Strategies of Public Diplomacy: An Assessment of the Current U.S. Public Diplomacy Strategy in Light of a Directional, Elite-Oriented Model and Two Historical Cases

by

Ryan Michael Crow

B.A. Biology & Anthropology
Bowdoin College, 2002

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
SEPTEMBER 2003

© 2003 Ryan Michael Crow. All Rights Reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

Signature of Author: ____________________________
Department of Political Science
August 8, 2003

Certified by: ____________________________
Roger Petersen
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by: ____________________________
Stephen D. Ansolabahere
Professor of Political Science
Chairman, Committee for Graduate Students
Strategies of Public Diplomacy: An Assessment of the Current U.S. Public Diplomacy Strategy in Light of a Directional, Elite-Oriented Model and Two Historical Cases

by

Ryan Michael Crow

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 8, 2003 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Political Science

ABSTRACT

While undoubtedly the most powerful nation in the world, the U.S. is constrained in its ability to further its national interests by the attitudes and actions of foreign governments and, more importantly, foreign publics. The growing ability of individuals and small groups to threaten the security and vital interests of the United States necessitates improved cooperation and empathy on the part of foreign publics as well as their governments. Moreover, the concurrent decline in the utility of military statecraft due to both higher costs and decreasing international legitimacy means that policymakers are forced to consider alternative means of influencing the behavior of others.

Public diplomacy is a critically important example of such an alternative means. Unfortunately, understanding public diplomacy and its effects is hampered by a lack of conceptual tools used to develop and evaluate various strategies of public diplomacy. Consequently, the following paper seeks to combine existing theoretical arguments regarding strategic communication and mass persuasion to develop an analytical model that can be used to critique the United States’ current public diplomacy strategy.

According to the model developed and tested herein, strategic directionality and the level of elite orientation are the two primary causal factors that determine the outcome of a particular public diplomacy campaign. Target audience predisposition and the degree to which the campaign itself is concealed from the audience serve as two intervening variables that may retard the progress of a campaign. Thus, the diagrammatical structure of the model is as follows:

Directional Message + Elite-Oriented Message → Successful PD Campaign

Intervening Variables: Predisposition
Concealment of Campaign

When tested against Britain’s efforts to recruit the U.S. as an ally prior to the end of 1941 and Kuwait’s efforts to retain the support of the U.S. after Iraq’s invasion in August
1990, the model is found to be sound. The model predicts that the current U.S. public diplomacy campaign in the Middle East will fail due to a lack of strategic directionality, limited elite orientation, and poor concealment of the campaign itself. By way of conclusion, several policy prescriptions are offered to improve the levels of each of these variables.

Thesis Supervisor: Roger Petersen
Title: Professor of Political Science
CHAPTER 1- Introduction: Describing the Need for Public Diplomacy

As the United States enters the 21st century, it faces a paradox unique in history. While undoubtedly the most powerful nation in the world, the U.S. is increasingly constrained in its ability to further its national interests by the attitudes and actions of foreign governments and, more importantly, foreign publics. Anthony Blinken (2002: 104) puts it succinctly: “Never has a country been more powerful by traditional measures: military might and economic prowess. Yet, never has a major power been so dependent on the active cooperation of others to defeat its enemies and to advance its interests.”

No where has this dependence become more apparent than in America’s efforts to protect itself from terrorism since September 11, 2001. Basing rights, rights of way, local intelligence, and the strangulation of terrorist assets both human and monetary all depend, to varying degrees, on the cooperation of foreign governments and their citizens. Having appropriated the broader points of bandwagoning theory, some U.S. policymakers argue that U.S. power will silence critics and pull more people and countries into line with U.S. objectives rather than pushing them away. According to these people, “military power remains the foundation of U.S. security; successfully applied, it magnifies influence” (Blinken 2002: 102-103).

Unfortunately, this assessment of the way states and individuals behave in the face of U.S. military power does not seem borne out by reality. Hostility toward and non-cooperation with the United States continues to abound in the Middle East and other areas of the world vital to America’s security in spite of prominent displays of military strength in Afghanistan and Iraq. Turkey’s refusal to grant access to Northern Iraq
through Turkish territory, in the spring of 2003, is just one example of this. More important than the cooperation of state actors, the local population in these areas continues to be overwhelmingly opposed to the U.S. government and its policies. According to the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, in Turkey, the percentage of survey respondents with a favorable view of the U.S. fell from 52% to 30% between 2000 and 2002. The percentage of Pakistanis with a favorable view of the U.S. fell from 23% to 10% during the same period ("What the World Thinks" 2002: 3). Three quarters of all Jordanians have a poor image of the U.S. despite the fact that Jordan is the fourth largest recipient of American aid; no more than one in ten people in Egypt have "positive feelings" toward the U.S. ("What the World Thinks" 2002b: 54). Long term U.S. security from terrorism can only be achieved through the establishment of mutual understanding and respect between these people and those of the United States. Without it, there is simply no way to choke off the supply of recruits and funds to terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, nor is it possible to deprive them of the sanctuary they need to organize and carry out their work. Moreover, U.S. policies in these countries are doomed to fail irrespective of local government support if mass publics (who ultimately grant the mandate to even the most authoritarian regimes) cannot be convinced of their rightness on at least some minimum level. Adherents to this bandwagoning theory fail to recognize that "foreign policy based solely on such principles of power and dominance leaves no room for legitimate political opposition, driving all discontent into the camp of extremists and terrorists" (Andoni 2002: 85). Clearly then, military power alone is insufficient to ensure sustained U.S. security.
The bandwagoning theory above fails to accurately reflect reality because it does not take into account the role of perceptions (rather than objective reality) in determining the behavior of actors both large and small. Only when these perceptions are included in the analysis can the current global political reality be explained. Without a doubt, there is a growing gap between the local perception of the U.S. and the U.S.'s perception of itself throughout the world. If the gap persists or grows, U.S. influence abroad will decline, U.S. allies will begin to stand on the sidelines, and America’s enemies will gain influence (Blinken 2002: 101). So important are perceptions in determining the behavior of actors that some scholars have argued that U.S. military and intelligence efforts will “count for little” if the United States fails to close this gap in perceptions (Blinken 2002: 101).

The gap in perceptions is wide even in areas of the world traditionally friendly and culturally similar to the United States. Europeans see the U.S. as barbaric (death penalty), gun crazy and overly capitalist. This is in spite of the fact that crime is at a 30 year low, large majorities favor stricter gun control, many question the death penalty, and policies are in place to try to close the gap between rich an poor (Blinken 2002: 102). Moving beyond Europe, the gap in perceptions becomes more serious. Many Muslims outside the U.S. consider it hostile to Islamic and Arab interests. This is in spite of U.S. efforts in Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and even Israel (Blinken 2002: 102).

Public understanding of specific policies is similarly skewed. The U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq throughout the 1990’s provide an instructive example. People across the world believe that the U.S. imposed the sanctions on Iraq single handedly. In reality, the U.N. imposed the sanctions after an Iraqi invasion and set three conditions which Iraq could meet to lift the sanctions: 1) verifiable destruction of WMD and their production
and delivery systems, 2) reparations to Kuwait, and 3) accounting of missing Kuwaitis.

Similarly, many think the sanctions applied to food and medicine; they do not and never did. Despite widely publicized claims to the contrary, the sanctions are not responsible for the misery of the Iraqi people. In Northern Iraq (where the U.N. and local Kurdish authorities distributed the oil-for-food revenue), infant mortality is lower than it was before the Gulf War of 1991, and the average caloric intake is higher. In the South (where Saddam diverted the proceeds of the oil-for-food program to his own ends), people were indeed suffering (Blinken 2002: 104).

In addition to widespread misperceptions of U.S. policies, the portrait of American culture that is absorbed through contact with private U.S. media is skewed, negative and unrepresentative (Ross 2002: 81). Television shows such as *Baywatch* have achieved worldwide popularity, but they depict a decadent, amoral culture as the norm in the U.S.. The globally popular music of Brittney Spears and the Backstreet Boys has a similar effect, and the marketing campaigns of large U.S. companies such as Coca Cola and McDonalds can hardly be said to represent U.S. culture accurately. In reality, America is unique among the great powers in its social and religious conservatism. The United States is less secular than any Western European country save Ireland, and it is “more traditional” than any country in Central or Eastern Europe. Similarly, the religious attitudes of Americans are closer to those of Nigerians and Turks than they are to Germans or Japanese (“Living with a Superpower” 2003: 18-20).

Misperceptions of U.S. policies and general anti-Americanism are nothing new, but as noted above, their relevance to U.S. interests is now more pronounced than in previous eras (Blinken 2002: 101). Prior to World War II, U.S. interests abroad were so
limited as to make foreign opinion of the U.S. a matter of limited and only intermittent concern. After World War II, U.S. concern for foreign publics’ perceptions grew in accordance with it greatly expanded interests. In the current era (post-September 11th), the importance of foreign perceptions has reached its zenith. Without working to shape these perceptions in its favor, the United States cannot hope to achieve its security goals over the long term. “In all modern governments, public opinion serves to legitimate government institutions and to determine in greater or lesser detail the limits of public policy” (Margolis and Mauser 1989: 1). If the U.S. can influence public opinion in other countries, it then has the indirect ability to influence the policies and legitimacy of those governments to at least some degree. Thus, not only do public perceptions of America and its policies play a critical role in constraining the U.S.’s ability to act effectively, they also provide a space within which the U.S. can endeavor to promote the democracy, freedom, and mutual respect needed for a general peaceful and prosperous world.

This study endeavors to systematically examine the primary tool with which U.S. policymakers seek to influence foreign publics’ perceptions of the United States, public diplomacy. As such, this paper seeks to address the following three questions: 1) What is public diplomacy and how does it compare to other means of influencing the behavior of others? 2) What are the critical variables in determining the outcome of a particular public diplomacy campaign? 3) How does the current U.S. strategy measure up with respect to each of these factors? 4) How might the current U.S. strategy be improved upon in light of these factors?

Broadly defined, public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and
ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”  
(Tuchs 1990 as quoted in (Manheim 1994: 5). The need for public diplomacy is driven by 
one simple fact that the above problems and opportunities make clear: “Foreign citizens 
do not consider U.S. policies in a vacuum. To accept them requires an understanding of 
the society and culture behind them” (Hitchcock 1988: viii). As U.S. political, economic 
and security interests are increasingly being contested abroad, public diplomacy is 
becoming increasingly important over time in spite of continued U.S. hegemony. Without 
the ability to convince foreign publics of its good intentions, beneficial policies and 
similar values, the gap in perceptions is likely to widen, and the U.S. will face major 
foreign policy obstacles in the future. Unfortunately, academic understanding of public 
diplomacy and its effects is hampered by a lack of good conceptual tools that can be used 
to develop and evaluate various strategies of public diplomacy. Consequently, the 
following paper seeks to combine existing theoretical arguments regarding strategic 
communication and mass persuasion to develop an analytical model that can be used to 
critique the United States’ current public diplomacy strategy. Specifically, Manheim’s 
concept of directional strategic communication is combined with aspects of mass opinion 
theory to form a strategic, elite-oriented model of public diplomacy. The second section 
of the paper lays out the model and elaborates on the theoretical foundations that inform 
it. The third section of the paper then valuates this model in light of several historical 
public diplomacy campaigns where the benefit of historical hindsight permits an accurate 
assessment of the model’s validity. First, Great Britain’s effort to recruit the United 
States as an ally against Germany from the late 1930’s through 1941 is examined as a 
case of highly successful strategic communication. The third case study scrutinizes
Kuwait’s efforts to enlist the aid of the United States in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait in 1990-1991. Having thus bolstered the strength of the model, the fourth section then uses the model to analyze and critique the current public diplomacy strategy of the United States. In this final chapter, a number of policy prescriptions suggested by the model are discussed.

CHAPTER 2- Defining Public Diplomacy

Before delving into the theoretical foundations of the model developed and utilized herein, it is first necessary to elaborate on the definition of public diplomacy given above and to accurately describe its position in the larger field of statecraft. As will become clear over the course of this paper, the roots of public diplomacy are closely intertwined with those of mass communication:

Beginning with radio, diplomacy—the conduct of relations between states by official agents by peaceful means—was all but obviated by the new technologies. For the first time, states did not have to rely only on these official agents (diplomats) to communicate their messages to other states. Appeals could be made directly to foreign publics most forcefully through radio, and later via satellite TV, and by means such as student and professional exchanges, movies, periodicals, books and language teaching” (Alleyne 1994: 418).

As the above definition makes clear, public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy primarily in that it deals with nongovernmental individuals and organizations, but the differences go deeper than merely shifting the focus of the communication. In many ways, public diplomacy is more complex and sophisticated than standard forms of communication between governments. Public diplomacy targets specific sectors of foreign publics to develop support for strategic goals (Ross 2002: 75). Also, public
diplomacy campaigns may present many different views in addition to the official view of the government. According to the Planning Group for Integration of USIA in the Department of State (June 20, 1997), public diplomacy is defined as follows: “Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences” (“What is Public Diplomacy?” 2002). In practice, the conduct of public diplomacy is far more involved than this definition would at first suggest. Public diplomacy is a truly multidisciplinary science:

Strategic political communication incorporates the use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of human behavior as attitude and preference structures, cultural tendencies, and media-use patterns—as well as knowledge of such relevant behavior as how news organizations make decisions regarding news content and how congressional committees schedule and structure hearings—to shape and target messages to maximize their desired impact while minimizing undesired collateral effects” (Manheim 1994: 7).

The tools of public diplomacy include technological tools, such as modern communications equipment, which are used to distribute the message, institutional tools such as censorship, media pools, selective granting of access, selective granting of media credentials, appeals to patriotism of journalists, conduct of briefings, and grass roots organizing which are used to mold the message into a specific form and direct it to the proper audience, and psychological tools, which are used to ensure that the message shapes and maintains public opinion toward the specific purpose intended (Manheim 1994: 41). Ideally, public diplomacy efforts cover a wide range of activities designed to incorporate this knowledge into a strategic communications plan. Radio and TV broadcasting, print publications small and large, language teaching, art/cultural exchange
programs, and managed press relations may all be part of a public diplomacy campaign. While public diplomacy represents only an extremely small fraction of the personal relationships between Americans and foreigners, it is the only part of these relationships that are expressly directed toward the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 1).

**Differentiating Public Diplomacy from Other Forms of Government Communication**

Public diplomacy is commonly confused with other forms of government communication such as public relations or propaganda, but while public diplomacy shares some common characteristics with these other forms of communication, it is distinct in both its focus and the means employed to convey the message. Typically, public diplomacy is conceptually very similar to public affairs or public relations, public affairs conducted by private entities. But as the United States Information Agency Alumni Association points out, public diplomacy is directed at foreign rather than domestic audiences:

Public affairs is the provision of information to the public and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. government. Public affairs seeks to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions, and domestic and international media. However, the thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience ("What is Public Diplomacy?" 2002).

In the United States, the distinction between public affairs and public diplomacy is maintained by laws that prevent the domestic dissemination of any public diplomacy material. Specifically, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 states that the products of any U.S. public diplomacy agencies cannot be distributed to domestic audiences because of their
potential to be used for political advantage ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 30). This strict limitation on the use of public diplomacy material probably stems from public diplomacy’s close association with a second form of strategic communication: propaganda.

Public diplomacy is not the only means a government has available when it wishes to communicate with foreign publics. Psychological operations or propaganda carry with them significant negative connotations because of the dishonesty and misdirection their names imply. Often conducted by military or intelligence organizations, this type of strategic communication is both similar and different from public diplomacy depending on how it is conducted. Most scholars refer to three types of psychological operations/propaganda: white, grey and black. White operations are those where the source of the information is obvious to the recipients (Taylor 1998: xix). Grey propaganda is information from a false 3rd source, and black propaganda is information ostensibly coming from the target group itself ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 34). Some of the same activities now characterized as public diplomacy used to be called propaganda. Partly this is a recognition of how the label attached to an activity affects how others perceive it, and partly it is a reflection of the increased sophistication seen in the field (Manheim 1994: 5). Under this rubric, most public diplomacy would fit into the category of white propaganda if it could be classified as propaganda at all. Occasionally however, some public diplomacy efforts may slip into the grey category, as those campaigning work to reduce the profile of the campaign itself. The Kuwaiti government’s use of a private foundation to carry out its public diplomacy
efforts leading up to the first Persian Gulf War (discussed below) is but one example of how the line between public diplomacy and propaganda can become blurred in practice.

Placing Public Diplomacy in the Field of Statecraft

Having now described public diplomacy more fully and differentiated it from other forms of strategic communication, it is now important to accurately place public diplomacy in the wider field of statecraft. Though the term statecraft has a number of meanings, in this case it is used to refer to “the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals” (Baldwin 1985: 8). The study of statecraft is thus the study of the instruments that policymakers use to get others to do what they would not otherwise do (Baldwin 1985: 9). In attempting to alter the behavior of others, statesmen have a wide variety of tools available to them, and, as noted in the introduction, public diplomacy is best thought of as one of these tools. To be completely understood then, public diplomacy must be at least briefly compared to these other options policy makers have at their disposal when they wish to influence the behavior of others. Only through this comparison can reasonable expectations be developed as to the efficacy of public diplomacy under different circumstances.

According to Baldwin, the tools of statecraft fall into four general categories: diplomacy, economic statecraft, military statecraft, and propaganda. The category of diplomacy includes “influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation.” Economic statecraft covers those influence attempts “relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.” The third category, military statecraft, comprises those influence attempts that rely “primarily on violence, weapons
or force.” Finally, propaganda includes “influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols” (Baldwin 1985: 13-14). Although not strictly propaganda as I have characterized it, public diplomacy would clearly fall into this category. Thus, public diplomacy represents a fourth pillar of foreign policy, next to economic action, traditional diplomacy, and military force.

It should be noted that even though the categories are discreet in their own right, actual attempts to influence behavior often involve combinations of these four possibilities. Economic levers are rarely employed without the concurrent use of some form of diplomatic negotiation for example.

**Setting Reasonable Expectations for Public Diplomacy**

Although it can accomplish some of the same goals as negotiation or economic or military action, public diplomacy reaches the ultimate goal of altering another actor’s behavior in a way fundamentally different from other tools of statecraft. Manheim (1994: 40-41) outlines five ways in which public diplomacy may be employed: 1) Mobilize support for one’s cause/demobilize support for the adversary’s cause, 2) Legitimate one’s objectives/delegitimate those of one’s adversary, 3) Empower your forces/disempower your enemy’s forces, 4) Highlight potency of one’s forces in contrast to those of the enemy, and 5) Define circumstances and terms of conflict on terms most favorable to one’s needs. These efforts may at first seem to be relatively inconsequential compared to sanctions or military force, but when evaluating the significance of public diplomacy one should keep in mind that “means-ends analysis is complicated by the fact that very few
ends are ultimate or final values; most are intermediate or instrumental in some sense” (Baldwin 1985: 16).

When compared to economic or military action, public diplomacy has long been marginalized as an ineffective means of influencing the action of others. However, I argue that public diplomacy has been misunderstood as a tool of foreign policy and unfairly criticized as a result. When claiming that a tool of statecraft (public diplomacy included) has failed, critics often make the following arguments: the costs outweighed the benefits, an alternative influence attempt would have been more effective, the minimum degree of success was not achieved, or some goals were not achieved. However, these definitions of failure are each problematic.

Once again Baldwin’s (1985: 131) discussion of economic statecraft is enlightening. Arguing that costs outweighed benefits is only an acceptable criticism if there is an identifiable, superior alternative, something that is rarely done or may not exist. Similarly, claiming that another alternative would have been more effective ignores the costs associated with that alternative. Where public diplomacy is concerned, the cost of alternatives (sanctions or force) will often be unacceptably high. It is important to analyze the utility of alternative ways of solving the same problem before passing judgment on the efficacy of public diplomacy. In many cases, public diplomacy may be the only means of solving the problem at hand. Even when public diplomacy does not appear to be a particularly useful option, military or economic action may be politically or practically infeasible. For example, despite the extended effort involved and lack of definite results, it is difficult to see how any influence attempts other than public
diplomacy could have been aimed at upsetting the Soviet Union’s control over its citizens without risking global war.

Determining whether or not the minimum acceptable degree of success was obtained is difficult. Most influence attempts do not lay out a clear indicator of success, and this is especially true with public diplomacy. First, the ultimate goals of public diplomacy campaigns may not be readily apparent to outside observers. As Baldwin (1985: 18) points out, “recognition that a given influence attempt may involve multiple goals and targets of varying generality and significance is an important first step for assessing the utility of various techniques of statecraft…” Economic sanctions may be important not because of their economic impact (which may be of no significance) but because they demonstrate the intentions of the state imposing the sanctions (Baldwin 1985: 24). Public diplomacy operates in the same way. Demonstrating solidarity with the oppressed people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc through international broadcasting is one example of this. Second, to the extent that influence attempts increase the cost of a target country’s noncompliance, power is still being exerted even though there is no change in the actions of the target country (Baldwin 1985: 132). Thus, public diplomacy may not lead to change in the policy of a particular country, but it will still be exerting influence even if it only forces the target county’s government to put forth more effort to prevail against American wishes. “Not all influence is manifest in terms of changes in policy; changes in the costs of noncompliance also constitute influence” (Baldwin 1985: 133). Third, attempting to persuade one to do what he or she would otherwise not do through verbal and visual symbols is difficult to determine under the
best of circumstances, and as will be discussed below, where public diplomacy is concerned, there are nearly always confounding variables operating concurrently.

Criticizing an influence attempt because some goals were not completely attained is a similarly flawed criticism. In most influence attempts of every kind, goals are usually approximated rather than reached precisely. Influence is a matter of degree. Thus, the lack of clear cut success is not definitive proof that public diplomacy is not useful. When talking about economic statecraft (just one other tool of statecraft) Baldwin argues: “To view the use of... statecraft strictly in terms of securing compliance with explicit and publicly stated demands is to load the dice in favor of failure. Third parties, secondary goals, implicit and unstated goals are likely to be significant effects of such undertakings” (Baldwin 1985: 132). This certainly holds true for public diplomacy. It is unlikely that U.S. public diplomacy efforts will suddenly convince the Arab world to favor American policies for example, but there may be significant unseen impacts nonetheless. Judging a tool of statecraft to be weak and ineffective because it did not achieve goals such as eliminating global communism, winning the Vietnam War, or eliminating terrorism “is to ignore the difficulty of the undertaking and thereby to underrate the effectiveness of the policy instrument being used” (Baldwin 1985: 133).

The effects of public diplomacy are likely to accrete slowly over time. The changes tend to be slow, relatively undramatic, and difficult to estimate. I contend that this has led many policymakers to mistakenly place public diplomacy at the bottom of their proverbial statecraft toolbox when in fact, its utility has been climbing steadily throughout the 20th century. The costs of military statecraft have increased markedly, thus reducing its utility. The increased costs of military hardware and troops are the least
significant aspects of this increased cost, and they alone are quite substantial. Before the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf, the Congressional Budget office estimated that the fighting could cost up to $9 billion per month and that occupation would cost up $4 billion per month (Vespereny 2003: 037). By contrast, the United States’ worldwide public diplomacy effort costs little more than $1 billion per year (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 10). Monetary costs aside, the decline in the legitimacy of force as a tool of foreign policy and the increased risks associated with weapons of mass destruction/terrorism are the two most important causes of the decreased utility of military statecraft (Baldwin 1985: 68). One need only examine the diplomatic and opinion costs the U.S. paid prior to, during, and since its drive to remove Saddam Hussein from power to witness the decreased legitimacy of military force, and much of the terrorist ire currently directed at the United States is the result of previous military action and the forward bases it required. Therefore, as the utility of military statecraft declines, public diplomacy should be regarded with new significance as an alternative to military (or even economic) statecraft given its comparatively low cost and limited potential for unwanted side-effects.

**Placing this Work in the Field of Public Diplomacy Studies**

Having fully elaborated on the definition of public diplomacy and how it fits into the wider field of statecraft, it is now appropriate to begin developing the model that will be used to analyze the historical cases and assess current U.S. public diplomacy strategy. Before doing so however, I would first like to briefly reiterate the goal of this study. Namely, I hope to offer an important conceptual tool that allows one to evaluate and even predict the effectiveness of a particular public diplomacy campaign. Though many
scholars have studied various public diplomacy campaigns in intricate detail, there remains a good deal of uncertainty and imprecision when attempting to appraise the effectiveness of a particular campaign even after the fact. Partly, this is a reflection of the inherent difficulties in parsing out the effectiveness of strategic communication when there are many other (often unknown) variables operating at the same time, but it is also the result of a lack of good theories designed specifically to facilitate the understanding of public diplomacy. In the case of the United States at least, this academic uncertainty has translated into under-commitment to public diplomacy and confused policymaking on the part of the government. Thus, the improved understanding of public diplomacy offered by this model is important not only because it will permit a more systematic evaluation of past public diplomacy efforts, but also because it allows policymakers to understand the likely impact (or lack thereof) of specific public diplomacy efforts not yet implemented. In other words, after testing the model against British and Kuwaiti cases, applying it to the current U.S. public diplomacy strategy should yield a prediction of the likely outcome of the campaign and specific policy prescriptions to improve its effectiveness.

CHAPTER 3- Developing the Model

Lack of good conceptual tools regarding the effectiveness of public diplomacy notwithstanding, there are several existing theoretical works regarding strategic communication and mass persuasion that offer important insights into which aspects of such campaigns are critical to success. The following chapter seeks to make use of these insights in developing a directional, elite-oriented model of successful public diplomacy.
Model Part I: Strategic Image Direction- The Directionality Variable

Virtually all governments conducting a public diplomacy campaign seek to portray their nation in as favorable a light as possible to the target audience. In fact, this is often the primary means by which the influencing nation seeks to alter the behavior of the target group. Quite simply, those who feel positively about a particular nation and view its culture in a favorable light are far more likely to agree with its policies and accept its actions than those who have a negative impression of the nation and its culture. Put even more bluntly, it is difficult to get someone to understand and agree with you if they do not like you to begin with. Unfortunately, the clear benefits of trying to develop or maintain a positive national image in the eyes of a specific target audience belie the inherent difficulties in implementing it effectively. Often foreign publics are only dimly aware of the existence of other nations, much less its policies and culture. A national geographic survey conducted in late 2002, found that only 13% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 could even find Iraq on a map, and even though 58% knew that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were based in Afghanistan, only 17% could find that country on a map (“Survey Results” 2002). At the same time however, simply raising the profile of the nation in question in an indiscriminantly fashion is not sufficient to ensure that a positive image is developed or maintained within the target audience. Often, countries have policies or particular aspects of their culture or government that the target audience would disapprove of, and these must be minimized to whatever degree possible. As the experience of South Africa during the 1980’s and early 1990’s points out, simply having a high international profile is no guarantee that a positive national image will follow.
To begin examining the means by which a positive national image can be cultivated, we must first systematize the concept of national image. A scholar of strategic communication, Jarol B. Manheim (1994) provides a means of conceiving of national image as a position on a two dimensional plane. As Figure 1 shows, visibility, or the prominence of the influencing nation in the minds of the target audience is measured along the vertical axis of the plane while the positive or negative character of the image is measured along the horizontal axis.

A nation’s location on the chart is determined by plotting its visibility against the positive or negative character of the image held by the target audience. Visibility can be described simply by the number of news stories relating to the country in question in the local media. The number and variety of media outlets providing information about the
influencing country would also have an impact on visibility as the amount of time or space each devoted to the influencing country. Visibility is increased by increasing the number of insertions, the size and position of headlines, and the breadth of sources covering the country. Topics that are “relatively more visible in the media are more likely than others to be transferred to the public agenda” (Manheim 1994: 152). Thus, as will be discussed in the next subsection, the role of elites in setting the media agenda becomes critically important.

Reducing visibility is a bit less intuitive and thus deserves a bit more discussion. Reducing visibility may entail restricting the privileges and access of foreign journalists, limiting contact between citizens of the target country and the influencing country (in this example South Africa), and limiting the public appearances and foreign travel of national leaders. More directly, reduced visibility may be achieved by curtailing the most blatant aspects of existing public diplomacy programs or by reducing one’s diplomatic, military or commercial presence in a target country. Critically, reducing visibility may also entail countering malignant misperceptions that are being promoted by others. This is somewhat counterintuitive, but the ultimate goal of countering such misperceptions is to reduce the prominence of the nation in the eyes of the target audience. For example, an America that is killing tens of thousands of Iraqi children through its malicious sanctions is far more visible to Arab world than one that is merely carrying out a U.N. sanctioned program designed to achieve inspection compliance.

The positive or negative aspect of a national image can be determined by a survey of relevant media sources (during the period in question) and a simple characterization of each reference as either generally positive or generally negative. Positive stories include
references to progress, advances, resources, assets, strengths, continuity, reliability, or dependability. Negative references would include references to decline, weakness, poverty, liabilities, lack of progress, instability or unreliability (Manheim 1994: 136). Opinion surveys may also provide a measure of the positive or negative aspect of a national image. However, this type of data must be treated with caution if it is being compared over time as small differences in phrasing or methodology may alter the results to some degree (Mueller 1971: 367-368). Changing the positive or negative aspect of the image is relatively self-explanatory. Increasing the number of positive references regarding the influencing country should improve the image of that country in the eyes of the target audience provided the conditions of strategic directionality discussed below are being met.

Although this study plots national images based on approximations of both visibility and image character—the wide array of media sources and types involved in each case combined with the varied types of data available on image character raise methodological issues that militate against doing otherwise—Manheim (1994: 138) argues that this process can in fact be quite quantitative and precise. The two axes of the previously delineated chart can be defined by the number of insertions per unit of time (y-axis) and the percentage of positive or negative references contained in those stories (x-axis) so as to yield a location on the chart that can be objectively plotted over time.

Importantly, Manheim also provides evidence and advice for how movement on this plane is best achieved. Through the use of multiple detailed case studies he not only proves conclusively that national image is an important aspect of any public diplomacy campaign, but also that altering one’s national image must be approached strategically if
it is to be successful. Obviously, a nation conducting a public diplomacy campaign would hope to reside firmly in the upper right quadrant (highly visible, positive image) by the time its efforts are concluded, but the straight line path to this quadrant is not always available. Only through the careful use of what I will call strategic directionality can most nations hope to achieve their public diplomacy goals. During the early 1990’s South Africa provided a good example of those countries that fall into the upper left quadrant. The image of these countries is not only highly negative, but also highly salient in the minds of the public. Critically, “under these conditions, explicit efforts to portray a country in a positive light are likely to be rejected, by the media and public alike, as propaganda in the most pejorative sense” (Manheim 1994: 132). The only real option for a country in this category is thus to attempt to reduce its visibility by whatever means possible with the hope that national image can be altered at some point in the future (Manheim 1994: 132).

Countries that fall into the lower left quadrant are those that may have an image that may be as negative as those in the upper left quadrant but is not nearly so highly visible (Manheim 1994: 133). The Philippines and Sudan are representative of countries that fall into this category with respect to the United States. According to Manheim, countries in this quadrant offer the greatest possibility of successful public diplomacy-based image manipulation (Manheim 1994: 133). In these cases, the negative aspect of the influencing country’s national image may be attacked first, while the visibility remains comparatively low. Once sufficient progress has been made on this front and a neutral or slightly positive image has been cultivated, visibility can be increased while further concurrent efforts are made to improve the national image.
Currently, Switzerland would typify the lower right quadrant while Britain would typify the upper right. This is not to say that there are not negative aspects of each of these countries images. Rather, the positives simply outweigh the negatives. Because countries in these quadrants already have a largely favorable image, their efforts are likely to focus more on increasing their visibility, though efforts to improve image may also occur (Manheim 1994: 133).

Following the above logic, the natural progression through the image chart is a u-shaped course of decreasing visibility, followed by increased positive image, which is in turn followed by an increase in visibility (See Figure 2) (Manheim 1994: 134).

In practice of course, some upward diagonal movement (indicating simultaneous efforts to improve visibility and image) may occur once a neutral or positive image has been achieved (See Figure 3). Manheim’s examination of various successful public
diplomacy campaigns bears out this prediction of this diagonal movement (Manheim 1994: 138).

The importance of strategic directionality is two-fold. First, the strategic directionality (or lack thereof) of a particular public diplomacy campaign is an important variable in the ultimate success or failure of that campaign. If the influencing nation fails to take into account its initial position in determining the course of its campaign, its public diplomacy efforts may only succeed in being perceived as propaganda by the target audience. Second, and of equal importance, this discussion of strategic directionality has served to further define the cases in which public diplomacy can be applied most successfully. Clearly, the traditional tools of public diplomacy do not lend themselves readily to severe image problems such as that faced by South Africa in the early 1990’s or North Korea today. In such extreme cases, any public diplomacy campaign must work to reduce the salience of the negative national image through a
combination of the means discussed above while being careful to avoid any activities that could be characterized as propaganda. Only when this difficult initial reduction in visibility is accomplished can stronger efforts be made to increase the positive aspects of one’s national image. At the same time, a clear understanding of the importance of strategic directionality shows U.S. that countries that already have a positive image in the eyes of their target audience may focus primarily on visibility without resorting to slower, more expensive efforts such as exchange programs to achieve their ultimate goal of influencing behavior. Turning to the following discussion, each of the historical cases chosen would initially fall into the lower left (negative image, low visibility) quadrant, making them, at least in this respect, ideal cases for the application of public diplomacy. In spite of this, both of the historical cases chosen represents a hard test of this model because of the considerable goals each set out to achieve.

Model Part II- The Elite Orientation Variable

Having now outlined Manheim’s ideas regarding the importance of directional strategic communication, the first part of the model is in place. This section examines the second causal variable behind successful public diplomacy, elite orientation of the message. In this section, I argue that elites play a critical (but not exclusive) role in determining which issues enter the public discourse while also using their elevated status to shape the acceptable range of positions within the discourse to varying degrees. Hence, any successful public diplomacy campaign, while still remaining a program of largely mass communication, must contain some elements directed specifically at winning the support and trust of target audience elites because elites play a role in determining what
information the mass public receives and how that information is perceived. It is important to note that extensive empirical data from both the U.S. and other countries supports this line of argument (Zaller 1993, Geddes and Zaller 1989). Thus, the following paragraphs seek to lay out the case for this argument by first discussing elite agenda-setting and then examining the role of elites in opinion formation.

Media agenda-setting is one of the major ways local elites determine the issues and positions that are internalized by the masses (Qualter 1989: 140). According to this view, news items make the front page not because of their intrinsic importance, but because the media makes them important (Qualter 1989: 142). Without media attention, it is unlikely that any particular issue will develop into a matter of general public interest. Elite agenda-setters contribute to social consensus by sorting out for others what should be paid attention to (and with what intensity) and what should be ignored in an increasingly complex world (Qualter 1989: 141). Mass individuals depend on elites who devote their full time and attention to politics or public affairs for much of their information about the world. First hand experience with foreign countries is generally rather limited, so mass individuals are forced to depend on these elites. Information from friends or family may simply be second hand information from some kind of elite (Zaller 1992: 6).

Additionally, media coverage of foreign events is hampered by a lack of resources and the increased expense and difficulty of covering foreign events. This in turn makes the media somewhat dependent on government officials and other foreign policy elites for information (Manheim 1994: 128). Thus, “the media’s priorities tend to reinforce elitist views of the proper boundaries of public concerns” (Qualter 1989:139).
Consequently, the media (and through it elites) may not determine what people think, but it play an important role in determining what people think about (Qualter 1989: 140). According to Manheim (1994: 128), “together, these observations add up to an opportunity for influence, a collection of vulnerabilities to outside intervention that are inherent in many foreign affairs related issues and events.” As a result, any attempt at mass persuasion or influence must begin with these elites who help to set the agenda and determine the cognitive and ideological framework through which the masses receive their information.

In addition to their major role in setting the media-agenda, it is also important that public diplomacy efforts be directed at local elites because of the disproportionate impact their opinions have on mass opinion as a whole. The mass public generally relies on elites working through the mass media to sort out the important issues of the day, but this dependence on elites extends beyond simple agenda-setting. Full-fledged ideologies are produced by a small number of “creative elites” and then diffuse through the public. “The shaping of belief systems of a range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a miniscule proportion of any population” (Converse 1964: 211). Elites are thus the source of mass ideologies, and these ideologies are then utilized by the mass public as a sort of cognitive shortcut when forming opinions about specific issues.

As noted earlier, mass publics can generally be characterized as having low political awareness (Zaller 1992: 18). In this case the term political awareness refers to both the extent to which an individual takes notice of politics and understands the information he or she receives. This is not to suggest that the mass public is unintelligent
or easily fooled, rather most individuals are “rationally ignorant” of politics according to a simple calculation of the time it would take to familiarize oneself with the issues as compared with the impact that this knowledge would have on one’s daily life. Rationality aside, the low level of political awareness on the part of the general public means that ideologies and other such cognitive shortcuts facilitate mass opinion formation in the absence of complete information. As Zaller (1992: 8) puts it:

Culturally given and elite-supplied stereotypes may be the most powerful in shaping public understanding of events that are “out of reach, out of sight and out of mind”... Stereotypes and frames like these are important to the process by which the public keeps informed because they determine what the public thinks it is becoming informed about, which in turn often determines how people take sides on political issues (Zaller 1992: 8).

Some scholars argue that elite discourse leads rather than follows public opinion. If this were the case, specifically targeting some aspects of a given public diplomacy campaign toward local elites would not influence the effectiveness of the campaign. However, the elite-orientation model utilized herein can be further justified on the grounds that the provision of elite messages is clearly exogenous to mass attitude change in most cases (Zaller 1992: 268-269). For example, President Bush’s efforts to develop public support for U.S. intervention in Somalia clearly preceded any massive public demand for action (Robinson 2000: 4, Livingston 1997: 7-8). Even when politicians or other elites are responding to public pressure, they are often responding in anticipation of pressure that has yet to actually materialize. “The public opinion to which elites try to be responsive is not the public opinion that is reflected in the polls at the point of decisions, but the public opinion that an opponent might be able to call into existence at the next election” (Zaller 1992: 270).
In addition to their important ability to influence the general public, elites seem more likely to be aware of the public diplomacy communications in the first place. In the developing world for example, elites seem to make up a disproportionately high percentage of U.S. public diplomacy’s receiving audience. The 5% of Kenyans who had a secondary education in the mid 1980’s made up 32% of the Voice of America’s (hereafter VOA) listening audience. Similarly, in Argentina, the 19% of the population with a secondary education made up 66% of VOA’s regular listeners. The same study found that those with a university education exhibited the highest listening rates (Burnett 1986: 75).

In light of the above discussion, the importance of orienting public diplomacy efforts toward local elites becomes clear. The elite set the “boundaries within which the public discussion of politics takes place, it also provides the symbols, the language, and stereotypes through which issues are articulated” (Qualter 1989: 143). Mass media then plays the crucial role of linking the elites and the public (Margolis and Mauser 1989: 3). This is not to suggest that public diplomacy efforts should be entirely focused on local elites. Mass communication is still crucial to any public diplomacy effort. The target mass public remains the ultimate group one is seeking to influence, and direct communication is still critical to altering both visibility and the positive or negative aspect of the national image as discussed above. Elite orientation is a means of facilitating the dissemination of one’s message through local media and existing networks of trust and communication.
Intervening Variable 1- Resistance to Influence Due to Target Predisposition

The central core of the model to be tested is now in place:

Directional Message + Elite-Oriented Message → Successful public diplomacy Campaign

However, before proceeding to the cases, it is important to add two intervening variables, target predisposition and campaign concealment, to the model. Although they complicate the analysis of the model’s validity and reduce its parsimony to some degree, this sacrifice is justified by the more complete simulation of reality and greater predictive power that results.

The predispositions of the target audience can have a profound effect on the efficacy of a particular public diplomacy campaign. As Zaller (1992: 6) points out, “every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it.” Thus predispositions are an important intervening variable that resides between the message that the mass public receives and the opinion they display as a result of it. If a target audience is predisposed to resist the message carried by a given influence attempt, even the most well-constructed public diplomacy campaign may meet with little success. Predispositions are partially the result of lifetime experiences, current social and economic location, and inherited or acquired personality factors and tastes. Importantly, elites do not play a significant role in shaping the predispositions of the masses as these are far less fluid than opinions regarding specific issues. Although internalized elite
discourse may have some impact on predispositions over the long run, over the short term, elite influence may be ignored (Zaller 1992: 23).

Predispositions may engender resistance to an influence attempt by causing people to reject communications that are not in accordance with their underlying values and beliefs (Zaller 1992: 121). For example, while it may be nearly impossible to convince a successful stock broker that communism is a valuable political/economic system, a downtrodden factory worker may alter his opinion as a result of the same argument. In similar fashion, Americans would have been unlikely to support efforts to join Great Britain in the fight against Germany in the years leading up to 1941, regardless of British public diplomacy efforts, if racial discrimination or some other negative predisposing factor had been in operation. As Manheim (1994: 147) suggests, “even the most effective public relations effort is unlikely to possess the power to overcome substantial historical forces once they have been set in motion against the interests of the [influencing nation]” (Manheim 1994: 147).

**Intervening Variable II- Concealment of Campaign as a Necessary Condition of Success**

The second intervening variable is the level of concealment an ongoing public diplomacy effort may or may not enjoy. Put simply, public diplomacy becomes less effective when the strategy being employed becomes widely known, but this point requires some elaboration to ensure that it is not misconstrued as destroying the distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda (Manheim 1994: 10). First, I must stress that I am referring to concealment of the campaign itself rather than deception or concealment operating within the campaign. Recognition of the importance of
concealment is attested to by the numerous and varied deliberate efforts influencing nations make to reduce the profile of their public diplomacy efforts. These may be as simple and small as choosing politically innocuous names such as the United States Information Agency, for public diplomacy efforts, but they may be far more extreme. Kuwait went as far as creating a private foundation to handle its public diplomacy efforts during the first Persian Gulf War (Manheim 1994: 45). Those hoping to counter public diplomacy campaigns have also recognized the importance of reducing the overt presence of the campaign itself. In the U.S. for example, efforts at strategic communication on the part of other countries become part of the public record, but these activities are not widely discussed (Manheim 1994: 10).

The reader may now be confused about the earlier distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda given that the former is supposed to be completely overt. Although this certainly does blur the distinction to some extent, I argue that concealing or reducing the profile of a public diplomacy campaign is fundamentally different from conducting propaganda. Concealing a public diplomacy campaign, as I have characterized it here, merely means reducing or eliminating the appearance of a deliberate effort to alter the behavior of others through the use of verbal or visual signs and symbols. This does not include purposeful efforts to disseminate misinformation or the misattribution of information to third parties. In much the same way as sophisticated advertising campaigns often push a product without mentioning its price or directly asking audiences to buy it, a successfully concealed public diplomacy campaign pushes the same image without making the presence of the effort or even its ultimate goal explicit. For example, British films designed to demonstrate the steadfast nature of
British resistance during the Blitz did not tell viewers that their goal was to recruit the United States as an ally in the war even though that may have been their intention. In contrast, when the Philippines carried out a highly overt effort at self-promotion prior to a state visit by Ferdinand Marcos in 1982, image consultants and embassy officials spoke openly about the media blitz, their effort to win the “public opinion battle”, and distributed lavish press packages containing bamboo briefcases and hardcover books ostensibly written by Marcos himself (Manheim 1994: 141). As a result of this lack of concealment of the campaign (the national image of the Philippines was hyped, not concealed), the public diplomacy effort became the primary story in the U.S. media, and the campaign actually increased the negative image of the country held by the American public.

CHAPTER 4- Testing the Model against the Historical Cases

With the two intervening variables included, the model to be tested against the three cases in this chapter now appears as follows:

Directional Message + Elite-Oriented Message → Successful PD Campaign
Intervening Variables: Predisposition
Concealment of Campaign

Accordingly, a strategically directional, elite-oriented public diplomacy campaign is more likely to be successful than a non-directional, purely mass oriented campaign, provided the target audience is not strongly predisposed against the influence attempt and the existence of the campaign itself is not particularly prominent in the minds of the target audience. The following chapter endeavors to test this assertion against three historical cases where the application of public diplomacy seems well founded according
to the criteria discussed previously (viability and cost of other options, location on
dimensions of national image chart, etc.), but where the goals sought make each a hard
test case of the efficacy of this model. The first section will test the model against British
efforts to recruit the U.S. as an ally against Germany in the years leading up to 1941. The
second section will test the model against Kuwaiti efforts to garner U.S. support during
the 1990-91 conflict in the Persian Gulf. After briefly supplying the historical context for
both cases, I will describe the public diplomacy campaign in some detail and then outline
what the model would predict in light of each of the four variables discussed in the
previous chapter. Finally, the predicted outcome will be briefly compared to the actual
outcome in an effort to bring the testing aspect of this chapter back into focus.

CASE 1- British efforts to recruit the U.S. as an ally in World War II

Historical Background- The Need for a Public Diplomacy Campaign

Great Britain’s need for a public diplomacy campaign to woo the United States grew
steady in the years leading up to World War II. As German and Japanese military
expansion progressed throughout the 1930’s, it became clear that, as in the last Great
War, Britain was going to require American assistance to prevail in any upcoming
conflict. With war looming, the British were frightened by both a deteriorating strategic
situation and continued American isolationism. American aid had been absolutely critical
to Britain’s ability to survive WWI. Aside from the late entry of U.S. troops, $500
million of U.S. arms and ammunition had been transported to Britain in the earlier years
of the war (Cull 1995: 6).
As early as 1937, the geopolitical environment that confronted the British Empire was distinctly hostile and a serious threat to its continued existence. By 1937 the Japanese were already firmly established in Manchuria and looking to expand into British held areas of Asia. Perhaps more troubling, the Germans had invaded the Rhineland in March of 1936, and Mussolini had begun to align himself with Hitler. Most worrisome of all, it was clear in 1937 that even with a full scale rearmament program begun in 1935, Great Britain would not be able to offer a credible deterrent threat until at least 1939 (Cull 1995: 5, 13).

Sustained U.S. isolationism combined with this highly threatening strategic situation to make the need for a public diplomacy campaign directed toward the United States even more apparent. The U.S. passed strict neutrality acts in 1935, and these acts were tightened in 1936 to preclude all trade with belligerent powers (Cull 1995: 5). Many Americans favored Britain and British culture over all others in Europe. At the same time however, U.S. neutrality toward Britain had strong historical, cultural, and economic roots, meaning it could not be expected to be easily brushed aside at the moment Britain’s strategic situation became truly desperate. Though deep in the past, America’s history of fighting the tyrannical British monarchy in both the American Revolution and the War of 1812 still held meaning for many Americans. Second, the British class system seemed antithetical to American values of individual liberty and personal self-worth. Third, numerous German and Irish-Americans were distinctly hostile to the British cause for obvious reasons. Fourth, because of their own experiences, recent Eastern European immigrants did not favor empires, even the comparatively benign British type and were reluctant to support their preservation. Finally, regardless of ethnic or political stripe,
most Americans were aware that Britain had not paid its war debt, and that its imperial preference trading practices were unfair to the U.S. as well (Cull 1995: 6-7). Although Franklin Roosevelt empathized with the British plight, the British had learned that the sympathy of the White House was not sufficient to result in meaningful U.S. action. Congress and national public opinion could hamstring the good intentions of the President if they were not dealt with (Cull 1995: 3). Thus, it was clear by 1937 that deliberate action had to be taken if the United States was to be convinced to come to the aid of the British Empire. The goal was to undermine U.S. neutrality and sell the war to the American public (Cull 1995: 4).

The Public Diplomacy Campaign

In Britain, American public opinion was seen as critical for winning support for the war because:

To an extent unknown under the parliamentary system it is public opinion as revealed in the press, the Gallup polls, the tornado of telegrams addressed to Congress and the ordinary reports of party and political whips and not the responsible view of the executive which decides... (Lord Lothian as quoted by Cull 1995: 34).

Therefore, from the moment the British government recognized the need for American aid it sought to develop a public diplomacy machine capable of shifting American public opinion in favor of assisting in the war effort.

Although efforts to recruit the United States did not really begin until 1937, British public diplomacy efforts did not begin from scratch at that point. Limited public diplomacy efforts directed at the U.S. had begun in the 1920's and early 1930's, and Britain had voluminous experience with attempts at persuasive communication dating from its efforts to recruit the United States as an ally prior to World War I. From 1920 on,
the British maintained a small press bureau in New York. Dubbed the British Library of
Information (BLI), its goal was to improve press relations (Cull 1995: 10). The directors
of the BLI sought to be viewed as the authority on British policy and views in the U.S.
(Cull 1995: 11). In 1932, British radio broadcasts (BBC empire service) aimed at Canada
actually generated more response from Americans who could receive the signal than
Canadians. Because the broadcasts were in Queens English and discussed only British
news, the BBC felt that Americans would not feel they were being propagandized (Cull
1995: 12). Radio exchange between Britain and the U.S. was initiated by Roosevelt in
1934 because of British misconceptions of the New Deal. By 1935, the BBC had opened
its first office in New York (Cull 1995: 12). Having long recognized the American fear of
propaganda, the British instituted a strict “no propaganda” policy in 1924. According to
this policy, the British government pledged itself to tell only the truth and let the facts
speak for themselves (Cull 1995: 10). The only exception to this rule was $2000 devoted
annually to countering Indian nationalist propaganda in the U.S. (Cull 1995: 11).

In addition to the BLI and a limited radio exchange program, by the mid 1930’s
the British also had a small policy group designed specifically to deal with public
diplomacy issues and an Anglo-American cultural organization to facilitate cultural
exchange. The British Council on Cultural relations abroad was founded in 1934, and the
English Speaking Union (ESU) had actually been in existence since 1919 (Cull 1995: xiv,
9).

Despite the dismal strategic outlook and continued American isolationism, the
British were initially reluctant to launch a major public diplomacy campaign in the U.S.
in the late 1930’s because their manipulation of news and outright propaganda from
WWI was widely recognized and now reviled in the U.S. (Cull 1995: 9). In 1935 Walter Millis (an eminent historian of the day) reminded Americans that they had been deceived by widespread British propaganda in the past. This touched off a wave of Anglophobia (Cull 1995: 9). Compounding this was a general, widespread fear of propaganda during the 1930’s as scientists began to show how mass opinion could be manipulated. People were greatly concerned at the impact a foreign power could have on U.S. policy (Cull 1995: 9). By 1937 however, the strategic situation had deteriorated to the point where British leaders realized that their current limited strategy would be insufficient to improve both the visibility of their plight and improve their image sufficiently to enlist American support. Thus, in March 1937, public diplomacy efforts specifically designed to recruit the U.S. as a wartime ally began with a report commissioned by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (Cull 1995: 13).

Unfortunately, the report back from the British ambassador to the U.S. on March 22, 1937, offered only limited recommendations regarding the effort to recruit the U.S. as an ally. Wary of American anti-propaganda hysteria, the Ambassador first recommended that public diplomacy efforts within the United States not be extended much beyond the BLI. Although generally cautious, the Ambassador did recommend that the British government make a substantial contribution to the World’s Fair in 1939 in an effort to display British culture. Finally, the ambassador went on to say that although the “no propaganda” policy should be maintained, there remained a good deal of room for influence within this policy (Cull 1995: 14). The extremely conservative strategy outlined in this initial report seemed born out as U.S. fears of propaganda grew in the years leading up to all out war. The Foreign Agents Registration Act was passed in June 1938.
This required foreign agents both to register themselves and to label all the literature they produced with its country of origin (Cull 1995: 19). Consequently, BLI officers were included as agents of foreign propaganda when the list was published (Cull 1995: 20). In August 1938, the House Committee for the Investigation of U.N.-American Activities convened under the chairmanship of Congressman Martin Dies of Texas. One of the primary concerns of the committee was the impact of foreign propaganda in the U.S., and British efforts were included in the investigations (Cull 1995: 19). Finally a September 1939, Gallup Poll showed that only 8% of Americans had confidence in the news being reported from England and France (Gallup 1972: 182).

Putting growing American fears of propaganda aside, the British quickly embraced a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy of gradually increasing pressure far more aggressive than that suggested by the British Ambassador. The first aspect of this more aggressive strategy was press relations. Despite U.S. isolationism, the American press corps in Europe expanded during the late 1930’s. Given the common language, London became the headquarters of this growing group. British government officials who hoped to bring American support to their country saw this group of influential individuals as the first place to start. The Foreign Office News Department made every effort to ensure that American journalists were well-supplied with material. Daily briefings, with strictly controlled question and answer time at the end, were conducted, and individual interviews with News Department officials (also strictly controlled) were frequently granted (Cull 1995: 14, 15).

Britain’s more aggressive public diplomacy strategy also included increased efforts to ensure that British culture was being displayed favorably in films. During 1938
and 1939, more and more Americans began to watch British films, and this in turn brought an increase in the number of British directors working in Hollywood (Cull 1995: 18). Hitchcock is but one example of the importance of this infusion of British directors. He came to the U.S. to make movies and money, but he also saw the importance of helping Britain. The conservative party charged him with working for “the better representation of British characters in Hollywood produced film.” Hitchcock reported to the consul general in Los Angeles that he planned to include “secondary characters whose representation will tend to correct American misconceptions regarding British people” (Cull 1995: 18).

In indication of a more widespread trend, Warner Brothers began letting anti-totalitarian sentiments creep into their films. Films denouncing the Spanish civil war and fascism began to appear in 1938. By 1938, 5000 members of the Hollywood community had joined the anti-Nazi league (Cull 1995: 17).

Importantly, the increased assertiveness of British public diplomacy had not erased the government’s caution about not straying into the realm of propaganda. Pro-German propaganda that was discovered in the British post was allowed to proceed to the U.S. without alteration, while pro-German propaganda bound for other neutral nations was replaced with pro-British material and resealed in its original envelope (Cull 1990: 13). Allowing pro-German material to proceed to the U.S. unmolested was undoubtedly part of the effort to ensure that Britain did not aggravate anti-propaganda sentiments in the U.S..

Despite the above improvements, the Munich crisis (September 1938) clearly showed that British public diplomacy efforts remained wholly inadequate, and in some
cases, completely inept. While public opinion initially surged, returning ESU lecturers soon reported a strong anti-Chamberlain sentiment in the U.S. The Munich agreement was seen as confirming the worst U.S. suspicions about Britain, namely that it was a weak ally, incapable of resisting the Germans and desirous of pacifying them. Clearly, Britain needed to show its willingness to fight fascism, or the U.S. would give up on Britain. One British official even released a statement saying that Britain and Russia would certainly stand by France if Czechoslovakia was attacked, something that was not official British policy at the time (Cull 1995: 21-23).

As a consequence of the decline in U.S. public opinion after Munich, the British government once again stepped up its efforts to improve American perceptions of Great Britain and the empire. In December 1938, the administrative division between public diplomacy and propaganda was laid out. The Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department was to be responsible for propaganda in enemy and enemy-occupied countries while the Ministry of Information (MoI) would be responsible for public diplomacy at home, in all neutral countries, and within the empire (Cull 1995: 24). BLI was made semi-independent and also tasked with monitoring U.S. public opinion on a day to day basis (Cull 1995: 31). The survey section was kept somewhat independent of the information section and its no propaganda policy (Cull 1995: 32). On September 4, 1939, the Foreign Publicity Directorate was formed under the MoI to conduct public diplomacy for all of the neutrals other than the U.S. Although a staff of 50 was authorized, only 35 staff members filled this important office (Cole 1990: 7). Clearly, the British government viewed the United States as the most important public diplomacy target.
Press relations remained a central pillar of the British public diplomacy effort. Once the administrative divisions were laid out, one of the first decisions made by the new MoI department was to continue to try to use American journalists to disseminate the majority of the war news it wanted to reach the American public (Cull 1995: 25). This was important because it reduced the profile of the campaign itself while at the same time utilizing elite opinion makers to carry the message to the masses. By August 1939, the wartime propaganda and public diplomacy structure was firmly in place. American correspondents would be briefed by the Foreign Office’s News Department while the BBC liaison unit and the American division of the MoI would also lend support. In addition, the BLI was expanded and a press attaché was attached to the British Embassy in the U.S. (Cull 1995: 29-30).

In addition to the standard activities, the months leading up to the outbreak of war also saw some one-time public diplomacy activities specifically designed to improve the American image of Great Britain and its empire. The British pavilion at the 1939 World’s Fair hosted more than 14 million visitors by the time the exhibit closed (Cull 1995: 26). At the World’s Fair, the commercial aspects of the empire were downplayed while the humanitarian and cultural benefits of the empire were emphasized (Cull 1995: 27). The centerpiece of the pavilion was the “Hall of Democracy” which contained an original copy of the Magna Charta and was designed to draw the link between British and American democracy explicitly in the minds of visitors. A translation of the document was mailed to every school in the U.S., and the BLI convinced the New York Times to produce a piece on the document (Cull 1995: 27). The Royal visit in June 1939 was also very important. The King and Queen’s efforts to dispatch with their customary pageantry
played very well with the American public (Cull 1995: 28). Stories of them eating hot
dogs and drinking beer with the President were widely circulated in the press.

When war broke out in Europe in 1939, Britain’s public diplomacy campaign was
far from complete. Few Americans showed strong support for the Germans, but few were
strongly in favor of the allies either. Roosevelt made it clear privately that his pro-ally
stance was politically shaky at best (Cull 1995: 34-35). The Ministry of Information
remained so concerned with the appearance of propagandizing that it actively
discouraged British lecturers from traveling to the U.S.. Such efforts were of only limited
success, and isolationists pointed to these lecturers as evidence of British attempts to
propagandize the American public. Such lecturers were actively protested against (Cull
1995: 35). British policy also worked against British public diplomacy efforts. Britain cut
its import of American luxury items such as movies and tobacco in order to buy more
munitions, and the blockade of Europe was a constant source of tension (Cull 1995: 36-
37). In contrast, the Germans did not face the same uphill battle of convincing the U.S. to
make sacrifices to aid an ally. They merely had to reinforce America’s isolationist
inclinations. Hitler’s order not to sink American shipping is a clear example of this effort

As before the war, press relations remained a primary focus of the British public
diplomacy effort. The Foreign Office News Department continued to be the primary
source of news for American correspondents, and its system of tightly controlled daily
briefings was maintained (Cull 1995: 40). In addition, the American Division of the MoI
gave radio correspondents extra attention, and this paid off in the form of discreet favor
of the allied cause despite strict National Association of Broadcasters rules against the
practice (Cull 1995: 42). In Great Britain, organized outings to places of interest such as contraband control ports or munitions factories were an especially effective means of communicating favorable stories through the American press and thus to the American public (Cull 1995: 42). British officials also made an effort to put American reporters in contact with Americans who were experiencing the war themselves, whether through being on torpedoed vessels or living in Britain at the time (Cull 1995: 42-43). The BBC worked closely with American radio correspondents to ensure their dispatches went out and that they had good stories to cover (Cull 1995: 42-44). By the account of one reporter at least, the sensors served as much as guides as they did guarders of secrets (Cull 1995: 44). Finally, recognizing that it could never match the appeal (and thus the audience) of an American broadcaster, the BBC restricted its broadcasts in the U.S. during the period between the outbreak of war and the fall of France. Only speeches by the King, Queen and Churchill were rebroadcast on American networks (Cull 1995: 45-46). By February 1940, the BLI had a mailing list of 2,500 customers (mostly journalists) who received regular infusions of information about Great Britain and the Empire (Cull 1995: 59). The BLI also made a strong effort to examine and analyze U.S. media coverage of Britain as the war progressed. Daily reports/press summaries were telegraphed to Britain (Cull 1995: 60).

The outbreak of war stimulated increased focus and creativity in British public diplomacy activities related to the film industry as well. The agenda of the films division was threefold: show “what Britain was fighting for”, show “how Britain fights”, and show “the need for sacrifices if the war is to be won” (Cull 1995: 47). MoI assisted newsreel companies in the same way it assisted broadcasters. Couriers were hired to
ensure British footage beat German footage back to the states for example. The film
division also worked with Hollywood production companies to get them to produce films
that favored the British cause (Cull 1995: 48). It should be noted that Hollywood was
inclined to favor a pro-British stance because the totalitarian countries were largely
closed to U.S. films of any sort. Thus, favoring Britain made good business sense (Cull
1995: 50). By January 1940, the MoI films division reported success saying: ‘nearly all
the leading producing companies in this country, both British and American, have been
persuaded to produce films presenting our war effort in a favorable light (Cull 1995: 46).

British intellectuals were recruited to challenge the view that this war was like the
last European wars, one of simple power politics. Dozens of the most renowned British
writers were used to produced pamphlets, articles, novels, and other publications that
carried the British message. Well-known British publishing houses such as Penguin,
Harcourt, and Oxford University Press were used to make the works appear less like
government-sponsored propaganda. Included were works with titles such as For What do
we Fight?, Winston Churchill’s Fighting Speeches, and Forever Freedom (Cull 1995:
53). This literary material worked to argue Britain’s moral case for the war.

Critically, Britain paid close attention to elite American opinion makers in
carrying out its public diplomacy campaign. Churchill was pushed to attend dinner
parties with senior American journalists, and these journalists were in turn, encouraged to
socialize with British officials on weekend retreats and holidays (Cull 1995: 44). For
example, Edward R. Murrow spent Christmas 1939 as the guest of the MoI Secretary,
Iveson MacAdam. In return, Murrow arranged for a poignant live chat (broadcast
nationwide) between the MacAdams and their children who had been evacuated to the
Western U.S. (Cull 1995: 45). Catholic and Protestant church leaders were mailed regular pamphlets on Germany’s stance on religion. Pro-British ads were placed in Catholic newspapers. Catholic and Protestant Journals were started and mailed to church leaders for free from “a neutral friend”. *Christian Commonwealth*, an MoI publication, was mailed biweekly from an independent address to more than 10,000 church leaders and editors (Cull 1995: 54-55). Rabbi Perlzweig, an MoI recruited lecturer, gave more than 100 pro-British speeches at synagogues throughout the country. He also delivered radio addresses, attended conferences and spoke at rallies (Cull 1995: 55). Efforts were made to emphasize the common, democratic connection between Britain and the U.S.. The copy of the Magna Charta displayed at the World’s Fair was placed in the Library of Congress at a special ceremony ‘alongside its own descendents, the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution’ (Cull 1995: 58).

Although still far from achieving their ultimate goal of direct U.S. intervention, British public diplomacy efforts began to reap some rewards by late 1939. Pro-British non-profits began springing up in the U.S. in late 1939 and early 1940, and individual Americans began volunteering to serve the allied cause in various ways. At the same time, previously established aid organizations began raising money to support the allied cause as well (Cull 1995: 62-63). By early 1940, the BLI had noted a marked decline in American concerns about propaganda (Cull 1995: 63). By April 1940, British war photographs now outnumbered German photographs 12 to 1 in the Midwest where only a year earlier the ratio had been 4 to 1 in favor of Germany (Cull 1995: 67). The revision of the American Neutrality Acts in November 1939 was the first major payoff to result from Britain’s increased public diplomacy efforts and a boost to the British war effort to be
sure, but it by no means made U.S. intervention automatic. The insistence on cash purchases ensured that British debt would not draw the U.S. into the war, and the ban on all U.S. shipping entering belligerent European waters ensured that there would not be another *Lusitania* (Cull 1995: 61-62).

In spite of the above gains, many Americans continued to favor neutrality in early 1940. American support was still not seen as necessary for the allies to win the war, so when Germany began its westward march in early May 1940, British public diplomacy officials once again redoubled their efforts (Cull 1995: 63). British public diplomacy during the summer of 1940 remained focused on the U.S. press in Britain and the interventionists in the U.S. (Cull 1995: 88). These interventionists were mostly the foreign policy elites or the internationalists of the Eastern U.S. Lord Lothian made moves to reinforce the surge in public support for Britain that developed in the U.S. after Dunkirk and during the battle of Britain. He installed press officers in the BLI in New York to "cut off each Hydra-head of argument on the other side as it appears" (Cull 1995: 78). The Ministry of Information also sought to increase the number of British children allowed in to the U.S. as a means of increasing U.S. awareness of the costs Britain was paying in defense of its freedom. Each arriving evacuation ship was treated to a flurry of press activity at the behest of the MoI (Cull 1995: 92). However, the major change in the journalism arm of Britain's public diplomacy campaign came not in the form of further improvements at the interface between British officials and the American press, but in the shift to direct British broadcasting in the United States.

The BBC began broadcasts explicitly directed at the U.S. on May 28, 1940 (Cull 1995: 85). Broadcasters were chosen specifically because they had a more neutral accent
than the typical BBC newscaster. English words such as tram were exchanged for their Americanized synonyms such as streetcar. Finally, these broadcasters worked to cultivate an image of Britain standing alone against aggression rather than making direct appeals for American aid. As with American broadcasting, firsthand accounts were emphasized, and some music was incorporated to try to increase listener share (Cull 1995: 85). Trips to RAF bases were organized to increase coverage of the Battle of Britain. American pilots fighting for the RAF were strongly emphasized (Cull 1995: 89-90). Restrictions on American reporting eased as British need for American aid increased. Shortly after the Blitz began American broadcasters were granted access to civilian sites that had been damaged or destroyed by German bombs. Previously, access to sites that were not so favorable to Britain had been denied, but now they were seen as a means of drawing America into the war (Cull 1995: 101). Soon (September 19, 1940), live broadcasts of bombing and dogfights were also allowed. Murrow covered a German bombing raid live on September 21, and his report received a great deal of sympathetic attention in the American press (Cull 1995: 102). A weekly radio show carried widely in the U.S. broadcast the calls of British parents to their children living in the U.S. (Cull 1995: 92). BBC and American news network coverage became nearly indistinguishable as the Battle of Britain continued (Cull 1995: 106). By 1941, mailings to the BBC offices in the U.S. had increased to the point where broadcasters had to appeal to listeners for restraint. This is clear evidence of a large and growing audience far above the 5000 first estimated by Murrow in 1940 (Cull 1995: 87).

Film production continued during the Blitz in attempt to bring the images of the cost of war to American viewers. The October 1940, film *London Can Take It*, in which
Londoners are portrayed as stolidly going about their business despite nightly bombing raids, was just one example of this effort (Cull 1995: 107). Within months *London Can Take It* was seen by an estimated 60 million Americans (Cull 1995: 108). In January 1941, MoI moved away from the “Britain Can Take It” line so as to promote the view that Britain was capable of striking back at the Germans and winning the war with help (Cull 199: 114). With Americans now deeply sympathetic to the British cause, they now needed to be convinced that Britain was an ally worth aiding and with whom the Germans could be defeated.

Importantly, officials continued to focus elements of their campaign on elite American opinion makers. British elites were dispatched to the U.S. to enter highbrow American social circles of the elite and informally survey their opinions (Cull 1995: 80). Murrow privately encouraged the BBC to continue to pay attention to its shortwave service. Although the audience was small because shortwave sets were expensive, according to Murrow, these listeners were “class people” and swaying them would have a cumulative effect far greater than the actual audience numbers would suggest (Cull 1995: 85). British public diplomacy efforts continued to be tuned slightly in the months leading up to the U.S. declaration of war in December 1941, but for the most part, the campaign simply continued apace after the battle of Britain was concluded.

**Evaluation of Strategy in Light of Model**

Having described Britain’s public diplomacy efforts prior to U.S. entry into World War II in some detail, it is now important to apply the model developed in the previous chapter to the data at hand. This systematic analysis of each of the four variables
discussed in the model will permit a comparison of the model’s predicted result with the historical facts available, thus providing a test of the model’s validity.

**Directionality of strategy**

At the outset of the public diplomacy campaign (1937 for our purposes), Britain clearly would have resided in the lower left quadrant (low visibility, negative image) of the national images chart. For various, historical, ethnic, and economic reasons, numerous Americans had an unfavorable view of Great Britain and its empire. Furthermore, although Britain may have received a substantial portion of U.S. foreign press coverage, this coverage was clearly insufficient to produce the level of visibility necessary for the general American public to take note of Britain’s plight. Figure 4 shows Britain’s approximate position on the national images chart prior to its campaign.

![Fig. 4- Britain’s approximate position in 1937](image)

Given this initial position, Britain’s initial efforts to improve its image, coupled with a sustained but gradual escalation in visibility as the war intensified seem
appropriate according to the model. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, British public diplomacy efforts consisted primarily of efforts to improve the image of Britain in the eyes of Americans. The reader will recall the Mol’s efforts to improve the depiction of Britons in American films, the large British exhibit at the 1939 designed to highlight the parallels between Britain and the U.S., and the royal visit in June of the same year.

Efforts to improve visibility remained rather limited during this period. U.S. journalists did receive briefings from the Foreign Office News Department, but there were none of the guided tours, or direct radio broadcasting found in later phases of the campaign. As Britain’s image improved in the eyes of the American public, British officials began to work diligently to increase visibility through these methods. Figure 5 charts Great Britain’s course through the different phases of the campaign.

Interestingly, initial reluctance to be charged with propagandizing probably ensured that British public diplomacy efforts followed the course advocated by the model. Had Britain not been so concerned about appearing to propagandize, its initial
efforts might have been far more self promoting, with the result that the U.S. public rejected the effort. Whatever the cause, the proper application of strategic directionality in this case supports the hypothesis that Britain’s public diplomacy campaign would be successful.

**Elite Orientation**

Although clearly mass oriented at its core, the British public diplomacy efforts also devoted significant attention to the cultivation of agenda-setting American elites. The BLI was deliberately designed to be the first point of contact for American journalists and politicians conducting research on Great Britain. As Cull (1995: 11) points out, “although the library was always available to curious laymen, the BLI consciously aimed its activities at the makers of American public opinion.” In a clearly elite-oriented move, the library sought (only moderately successfully) to develop a list of important contacts in the literary, film, and academic world (Cull 1995: 11). Shortwave broadcasts were continued specifically because the expense of the receivers meant that such broadcasts could be tailored to the elite of the U.S. In later phases of the campaign, British intellectual and social elites were encouraged to travel to America in order to socialize with their counterparts and deliver the British message. Moreover, religious leaders of numerous denominations received mailings designed to win their support for the British cause. But perhaps nowhere was the elite-oriented aspect of Britain’s strategy more apparent than in its heavy emphasis on cultivating the American journalists who would disseminate the British message. American reporters mingled socially with the very officials that would plan the public diplomacy campaign directed at the United States, and as noted above, even traveled home with British officials during holidays.
(Cull 1995: 16). In light of British officials’ numerous efforts designed specifically to influence America’s agenda-setting elites, the model also predicts a successful campaign with respect to the elite orientation variable.

**Predisposition**

Despite strong isolationist sentiments, the American public was generally predisposed to accept the information contained in British influence attempts. Despite the issues of class and monarchy, for several reasons, American and British value systems were not vastly different in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. Great Britain was the “mother” of America, and as such, many of its government institutions were similar to those of the United States. Second, Britain’s vast empire and admirable naval supremacy in the years leading up to World War II provided Americans with a shining example of how to be a strong, successful nation (Cull 1995: 7). Most importantly, a shared racial/lingual identity fostered a conception of a shared destiny between the people of Britain and the people of the U.S (Cull 1995: 7). Sharing a language meant that Americans and Britons shared common literature of Twain, Kipling, and Sherlock Holmes (Cull 1995: 8). Sharing heroes, villains, and general literary culture could not help but ensure that Americans and Britons shared the same value system, thus making it less likely that they would be predisposed to reject persuasive British communications out of hand. Moreover, intermarriage between British and American elites was quite extensive during the interwar period (Cull 1995: 8). As a whole then, extensive cross-cultural ties and communication ensured that Americans remained predisposed to accept British public diplomacy in spite of the negative image of Great Britain and its empire.
held at the start of the British campaign. As a result, the model once again predicts a successful public diplomacy campaign with respect to this variable.

**Concealment of the Campaign Strategy**

As noted above, fear of being accused of propagandizing led British officials to use extreme caution in developing their campaign. As a consequence, the public diplomacy campaign deployed against American public opinion kept an extremely low profile throughout its course. First and foremost, utilizing the American press corps to disseminate messages effectively removed the appearance of British propagandizing by making it appear as though the information contained in the news stories had been dug up by American reporters rather than “spoon-fed” directly to them. Guided tours of places of interest and assistance in finding Americans caught up in the war were all part of this effort. Importantly, using the American press as an intermediary did not conceal the source of the information, instead it simply concealed (to some degree) the source’s deliberate and calculated effort to deliver that information to the American public. In similar fashion, early BBC broadcasts appeared to be destined for Canada and made no direct reference to their American audience even though their audience was primarily American. By the time direct broadcasts began in 1940, American fears about propaganda had declined sufficiently so as to permit this increase in visible footprint. Even then however, British officials scrupulously avoided making any direct appeals for American aid, choosing instead to focus on Britain’s stalwart defense of freedom. As with the other variables, the level of campaign concealment in this case suggests that the campaign should be successful.
Prediction versus Historical Outcome

With both of the independent and both of the intervening variables pointing strongly toward success, it is clear that the model outlined in Chapter 3 predicts a successful public diplomacy campaign in this case, but this prediction will only constitute a successful test of the model if the prediction jibes with historical reality. The following section seeks to demonstrate that this is indeed the case.

Cull (1995: 3) argues convincingly that, “During the period of the campaign, American public opinion clearly changed... In 1935, most Americans were isolationists... But by 1941, this same public was ready to risk war to aid the allies and was quite unprepared to allow Germany to dominate the world.” American isolationist attitudes took time to disappear. Even after Britain’s public diplomacy campaign was well underway, isolationist attitudes remained strong in the U.S. A February 1939 Gallup that asked, “Should we send our army and navy abroad to help England and France,” found only 17% answering in the affirmative (Gallup 1972: 145). In October of the same year, a Gallup poll asked, “If it appears that Germany is defeating England and France, should the United States declare war on Germany and send our army and navy to Europe to fight?” 29% of respondents favored aiding England and France while 71% did not (Gallup 1972: 186).

At this point, some may argue that America’s decision to ally with Great Britain had less to do with the public diplomacy campaign than it did with economic self interest or Japanese aggression for example. However, American public opinion did begin to shift in favor of aiding Britain long before confounding events such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could leave their mark. The reader should recall that the Neutrality Acts
were revised in November 1939 (itself an indication that public opinion was beginning to shift), but that the revisions were specifically designed to preclude U.S. entry into the war out of a need to recover sunk costs. By December 1940, 60% of Americans were willing to risk war to help Britain stave off defeat. In May 1940, only 36% had favored risking war by aiding the British (Cull 1995: 109). Over time, American fears of British propaganda had subsided as well. By January 1941, Roosevelt felt confident enough in eventual American intervention to enter in preliminary planning discussions with the British and by mid-1941 more than half of all Americans had high or moderate levels of confidence in British news sources. In contrast, more than 50% of Americans had low or no confidence in German news sources (Cull 1995: 199, 199n). Passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 provides further evidence of the erosion of American neutrality. Finally, by September 1941, after the public diplomacy campaign had run its course, but still months before the U.S. had been directly attacked, a Gallup poll found that 70% of American's surveyed felt that defeating Germany was more important than simply keeping out of the war (Gallup 1972: 300). Therefore, British public diplomacy efforts undoubtedly played a significant role in undermining American neutrality and isolationism in their own right even if other factors provided the proximate cause for U.S. entry into the war. Cull (1995: 201-202) describes this process aptly when describing the results of the campaign:

The Japanese Air Force did not attack a sleeping giant, but a nation politically and industrially—if not quite militarily—prepared for war. Isolationism was already a spent force...although British propaganda may not have changed history, it certainly accelerated the process (Cull 1995: 201-202).

This close congruence between the model’s prediction and the observed outcome bolsters the strength of the model by proving that it does indeed accurately describe
reality in at least some cases. At this point, it should be reiterated that the test the model has just passed must be considered a hard test case in light of the goal the public diplomacy campaign set out to accomplish. Unlike other public diplomacy campaigns, the British effort had to work against strong U.S. isolationist sentiments, and it sought to convince the American public to willingly bear significant costs in support of its ally. This sort of effort stands in stark contrast to the more common sort of public diplomacy campaigns such as South Korean government’s drive to win the 1988 Olympics.

CASE II- Kuwaiti efforts to recruit the U.S. prior to the 1st Gulf War

Historical Background

Before setting out on an examination of Kuwait’s public diplomacy strategy it is first important to note that Kuwait faced a substantial uphill battle in convincing the United States not only to come to its aid, but to apply substantial military force in doing so. As Canadian military analyst Gwynne Dyer put it, “Saddam Hussein was not a problem that kept anybody awake in July” (Quoted in MacArthur 1992: 37). The U.S. (outside of human rights NGO’s) had not been overly concerned by Hussein’s brutal conduct in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Indeed some elements of the U.S. government supported Hussein’s actions during this period (MacArthur 1992: 38). For example, as late as the spring and summer of 1990, U.S. government officials were attempting to support Iraqi contentions that human rights violations including the poison gas attack at Halabja in 1988, were not deliberate attempts by Hussein to control his own people (MacArthur 1992: 41). Finally, On July 25th, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, suggested to Hussein that the U.S. would not intervene in an Iraq-Kuwait conflict (MacArthur 1992: 41).
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had a substantial image problem in the United States. Very few Americans could find Kuwait on a map, and those who were able to, were probably cognizant of the fact that the tiny nation was not a democratic country. In 1986 the ruling family had dissolved the National Assembly, but even before the National Assembly had been dissolved, voting rights had been granted to only 65,000 males out of a total population of 2 million. Only those who could prove their Kuwaiti ancestry before 1920 were permitted to vote (MacArthur 1992: 43). Moreover, political parties were banned in Kuwait, and the Emir (who controlled the executive branch) was selected by and from the ruling al-Sabah family (MacArthur 1992: 43). On January 22, 1990 Kuwaiti police broke up a pro-democracy rally during which several opposition politicians were beaten. Political assemblies were banned thereafter (MacArthur 1992: 44). In addition to its lack of democracy, Kuwaiti treatment of Kuwait’s nearly 500,000 guest workers drew the attention and disdain of reporters and human rights groups alike (MacArthur 1992: 45). On June 30th, the New York Times reported that more than 1200 Bedouin refugees fled into Iraq from Kuwait for fear of the death sentences the Kuwaiti government had placed on some of their heads (MacArthur 1992: 48). Its lack of democracy and poor treatment of guest workers aside, Kuwait was not even a strong U.S. ally prior to the Iraqi invasion. Between January 1989 and June 1991, Kuwait voted with the U.S. only 19 times in the U.N. General Assembly. This was three times less than the Soviet Union did during the same period (MacArthur 1992: 44). Thus, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990, the Kuwaiti government was faced with the difficult task of bringing into the conflict on its side, not only the most powerful nation on the planet, but
a nation that had shown substantial favor to Kuwait’s adversary in the past and one that was not automatically inclined to come to the aid of the tiny nation.

The Kuwaiti Public Diplomacy Strategy

From the outset of the campaign, the Kuwaiti government’s position was slightly different than that of the British government in the previous case. First, while prior to World War II, Britain was a major world power whose fate would have a substantial impact on that of the United States, the Kuwaitis had little to no real political power to influence events. Money (and through it, U.S. public opinion) represented their only means of creating leverage to influence U.S. policy (Manheim 1994: 45). Second, being a small nation with little previous need to conduct public diplomacy in the U.S., the Kuwaiti government had no public diplomacy apparatus and little experience of its own upon which to build. For both of these reasons, the Kuwaiti government retained the outside assistance of Hill and Knowlton Public Affairs World Wide for the development and implementation of its public diplomacy campaign. Importantly, one of the reasons the Kuwaitis chose Hill and Knowlton over the numerous other public relations firms in Washington was because of the firm’s experience with public diplomacy (as opposed to straight PR) and its high-level contacts with agenda-setting elites. All together, 119 Hill and Knowlton executives spread across twelve U.S. offices worked on the Kuwaiti account, but three stand out as the most critical (MacArthur 1992: 49). Direct management of the account was left to Lauri J. Fitz-Pegado, a former USIA officer with obvious public diplomacy experience (MacArthur 1992: 50). In addition, Craig Fuller, previous chief of staff to George Bush when he was Vice President, was to become the
new head of Hill and Knowlton (Manheim 1994: 45). Fuller’s contacts in the government had undoubtedly remained strong in the interim because he was selected to head the Republican National Convention in 1992 (Manheim 1994: 52). Indeed, Fuller visited the White House several times during the course of the campaign. On November 8, the express goal of the meeting was to help the White House develop the message it wanted to send to the public (Manheim 1994: 52). In a 60 Minutes interview conducted after the war, Fuller testified to the fact that he was attempting to coordinate the communication strategies of the Kuwaitis and the U.S. government (Manheim 1994: 52). In addition to Fuller, the Chairman of Hill and Knowlton, Robert K. Gray, had worked on both of the Reagan presidential campaigns (MacArthur 1992: 49). Clearly, the ability to communicate effectively with Washington elites was an important aspect of the Kuwaiti strategy.

Through Hill and Knowlton, one of the first tasks the Kuwaiti government accomplished was establishing an organization called Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK) (Manheim 1994: 45). Additional branches of the CFK soon opened in London and other strategic cities. In an effort to reduce the appearance of direct lobbying or propagandizing on the part of the Kuwaiti government, it was representatives of the CFK that interacted with Hill and Knowlton rather than Kuwaiti government officials themselves (Manheim 1994: 46). However, this is not to suggest that CFK was anything other than an arm of the Emir’s government. Kuwaiti political elites made up the primary membership of the CFK. A former education minister, cultural attaché at the Kuwaiti embassy, and a World Bank executive all were CFK members for example (Manheim 1994: 46). CFK spent $11.5 million in the U.S. between the end of August 1990 and the end of March 1991.
The overwhelming majority of this money came from the Kuwaiti government and $10.8 million of the total went to Hill and Knowlton (Manheim 1994: 45). According to MacArthur (1992: 49), only $17,861 of CFK’s funding came from private donors; the rest came from the Kuwaiti government. CFK was a doubly useful creation in that it reduced the appearance of a government-sponsored public diplomacy campaign while also allowing Hill and Knowlton to speak about their client’s love of freedom and democracy rather than having to defend the actual monarchical regime of the Emir (Manheim 1994: 46).

The campaign’s efforts to cultivate American elites did not stop with the hiring of Hill and Knowlton. CFK went to extreme lengths to win the support of American agenda-setters, often blurring the line between public diplomacy and propaganda. A young woman (15 at the time the testimony was given) identified only as Nayirah testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus that she had witnessed the now-notorious incubator baby murders personally. Nayirah’s testimony was later quoted in a Hill and Knowlton media kit:

I volunteered at the al-Addan Hospital… While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns, and go into the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators, and left the babies on the cold floor to die (As quoted in MacArthur 1992: 58).

However, it was later made public that Nayirah was in fact the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S. and that Hill and Knowlton had helped her to rehearse her testimony at their Washington offices (Manheim 1994: 47, MacArthur 1992: 59). Of equal importance, the Human Rights Caucus also received a $50,000 donation from the CFK at the time of the testimony (Manheim 1994: 47). Other incubator testimony was
given before the U.N. Security Council by a woman who was ostensibly a Kuwaiti
refugee. Later it turned out that she was the wife of the Kuwaiti planning minister, a man
who was also a prominent TV personality in Kuwait (Manheim 1994: 47-48). Another
witness was the vice president of CFK and serving as a vice president at the World Bank
(in Washington) for the past six years (MacArthur 1992: 65). In fact, 5 of 7 Kuwaiti
witnesses that appeared before the U.N. used false names without indicating that they
were doing so and all had also been coached by Hill and Knowlton before their
appearance (MacArthur 1992: 64). Had the focus not been on wooing American elites, it
would have been sufficient to release the story to major news organizations alone. In
1990, CBS, ABC, NBC and CNN had a combined evening news audience of 40 million
voting age Americans (MacArthur 1992: 1).

As in the British case, media relations was one of the primary focuses of Kuwaiti
efforts to influence American behavior. Hill and Knowlton also distributed thousands of
press kits and held media events with resistance fighters (MacArthur 1992: 50).
Furthermore, Hill and Knowlton maintained a TV station in Saudi Arabia that served as
the only channel through which video produced by the Kuwaiti resistance could be
disseminated to the world, and news segments were produced to depict life under Iraqi
appeared on several news talk shows, such as Crossfire, in an effort to persuade the
American public (MacArthur 1992: 50). Numerous events around which media attention
could crystallize were organized. On September 12, a Kuwait information day was held
on twenty college campuses (MacArthur 1992: 50). On Sunday, September 23rd, a
national day of prayer was held for Kuwait, and on September 24, 13 state governors
declared a national Free Kuwait Day (MacArthur 1992: 50). Kuwait’s plight was even highlighted during the traditional Thanksgiving Day football games (Manheim 1994: 48). $1.1 million was spent on research, $644,000 on video production and $436,000 was spent on printing (MacArthur 1992: 50). In the end, only $43,217 was spent on “advertising”. The goal of receiving free advertising in the form of extensive press coverage had clearly been achieved (MacArthur 1992: 50).

A third aspect of Hill and Knowlton’s campaign was the strategic management of the image of the Kuwaiti people themselves. In an effort to build support for Kuwait’s cause in the U.S., Hill and Knowlton attempted to draw some links between the cultures of Kuwait, and the U.S. Publicity efforts often touched on the relative freedom Kuwaiti women enjoyed. For example, the fact that women in Kuwait could drive and serve as university employees were both heavily emphasized (Manheim 1994: 47). Emphasis was also placed on the high level of 3rd world aid Kuwait provided and its ostensibly democratic values (Manheim 1994: 50). Furthermore, each of the approximately 5000 Kuwaiti citizens living in the United States was sent policy guidelines and information on how to contact their compatriots, in addition to information on how to conduct themselves at rallies and ways to support each other emotionally (MacArthur 1992: 47). Kuwaiti citizens (who usually dressed in Western-style clothing when in the U.S.) were also instructed to appear in public wearing their traditional apparel as a means of making American’s more aware of their presence (Manheim 1994: 48). Hill and Knowlton also distributed thousands of Free Kuwait t-shirts and bumper stickers (MacArthur 1992: 50).

The Kuwaiti Government (once again through Hill and Knowlton) also devoted significant time and resources to analyzing the impact their efforts were having on
American public opinion. $2.6 million of the $11.5 million went to a subcontracted polling company that conducted daily U.S. opinion polls (Manheim 1994: 48). In addition to the usual polls and focus groups, the polling firm also examined opinion among congressional staffers (Manheim 1994: 49). Different speakers were chosen for different audiences based on the results of the focus groups. Wives of hostages and refugees went to some locations while men in business suits went to others. The black press, the labor press, and the conservative press all got slightly different, tailored messages (Manheim 1994: 50).

A significant increase in popular support for U.S. military involvement in Kuwait was noted in December, and as time progressed, the Kuwaiti government began to play a more direct role in the public diplomacy campaign (Manheim 1994: 51). CFK’s connection to Hill and Knowlton ended in December, but by May 1991 the Kuwaiti government had retained no less than four public relations firms to help improve its image even further (Manheim 1994: 59). By June of that year, the Kuwaiti government had a plan in place to bring congressmen, business leaders, federal and state officials, and even the Secretary of Commerce to tour the devastation in Kuwait (Manheim 1994: 59).

**Evaluation in Light of Model**

The Kuwait’s public diplomacy-based efforts to enlist the aid of the United States in ejecting Iraq clearly had a strategic character about them given the extensive research and planning that seemed to go into each aspect of the program. Any effort involving a professional public relations firm might be expected to. However, it is important to examine how the campaign scores with respect to each of the variables included in the model before generating a prediction as to the campaign’s likelihood of success.
Directionality

Prior to the initiation of the public diplomacy campaign, Kuwait clearly suffered from both visibility and image problems. Kuwait certainly did not figure very prominently in the minds of the American public prior to the conflict, and those who did think about Kuwait would find little to approve of. This would place Kuwait, like Britain, firmly in the lower left quadrant on the dimensions of national images chart as Figure 6 shows.

![Figure 6 - Kuwait's approximate position in 1990](image)

According to the tenants of the model, this doubly low position, while worrisome, offered Kuwaiti strategists an excellent opportunity to alter their national image in the eyes of the American public, and Hill and Knowlton certainly took advantage of the situation. Had Kuwait been highly visible before the Iraqi invasion, attempts to portray the country as liberal and somewhat democratic would likely have failed disastrously. That Kuwait's public diplomacy strategy worked to improve both Kuwait's national
image and the visibility of its plight is readily apparent from the discussion above, and is thus not worth belaboring any further. The timing of the campaign does deserve some attention however. Hill and Knowlton's strategy of working to improve Kuwait's national image before raising Kuwait's visibility to the highest levels is exactly what the model suggests in this situation. For example, the widespread "information day" activities which emphasized Kuwait's ostensibly liberal, democratic leanings were held before much larger events like the Thanksgiving Day broadcasts. Similarly, the Kuwaiti government only took a more active role in the campaign—thus turning the focus to Kuwait the nation rather than Kuwait the people—after sufficient improvements had been made in the national image to permit this direct involvement. Moreover, Kuwait's extremely low initial visibility permitted (and may have even necessitated) efforts to improve image and visibility simultaneously. In other words, Kuwait had such a long way to go before its visibility reached the point where attempts to improve the national image would be rejected as propaganda, that working to improve visibility and image simultaneously was probably not problematic. This sort of diagonal movement has been included Figure 7's depiction of the shift in Kuwait's national image that occurred between August 1990 and February 1991.
Orientation

The Kuwaiti government’s public diplomacy strategy clearly contained numerous elite-oriented elements. According to the model developed in the previous chapter, this favors a successful public diplomacy campaign. Hill and Knowlton’s political connections in the executive branch are perhaps the most readily apparent among these. The organization of speaking engagements at leading academic and business institutions provide a second example of this effort as does Kuwait’s attempt to enlist the support of human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (Manheim 1994: 47, MacArthur 1992: 68). Each of these facets of the campaign was significant in its own right, but the campaign’s focus on Congressional opinion makers must be judged the most significant. Hill and Knowlton’s efforts to survey the opinions of Congressional staffers demonstrates the importance they attached to this group of agenda-setters. Finally, the impact of the incubator testimony given before lawmakers is difficult to underestimate. President Bush referred to the incubator babies several times in the run up
to the war and both the House and Senate specifically cited the incubator babies in their speeches supporting pro-war revolutions (MacArthur 1992: 68-70). As late as February 15th, 1991--after little supporting evidence for the incubator claims had been found and several witnesses had argued against the claims--Vice President Dan Quayle continued to use the incubator story as a justification for war (MacArthur 1992: 73).

**Predisposition**

It is difficult to determine either the level or the orientation (favorable or unfavorable) of American predispositions prior to the conflict, but a few cautious judgments can be made. It seems likely that although American and Kuwaiti cultures were quite dissimilar, the American public was not predisposed to reject Kuwaiti appeals for assistance given the nature of the conflict and Kuwait’s role therein. To American audiences Iraq’s invasion appeared to be an unprovoked act of aggression against an essentially defenseless neighbor. As a result, Kuwait’s pleas for assistance resonated strongly with Americans’ self-image as a defender of freedom and justice throughout the world. That the United States would be helping an undemocratic regime that was not a strong friend of America mattered little in light of the clear moral call to duty. Consequently, the American public may have even been predisposed to accept persuasive Kuwaiti messages. As with the first two variables then, predisposition seemed to favor a successful campaign in this case.

**Concealment**

Concealment of the Kuwaiti government’s public diplomacy campaign was accomplished primarily through the use of the ostensibly independent CFK as an intermediary between the Kuwaiti government and Hill and Knowlton. Although the
ultimate source of funds did have to be disclosed, as noted earlier, few interested citizens ever make the effort to obtain this information. Using CFK as the primary voice of the campaign reduced the impression that a government was lobbying for support and replaced it with the image of citizens struggling to enlist aid to defend their nation. Through the CFK, the Kuwaiti government was also able to utilize the American press to disseminate the video footage and resistance images they wished the world to see without appearing to overtly beg for assistance. Furthermore, like the British government in 1940, the Kuwaiti government only took a more prominent role in the campaign when it became clear that America’s image of Kuwait was sufficiently favorable to do so.

Importantly, Kuwaiti “concealment” did occasionally cross into the field of propaganda. The false witnesses who testified before Congress and the United Nations did more than simply reduce the appearance of a deliberate effort to influence American opinion. Their largely fabricated information played a critical role in garnering support for U.S. involvement among the American people. My model does not account for the efficacy of using false information, but public diplomats generally avoid this practice on the grounds that it can only damage one’s overall credibility. In this case, the false information did negatively affect Kuwaiti credibility when it was proven that no great massacres had taken place, but by then the public diplomacy campaign had concluded, its mission accomplished (MacArthur 1992: 73-74).

Prediction versus Historical Outcome

With all four variables favoring success, in this case it is clear that the model would predict that Kuwait’s public diplomacy campaign would achieve its goal. At a superficial level, the historical outcome would appear to confirm this prediction. The
United States did indeed provide a sizeable military force for the purposes of removing Iraq from Kuwait. However, a slightly deeper analysis is needed to ensure that Kuwait's public diplomacy campaign was indeed responsible for the result.

It is first important to acknowledge that the U.S. did have legitimate and significant strategic interests in removing Iraq from Kuwait, namely to prevent Iraq from controlling such a large segment of the world's oil supply, and to discourage future aggression against Saudi Arabia. President Bush was undoubtedly aware of these interests and wished to pursue them. Therefore, Kuwait's public diplomacy campaign should not be conceived of as operating in a vacuum. Many other variables were at work in the overall decision to send American troops to fight in Kuwait. Manheim (1994: 59-60) accurately describes the campaign's ultimate purpose:

At the political level, the public relations effort... was not a part of the process of policy formulation so much as it was a key element of policy implementation. It's purpose was not, in other words, to convince the president of the wisdom of the desired policy, but to maximize his freedom of action in dealing with Congress and the public alike in carrying it off (Manheim 1994: 59-60).

That said however, Kuwait's public diplomacy campaign still had a sizeable goal to accomplish. The American public needed to be convinced that fighting for Kuwait was a task worth undertaking, and as the first major conflict since Vietnam, the Kuwaiti government was by no means assured of success. When an early August, 1990 Gallup poll asked, "In your opinion, what if anything, should the United States do concerning the current situation involving Iraq and Kuwait" the results were not encouraging. Only 6% of those surveyed recommended sending troops to actively fight against Iraq. A mere 2% of those surveyed recommended air strikes, and 9% favored sanctions (Gallup 1991: 93). In the same poll, respondents were asked directly, "Do you favor or oppose direct U.S.
military action against Iraq at this time?” When provided with only a yes or no choice, 23% said they favored military action while 68% did not (Gallup 1991: 93). However, when an early January Gallup poll asked, “If the current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait does not change by the end of January, would you favor or oppose the United States going to war with Iraq in order to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait,” the response was quite different from that of several months earlier. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed favored going to war and 39% opposed the move, while 9% expressed no opinion (Gallup 1992: 11). Thus, American public opinion clearly shifted over the course of the campaign in spite of America’s ostensible reluctance to become involved in ground wars in the post-Vietnam era. Kuwait’s public diplomacy campaign accomplished its difficult goal of facilitating American involvement in the conflict, and as a result, the model has passed its second hard test case. With the validity of the model now more firmly established, we are now able to turn our attention to the assessment of current U.S. public diplomacy strategy promised at the outset of this endeavor.

CHAPTER 5- Assessing post-9/11 public diplomacy directed at the Arab world

This chapter seeks to examine the United States’ current public diplomacy strategy in the Arab world relying on the same format and methods used to examine the two historical cases. Having tested the systematic model of public diplomacy developed in Chapter 3 against two difficult historical cases I now attempt to use it to predict the likely outcome of the present strategy. In addition, and by way of conclusion, I hope to develop a set of policy prescriptions that might be implemented to improve upon U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the region in the future.
Historical Background

After World War II, the use of public diplomacy “became an institutionalized means of conducting international relations instead of being the short-term expedient in times of armed international conflict” (Alleyne 1994: 418). This change was partly the result of technological advances in the field of mass communications (inexpensive transistor radios, the development and spread of television, etc.), but the post-World War II geopolitical environment was probably most responsible for this shift. The bitter ideological nature of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that each superpower would continually work to undermine the stability of the other and recruit allies, large and small, to its respective side. However, the implacable nature of the foes and the very real risk of all out war restricted the means available for this undertaking. Diplomatic and economic statecraft could accomplish some limited goals, but neither was likely to bring about the end of the Soviet Union. Military force presented an even less viable option, since from at least the mid 1950’s on, the Soviet Union had the ability to impose unacceptable costs on the United States should it attempt any forceful resolution of the conflict. In this geopolitical environment public diplomacy became a highly useful tool of statecraft in the eyes of the superpowers. If properly employed, public diplomacy would be able to reach across the Iron Curtain and highlight the virtues of each superpower’s respective economic/governmental system. Ideally, public diplomacy offered the U.S. government the opportunity to weaken the Soviet government’s hold on its people without risking global war.

As a consequence, U.S. public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War were significant. According to President Carter, in 1978 the tasks of the Information and
Communication Agency (also named the U.S. Information Agency or USIA at different times) were to: 1) Encourage “the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas” between the U.S. and other nations, 2) Give foreign peoples “the best possible understanding” of U.S. policies and American society and culture, 3) Help the U.S. government and American citizens understand foreign public opinion and cultures, 4) Assist in the development and execution of “a comprehensive national policy on international communications” looking to the maximum international flow of information and ideas, and 5) Conduct negotiations on cultural exchanges with other governments ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 30). In an effort to ensure that it did not appear to be carrying out propaganda activities, the ICA was directed to maintain independence and integrity, while avoiding all “covert, manipulative or propagandistic activities” ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 30).

A few numbers may serve to further illustrate the point. As early as 1953, USIA had 160 libraries and information center scattered throughout the world. In addition, a daily press service known as the “wireless file” was distributed to over 10,000 newspapers and over 25 periodicals were being published on a regular basis. Supplementing this prodigious amount of material were numerous irregular publications ranging from pamphlets, to comic books, to academic analyses of communism (Bogart 1995: xiv). ICA broadcasting reached an estimated 75 million listeners in 1979, and ICA also published 14 magazines in 16 languages ("The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries" 1979: 33). In 1965, USIA translated 12.7 million book copies in 57 different languages. By 1993, this had fallen to 650,000 copies in only 15 languages (Bogart 1995: xxiv). Total U.S. public diplomacy expenditures for 1978 were estimated at $413.3
million directed relatively evenly at all regions of the world: $44.2 million went to Western Europe, North Africa, the Near East and South Asia received $40.1 million, East Asia and Pacific received $39.3 million, while Africa and Eastern Europe/Soviet Union received $31.9 million each. (“The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries” 1979: 29-30).

Perhaps more telling, the budget of USIA (renamed when Reagan took office) grew 79% between fiscal year 1981, and FY 1988, reflecting the increased importance of public diplomacy in the last years of the Cold War. (Hitchcock 1988: 1, Burnett 1986: 70).

However, with the end of the Cold War, policymakers began to view public diplomacy as expendable. It was thought that private media would be sufficient to carry the U.S. message to the world (Blinken 2002: 102). Moreover, a traditional ambivalence to involvement in foreign affairs, a historic mistrust of involving the government in education and the media, and a preference for leaving such matters to the private sector all reemerged in the absence of a strategic rival and combined to accelerate this downward spiral (Sablosky 2003: 3). Between 1989 and 1999, the USIA budget decreased by $150 million, or 10% (Blinken 2002: 105). In 1996, USIA had 523 American and 2,318 foreign national personnel. In 1981, USIA employed 642 Americans and 2,960 foreign nationals (“U.S. Information Agency” 1996: 16). The chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Harold C. Pachios observed: “There was, in fact, a downgrading of the importance of public diplomacy after the fall of the Berlin Wall and people tended to diminish its importance, particularly on the Hill and, frankly, in the State Department” (“Announcement” 2002).

As mentioned at the outset of this essay however, continued ambivalence toward public diplomacy seems increasingly misguided. With the end of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the U.S. lost an ideological rival whose shortcomings highlighted America’s virtues; continued U.S. hegemony makes it a symbol of the status quo, and thus the prime target for those who dislike the status quo (Blinken 2002: 102). Moreover, private media presents a view of the U.S. that is tilted toward “materialistic expressions of U.S. success” which do nothing to improve the national image of the U.S. abroad (Blinken 2002: 105). Furthermore, private media rarely touches on the foreign policy issues that are absolutely fundamental to the way in which the U.S. is perceived abroad. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy outlines the problem succinctly:

Negative messages broadcast and disseminated by rogue states, terrorist groups and even U.S. and international commercial news and entertainment outlets have resulted in a deep misunderstanding of the United States and its policies (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 3).

As a result, the U.S. now finds itself on the on the defensive in the “War of Ideas” with a growing need to ensure that it is properly understood in the eyes of foreign publics (Blinken 2002: 102).

**Current Public Diplomacy Strategy**

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government has made a concerted effort to reinvigorate U.S. public diplomacy efforts. According to the National Security Statement released by the Bush administration in late 2002, public diplomacy is to be used “to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom in those societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism” (“National Security Statement” 2002). Although the rhetoric is rather ostentatious the overall goal of current public diplomacy efforts can still be discerned: to enlist the
support of foreign publics in confronting global terrorism. The remainder of this chapter will analyze U.S. public diplomacy efforts in light of this goal.

**Organization**

Before delving into specific public diplomacy programs it is first important to be aware of public diplomacy’s position relative to other instruments of statecraft, and to develop at least a cursory understanding of the institutional structure of public diplomacy apparatus itself. The U.S. currently spends approximately $25 billion on traditional diplomacy, more than $30 billion on intelligence and counter intelligence, and nearly $400 billion on the military annually. The approximately $1 billion spent on public diplomacy is spread over more than 200 missions across the world and must be shared between several agencies (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 10). This may seem like a comparison of apples and oranges. Tanks are simply more expensive than pamphlets and academic exchanges. But compare this $1 billion with the $222 billion a year American companies invest in overseas advertising and the relatively small size of America’s public diplomacy efforts becomes apparent (Peterson 2002: 93). Moreover, the U.S. spends significantly less on public diplomacy than many other countries as a proportion of budget share (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 9).

In 1999, the previously semi-autonomous USIA was folded into the State Department at the Under Secretary level where it now accounts for 8% of the total budget (“Combating Terrorism” 2002: 15, Blinken 2002: 105). The State Department is thus now responsible for the implementation of virtually all public diplomacy programs except for international broadcasting. This includes both information and cultural activities, overseas posts and general administrative necessities. To accomplish this task
there are currently 614 Foreign Service Officers in the department assigned specifically
to public diplomacy issues (Sablosky 2003: 8). These activities account for
approximately half of the total public diplomacy budget.

Most of the other half of the roughly $1 billion dedicated to public diplomacy is
consumed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors or BBG (“Building America’s Public
international broadcasting within the International Broadcasting Bureau which was, in
turn, placed within the USIA. The Broadcasting Board of Governors was tasked with
oversight of broadcasting itself. On October 1, 1999, the IBB (and with it the
Broadcasting Board of Governors) became a fully independent agency (“Public
Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002).

In addition to the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors a new
government entity was designed in 2002 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts across the
federal government. Specifically, the White House Office of Global Communications
“coordinates strategic communications with global audiences, integrating the President’s
themes into new and ongoing programs.” The primary goals of this effort are to “prevent
misunderstanding and conflict, build support for and among United States coalition
partners, and better inform international audiences (“Office of Global Communications”
2003). Modeled after the temporary Coalition Information Center that operated during the
Afghan conflict, the OGC is designed to react rapidly to the misinformation put forth by
U.S. adversaries. This effort involves close coordination with State and DoD. OGC is
responsible for producing the daily fact sheet, The Global Messenger, distributed to key
U.S. facilities throughout the globe (“Office of Global Communications” 2003).
Occasionally, OGC will dispatch teams of “communicators” to areas of media interest to ensure the U.S. message is accurately received and disseminated. One such team was sent to Kabul at the time of the *Loya Jirga* to facilitate international media coverage of the event (“Office of Global Communications” 2003). As primarily a coordinating office, the OGC is quite small compared to either the BBG or the State Department’s public diplomacy division.

Another small public diplomacy entity is the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Established in 1948, the advisory commission’s charter directs the commission to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy policies and programs and to provide the President, Secretary of State, Congress, and the public with recommendations on U.S. public diplomacy policy in the form of both regular and requested reports (“Charter” 2002). The bipartisan commission is comprised of seven members appointed by the President and has a support staff of two. Meetings are to be open to the public as are the records of the meetings. The advisory commission’s FY 2002 costs were approximately $280,000 (“Charter” 2002).

With the administrative division of the U.S. public diplomacy effort accounted for, we may now turn our attention to the actual programs that are carried out. Since its inception, U.S. public diplomacy has relied on an explicit two-level strategy to attempt to influence foreign publics. The short term strategy is to focus on the dissemination of American policy and the refutation of common misperceptions while the long term strategy attempts to communicate American culture and values to the same audiences (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 3). The short term strategy is largely put into practice through information programs, and the long term culture strategy is typically
carried out through cultural exchange efforts. The separation between these efforts is maintained because officials have long-felt that one activity has the potential to impede the success of the other (Hitchcock 1988: 2-3). Although these two strategies often blend together, because of the way these efforts are largely kept separate in practice, it is simplest to divide our discussion of U.S. public diplomacy programs in similar fashion. Even though not all programs discussed below are directed specifically toward Arab audiences, a full discussion of U.S. public diplomacy activities is necessary for comparative purposes.

**Information**

A myriad of programs fall under the rubric of information activities, but each is designed to improve foreign understanding of U.S. policies in one way or another. Text-based activities come in several forms. First, the Washington File, which includes full text of official statements, transcripts of press conferences and briefings, and some interpretive articles, is transmitted to U.S. embassies regularly. Information contained in the Washington File is intended for use in local embassy press releases or for incorporation into other information dissemination activities. Second, the United States maintains Information Resource Centers in many countries throughout the world. Essentially libraries containing American publications and reference material about America, these entities also work to translate books by foreign publishers into the local language. In some cases, these resource centers underwrite some of the costs of translation and reprinting, so translated books are more widely available in general. Finally, the State Department publishes numerous books, pamphlets, and brochures in multiple languages for distribution to the various information centers and embassies throughout the world.
At various times these publications run the gamut from comic books to serious academic critiques of communism (Bogart 1995: xiv). Since September 11th, text-based U.S. information efforts in the Middle East have primarily been directed at explaining the U.S. War on Terror to various audiences in the region. “The Network of Terrorism”, one of State’s major public diplomacy publications since September 11th aims to put the attacks “in their fullest context” ("Commission Reviews Middle Eastern Perceptions" 2002).

In addition to text-based activities, Foreign Press Centers in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles provide liaison services and general information to foreign journalists stationed in the United States. This important activity is directed at the more than 1,600 foreign journalists permanently residing in the U.S. and the many thousands more on temporary assignment. Since September 11th, the State Department has increased its assistance to foreign television crews in the U.S. in an effort to get the U.S. message on Arab TV more frequently ("Commission Reviews Middle Eastern Perceptions" 2002). There are increasing efforts to get State Department-produced footage on foreign TV networks, but this effort remains relatively small and ad hoc (Beers 2003). A recent example of State Department public diplomacy efforts is “Iraqi Voices for Freedom”. This program included interviews with Iraqi exiles, a press package, and video footage suitable for news broadcast (Beers 2003). The State Department is also trying to establish a public diplomacy beachhead in London, where many Arab media outlets are based (Beers 2003).

U.S. information activities also include a variety of programs designed to put individuals or small groups of target audience members into direct contact with American
citizens. Lecturers and specialists representing U.S. business, government, academia, media, and local communities often conduct short speaking programs at the behest of the State Department. A second group of programs facilitate professional exchanges designed to introduce foreign audiences to American professional practices and policies. As part of these efforts, lawyers, academics, law enforcement officials, public administrators and businessmen spend several weeks in various countries serving as advisors to non-academic institutions. Lastly, teleconference programs are frequently used to link speakers and advisors to overseas audiences, a valuable effort in countries where a lack of communications infrastructure might otherwise limit such contacts ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002:1-2).

The third category of information activity conducted by the U.S. government is international broadcasting, probably the most widely recognized facet of American public diplomacy efforts. Perhaps not surprisingly then, from a monetary standpoint, these programs are far more important than all other information activities combined. International broadcasting activities include several radio and television networks. First and foremost, the Voice of America (VOA) serves as the official U.S. government radio outlet throughout the world. The VOA charter mandates accuracy and objectivity as a means of ensuring credibility. With more than 1000 affiliate broadcasters relying on taped or live VOA feeds for at least part of their daily programming, VOA boasts an estimated 90 million listeners worldwide ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002). 59% of VOA programming is news. 26% is feature reporting about economics, science, medicine, American history and culture. 12% is music. The remaining 3% is U.S. government editorials ("U.S. Information Agency" 1996: 56). During the Cold War
VOA, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (discussed below) together reached 50% of the Soviet populace every week and between 70 and 80% of the population of Eastern Europe. Today, only 2% of Arabs hear VOA (Blinken 2002: 105).

Second, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a nonprofit, private corporation funded by the BBG that broadcasts news and information to Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although RFE/RL broadcasts from Prague, it is headquartered in Washington (“Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002). A third broadcasting entity, Radio Asia, is very similar to RFE/RL insofar as it is also a BBG-funded nonprofit. It broadcasts news and information in seven languages with the goal of bringing balanced news and media coverage to those without access to free news media. RFA seeks to promote rights to freedom of opinion and expression. RFA broadcasts to China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, North Korea and Cambodia. It is also headquartered in Washington (“Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002).

Authorized under the Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983 (Public Law 98-111), Radio and TV Marti constitute the bulk of America’s effort to weaken hold of the Castro government through the use of public diplomacy. Radio Marti began broadcasting in 1985, and TV Marti began broadcasting in 1990. Both followed VOA guidelines regarding objectivity, accuracy and balance (“Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002). A misguided effort from the beginning, between 1990 and 1993 a balloon carrying the transmitting antenna for TV Marti was sent aloft each day in spite of intense Cuban jamming at a cost of $60,000 dollars a day (Bogart 1995: xlv).

The last two aspects of the United States’ international broadcasting effort have more direct bearing for an assessment of current public diplomacy strategy in the Middle
East. Worldwide Television and Film Service is a satellite TV network that began broadcasting in 1983. Programming on this network is similar to VOA-style programming in that it focuses on news and explaining U.S. policies through informational pieces. Some VOA programs have even been translated into a format for TV. However, this service is somewhat unique in that it also provides a visual image of U.S. culture, history, and scientific and cultural achievements (“Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002). The second program is even more central to the focus of this study. Radio Sawa, also funded by the BBG, is aimed at listeners under 30. “One of the guiding principles of Radio Sawa is that the long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly in Arabic with the peoples of the Middle East by radio.” Radio Sawa began transmitting via FM in March 2002 and is also available via satellite (“Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” 2002).

Critically, 94% of the BBG’s roughly $500 million budget is devoted to radio, and the remaining 6% goes to television (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 10, Epstein 2002: 6). BBG’s $517 million request for FY 03 called for a radio/TV spending ratio of 16:1 (“Building America’s Public Diplomacy” 2002: 10). This is in spite of the fact that a 2002 survey revealed that 80% of Egyptians, 72% of Jordanians, 88% of Lebanese, 51% of Pakistanis, 93% of Turks, and 86% of Uzbeks get their news primarily from television. By comparison, only 67% of Americans get their news primarily from television. No more than 16% of those surveyed get most of their news from radio in any of the countries mentioned above (“Global Attitudes” 2002: T-96). In the same countries, radio is not even the most prominent secondary source of news in
most cases. Only in Jordan is radio even the most favored secondary source of news ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-97).

In addition to the numerous above-mentioned activities designed to deliver information to foreign publics, the U.S. also conducts limited research designed to determine which issues resonate most strongly with particular groups abroad and which media sources they are using to acquire their information ("Announcement" 2002, "Building America’s Public Diplomacy" 2002: 10). The U.S. currently spends about $5 million a year on public opinion research abroad. This is a decline in real dollars over the past decade in spite of the increased openness to polling in many societies (Blinken 2002: 106-7). Five million dollars is less than is spent on many congressional campaigns. By contrast, American private sector firms spend $6 billion a year for the same purposes (Peterson 2002: 82). Some of this private research can be utilized by public diplomacy officials, but the vast majority of it is not fit their very specific needs.

**Culture**

As noted at the outset of this section, U.S. cultural activities are kept largely separate from information activities, and for the most part operate with longer time horizons in mind. Like the information programs, these efforts vary widely, but the overarching goal is to familiarize foreign audiences with U.S. culture and values in the hope that this knowledge will permit more understanding of and even concurrence with future U.S. policies. Since September 11th, these programs have not altered their goals or their methods to a significant degree, but they remain a critical part of U.S. public diplomacy efforts ("Commission Reviews Middle Eastern Perceptions" 2002).
Academic exchanges are one of the primary means by which the State Department carries out its cultural public diplomacy efforts. In FY 2001, foreign governments contributed about $27.9 million for U.S. academic exchanges and a further $18.4 million was received from foreign private sector companies. U.S. academic institutions are estimated to contribute roughly $46.4 million to the program in the form of tuition waivers, stipends, and free or reduced rate student housing (Sablosky 2003: 7). The Fulbright program, a student, teacher, and scholar exchange program, is probably the best known example of these programs, but it is only one of several ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002: 2). In addition to academic exchange programs, the State Department also works to maintain American studies programs in numerous foreign universities, and conducts English teaching programs throughout the world ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002: 2).

U.S. public diplomacy efforts also include non-academic exchange and travel programs designed to bring foreign individuals into close contact with American culture. Under the International Visitors Program foreigners come to the U.S. for 3 and 4 week visits to meet with their professional counterparts and learn how U.S. institutions work. The program utilizes volunteers in 44 states to provide contacts, program arrangements, home stays and tours and ensure that visitors meet as many Americans as possible in the cities they visit (Sablosky 2003: 7). Citizen exchange programs are also developed in coordination with U.S. nonprofits in an effort to facilitate a broad range of exchange types. The Program for Building Democratic Institutions utilizes hands on training and professional networking to facilitate the development of democratic institutions abroad ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002: 2-3). The reader will note that this
program overlaps both the information and culture categories quite clearly and thus has been mentioned in both.

Performing and visual arts exchanges constitute the final aspect of U.S. cultural public diplomacy efforts. U.S. performing and visual arts are sent abroad to put U.S. culture on display, both in U.S. embassies and more accessible venues ("Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs" 2002: 2-3).

Between 1993 and 2001, total funding for cultural and educational exchange programs declined 33%, from $349 million to $232 million in real terms ("Building America’s Public Diplomacy" 2002: 10). Overseas staff for cultural programs has declined by 30% since 1993 and U.S. staff for the same programs has declined by roughly 20% (Sablosky 2003: 1). In Germany, staff resources were cut by 48% between 1994 and 1998 for example (Sablosky 2003: 7). As a result of this decrease in funding, the number of exchange participants dropped from 45,000 to 29,000 between 1995 and 2001 ("Building America’s Public Diplomacy" 2002: 10). One example of the impact of this reduction in funding occurred in 2002. Only 49 Arab women were on hand to witness the elections and get a view of American democracy in action (Beers 2003). However, “the impact of these programs is disproportionate to their size.” Nearly 200 current and former heads of state and 1500 cabinet-level ministers have participated in the past. (Blinken 2002: 110).

**Evaluation in Light of Model**

**Directionality**

Unlike the two test cases, the U.S. currently finds itself in the unenviable position of being both highly visible and confronted with a highly negative image in the Arab
world. Arab television networks such as Al Jazeera continuously publicize the American presence in Afghanistan and now Iraq, and spare no effort in highlighting the bloody consequences of these occupations. The coverage of other global networks such as Sky News and CNN (both of which are available via satellite) is perhaps less graphic, but they too increase both the visibility and the negative aspect of America's national image all the same. Arabic-language newspapers have a similar impact. Opinion data bears this out. In 2002, three quarters of all Jordanians had a poor image of the U.S. despite the fact that Jordan is the fourth largest recipient of American aid. No more than one in ten people in Egypt and Pakistan had "positive feelings" toward the U.S., and more than 50% of the people surveyed in these countries had a strongly unfavorable view of the U.S. ("What the World Thinks 2002b: 54). Clearly, this places the United States firmly in the upper left quadrant of the national images chart as Figure 8 indicates.

![Figure 8: The United States' approximate position in 2002](chart.png)
Given this position, the United States must take a different approach from those of Britain and Kuwait if it hopes to be successful in its efforts to cultivate widespread support for its war on terror. Specifically, the U.S. should move to reduce its profile before attempting to improve its national image to any significant degree. Efforts to raise America’s visibility through information programs seem to run counter to the directional tenants of the model. “Iraqi Voices of Freedom”, “The Network of Terrorism” and similar efforts are likely to be rejected as overt attempts at propaganda in this environment. Thus, current U.S. public diplomacy efforts appear likely to be unsuccessful with respect to the strategic directionality variable.

**Orientation**

Although some cultural exchange programs specifically focus on elite elements of the target society, as a whole, the current U.S. public diplomacy strategy is largely mass oriented. The Program for Building Democratic Institutions does indeed focus on foreign professional elites, but U.S. public diplomacy efforts lack the same concerted effort to cultivate agenda-setting elites found in the two test cases. U.S. public diplomacy officials do not appear to try to mingle socially with Arab journalists, academics or religious leaders. Ambassadors who engage with local media, students, NGO’s, and religious leaders are the exception, not the rule. This is particularly true in the Middle East (Blinken 2002: 105). Few ambassadors speak the language of their host country and there is a dearth of Foreign Service officers who speak difficult languages such as Arabic (Blinken 2002: 105). The continued budgetary dominance of radio broadcasting (over cultural and elite-oriented information programs) is further evidence of this pattern.
The improved efforts to interface with foreign journalists through the Foreign Press Centers located within the U.S. is a promising development. Nonetheless, these activities still do not match the guided tours U.S. journalists were treated to in 1940 or the exclusive interviews with resistance fighters granted by the CFK. Thus, while not wholly negative, the current U.S. public diplomacy strategy does not seem likely to be particularly successful when one considers the elite-orientation variable in isolation.

Predisposition

Historical factors such as support for Israel and the decade-long stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia make Arab audiences resistant to current U.S. influence attempts. According to Andoni (2002: 94), no image campaign can overcome the fact that the U.S. classifies Palestinian resistance as terrorism while treating Israeli violence as legitimate law enforcement. From the very outset, the U.S. propaganda war found little audience among Arabs and Muslims. “The U.S. record of double standards on human rights and international law had been deeply entrenched in the Arab psyche” (Andoni 2002: 96). However, recent opinion research shows that the Middle East (loosely defined) is not generally closed to the influx of new ideas and cultural elements. Strong majorities in all Muslim countries surveyed (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan) favored greater international travel and communication between people of different nations to at least some degree (“Global Attitudes” 2002: T-22). The results were more mixed, but still encouraging when respondents were asked about “the way movies, TV, and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country).” In Egypt 56% thought this cultural diffusion was at least somewhat good. In Jordan 15% and 36% thought it was very good and somewhat good respectively. The response was
slightly more favorable in Lebanon where 81% thought this was at least a somewhat good trend. Turkey and Uzbekistan expressed a similar sentiment with 78% and 71% supporting the trend respectively. Pakistan was the most negative with only 26% of the surveyed group expressing any support for the increased diffusion of TV and music from other parts of the world ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-23).

Perhaps more encouraging than cultural openness, many Arab populations seem to share some values commonly thought to be American. Seventy-one percent of Lebanese, 83% of Kuwaitis, 69% of Jordanians, and even 64% of Moroccans think that Western-style democracy can work well in their country. Time series data is only available for Jordan, but here the percentage was up from 63% in 2002 ("Views of a Changing World" 2003: 5). Furthermore, narrow majorities in Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey thought that it was more important "that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the state" than it was "that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee no one is in need." In the U.S., 58% favored the individual freedom answer ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-42). Majorities in all Muslim countries save Egypt (no data) and Jordan (46%) felt that the government controlled too much of their daily lives ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-54). When asked if religion should be kept separate from government policy, majorities in all Muslim countries surveyed (the question was not permitted in Egypt) favored the statement to at least some degree ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-58). Majorities in Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan felt that it is at least somewhat important for citizens to be able to criticize their government. In all countries except Jordan, this sentiment registered 78% or higher. Similar percentages supported the need for honest, regular elections with at least two
political parties and for a fair judicial system ("Global Attitudes" 2002: T-66-T-68). As a whole, this data suggests that while U.S. actions in Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan may have embittered many in the Arab world, properly constructed public diplomacy efforts may be able to find a receptive audience in the Middle East.

**Concealment of Campaign**

Evaluation of the concealment variable yields slightly mixed results, but current levels of concealment does not appear sufficient to permit a successful public diplomacy campaign. At the outset, it should be emphasized that the United State’s high visibility and highly negative national image necessitate a higher level of concealment than was necessary in the two test cases. Attempts at persuasive communication are highly likely to be rejected in this environment, and the appearance of any deliberate influence strategy will only increase this risk. Moreover, The independent status of VOA, Radio Sawa, and State Department-run satellite TV is less significant than during the Cold War. The presence of multiple media outlets makes expressly American outlets, even ostensibly independent ones, automatically more suspect. Moreover, the lack of effort to carryout the campaign predominantly through Arab media sources makes the current U.S. campaign more readily apparent. Because “The Network of Terror” and other similar publications are published by the State Department, it is abundantly clear to Arab readers that such works are part of a deliberate campaign to alter their opinion. Thus, the information contained in these works has far less impact than if the same information was published in an Arab magazine or newspaper with the source of the information still prominently displayed.
On the other side of the argument, the continued objectivity of information outlets does appear to be helpful in reducing the appearance of an overt attempt to influence foreign opinion. 80% of Afghan men listen to VOA in Dari and Pashto. 72% say they trust VOA, and agree that it provides facts and lets them make up their own minds (Blinken 2002: 108). It must be remembered however, that this is somewhat indirect evidence of the credibility of U.S. media outlets in the Middle East both because the above data is from Afghanistan and because VOA reaches only 2% of the Arab world. Furthermore, U.S. cultural programs do not make direct attempts to inculcate participants with American values and culture. Rather, the immersion in American culture, a major aspect of most of these programs, is allowed to run its natural course. Therefore, while the United States’ public diplomacy campaign could certainly benefit from increased efforts some level of concealment already does exist.

**Prediction of Outcome**

Applying the model developed in Chapter 3 to the United States’ current public diplomacy strategy in the Middle East strongly suggests that the effort to garner even minimal support for the War on Terror will fail if the effort continues in its current form. The ill-conceived strategic direction of the campaign (to increase visibility rather than to reduce it) and the lack of extensive elite orientation both imply that it will fail to improve the U.S. national image in any significant way. Additionally, while the predisposition variable seems to offer some hope that a properly considered campaign might make some progress, the lack of concealment in the current effort combines with the two independent variable findings to demonstrate that this is not such a case.
Once again, the opinion data available to date supports this contention. By almost every measure, the U.S. continues to be viewed with hostility and its policies remain misconstrued and misunderstood ("What the World Thinks" 2002b: 53). In Turkey, the percentage of survey respondents with a favorable view of the U.S. fell from 52% to 30% between 2000 and 2002. The percentage of Pakistanis with a favorable view of the U.S. fell from 23% to 10% during the same period ("What the World Thinks" 2002: 3). Although no earlier data is available, only 6% of Egyptians held a favorable view of the U.S. in 2002 ("What the World Thinks" 2002: 3). In 2002, virtually all predominantly Muslim countries contained majorities opposed to the War on Terror. Uzbekistan, where the U.S. had recently stationed 1,500 troops, was the one exception ("What the World Thinks" 2002: 4). More recently, 21% of Jordanians surveyed by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 thought that the U.S. represented a strong military threat, and a further 35% viewed the U.S. as somewhat of a military threat. The numbers were similar in Lebanon. Perhaps more alarming, 35% of Kuwaitis surveyed thought that the U.S. could be become a strong military threat in the future and a further 18% thought that it could become somewhat of a threat despite U.S. assistance barely a decade ago ("Views of a Changing World" 2003: 2). Between 93% (Morocco) and 81% (Palestinian Authority) of Muslims surveyed were disappointed with the lack of Iraqi resistance during the recent Gulf conflict ("Views of a Changing World" 2003: 3). Clearly, the current U.S. public diplomacy campaign is fulfilling the model’s prediction and failing to achieve its goal. Indeed, the limited data available opens the possibility that the campaign is actually having a negative effect on how the U.S. is perceived in the Middle East.

Prescriptions
Fortunately, the model’s critique of the current U.S. public diplomacy strategy is not without its benefits. Its variable-by-variable examination offers a few general and several specific policy prescriptions that should serve to improve the odds of the campaign’s success in the future. Virtually all scholars of public diplomacy offer at least a few policy prescriptions at the end of their work. Many of these prescriptions are intuitively logical, but they are often not based on anything more than a vague notion that more money, more attention, and better training will automatically yield improved results. Therefore, in the interest of both concision and academic rigor, I will highlight only those reforms that stem directly from my model.

At the most general level, a revised U.S. public diplomacy strategy needs to incorporate three major modifications: improved strategic directionality, increased elite-orientation, and improved campaign concealment. Let me address each in turn. In this case, improved strategic directionality involves reducing visibility before attempting to improve one’s national image in any significant way. Every day that the increasingly bloody U.S. occupation of Iraq is the leading news story, is another day that American efforts to appear as a benevolent crusader against evil will come to naught. Thus, the most obvious means of reducing U.S. visibility in the region is to reduce the U.S. military’s footprint in the region. Indeed, as the Pew Global Attitudes Study points out:

In general, antipathy toward the U.S. is shaped more by what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for politically and economically. In particular, the U.S.'s perceived unilateral approach to international problems and the U.S. war on terror play large roles in shaping opinion toward the U.S. (“What the World Thinks” 2002b: 69).

Unfortunately, with the rebuilding of Iraq far from complete and the pronounced absence of U.N. troops prepared to replace U.S. forces in the country this option may be
impractical for the near future. A second means of reducing visibility would be to curtail overt attempts at self-promotion in the region. Restricting the publication and distribution of books like “The Network of Terror” has already been cited as one example of this. Reducing the number of briefings on the capture and interrogation of Iraqi leaders would be a second example.

Significantly, reducing visibility does not only entail changes in U.S. military policy and reducing one’s media profile. Countering gross misperceptions and the exaggerations of adversaries is a crucial part of any attempt to reduce visibility, and it may have the added effect of improving one’s national image as well. Therefore, the U.S. should work to develop its ability to rapidly respond to distortions of its policy. In addition, improved coordination of public diplomacy efforts and foreign policy should serve to reduce the potential for such distortions in the first place. As noted earlier, the Office of Global Communications bills itself as the solution to both of these problems. However, it remains to be seen whether or not these capabilities will materialize.

Increasing the elite orientation of America’s public diplomacy strategy can be accomplished through several means as well. First and foremost, increased attention should be paid to the personal cultivation of local elites given their central role in articulating scope and tone of public discourse. U.S. officials should seek to develop social contacts with local media, political and religious leaders in much the same way as the British did in 1940. This would entail improving language skills among Foreign Service Officers and Ambassadors as well as offering reimbursement for embassy officials pursuing this effort during their off hours. Second, cultural exchange programs
should be enlarged and increasingly directed toward the prospective elites of target nations. As the Pew Research Center observes:

Those who have traveled to the United States, or are in regular communication with Americans, have a more favorable opinion of the U.S. compared with those who have had no comparable exposure. This is even true in countries where many hold an unfavorable view of the U.S.: Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and South Korea (“What the World Thinks” 2002b: 56).

This enlargement could be accomplished through a more selective screening process or augmenting the number of programs designed for professionals whose path in life is slightly clearer than that of students. Additional funds for a larger cultural exchange program could be obtained from the international broadcasting budget which is purely mass-oriented and appears somewhat outdated from a technological standpoint. Third, information programs could be tailored so as to specifically cater to elite tastes. As Bogart (1995: xxxvii) points out:

Political Elites are usually comfortable with elite culture and uncomfortable with mass culture. If USIA’s real objective is to support American foreign policy by courting influential allies, it is helpful, indeed essential, to establish and maintain the sense of kinship that comes from shared values. A far larger audience is reached by the National Enquirer than by Harper’s, but there is no question of which publication carriers greater impact on public policy (Bogart 1995: xxxvii).

Improving on the third weak aspect of the current public diplomacy strategy, campaign concealment, is both essential and relatively easy to achieve. The organization independence and philosophy of objectivity under which U.S. broadcasting entities operate should be vigorously maintained and defended. Furthermore, as the test cases demonstrated, relying on local media to disseminate one’s message is an effective means of reducing the profile of a public campaign. Even if the ultimate source of the information is in no way obscured, the use of local media as the delivery vehicle still
reduces the appearance of a deliberate effort to alter opinion to some degree. In this particular case, some Arab media outlets are eager to assist in this process. "Al Jazeera’s Washington bureau chief told the press that his network is ‘desperate to find any [U.S.] officials. We say every day, ‘Please come talk to us, exploit us’" (Blinken 2002: 108). Al Jazeera claims to have 35 million viewers. The U.S. should seize the opportunity to reach a large audience with a subtle message rather than attempting to sensor the network (Blinken 2002: 108). A third option is to increase the use of private citizens, particularly Arab-Americans, to propagate the U.S. message. As when Britain used American’s caught up in the early stages of World War II, this tack away from the use of government spokespeople will make U.S. public diplomacy efforts appear more genuine and less calculated. Finally, the cultivation of local agenda-setting elites as propagators of persuasive American communications, in addition to increasing elite-orientation, should serve the same purpose.

If even a few of these prescriptions are followed, the odds of the United States conducting a successful public diplomacy campaign in the Middle East should be markedly improved. Significantly, virtually all of these policies are relatively easy to implement. With the notable exception of redrafting troop deployments, none of the above prescriptions would require a major increase in funding, an organizational restructuring, or even a large shift in policy.

Conclusions

Although this study has made every attempt to be as thorough as possible, as with any piece of research, it has raised more questions than it has answered. Further case
studies are needed to fully pin down the range of cases in which this model applies, and the option of quantifying Manheim’s dimensions of national images chart as I have used it here, while daunting, remains an important undertaking. Perhaps most importantly, future work in this area should attempt a fuller understanding of the interplay between public diplomacy campaigns and the other variables pulling and tugging a nation toward a particular decision.

America’s continued low appreciation of public diplomacy as evidenced by its comparatively small budget and lack of Presidential attention is misguided (“Announcement” 2002). Given the declining utility of military force and the increasing importance of non-state actors in sustaining American security, effective strategy of public diplomacy is now more critical than at virtually any time in the past. The goal of this paper has been to develop a conceptual tool that will permit a more systematic understanding of when and how public diplomacy can be applied successfully. The task facing U.S. public diplomacy officials is difficult; the United States has both a highly visible and a highly negative national image with respect to Arab audiences. But, the test cases of Britain and Kuwait discussed herein have shown that a properly constructed public diplomacy campaign that takes into account strategic directionality, elite-orientation, target audience predispositions, and campaign concealment can be successful even when the task at hand is a difficult one. If the United States can reduce its visibility, improve its efforts to cultivate local agenda-setting elites, and reduce the profile of its public diplomacy efforts, there is hope that ground can be gained.
References


