WORKING PAPER
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

Worker Participation and American Unions:
Threat or Opportunity?

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February 1984

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SSM WP # 1526-84
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This paper is drawn from a larger study that was carried out with the support and cooperation of the Labor Policy Institute and the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO. Financial support was also received from the Alfred P. Sloan and the Sidney Harmon Foundations. The views expressed are our own and should not be interpreted as the official views of the sponsoring organizations or of MIT. We wish to thank Howard Samuel and Richard Prosten for their encouragement and assistance throughout all stages of this work and the union leaders who served on our advisory committee and have commented on the final report. We also wish to express our appreciation to the many union and employer representatives and workers who provided the data contained in this work.
The growth of quality of working life (QWL) programs, related forms of worker participation, and experiments with new forms of work organization have posed both new challenges and potential opportunities to the American labor movement. On the one hand, these informal mechanisms require union leaders and managers to modify their traditional roles and relationships in significant ways. On the other hand, they open new channels for direct worker involvement, and possibly, for greater worker and union influence. These developments have generated a vigorous debate among leaders concerning whether QWL and related participation processes will, in the long run, have positive or negative effects on the interests of labor unions and the workers they represent. Yet, the debate has, to date, largely taken place in a vacuum. While strong and convincing rhetorical or philosophical arguments have been presented by both the supporters and the critics of worker participation processes, little direct examination of union experiences with these processes has informed the discussions.

In early 1982, however, a group of labor leaders meeting under the auspices of the Labor Policy Institute agreed to commission an independent study of the experiences of unions with worker participation processes. These processes operate under a variety of labels in addition to QWL, such as Quality Circles (QC), Employee Involvement (EI), Labor-Management Participation Teams (LMPT), socio-technical work systems, etc. Their common characteristics are that they involve small groups of union members and/or officers in informal participation processes at the workplace as supplements to the formal collective bargaining negotiations and grievance handling
procedures. Some go on to also modify the way jobs and work are structured and organized at the workplace. This paper summarizes the results of that study and outlines its implications for the labor movement. A more detailed report on this study is found in (Kochan, Katz, and Mower, 1983).

The Sample

Survey data were collected from more than 900 union members from five local unions and over 100 officers and activists from another five locals. These data were supplemented by interview and case study data from these and several other worker participation experiments and by an analysis of the written statements and speeches of leaders of various national unions of the AFL-CIO.

The five cases for which rank and file survey data are available span the range of relevant worker participation programs and employer-union relationships needed to make useful comparisons and, with appropriate caution, some limited generalizations. With the help of our advisory committee we identified local unions and employers where some form of worker participation activity was underway. We then discussed our research interests with representatives of these locals. A decision to conduct a survey of rank and file workers was then made if:

(1) Sufficient time had elapsed under the worker participation project to allow for a meaningful assessment of worker views of their experiences.

(2) Some basis existed for comparing workers who were covered or actively involved in a worker participation process with similar workers who were not covered or actively involved.

(3) Both the union and the employer representatives agreed to cooperate with a survey.

(4) The group added diversity to the sample.
A brief description of each case is provided below. The actual names of firms and local unions are disguised in accordance with our agreements with each party.

Case 1: Local 1 and APEX Corporation

This case involves a large highly skilled blue collar bargaining unit located in a large manufacturing facility of a Fortune 500 firm. The union and the company began a jointly administered QWL program in late 1980 after a clause authorizing experimentation with such a program was included in their 1980 bargaining agreement. Survey data were collected from a sample of 387 out of a bargaining unit of approximately 4,000 workers. The data were collected during the summer of 1982, approximately twenty months after the start-up of the QWL project. In this case the union is a full joint sponsor and sits with representatives of management on all of the various QWL steering and oversight committees. The actual participation process resembles a Quality Circle (QC) program. After receiving forty hours of training in problem solving techniques, workers and supervisors meet in work teams for approximately one hour per week to identify problems and suggest solutions.

Case 2: Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Corporation

This is a bargaining unit of approximately 300 semi-skilled and unskilled workers located in a small manufacturing plant. The structure of the participation process again resembles a QC program. In this case the union is less centrally involved in the different stages of the process and adopts more of a "watchdog" rather than a joint sponsor role. The program had been in effect for approximately two years prior to conducting the survey in the autumn of 1982. Data were collected by mail survey from 69 workers.

Case 3: Local 3 and the Communication Services Corporation

This is a large bargaining unit of blue collar workers covering a wide range of skills employed in a facility of a large communications services firm. The QWL process in this firm is only in the early stages of development. It had been in place less than one year prior to our survey in late 1982. The process is part of a nation-wide program that has been underway since the signing of a national agreement in 1980 in which the union and the company agreed to jointly develop a QWL program in its various locations. The union and management serve as joint sponsors of the process which also is similar to a QC program. One hundred seventy responses are available from this unit.
Case 4: Local 4 and the APS Company

This is a large bargaining unit of approximately 9,000 workers employed by a major parts supplier in the auto industry. Data were collected from 104 workers in various adjacent plants of a large manufacturing complex. This case serves as our longest running QWL process in the sample. Discussions of joint activities between the union and the firm date back to 1977 and formal QWL activities have been underway since 1978. The primary union objective in this program from the outset was to save jobs in this location. In addition, this case provides data from union members in a QWL process that has gone beyond the QC stage by experimenting with autonomous work groups and work team organizations. The local union has been a full joint partner in developing and administering the participation activities since 1977.

Case 5: Local 5 and the Metro Newspaper Corporation

These data are collected from two units in the same local of the Newspaper Guild (NG) located in a large metropolitan area. One of the units is covered by a labor-management committee called the Worker Participation Committee (WPC). The WPC grew out of a 1972 bargaining agreement between this local and the Newspaper Corporation. It is a joint union-management committee that discusses a wide range of topics including working conditions, new technology, systems for performance appraisal, the selection of assistant editors, etc. Thus, this case provides both a different type of participation structure (a labor-management committee as opposed to direct involvement of individuals and small work teams) and a white collar professional employee group as opposed to blue collar manufacturing or service workers. Because this unit and its participation program differ in these ways from the others, it will be treated separately in much of the statistical analyses that follow.

Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 provides a demographic profile of the union members included in these cases. Overall, survey data are available from approximately 931 workers of whom approximately 446 are currently participating in or covered by a worker participation process and 485 are nonparticipants. The exact sample size varies in the analyses reported below because of missing data on some of the questions.
The average worker in the sample is 39 years old, earns approximately $11.80 per hour and has 13 years of seniority with his or her employer. Thirty-one per cent of the sample are female and 12% are members of a minority group. Six per cent of the sample have less than a high school education, 45% completed high school, 29% have some college or post high school experience, and 20% have a college degree. As the data in Table 1 indicate, there are few significant differences in the characteristics of the participants and nonparticipants. Participants have, on average, two years more seniority with the company and are less likely to be members of a minority group than are nonparticipants. Although these average differences appear to be relatively insignificant, in the analyses to follow we will control for variations in these characteristics as we attempt to estimate the net effects of these worker participation processes.

Participants, on average, have a history of being slightly more active in union affairs than nonparticipants. These differences are also highlighted in Table 1. For example, participants were more likely to be members of union committees, have attended union meetings, and voted in union elections. While these are not large differences, they do indicate that those who get involved in worker participation processes tend to be the same individuals who have higher than average rates of participation in union affairs.

The Worker Surveys

Is there Worker Interest in QWL Issues?

The first question asked in the worker survey was whether union members are sufficiently interested in QWL types of issues to warrant
Table 1

Demographic Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sample N=931</th>
<th>Participants N=446</th>
<th>Nonparticipants N=485</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (% Female)</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (% Non-White)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (% High School or Beyond)</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Seniority (Years)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.7*</td>
<td>13.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hourly Wage Rate ($/hr.)</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Steward (%)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Union Committee(%)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.7***</td>
<td>3.0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Union Executive Board (%)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Union Officer (%)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a Meeting in Last Year (%)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>54.4**</td>
<td>42.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in Last Union Election (%)</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>90.1***</td>
<td>80.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran for Union Office (%)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called Union Office in Last Year (%)</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
** Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
*** Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
attention to these issues from union leaders. The degree of interest expressed in QWL, more traditional bread and butter, and strategic issues normally reserved to management is reported in Table 2. The numbers presented in the Table are the percentages of respondents reporting they want "some" or "a lot" of say over these issues.

A strong majority--four out of five workers--want to have some or a lot of say over the issues most typically associated with QC or QWL processes, namely, the way work is done and the quality of the work produced. When these responses are compared to the degree of interest expressed in gaining a say over bread and butter and strategic issues, it is clear that QWL issues rank high enough in workers' priorities to warrant attention from union leaders. 

Interest does taper off somewhat, however, over issues more directly associated with autonomous work group processes. For example, between 70 and 85 percent report an interest in influencing the speed of work; between 43 and 70 percent want to influence the amount of work performed; and between 46 and 63 percent are interested in influencing work assignments.

Does Participation Increase Worker Interest?

It is often claimed by QWL advocates that even if there is no strong worker interest in QWL issues prior to actual experience with a program, once exposed or involved in a participation process, interest will escalate. The data in Table 3 test this hypothesis by comparing the degree of interest in gaining a say in QWL (and other) issues reported by those workers currently participating in QWL activities and those not participating. While on average, union
Table 2

Interest in Participation by Areas of Concern

Total Sample

(\% of respondents agreeing they want "some say" or "a lot of say")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QWL Concerns</th>
<th>Case 1</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 3</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Case 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The way the work is done—methods and procedures</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The level of quality of work</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How fast the work should be done—the work rate</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much work people should do in a day</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who should do what job in your group or section</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread and Butter Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the work day begins and ends</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay scales or wages</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who should be fired if they do a bad job or don't come to work</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who should be hired into your work group</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling complaints or grievances</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who gets promoted</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of new technology on your job</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management salaries</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring or promotions to upper management</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The selection of your supervisor</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant expansions, closings, or new locations</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way the company invests its profits or spends it money</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Interest in Participation by Area of Concern**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Concern</th>
<th>Participation and Non-participation</th>
<th>Case 1</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 3</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Non-Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=1169</td>
<td>N=1590 N=139 N=52 N=49 N=130 N=83</td>
<td>218%</td>
<td>218%</td>
<td>218%</td>
<td>218%</td>
<td>218%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- % of respondents agree that they want “some say” or “a lot of say”:
- Participants and Non-participants
The way the company earns or spends its money

48 44 44 31 36 38 49 42 44 36 35 48 43 47 43 43 44 63

**49** 47 40 36 39 32 46 40 18 20 30 30 30 38 31 29 29

The selection of your management

52 49 32 7 26 27 7 9 23 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38

Hiring or promotions to upper management salaries

43 15 3 9 3 22 20 24 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29

The use of new technology on strategic concerns

73 63 80 67 69 85 82 77 77

(continued)
members who are currently participating in a QWL process reported a higher degree of interest, the differences were not large and varied considerably from case to case in our sample. More surprisingly, however, was that participants expressed a greater degree of interest in several strategic issues such as the use of new technology and in several issues directly affecting their work group. Further analysis (using a regression equation that estimated the degree of interest associated with being a QWL participant after controlling for demographic characteristics of age, seniority, sex, race, wage level, and education) showed that while some of the differences were due to predispositions of the employees prior to joining the QWL process, a significant amount of the remaining differences appear to be attributed to participation in the QWL process. Thus, there appears to be a marginal increase in the desire for gaining a say over QWL and selected other workplace issues that results from experience in a worker participation process.

Does QWL Increase Actual Influence?

If one objective of worker participation is to increase the amount of say or influence individuals have over their work, is there any evidence that this actually occurs in these QWL processes? The evidence on this is reported in Table 4. In four out of the five cases there was no evidence that workers participating in these QWL processes actually experienced greater say or influence over these workplace issues than did nonparticipants. A significant difference was observed between participants and nonparticipants in the one case in which the local union was a full joint partner in an autonomous work group or work team project.
Sample sizes are the same as in Table 3.

Money
The profits or how the
way the company invests
or new locations,
plant expansions, closings,
supervisor
The selection of your
management
Hiring or promotions to upper
management salaries
Your job
Use of new technology on
Strategic Concerns
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parts Non-</th>
<th>Parts Non-</th>
<th>Parts Non-</th>
<th>Parts Non-</th>
<th>Parts Non-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 5</td>
<td>Case 4</td>
<td>Case 3</td>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>Case 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Does QWL Improve the Content of Workers' Jobs?

QWL processes are often viewed as strategies for allowing workers to learn new skills, increase their freedom on the job, provide more control over the pace and content of their work, and provide more information on how their work fits into the overall production process. Table 5 presents the data from our survey that tests whether these results occurred in these cases. On average, participants in QWL processes did evaluate the content of their jobs on these dimensions more favorably than did nonparticipants. However, only in the case in which the union was involved as a joint partner in the work team/autonomous work group processes were these differences consistently large and significant. Thus, here again is some evidence to support this claim of QWL advocates, however, the result is neither uniformly positive nor extremely large.

Does QWL Strengthen or Undermine Workers' Views of Their Union?

One of the most important and hotly debated issues within the labor movement pertains to the effects that union participation in these QWL types of programs will have on members' views of their union. Advocates claim union involvement will strengthen union performance and members' perceptions of the union while critics fear support for the union will be undermined. The data in Table 6 report the evaluations of union performance of the participants and nonparticipants in these five cases. Three points stand out in these data. First, overall, workers rated the performance of their union lower on QWL issues than on bread and butter issues regardless of whether they were involved in a QWL process or not. Second, there is no evidence, except in case 2, that participants evaluated their
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>Case 3</td>
<td>Case 4</td>
<td>Case 5</td>
<td>Case 6</td>
<td>Case 7</td>
<td>Case 8</td>
<td>Case 9</td>
<td>Case 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The work I do on my job is meaningful to me.
- Product or service impact my work on the job.
- It is hard to tell what I do.
- The speed at which I work is determined by the supervisor.
- I never seem to have enough time to get everything done.
- I have to do 100% of my job.
- My job requires me to use my skills.
- I get to do a number of different things on my job.
- What I do on my job is what I have the freedom to decide.
- Learning new things.

(2) of respondents who "agree" or strongly agree".
Table 5 (continued)

Worker Views of the Job
Participants and Nonparticipants (% of respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Case 1</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 3</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
<th>Case 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part's 94</td>
<td>Part's 94*</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-part's 58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonparticipants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part's 94</td>
<td>94*</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I feel personally responsible for the work I do on my job.

My job has rules and regulations concerning everything I might do or say.

Sample sizes are the same as in Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Union Performance by Area of Concern</th>
<th>% of Respondents Rating the Union as Doing a &quot;Good&quot; or &quot;Very Good&quot; Job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important safety and health</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling grievances</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving job security</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting good fringe benefits</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting good wages</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair treatment</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting members against bread and butter issues</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining management to listen</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping improve productivity</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making the job better</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping make jobs more interesting</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting workers a say in their jobs</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6
Table 6 (continued)

Sample sizes are the same as in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30**</td>
<td>16**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52**</td>
<td>40**</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64**</td>
<td>45**</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77**</td>
<td>55**</td>
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The union is very satisfied with "percent satisfied" or overall union satisfaction. The local union is doing well according to workers' interests. It is challenging management making the business interests are the same as in Table 3.

(2) of respondents rating the union as doing a "good" or "very good job".

Participates and Nonparticipates.
union lower than nonparticipants. Case 2 is one in which the union is not serving a full joint partner with management but rather has taken a "watchdog" role in the process. Third, when an average is computed across the cases, participants rated their unions higher on QWL issues than did nonparticipants. This difference remained significant after controlling for differences in demographic characteristics. Fourth, again this difference was strongest for the union in the work team/autonomous work group project.

Do Nonparticipating Workers Want to Join the QWL Process?

The final question addressed in the survey was whether those not currently participating were interested in getting involved in the QWL process. Overall, 35 percent of the nonparticipants expressed an interest in joining the QWL process underway in the organization, however, there were wide variations in interest across the cases. For example, only 15 percent in Case 2 and 25 percent in case 1 wanted to get involved, compared to 55 percent in case 4 and 63 percent in case 3. The low rates of interest in cases 1 and 2 were likely due to the layoffs that were occurring in both cases during the time of the survey. Concern for job security was compounded in Case 2 by the movement of jobs out of this bargaining unit to a new nonunion plant of the company. In case 4, on the other hand, the union had approached the QWL process right from the start as a strategy for saving jobs and was quite successful in doing so. In case 3, the QWL process was still in the very early stages of development (approximately nine months old) and therefore there was still a good deal of initial interest in the process and a number of groups waiting to start training for the program.
Overall, the survey data suggest that real improvements in workers' views of their jobs and of their union's performance have resulted from some worker participation programs but not from others. Those experiencing improvements were ones in which:

(1) the union served as a visible joint partner in the process;
(2) the participation process led to actual changes in work organization that enhanced the security of the labor force and the economic performance of the firm;
(3) union leaders linked their support for QWL to their larger collective bargaining and representational strategies, and;
(4) sufficient time had passed for the union's contribution to improving the QWL experiences of its members to be seen while the union continued to effectively deal with members' bread and butter concerns.

Local Union Officers'/Activists' Views

The surveys of rank and file workers were supplemented with surveys and interviews with local union officers and activists (union committee members, stewards, executive board members, etc.). A full discussion of these data is provided in our larger study. Space constraints allow only a brief summary of the views expressed by the officers and activists. The survey and interview data suggest that these individuals hold the following views of worker participation programs.

(1) Worker participation programs have strong positive effects on union officer-plant management relationships, worker-supervisor relations, product quality, and productivity.

(2) There is a mixed effect on the local union. A majority think that overall the programs will strengthen the local union. However, a significant minority is concerned about the interaction between traditional bargaining processes and the participation programs. In addition, there is no strong evidence of an increase in either member satisfaction with the union or member participation in local union affairs resulting from the programs. Union leaders also face the problem that members do not seem to perceive or appreciate the local union's role in the participation program.
A new intermediary union role of participation "coordinator" or "facilitator" has arisen which emphasizes training, communication, and problem solving skills. This coordinator often is the union representative who must mediate any tensions between the participation process and traditional bargaining procedures.

The biggest problems inhibiting the expansion of participation programs are layoffs, management efforts to change work rules, and supervisory resistance.

Two divergent views surfaced concerning the future course of participation programs. One group of union activists foresaw a limited role for their programs as a complement to traditional collective bargaining. Another group envisioned the possible expansion of the participation process to the point that workers will carry out many of the responsibilities now held by management.

Dynamics of Worker Participation Processes

In addition to the surveys, qualitative case studies of participation programs in the cases described above and additional cases in the steel, auto, and retail food industries were conducted. Each of the case studies provided different insights into the diversity of paths that worker participation programs can take over time. Again, a full discussion of these case studies is contained in the larger study. The central conclusions we draw from these cases are summarized below.

(1) Workers and union officers are initially quite skeptical of the merits of QWL or other worker participation processes. This initial skepticism can generally be overcome if key local union leaders strongly support the idea of experimenting with the process.

(2) In the early stages of a participation experiment, this initial skepticism among workers is replaced by generally positive responses among those who volunteer to get involved. Skepticism may, however, remain relatively high among nonparticipants unless the union and the employer keep nonparticipating workers adequately informed about what is occurring within the participation process.

(3) There is a tendency for support among the participants to plateau or decline over time as various problems or obstacles to the continuity of the process arise in the larger bargaining relationship. Among the obstacles that
led to the decline of support of workers and/or local union representatives in the cases studied were:

(a) layoffs of bargaining unit members, especially where these layoffs were handled in a way that was viewed by workers and union officers as inconsistent with the consultation and problem solving ethic that was being encouraged within the participation process;

(b) employer actions or strategy decisions that were viewed as inconsistent with the high level of trust that was being encouraged in the participation process. Examples of this included the opening of a nonunion plant by the employer and the shifting of bargaining unit work to this plant; unilateral management decisions to consolidate job classifications over the objection of the local union, and announcement of the decision to close a part of an operation without any advance consultation with union officials.

(4) On the other hand, those cases that successfully overcame this plateuing of worker and/or union officer support were ones in which:

(a) the employer was able to achieve tangible improvements in economic performance through the participation process. Examples of this were a case where the worker participation process led to a new way of reorganizing work and lowering the costs of operations that otherwise would have been subcontracted to outside vendors; the case of a steel company that used the problem solving processes developed within the worker participation process to structure and implement an organization wide cost improvement program; and the case of an auto parts firm that worked jointly with the union to save jobs and to open new plants under a work team/autonomous work group design.

(b) the union was able to link its role in the worker participation process to its broader bargaining and other strategies for representing not only its members' interests on QWL issues but also their interests on bread and butter and broader strategic issues. The same examples as cited above serve as successful examples of this.

(5) Local unions and their members were more likely to benefit from a worker participation process when they played the role of a full joint partner in all phases of the development and administration of the program rather than adopt the role of a watchdog or a secondary party.
Indeed, there are clear dangers that a QWL program will narrow the role of the union and will fail to adequately forge a linkage with the larger collective bargaining processes or the employer's larger business strategies if the union is not involved as an active joint partner.

The central implication of these case studies is that for worker participation processes to survive the economic and political obstacles that they encounter over time, each party must see them contributing to their separate economic and organizational interests. While improvements in the psychological rewards workers derive from their day-to-day job experiences may be a necessary condition for a successful participation program, psychological rewards alone do not appear to be sufficient to maintain the commitment of management, the union and its leaders, and, indeed as the rank and file survey demonstrated, the workers themselves.

**National Union Policies**

Four different national union policies toward worker participation processes were identified in our review of activities at this level of the labor movement:

1. **General Opposition:** The national union leaders clearly state their generalized opposition to worker participation as it is currently being practiced and discourage (but do not prevent) local unions from participating in them. At present, the International Association of Machinists is one union that fits this description.

2. **Decentralized Neutrality:** National union leaders take neither a blanket stand for or against worker participation, leave the decision up to the local unions, possibly offer suggested guidelines on how to approach employer overtures about QC or QWL programs, but do not provide significant staff support or leadership to local unions that get involved in such programs. At present, probably the majority of national unions fit this description.
(3) Decentralized Policy with National Union Support: Specific national union officials other than the President are strong advocates of worker participation and lend their support and expertise to locals that indicate an interest in the concept. At present, perhaps only two unions, the United Steel Workers and the United Auto Workers, fit this description.

(4) Support from the President: The President of the union publicly advocates the diffusion of worker participation processes as a part of the basic strategy of the union for representing current and future members. Staff support is provided to study and plan for the evolution of worker participation efforts, to assist and train local officers, and integrate the worker participation processes with collective bargaining and other union activities. At present only one union, the Communication Workers of America, fits this description.

Despite these differences in national union policies, there appears to be unanimous agreement among labor leaders that the single biggest obstacle to the more general acceptance of cooperative strategies and experimentation at the workplace is the opposition to union organizing efforts within the American management community.

Implications for the Labor Movement

The findings summarized above suggest there is no single best policy toward worker participation processes that fits all situations. This implies that rather than adopting a uniform position for or against worker participation on some philosophical ground, union leaders need to think strategically about whether worker participation is in the interests of their members as well as the union and can be linked to the union's broader strategies for improving the effectiveness of its bargaining relationship.

What follows then are some implications for the labor movement that we believe can be drawn from this study and from our related research on developments at the workplace. These comments should not be interpreted as a blanket endorsement of a union

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strategy of support or opposition to worker participation. Rather we present what we see as the major factors for unions to consider in shaping a strategy that fits their particular circumstances.

Local Union Leaders

The ultimate choice of whether or not to actively support the development of a worker participation process in a specific plant, office, or worksite can best be made by local union leaders based on a consideration of the need for change in their bargaining relationship and the viability of some form of worker participation as a partial solution to their problems. The pressures for change may arise from two sources: (1) external pressures to improve the economic performance of the employer and the job security of their members, or (2) internal demands from rank and file members for changes in their day-to-day job experiences and in the relationships between workers and managers. In the current period of high unemployment, intense competition, and general concern for productivity and product quality, the external pressures appear to dominate. However, this could easily reverse itself during periods of tighter labor markets when the workers typically become more vocal and assertive in expressing their preferences. The survey data clearly demonstrated that interest in gaining greater influence over selected workplace decisions is widely shared among union members.

It is also clear, however, that if neither sufficient external nor internal pressure to modify the collective bargaining relationship exists, there is little incentive on the part of either unions or employers to embark on a worker participation process. In
many cases the collective bargaining process may have already produced sufficient flexibility in work organization, and workers may have the individual autonomy or decision making responsibility they desire. In these cases, the effort and resources needed to foster small group problem solving, organization of work into teams, or other forms of organizational change may not be warranted.

In cases where either external or internal pressures are driving the parties to search for ways to improve their bargaining relationship, union leaders still need to decide whether a participation process is likely to succeed and is in the interests of their members and the union before endorsing this strategy. While a variety of factors will influence the probability of success, there are at least three necessary conditions for union support: (1) employer acceptance of unions, (2) deep managerial commitment to the worker participation process, and (3) a viable economic context.

Management Acceptance of Unions. Clearly, if union leaders believe the employer is intent on using the participation process to undermine the support for the union, and if the employer is unwilling to accept the legitimacy of the union, it makes little sense to cooperate with a worker participation process. To support or endorse a participation process under these circumstances is tantamount to the local union participating in its own slow demise.

The more difficult case, however, is one where local management accepts the legitimacy of the union in one particular plant, but higher corporate management uses union avoidance strategies to keep unions out of other new or existing sites. Local union opposition to QWL and other participation processes under those circumstances would
appear to be a necessary step toward implementing the strategy that is favored by most national union leaders, namely, to force employers to make a choice between (1) acceptance of unions and the potential growth of worker participation and other joint union-management efforts, or (2) continued low trust/high conflict arms-length relationships.

Management Commitment. Union leaders need to assess the depth of commitment to the participation process among the various managers at different levels of the firm who have the power to support or discourage the process over time. Without a deep managerial commitment to supporting a participation process over an extended period of time, neither union commitment nor rank and file enthusiasm for the process can make a worker participation process succeed.

Management commitment needs to be assessed not only on verbal statements of philosophy but on the willingness of management to adjust its strategies and behaviors in ways that are supportive of worker participation. This means, among other things, the willingness to allocate resources to support participation efforts, and to maintain the commitment of resources through periods of short term economic crisis. Management (and union) commitment also is likely to be severely tested at various points during the evolution of the process as inconsistencies arise between other company (or union) strategies and objectives and the worker participation process. Thus, the depth of commitment can only be estimated at the outset of a participation program. The real tests come later when hard decisions and tradeoffs must be made between maintaining support for the process and pursuing other strategic objectives.
Economic Viability. Worker participation programs cannot be a panacea in the face of economic problems which lie beyond the control of the local union, the employer, or the workers. In those cases, a worker participation process may simply serve to divert attention for a short period of time from the more basic problems and will eventually lead to disenchantment among the rank and file as the problems worsen. Sometimes participation programs can be combined productively with steps such as compensation concessions. But, unless the economic foundation upon which the worker participation process will rest is itself viable, the union's efforts might better be put to other uses.

This is perhaps the hardest condition to assess prior to the start of a participation effort. In addition to the general uncertainty that is involved in forecasting the economic future of a plant or firm, employers have some discretion over the allocation of resources needed to maintain a viable, ongoing concern. Thus, an analysis of the economic viability of the enterprise must consider both the external or uncontrollable economic factors that affect survival of the business and the investment plans of the employer. The need for the employer to link the worker participation process to its larger business strategy, and to communicate this linkage to the union, is the counterpoint to the union's need to embed its support for worker participation efforts in its broader collective bargaining strategies.

Linkages to Collective Bargaining. Where local union leaders are convinced that the conditions necessary for a potentially viable worker participation process exist, their next task is to think about
how this process will fit into their overall bargaining and representational strategies. The point here is that for unions and their members to benefit from the process, union leaders must do more than react to the employer's or the consultant's vision or expectations for worker participation. Instead, union leaders need to anticipate how the process will evolve over time and to consider what part they want it to play in their collective bargaining relationship and in the union's role in the workplace. As the case studies clearly pointed out, over time a total separation of worker participation from collective bargaining is neither possible nor desirable. Thus, it is important to recognize this at the outset. Discussion of several specific issues to consider may better illustrate this general point.

One of the biggest challenges to the traditional role of the union that a successful participation process will produce is increased variability in practices and conditions within the bargaining unit. Three different sources of variation will arise that may cause problems for the union leadership.

First, because worker participation processes diffuse slowly through an organization, for an extended period of time there will be a group of "participants" and "nonparticipants." Even after the process is widely diffused, there are likely to be some individuals who prefer to not get involved in group activities and problem solving processes. The existence of these two groups provides a fertile ground for rumors, competition, and internal political conflicts within the union. Since participants are likely to be
Introducing changes into the practices in their work areas, there will be a natural tendency for nonparticipants to rationalize their noninvolvement by voicing skepticism toward the QWL process.

Second, introducing changes in work practices based on the ideas generated in the worker participation process has a general decentralizing effect on the collective bargaining relationship. Proposals to modify established customs and practices, if not formal collective bargaining agreement provisions, are likely to arise. This has the effect of reducing the "common rule" strategy that American unions have used to limit competition and standardize conditions among individuals and groups within their bargaining units. The standardization of practices and rules established through the collective bargaining agreement and enforced through the contract administration process by shop stewards has historically served as a basic source of worker security and internal union control.

A third change is the shift away from detailed job and associated contractual rules in work reorganization experiments which broaden out job responsibilities. In the more advanced cases, such as work team arrangements, the concept of an individual job description or assignment is replaced with a set of tasks that lie within the general responsibility of the group. The movement toward work teams, payment for knowledge compensation systems, job rotation, and semi-autonomous work groups therefore all require workers and their local unions to partially abandon their historic strategies for maximizing job control through enforcement of detailed rules governing specific, narrowly defined jobs. In return, the workers
receive greater training in a variety of job responsibilities and more control over how the group organizes itself to conduct its tasks. Workers and their union representatives also gain more information about the work and its contribution to the overall production process and the economic performance of the enterprise. In short, all of these changes reduce the reliance on strict rules governing individual worker job rights and responsibilities and increase the variation in practices and flexibility in the use of human resources. The shift away from standardized and tightly detailed jobs also increases the variability across and within workplaces. Managing this variability and flexibility without increasing divisiveness and competition among its members will become a major new role for the local union.

Although our findings stress the need to link worker participation processes to the larger collective bargaining efforts on a strategic level, this does not imply that there necessarily need be a total integration or merger of the participation process with the procedures for resolving grievances and negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Issues of contract interpretation or alleged violations of individual worker rights will continue to occur that are best suited to resolution through the established grievance procedure. Likewise, basic differences in economic interests will continue to exist between workers and their employers which will require hard bargaining at periodic intervals. The key challenge to union leaders and management representatives is to manage these "mixed-motive" relationships such that cooperative problem-solving efforts can comfortably coexist with hard bargaining and the formal adjudication of disputes.
In some cases the union and management representatives may be successful in carrying over their problem solving processes to their collective bargaining negotiations process, while in others the styles of interaction and the decision-making processes between these two activities may continue to differ. Whatever mixture of styles and processes evolve, the key to their successful management lies in the ability of the parties to prevent the episodes of more intensive conflict from driving out the high levels of trust needed to continue the problem solving processes. Union leaders and employer representatives will continue to experience periodic conflicts that pose threats, or as one union official put it, "shocks to the system". Maintaining trust and commitment to the participation process through these periodic conflicts or adversarial shocks will be a skill required of those who want to maintain the continuity of the worker participation process. Eventually, the ability to do so successfully will be viewed as a sign of the maturity of the parties and of the participation process.

The survey data clearly showed that union members will not radically transform their views of what they expect from their local unions once a QWL or other worker participation process is underway. Unions will continue to be evaluated by members on their performance in handling traditional collective bargaining responsibilities as well as their performance on QWL issues. This suggests that union leaders will need to devote time, energy, and organizational resources to providing both sets of services. Internally, therefore, this means recruiting, training, and developing both union stewards and union facilitators of QWL processes; finding volunteers to staff
both traditional internal union committees and those union-management committees that support the participation process; and, most importantly, coordinating these dual sets of activities. All of this adds additional complexity to the task of local union administration.

Strategies for National Unions

Even though worker participation processes are carried out through local unions, national union officers and staff have important roles to play in the development and implementation of a coherent union strategy toward worker participation. Indeed, given the interest that now exists among many employer and local union officials, QWL and other forms of worker participation will continue to develop. Unless national unions develop a clear policy and take the necessary steps to implement it at local levels, these processes will proceed without national union guidance.

Given the diversity of employers with whom the different locals of most national unions deal, neither blanket endorsement nor blanket opposition of worker participation by national union leaders makes sense. Instead, national union leaders might do better to communicate their views on the conditions under which they believe participation processes are viable and the conditions under which they would advise against union endorsement and involvement. Beyond articulating a clear policy position, however, there are a number of important functions that national union leaders and staff professionals can carry out that will help implement a strategy of supporting worker participation in those bargaining relationships where they are deemed appropriate, and discouraging them where these conditions are not met.
Leadership Development. One of the most positive byproducts of QWL experiments is the emergence of a talented group of new local labor leaders who have been trained in group dynamics, problem solving, and team building. Through their roles as QWL facilitators these local union representatives are also gaining a greater exposure to and serving a much wider cross section of union members than most shop stewards or grievance committee members. These individuals represent a rich pool of potential future union leaders.

Along with these facilitators stand the elected local leaders who have taken the political risks associated with supporting a QWL process. Together, these elected leaders and QWL facilitators represent a highly committed group that both believes deeply in the need for strong unions and in the value of worker participation. One of the most important contributions that a national union can make toward strengthening the role of worker participation within the union and diffusing the process to a wider spectrum of union members is to reinforce, support, and draw on the talents and experiences of these individuals. Failure to provide career opportunities within their unions for these local activists risks losing many of them to management positions or underutilizing them if they fade back into a less active rank and file status. Taking advantage of their training and experience, on the other hand, by, for example, using them in educational and training conferences, not only will help others to learn from their experiences but also will provide the support and reinforcement needed to encourage them to continue to be active in their union. In short, as one member of our project advisory committee noted, these experienced local leaders represent a pool of
largely untapped resources from which the labor movement can draw in training and educating other members.

Worker Participation Training. In addition to the career and leadership development efforts for those already experienced with worker participation, there is a major role for national unions in educating other local leaders and national staff representatives about these processes. With a few notable exceptions, up to this point most of the training and education of the union leaders about QWL and related participation programs has been organized and run by management, academic, or consulting organizations. While these programs have been useful in exposing union representatives to the concepts, philosophies, and procedures of QWL, they are not likely to be useful in helping unions develop their own ideas of what worker participation can do for their organizations and how it fits into their larger bargaining and representational strategies. For the labor movement to develop its own vision of where worker participation processes will take their organizations, it is essential that national unions take the initiative in training their local representatives.

This need not necessarily be totally separate training from that provided by employers and QWL consultants. Indeed, there is merit in jointly designed and conducted training processes where the consultants, union representatives, and management professionals share their experiences and expertise and provide skills training for union and management facilitators. Regardless of whether training is joint or separate, national unions need to develop specialists who can serve as trainers of local officials. By doing so, national
unions can insure that local union leaders will understand where the QWL process fits in the broader strategies of the union.

**Monitoring/Supporting Local Union Activities.** If a national union wishes to implement a policy of supporting worker participation under appropriate conditions, and have this policy implemented in a consistent fashion at local levels, it will need to (1) develop experts on its national staff who can participate in the national networks of QWL professionals, (2) provide staff assistance to local unions that are considering the question of whether or not to get involved in a participation process, (3) monitor developments at the local level as they unfold, and (4) engage in the types of "firefighting" activities that are necessary to help see these processes through times of crisis. A few unions have developed this type of expertise on their national staffs or have individuals who regularly represent their unions in the many public forums and conferences devoted to QWL and related topics. More active union involvement in this professional network can help to shape the thinking of the consultants and management professionals who now dominate those groups and influence the evolution of ideas about worker participation. Union involvement will help to educate the consultants and other ardent advocates of what must be done to make these processes acceptable to the labor movement. Having expertise in the national office of the union will also be essential for any union that seeks to both know what is happening within its local unions and to influence the course of development of worker participation. Our case analyses also demonstrate that representatives of the national union can take some of the pressure off innovative local leaders and show workers the connection between
participation programs and other national union activities.

The Role for the Top: The AFL-CIO and its Departments

While there is no expectation that the AFL-CIO, the Industrial Union Department, or any other unit at the Federation level will or should deviate from the approach of leaving policies regarding worker participation to their constituent unions, there are several critical functions that can be served by leaders at this level that are consistent with their role in the structure of the labor movement. These functions are to: (1) foster dialogue on this issue among national union leaders and with representatives of business and government, (2) convey to the larger public the labor movement's views and strategies for relating worker participation to collective bargaining and broader national economic and labor policies, and (3) encourage experimentation with worker participation efforts that operate under appropriate conditions.

There clearly will remain a range of views about the viability of worker participation efforts and their appropriate role within broader labor movement strategies. While it may not be possible nor desirable to press for a consensus on these issues across the various national unions and their leaders, it is clear that the issue of how the worker participation efforts fit within the larger collective bargaining and public policy agenda of the labor movement needs to be moved to a higher level of priority and to be more actively debated at the highest levels of the labor movement. Bringing together national union leaders with different views and experiences to discuss actual experiences with worker participation processes and to debate their implications can best be done by the Federation and its
Departments and affiliates. Out of these discussions may emerge a clearer picture of what the labor movement's model for QWL and related processes should be—a limited supplement to collective bargaining or an evolving step toward an American brand of shop floor industrial democracy that is an integral part of the collective bargaining process.

Labor movement leaders have an important role in shaping the image of unions in the eyes of workers, employers, and the larger society. If, under appropriate conditions, worker participation is seen as an integral component of the broader strategies for strengthening the roles and effectiveness of unions at the workplace and supplementing their collective bargaining activities, then the task of the top leaders will be to convey this view to all of these audiences. The current message conveyed from the top of the movement is one of "cautious skepticism" and neutrality. One can envision, however, a different message which specifies the conditions that must be present, but then conveys enthusiastic support for experimentation with alternative types of worker participation. This shift in the message communicated would again help challenge management for the initiative on worker participation efforts and would serve to further legitimate and support the activities that are underway within the various national unions.

Finally, the experience of this project suggests that the Federation has a unique role in fostering research that takes advantage of the many natural experiments currently underway within the various national and local unions. This research has only begun to tap the diversity of experiences that will be playing themselves
out over time. From this diversity generalizations can be drawn about what conditions produce successes and failures with greater objectivity than can be expected from research conducted by parties who have a direct political stake in the outcomes of these efforts. Furthermore, like high level management executives who have difficulty getting objective information from their QWL staffs about potential problems that may be brewing below the surface, union leaders may have difficulty acknowledging problems with programs that they have supported. Yet it is from problems or failures that we often learn the most important lessons.

Likewise, where there are success stories to be told, the stories have more credibility if told by people who have less of a political stake in promoting them. Again from the successful cases, important lessons can be learned by probing the reasons that lie behind the successes. Thus, a major role for the Federation should be to continue to support research on these topics, to debate the implications of the results of the research produced, and to disseminate these results and their implications as widely as possible within the labor movement and among the larger community of interested management, government, and third party representatives.

Implications for the U.S. Industrial Relations System

Integrating worker participation efforts into the broader bargaining and public policy strategies of the labor movement could potentially lead to a number of important changes for the larger U.S. industrial relations system. In this final section, we will outline a number of those implications that can be readily identified.
Impact on Job Control Unionism

The most direct effect of expanded worker participation efforts, especially those that involve work reorganization, is a movement away from the detailed job control form of unionism characteristic of U.S. collective bargaining. This does not mean that the collective bargaining agreement will no longer govern the terms and conditions of employment. However, it does imply that the detailed specification of contractual rules may give way to a more flexible and varied form of work organization at the plant level. This implies a major change in the roles of the local union, supervisors, and higher levels of management.

For the union, this requires relinquishing one of its traditional bases of power and security in return for greater information and perhaps influence over a wider array of issues that traditionally have been reserved to management. It implies that the traditional principle that "management acts and workers grieve" will have to give way to more joint planning and consultation at the workplace.

For the worker, this new arrangement means exposure to a wider variety of tasks and more advanced training, and, therefore, wider opportunities for skill acquisition and enhancement. On the other hand, it also implies greater responsibility for decisions that would otherwise have been left to a supervisor or low level manager.

For management, this development implies a trade of some of its traditional prerogatives and a redesign of the role of the first line supervisor in return for greater flexibility in human resource management and a reduction in the detailed rules governing job definitions and assignments. In summary, for all the parties, it
implies a movement toward a more proactive form of labor-management relations based around more joint research and analysis, planning, and consultation.

**Effects on Labor Law**

Over time, the expansion of this form of organization and participation may lead to a breakdown in the legal line of demarcation between "labor" and "management". It particularly places the role of the supervisor in an even more nebulous status than before. This, in turn, should call into question provisions in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) used to determine who is a worker covered under the Act and who is a supervisor to be excluded from the Act. It also challenges the relevance of the NLRA's scope of bargaining doctrines as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). If work teams and union representatives are to get more deeply involved in sharing information, consulting, or perhaps even effectively deciding issues that lie outside the issues of wages, hours, and working conditions, the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining becomes increasingly blurred and less relevant.

One further potential outgrowth of these participation efforts may eventually be the development of some form of "works council" arrangement at the plant level. In a sense, a form of this already exists in the joint labor-management steering committees that oversee many of the QWL participation processes.

**Linkages to National Labor and Economic Policies**

At a higher level, one might ask whether worker participation has an important role in the larger labor, human resource development, and economic policies of the country. Should worker
participation, along with the other changes in industrial relations set in motion by these projects, be viewed as part of a larger national strategy for reforming labor policy and enhancing human capital investment and development? Can it be part of the debate over the adequacy of the public policies governing not only union recognition and collective bargaining but the entire range of labor and human resource policies and their linkages to national industrial and economic policy?

We believe a strong case can be made for treating these practices, forms of work organization, and the labor management relationships as the micro foundation for a new industrial and human resources development policy. Furthermore, it may be desirable for public policy debates over trade or tax policies targeted on particular industries to consider the state of labor-management relations (and joint efforts to improve them) in those industries.

These are questions that the labor movement and others concerned about the future of the U.S. industrial relations system must grapple with in the years ahead. Perhaps the analysis here will stimulate the dialogue needed to move this debate closer to center stage.
Footnotes

1. The degree of interest expressed here is consistent with the results of similar surveys of blue collar workers. See, for example, Kochan, Lipsky and Dyer, (1974) or Kochan (1979) or Quinn and Staines (1979). For a study that also demonstrates that workers assign a higher priority to gaining influence over issues that directly affect their immediate job related experiences than over the broader strategic issues normally reserved to management, see Witte (1981). For further evidence of this from samples of workers from twelve countries, see Industrial Democracy in Europe (1980).

2. All regression equations referred to in this paper included these demographic characteristics plus a set of dummy variables that control for other unmeasured characteristics of the local unions. The complete regression results are reported in the Appendix to Chapter 4 of the larger report (Kochan, Katz, and Mower, 1983).

3. Ideally, one would prefer to measure differences in perceived influence of the same workers prior to and after participating in a QWL process. While this was not possible in this study, results reported here using cross sectional comparisons of participants and nonparticipants are consistent with panel studies showing little or no significant change in actual influence. See Witte (1981).

4. These questions are taken from the Job Diagnostic Survey, an instrument designed to measure the content of jobs and their motivational potential. See Hackman and Oldham (1981).
References


