THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION
Re-viewing Islamabad’s Fifth Function

By
Robert Allen Mohr

Bachelor of Architecture
Iowa State University (2000)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
and the Department of Architecture
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of

Master in City Planning
and
Master of Science in Architecture Studies

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June 2009

© 2009 Robert Allen Mohr. All Rights Reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part.
THESIS SUPERVISOR
Julian Beinart
Professor of Architecture

THESIS READER
John de Monchaux
Professor of Architecture and Planning, Emeritus
THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION
Re-viewing Islamabad’s Fifth Function

By
Robert Allen Mohr

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning and the Department of Architecture on May 21, 2009 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Master in City Planning and Master of Science in Architecture Studies.

ABSTRACT
This thesis is about Islamabad’s center.
Islamabad is a city built from scratch. It was the “dream” of Ayub Khan–Pakistan’s gregarious and globe-trotting general-cum-president–and the product of its chief master planner, Constantinos Doxiadis–the gregarious and globe-trotting architect-cum-global development expert. Endowed with a propensity for large-scale planning, both operated with a hubris-laden confidence in developing rational solutions to urban and national dilemmas, technocratic strategies employed as a means to realize grand visions. In this way, Islamabad was conceived by both as part of something much larger–Ayub’s symbol of a freshly unified nation, steeped in nationalist fervor and draped with the dreams of progress, development and national unity, and Doxiadis’s far-reaching vision of “Ecumenopolis”, a planetary-scale entity of the far-distant future.

Rationality and dreams form the structural and symbolic basis upon which Islamabad and its core were conceived and constructed; yet its envelopment in the dialectic of rationality and dreams, of practice and theory, has prevented Islamabad from developing its own cohesion independent of these larger visions. Functionally deficient and overly symbolic, what exists in Islamabad’s central area today is not realized dreams but what emerged in between them.

This thesis uncovers the story of how Islamabad’s central axis and its terminus–the major buildings of Pakistan’s Capital Complex–came to be what they are today. This thesis is not solely concerned with the forensic or analytical, however. Nor does it look at Islamabad in a vacuum. Rather, I am interested in Islamabad as the contemporary capital of the nation-state of Pakistan–a state where the dream of an “Islamic Democracy” is still being sought after. It is the intention of this thesis to re-consider the physical manifestation of the national center of power and its environs and re-frame its monuments in a more complex light, acknowledging that the very question of the Pakistani “public” is entangled in that space.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following people.

My Thesis Adviser, Julian Beinart, has been consistently supportive, both of this thesis, and of all my work here at MIT. The conversations in his office, whilst surrounded by decades of writing on cities, have been some of the most interesting, thought-provoking, surprising and meaningful discussions on cities and humanity that I have been a part of.

John de Monchaux, my thesis reader, contributed in great ways to my experience at MIT, and to this thesis. He has been a joy to get to know, and my experience here at MIT has been greatly enriched by his presence and endless optimism. It was upon his encouragement that I pursued a cross-disciplinary degree track, and it is through his inspiration that I will continue searching for something more.

Rahul Mehrotra has been most helpful in critiquing this thesis. I have enjoyed, and gained immensely from, collaborating with him while here.

Thanks for the tremendous help from those at the various archives I visited for this thesis: Giota Pavlidou, at the Constantinos A. Doxiadis Archives in Athens; Nancy Thorne, as well as Bill Whitaker at the Architectural Archives at the University of Pennsylvania; and Librarian Shafquat Mahmud Khan Khattak, as well as Mohammed Javid Khan, at the CDA Library in Islamabad.

Thanks to others in Islamabad who helped me tremendously while last there. Rose Puffer, my kind and gracious host. Faisal Butt, with whom hiking in the Margallas was a joy. Butt Sahib, whose connections around town were indispensable. And Anwar Said, who brought the Louis Kahn proposal to my attention.

Thanks to Nida Rehman for being a willing and critical reader of this thesis throughout its production. Her feedback has helped me find my voice.

Thank you to Ahmed Zaib Khan Mahsud, who has very kindly made himself and his work available to me. His fortuitous presence at MIT this year has made this work much more informed.

Thank you to Ash Lettow, who has been an indispensible consultant to me, both in writing this thesis, and as a friend. His endless willingness to read and edit has added more than I know to this work.

Thanks to all my SMArchS and MCP friends who have been critical, inspiring, and supportive.

Thank you to my family for always supporting me, and my pursuits in life and work.

Lastly, thank you to Sarah Gaines, whose love, support, and optimism I cherish. TTB.
TO MY PARENTS
For taking me there

TO SARAH
For supporting my return
# THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION

Re-viewing Islamabad’s Fifth Function

## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION 11

### PART I

#### 1. THE STATE (IN THE CITY) 19

1.1 The Ayub Khan Era 21
1.2 Pakistan: From Idea to State 24
1.3 Islamabad as National Project 28
1.4 Islam as Subnational Proxy 31

#### 2. THE CITY (AND THE STATE) 35

2.1 Doxiadis and the Global Practice of Ekistics 37
2.2 Ekistics and Islamabad 40
2.3 Global Thinking: Ekistics and Cosmopolitanism 48

#### 3. THE CENTER(S) OF THE CITY (AND THE STATE) 53

3.1 The Capital Complex 55
3.2 The Capitol before Stone 57
3.3 Louis Kahn in Islamabad 62
3.4 Doxiadis’s “Dynamic” Center: Where City Meets State 70
3.5 The Central Area Today: A return to City of the State 78

### PART II

#### 4. THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION 85

4.1 The Problem with Imagining Civic Spaces 87
4.2 The Rights to the (Capital) City 89

#### 5. PROJECTING A CITY FOR ALL PEOPLE OF THE NATION 93

5.1 Accessibility 97
5.2 Connectivity 99
5.3 Collectivity 103
5.4 The Civic Foreground 105
5.5 Broader Recommendations 109

### CONCLUSION 113

### BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
INTRODUCTION

On June 13 2008, a group of well-dressed lawyers and their supporters staged a massive protest in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the foreground of the city’s national government buildings. Formalized in response to the 2007 sacking of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Lawyers Movement represents an emerging group of civil society interests that have begun to challenge the government in Pakistan around broad issues of human rights, democracy and the “rule of law.”

The lawyers targeted their protest at the base of Islamabad’s Capital Complex, the collection of formal white concrete and marble modernist structures that comprise, and symbolize, Pakistan’s center of state power. The buildings sit as lonely monuments centered at the terminus of Islamabad’s major axial boulevard of Jinnah Avenue, which stretches for miles to the southwest. Pakistan’s government complex has been formally fenced off for years, only accessible by those under government employment or with privileged access to the halls of power. Its foreground, the host of many protests such as that staged by the Lawyers Movement, sits empty on most days, as the section of the street has been closed to traffic in a time of heightened security concerns, and its only structure, beyond a few police shelters, is a grandstand built for the express purpose of viewing annual national parades. Jinnah Avenue, straight as an arrow, with its wide traffic lanes and median of well-manicured grass, is lined with non-descript commercial towers and low-slung commer-
cial, retail and institutional buildings set far back from the street such that they fade into the background of a nearly hypnotic linear progression.

This thesis begins with the question of how Islamabad’s central axis and government complex became what they are today, and it concludes with a provocation for how the area might change to accommodate a changing national landscape, acknowledging that the very question of the Pakistani “public” is entangled in that space.

Islamabad is a city built from scratch. It was the “dream” of Ayub Khan—Pakistan’s gregarious and globe-trotting general-cum-president—and the product of its chief master planner, Constantinos Doxiadis—the gregarious and globe-trotting architect-cum-global development expert. Endowed with a propensity for large-scale planning, both operated with a hubris-laden confidence in developing rational solutions to urban and national dilemmas, technocratic strategies employed as a means to realize grand visions. In this way, Islamabad was conceived by both as part of something much larger—Ayub’s symbol of a freshly unified nation, steeped in nationalist fervor and draped with the dreams of progress, development and national unity, and Doxiadis’s far-reaching vision of “Ecumenopolis,” a planetary-scale entity of the far-distant future.

Rationality and dreams form the structural and symbolic basis upon which Islamabad and its core were conceived and constructed; yet its envelopment in the dialectic of rationality and dreams, of practice and theory, has
prevented Islamabad from developing its own cohesion independent of these larger visions. Functionally deficient and overly symbolic, what exists in Islamabad's central area today is not realized dreams but what emerged in between them—relatively banal urban form that is part-Dubai and part-suburbia, with a hint of weak clichéd nationalist monumentalism.

Relatively little has been written about Islamabad. Recently, a renewed interest in the work of Constantinos Doxiadis has yielded scholarship on the city as his magnum opus, most recently in the work of Ahmed Zaib Khan Mahsud, whose lengthy work on the making of the city of Islamabad is a great resource on the city and its plan. Prior to his work, as Mahsud writes:

\[\text{Islamabad [had] attracted the attention of a modest number of researchers resulting in the publication of one and a half book (Yakas 2001; Nilsson 1973), two and a half PhDs (Siddiqi 1994; Spaulding 1994; and Hull 2003), limited number of articles, the official discourse (Doxiadis, Ekistics, and the CDA pamphlets), and mention in a few books as footnote.}\]

Most of the scholarship on Islamabad, including Mahsud’s, focuses on the plan of Islamabad. My specific interests in writing this thesis are in the city-as-built—the city as the Capital of the contemporary nation-state of Pakistan. The task of uncovering the story of the built and un-built proposals along the way from project to built entity occupies a significant portion of this work. Where the most deviation from Doxiadis’s master plan occurred was in the formation of its “Dynamic” center–Islamabad’s central axis—and its terminus in the monumental iconic buildings representing the national government. The story of these changes greatly reflects the national condition of a new nation-state struggling with its cohesion, rather than the work of determined visionaries sculpting Islamabad in their image.

Of specific relevance to the Capital Complex and central axis are the subjects of power and “national identity.” Two written works that relate this subject to Islamabad have been resources for this thesis—Lawrence Vale’s *Architecture, Power and National Identity* and Imran Ahmed’s MIT Masters thesis, entitled *The Journey from New Delhi to Islamabad*. These works have yielded valuable insights on the city’s colonial legacy (Ahmed) and broad context of national power and built form (Vale). However, this thesis contends that a critique of Islamabad along these lines is more fruitful when it acknowledges

the complexity of the evolution of the plan as it changed from conception to reality. Not doing so runs the risk of conflating the acts of multiple actors in what was clearly a complex and multivalent effort to construct a city from scratch.

This thesis has two parts. Part One consists of three chapters that tell the story of how Islamabad’s central axis came to be what it is today, much of which—especially the development of the Capital Complex schemes—is not written about, and certainly not compiled in such a fashion. Chapter One focuses on the creation of Islamabad from the national point of view. This chapter analyzes the subject of Pakistan and its difficult attempt to sculpt an “Islamic Democracy,” an effort which—characterized by the polar opposition of secular and fundamentalist factions—still plagues the country in a serious way today. In this chapter I argue that by attempting to build the future of a country atop a legacy of past “greatness,” Pakistan has remained hovering in a perpetual and ambivalent present. This condition of “hovering above” is echoed in Islamabad as well. Chapter Two focuses on Constantinos Doxiadis and his conceptualization of Islamabad, which I argue was grounded more in a cosmopolitan utopian vision for the globe than that of a capital city for a new nation-state. Chapter Three deals with the evolution of the designs of Islamabad’s Capital Complex and central axis, which is the core area of study for the thesis. In this story, the themes of Islam, nationalism and power inevitably surface. Yet, in this chapter I argue that these issues must be seen within the context of how Islamabad’s Capital Complex and axis developed over time. In this chapter I argue that Doxiadis’s unique approach to conceptualizing the city’s center—a dual center juxtaposing city and state functions—was fundamentally different than the ideal set out by a government seeking to unite a nation. I argue that, as a result, the expression of the city of Islamabad has not only been consumed by nationalist spectacle rather than developing an identity of its own, but that the absence of local expression has left banality at the core of the city.

Part Two focuses on the present condition, and culminates in a provocation for how Islamabad’s central area could be re-conceptualized. This re-conceptualization is undertaken both in the interest of addressing functional problems with the city, which are largely the legacy of an over-determined rationalism, as well as addressing the broader and deeper issues that affect a
struggling nation, and thereby its capital city.

Islamabad is somewhere between *project* and *city*; the city has no elected municipal government, but is rather operated by the Capital Development Authority, the government body established in 1960 to produce the city from farm fields. Similarly, Pakistan is somewhere between *idea* and *nation.* The project of creating an “Islamic Democracy” continues today, as the very idea of it has been fought over since before Partition, and it continually resurfaces in unstable times. This thesis, in its concluding design provocations, suggests that resolving the project of Islamabad could go hand-in-glove with new beginnings for the nation of Pakistan.
PART I
Chapter One
THE STATE (IN THE CITY)
1. THE STATE (IN THE CITY)

Pakistan embarked on the project to build a new capital city in the late 1950s, over a decade after the partitioning of British India in 1947. The new capital, it was imagined would lend physical form to a new government’s mission to unite what was then an ethnically heterogeneous and territorially non-contiguous nation-state, comprising of an East and West wing. The chief advocate of such a new capital was the general who became President, Mohammed Ayub Khan.

1.1 The Ayub Khan Era

Barely two years following the formation of Pakistan’s first constitution, that document was dissolved and the country began its long-lasting and uncomfortable experiment with authoritarian military rule. Mohammed Ayub Khan was without a doubt one of Pakistan’s most transformational figures. A native of West Pakistan’s north, Ayub has been compared to Solon, Lycurgus, and DeGaulle, and described as the “Nation’s Principal Architect.” When Ayub took control in 1958, the country had progressed little since the trauma of Partition. Leaders had died or been assassinated,

FIGURE 4: East and West Pakistan in the 1960s. Sourced from Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters.

2 All of these are well referenced comparisons of Ayub. The “Solon” and “Lycurgus” references are from Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 251. The reference to “de Gaulle” is from George J. Lerski, “The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 5, 251. The moniker of the “Nation’s Principal Architect” is from Lawrence Ziring, “From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan,” in Asian Survey Vol. 24, No. 9, 935. All are as quoted in Mahsud, Dissertation, 95-96.
Ayub summarized the debate that he inherited in the following way: “But more than anything else it was the irreconcilable nature of the forces of dogmatism and revivalism which was operating against the unification of the people. A sharp cleavage had been created between the State and the Religion, and all the old controversies – the temporal versus the spiritual, the secular versus the religious – revived.” He then argued that what was needed was an agreement to build the foundation of the country within the common ground. From Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 195.

Ayub Khan was a pragmatist, and seemed to strive for a modern and progressive reconciling of the state and religion. “The Constitution,” he wrote, “should provide a framework based on the experience and history of Islam and suited to the genius, temperament, and traditions of the people, but within that framework the community should be free to adopt principles derived from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah and evolve methods for the application of those principles to its own circumstances.” From Mohammed Ayub Khan, 198. When Ayub re-wrote the Constitution (largely on his own) in 1962, he removed the word “Islamic” and named the country the “Republic of Pakistan.” This was quickly modified by the first Constitutional Amendment in 1963. From Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 157-158.

the economy was quite stagnant, and the political landscape was unstable and shifting, principally due to the on-going dispute over the founding principles of Pakistan’s “Islamic Democracy.” Ayub made it his task to re-invent and completely restructure the nation-state around his vision, and fashioned both his personality and government around this theme of re-invention. Ayub was generally secular in his approach, and his aim was modernization and “progress” through economic development, by way of a technocratic, rational approach to a massive task of reinvention. “He imagined,” as Mahsud describes, “a Pakistan of the future that would be progressive and modern, and believed that through rational (dispassionate) planning he could graft a structure that would assure this future for the nation.”

Islamabad was a significant part of this vision.

Indeed, significant economic growth did occur during his time in power, as did major projects for infrastructure and agricultural development, and the new capital city of Islamabad. These ultimately yielded his era the moniker of the “decade of progress.” While Ayub clearly aimed for his country’s im-
provement, he was preconditioned by his military background for a kind of benevolent authoritarianism, one reminiscent of the Mughals or the Raj, and his government reforms are characterized by a paternalistic elitism. In his memoirs, he wrote:

> Our people are mostly uneducated and our politicians not so scrupulous. The people are capable of doing great things, but they can also be easily misled. Unfettered democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous, especially nowadays when communism from within and without is so quick to make use of its weakness. We, therefore, have to have a controlled form of democracy with checks and counter-checks.  

This is emblematic of Ayub’s simultaneous aims of “progress” and “modernization,” and the centralization of power—a kind of “democracy from above.” Ayub is, in this way, a paradoxical and controversial figure—the man who transformed the condition of the state in a multitude of ways and took the reins to guide the country through major reforms, was the same man whose politically expedient strategy forsook democratic processes in favor of other measures of progress. Ayub’s reference to the Cold War is not incidental, as he made the strategic decision to allow Pakistan to develop formal and informal ties with the United States. Formally building on a previous defense treaty, the armies of the two countries began to coordinate and collaborate, and informal connections with U.S. non-governmental development and philanthropic organizations were fostered as well, most significantly in that of the Ford Foundation, which aided the government’s development of several infrastructure and housing development projects and facilitated the link to Constantinos Doxiadis, who worked on several projects in Pakistan in addition to the master plan for Islamabad.

Overall, Ayub’s brand of rule planted the seeds for two lasting legacies—the strengthening of the army and its close connection to the country’s reins (two long-standing military regimes have followed Ayub’s), and strategic alliances with the West, specifically the United States. In describing Pakistan, American historian Stephen Cohen has noted:

> For most of its history, Pakistan has oscillated between unstable democracy and benign authoritarianism.

To say that Pakistan’s political history is one of a shifting between democracy
The term “Military-Bureaucratic-Oligarchy” is a widely-used term that appears in multiple history books as well as the popular press. Cohen uses the term “Establishment,” which he acknowledges is not his original term. Cohen, 68.

The Western media often enjoys focusing on the question of whether Pakistan is a “failed” state. For a critique of such a viewpoint, see Manam Ahmed, “Legends of the Fail,” in The National newspaper in the UAE: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090508/REVIEW/705079996/1008
I am not speaking these terms, but rather positing that the strength of Pakistan as an idea may be stronger than its state institutions.

Comprised of the three remnant power centers from pre-Partition, as Cohen describes it, this informal elite establishment—although veiled by public disputes—has conspired to prevent the development of a stable system of governance and broad physical and institutional infrastructure in Pakistan. This phenomenon, along with the populist distractions of Kashmir and an amplified rivalry with India, are constant themes within Pakistan’s continued state of hovering oscillation. In many ways, Pakistan exists as more of an “idea” (one which has multiple conceptions), than as a well-functioning nation-state.

1.2 Pakistan: From Idea to State

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State… We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.

—Mohammed Ali Jinnah, August 11, 1947

On the eve of Indian independence, Jawaharlal Nehru sketched the profile of a new nation-state of India, in his now most famous “Tryst with Destiny”
address. Nehru, remaining India’s leader until his death over 16 years later, solidified a commitment made to India’s modernization through industrialization and to secular, democratic governance. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s address to Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly—quoted above—just three days prior, is characterized by an equally progressive enthusiasm, yet Pakistan’s 60-year experience with nationhood has been markedly different from that of its next-door neighbor. Jinnah died barely a year after independence, and the country is still struggling to realize—or even define—the “Islamic Democracy” that the country’s founders aimed to shape a country around.

The idea of Pakistan began long before the creation of the nation-state of Pakistan in 1947. Muslims in South Asia had been advocating for spatial autonomy of some kind for over a century, but the contemporary notion of an autonomous Muslim territory on the subcontinent is rooted in a movement for Muslim representation within British India that later gathered momentum in the late 1930s as pleas for a distinct state were popularized. The All-India Muslim League, the organization-cum-political party comprised of Muslim elites, professionals, and intellectuals that would come to lead the charge for an independent state, was originally formed (1906) as an effort to formalize solidarity among Muslims of British India. By 1930, the League was led by Mohammed Iqbal, the poet and social/political activist of the time who is widely credited as the first to articulate a future vision for what would become Pakistan. In an address to the League, Iqbal stated:

*I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formulation of a consolidated north-west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims of north-west India.*

Clearly leaving the door open on the subject of independence from Britain, Iqbal’s sentiments stressed autonomy and contiguity of territory—the “north-west Indian Muslim state”—above the singular element of religious identification. Of notable exception, of course, is the State of Bengal, the high Muslim percentage of which would bring it into the Partition equation in the coming years. The partitioning of Bengal by the British had been a founding cause for the League, which makes Iqbal’s exclusion of it in the articulation of Muslim autonomy even more revealing. He later made his

---

14 See Cohen, Chapters 1 and 2, for this “Idea-State” distinction.


16 “Pakistan” was coined four years later in 1934 by Cambridge University student Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who published it in an independence pamphlet entitled *Now or Never*. Also meaning “Land of the Pure” in Persian, PAKSTAN (in its original spelling) stood then for Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. Ali also argued for a contiguous territory, with the exclusion of Bengal, as did Iqbal. The name “Pakistan,” as Cohen describes, “did not come into common use until 1945. Even in the 1940 resolution of the Muslim League calling for a separate state for India’s Muslims did not mention it.” Cohen, 26.

17 Asad M. Zaidi, *Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India* V. 1, 51, quoted in Imran Ahmed, 90.

18 Bengal, which the British had partitioned, was kept so after
view on the necessity of territorial contiguity explicit. “The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country,” he wrote, “very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory.”

Iqbal’s 1930 speech was a transitional episode in the League’s efforts—a hinge between an early phase of advocacy for Muslim representation within British or independent India, and an advocacy for an autonomous region for Muslims.

Jinnah did not come instantly to the League, but he joined in 1913 and quickly led the organization through the historic Lucknow Pact with the Congress Party, which marked the League’s shift toward the Independence Movement. Jinnah, the well-heeled British-trained lawyer from Bombay, quickly became the figurehead and spokesman for Muslims in the independence movement. Now immortalized as Pakistan’s founding father, the Quaid-e-Azam (“Great Leader”), Jinnah was by all accounts a moderate Muslim who, although on passionate occasions prone to divisive religious rhetoric, was undoubtedly committed by the time of independence to a democratic and secular Pakistan.

Jinnah is the figure who, by default, escorted the transition from the Idea of Pakistan to the Nation-state of Pakistan, from a movement for civil rights and representation within a larger entity to a full-fledged separatist movement, and finally a nation-state. The paradoxical nature of this transition is reflected in how Jinnah is often described. One scholar writes:

_He is the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity who ends up dividing India. He is the man of avowed secular habit who presides over the realization of a religious ideal. He is the advocate of Pakistan who leaves open to the end the possibility of a united India, indeed, shows interest in being its first prime minister._

Quotes by pre-and post-Partition Jinnah, when taken singularly, are fodder for divisive and inclusive perspectives, respectively. When seen through the contextual lens of Partition, they reveal the paradoxical realities of shifting from freedom movement to nationhood, from a minority seeking acknowledgement to a majority taking power. What was consistent and unwavering in Jinnah’s personality was his legal background. Trained in a commitment to the “rule of law,” Jinnah would have been more disposed to a Pakistan built upon a strong constitutional foundation, rather than dominated by

---

19 Asad M. Zaidi, _Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India V. 4_, 67, quoted in Imran Ahmed, 91.

20 Jinnah’s early opposition to membership in the League was an opposition to their initial position in support of the British in India. This reveals the complex nature of South Asian Muslim unity at the time. The League had been formed in the interest of representative rights for the subcontinent’s estimated 20-25% Muslim minority. Realizing their continued minority status within a post-British state led the early League to support the British Raj in an effort to win favor with them, which reveals the political entanglements of early efforts at Muslim unity. Jinnah ultimately joined the Muslim League after they revised that position, and, as Ziring has argued, he did so in the interest of promoting a more moderate position against a rise in extremism by both Hindus and Muslims. Lawrence Ziring, _PAKISTAN: At the Crosscurrent of History_, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 4-5.

21 The Lucknow Pact was an agreement between the Muslim League and the Congress Party (which Jinnah had recently been a member of) to fight jointly for Indian Independence from Britain, with the understanding that an allowance for the representation of India’s Muslims was important to that struggle. This was a major step for the Muslim League to support Indian Independence, and Jinnah was in a unique position to facilitate the negotiation between the League and the Congress. Jinnah is thus
described as the “Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity,” a moniker which is often used in contrast to his latter arguments for Partition. See Ziring, 4-5.

22 On March 22, 1940, during the Lahore Conference of the Muslim League, Jinnah delivered a speech that argued that Hinduism and Islam were “different and distinct social orders… [that] can ever evolve a common nationality.” This speech is often quoted as evoking a “divisive” side of Jinnah. The speech is widely quoted, including in Rubina Saigol, “Myths vs facts about fundamentalism, Part 1”, in The News, February 21, 2009: “http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163789 (accessed May 20, 2009)

23 Any claim about the definitive beliefs of Jinnah should be treated skeptically; the man kept no diaries, wrote no autobiography and reportedly had few close friends. See Francis Robinson, “The Jinnah Story” in M.A. Jinnah: Views and Reviews, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 91-92. Scholars agree that his personal habits were not that of a strict Muslim, but there is little consensus on the subject of Jinnah’s “true” intentions for the State of Pakistan, specifically that of the relationship between religion and government. As Stephen Cohen describes, “secular” is often used pejoratively in Pakistan (as is “liberal”) to describe those not committed to an Islamic state. [See Cohen, 43.]

In this work, I have taken Jinnah’s latter speeches – those delivered while as the leader of

Pakistan – as characteristic of his wishes for the country. These are decidedly more “secular” in outlook than earlier speeches made in the throws of Pakistan’s independence movement, which stressed religious difference in the name of Partition.

Jinnah’s push for an independent Pakistan did not come until the early 1940s, and scholars hold in contention the nature of his commitment to the two-nation theory, even up to the year of Partition. Until the opening up of both British and Pakistani archives in the late 1970s, much of the scholarship on Jinnah focused on his public speeches and portrayed him within the Quaid-e-Azam persona. Jalal’s The Sole Spokesman (1985) was the first biography of Jinnah to challenge the established narrative. She later describes the book as stressing the “uneasy fit between the claim of Muslim ‘nationhood’ and the uncertainties and indeterminacies of politics in the late colonial era that led to the attainment of sovereign ‘statehood.’” [Ayesha Jalal, “Between Myth and History” in M.A. Jinnah: Views and Reviews, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005) 120] It was widely labeled the “revisionist” history of Jinnah, and her thesis was over simplified by critics as arguing that “Pakistan” was used simply as a “bargaining chip” in negotiations with Congress and the British. It could be argued (as Ali does) that the contemporary and long-standing dispute in Pakistan between supporters of Jinnah et al’s conception of “Pakistan as Muslim Nation” and those who support a more theocratic orientation—Pakistan as an Islamic State—is rooted in this foundational conflict at the time of Partition.

Reviewing the well-recorded and theorized history of Indian Partition, or of its leadership, is not within the scope of this thesis; there is voluminous literature on the subject. What is relevant to the city of Islamabad and its center, however, is how a particular pair of subjects was framed while the nation was born—that of Muslim unity on the subcontinent, and how Islam should influence the government of the state of Pakistan. These twin subjects emerge as implicit and explicit tropes within the project for Islamabad.

1.3 Islamabad as National Project

Islamabad, has been my dream always—and it is not a dream which is unrealistic or unwanted… Let me tell you this, the capital of a country is the focus and the centre of the people’s ambitions and desires, and it is wrong to put them in an existing city. It must have a colour of its own and character of its own. And that character is the sum total of the aspirations, the life and the ambitions of the people of the whole of Pakistan. –Ayub Khan

Ayub Khan wasted no time in putting into place the mechanisms from which to create the new Pakistani capital city, establishing a special “Capital Commission” just months after taking power. The interim capital, the port
Ayub felt, in other words, that the “neutral” territory of a brand new city would provide the means to unite the country. Ayub’s aims at unification places Islamabad squarely within the genre of other capital-building projects of its time–cities built in the name of unifying a new nation-state and of constructing a “national identity” through the cultural production of architecture and urban design. On this subject of constructing a “national identity,” Lawrence Vale argues that the framework is three-fold, that “what is passed off as a quest for national identity is in reality a product of a search for sub-national, personal, and supranational identity.” One can read all three of these in Pakistan’s project for Islamabad, and it is that of the “supranational” and “subnational” (that which might innately tie a diverse public together) that Pakistan has most struggled with, both in the capital-building project and more generally. Paul Ricoeur summarized the struggle to construct a “national identity” in paradoxical terms:

_There is a paradox. How to become modern and to return to sources; how to revive an old dormant civilization and take part in universal civilization._

“Returning to sources” was implicit in the project to relocate Pakistan’s capital. Officially, Ayub’s Capital Commission was to advise the President on the matter of the best location for the Capital functions. Unofficially, this commission is widely considered to be a bureaucratic veil employed to conceal a largely pre-determined course. The Commission recommended

---

27 Ayub wrote that Karachi had become “a centre of agitation-al politics: politicians found that they could collect mobs with the help of industrialists and businessmen and bring all kinds of pressures to bear on the government... Constant contact with businessmen had a corrupting influence on government servants and many of them succumbed to temptation.” Mohammed Ayub Khan, 96.

28 Mohammed Ayub Khan, 97.

29 Lawrence Vale, _Architecture, Power, and National Identity_, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 53. Vale’s three frameworks refer to 1) the relationship of sub-groups to the whole (subnational) 2) the influence of a designer’s “personal identity” on a nation’s expression and 3) the relationship of a nation to an external, Western audience.

Ayub considered the Islamabad project as improving on that Legacy, through the bringing of reliable water resources to the area through the use of hydrologic dams. Mohammed Ayub Khan, 97.

Doxiadis had been appointed Chief Consultant to the Federal Capital Commission, so presumably he would have had some influence over the decision. Yet, his position seems to have been more the role of a compiler of material from various government bodies, rather than a decision-maker.

locating the capital far from Karachi, and immediately adjacent to the military's headquarters in Rawalpindi. This military component to the recommendation is widely written of, but was downplayed at the time by the government and Ayub. Although, the remote site's "supranational" strategic character is difficult to deny. The new site was located along the historic Grand Trunk Road, connecting (via the Khyber Pass, the entry point to the subcontinent used by the Mughals and others across history) the ancient capitals of Calcutta, Delhi, Lahore, Kabul and Tehran. The location, in its references to the Mughal legacy on the subcontinent, added a cultural legitimacy to the city's new location that resonated with Ayub's leadership style of the benevolent authoritarian. Of additional "cultural capital" for the Islamabad site was Taxila, the historic location of the Buddhist Gandhara (and later Greek) civilization. It seems apparent that Doxiadis, considering the relocation decision to be a political one, remained largely on the sidelines, although ostensibly he had some influence over the decision. His contribution as a city planner and development expert did lend an authority to the argument for Karachi's unsuitability, and his writings and reports embraced the cultural legacy that the site presented. Doxiadis's complicity in the mining of a cultural legacy for Islamabad is apparent, but it would be difficult to trace its origins to him. Indeed, As Mahsud has argued, given that Doxiadis had been working with the Pakistan government for some
time, it is difficult to distinguish between the influences of the government and Doxiadis on the Capital project. \(^{33}\)

In the case of India, the task of mining the “dormant civilization” of Ricoeur’s paradox came on the heels of an independence movement with wildly popularized cultural imagery, and one that had the immediately recognizable name “India.” Certainly there was a very real struggle over the future trajectory of the country—Gandhi’s villages or Nehru’s modernist urbano-industrialization—but its experience was fairly typical for a post-colonial state. Pakistan, on the other hand, was a more unique case; compared to the typical “from scratch” project of post-colonial identity production, Pakistan’s was instant. Being the product of a secessionist project (and thereby required to differentiate itself from India) burdened Pakistan with an extra layer of identity-production, resulting in a country that has defined itself more by what it is not (India) than what it is.

1.4 Islam as Subnational Proxy

In the effort of constructing nationhood, Pakistan was heterogeneous in ethnic terms. Unity among Muslims in British India was not something to be taken for granted. As Cohen summarizes, “By the time of the Raj, India’s Muslims had become a politically and culturally mixed population. They had a dispossessed court, narrow elite, and large poor peasantry.” \(^{34}\) Given the large rural poor peasantry, Partition’s legacy of Hindu-Muslim strife, Cohen argues, likely stems more from issues of class and power than from religious difference. \(^{35}\) India’s Muslims were, culturally speaking, a diverse group spread across the subcontinent, largely in pocketed remnants of Mughal Princely states. Many might have likely identified more with their fellow Punjabis or Bengalis than with a Muslim from a thousand miles away.

There is copious literature on the subject of the Muslim response to the decline and fall of Moghul rule in the subcontinent. Pakistani administrator and scholar Akbar S. Ahmed argues that Indian Muslims, with the breakup of the Mughal court, “lost their kingdom, their Mughal Empire, their emperor, their language, their culture, their capital of Delhi, and their sense of self.” \(^{36}\) Although this view might seem to be an overstatement, it was thought that all Muslims could identify with the Mughal Empire (and its greatness), and that its loss affected more than just the elite. (Thus, its
appearance as a trope of cultural legacy within efforts to build a national identity. The subject is certainly susceptible to a flavoring with nationalist ideology, and scholars disagree on many details of how post-Mogul Muslim identity was shaped. There is agreement, however, on the galvanic effect of one particular event—the uprising of 1857 that led to the British Crown installing the governance of the Raj in British India. With the arrival of Crown rule came not only the formal disassembly of Mughal rule, but also the British colonial propensity for categorizing and classifying their domain and subjects. A massive bureaucratic mechanism was deployed across the subcontinent in an effort to take record of the population and the territory, and the political anxiety of the Muslim elite following the end of Mughal rule coincided with these taxonomic efforts and the subsequent development of “Muslim” as a category. The two later conspired informally and unwittingly in the build up to Partition.

Distinction between cultural, ethnic and religious groups was formalized and institutionalized by the colonial government in the late 19th Century, and politicized by the establishment of special electorate and quota systems across India. At the same time that religious difference was being formalized in this way, a growing sense that India was heading toward political independence led to a jockeying for power within projected national scenarios. This emphasis on difference, arguably enabled if not encouraged by the colonial regime, developed into propositions around the notion of Muslims as distinct and subsequently into arguments for the unique status of minority Muslims in South Asia. The movement for Pakistan-as-nation-state is built on this notion of distinction, which was itself built atop a monolithic colonial construction of religious identity.

Pakistan’s potential territorial composition was quite vague and shifting in the years leading up to Partition, a function of continuous negotiations at the “bargaining counter” by the Muslim League with the Raj and Congress, and an uncertainty in the likelihood of transitioning from the Idea of Pakistan to an actual state. The potential constitutional framework and governance structure was even less clear. The Constituent Assembly, meeting only three days prior to Partition, was host to a tremendous debate on the constitution and its “Islamic” content, with the two sides essentially comprising of the centrist/secular Muslim Leaguers like Jinnah on one side and on the other


38 Cohen, 25.

the Islamist figures who were arguing for the incorporation of Islamic Law in the constitution. Jinnah, by and large, won the debate, and the resultant agreement of the Constituent Assembly, the “Objectives Resolution,” was decidedly centrist and open to flexible interpretation. It contains a commitment to social welfare and the “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice,” positioned within the rubric of Islam.

While Jinnah might have argued that the act of Muslims voluntarily forming a nation-state together would be solidarity enough for national cohesion, this could only go so far. Iqbal’s 1930 speech envisioned a homeland predicated on a cultural cohesiveness above religion, one defined by a particular contiguous territory. In Iqbal’s scenario, Muslim unity would have been something to be fostered, not a monolithic pre-condition presumed to hold any cohesive strength. The question of whether Islam was, or is, a prerequisite for state formation (which opens the door to Pakistan as an “Islamic State”) or an end-goal of it (i.e. a “Nation of Muslims,” characterized by a distancing of state and religion), still surfaces today.

Over time, Islam has gradually come to serve as a proxy for ethnic unity across the nation. As Imran Ahmed put it in his analysis of Islamabad, “in order to buttress the fallacy of a Pakistani nation state religion is... instrumentalized and made into a solution to the problem of ethnic heterogeneity. Religion which held the potential of being subversive to colonial legacies, has now in an instrumentalized form and precarious manner been made a parallel source of authority.” Thus, religious distinction not only has a colonial legacy, but also is transformed from a means of subversive rebellion to a form of domination. The twin themes of “progress” and resurrection implied in Ricoeur were both well served in the employment of the Mughal legacy in the project for Islamabad. It served as a mythical legacy from which to construct legitimacy, and had cultural form and imagery to reinforce that authority, as well as the legacy of capital creation and the idea of Muslim “greatness.” Chapter Three outlines how these issues surface in the effort to create Islamabad and its center.

40 As Zafaryab Ahmed describes, “Sovereignty” is a key controversy for those opposed to a Muslim nation-state on orthodox Muslim grounds. The argument, put forth most notably by Maulana Maudoodi—at the Objectives Resolution later—is that the power to create laws (over a sovereign territory) is only in the hands of Allah. This extended to “democracy” (the people rule) as well. More mainstream Muslim scholars, needless to say, dispute this sentiment on both religious grounds and regarding his interpretation of the term “sovereignty” as a purely legal construct. Zafaryab Ahmed, “Maudoodi’s Islamic State”, in Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience, Mohammed Asghar Khan, Ed. (London: Zed Books, 1985), 95-113.


42 Imran Ahmed, 10-11.
Chapter Two

THE CITY (AND THE STATE)
2. THE CITY (AND THE STATE)

Out of all the factors that have influenced the city of Islamabad, it is Constantinos Doxiadis and his rubric of Ekistics that had the most significant impact on the physical form of the city.

2.1 Doxiadis and the Global Practice of Ekistics

The prolific career of Constantinos Doxiadis began in the 1950s and involved architecture, engineering and planning projects across the globe, over a dozen published books, and a self-established journal and educational institute dedicated to his theories. His work involved a radical expansion of the field of architecture, and its marriage to the then-nascent field of international development. Over his career Doxiadis developed *Ekistics - The Science of Human Settlements*, which aimed to bring together virtually every element of study which had an impact on the physical manifestation of the human condition—architecture, city planning, economics, social sciences, biology, anthropology, network theory, etc—under the umbrella of a single theoretical and scientific pan-discipline.

Doxiadis derived his neologism “Ekistics” from the Greek *oikistiko*, meaning “concerning the foundation of a house, a habitation, a city or colony; contributing to the settling.” Ekistics was an attempt to scientifically study and understand all aspects of human settlements at all scales—from the human to the planetary. The product of an increasing influence of “Taylorist” technocratic rationalism on the fields of architecture and planning, its premise was that through scientific study, statistical analysis and rational planning—through an understanding of how cities function, how people use space, and how development patterns evolve—the then-contemporary problems of the urban condition could be tamed and managed, and humans could develop better spaces, better towns, better cities and a better planet. As Mark Wigley has described, in other words, “…if the data could be controlled, cities could be controlled.”

Peripheral to the avant-garde urbanists of CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne), yet more theoretically-oriented than many post-war international development planners, Doxiadis and Ekistics occupy

43 By 1963, Doxiadis had offices on every continent and, as Mark Wigley has written, had “already completed major buildings, complexes, infrastructures, urban plans, and regional studies in Greece, Pakistan, India, Ghana, Spain, Denmark, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, Lebanon, the United States, Australia, Iran, Jordan, and Iraq.” See Mark Wigley, “Network Fever,” in Grey Room, No 04. (Summer 2001), 87. In addition to the practice of this firm, Doxiadis established the Athens Center for Ekistics, an institute dedicated to his “Science of Human Settlements.”


45 Growth in cities was a near-obsession of Doxiadis’s, as the post WWII era saw a massive increase in global urban populations, and a horizontal spreading of Western cities amplified literature on the value of city centers.

46 Wigley, 87.
The Athens Charter outlined a rigid monofunctional approach to cities, and involved high-rise housing blocks, office towers and greenbelts. It would not be released until 1943, and it did not take long for it to be challenged amongst the profession and greater society. See Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

In the 1950s and 60s, architecture and urbanism were in transition. Suburbanization in the United States was deurbanizing and expanding cities, while projects attempting to deploy modernist urban principles were beginning to be implemented. CIAM, then the de facto authority on architectural modernism, was in the process of breaking apart; its 1933 Athens Charter, which had formed the basis for the Modernist conception of the city was being challenged, and in 1953 the organization famously splintered with the formation of Team X in a dispute over what had been the core tenants of that charter. Shortly afterwards, the Urban Design program was established at the Harvard Uni-

**FIGURE 9:** Constantinos Doxiadis. Clockwise from top left: Working on the Islamabad model in Athens, Travelling through Beirut, and Teaching.
versity Graduate School of Design, principally by Josep Lluis Sert, who was one who had been advocating within CIAM for a reinvestment in the core of cities, with the argument that cities were directly linked to modern liberal democratic thinking, and should thus be committed to and invested in.48

Occurring at the same time was an almost wholesale backlash against Modernism, and specifically its preeminent symbol—the Modernist city. Jane Jacobs’s famous *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), lambasted Modernist urbanism (or at least as it had been represented in the United States)49, and provocations like Bernard Rudofsky’s “Architecture without Architects” exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art in New York (1964) challenged the very purpose of the architectural discipline, its rootedness in Europe, and its aesthetic. “City Planning” would soon shift away from physical planning and the top-down approach that had characterized it (which had the unfortunate association with large modern post-WWII redevelopment projects, such as “Urban Renewal” in the United States.) The image of the city planner sitting behind a large desk directing a government bureaucracy in the laying out of city form shifted rapidly to that of the “advocacy planner,” the character who works on behalf of the community to “empower” them to realize their vision of their city.50 It was a dramatic and multivalent transition, and Doxiadis—the quintessential polymath, the architect-cum-planner—found himself squarely in the middle of it.

CIAM’s interest in the city and its core urban functions escalated as many of its members became involved in the reconstruction of European cities following World War II. CIAM was not solely focused on Europe, however, as its members soon became involved in urban development and housing projects in Latin America, Africa and Asia, including the infamous capital building projects of Brasilia and Chandigarh. This international manifestation of CIAM’s oeuvre is how the story of modernist architecture in the “Third World” has largely been told, that Modernist architects injected the “developing” world with a small collection of projects and that, following that, the modernist aesthetic remained even in the absence of any social transformation. Yet, as Ijlal Muzaffar has written, other architects and urbanists who were peripheral to CIAM and sympathetic to Modernism’s latent social mission, yet aware of broader components to urbanization, such as economics, social sciences, etc, began to hybridize and become increas-

“Developmentalism” is a school of thought that emerged immediately following World War II. Characterized by the establishment of international political agreements and a global financial infrastructure established under the Bretton Woods agreement, the “developmentalist” perspective was that the best way to increase in prosperity of nations was through economic development. See Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Doxiadis was a prolific “neologist”. His new lexicon presumably lent an academic feeling to his writing for some, but for those closer to the practice of urban design they were symbolic of his peripheral position. As Pyla has described, “The ‘Glossary’ was to become indispensable to each one of Doxiadis’s books.” Pyla, Panayioti I. “Ekistics, Architecture and Environmental Politics, 1945-1976: A Prehistory of Sustainable Development”, (PhD Dissertation, MIT, 2002), 75.


It is in this “developmentalist” context that Doxiadis’s career was launched, and his “Science” of Ekistics was formed as the manifestation of a campaign to diversify and broaden architecture, as well as organize and compile a new collaborative and multifaceted approach to global development.

2.2 Ekistics and Islamabad

Islamabad was Doxiadis’s largest project and, being his masterwork, it is straight from the Ekistics playbook. In looking at Doxiadis’s work, two themes rise to the surface, both of which are embedded in Islamabad: A propensity for categorization and classification, and an apparent obsession with time, and growth of cities over time.

Doxiadis’s approach to understanding “Human Settlements” was to relentlessly classify and categorize. He conceived of human existence as being comprised of five “elements”, some with their own neologisms: Nature, Anthropos (human beings), Society, Shells (i.e. structures), and Networks. Central to the “science” was the Ekistics Logarithmic Scale (ELS), which classified human settlements from the scale of the human to that of the entire planet. While technocratic in its approach, the purpose of articulating the ELS and the five elements was not in the interest of simplification or automation of the design process; it was not about distinguishing between scales, but of highlighting their inter-connectedness. The ELS served to illustrate Doxiadis’s contention that design should consider all scales, and all Ekistics elements, at once—especially as the domain of the architect and planner grew (to that of the “Ekistician”) to include projects of extraordinary size. “Nature” could not be distinguished from “Man,” and neither should the “dwelling” and the “town;” they were all components in relation to one whole—a massive, global system of humanity’s footprint on the planet that, he argued, should be considered holistically rather than as distinct, individual components. On the subject of interdisciplinarity, Doxiadis wrote, “In our endeavor to study Ekistics we must remember that even though we have to study and learn many things, our main obligation is to study the gaps between elements and between disciplines; here is where the weakness lies. If we fill the gaps, the whole system will operate as one complex entity in a synergetic way.” The classification and categorization of Ekistics was not
unique or new; the ELS can be seen as taking to an extreme both the CIAM grid, as Mark Wigley has argued, and the scales developed by the MARS Group in the study of city cores.\textsuperscript{55} Nevertheless, Ekistics took holistic thinking and categorization well beyond anything that had come before, and for this reason scholars have argued that Ekistics, with its emphasis on holistic “balance”, represents a precursor to the contemporary notion of sustainability, albeit within a scientific framework.\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{ekistics_elements.png}
\caption{The Five Ekistics Elements: Nature, Man (also called “Anthropos”), Society, Shells (buildings), and Networks. Sourced from Kyrtsis.}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{ekistics_scale.png}
\caption{The Ekistics Logarithmic Scale (ELS). Sourced from Doxiadis, \textit{Ekistics}.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{55} For Wigley’s comparison to the CIAM grid, see Wigley, 93. For reference on the MARS Group scales presented at CIAM 8, see Mumford, p203.

\textsuperscript{56} Pyla. 149-154.
Islamabad was sited adjacent to the existing city of Rawalpindi, a former colonial cantonment on the Pothwar Plateau in Pakistan’s north, a fertile landscape of undulating terrain criss-crossed by small creeks at the base of the Margalla Hills, the Himalayan foothills. The most legible element in the city–both in the Master Plan and the contemporary satellite image–is the city’s mega-sized grid. Laid down across the undulating landscape of the plateau are major roads at an even spacing, which divide the city into equally mega-sized square sectors of 2,000 yards on each side.
Doxiadis’s sectors were designed as “Communities Class V,” which matched “scale-level 8” within Doxiadis’s ELS—that of the “town.” Each was divided into four “Communities Class IV”, and each of those into “Communities Class III” and those into “Communities Class II.” The hyper-rational prescription applied to the nesting of “communities” was extended to the population as well, where the civil servants were projected to live in housing designed to their needs, with areas reserved for particular income groups.57

FIGURE 14: Sector Plan for G7. Sectors were designed as the domain of the human, with minimum penetration by vehicles. Sourced from Kyrtsis and Google Earth, composed by author.

FIGURE 15: “Structure of Communities,” a sketch showing how the ELS hierarchy was put into place. Sourced from Kyrtsis.

57 Doxiadis supported the mixing of income groups, but not an a very fine-grain, and his official reports for Islamabad include the assumption that civil servants would relocate from building to building and from neighborhood to neighborhood as they grew in rank and income. This is likely more the result of government influence than that of Doxiadis. For a study of Islamabad’s incomes (now dated) see Rabia Specht, Islamabad, Rawalpindi: Regional and Urban Planning, (Copenhagen: School of Architecture, 1983).
FIGURE 16: Nesting of “Communities” in Islamabad’s sectors. Sourced from Kyrtsis, composed by author.
Doxiadis envisioned a city of individual self-contained sectors that, much like his descriptions of his childhood in Athens, consisted of a rather tightly knit, largely pedestrian-oriented built environment arranged around public open spaces and community functions. Each sector as a whole was to have a center (known as a “Markaz,” in Urdu) for community facilities at the sector scale, and smaller “centers” would be implemented at each of the smaller scales. Doxiadis’s sectors were echoes of both English New Town functionalism and earlier conceptions of the “Neighborhood Unit,” taken to an unprecedented scale. Two things were arguably unique about Doxiadis’s sectors; they were definitely mixed-use (and thereby a rejection of CIAM’s Functionalist City) and their internalization and introversion was amplified in their isolation by the grid.

Although Doxiadis’s intention to integrate between scales was feasible within the sectors, the grid hinders the connectivity between sectors. Doxiadis conceived of the grid as the domain of fast-moving automobiles on divided highways within greenbelts, and of sectors as the domain of the human—internalized, with a highly pedestrian environment, and minimal penetration by vehicles.

58 Clarence Perry conceptualized the “Neighborhood Unit” in the 1920s, and the English New Towns followed World War II (close contemporaries to Doxiadis’s career).

59 Doxiadis conceptualized these wide rights of way as “utilidors”, and projected that they would come to be host to not only extremely high-speed vehicular travel, but trunk lines for utility infrastructure and future, unknown modes of travel as well.
In Doxiadis’s own words:

"The open places between Sector Class V, should be very wide to allow for all future needs. Within them certain strips will be used immediately. The remaining part should be enclosed within fences or, if this is not practicable, at least enclosed by planting."

Doxiadis’s motivation of segregating between humans and vehicles is understandable given his time period, and his particular preoccupation with the detrimental impacts of vehicles on cities. Yet, it has a lasting impact on the functioning of the city.

Doxiadis and Ekistics are also marked by a preoccupation with time, which he described as the fourth dimension. “Even more revolutionary than the conquest of the third dimension in the development of our cities is the advent of the fourth,” he wrote, “The cities of the past were static...In the modern city the fourth dimension, the dynamic growth through time, is the dominant feature.”

Time, and the related theme of growth over time, is reflected most vividly in his two major concepts of Dynopolis—the “Ideal City of the Future”—and Ecumenopolis—“The Inevitable City of the Future.” Dynopolis was the vaguely reasoned response to what he argued was an “explosive” growth in cities, and it reflected Doxiadis’s belief that a city and...
its center needed to grow, and that they needed to grow in a rational way to accommodate what he saw as a massively changing urban environment growing at incredible speed through population growth and rural-urban migration. New city center growth would be achieved not by green belt land-banking, vertical expansion, or through poly-nuclear development of additional sub-centers, but through uni-directional expansion. Doxiadis's Dynapolis was integrated into plans at every possible opportunity—from Detroit to Athens to Islamabad—and it appeared on planning documents as a ubiquitous lightning-bolt like stripe. Doxiadis's plan for Islamabad was predicated on this concept of Dynopolis. The intention was for Islamabad to grow, over time, to the southwest, with its “Central Area” growing and expanding along “Capital Avenue,” now Jinnah Avenue. In fact, Islamabad was meant to grow in tandem with the existing city of Rawalpindi, as a “double-dynapolis.” (See Figure 21) The fallacy of such an idea as uni-directional growth is plainly evidenced by the master plan’s depiction of the city simply stopping at a pre-determined point, as though it hit an invisible wall. (See Figure 12) Although Islamabad has largely stuck to its assigned course of growing to the southwest, the pace of the city’s growth is nowhere near that forecasted by Doxiadis, and its residential sectors remain highly isolated from one another.

62 Dynapolis was a reflection of Doxiadis’s belief that his era was one of a fundamental transition from a “static” condition to a “dynamic” one; thus the term Dynapolis. The basis for his “dynamic” condition was essentially two-fold—one being the influence of the automobile on cities, and the other being the considerable population growth at the time. The Four Principles to Dynopolis, as described by Doxiadis, were “1. The Unity of Purpose, 2. Hierarchy of Functions, 3. The Four Dimensions, and 4. Many Masters and Many Scales.” See Doxiadis Associates, Preliminary Program and Plan (DOX-PA 77), 134-137.
2.3 Global Thinking: Ekistics and Cosmopolitanism

Doxiadis’s early career is steeped in the cosmopolitan fervor of post-war reconstruction, the founding of trans-national organizations and governance structures, and the beginnings of the “developmentalist” project, all of which saw economic and national development across the globe as critical to the formation of a global peace. Doxiadis had served as a representative of Greece at the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and later as director of the Marshall Plan in Greece and Turkey, and these early days of reconstruction and large-scale redevelopment would permanently color his instantly-global career, as well as help him to launch that career, since the connections he established then—specifically with the future leaders of the Ford Foundation—would be crucial as he followed the “developmentalist” project as it spread from Europe to the “Third World” in the 1950s.\(^{63}\)

The Islamabad project is enwrapped in what Mahsud has termed a “nexus” amongst the Ford Foundation, the Harvard Advisory Group, Doxiadis, and Ayub’s government.\(^ {64}\) All four entities—the first a funding agency, the second a “think-tank”, the third a development planner, and the fourth a powerful government—were interested in and committed to putting large-scale modernization projects into place. It is within this “nexus” that Doxiadis was able to launch his “City of the Future” project, which Islamabad was inevitably a part of; and it was how many other development projects—all within the “developmentalist” mode of progress through economic and industrial development—came about in Pakistan.

---

\(^{63}\) See Escobar and Muzaffar for information on architectural modernism and “developmentalism.” For specific reference to the personal connections from reconstruction to developmentalism, see Alexandros-Andreas Kyritsis, ed. Constantinos A. Doxiadis: Texts, Design Drawings, Settlements, (Athens: Ikaros, 2006), 359.

\(^{64}\) Mahsud, Dissertation, 130-138. The “City of the Future” project was Doxiadis’s self-generated term for a life-long project to study, speculate on, and design for the “City of the Future.” This project received significant funding from the Ford Foundation.
It is in this globalized context that Doxiadis’s most enduring legacy of Ecumenopolis is situated. Doxiadis defined Ecumenopolis as:

“...the coming city that will, together with the corresponding open land which is indispensable for Anthropos [humans], cover the entire earth as a continuous system forming a universal settlement. It is derived from the Greek words ecumene, that is, the total inhabitable area of the world, and polis, or city, in the broadest sense of the word.”

Ecumenopolis was the largest unit of Doxiadis’s ELS, and a neologism for the planetary-scale urban conglomeration that Doxiadis envisioned would emerge some 150-250 years in the future to stretch across all continents, supporting a theoretical maximum global capacity of 22-30 billion people. It was the logical extension of Jean Gottman’s analysis of Megalopolis in the northeast United States, where cities had begun to converge into one continuous urbanized “corridor.” Ecumenopolis was both a warning of the coming crisis of urban growth (should it remain uncontrolled on a global scale) and a call to arms, a plea for his own rational approach to creating a better version of the “Inevitable City of the Future.” It is exemplary of Ekistics’s framework of rational planning based on statistical data and projects, onto which Doxiadis always applied an implicit social and environmental agenda. The premise of Ecumenopolis as a city of the total inhabited world was (especially in its quasi-theological etymology, a short step from ecumenical and ecumenism) to prevent disorder and to prepare for a world where mankind could return to living harmoniously with each other and with the environment.


Doxiadis even incorporated Megalopolis into his ELS, as scale 12 of 15.

This is the subtitle of the book “Ecumenopolis”, and it speaks to his willingness to accept the trends in development, while pushing for an alternative.
Doxiadis always framed his work within the “crisis” facing cities. From this crisis, he hoped to “lead humans back to the harmony they badly need,” an implicit reference to the traditional Athens of his youth. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, *Building Entopia*, (New York: Norton, 1975), 308.


The issue of the Ekistics Journal that celebrated Doxiadis after his death featured this phrase on the front cover. See *EKISTICS* Vol. 41, No. 247, June 1975. See also Pyla, 221.


I am paraphrasing Doxiadis here, although his terminology was very similar. See Doxiadis, *Architecture in Transition*, 31-33.

Pyla, 81.

His text goes on to describe the root causes of what he saw as components of a troublesome trend toward “similarity”—mechanical transportation, global trade, and the dissemination of Western-dominated architectural training. The fact that he, his principles of Ekistics, and his global career were implicated in this phenomenon seems unacknowledged, and Doxiadis himself seems to have been conflicted on the whole subject. As he did with Ecumenopolis, Doxiadis always characterized the “transition” from the local to the international as an unavoidable phenomenon, something to be mediated but not challenged, which was very much in line with other aspects of the “developmentalist” school of thought. His simplistic view of the “local” and natural world, Ecumenopolis, it can be argued, was largely built upon a cosmopolitan worldview. Doxiadis once wrote:

*Now the time is riper for cosmopolis than ever before… But cosmopolis sets only the conceptual frame; the real subject we have to face is the universal city in its true sense. Its realization is Entopia. In this way, we can now foresee when cosmopolis, the dream of a unified world, can be reached.*

“Entopia” was something that Doxiadis began to articulate late in his career. It was what he projected as the end condition created by the project for Ecumenopolis, which he described as “between Utopia and Dystopia.” Entopia was conceived of as a kind of “attainable ideal,” emblematic of Doxiadis’s hybrid career, one that was somewhere between practice and theory, his proposals somewhere between rationality and dreams.

A similar tension related to Ecumenopolis is that of Doxiadis’s affiliation for the local/regional (polis), and his subscription to the universal ideals (cosmos), values and principles espoused by his transnational context and implied in his project for Ecumenopolis. Doxiadis always presented a rather binary conception of the interface of the international and the local, and in his first published book, *Architecture in Transition*, he described this tension, and his career motivations, in explicitly architectural terms:

*Architecture… moves between the local and the international, and architects are permanently caught between these two competing forces. International co-operation on matters of development is a very recent phenomenon, and experience in this field is limited. We are all still at the experimental stage of this new attempt to foster a better understanding among people and create a better world.*

“international” is evidenced by his conflation of local with national, even in his work in Pakistan. His projects there—including Islamabad—are peppered with references to the elements of “local” (Pakistani) tradition, which he embraced. In this way, he lacked a sophisticated understanding of the post-colonial environment that the bulk of his work was situated in, where local culture did not always match national boundaries. Doxiadis was perpetually in the middle, simultaneously the purveyor of international development (and all that came with it), and its detractor, attacking the negative symbols it created—corporate skyscrapers of a foreign style, automobile traffic disrupting/destroying traditional cities, etc.—continuously advocating for universal thinking, yet ridiculing the results of similar experiments elsewhere. He was the practitioner who tried to change from within, to aim toward balance as the march progressed toward the globalized world on the horizon.

The ELS, which categorized human settlements by size from the human (Anthropos) to the planetary (Ecumenopolis), is remarkably similar to a description of the Stoic philosopher Hierocles’s metaphor for affiliations within humanity. In reconciling the interface of local identity and worldly affiliation, Hierocles conceived of the human as being “surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first circle is drawn around the self; the next takes in one’s immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, one’s neighbors or local group, one’s fellow city dwellers, and one’s fellow countrymen. Outside all these circles is the largest one, that of humanity as a whole.” Whether Doxiadis drew from or knew of this work is not apparent, but the similarity is difficult to dismiss. In Martha Nussbaum’s reading of the Stoics, she argues that the point of articulating the concentric circles was to encourage a kind of mental flattening, or shrinking of them, to encourage people to see the rest of humanity as their neighbor. The act of rendering all of humanity together would foster the sense of value in it, and an identity with, a commonality with, one’s fellow mankind beyond the immediate affiliations of family or city or nation. Although Doxiadis’s scales are certainly a product of a modern technocratic approach to diagramming and ordering society, one could see them in a similar manner; by representing the totality of humanity in one chart, one might even draw personal affiliations across boundaries which the scale does not depict—the nation, the tribe, etc. By only using categories of size (and not the theme of national

74 In one of the Islamabad publications, Doxiadis attempted to describe, through a series of diagrams and photographs, the dilemma of “local style,” which skyscrapers were never a part of in Doxiadis’s logic. See Doxiadis Associates, On Architecture in Islamabad (DOX-PA 115), (Athens: Doxiadis Associates, April 22, 1961).


76 Nussbaum deliberately mentions that Hierocles is sourcing Cicero’s earlier work on the subject. Nussbaum, 32-33.

77 Nussbaum, 33.
Ecumenopolis was a project that, through built form, challenged the legitimacy of state boundaries, and the affiliations with them—a manifestation of the transnational structures that Doxiadis was surrounded by, pushed to an extreme by its physicality. Doxiadis, of course, did not live in his cosmopolitan future; he lived in the 20th Century, and much of his career was concentrated in the “third world” context of post-independence nation-states, and the proliferation of national boundaries that came with them. Thus, his career always involved a projection of a long-term cosmopolitan dream onto the context of the nation-state. In the case of Islamabad, of course, the context of the nation was complicated by virtue of the capital city being a genre designed specifically for the playing out of nationalist ideology. It is in this incongruence—the overlapping and intertwining of visions and rationality—that a study of Islamabad becomes fruitful.
Chapter Three
THE CENTER(S) OF THE CITY 
(AND THE STATE)
3. THE CENTER(S) OF THE CITY (AND THE STATE)

Doxiadis and Ayub shared a faith in the rational pursuit of long-term visions, yet the visions within which they composed the project of Islamabad were distinctly non-isomorphic. The government sought to (literally) disentangle government from corrupting influences and represent the modern nation-state through an isolated object, an exemplary symbol of nationalist ideology enveloped in the themes of progress and an “imagined” collective nationhood. Doxiadis's brand of urban study was based on long-term thinking at a massive scale, one that extended beyond the nation-state, and, being his more significant project, he would have been inclined to see Islamabad within this much larger body of work. The incongruence of these motivations plays out in the development of Islamabad’s central axis and Capital Complex, and I argue that the uncovering of this story reveals not only that the area today reflects neither Ayub’s or Doxiadis’s dream, but is rather the result of what can arise from in between.

3.1 The Capital Complex

I don’t know if you have seen Islamabad today. Gio Ponti, Edward Stone etc., have designed quite a number of buildings there. I remember the President's 'Palace.' A huge building at the end of one of the main roads on a beautiful site. It’s really a third class building. Anyway, the government got what they deserved. —Mazharul Islam

Islamabad’s presidential residence is a white concrete and marble edifice sitting atop a squared-off hilltop at the end of Islamabad’s wide axial boulevard. (See Figure 3) Flanked by the National Assembly Building and the Cabinet Building, the presidency has a privileged view of the city and a privileged position within it, and it is the most visible symbol of Pakistan’s bureaucracy and nationalist ideology. Edward Durell Stone, its architect, was not the first to work on Islamabad’s “Capital Complex.” Many practitioners were approached about, and submitted design proposals for, the project. These multiple designers worked on behalf of (and sometimes in reaction to) an anxious government impatiently yet quite uncertainly navigating the waters...

Of his New Delhi Embassy, Stone wrote, "I elected to place the offices on two stories around a water garden to gain the cooling effect of the fountains and pool. To shade windows and other glass areas from the sun to reduce glare, I adopted a terrazzo grille for exterior walls—an ancient principle in tropical climates... For proper shade I carried the canopy well beyond the wall of the building—beyond the reach of a cantilever—so columns were required for support. These steel columns were finished with gold leaf and introduced a note of oriental opulence. The result of solving all these considerations of climate and function produced a building type—a temple—almost as old as history... The architects of the Mogul Emperors were the first to perceive the feeling of serenity given their temples by the reflection of temple images in calm lagoons. I placed a large circular lagoon in front of the Embassy to give the building the same sense of tranquility." See Edward Durell Stone, Evolution of an Architect, (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 138-139.

82 Of his New Delhi Embassy, Stone wrote, “I elected to place the offices on two stories around a water garden to gain the cooling effect of the fountains and pool. To shade windows and other glass areas from the sun to reduce glare, I adopted a terrazzo grille for exterior walls—an ancient principle in tropical climates... For proper shade I carried the canopy well beyond the wall of the building—beyond the reach of a cantilever—so columns were required for support. These steel columns were finished with gold leaf and introduced a note of oriental opulence. The result of solving all these considerations of climate and function produced a building type—a temple—almost as old as history... The architects of the Mogul Emperors were the first to perceive the feeling of serenity given their temples by the reflection of temple images in calm lagoons. I placed a large circular lagoon in front of the Embassy to give the building the same sense of tranquility.” See Edward Durell Stone, Evolution of an Architect, (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 138-139.

Every time you come to Pakistan, I try to get you an assignment because we admire your love for the Mughal architecture and the spirit and grandeur the Mughal buildings emanate. . . Faruqui [the new CDA chief] is very keen to get our Islamic heritage of architecture reflected in the public buildings of early nationhood. As the project evolved—a project meant to lend physical form to the ideals of a nation-state—Pakistan drafted and implemented a new constitution, went to war with India for a second time, and was beginning to feel the challenges of a physically discontinuous nation-state. By the time Edward Durell Stone came to work on the project, he had been working on the subcontinent for some years, promoting his attempt at an ornamental integration of “Mughal” and Modern.” Stone had recently completed the United States Embassy in New Delhi (See Figure 26) that, stripped to a modernist aesthetic, incorporated several building practices—deep overhangs (chujja), perforated walls (jaali), pools, gardens—which he considered locally situated references to a Mughal and climatic tradition. Stone’s “localized” aesthetic expression was considered by some elements in Pakistan’s government to be perfect for expressing a “Pakistani” identity, never mind the fact that it had just been employed for an “American” one.

Hassan Urmani, who had earlier commissioned Stone for the nearby Atomic Energy Institute, was instrumental in getting Stone involved in the Islamabad project, according to historian Sten Nilsson. He records that Urmani wrote to Stone, stating:

Every time you come to Pakistan, I try to get you an assignment because we admire your love for the Mughal architecture and the spirit and grandeur the Mughal buildings emanate. . . Faruqui [the new CDA chief] is very keen to get our Islamic heritage of architecture reflected in the public buildings of
83 Sten Nilsson, “Palaces, Camps, Capitals”, in Lotus International, No 34, 1982, 125-127. Faruqui became the CDA Director in May 1965, and the letter quoted was written to him in July of that year. Immediately following his appointment to that position (from that of personal secretary to Ayub Khan) he began to formally put pressure on Louis Kahn, who was engaged to work on the project at the time, to modify his designs to reflect an “Islamic touch.” Kahn was not interested in complying, and ultimately the job went to Stone the following year.

84 Imran Ahmed should be credited with much of the research on this aspect of the present-day Capital Complex.


The approaching of Stone and his Mughal-ified ornamental Modernism by the government reflects the ongoing struggle within Pakistan to define the unifying elements of the “Pakistani” identity, and served to combine the twin motivations of Ricoeur’s paradox—employing the past in service of the future.84 While Stone’s project sits prominently in Islamabad today, the background story to this “third class” building is not well-compiled, and—in its telling—the story reflects a nation fumbling through its post-colonial formation and a gradual and unfortunate isolation of a nation’s people from their government.

3.2 The Capitol before Stone

Doxiadis appears to have had every intention of designing all the buildings within Islamabad’s Capital Complex85, but the government of Pakistan decided relatively early to invite several architects of international stature to provide proposals for the project, and they restricted Doxiadis’s role to his contract for the master plan. The “Administrative Sector” in Doxiadis’s plan for Islamabad was a large area of the city, and contained much more than just the symbolic buildings of today’s Capital Complex, including all the functions of the government bureaucracy and cultural institutions, all

Islamabad. He likes your designs for our Institute but has not seen the design of other buildings done by you throughout the world, particularly those which have domes, verandahs etc., typical of the old Moghul buildings.83

FIGURE 27: The Admin. Sector is located at the northern end of the city. Overlay over Master Plan.
Doxiadis Associates, *The Administrative Functions* (DOX-PA 78), 109. (Sketch 11: D-PA 1644 “Tentative Location of Buildings to be Included in the Admin. Sector.”) The mosque in this list was never intended to be a major feature. In the same document, Doxiadis allocated an area for the “National Mosque” in another location in the city, at the terminus of the Islamabad Highway. This is now the location of Faisal Mosque.


Doxiadis had intentionally chosen the Capitol location for its topographical features, modest hills that he felt would accentuate the importance of government buildings and offer good views of and from them.87 (See Figures 28-31.)

Doxiadis’s first proposal for the layout of the Capitol was presented in the first major submittals to the Pakistan government in May 1960—*The Administrative Functions*. This scheme depicted the main government buildings as spread out over many acres. Grouped together as the “Capitol” were four elements of central importance and highest priority—-the Presidential Palace, Parliament, Supreme Court and a Mosque, which he located at a collection of hillocks at the end of the central axis of Capitol Avenue.86

Doxiadis Associates, *The Administrative Functions* (DOX-PA 78), 109. (Sketch 11: D-PA 1644 “Tentative Location of Buildings to be Included in the Admin. Sector.”) The mosque in this list was never intended to be a major feature. In the same document, Doxiadis allocated an area for the “National Mosque” in another location in the city, at the terminus of the Islamabad Highway. This is now the location of Faisal Mosque.


Doxiadis had intentionally chosen the Capitol location for its topographical features, modest hills that he felt would accentuate the importance of government buildings and offer good views of and from them.87 (See Figures 28-31.)

Doxiadis’s first proposal for the layout of the Capitol was presented in the first major submittals to the Pakistan government in May 1960—*The Administrative Functions*. This scheme depicted the main government buildings as spread out over many acres. Grouped together as the “Capitol” were four elements of central importance and highest priority—-the Presidential Palace, Parliament, Supreme Court and a Mosque, which he located at a collection of hillocks at the end of the central axis of Capitol Avenue.86
each of three governmental “powers,” each paired with a large plaza. At the foot of the Parliament was Legislative/Republic Square (the name varied), in front of the Presidential Palace was Presidential Square, and adjacent to the Supreme Court was Judicial Square. Importantly, the mosque was incorporated into Legislative Square (rather than as a “fourth power.”) Rather than three structures collected around one monumental plaza—symbolic buildings addressing each other across a singular public realm—each individual open space in Doxiadis’s plan was distinct, and only connected to each other by a long narrow esplanade. Rather than a “Plaza of the Three Powers,” he articulated three plazas of the powers. (It is necessary to clarify that Doxiadis distinguished between a “Presidential Palace” and a “Presidential Residence”, with the first being prominent and ceremonial and the second being private and functional.)

88 This is the name given to Brazilia’s major monumental square, around which monumental buildings are arranged.


At the time, it is important to remember, Pakistan had been under the leadership of Ayub Khan for two years, the constitution had been suspended by Martial Law, and a new constitution was being formulated, but it was unknown how the constitution would come to structure the distribution of power. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Pakistan was “undergoing a period of constitutional re-orientation,” as Doxiadis put it, 89 and a clear opportunity to win favor with a presidential client, Doxiadis’s first scheme placed the legislative function of Parliament in the most prominent position—between the executive and judicial functions, more or less centered on the “dynamic” axis, and on top of the highest hill in the Capitol area—“Hill Number 17.” He rather weakly justified the scheme in his proposal, by writing:

The main axis of Islamabad focuses on Hill No. 17. The question arises as to whether on Hill No. 17, which is the centre of the whole synthesis, we should have the Presidential Palace or the Parliament. However, this is a decision to be taken by the appropriate authorities and in keeping with the symbolic character to be given to these buildings. In our sketches, however, the Parliament is shown on Hill No. 17. On the basis of this idea, we proceed to locating the 3 basic functions within the administrative sector: the legislative function at the focus of the core of Islamabad, with the two other powers, judicial and executive, on either side of it. 90

Typical of Doxiadis’ publically apolitical sensibility, he ultimately yielded the decision to the “appropriate authorities.” Only months later, in the publication of Doxiadis’s Final Master Plan in September of 1960, the arrangement of buildings was modified upon the request of the government, with the placement of the Presidential Palace on the hill, a change that remained consistent all the way through to Stone’s built scheme years later. 91 In addition to the relocation of the Palace, this revised scheme articulated both a further refinement of the central functions—the Supreme Court became part of a “Judicial Center,” and a sub-category of “Cultural” buildings was added—and a clearer expression of the public space. In this final scheme, Doxiadis proposed the covering of National Avenue with a colossal (110 yards x 850 yards) at-grade pedestrian platform (over a depressed road), and showed the beginnings of another public esplanade extending perpendicularly from the Presidential Palace, along Capital Avenue to the southwest. 92

If anything can be read into Doxiadis’s initial schemes, it would be their
generic ambivalence. While he made a clear decision to recognize the significance of placing the legislature on the hill, he allowed the “decision to be taken by the appropriate authorities.” Although architecturally different from that of Chandigarh and Brasilia, Doxiadis’s scheme follows the same general thinking, which equated large open plazas with “publicness” and accessibility, thus giving physical form to the notion that a free people would have easy and unquestioned access to government. One gets the feeling from Doxiadis’s proposals, however, that he was driven more by an interest in creating an “acropolic” structure atop Hill 17 than by determining its monumental symbolic function. Had he any particular conviction about the importance of enhancing the Legislature over the Executive, he could have done so by minimizing the expression of the “Presidential Palace” on the hill. Instead,
the building appears just as monumental as the original Legislature, which reinforces the implied power of the Presidency. Meanwhile, his architectural expressions of the Capitol are uninspired, and his approach resembles a recycled version of established aesthetics and relationships between monumental buildings and platforms and in the drawing of a relationship between citizens and government. One wonders, in retrospect, whether Doxiadis’s weak reasoning of his position, and rendering of a monumental “Presidential Palace” facilitated the relocation of the Presidency. More than likely, these can be attributed to the pragmatic side of a career characterized equally by theory and practice, one that was committed to broad societal gains through development, and not on taking ideological stances on symbolic issues that might have risked the project, not to mention his contract.

3.3 Louis Kahn in Islamabad

Louis Kahn was approached in 1963 regarding potential work in Islamabad, and he was the first after Doxiadis’s Master Plan to compose designs for a collection of buildings that could be called a “Capital Complex.” Kahn had just recently begun work in East Pakistan on the design of the then-called Second Capital in Dhaka, one of his most well-known projects.93 Two years prior to Kahn’s arrival in Islamabad, the Capital Development Authority (CDA)—the state body tasked with developing the city—decided that the commission for individual buildings in the Administrative Sector would not go to Doxiadis.94 Instead the government had aimed to engage an architect of international repute to design the major buildings, with Doxiadis remaining as Master Planner. In his memoirs, Zahir-ud Deen Khwaja (who was planning director with the CDA at the time) recalls that, after being declined by both Walter Gropius and Kenzo Tange to design the entire area, the government switched to an alternative plan of inviting a collection of Western architects, all with Modernist sensibilities, to consult on individual buildings.95 Gio Ponti was the first to build in the capital city, starting with a government hostel, and later the Secretariat buildings, which were, according to Khwaja, largely the work of his partner, Alberto Rosselli.96 Marcel Breuer visited the site but could not come to an agreement with the Pakistan government, and Arne Jacobsen was hired to work on the National Assembly Building, but his designs were ridiculed by the government and rejected rather quickly.97
By 1963, Ponti/Rosselli’s Secretariat was under construction and Arne Jacobsen was on the verge of being relieved of his contract for the National Assembly. As previously noted, the Constitution was under revision, and in that climate the subject of the influence of Islam on the Republic (and its symbols) was under much discussion. Many of the architects who were interested in working in Islamabad ran into contractual issues, and those who produced design work were consistently scrutinized for their lack of the “Islamic Touch.” Louis Kahn had this eventual fate as well, but he eagerly took the project on. Doxiadis remained briefly as the master planner for the Administrative Sector, but his contract ended soon after Kahn began his work. Sir Robert Matthew, who was initially invited to design buildings in Islamabad, was placed in the position of “Coordinating Architect” amongst the various consultants working in the sector, and he acted as an intermediary between the Pakistan government and individual architects like Kahn. Kahn’s work in Islamabad lasted just over two years, and he never seemed to have had a signed contract, despite his earnest efforts to gain one. Over

FIGURE 36: Site Visits by Foreign Architects. Clockwise from top left: Marcel Breuer, Gio Ponti, and a group meeting with various consulting architects, including Sir Robert Mathter, Gio Ponti, Alberto Rosselli, Arne Jacobsen, and Louis Kahn (top left). Sourced from Khwaja.

98 “In appointing me,” Faruqui wrote, “the government gave me a directive to see that the architecture of the major public buildings in Islamabad has an Islamic touch, reflecting our past traditions and culture.” N.A. Faruqui, Letter to Robert Matthew, May 11, 1965, Folder 030.11.A.82.84, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

99 The Louis Kahn Collection at The University of Pennsylvania contains multiple copies of con-
tract drafts, and much correspondence related to its continuous revision. The dispute boiled down to the payment of tax revenue in Pakistan, and no copy within the archives includes a signature of any official from Pakistan. The bulk of the correspondence relating to the contractual difficulties is located in Folder 030.11.A.82.27, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

100 In correspondence between Louis Kahn’s office and the office of Sir Robert Matthew, Roy Vollmer inquired as to the specific intentions of the “Pedestrian Promenade and Central Square adjacent to the Parliament Building” as well as information on the surrounding buildings labeled by Doxiadis as “Special Institutions.” Roy Vollmer, Jr, Letter to John Richards, RMJM, June 12, 1964, Folder 030.11.A.82.4, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

101 Kahn appears to have undertaken the Supreme Court program on his own. Multiple contracts were drafted and re-worked over the course of the project, and the Supreme Court is not listed in these drafts, including the final draft. This provides a good explanation for its appearance as less complete in his drawings and models. This final contract, sent to Pakistan on August 16, 1965, is located in Folder 030.11.A.82.25, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

time, the scope of his work grew from the single building of the President’s House (which he was initially approached about) to include buildings such as the National Assembly, The Supreme Court, and other buildings and associated public spaces, such as a Museum of Islamic History/Council of Islamic Ideology, that varied with each submission.

It is unclear how familiar Kahn was with Doxiadis’s master plan, although he did have access to the documents. His proposals challenged from the outset Doxiadis’s intention of stringing a series of public spaces along National Avenue. Kahn’s first scheme in Islamabad was strictly for the “President’s Estate” (as his office termed it), which was to be sited atop “Hill Number 17” as prescribed. Kahn proposed that the “Presidential Square” of Doxiadis’s master plan be located atop the hill with the President’s House and Secretariat offices, and a “Museum of Islamic Ideology,” rather than at the bottom. The Presidential Square was to be accessed from the Southeast via an additional square surrounded by the “Council of Islamic Ideology,” which then connected to the Assembly, Supreme Court and associated squares (by other architects) along Doxiadis’s esplanade-lined National Avenue. This initial scheme removed the Presidential Square from the immediately-public realm and gave it the feeling of a background building, foregrounded by the lower functions, including the new “Islamic-themed” program that he presumably added independently. His adding the program of a museum to the hilltop simultaneously amplified its condition as a destination and increased its public accessibility. Kahn’s treatment of religious program is interesting, and implies that he was taken by the idea of Islam’s influence on Pakistani “identity,” but typical to Kahn’s work, he incorporated it into a decidedly modern aesthetic.

Kahn’s schemes entered a second phase of development rather quickly, as they began to incorporate additional programmatic elements, including the National Assembly (formerly by Arne Jacobsen), a major public square, and the Supreme Court. These plans (although architecturally in flux) are relatively similar with respect to the overall layout of buildings on the site. The President’s House was consistently on the hill, and two buildings were consistently located on National Avenue—the National Assembly, and a building that combined the Cabinet and Council of Islamic Ideology. Kahn consistently located the Supreme Court across National Avenue, adding to the

“Central Square” begins to appear on correspondence relating to the project shortly after Kahn’s scope grew in late 1964. This is based on Meeting minutes observed in the Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

It is unclear from the archival material who initiated the concept of a “National Monument.” One possibility is that the CDA requested Kahn to produce such an element when he took on the extra program around “Central Square.” This possibility is reinforced by a telegram sent from the CDA to Kahn, which reads: “REFERENCE LAST MEETING IN OCTOBER HELD IN RAWALPINDI. HOPE YOU WILL BRING WITH YOU PROPOSALS AND DESIGNS OF COMMEMORATIVE ARCHWAY AND NATIONAL MONUMENT.” Capital Development Authority, Telegram to Louis Kahn, December 30, 1964, Folder 030.11.A.82.7, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

Kahn’s proposal was constantly changing and, since it was never built, we are left only to draw conclusions from the material left behind, the limited recorded thoughts of those involved, and Kahn’s larger body of work. From this material, certain things are evident. There is a clear dominance of the National Assembly building in his work. Always the most monumental in expression (perhaps due to the overlap of this project with the Dhaka project), the Assembly was consistently located immediately adjacent to the Central Square. The Presidential structures were, although clearly intricate and architecturally interesting, always depicted as being integrated into the hill—more distant from the square and connected to it only by a secondary connection, and/or through other program, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology. Compared to Doxiadis’s schemes, Kahn’s work is much more nuanced in its expression of a “balance of power,” and he clearly prioritizes the Legislative branch of government. While the Executive remains on the hill, presumably as specified by the government, the Legislative branch is adjacent to and at the same level as the large plaza. In the face of Kahn’s work, both Doxiadis’s Parliament and President’s Palace atop the hill seem definitively “Acropolis” in their temple-like prominence. Kahn’s consolidation of public space into one large plaza is also fundamentally different from Doxiadis’s approach. More in line with the high modernist projects of Brasilia and Chandigarh, Kahn’s Central Square can be read as an attempt to express a highly accessible secular government.

In 1965, while the bulk of Kahn’s work was being designed, Pakistan and India went to war. The heightened nationalism of wartime, not to mention the general distraction of it, affected the Islamabad project. As the country and its citizenry were faced with the reminder of who they were not, i.e.


FIGURE 42: Site Plan sketch, Louis Kahn. This is believed to represent his final scheme prior to termination. Believed to be December 1965. Sourced from Heinz Ronner, Louis I Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974.

FIGURE 43: Model, Louis Kahn. This is believed to represent his final scheme prior to termination. Believed to be December 1965. Sourced from Heinz Ronner, Louis I Kahn: Complete Work, 1935-1974.
India, Islam quickly became a default representative of Pakistani “identity” (see Chapter 1). This developed into an explicit call to incorporate an “Islamic” aesthetic into Islamabad's expression of Pakistani nationhood. Despite Kahn's inclusion of the “Islamic-themed” programs in the Capital Complex, and his attempt to incorporate religious functions in the public space, Kahn was not an architect who was bound to be interested in such an overly aesthetic demand. Kahn was dismissed from the project in early 1966, and Edward Durell Stone eagerly jumped in.

By the time Stone became involved in the Capital Complex project, Pakistan was eager for a solution, and Stone's proposals were quickly adapted. His scheme involved the squaring off of the hill and enveloping its southwest side with the tall façade of the Presidential Palace. Flanking its two sides were the Cabinet Building (originally the “Foreign Office Building”) and National Assembly. By eliminating the hill, the President’s House appears much larger than its programmatic context and it dominates—in height and bulk—the two other functions. Although the general layout did not change, Stone's plan was altered along the way. Stone's first rendering of the complex (which has more Islamic ornament, including pointed arches and a dome) shows the buildings in much the same position as they were realized, although with one key difference. He depicts the spaces in between the three buildings as open.

presumed to be from Pakistan) from April 11, 1966, eliminates any definitely stated in print that “Reasons for rejection of Mr. Kahn’s designs is believed to be his inability to modify designs so as to reflect Pakistan’s desire to introduce Islamic architecture in Islamabad public buildings.” Folders 030.11.A.82.25 and 82.26, 82.30 and 82.33, Louis I Kahn Collection, University of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. See also a detailed description of Stone’s correspondence with Faruqui and Urmani regarding the Islamabad project in Nilsson, Palaces, 125-127.

Khwaja considers these aesthetic components to be pandering on the part of Stone to please Faruqui as Chairman. He attributes this to his general impression of Stone (“A salesman selling a doubtful quality of wares”) and to the fact that these features disappeared after Faruqui was replaced the following year. [Khwaja, 122]. One wonders whether Kahn would have remained on the job had Faruqui, the “great protagonist of Islamic architecture”, [Khwaja, 117] not come to be Chairman.

Ultimately, the entire complex was fenced off and was never opened to the public. Functionally, this would have given the people of Pakistan the same kind of access to the National Assembly building as Kahn’s proposal, yet in a public plaza overlooked by a monumental structure representing the Executive branch of government–is a far cry from the subtlety of Kahn’s Presidential residence.

The Constitution of 1962 was replaced by the Constitution of 1973, which established the Prime Minister as the more powerful of the two, as well as a bicameral Legislature. After that change, not only did the President’s House dominate in a country which had just re-positioned it, the spaces for the Legislature needed renovation as well. Khwaja, 118.

3.4 Doxiadis’s “Dynamic” Center: Where City Meets State

In the plans for Chandigarh and Brasilia, the 1950s modernist cities-from-scratch that, as contemporaries of his own project, Doxiadis often compared to Islamabad, the preeminence of government functions can easily be read in the master plan. Chandigarh’s “head” stands out as an isolated collection of buildings at the edge of the city, and Brasilia’s monumental axis and Plaza of the Three Powers comprise the torso and head of the city’s iconic form. Both were attempts to quite literally express the democratic ideals of new nations and capitals through bold architectural and urban form—individual buildings arranged to address one another across vast public open plazas as cast-in-place diagrams of the democratic process. Both Capital Complexes
Doxiadis’s conceptualization of the “city center” is rooted in his theory of Dynapolis—“The Ideal City of the Future.” This proposition was relatively simple; although, the distinction between simple and simplistic is a fine one in this case. The theory boiled down to the idea that cities were fundamentally changing, both as a result of a significant increase in urban migration and the introduction of automobiles. Not only were existing cities “completely inadequate for the machine age,” but urbanization was occurring at a pace that demanded a reconsideration of how the central functions of cities were composed. As cities grew, Doxiadis argued that their city centers needed to expand and, rather than allow their growth to “cannibalize” the surrounding urban fabric, space should be allocated for “central functions” to physically expand. In Doxiadis’s time, the automobile was indeed a major subject of discussion amongst urbanists, but Doxiadis rarely backed up his claims with more than anecdotal sentiments or very general statistical data delivered in a declarative manner. One quickly gets the feeling from his writing that the Dynapolis proposal was driven more by a pre-determined conviction about how cities should develop than as an argument backed up by hard evidence.

Doxiadis Associates, Preliminary Program and Plan (DOX-PA 77), 132. Doxiadis speculated wildly in his picturing of other new modes of transportation that Dynapolis would involve, referring to “new means of transportation – the helicopter, even the rocket may very soon take over part of the traffic.”
Doxiadis's obsession with the “center” of cities was not unique in his time. The question of the city center was of increasing interest in the post-war era by the likes of the avant-garde of CIAM and general practitioners throughout the West. Europe’s cities had been devastated by World War II, and cities in the United States were expanding rapidly through suburbanization, leaving downtown areas in both emptied. *Dynapolis* was developed within this larger context of thinking on city centers, as both Doxiadis’s particular solution to the problem of existing cities, and as a preventative measure for new ones. J.L. Sert, Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design and founder of its Urban Design Program, wrote extensively on the subject of the city “core,” which gained traction within the architectural discipline as a kind of “Fifth Function” of the CIAM Functionalist City. The issue became the focus of official attention during Sert’s Presidency at CIAM (1947-1956); Both CIAM’s 1947 Conference on the “Reconstruction of the Cities” and the 1951 Conference on the “Heart of the City” produced and spurred copious literature on the subject of postwar reconstruction and the city “core.”

“To put an end to this unplanned decentralization process,” (of suburbanization) Sert wrote, “we must reverse the trend, establishing what we may call a process of *recentralization*.” While the time period saw much speculation on new communication and transportation technology influencing urban form (Marshall McLuhan’s commitment to networks, Le Corbusier’s hierarchy of roads, for example), Sert asserted, in his key texts on the subject, “The Human Scale in City Planning,” (1944) the societal need for “civic centers” in cities:

*This civic and cultural center constitutes the most important element of a big city, its brain and governing machine. It is at the same time the highest exponent of civic life… In it should be found: the university buildings, the main museums, the central public library, the main concert hall and theatres, the stadium and area for Olympic games, the central administration buildings (for local regional and sometimes national governments), central park, and areas especially planned for public gatherings, the main monuments constituting land marks for the region, and symbols of popular aspirations should also be found there.*

Doxiadis seemed to have similar convictions on the necessity of city centers. Although he operated at the fringes of CIAM, he had established a close
partnership with the omni-present CIAM figure of Jacqueline Tyrwhitt in the publication of the *Ekistics* journal,¹¹³ and exposure to CIAM’s thinking likely came through contact with her. Even so, the issue of the “center” was, by the time Doxiadis’s career was launched in the 1950s, established as a significant subject of post-war design thinking. Doxiadis’s design of Islamabad’s “Central Area”¹¹⁴ fits within Sert’s general school of thought. Although, Doxiadis wrote and spoke of such “centers” simply as necessary components to cities, stressing their fundamental need rather than their embodiment of any notion of the “public sphere” specifically.

In the master plan for Islamabad, Doxiadis’s “Dynamic” center is the most recognizable element—a widening blue hatched area shooting like a lightning bolt along the city’s central axis from the northeast to the southwest. The “Central Area” for Islamabad’s first phase of development was to serve the sectors from the Administrative Area through E8/F8/G8. From then on, further development of the Central Area would occur along the axis.¹¹⁵ Its form was to be a rather tightly knit collection of low buildings stretching along the axis from the Capital Complex, comprising of commercial, retail, residential and civic uses.¹¹⁶ In keeping with a commitment to separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic, Doxiadis located the Central Area along the northwestern edge of Capital Avenue (now Jinnah Avenue) and oriented it toward pedestrian circulation at its interior, rather than to the Avenue. Thus, the road—conceived of as a highway—and the Central Area were distinctly different entities to him. Not quite at an architectural scale, yet showing a high degree of definition and prescription in building layout, the Central Area scheme is somewhere between a schematic architectural proposal and a master plan, and it exhibits many of Doxiadis’s key principles—the integration of the natural landscape, dense development of a low height, mixed programs, and the separation of traffic modes. This mixed-use element was to be connected laterally to the centers of neighboring sectors, via smaller-scale mixed-use connections.

¹¹³ In the mid-1950s, Tyrwhitt began serving as editor of the *Ekistics* journal. For more detail on Tyrwhitt and her relationship with Doxiadis, see Wigley, 95.

¹¹⁴ “Central Area” is Doxiadis’s most early term for the built form along the central axis. The meaning and terminology used by Doxiadis to describe it shifted over the course of the project—both in the distinction between the national and municipal functions, and in that he at times referred to it as a “Central Area,” and at others as a “Civic Center.” Doxiadis Associates. *Basic Considerations of the Central Area* (DOX-PA 172), (Athens: Doxiadis Associates, March 31, 1962).

¹¹⁵ This area was considered to be “Community Class VI” in Doxiadis’s ELS parlance—a “large city”, which he estimated would include 153,000 people, including 6,000 housed in the Central Area. [Doxiadis Associates, *Basic Considerations of the Central Area* (DOX-PA 172), 11-12] Following the first phase, Doxiadis envisioned new phases of the “Central Area” being developed along the axis. “This is the only way in which we can preserve the investment in the city, both in the economic and cultural way... This is the only way in which we will be able to save our city from the pressures which transform it by force and eventually lead to its death.” Doxiadis Associates. *The Spirit of Islamabad* (DOX-PA 127), (Athens: Doxiadis Associates, July 21, 1961), 12.

¹¹⁶ Doxiadis listed four categories of space in the “center”: Commercial, Civic, Social, and Transportation. The evidence used as a basis for developing the proportions of spaces was phased in the following way: “In many respects, therefore, this study had to be based on the general
FIGURE 46: The Central Area, the first phase of “Dynapolis” in Islamabad. Sourced from Doxiadis Associates, Basic Considerations of the Central Area.

A most interesting element of the Central Area scheme is the distinction drawn between the functions of the city and the functions of the state. Doxiadis specifically addressed this in a report published in 1962, entitled Basic Considerations of the Central Area:

The whole central area of Islamabad consists of two different types of functions. These are:

a. Functions of national character

b. Functions of local character

In the first category we have functions which are related to the capital of the country, functions which have nothing to do with the services for the popula-
This points to a clear distinction between how Ayub’s government envisioned Islamabad—a modestly-sized administrative city comfortably isolated to enable an “objective” bureaucracy—and how Doxiadis did—a city that would grow well beyond its administrative identity into a “City of the Future.” Surely, the idea of an exclusively administrative city would be impossible to maintain over time, but Doxiadis was deliberate in planning for a city with a “life” (and a “center”) of its own from the beginning. This is indeed rare in comparison to other modernist purpose-built capitals, where the functions of municipal and national governance were distinct and non-integrated. While he drew a clear line between municipal/civil and state/national functions, Doxiadis’s design and writing demands an intertwined relationship between such functions. In his first report on Islamabad’s administrative functions, Doxiadis wrote:

Thus, and on the basis of the theory and the principles of the city of the future, –Dynapolis–, we are led to the normal conclusion that the administrative sector as well as the central sector of the city (commerce, local government, etc.) should both begin at the focus of the ideal city of the future… The Capitol of the city, and by Capitol we mean the complex of the Presidential
Doxiadis clearly acknowledged that the Capitol had symbolic importance as a kind of “heart” of the city, and his deliberate placement of it at the end of the axis lends it prominence in the city. Here, however, we can see that—although the two were conflated by Doxiadis’s overly simplistic graphic representation of Dynapolis—Doxiadis was attempting to, albeit crudely, establish a balance of power between the local and the national. The distinction between the two centers is amplified by the programmatic juxtaposition within the plan of the symbols of the state—the Capital Complex—and the city—Islamabad’s Town Hall. In describing the interface between the city and the state, Doxiadis wrote:

Special functions for the headquarters of the city administration, such as the Town Hall, are considered to be the link between the central area with city functions and the central area of national functions. This is why these central municipal functions are at the crossing of the national and the city central sectors…

The Town Hall, located in this “zone of interface” between city and state, was where Doxiadis saw the symbolic origin of Islamabad’s “local” identity. It was, in one of his latest schemes, to be a tall building in a modest plaza, a visible symbol of civic importance (as well as bureaucracy). Doxiadis called for the top of Town Hall to come just below the elevation of the Presidential Palace atop the hill, placing the two in a kind of dialogue. Brasilia’s monumental axis was lined with ministerial blocks, as a fully integrated component
of the city-scale monumental expression of the Capital Complex—the body of the bird, the fuselage of the plane, the torso to the head. In Islamabad, Doxiadis planned for the two distinct functions of the state and the city to work together while remaining distinct. While the entire city of Brasilia—its form and symbolism—was of the state, Islamabad was a city hosting the state and its symbols.

Doxiadis’s reinforcement of the identity of the city makes sense when one considers his global practice as a whole, and I would argue that the dual-center that Doxiadis proposed is rooted in the cosmopolitan framework of his thinking. Dynapolis, as an Ekistics-wide concept about cities, was implemented by Doxiadis wherever possible, and it thereby had little to do with the specifics of the symbolic or capital functions of a nation’s capital city. Islamabad was not simply a capital-building project for him, in other words; it was always tied to something larger, be it the “City of the Future” project or his concepts of Dynapolis or Ecumenopolis. In the context of Ecumenopolis, the global order of nation-states that was being propagated in Doxiadis’s field of the developing world would have been transcended by the global interconnection of cities stretching across natural and national boundaries. In this way, the nation-state would be considered a phase in a long progression toward a universal settlement (and an implied post-national condition.) While the vision of the Pakistan government was of the city as an entity around which to unite a newly derived nationhood, Doxiadis’s priorities lay elsewhere—in the preparation for the coming Ecumenopolis—rather than in the national priorities of the inescapable present that his “City of the Future” happened to be situated within.

3.5 The Central Area Today: A return to City of the State

Islamabad’s Town Hall was never constructed, and neither was Doxiadis’s vision for the Capital Complex or the Central Area. Rather, decisions made in the process of developing the area conspired to produce an urban system that, rather than acknowledging a synergy between municipality and state (or any distinction between the two), is dominated by the state’s symbols and specifically that of the Presidency. While Stone was developing his design work for the CDA, a suggestion was made to shift the central axis of the city to the northwest in order to align it with the centerline of Stone’s scheme—
that of the Presidential Residence atop the hill. The decision to move the axis seems to have come out of a discussion within the CDA about their impressions of Islamabad’s plan and capital buildings as they were being developed, which specifically revolved around the notion of a “Monumental Axis,” an idea that had an obvious synergy with the formal presentation, and hierarchical implication, of Stone’s proposal. Despite Doxiadis’s vigorous defense of his original scheme for the Central Area and the unfortunate fact that it was already partially complete, the axis was indeed shifted to align with Stone’s Capital Complex. After proclaiming his discontent with the general idea, Doxiadis reluctantly agreed to redesign the Central Area along this newly-aligned axis, upon the CDA’s request. This revised scheme—which involved perimeter boulevard buildings inspired by the European boulevards—was not realized either.

Today, commercial and retail uses dominate the buildings along Jinnah Avenue, and the area has come to be called “Blue Area,” a name which—incredibly—is derived from the blue “dynamic” Central Area that Doxiadis indicated on the original Master Plan. The built form of the Central Area today stems from a specific master plan that came about after the Capital Development Authority deemed Doxiadis’s revised proposal too difficult to develop. This plan, generally described, involved the allowance of tall towers on the Northwest side of Jinnah Avenue and smaller-scale (5-7 story) buildings on the Southeast side, with the conceptual basis for the plan being that views of the Margalla Hills would be better preserved by having towers at the Northwest side.

What exists in the Blue Area is unfortunate but not surprising. Doxiadis’s “Central Area” scheme, which would have undoubtedly required large sums of centralized capital and coordination, was not likely to be realized in a developing country whose time and resources were spent at war with its neighbor and in trying to hold the East and West wings of the country together. What was realizable at the time were well-established commercial typologies that either a Pakistani developer could take on (the smaller buildings on the southeast side), or that a large foreign investment firm would be familiar enough with to buy into (the towers on the northwest side.) The re-alignment of the axis is a development that worked well with Stone’s Mughal symbolism and aesthetic, as well as the government’s enthui-
adapt to the new realities that were created for the future of Islamabad as a result of the C.D.A. decision and make the most out of them.” Doxiadis Associates. Preliminary Design of Civic Center (DOX-PAK-A269), 2.

125 The origin of the term “Blue Area” is acknowledged in broad terms in various journalistic articles on the city. The term also appeared on some documents and correspondence authored by Doxiadis Associates in the later years of the project, which alludes to its entrance into a common parlance amongst the planning team. See Doxiadis Associates. Preliminary Study for the Blue Area in Sector F7 (DOX-PA 213). Athens: Doxiadis Associates, April 25, 1963.

126 Here I should acknowledge Anwar Said, who made a similar point to me in a conversation in Islamabad. August, 2008.
siasm for the implications of such, which was amplified in the context of a nation that—limping back from a lost war with India—might have been more receptive to an approach that engendered as much nationalist symbolism as possible in the Capital City. What the Blue Area is not a result of, clearly, is Constantinos Doxiadis; and, I would argue, that it is not strictly the product of Ayub Khan either, but rather that of opportunistic and well-positioned bureaucrats who took the opportunity to make major changes to the face of the city, principally the figure of N.A. Faruqui, who pushed for the shifting of Jinnah Avenue in favor of a “Monumental Axis” and for the application of the “Islamic Touch” to the Capital Complex.

Critiques of Islamabad's urban form along the lines of power and national identity have yielded valuable insights on the city's post-colonial dilemma, and the broad issue of national power as it relates to built form, which I acknowledge as critical to the analysis of any capital city. What these approaches can result in, however, is a conflation of the acts of multiple actors in what was clearly a complex and multi-valent effort to construct a city from scratch. A critique of Islamabad along these lines is clearly more fruitful when it acknowledges the complexity of the evolution of the plan, and its changes from conception to reality. No capital project is free from the influences of the political interests backing it, and one should bear in mind that all proposals for Islamabad—from Doxiadis to Kahn to Stone—have included major symbolic expressions of nationhood articulated through city form.

In Chandigarh's project to derive an Indian identity, the buildings provide an unquestionably modern one. The same is true for Brasilia. In Islamabad, a series of moves conspired to produce a result that reflects not the modern, secular democratic ideals of a new country, but rather an ornamented and singular expression of power concentrated in the hands of the presidency, in dominion over the city.

On Ricoeur's Paradox—the question of “how to revive an old dormant civilization and take part in universal civilization”\textsuperscript{127}—Chandigarh took a stance; Islamabad succumbed to it.

\textsuperscript{127} Ricoeur, 277.
PART II
Chapter Four

THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION
4. THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY OF THE NATION

4.1 The Problem with Imagining Civic Spaces

Some of Doxiadis's ideas were clearly evolving throughout his career. Toward the end of his life, Doxiadis began to modify his argument for Dynapolis, and in so doing he modified much of the foundational rationale of Ekistics. Through most of his career, he referred to Dynapolis as the “Ideal City of the Future”—the built environment that would reflect the new nature of human settlements, which had been fundamentally changed by the introduction of mechanical technology (i.e. automobiles.) Toward the end of Doxiadis's career, however, as he developed the idea of Entopia, the argument for Dynapolis shifted from an argument for an “Ideal City of the Future” to that of a “dynamic” transitional state, between the “static” settlements of the (pre-industrial) past and the “static” settlements of the future, where mankind would return to living in a harmonious and peaceful state.128 Thus, what Doxiadis was advocating for in Entopia (which he described as “between Dystopia and Utopia”) was finding a way to negotiate between the traditional city of the pre-industrial past and the realities of an “inevitable” modern industrial future.

Doxiadis often employed a description of his youth in Athens as a way to introduce his work:

*As a child in Athens I played in a beautiful square filled with tall pines. Horse-drawn carriages passed round its edge. When I was 10 the street around the square was widened to make room for automobiles. When I was 20 the last pines were destroyed and the square was reduced to a postage-stamp size to provide parking space. A statue of a statesman was placed in the middle and a bit of space was left for children. When I was 30 the statue was carted away to let a highway pass through the middle of the square. Now the square is just a parking lot on either side of a wide highway.*129

Doxiadis’s entire body of work is colored with the sentiment described in this story, one that implied that in the end what human settlements should be is a pedestrian-oriented fabric-like built environment, free of cars and full of the vibrancy of the collective feeling he recalls of the Athens of his youth. “The more we try to clarify our ideas and reach the most basic and essential forms, the more we find ourselves reaching back towards tradition.”130 Through
his particular brand of urbanism, employed in Islamabad’s sectors, Doxiadis implied a certain kind of public sphere that would emerge from such a condition. The pedestrian-oriented public sphere that Doxiadis seemed to be imagining is not dissimilar to the urban environment that Mumford had been nudging CIAM towards, and Sert ended up advocating for in his promotion of “Civic Centers.”

Sert wrote “that the places of public gatherings such as public squares, promenades, cafes, popular community clubs, etc, where people can meet freely, shake hands, and choose the subject of their discussion, are not things of the past and, properly re-planned for the needs of today, should have a place in our cities.” Implied in Sert’s writing on the core is the notion of democracy. In “The Human Scale in City Planning,” he advocated boldly and unambiguously for the value of urban cores to democratic societies. It is important here to remember that, to designers in this era, the fragileness of “democracy” had an urgency that is not experienced in the West today. Sert’s own personal history (not unlike that of many other European Modernists) involved fleeing his native Barcelona on account of political ideology. “We must ask ourselves right now,” he wrote, “whom do we intend to plan for? In a democracy there can be only one answer: we should plan for the people, or the community as a whole.”

Sert was an academic; Doxiadis was not. While Sert took advantage of his academic freedom to advocate for larger questions like “democracy” and the public sphere, Doxiadis’s globe-trotting professional career involved a less dogmatic (at least in appearance) conviction on the relationship of cities to such things as democracy, and the fact that he did not always work for stable governments fully committed to democratic institutions would have made such a public stance problematic. His career was justified more by pragmatics than convincing arguments about the social value of the public sphere, and he communicated with graphs and abstract diagrams, rather than eloquent social rhetoric. Doxiadis’s career was firmly positioned on the U.S./Capitalist/Liberal market side of the emerging Cold War equation, which came with a certain set of assumptions on the relationship of economic progress and “development” to national stability. Thus, notions of liberal capitalism and democracy (as opposed to the nearby “threat” of Soviet communism) appear in his work more as assumptions than the convictions of an activist.

A key problem with Doxiadis’s work in Ekistics was its overly pre-determined

---

131 Eric Mumford argues that the embracing by elements in CIAM of the “Fifth Function” stems from the advocacy of Lewis Mumford, and his interest in the civic qualities of traditional cities, which would have been at a finer grain. Mumford, 131-145.


133 Sert, “The Human Scale in City Planning”, 394.

134 Although Doxiadis spoke in an academic manner, lectured extensively throughout the world on the subject of cities, and even served as a visiting professor in the United States, he is more widely considered to be a professional. Doxiadis was never offered a long-term position lecturing at prestigious U.S. universities, but did lecture in Athens and founded his own institute – the Athens Center of Ekistics.
nature. Despite his propensity for thinking across vast scales of time, and for anticipating the growth of cities across these time periods, Doxiadis did not seem to acknowledge, or significantly incorporate, the notion that a city could change over time, that uses and functions would evolve. In the case of mechanical technology, he imagined that new modes of transport would emerge to replace the car, and he even speculated that rockets and helicopters would transport humans across cities and the world. Yet, he did not speculate in the same way on the built environment of cities, and as a result his idea of Dynopolis is strictly an idea of growth—as in the addition of physical territory to cities, rather than their ability to change over time—a far cry from what the word “dynamic” evokes. Indeed, Doxiadis’s “Central Area” for Islamabad, and his concept of “Dynopolis” in general, always depicted the “center” with a monolithic and object-like quality. It is the most dominant element highlighted on the Master Plan, and the fact that its current name of the “Blue Area” is derived from this highlighting of it, speaks to an ongoing conception of it as a “special” area of the city. While the present-day urban form of the “Blue Area” in Islamabad is not Doxiadis’s design, it’s independence within the city is certainly derived from its “special” origins. This notion of “specialness” plagued other conceptions of the city center as well. CIAM’s “Fifth Function” was generally conceived of as an object within the city—the “Civic Center” defined chiefly by the uniqueness of programmatic function, and less by the precise nature of its relationship to the rest of the city.

4.2 The Rights to the (Capital) City

Islamabad is a short drive from Pakistan. –local maxim

The above colloquialism has been the reputation of Islamabad nearly since its inception. The city, built in a fit of nationalist-laced enthusiasm, which aimed to prove to the world the country’s arrival on the world stage and to embody the united “hopes and aspirations” of the people, has become the city that is viewed more for its distinction from the rest of the nation, and for the population of wealthy Western-oriented elite that has consolidated there over the years. Aesthetically, Islamabad never resembled the rest of Pakistan, and it was never intended to, since it’s conception by all parties was one of something completely new. “Islamabad the Beautiful,” as is the CDA slogan, is
boasted as Pakistan’s cleanest and greenest city—a city of wide boulevards and green spaces, one largely free of slums and in immediate proximity to retreats in the Margalla hills. It is no surprise that Islamabad has become an enclave for the country’s establishment. Over time, Islamabad’s general pattern has been to grow less dense and wealthier, as it continues to spread horizontally in a sectoral pattern repeated consistently across the plain. Property values have risen steadily since the city was built, and have skyrocketed in recent years as the city has grown more and more attractive within a country experiencing internal instability, as well as amongst the Pakistani community abroad.

The same wide boulevards, green spaces, and well-ordered built environment—the principal legacy of Doxiadis’s rationalism—that make it attractive to the well-heeled, also lend Islamabad its other reputation as Pakistan’s most “boring” city. Islamabad has plenty of commercial centers, but none is considered a hub of urban life, and an urban sterility is reinforced by the city’s horizontality, a condition where getting from one place to another requires a vehicle and the deliberate willingness to travel a certain distance. Sectors are quite isolated from one another (as planned) and the residences are nearly entirely single-family homes—a legacy both of Doxiadis’s contribution and the aspirations of a constituency aiming to realize an enlightened and more “Western” existence. What the built environment amounts to is a kind of automobile-centric urbo-suburbia, a subsidiary only to itself.

Additionally, as Islamabad has grown, the city has developed a deliberately non-porous perimeter. Security checkpoints monitor traffic entering the city, principally out of a concern for domestic terrorism. There is another, more aesthetic, form of restriction going on in Islamabad as well. The type of buses which serve as a primary mode of transit for Pakistanis throughout the country are banned from the city, ostensibly for environmental reasons. Only minivans and modern bus lines are allowed in. The same goes for animal-drawn vehicles (tongas), and trucks delivering construction material, that are banned from the city during the daytime. Allowing any of these elements into the city, it is thought, will disrupt the pristine environment of Islamabad, and violate its primary purpose as the façade of a well-run city (and thereby country). Through these security and aesthetic moves, Islamabad has become a well-fortified and distinct island within Pakistan.
That Islamabad is an island is ironic in two ways. Firstly, it is a reflection of the “Pakistan-as-fortress” mentality that has dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy and governmental psyche in the decades since Ayub. Putting its primary attention and resources toward the “threat” of its immediate neighbors has led to the deterioration of Pakistan’s infrastructure and a national leadership alienated from its people. The gradual “enclaving” of Islamabad over the years is a tangible reflection of this neglect and isolation. Secondly, Islamabad-as-island is especially ironic given its proximity to the City of Rawalpindi. Islamabad’s original Master Plan conceptualized Islamabad and Rawalpindi as a “double-Dynapolis”–twin-cities growing side-by-side together. Doxiadis argued early on that the proximity of Islamabad’s site to Rawalpindi would be a great asset to establishing the city. Rawalpindi was to serve as a “foster parent” to Islamabad, providing access to its labor market, goods and services, and infrastructure, making the Capital city enterprise more efficient. Islamabad, it was believed, would grow to become the more dominant city, with Rawalpindi ultimately as its subsidiary. Today, 50 years after Islamabad’s conception, Rawalpindi is still the more populous of the two cities, as well as the denser one. It is where the region’s bus and train hubs are located, as well as the capital city’s current airport. Rawalpindi also provides Islamabad with much of its labor force. Precise data is not available to this author, but anecdotal evidence suggests that upwards of 50% of Islamabad’s workforce commutes from Rawalpindi, primarily for lower-wage employment.

Bustling and crowded, Rawalpindi is a city of approximately 3.0 million, one of a character and nature much more similar to the typical South Asian urban condition than Islamabad will ever be. The plan for side-by-side “dynamic” growth to the southwest did not occur as planned. While Islamabad has largely stuck to its plan, as it is proceeding (almost blindly, one could argue) with its pre-determined course of expanding along the “dynamic” axis to the southwest. Rawalpindi, however, has nearly done the opposite. Rawalpindi has densified on its northern edge, growing up to its city limits, a growth pattern that makes absolute sense given its subsidiary relationship to the city, and resembles a border condition akin to that between the United States and Mexico, rather than an integrated or cooperative “twin-city” system. In this way, Islamabad is still the minor yet
dominant city, akin to that of a colonial cantonment—wealthy, powerful, and occupying an area peripheral to the “real” Pakistani city just next door.

Ayub’s vision was to unite a diverse population around a new state of Pakistan, and to represent it through built form. The singularity of that idea overtook other conceptions of the city, and Islamabad is now a national capital dominated by state symbols. Socially, Islamabad has both an elitist reputation and outlook, a far cry from a city meant to represent the “hopes and aspiration” of a nation’s people. Perhaps what Islamabad needs most is to let the rest of the country in; perhaps what Pakistan needs is a capital city that embraces the nation.
Chapter Five
PROJECTING A CITY
FOR ALL PEOPLE OF THE NATION
Today, Islamabad is an isolated city. It is seen as foreign, privileged, and principally as the symbol of a state which is 1) too influenced by foreign powers (a sentiment amplified by the city’s western suburban character), and 2) deficient in servicing its populace. The following proposition begins with the notion that the present deficiency of the state is no reason not to speculate on a future. I further argue that re-considering the condition of the capital city, and its fundamental identity, could go hand-in-glove with broad reforms nation-wide. The goal of this proposition is to establish a framework for a city of Islamabad that can speak to a 21st Century Pakistan. The bulk of the proposition involves specific Urban Design strategies for the re-conceptualization of the physical territory of Islamabad’s central axis. Following those strategies are a series of recommendations that relate to this re-conceptualized center, and to the city as a whole; these relate more to policy than to built-form.

Doxiadis had a unique proposition: that the city of Islamabad, capital city or not, needed to have civic functions, and a civic expression independent of the state. He was wise to foresee that a municipality could move beyond strictly representing the nation-state, a proposition that represents a positive aspect to his propensity for long-term thinking. On the other hand, his belief that the world’s people would soon be united by cosmopolitan institutions and, eventually, the built form of Ecumenopolis was rather naïve. Nevertheless, I share with Doxiadis a belief that he seems to have held, which is that the city is a part of something much larger, and that the people in the city of the nation deserve something better from their Capital City.

The following proposition takes as its territory the area immediately in front of the Capital Complex—an area that is largely closed off today, and only host to civic protests and once-yearly national parades—as well as the section of the axis between Islamabad’s first four sectors of F6, G6, F7, and G7—the area known today as “Blue Area.” Implicit in my confining the study area to this zone is a commitment to restricting the further growth of Islamabad’s
The effort at expanding Blue Area to the southwest of Faisal Avenue has already begun, with the massive Centaurus project, a very large mixed-use project that is a joint Saudi-Pakistani venture.

Blue Area along the axis, for the foreseeable future. At present, large areas within the Blue Area are vacant land that has not been developed at all in Islamabad’s 50 year history. Much of the following proposition focuses on these vacant areas. To extend Blue Area to the southwest along the axis in the face of all this vacant territory seems misdirected. Focusing on the Blue Area as a distinct and unique central element in the city will lend hierarchy to Islamabad as a whole, and such an effort should go hand in glove with policies put in place by the city to deliberately plan for and implement such a concentration.

The following proposition is arranged around three Urban Design strategies: Accessibility, Connectivity, and Collectivity. Within the strategy of Collectivity is an Urban Design proposition for the foreground of Islamabad’s Capital Complex. Each strategy is undertaken in an effort to lend cohesion to the Central Area as an element within the city, and to address practical dysfunctions. They are also designed, admittedly, to subvert the overt na-
nationalism of the axis, and to claim the Central Area as a territory for civic expression that is more voluntary and benign, and not necessarily tied up in the issues of the state—either in the protest against it or the support of it.

5.1 Accessibility

The strategy of Accessibility attempts to address the relationship that Islamabad has to its surroundings, and to begin to address Islamabad’s reputation as being “a short drive from Pakistan,” as the colloquialism goes. The city feels like a foreign, “western”, hyper-rational city, one not at all characteristic of a more typical South Asian urban experience. To a certain extent this will always characterize Islamabad; it was, after all, designed by everyone involved to be something new, and its residents do enjoy their exclusivity. Yet, accessibility to the capital is fundamentally important for both the country at large and one’s experience in what is now widely nicknamed Pakistan’s most “boring” city. Islamabad’s aura of a colonial cantonment is highlighted by its immediate proximity to the dynamic and bustling city of Rawalpindi on its southern boundary—which has three times Islamabad’s population squeezed into a smaller area. In order to embrace the rest of the country, or at least Rawalpindi to start with, any re-configuration of Islamabad’s central area needs to incorporate a transit system that both connects to the periphery in a deliberate way and reinforces the central area as an urban element.

Thus, the proposition suggests two approaches. The first is to place a regional bus terminal at the southwestern end of the Blue Area. Presently, the region’s central bus terminal is located in Rawalpindi. The terminal in this proposal is intended to serve two types of needs—one being a hub for shuttles that would transport travelers from Islamabad to the Rawalpindi station, and the other being a hub for a small group of private bus lines that have begun to connect Islamabad itself to destinations such as Lahore. Currently these bus lines operate from different stations outside of the Blue Area. The second approach with respect to accessibility relates to transit within the city itself. There already exist a good number of intra-city transit routes served by private minibus lines (formerly large buses). These lines would naturally remain, and they would be augmented by the addition of a transit loop that would operate from one end of the axis to the other. Rather than moving
ACCESSIBILITY

FIGURE 54: Accessibility
along the main axial street of Jinnah Avenue, this loop line would travel along the streets closer to the edge of the residential sectors. This would de-emphasize the axial street and, over time, encourage development that relates just as much to the residential sectors as with Jinnah Avenue. Stops along the transit route would be located at the development concentrations called out in the “Collectivity” strategy, as well as the crossings called for in the “Connectivity” strategy.

5.2 Connectivity

The strategy of Connectivity relates closely to Accessibility, in that it is meant to address the flow of individuals and traffic to the Blue Area. This strategy specifically addresses the connections to the adjacent sectors, which are currently very isolated from each other. Their isolation is a direct result of the kind of circuit-city functionalism present in Doxiadis’s master plan, which called for the sectors to be “human sectors” separated by vehicular highways, and as such the connectivity between them was limited. Often, the 2,000 yard sides of the sectors only have one vehicular access point into the sector. In the Blue Area, where--despite the physical proximity of the residential areas to the buildings of the Blue Area—the street pattern makes for an extremely cumbersome routing of traffic.

The street pattern in the Blue Area as a whole reinforces the linearity of the axis. In the approximately four-kilometer length of the Blue Area, there is only one crossing from the north side to the south side, outside of the grade-separated interchanges between the sectors. By contrast, in the approximately 1,300 foot transect of the axis—stretching between the outer edges of the sectors—there are at least 22 lanes of traffic moving parallel to the axis. The “Connectivity” strategy aims to address this radical imbalance in two ways.

Firstly, improvements can be made in both connecting vehicular streets from the residential sectors to the buildings of the Blue Area and, where feasible, across Jinnah Avenue. Wherever a residential street comes to the edge of the sector, the recommendation is to extend it at least as far as the buildings of Blue Area. This would be especially beneficial on the north side of Sector G7, where incredibly there is no vehicular connection from the sector edge to the buildings of Blue Area. Some streets can easily be connected across Jinnah Avenue, the most obvious opportunity being the extension of Marvi
CONNECTIVITY: Tactic 1

FIGURE 56: Connectivity, Tactic 1

VEHICULAR CONNECTIONS
From Sectors to Blue Area
Across Axis where feasible
Road from F7 across Jinnah Avenue to Jasmin Road in G7. However, the recommendation would be to not employ the strategy that was used between F6 and G6, which incorporated a grade-separated interchange. While this strategy would certainly increase the speed of vehicular connectivity between sectors, it would do little to enhance the experience along the axis itself. The investment in such a project, additionally, is likely better spent elsewhere. Currently, the proliferation of traffic lanes moving parallel to Jinnah Avenue seems quite redundant. To address this redundancy, this scheme proposes to eliminate Fazal-e-Haq Road, the dual-carriage boulevard on the south side of Jinnah Avenue. Currently, this road is heavily travelled, principally because it has good access to Blue Area. Over time, as the primary axis of Jinnah Avenue is more perforated with cross-streets, Fazal-e-Haq will become less important and its removal will seem more feasible. Its elimination would not only provide for a more efficient allocation of traffic capacity moving parallel to Jinnah Avenue, but in its combination with the lateral extensions of residential streets through to Jinnah Avenue, it would allow a significant area of the city, between Blue Area and G7, to be opened up for development. In this scenario, the service road on the south side of the Blue Area buildings of G6 and G7 could become an urban street with buildings on each side, as opposed to the asymmetry it has now. One could perceive of the development of this area as providing the financial backing for the significant modifications to the vehicular streets that this proposal recommends.

The second means of increasing connectivity across Jinnah Avenue is to reconnect an existing network of nallahs, or streams, in the city, which are currently culverted within the transect of the axis. These are an intriguing element of Doxiadis’s master plan, a part of his effort to integrate the natural landscape and urban environment. The proposition is to daylight them, and use them as a means to collect pedestrian and two-wheeler traffic. The locations where these nallahs cross the axis transect make for good opportunities to concentrate the development proposed in the “Collectivity” strategy. As with the other strategies, this one also attempts to serve two purposes: to address a dysfunction in the city (the fact that traffic between sectors is disrupted by the axis), as well as to challenge the linearity of Jinnah Avenue, which embodies the nationalist dominance of the axis. The nallahs and the plantings along them would interrupt the hypnotic view of the
CONNECTIVITY: Tactic 2

FIGURE 57: Connectivity. Tactic 2

RECONSTRUCTED NALLAHS
As a means for Pedestrian and Two-wheeler connections
Capital Complex at regular intervals, such that—in perspective—as one moves along the axis the Presidency on the horizon rises and sinks with respect to the planted foreground.

5.3 Collectivity
Within the strategy of collectivity, I am proposing to distribute concentrations of new urban development along the axis, which would include civic programs that are public in nature. These concentrations would be located where the nallahs cross the axis transect, and also co-located with stops on the transit loop. At this point, the intention of these “concentrations” is merely that they be comprised of civic programs, urban open spaces, and housing. Housing has a certain relevance to the contemporary needs in the city, and it would be a good opportunity to provide a mixture of programs in this area of the city. Incidentally, Doxiadis’s plans for the Central Area included up to 6,000 units of housing, making it unique from the vast majority of the other “Fifth Function” Civic Centers that were being proposed at the time. Regarding the precise civic programs to be located along the axis, it

FIGURE 58: Integration of pre-existing Nallahs in Doxiadis’s plan. Green overlay by author.
COLLECTIVITY

CIVIC CONCENTRATIONS
Distribution of public program along central axis.
Located at crossings of Nallahs and Transit links.

FIGURE 59: Collectivity.
seems too early to make such recommendations, but they could include programs such as museums, libraries, theaters, etc which could be either municipal or national in scope. Locating civic programs of national scope—such as a national library, etc—would be an opportunity to expose visitors to the national capital to the potential for a positive patrimony of a national government. This is out of an effort to stretch the presence of “Pakistan” from that of a *state* expression at the end of the axis to that of a *nation*.

5.4 The Civic Foreground

Concentrated at the end of the axis, immediately in front of the Capital Complex, is what I am terming Islamabad’s “New Civic Foreground.” In the area where the Lawyers Movement protest from this thesis’s introduction was staged—the place which is now largely empty, and only used for the necessary function of challenging the government or for witnessing an organized national spectacle of a parade, is here filled with productive civic uses in the foreground of national spectacle. The proposal is for a large park to replace the entire space—a park which collects arts, educational, and recreational uses. The major elements in the *Civic Foreground* are (as indicated in red) a Central Library for Islamabad, an outdoor performance pavilion adjacent to the existing National Art Gallery, and a transit station for the loop line. Recreational fields comprise the majority of the park, with cricket pitches being a central component. A sizeable section of the only existing built element in the area—the grandstand put in place for national parades—is re-incorporated as a viewing platform for sports matches. Parades, incidentally, could still very well proceed through the park, although the option of having a national parade circumambulate a civic park is an even more intriguing possibility.

Embedded in this proposition is an idea that the city—capital or not—requires a civic function. This proposition embraces the notion that there is something subversive, as well as productive and poetic, about playing cricket in front of your national capitol, which says something more about the country—something that speaks more to pluralism and complexity in the country—than what we find there today.
FIGURE 61: The Civic Foreground
FIGURE 62: Perspective within Civic Foreground.
5.5 Broader Recommendations

Restructuring of the Capital Development Authority. This thesis cannot speak with tremendous authority on the issue of municipal governance in Islamabad, since the subject has simply not been its focus. However, in general terms, certain things are clear. As the government institution established to build the City of Islamabad, the CDA does not seem to have moved beyond the practice of producing Islamabad to projecting and maintaining Islamabad. The mode of the CDA still very much resembles that of a property developer, selling parcels of land, overseeing projects within the city, and expanding the city further into the periphery. Yet, the CDA does deliver municipal services to the population (and manages tax resources from citizens), and its leadership organ has taken on the persona of a city council. The CDA is mired in a vast transitional field between developer and government body. Islamabad, by extension, is somewhere between Project and City. In this middle ground is where the city’s future potential, and specifically the future of the city’s center, is harbored.

The roots of this condition, to my mind, are in the city’s governance structure. The CDA is still, as it was when it was formed in June of 1960, a body appointed by—and answerable to—the Pakistan national government. This direct link to the state is understandable given Islamabad’s capital city function; yet, it has two detrimental impacts on the city today. Firstly, having the CDA as a non-elected body places an unproductive distance between the governance of the city and its residents. Despite the government’s founding notion of Islamabad being simply an administrative capital, the city today has well-established business interests and a population that largely relates to the administrative functions in only an indirect way, if at all. Thus, the city has outgrown its founding intention. Moreover, such a direct connection to the state automatically telegraphs difficulties at the state level to that of the city. This makes Islamabad susceptible to the whims of bureaucrats appointed by weak and constantly shifting political figures. The lack of accountability by the city government to its residents engenders the city with a broad sense of disconnection, and could keep both parties from investing productively in the city’s future. Even despite this disconnection, however, community groups within the city have successfully lobbied the CDA on
issues such as transportation and green space; under a more accountable system of governance, this type of engagement could flourish. Secondly, the CDA's oversight by the state government amplifies nationalist expression in the city, rather than recognizing any balance between the needs of the city (whose population, once again, has moved beyond a uni-dimensional definition as an administrative city) and its state functions.

A re-structuring of the CDA to incorporate a directly-elected government body would not only make it accountable to the residents of the city, but would bring Islamabad in line with all other municipalities in Pakistan which have had direct elections of local councils since at least 2001. Changing the leadership structure at the CDA would be a significant step in guiding Islamabad from Project to City.

Dismantling of the City’s Perimeter. The accessibility of the city is of paramount importance to Islamabad’s future. What is critically important to Islamabad, and its reputation as being “a short drive from Pakistan,” is the free access of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to their Capital City. While Rawalpindi is bursting at the seams, Islamabad has constructed a virtual wall in the form of implicit and explicit rules that exclude certain types of vehicles, specifically those associated with the lower-income population—horse- and ox-drawn carts, buses, and construction vehicles during daytime hours. Security requirements are real, and will likely be necessary for some time. Yet, these other practices of aesthetic policing only heighten Islamabad’s exclusivity, and yield little beyond the maintenance of an aesthetic illusion of the city as an enlightened exclusive entity. Creating civic destinations such as those described above will combat this issue from another angle, by drawing people to the city.

Blue Area Overlay District. Islamabad’s zoning laws focus primarily on the Residential sectors of the city. The Blue Area at this time is subject to the Master Plan that brought about the asymmetrical layout of high-rise towers on the north side of Jinnah Avenue and the lower buildings on the south side. As is evident from the existing condition, the area on the north side of the boulevard has developed at a much slower pace than that on the south side. Over half of the available area on that side is un-built, while the south side is nearly fully built. This proposition contends that the zoning of the
Blue Area needs to be readdressed in order to lend the area a distinction within the city. The best means toward that end could be the creation of what could be called a “zoning overlay” which would give special consideration to the projects happening within the Blue Area, and relate them to a plan for the wider area based on the strategies described above. This would be necessary for approaching implementation.

**The Capital Complex as Remnant.** That Islamabad is the capital city is not an incidental fact. It does little good to lament the “third class” buildings of the Capital Complex. The buildings are what they are—symbols of a national power structure. It is difficult to imagine a near-term scenario which would allow an opening up of the Complex to the general public—both for security concerns and the fact that the political structure has much more important issues to deal with. In the long-term I believe there is some sense to the notion of bringing the public closer to the center of power. The buildings exist as monuments in the city and their uses could easily be re-interpreted and even re-programmed, especially as Pakistan develops a more democratic profile of government. In the meantime, the re-formalization of their foreground offers an opportunity for the type an interface between a people and their government that is confrontational only at times necessary, and productively communal at all others.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have tried to avoid significant attention to or speculation on the contemporary condition of Pakistan. Even so, in this conclusion I would like to return briefly to the national landscape alluded to in the Introduction. Slowly the State of Pakistan is coming around to the idea—an idea that has been well-known by the nation’s people for some time—that the “fortress” it has constructed to protect itself from hostile neighbors has been well outgrown. Pakistan’s overly militarized leadership and elements of religious fundamentalism are not simply frustrations to the national psyche, but deeply problematic issues for the nation’s present and future. As this thesis is being written, the Pakistan Army has launched a major offensive against religious fundamentalists in the Northwest Frontier Province, following months and years of placation and attempts at negotiation. Few believe that Pakistan will succumb to such insurgencies; there is indeed enough national unity, and plenty of military support, to prevent that from happening. Even so, it remains to be seen to what degree this recent manifestation of Pakistan’s “crisis” will lead to significant change in the country’s governance.

The late Pakistani writer and public intellectual, Eqbal Ahmed, writing in the 1980s when Islamization in Pakistan was on the rise, wrote about a “crisis” in Islam and governance in the following way:

*When a civilization reaches a point of fundamental crisis and perceptible decline, we see three responses: restorationist, reconstructionist, and pragmatist… The restorationist is one that seeks the restoration of the past in its idealized form. This is the thrust of fundamentalism… The reconstructionist is one that seeks to blend tradition with modernity in an effort to reform society… The pragmatist denotes an attitude of viewing religious requirements as being largely unrelated to the direct concerns of states and governments and of dealing with affairs of state in terms of the political and economic imperatives of contemporary life. The regulation of religious life is left to civil society and to private institutions.*

Eqbal Ahmed goes on to posit that “The often publicized ideological resurgence of Islam… is a product of excessive and uneven modernisation and the failure of governments to safeguard national sovereignty or to satisfy basic needs.” His observations are incredibly salient in light of Pakistan’s contemporary condition, despite their being over two decades old. The struggle that

---

142 Scholars of Pakistan, largely from the West, often write of the country as being in a perpetual condition of “crisis,” and Pakistan is frequently portrayed as moments from “failure.” It is undeniable that Pakistan is facing a national crisis, but I am more interested in the systemic origins of that “crisis” – failures of infrastructure and an unresolved debate on religion and governance – than on questions of domestic terrorism or authoritarian rule specifically in isolation. See Manam Ahmed, “Legends of the Fail,” in *The National* newspaper in the UAE: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090508/REVIEW/705079996/1008

Pakistan faces today, he reminds us, is not an old one at all. The Muslim League faced the very same issue at Partition. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was of Eqbal Ahmed’s second school—the reconstructionist leader seeking to form a modern “Islamic Democracy.” Jinnah’s secular side won the debate on the eve of Partition, but it is one that still lingers in the present day. The key to addressing the “crisis” in Pakistan, Ahmed stresses, is in addressing infrastructure and services and—most importantly—access to them.

What Pakistan’s present-day experience with extremists at its periphery does is push the debate of Pakistan’s “Islamic Democracy” into the open. The extremists are driven by an ideology of the past—the restorationist of Eqbal Ahmed’s model. Pakistan’s Lawyer’s Movement is a contemporary manifestation of Jinnah’s mold; they hold a strong belief in the “rule of law” and the Constitution, and a general conviction to defend those over any political or religious ideology. Pakistan’s yet emerging civil society is showing signs of strength. If it were to continue pushing Pakistan toward a more stable, democratic condition, there is a role—perhaps a necessity—for the capital city to imbue such a change in profile. It is my contention that a time of “crisis” is precisely the time to make bold propositions—provocations that speak to how a society should be, and to what its public realm should be like. Urban Design, as the practice of advocating for the public realm, is precisely the discipline within which to make such provocations.


Wigley, Mark. “Network Fever” in Grey Room, No 04. (Summer 2001), 82-122.
