attempts.

4. In the last decade, we observed only one case, i.e., the unification of Senegal and Gambia.

5. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 65-69)

6. For this reason, it seems misleading for the cybernetic theory to be called the transaction theory/approach.
17. (Balassa 1961; Tinbergen 1965)

18. The Ballasa-Tinbergen formulation of economic integration is based on the liberal economic theory, and is applicable to market economy countries. But economic integration can, and do as in the case of East Europe, occur among central planning economies. It is also aimed at regional economic gains. See, for example, (Kaser 1965), (Wiles 1968).

19. The sense of economic rationality is certainly different between market and central planning economies.

20. (Haas 1958; 1964; Haas and Schmitter 1964; Schmitter 1969; etc.)

21. (Nye 1966; 1967)

22. (Newhouse 1967; Camps 1966)

23. (Haas 1967; Nye 1971; Schmitter 1972)

24. (Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979)

25. The clear cut distinction between economy and security has been under attack, and close relations between them have been stressed particularly in the context of interdependence. However, they have not much treated in the context of regional integration.

26. (Hirschman 1958; Mytelka 1973, etc.)

27. In this regard, the liberal theory (Nurkse 1961; Johnson 1967; etc.), the Marxist theory (Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1974; etc.), and the non-Marxist dependency theory (Prebisch 1950; Myrdal 1957; etc.) all agree, even though they value and assess dependence differently.

28. (Nye 1974)

29. (Schmitter 1972; Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979),

30. (Barratt-Brown 1974; Rosen and Kurth (Eds.) 1974; Nabudere 1977; etc)

31. (Keohene and Nye 1975; 1977)
32. (Deutsch et al. 1957)

33. NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and Warsaw Pact all are facilitated with some form of organization which implies close, regular communication and collaboration among the member countries.

34. While NATO, Warsaw Pact and other collective defense arrangements are legally based on the United Nations Charter Article 51, the collective security arrangement is based on Chapter VIII.

35. (Miller 1970; Haas, Butterworth and Nye 1972)

36. (Deutsch et al. 1957)

37. (Sidjanski 1974)

38. (Lindberg 1971)

39. As Haas (1964) argues, international organizations are not like the modern organizations that can be understood from "the rational systemic perspective" (Scott 1981). Allison (1971)'s Model II (Organizational model) is based on this perspective. With respect to the characteristics of international organization, "the open natural systemic perspective" (Scott 1981) is suggestive.

40. (Etzioni 1963: 413)

41. It is the accommodation on the basis of upgrading the common interests in (Haas 1964: 111), and the cooperative variable-sum game in (Lindberg 1971: 101-102).

42. I have no intention to attack the desirability of a higher integrative mode if it does not impose untolerable burdens on the participants. I am insisting that it may be necessary to keep the mode of collective decision-making at a lower level so that all the participants can bear its burden.

43. In general, establishing the practice of seeking and pursuing common interests is burdensome. A voluminous literature on the theory and experiment of the prisoner's dilemma game illustrates how difficult it is for the participant to develop and sustain a situation of mutual trust.

44. Among African countries, supranational organizations such as the West African Monetary Union have been functioning. They are, in a sense, the resultant of disintegration from the level of unified entity under the colonial rule. The case of EAC is a good example of downward movement on the hierarchy of organizational level in Table 2.1.
45. In my opinion, the minimal common denominator is quite a misleading application of a mathematical term to a situation that is more appropriately described by the metaphor of the greatest common divisor. Both its users and I want to predicate the mutual agreement only on the points shared in common. The set of agreed points must be smaller than any sets of points advocated by parties involved. The finally reached agreement may look minimal, but it is actually the maximal set of points on which all the participants can agree. I am therefore obliged to use the greatest common divisor.

46. For problems of consensus in the context of regional integration, see (Haas 1960). On this particular point, both the neofunctionalist of integration and the classical theorists of power politics have agreed. The former argued that, because of that, higher integrative mode should be adopted. The latter argued, on the other hand, that, because of that, integration is unlikely.

47. (Haas 1964: 97)

48. (Scott 1981: 270)

49. Again, the critical point is what inter-participant relations result in.

50. Borrowing the notion from an eighteenth-century biological controversy, Etzioni (1963) introduced the distinction between preformism and epigenesis into sociology. While he correctly pointed out that they are "mutually exclusive in the sense that new units are either institutional 'embodiments' of old functions or serve new ones"(p. 409), he connected them mistakenly with the differentiation model and the accumulation model, respectively. Originally, the controversy was over whether the embryo or the germ cell was already functional and structurally complete, i.e., preformed, or not. The point was, therefore, not either differentiation or accumulation, but whether the enlargement of already formed functions and structures or the emergence of new functions and structure.
Chapter 3. Towards the Formation of ASEAN

3.1. The Background of the ASEAN Region: the Configuration of Diversities That Makes Cooperation Look Unrealistic

The five countries of ASEAN occupy the bulk of Southeast Asia in many respects. ASEAN's land area is 68%, its population is 71% in 1977, and its gross domestic product (GDP) in 1977 is as high as 86%.

Geographically, the ASEAN region can be sketched, very roughly to be sure, as a parallelogram leaning west-wise, to whose east and west upper corners are attached two relatively small but tall rectangulars with approximately the same size. This figure is in fact 2,000 miles longitudinally by 3,000 miles latitudinally. The equator runs across on the middle of the parallelogram, whose north-west quarter is occupied by Malaysia and Singapore, and the rest of which is by Indonesia. The east rectangular corresponds to the Philippines. Corresponding to Thailand, the west rectangular is wedged in the Indochinese peninsula: Burma on its west-side and Cambodia and Laos on its east-side. The ASEAN region is predominantly insular, with over 20,000 large and small islands, and there are only two national borders drawn on the land: between southern Thailand and peninsular Malaysia, and between Indonesia and Malaysia in the island of Borneo. Lying between the Asian continent and Australia, this insular region roughly separates the Pacific from the Indian ocean, but more precisely it provides commercially and strategically
important sea routes inbetween.

The ethno-linguistic configuration is the result of thousands of years' history involving Indian, Chinese and Western civilizations and military forces. In the ASEAN region alone, hundreds of ethno-linguistic groups are distinguishable, and their diversity is an oft-told obstacle of national integration of each country. Admittedly, hostilities, insurgencies, resentment, or indifference have been observed as closely related to ethno-linguistic differences. However, at the national level, politically and/or economically relevant groups who have more or less privileged influences are relatively limited. Such indigenous peoples are the Thai including the Laotian, the Malay, the Javanese, and the Tagalog. Peoples migrating from outside the region especially in this century are several Chinese ethnic groups who have to use Mandarin to communicate with each other, and Sinhalise and Tamil Indians. While the Chinese are scattered all over the region, Indians are mainly in Malaysia and Singapore for the apparent reason of British colonial rule.

Moderately congruent with the ethno-linguistic characteristics is religious affiliation. The Thai are Theravada Budhists; the Indian are mostly Hindus; the Chinese are plural affiliates with Mahayana Budhism, Taoism and Confucianism; the Malay are Muslim; many Indonesian people are Islam-Hinduism amalgam; many of the Philippine people are Roman Catholic.
The vast diversity in religion, language and ethnicity may be considered as the cause of the fragmentation and compartmentalization of the ASEAN region, not to mention Southeast Asia as a whole. However, what really matters in the ASEAN region today is the boundaries of language, religion, ethnicity, and state hardly run along with one another. Muslim Malays live in southern Thailand; both Muslims and Catholics in the Philippines are racially Malay; many Malay Malaysians have relatives in Indonesia, etc. An obstacle to national integration is not the ethno-linguistic diversity per se, but its incongruity with the territorial configuration.

Western colonialism in the last few centuries added another diversifying factor of the ASEAN region. Indonesia is almost completely identical with the Dutch East Indies; Malaysia and Singapore are former British Southeast Asia; the Philippines experienced the Spanish and then American rules. The independence was realized peacefully in the cases of the Philippines (1946), the Federation of Malaya, the predecessor of Malaysia (1957), and Singapore (1959 as the self-government). Those countries continued more or less close relations with the respective former metropolises politically, economically, culturally, and militarily. On the other hand, Indonesia had to fight against Dutch armies to become independent (1945-49). Under President Sukarno, Indonesia adopted the policy of anti-colonialism and non-alignment, and paid more attention to world politics as the leader of revolutionary independence movement than to less
dramatic regional relations. Thailand, the only Southeast Asian state that survived colonization, had been close to Japan even before it occupied the entire Southeast Asia. But the Thai succeeded in establishing a very close relationship with the United States soon after the defeat of Japan.

In the rapidly expanding international economic transactions since World War II, the ASEAN region remained dependent upon industrial countries outside the region. The trade ties with former colonial rulers were declined throughout the 1950's and the 1960's. The percentage of exports from Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore to their respective colonial rulers were about 20% in 1950, but in 1970 the figure dropped to about 5%. The United States has been continuously one of the major destinations of the exports from the ASEAN region. For the region as a whole, the percentage of exports to the United States was about 30% in 1950, and about 20% in 1970. On the other hand, Japan rapidly became the region's major trade partner: less than 5% in 1950; 15% in 1960; and 30% in 1970. The ASEAN region, therefore, was heavily dependent upon its trade with extraregional powers: the United States, Japan and/or colonial powers (Figure 3.1). From those diversified characteristics of the ASEAN region, one may draw a conclusion that regional cooperation is unlikely. Provided those conditions, did people(s) in the ASEAN region not find any communality at all? Why did the creation of international organization for regional cooperation come to the minds of the leaders of the ASEAN countries? Then, on what basis was ASEAN created,
The export % of the origin

the Philippines to USA and Japan

Indonesia to the Netherlands, USA and Japan

Malaysia to UK, USA and Japan**

Thailand to USA and Japan

Singapore to UK, USA and Japan**

Figure 3.1. The Export Dependence of the ASEAN Countries upon Extra-Regional Powers*

Source: (Yamakage 1977a)
Notes: *Extra-regional powers are herein identified as the United States, Japan and/or respective former colonial rulers. **Trade statistics were aggregated for Malaysia and Singapore in 1950.
maintained, and even developed?

3.2 ASA, Maphilindo and Confrontation: Paving the Way to ASEAN

ASA (the Association of Southeast Asia)

In general, precedents which are recalled from one's memory play an important role in decision-making. The meaning and evaluation attached to each precedent enables one to learn, whether correctly or incorrectly, from the past, and to associate the past information with the present situation.

As for Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN was not the unprecedented experience of regional cooperation. There had been some lessons from the regional affairs, both cooperation and conflict, prior to the creation of ASEAN. As in other developing regions where new states were born one after another, the orientation toward regional cooperation started in the late 1950's. In that period, regional cooperation was much in fashion stimulated by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The demonstration effect of EEC (1957), and of following UDE (1959), LAFTA (1960), etc. cannot be ignored to understand the similar movement in Southeast Asia.

The initiative for Southeast Asian regional cooperation can date back as early as 1959, when a Malayan Primier and a Philippine President launched the idea of economic cooperation, independently of each other.

Soon after the independence in 1957, the Federation of
Malaya led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (the Tunku, the title of Prince, henceforth) began to take a regional initiative. The Tunku's plan was to create an economic treaty organization of all the Southeast Asian nations. The Tunku's plan was to create an economic treaty organization of all the Southeast Asian nations. On the other hand, Philippine President Carlos Garcia announced a plan for the creation of regional bloc among anti-communist Asian countries for economic and political cooperation.

These two plans were confronted with each other when the Tunku paid an official visit to the Philippines. The Malayan leader opposed Garcia's plan because its anti-communist nature would generate antagonism from many Asian countries. He preferred a grouping of non-communist countries including non-aligned. On the very same point, Garcia was not content with the Tunku's plan.

The consequences of the meeting of both leaders were interesting. They agreed to collaborate with each other for the creation of economic treaty organization to be constituted by non-communist nations in Southeast Asia. Stronger commitment to anti-communism and to political cooperation was abandoned by Garcia. Compromise was reached at the greatest common divisor of the two plans.

Based on an agreement between the two leaders, Malayan and Filipino foreign ministries made contact with each other, and concretized the idea of an economic treaty organization. In such a move, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman was interested, and proposed his alternative in July 1959. Thanat's counter-proposal insisted that regional cooperation
should be as informal and practical as possible, and that it also should include cooperation in political matters. Eventually, Thanat succeeded in persuading both Malayan and Philippine leaders to grade down the legal foundation of organization from that of a treaty organization to an informal arrangement. At the same time, however, he compromised with them to limit its objective to purely non-political matters. By July 1960, Malays, the Philippines and Thailand had agreed on establishing an association for regional cooperation, which was again the greatest common divisor of the three plans proposed by respective governments.¹³

Those three countries were all unmistakably pro-Western states. The Philippines and Thailand were members of American-guided SEATO, and Malaya was indirectly associated with the United States through a defense pact with the United Kingdom which was a member of SEATO, too. In order to evade criticisms from the Eastern Camp that a planned association was subsidiary to SEATO, three countries wanted non-aligned countries to join it as founding members. Despite continuous efforts, especially directed toward Indonesia and Burma, no non-aligned countries showed interest in joining.

On the other hand, South Vietnam, another pro-Western state, expressed its willingness to join the proposed association on such occasion as bilateral meetings of Vietnam leaders with Malayan and Filipino counterparts. However, South Vietnam was asked not to apply for joining until
non-aligned countries became prospective founding members.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand were approaching non-aligned countries on the one hand to persuade them to join, and on the other hand they did not want to include another pro-Western state. Those three pro-Western countries were trying hard not to commit themselves further to their Western Camp in the structure of the Cold War. Their consensus on not cooperating together politically should be understood as an effort to dilute the anti-communistic political nature of cooperation among pro-Western countries.

Non-aligned countries were awaited, and the establishment of an association was postponed day by day. However, in February 1961, on the occasion of Garcia's visit to Malaya, Malayan and Filipino leaders agreed to launch an association without non-aligned countries if the Thai government also agreed.\textsuperscript{15} Thanat visited Kuala Lumpur, and met with the Tunku who served concurrently as Foreign Minister and Filipino Foreign Secretary Serano. They agreed to create an association for economic and cultural cooperation. In June, a meeting of the Joint Working Group was held, and made the final draft. On July 31, and August 1, 1961, foreign ministers of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand met in Bangkok, and declared to establish the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).

According to the declaration proclaimed on July 31, the objective of ASA was primarily consultation, collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural and
scientific fields. It was also explicitly declared that "This Association is in no way connected with any outside power or power bloc and is directed against no other country." Thus, the emphasis on its non-political activities was obviously the message vis-à-vis non-Western neighbor countries. On the other hand, ASA's main objective of economic cooperation was left unspecified in terms of programs and projects. ASA's three paragraph declaration was very short and simple compared with the founding documents of other organizations for regional economic cooperation.

On the next day, the joint communique was issued, in which ASA's organizational structure was specified. It was to consist of (1) the annual meeting of foreign ministers, (2) the annual meeting of the Joint Working Party, (3) the standing committee, (4) functional committees to be set up as needed, and (5) national secretariats. Corresponding to a generality of the objective and to the lack of concrete programs at the outset, the structure of organization was not ready to implement any functional cooperation. ASA was created only with a decision-making apparatus and supporting machinery. Although unspecified, the decision rule taken for granted was unanimity based on consensus building. Concrete programs and projects were yet to be formalized in the following months.

It is difficult to deny that the nature of ASA was ambiguous: its non-political nature was emphasized, but its economic nature was not elaborated. However, the formation of ASA paved a way for regional cooperation in Southeast
Asia. During the formation process over two and a half years, frequent political communication was established among Southeast Asian countries for the first time. The start of regional cooperation was for them the start of mutual communication which is indispensable for mutual understanding and trust.

ASA was also the first multilateral entity within Southeast Asia, in which the collective decision rule was unanimity as a result of consensus building. More importantly, consensus on the greatest common divisor was to become the implicitly established tradition among three ASA countries. When the network of mutual communication was expanded to include Singapore and Indonesia in 1967, the implicit tradition of consensus on the greatest common divisor was also inherited.

If it was not well facilitated for economic cooperation, ASA provided its members with a crucial forum for mutual understanding and trust. There was no replaceable international arrangement in the region.

Another noteworthy point is that the three pro-Western ASA countries were seeking for the way to lessen their commitment to the Western Camp. Even the Philippines, the state most dependent on the West, had adopted that policy by 1960 as a means to de-link with the United States and to identify itself with Asia. The ASA countries wanted non-aligned countries to join the group for the obvious reason that they would make the group less pro-Western. ASA took the form of a functional organization for economic and social cooperation. The three member states emphasized
its non-political nature. However, such an attitude should not be interpreted as their objective was apparently economic. In the Bangkok Declaration, more specific goals and/or programs would have appeared perhaps with a time table. De-emphasis of politics in ASA can be understood in the context of a disengagement policy vis-à-vis the East-West confrontation. Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines attempted to evade criticism from non-aligned neighbor countries, and from communist powers. The ASA countries related ASA with their economic development which was believed to be an effective way of fighting with domestic destabilizing factors, notably communist insurgency. If not ostensible, functional cooperation in economic and social fields was regarded as a means to serve a higher political goal. A severe international environment forced the ASA countries to downplay the organization's political nature.

ASA's concrete programs took shape in the following months. An express train service was started in 1962 between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. A million dollar contribution from each member resulted in the ASA fund in 1963. If everything had been all right, ASA might have strengthened functional cooperation among members. As in the case of other regional organizations in the developing world, obstacles to ASA's development came from an unexpected direction. That is, a territorial dispute between members of organization.

In the same year as ASA was created, the independence of British Borneo (Sabah, Srawak and Brunei) was begun to be discussed. Great Britain and its former colony, the
Federation of Malaya, announced a plan to integrate Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo into a single state. Under this circumstance, the Philippines suddenly claimed its sovereigny over Sabah on the basis of pre-colonial rule of a Sultanate. Although relations between Malaya and the Philippines worsened, they agreed on the principle of mutual consultation, and ASA kept operating. However, a unilateral declaration of the establishment of Malaysia in September, 1963 was followed by rupture. In consequence, ASA stopped working.16

However, ASA was not dissolved. Both Malaysian and Philippine governments expressed no intention of withdrawal or dissolution. The normalization between the two countries was realized in 1966 as will be discussed later in relation to the formation of ASEAN. ASA was soon activated, and had the first meeting of foreign ministers in the previous three years in August, 1966. In the following year, ASEAN was established, and it absorbed ASA's projects.

Maphilindo

The plan to integrate British Southeast Asia into an independent state, the Malaysian Plan, triggered another plan of regional integration which resulted in the formation of Maphilindo. Maphilindo, which existed for barely two months, was a loose consultation (mushawarah in Malay languages) system of three Malay nations, i.e. Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. It can be said that Maphilindo was created on
the basis of Pan-Malay sentiments shared by Malay peoples living in those three countries. However, it was based less on such an emotional tie than on the strategy of both Indonesia and the Philippines to intervene in Malaya's plan to create Malaysia. Therefore, when the establishment of Malaysia was announced ignoring the objections by Indonesia and the Philippines, Maphilindo automatically vanished.

Although short-lived, Maphilindo had some significant implications with respect to regional cooperation and integration to come. First of all, Indonesia participated in a regional scheme. Indonesia under Sukarno had been acting more as a global power representing the non-alignment movement than as a regional actor. A dispute in neighborhood involved Indonesia in regional affairs. It took efforts to establish mutual consultation with smaller neighbor countries on the principle of equal partnership, rather than as their leader.

Second, non-aligned, anti-Western Indonesia formed a regional group with more or less aligned, pro-Western countries such as Malaya and the Philippines. Indonesia under Sukarno had not only been a leader of the non-alignment movement, but had also shown both strong distaste for American and British "neocolonialism" and sympathy to communism. Nonetheless, Maphilindo proved that Indonesia could cooperate with a member of SEATO and with an agent of the British "neocolonial" plan of Malaysia. On the other hand, both Malaya and the Philippines showed flexibility that they were "(i)nspired...by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity
forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955," and that they agreed that foreign bases in their territory was temporary in nature. Thus, differences in foreign policy were overridden by the necessity of showing mutual cooperation.

In mid 1963, there were two triangles of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia: Malaya-the Philippines-Thailand, and Indonesia-Malaya-the Philippines (Fig. 3.2). Except for Singapore which was yet to become independent, all the ASEAN countries were involved in regional cooperation. The only missing direct communication tie was that between Indonesia and Thailand.

**Indonesian Confrontation and Aftermath**

Consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, Malaysia declared its independence in September, 1963. The formation of Malaysia had disastrous impacts upon insular Southeast Asia. First of all, it destroyed a delicate balance of regional cooperation between Malaya on the one hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other, which had been created in the previous month. Second, the rupture between Malaya and the Philippines paralysed ASA, which had just initiated concrete forms of cooperation. Finally, Indonesia adopted a "Crush Malaysia" policy of confrontation, which caused an almost three-year armed conflict against British-supported Malaysia. Interestingly, ASEAN is located on the extended line of this turmoil in insular Southeast Asia. In other words, the formation of ASEAN and the
Figure 3.2. Frameworks of Regional Cooperation in the ASEAN Region, 1963
rapprochement in the region are difficult to discuss separately. In fact, those two processes were intertwined as will be discussed below.

Indonesia's internal political turmoil beginning at the end of September 1965 resulted in the military take-over of government in the next March. Under the new anti-Chinese and anti-communist leadership of Suharto, Indonesia started to rebuild a more favorable regional environment. Although representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia had been meeting before Suharto took power, new Foreign Minister Adam Malik made contacts with Philippine and Thai counterparts, seeking the normalization of diplomatic relations with Malaysia. In a series of negotiations, both direct and indirect, Indonesia assured that it would stop confronting against Malaysia. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who had been trying to mediate adversaries on several occasions since the end of 1963, finally succeeded in hosting a meeting between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Adam Malik in the end of May, 1966, at Thanat's house in Bangkok. In August, Razak and Malik signed an agreement on the normalization of diplomatic relations between those two countries. In the course of his mediation, Thant established a strong communication channel with Malik, which would play an important role in the creation of ASEAN.

As for the Philippines, consular relations with Malaysia revived in 1964 due to criticisms at home. Also, Sukarno's further inclination to communism caused distrust and fear in the Philippines. The new President Marcos desired to restore
full diplomatic relations, but Sukarno strongly opposed Marcos' move, and succeeded in postponement. However, since Sukarno's fall in March, 1966, the Philippine government proceeded with rapprochement on the one hand, and served to mediate between Indonesia and Malaysia on the other. Relations with Malaysia normalized in June, 1966. In the course of rapprochement, ASA resumed its activities, and in March the first ASA meeting since April, 1963 was held in Bangkok.

In mid 1966, as a result of the end of Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia, another triangle of communication channel, i.e. Thailand-Indonesia-Malaysia, was present in the region. In addition, a triangle of ASA was reactivated. Although Maphilindo was scarcely heard of again, a triangle of three Malay states was again collaborative (Fig. 3.3).

3.3 The Formation of ASEAN

Participants' Motives and Their Negotiations with One Another

It was Thanat who took the first step toward ASEAN. On the occasion of peace talks in his house in the end of May, 1966, Thanat asked Malik if it was possible for Indonesia to join a new regional organization, and received an affirmative answer. Malaysia's response was quick. Within a month, the Malaysian government suggested that the most important issue was not ASA's survival, but Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation. In August, Malik and ASA foreign ministers met each other, and they agreed on the creation
Figure 3.3. Frameworks of Regional Cooperation in the ASEAN Region, 1966
of a new organization in which Indonesia would participate, and on the draft-making by Indonesian and Thai foreign ministries.\textsuperscript{23}

Later in that year, a "Draft Joint Declaration" of privately-called South-East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) was sent from Bangkok to Jakarta, Manila and Kuala Lumpur.\textsuperscript{24} This document, "a careful and conscious melding of the purpose of ASA with much of the style and flavor of MAPHILINDO"\textsuperscript{25} was doubtlessly based on two precedents of regional cooperation in which Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand had been involved. With some changes in phraseology, that Draft would become the declaration of establishing ASEAN.

Since taking office as Foreign Minister in 1959, Thanat Khoman had been advocating not only economic but also political regional cooperation among both pro-Western and non-aligned countries. For him, regional cooperation was to be pursued for the purpose of avoiding domination by outside powers and of ameliorating the underrated status of Southeast Asia. In order to realize cooperation, conflict and distrust should turn to stability and mutual trust, which was a reason why Thanat was eager to mediate the territorial conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. On the one hand, Thailand committed to the Vietnam War, but on the other it was seeking the way of decreasing commitment to the East-West confrontation. In this sense, non-aligned Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation was most welcomed. Advantage should be taken of the change in Indonesia's foreign policy under
Suharto. Thanat did not hesitate to replace ASA by a new organization in order to include Indonesia.

For Indonesia under Suharto, participation in regional cooperation had three advantages. First, it would ameliorate the international environment which had been devastated by Sukarno's confrontation policy. Second, it would serve the new guidelines of foreign policy pursued by the new regime as opposed to Sukarno's pro-communist foreign policy. Third, it would help the country show its peaceful and friendly posture toward neighbor countries. On the other hand, Indonesia had been accusing ASA for the reason that it had consisted of pro-Western countries. In order to keep its foreign policy consistent with the previous exercise, and in order to maintain legitimate non-alignment, it was practically impossible for Indonesia to join ASA. The dilemma of participating in regional cooperation without joining ASA could not be solved but by the creation of a new organization which was compatible with Indonesia's non-aligned policy. In this sense, it was very much in favor of Indonesia that Thanat's draft for SEAARC contained almost identical phrases with those in Maphilindo documents. Furthermore, the military preferred more pro-Western policy for regional security against communism than the policy Malik and his foreign ministry was pursuing.

As its quick response illustrated, Malaysia welcomed Indonesia's willingness to join regional cooperation. Hostilities with Indonesia taught Malaysia its vulnerable position in the region, the difficulty of ignoring Indonesia's stands, and the importance of maintaining good-will relations
with it. An important leader had a different view, however. The Tunku, Malaysian Premier, was suspicious of the Suharto government's detente policy, and was afraid of the revival of Sukarno with his confrontation policy. Thus, he was against not only rapprochement with Indonesia, but also the creation of a new organization with it. As a founder, the Tunku was attached to ASA, and insisted that Indonesia should express its good-will by joining ASA. Thanat, co-founder of ASA, had not succeeded in persuading the Tunku that the proposed organization was substantially expanded ASA until May, 1967. Otherwise, Malaysian leaders put the highest priority on the establishment of cooperative relations with Indonesia. In the course of rapprochement with it, the Tunku lost his considerable influence on foreign policy. It was they, rather than the Prime Minister, who steered the country toward the formation of ASEAN.

In order to counterbalance its dependence on the United States, the Philippines had been seeking for the way to identify itself with Asia. Two successive leaders had been heavily committed to creating regional organizations, i.e., ASA and Maphilindo respectively, for the purpose of establishing Asian regional identity. It was then Marcos' turn. Instead of getting involved in organizations previous administrations had been committed to, he wanted to launch his organization, and proposed Asian Forum, in September, 1966 when he visited the United States. Although ASEAN did not spring from Marcos' proposal, the involvement in the creation of a new organization meant, domestically, the triumph of
Marcos' diplomacy, which would increase his prestige at home.

When ASA was founded, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand failed to persuade any non-aligned countries to join it. Their desire to cooperate together with non-aligned countries was satisfied with the participation of Indonesia, a prolonged leader of non-alignment. For the ASA countries, welcoming Indonesia was more essential than the continuance of organization. As for Indonesia, cooperation with pro-Western ASA countries should not mean its abandonment of non-alignment. Intake of phrases of Maphilindo documents into the SEAARC Draft was not enough. With the support of Thanat, Malik took efforts to add some non-aligned countries to the prospective grouping. Malik had been trying to have other non-aligned countries in the region, Cambodia and Burma, join in vain until the end of May, 1967. At worst Malik hoped to persuade them not to denounce his country or his scheme. At this stage, it became probable for new-born, non-aligned Singapore to join regional cooperation. Eventually, both Malaysia and the Philippines agreed with Indonesia and Thailand to invite Singapore as a founding member.

When Malaysia was formed in 1963, Singapore integrated itself with the new federation. However, in 1965, the Tunku persuaded Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew to separate his state from Malaysia. The withdrawal from Malaysia left Singapore alone between the two much larger neighbors confronting with each other. In a stormy sea of Southeast Asia, a small island country was forced to sail out. Announcing the pursuit of a non-aligned policy, Singapore had to manage to survive in difficult situations under Indonesia's
confrontation policy. Furthermore, this Chinese-predominant country needed to identify itself with Southeast Asia, and to wipe out its image of a third China. For the Chinese minority was the source of domestic tension, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, and China was the source of external threat for Southeast Asian nations. As Indonesia abandoned confrontation, and started cooperating with Malaysia, it was crucial for Singapore to establish good-will relations with them. When they were about to launch a regional organization, Singapore had no other choice but to go along with them. Also, participation in regional cooperation would help it establish its identity with the region rather than with China.

ASEAN's Goal and Structure: Inheritance from ASA and Maphilindo

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand agreed in principle to the establishment of a new regional organization, and foreign ministers of the five countries convened at Bangsaen, a seaside resort of Bangkok, from August 5 to 7, 1967. What goal did they assign to the new organization? How did they design the new organization? As briefly mentioned above, the proposed organization as SEAARC was to have almost identical purpose and aims, and structure with those of ASA. At the meeting no one seemed to have objections to the draft. As if organization's objective and structure were not important, no serious
discussion on those subjects was reported. As a matter of fact, it is quite easy to trace the Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN back to the Bangkok Declaration of ASA, in terms of its organizational goal (Table 3.1). The structure which was specified in the ASEAN Declaration is identical with that specified in the joint communique of ASA's founding meeting (Table 3.2). Thus, as far as the organization as such is concerned, ASEAN can be said to be the extension of ASA. Even so, ASEAN was a new organization, and this fact must have satisfied Indonesia. Perhaps for the three ASA countries, it must have not mattered.

Not only with respect to the objective and structure, but also with respect to the manner to launch the organization, ASEAN was difficult to distinguish from ASA. The SEAARC Draft took the form of a joint declaration to establish the organization by foreign ministers, basically following the pattern of the foundation of ASA. It indicated that Malik accepted Thanat's preferred informal and practical procedure concerning the prospective regional cooperation. Needless-to-say, Malaysia and the Philippines which had already accepted such a form at the inception of ASA, must have had no objection to the Thanat proposal in that regard. ASEAN was consequently established on August 8, 1967 by Bangkok Declaration of foreign ministers from the five countries. ²

Thus, it is undeniable that ASA was an influential precedent. Through the SEAARC Draft co-authored by ASA's co-founder Thanat, ASEAN was born as another ASA.²
Table 3.1  The Comparison of ASEAN with ASA: Purposes

Bangkok Declaration of ASA (1961)

We do hereby declare:

First, the establishment of an association for economic and cultural cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia to be known as ASA---Association of Southeast Asia.

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To establish an effective machinery for friendly consultations, collaborations and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative fields;

3. To exchange information on matters of common interests or concern in the economic, cultural, educational and scientific fields;

2. To provide educational, professional, technical and administrative training and research facilities in their respective countries for nationals and officials of the associated countries;

5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in utilization of their respective natural resources, the development of their agriculture and industry, the expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities, and generally raising the living standards of their peoples;

6. To cooperate in the study of the problems of international commodity trade;

Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN (1967)

We do hereby declare:

First, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical scientific and administrative fields;

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;

5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
4. To cooperate in the promotion of Southeast Asian studies;

7. Generally, to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve the aims and purposes of the Association, as well as to contribute more effectively to the work of existing international organizations and agencies;

Third, that this Association...is essentially a free association of Southeast Asian having as its objective the promotion, through joint endeavor, of the well-being and the economic, social and cultural progress of this region.

6. To promote South-East Asian studies;

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves;

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations;

2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASA at the outset (1961)</th>
<th>ASEAN at the outset (1967)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Meeting of the Foreign Ministers</strong>&lt;br&gt;by rotation</td>
<td><strong>Annual Meeting of the Foreign Ministers</strong>&lt;br&gt;(ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) same as left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standing Committee</strong>&lt;br&gt;composed of the foreign minister of the&lt;br&gt;host country as the chairman, and of the&lt;br&gt;ambassadors residing there</td>
<td><strong>Standing Committee</strong>&lt;br&gt;same as left</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Secretariat</strong>&lt;br&gt;set up in each member</td>
<td><strong>National Secretariat</strong>&lt;br&gt;same as left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent and Ad Hoc Committees</strong>&lt;br&gt;to be set up as needed on specific subjects</td>
<td><strong>Permanent and Ad Hoc Committees</strong>&lt;br&gt;same as left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Working Party Meeting</strong>&lt;br&gt;to prepare for the annual meeting of&lt;br&gt;foreign ministers</td>
<td>- no corresponding machinery-</td>
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**Source:**<br>ASA - The Joint Statement by the ASA Foreign Ministers on August 1, 1961<br>ASEAN - The Bangkok Declaration on August 8, 1967
What about the "flavor of MAPHILINDO"? It was the mutual responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the region, and the temporary nature of foreign bases, both of which were explicitly mentioned in the SEAARC Draft as a virtual repetition of the Manila Declaration of Maphilindo. The inclusion of those phrases, which unmistakably conveyed political implications, was partly a result of Thanat's compromise with Indonesia's attachment to non-alignment in order to assure its participation in regional cooperation. More importantly, however, it cannot be overlooked that Thanat had been inclined to enhance the political solidarity of the region vis-à-vis outside powers, and to disengage the region from the East-West confrontation. It seems that Thanat utilized, rather than compromised with, Indonesia's traditional non-alignment and its manifestation in Maphilindo.

Although this phraseology appeared only in the preamble, it caused some controversy at the Bangsaen meeting. To some extent, the countries other than Indonesia and Thailand had objections to the non-alignment oriented political clauses. If ASEAN had been created a few months earlier, the controversy would have been harsh. For, in July, 1967, the prospect of regional security shifted completely. That is, Britain published the plan to withdraw its troops from Southeast Asia by the mid 1970's.

Malaysia and Singapore, both of which depend upon the Commonwealth, especially British, troops for the defense. Without military supports by the United Kingdom, Malaysia
might have been unable to survive under Indonesian hostilities a few years before. Both Malaysia and Singapore were aware of the importance of foreign military presence for their national security, and also aware of the importance of regional stability and security. Foreseeing the withdrawal of British troops, they were forced to find another way to national security on the one hand, but on the other hand they had no reason to keep opposing the temporary nature of foreign bases. Particularly, Malaysia began to seek for regional stability and security rather than national security dependent on the outside powers.31

The Philippines' eagerness to promote regional cooperation in the early 1960's was associated with its anti-American nationalism,32 which eventually caused Macapagal's loss of Presidency.33 His successor, Marcos, tried to balance the country's dependence on the United States with the promotion of regional cooperation. In that context, the Philippines was against the new organization's committing itself to a strong posture of anti-outside power, although it had signed the Manila Declaration under the previous administration.

Five foreign ministers gathering at Bangsaen finally reached a compromise. The Philippines accepted the interpretation that the phrases in question were a general purpose which it was unnecessary to implement or realize in the foreseeable future. The phraseology was toned down to the extent that the most opposed country, the Philippines, was able to accept. In consequence, some phrases were added so as to dilute a strong political commitment to non-alignment
and collective security as appeared in the SEAARC Draft. Nonetheless, phraseology of Manila Declaration was easily discernable in the declaration of ASEAN (Table 3.3).

The last issue of controversy at the Bangsaen meeting was the name of the new organization which had been privately called SEARRC. It was the Philippines, or perhaps its representative, Foreign Secretary Ramos who was opposed to SEAARC for the reason that it resembled "shark." As proposed by Malik, ASEAN was finally adopted as the name.34

ASEAN inherited much of its organizational goal and structure from both ASA and Maphilindo. The influence of the precedents cannot be ignored or overlooked. Indeed, ASEAN inherited the operational code, too. During the formation process of ASA, Maphilindo and ASEAN, the consensus rule became the region's established practice of collective decision-making. Although consensus was of course the result of negotiation and bargaining, the ASEAN countries had adopted, if implicitly, the greatest common divisor as the basis of consensus. They preferred the consensus or unanimity rule which finally emphasizes the agreement by all the participants to the majority rule which inevitably divide between winners and losers. At the expense of probable efficiency, they adopted a more subtle way of collective decision-making operational code.

The five foreign ministers moved to Bangkok, and held the inauguration meeting of ASEAN on August 8, 1967. It was the very next day that they agreed on (1) the creation of ASEAN, (2) its founding declaration, and (3) the country to
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Intent</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Manila Declaration of Maphilindo (1963)</strong></td>
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<td>Convinced that their countries...share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities and to ensure peaceful development of their respective countries and their region in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN (1967)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considering that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of peoples;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Statement on August 5, 1963</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Agreeing) that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries.</td>
</tr>
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host the next foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta. In
Bangkok, they signed the ASEAN Declaration, and announced
its establishment. They pointed out tourism, shipping and
fisheries as likely fields of cooperation at the outset. 35

3.4 ASEAN's Comprehensive Orientation in the Domain of
Regional Integration

Shared Perception of the Urgent Need for Mutual Security

But for Indonesia's abandonment of confrontation and
change in its leadership, the formation of ASEAN would have
been unfeasible. At the same time, however, the confronta-
tion policy imprinted on its neighbor countries the vital
importance of Indonesia, in particular its destructive poten-
tial. For neighboring countries, the establishment and
institutionalization of a good-will relationship with Indo-
nesia was recognized as the crucial prerequisite of their
own security. Thus, the unmet desire to include non-aligned
countries in regional cooperation of the ASA countries was
redirected toward the largest and the most influential non-
aligned country in the region. Moreover, during the confron-
tation and in the course of Indonesia's attempts to ameliorate
relations with its neighbors, the missing link of communication,
Indonesian-Thai linkage, was established. Particularly,
personal relations between foreign ministers, i.e. Malik and
Thanat, were most important. For the formation of ASEAN was
all-the-way guided by those key people who closely collaborated
with each other. Those consequences being taken into account,
it can be said that both Indonesia's confrontation and its abandonment made possible the formation of ASEAN. The keen attention to the need for mutual security was a new conspicuous element of common recognition among the ASEAN countries, which had been shared neither in ASA nor Maphilindo.

The ASEAN countries had to reduce, if not eliminate, mutual distrust before they could start cooperation. Mutual security and responsiveness was missing among them. Being the highest priority of the five countries, the need for mutual confirmation of friendly policy vis-à-vis one another was clearly mirrored by the ASEAN Declaration. Phrases which never appeared either in the Bangkok Declaration of ASA or in the Manila Declaration of Maphilindo are underlined in the following quotations. "Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation," and "to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership...the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity the blessing of peace, freedom and prosperity."36

On the other hand, little concern with the concrete goal, program, project, or schedule was also easily recognizable in the Declaration. As spelled out, the aims and purposes of the Association were all general guidelines for future cooperation, and no machinery was set up for functional
cooperation which was supposed to be the essence of cooperation within the framework of ASEAN. Such characteristics of the Declaration can be said to have neatly corresponded to what the participant countries had in their minds.

**ASEAN's Orientation toward Community**

Although concrete programs were unspecified in the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN countries' common orientation toward regional integration was observable. First of all, their orientation toward community is obvious, in spite of it being usually overlooked or regarded as very dubious. They did not hesitate to express their fundamental concern with community-building. However, it is difficult to take for granted literally that they are "already bounded together by ties of history and culture." In fact, provided the diversified background of the ASEAN region discussed in Section 3.1, there was little evidence supporting the belief in the community of Southeast Asia. Reality was better represented by the former Thai foreign minister Thanat's view that the ASEAN countries "are 'balkanised' by prolonged diverse colonial rule which oriented them towards their respective metropolitan centers rather than towards their neighbors in the area..." 

If not in existence, community was postulated as an ultimate goal to pursue. ASEAN was expected to serve "to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community in South-East Asian nations." The creation and
maintenance of a peaceful community was understood by the ASEAN leaders as an absolute necessity for their own economic development and political stability.

Although community-building was oriented, the amalgamation or political unification of the participant states was not sought. Regional community was, from each participants' viewpoint, an instrument for its own development, not a step toward eventual amalgamation. The ASEAN countries shared a general intent to create, according to the Deutschen integration theory, a "pluralistic security-community" among themselves.

ASEAN's Orientation toward Security

The ASEAN countries did not limit their deep concern with security among themselves. They had recognized their vulnerability vis-à-vis the outside world, either major global powers or their neighboring hostile countries. They agreed at least to express their common concern with external security in the Bangkok Declaration. As discussed above, ASEAN's inheritance from Maphilindo showed a conspicuous inclination toward non-alignment.

More importantly, the ASEAN countries all felt a Chinese threat to their own internal political stability. Anti-governmental guerillas in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand had been at least morally supported by the People's Republic of China for years. Even Thailand, which had been more directly threatened by North Vietnam,
considered China as more formidable. The existence of Chinese minorities intensified the ASEAN governments' fear. The new leadership of Indonesia banned communism, and became strongly anti-Chinese.

Nevertheless, it is misleading to equate ASEAN's common orientation toward external security with an anti-communist or anti-China alliance. Even after the regime change in Indonesia, for instance, North Vietnam kept its embassy open, and the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government had a representative in Jakarta. Although the ASEAN countries, except for Indonesia and Singapore, joined an obviously anti-China organization sponsored by South Korea, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), they tried ASEAN not to be an anti-Chinese or anti-communist alliance. They chose a more subtle way to cope with the penetrating external threat. While ruling out military cooperation, the ASEAN countries agreed in principle to cooperate in other forms in the pursuit of external security.

**ASEAN's Orientation toward Economy**

Although the declared intent of ASEAN was primarily socio-economic cooperation, as described in the previous section, none of the five countries were serious about discussing concrete projects of regional cooperation. Unlike other similar regional organizations, ASEAN did not propose any types of regional economic integration. ASEAN's orientation toward a unified regional economy seemed weaker than
the other two orientations.

No matter if regional economic integration serves national economic development, the ASEAN countries did not regard integration efforts to be realistic measures for themselves. They agreed, instead, to begin with more or less technical cooperation such as shipping, tourism and fisheries. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the ASEAN countries oriented themselves toward regional economy, but this orientation was limited to very low degrees of cooperation compared with the ordinary sense of economic integration.

As briefly sketched in Section 3.1, the ASEAN countries' economic dependence on the outside world was evident. Due to the vulnerability of its economic structure, the ASEAN region's economic security was in jeopardy. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries did not seem to be seriously concerned with this problem during the formation process of ASEAN. Nor were they concerned with the collective remedy of economic dependence. The orientation toward the aspect of economy—security was not taken into consideration by the ASEAN countries at the inception of the organization.

In a word, ASEAN's declared purpose revealed the orientation toward economy, it seemed much less important than the orientation toward community and security.
Notes for Chapter 3

1. Southeast Asia consists of, besides the ASEAN countries, the former French Indochina—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—, Brunei and Burma.

2. On a history of Southeast Asia, see, for example, (Hall 1968).

3. Recent arguments on ethnic politics include (Enloe 1977).


5. Thai and Lao are almost identical, and more Laotians are in Thailand than in Laos. Malay, Javanese and Tagalog belong to the same linguistic family, but they are quite distinctive with each other. The national Indonesia language (Bahasa Indonesia) and the Malaysia counterpart (Bahasa Malaysia) are almost identical because both are based on Malay (Bahasa Melayu). The former vocabulary includes many Javanese and Dutch words, while the latter English.

6. Language diversity is actually comparable with the original six countries of EEC whose major languages are French, German, Italian, Dutch, and Flemish. Past antagonism between Catholic and Protestant must have been much more serious than present antagonism between Muslims and Hindus in Malaysia.

7. The above diversified characteristics can be extended to Southeast Asia in general. Despite the cogent warning to the exaggeration of obstacles to cooperation nearly two decades ago (Gordon 1964), they are still widely believed to be the major source of dissonance in Southeast Asia. "Southeast Asia is still essentially a geographic abstraction," and not the political reality (Pauker 1977: 19-23).

8. For more detail, see (Gordon 1966: 166).

9. For more detail, see (Vellut 1965: 57).

10. (Gordon 1966; Vellut 1965; Smith 1959).

11. (Yamakage 1980)


14. (Singh 1966: 218)

15. (Vellut 1965: 60)

16. See (Gordon 1966: 9-14) for the Sabah dispute between Malaya and the Philippines.

17. On the formation process of Maphilindo, Philippine President Macapagal took initiative in proposing "The Greater Malay Confederation" to prevent Malaya's acquisition of Sabah. Later on, Indonesia President Sukarno got involved in Malayan-Philippine dispute over Sabah, and showed his leadership in the creation of Maphilindo. In detail, see (van der Kroef 1963; Taylor 1964; Gordon 1966: 22-24, 31-35, 100-103, 188-192), etc. It is little wonder that the Manila Declaration which proclaimed the establishment of Maphilindo was issued simultaneously with the joint statement in which three leaders agreed on a rationale for solving the Sabah dispute in a United Nations guided referendum to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah.

18. Compared with Sukarno's attitude towards ASA (Gordon 1966: 171; Morrison and Surhke 1978: 267), his commitment on regional affairs through the creation of Maphilindo is worthy to note.

19. (Manila Declaration, August 5, 1963)

20. (Joint Statement, August 5, 1963: Parag. 11)

21. In detail, see (Mackie 1974).

22. Relations normalized formally one year later, after ASEAN was created. It is believed that there was a secret agreement that relations were to normalize after an election was held in Sabah and Sarawak as evidence that people there wished to belong to Malaysia (Weinstein 1969: 79-88). Delay of normalization, however, had no impeding influence on establishing mutual collaboration (Yamakage 1981).

23. (Yamakage 1981)

24. (Gordon 1969: 114-116)

25. (Gordon 1969: 114)

26. (Crouch 1978: 330-341)

27. Malaysia representative was not Prime Minister concurrently Foreign Minister, but Deputy Prime Minister concurrently Defense Minister, Abdul Razak.
28. When ASEAN was established, ASA was functioning. Late in the same month, the fourth annual meeting of foreign ministers was convened in the same city. It was decided that ASA's projects should be transferred to ASEAN.

29. (Gordon 1969: 116)

30. It changed in January 1968 to the withdrawal from east of Suez by 1971.

31. By the end of the 1960's, Malaysia had begun to advocate regional neutralization plan, which resulted in ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration calling for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

32. (Gordon 1966: 19-21)

33. (Fernandez 1977: 248-249)

34. ASEAN had been proposed by Fifield (1963) as anti-communist alliance, which must have been the first appearance of its name (Fifield 1979). Apparently, Malik did not know of this, and learned of it when he visited Moscow (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 335, fn. 19).

35. (Joint Press Release)

36. (the ASEAN Declaration; emphasis myself)

37. This phrase was clearly taken from the Manila Declaration of Maphilindo which included that three Malay nations "are bound together by close historical ties of race and culture." As for Malay nations there may be a truth in it.

38. (Thanat 1975)

39. (the Bangkok Declaration; emphasis myself)

40. See (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 134-137) on the change in the Thai view of China and North Vietnam since the late 1960's.

41. The military leaders suspected that China had been involved in Indonesian communist party's attempted coup and the murder of their fellow army generals in September 1965. Indonesia's relations with China worsened to suspend diplomatic relationship in October 1967.

42. (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 227)

43. Like ASA, ASEAN was accused of its anti-communist policy by the communist countries. But they would endorse ASEAN by the mid 1970's for their own reasons.
Perhaps Singapore, the most developed of the ASEAN countries and most dependent on trade, was the only member that advocated economic integration. Singapore's foreign minister Rajaratnam expressed the desirability of a neo-functional type of regional economic integration before ASEAN was created (see Starner's interview with Rajaratnam 1967). But even for Singapore, economic cooperation was not the main reason to join ASEAN as delineated in the previous section.
Chapter 4. The Organizational Transformations of ASEAN in its First Decade

4.1 From Infrastructural Cooperation to Economic Integration

Setting Up Functional Committees in the Initial Years

At its inception, ASEAN was at least expected to promote regional cooperation "in such fields as tourism, shipping and fisheries,..."¹ Within a year, five ad hoc committees were set up: three of which were to meet with the above mentioned suggestion at the inaugurating meeting; and the remaining two were on civil aviation and on transportation and communication. The first meeting of those ad hoc committees was held in June 1968, in the five capitals of ASEAN.

On the occasion of the second annual meeting of foreign ministers in August 1968, ad hoc committees on shipping, food production and supply, civil air transportation, and communication/air traffic service/meteorology were upgraded to permanent committees, the last two of which had been sub-committees of the ad hoc committee on civil aviation. Thus, ASEAN became equipped with four permanent committees for the purpose of recommending and implementing functional cooperation on intra-regional socio-economic matters.

All of the four new permanent committees had been operating to convene their first respective meeting in the latter half of 1969. Moreover, the ad hoc committee on commerce and industry was established during that period. At the third
annual meeting of foreign ministers, it was agreed to transform into permanent committees the following ad hoc committees: on tourism, on transportation and communication, and on commerce and industry. It was also decided to set up the permanent committee on mass media, on that occasion.

Although ASEAN was faced with the most serious crisis to date during 1968 and 1969 because the "frozen" territorial conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah resuscitated, it was not paralyzed by the conflict.

By the time the rapprochement between Malaysia and the Philippines was announced at the annual foreign ministers' meeting in December 1969, ASEAN had expanded its organizational structure so as to have a number of permanent committees in order to enhance its functional goal ambiguously proclaimed in its founding declaration in August 1967.

Organizational expansion did not stop. In 1970, the ad hoc committee on science and technology was set up, and in the following year it was transformed into the permanent committee. In 1972, the permanent committee on socio-cultural activities was established. Thus, within five years of the inception, ten permanent committees started operating in order to fulfill the collective will of intra-regional cooperation in a functional sense.

Those permanent committees consisted of government officials and experts on specific subjects from the ASEAN countries. Their location and chairmanship were distributed among the five participant countries on a rotational basis. The past exercise indicates that the rotation usually occurs
every three years.³

In the meantime, the special committee of ASEAN central banks and monetary authorities was set up, and its first meeting was held in 1972. Subsequently, the set-up was approved at the following annual meeting of foreign ministers, the sixth in 1973.

The abovementioned ten permanent and one special committees were set up one after another during ASEAN's first five years (Figure 4.1). Those committees worked to concretize the organization's unspecific goals for functional cooperation in socio-economic fields.

Nevertheless, such a structural development was not regarded to be directed toward integration even at some corners in the region. Most striking was perhaps Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew, who addressed at the opening of the fifth annual meeting of foreign ministers in his country that "he gained the impression that ASEAN did not for the present aim at integrating a regional economy," which became publicly recorded in the meeting's joint communique. He was doubtlessly right if regional economic integration had to mean at least trade liberalization as commonly taken for granted.

However, in the very meeting where Lee made some disappointing remarks on ASEAN's cooperation, its foreign ministers agreed to study the restructuring of ASEAN to more effectively meet the anticipated increase in regional cooperation.
The number of committees

12 -
10 -
8 -
6 -
4 -
2 -
0 -

Year

Total

Permanent committees

1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Figure 4.1. The Number of ASEAN Committees to Carry out Intra-Regional Functional Cooperation on Socio-Economic Matters

Note: The number is counted on the mid-year of each year. The advisory committee on the United Nations study team, which was in operation during 1970-72, and the permanent committee on finance are excluded from the counting.
Commitment to Economic Integration

In May 1974, the ASEAN foreign ministers "agreed that ASEAN, having completed its first stage and presently entering its second stage of cooperation, should now embark on a more substantial and meaningful economic collaboration." As promising rationales, they specified three cooperative techniques: trade liberalization, complementary agreements, and package deal arrangements. This was the first commitment to regional economic integration in the form of ASEAN's collectivity agreed by the participants.

The consideration of economic integration in the framework of ASEAN dates back to 1970. Under the initiative of the United Nations, ASEAN let a U.N. team study the regional economic situation and recommend the rationale of intra-regional cooperation, including economic integration. For the ASEAN side, the advisory committee was set up, and five meetings were held during 1970-72. The report was submitted to ASEAN in 1972, which was published in 1974. In that report, among the recommended procedures were selective trade liberalization in selected commodities, industrial complementary agreements, and package deal arrangements. At the sixth annual meeting in 1973, the foreign ministers "directed that appropriate steps should be taken by ASEAN to implement those recommendations of the U.N. Study Team which can be agreed upon."

Thus, step by step the ASEAN countries approached economic integration. By 1974, they had in principle agreed to start a new type of regional cooperation toward economic integration. However, at this point concrete programs were
yet to be agreed upon. In order to concretize the orientation of integration, the foreign ministers decided in 1975 to set up the meeting of economic and planning ministers to deal with those technical issues to clear up. It is undeniable that the abovementioned UN report (1974) played no small a role in paving the way to launch a new goal of ASEAN's intra-regional cooperation.

Under those circumstances described above, it can be said that the foreign ministers empowered the economic ministers to conduct intra-regional economic cooperation toward integration. While the foreign ministers' meeting remained as the highest policy-making organ of ASEAN, and in the position of supervising the economic ministers' meeting, this began to act independently of that. With respect to the organizational structure, the economic ministers created an ad hoc committee on restructuring of ASEAN's permanent, special and ad hoc committees. Accordingly, several committees under the economic ministers' meeting came into existence simultaneously with those under the foreign ministers' meeting. Some important economic functions were conducted by two different kinds of organs, which was of course considered undesirable by the ASEAN countries.

The Start of Economic Integration in the Second Decade

The fundamental restructuring of ASEAN's functional committees took place during 1977 and 1978, leading eventually to eight committees for implementing regional
functional cooperation in socio-economic fields. Under the supervision of the meeting of ASEAN economic ministers were five economic committees: trade and tourism; industry, minerals and energy; food, agriculture and forestry; communications and transportation; and finance and banking. Under the auspices of the foreign ministers remained the socio-cultural committees on science and technology; on culture and information; and on social development. Each committee worked to seek and implement various types of cooperation and integration.

As a result of the abovementioned reform, a so-called division of labor was established between economic ministers and foreign ministers. Moreover, regular mutual consultation was established among other ministers such as education, labor, information and social welfare. There were undeniably more talks than decisions. Nevertheless, the establishment of other ministerial meetings broadened the scope of trans-governmental cooperation within ASEAN, and also activated functional committees further.

4.2 The Limited Strengthening of Administrative Machinery

Decentralized, Minimal Administration

Originally ASEAN had considerably a decentralized administrative structure. The host of the annual meeting of foreign ministers and hence of the standing committee rotated every year; that of permanent committees also rotated usually every three years. The administration was taken care
of by the national secretariat in the foreign office of each participant state. For the purpose of smooth functioning of the organization's activities, the meeting of ASEAN secretaries-general was established by the five national secretariats-general. It was usually held on a quarterly basis.

Just like any other international diplomacy, the negotiation at the senior officials' level played an important role in clearing out as many differences as possible in ASEAN. The meeting of secretaries-general was responsible for the preparation of the final draft for the foreign ministers' meeting. Many administrative decisions on functional cooperation were made at this level. For example, the set up of functional committees, and the transformation from ad hoc into permanent committees were decided at the meeting of secretaries-general, and later approved at the foreign ministers' meeting.

Related to administration is the budget. ASEAN started its operation without its own funding, and the host country was responsible for spending. Such a procedure was, needless to say, very defective for implementing any cooperative programs other than just the convening of the meetings. In order to study financial matters, the foreign ministers agreed to set up an ad hoc committee on finance at the second annual meeting in 1968. Overcoming the intra-regional conflict, the ASEAN countries agreed to establish a common fund in the following year. At the third annual meeting, the foreign ministers signed the Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the Association of South-East Asian Nations,
and transformed the ad hoc committee on finance into the permanent committee. Each participant state was to contribute a million U.S. dollars, and a common fund was allowed to be increased from time to time. This fund was agreed upon to be used for the purpose of implementing projects which had been approved by the ASEAN foreign ministers. The fund was operated by the permanent committee on finance. Along with a large-scale organizational reform, the committee was transformed into a committee on budget, and supervised by the foreign ministers' meeting.

The Creation of the Central Machinery

As the concretization of intra-regional economic cooperation began to be seriously considered within ASEAN, strengthened administrative machinery was also designed. At the fifth annual meeting in 1972, the foreign ministers agreed to consider the need and desirability of a central secretariat. In the following year, they "decided that the time had come for the strengthening of the structure of ASEAN by establishing a Central Secretariat for ASEAN", and set up a special committee to consider the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, which consisted of secretaries-general of the five countries' national secretariats.

The establishment of the central secretariat was discussed both at the abovementioned special committee and at the meeting of secretaries-general. At the sixth annual meeting of foreign ministers, Indonesia already offered to
provide the secretariat. Although the Philippines later made a counter-proposal to set it in its territory and to expend all the cost, it was decided to share the expense on an equal basis, and finally the Philippines withdrew its proposal.

At the seventh annual meeting of foreign ministers in 1974, it was finally decided to establish the central secretariat in Jakarta. In the following months, secretariat's organization, posts and budgets were negotiated about at the consecutive meetings of secretaries-general. The draft agreement on the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat must have been finalized by early 1975. The ASEAN foreign ministers initialed the text of the Agreement for submission to their respective governments.

The Limits of the Central Machinery

When the ASEAN leaders gathered in the island of Bali for the first ASEAN summit meeting, the foreign ministers signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. The secretariat was formally set up in June 1976.

Although the establishment of the ASEAN secretariat was undoubtedly the first major step to centralize the administration and to make procedures more effective, the structure was simple, and the power was weak. In terms of the structure, the secretariat consisted of three bureaus: economic, science and technology, and social and cultural. All together, there
were only seven high-ranking officials, all of whom were to be appointed by the standing committee upon nomination by the participant states: three of whom were bureau directors of at least counselor rank, and the remaining were a foreign trade and economic relations officer, an administrative officer, a public information officer, and an assistant to the secretary-general of at least first secretary rank, and the three-year term of appointment was to be equitably distributional and rotational.\textsuperscript{23}

The secretary-general was to be appointed by the ASEAN foreign ministers upon nomination by the participant on a rotational basis, whose tenure was to be two years.\textsuperscript{23} His function and responsibilities were those which were entrusted by the foreign ministers' meeting and standing committee, and his main task was coordination rather than decision-making on functional cooperation.\textsuperscript{24} As a matter of formality, the central secretariat including the secretary-general and his staff, was subject to the foreign ministers' meeting, but substantially they were kept under the control of the participant states.\textsuperscript{25}
4.3 Building Up Machinery for Collective Action vis-à-vis the Outside World

ASEAN's Committees to Deal with External Economic Affairs

When intra-regional cooperation on economic and social fields had barely started, ASEAN had already shown a sign of "policy externalization." By 1971 it had been foreseen, and in January 1972 it became unavoidable when Britain signed the Treaty of Accession with EEC, that Malaysia and Singapore would lose the preferential trade arrangement of the Commonwealth. This would directly affect only two of the five ASEAN countries, but ASEAN took advantage of this occasion to formulate a common stand vis-à-vis EEC. For that purpose, ASEAN decided to set up the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) in January 1972. At the fifth annual meeting, the foreign ministers approved the creation of SCCAN. It held its first meeting in Bangkok, in June of that year, followed by the creation of the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) consisting of the ASEAN ambassadors there to carry out regular communication with EEC. SCCAN and its subsidiary ABC were the first machinery of ASEAN for the new purpose of jointly dealing with actors outside the region.

ASEAN's concern with extra-regional trade was not limited to joint negotiations with EEC. In the year following the set up of SCCAN and ABC, ASEAN established additional machinery for multilateral negotiations. That is, at the sixth annual meeting, the foreign ministers "agreed that there was an urgent need to make necessary preparations for, and a collective
approach to the forthcoming Multilateral Trade Negotiations" in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).\textsuperscript{29} That top-level agreement was concretized by the establishment of the committee of the ASEAN senior trade officials, and of the ASEAN Geneva Committee (AGC) composed of the ASEAN representatives to the United Nations in Geneva.\textsuperscript{30}

Accumulating Links with Third Parties

The collective bargaining of ASEAN with extra-regional powers was formalized first against Japan. The initiative was taken by ASEAN, and started with accusation. The ASEAN foreign ministers expressed "their grave concern" with Japan's increasing export of synthetic rubber.\textsuperscript{31} Subsequently, the ad hoc committee of the ASEAN senior officials on synthetic rubber was set up. Within ASEAN, not all the participants had been affected by Japanese synthetic rubber. At the annual meeting, the harshest voice came from the Malaysian representative, which was no surprise at all due to the country's heavy dependence on natural rubber exports. It is worth noting that other ASEAN countries whose economies did not heavily depend on natural rubber supported those which depended on it, and unanimously criticized Japan.

In August, ASEAN rather than the ASEAN countries, proposed that Japan convene a ministerial meeting between the two parties with regard to the rubber issue; Japan agreed, perhaps reluctantly. Based on an agreement in the ministerial meeting in November 1973, the ASEAN-Japan Forum on
Synthetic Rubber was established. In the following year, the Japanese government promised the country's exports of synthetic rubber would not affect natural rubber producers; the ASEAN foreign ministers "expressed their satisfaction" with the consequence of "the ASEAN joint approach." 32

The success in dealing with Japan may have most likely encouraged the ASEAN countries to adopt more collective operations vis-à-vis extra-regional powers. In fact, ASEAN started joint dialogues: with Australia in 1974; with New Zealand and with Canada in 1975; with the United States in 1977.

Established in 1975, the meeting of economic ministers was originally supposed to take care of primarily intra-regional cooperation on various economic fields. However, the ASEAN heads of governments assigned to the meeting the discussion of "the formulation of joint approach to international commodity and other economic problems..." 33

Consequently, the meeting of economic ministers has been functioning as the machinery for dealing with parties outside the region. It was the economic ministers who considered a joint approach, and agreed "to establish ASEAN machinery for dialogue with third countries or groups of countries..." 34

Accordingly, informal dialogues with Canada and New Zealand were formalized. Since 1977, already formalized dialogues with Japan and Australia were upgraded to forum status. 35

As ASEAN increased the more or less regularized
communication and negotiation channels with powers outside the region, its participant states adopted "the division of labor" policy to deal with them. Each participant is responsible for the coordination of the following parties:

Indonesia--------Japan and the European Communities,
Malaysia----------Australia and West Asian Countries,
the Philippines------U.S.A. and Canada,
Singapore---------New Zealand, and
Thailand----------UNDP and ESCAP.36

Thus, although there is no permanent machinery within ASEAN to deal with third parties, except for the ad hoc committee of the ASEAN senior officials on synthetic rubber which took care of the ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rubber, this function is differentiated in order to smooth extra-regional relations.

Collective Action as Mutual, Flexible Responsiveness

Thus, ASEAN had started its collective approach on international economic issues by the early 1970's. It is true that the entry of Britain into the EEC was most influential in uniting ASEAN vis-à-vis EEC, and that Japan's increasing export of synthetic rubber solidified the ASEAN countries vis-à-vis Japan. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to say that the ASEAN countries were forced to do so by external pressure. For not all the ASEAN countries were affected by external pressure, and less affected partners decided to support more affected partners on behalf of the latter. Faced with unfavor-
able international environments, the ASEAN countries adopted the collective approach toward the third parties outside the region. ASEAN was responsive enough to take efforts in order to improve its environment. In the early 1970's, the ASEAN countries revealed their mutual responsiveness to some partners' need for the support of others.

ASEAN's increasing contacts with third parties described above might be called "policy externalization." However, its process is not the way Schmitter theorized. ASEAN's policy externalization was not the consequence of the emergence of more or less integrated body so that the participants are compelled to adopt common policies. In the absence of an integrated region, the ASEAN countries discovered the utility of a common policy and collective action vis-à-vis nonparticipants. It is evident that policy externalization does not necessitate internal integration. Without an integrated regional economy, the participant countries might find issues in which they share common interests and may agree to take action collectively. Such a development may be more likely for highly integrated countries, but certainly possible for barely integrated ones like the ASEAN states. The critical question is not how much they are integrated, but how far they are willing to act jointly. In the case of ASEAN, the participants were not rigidly bound to the formal goal and structure. Almost regardless of the goal, they were able to carry out whatever type of cooperation they wanted.
4.4 Regional Security-Seeking

The Informal Meeting for Mutual Consultations

When the foreign ministers convened for the first time since the establishment of ASEAN, and took an initial step to concretize intra-regional cooperation in economic and social fields, they also met informally, and consulted with one another on regional security issues. The topics included the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, foreseeable impacts upon Malaysia and Singapore of British withdrawal from the east of Suez by 1971, American troops and bases in Southeast Asia, and so on.

The most important outcome of that informal meeting held on the second day of the second annual meeting of foreign ministers was not the fact that they carried out mutual consultations on security. Of vital importance to ASEAN in the years to follow was the fact that the foreign ministers agreed to meet informally so as to discuss any urgent international or regional problems when it arises. It was reportedly Thanat who proposed to institutionalize the informal meeting to discuss political and security matters affecting the ASEAN region. 37

Thus, although the ASEAN Declaration did not specify any cooperation in a political field, the foreign ministers took advantage of the ASEAN annual meeting to consult mutually with little difficulty on unspecified matters. As discussed in the previous chapter, the ASEAN countries were invariably concerned with international developments affecting regional
politico-security conditions when they were shaping the new organization that was to become ASEAN. The annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers was doubtlessly a great opportunity to exchange information and views and to consult with one another. It even may have been a good excuse for doing so.

The Need for Mutual Security

At the second annual meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers were faced with a more serious problem which might dissolve the organization. At the time, the survival of ASEAN was challenged by the Malaysian-Philippine dispute over Sabah. In 1966, both countries normalized diplomatic relations while the dispute had been "frozen." In early 1968, the Philippine government started to claim its sovereignty over Sabah, and worsened relations with Malaysia. The other three ASEAN foreign ministers offered their good offices between disputing foreign ministers at the second annual meeting, which was followed by an agreement to "cool down" the dispute so as to seek the way of peaceful settlement.

Despite the tacit agreement, the territorial dispute escalated to the extent that each country closed its embassy in the other country in November, 1968. Worried about such a development, Thanat tried to take opportunity of the third ECAFE ministerial meeting on economic cooperation which was scheduled to be held in Bangkok from December 11 to 14, which the Malaysia Deputy Premier and the Philippine Foreign
Secretary planned to attend. On December 12, the Indonesian and Singaporean foreign ministers arrived in Bangkok, but not for attendance at the ECAFE meeting. Nonetheless, it had not been agreed when and whether the ASEAN foreign ministers should meet, because the Malaysia government was very reluctant to negotiate with the Philippine counterpart. Finally, after the ECAFE meeting was over, the foreign ministers met informally at Bangsaen on December 14, 1968. Thanat, who kept taking the initiative, said to the press that the foreign ministers from the ASEAN countries were interested in regional peace, prosperity and stability, and in mutual understanding. Although he dared not mention whether the Sabah dispute was on the agenda, it was the issue which the foreign ministers discussed. Although no agreement was made public, they said with one voice that Malaysia and the Philippines had agreed to solve the conflict peacefully, and that it would never cause the dissolution of ASEAN.

Thus, the first informal meeting was convened in order to solve an intra-regional conflict, only a few months after it was agreed that the informal meeting might be held. Such a type of meeting may have been designed for the purpose of dealing with extra-regional developments affecting the region. As a matter of fact, the first occasion was utilized in order to deal with the management of intra-regional conflict. Obviously, not only Thanat but other ASEAN foreign ministers were seriously concerned with the conflict between two participants, and could not as bystanders
simply sit by and observe the situation worsening. They made every effort to ameliorate Malaysian-Philippine relations. These two governments seemed compelled not to dissolve ASEAN, and assured the other ASEAN participants that they put the highest priority on ASEAN's survival rather than on antagonistic nationalism.

In its second year, ASEAN came to possess important precedents of regional cooperation on mutual security through the management of the intra-regional conflict. For the ASEAN countries, ASEAN was the single existing, and indispensable, mutual consultation network that enabled them to conduct face-to-face communication regularly.

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines was announced on December 16, 1969, the first day of the third annual meeting. The Sabah dispute was "frozen" again, and the two countries resumed cooperation within the framework of ASEAN. The critical period was over.

Increasing Common Concern with External Security

Since ASEAN was established in 1967, its participants were experiencing rapid changes in their international politico-security environment. In January 1968, the British labor government published its plan of withdrawal from east of Suez by 1971. A year later, President Nixon's Guam doctrine made clear American disengagement in continental Southeast Asia. In the same year, Brezhnev proposed a vague
but important idea of collective security system in Asia. There was every reason for the ASEAN governments to worry about the region's future.

As mentioned earlier, the ASEAN governments were deeply concerned with China. Since 1970 it began to send messages to the ASEAN countries, vis-à-vis Malaysia and Singapore in particular, regarding its intention of accommodation with those governments. Much more influential was the dramatic start of the Sino-American rapprochement in July 1971. In October of that year, People's Republic of China took over the seat in the United Nations from the Kuomintang government in Taiwan. The ASEAN countries had to reconsider their own relations with China.

The ASEAN foreign ministers were attending the United Nations General Assembly when China won the UN seat. They met with one another informally in New York, and discussed the future of regional security. In November they met again in Kuala Lumpur, and proclaimed the Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) based on the agreement that "the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective..." The idea of neutralizing Southeast Asia had been one of the main pillars of Malaysian foreign policy since the late 1960's; it had been advocated particularly since Razak took the office of Premiership in 1970. Compared with Malaysia, the other four participants of ASEAN were less committed to the neutralization plan. As a result of the ASEAN practice, the declaration on which all the ASEAN countries agreed
turned out less concrete and less specific than the Malaysian prototype.

The orientation toward ZOPFAN was initiated by the ASEAN countries, but should not be limited, in their view, to the ASEAN region. ZOPFAN was to be wider than the area just containing the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN foreign ministers decided to set up a committee of senior officials on the creation of ZOPFAN. The committee was to consist of only representatives from the ASEAN countries initially, but was also expected to include senior officials from other countries. Although no other countries has joined the neutralization plan, that committee is not yet considered to be either special or ad hoc committee of ASEAN. If formality is concerned, ZOPFAN was initiated by the ASEAN countries, but it is not ASEAN's plan.

The Regularization of Informal Meetings

The proclamation of the Declaration of ZOPFAN was certainly an important event. But its importance did not lie on its substance. Like the Bangkok Declaration, it was nothing but a vague general intent. Neither the procedure toward neutralization nor its time table was specified. The declaration was important because it means that the ASEAN countries committed themselves to more formal political cooperation than mutual consultations on regional security.

Because the Declaration of ZOPFAN was the first political commitment collectively made by the ASEAN countries, the
Kuala Lumpur meeting of foreign ministers began to be regarded as the first special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers although it was actually an informal meeting. No matter whether that meeting was special or informal, the obvious fact was that the ASEAN countries used ASEAN as the framework of mutual consultations and collective actions with respect to politico-security issues. Even though the ASEAN governments continued to insist that ASEAN was not a political, but a socio-economic organization, it was more rhetoric than reality.

When the ASEAN foreign ministers convened in Singapore in April 1972 for the fifth annual meeting, they held an informal meeting again. On that occasion, another major step was taken toward the institutionalization of cooperation in the politico-security field. That is, the foreign ministers agreed to meet at least once a year so as to consult with one another on the international affairs affecting the region. Thus, the informal meeting of foreign ministers from the ASEAN countries, which had been already de facto formalized, became regularized henceforth.

Only a few months later, in July 1972, the first informal meeting that referred to the abovementioned agreement was held, and a half year later another informal meeting was held.43

At the sixth annual meeting of foreign ministers, another aspect of ASEAN's politicization took place. That is, the foreign ministers agreed to establish the ASEAN coordinating committee for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Indochina States (ACCRRIS). This has been the only one
genuine ASEAN committee to deal with more or less politico-
security issues. Before ASEAN found the way to play a role
in Indochinese situations, the communists took over all the
regimes in Indochina. ACCRRIS is still in existence as an
ad hoc committee, but its recent activity is unclear.

The regularized informal meeting of foreign ministers
became difficult to distinguish from ASEAN’s formal struc-
ture. During the sixth annual meeting of foreign ministers
in April 1973, the regularized informal meeting was held on
one day. Since then, this arrangement has become a tradi-
tion of the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers.

From the second through the fifth annual meetings, two
days had been spent at each meeting. Since the sixth, the
annual meeting had been held for three days, and the second
day had been spent on the regularized informal meeting. The
informal meeting was barely recognized as separate from the
annual meeting, because the press release was issued as
separate from the joint communiqué of the annual meeting.
As will be examined thoroughly in the next chapter, the
agenda of the informal meeting was the other issues than
what ASEAN was supposed to do in the economic, social, cul-
tural and scientific fields. Namely, it was focused on issues
on politico-security matters.

Thus, in the way described above, the ASEAN countries
built up the machinery to deal with both intra- and extra-
regional issues concerning security, step by step in almost
every year in the early 1970's. The structure to support
ASEAN's politicalization had been constructed before 1975.
The Formalization of Political Cooperation

The organizational reform which took place in the mid 1970's was primarily of the machinery for functional cooperation and of the administrative structure, but it indirectly affected the foreign ministers' meeting too. Particularly the establishment of the meeting of economic and national planning ministers was significant. In 1976, the newly established economic ministers' meeting took over all economic cooperation tasks from the foreign ministers' meeting, and obtained control of most functional cooperation activities. Furthermore, establishment of other ministerial meetings such as information, labor and education took the burden of managing remaining functional cooperation away from the foreign ministers' meeting. Due to those organizational changes, the decision-making of high policies and cooperation in politico-security fields became the most important tasks for the foreign ministers' meeting.

In addition, political cooperation was officially specified as part of the objectives of ASEAN for the first time in its entire history, on the occasion of the summit meeting in 1976. Because it was made public by heads of governments that ASEAN should promote regional cooperation in a political field, there was no reason any longer for the meeting of foreign ministers to deemphasize political cooperation. The ASEAN foreign ministers did not have to distinguish the meeting of ASEAN to perform functional cooperation as specified originally in the Bangkok Declara-
tion on the one hand, from the meeting of the ASEAN countries which deals with political and security issues affecting the ASEAN region, on the other.

Thus, in the mid 1970's, the conditions enabling ASEAN to formalize its political cooperation function was matured.

In accordance with the established practice since 1973, a regularized informal meeting was held during the ninth annual meeting in June 1976. On this occasion, however, the press release for the informal meeting was not issued any longer. The informal meeting began to be treated as if it had been the closed-door session of the annual meeting. At the tenth annual meeting in August 1977, the informal meeting was not even mentioned, and the foreign ministers spent two days at the closed-door session. Thus, the regularized informal meeting was absorbed by the annual meeting. The machinery for dealing with the politico-security cooperation of the ASEAN countries was finally formalized completely as part of the structure of ASEAN proper.

4.5 ASEAN's Comprehensive Development in its First Decade: A Summary

Developmental Process and Expansion in the Domain of Integration

Referring to the creation of a "peaceful community," the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 characterized ASEAN as a functional organization for regional cooperation in socio-economic fields. However, concrete procedures in that direction were undecided at the time of inception, and were to be
later specified by the meeting of foreign ministry, the highest decision-making body. In short, with full potential for regional integration, ASEAN was created without any acutality.

The transformation of potentiality into actuality can be characterized as a particular sequential order with some overlapping periods. In other words, ASEAN developed step by step, as follows.

It is not a surprise that ASEAN started to institutionalize the machinery for cooperation in social and cultural fields. For that was the only specified range of ASEAN-based cooperation in the Bangkok Declaration. It took five years, namely 1967-72, to reach a saturation point where ASEAN came to contain eleven functional committees. Their tasks were limited to very specific subjects including cultural exchange and infrastructure building.

Surprising is the fact that ASEAN had completed institutionalizing the machinery to deal with both intra- and extra-regional security by 1972. That was the informal meeting of foreign ministers, and was made of a maximal use for the above purposes. Actually, ASEAN's development in that direction was not surprising if its formation process is well understood. The five countries which would become the participants of ASEAN were deeply concerned with two aspects of security. One was security from outside threats, or the avoidance of war caused by interventions. The other was security among themselves, or the avoidance of intra-regional conflicts. Therefore, such development was quite
136
natural.
Subsequently, ASEAN became concerned with its external
relations with industrial countries and with international
organization on international economic problems.

The initial

step was establishment of the machinery to deal with EEC in
By the time ASEAN

1972.

States in 1977,

it

set up a forum with the United

had been already working in several institu-

tionalized arenas with third parties outside the region.
Thus, during the second half of its first decade, ASEAN
acquired the capability of common actions,

and hence of

political cooperation, vis-a-vis third parties on economic
issues.
ASEAN's organizational reform was initiated by the
decision to establish its central secretariat in 1973, in
order to respond to increasing activities and to the need
for higher efficiency.

Although the central secretariat

began to operate in 1976, its authority and responsibility
has been very limited.

The establishment of the economic

ministers' meeting led to the overhaul of existing functional
committees and set up new management during 1977-78, for
the same reason as the establishment of central secretariat.
Thus, the period 1974-78 can be characterized as the age
of organizational reform of ASEAN.
It was 1974 when the ASEAN countries decided to start
cooperation toward regional economic integration.

In the

following year, the meeting of economic ministers was created, and it took over from the foreign ministers' meeting
the responsibility for handling economic cooperation.


Substantial cooperations started after ASEAN entered into its second decade. Trade liberalization, package deals, and the industrial complementation were the main pillars of ASEAN's intra-regional cooperation for economic integration. The developmental process described above can be summarized as Figure 4.2. ASEAN's organizational structure had started to develop well before the communist victory in Indochina in 1975.

In sum, it can hardly be said that ASEAN is a supranational organization. For the highest decision-making body is still the meeting of foreign ministers; the central secretariat has yet no power to influence its participant governments. Being an inter-governmental organization, however, ASEAN had acquired a certain unified capability of performing collective actions. In another respect, ASEAN is an entity to generate and implement various agreements in accordance with broadly defined goals of the organization. More fundamentally, ASEAN has been providing its participant governments with the forum of mutual consultation on almost any subject that concerns one or more participants.

By the early 1970's, ASEAN had already been equipped with the machinery, either formal or informal, to perform cooperation not only in intra-regional socio-economic fields, but also in politico-security fields and in extra-regional economic fields. It can be said that ASEAN had extended its structure over the entire domain of regional integration presented in Chapter 2, in its very early days. (Fig. 4.3). ASEAN is better understood, therefore, as a diffuse-purpose
Figure 4.2. The Developmental Process of ASEAN's Organizational Structure in its First Decade
TOWARD SECURITY

Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochina States

Senior Officials' Committee on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

The informal meeting of foreign ministers

external sphere

regional sphere

national sphere

TOWARD COMMUNITY

Eleven permanent committees

The Special Committee of Central Banks

TOWARD ECONOMY

The Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Officials on Synthetic Rubber

Special Coordinating Committee -- ASEAN Brussels Committee

The Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Officials on Trade -- ASEAN Geneva Committee

Figure 4.3. ASEAN's Machinery as of 1973, Covering Most of the Domain of Regional Integration
organization to carry out almost any agreed cooperation, rather than as a functional organization to pursue certain specified goals, from the very time of the foundation.

The Confirmation of ASEAN's Comprehensive Orientation toward Regional Integration

For the almost fifteen-year old ASEAN, the most important document is the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. It was proclaimed on the occasion of the first ASEAN summit meeting in February, 1976. It was the first document that was signed by the heads of governments. It specified ASEAN's goals for the first time since its founding declaration in 1967. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the ASEAN heads of government, for the first time, endorsed explicitly ASEAN's activities in various fields. The ASEAN presidents and prime ministers launched ASEAN's objectives and programs in the document far more clearly than their foreign ministers did in the Bangkok Declaration nine years earlier.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord became authoritative guidelines for ASEAN's cooperation and integration in its second decade.

Political cooperation was publicly counted as part of ASEAN's objective. As a whole, ASEAN was to cooperate "in the pursuit of political stability." It is in clear contrast with the original statement in the Bangkok Declaration in which the word, "political," was almost taboo. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the political objectives
came first:

"1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

"2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality."47

In the section where the ASEAN cooperative programs of action were listed, political cooperation came first again, and was elaborated into the seven items, which included the pacific settlement of intra-regional disputes. The most general program was "(s)trengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating positions, and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions."48

In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, "security" cooperation was specifically mentioned as "continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests." At a glance, such a stand seems the same as ASEAN's practice prior to 1976. However, this interpretation is not acceptable because the informal meeting to deal with security matters had already been substantially formalized. "Security" in the declaration should be interpreted as narrowly defined security, i.e., military arrangements that were some type of collective defense. In fact,
bilateral military cooperation had been started much earlier between Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Malaysia and Thailand along their borders to cope with anti-government guerillas. Cooperation on security matters in a broad sense of ours can be, and actually has been, carried out in accordance with ASEAN's objective of strengthening political solidarity.

Regional cooperation in an economic field was also specified concretely. The cooperative programs were classified into five categories: (1) cooperation on basic commodities, particularly food and energy; (2) industrial cooperation; (3) cooperation in trade; (4) joint approach to international commodity problems and other world economic problems; and lastly (5) machinery for economic cooperation. The last category assigned tasks to the meeting of economic ministers, and the first two categories specified the intra-regional economic cooperation. Interestingly, cooperation in trade included both the promotion of intra-regional trade and the export drive to markets outside the region. The cooperation in extra-regional trade was further specified in the fourth category above. If not earlier, it became obvious that ASEAN could act as a unity in international economic scene. Regional economic integration in the form of trade liberalization was not the only objective of ASEAN, but became part of it.

Being part of the original goal, cooperation in social and cultural fields was also to be promoted further. There were altogether seven items of cooperative programs in those
fields as specified in the declaration.

Compared with the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was more extensive, more substantial and more specific. There were much more concrete programs in the new declaration. However, it should be noted that, except for a few programs of economic cooperation, both the goals and the programs were not new. They were not what the ASEAN countries would start to pursue since then. Instead, they had been already pursued by ASEAN by 1975. It is true that many differences had remained among the ASEAN countries until the eve of the summit meeting. In February 1976 alone, two foreign ministers' meetings and a two-day economic ministers' meeting were held to reach consensus. Nevertheless, or perhaps therefore, the substance of ASEAN's declared objectives and programs strongly suggests that the ASEAN heads of governments endorsed the organizations' past activities, and confirmed their continuation. Unlike many other regional organizations, ASEAN chose to remain without concrete commitment to the future goal or the future program, not to mention the time table.

The ASEAN countries have never suggested the possibility of political union or amalgamation. Provided the maintenance of sovereignty, the regional community building was more explicitly mentioned in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord than in the Bangkok Declaration. That is, "(m)ember states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community." The future image of ASEAN which the participant countries
foresaw was, theoretically speaking, a pluralistic security-community that settles intra-regional disputes by peaceful means. The community was to be secure as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality from the extra-regional disturbance. The community would act as a unified body of the participants in international political and economic arenas. Also, intra-regional socio-economic cooperation including integration programs was to be promoted so as to develop and strengthen each participant's economy, and hence the regional economy.
Notes for Chapter 4

2. (ASEAN 1978: 19)
3. For some critiques, such a custom was seen as inefficient way and the aste of manpower (e.g. Jørgensen-Dahl 1978). On the other hand, it was egalitarian, and enabled to involve many bureaucrats and private peole in ASEAN (E.G. Morrison and Suhrke, 1978)
4. (Joint Communiqué, May 9, 1974, Parag. 10)
5. (ibd. Parag. 10)
6. (ASEAN 1978)
7. (United Nations 1974)
8. (Joint Communique, April 18, 1973. Parag. 13)
9. (ASEAN 1978: 39)
10. (Joint Communiqué, August 7, 1968. Parag. 4)
11. (Joint Communiqué, Dec. 17, 1969. Parags. 6 and 7)
12. (The Agreement. Art. II.2.(a))
13. (Annex of the Agreement. Rule 1)
14. This committee should not be confused with the special committee of central banks and monetary authorities which dealt with financial cooperation.
15. (Joint Communiqué, April 14, 1972. Parag. 9)
16. (Joint Communiqué, April 18, 1973. Parag. 9)
17. (ibd, Parag. 9)
18. (Joint Communiqué May 9, 1974)
19. (Joint Communiqué May 15, 1975. Parag. 18)
21. (The Agreement. Art. V.1.)
22. (The Agreement. Art. IV)
23. (ibd. Art. III.1)

24. (ibd. Art. III.2)

25. Perhaps the most illustrative event to reveal the powerlessness of the secretariat is the dismissal of the secretary-general by his home government in 1978. The first secretary-general Dharsono, an Indonesian general, criticised the Indonesian government on regards unrelated to ASEAN. In early 1978, the government was determined to dismiss him, and sent its foreign minister to the four other capitals so as to obtain the consensus. In its official capacity, the chairman of the standing committee dismissed Dharsono. His term was completed by another Indonesian who was nominated by his government so as to replace Dharsono.

26. On the concept of policy externalization, see (Schmitter, 1969).

27. (Communique, the meeting of secretaries general)

28. (Joint Communiqué, April 14, 1972)

29. (Joint Communiqué. April 18, 1973. Parag. 10 the emphasis added)

30. While SCCAN and ABC are the special committees, both the senior trade officials' committee and AGC are classified into the ad hoc committees (ASEAN 1978: 19-21). This probably implies that ASEAN considers the relations with EEC is more permanent and perhaps more important than the joint action on GATT.

31. (Joint Communiqué. April 19, 1973. Parag. 12 emphasis myself)

32. (Joint Communiqué. May 9, 1974. Parag. 13)


34. (Joint Press Statement, March 9, 1976. Parag. 20)

35. The arena of ASEAN's collective action vis-a-vis Japan had been already established under the name of forum, but its primary agenda had been supposed to be the synthetic rubber although other issues had been discussed.

36. (ASEAN 1978: 221)

37. (the Bangkok Post. August 8, 1968)

38. (Joint Communiqué. Dec. 17, 1969. Parag. 2.)

40. (The preamble of the Declaration). Although it is nowadays called the first special meeting of foreign ministers, i.e., one of the formal organs of ASEAN, the Kuala Lumpur meeting in November 1971 was not that sort. It was an informal meeting of foreign ministers from the ASEAN countries. One cannot find the phrase, "special meeting," anywhere either in the declaration or in the joint communique. It must be concluded that the Kuala Lumpur meeting was as informal as the Bangsaen meeting in December 1968 and as the New York meeting in October 1971.

41. Malaysia's plan of neutralization, and its connection with the Declaration of ZOPFAN was discussed in detail by Wilson (1974) and Ott (1974). (Ghazali 1971) is a view of the highest-ranking official of Malaysian foreign ministry.

42. (Joint Communiqué. November 27, 1971. Parag. 8)

43. Both of them were called the special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers: the second and the third, respectively.

44. (Joint Communiqué. April 18, 1973. Parag. 7)

45. (ASEAN 1978: 19)

46. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord)

47. (ibd.)

48. (ibd.)

49. When the eighth foreign ministers' meeting was held in May 1975, they seem to have informally agreed to convene the summit meeting in August. The major differences were on how firmly they should make commitment to ZOPFAN, and how extensively and concretely they should specify their economic cooperation including integration programs. Months were spent to reach a consensus among the ASEAN governments.

50. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord. emphasis myself)

51. (Deutsch et al. 1957)
Chapter 5. The Dynamics of ASEAN's Organizational Performance: the Activities of Foreign Ministers' Meetings

5.1 the Meeting of Foreign Ministers: Its Significance to ASEAN

The Position of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in ASEAN

In the organizational development and the expansion of activities, the most crucial role has been played by the meeting of foreign ministers. First of all, it is the highest policy-making body of ASEAN. Based on the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN's constitutional framework includes two types of foreign ministers' meeting. One is the annual meeting, which is sometimes simply called the ministerial meeting. This is the highest policy-making body. The other type is the special meeting which may be convened as needed. Although in existence since 1976, the meeting of heads of governments is not regularly held. The foreign ministers' meeting is still now the highest organ of ASEAN. Until the meeting of economic and planning ministers was set up in 1975, the foreign ministers' meeting had been the only ministerial machinery of ASEAN.

Second, decision-making at the foreign ministers' meeting is particularly important for ASEAN's activities because it was established with neither specific goals nor specific programs. ASEAN would have been without substance but for foreign ministers' collective decisions to activate the organization. As a result of foreign ministers' decisions,
ASEAN expanded its repertoire, and developed its organizational structure.

Third, and most fundamentally, the foreign ministers' meeting has been working as a political forum, a framework for mutual consultation. Recall that ASEAN was created largely for the purpose of expressing each participant government's good-will vis-à-vis the other participants, and of replacing mutual distrust with mutual understanding. Moreover, soon after the creation of ASEAN, its participant governments agreed to mutually consult on regional security issues affecting the stability of the ASEAN region. For the above purposes, direct face-to-face communications among the ASEAN foreign ministers were indispensable.

The Analytical Function of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The ASEAN foreign ministers did not limit themselves to policy-making on intra-regional socio-economic cooperation. They dealt with politico-security issues as well. It can be said that the issues brought into ASEAN by its foreign ministers ranged as wide as to cover the entire domain of regional integration discussed in section 2.2. To be sure, not all the issues were brought in for making decisions. Many of the issues were for mutual consultation or the exchange of views.

ASEAN inherited its decision-making code from its precursors, i.e., ASA and Maphilindo. Namely, consensus-building has been the only legitimate mode of ASEAN's decision-making. To reach consensus, mutual consultation is the crucial process. The unanimous agreement is required for
Figure 5.1. The Processing Flow of Issues at the Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers

Note: See Section 2.3 on the definitions of forum, council and agency as organizational functions.
ASEAN to make decisions.

Foreign ministers' collective decisions are often the agreement to set up the subordinate machinery of ASEAN or to endorse certain functions to their subordinates. Sometimes, decisions are concerning their own collective actions vis-à-vis third parties. The signing of agreements is certainly one of the important functions of foreign ministers' meetings.

In short, the meeting of foreign ministers processes issues: it makes consultations; if needed it makes decisions upon agreement; and it may act collectively vis-à-vis third parties. Such functions are schematically shown in Figure 5.1.

Types and Frequency of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting

During ASEAN's first decade, 1967-77, ten annual meetings of foreign ministers were held. Because of ASEAN's alphabetical rotation rule, meetings were held twice in each participant country (Table 5.1.a). In the same period, there was only one special meeting, which was held to commemorate the first summit meeting's first anniversary (Table 5.1.b).

In addition to the above two types of formal meetings, the ASEAN foreign ministers met informally on various occasions. As discussed in Section 4.4, they institutionalized informal meetings as a political forum in 1972. This institutionalized regular informal meeting was convened several times (Table 5.1.c). Also, there were many other informal meetings (Table 5.1.d). Because of its informal nature, the ASEAN
Table 5.1. The List of Meetings of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 1967-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Annual Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
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<td>5th</td>
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<td>6th</td>
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<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Special Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/ 24/1977 Manila</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Regular Informal Meetings*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/13-14/1972 Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/ 15/1973 Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/ 17/1973 Pattaya, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/ 8/1974 Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/ 14/1975 Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/ 25/1976 Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/ 6- 7/1977 Singapore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d. Other Informal Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/ 7/1968 Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/ 14/1968 Bangsaen, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/ 2/1971 New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/26-27/1971 Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/ 14/1972 Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/ 9-10/1976 Pattaya, Thailand**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/ 20/1976 Bali, Indonesia**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 1/1977 Kuala Lumpur***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/ 5/1977 New York</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Refer to Section 4.4. **Preparation for the first summit meeting. ***Preparation for the second summit meeting.
Table 5.2. The List of Meetings of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 1978-1980

a. Annual Meetings

11th  6/14-16/1978  Pattaya, Thailand
12th  6/28-30/1979  Bali, Indonesia

b. Special Meeting

None

c. Regular Informal Meeting

None*

d. Other Informal Meeting

1/12-13/1979  Bangkok
8/    16/1979  Kuala Lumpur
10/   /1979  New York
12/   14/1979  Kuala Lumpur
3/    6/1980  Kuala Lumpur
5/    24/1980  Geneva

Note:  *The function of the regular informal meeting was taken over by the annual meeting in 1977. Refer to Section 4.4.
foreign ministers' informal meeting did not leave a complete list of convening. Further examination could possibly identify some other meetings listed in Table 5.1.d.

In the period, 1978-80, annual and informal meetings were held as listed in Table 5.2.

In sum, there were at least twenty-seven meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers in the eleven-year period, 1967-1977. In other words, foreign ministers met either formally or informally 2.5 times a year. However, the per annum frequency in that period ranges from zero to five, as shown in Figure 5.2. In the first four years, 1967-70, the frequency fluctuated. The following several years, 1971-75, reveals a relatively stable pattern. In the late 1970's, 1976-80, foreign ministers' meetings were convened more frequently and more fluctuatingly than the previous years. The pattern of frequency of foreign ministers' meetings, especially that of informal meetings, reveals that the ASEAN foreign ministers met with one another more actively than they were supposed to meet annually.

5.2. The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as a Forum: Mutual Consultation in the Framework of ASEAN

Agenda for Mutual Consultations

Meetings in the framework of ASEAN were doubtlessly convenient occasions for the foreign ministers to make mutual
Figure 5.2. The Frequency of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meetings, 1967-1980

Source: For 1967-77, Table 5.1, and for 1978-80, Table 5.2.
consultation. But what did they discuss? Since Thai Foreign Minister Thanat persuaded his counterparts to keep the regional organization as informal as possible, in 1959, the ASA and ASEAN foreign ministers have been accustomed to discussing delicate or controversial issues with relative ease. However, they have been extremely careful not to release the contents of their discussion. Except for a few occasions, details of differences in opinions were not disclosed publicly. However, the press tried to cover the issues mutually consulted but unmentioned in the public documents.

To include those issues untouched in official documents is particularly important in order to better understand the performance of ASEAN as a forum. With respect to security matters in particular, issues which do not appear in official documents may most probably cover delicate international problems which the foreign ministers left unmentioned.

On the one hand, the exclusive use of only public documents would make the analysis more objective and easier to check. On the other hand, the result based on it would be less accurate and less relevant for the purpose of shedding light on ASEAN as a whole. At the expense of a guaranteed objectivity, this analysis will not rely only on the public document, but on the press report as well.

Fortunately, partial objectivity can be retained by using independent source of this analysis in order to identify issues brought into the foreign ministers' meeting. As an appendix to a book of ASEAN, A Concise Summary of ASEAN's Meetings' identified those issues which not only the
decision was made on, but also the mutual consultation was conducted on. This identification was based on both official documents and news reports.

According to the perspective developed in Chapter 2, those identified items are classified by this author into the following categories: (1) intra-regional cooperation on the community—economy aspect (CE₁); (2) intra-regional cooperation on the economy—security aspect (ES₁); (3) extra-regional cooperation on the economy—security aspect (ESₑ); (4) intra-regional cooperation on the security—community aspect (SCᵢ); and lastly (5) extra-regional cooperation on the security—community aspect (SCₑ). The first category is for functional cooperation which was, in substance, the only original objective of ASEAN explicitly specified in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. The second and the third categories are for primarily ASEAN's collective decision or action on the so-called economic security problem. The fourth and the fifth categories are for ASEAN's activities toward intra-regional conflict control and toward external security, respectively. Unless specifically mentioned, the region refers to the ASEAN region, rather than Southeast Asia entirely. If a certain item identified in the abovementioned data source is judged to include issues which are supposed to belong to more than one category, it is classified into them in proportion.
Table 5.3. The Distribution of Agenda of Foreign Ministers' Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Break-down distribution</th>
<th>Composite Distrib.</th>
<th>Number of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CE&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>ES&lt;sub&gt;i&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>ES&lt;sub&gt;e&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>7'</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: CE<sub>i</sub> = intra-regional community---economy aspect; ES<sub>i</sub> = intra-regional economy---security aspect; ES<sub>e</sub> = extra-regional economy---security aspect; SC<sub>i</sub> = intra-regional security---community aspect; SC<sub>e</sub> = extra-regional security---community aspect; ES = ES<sub>i</sub> + ES<sub>e</sub>; SC = SC<sub>i</sub> + SC<sub>e</sub>; Intra. = CE<sub>i</sub> + ES<sub>i</sub> + SC<sub>i</sub>.

Note: Data are unavailable in (Okabe (ed.) 1977: 367-177) for the following informal meetings: Bangsaen(1968), New York(1971), Pattaya(1976), Bali(1976), Kuala Lumpur (1977), and New York(1977).
Comprehensiveness and Differentiation

The ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting obviously dealt with not only intra-regional socio-economic issues which had been specified in the Bangkok Declaration. As shown in Table 5.3, the subjects which at least consulted mutually among the ASEAN foreign ministers scatter no only in CE$_1$, i.e., the original objective of ASEAN, but also in the other four categories none of which had been specified as explicit goals. It is quite impressive how extensively the meeting dealt with issues related to regional security, SC$_1$ and SC$_e$. As the highest policy-making machinery, ASEAN was unmistakably involved in regional security as well as functional cooperation. The view that ASEAN was functional body for socio-economic cooperation is therefore untenable.

From the perspective of this work, the ASEAN countries brought into the organization various problems which correspond to the entire domain of regional integration charted in Figure 2.2. Such problems were not brought into ASEAN in a random fashion. Rather, a certain order can be observed. In a word, it is the bifurcation of the problems into the annual and the informal meeting.

In terms of the organizational structure, as discussed in Section 4.4, the informal meeting was institutionalized to deal with political issues. As expected, it dealt predominantly with issues on the security—community aspect, i.e., SC$_1$ and SC$_e$ (Figure 5.3). Obviously, the ASEAN foreign ministers utilized informal meetings to discuss intra- and extra-
Figure 5.3. Agenda of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Informal Meetings

Source: Table 5.3.
Note: The dotted line indicates that there was at least one informal meeting held inbetween whose data are unavailable.
regional security issues.

As shown in Figure 5.4, agenda for the annual meetings were changing. In the first few years, the share of issues on the security—community aspect ($SC_i$ and $SC_e$) is relatively large. This corresponds to the pre-institutionalization of informal meetings. In other words, the ASEAN foreign ministers had not yet set up a political forum outside the annual meeting. As the $SC_i$ and $SC_e$ share declined, the share of issues on the intra-regional community—economy aspect ($CE_i$) increased. Since 1969 until 1975, the issues on $CE_i$ had occupied the largest share. However, the $CE_i$ share tended to decline since 1970 because the issues on the economy security aspect ($ES_i$ and $ES_e$) had emerged and increased since then. In 1976, the $SC_i$ and $SC_e$ share drastically increased. Recall that the Declaration of ASEAN Concord explicitly specified ASEAN's political goals and that the economic ministers' meeting was set to implement economic objectives. The annual meeting of foreign ministers became more political than the previous year.

The ASEAN foreign ministers discussed issues covering the entire domain of regional integration. In the initial few years, they discussed not only intra-regional socio-economic cooperation, but security issues at annual meetings. However, as they institutionalized the informal meeting as a political forum, they discussed more heavily economic issues including economic security problems at annual meetings. In 1975, they decided to set up the economic ministers' meeting for economic cooperation. In the following year, as poli-
The share of issues (%)

- intra-regional community-economy issues (CE₁)
- economic security issues (ES₁ + ESₑ)
- security issues (SC₁ + SCₑ)

Figure 5.4. Agenda of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Annual Meetings

Source: Table 5.3.
tical cooperation is publicly mentioned as one of the ASEAN objectives, the foreign ministers began to discuss security issues openly at annual meetings. Thus, the differentiation of the organizational structure and the specialization of function was observed in ASEAN at the ministerial level.

Externalization

As discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, the ASEAN countries created the organization more because of the indigenous necessity to create a peaceful community than of the external pressure of economic dependence and/or security threat. In fact, the ASEAN foreign ministers discussed more on internal issues than on external ones in the initial years. Issues belong to the intra-regional community—economy aspect (CE$_i$), the intra-regional economy—security aspect (ES$_i$) and the intra-regional security—community aspect (SC$_i$) are all related to internal problems. The CE$_i$ + ES$_i$ + SC$_i$ share is charted in Figure 5.5 for annual and informal meetings separately. The internal issues exceeded the external ones at most of the annual meetings (8 out of 10). Even at seven out of the nine informal meetings, the share of internal issues occupied more than 30% of the total issues.

To be sure, the ASEAN foreign ministers dealt with both internal and external issues. But it cannot be said that they were initially more concerned with external problems. In the initial few years, issues discussed were predominantly internal. Nor can it be said that the foreign ministers
Figure 5.5. Intra-Regional Issues at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meetings

Source: Table 5.3.
Note: The dotted line indicates that there was at least one meeting held inbetween whose data are unavailable.
later became concerned more with internal issues. For the share of internal issues reveals a declining trend for both the annual and informal meetings. The trend suggests the externalization of the ASEAN foreign ministers' concern.

5.3. The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as a Council: the Accumulation of Formal Collective Decisions

Among various types of collective decisions indicating regional cooperation or integration, most conspicuous and most formal is the binding agreement such as treaties, agreements and declarations. Although not all the important decisions are made in such formal means, those signed by the representatives of the participant governments may be thought of as constituting fundamental operational codes of the organization.

In the case of ASEAN, the accumulation of agreements is particularly important because the organization was created without specific agreements on its activities. Starting from the almost substance-free, and hence operationally insignificant, statement of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN's activities would have remained contingent without agreement on specific goals or programs.

During ASEAN's first decade, its foreign ministers signed eleven agreements or declarations; its heads of government signed a treaty and a declaration; and its governors of central banks and monetary authorities signed a memorandum (Table 5.4). Due to their importance, those
Table 5.4. ASEAN's Treaty, Agreements and Declarations

a. Signed by Foreign Ministers, 1967-77

1967 The Bangkok Declaration

1969 The Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media and Cultural Activities

The Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the Association of South-East Asian Nations

1971 The Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services among the Association of South-East Asian Nations

The Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

1972 The Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Aircraft in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents

1975 The Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Ships in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Ship Accidents

1976 The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat (initialled in 1975)

The ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters

The ASEAN Declaration of Principle to Combat the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs

1977 The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements

b. Signed by Other Than Foreign Ministers, 1967-77

1976 The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (by heads of government)

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (by heads of government)

1977 The Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Swap Arrangements (by the governors of central banks and monetary authorities)


1978 The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Fund

1979 The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and ASEAN Relating to the the Privileges and Immunities of the ASEAN Secretariat

The Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve
agreements signed by other than foreign ministers will be included in the analysis. By 1980, three additional agreements had been signed by the ASEAN foreign ministers (Table 5.4.c).

According to the subject of agreement, the abovementioned seventeen agreements produced during 1967-1980 can be plotted on the domain of regional integration as shown in Figure 5.6.

Truly many of ASEAN's agreements in its first decade were more or less technical, and some did not require an immediate or continuous implementation. Nevertheless, as the expression of each participant's willingness to cooperate with its partners of ASEAN, the signing agreements had significant implications on ASEAN's collective orientation toward regional integration. ASEAN's agreements accumulated in its first decade suggest, as a whole, that ASEAN has been active since the 1960's, and that it was not a functionally specific, but a diffuse organization covering the entire domain of regional integration.

Ostensible Impacts of Communist Victory in Indochina

While ASEAN produced seven agreements during the first nine years, 1967-1975, it produced as many as ten agreements during 1976 and 1980. The accumulation of agreements seems to support the view that communist victory in Indochina in 1975 activated ASEAN. Applying the idea of quasi-experimental design, the magnitude of the impact of Indochina's political change can be tested by comparing between the trend prior to
Figure 5.6. ASEAN's Agreements, 1967-1980, in the Domain of Regional Integration

Source: Table 5.4.
Note: Unlike other figures in the domain of regional integration, in this figure, the closer to the center, the more general, and the farther to the center, the more specific is the characteristics of each agreement.
1975 and trend post 1976. The linear trend for the two successive periods is as follows:

\[ ECA = 0.22 + 0.80(\text{Year} - 1966) \] during 1967-75, and
\[ ECA = -0.60 + 1.30(\text{Year} - 1966) \] during 1976-80,

where ECA denotes the estimated cumulative agreements. Differences between two trends indicate that the annual "productivity" of agreements increased by 60%, and that the gap at the break-down point was about four agreements. In other words, the hypothesized impact in 1975 was not only abrupt but also lasting. Hence, the communist take-over of Indochina seemed jumped up and accelerated ASEAN's activity of producing agreements.

However, in the above interpretation, the impact of communist victory may be exaggerated. First of all, out of the five agreements signed in 1976, two were in terms of social cooperation on drug abuse and natural disasters. Although it is conceivable that external threats solidify the participants so that the organization more actively produces socio-economic functional decisions, the ASEAN countries could not respond to the worsening security conditions by demonstrating their cooperation on narcotic drug abuse.

Second, additional two agreements had been ready to be agreed upon by 1975. The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat was initialed by the foreign ministers at the eight annual meeting held a few weeks later than the fall of Saigon, which was based on the agreement reached in 1974. As for the important document of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the draft treaty had been ready, and was
Figure 5.7. The Accumulation of ASEAN Agreements and Linear Trends

Source: Table 5.4.
adopted by the foreign ministers for each government's early approval at the same annual meeting in 1975.

The remaining agreement is the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Publicly declaring ASEAN's comprehensive objectives as delineated in Section 4.5, the ASEAN head of governments demonstrated their countries' solidarity vis-à-vis the neighboring communist Indochina.

Thus, except for the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, agreements in 1976 do not seem to have been responses to the hypothesized impact, i.e., communist victory in Indochina in 1975. If not, how can the sudden increase of signing agreements in 1976 be explained otherwise? Is there any model that can explain the entire cumulative process of agreements by ASEAN?

An Alternative Model of ASEAN's Indigenous Development

As observed in various aspects of preceding analyses, ASEAN's activities revealed the process of the concretization of vague principles, the change from the potential orientation to the actual cooperation, and the differentiation of organization's functions. They are, in a word, development. Because the accumulation of agreements is another process of ASEAN's development, it may be explained by an indigenously governed developmental pattern. The developmental process is often traceable by the so-called S-shaped curve with bottom and ceiling saturations, or the logistic curve.

The application of the logistic development pattern model to the cumulative agreements resulted in two periods
Cumulative number of agreements

Figure 5.8. The Accumulation of ASEAN Agreements and Logistic Developmental Patterns

Source: Table 5.4.
of development (Figure 5.8). The break-down point is about
the year 1974. The estimation of the curves is as follows:

The estimate of outputs = \frac{7}{1 + 12 \exp(-0.7 (\text{Year} - 1966))}
during 1967-74,

The estimate of outputs = \frac{12}{1 + 33 \exp(-1.0 (\text{Year} - 1973))} + 6
during 1974-80.

The estimated development pattern indicates several points. First, the first development saturated at seven outputs with a gradual take-off. The second development is relatively steep, and saturates at eighteen outputs. Second, as the first development approached the saturating point in the early 1970's, the second development started to take off. Third, while the first development accumulated six to seven outputs, the second has done eleven to twelve outputs. This implies that the latter is the more conspicuous. Fourth, by the end of the 1970's, the second development approached to the saturation point. Provided that the model is correct, this development had been completed by the beginning of the 1980's.

The second stage of development started to take place in 1974. This implies that ASEAN's remarkable development which occurred in 1976 was the consequence of the fastest growing phase within the second development pattern, and that the communist victory in Indochina happened at the time of developmental take-off more or less coincidentally. The gap between the estimated curve of development and the actual accumulation of outputs in 1975 suggests that Indochina's incidents impeded ASEAN's development perhaps because the
participant countries had to consult with each other on the new situation, and to postpone the scheduled agreements.

Moreover, the estimated result of development model reminds one of the statement made by the foreign ministers at the seventh annual meeting in 1974 that ASEAN had just entered in its second stage for more substantial cooperation. Although that statement was hardly taken seriously at the time, our retrospective examination suggests that one should have given credit to ASEAN's statement on its commitment to regional cooperation. ASEAN's self-image at the time seems to have reflected the saturation of the first stage of development according to our model, and ASEAN's determination to cooperate further seems to have resulted in the start of the following stage of development.

The validity of the development model applied here can be checked empirically by the mid 1980's. The model indicates that the second stage of development reached the saturating level by the early 1980's. If the model is correct, ASEAN may make decisions either to stay at that level of cooperative repertoire, or to proceed to the third stage for the further enhancement of cooperation's behavioral codes.

As shown above, the accumulation of outputs could be described as the incremental process by the linear trend model. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the way of accumulation and the impact of Indochina's regime change suggest that the augmented logistic development pattern is more appropriate to explain the reality. Both models revealed that ASEAN had not been inactive before the mid 1970's. While the linear trend model fits to
the widespread image on the impact of the fall of Saigon, the latter model goes along very closely with the actual process of ASEAN's generation of firm agreements. In short, not only theoretically, but also empirically, the development model of logistic pattern is better applicable to ASEAN.

5.4 The Foreign Ministers' Meeting as an Agency: Collective Deals with Outside World

Foreign Ministers' Collective Actions vis-a-vis Third Parties

In a verbal form, ASEAN's collective action at the authoritative ministerial level can date back in the early 1970's. If not likely to take place, the Declaration of ZOPFAN in 1971 was, in part, a proposal directed toward the neighborhood in Southeast Asia to join the ambitious program ASEAN would take initiative. This explains well why the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is open for accession by other Southeast Asian countries. If formality is concerned, the treaty took shape of the five ASEAN countries', rather than ASEAN's.

Another verbal collective action of the earliest ones was the accusation of Japan for its accelerated export of synthetic rubber. It was followed by Japanese government's response toward ASEAN as opposed to some of the ASEAN countries. As described in the previous chapter, ASEAN's collective action against Japan was organizationally equipped with a committee within ASEAN, and the arena against Japan by the name of the ASEAN-Japan Forum on Synthetic Rubber. Collective barbaining
was taken place not by the foreign ministers, but by governmental officials representing ASEAN.

During 1972-73, the ASEAN foreign ministers took action collectively for the peace in Vietnam. They sent the ASEAN proposal for the peace in Indochina to concerned countries including the United States, although they would receive no positive response. 5

Another example of the ministerial collective action in the early 1970's, is ASEAN's expressed concern with the Middle East conflict. In November 1973, an active foreign minister, Adam Malik, of Indonesia issued a press statement in his capacity of the chairman of the ASEAN standing committee. In the four-line statement, the ASEAN countries unifiedly urged the settlement of the conflict along with the line of the United Nations' actions, and took a pro-Arab attitude.

The above examples unmistakably reveal that the ASEAN countries had started to take collective actions vis-à-vis extra-regional actors, or in regards to extra-regional affairs, by the early 1970's. At the foreign ministers' level, however, those actions were verbal, i.e., the expression of their intent or wish or concern, rather than direct deal with the third parties outside the region.

Ministerial Links with Extra-Regional Counterparts

Until 1977 there had been no institutionalized machinery at the ministerial level to carry out specifically collective actions. ASEAN's ministerial contacts with extra-regional
powers was inaugurated drastically and dramatically. Taking the opportunity of gathering in Kuala Lumpur for the second ASEAN summit meeting, the heads of governments met with prime ministers of Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Three ministers were invited by Malaysian Premier Hussein on behalf of ASEAN, and met with the ASEAN counterparts both simultaneously and individually in Kuala Lumpur. In their respective joint communiqués with the ASEAN heads of government, the three invited prime ministers were made to promise more aid to ASEAN, more import from ASEAN, and further general support of ASEAN. The ASEAN countries expressed their strong preference to the collective deal over the participant countries' bilateral deals with those extra-regional powers.

The meeting with prime ministers of three Pacific powers had symbolic importance for ASEAN so as to be externally recognized as a united entity in a highly authoritative manner. The significance of the meeting was not merely symbolic. Japan, for instance, committed itself to a billion dollar aid to the ASEAN industrial projects. Note that the aid was not to the individual ASEAN countries, but to ASEAN. In the long run, by beginning with the direct contact at the summit level, ASEAN's ministerial collective action vis-à-vis extra-regional powers came to be empowered in various forms of cooperation and negotiation.

The ASEAN meeting with extra-regional powers were subsequently inherited by the foreign ministers' meeting. At the eleventh annual meeting at Pattaya in 1978, Japan's foreign minister met with ASEAN counterparts upon the completion of
the annual meeting. In 1979, the countries which sent their foreign ministers were Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Also the European Communities sent its chairman of the Ministerial Council, Ireland's foreign minister, to Bali where the twelveth annual meeting was held. In addition to meetings of the ASEAN foreign ministers with those five foreign ministers outside the region, a general meeting of all the ten ministers was held on that occasion. This type of direct communication with extra-regional powers became an established practice of ASEAN's collective action at the ministerial level.

As a consequence of the establishment of formal arena of collective action vis-à-vis extra-regional powers, ASEAN's meetings with those powers have increased in number. In the first half of the 1970's, the number of meetings steadily increased (Figure 5.9). With the outstanding exception in 1977, about three meetings have been held each year in the last few years.

On the other hand, although started very late, the collective deal with extra-regional powers at the ministerial level has revealed a rapid increase in the number of meetings. Such increase can be mostly attributed to the semi-institutionalization of the foreign ministers' meeting between ASEAN and extra-regional powers following the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting.

It seems clear that ministerial collective bargaining was encouraged by unprecedented meetings of heads of government in 1977. The practice was established recently. The
Table 5.5. Ministerial Meetings Between ASEAN and the Outside World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/6/1977</td>
<td>Heads of government Australia, Japan and New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/7/1977</td>
<td>Heads of government Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/7/1977</td>
<td>Heads of government Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8/1977</td>
<td>Heads of government New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17/1978</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/2-4/1978</td>
<td>Ministerial level USA (2nd ASEAN-US Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/20-21/78</td>
<td>Foreign ministers EC (1st ministerial meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/20-21/79</td>
<td>Ministerial level Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Australia, EC, Japan, New Zealand and US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/3/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/3/1979</td>
<td>Foreign ministers New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27/79</td>
<td>Economic ministers Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers EC (2nd ministerial meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/26/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/28/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/28/1980</td>
<td>Foreign ministers US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/28-29/80</td>
<td>Ministerial level EC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.9. ASEAN's Formal Contacts with Extra-Regional Powers*

Source: Table 5.5. for the ministerial contacts.
Notes: *Extra-regional powers include Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. **The 2nd ASEAN-US Forum in 1978 is counted as a ministerial contact.
impetus was the decision made by the ASEAN heads of government in 1976 to commit their countries further to collectively deal with extra-regional powers on international economic issues. The direct contact at the ministerial level is so conspicuous that ASEAN's collective action seems to have become externally active in the late 1970's. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that ASEAN had already performed its external collective activities in the early 1970's. Externally, in a word, ASEAN became increasingly active since the late 1970's.

5.5 ASEAN's Organizational Performance toward Regional Integration

ASEAN's Open-Ended Goal and Foreign Ministers' Involvement

ASEAN has never been a functional organization for regional economic integration or cooperation. More specifically, it has never been an organization to carry out a particular program or programs in the pursuit of a certain goal that was set in advance by the participant countries. ASEAN was created as its purposes were so general as to be almost open-ended. Lack of specific goals, or more appropriately open-endedness of goals made possible for ASEAN to develop much more generally than the functional organization is supposed to do. If ASEAN had been legally based on a treaty which specified the goal, procedures and the time-table, it must have been very difficult for ASEAN to revise the treaty in order to increment new goals one after another. In
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cultural fields. It was natural for foreign ministers to consult with each other on politico-security issues, and to attempt to resolve outstanding conflicts and disputes. In a word, that was what the ASEAN foreign ministers did, especially in the first few years. They communicated with each other, face to face, on whatever they thought were important for the ASEAN region. But for the meeting of foreign ministers, ASEAN would have been different from what we see now.

The Expansion of ASEAN's Functions

It is evident, from the discussion in Chapter 3, that the prospective ASEAN countries were most concerned with security among themselves. Their commitment to regional cooperation was, whatever it implied, the manifestation of mutual trust. In reality, mutual distrust was prevailing amongst their governments and peoples. Therefore, leaders of the ASEAN countries were hasty to commit mutually to the principle of cooperation and non-aggression. For that purpose, they thought, mutual communication and understanding had to be sought with no delay. At the governmental level, the foreign ministers' meeting and the standing committee would provide a regular channel of face-to-face communication. At the popular level, attention to and understanding of the neighborhood should be enhanced by tourism and mass media. It is symbolic that one of the first agreements signed by the ASEAN foreign ministers was the Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media and Cultural Activities.

The ASEAN countries began to make mutual consultation
on regional security from external threats, especially the situation after the anticipated American and British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. As the intra-ASEAN crisis was over by freezing the Sabal dispute in 1969, their concern with external security became conspicuous.

Supported by the increasing sense of mutual trust, the ASEAN governments chose to act collectively as ASEAN in declaring the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Like the Bangkok Declaration to establish ASEAN, the Declaration of ZOPFAN was neither concrete nor specific. It was the expression of general, if vague, intent of the ASEAN governments.

In general, a sense of community, or we-feeling, is a twin of a sense of environment, or they-ness. The existence of a certain common enemy does not necessarily create a sense of community within a particular group of people(s), but certainly the latter will, once it emerged, be reinforced by the former. The threat from China did not create the we-feeling among the ASEAN countries, but emerging we-feeling was enhanced by the threat of China. Other threats to the ASEAN countries were conceived with various degrees of acuteness, but the emerging sense of community made the ASEAN countries regard them as common threats. In short, commonness was emphasized; differences were deemphasized. But for the commitment to community building, the ASEAN countries would have responded differently and more individually toward external threats. In the grand design drawn by the ASEAN governments, the formation of a pluralistic security-community and regional security from external threats are closely interconnected.
Chronologically, security cooperation was followed by ASEAN's collective bargaining strategy on international economic problems. It is often said that cooperation on external problems is easier to carry out than that on internal problems, which may be true. However, it does never assure that a certain group of countries make common actions. As security cooperation had been, ASEAN's collective action strategy was certainly supported by the emerging sense of community among, at least, the governments. Moreover, collective actions worked with some effect: the ASEAN countries benefitted to various extents from such actions vis-à-vis third parties. Providing them with tangible benefit, external cooperation in the form of collective action reinforced the utility of collectiveness and the sense of community.

ASEAN's decision in 1974 to commit the participant countries to engage more substantial intra-regional economic cooperation implies two things. One is that the ASEAN countries conceded ASEAN's low performance of intra-regional economic cooperation. The other is, more importantly, that they expected ASEAN to perform such difficult tasks. While the ASEAN countries had been in need of economic development, they had dared not to cooperate with each other toward regional economic integration. The need had not resulted in economic expectations directed toward ASEAN. Therefore, ASEAN's abovementioned decision suggests that the ASEAN countries began to see ASEAN as viable and workable. This change in the image of ASEAN was underlined by the establishment of mutual trust and of the sense of community among the ASEAN governments, at least
durable enough to carry out intra-regional economic cooperation. Without the sense of community, economic integration may be pursued by technocratic bureaucrats with shared economic rationality. In fact, those bureaucrats who are relatively free of political stakes can make decisions and pursue certain goals within the range that were approved of by higher authorities in advance. Until 1974, in the case of ASEAN, the highest authority had not endorsed any form of economic integration.

As for foreign ministers, economic rationality was subject to mutual trust and a sense of community.

In 1976, the heads of government of the ASEAN countries assigned the meeting of economic ministers to promote cooperation on both intra-regional and external economic fields. The significance was two-fold. First, the sense of community had been so heightened that the heads of government were able to commit themselves to the economic integration of ASEAN. Second, economic ministers participated in ASEAN so that expertise became readily available in respective ministries. Thus, starting with cooperation among foreign ministers, ASEAN involved not only other ministers, but also the heads of government. At that time, again, the ASEAN countries had no concrete idea except for some broad guidelines already agreed upon. When economic cooperation was decided to promote, the economic ministers were allowed to substantiate whatever they agreed upon because they were so empowered by the heads of government. In terms of economic cooperation, the only task left in the hands of the foreign ministers is to sign Agreements.

In general terms, ASEAN's development in its first
decade can be described as the transformation of its potential orientations into its actual repertoire, the accumulation of various factions, the emergence of new organizational machinery, and the differentiation of the organizational structure. In short, those developmental processes of ASEAN can be summarized, a word, as the epigenesis of organization.
Notes for Chapter 5

1. See my argument in Section 3.2 and (Gordon 1966: 167) for Thanat's intention.

2. (Okabe (ed.) 1977: 367-377)

3. With respect to the quasi-experimental design, see (Campbell and Stanley 1966), (Caporaso and Roos (eds.) 1973), and (Cook and Campbell 1979).

4. (Art. 19)

5. ACCRRIS was set up to assist those actions by foreign ministers.

6. In 1980, the representative of EC was absent, while the foreign minister of Canada joined the extended ASEAN ministerial meeting.

7. It could be argued because the foreign ministers created ASEAN, it had little accomplishments in economic fields. For instance, (Morrison and Suhrke 1978: 277).
Chapter 6 ASEAN's Contributions and Limits

6.1. Questions of ASEAN's Contribution to Regional Integration

Since the creation of ASEAN, none of its participant countries have even suggested the possibility of political unification. Regional economic integration became operative at last in 1977. Despite intermittent proposals by some participants consensus has never been reached on the inclusion of military cooperation in ASEAN's already multi-fold objectives.

Did ASEAN contribute to its region's integration in its first decade? As described in Section 1.4, the answer given by most of the scholars is negative. Did ASEAN not contribute significantly? If not, what was the use of ASEAN for its participants?

To evaluate ASEAN's contribution, conventional criteria of integration such as political unification and economic union are not relevant. For ASEAN has not even attempted to unify its member states, to integrate its economies completely, or to form a military alliance. In a sense, ASEAN's objectives have been modest. But it can be said to be ambitious in the sense that its participant governments have been trying to establish a peaceful pluralistic security-community. Not many countries have succeeded in it.

Recall that the problems ASEAN has been coping with are regional security from external threats, economic development vis-à-vis external dependence, and community-building despite divergent interests among its member countries. The assessment
of ASEAN must be, therefore, multi-fold. In this chapter, ASEAN's contribution to regional integration will be assessed with respect to three main aspects according to our perspective of regional integration: community—economy, economy—security, and finally security—community.

6.2. Toward Socio-Economic Development and Interdependence

Trade Interdependence

Regional economic integration started with the conclusion of the Treaty of ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement in 1977. Since then, however, trade liberalization has been in gradual, but steady progress. As of early 1981, there were more than 6,300 items for tariff preferences.¹

Besides trade liberalization, ASEAN launched two more rationales for economic integration. They are ASEAN industrial projects and industrial complementation programs. In terms of ASEAN projects, Indonesian and Malaysian plants, both of which are urea fertilizer factories, are only now being implemented. 70% of total costs were financed by Japan, the remaining by the ASEAN countries. The industrial complementation programs are yet to be concretized.

In sum, ASEAN's economic integration started in its second decade. In order to assess ASEAN's accomplishments, attention should be paid to current economic activities; a full evaluation is not yet possible.

Due to no practice of trade liberalization, it can be
inferred that intra-regional trade must have not increased in its first decade. In a sense, such an inference is correct. When ASEAN was created, nearly 20% of ASEAN’s total trades were transacted within the region. Ten years later, the figure had dropped to 15%.

Nevertheless, it is misleading to conclude that trade interdependence in the ASEAN region had continued to decrease in ASEAN’s first decade. The reality is much more interesting to observe (Figure 6.1). Throughout the 1960’s and until early 1970’s, intra-ASEAN trade revealed an unmistakable declining trend. Recording the bottom in 1974, however, the trend seems to have shifted upward.

Fitting the straight line to the figure in the period 1963-1978 reveals the declining trend of intra-ASEAN trade. The trend for the entire period is

\[
\text{the estimate of percentage} = 23.05 - 0.61(\text{Year} - 1961).
\]

In order to examine the impact of the creation of ASEAN, the trends should be calculated for the period prior to 1967 and for the period later. Also, it is more appropriate to separate ASEAN’s self-evaluated first stage before 1974 from the second stage since 1974. Thus, three different periods are assumed to examine trends. The result of estimation is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{the estimate of percentage} & = 28.11 - 2.19(\text{Year} - 1961) \text{ for 1962-66} \\
\text{the estimate of percentage} & = 20.94 - 0.43(\text{Year} - 1961) \text{ for 1967-73} \\
\text{the estimate of percentage} & = 9.78 + 0.30(\text{Year} - 1961) \text{ for 1974-78}.
\end{align*}
\]
Figure 6.1. ASEAN's Intra-Regional Trade, 1962-1978.

Source: For 1962-66, the United Nations Yearbook of International Trade; for 1967-78, the International Monetary Fund, the Direction of Trade.
Although ASEAN's formation did not raise intra-ASEAN trade in the first stage, the slopes of those trends suggest that it diminished the rate of decrease in intra-ASEAN trade to a large extent: from more than two points to less than half a point. The upward trend in the period 1974-78 is not impressive, for the annual increase is but 0.3 points. Nevertheless, the difference from the previous period, which is nearly one point, is noteworthy.

The creation of ASEAN did not stop the decline in intra-regional trade. For those who believe that ASEAN was established for functional economic-social cooperation, the above figure is indicative of ASEAN's failure of goal achievement. But it must be reiterated that ASEAN was not established for such a specific purpose. It is true that some ASEAN countries were concerned with the declining trend of intra-ASEAN trade (see Section 4.1). Nonetheless, it is also true that before 1974 they had not been serious about intra-regional trade cooperation. Recall that the ASEAN foreign ministers declared that the organization entered into the second stage of substantial economic cooperation only in 1974. Intra-ASEAN trade has shown an increasing trend since then.

**Economic Development**

As specified in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, national economic development was a relatively direct goal of the ASEAN countries. But ASEAN had implemented no direct measure for that goal until recently. Economic performance is not expected
to reveal ASEAN's impact upon regional economies. In fact, the growth rate of their per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was markedly higher, except for the Thai economy, during the first several years (1968-74) than during non-ASEAN period (1960-67) as shown in Table 6.1. Despite the recession in world economy, they maintained high growth rates in recent years (1975-78).

In comparison with other groups of economies, and ASEAN region gradually improved its relative position. Until ASEAN was created, it had been unimpressive. During 1968-74, the economic performance of the five countries definitely exceeded that of East and Southeast Asian developing countries. In the late 1970's (1975-78), the ASEAN countries enjoyed high growth rates in the stagnated world economy (Table 6.1).

Although ASEAN's past operation may not have directly caused the enhancement of economic growth, the fact that the ASEAN countries experienced higher rates of growth enhanced the symbolic utility of ASEAN. The substantial impact should be evaluated based on the data since 1978, the year in which trade liberalization started.

**Regional Communication Facilities**

Perhaps the most conspicuous accomplishment in the community—economy aspect was a number of projects to improve the infrastructure for economic and social transactions in the ASEAN region.

First of all, to build communication networks was aimed
Table 6.1. The Average Annual Growth Rate of per capita Gross Domestic Products at Constant Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960-67</th>
<th>1968-74</th>
<th>1975-78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>(4.2)*</td>
<td>(6.6)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Philippines</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1960-67</th>
<th>1968-74</th>
<th>1975-78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Economy</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Market Economy</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean and Latin America</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia except Japan***</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1971-74. **1975-77. ***Including the ASEAN countries

at. In early 1970's, several microwave link projects were completed in the framework of ASEAN projects between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Other forms of telecommunication networks were installed, too.² Currently, projects to connect all the ASEAN countries by submarine cable networks are being implemented.³

In the field of shipping, secondly, ASEAN took initiative to study and set the common policy on containerization and on bulk shipping. Also, improvement of port and harbor operation was ASEAN's concern. For those purposes, private sectors were invited to participate in ASEAN projects. As a consequence, a few non-governmental ASEAN organizations were established.⁴

Human Mobilities

Enhancement of intra-region travel, particularly tourism, was one of the earliest focuses of cooperation within ASEAN. The ASEAN countries cooperate with one another to simplify and standardize procedures of quarantine, custom formalities, and embarkation/disembarkation. The issuance of collective travel documents were recommended and implemented. Mutual visa abolition for short visits was also a considerable accomplishment.

Due to geographical setting, the five ASEAN countries have limited mutual access by land. Therefore, it is difficult to expect a high human mobility all over the region. Truly, a considerable number of people cross the border between Malaysia and Singapore connected by a causeway for both cars and trains, and the border between
Malaysia and southern Thailand where Malay muslims live densely. Also, people travel via short distant sea routes between heavily populated Java, Indonesia and Singapore. Otherwise, the main means of international travel is air transportation, which ordinary peoples in the region cannot afford. In sum, the bulk of human mobility can be observed along with a narrow strip of the Malay Peninsula extending to Java.

Therefore intra-regional travels may poorly represent the level of interdependence in the entire ASEAN region.\textsuperscript{5} Available statistics are incomplete. Nevertheless, the number of intra-ASEAN tourists increased considerably. Its rate of increase by and large exceeded that of travelers coming into the region (Table 6.2).

**Increasing Transnational ASEAN Organizations**

In order to assist, and sometimes to take initiative on functional cooperation at the governmental level, non-governmental organizations are in operation in the ASEAN region.

Established in 1971, the first non-governmental ASEAN organization is the ASEAN Tours and Travel Association (ASEANTTA). It has been in close collaboration with the Permanent Committee on Tourism. The second organization established in the private sector was the Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI). It was organized in 1972 for the purpose of supporting ASEAN's efforts in economic and industrial cooperation. Consisting of several working groups, for instance on trade liberalization and on
Table 6.2. The Change in International Tourists, 1972-1977
(in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>the Philippines</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Philippines</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

industrial complementation, ASEAN-CCI was accorded sole consultative status by the Permanent Committee on Commerce and Industry. Currently, ASEAN-CCI is taking initiative toward the implementation of ASEAN's industrial cooperation.

As of 1978, ASEAN recognized as many as twenty-seven non-governmental organizations for complementing ASEAN's intra-regional cooperation in economic, social, cultural and scientific fields (Table 6.3).7

Cultural Exchanges

Getting to know each other does not necessarily mean getting to like each other. At least, one of the founders of ASEAN had been worried about it. In 1959, governments of Malays and the Philippines were collaborating with each other to create a regional treaty organization for economic, social and cultural cooperation. To this plan, the Thai counterpart responded positively with several counter-proposals.8 One of the Thai objections to Malaya-Philippine plan was about cultural cooperation. In the region consisting of Muslims, Buddhists and Catholics, the Thai government concluded, cultural cooperation would be more divisive than cohesive.9

Ten years later, in 1969, the ASEAN countries concluded the Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media and Cultural Activities. Mass media cooperation includes:

(a) broadcasting regular programs to reflect the aims, purposes and activities of ASEAN,
(b) organizing film festivals,
(c) encouraging the exchange of film artists and the undertaking of joint film productions and
Table 6.3  ASEAN's Transnational Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>ASEAN Tour and Travel Association (ASEANTTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-OCI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>ASEAN Motion Picture Producers' Association (AMPPA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1975 | ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIO)  
     | ASEAN Council of Museums (ASEANCOM)  
     | ASEAN Women Circle of Jakarta  
     | ASEAN Port Authorities Association (APAA)  
     | ASEAN Cardiologist Federation  
     | Confederation of ASEAN Youth Cooperation (CYC)  
     | Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA) |
| 1976 | ASEAN Federation of Women's Organization (ACWO)  
     | ASEAN Automotive Association (AAF)  
     | ASEAN Bankers' Association (ABC)  
     | Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Council (FASC)  
     | Federation of ASEAN Newspaper Publishers  
     | Federation of ASEAN Economics Association  
     | ASEAN Pediatric Federation |
| 1977 | ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA)  
     | ASEAN Council of Japan Alumni (ASCOJAAL) |

Date of Establishment Unknown  
ASEAN College of Surgeons  
ASEAN Consumers Protection Agency  
ASEAN Steel Community  
ASEAN Federation of Jurists  
ASEAN Trade Union Council  
Federation of the ASEAN Public Information Organization (FAPRO)

Source: (ASEAN 1978: 239). The date of establishment was obtained from other sources for some organizations.
(d) organizing seminars and other activities on mass media. 10

Cultural cooperation to promote includes:

(a) exchanging artists in the field of visual and performing arts,
(b) undertaking joint research in the arts and in literature,
(c) organizing seminars and exhibitions in the arts, literature, and related matters, and
(d) organizing cultural festivals. 11

In accordance with this agreement, festivals, seminars and exhibitions have been held in the ASEAN countries by the sponsorship of ASEAN. Have they been affecting cohesively or divisively the level of regional integration? It is difficult to assess precisely. Such cultural cooperation involved many artists, professionals, experts, authorities and scholars in the ASEAN region. The direct effects seem to have promoted friendly familiarity with one another. Moreover, particularly through mass media, cultures in neighborhood have been exposed to local people who could not afford to tour the region. Regional cooperation in cultural activities may have changed to some extent some countries' excessive attachment to former metropolises.

It is remarkable that those countries which are now in the course of nation-building have been cooperating with one another in the field of mass media and cultural activities. For this may be perceived as an obstacle to establish national identity with a certain culture. Any way, mutual interest in,
and familiarity with, neighborhood is a necessary condition for regional community-building.

6.3. Forming the Externally Recognized Unit

Collective Action for Regional Self-Protection

In its first decade, ASEAN's major success in the collective bargaining was against Japan. In the bargaining process, the ASEAN countries showed a strong solidarity in pressuring the Japanese government through both diplomatic channels between the participant countries and Japan, and ASEAN's joint missions to Japan. The Japanese government was forced to promise to exercise a restraining influence on the Japanese synthetic rubber industry, and to provide technical assistance for the increase of the consumption of natural rubber.

ASEAN's collective action in shipping was not so dramatic as ASEAN's deal with Japan, but was so significant to indicate the level of regional integration through ASEAN. In 1973, for instance, ASEAN adopted a common stand in the meeting to formulate a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. While the Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) proposed an increase of tariff by 26%, ASEAN opposed the plan to make FEFC propose an 18% increase. This collective bargaining took place in 1974, which was conducted by a private ASEAN organization directed by ASEAN.

In the late 1970's, a similar tactic was taken by ASEAN again to deal with Australia on its low air fare between
Australia and England and on costly stop-over surcharges which would particularly hurt Singapore. ASEAN succeeded in participating in flight operation and in reducing the surcharge to great extent.

Concrete accomplishments in the aspect of economy — security, out of the collective bargaining vis-à-vis powers outside the region, became more conspicuous since the meeting of economic ministers took over charge of ASEAN's economic cooperation. In other words, ASEAN's gain became further significant as ASEAN entered into its second decade.

In terms of trade relations, ASEAN and EC accorded each other most-favored nation treatment. Furthermore, EC, Japan and Australia have agreed to reduce tariff and/or to improve and expand product coverage of the Generalized System of Preference.

ASEAN's success in bringing in more aid from advanced countries outside the region is two-fold. First, extra-regional powers have committed themselves to increase aid to the ASEAN countries. Australia, for instance, made a decision to increase its bilateral aid to the ASEAN countries by 90 million Australian dollars to 250 million. Japan's Premier expressed the country's intention to more than double its official development assistance (ODA) and the priority would be given to the ASEAN countries.

Second, ASEAN has become an entity to receive aid and loans, as an organization. As early as in 1974, Australia agreed on 5 million Australian dollar aids to ASEAN. The biggest commitment to ASEAN has been so far made by Japan in the amount of one billion U.S. dollars to ASEAN industrial
projects. Australia's commitment, as of 1980, had increased to 34.5 million Australian dollars.

Initiatives toward the New International Economic Order

The ASEAN countries' similar economic structure enabled the governments to recognize common problems and needs for cooperation on commodity issues. The Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) was established in 1970 whose majority has been ASEAN countries. In 1974, the Southeast Asian Lumber Producers Association, a non-governmental organization, was set up by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

ASEAN expressed its interests in such commodities as natural rubber, tropical timber, vegetable oils and oil-seeds, copper, tin, sugar, etc. The ASEAN economic ministers adopted a joint ASEAN approach on those major commodity issues in the arena of UNCTAD. They were particularly eager to establish common funds.

ANRPC, now consisting of the all ASEAN countries, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea, took initiative to create the international natural rubber agreement. It was concluded in 1979, as the first of that sort in accordance with UNCTAD's guideline.

More generally, the ASEAN countries are heavily dependent upon the industrial countries as briefly sketched in Section 3.1. In the first half of the 1970's, ASEAN's imports were supplied mainly by Japan (25%), the EEC countries (17%),
and the United States (16%)\textsuperscript{16}. In the same period, intra-regional imports were 10% while the oil exporting countries supplied 10% of ASEAN's imports, and the socialist countries including China only 4%. Although the economic development policy and the foreign economic policy of the ASEAN countries have made their economies open to the capitalist market economy, and hence have kept them dependent upon it, they are certainly in favor of the New International Economic Order. The Philippines hosted the fifth UNCTAD in 1979. The ASEAN economic ministers decided to act collectively at UNCTAD. On the other hand, while closely tied with the industrial world, the ASEAN countries have attempted to improve their relations with major industrial countries. Instead of bilateral negotiations, they conducted collective bargaining.

**Propensity for Collective Bargaining**

There have been several events which indicated that the ASEAN countries preferred to act as a regional group rather than individual countries. In other words, they seem to have chosen to act collectively as a recognizable entity vis-à-vis the world outside the region.

First of all, as described in Section 4.3, regularized forums where the ASEAN countries conduct collective deals were established by the initiatives taken by ASEAN. "Cooperation" with Japan began with ASEAN's accusation of it; the group of ASEAN national secretaries general initiated the dialogue with Australia; ASEAN successfully took efforts to be recog-
nized as a substantive group by EC.

Second, the ASEAN countries preferred to be treated as a regional group by outside powers. Relations with EC seem very illustrative. When the United Kingdom joined EC, the Commonwealth countries in Asia were treated as "non-associables," and were expected to resolve problems related to Britain's entry into EC at bilateral basis in accordance with "Declaration of Intent" in 1963. In the original plan, the Declaration of Intent would be applied only to Malaysia and Singapore in the ASEAN region. Eventually ASEAN succeeded in making EC apply it to all the ASEAN countries. Moreover, when EC proposed to conclude trade agreement with them bilaterally, the ASEAN countries refused to accept EC's plan. Instead, they insisted to be treated as an entity. It is notable that the above development of ASEAN-EC relations took place during 1972-74.

Third, the ASEAN countries conducted collective actions even in the situation where not all of them would benefit from the deal. Rather, they collaborated with one another where some of them would benefit and the other would not hurt. One of such cases is ASEAN's collective action vis-à-vis Japan on synthetic rubber. Another recent example is a tough bargaining with Australia on air fare. In the former case, only Malaysia was the substantial beneficiary. In the latter case, only Singapore. Nevertheless, in both cases, the ASEAN countries surprised their counterparts by a close collaboration and joint moves which were apparently well planned based on mutual consultation in advance among the ASEAN countries.

Thus, the ASEAN countries established the practice of
mutual consultation and collective action in terms of some major international economic issues during ASEAN's first decade. The process of institutionalization was undoubtedly reinforced by the success of early trials in getting concession from powers. The ASEAN countries quickly learned the utility of integration vis-à-vis external world.

Attempts at Collective Self-Reliance

In terms of intra-regional collective economic security, ASEAN has been especially concerned with the security reserve of rice and petroleum. ASEAN's official commitment started with the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976, in which cooperation on basic commodities, particularly food and energy was mentioned. In 1978, the ASEAN economic ministers agreed to set up a reserve system for rice. In the following year, the ASEAN agricultural ministers met to initial the agreement on the reserve of rice, which was subsequently approved by the economic ministers. Finally, in December 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers signed the Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve. Although the amount was only 50,000 metric tons, it was a significant symbolic step toward ASEAN's collective economic security.

The agreement on petroleum took more time than that on rice. In September 1980, the meeting of the ASEAN energy ministers was held to pave the way for energy cooperation and for energy security. In the following month, the economic ministers took note seriously of the recommendations made by
the energy ministers.¹⁹ A week later, the sixth meeting of ASEAN Council of Petroleum (ASCOPE), a non-governmental organization, was held by region's national petroleum companies. Indonesian energy minister who attended in the meeting proposed the system of joint reserve of petroleum. The plan was welcomed, and is to be concretized at the time of this writing.

6.4. A Flexible Search for Security

Increasing Mutual Responsiveness

In the first half of the 1970's, one of the most serious external problems for individual ASEAN countries was their relations with People's Republic of China. As mentioned in Section 4.4., China sent subtle but unmistakable messages on its willingness to accommodate its relations with the ASEAN countries. It even supported, though informally, Malaysia's neutralization policy and subsequently ASEAN's. Malaysian Premier Razak already expressed his plan to establish diplomatic relations with China.

In 1971, the ASEAN foreign ministers started to consult with one another on their relations with China, and agreed to make prior consultations on taking any action. At the expense of a few-year delay, Malaysia, the most eager ASEAN member to establish diplomatic relations with China, took efforts for all the ASEAN governments to reach consensus on the issue. Although they failed to take action simultaneously, they agreed on the order: Malaysia first, then the Philippines and Thailand. Singapore decided to be last to establish
diplomatic relations with China.

Malaysia normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1974. In the following year, the Philippines and Thailand established diplomatic relations with China, and immediately severed those with Taiwan. Since its suspension of diplomatic relations with China in 1967, Indonesia has not yet normalized them; hence, Singapore has not either.

Muslim insurgency in the Philippines is another good example to take a look at as an illustration of ASEAN's mutual responsiveness to security issues. While the population in the Philippines are predominantly Catholic, there is a significant proportion of Muslims in the southern Philippines. Since the late 1960's, many have supported the independence movement against the central government. Very importantly, Sabah's chieftain Mustapha and Libya's revolutionary leader Kadaffi evidently supported this Muslim separatist movement. This development could have challenged ASEAN's solidarity. For, Indonesia and Malaysia are both Islamic states, and might be supposed to support Philippines' anti-government movement. Moreover, the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines could have flamed up again.

The actual response of ASEAN neighbors to Philippines' Muslim rebellion was indeed interesting. Both Indonesia and Malaysia took efforts successfully to tone down the Islamic countries' accusation of the Philippine government as an oppressor of Muslims, at the foreign ministers' conference of Islamic countries in Benghazi, in 1973. It is no surprise that the Philippines government expressed gratitude to
Flexibility: an Advantage of ASEAN's Diversity

Although Indonesia's political change in 1966 made all the ASEAN countries anti-communist, they maintained different security arrangements. Through SEATO, the Philippines and Thailand were linked with the United States. Malaysia and Singapore were with the United Kingdom through the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (AMDA), which was replaced in 1971 by a looser but broader arrangement involving not only Britain but also Australia and New Zealand. For Indonesia, any alignment with major powers was contradicting with its traditional non-alignmient policy. The ASEAN countries did not form ASEAN because they needed a stronger military defense arrangement. Facing the turbulent international environment, e.g., the unsettles Vietnam war, Sino-American rapprochement, the ASEAN countries had recognized their incapability of influencing major powers to create the favorable environment. Allied countries in ASEAN sought for a flexible way of security arrangement, rather than keeping attached to rigid collective defense systems. While five Southeast Asian countries created ASEAN primarily because they wanted to show their mutual good-will, they also recognized ASEAN's utility as an instrument to increase their own foreign policies' flexibility.

To begin with, foreign policy differences were part of incentives to create ASEAN. For Indonesia which had been inclined heavily to communist China until 1945, to form a
grouping with the Philippines and Thailand would serve for amelioration of relations with Western countries, the United States in particular. For the Philippinos and Thailand, which both felt to be involved excessively in the Vietnam War, to form a grouping with Indonesia would add an element of non-alignment in their foreign policy options.

Because the majority of their population are Muslim, and because their national religions are both Islam, Indonesia and Malaysia have been members of the Conference of Islamic Countries. Association with these two Islamic countries was invaluably useful for the Philippine government when it dealt with the Muslim rebellion in its territory and with some Islamic countries supporting the rebels. In addition, because of Indonesia's membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), other ASEAN members which had not established strong ties with the Middle East countries benefitted during the oil crisis in 1973 to adopt pro-Arab attitude in international scene.22

Being a non-aligned state, Indonesia had recognized all the Indochinese countries by 1955, and established ambassadorial diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1964. This long existing channel served for Malaysia and Singapore when they established their diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1973. Interestingly, since Indonesia temporarily worsened its relations with North Vietnam in 1975 in response to communist victory in Saigon, Malaysia became a mediator between Vietnam and the other ASEAN countries.

Similarly, since Malaysia established diplomatic rela-
Figure 6.2. The Variety of Linkages between the ASEAN Countries and Security-Relevant Third Parties
tions with China in 1974 in accordance with an ASEAN consensus as the first ASEAN country to do so, it served as the ASEAN representative in Peking. Even now, three of the ASEAN countries which have diplomatic relations with China play a role on behalf of Indonesia and Singapore. Strongly affected by the feeling of military threat by the occupying Vietnamese army in Cambodia, Thailand became closest to China among the ASEAN countries.

Toward the Peaceful Resolution of Intra-ASEAN Conflict

While the ASEAN countries were deeply concerned with external threats to regional security, all of them, the neighboring countries of Indonesia in particular, were most concerned with intra-regional security problems. Among many other motives, regional integration toward a peaceful pluralistic security community was most strongly perceived by the ASEAN governments.

As discussed in Chapter 5, ASEAN started toward such crucial integration in 1968, in order to encapsulate the Sabah dispute. The conflict control was formally introduced with the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In its Chapter IV (Arts. 13 through 17), pacific settlement of disputes is assigned to the ASEAN countries. Rather than a formalized procedure to settle conflicts peacefully, the informal conciliation and good office is preferred.

Was ASEAN’s spirit to settle conflicts peacefully substantiated in any form at all? Was the only major outstanding dispute, i.e., the Sabah dispute, settled peacefully? In 1977, Philippine President Marcos visited Malaysia to attend
the second ASEAN summit. As a contribution to order, fairness, and justice among the ASEAN peoples, he announced, the Philippine government was taking definite steps to eliminate one of the burdens of ASEAN, the claim of the Philippine Republic to Sabah.

6.5 Some Limits on ASEAN's Contributions

The Intra-ASEAN Problem

In the framework of ASEAN, its participant governments considerably enhanced mutual responsiveness and mutual trust. Nevertheless, some members' distrust vis-à-vis others has not yet completely disappeared. Despite the public statement on the Sabah issue by the Philippine government, Malaysians seem still skeptical. Since the Philippines claimed its sovereignty over Sabah in 1962, none of Malaysian premiers have visited the Philippines. When Indonesia annexed Portuguese East Timor by military forces in 1976, at least Singapore expressed its displeasure by abstaining votes on resolutions accusing Indonesian military annexation in the United Nations General Assembly while the other ASEAN countries firmly supported Indonesia. Although by the late 1970's Indonesia had experienced bilateral naval exercises with four other ASEAN countries, and although bilateral joint military operations against communist guerillas on state borders have been conducted, the contingent plan against military attack by one of the ASEAN countries may be still in existence in some participant governments. It cannot be said that the ASEAN countries are already a pluralistic security-community.
As mentioned earlier, ASEAN started to implement economic integration programs in 1977. Like preceding efforts of economic integration in other regions, ASEAN's program faced various obstacles to further integration. Intra-regional gaps on industrialization and development were huge. Agricultural outputs occupied 43% of GDP in Indonesia, but only 1.5% in Singapore in 1975. In that year, Singapore's per capita GDP was thirteen times as high as Indonesia's despite its considerable increase in oil export revenue. Singapore was advocating trade liberalization, but Thailand and Malaysia were very reluctant. Interestingly, Indonesia which had been expected to be reluctant turned out most cooperative in concessions but Singapore.\(^2\)\(^4\) With regard to the package deal arrangement, Singapore had to abandon its ASEAN project of a diesel engine manufacturing factory because of Indonesia's strong objection.

Differences in individual countries' interests were evident. Because ASEAN has been adopting and implementing integration programs based on consensus, those differences will not cause the dissolution of the organization or some members' withdrawal. In the case of ASEAN, they will inevitably slow down or eventually stagnate the pace of economic integration unless consensus is reached through mutual compromise.

The Extra-Regional Problem

Since 1979, ASEAN has been facing a new security problem caused by Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia. In 1978, the relations between the ASEAN countries and Vietnam considerably
improved, and the Soviet Union expressed its support of ASEAN for the first time since the formation of ASEAN. Thus, the ASEAN countries became optimistic about their peaceful coexistence with Vietnam. However, Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia in December 1978, the fall of Phnom Penh in the following month, and Chinese invasion in Vietnam during February and March 1979 had large impacts upon the ASEAN countries. Although the Vietnamese refugees (boat people) problem united the ASEAN countries, and although four other ASEAN countries expressed their will to support Thailand in case of Vietnamese invasion in the Thai territory, their perceptions of external threats diverged. Thailand regarded Vietnam as the main threat, and wanted to move closer to China; Indonesia still feared China as the main source of threat, and preferred the accommodation with Vietnam. As a collectivity, ASEAN took its traditional flexible response: while Indonesia and Thailand kept contact with Vietnam and China, respectively, ASEAN took the different position on the Cambodian problem from China's, and argued for a "political" solution. However, if some members of ASEAN adopt defense policy that is incompatible with others', ASEAN's utility of external security-seeking will diminish.

Although acute conditions in Indochina highlighted the security vulnerability ASEAN faces, the economic vulnerability of the region still remains as problematical as ever. Despite their dependence upon industrial economies, the ASEAN counties have kept their economies open to the world economy. Unlike ANCOM, ASEAN has not adopted any
measures to regulate foreign investment in the region. Exports from the ASEAN countries are occupied by a few primary commodities. Once, Thailand showed its resentment against Japan's economic over-presence. Through collective actions and ministerial negotiations vis-à-vis major industrial countries, ASEAN succeeded in obtaining several types of economic gains as delineated in Section 6.3. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries will continue to be dependent upon and vulnerable against economies outside the region.

Past Contributions and Future Prospects

While many obstacles to ASEAN's further integration should be taken seriously, its contributions, whether direct or indirect, to regional integration should be also taken seriously. Supported by the participant governments' common orientation toward the creation of a peaceful community, ASEAN's activities have been various, and its contributions to integration among its participants have covered various aspects, too (Figure 6.3).

ASEAN has been receiving widespread pessimistic assessments and predictions on its activities. Although its success in the past does not guarantee its success in the future, ASEAN demonstrated its viability and utility for its participants. Through the fifteen-year experience of consultations and cooperation in the framework of ASEAN, the five ASEAN countries learned how to compromise with each other in order to create a peaceful pluralistic community. ASEAN's past experience
Figure 6.3. ASEAN's Direct and Indirect Contributions to Regional Integration: Some Examples of Cooperative and Integrative Practice
revealed its participants' increasing capability of handling differences in interests among themselves.

It is certainly worthwhile to keep paying attention to ASEAN's future. Will the participant governments continue to resolve conflict between themselves without resort of forces? Will ASEAN's flexible regional security-seeking suffice the need of its participant governments to cope with external threat? Will new political generations keep committing themselves to regional cooperation and integration in the framework of ASEAN? Will less privileged peoples in the region identify themselves with the ASEAN community?

In terms of the major power relations such as Sino-American relationship, the ASEAN countries, whether individually or collectively, have insignificant influence. The maintenance of security depends upon their capability of adaptation toward international environment.

On the other hand, the ASEAN countries are relatively capable of handling their own problems. Adopting economic development policy under the strong leadership, each government of the ASEAN countries are currently trying to build a nation. Nation-building is still an important goal of each ASEAN country which contains various ethnic groups. At the same time, interestingly, the ASEAN countries did not hesitate to create the regional identity which might impede their own national identities from taking root. They have so far succeeded in keeping their respected national identities compatible with the regional identity of ASEAN.

Most probably, the five governments will continue to
aim at establishing both national and regional identities. Peoples can identify themselves with more than one identity: in this case, ASEAN and respective nations. The establishment of identity, however, depends on the actual condition of well-being and the future promise of better-off that the identity in question provides people with. If the ASEAN governments succeed in national economic development and the better-off of less privileged people through cooperation in the framework of ASEAN, then they will have a good chance to establish both national and regional identities, and hence the nation and the ASEAN pluralistic security-community. If they fail, people will not regard government-led identities to be desirable. Instead, people will look for, and will eventually find, alternative identities to pursue. In this sense, as for the ASEAN peoples, the choice is to accept either both or none.

So far, regional cooperation at both governmental and private sectors goes along with the cultivation of mutual trust and understanding. In the long run, however, the formation of a security-community in the region will also depend on domestic politics and economy that could attach peoples to the nation and ASEAN. Certainly, there is a long way to go.
Notes for Chapter 6


2. (ASEAN 1978: 35)

3. (ibd.: 43)

4. (ibd.: 35-36; 233-234; 237)

5. There may have been no evidence of community formation in terms of human mobility during the first five years of ASEAN (Hill 1978). However, it is the fifth year when the participant countries eased intra-regional travel regulations.

6. (ASEAN 1978: 33-34)

7. (ibd.: 239)

8. See in Chapter 3.2

9. (Gordon 1966: 168)

10. (The Agreement. Art. 1.)

11. (Art. 2)

12. (Cooperation Agreement, Art. 1.)

13. (Joint Statement, ASEAN-Australian summit meeting. August 7, 1988. Parag. 8 (c).)

14. Four out of the five participants are founding members of six-member association.

15. (Joint Press Release, the fifth meeting of economic ministers. September 4, 1977. Parags. 6,7,8.)

16. (Wong 1979: 144-145)

17. The Commonwealth countries in the other regions were allowed to establish associations with EC, which resulted in the Lome Convention.

18. (Joint Press Release, the sixth meeting. June 6, 1978. Parag. 7)

19. (Joint Press Release, the tenth meeting. October 25, 1980. Parags. 5,6,7,8,9.)

21. (Chin 1974)

22. In his capacity as the chairman of ASEAN's standing committee, Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik made a statement on all the ASEAN countries' attitude toward the Middle East problem in November 1973.

23. Morrison and Suhrke (1978: 273-274) regard those phenomena as "Free Rides" and "Broader communications" among some ASEAN's political benefits.

24. (Yasuba 1980)
7.1 Reasons for the Integration of the ASEAN Region

In Section 1.5, I argued that neither the problem ASEAN was faced with nor the strategy it adopted was peculiar to the ASEAN region, and that they were more or less prevalent in the developing world in general. My question there was why the integration effort worked so well in the case of ASEAN. The reason for ASEAN's current "success" will be synthetically summarized in this section from three clusters: the background condition, the initial conditions and driving forces, and the process of regional integration.

The Convergent Background

As briefly surveyed in Section 3.1, the ASEAN region can be characterized by the considerable divergence in ethnic, linguistic and religious terms, which one might be tempted to call primordial factors. However, such divergent backgrounds did not play any major roles to obstruct the creation of ASEAN. There was an overriding convergent background in political and economic terms.

One of the basic aspects of the convergent background was the ASEAN economies. Although the economic dependence of individual ASEAN countries upon the outside world prevented them from creating an interdependent regional economy, there have been notable communalities. Each of the ASEAN countries
has adopted economic development policies within the world capitalist market economy. In each economy of the ASEAN countries, foreign investment and aid from Western industrialized countries have played important roles in economic development.

Compared with those economic aspects, the anti-communist stance of the ASEAN countries is a very conspicuous political aspect of the convergent background. In particular, China was seen suspicious of the source of domestic political instability in each ASEAN country.

This political convergence and the economic policy convergence was brought into the region by Indonesia's political shift in the mid 1960's. In this sense, the convergent background appeared only one year before the creation of ASEAN. Without Indonesian political change, the ASEAN countries would never have the convergent background to create the organization.

Nevertheless, this convergent background could be applied to a broader area than the ASEAN region. Economic dependence on external economy was more or less observed in most of the Asian countries. The market economy oriented development policy and the anti-communist policy were in fact the convergent background of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). In short, the above convergent background was necessary for the ASEAN country to create the organization, but certainly not sufficient.

The last aspect of the convergent background was more directly associated with ASEAN's operation. That is, the
practice of consensus building based on the greatest common divisor. This practice was substantially established during the formation process of ASA and Maphilindo. Differences were put aside, and the commonness was emphasized. Because it had been customary before ASEAN was formed, the practice was smoothly introduced into the new organization.

The Initial Condition and Driving Forces

Admittedly, the participant countries did not expect much from ASEAN at its inception, nor they have ideas what to do. ASEAN's profile was, in a word, unimpressive.

On the other hand, there were no other practical alternatives than ASEAN for the ASEAN countries to communicate with each other. Even ordinary diplomatic channels were not well established within the region.

Moreover, the ASEAN countries urgently needed to consult with one another about changing international environments. Specifically, the unsettled Vietnam war and British military withdrawal plan from Southeast Asia were the major concerns at the time of ASEAN's creation. By 1969, American disengagement in Southeast Asia had become foreseen.

The most fundamental and decisive driving force of ASEAN was the agreement among national leaders in the ASEAN countries to create a "peaceful community" in their words, which I called a security-community. To be sure, they did not have any promising programs to guarantee the establishment of a security-community. But they invariably felt the need for establishing frequent and regular communication practices to
replace mutual distrust by mutual understanding and trust.

The Process of Regional Integration

ASEAN was not ready to produce any conspicuous outcome; it provided its participant countries with the forum, however. In its initial years, 1967-71, ASEAN's function as the forum seems to have satisfactorily met its participants' low expectation vis-à-vis ASEAN. Recall how intensively did informal foreign ministers' meetings deal with threats to their security from within and without.

Precisely because ASEAN was expected little, its performance was perceived as rewarding. On the one hand, cooperation in the framework of ASEAN changed from necessity due to no alternatives to preference due to its utility. On the other hand, as a forum, ASEAN gradually fermented mutual understanding, and to a lesser extent mutual trust, among its participant countries' leaders. In consequence, ASEAN started to serve for its participant governments as the council to make decisions on regional cooperation. ASEAN as a council worked mainly in the aspect of community while ASEAN as a forum extensively worked in the community—security aspect.

The existence of the ASEAN countries' preference to cooperate in the framework of ASEAN has been observed since the end of 1971. The Declaration of ZOPFAN in November 1971 and collective actions vis-à-vis third parties which was initiated with dealing with EEC in 1972 were good examples. ASEAN began to work as an agency in the community—security and the security—economy aspects. In the period 1971-74,
mutual understanding and mutual responsiveness became apparent at least at the governmental level. Notable events include the support of Malaysia by the other four on rubber problems since 1973, and Indonesian and Malaysian support of the Philippines on its Muslim minority problems since 1974. Also in this period, transnational ASEAN organizations began to emerge, and played a considerable collaboration with ASEAN in the implementation of ASEAN projects as well as in the conduct of collective bargaining with extra-regional non-governmental organizations.

The above development of ASEAN and of the ASEAN region cannot be explained wholly by the external threats to political and/or economic security. For such factors do not work effectively unless the ASEAN countries agree to respond to such threats collectively. ASEAN's development in the period 1971-74 was made possible by the gradual increase in both expectation vis-à-vis ASEAN and the commitment to ASEAN's cooperative framework, which in turn took place the satisfying activities of ASEAN mainly as a forum. The dissemination of a symbolic use of ASEAN from the public to the private sector strongly suggests how positively was ASEAN regarded in the region. The gradual increase in the expectation toward ASEAN seems to have been balanced with its limited performance with certain rewards. Through the involvement in ASEAN's cooperative framework, the participant governments gradually but steadily became convinced of mutual understanding, responsiveness and trust to the extent enough to commit themselves to more difficult tasks. To state differently, ASEAN's utility
was demonstrated not only in terms of forum, but also agency. The ASEAN countries recognized that the organization could be used more extensively as council on regional matters.

The year 1974 deserves the starting point of the third period of ASEAN. In that year the ASEAN countries agreed to start substantial economic integration efforts, to establish the central secretariat, and to materialize mutual security commitment. These decisions seem to have illustrated that the confidence about the viability of ASEAN was confirmed among its participant countries. Mutual trust became more reality than ideal. The central secretariat was established in 1976 upon agreement initialed in 1975, and signed in 1976 in the form of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Economic integration program became concrete in 1976, and started to be substantiated in the following year including the conclusion of the Agreement on the ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement. In this way, ASEAN expanded its activities into the community—-economy aspect.

Thus, by 1977 ASEAN had been operated as not only a forum but also a council and an agency in the entire domain of regional integration. ASEAN's development in its first decade was undeniably a result of its participant countries' response and initiative toward secure international political and economic environment. It should be repeatedly stressed that ASEAN's development was not the forced reaction of its participant countries against worsening international environment. It was based on the deliberate choice by each participant government to commit itself more to ASEAN. Such
commitment was certainly induced by a recognizable degree of benefit ASEAN had brought in and a sufficient degree of trust on its partners.

**Conditions for Successful Integration**

In the preceding reasoning of ASEAN's integration process, a relatively small number of factors seem to have played a crucial role in making the organization successful. The most fundamental and indispensable factor is the comprehensive orientation toward region integration. Especially, the inclusion of the orientation toward community seems imperative for the organization to be invulnerable vis-à-vis various forms of problems and obstacles.

Provided a relatively comprehensive orientation, the next important factor is appropriate organizational characteristics. The appropriateness of organization is the bearable organizational burden by its participants. It must be light if the current level of integration efforts is low. If there is already high, then the burden may be heavy.

When an appropriate type of organization is in existence, the successful integration process depends largely upon the participants' satisfaction about the organization performance. The satisfaction level is the reverse level of the gap between their expectation toward the organization and the actual performance. It is very important for them to be satisfied with the organization in order for them to commit to it more deeply and to take more efforts within it.
7.2. Prospective Integration Efforts in a New Perspective: a Generalization of the Experience of ASEAN

The perspective of regional integration proposed in Chapter 2 is an hypothesized viewpoint that would enable one to look into integration efforts more relevantly and accurately than existing regional integration theories. Admittedly, numerous factors are involved in the process of integration efforts. It is not easy task to formulate a model of (dis-)integrative processes in which those factors are interlocked.

In the previous section, 7.1., however, a relatively small number of crucial factors were identified in the reasoning of ASEAN's successful integration process. It was explained by the particular combination of the existence or absence of several factors. It seems important to generalize ASEAN's pattern in the perspective of regional integration so as to obtain useful lessons from a successful experience, and to formulate a more specific model of regional integration.

The Comprehensiveness of the Orientation

On the most fundamental basis, the successful integration process depends on the comprehensive orientation toward regional integration. If they do not agree with one another on the concrete program or the schedule, the participant countries need to agree that they are concerned with regional matters comprehensively: not merely economy, or security, but economy, security and community. Especially, the orientation
toward community should exist in the first place. Otherwise, the accommodation on the inevitable difference in individual interests will be very difficult. That economic integration will eventually succeed in establishing community does not seem realistic. The successful economic integration is subject to the strength of the orientation toward community because the latter affects the capability of solving problems that would sooner or later emerge in association with the implementation of economic integrative programs. Those who have the will to pursue the orientation toward community would most probably overcome problems in the future, whether anticipated or not.

On the other hand, the orientation solely toward community is insufficient, or at least inefficient, to realize integrative process in the long run. The orientation toward economy or security should never be ruled out. In fact, economic integration would establish the economic basis for community development. Mutual security is inseparable from the successful community-building. External security enables one to get more involved in intra-regional matters. As discussed in Section 2.2, community, economy and security are interrelated in the domain of regional integration. Each aspect does not guarantee the emergence or maintenance of the others. Although all the aspects do not have to be started to pursue at the same time, they seem to need to be pursued for the successful integration in the long run.

In the developing world, for the states that became independent after World War II in particular, the prior
experience of pursuing security, economy or community is very weak, if ever existed. The attempt of establishing integration in one aspect would be sooner or later be faced with the ceiling imposed by the absence of orientation in other aspects. The conscious comprehensive orientation toward community, economy and security is most important background condition for the group of countries to succeed in regional integration.

Moreover, countries in the developing world are vulnerably exposed to international political and economic environment. Hence, security in a broad sense is a particularly relevant aspect in the domain of regional integration. In its link with economy, security is pursued through such measures as the collective economic-security arrangement of the trade and investment diversification policy to reduce economic dependence on a particular industrial country. In an ordinary political sense, the security-seeking measure includes not only traditional alliance formation but also common regional policy vis-a-vis destabilizing oppositions and guerillas.

Thus, the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward regional integration is perhaps more important for the integration effort in the developing world than in the developed world.

The Appropriateness of the Organizational Characteristics

The mutual commitment to the comprehensive orientation toward regional integration is relatively easy compared with
the mutual commitment to the implementation of such orientations. The organization with centralized power, with specific goals and programs, and with efficient machinery will carry out a high level of integration efforts at a rapid pace. In fact, a powerful, efficient organization may be precisely needed by some industrialized countries to integrate their economies. Moreover, for those countries with a long history of independence and international relations, more than one organization exist for carrying different orientations in the forms of an organizational division of labor.

A powerful, efficient organization could eventually succeed in achieving goals if the burden it imposes to its participants can be borne by them for a long period. It is a big "if" particularly for new states in the developing world. Several types of organizational characteristics are perceived as the burden by the participants.

Most widely recognized burden is the degree of the centralization of power. Supranational organizations have been disliked by sovereign states. Even at the inter-governmental level, the higher is the ladder of the power structure (Table 2.1), the more reluctant is the participant to be involved. It is particularly so for sovereignty-conscious new states. Similarly, the mode of operational code for a regional organization can be burdensome. The fear of the infringement of sovereign right has always added a kind of escape clause in the institutionalized collective decision-making. Despite its probably inefficiency and possible impasse, the consensus rule has been preferred not only in diplomatic negotiations but also
in regional cooperation. Like diplomacy, an informal style of consensus-building may be needed prior to making formal decisions according to the unanimity rule. Moreover, the specific goal can be burdensome, too. For less-experienced new states in the developing world, or relatively vulnerable countries in international political and economic environment, the specification of explicit goals tends to be excessively rigid. Instead, such countries need more flexible goals to start and enhance integration efforts collectively. They must adapt their own organization smoothly to changing international environments. For this purpose, goal definition and redefinition must be flexibly carried out.

Although smooth adaptation seems conflicting with the less efficient consensus-based organization, both needs should be pursued however difficult. Contrary to the neofunctional argument, the continuously politicized organization seems most appropriate to carry out such difficult tasks. In short, efficient and powerful organization may be appropriate for industrial countries, they are not so for developing countries.

The Reinforcing Mechanism of the Organizational Performance

The successful implementation of integration efforts largely depends on the performance of the organization, which is in turn, whether supranational or intergovernmental, dependent upon the firm commitment of the participants. Not only passive consent but active involvement is necessary to succeed in integration efforts. If an ambitious goal is set, the
the remaining task is how to achieve it. On the other hand, if the goal is not well specified and open to the future agreement, and if the organizational power is decentralized, the successful integrative process must involve a certain mechanism of reinforcing the participant's commitment and the organizational repertoire of integrative programs. In other words, the organizational performance should be positively fed back to the commitment of the participants to further materialization of the orientation toward regional integration.

Provided that a group of countries in the developing world share a comprehensive orientation toward regional integration and they created a politicized, decentralized organization with less formal and less specific goals and programs, what type of "positive feed-back" mechanism is needed to generate a successful integrative process? It must be goal-finding and program-finding, rather than problem-solving for assigned goals. 3

The experience of ASEAN suggests one example of such a mechanism. When the organizational performance is started low for some reasons, the participants initial expectation must be low too. The frustration of participants due to the gap between high expectations and low performance seems a conducive factor of not integrative but disintegrative process. They tend to lessen, rather than enhance, their commitment to the integration effort in question. Especially at the initial stage, the balance between the participants' expectation and the organizational performance seems crucial; perhaps, even the "surplus" of the performance against the expectation is desirable.
The balanced or surplus performance against the expectation will induce a slight, but not negligible, increase in the participants' commitment to and expectation of their organization. Moreover, communication and understanding among the participants will gradually increase so as to enable to bear together the burden of more efficient organization in the future. Encouraged by a satisfactory performance, the participants become more confident of the viability and utility of their own organization, and make more commitment to it. In turn, supported by larger endorsement, the organization becomes more able to carry our difficult tasks. In short, the reinforcing mechanism if realized by, in the case of ASEAN at least, participants' satisfaction-commitment link under the initial condition of the low expectation vis-à-vis the organizational performance.

It is yet an open question if other types of relationships between participants and their organizations involve essentially the same reinforcing mechanism. Nevertheless, the experience of ASEAN reveals that there is at least one type that is applicable to decentralized, loosely-structured organization. The organization appropriate to the developing world can realize an expansive logic of regional integration.

A Simplified Judgemental Model of the Future Prospect

The perspective of regional integration in this work is a perspective, not a theory or model. It is not constructed to explain and/or predict the (dis-)integrative process or
the consequence of integration efforts. Nevertheless, the preceding argument suggests that variables in the perspective constitute a structure of interrelationship that provide an explanation to predict the future prospect of regional integration efforts. In other words, it contains the structural general reasoning that can be reformulated in the form of a more explicit model.

The model I am trying to construct is a judgemental flow chart model. A judgemental model cannot describe the dynamic process, but can provide a long-term consequence of the process. This type of model is especially appropriate when the available information is insufficient to formulate a quantitative interrelationship among variables.5

The variable to be explained is the future prospect of the given integration effort (FP). In fact, it is a set of aspects describing the process: the probable direction — integrative/disintegrative; the probable pace — fast/slow; the probable disturbances — smooth/problematical; etc. Many aspects being taken into account, the future prospect will be categorized in this model into likely, problematical, and unlikely. Although it can be differentiated much further, the trichotomized prospect at least suffice the judgement of integration efforts in the long run.

Independent variables can be also identified by the radical simplification of the conditions of prospective integration process. At least, seven essential variables should be included in the model. They are as follows:
1. the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward integration (CO)
2. the capability of the participants of bearing the organizational burden (CP),
3. the organizational burden of the participants (OB),
4. the appropriateness of the organizational structure (AS),
5. the participants's expectation toward their own organization (EO),
6. the performance of the organization (PO)
7. the satisfaction of the participants with respect to the organizational performance (SP).

The substantial meaning of each variable and its role in the perspective of regional integration has been already provided above. It should be noted that each variable is highly abstracted, and that the relationship among variables is skeletal, if not oversimplified. In terms of the direction of influence, the relationship of independent variables with one another and with the dependent variable can be summarized as shown in Figure 7.1. The simplified judgemental prediction or estimation of the dependent variable is conducted according to the flow chart shown in Figure 7.2.

According to this model, the judgement on the future prospect is not fatalistic. Becasue the independent variables are all changeable in the course of the integration effort and the organizational reform, the result of judgement are also changable from time to time. In other words, this judgemental model could be transformed into a dynamic process
Figure 7.1. The Simplified Direction of Influence among Some Crucial Variables to Predict the Future Prospect of Integration Efforts
Figure 7.2. The Simplified Judgemental Procedure of a Rough Estimate of the Future Prospect of Integration Efforts
model by involving the participants' collective decision to change the orientation toward integration or organizational structure or both as well as feed-back loops among some relevant variables.

**Toward an Epigenetic Model**

The dynamic process of the abovementioned organizational development can be understood, as mentioned in Section 2.3, from the epigenetic viewpoint. The idea of epigenesis has long been accepted as one of the premises of the development of organism and evolution of species, or ontogeny and phylogeny. But it has not been well understood in the social science literature perhaps because of the past mal-applications of biological thoughts to social systems, such as the social Darwinism. As Etzioni (1963) attempted, however, the application of the idea of epigenesis is worthwhile in order to understand the development of society or organization.

In the new perspective of regional integration, the epigenetic modelling needs (1) the potential capability, (2) the mechanism that can transform the potential into the actual, and (3) the internal and external conditions that activate the transformational mechanism. The domain of regional integration and the organizational characteristics would especially serve the specification of the above first and second prerequisites. To specify the third one, the shared orientation toward integration and the mutually responsive
inter-participant relationship would be crucial factors, but more comparative analyses are needed to postulate the activating conditions in general.

7.3. A Brief Comparative Assessment of Regional Integration Theories in the light of ASEAN

At the beginning of this work, I pointed out the insufficiency of existing regional integration theories to analyze the practice, that in the developing world in particular. Is the new perspective I proposed as an alternative sufficient enough to replace earlier theories? In the light of ASEAN's experience, the applied perspective will be compared with the Deutschean communication theory and neofunctional theory in this section.

To examine the relative validity of each theory, two contrasting situations will be used: 1967-70 and 1977-80. The former period corresponds to the creation of ASEAN, and the latter, ten years later, its substantial economic integration. In-between the Association experienced extensive transformation. Because both cybernetic and neofunctional theories concern the background, the initiation of integration, and the process (diS-)integrative, it seems most sensible to choose the situation of ASEAN during 1967-70 when it was created and started to work. On the other hand, because neofunctional theory primarily concerns economic union or common market, it may be unfair to evaluate the theory in ASEAN's initial period. But it seems applicable to ASEAN's second decade.
ASEAN AND Communication Theory

From their extensive research on historical cases, Deutsch and his associate (1957) identified background conditions that seem essential for successful integration to build and maintain a security-community. For the the pluralistic security-community, they found three essential, and thirteen helpful. The existence or absence of those sixteen background conditions are judged by myself with respect to ASEAN's 1967-70 and 1977-80 (Table 7.1)

The result is interesting. While conditions were very unfavorable for integration ASEAN's initial years, they changed relatively favorable ten years later. Why and how did this change take place? According to the theory, the process of movement toward pluralistic security-community is subtle. The process conditions also changed favorable (Table 7.1). In other words, ASEAN in the period 1977-80 seemed to move promisingly toward a security-community. However, the profile was dim in the period 1967-70; the background conditions were poor, and the process conditions were weak.

The Deutschen cybernetic theory cannot explain the change in ASEAN during its first decade although it did grasp the occurrence of change. The theory must miss some important conditions, whether background or process.
Table 7.1. The Assessment of ASEAN According to the Deutschian Social Communication Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Conditions of Integration toward a Pluralistic Security-Community</th>
<th>Assessment***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential Background Conditions*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. mutual compatibility of major values</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. mutual governmental responsiveness</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mutual predictability of behavior</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful Background Conditions*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. distinctive way of life</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. superior economic growth</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. expected economic ties and gains</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. broadening elite</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. unbroken communication links</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. multiple ranges of communication</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. interchanging group roles</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. compensation of communication/transaction</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. mobility of people</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. reluctance to wage wars</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. outside military threat</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. strong economic ties</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. ethnic and linguistic assimilation</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Conditions**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. increasing unattractiveness of war</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. intellectual movements</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. traditions preparing for integrative ground</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *
(Deutsch et al. 1957: 46-59; 154-159). **(Deutsch et al. 1957: 115-116). ***Y and N indicate the existence and absence, respectively, of each condition.
ASEAN and Neofunctional Theory

Admitting that integrative causal processes are complex, Haas and Schmitter (1964), the most eloquent advocates of neofunctional theory in the 1960's proposed a judgementsal table of nine "pattern variables." Several years after, three variables were added to the table so as to respond to the criticism that external factors had been ignored. Altogether, twelve variables were classified into the background conditions, conditions at the time of economic union, and the process conditions. While being compared with their evaluation on EEC, EFTA, IAFTA, CACM and Comecon, each condition in the case of ASEAN was judged by myself. The measure of judgement was the earlier high/mixed/low scale to avoid the deceptive precision (Table 7.2).

In comparison with EEC on the one extreme and African cases on the other, ASEAN's position was more or less unchanging despite recognizable changes in various variables. As a whole, both ASEAN in the late 1960's and that in the late 1970's were by and large comparable with IAFTA in the early 1960's. In their comparable framework, the development of ASEAN in its first decade was undiscernible, and hence unexplainable.

However, invariably high marks on the external factors were indicative of ASEAN's activities vis-à-vis extra-regional actors and problems. According to (revised) neofunctional theory, ASEAN must be regarded as an externally driven organization, which is partly true but misses more fundamental features of ASEAN as community-seeking framework.
Table 7.2. The Assessment of ASEAN According to Neofunctional Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable Conditions toward Integration through Spill-Overs</th>
<th>Assessment***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background Conditions*</td>
<td>1967-70 1977-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. homogeneous size of economic units</td>
<td>L L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. high rate of transaction</td>
<td>M M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. extensive pluralism</td>
<td>L L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. elite value complementarity</td>
<td>M M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. external economic dependence**</td>
<td>H H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total judgement</td>
<td>M M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Conditions at Time of Economic Union*                      |               |
| 6. government purpose of integration                        | L L           |
| 7. external pressure (meaning dependence)**                | H H           |
| 8. power of union                                           | L L           |
| total judgement                                            | L L           |

| Process Conditions*                                        |               |
| 9. decision-making style                                   | L L           |
| 10. high rate of transaction                               | M M           |
| 11. adaptability of government                             | L M           |
| 12. external pressure (meaning dependence)**               | H H           |
| total judgement                                            | M M           |

Notes: *(Haas and Schmitter 1964) and (Barrara and Haas 1969). **Conditions added in (Barrara and Haas 1969). ***L, M and H indicate Low, Mixed or Medium, and High, respectively.
Compared with cybernetic theory, neofunctional theory was explicit in postulating the integrative process. That is, needless to say, the spill-over. ASEAN's expansive development in the domain of regional integration looks very similar to the spill-over phenomenon. In short, the neofunctional notion of spill-over is a crisis-induced and dissatisfaction-motivated technocratic initiative to overcome obstacles for the pursuit of the goal specified in advance. On the contrary, in the case of ASEAN, the spill-over occurred as a result of the satisfaction-motivated political deliberations to find new feasible goals to pursue. In this sense, the observation of West European experience by Deutsch (1962) and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) was quite compatible with my observation of ASEAN in the sense the neofunctional logic of spill-over played a very minor role at best.

ASEAN and a New Perspective

In comparison with the above two theories, the new perspective is relatively simple in terms of conditions for successful integration. Unlike them, however, this perspective postulates a structural relationship between conditions. ASEAN's experience can be summarized, through abstraction, into the set of scored for conditions (Table 7.3). Based on it, one can follow the diagramatical model (Figure 7.2) to obtain the assessment of ASEAN.

In its initial few years, according to the assessment, ASEAN had appropriate organizational characteristics to meet the situations that its participant countries were faced with.
Table 7.3. The Assessment of ASEAN According to the New Perspective*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Assessment**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. comprehensiveness of shared orientation</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. capability of participants</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. organizational burden on participants</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. appropriateness of organization</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. expectation toward organization</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. organization’s performance</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. satisfaction on performance</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. future prospect of integration</td>
<td>likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *The assessment is based on the simplified judgemental model proposed in Section 7.2. **Variables 4 and 7 are measured in the scale of -, 0, and +. The other variables are in the scale of L(ow), M(edium) and H(igh). Note that H does not necessarily mean that the variable in question favorably affects the future prospect by itself.
ASEAN seemed to work slowly, but still promisingly. In the late 1970's, ASEAN was more comprehensive in the orientation, and evolved organizationally. The change in ASEAN in its first decade may be explained by the reinforcing mechanism of balancing growth of expectation and performance.

Admittedly, the dynamic process of regional integration efforts was not specific enough to stimulate quantitatively. Nevertheless, the domain of regional integration and the organizational characteristics provide some crucial explanatory and predictive conditions. The new perspective seems to have a higher theoretical utility than the above two theories at least in the case of ASEAN.

7.4. The Applicability of a New Perspective

**EEC in the New Perspective**

The most successful regional integration after World War II is, without doubt, the experience of West European countries that today comprise the European Community (EC). If the argument in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 is correct, how does this theoretical postulate fit the case of Western Europe? The development of EEC, the far-reaching success of regional integration, should be satisfactorily explained by the new perspective, if it can be claimed as useful in general.

In order to compare Western Europe with the ASEAN region, one should go back to World War II. The war destroyed Europe and left countries much weaker than the United States or the Soviet Union. In 1945, there were neither victors nor losers.
Even if Germany, the new governments, both West and East, were against the former ruling Nazis. The new West German Democratic regime was very much compatible with French and other Western European counterparts. It is a well-known fact the ECSC was proposed for the purpose of creating a peaceful community of Western Europe. Thus, by the end of the 1940's, those countries which would form EEC were in much common to pursue the establishment of community.

In international economic scene, Western Europe was peripheral to the extent that it depended totally on American economy. The former desperately needed aid from the latter. OEEC was established in 1948 as a regional entity to receive American aid. In short, Western European Countries shared common situations and outlook on the extra-regional economy.

Similarly, they shared the common enemy of communism led by the Soviet Union. They failed to create a genuine regional body for common defense, i.e., the plan of European Defense Community. Nevertheless, important was the fact that extra-regional security was provided in the framework of NATO. While NATO did not enhance the sense of community among all the members, Western European countries which had already raised the sense of community were considerably supported by the security provided by NATO.

Within the framework of NATO and OEEC, Western European countries rehabilitated their economies. Intra-regional trade had already shown a considerable increase prior to the creation of EEC. Industrialists and businessmen were established transnational collaborative networks in the continent. EEC
was created in 1957 on the already existing basis of regional market economy. It is evident that, since EEC was formed, intra-regional trade further was enhanced. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that EEC created the potential of regional transactions; at best, it significantly reduced the barrier which had prevented transforming the potential into the actual flow.

Based upon the above very brief narrative of the experience of Western Europe up to the formation of EEC, a striking correspondence of the case of Western Europe with that of ASEAN can be pointed out. The Table 7.4 must be self-explanatory.

For our purposes of discussion, important points are as follows. In the first place, the orientation toward regional economy through economic integration was preceded by the orientation toward community and security. Second, the orientation toward community including intra-regional security seem to have started to take off first, then the orientation toward extra-regional security followed. Third, to directly compare ASEAN to EEC has been irrelevant. If relevant, perhaps ASEAN's economic cooperation since 1977 will turn out appropriate to compare to the earlier stage of EEC. Fourth, if the neofunctional theory is applicable to EEC, then will be possibly applicable to the current economic activities of ASEAN, but certainly not to the entire ASEAN.

The neofunctional theory misled, I regrettably conclude, many integrative attempts in the developing countries to provide a seemingly applicable and promising model to them. The development of ASEAN illustrated the excessively narrow perspective of neofunctional theory and the necessity to take
Table 7.4. EEC and ASEAN in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Comparable Point</th>
<th>The EEC Countries</th>
<th>The ASEAN Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>destructive intra-regional conflict</td>
<td>World War II (1939-45)</td>
<td>the Confrontation (1963-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Change in the hostile country</td>
<td>Nazi to Democratic Germany (1945-50)</td>
<td>pro-communist Sukarno to pro-Western Suharto Indonesia (1965-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perception of powerlessness</td>
<td>vis-a-vis USA and USSR</td>
<td>vis-a-vis international environment in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community-building as the eventual goal</td>
<td>Schuman Plan (1950) followed by the formation of ECSC (1951)</td>
<td>the formation of ASEAN (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common external threat</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>China; later also Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common defense</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>no military alliance, but common political outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;periphery&quot; of world economy</td>
<td>destroyed economy, inferior to American economy</td>
<td>economic dependence upon the industrial world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need for commitment by &quot;center&quot;</td>
<td>need for aid and investment from USA</td>
<td>need for aid and investment from the industrial world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common external economic relations</td>
<td>the formation of OEEC (1948)</td>
<td>formal dialogues and fora with Japan, Australia, etc. (1973- )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic interdependence</td>
<td>increase in intra-regional trade in the 1950's</td>
<td>increase in intra-regional trade (1974- )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pluralistic association</td>
<td>spontaneous formation of transnational associations and commercial networks in the 1950's</td>
<td>government-encouraged formation of transnational associations and commercial networks (1971- )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4. EEC and ASEAN in Comparison (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Comparable Point</th>
<th>The EEC Countries</th>
<th>The ASEAN Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>high political</td>
<td>the Massina Conference of foreign ministers (1955)</td>
<td>the 7th annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment to economic integration</td>
<td>the Treaty of Rome (1957)</td>
<td>the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (1977)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
into account the orientation toward community. If ASEAN provides the developing world with any relevant model, it must be an externally-responsive community-building attempt model.

A Brief Assessment of Some Regional Integration Attempts in the Developing World

Despite their striking resemblance, there are radical differences between the EEC region and the ASEAN region. The latter is sharply distinguished from the former by continued external economic dependence, weak political and economic bases of national development and the vulnerability vis-à-vis international environment. For regions like ASEAN, the comprehensive integrative orientation and the light organizational burden is especially needed for a successful regional integration in the long run.

It is worthwhile to check if incomprehensive orientation toward integration and/or the heavy organizational burden can explain failed integration efforts in the developing world.

First of all, the failed attempts to maintain a regional community in British East Africa through EACSO and EAC seem to provide typical examples of how the orientation toward community is absolutely necessary for countries to realize and/or maintain integration.

Compared with the East African case, ACM and RCD may be regarded as relatively successful cases temporarily although both organizations failed to carry out integration efforts
eventually. These two attempts were obviously based on the orientation toward external security because ACM and RCD were "derived from" the Arab League and CENTO, respectively. Throughout integrative attempts, the orientation toward community continued to be weak in both cases. They taught us the importance of the mutual compatibility of basic values.

When LAFTA and CACM started to work in the early 1960's, both regions, the latter in particular, were oriented comprehensively toward not only economy but also community and security. Both were within OAS, and the CACM countries had created ODECA. In their initial years, both LAFTA and CACM revealed a smooth integrative process but until they found deadlocked in dealing with intra-regional conflicts over the share of benefits and integration. Both organizations were faced with crisis in the late 1960's. Consequently, ANCOM was formed within the LAFTA region, and the temporary withdrawal of Honduras and Costa Rica from CACM. In both cases, the goal, program and schedule were very specific, and disagreements in the course of integration process generated organizational crises. Neither the LAFTA countries nor the CACM countries were capable of solving their own intra-regional conflicts caused by integration. The organizational burden was too heavy for them to keep bearing for the further integration attempts. In this sense, the relaxation of the burden by changing the goal via structural reformation from LAFTA to ALADI in 1980 is very suggestive.

Special attention was paid to ANCOM because of its
externally oriented regional economic integration efforts. By the mid 1970's, ANCOM had been faced with the same problem as LAFTA and CACM, i.e., the slow down of the integrative process due to increasing intra-regional conflict over the process. Even the withdrawal of Chile in 1976 was caused not by the military coup but its conflict with Peru over economic policies. Thus, the organizational burden of ambitious goals was borne in the first few years, but it became intolerable for some participants. However, the resentment vis-à-vis Bolivia's military regime felt by the other participants and the border conflict between Peru and Equador suggest that the orientation toward community may not be strong enough to carry out concrete economic integrative programs. As ASEAN in its initial few years indicates, as long as the orientation toward community is kept sharing, conflict resolution and further integration is possible in the long run.

7.5. Regional Integration in the Developing World

Some Lessons from ASEAN's Success

Truly ASEAN is faced with various obstacles to further regional integration such as its participants' different preference concerning the pace and coverage of economic integration, and different perceptions of external threats. Among the ASEAN countries, mutual distrust has not been yet completely wiped out. Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years, they accomplished a wide range of regional cooperation and integration practices. Such accomplishments, which are certainly
a much lower level of integration compared with the EC, was made possible by the ASEAN countries' shared commitment toward a peaceful community. The case of ASEAN strongly suggests that a group of developing countries should be aware of the crucial importance of the orientation toward regional community if they seriously want to succeed in regional integration.

In the case of ASEAN, the shared orientation toward community encouraged its participants to establish the practice of their foreign policy coordination vis-à-vis the outside world. The sphere of coordinated policies ranges from ASEAN's relations with Indochina's communist countries to its pursuit of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the UNCTAD. The ASEAN countries have not reached consensus on all the major regional foreign policy issues, e.g., mutual military security arrangement. Not all coordinated policies resulted in success. Nonetheless, limited success in their coordination reinforced their commitment to further orientation toward community. As the ASEAN countries have tried, a group of developing countries should find issues on which they can cooperate, and should not fruitlessly spend their time and energy in discussions and debates of issues difficult to reach agreement. For those developing countries which are vulnerable vis-à-vis external political and economic environment, the promising sphere of coordination includes collective economic-security arrangements to reduce excessive dependence and trade and investment diversification policies.

As every economic integration effort has experienced, intra-regional cooperation toward integration becomes inevitably
faced with various types of intra-regional conflicts derived from the implementation of integrative programs. The ASEAN governments were skeptical of regional economic integration, and until recently they had not even attempted to integrate their economies regionally. It was wise for them to postpone the concretization of regional economic integration programs until they became confident of ASEAN's viability and mutual commitment to the organization although they had been urged toward the implementation of economic integration programs by, for instance, a United Nations research team. The experience of ASEAN gives a warning, if not disappointing, signal that a group of developing countries should not start regional economic integration programs until they feel they are at least psychologically integrated enough to resolve intra-regional conflicts which will sooner or later take place as integration programs are being implemented.

Organizationally, ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization with a very weak central secretariat, not to mention a supranational body. If probably efficient, a supranatural organization is difficult for developing countries to create and operate successfully because of their individual sovereignty-consciousness. In the case of ASEAN in particular, the organization was created with its vague goal, and later was provided its more concrete objectives and programs. For such an organization to work, its participants need to commit themselves seriously to the organization. The highest decision-making body of the organization should be at the ministerial level.

With respect to the collective decision-making, the ASEAN
countries have practiced a consensus-building approach, a so-called "the ASEAN spirit." Its catchword, mushawarah-mufakat, is a Malay word, and hence may be culturally bound. However, the custom of consensus-building is not a peculiar practice in Asian cultures. Informal caucusing, spadeworks or oiling are prevalent in every culture. In diplomatic relations, consensus-building is pursued, too. To operate the organization flexibly, the decision-making through consensus in the course of integration efforts may be more practical than the implementation of a particular goal decided in advance.

The New Perspective and the Developing World: Some Implications

According to the new perspective of regional integration, the comprehensiveness of the orientation toward integration is a crucial factor of successful integration. Particularly, the orientation toward community must come first. For developing countries, new states in particular, their limited experiences to deal with their neighbors make difficult for them to share the orientation toward community. However difficult, it is necessary for them to realize the importance of the orientation toward community if they want not merely a temporary coalition or alliance vis-à-vis a particular common problem, but a more or less lasting peaceful community that may or may not integrate their economy.

If a group of developing countries plan to create a regional economy through integration, they should be sure that they share a common orientation toward community before start-
ing concrete programs. When the compatible differences in the implementation of integration programs become politicized, the shared orientation toward community makes the participants seriously try to resolve those intra-regional conflicts.

According to the new perspective, the organizational structure seemingly desirable to efficiently implement regional integration efforts is not suitable for developing countries. In other words, specific goals, well designed programs and time table, a strong central machinery to carry out integration efforts, and the participants' prior commitment to the joint endeavor in question are too heavy a burden for the fragile and vulnerable developing countries to bear for a long period. The desirable organizational structure is, therefore, counterintuitively equipped with a weak central machinery if in existence. If they may look trivial, concrete goals and programs should be, at least in the initial years, those which will be accomplished without difficulties.

Such an organization cannot implement its tasks efficiently. Therefore, its participants should not expect a high level of accomplishment by the organization. It is important for the participant countries to keep their expectation toward their organization at a low level. It is improbable for the governments of developing countries to make little commitment to a strongly regional organization and to obtain benefits from it. The balanced gradual increase in both the commitment to and the expectation toward the organization seems an appropriate process of lasting and successful integration efforts in the developing world.
Utilities of an ASEAN Model in the New Perspective

If ASEAN's experience is applicable to developing countries, the disadvantage that an ASEAN model has should be well aware of. The integrative process is inevitably slow, if in progress. It depends upon the participants' joint initiative to transform their potential orientation toward integration into actual goals and programs. They should be patient enough to wait until consensus is reached in terms of each important issue.

On the other hand, neofunctional models and many integrative practices in the developing world are aimed at a fast integration process with specific goals and programs. This type seemed more promising than an ASEAN model. However, many promising practices turned out to be failures. There is a choice between a high reward with a high risk and a low risk with a low reward. In the short run, the former may bring a successful integration. In the long run, however, the latter seems more durable. ASEAN's case to date well represents regional integration with a low risk and a low reward. If low compared with EEC's, ASEAN's reward has been certainly attractive for its participants. It seems worthwhile for developing countries to consider the desirability and possibility of a type of integration efforts that the ASEAN countries have been engaged.

Countries in the developing world are more of less vulnerable against international political and economic environments, and have insufficient capability to control environments. Hence, their survival and development depends on successful
adaptation to environments. As a regional group, developing countries may not want to unify their sovereign states into one political union, but may be able to adapt themselves collectively to international environments according to an ASEAN model. A shared orientation toward a security-community and a flexible and responsive concretization seems a promising strategy for developing countries to succeed in their collective adaptation.
Notes for Chapter 7

1. See (Weinstein 1976) for the country's dilemma between development and dependence.

2. ASPAC consisted of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. It was formed in 1966 by the initiative of South Korea, and lost its raison d'etre in the early 1970's due to the Sino-American rapprochement.

3. Undoubtedly, more than one type of the interrelationship between the organization and its participants suffice such a mechanism. The neofunctional notion of spill-over is one of them. It postulates an expansive logic of regional integration practice. However, its assumptions are not applicable to the situation assumed here. One needs something else.

4. See (Alker 1971) for various types of regional integration models, and their advantages and disadvantages.

5. For similar reasons, Haas and Schnitter (1964) proposed a judgemental model based on "pattern variables."

6. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 65-69; 154-159)

7. (ibd.: 115-116)

8. (Barrera and Haas 1969)


10. Regional economic integration resulted in the increased dependence upon external economies (Schmitter 1972), but CACM had to experience crisis not because of high external dependence, but its inability to solve intra-regional conflicts caused by the integration in itself.

11. (Mytelka 1979)

12. Etymologically, both "mushawarah" and "mufakat" can be easily traced back to Arabic. However, they are applied to the traditional Malay, especially Indonesian, political custom in the village life. They became a slogan of national politics during the period of Sukarno's guided democracy in the late 1950's.
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