

THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF LIVING

LONDON, 1830s-1880s:
THE DIALECTICS OF URBAN LIVING AND CITY FORM

by

DAVID SELWYN WEINBERG

B.Arch., University of the Witwatersrand
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Signature of Author
School of Architecture and Planning / /

Certified by
Thesis Supervisor

Certified by
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Accepted by
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students,
Department of Architecture

Archives




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PREFACE

In 1852, Karl Marx wrote:

"Men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past."

Thus, the comprehension of past developments holds the key to an understanding of the present. In a thesis which examines the process of urban development, this observation is important in two senses--one concrete, the other theoretical. On the one hand, the impact of many concrete developments which occurred from the 1830's to the 1880's in London has extended beyond that period to the present and, therefore, an understanding of these developments is crucial to an understanding of the social and spatial geography of London today. On the other hand, the developmental processes which shaped London during these five decades of the 19th century can be abstracted and synthesized at a theoretical level to provide a generalizable basis for analysing and understanding the processes which shape modern cities.

It is in this dual light that I have undertaken this thesis. I have studied London's development during this period in an attempt to discover how the totality is constructed; which elements of that totality are most influential in producing changes in urban form, and which are more susceptible to change; what are the correct questions to ask in relation to urban development both past and present; and what are the crucial relationships on which to focus attention. Stated concisely, the purpose of this thesis is both to analyse and explain an important period of London's development and to use this study as the empirical foundation for a theoretical synthesis

which, it is hoped, will be more generally applicable to the analysis and understanding of the processes and problems of urban development under capitalism.

I have approached the subject from a radical, or Marxist, perspective for I believe that the philosophy of society and social change upon which this perspective is based most closely reflects the real-world situation. The thesis cuts across accepted disciplinary boundaries into fields with which I am only superficially familiar but which I believe must be integrated into the study of urban development at both an empirical and a theoretical level. The empirical section is based mainly on a secondary analysis of data already gathered and processed by others. Its value--if it has any--consists not in 'discovering' hitherto unknown facts, but in the analytical framework which it proposes and applies to the study of London's development. Whether this framework and approach indeed provide a useful basis for understanding London's development in particular and urban development in general is, of course, for the reader to decide.

The period from the 1830's to the 1880's saw the flowering of *laissez faire* capitalism in Britain. In Chapter 1, I will argue that the relationships between classes arising out of developments in London's economy essentially hinged on three important struggles: the political and social integration of the capitalist class with the landed aristocracy to form a new ruling class; the economic and social separation of the capitalist and petty-capitalist classes from the much larger working class and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class; and the broad economic and social stratification of the working class into the skilled 'labour aristocracy' and the unskilled or semi-skilled remainder. After setting the scene in Chapter 2 of London

in the 1830's, I will argue in Chapter 3 that the ways in which these class relationships were expressed in the housing process, together with the drive to improve the city's efficiency as a locus for capital accumulation, constituted the fundamental forces which patterned London's development. Further, I will attempt to show that the interaction of these forces in the land and housing markets, mediated by the economic and social relations inherent in various forms of the leasehold system of tenure--and this was the crucial element--determined the actual shape and evolution of London's social and spatial fabric. However, this interaction was such that it frustrated the residential aspect of the 'labour aristocracy's' struggle to disassociate itself from the remainder of the working class and this, we will see in Chapter 4, precipitated the housing crisis which beset London in the 1880's. The threat to the maintenance of social stability, which the crisis constituted, generated a search for new forms of tenure and urban development which would produce more congruent and acceptable outcomes.

During this period, approaches to London's chronic working-class housing problems essentially stemmed from the view that these problems were the fault of the 'demoralized' slum-dwellers themselves. In Chapter 5, I will argue that this view was an extension of the prevailing *laissez faire* ideology into the field of housing policy and that it served a system-maintenance, rather than problem-solving, function until the housing crisis of the 1880's necessitated and precipitated an ideological change.

In Chapter 6, I will attempt to abstract the analytical structure which is embedded in the historical analysis and synthesize it in the form of notes towards a radical theory of urban living and city form, thereby connecting the thesis to present-day urban issues, enquiries and practice.

Finally, on a more personal level, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the following people, each of whom, in his or her own special and important way, contributed to the realization of this thesis:

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CHAPTER 1.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLASSES

The Organization of Production

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, London was the most important and powerful centre of production and exchange in Britain, if not the world. [1]* Its economic dominance rested on four factors. [2] It was a major port, both in relation to British and world markets. This gave London's merchants access to a wide range of raw materials and enabled them to export finished products--and their economic power--to major market places at home and abroad. But this economic dominance did not exist in a vacuum. It was buttressed by the might of the British state which [3] aimed at ensuring favourable terms of trade for British merchants as it spread its colonial tentacles across the globe. London, as the centre of government and the royal court, was also the locus of Britain's political power. Thus it was an advantageous location for merchants to base their operations which rested so heavily on international trade and intimate relations with government. These two factors established London as a centre of world commerce and finance, a position which it maintained at least until the First World War. [4] Furthermore, London was the largest local consumer market in the country. [5] The process of feeding, clothing and housing its vast population (almost twice as large as Paris, its nearest rival at the turn of the 19th century) [6] provided employment for large numbers of people. Possibly of greater significance was the fact that London was the centre of conspicuous consumption, [7] a consequence of the second factor. In addition, capital goods and semi-processing industries,

*Notes will be found at the end of each chapter.

such as shipbuilding, sugar and leather manufacture and silk production, were prominent. But the supply of commodities, particularly luxury and capital goods, in those pre-industrial days depended on a highly skilled labour force, and this was the fourth factor which, together with the [8] third, made London the dominant manufacturing centre.

But the changes in the organization and technologies of production [9] which occurred during the Industrial Revolution altered the balance of power. New forms of industry grew and prospered in provincial towns such as Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham. This is not to imply that London ceased to be important as a manufacturing centre. On the contrary, it [10] remained the largest centre of production in Britain. What did change, however, was the nature of the products which were produced, the division of labour and the organization of production. It should be pointed out that these changes only occurred in those industries which faced direct provincial competition.

Why did London lose its grip on the productive activity of Britain? Why did its employers not adopt the new modes of production which began to flourish in the Midlands and the North, with a view to maintaining their competitive advantage? Three factors mitigated against this course of [11] action. The new machines used tons of coal and London was some distance from sizeable coal deposits. The new factories were land intensive and rents in London were high. And the factories had to be manned by armies of unskilled workers. Though London had proportionately more skilled to unskilled workers than provincial towns, there was nevertheless an abundance of adaptable, unskilled workers ready to acquire fairly [12] elementary skills. The main drawback was that London wages were

historically significantly higher than elsewhere in England. [13] In consequence of these three factors, the costs of production and, assuming similar profit margins, the final cost of commodities produced in London would be higher than those of provincial towns. Unless there were other overriding considerations, London was an unfavourable location for large factories.

Certain sectors of London's economy were unaffected by this growing competition. The aristocracy and *nouveaux riches* continued to value hand-made luxuries which held them abreast of current fashions. Though new technologies facilitated mass production of clothing, shoes and furniture, the markets for luxury versions of those commodities remained strong. Consequently, the production of luxury goods remained in the hands of skilled craftsmen working in small workshops using well-established techniques which had been handed down since the days of the craft guilds. These workshops were predominantly located in the West End close to the final consumers. [14] Other trades did not come under pressure during this period because new technologies had not as yet been developed. Service industries, tied to a localized area, such as building, transportation and urban infrastructure (gas, water, sewage, etc.), prospered in fits and starts, their fortunes following the ebbs and flows of other sectors of London's economy. The non-residential segment of the building industry specializing in public and commercial buildings and railways, mainly comprised relatively large firms. [15] The residential segment, on the other hand, was, with a few notable exceptions, comprised of a myriad of small firms using extensive sub-contracting. [16] In the transportation sector, large concerns predominated though small scale operations played important

parts in omnibus, stagecoach and hackney cab travel. [17] Finally, as Britain's international dominance increased and as its economy prospered, so the commercial, financial and public administrative sectors of London's economy, located mainly in the City and Westminster, expanded. By the mid-1860's, the economist Walter Bagehot characterized London's money market as "by far the greatest combination of economical power and economical [18] delicacy that the world has ever seen."

The responses and fates of those trades which came under the impact of growing provincial pressure can be divided into two categories: those which prospered in their present locations by adapting the organization and technologies of production to suit London conditions, and those which declined in their central locations and tended to move to the outskirts of London or to the provinces. In general, according to Gareth Stedman [19] Jones:

"The London trades which prospered after 1850 tended to be those producing commodities of relatively high value and low bulk, involving a great deal of specialization in warehousing and preparation for final manufacture, calling on the services of many ancillary trades, and requiring large inputs of labour and small inputs of power; in general, they were products which could be sold directly to final users. Conversely those trades which moved either to the outskirts or to the provinces tended to be those producing commodities of low value and high bulk, involving little specialization, much power and little labour, and not generally sold directly to final users."

The most important finishing trades in the first group were those segments of the clothing, footwear and furniture industries which produced [20] ready-made goods for mass consumption. Entrepreneurs in these industries, usually the owners of wholesale or retail outlets, attempted to reduce London overheads to a minimum by extensively adopting the

[21] sweating system. The use of relatively cheap, 'people-powered' machinery (which also reduced fuel costs) like the sewing machine and the band saw which were developed during the 1840's and 1860's, [22] made it possible to dispense with the services of most skilled workers and to exploit London's abundant supply of adaptable, unskilled workers, including women and immigrants, who had little choice but to work at or below subsistence wages. [23]

Thus the sweating system facilitated drastic cuts in wage bills, and the extensive use of subcontracting was well suited, from the employers point of view, to the arbitrary nature of demand in these markets as it gave him great flexibility in expanding and contracting production to cope with unpredictable seasonal fluctuations. The impact of London's high land rents was minimized by reducing workshop production to a minimum and expanding home-work. [24] These operations were predominantly located in the East End, but could also be found to the north-east of the City. Thus London's manufacturers competed with the factories of the provinces in the growing markets for cheap, ready-made goods by tightening the screws on the weakest sectors of London's labour market. [25]

As Charles Booth wrote in 1888:

"The economy effected under the factory system by a more extensive use of machinery, and by more highly organized and regular employment seems in London to be replaced by the detailed pressure of wholesale houses, or middlemen acting for them on master tailors who transmit this pressure to those working under them, masters and men suffering alike from the long hours, unsanitary conditions and irregular earnings characteristic of the East End workshop."

Industries in which the nature of the production process did not facilitate mutation to counteract high London overheads began to decline in their inner-London locations. Those which had little to gain by

remaining within the Greater London region migrated to other parts of Britain. The most important of these were shipbuilding, heavy engineering, [26] silk manufacture and leather tanning. Others, which relied heavily on proximity to London's consumer markets, moved to areas on the circumference of the then built-up area, such as West Ham, Stratford, Tottenham, Croyden and Willisden. As the 19th century wore on, these became important industrial districts where medium and large scale factory production occurred in printing, book-binding, chemical and rubber production and the like. [27] Finally, a proportion of these declining industries remained in their central locations, predominantly in south London but also in the East End, for a variety of reasons. [28] Thus, while inner-London industry gradually declined and/or migrated elsewhere, industrial production remained important in London as a whole.

The London labour market was divided into three sub-markets which were relatively distinct geographically and in terms of the nature of employment available and the organization of the labour movement. [29] Three main factors contributed to the formation of these sub-markets by severely curtailing working class mobility, thereby forcing workers to live within a short walking distance from their workplaces. These were the lack of cheap, convenient transportation; [30] the underdeveloped communications media which forced most workers to rely on personal acquaintances for job information; and the characteristics of casual and sweated trades whose essence "was that the work offered was insufficient to provide a regular livelihood but sufficient to prevent the worker straying permanently into some other occupation" [31] and which necessitated frequent immediate contacts with employers and other workers.

The three sub-markets were as follows. The North and West region comprised mainly of politically conservative, well-organized skilled craftsmen engaged in luxury production. This region was separated by a band of business, open space and medium and high quality residential land uses from the North and East region, comprised mainly of semi-skilled workers and casual labourers who were, until the 1880's, atomized and disorganized. This duality was noted by Henry Mayhew in the 1850's: [32]

†
"In passing from the skilled operative of the West End to the unskilled workman of the Eastern quarter of London, the moral and intellectual change is so great that it seems as if we were in a new land and among another race."

Finally, the above two regions were separated by the Thames River from the South region, comprised of relatively highly organized radical industrial workers.

Thus, the Industrial Revolution in London differed significantly from the standard picture of rapidly expanding large scale factory production, which is generally painted of provincial towns like Manchester. The manufacturing sector was not dominated by one large industry as were many provincial towns. [33] Those capital and semi-processing industries which remained in Greater London either declined slowly in their central locations or moved to outlying areas where new industrial districts gradually became established. The service sector was substantially larger and more diversified than other towns in the country. [34] London maintained its position as the "foremost finishing centre for consumption goods." [35]

An industrial revolution did occur in these trades but it did not lead to the growth of large factories. Instead, it engendered the sweating system

which was a most appropriate response to the specific conditions which prevailed in London. As a result, small scale production remained a significant element in London's industrial geography until the late 19th century. In sum, the "effect of the Industrial Revolution on London was to accentuate its 'pre-industrial' characteristics...[and this] determined that its economic structure, its social and political character and its pattern of poverty remained largely distinct from those of other nineteenth-century industrial regions."^[36]

The following section will explore the consequences which these developments in the structure of London's economy had for both the life chances and aspirations of, and the interactions between, broad groups of London's population, as a function of their respective positions in the economy.

Class Structure and Struggle

A discussion of the formation and development of a class structure in London from the 1830's to the 1880's (and also to the present) and of the dynamic interrelationships between different classes presents two significant difficulties. Firstly, the problem of the extent to which the evolution of class relationships in London are influenced by struggles at the national level. This difficulty always arises when one is analysing broad currents in a local context, but it is particularly vexing in the case of London where the economic structure was (and is) so different from that of other towns in Britain, while with a few notable exceptions,^[37] the literature on the development of class relations in Britain focuses mainly on the national scale. Without detailed original investigation of local

patterns, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is difficult to separate the general from the particular. One consolation lies in the fact that concurrent with the centralization of capital, the widening of markets and the development of modes of communication, local struggles have become integrated into the national (even international) picture. But this does not obviate the need for local research.

The second difficulty is one of finding a model characterizing certain periods within the overall process of societal development and of confining that model to relatively specific temporal limits without generalizing to a level of inconsequence. The boundaries of change from one system of socio-economic organization to another are fuzzy--they cannot be precisely defined. The change from Feudalism to Capitalism took approximately three hundred years. [38] Yet it is legitimate and instructive to differentiate one system from the other for, while they are part of the single complex process of human social evolution, they represent essentially separate and discrete stages in that process. [39] The difficulty becomes more acute when differentiating periods within the process of capitalist development itself. Nevertheless, I would argue that this type of abstraction also has substance and validity. [40] In fact, this thesis will attempt to show that such comprehension is crucial in analysing the process of urban development under capitalism. Unfortunately, this difficulty increases as the period under discussion approaches the present and it becomes problematic to discern long term trends whilst in the midst of present-day reality.

In the following discussion of the relationships between classes in London from the 1830's to the 1880's, I do not mean to imply that these processes began during that period. In fact, their roots probably lie

buried in the mid-16th century, a date which denotes the start of the capitalist revolution in England, according to Maurice Dobb. [41] The change gathered momentum from 1750, the 'start' of the Industrial Revolution in Britain. [42] I have chosen the 1830's as a starting point of my analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, during this decade the major political and economic institutions of capitalism [43] as we know it today, were finally established by the passage of important legislation. It was also a period in which the working class became class conscious and placed the capitalist and aristocratic ruling class under strong [44] pressure. In 1832, the Reform Act established representative government elected by means of a qualified franchise which excluded the working class. Since then, the qualification has changed and the vote has gradually been extended, but the institution of elected parliamentary government has remained essentially the same. On the economic front, the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 [45] marked the final step in the institutionalization of the market in labour and of markets in essential commodities like food, clothing and shelter. These markets were based on individual economic incentives, the cornerstone of capitalist motivation, as opposed to any form of state or squirarchical control of and responsibility for the individual. When seen in conjunction with the factory, municipal and church reforms of the period, the 1830's certainly were a "decade of reform" [46] which marked the culmination of centuries of struggle and the beginning of the heyday of competitive [47] capitalism.

The second reason for beginning in the 1830's relates to London's spatial development. The 1830's mark the beginning of the extensive application of public transportation technologies which had only

recently been developed. Horse drawn omnibuses began to ply the streets of London in July 1829 [48] and the Railway Age dates from 1836. [49]. These new modes of urban transportation facilitated major changes in the social and spatial fabric of London in line with its evolving economy and class structure. As such, they distinguish subsequent developments from the previous era of essentially private urban transportation. [50]

Keeping in mind the foregoing reservations, we may now proceed to elucidate briefly the progression of class relationships in London from the 1830's to the 1880's. The importance of class analysis is stressed by Maurice Dobb: [51]

"History has been to date the history of *class societies*: namely, of societies divided into classes, in which either one class, or else a coalition of classes with some common interest, constitutes the dominant class and stands in partial or complete antagonism to another class or classes."

The formation of, and relationships between, social classes in London was (and is) rooted in the relationship in which each group as a whole stood to the process of production and hence to each other. [52]

In my estimation, the local class structure and the dynamic interactions between and within classes were essentially moulded by three strong thrusts and a weaker one: firstly, the formation of a new, intrinsically capitalist, dominant class [53] by the integration of powerful capitalist employers and merchants with the established landed aristocracy; secondly, the aspirations of the middle stratum of small employers and shopkeepers, clerks, professionals and government officials towards a 'junior-capitalist' status and existence--and this was the weaker force; thirdly, the separation of the capitalist and petty capitalist classes from the much

larger working class and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class; and fourthly, the growing split which was occurring within the working class between the skilled 'labour aristocracy' and the remainder of the working class. Thus the period was characterized by integration at the top of the power structure and stratification below. Let us proceed to explore each of these forces in turn.

The struggle for political dominance between the rising capitalist class and the established landed aristocracy in England resulted in the peaceful integration of these two classes to form a new, intrinsically capitalist, ruling class. It did not lead to the overthrow of the aristocracy by the capitalist class which was characteristic of *bourgeois* revolutions in Europe. The formation of this integrated ruling class dates from the Reform Act of 1832, though struggles between its constituent parts continued for some time after that. A major factor responsible for this unique outcome in England was the strength of the restless, class conscious working class during that period. [54] This tension threatened both elements of the ruling class and forced them to bury their differences and unite in the face of working class opposition. "It was a contest between 'blood and gold'; and in its outcome, blood compromised with gold to keep out the claims of *egalite*." [55] This opposition was, in turn, masterfully manipulated by capitalist political representatives to serve their integrative purpose. [56] The enormous letdown of working class expectations which inevitably followed the passing of the Act was mainly responsible for the crystallization of working-class consciousness in opposition to the capitalist ruling class. [57] This, in turn, led to a critical change towards liberalization in the structure of English

[58]

society in the middle years of the 19th century.

The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, representing the anti-climactic culmination of the struggle for *laissez faire*, and the Factory Acts of 1847, which legislated a 10-hour day, are further examples of the concessionary attitude within the dominant class. Each side's 'victory' occurred when economic conditions were such that the opposition would be minimally

[59]

affected by conceding 'defeat.' Over the years the aristocracy had

[60]

become, increasingly capitalistic in their economic behaviour. The

leasehold system enabled them to turn their land holdings into income-generating assets, and thereby, to benefit from the rapidly rising land

[61]

rents. The Reform Act enabled the aristocracy to maintain much of their political power, but they were forced to share political control with capitalists who were steadily gaining control of the economic reigns of Britain. Capitalists, on the other hand, aspired to emulate aristocratic lifestyles thus signifying their submission to the *ancien regime*.

[62]

In the words of Zygmunt Bauman:

"In political terms, it [the aristocracy] had not only not been defeated but had actually gained victory, by inducing the *nouveau riche* stratum to dream of advancement into the aristocratic world. In accepting the superiority of the aristocratic system of social values, the new class that dominated the economy also accepted its own position, in which it had to look up to the aristocracy."

The growth of financial, commercial and governmental functions in London's economy led to an increase in the number of clerks, shopkeepers

[63]

and assistants and public sector employees. Many of these white-collar workers played important roles in the day-to-day operation of the economy. As a result, most were relatively well paid and regularly

employed for shorter hours than most working-class occupations, and their livelihoods were relatively secure. They did not constitute a very large segment of the working population at this stage. [64] However, when grouped together with other members of the middle stratum, such as professionals and petty capitalists, they constituted a sizeable group which was striving to improve their lot in society by saving money, consuming the 'right' commodities, living in respectable areas and pandering to the needs of the ruling class.

The separation of capitalist employers and middlemen from their workers and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class were two essential aspects of the realization of capitalist productive relations, and of increasing the rate of capital accumulation, during this adolescent phase of capitalism. [65] According to Zygmunt Bauman:

"After the sudden loss of their individuality and any possibility of keeping their own existence separate from that of the fragmented masses, the workers of the time were also abruptly confronted with a sharp increase in social distance between themselves and the owners and managers of the factories [or sweated trades] where they worked....The manufacturers of that period ...seized with eagerness on every opportunity of widening the gulf that separated them from those who were subordinate to themThe only limit was set by the physical endurance of the workers."

This separation and impoverishment was based on, and in turn promoted, the institutionalization of the market in labour. According to this institution, workers, who own only their ability to work, are 'free' to sell this labour power to employers, who own capital and control the production process, in return for a 'market-determined' money wage. They are then 'free' to spend this money in markets for essential and

non-essential commodities to buy a quality of existence which they deem desirable; the harder they work, the higher their wage--at least in theory. As Frederick Engels so sarcastically put it in his 1844 study of the condition of the English working class:

[66]

"In law and in fact the worker is the slave of the middle classes [i.e., capitalist class], who hold the power of life and death over him. The middle classes offer food and shelter to the worker, but only in return for an 'equivalent;' i.e., for his labour. They even disguise the true state of affairs by making it appear that the worker is acting of his own free will, as a truly free agent and as a responsible adult, when he makes his bargain with the middle classes. A fine freedom indeed, when the worker has no choice but to accept the terms offered by the middle classes or go hungry and naked like the wild beasts."

Due to the separation between work and existence--connected only by the money wage--the incentive of potential economic gain, which can buy a better existence and, conversely, the threat of a subjectively or objectively inadequate existence, are the major forms of motivation and control acting upon workers to give more effort.

[67]

Clearly, the relative integration between master-craftsmen and journeymen and the journeymen's relatively high level of social mobility, which existed under the guild system, was antithetical to the capitalist class interest as it subverted the operation of the market in labour. Capitalist employers simply could not afford to assume responsibility for the welfare of their workers as this would ruin the incentive and control system of the market labour and thereby potentially reduce the rate of capital accumulation. They had to separate themselves from workers who had to learn to fend for themselves according to the behavioural rules of this new institution. "Pre-industrial experience, tradition, wisdom and

morality," in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, "provided no adequate guide for the kind of behaviour which the capitalist economy required." [68]

Poverty and hardship were necessary evils associated with the creation of wealth at this state of labour intensive capitalism. This was the basis of the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class, not the malicious intent of capitalists. Besides facilitating a growing rate of capital accumulation--the lifeblood of 'progress'--it socialized workers to accept the 'rules of the game' because it made the nature of the economic gain incentive system, especially the threat to survival aspect of it, and the power and control which capitalists could exert over their existence, real to workers in their everyday lives. [69]

The obverse of this separation and impoverishment process was the creation of a place for the capitalists as indisputable and indispensable leaders of the production process. This was the capitalists' only way of gaining control over the productive capabilities of society. As Maurice Dobb has argued: [70]

"A role was created for a new type of capitalist...as captain of industry, organizer and planner of the operations of the production-unit, embodiment of an authoritarian discipline over a labour army, which, robbed of its economic citizenship, had to be coerced to the fulfillment of its onerous duties in another's service by the whip alternatively of hunger and of the master's overseer."

Clearly, the split between the capitalist and working classes and the impoverishment of the working class were integrally meshed into the struggle surrounding the rise to power of the capitalist class. Consequently, it is not surprising that the semi-patriarchal relationship between master and journeymen, both parties having similar tastes and

ideals, was replaced within a few generations by complete social separation between the employer and his employees. Henry Mayhew's description of the working class in 1851, from a dominant class point of view, as "a large body of people of whom the public has less knowledge than the most distant tribes of the earth," [71] was no idle chatter; it was a statement of fact.

State subsidization of the working class also had to be curtailed to achieve the mobility and socialization of labour necessary for the smooth functioning of a competitive labour market. [72] Under the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, each parish was responsible for the welfare of those who could not fend for themselves. In 1795, the Speenhamland Law had essentially pegged the level of poor relief to the cost of living and paid relief in aid of wages which fell below a certain minimum level. [73] This legislation was contrary to the capitalist class interest, as it too hampered the smooth functioning of the labour market and had to be revoked. [74]

Workers had to learn to take care of themselves by hard work and thrift. Sponging a living off the State negated the norms of the market in labour and placed a heavy burden on local rates. It had to be stopped, irrespective of the hardship which might, and did, result. This argument was succinctly stated by *The Economist* in 1848: [75]

"Suffering and evil are nature's admonitions; they cannot be got rid of; and the impatient attempts of benevolence to banish them from the world by legislation before benevolence has learnt their object and their end, have always been productive of more evil than good."

This task was essentially accomplished by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. It abolished the 'right to live' principle which characterized previous poor Laws. Outdoor relief (i.e., relief in aid of wages)

was abolished. Workers could only receive relief if they were unemployed, and doing so meant exposing themselves to the extremely severe discipline of the sexually segregated workhouses, which were consciously designed to make their existence 'less eligible' than that of the least prosperous outside workers--surely an impossible task! [76] One result of the Act was to teach the working class the hard way that the state operated in the interests of the dominant class, not in the 'national interest' or for the 'common good.' The radical activist James 'Bronterre' O'Brien put it this way, in 1836: [77]

"Previously to the passage of the Reform Bill, the middle orders were supposed to have some community of feeling with the labourers. That delusion has passed away....It vanished with the enactment of the Starvation Law (Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834). No working man will ever again expect justice, morals or mercy at the hands of a profit-mongering legislature."

The new Poor Law

combined with the Enclosures Acts, the rural population explosion and the ruin of village handicrafts which caused extensive rural over-population [78] pressuring workers to migrate to the towns, and with capital intensive technological developments, led to the formation and perpetuation of what [79] Karl Marx called a 'reserve army' of unemployed or underemployed workers. This 'reserve army' performed two essential functions in this adolescent phase of capitalism: firstly, of depressing urban wages to or below subsistence level, thereby facilitating a high rate of capital accumulation; and secondly, of tightening the employers' control over the labour force, [80] thereby ensuring the foundation of capital accumulation. In fact, Gareth Stedman Jones has convincingly argued that employers in London

often adopted a deliberate policy of casualizing (i.e., increasing the reserve of underemployed labour) as a means of increasing the power of their control over their workers. [81]

But we have seen that production at this state in the development of capitalism in London also required skilled workers. This requirement was the basis of the fourth major struggle which occurred within the working class itself but was supported by employers as it served their purposes as well. The productive relations of London's economy stratified the working class into two broad groups according to the nature of the workers' jobs and the remuneration and security (or lack of these) which was part and parcel of such employment. This division was fundamentally a function of the skill required of workers in the execution of their tasks, and was based on the importance and scarcity of skilled labour in the economy. Thus, the working class was essentially split into skilled workers and the remainder --semi-skilled or unskilled, casually employed or unemployed. The upper stratum consisted of two kinds of skilled workers: one was the dying breed of artisans and craftsmen whose origin lay in the guild system; the other was a growing group of skilled factory workers born out of the requirements of the new industrial technology. [82] Together they comprised [83] what was known as the 'labour aristocracy.'

"Because of its higher wages and potentially higher living standards, this stratum in fact constituted the aristocracy *sui generis* of the working class. The use of this metaphorical term is justified in part by the fact that both objectively and subjectively the relationship of this stratum to the remainder of the working class was in many respects reminiscent of the relations of the real aristocracy to the remainder of the English upper and middle classes."

For reasons which are outlined below, these workers aspired to separate themselves from the rest of the working class and to secure for themselves a lower-middle-stratum existence: to become, in the words of Ray Challinor, [84]
"junior partners in British Capitalism Limited."

[85]
The skilled craftsmen laboured at trades which had existed since the Industrial Revolution to produce goods mainly for the consumption of wealthy members of society. They were gradually declining in size and importance within the economy: their continued existence in the upper levels of the working class was perpetually threatened by the possibility [86]
of new machine technologies making their skills redundant. Consequently, they fought to *maintain* their already established privileged [87]
position within the working class. They did so by banding together in trade clubs which sought to regulate the number of workers permitted to practise each trade, thereby reducing the supply of skilled craftsmen and keeping wages high and to control production techniques in an attempt to ward off the incursion of new technologies. They had never been a part of the industrial working class and struggled to maintain their independence. They developed numerous mutual aid societies, such as friendly societies, co-operatives and building societies, in order to maintain a secure existence for themselves and their families. These organizations and [88]
trade unions were highly organized but without a leadership elite: leadership roles were mutually shared. Their rearguard struggle to maintain their position in society seldom led to demands for revolutionary [89]
change. For them, a secure existence rested on accepting the behavioural requirements of capitalist institutions--thrift, temperance and social stability would assure their status.

The second sector of the 'labour aristocracy' consisted of skilled factory workers who were part of the growing industrial working class. These 'mechanics' as they were often called performed essential functions during this stage of relatively primitive industrial technology, such as [90] keeping the machines running. They too organized unions along craft, as opposed to class, lines; but their struggle was to *gain* a secure place [91] for themselves as responsible workers in a capitalist society. In so doing they emulated their craft-based counterparts in the 'labour aristocracy' by forming similar societies and cultivating acceptable social values. However, their unions were bureaucratic with organizational structures similar to those of the factories where they worked. They made few demands for revolutionary changes in society: in fact, in their everyday behaviour, they aspired to be 'more capitalist than the capitalists themselves.' So much so that in 1870 Thomas Cooper, an old Chartist leader, [92] lamented the 'capitalization' of the working class:

"My sorrowful impressions were confirmed...you will hear well-dressed working men talking, as they walk with their hands in their pockets, of 'co-ops' and their shares in them, or in building societies. And you will see others, like idiots, leading small greyhound dogs."

Though their unions did produce a capable leadership elite, recruited from their ranks, these leaders believed in negotiation, not insurrection, and often used their high status within the union as a springboard to [93] politics and an improved existence.

Both segments of the 'labour aristocracy' were regularly employed under adequate working conditions and received relatively high wages. [94] Together they comprised between 10% and 20% of the labour force.

Their trade unions were stratified along occupational lines and this lack of unity added to their politically conservative posture. As Engels [95] put it:

"They form an aristocracy among the working class; they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively comfortable position, and they accept it as final."

The societies which they established--for support in case of illness or unemployment, to buy food cheaply and to build homes for themselves--went a long way towards securing their existence and diluting demands for change. In fact, capitalists tended to support these developments in subtle ways as they saw in them a means of maintaining social stability by controlling the organized, politically mature sector of the working class. [96] The Education Act of 1870, providing public support for elementary education--an increasingly important device for socializing and controlling the working class--was an excellent example of this subtle process of domination, especially coming so soon after the 'labour aristocracy' achieved enfranchisement as a result of the 1867 Reform Act. [97]

But there was another important aspect in the struggles of the 'labour aristocracy' for a place in capitalist society. In order to gain acceptance, they had to prove to the rulers of that society that they were totally unlike the remainder of the working class who were variously described as dangerous, immoral, irresponsible or lazy. Indeed, this negation of the behavioural norms and values of the mass of the working class was a major reason why they strove to cultivate capitalist norms and values. [98] As Thomas Wright, an artisan, wrote in 1873:

"The artisan creed with regard to the labourers is that the latter are an inferior class and that they should be made to know and kept in their place."

As a result, the 'labour aristocracy's' daily actions and their aspirations and consciousness were constantly focused on the drive to separate themselves from the remainder of the working class: resisting becoming one of the masses and possibly even crossing the fuzzy boundary separating them from the bottom of the middle stratum.

The remainder of the working class were expendable products created by the down-grading effects of capitalist productive relations and new forms of technology. Workers in this stratum of the labour force competed desperately for vacant jobs which required little or no training for proficiency. [99] Consequently, their wages were generally low, often below what was needed to buy even a meagre existence. Their working conditions were usually depressing and unhealthy. Some worked in sweated trades, at home or in small workshops; others at the machines of the new factories.

A substantial number were casually employed by the day or hour often at the whim of a dock foreman. [100]

Seasonality of production and fluctuations in consumer demand caused their jobs to disappear and re-appear almost at random. Clearly, they lacked even a modicum of social or economic security. What the middle stratum defined as 'demoralized' behaviour on the part of these workers was, more often than not, a rational response to their economic predicament. [101] To paraphrase Zygmunt Bauman, [102]

they were fragmented--their traditional hierarchies and social bonds were shattered in their struggle for survival; they were alienated--deprived of any rights in society; and they were an amorphous, though not entirely

homogeneous, mass--their minimal occupational differentiation meant that they could be moulded to suit the changing requirements of the economy.

As a result they were generally disorganized politically. On the occasions when they did organize, however, they did so on a class basis. Their protests were often violent and usually opposed to the existing order, but the focus of their attacks was often irrational. [103] They inspired fear and trepidation in the hearts of the rest of society, and consequently their protests were rapidly and sometimes violently, and [104] equally irrationally, repressed by the authorities. Their unions had no integrated leadership elite. Their leaders came from the working class or the middle stratum. They were charismatic and imposing, manipulating these 'butterfly existence' unions which usually disintegrated under an early defeat.

[105]
"To sum up, therefore," in the words of Zygmunt Bauman:

"there were, among the population...two fundamentally different groups at this time: one was amorphous, while the other had occupational structure....one was fragmented, the other firmly embedded in its occupational (and social) groups....one was alienated from society, while the other was strongly rooted in it; the one was totally antagonistic in attitude to that society, the other was eager for society to recognise the privileges it had already gained, and hoped for new ones."

With this general outline of the essential characteristics of the class struggle from the 1830's to the 1880's, we may now proceed to examine how London's social and spatial structure responded to, and in turn affected, these class pressures. This is the subject of Chapter 3. But first we must set the scene of London in the 1830's.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Hall [1962] p.10.
2. Jones [1971] p.19, indicates three factors but implies four.
3. "Internal trade in Western Europe was actually controlled...and regulated...by the intervention of the state," Polanyi [1944] p.63, and see pp.63-7; "Monopoly was of the essence of economic life in this epoch," Dobb [1963] p.89, and see pp.85-90.
4. Hall [1962] p.117.
5. Hall [1962] p.115; Sheppard [1971] pp.159-160.
6. Weber [1899] p.450.
7. Fisher [1948] passim.
8. Hall [1962] pp.117-8.
9. For an account of these changes, see Hobsbawm [1968] pp.56-78, 109-133, passim.
10. "In fact, London was the chief manufacturing centre of the country in 1861," Hall [1962] p.10; Gomme [1898] p.87.
11. For a more detailed exposition of these factors, see Jones [1971] pp.19-21.
12. Hall [1962] p.118.
13. Hobsbawm [1964] pp.3-7; Hall [1962] p.104.
14. Hall [1962] pp.53,83.
15. See Summerson [1973] passim.
16. Dyos [1968] pp.47-60, Appendices A and B; Olsen [1964] pp.52,59-62, 181-182; Thomas Cubitt, James Burton and Edward Yates were among the exceptions.
17. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.69-84,139-162,274-290, passim.
18. Quoted in Sheppard [1971] p.76; and see pp.46-82 for a history of the London money market from 1801-1870. Also see Court [1954] pp.92-102; Jones [1971] p.152.
19. Jones [1971] pp.26-27.

20. Hall [1962] pp.92-93,117.
21. The sweating system was both a system of subcontracting tasks based on extensive "vertical disintegration of production," Hall [1962] p.55,60-65,83-90; and a system of "subcontracting exploitation and management," Hobsbawm [1954] p.297.
22. Hall [1962] pp.52,54,82.
23. Hall [1962] pp.59,64; Jones [1971] p.22.
24. Jones [1971] p.23; Martin [1966] p.2.
25. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.23.
26. Jones [1971] pp.23-25; Martin [1966] pp.4,17; Sheppard [1971] pp.166-168,174,179-180.
27. For more detailed analyses of the reasons behind choosing these locations, see Jones [1971] pp.26,29; Martin [1966] p.20; Sheppard [1971] pp.180-182; and Gomme [1898] p.86.
28. For a more detailed treatment, see Jones [1971] pp.24-30; for the case of the printing industry, see Hall [1962] pp.96-110.
29. Hobsbawm [1964] pp.7-15.
30. Workmen's trains and trams only became practical means of working class transport after the 1880's. See Dyos [1953] passim.
31. Jones [1971] p.81.
32. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.30.
33. Hall [1962] p.25; Sheppard [1971] pp.158-159.
34. Sheppard [1971] pp.187-201; Hall [1962] Table I, pp.21-22.
35. Jones [1971] p.27.
36. Jones [1971] pp.26,32. Professor E. P. Thompson has correctly argued that the sweating system should be seen as another integral aspect of the overall Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, not as a separable anachronism caused by the growth of machine technology, as neo-classical economic historians are wont to do. "Ideology may wish to exalt one [aspect] and decry the other, but facts must lead us to say that each was a complementary component of a single process...the degradation of the outworkers...was accomplished by methods of exploitation similar to those in the dishonourable trades and it often preceded machine competitionIndeed, we may say that large-scale sweated outwork was as

- intrinsic to this [Industrial] revolution as was factory production and steam." Thompson [1963] p.261.
37. Two exceptions are Jones [1971] on London and Foster [1974] on Oldham, Northampton and South Shields. And see Professor E. J. Hobsbawm's foreword to Foster's book for a discussion of this issue.
 38. Novack [1971] p.50. For a brief analysis of this change, see pp.49-57.
 39. "In our preoccupation with the definition of an economic system, we must not let it be implied that the frontiers between systems are to be drawn across a page of history as a sharp dividing line. As those who distrust all such talk of epochs have correctly insisted, systems are never in reality to be found in their pure form, and in any period of history elements characteristic both of preceeding and of succeeding periods are to be found, sometimes mingled in extraordinary complexity....[But] in any given period to speak in terms of a homogeneous system and to ignore the complexities of the situation is more illuminating, at least as a first approximation, than the contrary would be." Dobb [1963] p.11. And see Selsam and Martel [1963] pp.182-223, passim.
 40. "If the conception of Capitalism and its development that we have here adopted be a valid one, it would seem to follow that any change in the circumstances affecting the sale of that crucial commodity labour-power, whether this concerns the relative abundance and scarcity of labour or the degree to which workers are organized and act in consort or can exert political influence, must vitally affect the prosperity of the system and hence the impetus of its movement, the social and economic policies of the rulers of industry and even the nature of industrial organization [and the class structure] and the march of technique." Dobb [1963] p.23.
 41. Dobb [1963] pp.18,123.
 42. Hobsbawm [1968] pp.34-55.
 43. The nature and primacy of these basic institutions is explored in Chapter 6.
 44. "In the years between 1780 and 1832, most English working people came to feel an identity of interests as between themselves, and as against their rulers and employers. This ruling class was itself much divided, and in fact only gained cohesion over the same years because certain antagonisms were resolved (or faded into relative insignificance) in the face of an insurgent working class. Thus the working class presence was, in 1832, the most significant factor in British political life." Thompson [1963] pp.11-12. And see Hobsbawm [1968] pp.73,77; Morton [1938] pp.387,392-393.

45. "In 1834....'the new Poor Law'....set the seal on unfettered free trade in the labour market." Dobb [1963] p.275. "Not until 1834 was a competitive labour market established in England." Polanyi [1944] p.83.
46. Findlayson [1969] p.1, and passim.
47. Rude [1952] p.17.
48. "This event has been recorded and commemorated as marking a new era in urban transport in Great Britain--as being, in fact, its real beginning." Barker and Robbins [1963] p.1.
49. "...before the first local passenger railway in London had run its course between Tooley Street and Deptford in December 1836 and marked the beginning of a new age." Dyos [1954] p.78.
50. By the 1820's, short-stage coach traffic had reached considerable proportions compared to the rest of Britain, but was diminutive compared to the numbers carried by omnibus and trains in the years after the 1830's. Hackney coaches differed little in essence from private coaches. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.3-10.
51. Dobb [1963] p.13.
52. "In other words, the relationship from which in one case a common interest in preserving and extending a particular economic system and in the other case an antagonism of interest on this issue can alone derive must be a relationship with a particular mode of extracting and distributing the fruits of surplus labour, over and above the labour which goes to supply the consumption of the actual producer." Dobb [1963] p.15. Furthermore, "a surplus of the product of labour over and above the costs of maintenance of the labour, and the formation and enlargement, out of this surplus, of a social production and reserve fund, was and is the basis of all social, political and intellectual progress." Engels [1894] p.231.
53. English historians of this period usually use the label 'middle class' in reference to the capitalist class of the day, that is, in the sense in which Engels [1892] p.5, used it, to denote the property-owning *bourgeoisie* which then occupied a middle position in the class structure, between the landed aristocracy and the working class. In modern usage 'middle class' generally refers to 'white-collar' workers, small traders and employers. This forms of class definition belongs "to a social stratification or gradation concept of 'class' antithetical to the Marxist dichotomic concept." Balbus [1971] p.42. In other words, this formulation tells little of a group's common objective relationship to the means of production and hence to other social groups. To avoid such confusion I will use the following class categories:

Landed aristocracy--the small group of big landowners whose income came from ground rents;

Capitalist class--bankers, financiers, big merchants and industrialists, who owned capital and lived off the profits which accrued to it.

Petty capitalist class--small shopkeepers and employers, small landlords and entrepreneurs.

Appendant class--lawyers, architects and other professionals, civil servants and other government employees who worked for commissions or wages in service of the above three classes. Rudin [1972] p.17. Together the above four classes comprised the *dominant or ruling class* which had a common objective interest in maintaining the capitalist mode of production, with the real power resting in the hands of capitalists and landed aristocrats.

Opposed to this class was the *subordinate class* which had a common objective interest in changing the capitalist mode of production and was comprised of all those who worked for a wage, including:

White-collar working class--clerks and other office workers, whose numbers were small but growing;

Working class--all manual workers, skilled or unskilled, who at this stage constituted the real opposition to the dominant class.

By calling all manual workers the 'working class,' I do not mean to imply that non-manual workers were not part of the working class.

I have done so for the sake of convenience: it is more instructive when analysing urban development to group all manual workers together in gaining an understanding of class relations during 19th century British capitalism, and the constant references to 'blue-collar' or 'manual' working class would be cumbersome.

Furthermore, at a subjective level, the capitalist appendant and white-collar working classes comprised what may be called the *middle stratum* which aspired towards a way of life which emulated the capitalists and landed aristocrats, albeit at a simple, if pretentious level. Consequently, when dealing with the residential aspects of their lives, it is reasonable to refer to these three classes under this composite label.

I would like to thank Jeffrey Rudin and Herbert Gintis for clarifying these points with me. A more theoretical discussion of 'class,' which supports the above formulation, is contained in Chapter 6.

54. See note 44. For an excellent analysis of the struggle leading up to the passing of the Reform Act, see Thompson [1963] pp. 807-832. Also see Morton [1938] pp.387-393,423-434; Findlayson [1969] pp.5-23; Nairn [1972] pp.187-194.
55. Thompson [1963] p.820. And see Engels [1880] pp.389-395.
56. "The agitation arose from 'the people' and rapidly displayed the most astonishing consensus of opinion as to the imperative necessity for 'reform.' Viewed from one aspect, England was without doubt passing through a crisis in these twelve months (1831-32) in which revolution was possible....The fact that revolution did not

occur was due...in part to the skill of the middle-class in offering exactly that compromise which might not weaken but strengthen both the state and property-rights against the working-class threat...and which enabled that accommodation to be made, between landed and industrial wealth, between privilege and money which has been an enduring configuration of English society." Thompson [1963] pp.808,817,819.

57. "On the one hand, there was a consciousness of the identity of interests between working men of the most diverse occupations and levels of attainment...which was expressed on an unprecedented scale in the general unionism of 1830-4....On the other hand, there was a consciousness of the identity of the interests of the working class, or 'productive classes,' *as against* those of other classes; and within this there was maturing the claim for an alternative *system*. But the final definition of this class consciousness was in large part the consequence of the response to working-class strength of the middle class." Thompson [1963] p.807.
58. "That liberalization was in fact a collective *ruling class* response to a social system in crisis and integrally related to a preceding period of working-class consciousness." Foster [1974] p.3. And see Morton [1938] p.382.
59. For the Corn Law Repeal, see Morton [1938] pp.401-407; for the Factory Acts, see Engels [1892] pp.361,366; and Morton [1938] pp.376-381.
60. "The landed aristocracy, although rulers and chief beneficiaries of an agricultural society, played an important part in promoting (industrial) economic growth." Spring [1971] p.16.
61. Spring [1971] pp.38-42.
62. Bauman [1960] p.76.
63. Reeve [1971] p.106; Dyos [1961] pp.148-150 for the growth of retail shopping.
64. For statistics of London's socio-economic structure in 1861 and 1891, see Jones [1971] pp.387-393, Tables 13-20. For 1851, see Sheppard [1971] p.389.
65. Bauman [1960] pp.13-15. "Conditions in unskilled manual labour or in outwork industries...were characteristic of a system designed by employers, legislators and ideologists to cheapen human labour in every way." Thompson [1963] p.313.
66. Engels [1892] p.89. Markets in labour and essential commodities and other capitalist institutions are examined in Chapter 6.
67. For an excellent historical analysis of the revolutionary nature of the economic incentive system, see Polanyi [1944] pp.33-55.

"Nineteenth century civilization alone was economic in a different and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly never before raised to a level of a justification of action and behaviour in everyday life, namely gain. The self-regulating market system was uniquely derived from this principle....The transformation implies a change in the motive of action on the part of the members of society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain must be substituted." Polanyi [1944] pp.30,41.

68. Hobsbawm [1968] p.87. And see Martin [1971] p.15.
69. Peasants and artisans were not *automatically* reborn in the new patterns of behaviour required by the market in Labour. As Max Weber wrote in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*: "A man does not 'by nature' wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose. Whenever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labour by increasing its intensity, it has encountered the immensely stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalist labour." Quoted in Bauman [1960] p.3, who adds that "ruthless discipline was necessary to extirpate the 'restless and migratory spirit'...of those suspended in the void between two contradictory cultural systems. There was no ideological substitute for this." Bauman [1960] p.4.
70. Dobb [1963] p.260. And see Marglin [1971] pp.31-61.
71. Quoted in Martin [1971] p.15. Disraeli's famous book, *The Two Nations*, also highlighted this split. As we shall see, poverty, overcrowding and unemployment among the working class, was only 'discovered' in the 1880's when the working class presented a threat to social stability. See Jones [1971] p.v; Wohl [1968] pp.207,227,231.
72. "A further group of assumptions follows in respect to the state and its policies. Nothing must be allowed to inhibit the formation of markets nor must incomes be permitted to be formed otherwise than through sales." Polanyi [1944] p.69.
73. For a good, though 'classless,' analysis of the Speenhamland system, see Polanyi [1944] pp.77-85. Blaug [1963] offers an alternative view. In my estimation, he is incorrect as he sees it through a present-day state capitalist ideological haze, removed from the class struggle of early 19th century England.
74. "During the most active period of the Industrial Revolution, from 1795 to 1834, the creating of a labour market in England was prevented through the Speenhamland Law....Indeed, nothing could be more obvious than that the wage system imperatively demanded the withdrawal of the 'right to live' as proclaimed in Speenhamland--under

the new regime of the economic man, nobody would work for a wage if he could make a living by doing nothing." Polanyi [1944] pp.77-78.

75. Quoted in Tarn [1971] p.3. Samuel Smiles' bestseller, *Self Help* [1894], was another example of the prevailing *laissez faire* ideology.
76. "The doctrine of discipline and restraint was, from the start, more important than that of material 'less eligibility,' the most inventive State would have been hard put to...create institutions which stimulated conditions *worse* than those [of the worst situated workers outside]...'our object [said an assistant commissioner] is to establish therein a discipline so severe and repulsive as to make them a terror to the poor and prevent them from entering.'" Thompson [1963] p.267. The more traditional argument goes as follows: "The whole point of 'less eligibility' was that it should be unpleasant and degrading to take poor relief. Becoming a pauper did not just mean being poor. It was an actual legal status and, like a black person in South Africa today, paupers were denied many basic human rightsThe essential thing was humiliation." Martin [1971] p.60, and see pp.50-62.
77. Quoted in Thompson [1963] p.822.
78. Huberman [1936] pp.107-111,171-174; Morton [1938] pp.326-330, Dobb [1963] p.274.
79. "But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus-population becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost." Marx [1867] p.632, and see pp.628-40. Mayhew's guess as to the size of the reserve army in London in the 1850's was as follows: "estimating the working classes as being between four and five million in number, I think we may safely assert...that... there is barely sufficient work for the *regular* employment of half of our labourers, so that only 1,500,000 are fully and constantly employed; while 1,500,000 more are employed only half their time, and the remaining 1,500,000 wholly unemployed, obtaining a day's work *occasionally* by the displacement of some of the others." Quoted in Thompson [1963] p.250.
80. On the depression of wages, see Engels [1892] p.366. On the importance of the reserve army in perpetuating working-class stratification, and control on the principle of 'divide and rule,' see Hobsbawm [1954] pp.290-291.
81. The nature of casual work was that it "placed tyrannical power in the hands of the foreman or man responsible for hiring and firing."

Jones [1971] pp.81-82,116. The film *On the Waterfront*, made in the 1950's and starring Marlon Brando, excellently portrayed the power and infectiousness of this control.

82. "The period therefore probably saw a transfer of the centre of gravity within the labour aristocracy from the old pre-industrial crafts to the new metal industries." Hobsbawm [1954] p.284. "During the period under discussion (1850-1890), therefore, two processes were occurring side by side which were transforming the structure of the working class. One was the disappearance of the division which had played a fundamental part in the preceding period, a specific division which belonged to the 'prehistory' of the working class; the other was the emergence of a new stratification within the working class that had been created by the industrial revolution....Occupational barriers remained high, and differences of occupational interests overshadowed any identity of class interests." Bauman [1960] p.75.
83. Bauman [1960] p.67. And see Hobsbawm [1954] pp.273-275 and Bauman [1960] pp.67-68 for a discussion of the elements which created a "labour aristocracy."
84. Challinor [1971] p.18.
85. Bauman [1960] pp.16-21; Thompson [1963] pp.234-264.
86. "But we must also bear in mind the general *insecurity* of many skills in a period of rapid technical innovation....Invention simultaneously devalued old skills and elevated new ones." Thompson [1963] p.244.
87. "Where a skill was involved, the artisan was as much concerned with maintaining his status as against the unskilled man as he was in bringing pressure upon the employers." Thompson [1963] p.244.
88. Bauman [1960] pp.22-38,51-53,95-98; Morton [1938] pp.441-442.
89. "The first unions were set up with aims that were defensive, not offensive, with the intention of maintaining the existing *status quo*, not of forcing through any progressive changes." Bauman [1960] p.30. But revolutionary fervour was high even among this group during the 1830's and 1840's; see Thompson [1963] p.831.
90. "As a result, the new industry produced a new stratum of skilled workers, men with definite jobs and a permanent place in the new system of production. These men were not identical, easily changed components; instead, precisely because of the difficulty of replacing them, and their important part in the production process, they had a lasting position in the social structure of production." Bauman [1960] p.63, and see pp.63-74,77-78. Hobsbawm [1968] pp.117-118.
91. "If one were to try to convey briefly the essence of their new social attitude, one would have to stress that their aim was the emancipation

of the stratum as a whole within the framework as a scale of values that was firmly linked with the capitalist system." Bauman [1960] p.69.

92. Quoted in Challinor [1971] p.17. For an analysis of their 'new model' unions, see Bauman [1960] pp.80-95,98-108.
93. Bauman [1960] p.131, and see pp.110-126.
94. Thompson [1963] p.251; Hobsbawm [1954] pp.278-284. But Jones [1971] p.387 estimates their numbers to be about 30%.
95. Engels [1892] p.368. "Given the 'law of uneven development' within capitalism...a purely 'economist' labour movement must tend to fragment the working class into 'selfish' (petty bourgeois) segments, each pursuing its own interest, if necessary in alliance with its own employers, at the expense of the rest." Hobsbawm [1970] p.123.
96. Challinor [1971] p.17.
97. Bowles [1971] pp.4-7. And see the entire article for an excellent argument of the function of education in reproducing capitalist class relations.
98. Quoted in Hobsbawm [1954] p.275. "Its [the 'labour aristocracy'] members' pursuit of social advancement was thus expressed both by their raising themselves to the position of the lower middle class and by a definite dissociation of themselves from the unskilled." Bauman [1960] p.74.
99. "Here men regard their fellows not as human beings, but as pawns in the struggle for existence." Engels [1892] p.31. "The living conditions of the mass of unskilled workers remained at a pitifully low level. Such workers were still easily interchangeable and not linked with any particular industry. This often made their position weak in the economic struggle which had to be waged with the employers if they were to improve their lot. In contrast to their skilled fellow workers, they did not play a key role in the production system." Bauman [1960] p.66.
100. "Casualized workers and their families comprised about 10 percent of the population--around 400,000 persons....To be subject to casualization, an occupation had to fulfill several conditions. Firstly, no natural barrier of specialized skill or knowledge restricted the field of potential applicants in the labour market; or else, the special qualifications were so widely shared or so easily attained that in fact they did not act as a barrier. Secondly, the nature of the occupation rendered it liable to sudden and arbitrary changes in the volume of the demand for labour. Thirdly, in casual occupations, employers gained only the most marginal advantages

from regularity, reliability, sobriety or other virtues of work discipline considered to be associated with constant employment; or else these advantages were offset by the availability of a cheap and elastic supply of labour." Jones [1971] p.56, and see pp.33-126 for an excellent analysis of the casual labour market in London in general, and the East End in particular.

101. "Habitual uncertainty of employment, as all social investigators know, discourages forethought and gives rise to the familiar cycle of hardship alternated with the occasional spending-spree when in work." Thompson [1963] p.264.
102. Bauman [1960] p.16.
103. "The working population from which the new skilled workers had imperceptibly emerged was nonconformist in all spheres. It was in revolt, not against its position in society but against society itself and the whole social hierarchy." Bauman [1960] p.68, and see pp.40-50, 53-59, for an analysis of these unions and their leaders.
104. Morton [1938] pp.365-366.
105. Bauman [1960] p.20.

CHAPTER 2

LONDON IN THE 1830's

From Feudal to Capitalist London

A snapshot of London in the 1830's obscures the fact that its social and spatial fabric was in the midst of a major process of transition which had begun during the 18th century and continued at least until the mid-20th century. London's internal organization was changing from a situation in which the workplace and the home were closely integrated, to one in which workplaces were concentrated together and substantially separated from residences. This process had its gradual beginnings when the craft guilds began to crumble as they became subservient to merchants and bankers, and as mastercraftsmen became capitalist employers themselves. It was part of a larger transformation whereby cities assumed increasing dominance over their rural hinterlands. [1] But we are here concerned with the internal transformation of the city--from feudal to capitalist London.

[2] In the days when the craft guilds were powerful, the City of London was controlled by the guilds. They regulated who could work, trade and live within the walls. Production was not too obnoxious and mastercraftsmen usually lived with their journeymen and apprentices above their workshops. The West End was the domain of the idle Royalty and aristocracy and as such was more uniformly residential and socially homogeneous. The areas surrounding the northern, eastern and southern boundaries of the City, the suburbs of the 18th century, were inhabited by all classes, with the poor, the unemployed and the tradesmen predominating, as they had been excluded from the City, either because they represented unwanted competition or

[3]
because their trades were obnoxious. The early housing legislation, which controlled the quality and quantity of housing built in the suburbs, was part of general legislation enacted by the guilds in an attempt to maintain their dominant economic position. Broadly speaking, London's social and physical structure was shaped by the guilds' activities.

But as merchants, and subsequently capitalist employers, became more prominent so the guilds' protective practices were eroded and replaced by competitive market relations. Merchants encouraged production in the suburbs to escape guild restrictions in the City which increased costs. They bought goods from craftsmen whose prices were low, whether or not they were located within the City walls. [4] As we have seen in the previous chapter, the capitalist labour market was antithetical to the guilds' practice of assuming responsibility for the essential needs of their journeymen and apprentices. In fact, the new labour market was predicated upon the separation of work and living--the essential commodity, housing, was the workers' responsibility and had to be paid for out of their wages. In any case, employers had enough headaches worrying about production: if others would provide housing for their workers, then well and good. Thus the development of the labour market was paralleled by the development of markets for housing and for land on which to build it. Work and living increasingly became separated in space. Productive and commercial facilities grew and gravitated towards the central area which became less attractive as a place in which to live. The surrounding countryside was more enticing, so those who could moved to the suburbs. But this was a slow, uneven process. Those with wealth and power were first to move, others followed, yet even today many poorer people are trapped in undesirable

parts of the central area, though they do live away from their workplaces.

[5]


Thus, in the words of H. J. Dyos:

"London suburbs have at different times performed different functions. At one period they were reception areas for the urban poor, almost literally the outskirts of urban society, and at another they were the exclusive residential areas of the middle classes. During the course of the period [1580-1836]...there was, in general, a characteristic change from the first of these residential functions to the second."

By the 1830's, due to the lack of suburban transport and other facilities, this suburban migration was confined to prosperous merchants and government employees, though the beginnings of this movement had already been recorded in the mid-18th century. There had been no working-class migration from the centre. London's workers lived within the confines of the central area within walking distance from their work. There were few socially homogeneous neighbourhoods; except in the north-west and West End, rich and poor lived cheek by jowl. [6] The population of the metropolis was approaching two million and was mainly concentrated in the City, [7] Westminster, Marylebone, Finsbury, Tower Hamlets, Lambeth and Southwark.

The Location of Classes and Economic Activity

The City was the commercial and financial heart of London. Merchants and employers still lived there, but the more prosperous ones had migrated [8] to the north and west and to suburban villages. The working class also resided in the City, often confined to decaying slums. Most of the structures had been built shortly after the Great Fire of 1666. Old homes were gradually being converted into businesses, or were being demolished to make way for more up-to-date commercial structures.



Abutting the City, the East End was a motley area of industry and predominantly working-class housing. Silk manufacture dominated Spitalfields, sugar-refining was located in Whitechapel, and shipbuilding and warehousing proliferated in Dockland along the Thames river. [9] The sweated clothing, shoe-making and furniture trades were diffused throughout the whole area. The East End was home for all levels of the working class. The better paid skilled workers probably lived in reasonable accommodations by the standards of the time, but the bulk of the workers, particularly the multitudes of casual workers, lived in densely packed, overcrowded, unsanitary rooms and lodging houses for which they paid high rents. [10] There must have been many who were literally homeless. For many sweated workers, their homes had to double up as workplaces.

To the north of the City, there was a sprinkling of light industry and sweated trades, but this area was predominantly the home of clerks, public employees, professional and petty capitalists. Some merchants and employers lived there and so did a good deal of workers. The Duke of Bedford's Bloomsbury estate was well managed, strictly controlled and inhabited by wealthy families. Its squares were pleasant and inviting, in contrast to its unimaginative architecture. The physical condition of most of the northern area was adequate, but there were some slums, like those in St. Giles, and in Clerkenwell on the Duke of Northampton's estate. [11] [12] The Figs Mead estate on the northern extremities of London was inhabited by artisans and labourers living in 'third and fourth rate' houses. The manager of the estate was fighting a valiant battle to prevent its decay to the level of the adjacent slums of Camden Town and Somers Town.

[13]

The north-west was altogether another kettle of fish. It was a highly fashionable residential area populated by successful merchants, employers, top civil servants and professionals. With such high class tenants, the Duke of Portman must have had few problems maintaining the high standards of his estate. There were, however, sprinklings of slums in awkward alleys and secluded courts. What little production there was in this area was concentrated around the Oxford street shopping precinct where the respectable bespoke tailors and dressmakers had their workshops.

Most of the West End was prime property. It was the traditional home of royalty and the aristocracy. A small proportion of highly successful businessmen and bankers probably lived there. [14] The Palace had

recently been moved to its present position at the end of The Mall. The seats of Government and Courts of Justice were dotted about the area.

St. James and Green Parks were decidedly pleasant and Hyde Park attracted the upper crust on Sundays when they strolled and rode along the banks of the Serpentine to see and be seen. Mayfair, Pall Mall and Belgravia were superb, spacious neighbourhoods. Bond and Regent streets were exclusive shopping precincts. [15] Again there were some slums in out-of-the-way

places. In fact, Regent street was built in 1815 both to increase the desirability of Regents Park by improving accessibility to the West End [16] and as a barrier between the West End and the slums of Soho.

Finally, south London was much more like the East End. Various mixed industries, such as tanneries, iron-foundaries, gasworks, dye-works, [17] breweries and shoe and hat manufactureres were located there. A few employers and more clerks lived south of the river, mainly on the outskirts

of the built-up area in places like Camberwell, Dulwich, Brixton and
[18] Clapham. But the area was filled with all strata of the working class
most of whom worked in local factories, though some crossed London Bridge
along with the clerks to work in the City and East End. The area was
polluted and most of the housing was dilapidated and overcrowded.

The distinction between town and countryside was sharp. Beyond the
built-up area there were market gardens and brickfields waiting to be
consumed by the relentless march of houses. [19] There was some ribbon
development along main roads leading to London, and some large residences
were dotted about the countryside, but the latter were not generally used
as permanent residences by those who worked in the centre.

Compared with what was to come in the decades ahead, the modes of
transportation in 1830 were primitive. Longer distances were traversed
in stage coaches and private coaches, shorter distances in short-stage
coaches, hackney cabs and private carriages. [20] The use of these vehicles
was generally restricted to the wealthier members of society who could
afford to own them or pay the fares. The working class and most of the
middle stratum walked to work. Goods were transported by sea, river or
canal and were conveyed by carts within the city.

[21]
The government of the metropolis was fragmented, chaotic and corrupt.
The City of London was the only local area which had one effective authority
responsible for the provision and maintenance of public services in the
area. The City Corporation, as it was called, was an ancient body which
represented the interests of the powerful City businessmen. It reigned
supreme within the boundaries of the City, was constantly at loggerheads
with Parliament in matters affecting the City's interests or challenging

the Corporation's authority and usually was the victor in those forays. The Council of Aldermen was the most powerful body within the Corporation. Its members were elected by a complex procedure which enabled them to remain in office for long periods of time. They often acted against the expressed wishes of the Court of Common Council, a much more representative body.

The remainder of London was governed by a myriad of local bodies. Almost 200 highly autonomous parish vestries were responsible for the paving, lighting and cleansing of streets and the relief of the poor.

[22]

According to Lynn Lees:

"London parishes...possessed the right to self-government almost up to the point of urban anarchy; no effective government beyond that of the City of London was installed until 1889 when the London County Council came into being."

More than half of these public bodies were 'open' vestries where all male ratepayers were entitled to attend. But in the fashionable western areas 'close' or 'select' vestries were more common. Here membership and power were restricted to a small, nominated group of 'principal inhabitants.' Public commissions and private companies were responsible for turnpikes, sewers, water and gas services, which were primitive at this stage. Jurisdictional irrationalities surrounding the distribution of responsibility for most of these public goods proliferated and led to inequities, inefficiencies and constant arguments between authorities. The one consistent fact in this maze was that the residential areas of the wealthy were generally far better served at lower rates than working-class districts. In 1839, Dr. Southwood Smith, the famous sanitary reformer, reported:

[23]

"While systematic efforts, on a larger scale, have been made to widen the streets...to extend and perfect the drainage and sewerage ...in the places in which the wealthier classes reside, nothing what-ever has been done to improve the condition of the districts inhabited by the poor."

Except for the Metropolitan Police which was formed in 1829, London lacked a city-wide governing body until the inception of the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855.

The Origins of the Leasehold System

Finally, we must explore the systems of tenure which mediated relations between the owners and occupants of residential land and housing. Outright ownership by the occupant, of both the house in which he/she lived and the freehold of the land on which it was built, was rare. More prevalent, though not widespread, were cases in which houses were owned by their occupants, by means of their own funds or money borrowed from solicitors or building societies, but the land was leased from an aristocratic or corporate freeholder. These systems of tenure, which are explored in the next chapter, were effectively subservient

until the 1880's to the overwhelmingly predominant leasehold system. [24]

A brief exposition of the historical origins of the leasehold system is instructive as it shows why it, and not a freehold system, for instance, was so prevalent during the 19th century, a factor of paramount importance in the evolution of London's social and spatial structure.

Basically, the leasehold system evolved out of the feudal form of land tenure as it increasingly came into contradiction with capitalist market relations. In many respects, it was a product of the integration which was occurring between the landed aristocracy and merchants and

employers. In the Feudal era, all land was ultimately owned by the Crown. Under a law instituted by William the Conqueror in 1066, all other persons having rights over land were his tenants and received their rights from him. He assigned control of the land in large portions between his retainers who comprised the landed aristocracy. In return these nobles had to furnish the king with military aid in times of war or with the equivalent value in money. They were regarded as 'freemen' and the holding of land on these terms was called *freehold*. With the passage of time, the freeholders' obligation to the Crown fell away and the term 'freehold' in England came to mean absolute right of ownership of land. [25] Each aristocrat's land holdings could be handed down within his family. The freeholder could 'by copy of court roll' convey the land to his retainers, a form of tenure known as *copyhold*. Undoubtedly, land changed hands in this way as freeholders attempted to offset debts which they had incurred. But land could not be bought and sold at will--it was inalienable. As [26] Karl Polanyi has correctly argued:

"Land, the pivotal element in the feudal order, was the basis of the military, judicial, administrative and political system; its status and function were determined by legal and customary rules. Whether its possession was transferable or not, and if so, to whom and under what restrictions; what the rights of property entailed; to what uses some types of land might be put--all these questions were removed from the organization of buying and selling, and subjected to an entirely different set of institutional regulations."

However, this system progressively came under pressure, particularly in London, as its rate of expansion increased and as the potential for realizing ground rents dawned on the freeholders of peripheral land. The change to a new form of tenure occurred first in urban areas as a result

of the basic difference in the formation of rural and urban land rent and due to the growing specialization of land uses which characterized urban areas. In the case of rural land, given a certain fertility of the soil, the landowner can, by investing more capital in the land, increase its yield and thereby its value. In urban areas, however, the landowner has minimal control over the value of his land. Rare is the occasion in which he can, by his own industry, increase the value of his land, which fundamentally depends on its place in the overall development of the city. [27] All he can do is to ensure that he gets the prevailing rent by developing his land in a manner appropriate to its situation. Further, unlike rural land, on which peasants lived and which they worked for their subsistence and for the needs of their feudal landlords, urban land was increasingly given over to specialized productive, financial or residential functions. Thus it was not amenable to a system of payment in kind or alternately working the land for one's own and the landlord's consumption as was rural land. What were landlords to do with half a tailor's produce of workmen's suits or half a ship? How could a financier pay in kind for his offices or a clerk for his house? Clearly, the only common denominator which could lubricate all these transactions was money. Attempts had been made to sell land freehold but these were effectively prevented by legislation enacted [28] by Henry VIII in 1558. Some other mechanism had to be found which would enable the landowner to assign the *use* of his land to others in return for *money*.

The building lease was an ingenious answer to this dilemma. In the [29] words of Michael Harrison:

"The device of the building lease--which smacks more of the cunning of the attorney than the self-protective ingenuity or the aristocrat with his lands in tail--enabled the owner of entailed property to evade not the provisions of the law but its disadvantages."

It allowed landlords to maintain ownership of their land and theoretically to control the use of the land, thereby satisfying the Crown, while others were granted rights to build on the land and to use the buildings for agreed purposes in return for an annual ground rent. Landlords, who were concerned with the distant future as well as the immediate present, had a financial incentive to provide good layouts which meshed well into those of surrounding estates. By means of covenants in the building agreements, they could control the quality of both the design and construction of their estates and maintain some degree of supervision over the period of the lease. On the expiration of the lease, which could vary from 21 to, more popularly, 99 years, the land, together with the improvements, reverted to the ground landlord who was at liberty to begin a new lease on the existing property, or to rebuild the estate. Thus, landlords were not required to transgress their agreements not to sell the land, yet they received an annual return for it; and what's more, they became the outright owners of improved and more valuable land once the lease expired. [30]

Leaseholders, on the other hand, received the use of space which was essential to their productive or residential requirements. Their initial outlay was much smaller than would have been the case if they had purchased the freehold of the property for a capital sum. No doubt they would have preferred not to pay the ground rent. However, employers were especially reticent to challenge this burden as it meant attacking the institution of private ownership of land which might bring private property in general

under fire, and that might have proved especially problematic at a time when they were struggling for political and economic dominance. The ground rent was a small price to pay for an essential item, and the leasehold system did facilitate the institutionalization of a competitive market in land, which prevented land from becoming communal property and enabled those with financial power to outbid others for prime locations which suited their requirements. [31] Thus, the market in urban land, mediated by the building lease, became an appropriate device for allocating space to competing users, a necessary process which might otherwise have posed thorny political problems.


The London building lease owes its origin to the fourth Earl of Southampton who first used it in the development of Bloomsbury Square. [32] After that freeholders increasingly applied to Parliament to pass Private Acts enabling them to grant building leases. They employed surveyors to plan the layout of the estate, often in conjunction with prospective builders, and to supervise its construction. Their attorneys drew up leases with appropriate covenants designed to regulate land use, costs, density, aesthetic and constructional standards and/or maintenance in an attempt to keep the value of the land high. But landlords had little control over changing market forces. In those cases where the status of potential leaseholders began to decline, freeholders found to their dismay, in the words of Donald Olsen: [33]

"that the forces which were undermining the integrity of their original plans were too powerful to be stopped by restrictive covenants....The difficulty was that during the term of the lease, apart from occasional expenditure on public services, the ground landlord was limited to passive and defensive measures....The building plan might have been a good one for its

own time, but have grown outdated because of changing circumstances."

In west London, many of the estates which were developed for building were very large indeed. In the inner districts of east London, the pattern of land ownership was generally more fragmented, as was the case in south London with the exception of larger estates in Lambeth and parts of
[34]
Camberwell.

Such was London's disposition and condition in the 1830's. We may now proceed to examine the nature of, and the reasons behind, the important changes and developments which occurred in the next half century.



NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. The early stages of the changing relationships between town and country and of changing internal urban organization in England are well analysed by Dobb [1963] pp.70-82,90-95.
2. Throughout the text, *City*, with the capital 'C', refers to the ancient city of London, "the square mile from the Tower to the Temple Bar," Gomme [1898] p.2. 'London' and *city* with a small 'c' refer to the entire urban area, which has progressively grown to become the Greater London of the present.
3. "It is probable that the suburbs were never occupied by completely homogeneous social classes....The poor generally lived cheek-by-jowl with the rich to an extraordinary degree." Dyos [1954] p.76, and see pp.61-62.
4. Dobb [1963] p.129.
5. Dyos [1954] p.75; and see Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.XXV-XXVI; Sheppard [1971] p.109.
6. See Gomme [1898] pp.1-36, Metcalf [1972] pp.1-18, and Sheppard [1971] pp.105-109 for more details.
7. Coppock [1964] p.28; Gomme [1898] pp.3-4; United Kingdom Newspaper [1832].
8. Martin [1966] p.1; Summerson [1946] p.45. For early examples of merchants who lived in the suburbs and worked in the City, see Dyos [1954] pp.64-65.
9. Sheppard [1971] pp.164-165.
10. Engels [1892] pp.30-39.
11. Dickens wrote in the 1830's: "...the early clerk population of Somers and Camden Town, Islington and Pentonville are fast pouring into the City, or directing their steps towards Chancery Lane and the Inns of Court," quoted in Hall [1962] p.32. And see Cherry [1972] p.11.
12. Olsen [1964] p.192, and passim, for estate development in this area.
13. For more details on the development of north-west London up to the 1830's, see Prince [1964a] pp.84-107.
14. "In the general expansion of London a new trend became obvious before the accession of Queen Victoria. That was the tendency for the West End and the districts to the West of London to become the only

- areas in which wealthier people sought a home." Trent [1965] p.161.
15. Summerson [1946] pp.172,179; Kellet [1969] pp.299-300.
 16. Dyos [1957b] pp.259-261; Sheppard [1971] pp.114-115.
 17. Sheppard [1971] pp.161-164.
 18. Dyos [1954] p.77.
 19. Beautifully portrayed in a cartoon by George Cruikshank in 1829 called "London Going out of Town, or, The March of Bricks and Mortar," reproduced in Thompson [1974] plate 4.
 20. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.3-10.
 21. See Ashworth [1954] pp.70-73; Gomme [1898] pp.37-67 passim; Sheppard [1971] pp.19-45 passim.
 22. Lees [1973] pp.426-427. And see Cherry [1972] pp.28-31. For a more detailed local example of Camberwell, see Dyos [1961] pp.138-148.
 23. Quoted in Thompson [1963] p.320. And see Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.381.
 24. Olsen [1964] p.6 estimates that seven times as many buildings were held on leasehold tenure than freehold. Dyos [1961] p.90 estimates that "freehold may have comprised about a third of residential property in London in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, but the proportion of homes which were occupied by their owners was much smaller than this."
 25. Rasmussen [1934] p.405.
 26. Polanyi [1944] pp.69-70.
 27. The market in urban land will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6.
 28. Nevitt [1966] pp.15-16
 29. Harrison [1965] p.143
 30. Dyos [1968] p.643; Sheppard [1971] p.93.
 31. "Its [the capitalist mode of production] only requirement is that land should *not* be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition of production, *not belonging* to it, and the purpose is completely fulfilled if it becomes state-property, i.e., if the state draws the rent. The landowner, such an important

functionary in production in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages, is a useless superfetation in the industrial world. The radical bourgeois (with an eye moreover to the suppression of all other taxes) therefore goes forward theoretically to a refutation of the private ownership of the land, which in the form of state property, he would like to turn into the common property of the bourgeois class, of capital. But in practice he lacks the courage since an attack on one form of property--a form of the private ownership of a condition of labour--might cast considerable doubts on the other form!" Marx [1863] pp.44-45. State ownership (nationalization) of land at this stage was clearly out of the question from the capitalists' point of view as they were not yet in control of the state apparatus.

32. Summerson [1946] pp.23-24; Harrison [1965] p.142.
33. Olsen [1964] pp.108,154. And see Dyos [1961] pp.87-91.
34. Sheppard [1971] pp.88-93.

CHAPTER 3.

THE DIALECTICS OF LONDON'S GROWTH

Having set the stage showing London during the 1830's, we must now attempt to answer the following general question: why did London's social structure and spatial form develop in the ways which many historians have observed, and not in others? And why, in particular, did slums proliferate in some areas and attractive neighbourhoods in others? What pressures caused transportation networks to assume certain forms and not others? Why was so little done before the 1880's towards alleviating atrocious housing conditions? The most popular answers to these questions attribute causative powers to 'market forces' or to economic and/or technological necessities. However, it is not my purpose to critique or evaluate these explanations. Instead, I will offer a view of London's development which incorporates such explanations within a broader economic, social, political and legal framework, and which, in my view, presents a more accurate picture.

In attempting to answer these and other questions, I will argue that the nature and quality of urban living experienced in both its rewarding and problematic forms by the various strata of London's population and the spatial form of the city, was shaped by the broad fulfilment of five major social and economic forces *mediated* by the forms of tenure whereby people secured their housing; and further, that the frustration of a sixth pressure constituted the essence of the Housing Crisis of which all London was aware in the 1880's. These forces arose out of London's class structure and the struggles between and within classes during this fifty

year period, as outlined in Chapter 1. They and the interactions between them broadly determined the aspirations of the members of each class, their differential abilities to participate in the land and housing markets, and either directly or indirectly defined the structure of these markets. With these parameters set, the autonomous actions of individuals or corporate bodies in the land and housing markets, mediated by the tenure relations, led to the observed social and spatial structure of the city. In sum, I will attempt to show that London's development was shaped by the acting out of the overall class struggle, in relation to the drive to accumulate capital on the one hand, and to people's quest for shelter on the other. Though I will deal with the city as a whole, my major focus will be on the residential sector.

The following were the six forces: *first*, the striving on the part of successful merchants, bankers and employers to emulate the lifestyle of the aristocracy; *second*, the search on the part of members of the middle stratum for an existence within their means which captured the essence of their bosses' lifestyle; *third*, the efforts by the capitalist class to improve London's 'capital accumulation potential' by increasing the internal efficiency of the city, especially the anachronistic central area, and by linking it to markets in other parts of the country and the world; *fourth*, the separation of the capitalist class from the working class; *fifth*, the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class such that they constituted an abundant, cheap and adaptable labour force; and *sixth*, the struggle on the part of the 'labour aristocracy' to separate themselves from the remainder of the working class and to establish a

place for themselves in capitalist society. I would stress that these pressures are all interrelated in the complex web of everyday life. They are all aspects of the general struggle by capitalists, on the one hand, to increase the rate of capital accumulation subject to the maintenance of social stability, and for improved working and living conditions by the middle stratum and the working class, on the other hand. These six forces were the major constituents of the whole. They have only been abstracted in order to facilitate a clearer understanding of why London's social and physical fabric evolved as it did. We may now proceed to examine each in turn.

Integration at the Top

In the previous chapter, we saw that the rise of the British capitalist class was not predicated upon a corresponding decline in the economic and political power or the social status of the landed aristocracy. Instead, a process of integration occurred in which capitalists and aristocrats gradually combined to form a single essentially capitalist, dominant class. An important aspect of this coming together is that successful capitalists envied the aristocratic lifestyle and endeavoured to buy their way into these upper circles or, at least, to achieve their own less opulent versions of it.

[1]

During the latter part of the 18th century, and especially during the period under consideration here, there was another pressure acting upon merchants, bankers and employers who were still living above their workplaces in the City and its surrounding parishes. As the productive, distributive and exchange functions of London's economy grew, so did the

space which they occupied in these central areas. External economies enticed new banks, offices, factories and warehouses to cluster in areas where these activities had established a foothold. In their wake came thousands of workers casual labourers and paupers who were forced to live close to sources of employment. The combined effect of these pressures on the central area land market was an increase in land values and congestion and a reduction in the space available for residential land uses.

[2]

Thus it is not surprising that:

"During the reign of Victoria almost the whole of it, [the City] was rebuilt, the vast majority of the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century merchants' houses giving place to warehouses and offices and enlarged company halls."

The overriding importance of central locations for their businesses meant that capitalists were unwilling to assert their power in the land market in order to maintain their residences in central London. This would have been expensive, and furthermore, the ancient, crowded buildings of the City, together with the lack of open space and cultural institutions, which enhance a residential area, must have made the City unattractive as a place in which to live.

The combined effect of these pulls and shoves was that successful merchants, bankers and employers migrated from the City and its surroundings. A small proportion might have made it into the attractive West End neighbourhoods such as Marylebone, Mayfair and Belgravia which had long been the homes of the aristocracy. [3] Many more planted roots in the newly-built areas of west and north-west inner London adjacent to those aristocratic havens, places like Bayswater, Paddington and Kensington in

the west and St. John's Wood and Belsize Park in the north-west. Referring to the westward migration of people in late-19th and early-20th century America, Donald Olsen conjures up the following image: [4]

"Standing at the Piazza Garden, Berkeley Square, and Queen's Gate in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries one could have seen an analogous procession: the nobleman, followed by the wealthy merchant, the professional man, the charitable institution, the solicitor's office, the shop—all moving inexorably westward."

As time passed, especially after the 1860's when train services improved, many decided to move further out of town, leapfrogging over the new middle-class suburbs to areas which their employees had not yet penetrated such as Hampstead and Highgate in the north-west and Dulwich, Brixton and Clapham in the south. [5] By the 1880's, this dual process of separation of work and living and social integration within the upper rungs of the socio-economic ladder, which had begun some time before the 1830's, was [6] virtually complete.

The lease was an appropriate legal instrument for mediating the social and economic relationships between estate owners and wealthy capitalists in their quest for housing in these established or newly-built neighbourhoods. Both parties were equally powerful and important in the class structure and therefore opposed each other as equals on opposite sides of the leasehold agreement. It was in their joint interests to build and maintain socially exclusive and spatially attractive residential areas: capitalists because they desired rewarding living environments, estate owners because they sought increased ground rents. Money was not a stumbling block. Tenants were able and willing to pay for high quality houses, thus, there was little need for financial middlemen. Indeed,

estate owners encouraged the exclusion of middlemen as this enabled them
[7]
to control the development better. The estates were well planned, the
object being to attract fashionable or respectable residential tenants
[8]
and not necessarily financial gain. As Olsen has argued:

"Perhaps the fundamental aim of all the planning was to attract to the estate tenants of fashion or at least of respectability....Purely economic motives cannot entirely explain the preference of landlords for upper-class residential property. There was, for instance, a feeling that, although shop property might produce higher rents, it was better to accept lower rents from a resident private gentleman than from a business concern. A street of single family houses was regarded as better in itself than a street of business property."

The squares for which London is so famous are a good example. They were consciously introduced by landowners as a means of attracting reputable builders, such as Thomas Cubitt, and encouraging them to build larger and more substantial houses than they might otherwise have done, with the hope that big houses would entice tenants of high status. These houses were soundly constructed and formed imposing architectural units whose general uniformity of facade matched the social uniformity of their tenants. On completion, ground leases were usually assigned to the occupants of the houses the majority of whom bought the houses with their own funds or with money borrowed from banks, insurance companies or solicitors who held
[9]
money in trust. The leaseholders' high economic credibility meant that they usually had few problems in these negotiations.

The equality and directness of the tenure relations between estate owners and tenants in general meant that both parties observed their obligations under the leasehold agreement. Landlords maintained much of the physical infrastructure or saw to it that parish authorities or private

companies did so, while tenants kept their homes in good repair. Together they prevented other homes in the neighbourhood from falling into disrepair or being converted to undesirable uses, by means of social and/or legal pressure on those who were responsible for those houses. All in all, the estates' surveyors had little trouble enforcing the covenants contained in the leases. Indeed, "there is no evidence that the Grosvenor estate was especially active in enforcing repairing or occupation covenants in Belgravia or Mayfair; there was no need to." [10] Furthermore, the parish councils, usually of the 'closed' variety, and composed of people from the same walks of life as the majority of tenants, generally saw to it that the tenants' interests were well served. As a result of these social and economic relationships, the residential neighbourhoods of the wealthy strata of London's society were well built and remained in good repair as long as [11] their upper-crust tenants continued to live there.

Suburbanization for the Middle Stratum

The second pressure which shaped London's growth arose out of the aspirations of the growing middle stratum of clerks, public employees, professionals and petty capitalists for an existence which captured the essence of the successful capitalist's lifestyle, but was appropriately depreciated to something they could afford. This period was the heyday of the 'rags-to-riches' entrepreneur, the dream of most members of the middle stratum. But it was easier to ape the manifestations of capitalist status in the non-work environment than to achieve the reality in the workplace. Consequently, this striving was stronger in the residential rather than the productive sphere. It translated into a search for attractive, sanitary

residential environments which were accessible to their workplaces in the centre.

The middle stratum was numerically larger than the capitalist class, and the bulk of its members received only moderate though adequate earnings. At the beginning of the period under consideration, probably only a few owned the houses in which they lived. They simply could not afford to pay the price themselves and generally lacked the contacts and credibility which would enable them to borrow money from banks or attorneys. The majority of the middle stratum were tenants who rented their accommodation from leaseholding landlords. As they descended the earnings scale, so the number of intermediaries between them and the estate owners increased and the quality of their accommodation diminished. These factors, combined with their lack of effective economic or political power, meant that they were unable to resist the encroachment of non-residential land uses into their inner-city neighbourhoods. They were essentially forced out of the central area, though they were not unwilling to leave as newly developed suburban areas came onto the market and as transportation systems developed, making the journey to and from work feasible within their limited budgets. A delightful poem of the day captured their suburbanization sentiments:

"OUR SUBURB:

He leaned upon the narrow wall
That set the limit to his ground
And marvelled, thinking of it all,
That he such happiness had found.

He had no word for it but bliss
He smoked his pipe; he thanked his stars;

And, what more wonderful than this?
He blessed the groaning, stinking cars.

That made it doubly sweet to win
The respite of the hours apart
From all the broil and sin and din
Of London's damned money-mart."

The development of outlying rural areas and of transportation systems, which were predicated upon innovations in both the social and economic relationships surrounding the housing process and in urban transportation technologies, were crucial in facilitating the massive (by Victorian standards) outward migration of the middle stratum, which gathered momentum from the 1860's onwards. The result was the rapid growth of places like Camberwell, Battersea and Deptford in the south, Hammersmith, Acton and Ealing, beyond the exclusive districts in the west and Islington, Hornsey, Kilburn and Swiss Cottage in the north and north-west. [13]

The major socio-economic innovations which facilitated 19th century middle-stratum suburban development were the permanent building society and the constant-repayment amortized loan. Before examining their characteristics, we must establish why they were necessary and where their historical origins lie. This will also explain why these innovations evolved and not others.

Most of these prospective suburbanites could not afford to engage their own builders. Others had to build houses for them. Speculative builders and developers filled this slot. [14] While large building firms were prevalent in the construction of commercial and public buildings, small firms predominated in the residential construction industry. [15] They might comprise only a carpenter and bricklayer who had teamed up to build

a few houses in their spare time, hoping thereby to make some money and escape the uncertainties of employment in the construction industry. [16]

But the majority employed a small amount of people and relied heavily on sub-contracting those tasks which the firm could not perform. These firms had small capital resources; they relied on estate owners leasing land to them at a peppercorn (i.e., token) rent and on selling the houses for cash as they neared completion, assigning the ground leases either to their future occupants or to speculative landlords. [17] The builders were interested in capital gains, not cash flow. How was this capital supplied? Landlords probably borrowed from banks or attorneys, though many must have received funds from the same source as future owner-occupiers--the permanent building society.

Renting from landlords remained by far the most frequent means whereby the middle stratum was housed. This was essentially a repetition of the leasehold form of tenure which prevailed in the older inner-city neighbourhoods. Under this arrangement, the small landlord drew together the financial resources and needs of the freeholder, mortgagee and tenant in the leasehold transaction and usually received the largest share of any profits which were realized in the process. According to Adela Nevitt, the capital structure of this sector of the 19th-century housing market was [18] as follows:

Freeholder--As owner of the land he granted a ninety-nine year building lease to the leaseholder. He retained land as a 'capital asset' which yielded 'ground rents';

Mortgagee--As owner of capital he lent money to the leaseholder to cover 66 per cent of the cost of buying the lease and building a house;

Leaseholder (landlord)--As owner of a relatively small amount of

capital--33 per cent of cost of house--he invested his money and made an income by managing the property;

Tenant--As a man with no capital (but an annual income) and a need to occupy a house he paid a rent in return for both the capital sunk in the house and the management undertaken by the leaseholder.

Owner-occupation was much less prevalent and generally meant owning the house and leasing the land. Nevertheless, permanent building societies, lending money directly to occupiers and to speculative builders and landlords, were an important form of home finance, [19] and were destined to dominate the home-building industry after the 1920's.

Permanent building societies evolved out of terminating building societies. The latter were of working-class origin--an ingenious invention of skilled craft workers, who developed them as a means of maintaining their historically cohesive economic and social ties under the pressure of atomizing capitalist market relations; and of gaining security and independence for themselves. They were based on togetherness and social responsibility and perpetuated these values. The aim of these mutual organizations was to build each of their members a house which he could own. In [20] the words of Edward Cleary:

"They were essentially small groups with social as well as economic ties, setting themselves a clear and limited objective. In some ten years they would achieve their purpose of giving each member the security that ownership of property brings: then they wound up."

Terminating building societies consisted of approximately 20 members who met at least once a month in a pub, to pay their dues, attend to business matters and socialize. Some money was set aside for the consumption of beer which took the place of rental payments to publicans for the use

of their premises. Responsibility for the operation of a terminating building society was shared on a rotating basis by all its members. As soon as sufficient money had been collected, the first house was built, either by the society itself or by other builders, and was allocated to one of the members by an agreed procedure, usually by balloting or bidding for it. From then on, this member paid a rent to the building society for his house, as well as his dues. This process was repeated for approximately ten years until all the members had a house. At that stage any excess funds which the society possessed would be distributed equally among its members, the society would dissolve and each member would own his house outright, though the land was usually leased from an estate owner. Houses were often built adjacent to each other, thus the social community which revolved around the building society thrived in the residential neighbourhood.

Terminating building societies were, however, inappropriate to the needs of the middle stratum for a number of social and economic reasons. The middle stratum was a product of capitalism. Its social and cultural values were based on individualistic and competitive market relations-- that was how a clerk, an entrepreneur or a lawyer might advance in capitalist society. Clearly, the communally-organized, mutual terminating societies violated these behavioural norms. Besides, there were five main economic weaknesses inherent in the organizational structure of terminating societies, especially from a middle-stratum point of view. [21] First, the fact that all members had to contribute equally made it difficult to attract new members once the society had been in existence for a few years, as new members would have to pay large sums of money to gain an equal footing.

Second, if members had to depend on their own subscriptions to raise funds on which the advances were made, then the progress of the society would be slow and some members would have to wait a long time for their advance. To obviate this difficulty, terminating societies began borrowing money from individuals or corporations who had capital to invest and demanded interest, as opposed to houses, in return. This created a third weakness. If a sufficient fund to satisfy all demands for advances was built up in the first few years, then for the remainder of the society's life, subscriptions would be flowing in and there would be no use for them. In an attempt to deal with the first and third weaknesses, the directors of the first society would start a second society as soon as the first had reached a stage where back subscriptions became a barrier to new members and where it had surplus funds. The new members joined the second society whose need to borrow money, to speed up the making of advances, was met from the surplus funds of the first society. The process would be repeated and very soon the directors would be in charge of a series of societies, interlocking by a chain of lending and borrowing. A further development was an arrangement whereby the society could be permanent with its membership terminating. A fourth weakness of the terminating system was that members did not know how long the society would have to continue in order to achieve its objective. This led to an organizational change whereby the life of the society was fixed in terms of a period of time, rather than of the value of each advance, which could vary depending on each society's history. Finally, terminating societies were unsuitable mechanisms for funding speculative builders and developers who were to play a crucial role in orchestrating suburban development.

The permanent building society, and the constant repayment, amortized mortgage [22] obviated these difficulties and supplied the capital requirements of many middle-stratum house occupants. Borrowing money was no longer predicated upon investing with the society. Members would take shares at any time. Under the constant repayment, amortized mortgage, the size and duration of a borrower's payments was fixed and certain. Each equal monthly installment repayed both interest and principal, the interest portion being highest at the outset, when the amount of the mortgage still outstanding was highest, but was progressively reduced as the loan was amortized and the proportion of principal repayed in each installment increased. The amount of the installments was calculated so that all the principal and the interest owing to the building society would be repayed at the end of the agreed period. It was quite straightforward to calculate the amount owing to the society at a particular time, and this facilitated redemptions or foreclosures. The money for these loans came not from subscriptions but from investors to whom the society paid interest and who could withdraw their investments at short notice.

Thus, permanent building societies performed two functions which were discrete in the eyes of the public but integrated in the societies' ledgers. They were organizations where one could make short-term investments of large or small sums of money and where one could borrow capital on long-term mortgages for the purpose of buying a house. Borrowers received their money as soon as their houses were completed. As a result they were insulated from the success or failure of the society; the risks were assumed by investors. It was no longer necessary for all the members' obligations to be identical. Investing and borrowing terms

could be varied to suit individual needs and capacities. Above all, prospective middle-stratum homeowners could deal with 'an organization' which was managed by members of the capitalist class and thus they did not have to concern themselves with the trials and tribulations of operating a collective society.

One further caveat for the capitalist class was that permanent building societies were an effective device for plowing small savings back into the economy for productive purposes, thereby increasing the overall rate of capital accumulation. They played a crucial role in Victorian suburban development, providing a major form of finance to speculative builders and developers until the 1870's when they began to concentrate on lending directly to house occupiers. "The growth of the permanent system changed the nature of the [building] societies: they became agencies for the investment of capital rather than for enabling the investors to provide dwellings for themselves." [23] They linked housing finance to the general capital investment market. As a result, suburban home construction was either retarded when capital could be more profitably employed elsewhere, or expanded far beyond current needs when idle capital was diverted to the 'safe-as-houses' home-mortgage market. Thus the housing market gradually came to serve an important dual buffering function in stabilizing the economy. When commercial investments were flagging, house building was a means of absorbing surplus capital. On the other hand, house building slackened when other sectors of the national or international economy provided more profitable outlets, though this problem was not severe in 19th century London. In the words of H. J. Dyos: [24]

"The supply of capital for house-building certainly ebbed and flowed but there is no clear evidence that it was ever checked in such a way as to impede development at all seriously; there is on the contrary, rather more evidence of over-building in periods of easy money than of under-building when money was tight."

The courts played an important guiding role in the change from terminating to permanent building societies, because the 1836 Building Societies Act had not foreseen the change and therefore provided an inadequate legal framework for permanent societies. [25] The most important cases related to the permanent societies' demand for powers to borrow money from non-members, on which they obtained a favourable ruling in the late 1860's. Permanent societies also exerted greater political influence as they were managed by non-rotating professional managers of dominant class origin. In fact, the joint action of these managers, who formed a powerful lobbying organization which eventually evolved into the Building Societies Association of today, played a crucial role of accelerating the decline of terminating societies in the struggle around the 1874 Building Societies Act. [26] The Act gave the basic framework within which building societies have operated ever since. Two of its important features at that stage were the continuance of stamp duties, a transaction tax which raised the cost of the mortgage, while terminating societies favoured exemption as an encouragement to working-class borrowers; and a borrowing limit of two-thirds of the societies' mortgage assets, which in no way met the needs of terminating societies to borrow money in their early years. Thus state action in both the courts and in parliament served the interests of the dominant class and to a lesser extent the white-collar working class, by promoting permanent societies and gradually eliminated the possibility of working-class

[27]
homeownership.

One further development in tenure relations, whose significance was [28]
only realized after the 1920's, was the growth of freehold land societies.
These societies became important in housing development during the 1850's,
both in their own right and in the spread of the permanent building society
principle. They had their legal basis in an Act of 1696 which gave the vote
to owners of freehold land of an annual value in excess of two pounds. The
number of freehold land societies was boosted by astute Liberal politicians
who saw in them a means for wresting political power from the landed interest
during the corn law and suffrage reform agitation of the 1840's. Freehold
Land societies bought tracts of land, subdivided them to meet the suffrage
qualification, put in roads and drains and then sold the freeholds, mainly
to members of the dominant class, under a gentlemanly agreement to 'vote
for the party.' The larger societies advanced mortgages to owner-occupiers
in the same way as permanent building societies, and they formed subsidi-
aries to develop houses and infrastructure on the estates.

Freehold land societies were political devices which directly shaped
the social and spatial form of some neighbourhoods. Their use in the
political arena diminished during the 1850's as both political parties
began to use them, thereby negating the original intention of gaining
differential voter support, and because there was no way of ensuring that
freeholders would vote for the correct party once the land was theirs.
As a shrewd American politician put it: "It's easy enough to buy votes;
[29]
the difficulty is seeing that they stay bought." But these societies
were important for the spread of permanent building societies for two

reasons. They gave influential politicians first hand knowledge of the permanent principle and gained their support for the 1874 Act. Possibly of more significance, they made the concept of freehold owner-occupation into a political issue and linked owner-occupation to social stability in the public consciousness by basing it upon 'a stake in the system,' that is, the right to vote.

What did these middle-stratum suburbs look like? They were speculative ventures having much in common with modern 'spec-built' housing developments. [30] The virtual absence of building regulations and the limited budget of future occupants meant that construction standards were often low. Estate owners usually had problems enforcing higher standards as too stringent conditions gave them a bad name with speculators and thus might negate the prime purpose of covering the land with houses and securing the commercial ground rent. The crucial role played by speculators in the realization of suburban development and their keen knowledge of the housing market gave them much power in deciding the layout of an estate. Their fundamentally short-term pecuniary orientation meant that estate planning was usually unimaginative and sometimes inefficient. Architects were seldom engaged. Design standards were low, and repetitive with small modifications. Fashionability was the most important measure of aesthetic quality. [31] Having secured the ground lease on a few acres of land, the speculative builder had a strong economic incentive to pack as many houses onto it as was socially and technically feasible. This enabled him to spread the ground rent over a greater number of houses thereby increasing his return. Leasehold covenants usually only stipulated the minimum

number and value (or 'class') of houses which were to be built on the estate. But the builder was constrained to a certain extent by his image of the future occupants' social and physical requirements. They would only walk up a certain number of stairs, they valued a certain amount of open space adjacent to their houses for light, air and relaxation, they required a street frontage, and so on. These requirements were as much determined by the sort of options which builders brought onto the market, as they in turn determined the nature of these options. It was a complex, two-way interaction. The speculators' answers were the mass-produced rows of two or three storey houses built in long terraces, or for the slightly more prosperous, in semi-detached units, situated on deep stands with narrow frontages [32] which proliferate in London's Victorian suburbs. [33]

In the words of Dyos and Reeder, the stratum suburb:

"gave access to the cheapest land in the city to those having most security of employment and leisure to afford the time and money spent travelling up and down; it offered an arena for the manipulation of social distinctions to those most conscious of their possibilities and most adept at turning them into shapes on the ground; it kept the threat of rapid social change beyond the horizon of those least able to accept its negative as well as its positive advantages."

Enhancing London's 'Capital Accumulation Potential'

The third pressure which shaped the social and spatial fabric of London was a composite of the on-going efforts to increase what might be called its 'capital accumulation potential'; to increase its economic efficiency as a centre of production, exchange and distribution. Under capitalist market institutions and in an era prior to the widespread diffusion of electronic communications technologies, this drive was

concretely realized in two broad dimensions. Firstly, by the growing clustering of economic activities in the central area, especially the exchange and service sectors. Secondly, by improving existing modes of transportation and developing new ways of moving people and goods within the city and between London and other national and international regions. This can be divided into three parts: dock development; railway development; and the development of modes of transportation which used existing streets, together with street improvement. I will now examine these developments in more detail.

The growing centralization of economic activities in London was based on the competitive market relations inherent in a capitalist economy. Given these 'rules of the game,' a central London location was of paramount importance for most commercial and even certain industrial concerns. The external economies to be derived from a central area location were simply too attractive for any rational businessman to resist. [34] Financial houses and banks congregated together in the City to facilitate frequent communications which depended on personal meetings and dealings on the Exchange; offices located there to be close to associated activities and to be able to draw on London's entire white-collar labour force which was relatively evenly distributed about the centre; department stores located in established West End shopping precincts which were accessible to fashionable West End residents as well as London's middle stratum consumers; wholesale warehouses took advantage of better central-area transportation and interpersonal contacts; sweated trades gravitated towards the cheap East End labour force; etcetera. As we have seen, the only businesses which moved away from the central area were mostly industries which

required large-scale factory production. The consequence of these developments was a large increase in land values in the centre which only businesses were able and willing to pay. The centre became the area where Londoners worked, in shops, warehouses, banks and offices, and a few specialized manufacturing industries. Through a gradual piecemeal process, commercial and industrial development, which was largely responsible for the huge increase in London's population, replaced residential land uses, evicting thousands of people, mainly members of the working class. It is [35] important to stress that:

"This transformation of the commercial centre did not result from the harmonious adjustment of the forces of supply and demand. The vast migration from central districts between 1851 and 1901 (for example, in the twenty years from 1861 to 1881, the population of the city fell from 113,387 to 51,439) was the consequence, not of workers moving out in pursuit of better economic opportunities, but of demolition, and the forcible eviction of a labour force whose workplace remained located in the centre."


The transportation of goods, between London and other predominantly international ports, was improved by the development of modern docks. Between 1800 and 1888, ten major docks were built, mainly along the north [36] bank of the Thames river in the heart of the East End. Their construction displaced thousands of working-class families. But while they reduced the area available for working-class housing, once they were in operation, the docks attracted enormous numbers of workers, especially casual workers, to the East End. And the gradual decline of the labour intensive dock and related industries, until they became relatively unimportant in London's economy by the 1890's, created even greater hardship for the working class.

The Development of the Railways

Railway development was unsurpassed in the 19th century as a form of investment which absorbed large amounts of surplus capital. As such, the railway-building booms of the 1840's and 1850's played a crucial role [37] in the process of capital accumulation at the national level. But railway development also played an important role in improving London's efficiency as an economic unit and thereby increasing the potential for capital accumulation for businesses located within the city. In many respects, the importance of the City as a commercial centre was responsible for the birth of the railway network. On the other hand, in addition to encouraging the decentralization of population, the development of railways in London also permitted an even greater concentration and specialization of economic activities in the central area. The importance of an efficient railway network in promoting capital accumulation was stressed [38] by the Board of Trade in 1845. In a report, it stated:

"The possession of good railway communications...has now become almost as much a matter of necessity as the adoption of the most improved machinery to enable a manufacturing community to contend on equal terms with its rivals and to maintain its footing."

Railway transport within London effectively began with the opening of the London and Greenwich Railway in 1836 and continued until 1899 when [39] Marylebone Station was opened. Before the early 1860's, most railway companies north of the Thames concentrated mainly on the transportation of goods between London and other cities. Subsequently, they began to follow their counterparts south of the river in catering increasingly to capitalist and middle-stratum suburban commuters, who had the time and money to live



away from the centre, especially when the railway companies realized how lucrative this traffic could be. Thus the main-line railway system of Victorian London came to perform a function "which it was never originally intended to perform, and which it did not perform very efficiently."^[40]

As a result the expansion of London beyond the 4-mile limit of the horse omnibus began in the 1860's. By the middle of the 1870's, the railway map of London, excluding the underground tube system, presents a remarkably modern appearance. Thus it is clear that 19th century railway development constituted a formative and lasting influence in both direct and indirect ways on London's social and spatial geography.

This raises an important question in an exploration of the determinants of urban form: what caused the railway companies to locate their lines and terminals where they eventually did? Were these locations based on necessities inherent in the technology or on calculations of economic efficiency? These are the usual arguments made in analysing the locational patterns of transportation modes, especially by modern urban economists. However, while economic and technical considerations were clearly important, I would argue that they were essentially subservient to the power relations inherent in the land and housing markets of 19th century London, which were based on the class structure and the leasehold system of tenure. Unlike horse omnibuses, cabs and tramcars, which could operate cheaply on existing public thoroughfares, the railways could only function if large areas of London were exclusively set aside for their fixed routes and separate rights of way.^[41] In their quest for the land necessary for lines, terminals and marshalling yards, railway companies

had to contend with the differential rights and powers which the leasehold system conferred on estate owners, leaseholders and occupants. The outcomes of the railway companies' struggles for land were fundamentally responsible for the ultimate location of railway lines and terminals.

Two important specifications which their land acquisitions had to fulfill put railway companies at a distinct disadvantage as buyers in the London land market of the 1830's. Firstly, the necessity for *permanent* rights of way to be set aside for their exclusive use. This was based on the size and durability of their investments. Here the leasehold system posed problems for the railway companies and the estate owners. Besides the administrative and legal headaches that the purchase and servicing of hundreds of leases from as many estate owners would have entailed, a single estate owner could halt the operation of large stretches of railway lines by terminating the lease prematurely because certain covenants were ignored or by refusing to enter into a new lease once the old one expired. These were contingencies which no sound railway company could afford to risk. On the other hand, the possibility of leasing their land to railway companies could not have appealed to estate owners because they must have been uncertain of the long-term fortunes of such novel enterprises and did not fancy the possibility of being landed with railway lines or terminals which were of no use to them. Thus the leasehold system had to be by-passed. Railway companies who represented some of the most powerful sectors of the capitalist class and whose infrastructure was absolutely essential to economic expansion (which included increasing ground rents), had to be permitted to buy land on a freehold basis.

This raises the second disadvantage with which railway companies were burdened. Besides requiring vast acres of urban and rural land on which to build their lines and terminals, all the necessary land had to be *contiguous*. This put railway companies at the mercy of freeholders along the railway's path. By holding out till the railway companies had completed the bulk of their purchases, landowners could demand exorbitant prices for their legal right to the land which was absolutely essential to the railway companies. Consequently, for railway lines to be viable economic propositions the companies had to change the power relations of the 'leasehold land market.' They had to acquire *compulsory purchase powers* to enable them to become *freeholders* of the necessary land at prices which they were able and willing to pay.

The only way in which these changes could be accomplished was for each railway company to apply to Parliament for the passage of a Private Act which gave them compulsory powers to purchase land on a freehold basis. This was a major reason why Parliament became a powerful controlling force in the development of the railways in 19th century London. Even after the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act and the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, which established a general legal basis for the compulsory acquisition of the necessary land, prospective railway companies were required to apply for Parliamentary approval of their proposals before any land purchases or construction could begin. Parliament had the power, which it frequently exercised, to change or veto the railway companies' proposals. However, though powerful, this was essentially passive control and the State's role with respect to the railway companies' impact and operation

remained passive for most of the period under consideration. It made no attempts to impose a planned network of lines and largely inconsequential attempts from the 1860's onwards to regulate fares and to force the railway companies to rehouse the working-class families which their lines displaced. [42] It seems as though Parliament was merely a venue for capitalists and landed aristocrats to struggle for or against each proposal, depending on the differential costs and benefits which each railway proposal conferred on them and their friends. By the mid-1860's, the combination of both houses reflected a relatively even balance between landed interests and industrial, mercantile and financial interests, thus it could be said that the changing fortunes of many railway entrepreneurs depended on the fluctuating patterns of dominance and submission between the two major segments of the ruling class. [43]

Parliamentary power was exercised with a vengeance against the railway companies in 1846 when seventeen out of nineteen proposed urban lines and termini were flatly rejected. Had they all been sanctioned, the topography and character of the central area would have been completely altered, probably for the worse. In the words of John Kellett, "The Metropolis would literally have been cut into pieces." [44] Instead, Parliament prohibited any incursions within an oval, four miles from east to west and one and a half miles from north to south (bounded by the Circle Line of today). This decision had far reaching consequences for further railway and transportation developments and for the spatial form of the central area. In the words of John Kellett, it [45]

"...not merely distorted directly the pattern of railway building,

but also exercised an arbitrary and indirect influence upon the conditions of competition between companies. The central government's unique exercise of a legislative *veto* combined with metropolitan central land values to erect a barrier around the core of the city which was virtually impassable to surface railways."

This position was re-affirmed in 1863 when ten out of thirteen proposals were rejected. A major result of this legislative intervention was the controversy surrounding, and the eventual construction of, a circular railway linking all the central stations. And, on a more general level, it snuffed out any competition which might have developed between large companies serving London from the north and south.

The railway companies paid a high price for their compulsory purchase privilege. Parliament had not accurately defined what constituted a 'fair market price' for land acquired compulsorily. Arbitration cases ruled generously in favour of landowners and quickly established the principle that the price to be paid for such land by the railway companies should be based on its value to the vendor, to which should be added compensations for interruption of business, loss of good will, various damages to surrounding property, and sometimes even for loss of possible future gain! To this sum, a further 10% was added for the privilege of compulsory purchase. As a result, railway companies probably paid twice the current market value for land. Railway companies were prohibited from becoming land speculators in their own right. They were required to sell surplus land on completion of their scheme. Once again, this put them at a disadvantage in the land market, this time as vendors. Buyers knew that the land had to be sold and were therefore able to bid lower than its true market value. And if at some future date the railway companies wanted to extend their lines,

they would have to pay even higher prices than before, an increase for which their earlier investments were largely responsible. In view of all this, one railway company director's complaints of the high costs incurred by the railways in these transactions is hardly surprising and probably representative of railway capitalists in general: [46]

"The Lands Clauses Act was passed at a time when landowners were absolutely supreme in Parliament, in 1845, and did just whatever they liked; and although we have to pay large sums by way of severance, we do not get anything whatever for the increment in value we give to the balance of the land."

Landowners, on the other hand, benefited in two ways. Firstly, railway lines increased the accessibility of much of their land, making it ripe for housing development and thereby increasing its value. This fact was the basis of a jingle which appeared in Tarbuck's Handbook of House Property in 1875: [47]

"The richest crop for any field,
Is a crop of bricks for it to yield.
The richest crop that it can grow
Is a crop of houses in a row."

Though the railways did bring destruction, congestion and pollution in their wake, they also enabled higher prices to be charged for urban and especially suburban land, without any effort or further investment on the landowners' part. Secondly, landowners benefited even more as the inflated awards of arbitration proceedings were translated into legitimate market prices. Thus, railway development generated windfall gains for landowners. In 1861, Henry Davies wrote the following graphic 'description' of this process: [48]

"If the first railway engine had been laden and fed funnelwise, with guineas, and if the wheels had been constructed with an apparatus for whirling the gold by centrifugal action over the land it traversed we should have an allegory in action which would correctly describe the working of the railway system."


And the fundamental reason why the landowners benefited was, to put it simply, because they owned the land, without which the railways could not exist. In sum, then, railway development was beneficial to most landowners while the railway companies were not permitted to gain from the increases in land values which their investments facilitated.

However, we must return to our original question which has not yet been answered: what caused the railway companies to locate their lines and terminals where they ultimately did? We have seen that while Parliament granted them the powers which were necessary to make them viable competitors in the land market, it played an essentially passive role with respect to the placement of lines and terminals. What was the active force which determined the railways' locational patterns? I will argue that the relative power of the many actors in the land and housing markets, which was based on their position in the class structure and on the leasehold system of tenure, was the major determining factor; that technological necessities and economic efficiency were of secondary importance and only became significant once the struggle for land had been decided. A brief but closer look at the power relations of the land and housing markets of London during this period and of the railway companies responses to it should clarify my argument.

We have seen that large landholdings predominated in inner London, especially in the north-west. Though these great proprietors were very

powerful, it was obviously more advantageous for railway companies to deal with them, in preference to a multiplicity of small owners, as the negotiations were usually much quicker, simpler and cheaper. But the power of both large and small estate owners in the land market and their willingness to sell to the railway companies was in turn largely influenced by three interrelated factors: the power and status of their tenants, the use to which their land was put and the physical condition of their property.

On the top of the power spectrum were the spacious, well-maintained inner-north-west residential areas, where both leaseholders and estate owners, whose joint interests the lease agreement protected, strongly opposed the incursion of railways into their neighbourhoods. They had the economic and political power to defeat the railway companies if they attempted such 'invasions,' or to impose costly qualifications on the construction of those few railways which they could not oust. H. G. Wells' comment in *Tono Bunday*, "that the great railway termini had been kept as far as possible from the 'Great House Region,'" [49] was therefore hardly surprising. In consequence, the North London Junction and Regent's Canal railways, for example, failed to gain authorization because they would have infringed on the Crown land surrounding Regent's park, whose imposing terraces and villas housed 'the first class of society.' The Bloomsbury, Portland, Grosvenor and Berkeley Estates were among the others which were successfully protected from the incursion of the railways. The Great Central's Marylebone station extension line was forced to skirt the western flank of the Crown's estate and to comply with the Portman Estate's



[50]

burdensome and expensive restrictions. Eton College's Charcot estate, which was built for 'respectable but undiscerning clients,' successfully insisted upon clauses in the London and Birmingham Railway Bill which required extensive tunnelling under the estate to reserve its future amenity. Thus, even at a relatively detailed level of spatial definition, the power of wealthy landowners and tenants determined the physical form of the railways. Within these parameters, railway companies were free to maximize technical and economic efficiency.

Also at the top of the 'power-in-the-land-market league' were the properties which made up the core of the central business district. The City Corporation was aware that railway development was beneficial to the City, as evidenced, for example, by their financial support which rescued the almost moribund Metropolitan Railway because of the good communications which it would provide. But they and the powerful interests at the financial heart of the world, were not prepared to allow the railway companies to carve up the City. In the words of John Kellett:

[51]

"Residential areas, historic buildings, graveyards, hospitals, craft workshops, even, where necessary, factories, could be traversed or swept away, but not the central Exchange area."

Thus, the Parliamentary legislation of 1846, which prohibited railway building within the central and West End area, bounded by the Circle Line of today, was essentially a recognition and ratification of the power and interests of City businessmen and West End residents and landowners. The virtually total exclusion of railways from this area was absurd on grounds of technical or economic efficiency, even allowing for the high cost of

land in this area. It interrupted national north-south rail communications, increased the congestion of central-area streets and forced many northern and western railway companies to incur large additional expenditures to reach the City via circuitous routes. Their success is ample testimony to the power and defiance of members of the dominant class when their interests were threatened and of the broad and lasting impact which their actions had on the railway network and on London's social and spatial geography.

It is difficult to generalize about the power relations of the land market in areas inhabited by the middle-stratum or by less powerful commercial or industrial concerns. In these cases, the outcomes of conflicts between landowners, leaseholders and tenants and the railway companies were not foregone conclusions. They depended on the details of each struggle which could be decided either way and probably favoured the railway companies more often than not. Nevertheless, the railway companies were forced to settle these issues prior to others related to technical and economic efficiency criteria.

This problem of generalization does not present itself at the bottom of the power scale. The predominant pattern in working-class residential districts was one of railway promoters deliberately choosing to smash their way through these densely packed areas, irrespective of the grave social consequences which this policy clearly incurred. The reason for these actions had little to do with the railway companies' irresponsibility or malice, as was the popular view. Instead, it was based on the power relations which existed under the leasehold system in working-class neighbourhoods. Large estate owners, both lay and clerical, were generally resigned to the fate of their landholdings and had pragmatically given up hope of

resurrecting elegant neighbourhoods in the place of their working-class slums. They had lost control of their properties and were only too willing to sell out, as they saw the coming of the railways as a way of retreating from a socially and economically problematic predicament and making wind-fall profits to boot. These "less fortunately located [estate owners] came to agree with Disraeli's Lord Marney that 'rail[ways] are very good things with high compensation.'" [52] Their properties were riddled with middlemen with sub-leases and house-jobbers with the fag-ends of leases who were collecting exorbitant rack rents from their tenants. These intermediaries had little power to prevent estate owners from selling out to the railways as they were in flagrant violation of most leasehold covenants. The tenants who were usually renting accommodation by the week, often by the day, had no legal standing to object to the sale or to claim compensation. Working-class people did not have the means, the connections or the know-how to oppose Railway Bills. Most were usually thankful if the railway companies paid their rent arrears or gave them between a sovereign or two pounds in cash. [53] Finally, local authorities could not resist this 'shovelling out the poor' because the change of land use increased rate- [54] able values and shed some of the burden of poor relief.

Thus it was not accidental nor conspiratorial that the railway companies located most of their lines and termini through the working-class districts of London instead of the homes of the wealthy or their places of business. Indeed, *The Times* recognized the advantageousness to the capitalist class of railway development according to these conditions, stating bluntly, in 1861 that: [55]

"The special lure to capitalists offered by railway projectors is that the line will pass only through inferior property, that is, through a densely populated district and will destroy only the abodes of the powerless and poor, whilst it will avoid the properties of those whose opposition is to be dreaded--the great employers of labour."

From the point of view of the engineers, surveyors and attorneys of the railway companies, it was commonsense to follow the line of least resistance, and the working-class neighbourhoods were the weak areas in the land and housing markets. Even more attractive to the railway companies were situations in which large areas of working-class housing were owned by a few substantial proprietors, as the small number of landowners simplified legal proceedings. Nevertheless, it required a great deal of ingenuity to find these fissures in the land market along which approach routes to the fringe of the central area could be made. This often caused planning problems and increased costs because many working-class areas abutted the commercial centre where land values were highest. As one parliamentary witness suggested in 1836, "the parties [railway companies] care very little whether the line they have adopted is exactly the cheapest and
[56]
best."

A number of historians argue that the main reason why railways were located in working-class districts was because this was seen by the propertied class as a means of slum clearance which would ultimately benefit the working class, as low-quality housing was demolished and higher quality housing for those displaced would automatically be provided by the
[57]
market. However, there is plenty of evidence in the proceedings and reports of Royal Commissions related to railways from the 1840's onwards which indicates that these classes were well aware that the contrary was

the case: that demolitions imposed even greater hardships on the working class by forcing them to compete for reduced amounts of accommodation at higher cost in adjacent areas. As John Kellett has correctly observed: [58]

"The fact that such conscientious investigations were carried out and given a hearing should correct the widely-held impression that the Victorians were entirely careless of the effects of the great works of urban reconstruction they were executing."

Doubtless the mythical qualities of railway demolitions as slum improvers played an important part in decisions to locate railways in working-class districts, but this view was not a *cause* of these decisions. Rather, as we will see in Chapter 5, it served the crucial function of providing *ideological legitimation* for the drastic and blatantly cruel destruction of working-class homes which was *primarily necessitated by the power relations of the land and housing markets* and secondarily by economic market forces.

This policy of locating railways in working-class neighbourhoods largely explains the location of lines and termini in north, south and east London. [59] To the north, Marylebone station permanently displaced thousands of working-class people from the slums of Lisson Grove while the approach line had to tunnel under the well-to-do Portman Estate and St. John's Wood neighbourhood, to avoid disturbing their 'respectable' residents. Euston, St. Pancras and King's Cross stations, together with their approach lines virtually demolished all of the slums of Agar, Camden and Somers Towns, where the railway companies were allowed unrestricted access by the aristocratic estate owners of these districts. The Holborn Viaduct, the only surface railway to be built across London, marched through the slums of Clerkenwell and Farringdon Street. In south London,

especially Southwark, railway companies were fortunate in having to face only a few large ecclesiastical estate owners who were usually only too pleased to have the railway companies remove the poor for them as this was not something the Church could legitimately do. Indeed, the powerlessness of tenants in these districts was acknowledged by Parliament when it exempted south railway schemes from the general restriction placed on inner London in 1846. The approach lines to Victoria Station, and London Bridge, Cannon Street, Charing Cross and Waterloo stations and their approaches, were largely located in working-class areas owned by the Church. In the working-class neighbourhoods of the East End, ownership was much more fragmented, the largest estate owners being the City Corporation and Companies. Consequently, it was easier for railway companies to ignore unco-ordinated opposition in building Bishopsgate, Fenchurch Street and later Liverpool and Broad street stations, though legal costs and compensation awards to land-owners were much higher. These costs did not, however, prevent the wholesale destruction of working-class homes by the maze of companies which sought to gain access to the City and the Docks. [60]

In the process nearly 800 acres of central land, enough for a fair-sized town, was taken for railway uses. H. J. Dyos has conservatively estimated that the numbers of people displaced by a total of 69 separate schemes came to at least 76,000 between 1853 and 1901, with 51 schemes displacing 56,000 people before 1885. [61] Spread over the area involved, an average of 95 persons per acre were displaced. John Kellett quotes the estimates of Dr. Lethaby in 1861 that between 150 and 300 persons per acre was nearer the true number of displacements. The lower figure would give a

total of 120,000 evictions which represented 5 1/2% of the then central
[62]
area population.

The *laissez faire* ideology was used until 1874 to rationalize the failure of Parliament to force railway companies to rehouse displaced tenants, which it deemed an unjustifiable invasion of landlords' rights. The subsequent requirement for them to provide alternative accommodation was successfully evaded until 1885 when the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes recommended sterner enforcement of these requirements. Even then, alternative accommodation was usually not available at the time of demolition and was therefore occupied by families other than those who were displaced, and the rents were usually too high for poorer
[63]
tenants.

During the period under consideration, rail fares were beyond the means of the majority of working-class people. There were two main reasons for this. The first and most important was an outcome of the railway companies' struggle for compulsory purchase powers. They were prohibited from buying up large tracts of land, in excess of their essential require-
[64]
ments, and becoming speculators themselves. This approach which was common in America was frequently suggested but never attained legislative approval. If the American experience can be generalized, then allowing railway companies to profit from land speculation would probably have
[65]
caused fares to be much lower. One consequence of this prohibition was that railway companies played an essentially passive role in London's suburban development. More importantly, it meant that they had to reap the bulk of their profits from the fares which they charged for the conveyance of people and goods.

This leads to the second reason for high fares which was based on the peculiar economic characteristics of public goods like railways. Unlike factories which produced relatively cheap, individualizable commodities, railways could not benefit from economies of scale as they increased their output. Beyond a certain point larger, unevenly distributed traffic increased operating and administrative expenses and spelt diminishing returns. The burden of a very high initial expenditure in fixed, indivisible capital made it unrealistic to respond to lower demand by proportionately reducing fares and 'output' until an equilibrium was reached. This classic market response was inappropriate to railway companies who had to make the bulk of their capital investments at the start of their operations and could not vary these according to subsequent fluctuations of supply and demand.

The railway companies soon learned that price competition over fares held little benefit for them. As a result, they agreed to maintain fares at levels which were high enough to generate adequate profits and instead began to compete over the relative attractiveness of their termini and other urban facilities. In answer to the following question of Counsel [66] for the House of Commons in 1872:

"Is it not the fact that in places where two great companies compete there is almost always an agreement as to what shall be the charges made to the public?"

the General Manager of the Midland Railway replied:

"That is true, but still you will always find that the competition is very keen. *I do not mean competition by charge but competition by accommodation*, and you will find that the public are generally very much better accommodated."

This policy suited the railway contractors, surveyors, architects and attorneys whose interests were best served by new construction as opposed to fare policy changes. It led to a duplication of termini and lines and violent disputes in cases where facilities were shared.

The overall result was that passenger fares were relatively high and generally beyond the reach of the majority of the working class. Cheaper 'workmen's fares' were provided by a few railway companies as a *quid pro quo* for the hardship which their demolitions caused. From the 1860's onwards, clauses requiring workmen's fares were included in Railway Bills, but their frequency and use only became significant and practicable after [67] the 1880's. Thus, while railway development facilitated or actively encouraged the exodus of members of the capitalist class and the middle stratum to the airy suburbs, it was one of the powerful forces which compressed the bulk of the working class into squalid and degrading inner-London environments.

In summary, we have seen that while railway development played an important part in London's growth from the 1830's to the 1880's, it was essentially subordinate to the power relations of the leasehold land and housing markets, which comprised the pre-eminent though not only force that shaped London's social and spatial development. We must therefore agree with one of John Kellett's conclusions to his excellent book on the impact [68] of the railways on Victorian cities:

"In many ways urban landowners were the most important single agents of change; more important than the railway managers, whose imagination and foresight could often be exercised only with very strict limits. The landowners profited at all stages of railway building and probably exercised the greatest single influence upon the

selection of central sites, upon the location and character of suburbs; and even exercised a lesser, though still considerable influence, upon the costs of the service offered."

Street Improvements and an Underground Railway

It only remains to consider the development of other modes of transportation which used existing public thoroughfares and where increased efficiency was largely predicated upon the improvement of those thoroughfares. As the separation of work and living progressed, so the volume of traffic increased, partly because of increased travel by well-to-do merchants, employers and civil servants, who generally used private carriages or hackney cabs to travel to and from their homes in the West End and north-west and their workplaces in Westminster and the City.

Horse-drawn omnibuses were a greater source of congestion. After their inception in 1829, omnibuses were popular with the bulk of the middle-stratum who could afford the fares and whose relatively short-hours of work [69] matched the operating times of the omnibus companies. Omnibuses were the most widely used form of public transport until the 1850's and 1860's when railway companies began to actively encourage suburban travel. From then onwards, omnibuses tended to be more popular within an approximate radius of four miles from the centre where their greater accessibility and flexibility offset the trains' speed. Outside this area, railways were un- [70] challenged as the predominant form of suburban transportation. As with the railways, and for similar reasons, competition soon gave way to co-operation between rival omnibus companies. In 1856, the London General Omnibus Company, the brain-child of Parisian businessmen, was formed. By 1859, it constituted a virtual monopoly, owning and controlling 75% of all omnibus

companies and tacitly agreeing to allow the rest to operate 'freely.' [71]

A third major form of public transport in 19th century London was the horse-drawn tramway, which was successfully introduced in 1870. [72] They were predominantly used by the middle stratum, though their cheaper fares did enable members of the 'labour aristocracy' to make use of tramways, especially after the 1880's. Like their railway counterparts, tramway companies had to gain Parliamentary approval before they could construct their lines. The pattern of tramways and their operating conditions again [73] reflects the relative power of local landowning interests. Tramways never penetrated the West End residential and shopping precincts as they were not welcomed by the powerful interests in the area. Only after the 1890's were they allowed to operate in the central area. In fact, their existence as private companies was limited to two decades, in an effort to win the support of antagonistic local authorities. As a result, their widespread use as a means of working-class transport occurred from the 1890's onwards as tramway companies reverted to public ownership.

Lastly, walking was the predominant form of working-class transportation up to the 1880's. Public transportation was either too expensive or travel times highly inconvenient. Many workers were forced to live close to their workplaces due to the requirements of their work. The working class constituted the bulk of the estimated 200,000 people who walked daily [74] to work in the City in 1851.

The volume of this road traffic increased as economic activity grew and as the separation of work and living became more widespread. The railway termini dotted about the circumference of the central area were

major foci and generators of traffic and tended to exacerbate the already severe road congestion. In addition, as Peter Hall has pointed out, the 'assembly line' of the sweated trades ran through the streets of London. [75] This enormous goods traffic further worsened the situation. Archaic turnpike trusts and tolls also slowed down road traffic. By the 1850's, the combined effect of all these factors on the essentially medieval street pattern of central London was one of utter chaos in which inefficiencies proliferated. Streets had to be improved, or street traffic somehow reduced, or else London's economic activity might slowly grind to a halt. In the words of one contemporary businessman: [76]

"It must be obvious that the constantly accumulating number of omnibuses, wagons and conveyances of all sorts would, if it continued two or three years longer, render London almost insupportable for purposes of business."

In 1855, the Select Committee on Metropolitan Communications heard proposals for a number of futuristic schemes aimed at solving London's traffic problems. [77] These entailed elevated urban railways powered by atmospheric pressure, elevated pedestrian crossings and/or elevated shopping arcades. The grandest scheme was proposed by Sir Joseph Paxton, who designed the Crystal Palace. He proposed a Great Victorian Way which would encircle and bisect the central area, linking all important locations. It would have consisted of a wide thoroughfare comprising elevated railways with a pedestrian shopping arcade above them, covered by a steel-and-glass vaulted roof. Similar schemes are still bandied around in *avante garde* architectural and city-planning circles today. Had they been realized in

19th century London, the city's spatial form would be drastically different today. But this was not to be.

Instead, the committee recommended a number of other proposals. These included abolished bridge and turnpike trusts, whose gates and tolls slowed vehicles down and abolishing the barriers which some estate owners had erected to maintain the exclusiveness of their property and which forced through traffic to take devious alternative routes. But, more importantly, the committee members made two further recommendations which were to have far reaching effects on London's social and spatial fabric.

Firstly, they advised that the fifteen railway termini, which were located about the circumference of the central area, be linked to each other and to other prominent activities by an "inner circuit of Railway" which was to be built underground. [78] This proposal for the world's first underground urban railway was originated in 1837 by a far-sighted City lawyer named Charles Pearson and became a pet project for which he lobbied the rest of his life. It was hoped that the inner circle railway would distribute passengers arriving at the main termini and also absorb much of the omnibus and cab traffic, thereby relieving the crowded streets. The first section, from Paddington to Farringdon Street, was opened by the Metropolitan Railway in 1863. Again, property relations determined its route. Property law obliged anyone who burrowed under buildings to buy them outright, even if the buildings would not be damaged. [79] Thus, wherever possible, buildings had to be avoided. Consequently, most of the line ran under the New (now Marylebone and Euston) Road and Farringdon Road and along the Thames Embankment. The circle line was ultimately finished

in 1884, with the aid of almost one million pounds of public money, when the rival Metropolitan and Metropolitan District railways were linked underneath the City and at Paddington. The line carried a lot a traffic but did little to alieviate congestion on the surface, as its capacity was insufficient to cope with London's vast traffic.

Street improvement was the Committee's second proposal. What this really meant was a policy of building new thoroughfares, mainly through already developed property and of widening existing roads, in an effort to improve the efficiency of the overall street network. This was by far the most drastic proposal in terms of the human suffering which its realization caused.

Prior to the 1850's, unco-ordinated street improvements had been carried out by the City Corporation and by the Commissioners of Woods, Forests and Land Revenues, a statutory body responsible for the administration of Crown lands. But really major projects depended upon the formation of an effective local government body responsible for the wider metropolitan area. Parish councils did not have the resources to undertake large-scale street improvements; nor did they have the motivation as it would have imposed a heavy burden on local rates while benefiting the metropolis as a whole. Local government reform was achieved with the foundation of the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855. Though street improvement, which involved the aquisition of a large amount of property, was one of the main reasons for the formation of the Board, it was only granted compulsory purchase powers in 1862, and very limited powers at that. Thus, in practice, the Board, like the railway companies, had to apply for Parliamentary approval in almost every important case. Nevertheless, after a slow start,

the Board completed a spectacular programme of new streets in the heart of central London before it was superseded by the London County Council in [80] 1888.

Like the railway companies, the Metropolitan Board of Works' decision-making with respect to the priorities for and location of street improvements was subservient to the power relations of the land and housing markets. Consequently, the outcomes were essentially similar to those discussed under the development of railways. Large-scale street improvements, involving the demolition of acres of buildings, were almost invariably located in working-class neighbourhoods, displacing thousands. What little street improvement occurred in the residential areas of wealthier families or in commercial zones usually involved only slight adjustments and thus minimal [81] property damage and displacement.

The three main reasons for this course of action were the weakness of working-class tenants in opposing the Board, the opportunity for estate owners to sell property which had become more of a liability than an asset while receiving handsome financial compensation, and the opportunity for local authorities to reduce the rates by forcing many of those who burdened [82] the rates to move to adjacent parishes. These material factors were bolstered by powerful ideological justifications for the most destructive aspects of street improvement. Slum clearance was deemed to be highly beneficial for all--including working-class families who lost their homes and were forced into already overcrowded surrounding dwellings. In some instances, the opportunity to 'air the rookeries' was sufficient reason for [83] driving new streets through working-class districts. These arguments


have previously been developed in detail, consequently I will proceed to outline briefly their applicability to and influence on 19th century street improvements.

The construction of Regent's Street (1817-23) was the most important street improvement prior to the 1830's. [84] Its aim was to attract wealthy residents to the speculative buildings around the newly formed Regent's Park, by linking the park with St. James and the West End. Its delicate twists and curves, which many attribute to solely aesthetic considerations, "are so ingeniously managed that they conceal the fact that the route was largely determined by the ownership of the land which the street traversed." [85] John Nash saved the Crown money by altering his initial, more direct proposal to include the sweeping quadrant north of Piccadilly Circus as this kept the street on Crown property, minimizing compensatory costs. Access from the east was purposely restricted to a minimum so that Regent's Street would become an effective barrier between the slums of Soho and the spacious streets of the wealthy to the west.

By 1856, New Oxford Street had been cut through St. Giles' rookery, Victoria Street passed through Westminster on a line chosen solely for its effectiveness in demolishing the slums known as Devil's Acre, [86] a scheme which the 1845 Royal Commission on Metropolis Improvements justified on the basis that: [87]

"Its effect has been to divert the channel of communication in a direction further south, into a more unperfectly drained, a more densely peopled, and consequently a more objectionable portion of the district."

Furthermore, Commercial Street punctured working-class Whitechapel and



BASED ON: BARKER & ROBBINS [1963] P. 249.

Map 6: Principal Central London Street Improvements: 1817-1889

Farringdon, Cannon and Queen Victoria Streets had been driven through the poorest and most densely populated areas of the City. After the mid-1850's, the Metropolitan Board of Works and the City Corporation ruthlessly continued this policy of allying street improvement with working-class displacement. Southwark street displaced poor people in Blackfriars who had recently been ousted from the City by the Cannon and Queen Victoria Street improvements. By the late 1880's, Charing Cross Road and Shaftsbury Avenue had aerated the slums of St. Giles' and Seven Dials; and Clerkenwell and Gray's Inn Roads had been cut through the densest districts of Holborn. No re-housing obligation was placed on the Board until 1877 when they were required to find alternative accommodation for a proportion of those evicted. This obligation slowed progress on the Charing Cross-Shaftsbury Avenue scheme and was thus eased to facilitate completion of the new roads. [88] Gareth Stedman Jones has estimated "that altogether street clearance accounted for the displacement of not far short of 100,000 persons between 1830 and 1880." [89]

In summary, the overwhelming outcome of this drive to improve London's efficiency as a base for economic enterprise was the eviction of approximately 10% of the entire population of the city, predominantly members of the working class, with extremely meagre efforts to rehouse those displaced. [90] In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones:

"In its arbitrary and unplanned way demolition and commercial transformation in nineteenth-century London must have involved a greater displacement of population than the rebuilding of Paris under Haussman."

Indeed, slum clearance became the most powerful ideological justification for an 'improvement' scheme. As most members of the working class were forced to live relatively close to their work, this effectively caused a reduction in the absolute amount of space available for working-class housing, thereby increasing the overcrowding and rents. It is difficult to imagine that any members of the working class could have benefited from these schemes. On the other hand, estate owners prospered from the high compensation settlements; and big employers and merchants benefited from the improved communications, which facilitated increased capital accumulation and their escape, along with much of the middle stratum to salubrious suburbs away from the degrading working-class environments of inner London. In the majority of cases, the power structure of the land and housing markets was the prime though not the only factor in the determination of the spatial form and location of communications channels and in the transformation of London's social structure.

Residential Separation and Homogenization

The fourth pressure which shaped London's social and spatial character was the effort by members of the capitalist class and, to a lesser extent, members of the middle stratum to separate themselves from the working class into socially homogeneous residential neighbourhoods. The greater economic and political power of wealthy employers and merchants meant that they were more successful than clerks, professionals and petty capitalists in this endeavour.

The socio-economic rationale behind this drive has been outlined in Chapter 1: the institutionalization of markets in labour and essential

commodities, upon which the capitalist economic system is based, drove a wedge between employers and workers. Old ties of social responsibility between the two groups had to be severed so that the new socio-economic institutions could operate effectively. It was logical for the sociological expression of this division in the workplace to extend into the residential sphere: for capitalists to want to live apart from the working class. As John George Rhodes, a successful merchant, put it before the Select Committee on Town Holdings in 1887: [91]

"I believe it is the view of the estate that houses for the class of people that we have been speaking about (the lower orders), and houses for the class of people to which, if you will allow me to say so, I belong, should be kept very widely apart."

But in addition to this, there were similar economic reasons for this class separation in the living environment. Each parish was responsible for the relief of working-class poverty within its bounds. This was paid for out of the rates. In parishes where wealthy residents were a majority, and together paid close to the total rate bill, poor relief was tantamount to a negation of the divisive principles of the markets in labour and essential commodities, which were so important in the workplace. Thus, the notorious insistence by propertied Victorian society on keeping the rates low was not based solely on the prospect of pecuniary savings. [92]

It was a necessary part of the establishment of the socio-economic institutions which defined 19th century British capitalist society. Furthermore, the proximity of the 'respectable' neighbourhoods of the wealthy to working-class residential areas, especially slums, was seen to be undesirable for two further reasons. Property values in 'respectable' neighbourhoods

were depressed below their assumed potential if the connection could be effectively severed. And local slums were a potential health hazard as cholera epidemics usually originated in these unsanitary areas and sometimes spread into adjacent areas. [93] Besides, slums were simply an eyesore, and a constant reminder of the deprivation upon which dominant-class existence was based: those who had the power to remove this assault on their senses and consciences were unlikely to pass up any opportunity to do so.

This class division was achieved in three ways. The first, suburban migration, has already been discussed under forces one and two above. Employers and merchants, followed after the 1850's by the middle stratum, simply moved away from the central area to the West End or the suburbs, their higher incomes affording them a wider range of choices in the land market. Most of the working class were confined within the central area, primarily because their low wages and the nature of their jobs and of public transportation made the central area virtually the only feasible residential location for them during the period under consideration.

[94]

According to Lynn Lees:

"This centrifugal movement intensified the separation of social classes in residential areas which, in London, was already well advanced. The cost of transport into the city effectively insulated the outer ring of suburbs from most working-class residents until the 1870's, and thereafter the availability of cheap trains directed them into certain areas."

The second means of achieving class separation in the residential sphere has also been covered to some extent, under the development and modification of modes of transportation. Working-class districts were separated from more affluent neighbourhoods by the erection of barriers,

which limited or completely curtailed access from one area to another and which spatially defined the limits of each neighbourhood for their respective occupants. On the estates of the wealthy, this was achieved by means of gates and bars which were guarded by gatekeepers whose job was to keep out undesirable people and through traffic. On the Bedford estate, for example, barriers were used on the northern and eastern boundaries to fend off incursions from the working-class districts to the north and east of the estate. Barriers were not erected, however, on the western boundary [95] as contact with the respectable West End was deemed to be desirable.

Railway lines were powerful social and physical barriers. Railway viaducts, which were widely used in an effort to avoid costly street closures, were massive barriers. They carried trains noisily past working-class houses at roof-top level, constricting neighbourhoods socially and intersecting them physically. Such isolation tended to accelerate the decline of many areas so that they rapidly became unwholesome slums. Cuts and tunnels, which were also products of the power relations of the land market, were equally powerful barriers. The criss-cross of supplementary lines and sidings produced many neighbourhoods which had very few physical connections with surrounding areas. [96] The Parliamentary 'limits of deviation' allowed the railway companies to buy more land than they needed. This land was usually sold to non-residential users, thus increasing the barrier effects of the lines. Segregation 'on the wrong side of the tracks' often had disastrous effects on land values in 'bad' areas further accelerating their decline.

Street improvement was another means of 'fencing off' working-class

districts from well-to-do areas. Regent Street was a prime example, though other street improvements achieved a similar purpose, besides improving traffic circulation. It was explicitly though not exclusively designed as a barrier between the slums of Soho and the estates of the nobility and gentry in the West End. John Nash, the street's designer, stated that the line chosen sought to strengthen [97]

"the line of separation between the habitations of the first class of society and those of inferior classes....It will also be seen, by the plan...that the whole communication from Charing Cross to Oxford Street will be a boundary and complete separation between the streets and squares occupied by the nobility and gentry, and the narrow streets and meaner houses occupied by mechanics and the trading part of the community."

The cumulative effect of these barriers at the metropolitan scale was to divide London into a predominantly working-class eastern sector and dominant-class western sector. To the north, railway lines and marshalling yards and gasworks created a twilight zone which permanently divided Regent's Park and Marylebone from Pentonville and Islington. The depopulated City formed a buffer zone separating the overcrowded East End from the respectable West End. Though weaker than in the north, some degree of social polarization between east and west, with railway lines as major barriers, is discernible in south London. [98] I do not mean to imply that widening the social and spatial gulf between affluent residential areas and poor districts was the only or the most important factor behind the locational decisions of railway developers and street improvements. In fact, I have argued that the power relations of the land and housing market were primary. Nevertheless, social and spatial segregation was a significant

consideration in the decision-making process and in obtaining Parliamentary approval, and upon completion, these transportation channels did become powerful barriers.

A third way in which class separation was accomplished in the residential sphere was by the homogenization of predominantly affluent or respectable neighbourhoods. Not all of the working class were confined to the East End. Sizeable working-class populations were still to be found in the fashionable neighbourhoods of the West End and in the middle stratum suburbs. The majority were domestic servants who slept in the attics and lived in the basements of their wealthy employers homes. In these instances, class separation was rarely problematic. The employment of servants conferred respectability and enhanced the families' social status. Servants, on the other hand, obtained food, shelter and, most importantly, security at the price of the loss of a large measure of personal freedom. They knew their place, and the threat of poverty and starvation on their own in the world 'outside' was a constant reminder that subservience and humility was 'good' for them. Consequently, the majority observed the spoken and unspoken rules which their employers laid down, and segregation at the architectural scale within each house was sufficient.

The real problem from the point of view of propertied and middle-stratum society was the local concentrations of dens of extreme poverty in back alleys and isolated courts close to their stately, or at least adequate, homes. As Engels noted in 1844: "Right behind the most elegant streets the dirtiest workers' quarters are to be found." [100] These slums were usually inhabited by workers and casual labourers employed in local

service occupations, but they also housed beggars and possibly a few criminals. Whether employed or unemployed, these people constituted the riff-raff whose removal was the focus of homogenization drives. It was not the existence of poverty that was seen to be problematic, but the proximity of the working-class poor to the homes of the wealthy and, to a lesser extent, the middle stratum. A leading article in *The Times* of 1843 [101] is worth quoting at some length to support this argument:

"Poor there must be everywhere. Indigence will find its way and set up its hideous state in the heart of a great and luxurious city. Amid the thousand narrow lanes and by-streets of a populous metropolis there must always, we fear, be much suffering--much that offends the eye--much that lurks unseen. But that within the precincts of wealth, gaiety and fashion, nigh the regal grandeur of St. James's close on the palatial splendour of Bayswater, on the confines of the old and new aristocratic quarters in a district where the cautious refinement of modern design has refrained from creating one single tenement for poverty; which seems as it were dedicated to the exclusive enjoyments of wealth--that *there* want and famine and disease and vice should stalk in all their kindred horrors, consuming body by body, soul by soul! It is, indeed, a monstrous state of things! Enjoyment the most absolute, that bodily ease, intellectual excitement, or the more innocent pleasures of sense can supply to man's craving, brought in close contact with the most unmitigated misery!"

The ability to segregate the various classes of society was one of the virtues attributed to the large, leasehold estate by its defenders. Social and architectural uniformity was one of the major goals in the construction and management of estates. [102] In fashionable areas like the West End, where the power and preferences of landowners and tenants coincided, the task was easier and the goal was often accomplished. A certain class of houses was built for certain class of people--it was as blatant as that. The architecture of an estate became the physical embodiment of the class of its inhabitants and of their relative power in the land and

housing market. Often, housing at the edge of an estate was specifically designed as a barrier to less attractive surroundings. Nash's terraces, on the eastern boundary of Regent's Park, are prime examples which have survived to the present. They were specifically built to separate the Crown's estate from the predominantly working-class Camden Town area. Viewed from the park, one sees the stately, cream painted and elegantly proportioned facades which tourists and students of architectural history are taught to love, usually without being made aware of the other side--the dull, scruffy brick frontage onto Albany Street and Camden Town. [103]

The management of estates during the life of the leases was oriented towards maintaining such uniformity of social status and land use as had been established when the estates were initially developed. Estate surveyors had to prevent houses from being downgraded or inhabited by families of lower social status. Obnoxious trades and shops had to be kept out or at least hidden in unobtrusive locations. If all else failed, landowners could resort to redevelopment once the leases expired. Slums were often demolished and more wholesome accommodations were built by speculators for the middle stratum or by model dwelling companies for the 'respectable' 'labour aristocracy.' Later in the 19th century some estates were sold for high compensation to the Metropolitan Board of Works who then evicted the tenants, demolished the buildings and sold the land to model dwelling companies, mainly the Peabody Trust, for much less than they paid for it. Model dwelling companies invariably built housing which was beyond the means of the old slum's inhabitants. [104]

In those parishes where the power of estate owners was not enough to

accomplish socially homogeneous neighbourhoods; or where landownership was fragmented, the central government stepped in with new legislation to facilitate the removal of the human riff-raff who were seen as undesirable elements within otherwise attractive residential areas. The legislation to which I am referring was a composite of the early Building Bye-Laws, the Sanitary Laws, the Public Health Acts (1848, 1875), the Metropolis Local Management Act (1855) and the early Housing Acts, particularly the Torrens (1868) and Cross (1875) Acts. I do not mean to imply that the homogenization of classes within residential areas was the main reason behind this legislation, but it was an important pressure which determined the ultimate form of these laws. [105] If one looks beyond their expressed intent, that they were aimed at ameliorating unsanitary and dilapidated working-class environments and thereby improving the lives of working-class people, to the nature of the laws which were eventually written into the statute books, and to the outcomes which these laws facilitated, then one begins to understand their significance to the needs of the ruling class (class segregation in this case) and their virtual irrelevance in improving the lot of the working class.

The legislation allowed Medical Officers of Health to enter and inspect unsanitary or overcrowded property, predominantly working-class housing and to instruct the owner or leaseholder to make good those elements which were deemed harmful to the health of the inhabitants or the surrounding community. If no action was forthcoming, then the property could be condemned and demolished. Up to the mid-1880's, no effective re-housing requirements existed. [106] The legislation was permissive and could therefore be applied at the discretion of the Medical Officers of Health or of

their employers, the vestrymen. It was applied differentially in affluent and working-class districts.

In the neighbourhoods of the wealthy and to a lesser extent of the middle stratum, the vestries generally acted in the interests of most local residents. Sanitary regulations were easier to enforce because the goals of the Medical Officers of Health, the vestries and the majority of residents coincided, and they had enough political clout to enforce the laws. [107]
The Select Committee on Town Holdings pointed out in 1889 that it was

"easier to enforce sanitary regulations...when there are special advantages attaching to a particular neighbourhood, and marking it off for the residence of a certain class."

As a result, many isolated slum alleys and courts were demolished without new housing being built for their evicted inhabitants, who were gradually forced into predominantly working-class districts.

On the other hand, the enforcement of sanitary and housing legislation in working-class areas was much more problematic. Vestrymen usually acted in the interests of local property owners and businessmen. The Metropolis Local Management Act specifically placed the medical officers' tenure and removal at the pleasure of the vestrymen, many of whom had property interests in the slums. Thus, friction was bound to arise between medical officers determined to improve the slums and their slumlord political superiors. [108]

In addition, the cruelty and deprivation which the application of the sanitary and housing laws imposed on the working-class slum dwellers soon became blatantly apparent to the medical officers. Their everyday experience made them aware that evicted tenants, because

they were forced to live in a certain area, merely moved to adjacent streets, increasing overcrowding and rents in the remaining houses which soon came to pose health hazards as well. Without effective re-housing obligations and actions, the legislation did little to remove health hazards, and generally made life worse for the working class. [109]

In sum, then, the early public health and housing legislation was most useful in the attractive and generally sanitary environments of the dominant class because, among other things, it facilitated the removal from their neighbourhoods of undesirable concentrations of working-class slums. The legislation did little to improve the quality of working-class districts, which was the ostensible reason behind it. Indeed, it probably made matters worse for the working class. The application of sanitary regulations was another example of the dominant-class bias of the state. This was highlighted by Marx in 1867 in comparing the treatment of landowners 'evicted' from their land by railways and street improvements, and workers, evicted from unsanitary housing: [110]

"Admire this capitalistic justice! The owner of land, of houses, the businessman, when expropriated by 'improvements' such as rail[ways], the building of new streets &c., not only receives full indemnity. He must, according to law, human and divine, be comforted for his enforced 'abstinence' over and above this by a thumping profit. The labourer, with his wife and child and chattels, is thrown into the street, and--if he crowds in too large numbers towards quarters of the town where the vestries insist on decency, he is prosecuted in the name of sanitation!"

Thus it seems that the sanitary problems of working-class districts became a means of *justifying and legitimizing* increased state intervention to accomplish other goals (class segregation in this instance, and others

stated below under the fifth pressure) which served the interests of the dominant class and to a less extent of the middle stratum. As a result, the spatial segregation of social classes in London became more and more sharply defined during the 19th century; and this outcome of the class struggle was directly reflected in the form of the city--the architectural uniformity of various areas being a direct expression of the broad uniformity of needs and socio-economic status of their inhabitants. In the words of [111] Steen Eiler Rasmussen:

"There is hardly any other city where the local features are as marked as in London. To cross a street separating two quarters may mean coming from one world into another. It is the boundary of two civilizations, two languages, two standards of life. A person who knows London well will be able to place his man as soon as he hears in what part of London he lives, a fact that is often alluded to by authors. The first act of Bernard Shaw's *Pygmalion* is always sure to be a success with a London audience when Professor Higgins phonetically determines in which quarter the persons live: Lisson Grove, Hoxton, Earl's Court and so on. The fact that the inhabitants are distributed in quarters according to their class and income has made it possible to standardize the domestic houses: as people living in the same street have the same requirements all the houses can be absolutely uniform."

The Impoverishment of the Working Class

The fifth pressure which shaped London's growth arose out of the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class so that they formed a cheap, abundant and docile labour force, thereby enabling London's employers and merchants to compete on favourable terms against provincial factory production. The social and economic reasons behind this aspect of the struggle between classes and the ways in which production relations changed in the process have been outlined in Chapter 1. The scope of that exploration

was limited to the impoverishment of the working class in the workplace. Here we are concerned with the counterpart of this process as it unfolded in the workers' struggle for adequate housing--with the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class in the residential sphere. This latter process was both an outcome of the former and an integral part of the overall process of working-class impoverishment.

Compared to the stately homes of the West End or even the suburban terraces, working-class slums were the concrete expression of the exploitation and degradation on which this process of impoverishment was based. Slums were not a novelty in the 19th century. What was new, however, was the intensification of overcrowding in the central area which was the product of the structural characteristics and tenure relations of the working-class housing sub-market. This structure was gradually defined, during the period under consideration, by the nature and necessities of the workers' position in the production process and by the changing mode of urban organization based on the realization of the first four pressures. However, the resultant environments found spatial expression via what may be called the 'sweated' leasehold system which mediated relations between landlords and working-class tenants in the latter's quest for housing. Given this framework, the operation of this segment of the housing market almost inevitably led to the proliferation of overcrowded, dilapidated and unsanitary slum neighbourhoods. A brief look at the nature of the working-class housing market will show why.

The nature and necessities of the workers' position in the productive process shaped the working-class housing market in two important ways: it

determined their lack of economic, social and political power as 'actors' in the land and housing markets, and it confined feasible residential locations for the working class to a limited spatial area adjacent to their workplaces. Their powerlessness in society, being a major factor in the formation of working-class slum environments, permeates the whole of my argument and its central importance will become apparent as the explanation unfolds.

The necessities of their jobs meant that most workers, including skilled artisans, had very little effective choice of residential locality. Casual labourers were crucially dependent on hearsay and personal contacts for information on possible employment. In the days before the widespread diffusion of telephones and newspapers, this meant being in the right place at the right time. The irregularity of their employment meant that job-hunting was as vital and continual an aspect of their employment as was the work itself. As a result, commuting usually involved journeys *for*, rather than *to*, work. All in all, they were effectively forced to live within short walking distances, often less than a mile, of potential employment sources, the bulk of which were located in central London and particularly in the East End. Though housing reformers may have preached otherwise, most workers were depressingly aware of their spatial fixity, as evidenced by the following statement of a 'respectable' shoemaker, a teetotaller what is more, justifying why he lived in a slum in 1869: [112]

"In London...generally speaking, poor people cannot select their lodgings, being obliged in a great manner to accomodate themselves to the circumstances in which they are placed through their employment and other contingencies."

At a Parliamentary inquiry in 1846, another worker stated that it was the docks

"which have brought the labour there. The labourer will not go away from where the manufactory is, however bad the occupancy of the dwelling may be; he still will be near his work."

Similar centripetal locational imperatives characterized the 'sweated' trades. Here the necessity for constant personal contact *during* work hours between 'sweated' out-workers and the wholesale houses which were the origin and end of the productive process, was paramount. [113] Equipment might have to be borrowed a few times a day; raw materials had to be fetched and finished orders returned. As we have already seen, the assembly line in the 'sweated' trades ran through the streets. Thus, increasing the proximity between workers and wholesale houses was akin to increasing the efficiency of the productive process. So much so that many employers demanded guarantees from workers not to live more than a certain distance from their employment in the central area. For example, Lord Shaftsbury told the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, 1884-5, that: [114]

"in some cases men are under an engagement to their employers not to live more than a certain distance from the warehouses."

Other factors also confined the working class, especially the poor to the centre, [115] and conversely played an important role in perpetuating the functioning of this stratum of the labour market and in sustaining the overall process of impoverishment. Food was considerably cheaper and could be bought in much smaller quantities there than in the suburbs due to the existence of street markets. Credit was easier to obtain from

local shops and pawnbrokers and so was second-hand clothing; and the opportunities for wives to work part-time was an added attraction. Furthermore, the feeling of community in the slums, of living with equals, sustained familiar elements of working-class culture--pubs, cheap theatres, rat-baiting, boxing--and must have been another significant factor that prevented any rapid dispersion from the central area slums. In fact, prior to the 1880's, most of the working class vigorously and logically resisted any encouragement to move from their homes in the centre, as this would involve the loss of tangible benefits and would threaten their precarious livelihoods as well. As one worker told the Select Committee on Artisans' Dwellings in 1882: "I might as well go to America as go to the suburbs." [116]

And the 1884-5 Royal Commissioners reported: [117]

"If regular work was to be had by all who want it without any uncertainty, the poor might pick and choose the locality for their dwellings, but as it is, it has been noticed that when they [the working class] have made an attempt to leave an overcrowded neighbourhood for some better locality at a little distance away, after a short sojourn many of them have often been compelled to come back to be near their work."

The changes in London's social and spatial structure, arising out of the realization of the first four pressures, affected the central area working-class housing market in two major ways. They led to drastic reductions in both the absolute space available for working-class housing and in the availability of financial resources needed to sustain an adequate network of urban social and physical infrastructure in working-class districts.

The imperatives of the process of capital accumulation and the residential needs of the working class came into direct conflict in the

centre-city land market. As we have seen, the increasing profitability of commercial and productive facilities was strongly dependent on central locations, on the construction of docks and railways and on the improvement of major thoroughfares. These productive and service land uses consumed large proportions of central area land, which was, on the other hand, virtually the only feasible location for the working-class housing. This conflict was the concrete expression of an aspect of the more general power struggle between the capitalist class, whose interests were served by the process of capital accumulation, and the working class; an aspect which directly affected the form of the city. In the majority of interactions, the outcomes were repetitious of those in the overall struggle between these classes: capital accumulation came before working-class needs: As Karl Marx argued in 1867, this outcome was far more blatant than its counterpart in the workplace:

[118]

"The intimate connexion between the pangs of hunger of the most industrious layers of the working-class, and the extravagant consumption, coarse or refined, of the rich, for which capitalist accumulation is the basis, reveals itself only when the economic laws are known. It is otherwise with the 'housing of the poor.' Every unprejudiced observer sees that the greater the centralisation of the means of production, the greater is the corresponding heaping together of the labourers, within a given space: that *therefore the swifter capitalistic accumulation, the more miserable are the dwellings of the working-people.* 'Improvements' of towns, accompanying the increase of wealth, by the demolition of badly built quarters, the erection of palaces for banks, warehouses, &c., the widening of streets for business traffic, for the carriages of luxury, and for the introduction of tramways, &c., drive away the poor into even worse and more crowded hiding places. On the other hand, every one knows that the dearness of dwellings is in inverse ratio to their excellence, and that the mines of misery are exploited by house speculators with more profit or less cost than ever were the mines of Potosi." (emphasis added)

Thousands of acres of central land were taken over for productive and service uses. This 'take-over' process was both economic, the result of market forces and the distribution of income, and political in nature. Commercial and productive enterprises were usually able to obtain the necessary land by outbidding owners of working-class housing, whose rents could not compete with the capitalists' profits. Businessmen bought sites, evicted the tenants, and converted the buildings to meet their needs, or demolished them and built new and more appropriate ones. Politics, in the form of the early sanitary and housing legislation, sometimes entered this cycle in cases where landlords were unwilling to sell or where tenants proved unusually tenacious. A businessman's subtle influence or even outright bribery must have worked wonders with local vestrymen in these instances; demolition and eviction orders, sanctioned by the legislation, clinching the deal where 'free' market relations had failed. We have already seen that political power played a central role in the acquisition of land for docks, railways and street improvements. Without parliamentary and metropolitan government intervention, most of these schemes may never have materialized, though money and the pressures of the land market were important motivators of landowners in these instances as well.

Land which supported working-class housing, being economically and politically the weak point in the land market, most frequently fell victim to the encroachment of productive and service activities. Because practical spatial locations for working-class housing were quite strictly limited to the central area, these 'takeovers' were tantamount to a drastic reduction in the absolute amount of space available for working-class residence.

The central land market was carved up in the process, often leaving dislocated and uninviting parcels for working-class housing because no one else [119] wanted this reject space. As John Kellett has argued, these land takeovers:

"...cramped and confined the inner districts...and, as it were, *suggested* areas where, because residential values had been frozen, the overflow might accumulate. Unlike other areas, for which the process of gradual improvement and residential replacement was always a possibility, however remote, the inner districts intersected by the railways were fixed in dereliction."

Thus, approximately 100,000 skilled and unskilled workers were not only displaced from their homes, in the interests of capital accumulation, but were forced to crowd into less and less space. Some were able to take advantage of workmen's fares on trains to escape to the suburbs. Others accepted what little alternative accommodation was provided by philanthropic organizations. But these forms of relief were either impractical for or unavailable to the bulk of the working class, especially those with lower wages and less security of employment, before the mid-1880's. Consequently, overcrowding and the potential for exploitation increased enormously in the remaining inner-city working-class residential districts. The resultant spatial inequalities, which had their basis in the unequal social relations of capitalism, were noted by William Ashworth in his book on the origins [120] of modern British town planning:

"Although towns occupied more space in proportion to their population there was no relief of congestion at their heart, whether that was indicated by the proportion of land under buildings or by the density of population. It was observed in London in the seventies that despite the extension of the built-up area some of the older districts were becoming more closely packed than ever as a result of railway and warehouse construction."

The flight of the capitalist class and the middle stratum from the centre and the growing homogenization of social classes within relatively discrete residential areas, was obviously accompanied by the corresponding flight of the financial resources necessary to establish and sustain adequate levels of urban social and physical infrastructure in working-class districts. Often money extracted from slum dwellers went to pay for suburban development. Schools, water, sewage disposal, gas and other services which were provided through private, frequently monopolistic, markets were offered in greater quantity and quality in the suburbs and the West End where consumer spending power was relatively high. Investments in other services, such as street-paving and drainage, which were funded out of the rates, likewise favoured the neighbourhoods of financially better-off residents. Even though the rates were much lower in these areas than those where the working class resided, the absolute amount available for investment per family was greater in wealthier areas. In effect, the poor footed a large proportion of the poor relief bill themselves. Working-class districts, which needed the greatest infrastructure investments, received the least. Class separation also eased the consciences of those who could not do most to alleviate slum conditions by eliminating slum environments from their daily experiences. Thus, the spatial environment of the city gradually came to replicate the social and economic disequilibria of the production relations. In the same way that capitalist prosperity and middle-stratum financial security rested on working-class impoverishment in the workplace, so the spacious and elitist West End, and the sanitary middle-stratum suburbs were buttressed by the overcrowded and degrading

working-class slums of central London.

The 'Sweated' Leasehold System

However, the consequences of the workers' positions in the production relations and of the changing urban structure are not sufficient as *causal* explanations for the proliferation of working-class slums or of the spatial structure of these districts. These factors are like the equipment necessary for a game of Monopoly--the structural features of the game. But without *rules* the game cannot be played; and different rules will produce different outcomes because the relationships between the various players and between players and equipment will not be the same. The equivalent rules of the 'housing game' are the *forms of tenure* which mediate the relationship between those who own bricks and mortar and want rent and those who have money and need houses. Significantly different tenure relations will lead to significantly different physical environments within the same structural framework. By attributing primacy in the determination of urban socio-spatial structure to tenure relations, I do not mean to imply that these are independent of the structural framework. Clearly, these two aspects of the housing and land markets are intimately intertwined, the one growing logically out of the other and in turn sustaining it. Carrying the metaphor one stage further, while it is possible to significantly change the rules of Monopoly and arrive at different end results, it would be impossible to play a game using the Monopoly equipment according to the rules of Contract Bridge. Similarly, while different forms of tenure were prevalent in the working-class housing market of 19th century London, a system of tenure which, for example, guaranteed palatial West End residences for

workers, would have been completely out of phase with the structural framework of the market, and would therefore have been untenable.

[124]

The most prevalent form of tenure relations in working-class districts was in fact a mutation of the leasehold system which, as has been shown, was so appropriate and effective in the development and maintenance of the attractive West End residences of the wealthy. The *'sweated' leasehold system* is an apt label for this set of socio-economic relations between estate owners or small freeholders and the occupants of the houses. The term *'sweated'* is borrowed directly from its more familiar usage in connection with that segment of the London labour market characterized by a high degree of sub-contracting--the *'sweated'* labour system described in Chapter 1. The similarities between the socio-economic relations and outcomes of both systems are striking.

The crucial element of the *'sweated'* leasehold system was the proliferation of middlemen--the original leaseholder plus a chain of sub-lessees --between landowner and house occupants. Large estate owners, who were interested in reliable, long-term, low-yield investments, were unwilling to enter into direct leases with working-class house occupants whose wages were low and irregular. Most owners of large amounts of capital preferred to invest their funds in other sectors of the local and foreign capital markets either because these were considered to be more lucrative and less risky capital outlets than the working-class residential sector, at least until [125] 1875, or to avoid the administrative complexities and unfavourable public image which being a large slumlord involved. This left the small investors for whom house property in inner London was the most popular,

accessible and lucrative means of capital gain. The proliferation of middlemen was a response to the relatively meagre resources which these investors possessed as it allowed the capital costs to be spread among as many people as possible. Each middleman was both a tenant and a landlord. As tenant he leased part of the prior middleman's lease and as landlord he expected a return on his equity investment from the tenant below him. As one descended the leasehold ladder so the length of the tenancies diminished, usually from the 99 year ground lease, to the weekly-tenancy arrangement with the house occupants, the rent increased, as it had to [126] provide a return to all the prior investments.

In effect, the 'sweated' leasehold system was a means of sub-contracting [127] management of residential property and exploitation of tenants. As the duration of a middleman's control of the property decreased, so the level of exploitation increased. This exploitation was justified on the basis that as the duration of the leases decreased, so the risks of defaults, or of demand fluctuations, and the administrative burdens increased; and this was probably true. But it is important to realize that exploitation was *built into* the 'sweated' leasehold system, it was not an aberration of the system--even if each party was 'honourable' and demanded a 'fair' return (that is, played by the rules) the house occupants ended up paying higher rents than would have been the case in the absence of middlemen, as was the case in the wealthy West End and in many suburbs. The advantages of this tenure system were that it facilitated the construction or conversion of housing for the working class without necessitating [128] the raising of unmanageably-large amounts of circulating capital;

it provided incentives for rapid economic advancement (seldom achieved in actuality) to thousands of middle-stratum small investors thereby ensuring their cooperation in a social system which exploited them as well; and it insulated estate owners and ground leaseholders from the demand fluctuations and administrative headaches of the working-class housing market, whilst allowing their property to be developed and produce a return.

However, the 'sweated' leasehold system was problematic in a number of important respects--economic, environmental and social, and physiological. Each was disastrous for the bulk of the working class, while the first was very advantageous for the mainly middle-stratum slum landlords, the second was worrisome for the estate owners, and the third gave capitalist employers and merchants some anxiety. A brief outline of the nature and outcomes of these three broad dysfunctionalities is instructive for analytical purposes, but it must be borne in mind that they were intimately connected in reality.

The rents which working-class tenants paid in the degrading inner city environments were exorbitant in relation to their wages, in relation to rents in other sectors of the housing market, and when measured against the quality and quantity of the commodity 'housing' which they received in return. As Lickchese, a rent collector, confides to Trench, in

[129]

George Bernard Shaw's *Widowers Houses*:

"Tenement houses, let from week to week by the room or half room --aye, or quarter room. It pays when you know how to work it, sir. Nothing like it. It's been calculated on the cubic foot of space, sir, that you can get higher rents letting by the room than you can for a mansion in Park Lane."

The 1884-5 Royal Commission found that over 85% of the working class paid

more than one-fifth of their income in rent, and nearly 50% paid between
[130]

one quarter and one half. And this rent generally only paid for a single room, which was all that even many skilled workers could afford; two rooms were often beyond the means of regularly employed workers. Although most slum landlords were 'little men' scraping a living from their few houses and hardly able to afford necessary repairs, it was often possible to make large profits from slum property. These overcrowded 'dwellings' were in effect machines for manufacturing rent for their leaseholders, indeed many streets were called....RENTS, e.g., Colliers Rents. As William Howitt wrote in 1846:
[131]

"There are courts and alleys innumerable called by the significant name of RENTS....they are not human habitations....They are merely so many man-traps to catch the paying animal in; they are machines for manufacturing rent."

Much of the blame for these high rents was then, as it is today, mistakenly heaped on the shoulders of speculative landlords, of either the living-on-the-premises or the absentee variety. Some landlords were probably corrupt but the majority 'played by the rules' of the 'sweated' leasehold system, with its built-in exploitation and nothing about profit limits or 'fair rents,' a highly ambiguous concept in any case. Nor were high slum rents caused by the fact that they were adjacent to expensive commercial land. Commercial land values could only be realized if and when the land was developed and used for commercial purposes. The *potential* for realizing commercial values which central working-class residential land enjoyed could hardly *cause* high rents; rather it provided powerful *justification* for the rents which landlords charged.

The real basis of high rents in the slums was the utter powerlessness of most members of the working class in 19th century British capitalist society. Rents were set in the weekly struggles between tenants and rent collectors, whose job was to extract as much of the workers' wages as possible on behalf of the landlords. The workers' social, economic and political powerlessness, and the fact that their locational choices were restricted to the totally inadequate central area, meant that they usually came off worst in these interactions, almost irrespective of the quality or quantity of housing which they rented. This fact largely explains why rent increases bore such a close relationship to increases in money wages and proved to be the great exception to the general trend of falling prices, especially in the late 19th century. As workers' ability to pay increased, so the rent collectors sapped more money from them, thereby virtually negating improvements in real wages or general living conditions. Rents went up while the quality of the accommodation remained much the same, or even declined. It was stated in Parliament in 1884:

[132]

"Since 1844, wages had risen, the taxes in necessaries had been lowered, and the ability of working men to obtain better accommodation had increased. But while that ability had increased, the rents of houses had also risen. Since 1844, house rent had increased by 150 per cent, and consequently, while the condition of the working classes had improved in all other respects, the state of their dwellings had not undergone a corresponding improvement."

In some instances virgin land was developed so badly that it became a slum from the start. [133] The lack of public controls to govern the width of streets, height of buildings or lighting and ventilation of rooms, facilitated this process. But new building was primarily oriented towards

[134]
the needs of the growing numbers of suburbanites. And most estate owners, being concerned with the long term value of their property, encouraged building for members of the classes which moved to the suburbs rather than the working class. In consequence, most of the working class received hand-me-down-housing as houses which had been vacated by wealthier occupants were converted downwards to more intensively occupied, lower quality accommodation. "No slum was worse than property transferred in this way." [135]
Often this process got completely out of control, producing very dense structures occupying as much space as possible with little regard for light, ventilation or sanitation.

The 'sweated' leasehold system was most appropriate as a vehicle through which this process of environmental and social degradation was realized. Each lease or sub-leaseholder had every incentive to exploit the property to the fullest over the period during which he was in control. This was especially important at the bottom rung of the leasehold ladder where the leaseholder's activities were only minimally restricted as he was only accountable to the house occupants who had but a week's 'security' of tenure. Overcrowding was thus an inevitable result of this tenure system in working-class districts. If tenants fell slightly behind in their rent payments, landlords would seize this opportunity to intensify occupancy by forcing them to occupy one room instead of two in return for a stay of eviction or a waiver of rent arrears. [136] This pressure to increase returns by overcrowding houses was ruthlessly intensified during the last decade or so of the ground lease--called the 'fag end' of the lease. These fag ends were exploited by 'house jobbers' or 'farmers' whose only

object was to make as much money as possible before the lease expired. In the words of Henry Trelawny Boodle, the agent for the Westminster and North-
[137]
hampton estates, in 1887:

"I have heard it stated over and over again, and I believe it to be true, that if a man hardens his heart and treats his fellow creatures like brute beasts, and crowds them in like pigs, this system of farming houses is the most remunerative thing possible...all (the middlemen) care about in the matter of 'interest' is merely to screw as much as they possibly can out of their tenants."

However, it is important to stress that house farmers, absentee landlords, etc., cannot be blamed for excessive rents and dilapidated housing as was, and still is today, popular among housing reformers. Rather, the 'sweated' leasehold system of tenure, which all but forced the middlemen to behave in this way, must be seen as the culprit. In the words of an artisan of
[138]
the day:

"Regarding excessive rents, it is no doubt very easy to indulge in violent diatribes against landlord greed and selfishness; but after all, property owners are not wholly to blame in this matter. The system of short leases and high ground rents,...is far more responsible for the existing state of things."

House occupants were neither financially capable of nor legally responsible for maintaining their houses in decent condition. And they had little incentive to pester their landlords' agents to undertake repairs as these demands usually went unheeded, or sometimes resulted in rent increases in anticipation of future repairs which were only carried out much later. Furthermore, the covenants contained in the ground lease became unenforceable due to the multiplicity of middlemen, which facilitated the evasion of
[139]
responsibility for maintenance. Absentee landlords were insulated from

any contact with their slum properties. If tenants agreed to pay the rents for substandard accommodation, landlords had little incentive to improve the standard. Small landlords who lived on the premises usually did not have the capital to keep their property in decent repair, often because they themselves were being exploited by more powerful prior leaseholders. Estate owners did not benefit from slum formation on their land as it reduced its reversionary value--the buildings became a liability upon expiration of the ground lease, not an asset as was originally intended. But they were powerless to enforce the covenants as that might frighten leaseholders off and as the courts generally supported the middlemen's right to do essentially as they pleased. [140] The seeming attraction of improved and more valuable property reverting to the estate owner at the end of the lease, with only minimal effort and investment on his part, was increasingly negated in working-class slums. In sum, then, the 'sweated' leasehold system led to extreme overcrowding, the lack of sanitary precautions, an almost total absence of maintenance and exorbitant rents; and these outcomes were intensified as the ground lease drew to a close.

Up to this point, I have made little reference to one of the most popular explanations for the growth of slums (and suburbs for that matter) in 19th century London--the urban population explosion. [141] I have purposely done so, not because I regard this factor as insignificant, but rather to counteract the weight usually given it, as I believe that it is of decidedly secondary importance in the determination of urban form, and definitely has no causal power. I have argued instead, and I hope convincingly, that the slums and the suburbs (and urban form in general) were

(and are) a product of the aspirations and relative power of various classes, arising out of the production relations of London's economy, and of the drive to accumulate capital, as these were realized through the systems of tenure which governed relations between the owners of controllers and the users of (residential) property. I have stressed tenure relations as in [142] my view these hold the key to the process of urban development.

A comparison between 19th century London and Paris illustrates my point. Both cities had similar economic and class structures, similar modes of transportation and similar rates of population growth, though London's population was numerically larger than that of Paris. The major difference lay in the tenure relations: in London the essentially uncontrolled leasehold system dominated whereas in Paris the law restricted development, both vertically and over horizontal space, until 1861, in order to preserve the 18th century boundary of the commune. As a result, 19th century Paris was much denser than London, with four to five storey blocks of flats (apartments) predominating, as opposed to London's dense centre and sparse suburbs [143] and its much greater superficial spread in relation to its population.

Population growth merely exacerbated or intensified outcomes which were determined by the tenure relations and the relationships between classes.

In fact, urban population growth was itself largely the result of changing social and economic circumstances. Thus, the stress on population pressure as a primary cause of urban structure and problems hides the fundamental causal forces and merely serves as false justification for the shape and [144] dysfunctionalities of capitalist cities.

The Functions and Dysfunctions of the Slums

Returning to the slums of 19th century London, it is clear that most workers paid disproportionately high rents, in relation to their wages, to the quality of their accommodation and to the rest of the housing market. Most working-class districts were overcrowded, poorly maintained and unsanitary, in varying degrees depending on the inhabitants' position in the general structure of the labour market. H. J. Dyos has convincingly related overcrowded living conditions directly to low money wages and insecurity of employment. [145]

Indeed, I would argue that the economic, social and political milieu of the slums was both an outcome and an important *active ingredient* in the broader process of working-class impoverishment which was in turn an important aspect of the development of 19th century British capitalism. As workers descended the job ladder, so the oversupply of labour increased, generating fierce competition for the scarce jobs which led to increasing insecurity of employment and diminishing wages. On the other hand, the abundance of these workers competing for scarce accommodation facilitated and legitimized increased rents and/or overcrowding. The quality of housing tended to deteriorate in relation to diminishing wages and employment security. While the exploitation of workers in their residential environments was qualitatively different from that which occurred in the workplace, it served to complete the cycle of working-class impoverishment. The majority of workers were trapped within this cycle. The meagreness and irregularity of their wages precluded any sort of saving. They were forced to live from hand to mouth, day by day--their bellies full when they had worked and

had money to spend; starvation, sickness and debts when jobs and money was scarce. Landlords charged higher rents to provide for the high possibility of bad debts. When the work situation improved, potential savings were devoured in repaying debts with interest. Each debt which they were forced to incur added another stone to the wall which made escape from the slums, and the social status and lifestyle which they epitomized, increasingly remote. [146]

Thus, working-class slums were functional, from the point of view of the dominant class, in two senses. In the direct economic sense of absorbing less capital than more adequate environments might have required, and thereby enabling more capital to be "ploughed heavily back into the commercial machine instead of being distributed in higher wages," and allowing the more prosperous classes to use "the wealth that was created in this process...quite literally to put a distance between themselves and the workers." [147] And the slums served the purpose of a 'stick' in the economic incentive system which workers, especially rural immigrants, had to be socialized to accept for the economy to operate smoothly. Workers had to be 'taught' to give their all to their bosses and to look after themselves with the wages they received in return. Evidently, the constant threat to their continued subsistence was necessary to motivate workers during this early period of capitalism, and it was also a powerful means of maintaining discipline in the workplace.

On the ideological level, the proliferation of slums, which were much more potent symbols of exploitation than degrading working conditions, served to shift the focus of blame for working-class impoverishment from its primary

and causative locus in the workplaces to its secondary manifestations--the slums. Consequently, slum landlords had to bear the brunt of much 19th century social criticism, which should more accurately have been heaped on the shoulders of the capitalist employers and merchants. It was hardly an accident that working-class slums were the targets of extensive public investigations forty years before the 'sweated' labour system came under the [148] Parliamentary microscope.

However, slums were seen to be dysfunctional by the employing class, in terms of posing a threat to the maintenance and control of London's cheap, overstocked, yet industrious semi-skilled and unskilled labour force upon which their prosperity depended. Their problem was succinctly stated by Jack London in his excellent sociological study of the East End [149] slums at the turn of the century:

"Class supremacy can rest on class degradation, and when the workers are segregated in the ghetto they cannot escape the consequent degradation. A short and stunted people is created--a breed strikingly differentiated from their master's breed."

High disease and mortality rates in the slums tended to reduce the absolute number of workers in the labour market by absenteeism or death, as well as to reduce the efficiency of those who managed to continue working. This imposed costs on employers in terms of lost productivity in their labour intensive plants, and to a lesser extent on the community as a whole in terms of increased poor relief bills. The slums were unfortunately not 'automatically productive' of healthy, stable employees. The concern was quite widespread that slums fostered unrest and defiance of the laws, which threatened [150] the existence of the social structure. William Ashworth has noted that:

"The propertied classes were not likely to ignore a factor threatening social stability when they had seen and remembered rioting at home... and had noted with apprehension revolutionary outbreaks in half the capitals of Europe. The possibility of an uprising remained as a shadow on the British [capitalist] class mind and a persuasion towards some measure of reform until in 1848 Chartism petered out in the face of advancing prosperity."

And with the onset of a long depression in the early 1870's, social unrest began to rise once again, bringing employers' apprehension in its wake.

Something had to be done, not to improve the lot of the working class *per se*, but to ensure that the numbers of the labour force were not drastically depleted and to step up social control. In my view, the early sanitary and housing legislation already referred to was mainly oriented towards fulfilling this dual goal. The expressed intent of much of this legislation to 'improve the condition of the labouring classes,' was a fiction. Rather it invariably exacerbated overcrowding in neighbouring dwellings. In 1867, [151] Marx wrote that it was:

"...self-understood that every sanitary measure, which, as has been the case hitherto in London, hunts the labourers from one quarter, by demolishing uninhabitable houses, serves only to crowd them together yet more closely in another."

However, it did enable Medical Officers of Health to mitigate the worst consequences of unsanitary slums. For instance, cholera, a disease which put tens of thousands of workers out of action, was gradually brought under control, though the slum remained. The legislation also enabled the Metropolitan Board of Works and the local vestries to step up their direct control of the working class, an important facility in view of the fact that maintaining control over much of the working class in their workplaces was

[152] very difficult due to their highly irregular employment. What is more, Richard L. Schoenwald has offered a provocative socio-psychological hypothesis about the connection between the sanitary movement and working-class discipline and control. He argues that the sanitary movement was in effect a gigantic societal toilet training exercise. Interpreted in Freudian terms he sees the state symbolizing the parental disciplinarian administering 'training' aimed at teaching society to use the water closet (potty), thereby gaining their submission to and energy in the cause of production for a distribution system which they could neither control nor see, symbolized by the sewer system. He makes a convincing case that the sanitary movement played a powerful role in socializing the working class (many of whom were still 'cursed' with pre-capitalist behaviour) to accept the behavioural norms and controls which were so central to the efficient functioning of a capital-
[153] ist economy.

In sum, then, the working-class slums of 19th century London were essentially the product of the 'sweated' leasehold system, which defined the social and economic relations of the working-class housing process, operating within the structural framework of the working-class housing market, the main features of which were determined by the production relations and by the changing mode of urban organization based on the drive to accumulate capital and the aspirations of more powerful classes. The formation and perpetuation of these degrading and unhealthy environments was absolutely beyond the control of their inhabitants. In fact, the extreme powerlessness of the bulk of the working class in 19th century British capitalist society was arguably the most important contributory factor to the existence of

working-class slums. In the words of H. J. Dyos:

"... the making of the slums of Victorian London, like the grooming of jallopies for the American Deep South, was a process that began far beyond the reach of the slummers who packed into them. It is important to recognise that these unfortunates were more than anything else merely the residuary legatees of a kind of house-processing operation which was started by another social class...the condition of the houses of the poor, far from being a quaint expression of their own debased tastes--a view widely held among the ruling classes of Victorian England--was a reflex of the allocation of political power and economic resources in society at large."

They were both an outcome of the process of working-class impoverishment which was rooted in the workplace and played a significant active role in the process as well. The slums were the physical and social infrastructure and the concretization of London's labour market. Most of the working class could not have survived elsewhere in the city, away from the intricate web of social and economic relations which sustained them in the slums. Yet, day by day the struggle of living in slums made life itself less and less worthwhile. Furthermore, the slums formed an essential part of the foundation of ruling-class prosperity and middle-class decency. But the continued reproduction of this outcome depended on slum conditions being kept under control, to a limited degree, to prevent any drastic depletion of the overstocked labour force and to maintain social stability. This control function gradually came to be exercised by the state and the early public health and housing legislation formed an important part of the state's ammunition in this endeavour. The overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of the slums, which this legislation was ostensibly aimed at mitigating, instead played an important role in justifying and legitimizing this increased state intervention in an era when the *laissez faire* ideology was still extremely powerful and

challenges to the laws of private property were stongly resisted.

A Brief Conclusion

In this rather lengthy chapter we have seen how the broad, and some detailed, features of London's social and spatial geography were fundamentally the product of the realization of five pressures--the flight of both the capitalist class and the middle stratum from the centre; the improvement of London's efficiency as a locus of capital accummulation; the social-class homogenization of residential districts; and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class--mediated by various forms of tenure relations, mainly variants of the leasehold system. These forces originated in the workplace --they were logical outcomes of London's class structure and the struggles between and within classes during this half century, as outlined in Chapter 1. As such, each complex pressure was but an aspect of the on-going macro-struggle between the capitalist class, bent on increasing the rate of capital accumulation subject to the maintenance of social stability and the status quo, on the one hand, and the middle stratum and the working class, on the other hand, striving to improve or maintain the standard of their living and working conditions. The totality of these interactions, and the objective and subjective ways in which individuals or corporate bodies plugged into them, broadly determined their motivations and aspirations, their differential abilities to satisfy these goals in the land and housing markets, and either directly or indirectly determined the structure of these markets. With these parameters set, though constantly evolving, the 'rules of the game' defined as it were the autonomous economic and political actions of these individuals and corporate bodies in the land and housing markets,

mediated by the various forms of tenure relations, gave London its social and spatial structure.

Thus, at the most fundamental level, *London's development was deter-*
[155] *mined by the acting out of the class struggle* in relation to two contra-
dictory tendencies--the drive to accumulate capital, on the one hand, and
people's quest for socially and biologically adequate shelter, on the other.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Sheppard [1971] pp.348-353. For a contrasting local situation in which the impact on urban development of the antagonisms between local landowners and foreign capitalists, is explored, see Frank Lewinberg's analysis of the development of Toronto. Lewinberg [1973] Chapter 5.
2. Trent [1965] p.195. And see Sheppard [1971] pp.47-48.
3. "The city turned out of its one square mile territory....a smaller class who went westwards to mingle, as far as they might be allowed, with the aristocracy." Gomme [1898] p.1, and see pp.1-17.
4. Olsen [1964] p.110. And see Ashworth [1954] pp.36-38; Reeder [1968] pp.255-258.
5. Trent [1965] pp.191-192; Dyos [1961] p.30; Sheppard [1971] p.107.
6. "The universal practice of living away from the place of business *which now almost perforce attains* was not absolutely general at the commencement of the reign." Gomme [1898] p.17. (emphasis added)
7. Reeder [1968] pp.262-264.
8. Olsen [1964] p.20. And see pp.65-70; Ashworth [1954] p.33. On Cubitt and other 'respectable' builders, see Dyos [1968] pp.647-650; Harrison [1965] pp.188-192; Olson [1964] pp.59-63.
9. Dyos [1968] pp.668-669; Sheppard [1971] p.103.
10. Olsen [1964] p.144.
11. "Thus, if the great task of the estate plan was to entice respectable tenants, the great task of management during the terms of the leases was to keep them there." Olsen [1964] pp.21-22.
12. Quoted in Simmons [1973] p.300. And see Dyos [1955] p.91; Dyos [1961] p.23; Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.198-199. The development of new modes of transportation will be dealt with in the analysis of the third pressure.
13. See Prince [1964b] pp.124-125; Reeder [1968] pp.259,266-268; Simmons [1973] pp.299-300; Trent [1965] pp.194-195. For the drop in central area population from the 1860's onwards, see Stevens [1964] pp.172-173.
14. "If we do not draw too fine a distinction between builders and developers it might be said that 'speculative builder' was in effect a term that merely described the person who responded to these various pressures and opportunities, who bore virtually all the risks and took some, at

- least, of the profits of meeting an anticipated demand for houses." Dyos [1968] p.663
15. For commercial and public building construction firms, see Summerson [1973]. For residential construction firms, see Dyos [1968]; Dyos [1961] pp.122-137; Reeder [1968] p.269.
 16. "The building workers...frequently attempted to escape from their predicament by direct speculative building--'the land,' as Clapham says, 'rented in hope, materials secured on credit, a mortgage raised on the half-built house before it is sold or leased, and a high risk of bankruptcy.' Thompson [1963] p.258. And see pp.319-330
 17. "The ground rent was not ordinarily paid until the houses were completed; for the first year or two the rent might be a peppercorn, after which the rent would rise gradually to its full figure. If the builder could dispose of his houses quickly enough, he need spend none of his capital on rent." Olsen [1964] p.30. Another way in which building was financed was for the landowner to buy the improved ground rents (i.e., the difference between the total rent paid by the occupier and the ground rent paid to the landowner) for a capital sum. This enabled builders who could not secure funds elsewhere to build, and meant that the landowner's land was developed and realized a higher return. See Olsen [1964] pp.36-37.
 18. Nevitt [1966] p.21.
 19. By the 1860's, it was estimated that "building societies...were financing the construction of one house in about every seven or eight built." Cleary [1965] p.289.
 20. Cleary [1965] p.25. And see pp.9-25 for a discussion of the origins of the 'building society movement.' For a more detailed account, see Price [1958] pp.1-78.
 21. The first four weaknesses are analysed in more detail in Cleary [1965] pp.55-58.
 22. "The strength of the [permanent] building society...stems from the nineteenth-century invention of the amortized loan. The invention is of such importance in housing economics that it should rank with the invention of the steam engine in changing the face of Britain. Owner-occupation and all the social changes which this implies only became possible when a method had been discovered and perfected of borrowing money over a short period and lending it out over a much longer period." Nevitt [1966] p.8. And see Cleary [1965] pp.48,58-61, for the advantages of early permanent building societies, and Price [1958] pp.99-116.

23. Cleary [1965] p.60. "Whether as channels for funds for occupying owners or for speculative builders, these highly parochial institutions performed the prime function of releasing the capital resources on one suburb for the development of a neighbouring one." Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.379. And see Dyos [1968] p.666; Dyos [1961] pp.116,130.
24. Dyos [1968] p.663. "For London as a whole, empty houses were seldom less than 4 per cent of the total during the last quarter of the nineteenth century." Dyos [1961] p.81. And see Kellett [1969] pp.412-413.
25. Cleary [1965] pp.30-46. The formation of terminating societies in London began to decline after peaking in 1845, whereas permanent societies grew in size and number from the 1850's onwards. In 1853, there were 390 terminating and 39 permanent societies, while in 1873, the numbers were 266 and 168 respectively.
26. Cleary [1965] pp.80-100.
27. The Royal Commissioner investigating friendly and Benefit Building Societies stated in 1872: "The growth of them [permanent building societies] has altogether changed the character...of the building society movement; that it tends to throw...[them] more and more... into the hands of the middle classes and secure to them its benefits," and they saw no reason why "comparatively poor people should be restricted from lending to the comparatively rich." Quoted in Cleary [1965] pp.91,93.
28. "The freehold land societies owed their origin to building societies, but they repaid that debt, for the building societies movement in turn gained a good deal." Cleary [1965] p.54. And see pp.49-54; Dyos [1961] pp.114-115,117.
29. Quoted in Cleary [1965] pp.52-53.
30. For examples of the development of these suburbs, see Olsen [1973] pp.345-352 for north London and Dyos [1961] pp.91-109 for the south.
31. Summerson [1948]; Summerson [1963] p.174.
32. The leasehold system encouraged *building speculation* in which the goal was to crowd as many houses onto the estate as was deemed feasible. A major limitation was that houses should front onto streets (a response to the back alley slums of the centre). Thus, *street frontages*, as opposed to plot area, became the unit according to which value was measured. The greater the lineal frontage the greater the value. The freehold system under which most American cities were developed, encouraged *land speculation* (before the builder came onto the scene). Consequently, *land area* became the unit according to which value was measured --the greater the acreage, the greater the value.

33. Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.369.
34. Hall [1962] p.119; Jones [1971] pp.160,164-166; Kellett [1969] pp.298-300,325.
35. Jones [1971] p.161. For the modern counterpart of this process of forcible central-area land use change, see Edel [1969].
36. Gomme [1898] pp.68-72; Sheppard [1971] pp.110-112. For an indication of the numbers of people displaced by dock development, see Jones [1971] pp.163-164.
37. "We often fail to appreciate to the full the unique strategic importance which railway building occupied in the economic development of this period. Railways have the inestimable advantage for Capitalism of being enormously capital-absorbing; in which respect they are only surpassed by the armaments of modern warfare and scarcely equalled by modern urban building." Dobb [1963] p.296. And see Hobsbawm [1968] pp.110-113.
38. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.9.
39. For a brief chronological sketch of railway development in nineteenth-century London, see Kellett [1969] pp.268-278. Barker and Robbins [1963] contains a more detailed account.
40. Hall [1964] p.66. And see Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.163-165, 169-171; Pollins [1964] pp.35-36; Prince [1964a] pp.114-116.
41. Assuming the central area of London to be the 14,453 acre area which was covered with buildings by 1840, Kellett estimates that by 1900 railways in the central area owned 776 acres of land, that is, 5.4% of the central area. Kellett [1969] p.290.
42. Sheppard [1971] p.118.
43. In 1867, the number of members of Parliament in both houses, holding railway directorships reached its peak of 215. "In the mid-1860's 436 members with landed and 545 with industrial, mercantile and financial interests could be counted." Kellett [1969] p.74, n.45.
44. Kellett [1969] p.35. And see pp.35-43,49-52,262; Barker and Robbins [1963] p.148.
45. Kellett [1969] pp.282-283. The Royal Commission of 1846 concluded and Parliament approved that no new railway should be permitted within the 'Metropolitan Railway District' which was "bounded by Edgware Road, Marylebone Road, Euston Road, City Road, Finsbury Square, Bishopsgate, London Bridge, Borough High Street, Lambeth Road, Vauxhall Road, Vauxhall Bridge, Park Lane." Dyos [1955] p.19, n.2. As a result,

"The centre of London was encircled by a series of terminal stations unparalleled in number anywhere else in the world." Simmons [1973] p.280.

46. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.394, and see pp.391-396. This is not to say that railway company directors did not benefit by buying land in their railway's path before it was public knowledge in the hope that once Parliament had passed their Bill, they could make windfall profits by selling the land back to their company. See Kellett [1969] pp.328-329, 397-398.
47. Quoted in Dyos [1961] p.87. "Nowhere was the rise in values more tantalising than in the suburbs. Although central land values as a whole in the Victorian cities may have risen by something of the order of 75% to 100% in the thirty years after 1840, and values in the more favoured streets by three to five fold, land prices in the outer suburban districts appreciated by ten to twenty-fold over the same period." Kellett [1969] p.392.
48. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.392.
49. Quoted in Briggs [1963] p.358. And see Kellett [1969] p.250; Prince [1964a] pp.100-101;105,109; Prince [1964b] pp.126,133-134.
50. "A lengthy tunnel was to be constructed, eight-foot walls erected to conceal the trains, no advertisement boardings were to be erected, nor dwellings for re-housing the working class in Marylebone or St. John's Wood, coal yards were to be roofed in, and railway buildings to be 'reasonably ornamental' in character." Kellett [1969] p.253. The power of local residents is further evidenced by the fact that: "Residents in one neighbourhood agreed to pay five per cent of the rental value of their houses towards a campaign fund to fight the proposed railways," and "In Leinster Gardens where the [Metropolitan] line crossed the road at right angles, false fronted houses had to be built to conceal the railway's existence." Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.148,152.
51. Kellett [1969] p.299. "The City authorities persistently opposed all railways which affected their interests. It was probably due to their support for its scheme that the Metropolitan Railway obtained its original Act in 1854....Thus, although numerous schemes were proposed from time to time, no surface railway ever penetrated the Metropolitan Railway District; the Metropolitan Railway, the first section of which was opened between Paddington and Farringdon Road in 1863, followed the perimeter of this area below street level." Dyos [1955] p.19, n.3. And see Pollins [1964] p.39.
52. Spring [1971] p.27.
53. Dyos alludes to the power of estate owners *vis-a-vis* tenants in making

the best of these transactions: "It is arguable that the scale of compensation [to estate owners] was far too high, for it is probable that the huge bill for the compensation of land and property owners was a powerful reason, apart from legal complexities, why tenants were not better treated." Dyos [1955] p.94. And see pp.95-96; Kellett [1969] pp.331-334. However, tenants did resist eviction as evidenced by the fact that railway companies resorted to "such urgent methods [as] blocking streets [and] unroofing houses to get the occupants out, and reducing the inhabitants of whole working-class districts like Somers Town to the state, in Lord Shaftesbury's words, of 'people in a besieged town, running to and fro, and not knowing where to turn.'" Kellett [1969] p.325.

54. Dyos [1955] p.14; Hall [1964] pp.62-63.
55. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.334, who states, on p.326 that: "without exception, the areas which were invariably selected for demolition were populous working class districts. The thinly inhabited commercial or industrial areas were meticulously avoided."
56. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.332. And see pp.8-9,15.
57. "The real explanation of why London's poor bore the brunt of the social costs of these railway extensions cannot be given, however, solely in these terms [i.e., in terms of the power relations of the land and housing markets as I have described them]. *The truth of the matter* appears to be that during the early part of the period *the ideas* of most of the 'improvers' of the champions of the interests of the poor and of railway promoters, temporarily complemented each other....it appeared that the demolitions not only served to expunge the stain of the slums but provided the means of evacuating their inhabitants to healthier surroundings." (emphasis added) Dyos [1955] p.97. Kellett, while admitting that power relations were important, nevertheless cites 'slum ventilation' as a *cause* for the railway's location in working-class neighbourhoods. See Kellett [1969] pp.335-336.
58. Kellett [1969] p.57. A summary of evidence supporting this argument is given on pp.36-38.
59. See Kellett [1969] pp.247-249,257-262; Prince [1964a] p.115; Prince [1964b] pp.123,127,134, for more detail.
60. "The railway companies' desire to obtain access to the docks produced a maze of lines in east London, debasing the existing residential development which they traversed." Sheppard [1971] pp.8-9.
61. Dyos [1955] p.14. A fuller account is contained in Dyos [1957a].
62. Kellett [1969] pp.327-329. He cites one reason for the inaccuracy of estimates in the fact that railway promoters often bought up land before their Bill was passed and evicted the tenants, or when they

could not buy the land, they persuaded landlords to evict the tenants. Consequently, many people who were displaced did not appear on the companies' demolition statements.

63. Sheppard [1971] p.151.
64. Kellett [1969] pp.394-396;406; Pollins [1964] pp.50-51.
65. For an analysis of the development of Boston, where this system was prevalent, and its effect on transportation development and land values, see Edel and Sclar [1971] especially pp.49-70. The typical pattern was for the owner of a streetcar [tramway] company, for example, to buy a large tract of rural land in the path of his streetcar line. He would then subdivide it into residential lots and deliberately reduce the streetcar fares, even to levels at which the streetcar company incurred a loss, in order to enhance the value of the land. Clearly he was more interested in profiting from land speculation than from fares. Once all the land was sold he would virtually abandon the streetcar company, forcing the local authorities to take it over and often receiving substantial compensation, as the line had become as essential part of the city's transportation network. In my view it is important to realize that this system came about because landed interests were weak in America and, therefore, freehold ownership and land speculation was common. In other words, this system was an outcome of the power relations of American urban land markets, based on freehold tenure.
66. Quoted in Kellett [1969] p.66, and see pp.65-74,264. This blatant contradiction of the prevailing competitive market ideology was tacitly accepted as "the exception which proves the rule"! Pollins [1964] pp.31-32.
67. Dyos [1953] pp.8-9; Sheppard [1971] pp.151-153.
68. Kellett [1969] p.421.
69. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.35-36; Dyos [1954] p.70; Sheppard [1971] pp.121-122.
70. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.168,171,174; Pollins [1964] p.30.
71. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.63-64,69-98 on the development of the L.G.O.C. Rasmussen [1934] p.133.
72. For the early development of tramways, see Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.178-197. And see Pollins [1964] pp.36,43.
73. "Tramways and omnibus lines were as incompatible with the atmosphere of quiet decorum which the estate was trying to maintain as were railways. The Bedford [Estate, for example] was generally successful

- in keeping bus and tram lines off its residential streets. Olsen [1964] p.152.
74. Dyos [1961] p.69; Kellett [1969] p.366; Hobsbawm [1964] pp.7-8.
 75. Hall [1964b] pp.227-228.
 76. Quoted in Barker and Robbins [1963] p.106. And see pp.10-13,64-67; Ashworth [1954] pp.110-113; Kellett [1969] pp.311-312. This chaos was graphically portrayed in perceptive etchings by Gustave Dore, see Dore and Blanchard [1872] pp.11,22,118.
 77. Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.66-67, plates 12,25.
 78. For a detailed account of the history of the inner railway (today's Circle Line) see Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.104-118,126-135, 148-162,225-240. And see Kellett [1969] pp.316-318; Sheppard [1971] pp.139-145 for brief accounts.
 79. Technology had little to do with this decision. By the mid-1830's, railway tunnelling technology was quite advanced, and had been widely used in rural railway construction in the North. Barker and Robbins [1963] p.100.
 80. Hall [1964a] p.57. On the formation and operation of the Metropolitan Board of Works, see Briggs [1963] pp.332-335 and Sheppard [1971] pp.279-288.
 81. This claim is born out by a comparison of the plans and accompanying text of all the street improvements carried out by the Metropolitan Board of Works, as reproduced in Edwards [1898] pp.23-132. Being supportive of the Board's actions, he does not give figures for the number of people displaced by each scheme. From the 1870's onwards, he states the numbers of people rehoused under each scheme, insinuating that these figures represent the numbers displaced. His gross inaccuracy in this respect is illustrated by the fact that the Board's estimate of 1,753 people displaced for the Charing Cross-Shaftesbury Avenue scheme was revised by it to 5,497 when confronted by a rival estimate of 6,600. Jones [1971] p.169.
 82. For example, the City Corporation used street improvement as a pretext for 'poor removal.' The Farrington Street and Blackfriar areas were cleared in the mid-1830's displacing thousands of the poor. By 1861, no one had been rehoused. Under pressure, the Corporation bought an additional site for this purpose but did nothing with it for a further nine years, then resold it at a considerable profit for the building of warehouses. Only in the 1870's was some housing built and then it was occupied by clerks! Jones [1971] pp.167-168.

83. "No stronger supporting claim for a [street improvement] scheme could be made than it improved an unhealthy district." Dyos [1967] p.36. And see Dyos [1957b] passim.
84. Sheppard [1971] pp.113-116.
85. Sheppard [1971] p.114.
86. Dyos [1967] p.36.
87. Quoted in Dyos [1957b] p.264.
88. Edwards [1898] p.20.
89. Jones [1971] p.169. And see pp.166-169 of which the above paragraph is a summary.
90. Jones [1971] p.159. And see Dyos [1967] p.38; Kellett [1969] pp.330-331,33-39,342.
91. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.21. "All this meant growing apart from the common herd, with its gross manners and dull wits; it made it natural for a gentleman to want to expand his park and his privacy by removing cottages from within sight of his windows, as the laird of Cramond near Edinburgh and many others did; and for the genteel to want a separate city quarter of their own, out of sight of Lazarus and his sores." Kiernan [1972] p.85.
92. "The wealthiest parishes of London had the lowest municipal rates, and their residents fought hard to keep things that way." Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.381. A glance at the annual volumes of *London Statistics*, published by the London County Council, from 1890 onwards, is testimony to their success.
93. "In 1850, one writer in the *Quarterly Review* expressed a typical view when he said that 'Nothing perhaps has so much contributed to drive away the opulent from the dwellings of the poor as the dread of their unwholesomeness and dirt.'" Dyos [1954] pp.76-77.
94. Lees [1973] pp.418-419. "By this time [1840's], the working people were virtually segregated in their stinking enclaves, and the middle-classes demonstrated their real opinions of the industrial towns by getting as far out of them as equestrian transport made convenient." Thompson [1963] p.321.
95. Dyos [1961] p.97; Olsen [1964] p.145.
96. Dyos [1961] p.112; Kellett [1969] pp.16-17; Prince [1964a] p.107; Lees [1969] p.362.

97. Quoted in Prince [1964a] p.101. And see Dyos [1957b] p.261.
98. Prince [1964b] pp.121-125; Sheppard [1971] pp.9-10.
99. "In 1851, there were nearly a quarter of a million domestic servants working in London." Sheppard [1971] p.368, and see pp.368-373. Rasmussen [1943] pp.294-296. The social and architectural aspects of the separation and interaction between master and servants during the Edwardian age is superbly portrayed in London Weekend Television's recent serial called "Upstairs, Downstairs."
100. Engels [1872] p.56. And see Ashworth [1954] p.51; Engels [1892] pp.33-34; Dyos [1967] p.29.
101. Quoted in Engels [1892] pp.38-39.
102. "Probably the very excellence of the town planning on the great estates was indirectly responsible for aggravating the overcrowding of the poor. By insisting on high standards of construction and maintenance, by encouraging the building of first and second-rate houses rather than smaller dwellings, by prohibiting subletting and the conversion of town houses into tenements, as well as by demolishing slums and redeveloping their sites, for commercial purposes, the well-managed estates forced the lower classes to live elsewhere, on poorly managed estates or on freehold land where conditions might be even worse." Olsen [1964] p.209. And see pp.21-22; Olsen [1973] pp.339-340. Indeed, the fragmentary pattern of landownership in the East End was probably an important reason why this area became the predominant working-class residential quarter in London.
103. "Nash was not the first to recognize these [spatial class] divisions, but he was the first to make them an object of planning, to design methods of effectively separating one class of residents from another." Prince [1964a] p.100.
104. "In both Bloomsbury and Covent Garden, the Bedford estate came to much the same conclusion as had the Foundling Hospital: that slum property could be dealt with effectively only by demolition or complete rebuilding. The enforcement of leasehold covenants helped the situation somewhat, but could not in itself solve the problem of substandard housing. Improvement schemes, while not solving the problem for the poor as a whole, did at least raise the standard of decency within the boundaries of the estate." Olsen [1964] p.143. For details of this process on each estate, see pp.130-139, 185-195. The intervention of the Metropolitan Board of Works, as a government agency which handled the troublesome process of land acquisition and preparation on behalf of, and which directly subsidized, the future private developers, is surprisingly similar to the role of United States urban local government agencies in administering the Urban Renewal Program so widely used during the 1950's and 60's as a strategy to 'improve' downtown slums. And the

outcomes were much the same too: the slums were torn down, sparkling new buildings for much wealthier families or for business arose in their place, and the slum-dwellers were forced to move on to the remaining slums, while property developers made exorbitant profits. See Anderson [1965] for his analysis and not his anachronistic prescriptions which belong in the 19th century world of *laissez-faire*. For a more perceptive class analysis, see Beagle, Haber and Wellman [1971].

105. Other important reasons for the early Public Health and Housing Acts are discussed under pressure number five below. The traditional argument for the origins of the Public Health Acts has been succinctly stated by R.A. Lewis, the prominent historian of the public health movement: "The *comma bacillus* [cholera] was a social climber; excreted by some lowly sufferer in Fore Street, Lambeth or Hairbrain Court, it might penetrate the half-hearted filter defenses of the water companies to poison his betters in the broad squares of the West End." Quoted in Cherry [1972] p.37. And see Tarn [1971] p.1. Thus the threat that cholera would infect the wealthy led to the enactment of public health legislation. I have omitted this argument because I feel that it was causally peripheral--that the reasons I have given under pressures four and five were the real basis for this legislation. Cholera visitations began in, and were prominently confined to, working class districts, especially the East End. Cholera spread in two ways: by direct contact or via a contaminated water supply. The former presented few problems for the wealthy as they seldom came into direct contact with the working class. Contaminated water was more problematic. However, the problem was localized within the area served by each of the nine private water companies, and the spatial separation of social classes meant that most water companies mainly served one class. The greater economic and political power of the ruling class probably enabled its members to 'keep the water companies honest' and maintain high levels of sanitation in their neighbourhoods. Further, in the late 1840's, Dr. John Snow largely explained how cholera could be spatially diffused via a contaminated water supply. Thus the wealthy merely had to control the quality of their own water supply in order to largely exclude cholera from their neighbourhoods. Without detailed statistics as to the spatial distribution and diffusion of cholera during each epidemic (an interesting question, beyond the scope of this thesis), it is difficult to prove the above argument definitively. But it does raise doubts that the spread of cholera was the primary reason for public health legislation, especially during the age of *laissez faire*, as the new legislation represented an affront to private property and necessitated a marked increase in government intervention. For a brief history of nineteenth century public health development in London, see Sheppard [1971] pp.247-296.
106. Dyos [1955] pp.17-18.
107. Quoted in Olsen [1973] p.345.

108. Wohl [1973] p.607. "The most notorious house farmers in Clerkenwell not only sat on the vestry, but often on the sanitary committee as well." Jones [1971] p.213.
109. "Under the Nuisance Removal, Sanitary, Torrens and Cross Acts, they found themselves operating under legislation which harmed rather than helped the poor; for while the legislation enabled them to recommend and initiate the demolition of houses and the eviction of the inhabitants, or the prosecution of overcrowded tenants, they knew that the poor could not wait for, or afford, the model dwellings which were provided under the rehousing clauses of the Cross Act. Thus, the medical officers found themselves in an anomalous position--and many of them preferred inactivity to negative solutions of 'pull down and push out' which could only aggravate overcrowding." Wohl [1973] p.613. And see pp.610-618.
110. Marx [1867] p.660. It should be remembered that many street improvement ventures served similar purposes of working-class removal and land use change to higher quality residential or to commercial activities. Victoria Street, Shaftesbury Avenue and Charing Cross Road were good examples of this phenomenon. Sheppard [1971] p.47; Wohl [1968] p.199.
111. Rasmussen [1934] p.293.
112. Both are quoted in Hobsbawm [1964] p.9. And see p.8; Dyos [1967] p.34; Kellett [1969] p.293.
113. Hall [1962] p.56.
114. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.172.
115. Jones [1971] p.173; Wohl [1971] p.17; Dyos [1955] p.15.
116. Quoted in Wohl [1971] p.17.
117. Quoted in Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.xxvii,xxx.
118. Marx [1867] pp.657-658.
119. Kellett [1969] p.343.
120. Ashworth [1954] p.19. "The combined effect of these four forms of displacement was profound, and in the short run at least, disastrous. The un-housing of a large section of the working class in Central London was not accompanied by any concurrent decentralization of industry. Nor before the end of the 1870's, was cheap transportation sufficient to account for any significant easing of the pressure on the housing of central London." Jones [1971] pp.169-170. And see Wohl [1971] pp.17-19; Barker and Robbins [1963] p.xxvii.

121. In 1871, "there were enormous variations in the incidence of the poor rates, ranging from over four shillings in the pound in parts of the East End down to fourteen pence in the pound in Kensington and Hampstead, and eighteen pence in the City. Yet despite the high rates in east London the vast extent of destitution there meant that the average outdoor relief paid there was only eight pence or ninepence per head per week, much less than half the amount paid in many less poverty stricken districts. A large part of the total cost of poor relief in London was in fact being paid for by the poor themselves." Sheppard [1971] p.382.
122. "The physical separation of social classes...meant that most of the problems of town growth, which pressed hardest on the poorest sections of the community, became chronic before serious attempts were made to solve them." Dyos [1954] p.78.
123. "The slums were part of this argument for the economy of low wages, and one of their practical functions was therefore to underpin Victorian prosperity....The movements of capital in the making of the metropolis determined the social space available to its different users, and hence the relative wealth or poverty of its different districts.... the poor were quite literally starved of [public] finance." Dyos and Reeder [1973] pp.361,381. And see pp.360-363.
124. Other forms of working-class house tenure were numerically minute in relation to the 'sweated' leasehold system. Briefly, these were the following. For the 'labour aristocracy': Starr-Bowkett Building Societies---a last-ditch attempt to promote working-class home ownership, see Cleary [1965] pp.101-102,104-108,114-115; and philanthropic housing associations. For the poorest workers: the Octavia Hill system; lodging houses featuring eight hours security of tenure to one-third of a bed; the workhouse; and literal homelessness for those who were out of work and excluded from workhouses. Some of these will be further explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
125. Jones [1971] p.209.
126. Nevitt [1966] pp.21-22.
127. Subcontracting management and exploitation characterized many sectors of the nineteenth century British economy, even the large factories. See Hobsbawm [1954] pp.297-306.
128. Olsen [1964] p.31.
129. Quoted in Dyos and Reeder [1973] pp.380-381.
130. Wohl [1968] p.239.
131. Quoted in Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.380.

132. Quoted in Wohl [1968] p.240. Wohl quotes figures for the period 1880-1900. Taking wages and rents in the base year 1900 as 100, money wages in 1880 were 77 while rents were 87. Wohl [1971] p.26,n.54.
133. "Not only Agar Town but part of Somers Town were slums from the day they were first occupied." Prince [1964a] p.112. Furthermore, in those cases in which working-class accommodation was built, extensive sub-contracting was the norm and low quality environments the result.
134. Olsen [1973] p.338. On the inadequacy of bye-laws, see Olsen [1964] p.127; Sheppard [1971] p.95; Ashworth [1954] p.24.
135. Dyos [1967] p.26. And see Dyos [1961] pp.105-113; Sheppard [1971] p.94; Ashworth [1954] p.19.
136. Jones [1971] p.210-211.
137. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.105.
138. Glazier [1883] p.955.
139. "The great number of people having leasehold interests in a single house often 'causes the greatest doubt as to who is the person...to execute repairs or to look after the conditions of the premises.'" Olsen [1964] p.105. And see pp.104-106,126-127,177-178; Sheppard [1971] p.95.
140. The powerlessness of working-class tenants was recognized and exploited by the courts and justified on the basis of changes in the nature of the housing market. "Charles Harrison referred to cases in which the court of chancery refused to enforce a covenant against a particular lessee because it considered that the neighbourhood had so changed in character as to make such enforcement unreasonable." Olsen [1964] p.107.
141. The most extensive and influential work based on this view is Weber [1899]. And see Ashworth [1954] pp.7-14 who states in his opening sentence: "The most fundamental influence on the condition of towns and town life in the last century and a half has been the enormous and rapid increase in their population." And Dyos [1961] pp.53-56; Wohl [1971] pp.16-17.
142. This argument is developed in more detail in Chapter 6.
143. Lees [1973] pp.417,420-421. On the other end of the scale, Los Angeles, where freehold tenure dominates, is vastly larger in area than twentieth-century London as the tenure system has led to very low density housing and encouraged the development of automobile transportation which sustains it. For a graphic representation, in support of my argument, showing the area of Paris, London and Los Angeles in 1869 and 1969, see New York City Planning Commission [1969] p.37. In 1969, the density (people per square mile) of 'selected high density

districts' in Paris and London was 69,368 and 34,315 respectively, while it was 6,051 for the entire city of Los Angeles. Unfortunately, I have not come across commensurable figures, but even if the Paris and London densities are halved to reflect an average density of the whole area, the disparities are striking. (Such a calculation is roughly accurate according to Greater London Council [1969].)

144. Thompson [1963] pp.321-322. The tenuous connection between population pressures and slum conditions is illustrated by the fact that while the seriousness of working-class housing problems in the central area increased from the 1860's to the 1880's, as will be argued in Chapter 4, the central-area population was in fact diminishing, as evidenced by the following table taken from Weber [1899] p.463.

Population of Central Area			
Year	Aggregate	% of London	Per acre
1801	588,264	61.3	60.9
1851	1,129,599	48.0	116.9
1861	1,187,687	42.3	122.9
1871	1,155,462	35.5	119.6
1881	1,101,994	28.8	114.1
1891	1,022,951	24.3	105.9

145. Dyos [1967] pp.33-34. On the extent of overcrowding, see Jones [1971] pp.174-178. And see Mearns [1883] passim.
146. The socio-economic structure of the East End slums, and the way they trapped the working class, is masterfully portrayed by Jack London [1902]. And see Engels [1892] pp.33-39.
147. Dyos [1967] p.27.
148. I am referring to Edwin Chadwick, *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* (1842) and the *Select Committee on Sweating* (1888-90). Working-class slums were also the subject of selective Parliamentary investigation in the 1880's, with the *Select Committee on Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings' Improvement* (1881-2) and the *Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes* (1884-5). The 'sweated' leasehold system was examined by the *Select Committee on Town Holdings* (1887-8).
149. London [1902] p.220. And see Ashworth [1954] pp.54,61.
150. Ashworth [1954] p.49.
151. Marx [1867] p.660. "Lord Shaftesbury...said in 1884, as a result of nearly sixty years' experience, that however great the improvement in the condition of the poor in London had been in other respects, the overcrowding had become more serious than it ever was." Ashworth [1954] p.20. And see Wohl [1971] pp.19-20.

152. Morton [1938] p.394.
153. "The control of excretory behaviour furnished the most accessible approach on a mass basis to inculcating habits of orderliness. The sanitary reformers wanted to break man's self-indulgent unboundedness by making him learn certain ways of behaving which he would repeat every day of his existence. They determined to remove with impersonal finality the products of his body. If man could be forced to yield to interference in such a sensitive domain, he could be made to acquiesce in any kind of control; he could be made to learn many ways of binding his energy, he could be pressed into modernity....The water-closet and the sewer as bringers of order do not ensure the disappearance of crime, or laziness, or untidiness. They underscore and reinforce the restraints and controls necessary to keep an industrialized society producing and consuming." Schoenwald [1973] pp.675,683. And see the entire article.
154. Dyos [1967] pp.26-27.
155. For a definition of the sense in which I use this misunderstood word, 'determine,' see Chapter 6, note 6.

CHAPTER 4

THE HOUSING CRISIS OF THE 1880's

In the previous chapter, the overall outcomes of London's developmental process were seen to be basically functional from the point of view of the capitalist class. It was even argued that the extreme hardship which the working class had to endure as a result of these developments was a necessary, if unfortunate, aspect of this stage of capitalist economic development. Overcrowded and unsanitary working-class slums might have comprised a housing problem in the minds and consciences of the middle-stratum reformers, but it cannot be argued that these slum conditions *per se* were problematic from the point of view of the capitalist class and the socio-economic system which served their class interest. It was quite the opposite: the slums, if kept under control, were part of the foundation of their prosperity.

But societies and cities do not develop in such a smooth progression. Contradictions and conflicts, which are the nuts and bolts of the evolutionary process, eventually reach a point of climax whence continued development along traditional lines becomes highly problematic, if not impossible. London's growth in the 19th century was no exception. A crisis point was reached in the 1880's when it became obvious that the existing laws and rules which governed the process of urban development and the attitudes towards that process had to be changed in order to maintain the social stability upon which continued economic development was based.

At the heart of this crisis of London's development was the fact that the evolutionary process of the preceding fifty years increasingly frustrated the realization in the residential sphere, of a sixth pressure, which

was a central feature of the relationship between classes generally satisfied in the workplace. I am referring to the struggle, outlined in Chapter 1, by members of the 'labour aristocracy' to separate themselves from the remainder of the working class and to establish a legitimate place for themselves in capitalist society.

In this chapter I will attempt to show that this contradiction constituted the basis of the *housing crisis* in the 1880's and was qualitatively different from the everpresent *housing problems* of overcrowding, supply and demand mismatches, lack of maintenance and poor sanitation, which characterized the working-class slums of the period. These problems were variously blamed on the 'demoralized' slum dwellers, greedy absentee landlords, 'market forces,' and/or inefficient local government administrations. Few people saw them as structural outcomes of the capitalist economic system. Consequently, while they may have represented 'thorns in the side' of the system, they did not constitute a crisis. At least not until the 1880's, when the system's failure to satisfy the residential aspirations of the relatively well-organized skilled workers brought the perpetual housing problems of the working class into political focus as outcomes of the struggle between the capitalist and working classes and as such began to pose a threat to continued social stability.

In the previous chapter we saw that a large proportion of skilled workers, who comprised the 'labour aristocracy,' were forced, by the necessities of their occupations and the lack of cheap, convenient suburban transportation, to live close to their workplaces in central London. Consequently, members of this 'privileged' stratum of the working class

were forced to compete for housing in the same spatially confined central-area housing market as the rest of the working class. The pressure for accommodation constantly rose as the area available for residential use diminished under the onslaught of commercial, railway and street improvement schemes. The constantly rising rents imposed considerable hardship on the artisans and skilled workers. Though they maintained a wage differential from unskilled workers, most had to pay much higher rents for the larger 2 or 3-room flats (apartments) which were important symbols of their higher status. However, in times of depression the majority were forced to move to smaller flats or to sublet space to lower-status workers. This was especially so during the 1880's, the mid-point of the 'great depression' of the late 19th century. In consequence, an increasingly large proportion of the 'labour aristocracy' was forced to forego the prospect of living in a flat of their own and/or of renting two or more rooms. As George Godwin wrote in [1] 1859:

"not from poverty, but from sheer want of any dwelling within reach of their work; respectable artisans...have been forced into the same dwellings with some of the worst class."

Contrary to the conscience-salving beliefs of the middle-stratum public, the slums were *not* only inhabited by disreputable or dangerous elements of the working class, and the 'respectable' workers had *not* been able to escape to the suburbs. All strata of the working class were forced to live in the central-area slums. These facts were brought home by the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes in 1884-5. In the words of Anthony Wohl, [2] the Commission

"brought to light for the first time for the general public the extent of one-roomed living....[It publicised the fact that] the miserable and dangerous sanitary condition of working-class tenements was not confined to the homes of the casually employed or poorer type of labourer, but applied also to the dwellings of thousands of skilled artisans, who, despite regular employment, sober habits and adherence to the precepts of Smilesian self-help, were forced by the housing shortage to live, more often than not, in just one room in wretchedly unsanitary surroundings."

Though the wages of skilled workers rose steadily, their standard of living declined. [3] More importantly, the progressively intensified residential integration of all strata of the working class contradicted the social aspirations and expectations of the 'labour aristocracy' which were generated and largely fulfilled in the workplace. Their desire for separate neighbourhoods close to their workplaces within the central area or, at the minimum, for status differentials between themselves and the remainder of the working class (for example, two rooms instead of one, a home of their own, higher quality housing, greater security of tenure) were generally not fulfilled. Capitalist society had not accorded them the recognition and respect which they felt was due; their dreams had been shattered. The everyday experiences of members of the 'labour aristocracy' in their residential areas were out of phase with those of their workplaces.

This contradiction had been growing more apparent and widespread since the 1860's. The demolition of working-class housing during the 1870's, for street improvement and under the Torrens and Cross Acts, had exacerbated the already serious situation. But the mere lack of realization of some of the artisans' and skilled workers' aspirations could not, in and of itself, have promoted a crisis. Similar frustrations were continually experienced by the working class. What transformed the 'labour aristocracy's' housing problem

into a housing crisis was the fact that it became a concrete symbol of the broader social crisis which beset capitalist and middle-stratum London in the 1880's

Under-employment and unemployment had become endemic conditions of the inner-London labour market due to the structural decline of many central industries, outlined in Chapter 1. But the severe cyclical depression of 1884-7, occurring in the middle of the so-called 'great depression' of the late 19th century and affecting a much wider range of occupations than previous trade slumps, intensified working-class hardship to chronic proportions. [4] As a result, members of the working class, especially the skilled stratum, began to lose faith in their automatic advancement under British capitalism and became less inclined to accept their fate passively.

London's dominant class had been alarmed by the brief period of working-class unrest in connection with franchise reform during the mid-1860's. However, due to the absence of a unifying ideology among the working class, the challenge was not serious and the demonstrations petered out after the passage of the Second Reform Bill in 1867. In the words of Gareth [5] Stedman Jones:

"Parliament hastened to pass a sweeping Reform Bill which would forestall the dangers of an incipient alliance between the casual 'residuum' and the 'respectable working class.' The political crisis quickly passed and wealthy London as a whole was not slow to regain self-confidence."

Though the Trade Union Congress was formed during the 1870's in an attempt to unite the working class, the decade was essentially calm, and wealthy London remained confident.

But the political complexion of the city changed markedly in the 1880's; indeed London became the national focus of the resurgence of working-class protest which was at the heart of this transformation. The institutionalization of universal manhood suffrage in 1884 gave the working class increased political leverage on the existing parties who were anxious to capture the working-class vote. In this context, the reappearance of Socialism and various brands of 'collectivism,' which served to unite the working class behind demands for fundamental structural changes in the economy and in opposition to the dominant ideology was particularly worrisome.

The socialist movement began in the East End and was most potent from 1886-8. During these years, the resoluteness and militancy of the working class strikes and demonstrations soon exposed the real extent of propertied London's fears of this new force. [6] The socialist-led strikes of the Bryant and May Match factory workers, the gas-workers and the dockers won important victories for the working class in general and, possibly of greater importance, they showed that the thousands of unskilled workers were no longer unorganizable. These events prompted Engels to write in 1892 that he was "glad and proud" to have lived to see the revival of Socialism in the East End, a place for which he had previously held only despair. [7]

"That immense haunt of misery is no longer the stagnant pool it was six years ago. It has shaken off its torpid despair, has returned to life, and has become the home of what is called the 'New Unionism,' that is to say, of the organisation of the great mass of 'unskilled' workers."

He stressed that the most important feature of these new unions was their revolutionary character. Unlike the old unions of the skilled workers,

they were not interested in getting a better deal for their members *within* capitalist society; rather, they were after *structural changes* towards some form of Socialism and, as such, formed the *avante garde* of the labour movement.

The riots in Trafalgar Square in 1886 and 1887 displayed the vehemence of the animosities between the working class and the propertied and privileged people of London and the extent of the latter group's fears. Much of the violence of these years came from the over-reaction of the Establishment to these mass demonstrations. [8] Finally, the efforts of social reformers to paint a less sensational picture of the East End, as a mean and monotonous environment rather than a hot-bed of poverty, vice and violence, were destroyed in 1888 when the widespread publicity which was accorded the savage murders of five prostitutes in Whitechapel by 'Jack the Ripper' abruptly "thrust into the public mind an image of East London as somewhere violent and outcast, rather than monotonous and outcast." [9]

What made matters infinitely more serious for the dominant class was the spatial separation of social classes and the consequent erosion of traditional methods of social control. It was during this decade that the overcrowded and haphazardly-planned East End and the spacious and orderly West End, began to crystallize as images of the poverty and powerlessness of the urban working class in opposition to the wealth and dominance of the ruling class. As P. J. Keating has put it: [10]

"By the mid-eighties the East End of London had become as potent a symbol of urban poverty (the natural, virtually inevitable point of reference for anyone wishing to place the urban working classes) as Manchester had been of industrial conditions in the 1840's....Gone [was] the idea that the East End was merely one slum area among

many; it [was] now regarded....as a complete city in its own right; a city of poverty and meanness in the east, set against a city of wealth and culture in the west....The east-west contrast (two classes facing each other, *en masse*, across the capital city of the Empire) reflected all of these attitudes, though also much more besides."

Thus, while the East End and the West End had separate and opposite identities, they were no longer seen as two separate entities; they were parts of a whole, and the degradation of the one part came to be seen in the public consciousness as both the cause and effect of the prosperity of the other
[11]
part. In the words of Lord Salisbury:

"The housing of the poor in our great towns, especially in London, is a much more difficult and much more urgent question, for the increase of prosperity tends rather to aggravate the existing evil than to lighten it. It is, in fact, directly caused by our prosperity."

Thus, the class boundaries of capitalist society had become geographical boundaries, expressed in terms of a whole range of social and spatial differences between the two major parts of the whole. As William Glazier, an artisan put it: "the opulence and luxury of one section of the community
[12]
has been built upon the moral and social ruins of the other." The no-man's land of commercial, governmental and service activities which formed a gulf between the East End and the West End came to epitomize the gulf between labour and capital in economy and society.

In the context of the economic uncertainty and political unrest of the 1880's, the anonymous East End came to be feared by the West End Establishment. Old methods of social control, based on paternalistic, face-to-face relations between rulers and ruled, were no longer adequate or appropriate in the homogeneous working-class environment of the East End, which was "virtually bereft of any contact with authority except in the form of the

[13]
policeman or bailiff." The Poor Law was no longer adequate, either as a means of poor relief or as an instrument of social control. And the separation of classes had depersonalized and deformed charitable gifts thereby depreciating their power as methods of social control. In fact, Gareth [14]
Stedman Jones has convincingly argued that:

"At the most fundamental level, the separation of classes had led to a breakdown of social relationships and traditional methods of social control....The ensuing deformation of the gift had led some of the rich to feel that the whole traditional fabric of social control was being threatened by the metropolitan environment."

The indiscriminate alms-giving and careless poor relief which followed each outbreak of working-class protest during the mid-1880's showed that charity and other transfer payments from rich to poor had become the payment of money in fear and guilt; the prestige, subordination and obligation which these payments had previously implied and commanded were no longer valid. The seething mass of human misery which 'Outcast London' was, had been transformed in the consciousness of dominant-class London into a monster which threatened the very foundations of their dominance and prosperity. Writing in 1884, George Sims, a prominent journalist, conveyed the urgency [15]
of these fears:

"It has now got into a condition in which it cannot be left. This mighty mob of famished, diseased and filthy helots is getting dangerous, physically, morally, politically dangerous. The barriers which have kept it back are rotten and giving way, and it may do the state a mischief if it be not looked to in time. Its fevers and its filth may spread to the homes of the wealthy; its lawless armies may sally forth and give us the taste of the lesson the mob has tried to teach now and again in Paris when long years of neglect have done their work."

The overcrowded residential environment of the East End was at the basis of these fears. But it was not the fact of overcrowding itself that aroused the social anxiety of the 1880's. Viewed objectively, overcrowding was far worse in the rookeries of the 1840's than those of the 1880's, though the proportion of the working-class population living under overcrowded conditions in the centre had considerably increased. [16] The real problem was that the pressure for accommodation in the central area was forcing members of the 'labour aristocracy' and other sections of the 'respectable' working class (that is, those who were undesirous of achieving structural social change) into cohabitation with the 'destructive,' 'disreputable' or 'criminal' remainder of the working class--the 'residuum!'

As we have seen, prior to the 1880's, it was thought that the 'labour aristocracy' had been getting better off and better housed, and that there was therefore little danger that this stratum, despite the radicalism of some of its constituents, would identify with the remainder of the working class. But the proliferation of literature on working-class housing conditions in the early part of the decade revealed that unsanitary, overcrowded housing and high rents afflicted the entire working class. Set in the context of a severe economic depression and growing working-class agitation, the forced co-habitation of all strata of the working class in slum districts generated the strong fear that the entire working class might combine behind demands for structural socio-economic changes and that therefore overcrowding posed a serious threat to the continued social stability upon which capitalist prosperity was based. In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones: [17]

"While the geographical separation of rich and poor was becoming ever more complete, the poor [that is, the working class] themselves were becoming more closely crammed together regardless of status or character. In this situation, the onset of cyclical depression was particularly disturbing. For, as the depression deepened, signs of distress began to appear in the ranks of the respectable working class. 'Agitators' were already beginning to blur the distinction between the respectable working class and the 'residuum' by appealing to both under the slogan of 'relief to the unemployed.' The dangerous possibility existed that the respectable working class, under the stress of prolonged unemployment, might throw in its lot with the casual poor."

Thus, it was in the 1880's that the *perpetual housing problems of the working class* were transformed into a *housing crisis for the dominant class*, as they potentially provoked a working-class challenge to the basis of their existence. On the one hand, the frustration in the residential sphere of the artisans' and skilled workers' aspirations for separation from the rest of the working class and for recognition and respect by capitalist society combined with the high unemployment of the depression years, made these workers increasingly aware that their lot was *inextricably linked* with that of the working class as a whole, and that it was therefore *fundamentally opposed* to the interests of the capitalist class and the reward systems of capitalist society. The fulfillment of their aspirations in the workplace had created an illusion that their dreams were reality; the degradation and suffering which they were forced to undergo in their residential areas, along with the remainder of the working class, awoke them from their slumbers to an opposite reality. When the chips were down, as was the case in the 1880's, they were just plain workers; they belonged in the slums of the East End, with the rest of the working class. On the other hand, as we have already seen, the forced cohabitation of all strata of the working class in the East End raised the spectre of revolution in the minds of members of the dominant class.

Working-class residential overcrowding had evolved to a stage where it comprised a direct threat to social stability.

At the root of this qualitative shift, from housing problems to housing crisis, was the fact that the working class was increasingly becoming conscious that the housing process was an integral aspect of the overall class struggle between labour and capital, and therefore that radical changes were necessary if the quality of working-class housing was to be improved. In the words of a representative of the capitalist class, Sir J. P. Dickson-Poynder, soon to become the chairman of the London County Council's Housing of the Working Classes Committee:

[18]

"The Housing problem indeed may be said to be the sum and total of all the social and economic problems which await solution, for it provokes the vexed question of the relation between rent and wages, which easily slides into that of capital and labour."

As a result, by the mid-1880's, the housing crisis had, for the first time, become the major social question of the day. In 1883, the *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote that "the Housing of the Poor takes its place in the front rank of the political questions of the day," and the *Lancet* that "the housing of the poor is the burning question of the hour." Working-class housing problems had surfaced in the social conscience as problems in their own right, no longer submerged under the broader banner of public health or sanitation. This attitudinal change will be explored further in Chapter 5.

[19]

[20]

However, I would like to stress that this 'newly-discovered' housing crisis, and the growing sympathy for housing reform, was centred around the fear of unified working-class rebellion which the frustration of the 'labour

aristocracy's' aspirations was seen to portend, and it was only concerned with the atrocious living conditions of the working class as a whole in so far as these related to this fear. As Anthony Wohl has argued: [21]

"Mearns' pamphlet [*The Bitter Cry of Outcast London*, 1883], appearing at a time of increasing public violence thus aggravated the fear that the overcrowded rooms of the poor were breeding grounds for malcontents and revolutionaries. In an age of unemployment, of increasingly organised labour and international socialism, the political dangers of the slums could not be ignored. When Cardinal Manning asked Mearns in one of the sessions of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes if social discontent took a political form among the more educated of the slum dwellers, he was merely expressing an anxiety about revolution or socialism (and to many they were synonymous) which was widespread and which created a public sympathetic towards advocates of housing reforms."

In sum, then, the housing crisis of the 1880's was the product of the resolution of the conflicting demands to which the land and housing markets of 19th century London were subjected by the drive to accumulate capital and the residential aspirations of various classes, and it was the product of the *normal workings* of the leasehold system of tenure which had evolved to mediate these conflicting demands for space. In more general terms, the housing crisis was an outcome of the broad spectrum of social relations which were defined in the process of struggle between classes in capitalist society.

The fact that working-class housing problems had reached crisis proportions was an indication that the legal and quasi-legal structure of the leasehold system, which defined the power relations between the various participants in the land and housing markets, was no longer adequate to its task of mediating the contradictory pressures generated in the process of London's development--no longer adequate, that is, if social stability and

the status quo were to be maintained and that was imperative from the capitalist point of view. Under the old medication, the disease was killing the patient: new medications had to be developed and applied to retard the progress of the disease. The contradictions which were embedded in the leasehold system had led to its negation, new forms of tenure had to be found which might lead to more appropriate, socially acceptable outcomes, thereby dampening the threat of revolution posed by the working class and reinforcing capitalist-class control. By this, I do not mean to imply that the transformation of tenure relations was the only or the most important method of averting social revolution, but rather that the struggle for new forms of tenure and new modes of urban development was a significant part of the overall changes which the social crisis of the 1880's necessitated. [22]

In this context, it is hardly surprising that tenure relations came under the parliamentary microscope and developed into a key social question for public debate during this period. [23] Tenure relations, especially the 'sweated' leasehold system, figured prominently in the proceedings of the Select Committee on Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvements in 1881-2, and of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes in 1884-5. They were the primary focus of the Select Committee on Town Holdings which sat from 1886-1891. The Land Enquiry Committee [24] reported on urban land tenure in 1914. The many organizations and actions developed to promote or attack the leasehold system, [25] 'leasehold enfranchisement' [26] (i.e., owner occupation), public housing or 'municipal socialism,' the [27] nationalization of land and general housing reform, all had the modification of tenure relations as their common thread. Whether the proponents and opponents of these schemes were conscious of it or not, what their

haggling and political manoeuvring was about was a redefinition of the power relation between individual participants in the housing process which would lead to more socially acceptable outcomes.

The housing crisis of the 1880's was the origin of all these struggles, and it defined their direction. It was both the reason for the existence of the land and housing reform movements of the following decades, and it patterned their responses by serving as a historical and real-life reference point for their actions. As a direct result of the housing crisis, a period of experimentation ensued, a search for new and more appropriate forms of tenure. Old forms of urban development continued to occur, but they began to mesh imperceptibly, to become subsumed by the new forms of the future. These struggles were given a new urgency during the First World War, and they culminated in the early 1920's with the institutionalization of home-ownership for the middle stratum and council housing for the working class--new forms of tenure which led to new forms of urban development...and to new problems. But that is altogether another story!

Right now, we must proceed to develop the third thread of this thesis. It concerns the theories which were developed to understand and explain the housing problems of the working class and to propose solutions to them. And it examines the ideological transformation which the housing crisis of the 1880's necessitated and generated.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.163.
2. Wohl [1971] n.29, p.22. Marx wrote in 1867 that: "the better-off part of the working-class, together with the small shopkeepers and other elements of the lower middle class, falls in London more and more under the curse of these vile conditions of dwelling, in proportion as 'improvements,' and with them the demolition of old streets and houses, advance, as factories and the afflux of human beings grow in the metropolis and finally as house rents rise with the ground-rents." Marx [1867] p.659.
3. For a useful, brief discussion of the famous 'standard of living debate,' see Thompson [1963] pp.209-212.
4. Jones [1971] pp.281-282; Morton [1938] pp.447-448.
5. Jones [1971] p.242. And see Morton [1938] pp.215-217.
6. This point is argued in more detail in Jones [1971] pp.290-296. And see Morton [1938] pp.447-450; Hobsbawm [1968] pp.165,170; Briggs [1963] pp.339-340. The tension of the period must have been similar to that which was experienced in the United States during the long hot summers of the late 1960's when black riots erupted in the central area ghettos of major cities. In both instances, the oppressed groups were no longer prepared to accept their fates passively, but an objective revolutionary threat never developed as the representatives of the dominant class stepped in with policies which successfully diffused the discontent. See Hobsbawm [1973] p.232.
7. Engels [1892] pp.370-371.
8. Keating [1973] p.593.
9. Keating [1973] p.595.
10. Keating [1973] pp.585,590,593. And see Briggs [1963] pp.325-326.
11. Salisbury [1883] p.115.
12. Glazier [1884] p.954. And see Briggs [1963] pp.327,358.
13. Jones [1971] p.14.
14. Jones [1971] pp.251,261. And see pp.247-252 for a more detailed argument as to why and how this "deformation of the gift" had occurred.
15. Quoted in Jones [1971] pp.224-225.

16. Jones [1971] p.219.
17. Jones [1971] pp.284-285. In the words of a housing reformer of the day: "There exists at the present moment, in the heart of the wealthiest city in the world, a large number of human beings whose lives from birth to death are, and must be, a long series of misery, hopelessness, and immorality; a mass of men and women who from the nature of their surroundings, both physical and moral, are inevitably committed to an existence of crime and disorder from which, under our present arrangements, there is no possibility of their ever emerging, and which, terrible in itself constitutes a grave danger to the community." Arnold-Foster [1883] p.941.
18. Quoted from *The Times*, 26 November 1883, in Counter Information Services [1972] p.1.
19. Quoted in Wohl [1970] n.61, and see p.9.
20. Quoted in Wohl [1968] p.189, n.4.
21. Wohl [1968] p.224. And see Jones [1971] p.285.
22. See Wohl [1968] pp.211,227; Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.381.
23. These issues are analysed in more detail in Ho[1952] Chapter V, "The State and Urban Land, 1873-1905."
24. *The Land...*[1914] of which part III contains a good summary of the findings of the Select Committee on Town Holdings.
25. In 1890, *The Times* (!) published a verbose diatribe against the leasehold system and the big estates of London. These were put together in the form of a book: Banfield [1890]. Lazarus [1892] is another example of the attacks against the leasehold system.
26. The struggles surrounding leasehold enfranchisement are well documented by Reeder [1961].
27. Henry George, whose book *Poverty and Progress* was published in 1884 is the most famous, though not the only, proponent of land nationalization during the period.

CHAPTER 5

IDEOLOGY AND WORKING-CLASS HOUSING PROBLEMS

Palliatives for 19th century London's working-class housing problems were not explicitly dealt with in the previous chapters, as these made an insignificant impact on the social and spatial geography of the city. However, these attempts to mitigate the problems offer important lessons for present-day practice in relation to contemporary housing problems. Consequently, this chapter will focus on official and philanthropic definitions of the nature of working-class housing problems from the 1830's to the 1880's, on the theories or assumptions upon which these problem definitions were based, and on the consequent proposals for the solution or mitigation of the problems. The purpose is not to delve into the details of the application of each approach: these are peripheral to the main argument and have been well covered by other writers. [1] Furthermore, their overall effect--that they did not solve or even mitigate working-class housing problems but rather reinforced the developmental processes described in the previous two chapters and thereby further exacerbated the working-class predicament--which is important to my argument, is obvious and incontrovertible. Instead, I will explore certain overriding, unifying features of each approach which have received far less attention: namely, the material and especially the ideological functions of approaching housing problems as they did.

I will attempt to show that status-quo maintenance was the main thrust of each approach to working-class housing problems, either consciously or, more often than not, unconsciously. By viewing working-class housing problems as essentially separable from the social, economic and political

structure of society, and by uncritically acquiescing to the prevailing ideology of 19th century British capitalism, these approaches offered problem definitions, theories and policies which merely extended this ideology into the housing field. As a result, housing reformers served the changing needs of the capitalist system, as opposed to the needs of the working class who lacked adequate housing and whom they purported to serve. In other words, each approach was but an aspect of the prevailing ideological paradigm [2] by means of which the dominant class understood and explained working-class housing problems. Furthermore, this paradigm served the important functions of reinforcing certain aspects of London's development, described in the previous chapters, and of legitimating the oppression and hardship which was a necessary, if unfortunate, part of this developmental process. But the crisis of the 1880's was as much a material crisis as it was an ideological one. The paradigm was no longer adequate as a device for maintaining the status quo. It had to change if it was to continue performing its reinforcing and legitimation functions. And change it did, as we shall see.

In the final chapter of this thesis I will argue that similar ideological processes are prevalent today. Consequently, this argument is very relevant to the role of modern city planners and housing policy-makers who, like their predecessors, are the people charged with performing these status quo maintenance functions in relation to housing and urban development. I do not mean to imply a conscious conspiracy on their part. Most of these professionals are unaware of performing this function; they go about their work in the sincere conviction that their actions will alleviate housing and other urban problems. But few pause to reflect on the paradigm through which they view the problems. And this paradigm is the force which

constrains them in the direction of status quo maintenance and the consequent ^[3] *perpetuation*, not solution, of housing problems in one form or another.

The aim of this thread of the thesis is to make city planners and housing policy makers aware of the pitfalls of uncritically accepting an ideological paradigm.

Demoralization

One canon of classical political economy dominated the ideological climate of Britain during the period under consideration. This was the firm belief in the efficacy of an idealized notion of freely competitive, self-regulating markets, as a mode of organizing the economic functions of society. *Laissez faire* reigned supreme. According to the Ricardian economic doctrine, ^[4] the interference of government, or organized collectivities such as unions, in the economy, particularly the labour and essential-commodity markets, was at best pointless and at worst counterproductive, in both an economic and a humanitarian sense. The less government intervened in the economy, the better.

Government intervention in economy and society had played a vital role in the previous era of capitalism. During this phase, which Karl Marx characterized as a period of "primitive accumulation," a high level of government involvement in the economy was necessary in order to separate the actual producers from the means of production and subsistence and to transform these into capital, under the control of a small capitalist class, and ^[5] the actual producers into wage-earners. In other words, government intervention was vital to promote capital accumulation in the infancy of capitalism. At the same time, social policy was shaped by the essentially feudal

assumption that "government had a duty to maintain a stable society in which every man had a right to live in the (generally low) station to which the Almighty had called him." [6] But, by the early 19th century, industrial capitalism had reached a stage where it could stand on its own two feet. The capitalist class had achieved sufficient economic power to accumulate capital without the assistance of government legislation. Indeed, most existing forms of government interference had become hindrances--they contradicted their original purpose of promoting capital accumulation--and therefore had to be [7] eliminated. Thus the *laissez faire* ideology, which came closest to perfection in the 1850's, evolved to serve the interests of the increasingly dominant capitalist class.

Total government abstention from economic and social affairs was, and is, a contradiction in terms. The mere existence of government, charged with public expenditures, currency regulation and the protection and administration of a certain structure of laws must influence economic and social life to some extent. Thus, the practical application of the idealized notion of *laissez faire* was really more concerned with the *character* of government intervention, and not the fact of it. And the role of government, according to classical political economy, was to create and maintain the best conditions for capitalism, under which the process of capital accumulation, [8] then regarded as basically self-regulating, could flourish. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the most important function of the state seldom came under fire in the public debate surrounding the institutionalization of 'practical *laissez faire*.' This function was the maintenance and fine-tuning [9] of capitalist property relations, which lay down the rules of

the capitalist economic system, and the maintenance of social stability in terms of these property relations. In most of the discussions regarding the abolition of old legislation or the introduction of new laws, this function of the state was not subject to question--indeed, it formed a datum against which the advisability of existing and proposed laws were judged. The state's role as guardian of capitalist property relations, that is, of private property and the basic socio-economic institutions [10] which defined people's places in the economy and society, was not challenged.

There were instances, however, in which more direct government intervention into the economy was called for and/or achieved. In these cases, the *laissez faire* doctrine was selectively upheld or compromised in favour of the dominant class and to the detriment of the working class. Indeed, Lord Salisbury alluded to this state of affairs when in 1883 he wrote: "Laissez faire is an admirable doctrine; but it must be applied on both sides." [11] A detailed analysis of 19th century economic and social policy in these terms is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, two examples, which directly affected London's development and its working-class housing problems, will be instructive in gaining an understanding of the prevailing ideological paradigm in terms of which housing problems were understood.

[12]
The development of London's railway network provides an example of how *laissez faire* ideology was severely compromised in the interests of the dominant class as a whole. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, railway development was vital to the expansion of capital accumulation, and it necessitated a high level of government intervention, both for its very

realization, and subsequently, for its rational organization. Without compulsory purchase powers, it is doubtful that many railway companies would have been able to acquire the necessary land; and without some government control over the placement of lines and termini, the overall network would have been chaotic, if not counterproductive. In these matters the State essentially acted as an arbitrator between the various sectors of the dominant class--in particular, the landed aristocracy, the railway promoters and the big capitalists. It did not give railway companies a free hand to go about their operations, which were so important to the capitalists in general, nor did it outrightly reject the challenge to existing property relations, and to the power of the landed aristocrats, which compulsory purchase posed. Instead, the state took somewhat of a middle road by facilitating relatively organized railway development, which enhanced the potential for capital accumulation, in ways which respected the power of the landowners, by strict regulation and by granting high levels of compensation, regardless of the devastating effects of the schemes on the working class. Thus, in this struggle to improve the economic efficiency of the city, the laws defining property relations in the land market were slightly modified, usually to the detriment of the working class, and government control over private economic activity was increased; but the changes did not seriously threaten the fundamental basis of these property relations, namely private property and market determination of compensation to landowners. These compromises altered the relative power of, and had direct economic consequences for, certain social groups, but they essentially reflected the subservience of government to economy.

On the other hand, the *laissez faire* dogma was usually upheld in reaction to demands for governmental or philanthropic intervention into the housing market to provide adequate accommodation for all members of the working class. Gareth Stedman Jones has succinctly labelled the dominant ideological paradigm which shaped official and philanthropic responses to working-class housing problems up to the 1880's, with the word "demoralization."^[13] This paradigm was a relatively faithful extension of the principles of *laissez faire* into the field of housing. According to this theory, the basis of most working-class housing problems was moral, not structural. Slums were caused by their demoralized inhabitants who had failed to internalize and act upon socially-accepted capitalist values, such as disciplined labour, thrift, self help and temperance.^[14] The structural characteristics of the labour and housing markets and of the 'sweated' leasehold system, which I have argued trapped the working class in the centre and were the causes of slums, were seen by contemporary reformers as the outcomes of working-class demoralization. It was assumed that the working class had effective control over the quality of their living environment. Thus the social and environmental evils of the slums were attributed to the personal psychological inadequacies of the victims, rather than to circumstances beyond their control. It was even argued the working-class poor *chose* to live in the congested, unsanitary slums of inner London because they preferred to spend their wages unwisely, on drinking or gambling instead of better housing, or because they shrewdly migrated to these areas to benefit from charitable handouts rather than subject themselves to painful labour.^[15] In this context, it is understandable that public health problems in slum districts, being more difficult to blame convincingly on individual slum

dwellers and therefore more difficult to explain within the demoralization paradigm, were seen to be more legitimate and urgent areas of public concern than housing problems--that the exterior environment was seen to be more important than the interior.

Furthermore, seen through the distorting lens of the demoralization paradigm it was inevitable for housing reformers to argue that the only practical solution to working-class housing problems lay in educating the workers to inculcate the canons of capitalist morality, to learn the value of hard work, careful spending, thrift and self help. As Samuel Smiles [16] put it in his celebrated book, *Self Help* (1859):

"No Laws, however stringent, can make the idle industrious, the thriftless provident, or the drunken sober. Such reforms can only be effected by means of individual action, economy and self denial, by better habits, rather than by greater rights."

There was little to be gained by the application of charitable or state aid to better house the working class. This would merely lead to an automatic rise in rents or fall in wages and would encourage mendicancy and further demoralization thereby exacerbating the problems rather than solving them. Indeed, indiscriminate public and private alms-giving was seen as an important cause of demoralization in the first place. [17] What this amounted to was an argument that the state or the charities had no right to interfere with the essentially unproblematic operation of markets in essential commodities, such as housing, as this would subvert the effective operation of the land and labour markets thereby diminishing the rate of capital accumulation. Where such intervention was deemed to be absolutely necessary, usually because of the fear of working-class insurrection, it should be accomplished

in ways which did not threaten the operation of these basic socio-economic institutions. Indeed, it should operate *according to the rules of these institutions*; in particular, it should produce a 'fair' return to the capital invested, not 'give the workers something for nothing,' and it should be permissive rather than mandatory. For example, Octavia Hill, one of the [18] foremost housing reformers of the day, told the 1882 Select Committee:

"It is far better to prove that you can provide a tolerable tenement which will pay, than a perfect one which will not....Give him by all means as much as you can for his money, but do not house him by charity, or you will house few but him, and discourage instead of stimulating others to build for the poor."

And in 1883, she wrote that her approach, which is analysed in the following [19] section of this chapter, did not

"...contemplate for a moment the disastrous policy of attempting to supply by the aid of the community a necessary of life (such as lodging is) for the working classes....Let working people fit themselves for better wages....never let them accept a rate in aid of wages, whether in the form of houses, or of anything else."

Though the attitude of wealthy London to chronic poverty changed during the 1870's, from one which saw poverty as the inevitable lot of the working class to a view that poverty only affected the unregenerate 'residuum' and would be eradicated by progress, demoralization was consistently evoked to explain why certain individuals and not others were poor or lived in slums. In fact, their acceptance of the demoralization thesis increased during the early 1870's due to the persistence of poverty and slums in the growing [20] prosperity and stability of the period.

In sum, then, under the demoralization paradigm which dominated the housing reform movement of the day, the victim was blamed for the housing

problems which he/she suffered. If environment played a part in creating housing problems, then it was a decidedly minor one. The paradigm fundamentally upheld the efficacy of capitalist market institutions, which I have argued were the real cause of working-class housing problems. The basically wrong assumption that the working class was in a position to control the quality of its residential environment led to 'solutions' which prescribed self-help and education. Where public or private aid was deemed unavoidable, an adequate return on the money invested was imperative as charity generated further demoralization as it ran counter to the precepts of the immutable market institutions.

The considerable ideological power of the demoralization paradigm of working-class housing problems needs to be emphasized. It was like a filter through which housing reformers and policy-makers saw the reality of working-class housing problems. Its action was similar to that of a coloured filter through which a beam of white light is passed. If the filter is blue, then only blue light passes through it; the other six colours (wavelengths) of the spectrum are absorbed by the filter. Change the filter to a red one and only the red light passes through it. Thus the beam of white light, representing reality in this metaphor, can seem radically different depending through which colour filter (the paradigm) it is viewed. Furthermore, the filtering effect of the paradigm coloured not only the theoretical explanation and policy proposals, but the definition of the problems themselves. The notion that the definition of the problem was, or can be, objectively true, and was therefore indisputable, could only be upheld when viewed through the paradigmatic filter. The imposition of an alternative paradigm, as is the

case in this chapter, rapidly exposes the myth of such objectivity--the biased, subjective dimension of the demoralization thesis becomes obvious.

As we shall see in the following section, the demoralization paradigm was an appropriate device for maintaining the status quo in relation to the housing plight of the working class. By covering up the structural causes of slums, it supported the interests of the dominant class which benefited directly or indirectly, from the impoverishment of the working class, for whom the situation worsened. Thus, this differential application of the *laissez faire* ideology in matters of public policy, consistently to the detriment of the working class, was a clear example of the subservience of the state to basic socio-economic institutions of the capitalist system, and to the dominant class whose interests the system served. Far from improving the lot of the working class, the demoralization paradigm, by blaming structural contradictions on the psychological inadequacies of the victims, served the purpose of legitimating working-class suffering and exonerating the system which caused it.

The Five Main Approaches

Attempts to improve working class housing conditions from the 1830's to the 1880's took five main forms: street clearance, sanitary regulation and slum clearance were the official responses; model dwellings and the Octavia Hill system were the 'philanthropic' responses. Each of the approaches adhered to the laws of classical political economy as embodied in the demoralization paradigm, but in varying degrees.

Other proposals were made, and implemented, but on such a small scale that they made an insignificant impression on working-class housing problems

during this period. Workmen's fares were advocated as a solution to central-area congestion as early as 1846. They were increasingly provided from the mid-1860's onwards, but their use by the working class, as a means of escape to more spacious suburbs, remained negligible until the 1880's, for reasons [21] previously cited. New towns or ideal communities had an even older

history but only began to make an impact towards the turn of the 19th century. [22] Starr-Bowkett building societies, which were established in the

1860's in an attempt to extend homeownership to the working class by providing low-repayment, interest-free loans to the full value of a property, were popular but hardly made an impression on the housing problem and petered out in the 1890's. [23]

Thus, the main thrust, which the five approaches represented, was directed towards the amelioration of slum conditions in the central area. We may now consider each approach in chronological order.

Street Clearance

Street clearance, or street 'improvement' as it was condescendingly known, was the earliest attempt to remove central-area slums. It was aimed at the relatively self-contained, crowded clusters of mean streets and delapidated tenements, called 'rookeries,' which conjured up images as dens of crime and immorality in the dominant-class mind. The slum problem was defined in terms of the isolation of slum dwellers from the watchful eye and moral behaviour of the 'respectable' sections of society, and, obversely, in terms of the moral contamination of honest members of the working class by the criminals and beggars who infested the rookeries. This inevitably led to mass demoralization which was responsible for the formation of unsanitary slums. This view was based on the widely-held beliefs that crime and

demoralized behaviour were a function of inadequate social and spatial environments, which were isolated from the 'public gaze,' and, in turn, that demoralized people caused slums. In the words of Octavia Hill before the [24] 1882 Select Committee:

"A great deal of the degradation of these courts is because no public opinion reaches them; if you hear anybody talk about a cul de sac, and contrast it with any place that is a thoroughfare, you feel at once that it is the public opinion that affects the character of a court more than police or anything else."

The circuitous and self-fulfilling nature of this theory is obvious. Given this way of defining and understanding the problem, the demolition of slums to make way for new thoroughfares and to expose them to the 'public gaze,' was an equally obvious solution, which was implemented with a vengeance, as we have seen in Chapter 3. As Percy Edwards put the official line in his [25] book on 19th century London's street improvements: .

"The Select Committee [on London] of 1838...called attention in its report to the fact that there were districts in London through which no great thoroughfares passed, and which were wholly occupied by a dense population composed of the lowest class of persons who being entirely secluded from the observation and influence of better educated neighbours, exhibited a state of moral degradation deeply to be deplored. It was suggested that this lamentable state of affairs would be remedied whenever the great streams of public intercourse could be made to pass through the districts in question. It was also justly contended that the moral condition of these poorer occupants would necessarily be improved by communication with more respectable inhabitants, and that the introduction at the same time of improved habits and a freer circulation of air would tend materially to extirpate those prevalent diseases which not only ravaged the poorer districts in question, but were also dangerous to the adjacent localities."

It soon became clear that street clearance substantially increased overcrowding and rents, and generated new slum districts elsewhere, rather than

clearing away the slums. For example, William Farr stated in 1841:

"You take down the dwellings of the poor, build houses in their places for which only the middle classes can afford to pay the rent, and thus by diminishing the amount of cheap house accommodation, increase the rents and aggravate the evil you attempt to cure."

However, in spite of this knowledge, no provisions were made for rehousing the displaced until 1877. The Metropolitan Board of Works, which was responsible for most of London's street clearances, persisted in the patently false belief that the displaced working class dispersed into the suburbs. When, in 1877, the Board was forced to find alternative accommodation for those evicted, it resented the order, arguing that rehousing was uneconomical and impractical and that in any case the displaced preferred cash compensation. It generally did everything in its power to evade or lessen its rehousing responsibilities. The Board was far more interested in traffic efficiency and increased rateable value. [27] The housing of the working class was left to the operation of the working-class housing market, which as we have seen was the structural cause of slum formation.

The connection between street clearance and the drive to enhance London's potential as a setting for capital accumulation by improving the efficiency of its street system, is obvious. It has been argued that the power relations of the land and housing markets were such that the new thoroughfares had to be located in working-class districts. There was an urgent need to alleviate the dominant-class conscience by making the wholesale destruction and displacement, and the resultant hardship, seem legitimate in their eyes. And the fact that the area did *look better from the new streets* made it seem to their generally superficial gaze that the street clearance

approach was viable, and therefore justifiable. Furthermore, under the demoralization paradigm "the absence of state intervention could be justified not only on grounds of present expediency, but on those of the ultimate welfare of the very classes who appeared to be most threatened" [28] by street and railway clearance schemes. There was a unity between the ideas of housing reformers and the expansionary needs of London's economy. In view of all this, it is understandable why the fallacy of street clearance as a solution to working-class housing problems prompted Engels to write in 1872: [29]

"In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of settling the housing question after *its* fashion--that is to say, of settling it in such a way that the solution continually poses the question anew. This method is called 'Hausmann.' By the term '*Hausmann*' I do not mean merely the specifically Bonapartist manner of the Parisian Hausmann....I mean the practice, which has now become general, of making breaches in the working-class quarters of our big cities...the most scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self glorification by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but--they appear again at once somewhere else, and often in the immediate neighbourhood."

Model Dwellings

The construction of 'model dwellings' was the earliest private philanthropic response to the problem of housing the poor. The model dwelling societies saw the slum problem as one of badly planned, designed, built and/or managed housing which perpetuated demoralization, rather than as a problem of overcrowding *per se*. They argued that this was caused by the fact that commercial builders and landlords felt that well-built and managed housing for the working class would not produce an adequate return to the invested capital, and therefore they had no incentive to provide decent accommodation. The model dwelling societies also assumed that good, well-managed housing

improved the occupants by raising their morale and giving them an incentive
[30] to better themselves. Thus, their solution was to set examples for private enterprize, to show that adequate and sanitary high-density working-class housing was practical and compatible with a fair return on capital and that, in the words of the Earl of Shaftsbury, "the moral were almost equal
[31] to the physical benefits." For example, the earliest model dwelling society--the Metropolitan Association for Improving the Dwellings of the
[32] Industrious Classes--resolved at its inauguration in 1841:

"That an association be formed for the purpose of providing the labouring man with an increase of the comforts and conveniences of life, with full compensation to the capitalist."

The maintenance of an exemplary posture was paramount; there was never any question of ousting commercial builders and landlords from their rightful place as housers of the working class. There was also never any question of subsidizing the working class by providing housing at such low cost that it did not produce a fair return, thereby representing a dysfunctional rate-in-aid of wages. This 'five-per-cent philanthropy' was only "philanthropic in the sense of ensuring certain minimum standards and of not raising rents to
[33] the maximum which market conditions permitted."

[34] Model dwelling companies were usually unable to provide decent accommodation at rents within the range of the poorer segments of the working class for whom they were supposed to provide. This was due to the fact that they were almost as much constrained by the structure of the
[35] housing market as were commercial builders. Their rents had to rise if they were to maintain their profitability under the pressure of the rising

prices of land and building materials. Except for the Peabody Trust, only the better-off skilled workers could afford to rent model dwellings. Besides the high rents, stringent regulations demanding regular advance-payment of rent, prohibiting sub-letting and controlling the usage of flats, put model dwellings (including Peabody) beyond the scope of the bulk of the working class. And many of those who could afford to live in model dwellings understandably preferred to remain in overcrowded commercial housing than to suffer the degradation of the paternalistic supervision and hostile architecture of most model dwelling companies. In the words of John Tarn, the
[36]
model dwellings

"...were designed as isolated buildings, railed off from the surrounding streets, with gated entrances, locked at nights....There was a resident superintendent responsible for the general maintenance of the estate and to ensure that the various rules were observed. Peabody tenants were expected to be respectable, but there were many who preferred the easy ways of the slums outside to the restriction upon life inside."

Consequently, these companies only catered for a small proportion of the
[37]
working class who were relatively well paid and regularly employed, and after the 1860's this became a matter of policy, justified on grounds of practicality and profitability. The poorer workers were merely displaced into surrounding areas by model dwelling company demolitions, thereby exacerbating overcrowding.

Thus, the most important contribution of the model-dwelling approach to working-class housing problems lay not in their solution, but rather in the fact that their well-publicized efforts salved the public conscience. "Something was being done, and the fact that the full extent of their efforts
[38]
only touched the fringe of the problem passed largely unnoticed."

By making it seem as though the problems were temporary malfunctions of their way to solution, while reinforcing the structural forces which perpetuated them, the model dwelling companies inadvertently served the purpose of legitimating the continued existence of working-class housing problems, at least until the crisis of the 1880's. Furthermore, model dwellings were an effective means of extending dominant-class control over the working class. Not only were they controlled in their workplaces but in their homes as well. Thus, it was not surprising that propertied London heaped praise on the paternalistic management of these model dwellings. In the words of a surveyor for one of the large landed estates: [39]

"It is found that the working classes can be better housed in large blocks of buildings where they can be brought together, and be under control and care, and management, and looked after. The very essence of it is their being looked after, and cared for, which secures for them the better dwellings."

Sanitary Regulation

Sanitary regulation was the second official response to the housing problems of the working class, prominent from the mid-century until 1875. [40] This legislation, which was a composite of the early Housing (Shaftesbury and Torrens Acts), Nuisance Removal and Sanitary legislation, has largely been dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4; only a brief treatment is necessary here. Implicit in this legislation was the view that the demoralization-slum-formation cycle could be reversed, or at least checked by regulating overcrowding and the sanitary condition of individual houses, on the assumption that environmental improvement would inculcate moral behaviour among slum dwellers. Most of these laws gave the police or the vestries powers to inspect houses and abate overcrowding. The Torrens Act of 1868 was the most radical. The

original terms of the bill not only empowered the vestries to demolish unsanitary property upon the recommendation of medical officers, but also to rehouse those displaced--a significant departure from the prevailing trend. Even more significant was the fact that this rehousing provision was eliminated in the bill's passage through the House of Lords--it was before its time. The compensation clauses were also removed.

Thus, the act which was eventually passed was purely destructive. It became a device for 'shovelling out the poor'^[41] and created more overcrowding than it removed. Its disastrous effects were not the result of the ineffectiveness or obstructiveness of the local vestries, though this exacerbated the situation, but rather of the structure of the legislation, the strict enforcement of which would have made the crisis of the 1880's much more severe than it actually was. Indeed, many compassionate medical officers refused to apply the act for this very reason. In consequence, as I have already argued, the most significant function of this legislation was the provision of legal instruments which facilitated central-area land use changes from residential to commercial, and the homogenization of more attractive neighbourhoods by the removal of the undesirable poor. And it helped to legitimate these socially oppressive actions by making it seem as though the solution of working-class housing problems were the sole purpose of the legislation.

The Octavia Hill System

Octavia Hill's system of property management was the second major philanthropic approach to the housing problem. Begun in 1864, it was almost universally believed to be an effective panacea, at least until the inquiries

[42] of the mid-1880's. Octavia Hill was the most faithful adherent to the demoralization paradigm. She placed the blame for working-class housing problems squarely on the demoralized character of the victims. In the words of Anthony S. Wohl, she believed: "that character was, even more than environment and certainly more than economic and social factors, responsible for poverty, uncleanness and overcrowding....it was the pig that was blamed for the sty and not the sty the pig." [43] Indeed, she argued that model dwellings were pointless if the demoralized character of their inhabitants [44] was not improved:

"Supposing we could so arrange all outward things as to re-house them, the people themselves are not fit to be so moved, *and can only very gradually become so*....for in the long run it will be found...that, without training these poorest people, no improvement in their houses will be of much avail."

Her solution was to take over the management of existing slum dwellings [45] and to train the inhabitants in energy, punctuality, thrift and self-help. This task was entrusted to the landlords or to her corps of lady rent collectors. Her aim was to show that even the housing of the very poor could be made to pay if they could be made to live according to *bourgeois* morals. Rents, which were calculated on the five-per-cent philanthropy principle, had to be paid punctually; arrears were punished by eviction. If tenants were thrifty and obeyed the rules, they were rewarded by having some money spent on improvement. Eventually they were encouraged to expand to two rooms, and pay higher rents of course. Thus, the improvement of the buildings would follow the moral improvement of their inhabitants, which the rent collectors made it their business to supervise.

Though Octavia Hill's scheme was the only one in this era which reached the poorer segments of the working class, it is doubtful that its impact was widespread; "that her scheme only worked successfully in the case of a specially hand-picked stratum of the London poor." [46] The incessant fluctuations and low wages in the casual labour market made thrift and punctuality impossible--irrespective of character. But the scheme was important in two ways. It was a means of directly controlling and socializing workers who had not yet inculcated capitalist values and behavioural norms and who were never employed long enough by the same employer to have this function performed in the workplace. For instance, one commentator praised an application of her scheme in 1875 on the grounds that: [47]

"No pauperizing fallacies destructive to their self-respect were tolerated; no rent allowed to run unpaid even for a week....how by degrees, the little community became laborious and thrifty, where they had been idle and thriftless, orderly and docile where they had been violent and outrageous."

This function became less necessary after the 1880's as the structure of the labour market began to change and more regular employment became available. Furthermore, the scheme helped to alleviate the dominant-class conscience by directly involving some of its members in the attempt to improve working-class housing. Something was being done, and they were doing it.

Slum Clearance

Finally, slum clearance was the third official response to working-class housing problems, predominating after the passage of the Artisans' Dwelling (Cross) Act in 1875. By the early 1870's it was beginning to be realized that the existing palliatives were not proving adequate to the task. However, the

Cross Act was not a radical departure from the established approaches, but rather a more systematic restatement of them. This contradictory response becomes understandable in the light of a nuance which became popular in the interpretation of the working-class housing problems.

Under this approach, the crux of these housing problems lay in the existence of vast areas of substandard dwellings, which formed an obstacle [48] to the erection of better housing, and not in the insufficiency of houses. The poor were seen to be unable or unwilling to pay the increased rents which new or more spacious, accommodation would necessitate. Since slum dwellings continued to yield handsome profits to landlords, there was no incentive for improvement or new construction. Thus, the solution was to give the Metropolitan Board of Works and the City Corporation compulsory purchase powers and to charge them with the tasks of acquiring slum property, compensating the owners, demolishing it and selling it to private or 'philanthropic' developers on condition that they erect working-class housing on the sites. [49] There was never any intention of state subsidies, either in the form of selling the cleared land at reduced cost, or by the Board doing the rebuilding itself. Under the demoralization paradigm, slum clearance had to pay or else a threat to private enterprise might be involved. Five-per-cent philanthropy had to be upheld. The influential Charity Organization Society, whose political pressure was largely responsible for the Cross Act, [50] stated in 1873:

"The destructive part of the duty of the authorities is of more importance, if possible, than the constructive; the first and more essential step is to get rid of the existing haunts of moral and physical degradation and the next is to watch carefully over constructing and reconstruction leaving however, the initiation of these usually to the law

of supply and demand....Philanthropic agency in building dwellings for the poor, means the supply of one of the chief necessities, viz. lodging, below its market value. Were such a practice to be extensively or indiscriminately sanctioned, not only would the profits of commercial investment be impaired, but the principle of self dependence would be attacked, habits of self-indulgence would be encouraged, and even the wages of unskilled labour might be reduced."

One theoretical assumption, a new addition to the accepted wisdom on how to deal with working-class housing problems, seemed to justify the slum clearance approach in the minds of contemporary reformers, even though this approach hardly differed from the existing palliatives which were making matters worse. It was known as the 'levelling up' theory. [51] According to this theory, better-off workers would move into the more expensive new housing erected on the cleared land, and the displaced poor would occupy the houses that they had vacated, which were assumed to be in better condition than the demolished housing. In this way, the physical condition of the housing stock would gradually improve, and with it, the moral condition of the inhabitants. But the theory was untenable because its assumptions were wrong. [52] It assumed that better-paid workers would indeed move into the newly-constructed housing, or at least migrate to the suburbs; that the central-area working-class population would remain almost constant; and that a unified housing market existed, with housing quality being a function of the physical condition of the housing stock and independent of the social and economic relations between landlord and tenant.

However, significant working-class suburban migration did not occur until the late 1880's. In any case, as we have seen, there were powerful forces which constrained much of the working class in the centre and made suburbanization unrealistic for them. Furthermore, central London was a

magnet which attracted multitudes of workers, especially casual workers. As has been shown, the pressure of this vast population increase was made worse by the diminishing supply of central land caused by railway, street and commercial development. But even if the artisans had vacated their houses for the poor, and the central population remained static, it is doubtful that much improvement would have resulted because the third crucial assumption was false. If the argument stated in Chapter 3 is correct--that the degrading, unsanitary and overcrowded condition of central working-class housing was the result of the social relations between landlord and tenant defined by the 'sweated' leasehold system and conditioned by the structural characteristics of the working-class housing market--then there is no reason to believe that the new accommodation would not rapidly deteriorate to the level of its surroundings. The persistence of 5% or more vacancies in the suburbs during this period while used in support of the 'levelling up' theory, was purely academic from the point of view of the central poor. These vacancies existed in a housing sub-market which was beyond their reach and therefore irrelevant to their needs. Indeed, surpluses in the suburbs and crowding in the centre are testimony to the centrality of social relations in the determination of housing quality and distribution. The Cross Act did nothing to alter these fundamental characteristics of the working-class housing process and thus could have little positive impact on their housing problems.

The fact that the implementation of the Act proved to be disastrous for the working class was bitter proof of the fallaciousness of the 'levelling up' theory. Under the Act, large areas in which the casual poor were concentrated were the consistent targets for demolition. In most cases, this was tantamount to eviction. One woman, whose family had been displaced a

number of times under this Act and other legislation, understood these facts
[53]
only too well:

"I came to London twenty-five years ago....and I have never lived in any room more than two years yet. They always say they want to pull the house down to build dwellings for poor people, but...I've never got into one yet."

Most workers could not afford the high rents of the new accommodation and even if they could, the time lag between demolition and rebuilding was often so long as to make the new housing irrelevant to the needs of the displaced. They were forced into even more overcrowded dwellings in the surrounding areas, and the increased pressure on the diminished supply of housing forced them to pay higher rents or settle for lower standard houses.

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Cross Act entailed financial loss for the authorities charged with implementing it, and therefore for the ratepayers. The power relations of the land market were such that generous compensation clauses were written into the Act, and the Metropolitan Board of Works soon found itself paying far more to buy land
[54]
than it received when it resold the land. Compensation was based on rental receipts. This was a direct incentive to landlords to herd as many people into their dwellings as possible, to charge high rents, and to allow their property to deteriorate in the hope of receiving high compensation for an extremely small 'investment.' It also encouraged racketeering and fake sales at high prices. Further, the fact that central land had commercial potential, and that the Board had to compensate every interest which might conceivably be injured, increased land acquisition costs. On the other hand, once the building had been demolished and the land was put up for sale, on

condition that as much working-class housing as had previously existed be erected on the site, there were few takers, low offers, and the Board was unable to obtain payment from any interest which had gained in the process. Model dwelling companies were usually the only takers. As a result of the considerable losses sustained by the Board in what amounts to a process of subsidizing property owners, there were long delays between demolition and reconstruction and the Board initiated a political struggle to have its housing responsibilities reduced. [55] In 1879, they were permitted to rehouse people elsewhere than in the immediate vicinity, and in 1882 the housing obligation was halved and they were allowed to sell part of the development for commercial purposes. Thus, almost the only people who benefited from the Cross Act were the owners of slum property. As the Royal Commission on the Housing [56] of the Working Classes put it in 1885:

"Rookeries are destroyed, greatly to the sanitary and social benefit of the neighbourhood, but no kind of habitation for the poor has been substituted. *This is the extreme instance of everything being sacrificed to the improvement of the property.*" (Emphasis added.)

As a result, working-class overcrowding was made appreciably worse and rents rose significantly. In the words of Reverend Andrew Mearns in [57] 1883:

"It is notorious that the Artisans' Dwellings Act has, in some respects, made matters worse for them. Large spaces have been cleared of fever-breeding rookeries to make way for the building of decent habitations, but the rents of these are far beyond the means of the abject poor. They are driven to crowd more closely together in the few stifling places still left to them; and so Dives makes a richer harvest out of their misery, buying up property condemned as unfit for human habitation, and turning it into a gold mine because the poor must have shelter somewhere, even though it be the shelter of a living tomb."

Indeed, the Act was an important contributory factor to the housing crisis of the 1880's. Like the earlier palliatives, it served to legitimate, not alleviate working-class housing problems by making it seem as though they were on the way to solution. The optimism surrounding the passage of the Bill, the shifting of responsibility from corrupt vestries to the energetic Metropolitan Board of Works, the improved appearance of the new dwellings and the belief in the validity of the 'levelling up' theory, all contributed to the feeling that 'something was being done' and therefore the problems would soon be solved.

In sum, then, it is clear that the effect of the five major attempts to alleviate working class housing conditions, especially those of the casual poor, from the 1830's to the 1880's, was exactly the opposite. The intensity of overcrowding in the centre was increased. It is possible that the housing conditions of some members of the 'labour aristocracy' improved slightly. But the situation worsened appreciably for those who needed improved accommodation most. In 1883, Lord Salisbury observed that:

[58]

"Nothing has been done for the housing of this poorest class, whose need is the greatest, and who furnish most of the terrible cases of overcrowding of which we read such deplorable descriptions."

Far from counteracting the developmental process outlined in Chapter 3, which was the fundamental cause of the atrocious working-class housing conditions in general and of the housing crisis of the 1880's in particular, the five palliatives added appreciably to the pressures on working-class living.

On the ideological level, the five approaches, in different ways and to varying degrees, served an important purpose of maintaining the status quo

and legitimating the inherent inequities and oppression which they sought to mitigate. Their blind adherence to the tenets of classical political economy, in the form of the demoralization paradigm, upheld the efficacy of the basic socio-economic institutions of capitalist society, which were at the root of the problems, and put the blame on the victims instead. Dominant-class London was exonerated from blame. The paradigm eased their minds by reconciling individual freedom, that most cherished of *bourgeois* values, with the reality of the lack of freedom and control over their lives which was the lot of the working class and accounted for most of their difficulties. [59] The notion that the poor were free to improve their lives if only they would improve their character was patently false. To borrow a Watergate phrase, the problem definitions, theories and solutions put forward by contemporary housing reformers and legislators--their ideology--represented one big 'cover-up' of the underlying causes of working-class housing problems; a 'cover-up' which was, however, far more successful than the Watergate caper.

The Crisis of the Old Paradigm and the Germs of the New

In the context of the East End housing crisis of the 1880's, the demoralization paradigm became increasingly untenable as a basis for understanding and dealing with working-class housing problems. Indeed, the mere fact that these problems had reached crisis proportions in the public consciousness was a nail in the coffin of the demoralization thesis. It had begun to fail in the fulfillment of its major task--the legitimization of the existence of working-class housing problems. The paradigm, and the 'solutions' which it spawned, had done little to change the outcomes of the working-class housing market which were at the root of the crisis. In fact, the five main palliatives

had been significantly instrumental in exacerbating the problems--they were partly to blame for the housing crisis. By the latter part of the 1880's, dominant-class London came to feel that there was an urgent need to change the outcomes of the working-class housing market to avert the threat on the maintenance of social stability and the status quo which the crisis represented. The view which blamed housing problems on the demoralized character of the victims was no longer adequate to this crucial task. There was a cogent need for new ideas, new views--for a new paradigm.

In Chapter 4, it was argued that the essence of the housing crisis was the fact that the pressures of the working-class housing market were forcing the 'respectable,' better-paid workers into co-habitation in the overcrowded slums of central London with the dangerous, demoralized 'residuum' of casual labourers, chronically poor and criminals. Fears arose that the 'residuum' might corrupt the 'respectable' stratum of the working class and/or that the latter, who were relatively well-organized in trade unions, might combine with the relatively disorganized segments of the working class and pose a unified threat to the status quo. These themes filled the popular literature of the housing problem during the early 1880's and were more systematically aired before the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes in 1884-5. [60] Far from being a dwindling enclave, as the Marshallian view would have it, the 'residuum' in fact comprised a substantial proportion of the working class. Packed into overcrowded slums, their demoralized character almost became understandable. Under these conditions, religion, thrift, temperance, if not civilization, were impossible. Reverend Andrew Mearns' revelation in *The Bitter Cry of Outcast London* that, as a result of overcrowding, incest was common brought an even greater

sense of urgency to the housing reform movement. [61] The discovery that, contrary to the widely-held beliefs of the 1860's and 1870's, industrious, 'respectable,' regularly-employed workers and their families "were being forced by the housing shortage and high rents into the tainted physical and moral atmosphere of the one-roomed system," [62] was the last straw. The 'residuum' if not checked might retard progress; overcrowding might provoke poverty to make common cause against wealth. In the context of the increasing unrest and economic depression of the decade, bad housing came to be viewed as a possible cause of revolution.

On the other hand, this view of the social crisis which besieged London during the 1880's holds the key to the understanding of the solution which became increasingly common currency in contemporary intellectual and business circles. A clearer distinction had to be drawn between the 'respectable' working class and the casual 'residuum.' The threat of social upheaval could be allayed by winning the adherence of the basically good 'respectable' workers and by imposing coercive controls on the dangerous 'residuum.' "In a period when the 'residuum' was becoming increasingly threatening, it was urgent that the 'respectable' working class should be enabled to participate more actively within the political system, and that their 'legitimate' grievances should be met." [63]

The belief in the viability of this policy of broad working-class segmentation was enormously enhanced by the researches of Charles Booth in the late 1880's and by the 1889 Dock Strike. Booth's work once and for all destroyed the myth that the working class was morally debased. Most were decent people whose poverty was the cause of their degrading existence.

Financial assistance, far from demoralizing them, would uplift them and make them more productive and devoted workers. The real problem was the nature and condition of the casual 'residuum' who were incapable of improvement and hard work, and whose competition prevented the 'respectable' working class from breaking the shackles of poverty. Separation of these two strata, and substantial concessions to the 'respectable' working class was the answer [64] to the social crisis which besieged London. In the words of Charles Booth:

"To the rich the very poor are a sentimental interest: To the poor they are a crushing load. The poverty of the poor is mainly the result of the competition of the very poor. The entire removal of this very poor class out of the daily struggle for existence I believe to be the only solution to the problem."

Furthermore, the discipline and self-restraint (that is, the non-revolutionary character) of the strikers, both skilled and unskilled, in the great dock strike of 1889 confirmed this thesis; it "came as cathartic release from the social tension of the mid-1880's." [65] Trade unions no longer needed to be feared as opposition to the status quo. According to Sidney Buxton, the [66] dock strike

"proved that the average docker himself was by no means the 'failure,' the ne'er-do-well, the hopeless wreck of humanity, of popular fancy. And it proved, too, I think, that the hordes of East End ruffians who have been supposed (did they but know their power) to hold the West in the hollows of their hands were a fantastic myth: for this Great Strike would have been their opportunity."

Trade Unions were thus viewed positively as agents of the moral and material improvement of most of the working class. They had accomplished what the dominant class had failed to achieve through charity. As such, trade unions came to be seen as an effective means of incorporating the 'respectable'

working class within the social system, and of widening the gap between them and the hopeless 'residuum.' Dominant-class London breathed a sigh of relief. [67]
In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones:

"Once disentangled from the respectable working-class, the residuum could not on its own overturn London. Once detailed social investigation and the activity of the strikers themselves had established a clear distinction between the 'legitimate' claims of labour and the ugly symptom of 'social disease,' fears of revolution could be turned aside. The casual residuum was not longer a political threat---only a social problem."

When these developments are borne in mind, the shift in focus of the emerging housing-problem paradigm becomes comprehensible. The problems were no longer seen to be the fault of demoralized victims, but were blamed on the degenerative pressures of urban existence, beyond the control of the victims. Overcrowding, not poor sanitation, was the culprit of the forced integration of 'respectable' workers and 'residuum'; overcrowding was the cause of the demoralized behaviour of all but a small segment of the working population; therefore, *overcrowding was the housing problem*. The report of the Royal Commission in 1885 stated that overcrowding was "a central evil around which most of the others group themselves." [68] And an editorial in [69] the *Pall Mall Gazette* declared emphatically:

"What the evil is everyone knows. It is the excessive overcrowding of enormous multitudes of the very poor in pestilential rookeries where it is a matter of physical impossibility to live a human life."

The focus had switched from the exterior environment of the slums to the interiors of the working-class houses. The previous era's incorporation of housing problems into the broader problems of public health and sanitary improvement was no longer viable. [70] It was a negative approach which

emphasized demolition of 'houses unfit for human habitation.' This only made matters worse because it increased overcrowding. Housing conditions could deteriorate while the sanitary condition of the slums improved and the death and disease rates diminished. The *housing* problem, as distinct from problems of public health and sanitation, emerged in its own right [71] in terms not too dissimilar to those of today: there was a *shortage of housing* which engendered overcrowding and forced large masses of 'respectable' workers to suffer the degenerating pressures of the urban environment.

The theory of this urban degeneration paradigm argued that chronic market imbalances, beyond the control of the 'respectable' slum dwellers, were responsible for overcrowding. [72] The majority of workers competed for scarce jobs and thus wages were low. With little money in their pockets, they could only afford, and therefore demand, a low quality and quantity of housing. This, in turn, was all that landlords were willing to supply if they were to receive the 'fair' profit to which they were entitled. An impasse had been reached. The *laissez faire* system had been responsible for the housing crisis and, once the demoralization paradigm was rejected, the system provided no convincing incentives for alleviating the problem. Without some massive form of intervention into the working-class housing process, the housing crisis and the threat of social insurrection would not simply 'go away.' Only the state was wealthy and powerful enough to accomplish such large-scale intervention into the problematic sector of the housing market. The failure of previous palliatives made it apparent that only massive direct state intervention into the housing process was necessary to deal effectively [73] with the problematic sector. State aid for the working class in their housing quest was increasingly seen as a positive means of improving their

lot, as opposed to a demoralizing rate-in-aid of wages as classical political economy would have it. Alfred Marshall, one of the most prominent instigators of this change in economic ideology, illustrated this new approach before [74] the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor in 1893:

"Suppose you could conceive a Mad Emperor of China to give to every working man half-a-crown for nothing: according to the current notions, as far as I have been able to ascertain them, that would lower wages because it would enable people to work for less. I think that nine economists out of ten at the beginning of the century would have said that that would lower wages. Well, of course, it might increase population and that might bring down wages; but unless it did increase population, the effect according to the modern school would be to raise wages because the increased wealth of the working classes would lead to better living, more vigorous and better educated people with greater earning power, and so wages would rise. That is the centre of the difference."

Furthermore, decent housing for the 'respectable' working class had become an insurance policy against revolution. So much so that an 1883 issue of *Punch* satirised Sir Charles Dilke agreeing with Queen Victoria that housing legislation was the "safest mode of protecting our present constitution" and [75] "the best, if not the only, method of nipping Communism in the bud."

The disenchantment with *laissez faire* in the housing field must be seen as part of the mounting general dissatisfaction with the doctrine, from both [76] the right and the left, during this period. It is important to stress that this attack on the principles of *laissez faire* was not an attack on the basic socio-economic institutions of capitalism, in particular, the labour, land and housing markets. Nor was it a call for socialism, except possibly in a few small circles. It was rather a search for a new economic philosophy according to which the socio-economic relations of capitalism would remain intact, while at the same time legitimating the increasing level of direct

state intervention, which was vital to the solution of the housing crisis and other social and economic problems. It was the outward expression of the need to justify what Booth called a "limited socialism," *whose main purpose was the maintenance of capitalism* or as Booth put it, "a socialism which shall leave untouched the forces of individualism and the sources of wealth."^[77]


According to the early adherents of the urban degeneration paradigm, the solution to the housing crisis was twofold: a better deal for the 'respectable' working class and the segregation of the casual 'residuum.' As Gareth Stedman Jones has convincingly argued, in the early stirrings of 'welfare-state' legislation, alleviating the condition of the deserving workers and a harsher attitude towards the undeserving poor, were two aspects of a single debate.^[78] Proposals for dealing with the latter stratum comprised detention centres for 'loafers,' the separation of pauper children from their degenerate parents, and shipping the 'residuum' overseas or to state-aided labour colonies.^[79] These schemes were technically voluntary, but coercive in reality. The strict enforcement of overcrowding legislation was to be the force behind these segregatory policies.

By the end of the 1880's, the 'better deal for the respectable working class' had found legislative expression, though only at embryonic levels. It was divided along two broad policy dimensions, both subsidized by the State: working-class suburbanization and public housing in the centre. However, in the early part of the decade, the Radicals had proposed stricter control of landlords, rent control, leasehold enfranchisement (a 19th century label for owner-occupation)^[80] and even municipal ownership of urban land. The Trades

Council, which represented the artisans, were mainly interested in policies which facilitated working-class home-ownership and suburbanization through workmen's fares. [81] But the Conservatives largely prevailed. From the increasingly anachronistic demoralization standpoint, they argued that the existing legislation was not deficient, rather lax administration was to blame for the housing crisis. [82] The Royal Commission on Housing in 1885 confirmed this view. Thus the dominant approach in the early 1880's lay in reinforcing existing palliatives by making the legislation mandatory instead of permissive.

One exception to this lack of change was the Cheap Trains Act of 1883 which put compulsory workmen's fares on the statute books and thereby facilitated working-class suburbanization. Significantly, this policy, which had been urged as early as 1846 and had already been implemented on a minimal scale by some railway companies, only found legislative expression in the 1880's. [83] It is interesting to note that, contrary to the expectations of advocates of cheap trains in the 19th century, that the advent of cheap travel did not lead to a breaking-down of the social-class homogeneity of residential areas, outlined in Chapter 3. Rather, the clear class distinctions which existed between different areas of Victorian London, especially the East End/West End duality, have tended to be perpetuated and simply expanded into adjacent areas. [84]

The other strand of this attempt to co-opt the respectable working class was legislated in the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890. [85] Besides consolidating existing overcrowding and slum-clearance legislation, it gave local authorities effective powers to build houses for the working class at the cost of public funds. The concurrent drive to improve



administration of these and other policies, led to the disbanding of the Metropolitan Board of Works and its replacement by the London County Council [86] in 1888. The Council rapidly established itself as an adherent of the urban degeneration paradigm and as a powerful active agent in the working-class housing process. It extended workmen's fares to the tramways when it assumed ownership of these in the 1890's, and it became the most vigorous though still reluctant local authority in the construction and letting of [87] public housing.

In conclusion, we have seen that the origins of the new urban degeneration paradigm lay in the need for a new ideology of working-class housing problems, which could perform the status quo maintenance and legitimation functions which the demoralization paradigm had failed to do. The way the problem was defined and explained, and the proposals for its solution according to this new ideology, all betray the urgent need to find ways of averting the threat of working-class insurrection which beset London in the 1880's. This is not to say that housing policy was the only means of averting the crisis. It must rather be seen as part of the broad current of social enquiry and action of the 1880's, all of which spelled the doom of the *laissez faire* ideology and its paradigmatic offspring in particular fields such as [88] housing. In the words of Anthony Wohl:

"It must be placed within the context of a decade of unrest, agitation and re-evaluation of the fundamental structure of society. Agricultural depression, factory working conditions, the poor law, private charities, education, workmen's trains, wages and cost of living, the sweating system, and the leasehold system, were all subjected to official investigation during the 'eighties."

Finally, the urban degeneration paradigm was equivalent to the childhood phase of the modern paradigm of the housing problem, which became institutionalized in the decade or so after the First World War. While the transformation from demoralization to urban degeneration was a qualitative shift, that from urban degeneration to the modern view--state interventionism--was one of degree. Thus, as was the case with changes in tenure relations, the roots of the state interventionist paradigm--according to which perpetual state intervention of one form or another is regarded as necessary and natural, the state being viewed as the legitimate authority responsible for the 'problematic' sectors of the working-class housing market--lie in the responses of dominant-class London to the housing crisis of the 1880's.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. See for example the excellent book, Jones [1971] pp.179-214 upon which much of my argument relies; Wohl [1971] passim; Tarn [1971] passim.
2. The word 'paradigm' is used in a special sense in this thesis and consequently needs some explanation. A paradigm is a conception of reality or of a part of reality--a way of looking at and understanding the social or natural world, either as a whole or in part. It consists of a set of important questions, significant facts, concepts, categories, relationships, methods and prescriptions for action which are accepted by a community of people as constituting the 'true' or 'correct' way of understanding, explaining and/or acting upon an aspect of reality which is their common concern. In the words of Thomas Kuhn, who has written a very worthwhile if idealistic book on paradigms in the natural sciences, a paradigm is "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing [paradigms, but]... sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve." Kuhn [1970] p.10 and see pp.1-42. What is crucial as far as I am concerned, especially in relation to paradigms of working-class housing problems, is the essential *unity between problem-definition, theory and action-prescriptions*--the one necessarily leading to the others and building on them,--and the *ideological* basis of paradigms. Louis Althusser has expressed this succinctly, if in complex language. He uses the word 'problematic' instead of 'paradigm': "What actually distinguishes the concept of the *problematic* from the subjectivist concepts of an idealist interpretation of the development of ideologies is that it brings out within the thought *the objective internal reference system of its particular* themes, the system of *questions* commanding the *answers* given by the ideology. If the meaning of an ideology's answers is to be understood at this internal level it must first be asked *the question of its questions*. But this problematic is *itself an answer*, no longer to its own internal questions--problems--but to *the objective problems posed* for ideology *by its time*. A comparison of the problems posed by the ideologue (his problematic) with the *real problems* posed for the ideologue by his time, makes possible a demonstration of the truly ideological element of the ideology, that is, what characterizes ideology as such, its *deformation*. So it is not *the interiority of the problematic* which constitutes its essence but its relation to real problems: *the problematic of an ideology* cannot be demonstrated without *relating* and *submitting* it to the real problems to which its deformed enunciation gives a false answer." Althusser [1969] p.67, n.30. For a Marxist critique of Kuhn, see Harvey [1973] pp.120-128. For applications of the paradigm concept to the major strands of economic thought, see Gordon [1971a] and Sweezy [1969]; and to housing problems, see Gordon [1971b].
3. In the concluding chapter, I will argue that working-class housing problems are a structural part of the capitalist system and therefore

that status quo maintenance implies, among other things, the perpetuation of these problems, and the frustration of the good intentions of most city planners and housing reformers.

4. "It is generally agreed that English economic and political thought in the period 1820-70 was overshadowed by what might be loosely called the Ricardian economic system. The principal components of this system were the Malthusian population theory, the labour or cost of production theory of value, the wages fund theory, and the Ricardian theory of rent. The whole system was held together and imbued with logical plausibility by a hedonistic psychological picture of social action." Jones [1971] pp.1-2. In the 1870's, Marshall, who was at the *avante garde* of economic theory, began to free it from its Ricardian moorings by substituting marginal utility theory in its place. Jones [1971] pp.4-11. However, the principles of *laissez faire* which originated with classical economics dominated the public consciousness and especially the ideas of housing reformers, at least until the mid-1880's. Furthermore, "government policy tends to reflect not so much the best contemporary economics...as the politically most acceptable economics, and often the simplified and vulgarized version of the science which is what actually tends to penetrate outside the ranks of the experts." Hobsbawm [1968] p.226.
5. "The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other the immediate producers into wage labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production." Marx [1867] p.714. On the role of state action in this process, see Ch.28 "Bloody Legislation against the Expropriated, from the end of the fifteenth century. Forcing Down Wages by Acts of Parliament" and Ch.31 "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist" *passim*.
6. Hobsbawm [1968] p.227.
7. "As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom...as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then...this expropriation [of labour-power by capitalists and its transformation into and accumulation in the form of capital] is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself." Marx [1867] pp.762-763. The repeal of the laws regulating wages in 1813, the new Poor Law of 1834 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 are all examples of the change in the nature of government intervention.
8. Hobsbawm [1968] pp.226-227.
9. "It is worth reminding ourselves that, in the view of most of the

electorate until 1867, or even 1884, this was the prime function of Parliament: not to develop positive policies, even upon such matters of domestic concern as public sanitation, and certainly not on railway building, but simply to maintain the rule of common law and to safeguard property." Kellett [1969] p.422.

10. The basic socio-economic institutions of capitalism are explored in more depth in Chapter 6.
11. Salisbury [1883] p.118. And see Hobsbawm [1968] pp.227-237, passim; Morton [1938] pp.377-378.
12. Street improvements are a similar example.
13. Jones [1971] p.262.
14. "Drunkenness [for example] seems to have affronted the Victorian conscience much more deeply than did such more deep-seated problems as bad housing or unemployment, and from the mid-1830's onwards innumerable temperance societies existed to put it down." Sheppard [1971] p.368.
15. Jones [1971] p.266.
16. Quoted in Martin [1971] p.15.
17. Jones [1971] pp.244,265-267.
18. Quoted in Tarn [1971] p.25. And see p.44 in connection with permissive and mandatory legislation.
19. Hill [1883] pp.925-926.
20. Jones [1971] pp.11,276-277. I do not mean to imply that "all mid-Victorian social thinkers saw poverty as a product of character rather than environment." Jones has pointed out that this view is misleading. For instance, Henry Mayhew was a prominent writer who "in embryo at least...provided a theory of the specificity of the London economy which in turn made intelligible the economic behavior of the London poor." Jones [1971] pp.262-263. Rather, the demoralization paradigm *dominated* the intellectual climate of London up to the 1880's.
21. Dyos [1953] pp.6-7; Dyos [1961] pp.75-77; Jones [1971] p.179.
22. Tarn [1971] pp.30-36.
23. Cleary [1965] pp.101-115.
24. Jones [1971] p.180.

25. Edwards [1898] p.10. Similar magical powers were attributed to railway developments.
26. Quoted in Jones [1971] pp.180-181.
27. Jones [1971] pp.181-183.
28. Dyos [1955] p.97.
29. Engels [1872] pp.68-69.
30. Tarn [1971] p.24.
31. Shaftesbury [1883] p.934.
32. Quoted in Tarn [1971] p.10.
33. Ashworth [1954] p.83. It was "a happy marriage between idealistic philanthropic endeavour and straightforward business enterprise."
Wohl [1968] p.200.
34. The Metropolitan Association for Improving the Dwellings of the Industrious Classes (1841) was the earliest Model Dwelling Society, followed closely by the Society for Improving the Condition of the Labouring Classes (1844). The two most prominent subsequent societies were the Peabody Trust (1862) and Sidney Waterlow's Improved Industrial Dwellings Company (1863). Ashworth [1954] p.83; Tarn [1971] pp.5,10-13. The operation of the latter company was surprisingly similar to housing built in the United States from the 1950's onwards under the 221.D and 236 housing programs. Waterlow syndicated the company which received a low interest loan from the Public Works Loan Commissioners (Federal or State government in the U.S. case) on condition that the return to investors be limited to 5% (6% in the U.S.). The only difference I have uncovered is that Waterlow's investors paid no tax on the return, whereas in the U.S. the return is taxable, the tax-break incentive being calculated in a more complicated way on mortgage interest and depreciation charges. In this context, it is interesting to note that Waterlow was seen as a philanthropist, whereas his modern counterparts are not.
35. See Jones [1971] pp.184-187; Tarn [1971] pp.10-11,16; Ashworth [1954] p.85; Wohl [1968] pp.200-201.
36. Tarn [1971] p.13.
37. "Octavia Hill pointed out in 1875 that all the private efforts of benevolence in London in the previous thirty years had housed only 26,000 people, which did not much exceed the increase of London's population every six months....In 1884 it was estimated that 28 associations had incurred a capital outlay of £1,200,000 in housing 32,435 persons."
Ashworth [1954] p.84.

38. Sheppard [1971] p.292.
39. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.192.
40. See Jones [1971] pp.188-193; Tarn [1971] p.25.
41. A number of medical officers consciously applied the legislation towards this end. One told the 1881-2 Select Committee that he was pleased that the displaced were often forced to go to another district, that he "was pleased to have got rid of them." Quoted in Jones [1971] p.190.
42. Wohl [1968] p.200; Ashworth [1954] p.87; Salisbury [1883] pp.127-128.
43. Wohl [1968] pp.201-202.
44. Hill [1883] pp.926,932.
45. See Jones [1971] pp.193-194,265; Tarn [1971] pp.24-25.
46. Jones [1971] p.195. Wohl estimates that by the 1880's, not more than 3,000 people could have been housed by this method, in Salisbury [1883] n.19.
47. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.261.
48. See Jones [1971] pp.197-198,200. Ashworth [1954] p.94.
49. The Cross Act is surprisingly similar to the United States Urban Renewal Program begun in the 1950's. The only differences are that in the U.S. the property need not be entirely redeveloped with housing (a later modification of the Cross Act made it similar in this respect) and the Federal Government is empowered to subsidize the land purchased by private developers by selling it for less than it was bought. As we shall see, the actual operation of the Cross Act amounted to a similar subsidy. Either our legislators lack ingenuity and imagination or their ideological myopia dooms them to repeat the mistakes of the past?
50. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.198.
51. See Jones [1971] pp.198-199. The levelling up theory provides another example of the myopia and narrow-mindedness of *bourgeois* housing theorists. The theory is still popular today under the guise of the 'filtering' theory. In the nineteenth century, people were assumed to move up to better housing; in the twentieth, better housing moves down to poorer people. But it amounts to the same thing. A most consistent and short-sighted, if not destructive, application of the modern version is Welfeld [1970]. For the standard statement of the filtering theory, which serves similar legitimation functions today as it did in the last century, see Smith [1964]. For a critique, see Edel [1972].

52. See Jones [1971] pp.206-208.
53. Quoted in Wohl [1971] p.19. Jones estimates that: "Altogether 22,868 persons were displaced under the Cross Act." Jones [1971] pp.202-204; Tarn [1971] p.26.
54. See Jones [1971] pp.200-201,213; Tarn [1971] p.25; Ashworth [1954] pp.99-103.
55. See Jones [1971] pp.205-206; Tarn [1971] pp.45-46. According to Ashworth [1954] p.99 the M.B.W. lost 1,500,000 on 59 acres of land, more than ~~£~~ 25,000 per acre--a sizeable sum in those days.
56. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.208.
57. Mearns [1883] p.69.
58. Salisbury [1883] p.124. See Dyos [1967] pp.38-39.
59. Polanyi [1944] p.84; Lees [1969] p.361.
60. Jones [1971] p.283; Wohl [1968] p.223.
61. Wohl [1968] p.208.
62. Wohl [1968] p.232.
63. Jones [1971] p.301. And see pp.296-312 for a detailed discussion of the variants of this view.
64. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.307. And see Keating [1973] pp.595-597.
65. Jones [1971] p.315. And see pp.315-321 for a detailed analysis of the dock strike which forms the basis of my argument.
66. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.320.
67. Jones [1971] p.321.
68. Quoted in Wohl [1971] p.24. And see Jones [1971] pp.286,313; Wohl [1968] pp.207-209.
69. "Is it not time?" [1883] p.82.
70. See Wohl [1970] pp.16-18,33-34.
71. "What is being overlooked, I think, before 'slum' was properly coined was the existence of a housing problem--itself not normally referred to as such until nearly the end of the century--as distinct from one of sanitation or public health. The changing meaning of this term seems to reveal a changing attitude to the phenomenon itself." Dyos [1967] p.9.

72. See Wohl [1968] pp.209,220,237.
73. *The Congregationalist*, an ecclesiastical journal, called upon the state to deal with the overcrowding problem, the solution of which was far "beyond the capacity of private benevolence." Quoted in Wohl [1970] pp.35-36. Mearns pointed to the fact that "without State interference nothing effectual can be accomplished upon any large scale. And *it is* a fact." Mearns [1883] p.69.
74. Quoted in Blaug [1963] n.1.
75. Quoted in Wohl [1968] pp.223-224.
76. For a discussion of this, see Hobsbawm [1968] pp.237-244. An important factor in this pressure for increased state intervention was the growing working class franchise which the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 legislated.
77. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.308.
78. Jones [1971] pp.303-304,313-314.
79. In a disguised and arguably less coercive form, similar policies are in existence today. Many people are "forced" to go and live in new towns on the outskirts of London when their housing need, often caused by local authority demolition of their homes, becomes acute.
80. See Jones [1971] pp.225-226; Broadhurst [1885] *passim*.
81. Jones [1971] pp.226-227; Hobsbawm [1964] p.7.
82. Jones [1971] pp.227-230; Wohl [1970] pp.27-28.;
83. Wohl [1971] pp.28-30, where he states that: "the number of workmen's tickets issued daily greatly increased from the 26,000 issued just before the 1883 Act. By 1902, almost 325,000 daily tickets were issued, and while in 1883, there were only 106 workmen's trains running daily in London for a total distance of 735 miles, in 1897, there were 466 such trains (3,248 miles), and by 1914, 1,966 workmen's trains, covering 14,060 total miles." It is important to realize that changes in the structure of the labour market played a significant role in the implementation and spread of workmen's fares. By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, many more workers were employed on a regular basis, for shorter hours and higher pay than before. Ashworth [1954] p.153.
84. Kellett [1969] pp.384-386.
85. Cherry [1972] p.90.

86. See Briggs [1963] pp.334-351.
87. Wohl [1968] pp.233-234; Wohl [1971] p.40..
88. Wohl [1968] p.227.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS: NOTES TOWARDS A RADICAL THEORY OF URBAN LIVING AND CITY FORM.

Having analysed London's development from the 1830's to the 1880's, we are now in a position to move to the synthetic phase of this study: to abstract the ideas developed and lessons learnt about the process of urban development and present them in the form of general conclusions which are more directly relevant in understanding the nature and dynamics of contemporary urban environments. Indeed, the purpose of this thesis was not merely to write a socio-economic history of 19th-century London in the form of an isolated case study. It was, rather, to describe and analyse London's development within the framework of a radical theory of the nature of society and of social change, with a view to extending the scope of radical theory into the realm of urban social and spatial development; and, thereby, writing a history which could contribute to contemporary scholarship and practice regarding urban development and the problems associated with it. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to briefly expose the theoretical structure which is embedded in the historical analysis, and in so doing, to connect the thesis to present-day urban issues, enquiries and practice.

Though my ultimate objective is to develop a general theory of urban development under capitalism, [1] I would stress that this chapter does not presume to fulfill this long-term goal--not even in draft form. There is still a great deal of historical and theoretical

research to be done before such a task can be attempted. Most theories consist of a series of concepts or categories according to which reality is understood and explained, and a series of arguments which integrate these concepts or categories into the form of a theory by exposing the relationships between them. In this chapter, all I seek to do is to outline briefly the concepts which the historical analysis has shown to be central, though not necessarily sufficient, to a correct understanding of the process of urban development under capitalism and, therefore, to emancipatory practice, in relation to urban problems. The interrelationships between the concepts are highly complex; where I can, I will attempt merely to expose some of the more important ones. Furthermore, because I am most concerned with understanding urban housing issues and problems, the major emphasis is on the social and spatial structure of urban living, that is, on the residential sphere of the urban environment. Thus, it is only in an extremely limited and preliminary sense that this chapter can be seen as a contribution to the construction of a radical theory of the dialectics of urban social and spatial development in capitalist societies and to radical practice in relation to contemporary urban problems. Its main purpose is, rather, the generation of ideas which the historical analysis has shown to be important in understanding the city as a social and spatial process.

It should be borne in mind that the object of these concepts, and eventually of general theory, is to enable us to answer the following 'umbrella' question: why do cities and towns in capitalist

countries develop, or decay, at the rates and in the directions and forms which have been, or which can be, observed? This question encompasses a myriad other, more detailed questions. What determines the value of urban land? What determines the locational decisions and patterns of the many urban activities? Why do certain modes of transportation proliferate, and what determines their location? What determines the social and spatial structure of the residential sphere of the city? What causes housing problems, and why do they perpetuate in the face of concerted efforts to solve or even mitigate them? The list could be enormously expanded. However, though the concepts outlined in the following pages are aimed at elucidating these and other questions, no attempt has been made to answer them in a methodical fashion. Where relevant, all I have indicated is the manner in which some of these questions may be understood and answered according to the proposed schema.

The concepts--which are both conclusions from the historical analysis, and building blocks of an eventual radical theory of urban development--are most usefully grouped under three categories. Firstly, those which provide the impetus for urban development, or decay, in the sense of determining the directions, objects, limits and/or rate of such development or decay. Secondly, those which constitute formative mechanisms whose function is to translate the pressures arising out of the first category into a social and spatial reality, and thereby to determine the actual shape of the city. Thirdly, those which relate to 'crisis management' in that their object is to mitigate problems or conflicts which emerge from the

day-to-day operation of those variables grouped under the first two categories, thereby ensuring that the process of urban development proceeds relatively smoothly. These three categories of concepts and variables are discussed in the following six sections of this chapter. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the nature of the housing problem in the light of the proposed conceptual framework and an indication of radical praxis in relation to housing problems.

Urbanism and the Mode of Production.

The first set of concepts and variables are grouped together because they all provide, either singly or through their mutual interaction, the impetus for urban development, or decay, by determining the directions, objects, limits and rate of such development or decay. These are discussed in this and the following three sections of this chapter.

To begin with, we must conceptualize in broad terms the nature of the phenomenon we wish to explain--we must develop a general notion of *what the city is in reality*.^[2] This might seem trite, even tautological, but it is important as a datum--an indication of the most appropriate mode and sequence of enquiry, and a continual reference point that the enquiry is still on track and has not strayed, from explaining reality, into meaningless abstraction. It is doubly important because assumptions about what the city is in reality inevitably get embedded into the theory as structural features. Thus wrong, or unrealistically abstract, assumptions lead

to incorrect and unrealistic theory.

For example, a major shortcoming of the neo-classical theory of location and land rent [3] is the naive and incorrect view of the real world upon which it is based. Surely its proponents understand, from their own experience, that the city is not a "featureless plane" upon which sovereign firms and households, all of whose members epitomise *homo economicus*, compete by making trade-offs between land area and accessibility to the "centre" in order to maximize efficiency and "utility" respectively, thereby arriving mysteriously and harmoniously at a "pareto-optimal" static equilibrium state in which everyone is satisfied because improving one person's lot would automatically deprive someone else; that urban land use patterns evolve sequentially, not instantaneously; that social and political power pervades the land market and is a significant structuring force; that social and physical infrastructure (schools, sewers, roads, etc.) investment markedly influences land rent and location decisions, does not obey competitive market criteria and does not simply "happen" the instant pareto optimality is reached; that whether a home is rented or owned influences land rent and locational criteria; etcetera. Neither the fact that these "assumptions" make it easier for the advocates of neo-classical theory to model and quantify "reality" nor the fact that their results loosely approximate the real-world situation (only with respect to land rents) should detract from the fundamental unreality of their view of the city. Such myopia merely serves to justify both the theory and the objective inequalities of urban existence. In order to avoid this trap, it is essential to make

constant reference to an arguably realistic datum of 'what the city is.'

The historical study indicates the following preliminary definition: *The city is a spatially structured environment created by society for the purpose of supporting and perpetuating a certain mode of production and reproduction of real life, in its totality; an environment which both reflects and reinforces, though potentially threatens, the smooth functioning of the mode of production and reproduction.* This complex statement holds the key to the set of forces which provide the impetus for urban development. I will briefly discuss some of the more important ones and simultaneously outline the concepts and variables which are appropriate in gaining an understanding of these forces and, therefore, in constructing a theory of urban development.

The first important concept is the *mode of production and reproduction of real life*. What does it mean and why is it so important? In 1890 Frederick Engels wrote that "the *ultimately* [though not the only] determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life."^[4] He was defending the materialist conception of history which argues that a group of individuals cannot survive on the basis of individual action; rather, in order to ensure their survival they must develop a certain mode of social organization and cooperation which enables them, as a social unit, to develop appropriate tools and techniques for changing the natural environment, and to apply these towards socially defined ends. The totality of these social relations, tools and techniques, and socially defined

[5]

ends constitutes the mode of production. The mode of production, as opposed to legal, political or ideological systems, is accorded the status of primary determinant [6] of the structure and evolution of a social formation because of its intimate connection to the material survival of that social formation, at whatever stage of development it has reached. This philosophy formed "the guiding thread of my studies" for Karl Marx, and his formulation of it bears lengthy quotation in view of its centrality to the theory of urban development. [7]

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness....With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic--in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict [in the economic foundation] and fight it out....[which] must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production."

Thus, the mode of production--the ultimate determinant of the nature and dynamics, indeed, the *raison d'etre* of the social formation--constitutes the economic *base* and must be differentiated from the

the legal, political, cultural and ideological *superstructure*, which plays a vital and influential role in reproducing and determining the form of the social formation, but which is, in the last analysis, circumscribed by the base.

Two qualifications are important to avoid any misunderstandings. Firstly, the base does not merely refer to the productive (primary and secondary industry) sphere of the economy. It denotes the whole range of evolving social and economic relationships which, of necessity, bind the members of society together in their crucial collective task of the material production and reproduction of society itself, at whatever stage of development it has reached. [8] In other words, the base is comprised of the dialectical interactions between all spheres of economic life; the processes of production (including the service sector), distribution, exchange and consumption (the reproduction of people and of production) form the 'seamless web' of dynamic social and economic relationships which together define and sustain society. This 'seamless web' constitutes the *totality* referred to in the definition of the city. While these four spheres of the economy form a complementary unity, each growing out of and in turn reinforcing the other, there are at the same time contradictions embedded in their interaction, and once again it is the productive sphere which holds the ultimately decisive influence in their continual resolution. [9] An understanding of the nature and dynamics of these unifying and opposing interactions is crucial to the comprehension of the evolutionary dynamics of the city--their *spatial* container and sustainer. This task lies outside the scope of this thesis, though the interactions

between production and reproduction, work and living, are briefly outlined in the following section.

Secondly, the dialectical interaction between base and superstructure in the perpetual struggle to resolve or mitigate material contradictions generated in the evolution of society, must not be underplayed. The relationship is not a one-way flow from primary, determining base to secondary, determined superstructure. Rather, each sector possesses a degree of autonomy, and therefore to a certain extent develops according to its own internal logic, while in their interaction, each has an important role to play in determining the nature of the outcomes, though the connection between the base and material existence designates to the base the power of setting limits and exerting pressures which ultimately circumscribe superstructural activities. [10] It is well to recall Engel's qualificatory remarks in [11] connection with his (and Marx's) statement quoted above:

"...if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element [base] is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*."

The most important purpose of this mutual interaction between base and superstructure is to create and maintain the conditions necessary for the perpetuation of the mode of production itself.

[12]

According to David Harvey:

"This means the perpetuation of political, juridical and other ideological forms (including states of social consciousness) which are consistent with the economic basis,

as well as the perpetuation of the various relationships (for example, division of labour) within the economic basis itself. The survival of an economic system requires, for example, the survival of the property relations upon which it is based."

It is in this respect that the various components of the superstructure play a vital role--maintaining things as they are, in some cases, and modifying existing social and economic relations when they become untenable in the face of concerted opposition, but always preserving the essential characteristics of the mode of production. This conclusion pervades the historical study, where it was seen to be highly influential in determining the form of London's development. It will be developed more concretely in a subsequent section of this chapter.

From the above discussion of the mode of production, it follows that numerous qualitatively and quantitatively different modes of production can exist, either in different societies or in the same society in preceeding historical periods, depending on the concrete social and economic relationships developed by the society in question to ensure the material existence of its members at a certain level of development. Furthermore, because modes of production are social processes which cannot be expected to begin and end at discrete time periods, it is highly likely that a particular society will simultaneously contain different, and potentially conflicting modes of production, though one will dominate and can be considered to be the mode of production which characterizes that society and differentiates it from other social formations. Thus it is both legitimate and instructive to analyse 'feudal' versus 'capitalist,' or 'competitive

capitalist' versus 'monopoly capitalist' modes of production, even though (and this should be accounted for in the analysis) elements of [13] one are present in the other.

Finally, it should be clear that the existence of cities is not inevitable or predetermined in some abstract manner, but is totally dependent on the nature and requirements of the prevailing mode of production. This fact has three important implications for the theory of urban development. Firstly, each mode of production will be characterized by a particular relationship between town and country. For example, a mode of production may not require, and therefore generate, urbanism--concentrations of people and wealth--in which case a theory of urban development would clearly be unwarranted! Secondly, in those modes of production which predicate urbanism, the nature and form of urbanism will be determined by the characteristics and requirements of that mode of production, *because it is the purpose of the city to serve the needs of the mode of production.* This does not mean that the concrete form of two cities which are situated within similar modes of production, will be identical. The concrete realization of urban form is a function of other criteria, discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter, which have a high degree of autonomy. Thus, these two cities could, and would in reality, exhibit vastly different social and spatial patterns, each of which lies within the limits set, and pressures exerted by the same mode of production. The differences among Paris, London and Los Angeles, referred to in Chapter 3, constitute an excellent example. Thirdly, urbanism must be seen as a dynamic process, always subject to change

and constantly evolving into new forms of social and spatial structure as the mode of production evolves and changes. These considerations point to a conclusion that the theory of urban development must explain the origins and basis of particular variants of urbanism; in other words, it must account for itself.

Class Struggle and Urbanism under Capitalism.

Up to this point, it may seem as though I am implying that the processes of societal and urban development are essentially egalitarian and harmonious; and, therefore, that conflict and struggle between fundamentally opposed forces play a negligible part in these processes. However, this conclusion is blatantly contradicted by the historical study. London's development was patently riddled with conflicts and struggles. Indeed, it was argued that the concrete form which the city assumed was fundamentally the resultant of their dynamic resolution. And this latter conclusion clearly concords with our everyday experiences of modern urban reality. Turn on the television, open the newspaper, and you are bombarded with reports which have conflict and struggle as their common theme: labour unions on strike for higher pay, their bosses busing in blacklegs to turn the tide in their favour; suburban residents defending the practice of exclusionary zoning against the onslaught of the central city poor; landlords versus tenants over rent control; public-housing tenants demanding adequate maintenance from local councils; etcetera. Conflict and struggle are obviously crucial in the processes of societal and urban development. In fact, they give these processes their dynamism. Thus we must understand the nature and basis of these conflicts and struggles.

We can accomplish this task by dissecting the word 'society' which figures as an active agent in our definition of the city.

'Society' means class society--to be more concrete, in this context it means capitalist class society--and it is the evolving struggle between classes which constitutes the dynamo at the basis of the process of urban development. Let us examine this assertion.

In this society, as in most existing and previous societies, there is a basic contradiction within the mode of production between,
[14]
as Ben Brewster has put it:

"the real conditions of appropriation of nature--all the social relations, cultural and physical factors that go into the process of production--and the conditions of expropriation--the relations determining the ownership and distribution of the product."

The fact that the process of production and reproduction of material life is overwhelmingly *social* in its character and consequences, contradicts the *private* character of the ownership and control of the process of production and reproduction itself and of the distribution and reinvestment of the outputs of this process. Any society must-- if it is to develop the capacities of its mode of production and thereby its potential for improving the material existence of its members--produce a surplus, over and above the amount of productive effort which is necessary to supply the consumption of, to reproduce, the actual producers; and it must develop a particular mode of distributing that surplus and ensuring that most of it is reinvested so as to expand its productive capabilities in defined directions. Under capitalism, control over this process does not rest with the

actual producers, and this is the social basis of the contradiction
[15]
within the mode of production, state above. Exploitation, in the
non-pejorative sense of the word, is built into capitalist society
and this forms the social foundation of class formation and of the
struggle between classes.

Thus, class derives, in an objective sense, out of the relation-
ships in which individuals stand to the mode of production. [16] These
relationships are a function of both the division of ownership and
control of property and the division of labour, which together define
the *social relations of production*. Capitalist society, both histori-
cally and contemporaneously, consists of only two objective classes:
one having a common interest in preserving and extending the capital-
its power and property relationships and division of labour, and the
other having an antagonism of interest on this issue. The former
constitutes the dominant capitalist class whose members own the means
and control the process and directions of production, the latter, the
subordinate working class, the non-owners and non-controllers. In
[17]
the words of Jeffrey Rudin:

"Membership of the dominant class is objectively confined
to owners [and controllers] of the means of production,
all levels of management and the various appendent groups
[lawyers, teachers, planners, police, administrative
public workers, etc. who are not directly involved in the
process of production and distribution but perform functions
necessary to maintain the mode of production.] All other
people who live by selling their labour--and this
explicitly includes technocrats and the so-called white
collar workers--objectively form the subordinate class."

These social relations of production make up the *objective
base of class*. The fact that they are determined in a perpetual

process of struggle emanating from the fundamental endogenous contradiction of the mode of production, implies that they are dynamic, constantly changing and evolving as the struggle unfolds. Thus, class is a relational and oppositional concept.

However, understanding this objective dimension of class is not sufficient to gain an understanding of the total behaviour of the members of a class. To complete the whole, we must understand the *subjective superstructure of class*, which is, once again, not merely a passive reflection of the base but actively interacts with it. It is also vitally important in understanding class aspirations in connection with urban living. Briefly, the superstructure of class refers to life style, racial and religious prejudices, educational achievement, etcetera, all of which can be subsumed under the heading of 'status', both subjective status and accorded status. [18] The relative autonomy of the superstructure (consciousness) of class means that individuals may or may not be conscious of their objective class allegiance: while they do comprise a class *in* itself, they may or may not comprise a class *for* itself. The lack of congruence between the objective and subjective dimension within the subordinate class, which seems to be the prevalent situation, makes it easier for the dominant class to maintain control.

A good example of the interaction between the base and superstructure of class is the behaviour of the 'labour aristocracy' during the 19th century: they accorded themselves the status of "junior partners in British Capitalism Limited" and so did not present a challenge to the dominant class. At least not until the 1880's when

they began to develop a subjective class consciousness which was more concordant with their objective position. It also meant that their needs and aspirations in relation to urban living differed substantially from those of the less privileged sector of the working class. And their failure to realize these needs and aspirations within the prevailing socio-economic institutions played an important part in their development of a working class consciousness towards the end of the 19th century. The development of the West End during that century further underlines the importance of the superstructure of class in the determination of patterns of urban living. Leading capitalists attained the status, both subjective and accorded, of landed aristocrats, and thus gravitated towards the West End where they could live like and with their aristocratic 'buddies' who welcomed them. As a result, the West End grew in size and has to this day maintained its image, and much of its quality, as the the home of the wealthy. The fact that both the 'labour aristocracy's' and the capitalist's status goals originated out of struggles within the base of class, and the reasons behind this, have been developed in Chapter 1 and should not be overlooked.

The dialectical interaction between the base and superstructure of class must, therefore, be an important variable in the radical theory of urban development. It raises a number of important conclusions about the process of urban development as a whole, and urban living in particular. One of these is developed below, some others in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Given the importance of the superstructure of class, and the

fact that the residential environment constitutes a very significant element in the expression and satisfaction of superstructural class aspirations, the conclusion must be drawn that *struggles within the sphere of urban living should be considered as part and parcel of the overall process of class struggle*. Thus, the radical theory of urban development must expand our understanding, which is severely limited at present, of the mechanisms by which, and the extent to which, certain forms of urbanism tend to promote, and others (more usually) to subvert, working *class* consciousness, that is, a concordance between the base and superstructure of class. Indeed, John Foster argues that this provides a useful means of comparing towns as a whole. In an interesting paper, he

[19]

"...puts forward a method of comparing nineteenth-century English towns; comparing them in terms of the class consciousness of their inhabitants. This [he argues] provides a way of comparing them as a whole--not just bits of them (birthrate, street-plan, council composition). *As a whole* (or nearly so) because the degree to which labour was politically and socially united very largely determined a community's mass social structure--housing and marriage, language and politics. *As a whole* because class consciousness or labour fragmentation refers to a community reaction to the essential nature of contemporary English society; a reaction to it as a structured, politically endorsed system of economic inequalities."

Thus the radical theory of urban development must expand our understanding of the relationships and contradictions between struggles around urban living, where the subjective dimension of class seems to dominate though the objective dimension is important (housing quality is both a function and an objective expression of a person's place in the division of labour and property), and those in the

productive sphere, where subjective issues are important but objective considerations dominate.

It should be clear from the preceeding arguments that the phrase 'created by society' in our definition of the city essentially means 'created by the class which is in control of society', and that this 'creation' evolves both in response to the drive to expand productive capacities and to challenges from the subordinate class. But more on this in the next section. Suffice it to say that urban development is not an entirely automatic process; that it betrays a degree of purposefulness behind the actions of members of the dominant class. By this, I do not mean to imply that a conscious coordinated conspiracy is being perpetrated by the dominant class but that we should guard against those theories which argue that urban development is an entirely automatic process--subject to the "invisible hand of the market"--and therefore beyond human control. This argument merely covers up and legitimizes the power and actions of the dominant class and promotes the subservience of the subordinate class.

Capital Accumulation and Urban Development.

In the previous section, we saw that there is a basic contradiction within the capitalist mode of production: that the social character and consequences of the process of production and reproduction contradict the private ownership and control of that process, which includes the production, distribution and reinvestment of surplus value. It was argued that this contradiction lay

at the basis of class formation and struggle, dividing capitalist society into two opposing camps: the dominant class of owners and controllers and the subordinate class of producers.

What the struggle between these two classes boils down to is a twofold battle over how much of the productive effort should be transformed into surplus value as opposed to supplying the consumption of the actual producers, in the first place, and how the surplus should be distributed and reinvested, in the second place. From this formulation of the class struggle, it follows that members of the dominant class, who control the production and realization of surplus value and benefit directly from it, can enhance their position, both economically and socially, by producing and realizing increasing amounts of surplus value; and, therefore, that this is their basic motivation, subject, of course, to their maintaining control over the process. On the other hand, members of the subordinate class can improve their lot in two ways: quantitatively, by capturing relatively more of the productive output for their own consumption and thereby improving their standard of living (this is the basis of everyday struggles); or qualitatively, by themselves gaining control over the process of production and reproduction and changing its structure to serve their needs and interests (this is the basis of revolution). In essence, this duality is what everyday conflicts over wages, profits, rents, taxes and interest rates are all about, and their outcomes play an important role in shaping the city.

The concept of *basic socio-economic institutions*, which was introduced in the historical study, is very useful in gaining an

understanding of how society mediates these conflicts in everyday life, why certain outcomes necessarily occur and how this process of conflict resolution patterns urban development under capitalism. These issues are briefly outlined in this and the following sections.

[20]

What are basic socio-economic institutions? The word 'institution' is not used in the popular sense which signifies a group or collectivity of people: for example, referring to banks as 'financial institutions' or schools as 'educations institutions'.

[21]

Rather, I will use the word in the following sense:

"An institution is simply a *social process* whereby individual people or groups of people interact with one another in a commonly understood, typical and patterned way. An institution, then, consists of two parts. First, there must be commonly understood guidelines (like rules in a game) which point out what is considered acceptable behaviour and on which people base their expectations of how other people will act....Second, such institutional rules must be accompanied by people actually acting according to those rules; that is, there must be normal and patterned behaviour consistent with the "rules of the game." A set of institutional "rules" does not constitute an institution unless people behave according to those rules."

These institutions are basic in the threefold sense of differentiating the capitalist mode of production from other modes of production, defining the 'rules of the game' of capitalism and thereby governing its historical development and in facilitating an understanding of the dynamics of capitalist society. Together these institutions define

[22]

the capitalist mode of social and economic integration by means of which the everyday actions and decisions of all the individual members of society are fused to form the evolving capitalist *gestalt*.

What are the basic institutions of capitalism? According to

Herbert Gintis, the most important are:

"(1) *Private ownership of factors of production* (land, labour, capital) according to which the legal owner has virtually full control over their disposition and development; (2) a *market in labour*, according to which (a) the worker is separated from ownership of non-human factors of production (land and capital), (b) the worker relinquishes control over the disposition of his labour during the stipulated work day by exchanging it for money and (c) the price of a particular type of labour (skilled, unskilled, white-collar, blue-collar, physical, mental, managerial, technical) is determined essentially by supply and demand; (3) a *market in land*, according to which the price of each parcel of land is determined by supply and demand and the use of such parcels is individually determined by the highest bidder; (4) income determination on the basis of *market-dictated 'returns' to owned factors* of production; (5) *markets in essential commodities* --food, shelter, social insurance, medical care; and (6) *control of the productive process by the owners of capital* or their designated managerial representatives."

It should be stressed that the word 'market' does not imply perfectly competitive markets--the 'ideal type' concept so important in neo-classical economic theory. Rather, it refers to institutions according to which the behaviour of participants who are antagonistic to each other is broadly governed by price movements and exchange value, but in which non-economic factors can, and usually do, also play an important part. Furthermore, the concrete character of these institutions can vary over time--markets in labour or land in London during the 19th-century were clearly very different from their modern counterparts--yet in essence they remain constant. Thus their exact nature must be determined through concrete historical analysis, always incorporating their essential characteristics.

It should be apparent that the analysis of the mode of production in terms of base and superstructure applies to the basic

institutions which essentially are the mode of production. Thus there are also *superstructural institutions* whose purpose is to support and perpetuate the basic institutions. The most important [24] ones are:

"[1] *Homo economicus* ['economic man'] the system of personality traits characteristic of and functional to capitalism, including especially the system of individual gain incentives; [2] the [*system maintenance*] *ideology* which abstracts and organizes "reality" in such a way as to justify and facilitate the operation of the other institutions;"

and (3) the *capitalist state*, which provides and administers the legal, legislative, military, police and general management functions necessary to the maintenance and fine-tuning of the basic [25] institutions.

Together these basic and superstructural institutions embody the capitalist system, and, therefore, each incorporates in [26] some way the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist mode of production, stated above. Thus, they are inherently unstable: in their mutual interaction they lay down the written and unwritten 'rules of the game' of capitalism which *produce both functional and dysfunctional outcomes*. Thus, while they must by definition maintain their essential qualities, and thereby their contradictory character, they must also be constantly modified in order to diffuse the conflicts and crises which their normal operation generates. I will now proceed to outline three major outcomes of the operation of these institutions and their important implications for urban development.

Firstly, the fact that members of the dominant, capitalist class, or their managerial representatives, control production means that capital accumulation (that is, profit and growth maximization) is the major goal of the productive unit. This is but a more accurate statement of the previous argument that the production and realization of surplus value is the capitalists' goal. Surplus value can be realized in three different forms: directly productive (i.e., in the form of capital, both 'human' and machine, which directly contributes to enlarged production in the next cycle and is paid for out of profits); indirectly productive (i.e., in the form of social and physical overhead capital which contributes indirectly to enlarged production and is paid for mainly out of taxes); and non-productive (i.e., in forms which absorb the surplus without leading to enlarged production--rent, interest and capitalist consumption). Clearly, if all surplus value is realized in its non-productive form, then the economy cannot grow and the basis of the capitalists' economic and social dominance is severely undermined. Thus, a certain proportion of the surplus must be realized in the form of directly productive capital, if only to ensure that capitalists prosper. And some of the surplus must be turned into indirectly productive investments--schools, roads, power generation systems, etc.--to ensure that the basis exists upon which the productive enterprise can grow. This leads to the conclusion that *capital accumulation is, and must be, the goal of the capitalist system* because it ensures the economic advancement and [27] dominance of the capitalist class.

This conclusion has a number of important implications for urban development under capitalism. In the first place, the accumulation of capital in progressively larger units is accompanied by its

concentration in the hands of fewer and fewer people and by the spatial concentration of capital in cities and towns. [28] Thus, *capitalism necessarily leads to urbanism* because the capitalist mode of realizing surplus value necessarily leads to its spatial concentration in cities and towns. The uneven distribution of wealth in society is mirrored by the uneven distribution of wealth over space. This points to the conclusion that the radical theory of urban development must explain the dialectical interactions embedded in the antithesis between town and country, large towns and small towns and between towns in advanced capitalist countries and towns in underdeveloped capitalist countries. This is especially important in understanding the concrete development and peculiarities of particular cities or towns, as the case of London --the financial heart of the 19th-century capitalist world--aptly indicates.

Secondly, because it is the locus of capital accumulation, [29] *the city must itself be regarded as a force of production* -- though indirectly productive; it is as necessary to the existence and efficiency of the productive enterprise as machines and raw materials. Thus, urban development must primarily occur in ways which support and enhance the process of capital accumulation, as opposed to those which enhance the social utility of living in the city. As the historical study showed, this goal was an extremely influential force in shaping London's development: the pattern of railway and dock development, the street improvements and the centralization of economic activity, all derived from it--and the

social consequences were disastrous. The fact that the responsibility for most urban infrastructure investments in modern cities is the responsibility of central and local government bodies and is paid for out of public funds does not negate this conclusion. The actions of these organizations form part of the third super-structural institution--the capitalist state. One of the most important functions of the capitalist state, as both London's history and modern urban development indicate, is to enhance or at least ensure the maintenance of a certain rate of capital accumulation [30] without impairing capitalist class dominance. Thus, unless popular responses to socially irrational public investments are particularly vehement and widely supported, priority will usually be given to those investments which promote capital accumulation by increasing the efficiency of the city as a force in production.

Thus, *the city can be viewed as the spatial embodiment of the fundamental 'socio-private' contradiction of the capitalist mode of production:* the social character and consequences of the process of urban development contradict the private--that is, the capitalist class--control over, and benefits from, that process.

A comparison between 19th-century London and modern London bears out this conclusion. While the productive efforts, both manual and intellectual, of society as a whole, have engendered great advances in urban technologies--for construction, transportation, communication and many other urban services--it is clear that urban problems which existed in the 19th-century continue to plague London today, though their form may have changed in certain cases;

and it is questionable whether the experience of urban living has improved, in a relative sense, for a sizeable proportion of the city's population. Pollution, congestion, slums--indeed, urban environmental destruction in general--are but different spatial expressions of the pervasive effects of this fundamental contradiction in shaping the urban environment. We will return to this contradiction, in the following section, when discussing the relationship between work and living.

The third urban implication of the capital accumulation imperative derives from the necessity for an adequate amount of the total surplus to be realized in its directly and indirectly productive forms. This exposes a *contradiction between the capital accumulation imperative and the institution which allocates space to competing users--the market in land*. Competition for urban space, an essentially fixed and scarce resource, leads to consistent inflation of land rents. This is the basis of the mythical qualities of land ownership as a hedge against inflation. However, land rent is a non-productive form of surplus value. Thus, to the extent that increasing quantities of surplus value are realized in the form of land rent, so the growth of production tends to diminish. On the other hand, the market in land is a necessary institution, both for allocating land to competing users so that locational advantage accrues in proportion to economic power and thus as a function of a firm's ability to accumulate capital; and, equally importantly, for justifying the resulting configuration in the minds of those who suffer in the process. [31] And, furthermore, the inflation of land rents is predicated upon the perpetuation of capital accumulation from whence

increased amounts of money to pay for increased land rents originate.

The fact that the nationalization of land has been advocated since the days of Henry George and has yet to be implemented not only indicates the power of the institution of private property and the political nightmares involved in placing responsibility for a necessarily uneven and anti-social allocation of land in the hands of the state, it also implies that mechanisms exist for mediating this contradiction between capital accumulation and land rent (and interest, for that matter). It seems as though state budgetary and legislative policies, [32] the investment decisions of major financial organizations [33] (banks, insurance companies, building societies, pension funds, etc.), as well as the dynamics of individual struggles between firms and land-lords, or tenants and landlords, or bosses and workers, [34] hold the key to the nature of such mediating mechanisms as exist. However, our knowledge on this subject is quite limited. Clearly, an understanding of what these regulatory mechanisms are, and how they operate, is important to an understanding of the process of urban development under capitalism, and, therefore, it should form part of a radical theory of urban development.

[35] *Spatially uneven development* is a fourth consequence of the drive to accumulate capital. The market in land ensures its uneven distribution: the allocation of land being a function of a firm's ability to accumulate capital, with the most successful accumulators being in a position to outbid all others for locations which best suit their needs. Thus, certain sectors of the city prosper and others decay depending on the fates of the productive and commercial

enterprises located within them. This phenomenon is compounded by the fact that declining productive and commercial enterprises are forced to pay low wages and are characterized by high rates of unemployment and underemployment. Furthermore, these workers are either excluded from most housing sub-markets or cannot afford the cost of transportation which would enable them to live away from their workplaces. Thus, declining enterprises are usually intermingled with slums. And the permanence and bulk of urban investments tends to seal the fate of these dilapidated areas for a long time. As was shown in the historical analysis, this, in the briefest outline, was the basic reason for the slums of the East End, an area which has, for similar reasons, maintained its low quality status and character. This inevitable tendency of the capitalist system to generate and sustain uneven spatial development is also the partial basis of the black central-area ghetto-- [36] white suburbs dichotomy so characteristic of large American cities.

The second major outcome of the operation of capitalist basic institutions arises both out of capitalist or managerial control of the productive enterprise and the institutionalization of markets as a mode of economic integration. As a result, *the capitalist system is "materially productive of individual, marketable (as opposed to social) goods and services"* [37] because it is only through producing increased quantities of goods and services and selling them on the market that the capitalist firm is able to realize profits and thereby expand. This entails the minimization of input costs and the expansion of production and sales. Hence, land, labour and capital are used as efficiently as possible in the production of and accelerated amounts of

marketable commodities, subject to capitalists, or their managerial representatives, maintaining secure control over the productive enterprise. It also engenders the pressure to find new buyers for the increased quantity of goods and to control the nature and extent of their demands through exaggerated advertizing campaigns stressing personal consumption, built-in obsolescence and, in general, the [38] creation of a whole commodity fetishist culture.

What this amounts to is the important observation, which will be expanded in subsequent sections of this chapter, that *capitalist class control must extend beyond the productive enterprise and into* [39] *most aspects of people's lives.* As Paul Sweezy has put it:

"The modern giant corporation has a profound need to *dominate and control* all the conditions and variables which affect its viability."

In all of its activities, the capitalist firm remains essentially oblivious to the social consequences of its activities, except when social pressures mount to such a pitch that lack of attention to them would threaten the continued existence of the firm, in which case changes (though not necessarily of the socially responsible variety) are initiated.

These processes have important consequences for urban development which must be incorporated into a radical theory. Firstly, the city functions partly as a receptacle, though not the most efficient or straightforward one, for the necessary disposal of surplus product (i.e., of productive capacity for which there is no effective consumer demand, but which the state 'consumes' in order to maintain a certain

[40]

rate of capital accumulation, e.g., military weapons, space programs).

Railway development was seen to be an important example in the case of 19th-century British cities. Monumental architecture is another example. And David Harvey argues that "much of the expansion of GNP in capitalist societies is bound up in the whole suburbanization process." [41]

Secondly, the city, being itself a massive composite of individual marketable commodities, is subject to similar pressures as those which determine the nature of other commodities. Built-in obsolescence, one of the capitalist system's devices for maintaining effective demand, pervades urban areas. [42] Buildings, once built to last, are demolished and new buildings with much shorter life-spans erected in their places. The shorter the economic and physical life of products, the quicker the rate of circulation of surplus value, and the higher the rate of capital accumulation.

Thirdly, the range of urban products available to citizens and consumers--houses, transport systems, entertainment--tend to follow the prerequisites of capital accumulation and not the preferences of individuals. [43] As Herbert Gintis has argued:

"....observed consumer behaviour in capitalist society is a rational reaction to the structure of available alternatives for social activity open to the individual. No theory of "consumer manipulation" is needed to explain this behaviour. Indeed, the ability of socializing institutions (family, schools, advertising) to affect behaviour must be explained by the verification of their "message" in the realities of day to day social life. If consumer behaviour seems odd or perverse, this is due less to any irrationality of individual preferences than to the restricted choice-sets of social activities they face, and to the fact that rational individuals will develop capacities to utilize what is available."

Thus, ranch or Spanish or colonial or ... style houses are built and consumers buy them, displaying their relative 'preferences' for one style or another. On a much larger and more significant scale, the production of automobiles, and their network of supportive infrastructure, especially in America has surpassed investments in public transportation to such an extent that car ownership has become a necessity of life in the city. [44] Thus, Marx was correct when he [45] wrote:

"Production thus produces consumption: first, by furnishing the latter with material; second, by determining the manner of consumption; third, by creating in consumers a want for its products as objects of consumption. It thus produces the object, the manner and the desire for consumption."

The neo-classical theory of location and land use, which is crucially dependent on the sovereign consumer maximizing his utility, becomes highly suspect in the light of this argument. The East End poor, for example, did not base their 'decision' to live in the slums on a utility-maximizing trade-off between accessibility to the centre and the cost of land. As we have seen, the slums of east London were the only choice of residential location open to them. The argument that they chose to live there merely serves to justify a system which deprived them of any choice in the matter.

Fourthly, the structural bias towards the production of marketable goods and services means that, wherever *financially* feasible, urban social and physical overhead capital will be privately produced and marketed. However, as soon as their production ceases to be profitable, such investments are discarded by private enterprise. If in the mean

time, they have become essential to the survival or smooth functioning of the economy, then the state is forced to assume ownership and to maintain and operate these infrastructure investments, the losses being borne by the tax payers and handsome profits accruing to the previous owners. [46] Social diseconomies are perpetually tolerated, but the state steps in as soon as financial losses are incurred. While I have not made detailed investigations of any British cases, the applicability of this model to American cities would seem to indicate that the nationalization of the railways and the 'metropolitanization' of London's underground, buses, roads, sewers, water and power supply--all of which were privately owned and operated during the 19th-century--followed similar developmental sequences.

Labour Market Stratification and Urban Living

Inequality of income and status is a third major outcome of the operation of capitalist institutions and it has especially important implications for urban residential development and the relationships [47] between work and living. In the words of Herbert Gintis:

"Income derives from the market value of privately owned factors of production. Ownership of non-human factors (land and capital) must be unequal in order to ensure the operation of the market in labour--i.e., in order to force workers to sell their labour or suffer the consequences. In addition, the prices of various types of labour and the price of capital (i.e., the profit rate) are determined through the autonomous operation of basic institutions, in such a manner as to allocate them toward their universal contribution to profit....Moreover, the organization of corporate production along lines of hierarchical authority and the association of income differentials as *symbolic* of relative hierarchical status, makes the income distribution a reflection of the very technology of production....Thus, capitalist societies are unequal societies."

From this it follows that a certain degree of income inequality is functionally essential to, and not a correctable aberration of, the capitalist mode of production.

The fact that urban residential land is differentially allocated by the market in land largely as a function of income obviously leads to unequal residential development. And residential inequalities not only reflect those emanating in production, but serve as powerful reinforcement as well, confirming and rewarding the structural inequalities of capitalist society. These facts 'leap out' of the historical study and are confirmed by the reality of modern urban living.

However, I am more interested in focusing on the dialectics of income, status and residential inequalities within the subordinate, working class, as these hold the key to an understanding of how urban residential development dovetails into the class struggle, and of the basis and persistence of urban housing problems. Obviously, such an understanding is crucial to a radical theory of urban social and spatial development.

The first step towards this goal is a radical theory of the nature of the market in labour--both within the firm and in general. This is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is useful to summarise briefly the major arguments and conclusions of the emerging radical analysis, as these reveal important implications for the theory of urban residential development.

[48]

According to this view, the market in labour consists of two mutually interacting parts--the social relations of production (i.e., the internal organisation of the firm) and the external relations of

production or external labour market (i.e., overall labour supply and demand, primary and secondary labour markets, unemployment, etc.). The structure, characteristics and dynamics of the external labour market are essentially determined by the social relations of production which are in turn influenced by external labour market conditions. "The central argument," according to Richard Edwards, "is that the institutional arrangements within the firm which govern production-- the 'social relations of the firm'--are essential in explaining labour market behaviour." [49]

Thus, an explanation of what determines a certain configuration of social relations within the firm lies at the basis of the radical theory of the market in labour. It is argued that the maintenance of capitalist or managerial control of the firm--one of the basic institutions--is the primary determinant of its organizational structure; that goals of technical efficiency or profitability hold sway only in so far as the configurations which they necessitate do not threaten or hamper the control imperative, because in the last analysis, capitalist or managerial prosperity is predicated upon their maintaining control of the productive enterprise. After examining the organization of production under feudalism, capitalism and Soviet socialism, Stephen Marglin concludes that: [50]

"...the primary determinant of basic choices with respect to the organization of production has not been technology-- exogenous and inexorable--but the exercise of power--endogenous and resistible."

In other words, class conflict, over the nature of the productive process and the division of the net product (the upper and lower bounds of which are set by external labour and capital market conditions), is

viewed as the fundamental determinant of the social relations of
production. The radical theory, in the words of Herbert Gintis: [51]

"...sees the internal social relations of the firm as chosen by the director, along with the political system of the enterprise, in order to *mediate* the contradiction between workers and directors. We thus begin with the contradiction and show *why* certain organizational forms, work roles and hiring practices result. This is what is meant when Marxists say that the social relations of production and their historical evolution can only be understood as emanating from the 'class struggle.'"

The resultant social relations of production are, therefore, both a way of organizing the productive efforts of workers, as well as a system of controlling them: through sanctions, incentives, the distribution of authority and other devices by which power is exercised and legitimized. The most powerful modes of control have historically been based on the principle of 'divide and conquer', a strategy which has served the capitalist class well by insulating one section of the labour force from another, thereby subverting the growth of a collective *class* consciousness. These divisions have always existed under capitalism, though the criteria upon which they have been based have changed--from the differentiation between trades and skills within the small, heterogeneous firms of the 19th-century to the more arbitrary and finely tuned bureaucratic hierarchies which seem to be necessary to hide the homogeneous atmosphere of mammoth modern corporations.

Thus, income and status differentials within the firm, while bounded by external labour market conditions, are really the product of the need for bosses to maintain control and are not simply a product of the varying marginal productivity of different groups of workers.

At the top of the scale, the potential loss of high wages and other trappings of high occupational status ensure that workers essentially control themselves; at the bottom, the threat to their existence forces workers to accept unfulfilling, low-status jobs, paying low wages. Furthermore, these stratificatory devices constitute a powerful system of economic and social incentives designed to motivate workers to 'give their all' in service of the productive enterprise.

It is important to understand that these divisions are not solely the product of capitalist or managerial manipulation, but are partly an expression of workers' responses to their loss of control over the decisions which affect their daily lives. [52] This is why sub-groups display such a tenacity for survival and opposition to attempts at class unification. This conclusion is amply confirmed by the development of a 'labour aristocracy' in 19th-century Britain. And the stirrings of a working class consciousness within their ranks, partly as a result of their housing problems during the 1880's, point to another conclusion which exposes the dynamics of this stratification process. This conclusion is [53] well stated by John Foster:

"If, therefore, the system's economic contradictions force the ruling class to ask too much of these men--to countenance attacks on existing expectations and identities--then it runs the risk of forcing at least part of them into opposition. In these circumstances, opponents of the *system itself* get the chance to take up their defence and, if the struggle goes on long enough, may even be able to merge sectional identities into a collective *class* identity developed around slogans incompatible with the existing order. Hence, false consciousness--while the antithesis of class consciousness--does contain within it (as a kind of historical ratchet stop) the crucial trigger capable of upsetting the whole system. And once the deeper social crisis has occurred...either the system is successfully overthrown or,

if the old order is to survive, its whole political economy must be fundamentally modified...to win back at least certain sections of the labour force."

In the light of these social relations of production, it is not surprising to find that the external labour market is also stratified-- [54] broadly into primary and secondary sectors, and more finely within each. Nor are the differential 'outputs' of systems which serve to prepare people for their 'slot' in the labour market--especially [55] schools, neighbourhoods and the family--surprising.

Finally, the radical analysis of the labour market views poverty, which is but the low end of the income-status differential scale, as both a functional and potentially antagonistic outcome of the market in labour, of which it is a structural feature and not a temporary aberration. As the London casual labour market of the 19th-century showed, it is an important part of the intricate system of incentives and controls which keep the overall economic system going. Howard Wachtel cites four [56] reasons for this:

"First, extreme wage and income inequality is necessary to induce workers to perform alienating work for external rather than internal rewards....Second, the existence of a poverty underclass...serves as a warning to the non-poor that their fate could be much worse, thereby mitigating labour militancy by dividing labour along status lines. Third, to the extent that the poor form a "reserve army of the unemployed," wages are depressed, some unions are weakened, and labour's ability to obtain a greater share of income generated in production is diminished. Fourth, the *non-poor's* real income is substantially increased by poverty,...since commodities and services can be obtained at lower prices so long as wages are depressed by the existence of the poor and capital retains its power to extract profits."

Furthermore, guaranteeing workers a socially adequate supply of

essential commodities is patently dysfunctional to, if not destructive of, the operation of the market in labour. Like the proverbial birds of a feather, capitalism, poverty and inequality flock together! [57]

I will now outline some implications which this stratification of the working class holds for urban residential development. In order to do so in a coherent and consistent fashion, it is useful to develop a new concept: that the *city is a force of reproduction of labour*. [58] This is the dialectical opposite of the concept of the city as a force of *production*, proposed in the previous section. What it refers to is the important truism that the city is not only a place where goods are produced by people, it is equally a place where people reproduce themselves (i.e., live) so that they are able to continue producing.

Under capitalism, these two functions of the city are spatially separated--there is an extensive and systematic split between work and living. And the existence of this split is fundamentally a product of the capitalist institutional structure. In order for the market in labour to exist and operate efficiently, work and living must be separate. Workers must be forced to sell their labour for a wage, the object of which is to procure a certain standard of living for themselves, partially via the *market in urban living*. [59] However, the spatial split between work and living tends to hide their interrelatedness and interdependence.

This uncovers another aspect of the relationship between urban form and the capitalist mode of production. The contradictory interactions between the city as a force of production and the city as a force of reproduction give capitalist cities their fundamental formal character: the *split between work and living*, physically linked by transportation

and communication systems, and socially linked in the day-to-day experiences of people--who inhabit both worlds. Once again, this contradiction is but another way of formulating the dominant-subordinate class antagonism of capitalist society.

Clearly, a symbiotic relationship between work and living-- between the social relations of production and the social relations of living. [60] --must exist if the city is to function relatively smoothly as a 'device' for reproducing labour. This leads one to expect that the market in urban living must exhibit certain similarities to the market in labour, that the market in urban living must also be stratified along income and status dimensions (which it obviously is) and, more importantly, that this stratification is equally functional in subverting the development of a collective working class consciousness. On the other hand, this does not mean that antagonisms do not exist between these two spheres of social relations, antagonisms which either serve a functional purpose of further diffusing class consciousness, or the dysfunctional (from a dominant class point of view, of course) purpose of class unification, thereby forming the basis of the evolutionary dialectic of the social relations of living. In fact, the historical study supports all of the above observations.

This can be summarized in the form of three related propositions which support the latter part of our earlier definition of the city, and which must be incorporated into a radical theory of urban living and city form.

The first proposition is that the market in urban living and the social relations of living *usually reflect* the market in labour

and the social relations of production--the primary structuring spheres of capitalist society. The autonomous operation of the market in urban living, given the income differentials among participants, can be expected to produce residential hierarchies which mirror work hierarchies. However, the fact that residential neighbourhoods, which comprise the hierarchical rungs, are more than just houses leads one to expect that this outcome is neither purely a market response, nor is it automatic or inevitable.

This leads to the second proposition: that residential hierarchies, by incorporating a comprehensive range of supportive systems and organizations (schools, shops, pubs, entertainment, welfare systems, transportation, the complex social network of friends and acquaintances, etc.) serve the purpose of supporting work hierarchies. [61] In other words, that the strata of residential neighbourhoods, which comprise the overall market in urban living, are each part of the material and ideological infrastructure which correspond to, and support strata within the labour market. The East End during the 19th-century was a perfect example of this.

The housing problems of the 'labour aristocracy' during the 1880's indicate a third proposition: that the resolution of the contradiction between the city as a force of production and the city as a force of reproduction can and sometimes does structure the market in urban living so that incongruent outcomes are produced--that the social relations of living contradict the social relations of production--and that such contradictions are potentially productive of collective working class consciousness. In these instances, the maintenance of ruling

class control necessitates changes in the structure of the market in urban living such that new forms of social relations of living are generated which are once again congruent with the social relations of production. Furthermore, because the social relations of production are themselves dynamic and changing, this contradiction might arise without significant changes in the structure of the market in urban living.

In all of these processes, the concepts of the 'market in urban living' and the 'social relations of living' are crucial. In the following section I will explain my understanding of the meaning and relevance of these concepts, which proved to be invaluable in understanding and explaining 19th century London's development from a radical perspective. A subsequent section will deal with the relationship between labour market stratification, poverty and the housing problem under capitalism.

The Social Relations of Living

The common feature of the concepts developed in the previous four sections of this chapter is that they are each related in some way to the determination of those pressures which provide the impetus for urban development or decay, the *gestalt* of these pressures determining the directions, objects, limits and/or rate of such development or decay. However, these pressures are only part of the process of urban development--they comprise complex bundles of decisions, usually contradictory and/or conflicting, which people make and endeavour to satisfy in the urban environment. Just as a tennis player's decision to hit the ball to the far left-hand corner of the opponent's court is not sufficient to actually move the ball there, so these pressures, while absolutely necessary, are not sufficient to actually shape

the city. For the tennis player to realize his/her intentions, he/she must hold the racket in a certain way, stand in a certain position, swing the racket at a certain speed, the racket must be strung in a certain manner, the ball must respond in a certain way, etc. Similarly with the process of urban development: certain formative mechanisms must exist which serve to translate the totality of pressures into the social and spatial reality which is the city. Consequently, the concepts developed to understand only these pressures do not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to build a radical theory of urban development. To make the theory complete, another set of concepts must be developed which elucidate the *formative mechanisms which determine the actual shape of the city and its parts*. This is the subject of this section.

What is the object of these pressures or intentions? Stated very simply, it is to secure a certain quality and quantity of space which is appropriate to the needs of all the individuals who, and corporate bodies which, must for a variety of reasons be located in the city. As I have argued, the totality of functions which are carried out in the city can be broadly divided into two categories--those which relate to the city as a force of production (not only industrial production but all those activities necessary to keep the city viable as a locus of capital accumulation--communication, transportation, public and private goods and services, offices, markets, etc.) and those which relate to the city as a force of reproduction (all those activities necessary to reproduce life in the city--housing, communication, transportation, education, health care, essential and non-essential commodity distribution, entertainment, other public and private goods and services, etc.).

Of course, many urban functions are both productive and reproductive. But the point is not the preciseness of the division; rather it is to stress that conflicting and contradictory pressures for urban space are generated both within each sphere and in the interactions between them, and that these must somehow be mediated for the city to become a reality.

Under capitalism, the socially-accepted institution which performs this mediating function is the *market in land*. According to this institution, the price of each parcel of land is broadly regulated by supply and demand, and the use of each parcel is largely individually determined by the highest bidder. In my view, it is inappropriate and uninformative to consider the market in land as a whole. Rather, it is more useful to conceptualise the market in land as comprised of a number of sectors, each relating to a different category of land use (residential, industrial, commercial, office, governmental, etc.) though connected by their competition for spatial locations which satisfy their particular requirements.

Both economic and political power play important roles in deciding the outcomes of this incremental and perpetual competition for urban space. Due to the structural inequalities in the distribution of income and political power in capitalist society, this competition is inherently unequal. Thus, in the overall urban land market, there is a pecking order for land, with those individuals and/or corporate bodies having the greatest economic and political leverage usually achieving priority and being most likely to acquire the area and location of land which matches their requirements; and those at the bottom of the scale usually having little option but to accept 'left-over' parcels of land. As the historical study showed, finance and

commerce chose to locate in the City, certain industries chose to move to the provinces, successful capitalists chose to live in the West End, most members of the middle stratum chose to move to the suburbs though some were forced to vacate their houses in the centre and, finally, most of the working class were essentially forced to live in the central-area slums.

In this respect, it should be stressed that this is a dynamic *process* over which no individual or corporate body has complete control. Those with more power may be able to control outcomes to a significant degree by combining their influence, but this cannot be guaranteed. On the other hand, the process of urban development is sequential and, once locations are fixed, the scale and permanence of the investment tends to perpetuate a certain *physical* configuration which may become inappropriate to the more easily changeable economic and social configuration. These changes are reflected in changing relative land values which, as it were, reflect the changing stage-set within which the actors in the land market must attempt to satisfy their needs.

I will now narrow the analysis down somewhat by confining the remainder of this discussion to the residential sector of the overall land market. I do believe, however, that appropriately modified versions of the concepts developed to understand the residential sector could be developed to understand other sectors of the land market with equally enlightening results.

The residential sector of the urban land market is usually referred to as the housing market. This is not a useful concept as its meaning is ambiguous [62] --ranging from just a market in houses to a market in houses-plus-residential-services--and most connotations are too narrow and therefore

restrictive. A more useful concept is the *market in urban living*.

What is urban living? It is a complex bundle of indivisible components which people buy or rent when they buy or rent a house. These components fall into three categories. First, those which relate to the land itself (its size, geology, topography, etc.). Second, those which arise out of the location of the parcel of land within the urban area. These consist of the physical infrastructure of the locality (roads, transportation systems, power, sewerage, parks, etc.); the access and accessibility which the location affords to other activities, such connections being either essential, necessary or desirable (workplaces, shops, entertainment, banks, social and community services, etc.); and both positive and negative neighbourhood externalities (people, community affairs, the physical condition of the area, property taxes, pollution, congestion, etc.). Finally, the third category of components of urban living relates to the house itself (its structure, space, layout, aesthetics, fixtures and fittings, etc.). Together all these components define the quality and quantity of the 'commodity' urban living which people 'consume' in their daily lives, and whose consumption is an essential aspect of urban existence.

Clearly the quality and quantity of these components and therefore of urban living vary with the location of the house and land within the urban area. Furthermore, no ideal quality and quantity of urban living exists, though the socially accepted definition of what is adequate changes, usually progressively, over time. For example, the 19th-century rookeries of central London would be totally unacceptable by today's standards, at least if similar proportions of the populations were forced to endure such degrading

environments. Indeed, the historical study has shown that the definition of what constitutes a socially acceptable standard of urban living varies with class. Successful capitalists, whose main goal was to mingle with the aristocracy of the West End, probably scoffed at the thought of moving to the sprouting suburbs of the middle stratum; whereas these suburbs must have seemed like paradise to the working class trapped in the slums of the East End. Thus, the notion of a socially acceptable standard of urban living for each class, being the data with respect to which people judge the quality of their living situations, is more useful than the notion of an ideal standard.

An important conclusion from the historical study in this regard is that the object of the class struggle in the residential sphere of people's lives is both to define the socially acceptable standard of urban living for each class (and here social aspirations emanating from the relations of production, such as the 'labour aristocracy's' struggle to separate themselves from the rest of the working class, are just as important as economic considerations) and to enable members of each class to achieve, maintain or improve upon their respective socially accepted data.

As with the analysis of the labour market, outlined in the previous section, it is appropriate to analyse the market in urban living according to the *external* and *internal* social and economic relations of which it is comprised. It is the interaction within and between these two sectors which determine the differential quality of urban living enjoyed by the population of the city, how much they have to pay for it, the spatial form of residential areas and the dynamics of their development or decay. Herein lie the formative mechanisms through which the intentions and aspirations of individuals

and corporate bodies are translated into a spatial reality. Thus it is important to understand the nature and operation of these two broad sectors of the market in urban living. I will first consider the external relations of the market in urban living, then the internal relations and, finally, their interaction.

What I have called the *external relations of the market in urban living* consist partly of the whole range of economic and locational factors to which most neoclassical economists restrict their attentions when analysing the housing market. These factors can be divided into two broad categories: those economic factors which affect the supply of and demand for housing and those spatial or locational factors which define the characteristics and quality of respective residential areas.

Briefly, the first category incorporates on the supply side: the availability (or lack) of *vacant* houses for sale or rental, the availability of capital to finance rehabilitation of the existing stock and/or new construction, the capacities of the residential construction industry to renovate run-down houses or build new ones, the availability of land for new residential construction, the interest rates on loans, the existence of governmental policies or programs designed to stimulate one or more of the above factors or to actually provide housing, etc.; and on the demand side: wages, salaries or other earnings which determine the occupants' abilities to pay for housing, the availability of capital for house purchase or improvement, people's willingness to put aside a certain proportion of their earnings to purchase or rent housing, governmental policies or programs which affect people's abilities to pay for housing, etc. The common feature of all the factors in this category is that each in some way conditions or set limits to the *exchange*

value of urban living for both house occupants and other individuals and corporate bodies involved in the housing process--landlords, building societies, construction companies, public housing authorities, etc. Most neo-classical models of the urban housing market restrict the second category to the area of land upon which the housing is built and its accessibility to the centre. This makes modelling and quantification easier but is an incomplete statement of what people look for in their search for housing. A more realistic definition of the spatial and locational factors which comprise the second category is all those elements, stated above, which determine the quality of the 'commodity.' In other words, all those elements which determine the *use value* of urban living.

However, two further categories of factors must be added to the above two to complete the constituent parts of the external relations of the market in urban living. First, those factors which define the socially accepted standard of urban living for the respective classes of society, as discussed above. This expands the purely economic definition of the demand for urban living, to which neoclassical economists restrict their attentions, to a sociological definition thereby incorporating urban living into the class struggle. The socially accepted standard of living for each class is, of course, the standard with reference to which the members of each class evaluate the use value of urban living and base judgements of the legitimacy of and their willingness to pay the exchange value demanded by the owners or controllers of urban living. Second, those factors which determine people's relative positions in the class structure and thereby their differential social and political power to command a certain quality of urban living at a certain price for themselves.

Clearly, the boundaries between these four categories cannot be sharply defined. Each set of factors conditions, and is in turn conditioned by, the others. What is important, however, is that in their totality these external relations of the market in urban living in turn condition, or set limits to, outcomes in the internal relations of the market in urban living, to which I now turn.

What are the internal relations of the market in urban living? These are the institutional arrangements, both legal or quasi-legal, between landlord (public or private) and tenant, buyer and seller, mortgagee and mortgagor. These institutionalised arrangements are commonly referred to as forms of tenure. However, this is another ambiguous concept. Its meaning is commonly restricted to those legal arrangements which govern the occupants' rights to ownership and/or control of the houses in which they live--their security of tenure. But this is only a part of the institutional arrangements surrounding the housing process.

The *social relations of living* is a more embracing and accurate conceptualization of the *gestalt* of these institutional arrangements which constitute the internal relations of the market in urban living. And here we arrive at the most crucial conclusion and contribution of this thesis--that *the social relations of living, in their totality, constitute the basic formative mechanism by means of which the pressures acting upon the market in urban living are translated into a social and spatial reality, within the limits set by the external relations of the market in urban living.*

Thus, an understanding of the social relations of living holds the key to an understanding of the processes which determine the quality of urban living, its class distribution, its cost, its spatial form and the

dialectical evolution of the behaviour and outcomes of the market in urban living. The historical study, where the social relations of living were labelled 'tenure relations,' bears out this conclusion--the quality and spatial form of urban living experienced by members of each social class, how much it cost them, the placement of transportation lines through residential areas, the possibilities for residential improvement, the housing problem of the 1880's, etc., were all fundamentally a function of the variants of the leasehold form of social relations of living. I would even go so far as to say that the concept of the social relations of living holds the key to a general theory of urban or non-urban residential development, irrespective of the economic system under which such development takes [63] place.

Under capitalism, the social relations of living consist of all those social and economic relations, either legal or quasi-legal, between individuals and/or corporate bodies involved in the housing process, which control and mediate the perpetual process of exchange, through which the 'commodity' urban living becomes a use value for house occupants by virtue of their consumption of it, and simultaneously becomes an exchange value for its [64] owners or controllers by virtue of the exchange process. In other words, the social relations of living take the specific form of a system of legal or quasi-legal controls which mediate the 'collision' process in which an empty carcass of timber, bricks and mortar, which an individual or corporate body owns or controls, and a quantity of money in the hands of a family, are transformed into a home (use value) for the family on the one hand, and a [65] rent (exchange value) for the owner or controller, on the other.

Tenure relations--by which I do not mean just security of tenure, but rather the whole range of social and economic relations which determine the rights and responsibilities of the owners or controllers of housing and the occupants--are the most important, though not the only, element of the social relations of living. Urban living, as we have seen, consists of more than just houses and, therefore, the social and economic relations governing the rights and responsibilities of those who provide and receive a return for the other components, must be incorporated into the concept of the social relations of living. For example, local authorities which provide public goods or services, paid for out of rates (or property taxes), and private corporations which provide telephone or electricity services for which they levy charges, must also be accounted for. Empirical observation seems to indicate that the relative power which a particular group of occupants are accorded in their tenure relations is generally similar to that which is accorded them in these other relations. For instance, the working-class inhabitants of the central London slums in the 19th century had a raw deal from their landlords, the local vestries and the private water and sewerage companies, whereas the opposite was the case for the wealthy West Enders. In view of the brevity of this treatment, I will focus my attention on the tenure relations aspect of the social relations of living.

These social relations of living, as I argued in the historical analysis, were the basic determinants of the quality and spatial form of a residential area, of the rent paid for housing and even of the location of transportation channels, specifically railway developments and street improvements. For example, it was argued that the reason why Paris, London and Los Angeles,

all cities in advanced capitalist countries, are so different, is because their historical development has been governed by different social relations of living. However, it must be stressed that the external relations of the market in urban living also play an important part in these processes by setting limits which tend to alter the balance of power between owner/controllers and occupants. For example, the acute shortage of accommodation in the East End slums gave landlords the upper hand and served to facilitate and legitimate the charging of high rents for extremely low standards of urban living. Thus, the social relations of living are the determining base of urban living while the external relations of the market in urban living are the conditioning, though important, superstructure.

As is the case with the market in labour, the market in urban living is also stratified--broadly as a function of the various social relations of living and more finely when these are meshed with two aspects of the external relations: the social class of the occupants, and the physical and locational characteristics of their neighbourhoods. For example, in modern London there are four main social relations of living: owner occupation, public housing, private unfurnished rental and private furnished rental. Housing associations and institutionalized squatting are at present negligible in proportion to these four. Each of these conveys different rights and responsibilities on owner/controllers and on occupants. Owner-occupiers generally get the best deal while private furnished tenants are usually worst off. Here is where the social class of the occupants becomes important. The small proportion of working-class owner-occupiers, for example, will probably have less effectual control over the quality of their urban living than the small proportion of capitalists who rent private-furnished accommodation, due to

the relative power which their respective classes are accorded in capitalist society. However, the fact that owner-occupation affords the occupants a high degree of control over urban living, when compared to private furnished rental, seems to be reinforced by the class distribution of tenure relations, with members of the more powerful classes predominating in the owner-occupation sector and those of weaker classes mainly renting private furnished accommodation.

Furthermore, empirical observation seems to indicate that the quality of urban living experienced, varies directly with the relative power which each stratum of the market in urban living affords the occupants. For example, areas where members of the lower strata of the working class rent private furnished accommodation tend to be of low quality and badly maintained due to the weak position of occupants in this stratum of the market in urban living. Thus, the previous argument that a mutually reinforcing sociological connection exists between the strata of the market in labour and those of the market in urban living seems to be justified, and the social class of house occupants seems to be the crucial common feature.

Finally, we must turn briefly to the determination of exchange value, or rent. Each stratum of the market in urban living has its own peculiar rent structure. The two main forms of rent are *absolute rent* and *differential rent*. [66] Absolute rent arises by virtue of the institution which permits private ownership and control of land. According to this institution, landowners are accorded the quasi-monopolistic right to keep their land off the market until the external relations are such that the land commands an acceptable rent. Thus, the absolute rent for each stratum of the market in urban living is the rent which the

land with the lowest standard of urban living within that stratum can command. Differential rent is the varying increment above the absolute rent, which a parcel of land can command by virtue of the higher standard of urban living, within the respective strata, which it affords; this standard being measured in relation to the standard afforded by the land which commands only an absolute rent.

The level of absolute and differential rent within each stratum of the market in urban living is a function of five interrelated factors. First, the quality of urban living which a certain location provides--i.e., its use value. Landowners do not have a great deal of control over this factor. All they can control directly is the nature of the house itself, while the remaining elements of urban living are subject to indirect control via political and social pressure on the bodies responsible for their provision and upkeep, mainly local authorities. Second, the scarcity of urban living within each stratum. A certain level of scarcity is as essential to the existence and operation of the market in urban living, as is the necessity that the land plus improvements have a certain use value. If the supply of urban living within a certain stratum was infinitely plentiful, then the land upon which it was built would command no rent. David Harvey's concept of *absolute space* [67] is useful in this respect. Each stratum of the market in urban living has a certain amount of absolute space within the urban area available for its members. The amount of absolute space usually diminishes in direct proportion to the power of occupants as defined by the social relations of living and the class structure. The more restricted the absolute space for urban living in relation to the demand for it within each stratum, the higher the absolute rent. The confinement of most members of the working class to the central

slums of 19th-century London and the high rents they had to pay, bears out this conclusion.

The third and fourth factors in the determination of rent are the ability and willingness, respectively, of occupants to pay the rent. These are mainly, a function of the occupants' relative positions in the social relations of production, their individual calculus as to how much to spend on rent as opposed to other forms of consumption, and of governmental policies which affect the availability of funds for purchase or rental, or which directly control rent levels. Finally, the fifth factor is the social relations of living themselves, rent levels being a function of the respective economic relations defined between the owners or controllers of urban living and the occupants. For example, the lack of middlemen in the West End leasehold system enabled occupants to pay more for their housing than those who were housed under the 'sweated' leasehold system where each middleman had to receive his cut. Similarly, today, the tax deduction on interest payments which owner-occupiers are allowed enables wealthier owner-occupiers to pay more than poorer ones, and owner-occupiers in general to pay more than renters.

This extremely preliminary analysis of the market in urban living indicates that the three concepts--'urban living,' the 'external relations of the market in urban living,' and the 'social relations of living'--which I have developed, are important and useful in gaining an understanding of the formative mechanisms which determine the actual shape of residential areas. As such, they must command an important place in a radical theory of urban living and city form.

Capitalism and Working-Class Housing Problems

Much of the historical study was concerned with the causes of working-class housing problems and the palliatives advanced for their solution or mitigation. Though different in form, working-class housing problems and the dilemma of what to do about them, are still as pressing today as they were a century ago. What do the historical study and the concepts outlined in this chapter tell us about the nature and basis of these housing problems and the popularly-accepted palliatives advanced for their solution or mitigation? In this section, I will briefly discuss some answers to this double-barrelled question.

We have seen that labour market stratification--and with it the stratification of the working class--and poverty, are structural features of the capitalist mode of production. And these outcomes of the market in labour and the social relations of production normally serve the functional purpose of maintaining the capitalist class structure by providing the incentive and control systems necessary to 'encourage' workers to 'play by the rules of the game'; though the contradictions and hardships generated in the process are potentially dysfunctional. Furthermore, as a result of the integral economic and sociological connections between the market in labour and the market in urban living, the market in urban living is similarly stratified, with its own 'down-and-out' sector, and the resultant residential hierarchies normally serve similarly functional incentive-and-control purposes.

Thus, as long as the capitalist mode of production exists, residential hierarchies will continue to exist--there will always be neighbourhoods in which the standard of urban living is relatively low and vice versa.

As long as people are free and able to compare their residential environments with others, those in the lower strata of the market in urban living will always feel that they have housing problems--that the quality of their housing is lower than the socially accepted norm. As Marx put it in 1847: [68]

"A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped with its four walls.

A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of productive wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, [and] in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature."

This leads to the important conclusion that *relative* housing problems are structural features of the capitalist mode of production and, that while they may occasionally become a 'thorn in the side' of the system, they are normally functional in maintaining the status quo, a fact which prompted Engels to write in 1872: "Capital does not *want* to abolish the housing shortage even if it could; this has now been finally established." [69]

Indeed, the fact that adequate housing at reasonable rents has perpetually been beyond the reach of a section of the working class--that housing problems have existed in London, for example, at least since the 1830's--amply supports these conclusions.

Furthermore, as we have seen, quality differentials and scarcities in urban living must exist, in order for the market in urban living to operate. [70] If, by waving a magic wand, everyone could be housed in socially satisfactory accommodation, then the demand for urban living would become virtually non-existent and the economic consequences under capitalism would be disastrous. The residential construction and real estate industries, as least, would collapse and possibly the most important buffer for the entire economy would disappear. Thus, capitalism must constantly make people feel that the commodity-consumption limit is still distant and it must make them fear the discomforts of falling to the bottom stratum of the market in urban living. The system is 'doomed' to continually create new demands whilst the capacity to satisfy them lags behind or is completely non-existent. Once again we arrive at the conclusion that a "decent home for all" [71] --the age-old goal of most *bourgeois* housing reformers--is an impossible dream under capitalism.

Furthermore, H. G. Wells' 19th-century observation that "it was nobody's business to see that people were well-housed under civilised conditions" [72] applies equally forcefully today. In fact, this phenomenon is part and parcel of the capitalist institutional structure--for the basic institutions to operate, workers must fend for themselves. And if these institutions generate and perpetuate working-class housing problems, then so be it.

Housing serves different and often contradictory functions for the respective individuals and corporate bodies connected with the housing process. This basically stems from the fact that some seek the use value [73] of a house, while others are concerned with its exchange value.

Occupants want a home in which to live; developers and the housing construction industry seek to profit from building and selling housing; real estate agents make money by selling as many houses as possible; landlords profit from rents; etc. Thus, there can be at least as many types of housing problems under capitalism as there are interest groups affected by the housing process. For example, the housing problems of the Depression years in the United States were as much problems for the housing construction and financing interest groups as they were for people who needed roofs over their heads. And the United States government's response--which encouraged new construction and suburbanization--reflected this fact. Thus, when people propose or demand a solution to 'the housing problem,' they must be clear about whose housing problem it is that they want solved.

Then what are the origin and nature of the everpresent *working-class housing problems*? At the most fundamental level, these are products of capitalist social relations in general and the social relations of living in particular. As a result of the social, economic and political inequities inherent in these relations, most members of the working class lack the power to alter the outcomes of the basic institutions; they do not control the decisions which determine the social and spatial geography of their communities and their standard of urban living. And this lack of control over urban living is but a part of the lack of power of the working class in all spheres of life in capitalist society. In the words of

[74]

Herbert Gintis:

"...alienation from the community corresponds to our general proposition [that alienation is a product of the basic institutions and social, rather than psychological, in origin]: the institutions determining the role structure, the power structure, and the physical structure of a community operate apart from the needs of individuals."

And this cannot be otherwise under capitalism, for the capitalist class must extend its control into all spheres of life if it is to maintain its hegemony. Thus, we may agree with Marx's statement to the First International, that: [75]

"The subjection of the man of labour to the man of capital lies at the bottom of all servitude, all social misery, and all political dependence."

While the external relations of the market in urban living--supply and demand mismatches, low wages, etc.--may aggravate working-class housing problems, they do not cause these problems. Increasing the supply or lowering the cost of housing for the working class may help in the short run, but unless the relative power of the working class in the social relations of living is enhanced, these gains will be lost in the long run. [76] Furthermore, concentrating the blame on factors in the external relations of the market in urban living serves to exonerate the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist form of urban development, both of which, by assumption, are seen to be unproblematic; however, as Engels put it, "the housing shortage...is one of the innumerable *smaller*, secondary evils which result from the present-day capitalist mode of production," [77] the central problem being the outcomes of the class struggle in the workplace. Thus: [78]

"As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for an isolated settlement of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the lot of the workers. The solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of all the means of subsistence and instruments of labour by the working class itself."

What of the standard, accepted definitions, theories and solutions advanced for working-class housing problems? A comprehensive critique is out of context, but a few brief conclusions are in order. The historical study has shown that the prevailing paradigm, by which these problems are defined, explained and proposed to be solved, by virtue of the fact that it manages to prevail because the capitalist class does not oppose it, [79] is part of the ideological armour for maintaining the status quo--and therefore perpetuating the very problems it purports to be able to solve. This end is not accomplished as a result of the malicious designs of the paradigm's proponents; indeed, most are unaware of the inevitability of this outcome. Rather, it is a reflection of the power of the ideological opiate embedded in the paradigm which dulls the senses of those who uphold it, blinding them to the central issues and the structural basis of working-class housing problems.

This is not to say that ruling paradigms of working-class housing problems are entirely wrong and therefore useless, but rather to put them into perspective as one-sided views, biased in favour of the ruling class. By viewing housing problems as separable from the essentially unproblematic capitalist mode of production and urban development, falling in the domain of the external relations of the market in urban living and not the social relations of living, they inaccurately imply that these problems are only temporary malfunctions which can, and will, be solved within the limits of the social system. Defining these problems in terms of a shortage of housing is a classic example. [80] The implication is that if only ways could be found to stimulate the construction industry to build more houses, clearly a solution which lies within the capabilities of the system, then

the housing problems of the working class will soon cease to exist. But
[81]
this is not the problem, for, as Engels put it:

"...one thing is certain: there is already a sufficient quantity of houses in the big cities to remedy immediately all real 'housing shortage,' provided they are used judiciously. This can naturally only occur through the expropriation of the present owners by quartering in their houses homeless workers or workers overcrowded in their present homes."

In other words, only by altering the balance of power within the social relations of living will it become possible to do away with these housing problems. Thus, the whole *gestalt* of actions and images emanating from the 'housing shortage' definition serves to mystify the real causes of these housing problems--the language of 'housing shortage' provides meaningless symbols which dull critical faculties of the reality. [82] And the same goes for the 'blaming-the-victim' [83] view of the anachronistic conservative school.

Thus, when dealing with working-class housing problems, it is crucial to be clear about the purposes and interest served by defining and explaining the nature and basis of these problems in a particular way.

The Role of the Capitalist State

Up to this point, save for the statement of the contention that the capitalist state is a necessary superstructural institution of capitalism charged with the function of ensuring the reproduction of the capitalist system itself, I have made few arguments which support this contention or which elaborate the role which the state does play in the process of urban development under capitalism. However, the actions of the state were and are crucial in this process. Therefore, in this section I will briefly

[84]

outline the major arguments of the radical theory of the state as these pertain to urban development and some conclusions from the study of London's development, which support these arguments.

As was previously argued, the basic institutions of capitalism delineate a set of property relations which, in turn, define and demarcate the class structure of capitalist society. These property relations ensure the dominance of and confer material advantages on the dominant class, which owns or controls the means of production and cause the subordinate, non-owning class to suffer material disadvantages. The inherent instability of these class relations means that, in the words of Paul Sweezy:

[85]

"A special institution capable and willing to use force to whatever degree is required is an essential to the maintenance of such a set of property relations. Investigation shows that the state possesses this characteristic to the fullest degree, and that no other institution is or can be allowed to compete with it in this respect....It is, therefore, not difficult to identify the state as the guarantor of a given [in this case, capitalist] set of property relations."

Thus, to put it another way, at the most fundamental level, the role of the capitalist state is to reproduce the conditions which perpetuate the capitalist mode of production and thereby to ensure the hegemony of the dominant class.

This means that *the state must primarily maintain and perfect the basic institutions*. It can do so in two ways. First, by actual *physical coercion*--maintaining law and order by virtue of its monopoly over the legitimate forms of social violence: the military and the police. Second by various forms of *ideological legitimation* whereby the subordinate class is socialized to believe that the basic institutions are natural, inevitable,

immutable and definitely non-problmatic (i.e., that social problems are soluble *within* the capitalist institutional framework). The achievement of such an acceptance obviates the need for control by means of physical coercion, for it implies that the subordinate class agrees to 'play by the rules' of capitalist society. The historical development of the state in advanced capitalist countries has seen the rising effectiveness of the processes of ideological legitimation and, therefore, the diminishing need to resort to overt physical coercion. However, the endogenous instability of these legitimation processes must be stressed--state actions can and must generate the *appearance* that the oppression and exploitation arising out of the operation of the basic institutions does not exist, or is at least transient, but they cannot change the *reality* of their structural basis.

[86]

In the words of Isaac Balbus:

"...the socialization process embodies the central contradiction of capitalist societies and is thus always a two-fold process: capitalist society by its very logic at one and the same time produces superordinate class consciousness *and* subordinate class consciousness, and it is therefore precisely the socialization process which serves as the 'transmission belt' through which the underlying societal contradiction--the 'motor'--operates to produce conflict and structural change."

The five 19th-century palliatives to London's working-class housing problems are an excellent example of the ideological legitimation process. Their main thrust was to serve the material needs of the capitalist class --by facilitating street improvements and land-use changes--thereby creating even more hardship, and to exonerate the real cause of these problems--the capitalist mode of production--by shifting the blame from the basic institutions and creating the illusion that the problems could and would soon be

solved within the capitalist institutional framework.

Furthermore, the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production by maintaining the basic institutions implies that the state must engage in three further categories of activity. It must maintain a certain rate of capital accumulation; maintain a functional labour force; and maintain social stability. Urban development in general and working-class housing in particular are important components of these three processes. Indeed, it can be argued that the historical origin and evolution of city planning lie in the necessity for the progressive institutionalization of these three functions under the aegis of the capitalist state. I will now consider the implications for urban development of these three functions of the state.

The expansion and maintenance of urban infrastructure--roads, railways, communications, sewers, etc.--is, as we have seen, crucial to the reproduction of a certain rate of capital accumulation. The particular economic characteristics of these classic 'public goods' have progressively led to their nationalization, which means that through taxation the working class bears much of the financial burden of providing these necessary elements of capital accumulation. The part played by the state in the development of London's railways amply supports the contention that enhancing capital accumulation is its primary goal as far as investments in urban infrastructure are concerned. Furthermore, state fiscal and monetary policies designed to ensure that a certain amount of the surplus is realized in directly and/or indirectly productive forms, influences the shape of the city in important ways. The regulation of the flow of funds to various sectors of the market in urban living and the 'threat' of land nationalization are good examples.

The reproduction of a functional labour force means assuming ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 'the right quality (of both mind and body) and quantity of workers arrive at the right workplaces at the right times.' In this respect, urban living is as important as education, welfare, health care, etc. For, as Engels so succinctly put it, working-class housing (and urban living in general) is "a part of the factory equipment itself."^[87] In so far as the working class is unable to achieve an adequate standard of urban living through the autonomous operation of the basic institutions, then the state must step in with direct (infrastructure investment, public housing, etc.) or indirect (sanitary regulation, rent control, subsidies, etc.) policies which change the outcomes of the market in urban living with a view to reproducing a functional labour force.

However, the state cannot go overboard and realistically guarantee a socially decent home and existence for all members of the working class. Urban living, health care, food, etc. are all component parts of the market in essential commodities, and their guaranteed provision at a socially adequate level--if it were possible--*whether or not workers work*, would almost inevitably destroy the market in essential commodities and the market in labour--two of the kingpins of capitalism.^[88] As Jeremy Bentham put it in the early 19th century:^[89]

"A single mistake in extending equality too far may overthrow the social order and dissolve the bonds of society. Equality might require such a distribution of property as would be incompatible with security....Equality ought not to be favoured, except when it does not injuriously affect security, nor disappoint expectations aroused by the law itself, nor disturb a distribution already actually settled and determined."

Thus, though the state has a high degree of autonomy and independence,

state power is ultimately constrained by the basic institutions and the veto power which the dominant class can exert should the existence of the basic institutions be threatened. State power "is not exercised in a vacuum but in a capitalist structured class society; and it is the structure of this society which makes the formal holders of power real though decidedly junior partners in the exercise of real authority." [90] In the last analysis, the *solution* of working-class housing problems is beyond the pale of state action. [91] In the words of Frederick Engels:

"It is perfectly clear that the state as it exists today is neither able nor willing to do anything to remedy the housing calamity. The state is nothing but the organized collective power of the possessing classes,...What the individual capitalists...do not want, their state also does not want. If therefore the *individual* capitalists deplore the housing shortage, but can hardly be moved to palliate even superficially its most terrifying consequences, the *collective* capitalist, the state, will not do much more."

The maintenance of social stability in capitalist society means the exertion of social control by the state over the subordinate class on behalf of the dominant class. As we have seen, dominant-class control must permeate all the pores of society. In so far as the 'automatic' operation of the basic institutions generates destabilizing discontent among the subordinate class, the state must intervene with modifications to some of the basic institutions--though not fundamental changes--which serve to diffuse social discontent and thereby reassert dominant-class control. London's housing crisis of the 1880's is an excellent example. The state responded with policies designed to change the social relations of living--public housing and owner-occupation--whilst buttressing the fundamental qualities of the basic institutions. Furthermore, the spectre of crisis

served as justification for the 'necessary though unpleasant actions' which state interference was seen to be at that stage--a tactic which has become part and parcel of the modern state's ideological legitimization arsenal. [92]

And the increased direct state intervention into the market in urban living which this crisis precipitated has created an image in the public consciousness that the state is the legitimate responsible authority for the problematic sectors of the market and thereby served to shift the focus from the class basis of working-class housing problems, a view which was prevalent during the 1880's.

Thus, all of this bears out Marx and Engel's famous, if misquoted, statement that: [93]

"The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the *common* affairs of the *whole* bourgeoisie." (emphasis added)

The liberal argument that government is primarily oriented towards 'serving the people,' that it impartially mediates disputes between similarly powerful 'interest groups' in 'the national interest,' is a myth. When the chips are down the capitalist state's primary responsibility is to guarantee the supremacy of the dominant class.

In sum, then, the overwhelming conclusion revealed by the historical analysis of London's development and these notes towards a radical theory of urban living and city form is that the evolution and form of the city, like that of society in general, is primarily and fundamentally a product of class struggle.

Radical Praxis and Working-Class Housing Struggles

I will conclude this thesis with a short discussion of some of the implications which the historical analysis and the notes towards a radical theory of urban living and city form hold for radical praxis aimed at alleviating working-class housing problems. For, to paraphrase Marx, it is not sufficient merely to *interpret* the city in a certain way; the point, rather, is to *change* it.

The task of formulating prescriptions for radical praxis is a difficult one, and this difficulty is intensified by the fundamentally oppositional and revolutionary orientation which the radical paradigm necessitates. In a society saturated with ruling-class ideology, most, if not all, proposals for radical change will seem 'impractical.' Indeed, the degree of 'impracticality' which capitalist society imputes to a proposal for change can almost be taken as a direct indication of its revolutionary character. This tension will persist as long as capitalist society does, and radical activists must 'learn to live with it.' Furthermore, revolutions do not just happen overnight--they are ultimately the *gestalt* of many small, local struggles unified by a common theory of the faults of the existing social formation and how and why alternative society can remedy them. Thus, the orientation of radical praxis in relation to working-class housing problems must be twofold--theoretical and practical.

On the one hand, radical academics in fields related to urbanism must work to construct a convincing interdisciplinary radical theory of the process of urban development under capitalism, to make clear to academics and workers alike that the shape of the city and the problems of the city are integral outcomes of the capitalist mode of production and the basic

institutions which support it. We must expose both the fictions and falsifications of dominant theories of the city and its problems and the purposes and interests which these theories serve. And we must unite radical academics from all disciplines in the effort to understand our present situation and indicate the potentials [94] for a more humane existence. In the words of David Harvey:

"This immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious and aware construction of a new paradigm for social [urban] thought through a deep and profound critique of our existing analytical constructs....Our task is to mobilize our powers of thought to formulate concepts and categories, theories and arguments, which we can apply to the task of bringing about a humanizing social change."

On the other hand, the major focus of the radical approach to the real everyday housing problems and struggles of the working class must be to build a collective working *class* consciousness--a unifying consciousness of the structural antagonistic contradiction between the working class and the dominant class and a consciousness of the powerful potential of the working class for creating a more humane social order. We must strive to bring the base and superstructure of class into concordance. Thus, housing struggles must not be fought in isolation. Our analysis has shown that decent working-class housing cannot be achieved through changes in the market in urban living alone. And isolated struggles tend to diffuse collective class consciousness and therefore ultimately serve to stabilize, not change, the capitalist system which generates the problems. Instead, "the point of revolutionary strategy, therefore, [must be] to overcome the current divisions...and reconstitute them into the primary division: capitalists and anticapitalists." [95]

We must make connections between struggles in workplaces, residential areas and other struggles which capitalist society generates. In struggling for socially creative and synthetic communities, we must build groups like one existing Notting Hill and North Kensington group, which [96] emphasizes that:

"By being a *housing* group, the group tends to concentrate its activities around housing, but the way people are oppressed through housing is only part of a much wider oppression; and many people may be brought into the struggle if we show them how the different ways they are oppressed fit together. This means that we must constantly be relating the oppression at work, the oppression at school, sexual oppression, the oppression through high prices to the oppression through housing."

Thus, while helping people deal with their day-to-day problems, we must simultaneously help them make connections to the social and structural basis of these problems and, therefore, make convincing the systemic changes needed for the ultimate solution of these problems. As the editors of [97] *Socialist Revolution* put it:

"The revolutionary task of our time is to unite this heterogeneity around opposition to the corporate ruling class and to develop its particularized grievances into explicit socialist consciousness and practice by demonstrating their common root in capitalist property relations."

A similar argument, more directly related to housing struggles, is that of five radical women, the sex most intimately connected with, and oppressed by, [98] the housing process:

"Housing struggles have been and can be struggles that unite all sectors of the working class, men, women, kids, in common struggle. People are confronted more directly with the need to challenge the way their interests are set against each other, through the divisions of labour that the system creates."

Furthermore, we must demystify dominant attitudes and 'solutions' to working-class housing problems. Only through ruthless criticism of these mainstream approaches can we discover and expose their ruling-class orientation. [99]

In all of these actions, the overriding objective must be to increase working-class people's control of the decisions which affect all aspects of their lives and, in particular, in relation to housing struggles, to increase their power to control the decisions which determine the social and spatial form of their residential communities. In this endeavour we must build on and unify the growing working-class discontentment with capitalist society, of which labour strikes, rent strikes, protest marches, etc. are but an expression. Thus, the main goal of radical praxis in relation to working-class housing problems must be, in the words of a London squatting group: [100]

"...becoming part of a many-sided movement of people taking control over their own lives."

We must help the working class to achieve their growing demands for control, so graphically and succinctly depicted by the Hartlepool Road, Redcar Road, Stockton Road Residents Association: [101]

**WE WOULD LIKE A HAND
IN DECIDING OUR
OWN FUTURE !**



NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. The complexity of such a theory is indicated by the fact that whilst particular aspects of cities have been scrutinized from many specialized points of view, few theorists have attempted, and none have achieved, what Louis Wirth sought in 1938: "a general theory systemizing the available knowledge concerning the city as a social entity." Quoted in Harvey [1973] p. 195. No general framework exists into which the plethora of detailed investigations --psychological, sociological, environmental, political, economic and more--can be meaningfully pigeon-holed. For a brief critique of the incompleteness of the most general popular theories of urban development see Harvey [1973] pp. 130-6. Reissman [1964] pp. 39-149, contains a lengthier, though less perceptive, treatment which surprisingly excludes the 'economist' theories that are so widely accepted today. In my view, our patent inability to cope effectively with deteriorating urban environments indicates the need for a general theory of the overall process of urban development according to which we may begin to effectively alleviate these objective problems. And see Harvey [1973] pp. 128-30; Williams [1973b]; Form [1954] p. 255.
2. I mean this in a *qualitative* sense of understanding the city (or village or town) as a *social process*. The problem of defining the city (as opposed to village or town) in quantifiable terms (population size or density, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, legal or political boundaries, land values, etc.) may be important to neo-classical economists (e.g., Mills [1972] pp. 7-11), politicians and state bureaucrats, but is not a valid form of definition for those seeking to explain the city as a social process, whose definition should be able to account for "cities" of all shapes and sizes.
3. The most popular recent statement of neo-classical urban location, land-use and land-rent theory is Alonso [1964]. For a brief, non-mathematical summary see Alonso [1960]. Mills [1972] pp. 37-102, contains a straightforward exposition of the 'academic textbook' version of the theory which is uncritically disseminated to students of urban economics and city planning at American universities. For a critique of the theory see Harvey [1973] pp. 160-94; Edel [1969].
4. Engels [1890] p. 692.

5. From here on, the phrase 'mode of production' is used as an abbreviation for 'mode of production and reproduction of real life'. The single word 'production' is used in its accepted sense as 'the process of manufacturing commodities and services'.
6. The word 'determine' is subject to misinterpretation and, therefore, the sense in which it is used in the thesis must be clarified. The semantic disparity is stated by Raymond Williams as follows: "...there are, within ordinary use...quite different possible meanings and implications of the word 'determine'. There is on the one hand, from its theological inheritance, the notion of an external cause which totally predicts or prefigures, indeed totally controls a subsequent activity. But there is also, from the experience of social practice, a notion of *determination as setting limits, exerting pressures*" (Emphasis added) Williams [1973a] p. 4. The word 'determine' is used in this latter sense which admits a two-way interaction between that which is determined and that which determines, even to the point of the possibility of limits and pressures changing, though not without conflict, depending on the nature and severity of the feedback from the determined activity.
7. Marx [1859] pp. 182-3.
8. See Williams [1973a] pp. 4-6 for a more detailed argument in favor of this view.
9. For an eloquent preliminary analysis of the dialectical interaction between production, distribution, exchange and consumption, see Marx [1857-8] pp. 22-33. He concludes as follows: "The result we arrive at is not that production distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one entity, different aspects of one unit. Production predominates not only over production itself in the opposite sense of that term, but over the other elements as well. With production the process constantly starts over again. That exchange and consumption cannot be predominating elements is self-evident. The same is true of distribution in the narrow sense of distribution of products; as for distribution in the sense of distribution of the agents of production, it is itself but a factor of production. A definite form of production thus determines the forms of consumption, distribution, exchange and *also the mutual relations between these various elements*. Of course, production *in its one-sided form* is in its turn influenced by other elements, e.g., with the expansion of the market, i.e., of the sphere of exchange, production grows in volume and is subdivided to a

greater extent. With a change of distribution, production undergoes a change; as for example in the case of concentration of capital, of a change in the distribution of population in city and country, etc. Finally, the demands of consumption also influence production. A mutual interaction takes place between the various elements. Such is the case with every organic body."

10. For a constructive analysis of the dialectual interaction between base and superstructure, see Williams [1973a].
11. Engels [1890] p. 692 and see notes 4 and 7 for the statements which he qualified.
12. Harvey [1973] pp. 200-1.
13. Harvey [1973] pp. 202-3; 205-6; Dobb [1963] p. 14.
14. Introduction to Lukacs [1966] p.26; and see pp. 29-31.
15. See Meszaros [1971] *passim*.
16. My definition and analysis of 'class' and 'class struggle' relies heavily on Rudin [1972], a paper which has unfortunately not been published. I have also benefitted in this respect from reading Balbus [1971]; Bendix and Lipset [1953]; Dobb [1963] pp. 11-17; Gintis [1970]; and Thompson [1963] pp. 9-11.
17. Rudin [1972] pp. 18.
18. Rudin [1972] pp. 11-16, 18-21.
19. Foster [1968] pp.281-2. This argument is developed in greater detail, both theoretically and historically, in Foster [1974], an excellent book. For a discussion of the relationship between city form and working-class militancy, see Hobsbawm [1973] pp. 220-33, "Cities and Insurrection."
20. For the remainder of this chapter, I will abbreviate 'basic socio-economic institutions' to 'basic institutions.' This analysis of the nature and *modus operandi* of the basic institutions of capitalism relies heavily on Edwards and MacEwen [1970]; Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf [1972]; Gintis [1972a]; and Gintis [1972b]. I have only referenced direct quotes from these works.
21. Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf [1970] p. 89.
22. For a more extensive analysis of capitalist and other modes of economic integration, see Harvey [1973] pp. 206-15; and Polanyi [1944], especially pp. 43-76. On the implications of different

modes of economic integration for patterns of urbanism, see Harvey [1973] pp. 240-84.

23. Gintis [1972a] p.45. The nature of markets in land and housing is developed in more detail in the following section.
24. Edwards and MacEwan [1970] p. 14. It is pertinent to quote Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf's [1970] p. 91, qualifications of the concept *homo economicus*: "It is important to note here that we are *not* saying that people are inevitably motivated by economic self-interest or the other characteristics of *homo economicus*. Nor are we saying that *homo economicus* is 'rational' or 'good.' Nor are we saying that people in a capitalist society act only according to the dictates of *homo economicus*. Indeed, much of the rest of this book is devoted to describing the tension which results from the need of capitalist institutions to have people behave *as if* they were *homo economicus* when in reality they are not--when they feel many needs and have many aspects and are not the single-mindedly greedy, materialistic people posited by *homo economicus*."
25. The role of the capitalist state is developed in more detail in relation to urban issues in a subsequent section of this chapter.
26. For a concise definition of 'contradiction' see Gintis [1972b] p. 27.
27. As David Harvey has put it: "Capitalism, however, has shown itself to be an inherently expansionary force; insofar as its existence is predicted on putting surplus value into circulation to increase surplus value, it has to expand in order to survive." Harvey [1973] p. 249. And, in the words of Paul Sweezy: "The central dynamic force in the world capitalist system as a whole is the capital accumulation process in the developed countries." Sweezy [1971] p.6.
28. On the concentration of capital in general, see Marx [1867] pp. 621-8. On the spatial concentration of capital, see Harvey [1973] pp. 232-8. It is interesting to note that neo-classical location and land-use theory is fundamentally an argument for the logic of the spatial concentration of productive capital, given capitalist basic institutions, and it forms a powerful justificatory device for such concentration, because it assumes capitalist basic institutions as given and immutable.
29. Henri Lefebvre comes to a similar conclusion in *La Revolution Urbaine* [1970]: "Can the realities of urbanism be defined as something super-structural, on the surface of the economic basis, whether capitalist or socialist? Or, as a simple result of economic growth and the increasing power of the forces of production, as a modest marginal elaboration of social relations of production? No. The reality of urbanism modifies the relations of production without being sufficient to transform them. *Urbanism becomes a force in production*, rather like science." (Emphasis added). Quoted in Harvey [1970] p. 306.

30. For the clearest statement on this issue, see O'Connor [1973]. Pages 5-10 contain a summary of his argument. And see Sweezy [1971], where he states (p.6) that: "Creating conditions favorable to the most rapid accumulation of capital and removing obstacles which impede the process are the central tasks of the capitalist state to which, in the final analysis, all its other functions are subordinated."
31. This is not to preclude nationalization of land as feasible under capitalism. This would merely place responsibility for a necessarily identical and, therefore, antisocial pattern of land allocation under the aegis of the capitalist state. Without counteracting certain basic attributes of the capitalist system, which is clearly impossible under capitalism, the state would be powerless to implement substantially different, and more socially responsible, policies. In other words, the *socialization* of land under capitalism is patently impossible. In this regard, it is interesting to note part of a passage by Marx already quoted in Chapter 2, note 31. He argues that the capitalist mode of production's "only requirement is that land should *not* be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition of production, *not belonging* to it, and the purpose is completely fulfilled if it becomes state-property." Marx [1863] pp. 44-5. Thus, demands for land nationalization under capitalism merely represent a call for a new *form* of the basic institution 'market in land,' whose essential characteristics--the non-common ownership of land and the allocation of land as a function of exchange value (contribution to capital accumulation) as opposed to social use value--would remain, and a call for the productive realization of surplus value. It is therefore not surprising that (relatively) high rents lead to demands for land nationalization. Thus, pundits of land nationalization as a panacea to urban problems would do well to consider whether they are proposing a qualitatively different institution or merely passing the buck. In this respect, it is well to note Donald Olsen's perceptive statement that: "Many of the arguments for land nationalization apply on a smaller scale to the big [leasehold] estate," Olsen [1964] p. 160, and to reflect on the inequitable and often hideous outcomes which the leasehold system engendered. And the inadequate performance of most local councils in the field of public housing (the nationalization of housing) usually due to forces beyond their control, makes one wonder if they could do any better when it comes to land.
32. For example, George Brown's ban on office building in London in 1964 swung the balance in favour of land rent. In the words of Oliver Marriott, it "was the crowning gift to the developers," Marriott [1967] p. 22. Planning permission revisions in favour of more intensive development (re-zoning in the U.S.) is another device by which developers realize greater rents. See Counter Information Services [1973] pp. 3-23. The mortgage insurance policy adopted in the U.S. by the Federal Housing Administration represents a more complex case. It led directly to increased property values

in the suburbs which netted land developers a fortune but at the same time it promoted substantial growth in residential construction and, thereby, capital accumulation.

33. The activities of financial organisations in the residential sphere in Baltimore, Maryland, are analysed in some detail in Harvey [1974] and Harvey and Chatterjee [1974].
34. The wage bargain can be regarded as a means whereby productive capital both defines the amount of surplus value and indirectly controls the amount of surplus realised in non-productive and indirectly productive forms. Conversely, the residential rent bargain can be regarded as a means whereby non-productive capital both realizes a certain amount of the surplus and indirectly controls the amount of surplus realized in its directly and indirectly productive forms. Likewise, the tax bargain can be regarded as a means whereby indirectly productive capital both realizes part of the surplus, and indirectly controls the amount of surplus realized in its productive and non-productive forms. In these struggles, the worker is a kind of go-between--fighting both for himself and for the three factions of capital.
35. This is but a spatial version of the capitalist 'law of uneven development,' which holds: "The key to the dynamics of capitalism.Those who are in a position to make new investments (capitalists) will tend to invest in those particular product lines, machinery and workers promising the highest return. Conversely, investment will tend to decline where potential expected profit is relatively low...the simple dynamics of profit maximization, especially in a period of monopoly capital, produce a tendency towards a 'secular deterioration of terms of trade' between nations, between industries and between social classes." Bluestone [1972] p. 65. And see Hymer [1972] pp. 122-35.
36. On the political economy of black ghettos in the U.S., see Fusfeld [1968]; and Vietorisz and Harrison [1970] Chapter 1.
37. Gintis [1972a] p. 46 (emphasis added). And see Edwards [1972a].
38. On commodity fetishism, see Sweezy [1942] pp. 34-40 and Gintis [1971].
39. Sweezy [1972] p. 21.
40. The most famous modern analysis of the tendency of the capitalist system towards over-production and how it copes with the problems of surplus absorption is Baran and Sweezy [1966], especially Chapters 1-7.
41. Harvey [1973] p. 271.
42. Harvey [1973] pp. 271-2.

43. Gintis [1972d] pp. 267-8. And see the entire article for a more detailed argument in support of this thesis.
44. "A need has been created out of a luxury. And it is essential that this effective demand for automobiles--the linch-pin of the contemporary capitalist economies--be maintained and expanded. Otherwise there will be severe economic and financial disruption throughout the whole economy." Harvey [1973] p. 271. For an argument on the power of the automobile-industrial complex in the U.S., and the impact of "automobilization" on the lives of city dwellers, see Sweezy [1966] and Baran and Sweezy [1966] pp. 300-5. The general argument that producers control much of the process of urban development is developed in more detail in Sawers [1972].
45. Marx [1857-8] p. 26.
46. For an example of this process in relation to Boston's street-cars, see note 64, Chapter 3.
47. Gintis [1972a] p. 46. And see Edwards and MacEwen [1970] p. 15; and Weisskopf [1972].
48. This is the briefest summary of the radical theory of the firm and the labour market, based on the following articles: Edwards [1973]; Gintis [1973]; Marglin [1971]; and Vietorisz and Harrison [1973]. Only quotes from these articles are referenced in detail.
49. Edwards [1973] p. 2.
50. Marglin [1971] p. 73. This thesis is borne out by Stone [1973], an impressive historical study of the United States' Steel Industry.
51. Gintis [1973] p. 21.
52. Foster [1974] pp. 4-5.
53. Foster [1974] pp. 5-6.
54. "The *primary labour market* functions more or less in keeping with public perceptions of work and its rewards and is characterized by high wages, high productivity, high stability and high rates of technical progress. Not so the *secondary labour market*; here a vicious circle keeps wages, productivity and stability to catastrophically low levels and brings about technological stagnation." Vietorisz and Harrison [1973] p. 366.
55. See Bowles [1971].
56. Wachtel [1972] p. 52.

57. As Marx wrote: "Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole." Quoted in Bendix and Lipset [1953] p.10.
58. For an indirect discussion of the place of the city in the reproduction of labour, see Gorz [1964] pp.82-94.
59. This is a composite expression for the urban housing and 'housing-land' markets, which are most usefully considered in combination. The market in urban living is analysed in the following section of this chapter.
60. This concept is developed in the following section.
61. Hodes [1973] pp.22-39 develops this argument in more detail.
62. For a brief discussion of this issue, see Aaron [1972] pp.3-6. And see Harvey [1973] pp.157-160.
63. David Harvey comes to the opposite conclusion, "that there can be no such thing as a 'general' urban land use theory," (Harvey [1973] p.192) because, in my opinion, he attempts to base such a theory on the concept of *rent*, which, as he correctly argues, exists only in a contingent sense. The concept of the social relations of living, however, can, like its counterpart in the productive sphere--the social relations of production--be applied to an understanding of the process of residential development under any social formation because it is based on the social relations of men to one another from which as Lukacs [1966] p.29, puts it, "*all economic and 'sociological' (and, one might add, spatial) phenomena derive.*"
64. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between use value and exchange value in housing, see Harvey [1973] pp.153-166,190; for commodities in general, see Marx [1867] pp.36-41.
65. The word 'rent' is used generally and specifically and includes funds derived from the 'sale' or 'lease' of property. Referring to each process specifically each time would be cumbersome. Furthermore, all property, with the exception of property sold for cash (i.e., not mortgaged), is effectively rented, be it from a landlord, leaseholder or building society.
66. The following analysis is an extremely brief summary of three sources: Roweis [1973] being the main one and Harvey [1973] pp.139-142,176-189, and Marx [1894] pp.640-648,748-781, being secondary.
67. See Harvey [1974] pp.26-27.
68. Marx [1847] pp.84-85.

69. Engels [1872] p.57.
70. A recent example of this 'necessity', albeit in another market, was the government sanctioned action taken by United States chicken farmers. In the face of blatant food shortages for a sizeable number of Americans, they suffocated millions of baby chicks because it was "too expensive to raise them for the market at current prices"!
71. This phrase comes from the most recent U.S. example of the impossible dreaming of *bourgeois* housing reformers, see President's Committee on Urban Housing [1969].
72. Quoted from *Tono Bungay* in Briggs [1963] pp.357-368. As we shall see in the following section, this goal is really not even the business of the modern capitalist state.
73. See Harvey [1973] pp.163-166.
74. Gintis [1972c] p.282.
75. Quoted in Sheppard [1971] p.337. More specifically, Engels wrote of "the great central fact that the cause of the miserable condition of the working-class is to be sought...in the capitalist system itself." Engels [1892] p.362.
76. Engels [1872] p.47.
77. Engels [1872] p.17.
78. Engels [1872] p.71.
79. "What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of the ruling class." Marx and Engels [1848] p.51. For a more detailed and general critique of bourgeois ideology, see Blackburn [1969].
80. The classic English statement of this view is Donnison [1967] esp. pp.17-78, a book which should, therefore be used with care.
81. Engels [1872] pp.30-31.
82. On the mystificatory powers of language, see Edelman [1964] pp.114-129,190.
83. For a critique of this view, see Ryan [1972].
84. My arguments in this respect rest heavily on the following sources: Edelman [1964]; Lenin [1932] pp.272-285; Miliband [1973]; Miliband [1972]; Miliband [1969]; O'Connor [1973]; Poulantzas [1969]; and Sweezy [1942a].

I have only made detailed reference to these works where I have quoted directly from them.

85. Sweezy [1942a] p.25.
86. Balbus [1971] p.43. Or, in the words of James O'Connor: "...the capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions--*accumulation* and *legitimation*. This means that the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state must also try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity, and the taxes drawn from this surplus." O'Connor [1973] p.6.
87. Engels [1872] p.51.
88. See Gordon [1972]; Wachtel [1972] pp.58-61; Edwards [1972b] pp.249-251.
89. Quote from Bentham's, *The Theory of Morals and Legislation*, in Nairn [1972] p.192.
90. Rudin [1972] p.28.
91. Engels [1872] p.65.
92. Edelman [1964] pp.13-14.
93. Marx and Engels [1848] p.37.
94. Harvey [1973] p.145.
95. Socialist Revolution... [1970] p.510.
96. "The Housing Fight..." [1973] pp.5-6. Similar sentiments are expressed in "Residents..." [1973] pp.11,14: "The activities of residents and tenants groups and those of unions and workers are usually seen in isolation. But if you are living in bad housing and have a low paid job with rotten schools and shops, and no park then you certainly do not experience these things in isolation--they all weigh you down at once, (it is only when you try to do something about it that you find one department handles rent, another education and distant companies control the job situation). That is why we have tried in this article to stress the....links between community action and industrial action, in the belief that the two cannot continue to be isolated if an effective means of changing this country's power structure is to be developed."

97. Socialist Revolution... [1970] p.504. And see Ollman [1973] pp.38-39.
98. Marion, et al [1973] p.4.
99. See Baran [1961] p.14 and passim. In the words of David Harvey, we must distinguish "between revolutionary theories which are productive of change, *status quo* theories which are derived out of and help to preserve an existing situation, and counter-revolutionary theories which produce only confusion, obfuscation and frustration." Harvey [1973] p.298.
100. B I T... [1973] p.1.
101. From: *Community Action*, No.10, p.5.

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Note: Two dates are listed for each reference. The first, enclosed in square brackets and appearing after the name(s) of the author(s), is the original date of publication--the date used in the text of the thesis. The second, appearing at the end of the listing, is the date of the edition or printing which I have used.

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