ARE CURRENT THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP CULTURE-BOUND?
AN EMPIRICAL TEST IN BRAZIL*

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April, 1971

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ABSTRACT

Leadership in 16 Brazilian financial institutions was investigated on the basis of an open-systems approach toward conceptualizing organizations in their environments and leadership processes within them. Six broad research questions tested aspects of contemporary U.S.-based leadership theory. On the basis of this initial empirical study of leadership in Brazilian organizations, it was concluded:

(1) research methods developed in the United States can be used successfully in Brazil;

(2) differences predicted by skill-mix theory may be present in a subtle fashion, but their effects are overcome by a strong tendency to rate higher level supervisors as more skilled in all areas;

(3) supervisors who are perceived by their subordinates as "successful" are seen as more skilled, less punitive, having higher standards of performance, supervising more closely, and using a mixture of man-to-man and group methods of supervision;

(4) the supervisor's upward influence is not overwhelmingly important in conditioning these relationships;

(5) the subordinate's interpersonal trust is not overwhelmingly important in conditioning these relationships, and in fact, the Brazilians in this study were much more similar to North Americans than Peruvians in level of trust;

(6) leadership and the Likert Organization Profile related to bank effectiveness only when effectiveness was measured by a bank self-rating, and not when measured by a loans/asset ratio, number of projects, or rankings by national bank experts.

Two hypotheses were advanced to account for these findings: a cultural hypothesis, and an economic development-manpower competence-performance feedback loop hypothesis. The latter was more consistent with the findings of this study. It raises questions about the interpretations of past research on leadership and suggests some possible directions for future studies of leadership.
Current organization theory is based largely on research done in the United States, which contains about 6% of the world's population. Yet leadership occurs in organizations in countries containing the other 94% of the world's population as well. A full understanding of leadership phenomena requires that statements be made having applicability to much more than the American situation alone. As William F. Whyte points out (1969, p. 717):

We need to face two crucial questions:

1. Can the findings of U.S. research be generalized to other cultures, or do we need to make substantial modifications to take cultural differences into account?

2. Does our conceptual framework enable us to interpret organizational behavior abroad, or do we need substantial changes in this theoretical orientation in order to make sense out of data from other countries?

A recent review of cross-cultural research related to organizations concluded that "It is not well guided by theoretical underpinnings, data are often weak, and conclusions are difficult to comprehend." Roberts (1970, p.347). Some of the better studies of leadership in other cultures have been of two general types: (1) attitudes toward leadership or attitudes or "motives" held by those in leadership positions (e.g., Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter, 1966; McClelland, 1961, McClelland and Winter, 1969; Bass, 1966; Sirota and Greenwood, 1971; Peter, 1969), and (2) a few studies of actual leader behavior (e.g., French, et al, 1960;
Whyte and Williams, 1963; Williams, Whyte and Green, 1965). Although this early work does not yet add up to a coherent whole, it offers suggestive and contrasting hypotheses about culture and organization. For example, compare these statements from two eminent social scientists:

The factor of culture has to be taken into account at every stage in the selection and training of personnel for cross-cultural work. The culture in which a candidate has been reared, the culture in which he will work, the cultures from which other members of the team are drawn, and the culture within which the particular bureaucratic procedure or ethic of international work originated or by which it was principally shaped, must all be considered.

-- Margaret Mead (1963,p.3)

There is a growing body of data which indicate that the same fundamental principles yield the highest productivity and best performance in widely different countries and cultures. Managers in all industrialized and partially industrialized nations, consequently, can improve their performance by basing their management on these principles.

-- Rensis Likert (1969, p.136)

The present paper attempts to provide information relevant to these points of view by investigating relationships among leadership skills and behavior, satisfaction and performance, organizational variables, and a cultural variable in one of those countries yet unscarred by the American empiricist: Brazil.

The general framework underlying this study is illustrated in Figure 1. It views organizations as open systems, influencing and influenced by their central and peripheral environments. Broadly speaking, the central environment includes environmental factors immediately relevant to the organization -- for example, manpower, suppliers, customers, controlling agencies, and "the public." The peripheral environment includes factors indirectly
relevant to the organization, which can affect characteristics of the central environment -- for example, cultural norms, level of economic development, educational system, or governmental system. From this point of view, a cultural norm in the peripheral environment, such as "people can't be trusted," influences attitudes of members of the central environment, such as manpower who may feel that they cannot trust people outside their immediate families, which in turn influence behavior of people in organizations such as superior-subordinate relations. To carry the dynamics further, the behavior of people in the organization may influence their attitudes, which may influence attitudes of other members of the central and peripheral environments, which eventually may influence the cultural norms themselves.

Within this general framework, it is possible to fit the "prototype US-based" conceptual framework for studying leadership in organizations shown in Figure 2. In general, we have viewed employee satisfaction and performance as a function of leader skills and behavior, with the nature of these relationships depending on the task, organizational factors, member characteristics, and (at least some of us argue -- see, for example, Farris, 1969; Farris and Lim, 1969) past performance. The environment in which leadership occurs may affect any one of our classes of variables or the relationships among them. To give but one example: Whyte and his colleagues (Whyte and Williams, 1963; Williams, Whyte, and Green, 1965) found that trust among students in Peru was lower than in the United States (peripheral environment), that clerical workers in a Peruvian utility had lower trust than those in similar jobs in an American utility (central environment) and that, among the Peruvians, those with lower trust tended to be more satisfied with closer supervision, and those with relatively higher trust tended to be satisfied with more general supervision (leadership in the organization).
In the present study, the "prototype US-based" conceptual framework, as modified to consider the organization's environment, is used to guide an investigation of leadership in 16 Brazilian financial institutions. An attempt is made to provide evidence regarding both of Whyte's (1969) "crucial questions" regarding leadership in these Brazilian organizations: is the framework useful, and can research findings from the United States be generalized? Specifically, these questions are examined:

1) Are US-based measurements and research methods reliable in these Brazilian organizations?
2) Do leader skills relate to hierarchical level in these organizations as "skill-mix" theory says they should? (Mann, 1965)
3) What leadership skills and behavior relate to employee satisfaction, motivation for performance, group performance, and organizational performance?
4) Does the leader's upward influence affect these relationships as might be expected in more "traditional" societies? (Pelz, 1951)
5) Does trust affect these relationships as it does in Peru? (Williams, Whyte, and Green, 1965)
6) How does leadership relate to the effectiveness of these organizations?

Obviously, these questions do not begin to exhaust the research possibilities raised by the conceptual framework. Notably absent are systematic treatments of important variables such as task, past performance, and critical aspects of the central and peripheral environments of Brazilian organizations. We hope, however, that this strategy of investigating these relatively disconnected questions provides a useful starting point for the investigation of leadership in its cultural context, since it samples important aspects of previous research and theory on leadership. We see such replication as an important initial step in the cumulative development of leadership theory.
Procedure

Setting and Sample

The research described in the present study was carried out as part of a larger program of technical assistance and action-research involving the Brazilian National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This program was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and included two full-time MIT personnel living in Brazil.

A major objective of the program was to increase the effectiveness of a development finance system operated by the BNDE through state and regional development banks throughout the country. The system, called FIPEME (Fundo de Investimentos para Pequena e Média Empresa) provided long term credit at low interest rates to small and medium size firms. As each project was approved, money was "repassed" from BNDE to the state and regional agent banks to the borrower-firm. The agent banks had other financing programs so that FIPEME was just a part of the banks' total operations.

Questionnaires were administered to 297 persons in group sessions on field visits to 16 banks. In all cases an attempt was made to include all technical and supervisory personnel who worked on the FIPEME program in the banks. When possible, other key supervisors including bank directors and presidents also filled out questionnaires. Differences in bank size and organizational structure, combined with the problems of initiating field research in organizations spread throughout the country, resulted in somewhat uneven sampling within the 16 banks. Nevertheless, approximately 85 percent of the eligible FIPEME personnel in each bank filled out questionnaires. For most banks, personnel involved with FIPEME constituted the majority of the professional staff.
Questionnaire Measures

Two questionnaires were used in the present study. A basic questionnaire designed especially for research on the FIPEME system measured such factors as communication, influence, motivation, etc., as well as the variables reported here. In addition, the Likert Organization Profile was used to measure the management style of the banks in terms of Likert's four systems theory of management (Likert, 1961 and 1967).

Questions were translated from English into Portuguese by bilingual Brazilians. These translations were then checked and revised by the authors in collaboration with the translators until all were satisfied that the translations were as accurate as possible. A re-translation into English indicated that the Portuguese and English versions of the questions were essentially identical. Both the English and Portuguese versions of the items used in the present study are included in the appendix.

Leadership. Ten items were used to measure leadership. The items were selected to reflect conceptually important and relatively well researched (in the United States) areas of leadership. They clearly stem from the "Michigan" approach to the study of leadership in organizations. (See, for example, Likert, 1961 and 1967; Georgopulos and Mann, 1962; Mann, 1965; Bowers and Seashore, 1966) Partly because of space limitations in the questionnaire and partly because the items had been used extensively in previous research, single items were used rather than indices.*

* In many cases, the items have been used as components of indices and were shown to account for the major portion of the variance of the particular index. In addition to the research cited above, see also Butterfield (1968).
Immediately before answering the questions about leadership, respondents indicated whether their own supervisor was a section head, department chief, director, president, or other type of supervisor. They did not identify him by name, nor was their work group identified. Respondents provided perceptions of their supervisor's skills as well as his behavior. The ten items may be summarized as follows:

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<th>Question No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Technical skills</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Man-to-man methods</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Human relations skills</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>High standards</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Administrative skills</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Close supervision</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Institutional skills</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Punitive behavior</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Upward influence</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Satisfaction with supervisor</td>
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Items measuring the supervisor's technical skills, human relations skills, administrative skills, and institutional leadership skills were used to test Mann's skill mix theory of organizational leadership (Mann, 1965). The item measuring the supervisor's upward influence with his own superiors was used to test Pelz's finding on the importance of supervisory influence upward (Pelz, 1951).

Question 42 on the extent to which the supervisor used group methods of supervision rather than individual (man-to-man) methods was used to test Likert's theory, which places great emphasis on group methods (Likert, 1967), and to a somewhat lesser extent, Bowers and Seashore's four factor theory (1966), which stresses "interaction facilitation." Another item important to both the

* In the present study a high score on item 42 indicates greater use of man-to-man methods, so it will be referred to as "man-to-man methods."
Likert and Bowers and Seashore models is the extent to which the supervisor maintains high standards of performance.

Question 44 on general versus close supervision* was used to test the late 1940's finding of Kahn and Katz (later summarized in Kahn and Katz, 1960) which over the years has become almost a basic tenet of enlightened management -- i.e., general supervision is more effective than close supervision.

Supportive behavior on the part of the supervisor is an essential ingredient of almost all theories of organizational leadership, Michigan or otherwise. The present study included an item to get at the reverse of this, i.e., punitive behavior, which asked how frequently the supervisor belittled or acted sarcastically toward his subordinates (see also Day and Hamblin, 1964). Finally, a question was included asking respondents, all in all, how satisfied they were with their supervisor. This is often used as a type of dependent variable in leadership studies.

Trust. The basic questionnaire contained four items to measure interpersonal trust. Williams, Whyte and Green (1965) found trust to be a potential mediator of employees' satisfactions with different supervisory styles in Peru and the United States. Responses on the four items were combined into a trust index. The items are included in the appendix.

Effort and Effectiveness. The basic questionnaire also included four items measuring, respectively, employees' perceptions of the effectiveness of their work group and their bank, and the effort expended by the personnel of their work group and their bank to achieve high level of performance. These items are used as dependent variables in the present study. They are included in the appendix.

* Similarly, item 44 is called "close supervision" since a high score indicates close as opposed to general supervision.
Analysis Methods

Analyses of variance and correlations are employed as the primary methods of analysis. The Pearson product-moment correlation is used to look at individual level relationships while the Spearman rank-order correlation is used for bank relationships. In all cases significance levels reported are for two-tailed tests.
RESULTS

Reliability of Measurements

Before turning to the substantive research questions, it is important to ask whether the questionnaire research methods which were "transplanted" from the United States to Brazil for this study were in fact reliable. In the beginning of our project, we were concerned with the applicability of questionnaire research to Brazilian organizations, and a number of our Brazilian colleagues (none of them psychologists) raised similar questions. As time went on -- as we jointly designed, pre-tested, and revised our instruments, and as we interviewed the Brazilian bankers and observed them at work -- our doubts were greatly reduced. The basic phenomena of organizational behavior in the Brazilian banks appeared not greatly dissimilar from that in North American organizations to our "anthropologist's eyes," and translation difficulties were found to be surmountable. On the whole, our intuitive feeling is that questionnaire research is no less (nor more) appropriate for Brazilian banks than it is for North American organizations with which we are familiar. Moreover, written and spoken comments by participants in the study generally indicated that we were asking questions about important topics which were readily answerable.

Our quantitative information as to the appropriateness of the questionnaire measurements is limited to a crude study of the reliability of the questionnaire measurements. An analysis of variance by bank of the questionnaire measurements used in this study was performed. If the measurements were reliable, we would expect greater differences between banks than within banks, especially on questions referring to the bank as a whole. (Recall that within a given bank, more than one supervisor was described; similarities within banks on questions referring to leaders or groups could be interpreted to be a result of a relatively consistent
"leadership climate" within an organization.)

The between-bank variance was found to be greater than the within-bank variance on all but one question. Moreover, as expected, the largest F's tended to occur for questions referring to the bank as a whole rather than sub-units. (See Table 1).

Skill Mix

Mann's (1965) skill mix theory holds that a different mix of supervisory skills is appropriate at different hierarchical levels of an organization. Technical skills are more important at lower levels, administrative and institutional leadership skills are more important at upper levels, and human relations skills are important at all levels of management. If skill mix theory holds for these Brazilian managers, we might expect subordinates to see technical skills as highest among first-line supervisors and lowest among top managers, and administrative and institutional leadership skills would be seen as highest among top managers and lowest at the first-line level.

The data in Table 2 and Figure 3 provide only mixed support for this theory. Top managers are seen as highest in all skill areas -- in administrative and institutional leadership skills as predicted, but, contrary to prediction, in technical skills as well. If we control for this tendency to see higher managers as more skilled in all areas by calculating separately for each level the deviation of each skill from the average skill score for each level (see Table 3), we find technical skills are relatively the strongest, followed by human relations, administrative, and institutional leadership skills as predicted at the first-line level and for middle managers as well. However, for top management, the strongest skill is technical, followed by human relations, institutional leadership, and administrative skills.

Subordinate perceptions of the skills of the supervisors at each managerial level were related to subordinate perceptions of satisfaction with supervisor, group and bank effort, and group
and bank effectiveness. Skill mix theory implies that stronger relationships to these "outcome" variables should hold for technical skills at the first-line level, and administrative and institutional skills at the top management level. For satisfaction with supervisor all skills at all levels were significantly related, with correlations ranging from .65 to .79 and a median of .72. Similar relationships held for group effort and group effectiveness. For bank effort and effectiveness, skills of first-line supervisors tended not to relate, while all skills of middle and top management related strongly, without the differences between skills predicted by skill-mix theory.

Leadership, Satisfaction, Effort, and Performance

Much of normative, U.S. -based leadership theory argues that best results are obtained when skilled leaders behave in certain ways. (See, for example, Likert, 1961, 1967; Bowers and Seashore, 1966; or Blake and Mouton, 1964) Specifically, these theories argue that in virtually all leadership situations, the more successful leaders are higher in technical and human relations skills, treat their subordinates as a group rather than man-to-man, have higher performance standards, provide general rather than close supervision, and supervise supportively rather than punitively. Although other students of leadership have suggested that characteristics of the task, situation, or subordinates may alter these relationships (e.g., Fiedler, 1967; Vroom, 1959; Andrews and Farris, 1967), the image of the successful leader as technically skilled, human-relations oriented, and democratic has been a persistent theme in U.S. -based leadership theory since the time of Mayo (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939) and Lewin (Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939).

Does this image hold as well for Brazil?

We investigated this question in two ways. First, we related perceptions of leadership to perceptions of satisfaction, effort, and performance. In a sense, we were asking indirectly about the
image or stereotype of an effective leader in the Brazilian banks. Second, we examined relationships between leadership as seen by members of the banks and independently obtained measures of bank effectiveness. These results will be reported later.

Intercorrelations were determined among perceptions of satisfaction with supervisor, group effort, group effectiveness, bank effort, and bank effectiveness. Data for the total sample are shown in Table 4. Relationships of very similar magnitude were found when intercorrelations were computed separately for each level of supervision, except that satisfaction with first-line supervisors was unrelated to perceptions of bank effort or bank effectiveness. Table 4 indicates that the five "success" measures are positively intercorrelated, with the strongest relationships occurring between the two effort measures and between corresponding effort and effectiveness measures. Satisfaction with supervisor is least related to the other measures.

Table 5 shows intercorrelations among the measures of supervisory skills and behavior. Again, relationships of very similar magnitude were found when intercorrelations were computed separately for each level of supervision. Highest intercorrelations occur among the supervisory skills and between supervisory skills and performance standards. Relationships among the supervisory behavior items and between supervisory skills and behavior are not so strong (although often statistically significant). It is interesting to note from Table 5 that supervisors seen as more highly skilled tend to be seen as using group methods, and closer, but less punitive supervision. Moreover, for these Brazilians, punitive supervision and close supervision are unrelated, just as Day and Hamblin (1964) said they should be.

Correlations between each measure of supervision and satisfaction, effort, and performance are shown in Table 6. Perceptions of supervisory skills are related positively and significantly to
perceptions of satisfaction, effort, and performance. The relationships tend to be strongest for satisfaction with supervisor and least strong when perceptions of supervisory skills are related to perceptions of bank effort and effectiveness. When these analyses were repeated separately for each level of supervision, results were quite similar, except that very weak relationships were found between the skills of first-line supervisors and bank effort and effectiveness.

The use of man-to-man methods tends to relate negatively to satisfaction with supervisor, but to be unrelated to perceptions of effort and performance. In examining these relationships separately by level of supervisor, however, an interesting difference was found. First-line supervisors were seen as having more effective groups the more they supervised on a man-to-man basis ($r = .27, p < .05$), but subordinates of department chiefs were more satisfied with them ($r = -.33, p < .001$) and saw their banks as more effective ($r = -.22, p < .05$) the less they supervised on a man-to-man basis.

High performance standards were positively related to perceptions of satisfaction, effort, and performance.

Contrary to the U.S.-based image of the good leader, the Brazilian bankers were more satisfied with their supervisors and saw group and bank effort and effectiveness as higher when they saw their supervisors exercising closer supervision.

Finally, punitive supervision was negatively related to perceptions of satisfaction, effort, and performance.

Similar relationships were found for performance standards, closeness of supervision, and punitiveness when separate analyses were done at each level of supervision.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the supervisor who is seen as effective in these Brazilian financial institutions is perceived as highly skilled, having high performance standards, and supervising in a relatively close, but non-punitive fashion. Tendencies were found for man-to-man methods to relate negatively
to satisfaction in the aggregate, and to bank effectiveness at the
department head level, but positively to group effectiveness at
the first-line level. Two further hypotheses will now be explored
to attempt to understand better the kind of leadership which is
valued positively by members of these Brazilian organizations.

Influence: a key?

Pelz (1951) found that a supervisor's upward influence appeared
to be a key factor affecting the strength of relationships between
his behavior and subordinate satisfaction with him. Relationships
in his study of 70 work groups at Detroit Edison tended to be stronger
for supervisors with greater upward influence. Anthropological and
sociological observers of Brazil often characterize Brazilian society
as "traditional" or "authoritarian" (Peripheral Environment of
Figure 1). Such cultural norms, if they exist, would be expected to
affect employee attitudes and thus underscore the importance of
influence in organizational structure. Would upward influence in
these Brazilian organizations be the key factor Pelz argued it was
in Detroit Edison?

Supervisors were divided into a high-influence and a low-
influence group on the basis of how much upward influence their
subordinates saw them as having. The high influence group included
16 people describing first-line supervisors, 39 people describing
middle managers, and 66 people describing top management. The low
influence group included 62 people describing first-line supervisors,
56 people describing middle managers, and 33 people describing top
management. Level of supervisor was clearly related to upward
influence. Relationships between the leadership items and satis-
faction with supervisor, group effectiveness, and bank effectiveness
were calculated separately for the high and low influence groups.
(See Table 7.)

For satisfaction with supervisor, 6 of the 8 comparable
relationships to leadership items were stronger for the low-influence

group; for group effectiveness, 6 of 8 were stronger for the high-influence group; and for perceived bank effectiveness, 7 of 8 comparisons were stronger for the high-influence group. Only in the latter case were the differences relatively large, the leadership of higher influence (and higher level) supervisors being more strongly related to perceived bank effectiveness. These analyses were repeated within each level of supervision with similar results.

Of course, it must be remembered that the eight comparisons made in each case in these analyses were not independent, since the leadership items are generally correlated with one another. (The method of analysis in Pelz's early work was also quite crude!)

Thus, to the extent that we can draw conclusions from these relatively crude analyses, it appears that high upward influence alone is not the key factor in affecting relationships between a Brazilian supervisor's characteristics and outcome variables. But, the outcome variable used is probably important. For satisfaction with supervisor, relationships to leadership tended to be stronger when the supervisor had lower influence (the opposite of Pelz's finding); for group effectiveness, relationships were slightly stronger for high-influence supervisors; and for bank effectiveness, relationships did tend to be stronger for high-influence supervisors.
Trust: a key?

Recall that to this point the leader in the Brazilian financial institutions who is seen as more effective is not the same as his North American counterpart. Both are seen as more skilled, having higher standards, and being less punitive, but the Brazilian, unlike the North American, is seen as supervising more closely and, in some instances emphasizing man-to-man rather than group methods of supervision. These findings in Brazil are not too different from those of Whyte's group in Peru (Whyte and Williams, 1963; Williams, Whyte, and Green, 1965). Moreover, in Peru it was found that people were lower in interpersonal trust than in the United States, and that those Peruvians lowest in trust were the most satisfied with close supervision. Could it be that there is some "Latin American temperament," common to both Peruvians and Brazilians, which accounts for effective leaders in both countries being seen as behaving in a manner different from the way normative North American leadership theory says they should?

We examined this hypothesis in two ways. First, our Brazilians were compared with the Peruvians and North Americans studied by Whyte's group in their scores on a Portuguese translation of the Interpersonal Trust Scale. Second, relationships between leadership and satisfaction with supervisor, perceived group effectiveness, and perceived bank effectiveness were determined for high, medium, and low trust groups of Brazilians.

A comparison of trust scores among Brazilians, Peruvians, and North Americans is shown in Table 8. Contrary to any expectation based on a "Latin American temperament" hypothesis, the Brazilians scored much closer to the North Americans than the Peruvians in trust.

Table 9 shows relationships between leadership and satisfaction, perceived group effectiveness, and perceived bank effectiveness separately for low, medium, and high trust Brazilians. Note that the trust
scores we used to create the three groups were much higher than those used in the Peruvian study, since very few of our Brazilian sample would have fallen into the low trust group, had we employed the same scoring categories used in Peru.

Although relationships tended to be stronger for the high trust group, trust was not overwhelming in its effects as a conditioner of relationships between leadership, satisfaction, and perceived effectiveness. Sometimes relationships were strongest for the medium trust group. Strongest effects of trust were observed for administrative and institutional leadership skills. Use of man-to-man methods related more strongly (and negatively) to satisfaction and bank effectiveness in the low trust group. Performance standards tended to relate least strongly in the low trust group, but no consistent effects of trust were found for close or punitive supervision.

Because people at higher levels tended to have higher trust, the analysis was repeated for first-line supervisors only (the level considered in the Peruvian study.) It yielded equally mixed results. Thus trust, like upward influence, does not appear to be the key factor in explaining the inconsistencies which occurred between our findings and predictions from the normative U.S. - based model.

To this point we have been discussing relationships between individual perceptions of leadership and individual perceptions of satisfaction and effectiveness. Now let us turn to an analysis at the organizational level.
Leadership and Bank Effectiveness

A major question is the extent to which bank leadership is related to effective bank performance. It is an important question from both a theoretical and practical viewpoint. Is organizational effectiveness in Brazilian development banks related to supervisory practices and management styles? If so, are the relationships the same as those predicted by contemporary "U.S.-based" leadership and organization theory? Will the principles of general, participative, group-oriented supervision, currently espoused by "enlightened" organization theory, work in Brazil? In short, is what's good for the United States good for Brazil?

Measures of bank effectiveness. In keeping with recent thinking about organizational effectiveness (e.g., Seashore and Yuchtman, 1967, Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967, Katz and Kahn, 1966), which tends to reject the concept of a unitary measure of organizational effectiveness, a number of independent criteria were used in measuring the performance of the development banks in the present study. Objective measures were gathered as well as evaluations from personnel inside and outside the banks. Not all measures were available for all organizations. Reliability of each of the measures tended to be high; intercorrelations among them tended to be moderate or low. The problem of defining and measuring development bank effectiveness is being pursued as a separate study in its own right. As previously mentioned, Spearman rank-order correlations are used in the bank effectiveness analysis.

Table 10 presents intercorrelations among the four effectiveness measures used in the leadership analysis. The ratio of loans to total assets is an objective measure of the cruzeiro volume of development loans outstanding divided by the total assets of the bank. The higher this proportion, the more the bank is utilizing its resources.* Though a rather crude measure, its reliability from year to year is quite high. For example, bank scores on this measure at the end of 1968 correlate rho = .84 with scores at the end of 1969.

* We are indebted to BNDE economist Luiz Carlos Gomes Pereira for developing this criterion for us.
Number of projects, 1970, is the number of FIPEME projects sent by the agent banks to BNDE in 1970. It measures the productivity of the banks in the area of developing small and medium size firms. It is a key indicator of the effectiveness of the banks as agents for BNDE. It is positively but not significantly related to size of the agents in terms of total assets, and not at all related to size in terms of number of personnel. Number of projects, 1970, is correlated rho= .88 with number of projects, 1969.

National bank ranking, 1970, is the average of rankings made by four judges in BNDE familiar with the performance of the development banks. After reading a definition of "overall effectiveness as a development bank," independent judgments were obtained from the four experts in BNDE. Intercorrelations among the judges' rankings were all statistically significant, ranging from .52 to .87. The averaged judgments for 1970 correlate .89 with average judgments for 1969.

Bank self-rating is the previously discussed item (No.49) taken from the questionnaire filled out by personnel working in the banks:

All in all, how effective do you feel your bank is at its work? (Circle one number on the scale)

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<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>Moderately effective</td>
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Bank averages on this item ranged from 3.55 to 5.93. The overall average across the 16 banks was 4.68. A one-way analysis of variance yielded an F of 4.90, p < .01, indicating that variations on this measure were significantly greater between banks than within banks.

The intercorrelations in Table 10 indicate that the four measures are tapping different aspects of development bank performance.
The number of FIPEME projects sent by the agent banks to BNDE in 1970 is significantly related to the loans/assets ratio and the national bank rankings. This may indicate an underlying "development productivity" element in the measures. Yet these correlations are moderate in magnitude, and the remaining interrelationships are much lower. The bank self-ratings appear quite unrelated to the other effectiveness criteria.* The question now is, are these effectiveness measures related to our measures of bank leadership?

Bank leadership and bank effectiveness. Correlations between bank averages on each leadership item and each of the four effectiveness measures are presented in Table 11. Also included in Table 11 are correlations between bank effectiveness and overall bank average scores on the Likert Organization Profile.

It should be noted that the leadership and LOP scores used here are aggregate scores combining data from all sources in the bank. This proved to be the most reliable method of analysis. As previously mentioned, analyses of variance showed that a fair amount of leadership or organizational climate existed in these banks. Bank size was not related to leadership scores. The possibility that banks in which a greater proportion of high level supervisors were being described might get higher leadership scores (recall that higher level leaders were described more favorably by their subordinates) proved to be of consequence only on the item dealing with the supervisor's upward influence.

* In addition to the judgments about regional bank performance obtained from national bank experts and regional bank employees, evaluations of regional bank performance were also obtained from clients of the banks. A total of 98 entrepreneurs described their regional banks on a short questionnaire. Bank scores were calculated for the ten banks with completed questionnaires from at least five entrepreneurs. Client evaluations correlated with bank self-ratings .52, but the client criterion was dropped when analysis of variance indicated it was unreliable. Work with other potential performance measures, such as additional financial indicators, and time spent processing loans, proved either redundant or unreliable.
Table 11 indicates that bank leadership is not related to utilization of bank resources for development (Loans/Assets). The highest correlation (.49) is with the use of man-to-man methods of supervision, but with an N of 11 it is not significant. Bank leadership is not related to bank productivity in developing small and medium size industry (No. of projects), nor is it related to judgments by national bank experts as to the overall effectiveness of the banks (National Bank Ranking). These first three criteria are also unrelated to bank scores on the Likert Organizational Profile.

Bank leadership is related, quite extensively, to evaluation of bank performance made by personnel working in the banks themselves (Bank Self-Rating). Since this criterion and the bank leadership scores were obtained from the same questionnaire, these correlations no doubt reflect a fair amount of methodological bias. Of the items which are significantly related to bank self-ratings, human relations skills has the weakest correlation (.55).

Note, however, the three leadership items not significantly related to bank self-ratings of effectiveness: man-to-man methods, close supervision, and punitive behavior. According to contemporary U.S.-based theories, these three variables should be negatively related to effectiveness; that is, group rather than man-to-man methods, and general rather then close supervision, should be positively related to organizational effectiveness. Punitive supervisory behavior should be negatively related to performance, as indeed it is here, though the correlation (-.39) is not significant, whereas it was at the individual level of analysis (see Table 6). These Table 11 findings with respect to man-to-man and close supervision may represent genuine failure to support key principles of U.S.-based organizational leadership theory.

The bottom line of Table 11 presents correlations between effectiveness and average bank scores on the Likert Organizational Profile. The higher the bank average on the profile, the closer its management style is to
Likert's System 4 method of management. Results are similar to those for the leadership items: no relationship with effectiveness, except for the self-ratings. The more bank personnel say their bank is using System 4 methods of management, the more effective they say their bank is. Objective measures and national bank expert evaluations do not concur in this finding.

Taken as a whole, Table 11 suggests that Brazilian development bank leadership as measured by standard U.S. items is not related to independent measures of organizational effectiveness. It is related in expected ways to self-ratings of organizational performance, except for man-to-man, close, and punitive methods of supervision, which are not significantly related to any measures of organizational performance, self-ratings included.
DISCUSSION

This study began with a rough statement of an open-systems approach toward conceptualizing organizations in their environments and leadership processes within them. Six broad research questions were raised, based upon contemporary leadership theory in the United States and our understanding of important factors in the environments of Brazilian organizations. On the basis of this initial empirical study of leadership in Brazilian organizations, we may conclude tentatively:

(1) research methods developed in the United States can be used successfully in Brazil;

(2) differences predicted by skill-mix theory may be present in a subtle fashion, but their effects are overcome by a strong tendency to rate higher level supervisors as more skilled in all areas;

(3) supervisors who are perceived by their subordinates as more "successful" (in terms of satisfaction with supervisor, perceptions of group and bank effort and perceptions of group and bank effectiveness) are perceived as more skilled, less punitive, having higher standards of performance, supervising more closely, and using a mixture of man-to-man and group methods of supervision;

(4) the supervisor's upward influence is not overwhelmingly important in conditioning these relationships;

(5) the subordinate's interpersonal trust is not overwhelmingly important in conditioning these relationships, and, in fact, the Brazilians in this study were much more similar to North Americans than Peruvians in level of trust;

(6) leadership related to bank effectiveness only when effectiveness was measured by a bank self-rating, and
failed to relate significantly to effectiveness when measured by a loans/assets ratio, number of projects, or an external evaluation by experts from the national government.

Let us discuss these results in terms of (1) their validity; (2) their meaning for leadership in Brazilian organizations; (3) their implications for contemporary developments in U.S. - based leadership theory.

Validity of the results

In his characteristically insightful manner, Norman Maier, probably one of the least recognized contributors to the field of leadership, proposed what he called "Maier's Law" (1960, p.208):

If facts do not conform to the theory, they must be disposed of.

Several of the above "facts" about leadership in these Brazilian financial institutions are at odds with U.S. - based normative leadership theory. Can we dispose of them on methodological grounds?

Although this study is the first empirical research on leadership in Brazilian organizations, we were fortunate in being able to draw upon a wealth of research experience in the United States in defining and measuring our variables. Given space limitations on our questionnaire, we used the best available single items to measure the theoretical constructs involved. Moreover, we used several measures of organizational effectiveness, and we eliminated measures of leadership and effectiveness which appeared unreliable.

Naturally, we would like to see this initial survey research followed up with more sophisticated methods — observations of leadership, systematic treatment of other possible contingencies (such as task, skills and motives of subordinates, etc.), experiments where possible, and of course, more thorough surveys.
In fact, we have proposed to do just this (Butterfield and Farris, 1971). However, until such more sophisticated research can be completed, the findings from this study must suffice as the only available "facts" about organizational leadership in Brazil.

Effective Leadership in Brazilian Organizations

The successful leader in the Brazilian banks is seen by his subordinates as highly skilled, having high performance standards, and providing close but non-punitive supervision on a man-to-man or a group basis. Neither upward influence by the supervisor nor the trust level of the subordinates substantially affects these relationships. Higher level supervisors are seen as the most skilled, but leader characteristics are unrelated to three external measures of bank effectiveness. What characteristics of the peripheral and central environments of Brazilian organizations could account for these findings?

The first hypothesis apt to be advanced by a North American scholar is that Brazilian cultural characteristics underlie these relationships. He will cite the (largely unsystematic and speculative) sociological and anthropological literature which emphasizes the importance of authority relations in the Brazilian family or on the Brazilian fazenda or as reflected in that country's history of military governments. Similar speculations are made about other Latin American countries such as Peru. Perhaps higher level supervisors are seen as more competent in the four skill areas because their subordinates attribute competence to the fact that a man is in a position of authority.

A number of factors argue against the hypothesis of cultural differences, however. First, upward influence, our most direct indicator of authority within the Brazilian organizations, did not affect perceptions of effective leadership as much as Pelz (1951) argued it did in the "less authoritarian" culture of the United States. Second, the "Latin American temperament" argument predicted incorrectly our findings of strong similarities in levels of interpersonal trust among Brazilian and North Americans, who
were, in turn, quite dissimilar in interpersonal trust from Peruvians. Finally, and perhaps most important, there is yet no solid evidence that interpersonal trust, authority structure, or other characteristics of the peripheral environments of organizations affect the attitudes of the manpower actually employed by the organizations in question. Development banks and other organizations may select as employees people who have attitudes atypical of the culture in which they are located or, through a process of "organizational socialization," change people's attitudes once they are employed.

A more plausible hypothesis than the cultural one may be made in terms of "performance feedback loops" (Farris, 1969; Farris and Lim, 1969). As described in Figure 4, the "performance" of a society as reflected in its level of economic development may affect the competence of the manpower available to an organization. At lower levels of economic development, less competent manpower may be available, perhaps because less good educational opportunities are available. As a result of their performance, in part, the more competent men are made supervisors. Thus, subordinates' perceptions of supervisory skills and performance standards are the best predictors of their satisfaction with their supervisors, and, presidents and directors are seen as the most skilled of all. Competent performance by the supervisor justifies close supervision in the eyes of his subordinates; less competent performance by the subordinates justifies close supervision in the eyes of the supervisor.

It could be that "successful" supervisors in the Brazilian banks are high in both consideration and initiating structure, as they are sometimes seen in Israel, Japan, and the United States (Fleishman and Simons, 1970), but we did not measure these variables directly. In any case, we are suggesting that manpower competence, as reflected in subordinate performance and as a reflection of general level of economic development, may be a key causal factor in determining the appropriate amount of close supervision (or initiating structure). Naturally, only further research, based upon a more specific elaboration of this broad hypothesis, can determine its validity.
Implications for Contemporary U.S.-based Leadership Theory

If this economic development–manpower competence–performance feedback loop hypothesis is true, the question then becomes, what has really been going on in the United States? One possibility is that most studies in the United States, which were done in the past 25 years, involved manpower having the technical competence their tasks required. By their performance they demonstrated that they deserved more general supervision. Theories of leadership developed during this time — a time when the United States was already at a high level of economic development — tended to emphasize democratic values and in so doing, may have neglected subordinate competence as an important factor in making general, participative supervision possible. What, for example, would have been the characteristics of effective leadership in U.S. organizations 100 years ago?

A related possibility is that the evidence supporting much of leadership theory developed in the post World War II era has been over-rated and over-simplified — perhaps following Maier's Law. Indeed reviews such as Korman's (1966) and Butterfield's (1967) suggest that, when a really hard-nosed look is taken at studies relating leadership to organizational effectiveness, the data indicate leader behavior may not be so important at all. Clearly the evidence from the present study shows no relationship between bank leadership and independently measured bank effectiveness.

It appears more and more that leadership in organizations is not a simple matter. There is no one best man, no one best method, and perhaps, no one best theory. A contingency model is the likely answer and in this respect Fred Fiedler may be leading the way (Fiedler, 1967). The trick is to develop a model with the right contingencies, and still keep the model humanly comprehensible. We are proposing here a model to guide leadership research which attempts to identify relevant factors in the organization's environment. We suggest that such a model can help not only in the study of leadership in other cultures, but in the contemporary study of leadership in the United States as well.
REFERENCES


REFERENCES (Cont.2)


TABLE 1

Analysis of Variance by Bank

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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Leader behavior</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Satisfaction, effort, effectiveness</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bank effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisor's upward influence</td>
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* p < .05
** p < .01
TABLE 2
Average Skill by Level of Supervisor

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<th>Average by skill</th>
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<td>4.98</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average by level</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>5.24</td>
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### TABLE 3

Deviations from Average Skill for Each Level

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TABLE 4

Intercorrelations Among Perceptions of Satisfaction, Effort, and Performance. (N=279).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Satisfaction Supervisor</th>
<th>Group effort</th>
<th>Group effect</th>
<th>Bank effort</th>
<th>Bank effect</th>
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<td>Group effort</td>
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<td>.67</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank effort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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* All correlations significant at p < .001.
TABLE 5

Intercorrelations Among Supervisory Skills and Behavior. (N= 279)

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<td>.64***</td>
<td>.25***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-17***</td>
<td>.62***</td>
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<td>-.34***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-17**</td>
<td>.76***</td>
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<td>-.36***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.27***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
TABLE 6

Correlations Between Supervision and Satisfaction, Effort, and Performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Sat/ sup.</th>
<th>Group effort</th>
<th>Group effect</th>
<th>Bank effort</th>
<th>Bank effect</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
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<td>.42***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
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<td>Human relations</td>
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<td>.42***</td>
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<td>.35***</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>.23***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 279

* p \(\leq .05\)
** p \(\leq .01\)
*** p \(\leq .001\)
TABLE 7

Relationships Between Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness for Supervisors High and Low in Upward Influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Satisfaction with supervisor</th>
<th>Group Effectiveness</th>
<th>Bank Effectiveness</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low infl. (N=151)</td>
<td>high infl. (N=121)</td>
<td>low infl. (N=151)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.35</td>
</tr>
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<td>Human relations</td>
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<td>.68</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
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<td>Administrative</td>
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<td>.63</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
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<td>Institutional</td>
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<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Brazilian Bankers (N=297)</td>
<td>American University Students (N=2,975)</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. &quot;... majority does not deserve to be trusted&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>19%</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. &quot;.. One never knows who he can really count on&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>34. &quot;... every man for himself&quot;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>35. &quot;... nobody really pays any attention..&quot;</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
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<td>Don't know</td>
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TABLE 9

Relationships Between Leadership, Satisfaction, and Effectiveness for Subordinates High, Medium and Low in Trust.

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<tr>
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<th>Bank Effectiveness</th>
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<td>.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>-.48</td>
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</table>
### TABLE 10

Rank-Order Intercorrelations Among Bank Effectiveness Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loans/assets</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>Nat'l bank ranking</th>
<th>Bank self-rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loans/assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No. of projects, 1970</td>
<td>.66*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National bank ranking, 1970</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.64*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bank self-rating</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because not all measures are available for all banks, N's for each pair of correlations range from 10 to 15.

* p ≤ .05
### TABLE 11

**Rank-Order Correlations Between Total Bank Leadership and Bank Effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Item</th>
<th>Effectiveness Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical skills</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human relations skills</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative skills</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional skills</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upward influence</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-to-man methods</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High standards</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close supervision</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive behavior</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction w/ supervisor</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likert Profile</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * p < .05
** ** p < .01
Figure 2. Leadership in Organizations: Prototype "US-Based" Conceptual Framework.
FIGURE 3. SKILL MIX

TECHNICAL

HUMAN RELATIONS

INSTITUTIONAL

ADMINISTRATIVE

LEVEL OF SUPERVISORS
Figure 4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MANPOWER COMPETENCE, AND PERFORMANCE AS DETERMINANTS OF LEADERSHIP.

PERIPHERAL ENVIRONMENT
- Cultural Norms
- Economic Development
- Educational System

CENTRAL ENVIRONMENT
- Customers
- Suppliers
- Manpower

ORGANIZATION

SUPERVISORY SKILLS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MANPOWER COMPETENCE
SUBORDINATE PERFORMANCE
CLOSE SUPERVISION
APPENDIX

Leadership Questions

Except as noted, each question was followed by a seven point scale ranging from "1", little or none, etc., to "7", very much, etc. Prior to answering the questions, each respondent indicated whether his supervisor was a (1) section head, (2) department chief, (3) director, (4) president, or (5) other.

**English**

**Supervisory Practices**

Please answer each question about supervisory practices by circling a number in the scale that would best describe your own supervisor.

37) He performs a good job on the technical aspect of his work— for example: general capability, knowledge of the job, technical capability required, etc.

38) He performs a good job on the human relations aspect of his work— for example: getting the people to work well together, helping them do the best they can, appreciating a good job performed, letting the personnel know where they stand, etc.

39) He performs a good job on the administrative aspect of his work— for example: planning and distributing the work, indicating clearly when the work is to be done, assigning the right man for the right job, inspecting and following up on work that is done, etc.

**Portuguese**

**Práticas de Supervisão**

Por favor responda cada pergunta sobre práticas de supervisão, com um círculo em redor de um número na escala que melhor descreva seu próprio supervisor.

37) Ele faz um bom serviço no trato do aspecto técnico de seu trabalho — por exemplo: habilidade geral, conhecimento do trabalho, habilidades técnicas requeridas, etc.

38) Ele realiza um bom trabalho no trato do aspecto das relações humanas de seu trabalho — por exemplo: fazendo o pessoal trabalhar bem em equipe, fazendo com que os indivíduos façam o melhor que eles possam, dando reconhecimento por um bom trabalho feito, deixando o pessoal saber onde êles estão, etc.

39) Ele realiza um bom serviço no trato do aspecto administrativo do seu trabalho — por exemplo: planejando e distribuindo o trabalho, indicando claramente quando o trabalho está para terminar, designando o lugar certo para o homem certo, inspecionando e seguindo de perto o trabalho que está sendo feito, etc.
40) He performs a good job on the institutional leadership aspect of his work; for example, creating and formulating action policy, handling the relationships of his unit with outside organizations, agencies and groups, understanding the importance of the relationship of the entity's mission in the field of political, social and economic development, etc.

41) How much influence does your supervisor have on his superiors?

42) Does your supervisor treat his subordinates individually (man-to-man), or mainly as a group?

(1 = group methods only; 4 = group and individual methods equally; 7 = individual (man-to-man) methods only)

43) To what extent does your supervisor maintain high standards of performance?

44) In accomplishing the basic duties of work, does your boss supervise you very closely, or does he let you work on your own?

(1 = work completely on our own; 7 = very close supervision)

45) How often does your supervisor belittle you or act sarcastic toward you?

(1 = never belittles us; 7 = belittles us frequently)

46) All in all, how satisfied are you with your supervisor?
APPENDIX

Trust Questions

Except as noted, alternatives were: (1) I agree, (2) I agree partially, (3) I do not agree, (4) I don't know.

English

32) Some people say that we can trust in the majority of people. Others say that we should not trust anybody. What is your opinion?

(1) the majority of people deserve to be trusted; (2) the majority of people do not deserve to be trusted; (3) I don't know.

33) Now-a-days one never knows whom he can really count on.

34) A good general rule is "every man for himself".

35) After all, nobody really pays any attention to what happens to you.

Portuguese

32) Alguns dizem que podemos confiar na maioria das pessoas. Outros dizem que não se pode confiar em ninguém. Qual a sua opinião a respeito disto?

(1) a maioria das pessoas merece confiança; (2) a maioria das pessoas não merece confiança; (3) não sei.

33) Hoje em dia uma pessoa nunca sabe com quem ela realmente pode contar.

34) Uma boa regra geral é "cada um por si".

35) Afinal de contas ninguém realmente presta atenção ao que acontece a você.
APPENDIX

Likert Organization Profile Questions

Each question was followed by a horizontal scale with 20 gradations.
Responses more towards the right on the scale received higher values,
and indicated a management style more towards system 4. (See Likert,
1967.)

**English**

1. How much confidence is shown in subordinates?

2. How much confidence is shown in superiors?

3. How free do they feel to talk to superiors about work?

4. Are subordinates' ideas sought and used, if worthy?

5. Is predominant use made of: 1-fear, 2-threats, 3-punishment, 4-rewards, 5-involvement?

6. Where is responsibility felt for achieving organization's goals?

7. How much cooperative teamwork exists?

8. What is the direction of information flow?

9. How is downward communication accepted?

**Portuguese**

1. Qual é o grau de confiança nos funcionários demonstrados pelos superiores?

2. Qual é o grau de confiança nos superiores demonstrado pelos funcionários?

3. Que grau de liberdade de falar com os seus superiores a respeito do trabalho sentem os funcionários?

4. As ideias dos subordinados são solicitadas e aplicadas?

5. Os principais processos de motivação usados na Organização são: 1-miedo, 2-ameaças, 3-punição, 4-recompensas, 5-participação.

6. A responsabilidade por atingir as metas da organização é sentida principalmente:

7. O trabalho é feito, realmente, em equipe, com a cooperação de todos os participantes?

8. Qual a direção usual do fluxo de informações?

9. Como são encaradas as comunicações vindas de cima?
Appendix pg.2
Likert Organization Profile Questions

**English**

10. How accurate is upward communication?

11. How well do superiors know problems faced by subordinates?

12. Do subordinates know the operational policies of the organization?

13. At what level are decisions made?

14. Are subordinates involved in decisions related to their work?

15. What does decision-making process contribute to motivation?

16. How are organizational goals established?

17. How much covert resistance to goals is present?

18. How concentrated are review and control functions?

19. Is there an informal organization resisting the formal one?

20. What are the cost, productivity and other control data used for?

**Portuguese**

10. Qual é a precisão das informações prestadas para cima?

11. Os superiores conhecem os problemas dos subordinados?

12. Os subordinados conhecem a política operacional da Organização?

13. A que níveis são tomadas decisões?

14. Os subordinados participam de decisões relativas a seu trabalho?

15. O processo de decisão contribui para a motivação?

16. Como são estabelecidas as metas de entidade?

17. Que grau de resistência existe para alcançar as metas estabelecidas para a entidade?

18. Como se distribuem as funções de controle interno de entidade?

19. Existe alguma organização informal resistindo a formal?

20. Para que são usados os dados de controle interno?
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Due Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 78</td>
<td>OCT 20 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 77</td>
<td>May 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 77</td>
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<td>May 78</td>
<td>May 79</td>
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<td>Oct 79</td>
<td>MR 4'88</td>
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<td>Oct 79</td>
<td>OCT 09 79</td>
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<td>Jul 81</td>
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<td>Sep 82</td>
<td>SEP 24 82</td>
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