Institutional Relationships and Organizational Change: Lessons from a Prominent African NGO in Dakar, Senegal

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ABSTRACT

The November, 2007, street vendor riots in Dakar, Senegal, were one of the country’s most powerful expressions of political and economic disintegration in recent times. Almost equally striking was the absence from these events of Enda Tiers Monde, Senegal’s oldest, largest, and most influential indigenous NGO and the champion of the “popular economy.” This thesis uses the vendor riots as a window into the response of an organization, Enda, to changing institutional contexts (i.e. different political regimes) and emerging development challenges (i.e. informal street vendors and urban spatial access). In its thirty years of operation, Enda has made significant contributions to urban development in Dakar and in cities throughout the global south. These contributions include extending access to basic services and improving housing in slums, organizing and advocating for the urban poor, and training local leaders in participatory governance. However, as demonstrated by its lack of involvement and influence in events surrounding the vendor riots, Enda’s role and relationship with both grassroots actors and national policy-makers has changed. This thesis demonstrates that different types of relationships between Enda and the state affect the organization’s relationship with its base, and therefore Enda’s legitimacy with and connection to both actors. I also argue that these changing institutional contexts have affected Enda internally. Since an important political turnover in the year 2000 and the death of Enda’s founder in 2002, Enda has been attempting to align its internal structure and functioning with its external institutional context. The challenge for Enda is to develop a system that will grant its teams the flexibility to experiment while supporting them with evaluation for learning and adaptation. This is essential for Enda’s renewed visibility and influence in urban development in Dakar.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIDAK</td>
<td>Association of Inter-Slum Committees of Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>General Assembly (of Enda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIX</td>
<td>Agency of Investment Promotion and Large Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Conseil d’Administration or Board of Directors (of Enda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Currency of Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGAD</td>
<td>Council of Development Support NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COU</td>
<td>Urban Objectives Convention (Enda program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diapol</td>
<td>Political Dialogue (Enda entity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopole</td>
<td>Ecological/Economic Center (Enda entity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopop</td>
<td>Popular Economy (Enda entity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enda TM</td>
<td>Environmental Development in the Third World (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENEA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAUP</td>
<td>Community Funds for Sanitation in Poor Neighborhoods (RUP initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIE</td>
<td>Economic Interest Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADEP</td>
<td>African Institute of Economic Development and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAGU</td>
<td>African Institute of Urban Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILMU</td>
<td>Local Development Initiatives in Urban Settings (Ecopop project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PADELU</td>
<td>Local Urban Development Program (European Union program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE</td>
<td>Local Governance Support Program (Ecopop project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Senegalese Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PDSQ</td>
<td>Neighborhood Social Development Program (Ecopop project)</td>
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<td>PDSU</td>
<td>Urban Social Development Program (Ecopop project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPAM</td>
<td>Millennium Water and Sanitation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>Urban Prospective Program (Diapol project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREF</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Recovery Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREFAL</td>
<td>Regional Support and Training Project for Local Associations and Community-Based Organizations (Ecopop project)</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Senegal</td>
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<td>RUP</td>
<td>Relay for Participatory Urban Development (Enda entity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Executive Secretariat (of Enda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCAD</td>
<td>Cheikh Anta Diop University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNACOIS</td>
<td>National Traders and Producers Union of Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS</td>
<td>Senegal Progressive Union Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARC</td>
<td>West African Research Center</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview of the Thesis

On November 21st, 2007, street vendors rioted in downtown Dakar, Senegal’s capital city. They burned cars and tires, threw stones at storefronts, and pillaged the mayor’s office and national electric company until they were eventually dispersed by the city’s police force. The riots were a spontaneous response to the forced removal of vendors and beggars from Dakar’s streets that began a week before, following a decree issued by President Abdoulaye Wade aimed at bringing order to the crowded city center (The Associated Press, November 21, 2007).

Overwhelmed by the spontaneity and widely dispersed nature of the riots, the government withdrew the removal decree temporarily. All sources say Dakar returned quickly to life-as-usual. Yet the day’s events were a shock for Senegal, widely regarded as the most stable, democratic nation in an otherwise volatile region. The riots were evidence of both political and economic disintegration and brought the issues of urban informality, marginalization, and public decision-making to the forefront of Senegal’s political landscape.

As someone who had lived and worked in Senegal previously, I was struck by the riots and by the lack of political foresight that caused them. Having bought carrots and cabbage from the woman who set up her vegetable table every morning just outside my apartment and laundry detergent from the guy who walked through the narrow streets with an assortment of hand-packaged baggies, I knew how many people earn their livings in Dakar through such small-scale vending. How could Wade have made such an error? At the same time, I was deeply familiar with the Senegalese’ vast capacity for patience and non-violent action. Why such a strong reaction this time?
I was curious, given the great number of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) working in Senegal and Dakar, whether any of them had been involved in the riots. I particularly wondered what had been the role, if any, of Enda Tiers Monde, Senegal’s oldest, largest, and most influential indigenous NGO and the champion of the “popular economy.” I anticipated that Enda would have been involved in the events surrounding the vendor riots, either before or after, given that the riots were one of Dakar’s most striking civil society moments in some time, and Enda has traditionally been a key player the domains of urban informality and the rights of the urban poor. Yet when I began my research in Senegal, I realized that Enda was entirely absent from, and even stunned by, the events. Where was Enda? Why were they absent?

I did not initially assume that Enda should have been involved, but as I spoke to people inside and outside the organization, most people were struck by Enda’s absence and felt they should have played a role. Why did people, ranging from union representatives to government officials to Enda staff, expect Enda to be involved? A staff member at Ecopole, one of Enda’s Dakar-based entities, argued that “Enda should have been involved in awareness-raising about the existence of this sector and their rights and responsibilities.” According to the Permanent Secretary of UNACOIS, the union that represents producers and traders throughout Senegal, Enda “could have created a framework for dialogue to bring actors together and discuss the issue and find solutions. Then they could have done a feasibility study on the impact of different proposed solutions.” When I asked him “why Enda, specifically?” he answered, “It should have been Enda specifically because they focus on the concerns of the ‘popular economy.’” During the latter months of 2007 and into 2008, “how could we have missed the vendor riots?” was among the critical questions being asked by staff responsible for coordination and strategic planning at the organization’s headquarters in Dakar.
1.1.1. Research Focus

I use the street vendor riots not as my ultimate explanatory variable, but rather as a window into the response of an organization, Enda Tiers Monde, to changing institutional contexts. What does Enda’s absence from events surrounding the riots say about the organization’s evolution and ability to respond to emerging challenges? What does it reflect about Enda’s relationship with marginalized urban populations and with the state? Finally, what does it demonstrate about the organization’s internal mechanisms for learning and adaptation?

I must clarify here what I mean by “institutional” and “organizational,” words that are used throughout this thesis and that are often confused and/or confounded. While often understood as the government or rule of law, when I speak of “institutions,” I am referring to formal and informal mechanisms of governance and social order. In my case, the state, NGOs, and community groups are all institutions. I understand an “organization” to be a bounded entity made up of people pursuing specific objectives with established roles, procedures, and culture. In my case, Enda is the organization of interest, but I refer to other organizations like associations, government agencies, and universities as well. There are important interactions between institutions and organizations, as shown in the rest of this thesis.

Many studies have explored the relationships between NGOs and states; a few studies have looked at the internal, organizational dynamics of development NGOs. Rare are studies that analyze both the institutional and the organizational, along with the interactions between these realms. This thesis will attempt to do just that, to answer the above questions through analysis of the historical development of Enda’s approaches, organizational structure, and institutional relationships, particularly around issues of urban informality.
In its thirty years of operation, Enda has made some significant contributions to urban development in Dakar, from extending access to basic services and improving housing in slums to organizing and advocating for the urban poor and training local leaders in participatory governance. However, as demonstrated by their lack of involvement and influence in events surrounding Dakar’s recent civil society mobilizations, Enda’s role and relationship with both grassroots actors and national policy-makers has changed. The rest of this thesis will explain this evolution and its implications for the organization’s current comparative advantage in addressing issues of urban informality in Dakar.

This thesis will address a variety of distinct, but interrelated, puzzles. First, for thirty years, Enda was run by its founder, a “charismatic leader” by all accounts but also, to some extent, autocratic and improvisational. How is it that the organization was able to grow and be successful under this leadership style, often portrayed in the literature as a hindrance to success? Second, NGOs are usually equated with civil society, grassroots groups separate from and acting to counterbalance the state. Enda complexifies this picture because it is an NGO born out of important relationships with the state, while also working closely with poor and marginalized populations. How did Enda’s relationship with the state impact its relationship with poor populations in the city? How was it able to acquire legitimacy with both of these groups? What impacts have political shifts had on Enda’s form, functioning, and positioning? Why has the organization adopted different structures and mechanisms at different moments in time? Third, what are the costs and benefits of Enda’s decentralized, “loosely-coupled” (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) structure? How can Enda reconcile the need for flexibility and adaptability important for responding authentically to new challenges in cities like Dakar, while also achieving some discipline in its form and processes?
Enda is unique in the combination of its acquired legitimacy with both populations on the ground and governmental decision-makers, its flexibility, and its capacity for research and knowledge production. Yet the organization’s comparative advantage is dependent upon its institutional relationships, internal structure and processes, and the interplay between these factors. I argue that different types of relationships between Enda and the state affect the organization’s relationship with its base, and therefore Enda’s ability to interact with both actors. In the organization’s earlier eras, Enda’s connections with high-ranking officials and strong links to the poor were important in terms of the types of resources it could access, as well as its capacity to influence relevant policies. As these conditions changed, with the election of a new political party and the death of Enda’s founding leader, the organization lost connection to the national government and was forced to find other actors (i.e. local governments, different donors) to both ensure Enda’s survival and deliver to its constituencies.

I also argue that these changing institutional contexts have affected Enda internally. The ability of Enda’s founder, Jacques Bugnicourt, to successfully mediate relationships with both the state and local populations allowed him to build his organization in an improvisational and patriarchal manner. Enda acted as a network of planning, architecture, and social work practitioners, bounded by a broader agenda of making the post-colonial world different. They were committed to both technically-grounded work, like urban land management and small-scale manufacturing extension services, and an alternative development vision, based in the realities of the African society and culture. This network grew out of and perpetuated informal channels of dissemination and learning that served them well. Yet with the year 2000 political turnover, followed by Bugnicourt’s death in 2002, Enda felt pressure to institutionalize its processes, a pressure that had not existed previously. Many people within and outside the organization argue
for greater cohesion and collaboration between Enda entities to increase the organization’s impact. Yet we know from studies, primarily done of business firms and public sector organizations, that there is some basis for loosely-coupled organizational behavior and that decentralization, duplication, and competition are sometimes traits of successful organizations. The focus on formalization of the organization, therefore, may be fruitless and even undesirable.

As a result of these shifts, it appears to many observers that the activities of Enda’s entities working on urban issues in Dakar have become de-politicized, their change-making agenda diluted. Whereas the organization used to be more focused on protecting slums from clearance and training informal producers to build both their economic and political power, their activities now involve installing local sanitation systems or training local governments in basic infrastructure maintenance. In many cases, Enda entities function as development contractors, filling service gaps left by the state or facilitating implementation of others’ policies or projects. What does this tell us about an organization like Enda’s ability maintain its relevance in the face of emerging challenges, like informal street vending and urban spatial occupation, and new institutional environments?

Before getting into the body of my analysis, the rest of this chapter will provide an exploration of evolution in African cities and the role of an organization like Enda Tiers Monde, a case overview of Enda, context for the vendor riots, and discussion of development NGOs in Africa. It will close with my research methodology and a preview of the rest of this thesis.

1.2. Managing Evolution in an Evolving City: The Role of Enda

There is a growing body of literature from African scholars arguing for the necessity of different approaches to urban development and poverty in African cities (Cisse, 2007; Fall, 2007;
A president like Wade believes that large, planned infrastructure projects and real estate development will solve Senegal’s urban crises. In contrast, Simone (2005) sees the African city as “a laboratory of change, rather than simply the embodiment of accommodation, social engineering or the spatial fix of economic growth.” Because of the dynamism and unplanned nature of growth in cities like Dakar, the institutions responsible for management of these cities must be able to respond in an equally dynamic fashion.

This raises important questions about the role of state and non-state actors in planning and management of Africa’s cities. According to Swilling (1997), one can understand what is happening in Africa’s towns and cities as a “search for governance in the space created by unmet governing needs in a context where the state is incapable of developing the necessary capacity to respond to the complexity, diversity and dynamism of rapidly changing conditions.” He argues for a:

Need to accept that African cities are shaped, driven and transformed by processes that the state system has virtually no control over. This highlights a general trend in African urban studies that seeks to break away from the notion that government (at any level) is the most important force involved in determining the forms and functions of African urban settlements and cities. This effectively means questioning much of the urban studies literature that has emanated from the developed world—and even in some instances from Asia and Latin America—where it has been assumed that state systems have the resources and capacity to decisively influence urban policies.

According to him, it is therefore useless to talk about public policy as the sole guiding force in cities like Dakar:

What intrigues African scholars is not the impact of public policy on cities, but the very severe limits of government action when it comes to resolving urban problems. This is not surprising given that in city after city in Africa, between 40-70% of the urban population reside in settlements that have either emerged informally (extra-legally), or even if they are not extra-legal, they remain untouched by the public provision
of services. It is now generally accepted that various forms of community-based and/or non-governmental non-profit organizations render the bulk of services enjoyed by the urban poor in many of Africa’s cities and towns.

One must take seriously the activities of these community-based and/or non-governmental non-profit organizations and their role with respect to the other institutions involved in planning and management of African cities.

Simone (2005) assumes that “While the state may consolidate, social groups and associations—so-called ‘civil society’—may dissemble and diversify, and each process is an essential aspect of the other.” In connection with, but as distinct from, the state, “The challenge for the broad range of associations, groups and institutions making up ‘civil society’ is to forge ways of creating, taking up and working on issues and activities without crystallizing themselves into clearly identified agendas, purviews and criteria.” For him, the task of these associations and institutions is to:

Experiment with different tasks, networks, powers and conditions as long as they productively interact with the complexities generated by the everyday practices of communities themselves. They need not embody, nor represent, these community complexities in any juridical or formal sense, but provide a conduit for different communities to interact with each other and produce ‘alternative or possible local realities’ for all.

Based on my analyses, this is the challenge for an organization like Enda if it is to maintain its relevance in Dakar, in Senegal, and in the international community.

Enda has shown itself to be the kind of organization able to understand and respond to “local realities,” one of its major contributions in a city like Dakar. Enda envisions itself as “an organization in constant evolution,” as stated on the homepage of its website. For them, this is operationalized through “organizational changes—i.e. increasing the number of entities—as well as through the setting of new priorities.” They continue, “The organization evolves, and the need to create synergies between domains and levels of interventions intensifies. This requires an
opening and coordination of the activities of different entities—among themselves and with 
external partners—in order to touch the greatest number of people.” The capacity of Enda to live 
up to this rhetoric depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of its activities, its 
relationships with other institutional actors, particularly the state, and internal mechanisms of 
learning and adaptation. All of these aspects will be explored in the chapters of this thesis.

1.3. Case Overview: Enda Tiers Monde and Its Urban Focus

1.3.1. Origins and Growth

Enda is a unique NGO in that it was founded and is based in Senegal, but with 
international satellite offices in Africa, South America, Asia, and Europe. Environnement et 
Developpement du Tiers Monde (Enda TM) was created in 1972 as a joint program of the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the African Institute of Economic Development and 
Planning (IADEP), and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) following the 
headed the program. He was a French national trained in economic development, political 
science, and geography who had served since 1961 as Director of Land Management in the first 
post-independence Senegalese government and as a professor at Dakar’s National School of 
Applied Economics (ENEA). In 1978, Bugnicourt decided to make Enda a separate, 
independent international environment and development NGO, retaining its base in Dakar. From 
its inception, Enda had strong ties with the Senegalese government, due in large part to 
Bugnicourt’s personal relationships with high-level governing officials, including the President. 
Enda and the Senegalese national government signed a contract granting Enda international
diplomatic status and rent-free government-owned office space for the organization’s headquarters.

Committed to building an independent, post-colonial Africa, Bugnicourt’s vision was for Enda to be an organization at the frontier of “alternative” approaches to development, originating in the developing world as opposed to being imported from the West. Enda’s early mission, as described in its contract with the government, was “promotion of research activities, grassroots community development training and support, environmental management, and diffusion of appropriate technologies in third-world countries, in close cooperation with groups, associations, and institutions of these countries with similar ambitions and with United Nations-affiliated organizations” (Enda “Accord du Siege”).

Bugnicourt decided to structure Enda after the United Nations, establishing an Executive Secretariat (SE), headquartered in Dakar, to run the organization, with oversight from an international Board of Directors. Enda started with 10 staff, all at the SE. Over time, the SE and local researchers and practitioners founded semi-autonomous, thematic “entities” in Senegal, their creation driven organically by emerging development challenges or interests of the Executive. Beginning in the early 1980s, entities were also established in other developing countries by nationals of those countries, usually friends or colleagues of Bugnicourt, who sought affiliation with Enda.

1.3.2. Early and Sustained Commitment to the Urban Poor

Urban development issues, particularly the informal sector and irregular settlements, have been at the heart of Enda’s activities since its inception. In the organization’s early years, both

1 “Accord de Siege,” contract between Environnement et Developpement du Tiers-Monde (ENDA) and the Government of the Republic of Senegal.
the state and the citizens of Dakar knew Enda, and the person of Jacques Bugnicourt, as the
defender of the rights of the urban poor to land, housing, and economic opportunities. In an era
when most NGOs were concerned about rural development and agricultural production,
Bugnicourt was determined to make the urban poor the focus of Enda’s interventions. A
member of Enda’s Board of Directors said this was due to the fact that Bugnicourt, with his
background in urban land management and political science, was particularly attuned to land
rights struggles in the cities of the developing world. As a resident of Dakar, he witnessed how
the rural exodus to Senegal’s capital city was causing it to become crowded with people looking
for work and places to live. And he was sensitive to the lack of security, both spatial and
economic, that dominated these people’s lives. At that time, the Senegalese government was
investing in planned housing developments just outside of the downtown, like HLM and SICAP
(see map of Dakar in Appendix 4), that attempted to control the growth of the city. Yet there
were populations already living in the development sites, and the government routinely took
down their settlements with force. As one member of Enda Ecopop stated, “Enda was one of the
first organizations to talk to the public sector about the ‘right to the city,’” getting government to
speak to and listen to slum dwellers.” According to a sociology professor at the University
Cheikh Anta Diop, Enda got the state to focus on urban marginalization and entrepreneurship.
Bugnicourt became deeply involved in the struggle to protect informal settlements like Ex-Rail
and Baraka and more broadly in defending the rights of marginalized urban populations in
questions of urban development.

2 The “Right to the City” concept was developed by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre in his 1968 publication Le
Droit a la Ville. Lefebvre argued that the “Right to the City” is the right to “urban life, to renewed centrality, to
places of encounter and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete usage of …
moments and places” (Lefebvre, 1968).
Many of Enda's entities have worked in urban areas, but this thesis focuses on the work of four of Enda's Dakar-based entities—RUP (Relay for Participatory Urban Development), Ecopop (Popular Economy), Ecopole (Ecological/Economic Center), and Diapol (Political Dialogue)—that have historically focused their activities on urban development. A snapshot of these four entities is provided in the following table:

**Table 1: Summary Table of RUP, Ecopop, Ecopole, and Diapol**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Education/Training of Founder/Head</th>
<th>Principle Domains of Intervention</th>
<th>Zones of Activity</th>
<th>Current # of Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUP</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>- Participatory land management</td>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Development of appropriate</td>
<td>Dakar (periphery)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>technologies for water and</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sanitation infrastructure</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Urban agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopop</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Architecture/Planning</td>
<td>- Popular economy and community</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>development</td>
<td>Dakar (periphery)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Capacity-building of local</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>leaders (governmental and non)</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for participatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>local development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Access to and maintenance of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>basic social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecopole</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Social Work</td>
<td>- Organizing and</td>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>accompaniment of poorest</td>
<td>Dakar (slums)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Alternative education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for participatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>local development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Public health and nutrition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Basic social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diapol</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Psychosociology, History</td>
<td>- Promotion and reinforcement of</td>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>20+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>political dialogue</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- International lobbying and</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>advocacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sectoral approach: fisheries;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agriculture (cotton); transborder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cooperation; migration and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An exploration of the evolution of these entities and their activities in Dakar, provided throughout this thesis, yields important insights into the changing role played by Enda in the city’s urban development.

1.3.3. Enda Today

There are now 18 entities in Senegal and international entities in 11 countries. For a full list of Enda’s entities and an organizational chart, see Appendixes 1 and 2. The entities are largely financially autonomous from the Executive Secretariat, expected to acquire their own funding through project grants. At the same time, each entity receives financial support from the SE; the SE pays the salary of each entity head, and central “institutional” funds are also used to pay other entity staff salaries and support entity operations, though this varies greatly by entity. Table 2 presents a picture of Enda’s annual budget in the years 2007 and 2006.

Table 2: Enda’s Annual Budget, 2006 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>US $22,324,887 (16,282,465 Euros)</td>
<td>US $18,957,874 (15,119,134 Euros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Funds (from the governments of Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland)</td>
<td>US $3,216,550 (2,345,963 Euros)</td>
<td>US $2,743,606 (2,188,059 Euros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Funds (from bilateral and multilateral donors)</td>
<td>US $19,093,055 (13,925,356 Euros)</td>
<td>US $16,214,269 (12,931,076 Euros)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 2, the majority of Enda’s funding comes in the form of project grants from bilateral and multilateral donors. For the years 2002-2007, Enda’s total budget increased steadily, mainly due to increases in project funding. The percentage of the organization’s funding coming from project grants has increased from 71% in 2002 to 86% in 2007, while that from institutional funds has decreased from 29% to 14% in the same years, an issue that will be
discussed in subsequent chapters. For a complete picture of Enda’s funding sources and trends for the past five years, see Appendix 3.

With over 300 staff in Senegal and around 500 globally, administration of Enda is complex. Currently, 26 people work at the SE, responsible for administrative, coordination, and communication functions, both internally among Enda’s entities and with the external world. There is a General Assembly (AG) comprised of 40 representative delegates from all entities/antennas who are responsible for many of the decisions related to internal operations of the organization. The Board of Directors, appointed by the General Assembly, has 16 members who are meant to guide the direction of the organization. The Board of Directors has some of the same responsibilities as the General Assembly, but is also charged with mobilizing financial resources, arbitrating conflicts within the organization, and naming the Executive Secretary. Representatives from the entities, the Executive Secretariat, the General Assembly, and the Board of Directors are expected to come together for an Inter-Entity Meeting every 18 months, though these meetings have historically happened less frequently.

It is difficult to talk about Enda’s activities or approach in general because the entities set their own agendas and develop their own methodologies for different projects. What is required of entities is that their activities be aligned with Enda’s fundamental mission and desired approach, which has remained relatively constant throughout its 30 years in operation. Broadly, Enda views itself as an organization that “works with grassroots groups, based on their experiences and objectives, in research and establishment of an ‘alternative development’.” In its actions, Enda is driven by “popular initiatives and mechanisms,” or those generated “at the base.” In general, Enda “seeks to validate local development knowledge and instruments, both
material and in terms of ideas. This consists of identifying and supporting popular development initiatives,” accomplished through:

Collaboration with numerous third world institutions and administrations, personal engagement of volunteers from the global South and certain industrialized countries, facilities granted by third world states and, first, by Senegal, and exterior support from donors like the United Nations, Switzerland, Austria... who assure the independence of Enda and lend their support (Internal Documents).

According to the organization’s website, half of Enda’s activities involve direct action on the ground (health, agriculture, sanitation, alternative education, child labor, etc.), with the other half involving research, advising, consulting, training, publishing and informing.

From 1978 until 2002, Jacques Bugnicourt was the force behind Enda. By all accounts, he was a charismatic, visionary leader who was excellent at raising money and building support for Enda’s work, both within Senegal and abroad. His weakness, however, was that he was averse to creating any formal administrative or operational mechanisms for his growing organization. His strong vision and personal relationships kept Enda together. When Bugnicourt died suddenly in 2002, Enda began a difficult period of internal evaluation, reorganization, and redefinition. After five transitional years and three different Executive Secretaries, a new Executive Secretary and the first from outside the organization, Josephine Ouedraogo of Burkina Faso, took office in September, 2007, marking the beginning of what many see as a new era for Enda. The organization is currently working to understand its comparative advantage and reposition itself, both in Senegal and internationally.

1.4. The Vendor Riots in Context

Before delving more deeply into Enda, it is important to give some context to the vendor riots. Since taking office in 2000, Senegal’s current president, Abdoulaye Wade, has prioritized...
economic development through foreign investment and large infrastructure projects including a new airport, seaport, and a toll highway out of Dakar. Wade announced his decision to enforce the removal decree clearing Dakar’s streets at the closure of his annual Presidential Investment Conference on November 12th, arguing that uncontrolled street vending had cost the country around 185 million dollars due to traffic jams that discourage investment (Tillinac and Ba, 2007).

He stated:

What is happening in Senegal is inadmissible because anyone [informal vendors] can plant themselves anywhere...The state will take full responsibility for putting an end to this anarchic occupation...No one will benefit from protection because we have the will to make Dakar a modern city (Sud Quotidien, November 13, 2007).

In response to the decree, the Governor of Dakar ordered the police to clear the streets of vendors, sparking the riots.

On the same day as the riots, members of Senegal’s 18 public and private sector unions took to the streets in a previously planned and authorized march protesting the high cost of living and demanding increases in salaries and support for struggling businesses (IRIN News, November 22, 2007). After the street vendor’s morning riots, the government withdrew the permit for the unions’ planned protest at the last minute, but more than 600 people marched anyway (The Associated Press, November 21, 2007). In addition to the street vendors, the day’s

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3 The Senegalese government has been talking about the problem of “human crowding” in Dakar since the early 1970s and its first president, Senghor, issued a decree in 1976 prohibiting street vending (Collignon, 1984). The decree has rarely been enforced. The issue was raised in early November, 2007, at the annual Presidential Investment Conference by Aminata Niane, General Director of the National Agency for Investment and Large Project Promotion (APIX), who showed the president a film depicting the “anarchic occupation” of the capital by street vendors and homeless people. After viewing the film and receiving pressure from a few other speakers at the Conference, President Wade said he would make the issue “his personal business, even if the laws already exist” (L’Office, November 23, 2007).

4 In addition to Wade’s foreign investment advisors, there are likely political constituencies, particularly wealthy merchants in Dakar, who supported and perhaps pushed for the clearance decree. Traditionally, street vendors bought their goods from Senegalese merchants who imported products from abroad, particularly from China. Today, there are many Chinese immigrants living in downtown Dakar who sell directly to the street vendors. Whereas in earlier times street vendors were essentially employees of Senegalese merchants, street vendors are now seen as competition for these wealthier shop owners. While my evidence is limited, it is very plausible that this changing context contributed to Wade’s decision to take on the street vendor issue.
protests included teachers, public servants, and average citizens struggling to feed their families as cost of living and unemployment rise. They were all met by police using tear gas, warning shots, and rubber truncheons.

The underlying frustrations demonstrated by the vendor riots suggest that Senegal’s economic growth, at an annual rate of around 5% for the last five years, is not being felt by the country’s urban poor. Senegal has one of the highest rates of urbanization in West Africa—defined as the urban population as a percentage of total population—which at 48% is higher than the average rates for sub-Saharan Africa (around 29%) (IRIN News, Senegal Humanitarian Profile). Furthermore, out of Senegal’s approximately 5.5 million urban dwellers, 76%, or roughly 4.2 million people, live in informal settlements (UN-HABITAT), and a 2006 World Bank study of employment in Senegal found that 95% of people actively employed work in the informal sector. In the face of rising inflation and rapidly increasing costs of oil and food, basic commodities like cooking gas, rice, and bread are becoming unaffordable for many Senegalese.

Urban informality in Senegal is not only an economic issue; it is also a socio-political issue. Related to the discussion in Section 1.2., in the absence of a growing “formal” economy, Dakar’s citizens are creating alternative mechanisms of survival based on deeply-held cultural values like reciprocity and solidarity. Though an in-depth exploration of the issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to mention the role Muslim brotherhoods, particularly the Mouridiya, have played in the growth and management of the informal sector in Senegal. Much informal trading and vending is organized by this brotherhood, a major economic and political force in the country. Yet despite this sector’s importance, it is still considered other, outside, illegal. It is for this reason that Enda chose many years ago to talk about the “popular economy,” rather than the “informal economy.” At this point, actors in this “popular economy” have
become the vast majority of urban citizens, presenting a political challenge, particularly as they become more organized. Dakar’s citizens are tired of being marginalized and are frustrated with a political regime in which power and wealth appear increasingly concentrated.

As one of the only countries in West Africa never to have had a coup d’état, Senegal is relatively unaccustomed to mobilization of the poor, particularly of a violent nature. Yet the vendor riots and policy actions that prompted them suggest a breakdown in communication between the government and the city’s poor on key urban development concerns related to investment, employment, and citizen participation in decision-making.

Because of the role Enda Tiers Monde has historically played, both as defender of the rights of the urban poor and as intermediary between these populations and the state, everyone from union representatives to elected representatives to Enda employees themselves thought Enda should have been involved in events surrounding the riots. When people think of Enda, they think of awareness-raising around “right to the city” issues. They think of service provision and capacity-building in poor neighborhoods. And they think of Enda’s ability to negotiate with the state to prevent slum clearances. The role Enda has historically played can be understood, in part, through a discussion of the political economy of development NGOs in Africa.

1.5. Development NGOs in Africa: Enda in Context

There is a good body of literature on the rise of development NGOs in developing countries (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Fisher, 1998; Igoe and Kelsall, 2005; Sanyal, 1994; Tendler, 1982). Prior to the late 1970s, the State was viewed by the international development community as the primary agent of development planning. Multilateral and bilateral donors funded “top-down” development projects, imagining that economic and social benefits would
“trickle down” to the poorest and most marginalized populations. However, by the end of the 1970s, it was clear that this approach was not improving the situation of the poor in many developing countries. States were blamed for this failure, giving rise to anti-government sentiment and the increasing popularity of so-called “civil society.” As stated by Sanyal (1994), “The notion of the people as a counterbalancing force to the State emerged in development planning discourse around the early 1970s, along with criticisms of Third World governments.” As discussed by Igoe and Kelsall (2005), this shift was reinforced in the 1980s by “two global political transformations: 1) The Reagan/Thatcher revolution, with its emphasis on free markets and the downsizing of government; and 2) The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of civil society in Eastern and Central Europe.”

As states in the developing world were “hollowed out” by donor pressure to contract and privatize services to improve efficiency and reduce public expenditures, NGOs proliferated to pick up the slack. Donors began looking for alternative agents through which to channel funds, and NGOs fit the bill for a variety of reasons. First, NGOs were assumed to facilitate the most cost-effective method for reaching the poorest and providing welfare services to those who the market failed to reach. As Edwards and Hulme wrote in 1995:

> NGOs have always provided welfare services to poor people in countries where governments lacked the resources to ensure universal coverage in health and education; the difference is that now they are seen as the preferred channel for service-provision in deliberate substitution for the state.

According to Sanyal (1994), NGOs were preferred because they were assumed to be: smaller and less bureaucratic, and therefore more flexible and responsive to people’s needs; closer to the people, more knowledgeable about local resources and technologies and therefore able to find
relevant and inexpensive solutions to local problems; and not coercive nor profit-seeking, but rather motivated by altruistic desires to do good.

Second, NGOs were viewed as “vehicles for ‘democratisation’ and essential components of a thriving ‘civil society’,” (Edwards and Hulme, 1995) which would improve governance in “backward” developing countries. The assumption was that NGOs were “by their very nature altruistic, autonomous, cooperative, efficient, empowering, participatory, and transparent” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). NGOs were also assumed to be autonomous from and opposite to state institutions, in both priorities and procedures. By fostering “bottom-up development,” NGOs were expected to build the capacity of citizens to push the state. As stated by Sanyal (1994), NGOs were believed to have “the power to influence policy implementation on the ground and the state could, in turn, learn from their opposition and formulate better policies.” Thus, through much of the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs were viewed as the “magic bullet” for both economic development and democracy-building in developing countries.

By the late 1990s, however, researchers and donors grew disappointed with NGOs because they “have failed to live up to their original expectations” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). First, NGO performance has been mixed with respect to poverty reduction and democratization. Second, questions have been raised about transparency and legitimacy of non-governmental organizations who claim to represent certain populations and provide them with services, but with no electoral mandate or corresponding accountability mechanisms. As argued by Houtzager and Lavalle (2009), non-governmental organizations face a legitimacy challenge when it comes to political representation. They are not elected representatives and they are often not membership based, yet they almost always claim to act in the interest of certain populations. The international community has become more suspicious of this claim. Igoe and Kelsall (2005)
state, “By the late 1990s, there was a growing perception among both donors and the African public that African NGOs were dominated by sophisticated con artists.” The “briefcase NGO,” established to benefit from the great amounts of money flowing to community organizations but with no real connection to or action on the ground, “stood in stark antithesis to the original promise of NGOs as institutions of grassroots democracy” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). Rather than agents of change, some view NGOs as pacifying the discontent and revolutionary potential of the poor and marginalized, acting as “ladles in the global soup kitchen” (Commins, 2000) by providing safety nets to the poor.

Of course, some of this disappointment derives from the unrealistic assumptions and expectations people have had about the nature and potential of NGOs. There has been a realization that the lines between states and NGOs is more blurred than originally thought, and a call for greater synergy between state and civil society, or between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. It is also important to recognize that “NGOs” do not exist as one clearly-defined and easily recognized institution in society, the way that “states” or “firms” are understood. NGOs are of many forms and functions, thus when we analyze an NGO, we must situate it in its historical and institutional context.

1.6. Methodology

To conduct my research, I spent two months during the summer of 2008 and an additional two weeks in January, 2009, at Enda’s headquarters in Dakar, working under the supervision of Cheikh Gueye, the Urban Policy Advisor to the Executive Secretary and the person responsible for Coordination of Methods and Approaches within the organization. While there, I reviewed internal documents and conducted interviews with 19 Enda staff, both at
headquarters and in program offices. I also interviewed 12 community beneficiaries, 4 social
science researchers, 10 government officials, 4 representatives from partner organizations, and 6
donor representatives. In addition, I spent 3-5 days in each of three Enda entities that focus on
urban development—Enda RUP (Relay for Participatory Urban Development), Enda Ecopop
(Popular Economy), and Enda Ecopole (Training and Organizing Center)—observing their
activities and conducting field visits to project sites. I chose to focus on these three entities and
one other, Enda Diapol (Political Dialogue), to assess the evolution of Enda’s role in issues of
urban informality in Dakar.

It is important to note that my task was to think about how Enda’s methods and
approaches have changed with respect to these issues and with what implications for the
positioning and added value of the organization in Dakar. This work does not involve
documenting or evaluating outcomes or impacts of the organization’s activities, which would be
a difficult task given the complexity of the issues and the dearth of available data and
information. Instead, I focused on the organization’s history and processes to understand why
Enda missed the vendor riots and with what implications for the organization’s current and future
comparative advantage.

1.7. Organization of the Thesis

As previously stated, my analysis of Enda proceeds through the historical evolution of the
external/institutional and the internal/organizational. Chapter 2 provides economic and political
background on Senegal and the city of Dakar, Enda’s home base. In Chapter 3, I begin my
analysis of Enda by exploring the changing relationships between Enda, populations, and the
state, both national and local. Chapter 4 takes us inside Enda in a discussion of the
organization's structure, processes, accountability, and learning, and how these aspects have been affected by and affect its position in its institutional context. Finally, I provide concluding thoughts in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2
THE CITY OF DAKAR, ENDA’S HOME BASE

Enda Tiers Monde has evolved over time and place. Though the structure and activities of the organization extend beyond the borders of Senegal and even the African continent, Senegal’s capital city, Dakar, has been Enda’s primary laboratory and home base for more than thirty years. Before I delve into the specificities of Enda’s evolution, it is important to provide background information on the geographic, economic, and political context in which the organization has developed, namely Dakar. This chapter includes an overview of the economic and political context in Senegal and its capital city, Dakar, some history on structural adjustment, decentralization, and urban planning and management in Dakar, and finally a discussion of informality in the city, one of Enda’s focal concerns.

2.1. Economic and Political Overview of Senegal and Dakar

Senegal is a French-speaking country located on the westernmost tip of Africa, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the east, Mauritania to the north, Mali to the West, Guinea to the southeast, Guinea-Bissau to the south, and the Gambia, which is surrounded by Senegal along the River Gambia. In 2008, the country’s population was estimated at around 12 million people, with a population growth rate of 2.3% annually. The same year, Senegal’s GDP was estimated at US $13.9 billion. With few natural resources, Senegal’s economy is dominated by a few sectors, including peanuts, the chemical industry (i.e. phosphates), tourism, fisheries, and services (i.e. telecommunications and construction). In 2007, the country was experiencing real GDP growth of 4.8% annually.

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5 Much of the information in this section comes from the CIA World FactBook on Senegal.
6 In comparison, the annual world population growth rate in 2008 was approximately 1.2%, while that of the African continent was about 2.4%.
Though economic performance has been strong in recent years, the majority of Senegal’s population is quite impoverished. As estimated by the United Nations Development Program, Senegal’s GDP per capita in 2005 was US $1,792 PPP\(^7\), with 56.2% of the population living below $2 per day and 33.4% of the population below the national poverty line. The adult literacy rate was 39.3% and life expectancy at birth 61.6 years. With a UNDP Human Development Index value of 0.499, Senegal ranks 156\(^{th}\) out of 177 countries with data.

Senegal has one of the highest rates of urbanization—defined as the urban population as a percentage of total population—in West Africa, which at 48% is higher than the average rates for all of sub-Saharan Africa (around 29%).\(^8\) Dakar, the capital city, is Senegal’s largest city and is located on the Cape Verde Peninsula on the Atlantic coast. Its position on the western edge of Africa is advantageous for trade, so Dakar has grown rapidly into a major regional port. The population of the Dakar metropolitan area in 2005, according to official estimates, was 2.45 million people, or roughly 21% of Senegal’s total population. Thus, one-fifth of Senegal’s population lives in an area that makes up 0.28% of the national territory.

This high population density is due to the fact that Dakar is the major administrative center, housing the National Assembly and the Presidential Palace, while at the same time the industrial, commercial and financial hub of the country. Despite land management, regional development, and decentralization policies that have sought to deconcentrate the capital city, the Dakar region contains more than 46% of the Senegalese civil service, 97% of commerce and transportation salaries, 96% of bank employees, 95% of industrial and commercial enterprises,

\(^7\) Purchasing Power Parity

and 87% of permanent jobs, according to the Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan created by the Ministry of Urbanism and Land Management.

During the French colonial period, which lasted until 1960, Dakar served as the point of contact between France and its territories in Africa. The city of Dakar is one of 67 communes in Senegal, created by the French colonial administration in 1887. The commune of Dakar was preserved by the Senegalese state after independence in 1960, though its limits have changed over time. The current limits of the Dakar were established in 1983. The commune of Dakar is at the same time a département, of which there are 34 in Senegal. Départements have no political power and function as administrative structures of the central government, responsible for some administrative services and overseeing the activities of the communes within their boundaries. The département of Dakar is composed of four arrondissements: Almadies, Grand Dakar, Parcelles-Assainies, and Plateau/Gorée (downtown Dakar). Like the départements, arrondissements are local administrative structures of the central state. The Dakar region, one of the 13 regions in the country, contains 4 départements composed of 9 arrondissements containing 47 communes d’arrondissement. For a map of Dakar and a complete listing of its administrative units, see Appendixes 4 and 5. The département of Pikine is the most populated, with 36.8% of the region’s population, followed by Dakar, with 33.5%, Guediawaye, with 17.6%, and Rufisque, with 12.08% (Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan). Much of Enda’s activities have focused in the densely populated and poorer areas on the outskirts of Dakar, including Pikine, Guediawaye, and Rufisque.

For 40 years following independence, Senegalese politics were dominated by the Socialist Party of Senegal, or PS. Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal’s first president after independence, established the Senegal Progressive Union party, or UPS. In 1976, he changed
the name of the party to PS, the Socialist Party. When Senghor stepped down in 1980, at the age of 74, elections were held and Abdou Diouf, also from PS, was elected the second president of Senegal. By the end of the 1990s, Senegal’s citizenry was tired of Diouf’s policies and of the PS party. In 2000, Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), defeated Abdou Diouf to become the third and current president of the country. Two years later, in May of 2002, Wade also ran and was elected president of the Dakar regional council, while another PDS leader, Pape Diop, was elected mayor of Dakar. Thus from 2002 until very recently, Dakar was controlled by the ruling PDS party.

The vendor riots in November, 2007, were the first major public expression of frustration with the current government, particularly by the urban poor. Since the riots, there have been increasing demonstrations in Dakar and the poor neighborhoods around its periphery, protesting everything from increasing food prices to electricity shortages. Disillusionment with Wade’s PDS party showed clearly in regional and municipal elections held in March, 2009. PDS suffered striking losses all over the country including in Dakar, where Wade’s son, Karim Wade, was running for mayor on the PDS ticket. The capital city will now be controlled by a coalition of opposition parties.

2.2. Structural Adjustment, Political Decentralization, and the Changing Role of the State in Urban Planning and Public Management

Since the early 1980s, two macro economic and political processes—structural adjustment and decentralization—have had significant impacts on the economy and governance of Dakar, Senegal’s capital city.
2.2.1. Structural Adjustment

At independence, Senegal's economy was dominated by the peanut industry, which accounted for 78 percent of export receipts, more than 50 percent of cultivated land, and at least 25 percent of GDP (Somerville, 1991). Senegal experienced severe, recurrent droughts between 1968 and 1982, causing declines in production and prices paid to peanut cultivators. As a result, rural peasants began migrating to the city, "swelling the slums of Dakar and its environs" (Somerville, 1991). Yet, in a country dominated by one agricultural sector, secondary industries were underdeveloped and not able to provide employment to all those displaced by the crisis in the peanut industry.

The government attempted to provide relief by subsidizing the cost of basic necessities like imported wheat and rice products. At the same time, the government stimulated employment generation through the creation of public and para-statal enterprises. By the 1980s, "these government-owned companies represented 20 percent of the modern sector GDP and employed 35,000 workers" (Somerville, 1991). Unfortunately, these enterprises quickly produced operating deficits, rather than surpluses. At the same time, prices for Senegal's exports fluctuated while the prices of its imports rose.

To deal with these increasing deficits, Senegal's government began to borrow from foreign financial institutions, primarily private banks. By 1978, the country was in a debt crisis, so in 1979 it signed a Medium-Term Economic and Financial Recovery Plan (PREF) with the IMF and a structural adjustment loan (SAL) with the World Bank. When Senegal was unable to meet the objectives of these programs, the loans were cancelled, and more adjustment measures were instituted over the next decade. New medium term adjustment plans were signed for the periods 1985-1989 and 1989-1992, consisting of the following reforms: "(1) reduction of
government expenditures, (2) improvement of public sector management, (3) development of the
growth sectors, and (4) mobilization of domestic savings for investment” (Somerville, 1991). In
order to reduce government expenditures, the government began reducing subsidies on
foodstuffs and limiting the growth of the civil service. They also sought liberalization of the
Senegalese economy through privatization of industries and increased flexibility of labor
regulations.

These reforms had significant impacts on the Senegalese population. Public and private
enterprises shrunk or closed as a result of austerity measures and reduced access to credit,
increasing unemployment rates. Between 1984 and 1995, the number of job losses due to the
restructuring of public and private enterprises, to the closing of businesses, and to voluntary
departures, grew to 40,000 (Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan, 2003). With limited subsidies, the
price of basic foodstuffs rose, and wages did not increase enough to keep up. In addition, social
services like education and health care that had been provided by the government free of charge
began to charge user fees, increasing the financial strain felt by ordinary citizens.

2.2.2. Decentralization

On the heels of structural adjustment reforms came calls in the development community
for greater political decentralization to improve public accountability, responsiveness, and public
sector efficiency in developing countries. Of course, democratization and decentralization have
taken a variety of forms:

Democratization across Africa is associated in one way or another with
decentralization to regional/provincial and local governments, as well as
to private business and non-governmental organizations. This, however,
can mean many things ranging from fully-fledged political
decentralization (devolution) through to administrative decentralization
(deconcentration), and to privatization (selling off to private for-profit
Democracy was deemed a necessary component of market-driven economic development, particularly in the impoverished and often conflict-laden countries on the African continent. Senegal is one of the few African countries that have had a peaceful, democratic system of governance since independence, though democratic “deepening” there has been a gradual process. “Senegal’s approach to democratization, rather than being revolutionary, has built upon a long tradition of carefully crafted plans for incremental change” (Vengroff and Ndiaye, 1998).

While Senegal had been divided into local administrative units for decades, it was only in 1996 that significant power was instilled in local governments. That year, the Parliament of Senegal voted in support of a massive reform of administrative and political divisions of the country. Regions, which had previously been local administrative structures of the central state, were made independent political units, with elected regional councils and presidents. They were granted responsibility for regional economic development, transportation, and environmental issues and for coordinating the actions of the communes beneath them. The Parliament decided that the commune of Dakar was too large and too populated, with almost 1 million residents, to be managed as one municipality. Thus in August, 1996, they divided Dakar into 19 communes d'arrondissement, which function like other communes and are coordinated by the larger commune of Dakar.

In addition, the 1996 reforms included important electoral reforms that allowed for greater diversity of representation. Previously, local government representatives were selected through party lists, ensuring that all seats would be controlled by a single party (Vengroff and Ndiaye, 1998). As a result, “aware that they owe their electoral victory to the party that short-listed them, the elected members are accountable to the political party rather than to the
The 1996 reforms redesigned the system such that half of the seats would be allocated on the basis of party list while the other half would be allocated through proportional representation. In theory, this allows for greater electoral competition and more legitimate representation.

With decentralization, however, have come some significant challenges for local governments in Senegal. The central government has transferred responsibility and technical capacity for key functions, like economic development, yet without sufficient resources to respond fully to the demands of their citizens. As stated by Halfani (1997), “urban governments have been allocated very weak financial bases, and they have been assigned to perform functions which do not match their resource disposition.” Multiple different correspondents of mine in Senegal, from both political and technical municipal government officials to someone at the UN-HABITAT regional office, noted the lack of development capacity at the local level.

In addition, while local governments are officially responsible for land management and planning, they have no legal mechanisms with which to enforce their plans. According to one official at the Dakar regional office of land management, their office is responsible for all spatial modifications in the region, from conception through construction, which are meant to follow the regional plan. However, he stated, “This is our role, theoretically. But in practice it is different. People say ‘everyone does land management except the office of land management.’” Another official at the urban planning division of the Ministry of Planning stated that local governments prepare development plans, “but a lot of people don’t consult the plans when making decisions.” Thus local governments may be “closer” to their citizens but quite limited in their ability to better serve them.
2.3. Urban Informality: The “Popular Economy” and Irregular Settlements

The rapid growth of Dakar has been taking place in the context of a weakened national economy and political decentralization, creating increased stresses on the city and its populations, particularly the urban poor. As in other African cities, “A prolonged period of macro economic stagnation reduced the capacity of the urban economy to effectively deploy the labour forces, to promote capital formation and accumulation, and to maintain the socio-political equilibrium necessary for sustainable urban development” (Halfani, 1997). While an economic challenge, this also produces a governance challenge. “In addition to the perennial problem of weak institutional capacities, urban authorities from Cape Town to Cairo and Dar Es Salaam to Dakar, demonstrate a serious absence of popular trust, lack of accountability, weak institutional capacities and an extremely poor delivery record” (Halfani, 1997).

The result has been increased reliance on informal employment and housing in the city. As described by Halfani (1997):

The intensified labour crisis in the formal sector of the African urban centres is leading to the increased ‘informalisation’ of socio-economic activities in the centres. In the majority of African cities today, more than three-quarters of the basic needs (shelter, subsistence incomes, services such as water, energy, neighborhood security, sewage removal, transportation and, in some cases, land) of the bulk of the population are provided by the informal sector. This implies that the majority of urban residents are accommodated in squatter housing, and they derive their incomes in petty commodity production activities. The pervasiveness of ‘informalism’ has reduced the scope of formal management to a very minimum sphere of urban life.

Swilling (1997) adds:

As many African cities are growing without a concomitant growth in the formal economic sector and without a significant expansion of public service provision or urban planning, the result will be increasingly large urban populations who survive by creating their own urban systems and livelihoods without regard to what the law may require or public policy intends.
This effect is clearly visible in Senegal. According to UN-HABITAT data in 2007, out of Senegal’s approximately 5.5 million urban dwellers, 76%, or roughly 4.2 million people, live in informal settlements. A 2006 World Bank study of employment in Senegal found that 95% of people actively employed work in the informal sector.

Though comprehensive and recent data is difficult to find in Senegal, we can explore the housing and employment situation in the Dakar region through household data collected in 2001 by the Ministry of Urbanism and Land Management for their Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan. Table 3 shows the population, surface area, and housing units in each of Dakar’s arrondissements.

**Table 3: Housing Distribution in the Dakar Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Surface Area (Hectares)</th>
<th>Population Density (people/hectare)</th>
<th>Total Housing Units</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Housing Density (Housing Units/Hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>215,343</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>29,254</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand-Dakar</td>
<td>253,434</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>27,290</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almadies</td>
<td>121,006</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13,914</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcelles Assainies</td>
<td>237,617</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>45,975</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiaroye</td>
<td>239,053</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>31,269</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagoudane</td>
<td>461,648</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>60,080</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niayes</td>
<td>209,859</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19,698</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guediawaye</td>
<td>435,350</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>56,595</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufisque</td>
<td>160,860</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>19,303</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargny</td>
<td>41,220</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebikotane</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Zone</td>
<td>76,940</td>
<td>30,330</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,925</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>2,471,730</td>
<td>53,640</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>315,347</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table, it is clear that *arrondissements* like Dagoudane⁹ and Guediawaye are the most populated in Dakar, both in terms of population and in terms of housing units. Table 4 shows a breakdown in type of housing by area in three of the four *départements* in the Dakar region.

**Table 4: Housing Typology (in Hectares)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Dakar</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Pikine</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rufisque</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular (Buildings, Villas)</td>
<td>4674.14</td>
<td>62.28</td>
<td>2951.99</td>
<td>89.05</td>
<td>1482.29</td>
<td>42.95</td>
<td>239.96</td>
<td>32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.15</td>
<td>31.71</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous</td>
<td>1633.13</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>98.32</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1464.23</td>
<td>42.42</td>
<td>70.58</td>
<td>9.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>89.65</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Type</td>
<td>1196.69</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>264.36</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>504.74</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>427.63</td>
<td>57.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>42.17</td>
<td>35.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7503.97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3314.67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3451.12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>738.17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the measure is hectares rather than units, it is difficult to get a sense of which housing type dominates. For example, spontaneous type houses may be smaller and therefore cover smaller surface area, but they may dominate in number in certain areas. What the table does show is that 21.76% of the area of the Dakar region is occupied by spontaneous housing units, and the percentage of spontaneous housing units is particularly large in Pikine. Dakar has the largest percentage of regular type housing, whereas housing in Rufisque is predominantly of the village type.

Employment data provide some additional information about lives and livelihoods of the Dakar population. Table 5 shows the number and percentage of jobs by city and arrondissement.

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⁹ To give readers a sense of the reputation of neighborhoods like these, “Dagoudane” in the native language Wolof literally means “he who slows down will fall.”
Table 5: Location of Employment in the Dakar Region in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or Zone</th>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Permanent and Temporary Jobs</th>
<th>Regional Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dakar Plateau</td>
<td>54,450</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand-Dakar</td>
<td>53,875</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almadies</td>
<td>31,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcelles Assainies</td>
<td>84,250</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>224,095</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37.86</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikine Thiaroye</td>
<td>70,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagoudane</td>
<td>102,525</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niayes</td>
<td>44,125</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>217,550</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>36.78</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guediawaye Guediawaye</td>
<td>91,275</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufisque</td>
<td>25,680</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargny</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebikotane</td>
<td>4,860</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Zone</td>
<td>16,230</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>591,790</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows that most employment opportunities are located in Dakar, Pikine, and Guediawaye. In addition, the most densely populated arrondissements, Dagoudane and Guediawaye, are also where the most employment opportunities are located, suggesting that people live in relatively close proximity to where they work.

We can also glean some important information by looking at the sectoral breakdown of jobs in Dakar. The region of Dakar contains 39,000 civil servants in the public sector, more than 46% of the total Senegalese civil service. Table 6 shows the breakdown of job type in the private sector.
Construction and public works generate the greatest number of jobs, followed by commerce and services, transportation and communications. The expansion of the private sector is constrained by regulatory mechanisms and financial pressures, which constrain investment, according to the Ministry of Planning. As a result, the private sector competes with the larger informal sector. Table 7 shows the breakdown of job type in Dakar’s informal sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Employment in the Modern Private Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-industry and food production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Clearly, informal employment accounts for more jobs than the private and the public sector combined. The importance of this sector is likely understated in the available data.
2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided some background on Dakar and the political economy in which Enda has developed and the vendor riots occurred. Structural adjustment, decentralization, and growing urban informality have had significant impacts, in terms of both poverty and governance. These macro dynamics explain, to some extent, why more and more urban Senegalese must create their own mechanisms for survival through activities like informal street vending. They also have influenced Enda’s activities and approaches. Interestingly, it could be expected that decentralization, by bringing government closer to the people, might have reduced the importance of an organization like Enda. Yet, the newly created local governments were weak, and therefore needed assistance from Enda. This issue and others are explored in the next chapter, which provides an analysis of Enda’s evolving institutional relationships.
CHAPTER 3
EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDA, POPULATIONS, AND THE STATE

Enda’s relationships with both the urban poor and the state, the principal actors involved in the events surrounding the vendor riots, have changed over time. Exploration of the evolution of Enda’s relationship with these institutional actors yields insights into the organization’s current position of influence in public policy and management in Dakar. In order to analyze these changes, it is important to think about the variety of roles played by NGOs like Enda vis-à-vis the populations with whom they work\textsuperscript{10} and the state.

Many authors have described the complex relationship between NGOs and states, particularly in the developing world (Clark, 1993; Fisher, 1997; Najam, 2000; Sanyal, 1994; Tendler, 1995, 1982). According to Najam (2000), NGO-government relationships usually take one of four forms: cooperation, confrontation, complementarity, and co-optation. At one extreme, NGOs and states may be in constant conflict and competition, engendering mutual suspicion and mistrust. At the other extreme, NGOs may be nothing more than extensions of the state apparatus, at time created by government officials to serve their interests. In the case of an NGO like Enda, this relationship is anything but static and unidimensional. As stated by Fisher (1997), “While the moniker ‘nongovernmental organization’ suggests autonomy from government organizations, NGOs are often intimately connected with their home governments in relationships that are both ambivalent and dynamic, sometimes cooperative, sometimes contentious, sometimes both simultaneously.”

\textsuperscript{10} People use many different words for the populations with whom NGOs work, from “stakeholders” and “communities” to “clients” and “beneficiaries.” Most people at Enda use, in French, “populations de la base,” so I have decided to use the simple “populations.”
The relationship between NGOs and their populations is also multifaceted. In much of Africa, and perhaps all over the world, there is “a pervasive assumption that NGOs equal civil society” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). They are assumed to be “of the people,” because it is in the interest of both their donors and NGOs themselves to believe that these organizations are close to, and therefore can serve the interests of, marginalized populations who aren’t being adequately served by the state. “In order to survive in the highly competitive environment of the development industry, African NGO leaders needed to maintain their connections to ‘the people’” (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). In the same vein, as stated by Houtzager and Lavalle (2009), “The presupposition that civil society actors are a continuous extension of the social world eliminates the need to ask ‘in whose name’ do civil society organizations speak, and ‘through what mechanisms’ is their political representation authorized and held to account.”

Non-governmental organizations face a legitimacy challenge when it comes to political representation (Houtzager and Lavalle, 2009). They are not elected representatives and they are often not membership-based, yet they almost always claim to act in the interest of certain populations. Making “a unilateral claim to represent the publics with which or for which they work,” these organizations engage in what Houtzager and Lavalle call “assumed representation.” In a survey of civil society organizations in Brazil, Houtzager and Lavalle found that mediation was the argument most commonly asserted by such organizations to justify assumed representation. They support their claims of assumed representation with “the need to play a mediation role to connect excluded segments of the population to the state and the political-electoral arena.”

Since its founding, Enda has been negotiating its role vis-à-vis both the populations with which they work and the state. This is a challenge faced by many NGOs, but particularly for an
NGO like Enda that historically had connections with high-ranking government officials but also sought to be deeply connected to people on the ground. There is a pervasive feeling, both inside the organization and external to it, that in its earlier years, Enda was closer to both populations and to the national government, granting them greater legitimacy and influence than they have today around issues of urban development in Dakar. At the same time, Enda entities like RUP, Ecopole, and Ecopop now have stronger relationships with local governments who, as a result of decentralization, have more responsibility for planning and service provision. The important questions addressed in this chapter include: Does Enda represent the interests of marginalized urban populations? How do they claim their legitimacy? Does Enda have the ability to influence decision-makers or have they simply become a broker, assisting the state in carrying out its policies?

I argue that, like the organizations surveyed by Houtzager and Lavalle, Enda would also justify its assumed representation with its ability to act as advocate and mediator, but, as a non-governmental organization, it has been careful not to engage in politics directly. As the organization has become more cautious in its relationship with the state, its relationship with local populations has also changed, limiting Enda’s ability to justify its role and act as an effective mediator. In the organization’s earlier eras, Enda’s connections with high-ranking officials and strong links to the poor were important in terms of the types of resources it could access, as well as its capacity to influence relevant policies. As these conditions changed, with the election of a new political party and the death of Enda’s founding leader, the organization lost connection to the national government and was forced to find other actors (i.e. local governments, different donors) to both ensure Enda’s survival and deliver to its constituencies.
3.1. Early Proximity to the National Government and the Urban Poor

The case of Enda is an interesting one because the NGO was born “at the top,” but also quickly acquired legitimacy “at the bottom.” Enda’s relationship with the post-independence Senegalese government granted them access to space, people, and resources, in addition to the ear of high-ranking policy makers, allowing them to serve their poor, urban constituencies.

3.1.1. Enda’s Founding Intimacy with National Decision-Makers

As discussed in Chapter 1, Enda grew out of an intimate relationship with Senegal’s national government. Jacques Bugnicourt, Enda’s founder, had been in university in France during the 1950s with many Senegalese post-independence leaders, including the first and second presidents and various ministers. After independence in 1960, one of Bugnicourt’s former classmates, Cheikh Hamidou Kane (a Senegalese national), was named Minister of Planning in Senegal, with oversight of three divisions: Planning and Finance, Land Management, and Rural Animation. Because of Bugnicourt’s extensive training in land management and socialist, anti-colonist politics, Minister Kane asked him to come to Senegal as Director of Land Management. Bugnicourt accepted and came to Senegal in 1961 to begin his task of organizing Senegal’s interior into structures of development as opposed to structures of control, as had been used by the French colonial regime.

Minister Kane left the government, and Senegal, for a period of time between 1972 and 1976. When he returned, Bugnicourt had also left the government to head Enda, which at that point was a joint project of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the African Institute of Economic Development and Planning (IADEP) in Dakar, and the Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA). Bugnicourt was in the process of making Enda its own, independent NGO and asked his friend Minister Kane for assistance. Kane facilitated the signing of a contract between Enda and the national government granting Enda international diplomatic status and rent-free government-owned office space for the organization’s headquarters. While retaining his ministerial position, Kane also agreed to serve as president of Enda’s Board of Directors, a post he occupied until 2006.

NGOs are typically thought to emerge as initiatives of grassroots, community-based groups. This is not at all the origin of Enda, making it a unique case. At its inception, the Senegalese who were aware of the organization viewed Enda as a support structure, a think-tank, for the Ministry of Planning and therefore closely tied to the national state. Because of Bugnicourt’s personal relationships with many high-ranking government officials, including the country’s first president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, and his successor, Abdou Diouf, who took office in 1980, he had privileged access to decision-making circles. One Senegalese researcher told me that Bugnicourt was quite close to Abdou Diouf because they had the same philosophies, friends, etc.

Why did the state work with Enda? While I have limited evidence with which to answer this question, it is plausible that partnership with Enda allowed the state to serve, indirectly, an important constituency: the urban poor. In the 1970s, when Enda was founded, researchers and social theorists were arguing that instead of from rural peasants, as Marx and other had argued, revolution would come from the cities. For a president like Senghor, who was primarily concerned with rural development, supporting the work of an NGO like Enda could have been a way to appease urban constituencies and prevent discontent.
Enada was often asked to play conflict resolution or mediation roles. A good example of this was the first project of Enada RUP (Relay for Participatory Urban Development), one of Enada’s first entities. RUP was founded in 1983 by the Executive Secretariat to facilitate participatory urban land management and planning in Dakar and smaller cities around the country. RUP’s first project was in a small city in southern Senegal, called Oussouye, which was experiencing conflicts with agricultural populations on the outskirts of the city over the city’s expansion. The Senegalese Ministry of Planning asked Enada for help in dealing with this conflict. Malick Gaye, the head of RUP, and the entity’s small team were joined in Oussouye by a civil servant from the Ministry of Urbanism. According to this former civil servant, who joined RUP full-time after the Oussouye project, the Ministry wanted its own representative involved in this land management project because “at that time the state didn’t fully trust NGOs.” Whatever the reason, the presence of a Ministry official with the Enada team undoubtedly leant the RUP staff a certain authority with local decision makers in Oussouye, allowing them to carry out their work.

Working with the local prefecture and populations both in the city and those living on its outskirts, the team facilitated an inclusive planning process that defined the boundaries of the city and laid out plans for its future expansion. This project in Oussouye, completed in 1988, was nationally recognized as one of the first to address local development in an urban area in a way that reduced conflict through stakeholder participation. According to a project manager at RUP, this project was an important success for RUP because it demonstrated the importance of

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11 RUP’s founder, architect Malick Gaye, had been trained by a professor at Dakar’s school of architecture who promoted action research, driven by communities for the purposes of practical application, and respected local culture and conceptions of livelihoods, housing, etc. Gaye was inspired by this approach and after receiving his diploma, he viewed Enada as an NGO that would allow him to continue to work according to these principles.
involving community members and taking local cultural factors into account in land management and planning processes, practices that were not common at the time.

In return for access and resources, Enda helped the Senegalese government fulfill some important functions. According to one member of Enda's Board of Directors, "the quality of Enda's work was appreciated by the government." For example, Enda took on the issue of HIV/AIDS in the mid-1980s, earlier than in many African countries, organizing widespread prevention education campaigns. The government recognized the importance of Enda's actions and have, to this day, credited Senegal's low HIV prevalence rate (at less than 1% of the population, compared to 15-25% in many southern African countries) to Enda's early and enduring efforts. Enda was also responsible for raising "right to the city" issues (i.e. downtown housing and economic opportunities for the poor) and was able to significantly alter the government's response to informal settlements. For 10-15 years prior to the early 2000s, no slums were destroyed, due in large part to Enda's organizing and support of a slum-dwellers association, ACIDAK, and awareness-raising in the government.

3.1.2. Early Proximity to the Urban Poor

In its early era, people in Senegal and beyond regarded Enda as intimately connected to marginalized, urban populations. Enda's founder was a white, French man, Jacques Bugnicourt, with strong international and governmental ties; not exactly the profile of "the people." Yet the organization was viewed from early in its existence as an "indigenous" organization because of Bugnicourt's local affiliates and their approach. As stated by the mayor of one of Dakar's neighborhoods, "Enda was born in the African context and began to take on issues that no one

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12 See Footnote 2, Chapter 1 for an explanation of the "right to the city" concept.
else had yet engaged with," like inclusionary urban land management and the popular economy. At the same time, Enda’s relationship with the national government allowed the organization to deliver to its constituencies.

Enda demonstrated its commitment to vulnerable populations by both securing their basic needs and defending their rights in the face of the authorities. In the 1980s and 1990s, Enda was well-known for their work securing land rights for the urban poor and for the service improvements, like drinking water and sanitation, they made in poor neighborhoods. For example, soon after completion of the Oussouye project, RUP became implicated in Enda’s neighborhood planning of Dalifort, a slum between Dakar and Pikine that was being upgraded with support from the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). RUP was responsible for securing women’s rights to land and was the only actor present who pushed for women’s perspective (i.e. on childcare, food preparation, drinking water, economic activities, etc.) to be taken into account in neighborhood restructuring.

RUP continued to expand its activities in neighborhood upgrading and service provision. Around 1990, Bugnicourt asked the RUP team to see what was going on in Rufisque, a town on the outskirts of Dakar, which was known to be experiencing significant coastal encroachment, threatening a poor fishing community on the outskirts of town. RUP sent university student interns who partnered with a local association of secondary school students to conduct studies of the phenomenon. The studies revealed significant annual increases in sea levels, and RUP felt it important to address the problem. Together with the population, the technically-equipped RUP team constructed nine dikes to prevent further erosion. According to one community leader in Rufisque who had been a local student involved with the project, the population was deeply
committed to and involved in the construction of the dikes because they knew the problem was theirs. This grassroots initiative was the entry of Enda into Rufisque.

While the local population and RUP team were working on the dike project, they recognized that the beaches were dirty due to a lack of sanitation and waste removal services in the neighborhood. They conducted a study and found that eighty percent of the houses didn’t have sanitation services and the neighborhood was excluded from the public system. So they decided together to start a sanitation program. In 1990-1991, RUP secured financing for the project from the Canadian International Development Agency and the European Union. The RUP team, in cooperation with the community groups who had worked on the dike project, organized a local pilot committee to oversee the project. Their first action was to purchase a horse wagon to go from house to house and gather household waste throughout the neighborhood. The municipality created a transit place for the waste and took responsibility for its removal. In addition, RUP and the pilot committee established a revolving fund for household sanitation. RUP named this fund FOCAUP (Community Funds for Sanitation in Poor Neighborhoods), which operated as a loan mechanism for poor households to construct sanitation facilities. Because of the high water table that risked contamination if traditional technologies were used, the RUP team found it necessary to create new technology for sanitation. They developed a septic tank model that was installed in more than two hundred households. This work in Rufisque was transformative for RUP, because they became the first NGO in Dakar to work on issues of waste removal, sanitation, and waste water.

RUP’s involvement with these issues grew and became their signature as the entity’s activities were scaled up. Other peripheral neighborhoods close to Rufisque saw the project and solicited RUP’s support in installing sanitation and waste removal systems. For example, in
1992 residents from the neighborhood of Castor approached RUP and together, with support from local officials, they undertook a similar project. According to someone on the sanitation pilot committee in the first Rufisque project, this was an important moment because there was a change in institutional management of the program. The municipal government of Rufisque issued a decree that established a voluntary health committee, which became responsible for the program. This health committee did monitoring, evaluation, and planning. As the use of the sanitation technology became more widespread, RUP was able to phase themselves out of management issues, which were left in the hands of the local leaders. Use of the technology has spread throughout Dakar and into other countries in West Africa.

As demonstrated by RUP’s early work, Enda entities developed deep relationships with populations and delivered to them. According to a director at the African Institute for Urban Management (IAGU), another important urban NGO in Senegal, while many civil society organizations have no relationship with the populations they claim to represent, Enda is an organization that has supported marginalized groups over the long term. “Many organizations don’t exist anywhere. They have no roots. NGOs are in the formal sector, but the informal world is where the people are. And they do things spontaneously (i.e. street vendors).” Many people see Enda as an organization that has been able to respond to the realities of urban African life because of its proximity to the urban poor.

Responding to growth of informal economic activity in Dakar and in cities throughout the developing world, in 1990 Enda’s Executive Secretariat decided to create Ecopop to focus on the “popular economy,” Enda’s preferred term for what many call the informal sector. It was headed by a professor of architecture from Dakar’s school of architecture and planning and designed to support, organize, and maximize the value of this sector. Ecopop’s first projects were in the Ex
Rail informal settlement, working with local artisans and Economic Interest Groups (GIE)\textsuperscript{13} in the creation of small-scale enterprises. This work with local economic actors expanded beyond downtown Dakar into peripheral neighborhoods like Pikine, Yeumbeul, and Guinaw Rail. From the beginning, Ecopop focused on training, both technical and socio-political. According to one staff member, "we trained actors, like local associations [i.e. student groups, women’s groups, etc.], so they had their own tools to deal with the issues in their communities." In addition, they did technical training as well in everything from management strategies to small-scale production techniques in sewing, dying, etc. This work on artisanal entrepreneurship propelled Ecopop into the realm of credit, so they began establishing small-scale credit unions in communities.

Participants of these initiatives in Yeumbeul and Guinaw Rail, neighborhoods in Pikine, argued that the work of Ecopop was important for them because it helped them organize and learn to pressure their elected officials. Multiple interviewees in these neighborhoods stated that Ecopop’s work with them helped them understand the meaning of “development” and what it might look like in their communities. This related to the creation of economic opportunities through small, local business, improved public health through sanitation and trash collection, and increased resident participation in local decision-making. In addition, the training of local associations “Taught us how to take care of ourselves; made us responsible,” as stated by a women who had been part of a youth association in Yeumbeul Sud. Her association had set up a theater troupe to raise awareness about development issues and create dialogue with elected representatives. She argued, “The awareness-raising project gave us a different image in the community. They started to see us as leaders, as people concerned about the community.”

\textsuperscript{13} In Senegal, GIE is a legal status for small businesses and cooperatives.
the same time, “With the theater, people better understood the role of the mayor and how to interact as citizens.”

As Enda’s activities with the urban poor grew in number and scale, the Secretariat Executive decided to create Ecopole in attempts to unite this work. In the early 1990s, Bugnicourt and the Mayor of Dakar engaged in a series of reflections about how to create productive spaces for the urban poor. They came up with the idea of the “ecopole,” “eco” for “economic” and “pole” for “center”. Their vision was to create multiple ecopoles throughout Dakar, each one with a different specialization. However, according to one of Ecopole’s earliest staff members, the state stalled the process and eventually was unable to come through with funding or support. Yet Bugnicourt was determined to make the vision a reality, so in 1994 Enda purchased an abandoned factory in downtown Dakar, just across from the Ex Rail slum, to create the first, and what would be the only, Enda Ecopole.

Ecopole opened officially in 1996 as a training, research, and meeting space for the poorest thirty percent of Dakar’s population, namely slum dwellers and actors in the “popular economy.” In some ways, Ecopole was an evolution of Ecopop, with a focus on disadvantaged neighborhoods. Its mission, according to one of Ecopole’s coordinators, was to “act as a mediator between the authorities and populations in poor and informal settlements, but also to train a generation of citizens and organize them to become their own interlocutors.” Ecopole was very much a pet project of Jacques Bugnicourt, who brought some of his closest friends within Enda, most of them social workers, to lead the center’s activities. Bugnicourt set Ecopole’s strategic agenda and secured all of Ecopole’s funding through Enda’s strategic funds, while staff served as the executors.
In its first five or six years of operation, Ecopole was a flurry of activity, both on-site and in its target neighborhoods. The space was used for training youth in on-site artisanal workshops, organizing meetings of slum dwellers to facilitate the creation ACIDAK, Dakar’s first and only association of slum dwellers, and educating elected officials about the “right to the city.” Beyond Ecopole’s walls, staff and volunteers established “street-corner” schools for kids in poor neighborhoods and summer camps for school children whose families couldn’t afford to pay, supported slum improvement projects throughout Dakar, and mobilized poor communities in defense of their rights.

3.2. Gradual Distancing from both the National Government and the Urban Poor

In its early era, Enda’s proximity to the national government granted them legitimacy with populations on the ground and vice versa. The organization’s position, however, has changed over time. While the organization used to have more influence vis-à-vis the national government, in the domain of urban development in Dakar it now seems a mere contractor or broker. It no longer has the direct ear of the highest level policy-makers, which has influenced its ability to deliver to its populations.

3.2.1. The Election of the Opposition Party and Enda’s Fall from Grace

Enda’s relationship with the national government changed significantly in 2000, when Senegal elected its third president, Abdoulaye Wade, from the opposition party. According to some interviewees, Wade came to office with a suspicion of many Senegalese NGOs and established a clear distance from Enda in particular. As stated by one observer, “With Wade, Enda was categorized, generalized, and they never had a chance to speak.” Though none of my
interviewees stated the reasons for this distance explicitly, it seems obvious why Wade, as the first president elected from an opposition party, would have been mistrustful of Enda. Given that Bugnicourt had had close personal relationships with important members of the PS party, it is understandable that Wade may have had suspicions about Enda’s political neutrality, despite its “non-governmental” status. It is also true that Wade had been elected by the urban poor, who he promised to support, so he may have wanted his party to engage with this population itself instead of through NGO conduits like Enda.

Also important, however, were conflicts about investment and development in Dakar and, specifically, the conflict over one informal settlement in Dakar called Baraka. Wade has focused his presidency on large infrastructure and investment projects like a new airport, toll highway, and housing developments. To make way for such development, 5 or 6 of the 11 slums Enda had been working in for years were cleared between 2000 and 2005. Early in his first term, Wade ordered that a long-standing informal settlement called Baraka, in the middle of a high-value planned development near downtown Dakar, be cleared. Baraka was also a community of great importance to Enda, one in which they had worked for decades and of particularly personal significance to Bugnicourt. According to one Enda board member, “When Wade took power, Jacques [Bugnicourt] was ready to use force to defend Baraka.” While Wade was on a trip to France, authorities brought in bulldozers to take down Baraka. Bugnicourt attempted to mobilize his international network, but according to a researcher at UCAD, none of Bugnicourt’s friends had access to Wade. So Bugnicourt called the French media and made contact with an old friend of his who was a Minister in France. That Minister, in turn, connected with Wade in France and pressured him not to raze the slum, that the consequences would be terrible. Wade called the authorities in Senegal and told them to leave Baraka. After that, according to the researcher at
UCAD, “Enda retreated to avoid conflict, and things quieted down, but they fell from grace” of the central government.

Some would argue that Enda entities working on urban issues in Dakar have moved away from highly politicized actions like mobilizing the urban poor and defending slums from clearance to avoid conflict with the national government. Fisher (1997) argues that this is common for NGOs, particularly those that have had historically close relationships with their governments. “The vulnerability of their position as beneficiaries of outside funding and support may make NGOs less willing to advocate positions that run counter to those taken by the agencies funding them or their home governments.” According to a researcher at UCAD, “Enda moved away from populism to become more technical and policy-oriented; they became an implementing agency to remove the threat to the state.”

However, this populist vs. technical is a false dichotomy. Some of Enda’s entities are able to use their technical capacities to their advantage in engaging with both populations and the state. Many of them have close relationships with particular national ministries and participate actively in policy- and decision-making around specific issues with relevance to populations on the ground. For example, in 2005-2006, the Senegalese government launched the PEPAM program to focus on the millennium goals for water and sanitation. RUP helped define standards for the state, and their sanitation technology was adopted and reproduced. An entity like Diapol coordinates a regional network on fisheries that works closely with both local fishermen and the Senegalese Fisheries Ministry. Diapol’s approach is sectoral, allowing them to achieve an important deepening of comparative advantage in a few specific domains (i.e. fisheries, cotton, transborder cooperation)—the opposite of what many NGOs, including other Enda entities, do.
Yet in the domain of urban policy issues like land management and the informal sector, Enda’s has not developed this comparative advantage and, as a result, its influence appears weaker than it once was. One Senegalese activist stated, “Enda used to be more visible in Dakar. Now, we don’t see their impact in terms of policy change at the city level. Maybe their research is taken into account by decision-makers, but we don’t directly see it.” She continued:

They are an organization that intervenes and tries to push things, but we don’t hear them in political positions against the state. They never take a position about sensitive issues. With their experience, their capacity, and the sum of their knowledge, they could do more in terms of lobbying and pressure. They are avoiding conflict with the state. But if NGOs don’t do [lobbying], who will?

Another researcher at UCAD argued, “They have lost coproduction of national public policy, with more focus internationally. There are many conversations they aren’t involved in now and no one even thinks to involve them.” He provided the example of a workshop held in late 2008 by the government concerning preparation of a national policy on development cooperatives that involved many non-governmental groups, but to which Enda was not invited.

3.2.2. Enda as Depoliticized Development Broker

In some ways, Enda has become a broker between the state and citizens, making it easier for the state to implement its policies but with no opportunity for the organization or populations to influence the policy itself. Many national government officials in the departments of housing, urban planning, land management, and infrastructure development with whom I spoke argued that the appropriate role for Enda to play in urban areas was in service delivery and social mediation, rather than influencing policy or decision-making.

From the point of view of officials in these domains, working with Enda grants their projects greater legitimacy with community groups. This is an important critique of NGOs, that
they simply ease implementation of top-down policy. According to an official in the Department of Land Management, “We work with Enda to legitimize processes with the population. Enda is more connected to the base, so they aid in communication with populations.” Someone at the Department of Housing said, “Collaboration with Enda allows us direct connection with populations. Often we don’t have the same kind of contact with populations of marginalized neighborhoods.”

A recent example of the role played by Enda entities in a large national project is the case of the Autoroute, in which the responsible government entity, the Agency of Investment Promotion and Large Projects (APIX), asked for Enda’s assistance mediating the conflict around displacement and relocation. Currently, the government of Senegal is engaged in a multi-year, multi-stage construction of a toll highway out of Dakar that has already displaced hundreds of people and will displace thousands more as it is finalized. According to a project director at APIX, the national agency responsible for large investment projects, they recognized that they would need the assistance of local NGOs to assist in the mediation around displacement and relocation of both property owners and economic actors along the project route. They sent out a request for proposals to many different organizations, and selected two of Enda’s entities, Ecopop and Ecopole, to act as the facilitators. The project director stated, “We wanted Enda to be an interface between us and the populations” because of their “experience with social communication.” Enda played a role that the agency could not play because “we are the ones who expropriate.” He said that APIX’s operational group would have been more “brutal,” and that Enda went above and beyond to assure that the displaced populations were adequately compensated and satisfied with the process. According to the project director, “They did a great job, and we would not have been able to do the work as well without them…As a result of
Enda’s work, we didn’t have any fights with the people being displaced. Not that they were happy, but they accepted the money we gave them and left without protest.”

Enda added value to implementation of the Autoroute project because the government agency lacked contact with local communities they knew was necessary in order to complete its project. Yet I wondered if Enda and the community groups there had been involved in any decision-making around location of the highway or processes for its construction. I asked the project director if Enda had been involved in any such decision-making or planning of the autoroute project, and he told me that they weren’t. “No. There are many NGOs in Dakar. But they don’t work on planning, but instead on the ground-level operational issues.” Clearly, Enda is respected by the government for the social “greasing” role it can play, but not for its ability to push policy agendas.

The APIX project director’s response reflects what many national government officials believe is the appropriate role of an NGO like Enda: to assist the state carry out its plans, but not to be involved in the planning. According to an official at the Department of Land Management, “We are here to conceptualize work, but for the ground work [Enda] is important.” Someone at the Planning Department stated, “Our conception is that when an NGO works somewhere, they should conform to the plan of the state. Their activities should follow ours, be complementary, in order to create a positive result.”

This position was echoed by an official in the Department of Housing, who stated that Enda often works on micro problems that don’t fit with the macro policies of the state. For example, the official argued that the slum of Baraka is a precarious place in a planned zone. Enda wants to do in situ upgrading, but the state will have to relocate the people sooner or later to make it a homogenous zone. According to the official, Enda has finally accepted this fact and
the state has bought land for the relocation. It will not be a forced removal, but rather a negotiated process with Enda as an intermediary. The official concluded that Enda “should continue working at the grassroots level, but they should try to link their micro level projects to macro level policies. Policy is defined by the state.”

With its values of participatory development based on local knowledge, Enda does not believe that its role is simply to implement the policies of the state. Yet the statements of government officials above suggest that the organization has had limited success in changing the mentality at the top about how decisions should be made. The fact that Baraka will not be cleared by force, but rather in negotiation with populations, mediated by Enda, shows progress, but Enda is not viewed as an actor to include in decision-making about planning and management in Dakar.

This pressure to conform to the policies of the state is growing for African NGOs, according to Igoe and Kelsall (2005):

In addition to the local blurring of state and NGOs in Africa, increasingly African governments are insisting that NGOs should be nothing more than an extension of the state—that it should be the function of NGOs to carry out state development policy...By extension this also means that NGOs should not become involved in politics.

An NGO like Enda has always claimed to act outside the realm of formal politics, but as the previous discussion suggests, the organization and its activities have been quite political.

This pressure to conform is an unfortunate development, particularly for those who see the role of NGOs as providing an important balance to the hegemony of the state. A representative at one of Enda’s bilateral European donors expressed this concern:

We want to use NGOs as a counterweight to the government. But we feel like they collaborate with more than control the government now. Perhaps they are collaborating more to reduce suspicion. If it brings advantages, collaboration can be good. But control is necessary.
Collaboration shouldn’t diminish the ability and scientific capacity of NGOs to act as counterbalance.

To sum up, in the domain of urban policy in Dakar, Enda’s entities have retreated from the stage, both in terms of counterbalance and in terms of collaboration. They are no longer as visible in their protest activities (i.e. protecting slums from clearances or advocating for the rights of the popular economy), nor are they as influential with national decision-makers setting spatial and economic policies around spatial occupation of the city.

3.2.3. Gradual Distancing from the Urban Poor

Over the past few years, particularly since the death of Bugnicourt, observers in Dakar, from ordinary citizens to social science researchers, have noticed a growing distance between Enda and the urban populations it was thought to be so close to. RUP, the entity founded to facilitate participatory urban land management, is now widely known for its technical contributions to sanitation and wastewater removal in poor neighborhoods. Ecopop, named for the “popular economy,” works more closely with local governments than it does with actors in the informal sector. Ecopole, designed to be a center for organizing and training of marginalized urban populations, has had to supplement these activities with ones that generate more income, like national nutrition projects. Finally, Diapol, with the capacity to research and conceptualize the urban from a sectoral perspective, no longer has an urban program area.

There are a variety of theories about why Enda’s relationship with its populations has shifted, but it is clear that this dynamic relates to the organization’s distancing from the national state. One social science researcher from the national university, UCAD, posited that Enda’s distance from populations it was originally close to is actually the result of a distance from the rest of civil society characteristic of Enda since its founding. Enda wasn’t present in the
frameworks for collaboration between nongovernmental actors like CONGAD, which was created in 1982 to serve as a network of all domestic and international NGOs operating in Senegal. According to this researcher, while Enda was one of the first members of CONGAD, Bugnicourt pulled out of CONGAD early because he wanted total autonomy for his organization. I would also argue that Bugnicourt wanted to preserve his privileged access to the state. As a result, the UCAD researcher argued that Enda has a legitimacy problem with other civil society actors, which weakens them in the face of pressing social and economic challenges. A member of CONGAD stated, “There is a need to consolidate Enda’s activities with other civil society activities. The stronger our relations, the more integrated our initiatives, the greater strength we have.”

There are other explanations for Enda’s distancing from populations. An advisor and coordinator at the SE attributed the shift to a change in approach. “Enda went from a defender of rights to a facilitator of dialogue. We are more in the middle now.” Others argue that Enda’s focus has shifted from the domestic grassroots to the international arena. In some ways, the organization is now more focused on international policies, engaging more in international lobbying for a just world, for example on issues of climate change and strengthening South-South collaborations in problems of the global economy. Other people feel that the distancing is related to the increasing “technocratization” of the organization, something that will be discussed more in Chapter 4. The researcher at UCAD argued that in its earlier phases, “Enda had militant engagement along with technical expertise.” A researcher at the West African Research Center stated that “before they were more focused on vulnerable populations, but now they are working on high level applied research that is grounded in the field.”
For others, Enda’s distancing from marginalized populations is a natural extension of their growth and need for expanded resources. The researcher at UCAD argued that when Enda was smaller and more focused, they were very close to vulnerable groups. With the growth of their sphere of activities, it is more difficult to identify Enda with these groups. He stated, “These groups used to go to Enda to have their voices heard. Now there are NGOs focused on specific issues who people prefer to go to. Enda has become too big for people to know who to go to there to be their interlocutor.” Someone at Ecopole argued that the problem was related to resources. “Before, we were closer to populations because we had the resources. Now we don’t have the resources.” For example, Ecopole used to organize summer camps for poor city kids whose families couldn’t afford the ones offered by private companies. Enda’s camps touched upwards of 10,000 children between 1999 and 2003, but when the Cooperation Francaise decided not to fund this work anymore, the program died. A former employee corroborated that the search for financing has changed Enda’s relationships with their populations. “Enda wants to privatize themselves and they can become seen as a consulting firm. Look for money, do the work, and get the profit. They used to be more militant, more closely aligned with populations.”

While marginalized people still have a considerable amount of trust in Enda and contacts have been maintained, I got the feeling from current and former beneficiaries of Enda’s projects that they remain connected to Enda for material, rather than political, reasons. Enda has financed projects in their communities and local people have benefited. Even after specific projects end, community beneficiaries look to Enda for financial support for smaller scale activities. For example, I spoke to members of a youth association in the Xadim Rassoul slum who were hoping to start a coffee roasting business to support their association and requested a grant from Ecopole. Thus, local populations have material interests in maintaining good relationships with
Enda even if the organization’s activities are not fundamentally tied to or affecting these populations’ lives in a more substantial way.

3.3. Enda’s Increasingly Strong Relationships with Local Governments

Enda’s fall from grace under the new central administration has forced Enda entities to seek out new sources of support and legitimacy. While Enda’s influence with the national government over urban issues may have decreased in the recent past, entities’ relationships with local governments in the Dakar region have grown stronger and more significant. This is an important contribution of Enda, as distinct from other NGOs. For example, Ecopop focuses on training and capacity-building for local elected representatives in areas of participatory planning and governance. Ecopole has worked with 10 communes d’arrondissement in Dakar, helping them write local development plans and build local development committees. One coordinator at Ecopole stated, “Maybe our impact isn’t so great nationally, but in local management, you feel Enda’s presence significantly.” Over time, urban entities like RUP, Ecopop, and Ecopole have moved from working exclusively with grassroots communities to also engaging and working with local officials.

The explanation for this shift is both ideological and practical. In the earlier days of RUP and Ecopop, the heads of these entities believed that the entities should focus on organizing and building the capacities of marginalized populations. These populations would then be able to use their new capacities as citizens to dialogue with and make demands of elected officials, improving governance and delivery of services. The entities learned through experience, however, that this was not an automatic process. For an entity like RUP, lack of coordination with local authorities prevented scale-up. For example, one team member recounted that when
RUP first went into Rufisque, they found a beach littered with waste and a number of neighborhoods without sanitation facilities. So they started a sanitation project with a student’s association in the community, as discussed in Section 3.1.2., creating a revolving fund for the installation of household toilets. At that point, RUP had not invited the mayor to participate because they felt they could handle the project on their own. But as the project began to scale up, it became a lot of work for RUP, and the team recognized a need for more extensive infrastructure and new technologies. It was at that point that they began working with the local government, who was able to support the project and facilitate its broader application.

Through its work with local associations and Economic Interest Groups (GIEs) in the artisanal and small manufacturing sectors, the Ecopop team began to understand that no matter how much demand populations exert on their local governments, if these governments do not have the capacity to respond to these demands, the situation will not improve. The structural adjustment programs and political decentralization discussed in Chapter 2 shrunk the Senegalese central government, which transferred responsibilities to newly-created local governments. Yet these local governments were weak. As stated by someone at Ecopole, “In the context of decentralization, local governments had new mandates, but not enough resources.” They also lacked capacity to utilize resources, according to someone at UN-HABITAT in Dakar. He stated, “We usually don’t give money directly to mayors because they aren’t equipped to use it properly. So we have to use NGOs as intermediaries because local governments don’t yet have the capacities to carry out development projects. They have administrative capacity, but not in terms of development.”

The fact that NGOs like Enda do the work of local governments can be seen as further incapacitating these local governments. Yet Enda entities have worked explicitly to counter that
tendency. Entities like Ecopole and Ecopop began developing programs to build the capacities of local officials and help them fulfill their missions. Ecopole has focused on helping local governments develop land management and local development plans. Ecopop has worked on training and capacity-building of local officials to collaborate with citizen groups and respond collectively and more effectively to the needs of their communities.

From the point of view of local government officials I interviewed, both elected representatives and permanent, technical staff, working with Enda adds value, both technically and politically. According to the municipal secretary for the local government of one of Dakar’s poorer neighborhoods:

>We don’t have the necessary resources to do everything, but we have to respond to social demands. There is a lack of competence in collectivités locales. The personnel are not well-trained because salaries are not high. So we look for partnerships to help us fulfill these demands. This is how our relationship with Enda started, particularly in the domain of health.

Partnering with Enda provides the communes with additional capacity to address their populations’ needs. The mayor of a commune with 34,626 inhabitants stated:

>We are given the responsibility to assist our populations; we are transferred power, transferred competencies, but without an equal transfer of resources. I have a 1 billion CFA budget per year (about US $2 million). The utility of an organization like Enda is that they can touch populations that we don’t have the resources to touch in terms of basic social services.

He went on to say that in certain domains like slum upgrading, health, and social communication, Enda has an “important know-how.”

Additionally, Enda is well-known and well-respected as an organization with strong community ties, so working with them legitimates local governments in the eyes of their constituencies. The mayor of one Dakar commune stated that the reason he works with Enda is because “It’s an NGO born in the Senegalese reality. International NGOs bring campaigns and
priorities from the external arena. Enda’s approach is different. Enda lives our problems, instead of bringing problems that aren’t ours.” Government officials appreciate the assistance provided by Enda. According to one researcher at WARC, “where the state is absent, Enda fills the gap. And the state recognizes this assistance in doing their job.” She argues that this increases the bargaining power of Enda vis-à-vis state actors. Yet it also, as described by an official in one Dakar commune, facilitates improved communication between local governments and citizens. The fact local governments feel better equipped to address their populations’ needs “has allowed us to make better connections with populations, and the population knows how to come to the commune with their issues.”

Particularly in the urban domain, Enda’s entities have developed deeper and more influential relationships with local governments over time. Thus, one important explanation for the organization’s increased distance from the national government is that decisions over urban planning and development are increasingly localized. It has been strategically necessary for Enda to become more involved with local authorities because they are the ones who now have responsibility, at least on paper, for such issues.

In addition, as a result of distancing from the national government, Enda has had to seek new sources of support and legitimacy, i.e. from local governments. Someone at the national Department of Planning stated, “As we have transferred capacities to the collectivites locales, our relationship with Enda is less evident.” However, according to one national minister, national authorities have looked favorably on Enda’s work with local governments. He stated:

I’ve seen that Enda has strengthened links with collectivites locales, and they have helped a lot in this domain. This work has showed the current administration the utility of Enda that they didn’t see before. USAID did a colloquium to showcase initiatives, including Enda’s work on decentralization. Wade was impressed with Enda’s work.
The fact that Wade would give Enda any credit at all speaks to the significance of the organization’s work, though it is interesting to note that it required USAID as an intermediary.

Though entities like Ecopop and Ecopole might be increasingly focused on municipal governance “because the national state is too far from citizens,” these entities’ influence may reach more broadly, though perhaps more indirectly. As stated by someone at Ecopole, “before, links [with the government] were created at the level of the SE. But now links are created transversally. Participation in decision-making is now happening at all levels. Our influence exists at multiple levels now.”

3.4. Conclusion

Enda is an NGO that occupied for many years a unique position between the Senegalese government and marginalized populations. Yet whereas in their earlier years they were able to be influential at both of these levels, their current position of influence is less clear. This explains, in part, why the organization was not involved in events surrounding the vendor riots. Marginalized actors like vendors no longer view Enda as their representative, and Enda is neither informed about nor influential in decisions being made at the level of the national government about planning and governance in Dakar. The organization still has the potential for influence at the level of specific technical ministries, as demonstrated by an entity like Diapol, and with local governments, as demonstrated by an entity like Ecopop. The challenge for the organization is using this influence for greater leverage on key issues, like occupation of city streets, an issue that will be discussed more in the next chapter.
In addition to Enda’s changing relationships with external actors like populations and the state, the internal dynamics of the organization also have significant implications for where they are today. In fact, the external institutional environment has affected the internal organizational dynamics and vice versa. The ability of Enda’s founder, Jacques Bugnicourt, to successfully mediate relationships with both the state and local populations allowed him to build his organization in an improvisational and patriarchal manner. Because Enda had the connections and technical capacities to get work done on the ground, no one, neither the state nor donors, demanded stronger accountability mechanisms. Yet with the year 2000 political turnover, followed by Bugnicourt’s death in 2002, Enda felt pressure to institutionalize its processes, a pressure that had not existed previously. Thus, the institutional pressures on the organization have been different at different moments in time.

Over time, the organization has grown, and management has changed. With growth came formalization of structure and processes, though not to the degree one might expect. For the majority of the life of the organization, management has granted the entities as much autonomy and flexibility as possible, believing this would make them more responsive and innovative in their work. In some ways, this has served the entities and their populations, who operate primarily in informal networks, well. However, because systems of internal evaluation and accountability have not been created, the organization has missed opportunities for learning and proactive engagement with issues like informal street vending in Dakar. This has weakened its position in the current institutional context.
4.1. The Benefits and Limitations of Enda’s Rapid Growth and Decentralized Structure

4.1.1. Growth without Formalization

Since its founding, Enda’s structure and administration have reflected Bugnicourt’s vision for the organization as an “alternative” development NGO. When Jacques established Enda in 1978, the organization had less than 10 staff. Yet over the years, the SE and Enda affiliates founded entities in Dakar, in Senegal, in other African countries, and on the continents of Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The organization now has around 300 staff in Senegal and over 500 worldwide, though no one can provide an exact figure. Each entity was created for its own, specific reasons and through the direct initiative of Bugnicourt himself. Anecdotally, people within and outside the organization explained that entities were created by people who had direct personal relationships with Bugnicourt and an idea they thought Enda should take on. According to a long-standing member of the Board of Directors, people established entities in countries outside of Senegal because Bugnicourt had many personal connections to people in developing countries and wanted to build a network of like-minded development actors.

The organization was open and accessible. One man who grew up in Dakar in the 1980s and 1990s told me that in those days, Enda was widely known as the organization to go to with ideas for improving the city. “For example, someone from HLM [a neighborhood in Dakar] could go to Enda and say ‘we have a waste management problem in our neighborhood,’ and Enda would work with that person to create a project or program financed by the organization.” Thus, according to a researcher at UCAD, “Any social entrepreneur could find a place and support at Enda. [Enda] became sort of a social entrepreneurship incubator. This is why they grew so fast.”
As the leader of this growing organization, Bugnicourt wanted to foster this organic evolution and creativity by letting Enda operate fluidly, without many rules or administrative protocols. According to all who knew him, Bugnicourt was a charismatic and deeply committed leader. At the same time, long-term staff of the organization say that management under Bugnicourt was subjective and improvisational, without standard operating procedures or strategic plans. In fact, Bugnicourt preferred that Enda staff view themselves not as employees, but rather as “militants.” According to a partner at UN-HABITAT, Bugnicourt structured Enda in direct contrast to the formal bureaucracies of the state. One member of the CA stated, “Jacques hated formality.” Instead of creating generalized systems of operation, Bugnicourt led the organization through his individual relationships with the heads of the various entities. He sought to keep the entity heads close to him, while leaving freedom to the entities to do their work.

As stated by an Enda board member, the “Lack of formalism allowed Enda to be a flexible organization, but brought a lot of inconveniences” related to communication and cooperation. Though perhaps not his intention, Enda staff have called Bugnicourt “patriarchal” because “individuals went to him directly to solve their problems.” There was little transparency in how the Executive Secretariat’s institutional funds were distributed among the entities and great variation in the managerial autonomy of the various entities. A number of people inside the organization explained that this management style created great discrepancies in terms of resources allocated to different entities and, in turn, significant rivalries between entity heads. An obvious question arises about the role of the Board in management and administration of Enda. One long-standing member of the CA said that he tried to push Bugnicourt to standardize some procedures and bring convergence in order to keep the rivalries to a minimum, but simply
as an informal advisor. “For a long time, we didn’t know clearly what the role of the CA [Board] was meant to be. Jacques had his friends as members of the CA. We didn’t know what we were meant to do; we didn’t have regular meetings. It was after his death that we constructed a formal role for the CA.”

The lack of formalized structure and operating mechanisms began to cause problems for Bugnicourt and Enda in around 1998, according to this board member. At that time, Enda’s primary funders, like the Swiss and the French, began to “retreat a bit” from the organization. The funders conducted an internal audit and demanded that Enda establish a formal CA and that Bugnicourt begin to phase himself out of his role as Executive Secretary. “We lived four difficult years because Jacques didn’t accept the changes. He didn’t want Enda to be bureaucratized. And he didn’t want to choose who would replace him.” In 2002, Enda’s Swiss funders suggested that Bugnicourt, age 72, leave Senegal for a period of time, so he decided to go to France for vacation. While there, he died of a heart attack. As stated by the board member, “I don’t think he could take the changes.”

Since Bugnicourt’s death in 2002, Enda has been attempting to make sense of and “modernize” its structure and operations. This has proven a challenging endeavor. A considerable amount of progress has been made in terms of laying out expectations for the organization’s governing bodies and the entities, but in most ways Enda operates the way it always has. Enda has had four different Executive Secretaries since 2002, and each of them have worked on creating more clear roles for the SE vis-à-vis the entities and codes of conduct for the internal functioning of the organization. Attempts have been made to improve communication within the organization and encourage greater collaboration between the entities. Yet in some ways, Bugnicourt’s death has allowed the entities to extend themselves further, with weaker
personal and financial ties to the SE. At present, the entities are still largely autonomous from headquarters. As long as they respect Enda’s central charter and statutes, the entities have discretion over their activities, management and operations.

4.1.2. Balancing Flexibility with Coherence

One of Enda’s greatest challenges is to figure out how to balance the flexibility and autonomy of the entities while encouraging greater coherence and synergy between them. This challenge, common to mission-driven organizations, is articulated clearly by Ganz (2008):

Command and control structures alienate participation, inhibit adaptation to local and often rapidly changing conditions, and curb organizational learning. On the other hand, as sociologist Jo Freeman famously noted, antipathy to structure creates a ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ in which authority is exercised in opaque ways, off the books, so to speak, with little or no public accountability. And while decentralization has benefits, it too can inhibit learning, constrict resources and inhibit strategic coordination.

Because Enda’s entities have had relative freedom and autonomy from the SE, the SE has found it difficult to exercise much authority over the entity heads. One of Enda’s bilateral European funders stated, “The great weakness of Enda is that there are entities that are too powerful and don’t want to be administrated by the SE.” As the head of one of Enda’s entities put it, “Enda has too many heads!”

In some ways, this decentralized structure has been an asset to the organization. As stated by one academic observer, “Each entity has their own expertise so they need a level of autonomy.” Each entity has been able to develop its own capacities and respond selectively to issues of their choosing. Some people within the organization, primarily at the level of the entities, believe that their autonomy allows them to be more innovative in their work.
Yet many would argue that the entities have become too independent, with their actions and approaches too widely dispersed. People both inside and outside the organization agree that greater synergy between the entities would help the organization have more weight in local, national, and international debates. A partner at IAGU argued, “The decentralization of the entities creates a tension between specificity and greater weight in bigger change.” It is also doubtful that the autonomy of the entities allows them to be more creative or innovative. This may be true for some entities, but for others, the independence has made them more vulnerable. As stated by one researcher, “Because entities are looking for funding, they end up being donor-driven.”

“Mission-drift” is common amongst Enda entities. In fact, the majority of entities undertake projects outside their expressed missions or areas of expertise. For example, RUP’s main expertise is in water and sanitation, but in 1999-2000, the entity responded to a European Union request for proposals to set up urban observatories, designed to serve as a permanent framework of discussion between different actors and sectors, engaging citizens in the definition of policies and evaluation of government. According to one RUP staff member, this wasn’t exactly RUP’s domain of expertise, but given that they had done a lot of participatory land management and social mobilization, they felt their approach was aligned with the project goals. RUP was responsible for putting local observatories in place in 22 cities in 9 countries. As defined by UN-HABITAT, these observatories were meant to promote a culture of local monitoring and assessment of urban development, strengthen local capacity in collection and use of urban development indicators, and support local planning and management processes. Going in yet another direction, around 2006, RUP began working on disaster risk reduction, culminating with the publication of a book on the issue.
Ecopole’s activities have also drifted quite far from its initial vocation. Given that Ecopole was Bugnicourt’s pet project, it is not surprising that his sudden death in 2002 had a significant impact on Ecopole and its activities. The entity was forced to become more autonomous, both in terms of management and in terms of financing. Changes at the level of the SE brought important changes for Ecopole. According to one coordinator there, Bugnicourt “really believed in Ecopole, but those following him didn’t have the same esteem. Also, other entities asked for a more fair distribution of funds.” As a result of a reduction in strategic funds allocated to them, Ecopole had to seek their own funding and scale-back both operations and staff. The entity is still in the process of “focusing its energies.”

Thus, Ecopole’s approach and activities have evolved significantly in the last six or seven years. They felt they had “a moral responsibility to continue to take care of the populations who asked for our assistance,” but it was difficult to find funding for the kinds of training, organizing, and social accompaniment work the entity had been known for. So, according to one coordinator, “we have integrated activities that weren’t in the original vision, like partnerships with the state in national projects, incorporation of rural projects, and we took new paths, new options. Also, we’ve seen micro-activities like workshops cannot be sustained, so we’ve had to scale up.” Ecopole’s has expanded geographically and become an operator in multiple national programs, both in urban and rural areas.

In addition to mission drift, many people argue that the lack of collaboration between entities causes “duplication, competition, and conflicts of interest,” as one project partner suggested. For example, multiple entities working in Dakar have undertaken water and sanitation projects despite the fact that there is one entity, RUP, which has more than twenty years experience with such projects. In terms of competition, I spoke to the head of one Dakar-
based entity who had proposed to another Dakar-based entity that they work together on a particular project proposal, but the second entity refused, preferring that the entities each submit their own individual grant applications.

4.1.3. The Challenge of Synergy

In order to deal with communication and collaboration issues, there have been attempts to bring the disparate activities of different entities together under the umbrella of transversal programs. These attempts have had limited success. In the domain of urban development, the first program of this kind was called COU (Urban Objectives Convention), which was undertaken in the years 1999 to 2003 with support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other international partners. Though COU was initially conceived of at the SE, it was transferred to Diapol when it became an autonomous entity in 2001 because the program’s coordinators transferred from the SE to the Diapol. The goal of COU was to offer the urban programs of 16 of Enda’s entities worldwide the opportunity to dialogue and find common positions. According to an Enda publication called “Cities of the South and How They Function” that was the culmination of COU, the program allowed Enda’s entities in cities throughout the global south to use their combined experiences on-the-ground to develop political perspectives and influence the international discourse and the policies it engenders.

COU was organized around three thematic axes of intervention: prevent urban violence; assist vulnerable groups to organize themselves economically and socially; and decide the city differently. Each entity proposed activities related to these three themes to be financed by the program. For example, RUP used COU financing to work on sanitation, waste water, and urban agriculture. Ecopole did case studies on ACIDAK, Dakar’s slum-dwellers association, and
people working in Dakar’s landfill in Mbeubeuss. COU financed Ecopop to facilitate a participatory strategic planning process called the “City Project” in Pikine, designed to help the city create a planning and municipal management strategy that reflected the needs of the population. Finally, Diapol’s PPU action-research project in Thiaroye-Sur-Mer was under the umbrella of COU.

The disparate nature of the projects undertaken by entities under the COU umbrella limited the opportunities for collective learning and political impact. In some ways, it was simply a mechanism that allowed entities to obtain financial resources for pre-planned activities. The program’s facilitators found it quite difficult to manage because communication among entities was fragmented. Yet, according to the coordinator of the program, COU was a decent attempt at what some people within Enda felt was much needed: more collective reflection and strategic thinking. According to one Enda staff member familiar with COU, the program allowed the organization to realize that the entities were addressing urban issues reactively, in response to emergencies, but not proactively as a process of invention. They realized that their urban initiatives weren’t about planning and anticipation. In that way, while the program administrators weren’t satisfied with it at the end, they conceded that COU was an important learning mechanism, both in terms of internal communication and coordination and about Enda’s strategic positioning on urban issues.

Given that many people have been arguing for greater synergy among the entities and between the entities and the SE for years now, why has it proven so difficult to generate? When I asked people within the organization this question, most attributed the lack of collaboration to communication problems and the ego-centric mentalities of many entity heads, primarily concerned with “protecting their turf.” The head of one entity stated, “Synergy isn’t easy. Each
entity has to manage space and personnel. It’s hard to take responsibility for integration because of internal power dynamics.” At the same time, while calling for partnerships has been the recent international fad, as this entity head stated, “The operationality of things doesn’t always require partnerships.”

Though not expressed by people I interviewed, the lack of synergy within Enda may inadvertently benefit the organization. Competition may push entities to constantly work toward improving their activities to stay in the game. Additionally, redundancy and overlap, though typically assigned a negative connotation related to excess and inefficiency, can play an important role in improving effectiveness by increasing flexibility. As Landau (1969) explains, in an organization, as in an airplane or a computer, no single unit is perfect. A unit is bound to fail at some point, and if there are no other units to pick up the slack, the entire system will come down. This kind of system requires tight control and rigidity, and even still is unstable. The goal, therefore, is to model organizations after neural networks in the brain, where “there appears to be some ‘overlap’ at all times which enables residual parts or subsidiary centers to ‘take over,’ though somewhat less efficiently, the functions of those which have been damaged.” Thus, while much internal organizational energy has been focused on attempting to foster greater cooperation and collaboration between entities, this may not be the most important or fruitful avenue to pursue.

4.2. Strategic Planning and Opportunism

A more important explanatory issue affecting Enda’s ability to respond to emerging challenges relates to entities’ ability to be strategic and selective about the work they do. Historically, Enda has sought to be an organization that “has always tried to react differently,” as
stated by one administrative assistant at the SE. He said, “We look for endogenous development, instead of bringing models from the West.” According to a researcher at CODESRIA, Enda “can pick up on issues no one is working on because they have a meeting of progressive minds. So they have possibilities for doing innovative work.” At the same time, someone new to the leadership of the SE stated that she decided to come work at Enda because “It’s an NGO that isn’t a development operator. It’s a political and strategic organization.”

It is true that some of Enda’s entities are “political and strategic” in their activities and operations. When I asked people for the characteristics of the strongest of Enda’s entities, one of which is Diapol, the most frequently cited elements included strong leadership, extensive networks, and the “capacity to renew their methods through reflection and anticipation.” Unfortunately, these are not characteristics of all of Enda’s entities. As stated by someone involved in evaluation at the SE, “Most entities are fairly specialized now. But that’s not true for all the entities. They do what they can do. There is what entities consider their initial vocation, but realities can push them into other activities. They are opportunistic instead of strategic.”

Examples of this shift can be found in the historical evolution of entities’ activities and approaches. For example, since the mid-to-late 1990s, RUP has undergone some changes and expanded its range of activity. They continued to work on water and sanitation, but grew in terms of scale and geographic reach. At the same time, RUP began to take on activities defined by outside actors like the central government and international donors, as opposed to activities developed through their own research and initiative. RUP worked within a number of national projects like the Long-Term Water Program in the neighborhoods of Ngor and Ouakam.

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14 When people in Senegal talk about Enda being a “political” organization, they are not referring to formal political activities, like participation in electoral politics. Rather, “political” means engaging in activities that influence public policy and push decision-makers at local, national, and international levels.
HABITAT involved them in their campaign Water for African Cities and deemed RUP’s sanitation innovations models for sanitation in poor neighborhoods. Around 2002, Austrian donors asked RUP to address the sanitation deficit in St. Louis, a city in Northern Senegal with a population of around 175,000 people, and to clean up the coastal areas of the city. The European Union’s PADELU program brought RUP into rural towns to do sanitation and wastewater treatment. In 2005, RUP expanded their work outside of Senegal, partnering with UN Habitat on sanitation interventions in Douala, Cameroon, and Ougadougou, Burkina Faso.

The structure and functioning of Enda has allowed its entities to take on a wide range of activities. One researcher at WARC argued that while Enda’s decentralized structure has allowed for flexibility, they have lost out in terms of agenda-setting, which is dominated by either funders or international movements. She also argued that the fact that Enda’s entities “do everything” makes their work “less visible.” Someone at IAGU, one of Enda’s partners, echoed the sentiment that the dispersion of Enda’s activities weakens their strategic positioning. He said:

They have done things case by case, but they should work on bigger strategies. They have helped many communities, supported them. They should capitalize on these experiences to have a bigger impact. They should choose their projects not by chance, but more strategically to have more power in decision-making.

Another important factor that has affected the entities’ ability to dictate their own agendas is funding. Under the leadership of Bugnicourt, Enda had large amounts of “strategic,” or institutional, funds that weren’t linked to specific projects. Specific numbers are not available, but anecdotal evidence supports this claim. According to someone at Diapol, “Jacques could have his own conception of issues and get funding to do it. Now people are following others; they have to work within the framework of funders.” As shown in Appendix 3, since the
death of Bugnicourt, the amount of institutional funds has shrunk, while project funding has increased significantly.

While less funding from the SE has put increasing financial pressure on the entities, someone at Ecopole told me that financial autonomy from the SE has been positive for the entity, allowing them to accept funds from different donors and undertake a greater variety of projects. He stated, “It gave us more freedom. For example, Jacques had strong principles about who we could take funds from and didn’t like certain funders (i.e. the World Bank). But now we are receiving World Bank funds to participate in national projects.” While this may be seen by the entity as positive in terms of greater flexibility to get money, I would argue that it shows diminished ability to be selective about whose money to accept and what activities to undertake. With greater opportunity perhaps comes greater opportunism and decreasing capacity to set agendas, both internally and externally.

4.3. Positioning the Organization: Development Projects and the Larger Political Project

Many people argue that Enda, in part as a result of this increased opportunism but also as a result of its changing institutional relationships, has shifted from being a “political” organization to being an implementing agency. In Enda’s earlier eras, Bugnicourt was able to negotiate a politicized role for the organization in Dakar. When Bugnicourt died, according to one RUP staff member, the national and international image of Enda changed. He stated, “[Bugnicourt’s] absence didn’t have a big impact in terms of projects, but it’s the larger image and political project of the NGO that has suffered.”

As stated by someone at the SE, “Recently, Enda has been more driven by outside agendas, whereas it was different before.” While this is not true for all of Enda’s entities, it does
appear to have some validity for the entities like RUP, Ecopop, and Ecopole working on urban development issues. This has been a major source of discussion within the organization for the past few years, particularly since the new SE, Josephine Ouedraogo, took office in the fall of 2007. One staff member at the SE told me, “The question at the heart of reform is how to link project work with political project. Josephine doesn’t want Enda to be a ‘project factory.’” According to someone else at the SE, “She wants to take the organization away from poverty reduction a bit and more towards a politicized search for development ideas.”

In some ways, this means taking the organization back to its “roots.” In its earlier years, Enda was known for undertaking experimental pilot projects designed to test their alternative development vision. RUP’s community sanitation technologies or Ecopop’s associational capacity-building projects are good examples. Enda linked this quest for alternatives to a larger political project, pushing the national and international community to recognize the value of this alternative vision. According to someone at Diapol, Enda’s “approach was always to use grassroots interventions to show it was possible to do development differently. The energy was there at the beginning to do reflection and action.”

However, there is the general perception that this changed over time. One researcher at UCAD stated, “Entities were moving from experimentation and influencing policy to service delivery and project implementation. They are no longer in the business of creating new ideas, but rather they are implementing agencies.” He gave the example of the Autoroute project, in which Enda was brought in as a mediator for the displacement and relocation process, but they were not at all involved in the decision-making about the project in the first place. He also cited Enda’s advances in wastewater treatment and reuse, stating that while beneficial, “these are limited actions that don’t have an impact on development choices.” According to someone at
Diapol, “Now the Enda label is becoming negated. We are becoming like the others who can do good work, but who aren’t bringing change to the development arena.”

In part, this change is related to the issues of growth, decentralization, and opportunism discussed in the previous sections. One researcher at CODESRIA claimed that Enda has a certain legitimacy that other outside organizations cannot have, but that the internal fragmentation weakens its position. “Their take on issues is closer to the position of the populations they work with because it’s not set by some international organizational agenda. If they had a more organized political agenda, it would allow them to be more powerful.” Someone at the SE stated, “Enda’s strength is in its politics, but they have lost this a bit because they’ve become focused on projects in order to survive financially.” According to someone at Diapol, “People have to stop chasing money, fighting for programs. What gives us credibility is our ability to propose alternatives, built on grassroots movements. Now we are like prostitutes of development. We don’t have time to think about what we are doing.” While important, these are not the only explanations of the weakened political position of a number of Enda’s entities.

A number of people I spoke to critiqued the approach of many of the entities, reactive to the problems facing marginalized communities instead of fundamentally transformative. One Dakar-based environmental expert told me many of Enda’s interventions were seen as populist, but leading simply to “sustainable poverty.” Echoing this sentiment, someone at the SE said, “We spent a lot of resources on things that aren’t as important like defending the rights of pockets of poverty without changing their situation much or that of many other citizens.” Finally, according to another observer, “You become a development operator when you help people, but they stay marginalized.”
According to some, the challenge is related to scale. At some point in the late 1990s, Enda began to recognize that its impact on poverty in urban areas was weak. So they decided that they would have to change scale in order to influence policies. According to someone at Diapol, “There was a progressive evolution where Enda realized that working on the applied/operational didn’t allow them to be politically influential.” This is when the SE created Diapol to focus explicitly on the “politics of development.”

Diapol was established as an entity in 2001. Before that, it was housed in the Executive Secretariat, meant to act as a sort of internal think tank on the politics of development and development policies. At the time of its creation, Enda was beginning an internal evaluation process, interrogating its work, impacts, and future directions. Bugnicourt was beginning to transition out of the role of Executive Secretary and two of his friends, Mr. Emmanuel Dione, the head of Enda Graf, and Mr. Youba Sokona, the head of Enda Energy, were temporarily assigned leadership over the organization. According to one Diapol staff member, Diapol was created because “despite all the actions carried out by Enda during its first 30 years, the overall impact wasn’t large. So we decided to focus on more structural issues. Diapol is trying to figure out how to really change things over time, how to attack the mechanisms generating the problems rather than the problems themselves.” Diapol looks for alternatives to development projects with the underlying philosophy that “to attack social and political poverty, we have to restore symbolic values of African cultures.” The objective was for Diapol to do this at the level of the SE while working with existing entities. This proved difficult, however, so they became their own entity, leaving the other entities in essentially the same, autonomous position.

Diapol’s focus is “political poverty;” their goal is to build capacity of impoverished populations to “engage with the power structures that affect their lives.” Their early work was
centered on themes like urban poverty, education, decentralization, and natural resource management, using an action research approach to engage with populations around these issues and help them learn how to dialogue with decision-makers. Diapol’s involvement in urban policies began even before the entity was established, through involvement of some of its members in a program called PPU, or Urban Prospective Program. PPU was a research project coupled with an environment and gender project in Thiaroye Sur Mer, a coastal neighborhood on the outskirts of Dakar. According to one member of Diapol, “in urban issues, Diapol’s work was more about coordination. Different entities were doing the same things. At some point, we pulled out of the urban thematic because we weren’t clear about what our role was vis-a-vis the other entities.” Currently, Diapol’s four thematic areas include fisheries, agricultural products, particularly cotton, transborder cooperation and regional integration policies, and international migration. In each of these arenas, Diapol engages with actors from the local cotton producers and fishermen to national and international decision-makers, facilitating joint research, dialogue, and policy-making.

Scaling up for a number of other entities meant going international, both with their projects and in terms of dialogue and networking. In this evolution, they may have lost touch a bit with the preoccupations of their populations in Dakar while not altering fundamentally their approaches. In contrast to an entity like Diapol, some of the entities are still involved in assistance, helping small pockets of poverty instead of “attacking the mechanisms that create poverty.” For example, while important for daily survival, the basic service delivery functions of RUP, Ecopop, and Ecopole are not likely to have a transformative impact on poor people’s lives.

People within the organization generally agree that Enda must now define its political identity more clearly if they are going to have influence in the direction of development in
Senegal and beyond. As stated by someone at the SE, “the entities are becoming more interested in influencing policies then in doing work of the state. Some are still reactive, but the tendency has been to become more proactive.” According to someone at Diapol, “Enda needs to rethink its positioning to become again an actor of change in its major domains…Now we have a hard time defining Enda’s identity as an actor of development.” He argued that because of increased competition to secure limited development funding, “There is an adjustment that will be made. Now the development market isn’t what it used to be. We will lose the fight. So we will be forced to find alternatives. We have to come together and reflect about our positioning.” The new leadership at the SE is committed to this endeavor. “There hasn’t been a strong leadership to remind everyone of this political reflection so that we’re not like every other NGO. Our projects should be political projects.” The challenge for the organization is to figure out how to unify project work with the larger political project of the NGO. As someone at the SE explained, “We won’t abandon project work, but we will ask that projects try to incite change.”

4.4. Accountability and Evaluation from Within and Without

Enda’s ability to be strategic in its activities is closely related to how the organization approaches evaluation and accountability. Accountability can be understood generally “as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Most people understand accountability in financial terms, as a way of monitoring how funds are used in organizations, particularly public and non-profit organizations. Yet accountability mechanisms can also be an important managerial tool for assessing the impacts of an organization and making adjustments to improve performance.
Until 2008, Enda had no internal evaluation or monitoring team at the level of the SE. As discussed in Section 4.1, Bugnicourt did not establish any formal control mechanisms within the organization in attempts to let its entities be as flexible and innovative as possible. One long-standing staff assistant at the SE stated, “The organization allowed people to cultivate their own initiatives. So there was no constraining system of control.” For Enda’s first 25-30 years in existence, “The relationship between the SE and each entity wasn’t clear. In fact, there was no relationship, no accountability interaction between the two.” Entities recognize that they must “conform to the values of the SE and inform them of what we do,” as stated by the head of one Dakar-based entity. Yet aside from that, the entities have near full autonomy from the SE.

At the level of the entities, teams have developed their own ways of evaluating their performance and planning for the future. Ecopole, an entity that for the majority of its existence was quite intimately tied to the SE, did not have the opportunity to develop internal planning and evaluation capacities. According to one Ecopole staff member, “When Jacques was alive, we carried out activities of his creation. After his death, we had to become more autonomous.” In recent years, the entity has struggled to develop such capacities. When I asked the staff there how they evaluate their impacts, they told me they did so in three ways: by doing the required project evaluations demanded by funders for specific projects; by collecting monthly reports from each of their program teams; and through the occasional external evaluation or audit conducted by a funder.

The Ecopop team approaches evaluation in a slightly different manner. In fact they used to have their own office of evaluation and monitoring, but decided to make everyone in the staff responsible for this work. They, too, conduct project evaluations at the end of each project. But they go a bit further. At the end of each project, the staff gets together to reflect on the project,
to be sure we’ve accomplished what we intended to, find lessons, and think about how to capitalize on the experience.” Additionally, every year Ecopop has a retreat to discuss its accomplishments, challenges, lessons, the outcome of which is the entity’s annual report and ideas for future projects. In order to select the projects it undertakes, Ecopop sends out its annual report and waits for other institutions to solicit its assistance, while at the same time writing its own project proposals and looking for funding. This approach is designed to nurture the entity’s “will to innovate,” as described by one staff member.

For much of its existence, Enda has operated with this ad-hoc system of evaluation and internal accountability with no pressure to change. However, in the early 2000s, Enda was under increasing pressure, particularly from funders, to undertake greater formalization of the organization’s structure and management, including transparency and accountability. While it isn’t clear whether pressure from funders was related to the year 2000 political turnover in Senegal, it is likely that this new institutional context also made Enda feel it had to prove the legitimacy of its activities and impacts. As the literature suggests, this has been a worldwide phenomenon. “In exchange for funds, NGOs must provide funders with information which demonstrates that those funds are resulting in ‘successful’ projects. In addition, funders expect NGOs to engage in some form of monitoring activity in order to be viewed as legitimate development actors” (Ebrahim, 2003). According to someone at the SE, funders “don’t understand who does what, where the money goes, etc. We have to standardize activities. And it’s funders who have the stick.”

In response to this pressure, Enda undertook a multi-year internal evaluation process called Mouya Yara, beginning in 2002 and wrapping up in 2004. Mouya Yara was designed to create an internal forum in which each entity appointed a delegate to prepare documents and
come to meetings to discuss any and all Enda issues. The outcome of the process was a Mouya Yara Synthesis document, prepared by a representative committee, which discussed the findings and made proposals about how to improve the functioning of the organization.

The outcome of the Mouya Yara process was mixed. According to someone at the SE, “It was a good process, but it wasn’t enough.” Out of the Synthesis document, the roles of various structures in the organization were formalized (i.e. the CA) and guidelines for the relationship between these structures and rules for internal operations were elaborated. Yet, as argued by someone at the SE, the impacts were mitigated by the fact that this informal process wasn’t followed by a professional evaluation and that none of the suggestions for improvement were binding. As a result, the Executive Secretary at the time, Soumare, was blocked in the implementation of certain Mouya Yara recommendations (i.e. regularization of salaries) “because entities didn’t want their autonomy attacked,” according to someone at the SE. He continued, “These fights were personal, and people thought about their own interests before the interests of the whole. And they were worried about having their secrets uncovered.”

One outcome of the Mouya Yara process was that Enda named “accountability” one of its guiding principles. They defined accountability as:

Being able to explain what we have done with mobilized resources and to what ends; evaluate, politically and financially, our activities and our management/governance and experiment with instruments for piloting, follow-up, and scale-up to be able to evaluate and self-evaluate our successes, failures, and their impacts.

Unfortunately, Enda has not yet been able to operationalize all aspects of this guiding principle. Because “funders have the stick,” as stated above, the organization has been more focused on what the literature calls “upward” accountability, which “usually refers to relationships with

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15 Taken from an internal document written for the final synthesis workshop of internal evaluation process entitled “Mouya Yara,” March 2004.
donors, foundations, and governments” and is often focused on the ‘spending of designated moneys for designated purposes’” (Ebrahim, 2003). In contrast, “downward” accountability, or accountability to clients, “refers primarily to relationships with ‘groups to whom NGOs provide services’” or other communities indirectly affected by their work (Ebrahim, 2003). Finally, internal accountability “includes an NGO’s responsibility to its mission and staff, which includes decision-makers as well as field-level implementers” (Ebrahim, 2003).

A number of authors also distinguish between functional accountability and strategic accountability. Functional accountability is “accounting for resources, resource use, and immediate impacts”, whereas strategic accountability means “accounting for the impacts that an NGO’s activities have on the actions of other organizations and the wider environment” (Ebrahim, 2003). According to Najam and Ebrahim, NGOs tend to focus on upward, functional accountability because this is what donors demand. In his study of two NGOs in India, Ebrahim found that “The bulk of information transferred from the case NGOs to their funders consists of product data rather than process data.” This can be explained by the fact that “Process data are problematic to present for they are not easily subject to quantification using simple indicators, are more difficult to generalize than product data, and are not easily categorized in terms of success and failure” (Ebrahim, 2003). Much of the evaluation conducted within Enda is of this short-term, output-oriented nature.

In its language, Enda is committed to internal, strategic accountability, but has not yet established the mechanisms for its achievement. According to someone at the SE:

Now there is no “system” of internal evaluation. Once in a while we do an internal evaluation of an entity or two that is participatory, non-binding, and about activities. But these evaluations are not about management or the impact of activities. Also there are evaluations conducted by funders at the level of entities. But this doesn’t concern the SE.
He continued:

The SE only receives information from time to time and the entities write what they want to write. The SE should be at the center of what people do. The evaluation unit should have at its disposal all information about the entities to be able to do monitoring and follow up. We should have an understanding of the activities of all the entities and their plans. It’s not a control mechanism. It must first be viewed positively as a resource for entities to improve themselves.

Many within the organization agree that the SE shouldn’t try to control everything or create strict guidelines about what the entities should do or how they should operate. As stated by the same staff member, “you have to let people take risks and fail sometimes.”

4.5. Research, Knowledge Production, and Organizational Learning

Though Enda possesses significant internal research and knowledge-production capacities, the evolution of its structures and the absence of internal, strategic evaluation and accountability mechanisms have affected the organization’s ability to use its experience and capacities for the purposes of learning and adaptation. Enda is committed to knowledge creation and diffusion, as evidenced by the vast number of publications that have come out of the organization over the years, both from the Executive Secretariat and from the entities themselves. Recent publications cover topics including urban-rural hybridization, neighborhood movements and urban environments, transborder dynamics in West Africa, and local perspectives on disaster risk reduction in West and Central Africa. Enda is widely recognized as a “scientific organization,” by funders, government actors, other NGOs, and outside researchers. Their studies and publications increase Enda’s visibility and legitimate their reputation as an experienced organization. Yet they also introduce new ideas about development into the national and international arenas, influencing governments and donors.
When asked about Enda’s strengths, many people I interviewed both within Enda and outside the organization highlighted their “research networks” and their capacity for “knowledge production.” A number of their state partners stated that they work with Enda because while the government is responsible for getting things done and doesn’t have the time nor capacity to think about what they are doing, an organization like Enda has the time and the capability to do the necessary “reflective” work. Someone at UN-HABITAT argued that they work with organizations like IAGU and Enda because it is different from working with a consulting firm who “do their studies, get paid, and leave.” Instead, NGOs like Enda “are interested in learning, using tools that they gain in new ways around issues important to them.” According to one of Enda’s funding partners, they fund Enda because “as a scientific structure, it has the ability to study, to translate, and to change. A scientific NGO asks how to act differently to solve similar problems. They are able to show alternatives.” Enda’s approach, as stated by someone at the SE, is to “bring scientific methods to recognize the value of local knowledge by doing grassroots research, asking people what they want, and helping people themselves in their own aspirations.”

This kind of action research has been at the heart of Enda’s approach since its founding. As stated by one social science researcher, “Enda used to be the only space for intellectuals to unite and debate about social problems” from exclusionary urban planning to the lack of alternative educational opportunities. From there, these “intellectuals” would test their theories on the ground, facilitating participatory land management planning processes or creating street-corner schools for kids who had left the formal educational system. “This allowed them to do work on the ground and show results, instead of just staying in the realm of theory. It was a place of experimentation and exploration.” In its earlier years, the size and looseness of the organization granted it a certain amount of “adaptive capacity.” Adaptive capacity can be
understood as “the organisation’s ability to step back and critically review its work and the changing environment in which it functions” (Ebrahim, 2008). According to Ebrahim, this kind of organizational learning is more likely “if internal accountability to mission drives NGO reporting...if failure is embraced as an opportunity...if information systems are simple and flexible...and if staff are rewarded for analysis and innovation and given the time and training necessary” (Ebrahim, 2002).

In its early eras, Enda had both the resources from funders and the permission from its government supporters to experiment with alternative development techniques and learn from its experiences. Ecopop’s early evolution provides good examples of organizational learning, with its trajectory clearly articulated by Ecopop staff. Ecopop’s early work with actors in the popular economy brought the entity into bigger questions of social development in the city. The years 1985-1992 were a period of structural adjustment and austerity programs in Senegal, and the local currency, the CFA, was devalued in 1994. As discussed in Chapter 2, these macroeconomic changes put increasing pressure on the urban poor, so Ecopop felt they needed to address poverty more broadly. After undertaking a study on socioeconomic insertion, the Ecopop team realized that they couldn’t work with economic actors without attacking aspects of family, city, etc. As stated by the head of Ecopop, “This brought us from the economic aspect to the territorial aspect because the link between the popular economy and poverty reduction isn’t just financial. It’s also territorial.” In 1994, they began the ILMU Project, or Local Development Initiatives in Urban Settings. This represented an important transition phase for Ecopop from working exclusively with artisans and other economic actors to working on local development more generally.
As part of ILMU, Ecopop carried out research on urban associations and associational dynamics. This research communicated to Ecopop that their local development initiatives showed a strong will of citizens to fight poverty, but a lack of capacity to dialogue and affect policies. With the intention of building the capacities of these civil society groups to translate their will into policy, Ecopop launched PREFAL, the Regional Support and Training Project for Local Associations and Community-Based Organizations. Ecopop wrote a project proposal and submitted it to the European Union, which secured funding for the project. As part of PREFAL, Ecopop organized a workshop on the issue of associational dynamics in development. Out of this they developed a training program for elected officials to better engage with their populations.

Ecopop continued to scale up their activities to the city and national levels. In 1996 they began the PDSU, or Urban Social Development Program, where they went from the neighborhood to the city scale. Soon thereafter, the technical aspects of PDSU became PDSQ, the Neighborhood Social Development Program, focused on “thinking globally but acting locally.” This project included initiatives in access to clean drinking water, sanitation services, and microcredit, combining physical, economic, and citizenship-building activities. According to Ecopop’s head, PDSQ “operationalized all aspects of our conceptualizations in one area.” The Cooperation Francaise financed the project through their social development fund.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, in the context of political decentralization, Ecopop began to think more about how to engage with local decision-makers. In those years, they made a transition to capacity-building of local institutions, beginning with PAGE, the Local Governance Support Program. In the same way they had trained community groups, they trained what they called “local decision-makers,” elected officials and leaders of local associations. The
training included workshops, accompaniment in their organizations, technical trips, and exchanges.

The learning trajectory in Ecopop’s recent history is less obvious. 2003 brought Ecopop into the realm of education. As part of PDSQ, they had worked a lot with schools as places of education and training. Yet in many impoverished neighborhoods, they also saw that schools were viewed as apparatuses of the state, particularly when people were frustrated. If there were strikes or riots, communities would attack school buildings and other government-owned infrastructures. So they felt they needed to change people’s mentality about who the education system belongs to, help people appropriate their local educational infrastructure. Ecopop began to work with the Ministry of Education, training academic authorities in the maintenance of educational infrastructure with the framework of the Continual School Quality Improvement Program. In addition to training students, parents, teachers, ministry officials, etc, Enda helped the Ministry produce manuals on maintenance of education infrastructure that were incorporated into national education policy. The idea of local infrastructure maintenance spread. As recently as 2007, the European Union incorporated the maintenance of local infrastructures into their PADELU program.

In recent years, Ecopop has been working mostly on local governance, for example on a participatory budgeting pilot project in a few African countries. Their focus is involving city dwellers in urban public management and helping leaders learn how to share power. Most recently, the Senegalese government contracted Ecopop to facilitate the displacement process associated with the construction of a new highway out of Dakar, as discussed in Chapter 3. Acting as a “social mediator,” they created consultative mechanisms to help the state figure out how to value the 99 houses to be destroyed and how to compensate their inhabitants. They also
negotiated agreements for the people who didn’t own property, but whose income-generating activities, like urban agriculture, were conducted along the route. According to one Ecopop staff member, this initiative represents the first time the state has really compensated all the populations affected by a large infrastructure project like this.

Over time and as the institutional environment has changed, Enda has lost some of its adaptive capacity:

As NGOs become more involved in large-scale service-delivery (or grow for other reasons), and/or become more reliant on official funding, one might expect some fall-off in their flexibility, speed of response and ability to innovate... When official agencies finance service-delivery they expect contracted outputs to be achieved and are less interested in a ‘learning process’” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).

As Enda has grown, attempted to scale up its impacts, and sought new sources of funding, the ability of entities to interrogate their actions and change course has been constrained. As stated by someone at the SE, “pilot projects have become bigger, funded by others, and there is less experimentation. What we called experimentation is less and less a reality. It’s now more about implementation of projects.” Because projects and project evaluation dominates, Enda may now be more focused on short-term outputs and production than they are on long-term impacts and learning.

Of course, in some ways, this behavior is rational. According to Pfieffer and Salancik (1978), organizations like Enda are dependent on resources for survival. Because resources are located in the external environment, organizations must be more outwardly than inwardly focused. The organization must determine which parts of the external environment are most important to take into consideration, and ends up attending to only those elements. This is rational because “if the organization attends to everything, it will be swamped with information and will be unable to function.” However, “if the information system is so tightly structured that
environmental changes are constantly missed, the organization will be unprepared to face threats to survival.” Organizations exist, therefore, in a dilemma about how much information to collect in order to be dynamic, but not so much that it cannot focus and exercise some control over its activities.

Some of Enda’s entities have been more successful at achieving this balance. For example, an entity like Diapol works hard to incorporate learning and adaptation into their activities, even their project activities. Diapol’s work has evolved over time, both in thematic content and in approach. According to some at the SE, “Diapol wasn’t supposed to be like other entities. They were supposed to have financial autonomy to create vision and anticipation for Enda.” Yet as an autonomous entity, Diapol was responsible for securing funding, so they began to take on more projects in addition to their policy research. This shift, however, was not driven only by requirements for funding. “In the life and development of the entity, there was a natural progression from research to projects because research demanded action.” According to one staff member, “any research done must have practical implications immediately. Research has to be used on the ground.” Diapol’s areas of intervention have also changed.

Diapol’s major strengths are in its research action approach. According to one Diapol facilitator, “People understand each other if they do research together. We help translate technical and strategic information into language that is comprehensible to actors, both at the level of producers but also at the level of administrators, to build their capacities to understand and make decisions together.” The entity is committed to linking research to action in order to facilitate dialogue and influence public policy. At the same time, “action research helps us figure out how to innovate and adapt” by focusing “on issues of change, places where society is changing.” Yet even Diapol is constrained by what someone there called “financing problems.”
"The kind of work we do demands that we identify for ourselves our areas of research. But it’s
not always easy to have that kind of autonomy.” In addition, they don’t do comprehensive
internal evaluation, so they are not certain about their impacts and have trouble capitalizing on
their experiences and systematizing their innovative approaches.

Many recognize that in the domain of urban development issues, Enda has not been as
innovative in recent years. As stated by someone at Diapol, “In terms of urban issues, Enda has
retreated from the place it was. At the time of Jacques, in the 1980s, 1990s, and even into the
early 2000s, urban questions were at the heart of Enda. Enda was the first NGO to attract
attention to the questions of urban poverty. And it was at the origin of many of Enda’s
interventions, not just their reflections.” Project COU, which became Minga, was designed to
help “us to develop a new political project on urban issues,” as stated by someone at the SE. “In
the past few years, we don’t reflect on urban issues the way we did.” Unfortunately, though
entities continue to publish widely on issues from participatory budgeting to urban disaster risk
management, they have been unable to bring this learning together and change course in any
kind of coherent way. At stated by someone at Diapol, “We don’t take the time to rethink our
context of intervention.”

Clearly, changing resource structures within the organization have had a significant
impact on its ability to be reflective. According to someone at Ecopop, “The great paradox of
Enda is that we reflect, we have good ideas, but we have to find the resources to put them into
action.” He continued, “If there were more strategic [institutional] funds, it would permit us to
be more innovative. Project financing is restrictive. Before, if it was Jacques’ idea, he could
find money for whatever he wanted.”
Others argue that while Enda’s urban entities continue to be strong in terms of research and knowledge production, the research has become removed from its practical applications on the ground. According to someone at Diapol, “Since then, people have gotten into theoretical questions about urban issues without thinking about strategic actions.” Another researcher observer commented, “The impact of Enda is less visible now than it was before. Before, they tried to have a local impact. But now it is a group of philosophers. The Enda that I appreciated was the one who did concrete activities. But now it’s hard to see anything concrete. Their writings are all conceptual.” In some ways, this may explained by the increasing “professionalization” of the organization. A significant proportion of Enda’s staff and leadership are now well-trained professionals with specific areas of expertise. According to someone at Diapol, this can be a handicap because “Development is first a question of engagement and voluntarism before a question of experts. When we treat it as a question of expertise, we lose contact with the base.”

4.6. Conclusion

Enda’s organizational structure and functioning have changed over time in response to changes in its institutional relationships. It has faced increasing pressure to formalize and consolidate, while the activities of its entities have expanded and diversified further. These internal transformations have affected the organization’s ability to influence its environment, particularly with respect to national and international policy makers. Given the current climate of pressure for increased accountability and transparency, the organization is in the process of figuring out how to structure and position itself to maintain its legitimacy in its changed context. Enda’s capacity to adapt its interventions depends on its ability to use grounded knowledge
production for the purposes of internal evaluation and learning. In turn, this learning is crucial for allowing Enda to be, again, a “political” organization.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters of this thesis have explored the historical institutional and organizational evolution of Enda Tiers Monde in attempts to explain the NGO’s striking absence from events surrounding the November, 2007, street vendor riots in Dakar. Enda is a unique NGO in a variety of ways: it was founded and is based in Senegal, but with entities throughout the global South; it was born out of intimate ties to the post-independence Senegalese state, but also acquired a legitimacy with community actors on the ground; its staff have professional, technical capacities but have also historically been committed to a larger, socio-political project of promoting “alternative” development models; the organization values research and publishes widely, atypical for development NGOs. Despite these exceptional characteristics, Enda’s influence in current urban planning and management issues in Dakar has diminished, as evidenced by their absence of involvement with either the state or the street vendors in events surrounding the vendor riots. The following main findings illuminate the role of and provide some recommendations to Enda in Dakar that, potentially, have relevance to other organizations in developing world cities.

1. Enda’s ability to respond to emerging challenges depends on its ability to understand how the organizational connects to the institutional. Historically, Enda was able to play an important mediator role between the national state and marginalized populations by maintaining intimate relationships with both of these actors. This was one of Enda’s significant comparative advantages. Enda’s proximity to the Senegalese government granted them access and resources that allowed the organization to deliver to its populations, which in turn granted Enda legitimacy
on the ground. At the same time, Enda’s success engaging with the urban poor served the need of the state to respond to, if indirectly, this growing constituency. Yet, with the political turnover in 2000 and the death of Enda’s founder two years later, Enda’s legitimacy at both the top and the bottom has changed.

In the domain of urban policy in Dakar, Enda’s entities have retreated from the stage, both in terms of counterbalance and in terms of collaboration. They are no longer as visible in their protest activities (i.e. protecting the Baraka slum from clearance or advocating for the rights of small-scale producers in the popular economy), nor are they as influential with national decision-makers setting spatial and economic policies around occupation of the city. Enda’s urban entities now function more like development contractors than actors on a politicized quest for alternative development ideas and models. The relationships between Enda and the state should not be unidirectional, with Enda assisting the state in fulfilling its mandates. Enda must regain legitimacy at the level of the state in order to influence policy.

The organization still has the potential for influence at the level of specific technical ministries (i.e. Diapol with fisheries) and with local governments (i.e. Ecopop’s capacity-building activities). An entity like Diapol is successful because they have developed specific, sectoral capacities that connect them with populations and decision-makers at multiple levels. Thus, the question is how Enda can use these capacities to push the state on planning issues in Dakar, particularly the interests of marginalized actors like street vendors. Reclaiming Enda’s unique position requires new forms of engagement with the national government and with populations on the ground, or some part of Enda to connect to the top while other parts connect to the bottom. To achieve this, I would suggest that Enda, led by Diapol, adopt a sectoral approach to the urban informal economy.
2. Enda’s organizational strength is in its ability to use its decentralized structure to respond to challenges on the ground, but only if its entities are bound by some uniting political vision. Jacques Bugnicourt, the organization’s founder, was able to build and sustain an image of Enda that united its staff and gained it legitimacy at multiple levels. Since his death, the organization has struggled to find unifying forces, so the entities have spread out further. This lack of synergy presents challenges related to scale and impact at the national level. It appears the organization is in need of a new organizing narrative and mechanisms for balancing flexibility with unity.

3. Enda’s technical and research capacities are important assets. Yet the organization must use these assets in a more “politicized” manner and in ways that allow the organization to learn and adapt. Enda and its urban entities must think about the impacts they are trying to influence in Dakar and beyond and how their activities and relationships can further these goals. They must develop mechanisms for tracking change and changing course, when necessary, to be able to respond proactively to emerging challenges (i.e. informal vendors).

This could involve experimenting with new approaches to internal evaluation and monitoring, particularly real-time systems that encourage reflection and learning. Examples of approaches that might be tried include advocacy impact evaluation (Patton, 2008), participatory action learning systems (Mayoux, 2005), or internal learning systems (Noponen, 2005). These approaches also emphasize evaluation and learning with clients or beneficiaries, which could help Enda reconnect with its populations. In turn, this legitimacy on the ground would help the organization reposition itself with respect to donors and the state.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Complete List of Enda Entities

**International Annexes:**
Enda Bolívia  
Enda Brazil  
Enda Colombia  
Enda Dominicana  
Enda Siddhi Bombay (India)  
Enda Vietnam  
Enda Europe (France)  
Enda Ethiopia  
Enda Inter-Arabe (Tunisia)  
Enda Mali  
Enda Océán Indien (Madagascar)

**Entities in Senegal:**
Enda ACAS (Actions in Casamance)  
Enda BUKOL (Office of Kolda)  
Enda Cyberpop  
Enda Diapol (Political Dialogue)  
Enda Eau Populaire (Popular Water)  
Enda Ecopole (Informal Settlements)  
Enda Ecopop (Popular Economy)  
Enda Energie  
Enda Graf Sahel (Research Action Training Group)  
Enda Jeunesse Action (Youth Action)  
Enda Lead Afrique Francophone (Promoting Good Leadership in Africa)  
Enda Madesahel (Applied Methods for Development in the Sahel)  
Enda Pronat (Cultural Preservation)  
Enda RUP (Relay for Participatory Urban Development)  
Enda Sante (Health)-Plantes Medicinales (Medicinal Plants)  
Enda Sante (Health)-Action Contre le Sida (AIDS Prevention)  
Enda Synfev (Synergy, Gender and Development)  
Enda Syspro (Systems and Planning)

**Common Services in Senegal:**
Enda Adressothéque (Connection/Communication for International Solidarity)  
Enda CAF (Administrative and Financial Coordination)  
Enda Eddoc (Editing, Diffusion, and Documentation)

Appendix 2: Enda Organizational Chart
## Appendix 3: Enda Funding Sources

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Sources: Enda Annual Reports 2002-2007
Appendix 4: Maps of Dakar

Sources: commons.wikimedia.org and www.toubab.com
## Appendix 5: Administrative Units in the Dakar Region

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Source: Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan
WORKS CITED AND REFERENCED


27(8):1383-1395.
Aid Partners in Mozambique.” Report to Programme Aid Partners and the Government of Mozambique.


Internal Enda documents on general policies, statutes, strategies, impacts, inter-entity meetings, “Mouya Yara,” COU, and Minga.


