Regime Legitimacy and Military Resilience: Lessons from World War II and Yugoslavia

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that regime legitimacy creates military resilience. A regime is legitimate when its constituents believe—whether because of ideological solidarity, patriotism, nationalism, or good governance—that a government has the right to exercise authority in its regime. Military resilience, which contributes to military effectiveness, refers to the willingness of troops to stay committed in combat. In modern war, dispersion of forces creates the need for a very high degree of troop commitment, making resilience more important than in previous forms of warfare. Resilient units do not disintegrate through desertion, and furthermore commit themselves actively under fire.

In arguing that legitimacy matters, this thesis revives a debate between two theories of military resilience. The first school, which comes out of the tradition of the mass army, holds that broad attributes like legitimacy, patriotism, and nationalism are crucial to resilience. In recent political science, a second school has been significantly more influential; these scholars argue that factors like small-unit cohesion and professionalism are the key explanatory variables for military resilience. Settling the debate between these competing methods of generating resilience is critical to effective army building.

This thesis strongly supports a revival of the first school of thought, based on the evidence from two cases where legitimacy experienced a sudden shock. The first case examines the military resilience of foreign legions forced to fight for Nazi Germany in World War II. It finds that those units were rarely resilient, even given otherwise similar conditions to German units, and what little resilience existed can be explained primarily through patriotism to soldiers’ original homelands. The second case examines the Yugoslav People’s Army during and after the disintegration of federated Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The evidence suggests that the army lacked resilience, experiencing mass desertion, when fighting for a disintegrated regime. It regained in resilience when it was reconstituted as a nationalist Serbian army in 1992.

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1. Introduction, Literature Review, and Theory

What affects the resilience of an army? Will soldiers fight harder on behalf of a regime or cause they see as legitimate? Scholars have long recognized that assessing state power requires incorporating more than quantitative strengths in troop numbers, matériel, and training. Qualitative attributes matter, too, whether analysts understand those as “spirit and moral factors,” “professionalism,” “national morale,” or something else.¹ Beyond fears that uncommitted soldiers will run away or surrender, modern warfare requires commitment in an active sense: the increased complexity of combat operations, combined with greater degrees of individual autonomy and force dispersion, require more of the soldier. One analysis, by Stephen Biddle, finds that measures of material factors, like GNP and population, can predict only 49% to 62% of war outcomes—victory or defeat—between 1900 and 1992; as Biddle remarks, these independent variables are thus little more helpful, statistically speaking, than a coin toss.² In a similar vein, Von Clausewitz observes that estimating the amount of military force needed to win a modern war leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term... To master all this complex mass by sheer methodical examination is obviously impossible. Bonaparte was quite right when he said that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic problems it would pose.³

Scholarship remains scattered and divided on what factors, beyond material power and technology, most explain military effectiveness. In this thesis, I focus on one potential source of military effectiveness that has been largely neglected by recent political-science literature: a sense that the regime or cause being fought for is legitimate.\(^4\) This theory holds that a sense of shared purpose creates resilience, which ultimately contributes to effectiveness. In arguing that ideational factors matter, I move away from a genre of accounts, common since World War II, that has stressed small-unit cohesion as the primary source of military resilience.\(^5\) Those theories argue that soldiers stay focused in battle because they have come to care about the soldiers in the trenches around them, their "primary group"; their loyalty and enthusiasm is owed less to the regime or the cause than to their fellow infantryman.\(^6\) The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, to be sure; a sense of national unity, obtained through legitimacy, may help military trainers induce the necessary camaraderie.\(^7\)

However, the divide between these two explanations has run deep in political

\(^4\) Drawing on Seymour Martin Lipset and other political theorists, legitimacy here refers to the belief by a population that a government has a right to exercise control over its regime. Legitimacy can be obtained and enhanced through nationalism, patriotism, shared ideology, and other factors, as well as by good governance. Causal legitimacy creates regime legitimacy by creating the sense that the military is being employed for an appropriate purpose.

\(^5\) I return to the distinction between military resilience and military effectiveness later, but briefly, military resilience refers to soldiers' commitment in battle, which affects—along with many other attributes—military effectiveness. Military effectiveness and military success should also be differentiated; an effective military can lose in battle to a less effective military because of bad conditions, bad luck, or bad balance of forces.

\(^6\) The idea came to popularity after a seminal study of Wehrmacht units' ability to stay effective even when outgunned. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1948), pp. 280-315.

\(^7\) Shils and Janowitz admit that patriotism and its "secondary symbols" can help form the primary groups that motivate soldiers, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-306. Summarizing the literature on small-unit cohesion, Alexander George distinguishes between armies like the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army and the Soviet Army where "comradely ties...were often grounded in patriotism," by contrast to "informal ties that cement small groups within the U.S. Army" that are "overtly apolitical or even antipolitical, and largely unregulated by higher authorities." Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance," in *Handbook of Military Institutions*, ed. Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 301-2 and 304.
science. The debate pits two fundamentally different methods of obtaining soldiers' cooperation—two distinct views of how to stand up a military—against each other. The first school sees such motivation as most readily obtained through purveying a set of "wholesale" factors, like nationalism, religion, ideology, or patriotism, that can be used to mobilize and motivate a mass army quickly and on the cheap. The second school, which has dominated the last half-century of political science research, favors what might be called "retail" factors. These include small-unit cohesion and professionalism; instilling these attributes may be more costly and time-consuming on a per soldier basis than the wholesale method, and can result in significantly smaller militaries. Such factors are also less likely to be effective or sustainable when personnel turnover rates are significant (for instance, due to high casualty rates).

In an era of interventions and foreign-imposed regime change, the debate has enormous policy significance. In the most prominent contemporary example, many American policy-makers appear to view the problem of standing up a new Iraqi army as largely logistical. Discussions of building this force seem to hinge on the presumption that with sufficient equipment, funding, and training, an effective army will naturally emerge, gradually allowing the United States to devolve security responsibilities to national forces. This view resembles a "retail" model for building militaries. But Iraq is mired in civil war, ethnic factionalism, and continued doubts

8. The terms "wholesale" and "retail" are suggested by Barry Posen. For use of the former, see Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 84.

about the legitimacy of its nascent process of democratization. Given this
uncertainty, to whom are the newly recruited Iraqi soldiers ultimately loyal?
National civilian leadership? Local or ethnic political leaders and warlords? Their
individual units? The idea of a state itself, through some emerging conception of
patriotism or nationalism? The United States government, which pays its salaries?

This thesis, in a sense, breaks off a piece of the larger puzzle posed by military
reconstruction. Indeed, if legitimacy matters, it begs the question of the extent to
which American policy-makers can affect the resilience of the Iraqi military. In Iraq,
the U.S. and its partners are attempting to do something with little historical
precedent: build a state and a military along separate tracks. By contrast, the
experience of modern Western states is largely one of synergy between the two
institutions: war-making helped form a state, which in turn helped structure and
form a particular type of military. 10 With few historical directly parallel historical
cases to study for relevant lessons, this thesis looks at one underlying component of
the challenge: how the legitimacy of a regime, for instance Iraq’s new government,
might impact the resilience, effectiveness, and loyalty of a military. With respect to
Iraq, the issue of loyalty will likely only grow more acute as security stresses on Iraq
increase and the U.S. draws down coalition troop commitments. In short, if soldiers’
propensity to fight under pressure indeed varies with their view of governmental
legitimacy, it is may be a doomed enterprise to center army reform around primarily
logistical and technical concepts. Instead, it may be more important to inculcate a
sense of patriotism, purveying the idea that the army is defending the Iraqi state—

10. I return to these arguments in my theory discussion below; they can be found in Charles Tilly,
regardless of its specific manifestation—against disliked outside enemies that threaten Iraqi independence.

This thesis proposes two contributions to the larger scholarship on military effectiveness. First, it attempts to move past the inconsistent way in which the term effectiveness is often employed in the literature, by focusing instead on a single factor that impacts effectiveness—military resilience—and operationalizing this term through easily measurable data points like disintegration and desertion. Second, it explores two data-rich cases which have largely been ignored by political scientists. Both cases involve extreme shocks to regime legitimacy, resulting in strong changes to the “wholesale” factors, with relatively little change to “retail” factors. They thus offer the possibility of a strong three-cornered fight,\(^\text{11}\) since the two theories make unique and certain predictions of how the legitimacy shock will impact military resilience. Specifically, retail theories predict little impact, while wholesale theories predict a legitimacy vacuum will produce dramatically lowered resilience. The test cases strongly support the influence of such wholesale factors. While it does not put a nail in the coffin of retail theories, it provides a critical test to demonstrate that their explanatory power is not unlimited. As a result, this thesis serves as an exercise in theory revival, buttressed by a fertile but relatively neglected universe of cases.

**Literature from the Wholesale and Retail Schools**

Arguments for the impact of wholesale factors on military resilience and effectiveness have been relatively unpopular in recent political-science literature. The key work arguing for an impact of macro-level, ideational variables comes from

\(^{11}\) On Imre Lakatos's concept of the three-cornered fight, in which rival theories are pitted against each other (and the null hypothesis), see Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, p. 38.
Barry Posen, who argues that elites purvey nationalism to improve military capability. Using a Waltzian model, where states in a competitive world emulate the most effective practices of other states, Posen focuses on the emergence of the mass army in Revolutionary France.\(^{12}\) He argues that leaders used compulsory education and propaganda to infuse nationalism in soldiers, resulting in the maintenance of fighting capability even with rapid replacement of troops. The argument thus directly connects nationalism and conflict intensity, arguing that nationalism spread throughout Europe in large part to make mass armies fight harder against other mass armies. He also cites several works of recent historical scholarship which focus on the military impact of wholesale factors like ideology, patriotism, and nationalism.\(^{13}\) (Indeed, the wholesale school of thought appears to be significantly more common as an implicit argument in military history rather than as an explicit argument in political science; additional relevant historical works are discussed in this thesis's conclusion.) Building on Posen's work, Dan Reiter uses the militarized, hyper-nationalistic case of Japan in World War II to argue that nationalism increased Japanese military effectiveness, by making soldiers more willing to risk their lives for the state, as evidenced in kamikaze attacks.\(^{14}\) He notes that nationalism can also decrease effectiveness by decreasing responsiveness: highly nationalistic soldiers may not respect the rights of a surrendering enemy, thus making that enemy more reluctant to surrender.


By contrast, most scholarship on military effectiveness has argued in favor of retail explanations. Shils and Janowitz’s previously-mentioned interviews with German prisoners suggest that small-unit cohesion was the primary factor in maintaining *Wehrmacht* effectiveness in World War II. Their loyalty was to the “primary group”—the men in the same unit—rather than to “secondary symbols” of Nazism.¹⁵ Shils and Janowitz’s work has rarely been directly challenged; the most prominent exception is historian Omer Bartov, who argues that primary groups carry little explanatory power on World War II’s eastern front, where high death and replacement rates would have prevented solidarity from emerging.¹⁶ A large number of subsequent studies have come to conclusions similar to Shils and Janowitz, including a prominent study of American soldiers in World War II and a much-cited volume comparing *Wehrmacht* and US Army performance by historian Martin van Creveld.¹⁷

Many of the cornerstone books on civil-military relations also implicitly fit into the retail school. Huntington’s seminal work deems the emergence of professionalism as a key explanation for officer loyalty and effectiveness. Professionalism emerges from careful training, not from shared ideology. It rests partly on a “military mind” which is generic—common to the profession—and not “bound to any specific theory of history.”¹⁸ An isolation of the political and military

¹⁵. Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration.”
¹⁸. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 64.
spheres is necessary for what Huntington calls objective civilian control. Several civil-military scholars have also focused on the difficulties in maintaining multiethnic armies. In the most notable work on the subject, Alon Peled essentially reverts to a retail-theory explanation for the success of certain multiethnic armies. In his study, professional officers play the key role in successfully integrating ethnic groups. Integration occurs more successfully in professional rather than politicized militaries. When integration succeeds, it usually occurs as the result of organizational needs rather than ideological factors.\(^\text{19}\)

One key roadblock to the adequate testing of retail versus wholesale theories is the inconsistent definitions used in civil-military relations literature.\(^\text{20}\) Literature on military effectiveness suffers from an inconsistently operationalized dependent variable, and conflation between correlation and causation. There is no agreed upon definition of, or metric for, military effectiveness. The central difficulty, of course, is that military effectiveness does not necessarily translate into military success. Outcomes also depend on the balance of forces and battlefield circumstances. A representative definition for effectiveness is Stephen Peter Rosen’s: “the amount of offensive and defensive military power that can be generated by a military organization from a given level of material resources.”\(^\text{21}\) The term, in other words, generally holds constant raw, quantitative forms of power, and treats as endogenous military strategy, doctrine, and decision-making. It focuses instead on a military’s ability to translate given strategy and resources into relative levels of battlefield

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success. Despite the flaws inherent in such a method, many scholars have operationalized military effectiveness with win-loss ratio in battles (offering a larger range of observation than whole wars). The most formal discussion of operationalizing effectiveness comes in the introductory essay to a volume edited by Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, who break the dependent variable into four interrelated components: integration (consistent military activity across different branches), responsiveness (accommodation to both internal and external constraints and opportunities), skill (that military personnel can perform on the battlefield), and quality (supply of essential matériel). Independent variables discussed in the subsequent chapters include culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-military relations, interstate competition, global norms, and international organizations. For Brooks and Stanley, military effectiveness combines with military resources (GNP, technology, industry, human capital) to create military power. This patchwork of terms has done little to clarify what is meant by military effectiveness.

Regardless of how the dependent variable is operationalized, scholars have pointed to a wide range of independent variables believed to impact military effectiveness, but rarely have tested these against each other. Several have argued that regime type matters, and in particular that democracies are more likely to win wars, though authors differ on the exact mechanism by which this happens.


Stephen Rosen’s discussion of military effectiveness, based mainly on India as a test case, takes as its explanatory values social structures and the degree to which military organizations divorce themselves from society. 25 Kenneth Pollack examines, across six states, a number of explanations for Arab military ineffectiveness since World War II: poor unit cohesion, disappointing generals, flawed tactical leadership at the junior-officer level, bad information management, technical skills that hamper weapons handling, problematic logistical and maintenance operations, low morale, inadequate training, and cowardice. He dismisses three factors in the Arab case (cowardice, cohesion, and logistics), finds mixed presence of three (morale, generalship, and training), and notes widespread issues with tactical leadership, information management, weapons handling, and maintenance. Pollack’s work, it should be noted, has little explanatory power because it does not purport to provide or test any theory of causation, but instead catalogs, out of a large set of possible causal factors, attributes that were and were not present in the Arab cases. 26

LEGITIMACY AND RESILIENCE

This thesis argues that regime legitimacy increases military resilience. In testing this, it attempts to address several of the aforementioned gaps in civil-military scholarship, including the failure to explore wholesale explanations alongside retail ones. The thesis examines two test cases where the wholesale independent variable sharply and quickly varies, while retail independent variables

are held steady. These cases allow us to pit the small-unit cohesion explanations of Shils and Janowitz against theories like Posen's hypotheses on nationalism and the mass army or the Nazi-ideology-focused historical scholarship of Bartov. In taking resilience as its dependent variable, this thesis also focuses on a more specific, and readily operationalized, aspect of military effectiveness than is typical in the literature.

I define legitimacy as the internal belief, shared among a population, that the government has a right to exercise political authority within its territory. It is a shared sense of purpose that binds those who hold it. Legitimacy may be indirectly produced or manipulated by elites through a variety of forces. Patriotism, nationalism, religion, ideology, and good governance can all increase legitimacy by developing shared values and a sense of loyalty. Nationalism and patriotism—unlike good governance—are ways of instilling a sense of legitimacy on the cheap and on the fly, but they are not the only sources of legitimacy. Legitimacy exists on a continuous spectrum, and does not require that a citizen agree with every decision of his government: while the two may covary at times, regime legitimacy should remain relatively more stable than would mere approval of leaders or their decisions. Legitimacy does not require a particular system of government, distinguishing this argument from those of scholars who have argued that democracies fight wars more effectively. Legitimacy and authoritarianism are not mutually exclusive; a population can accept the right of an oppressive regime to rule. Still, democratic regimes are often seen as highly legitimate, while

authoritarian regimes may have to work to build the sense of legitimacy. 28

Because scholars have reached no clear consensus either regarding the sources or definition of legitimacy, the term has inherent limitations. However, its use in the literature consistently suggests that legitimacy pertains to how a government transforms raw power into authority. 29 Similarly, this thesis explores how a military can obtain loyalty and resilience from its soldiers without simply resorting to the coercive methods of court-martials. As such, the term is used throughout this thesis to reflect a variety of sources of loyalty—most notably forms of shared group identity, including cultural, national, and ideological solidarity.

I define military resilience as the willingness of individual troops to remain committed on the battlefield, particularly in difficult situations. Such commitment has both passive and active components. In a passive sense, commitment involves the decision not to "disintegrate," to use the Shils and Janowitz term, which includes, from highest commitment failure to lowest: individual and collective desertion, active surrender, passive surrender, routine resistance, and last-ditch resistance. 30 In an active sense, commitment involves a soldier's decision to participate above and beyond the minimal acceptable level demanded by their commanding officers. Resilient behavior thus ranges from sacrifice and loyalty at one end, to compliance somewhere in the middle, to resistance and outright rebellion or disintegration at the worst end. Military resilience is one part of military effectiveness. I choose this narrower dependent variable because legitimacy seems unlikely to affect many components of effectiveness—for instance, the four

28. Lipset, Political Man, p. 78.
disaggregated aspects specified by Brooks and Stanley. A highly resilient army can still lose because of battlefield conditions, unfavorable balance of forces, poor leadership or logistics, or simply bad luck. Additional problems make it difficult to directly observe resilience: soldiers may lose resilience as the result of likely defeat, creating an endogeneity problem, and less resilient units may be less likely to be employed in difficult battles, creating a selection bias.

As a result, military resilience is not easy to measure. Observing it with accuracy requires holding all other factors that affect battlefield behavior equal. Still, it is easier to measure than military effectiveness, simply because it disaggregates an otherwise unwieldy concept. Since in practice we will rarely obtain a perfect test comparison, we look for evidence of poor or exceptional performance where factors other than intensity of soldiers' commitment can not adequately explain the gap between expected and observed performance. We can use objective data that directly demonstrates disintegration, which includes desertion rates or evidence from military court-martials of cowardice or defection. Additionally, we can supplement this with more subjective data in the form of military histories, including estimations of how a unit held up relative to what might be expected of a similarly trained and supplied unit in a similar situation. If military historians argue that a unit held together under unusually difficult circumstances, it suggests a high degree of resilience, even if the unit was ultimately unsuccessful. If troops fled, deserted, or surrendered—and particularly in a situation where the balance of forces did not overwhelmingly suggest their failure—such disintegration suggests a low degree of resilience.

31. Resilience would fit most closely into their “skill” category, as one component of how soldiers comport themselves on the battlefield.
How Legitimacy Generates Resilience

Military resilience is affected by legitimacy because of an antecedent condition: the difficulty of getting troops to perform under conditions of dispersion created by modern warfare. The 18th century saw the development of several characteristics of modern wars, including the mass army and growth in the use of skirmishers. Skirmishers fought outside the close-knit battle lines, which had emphasized quantity of firepower over quality of fighting; skirmishers independently chose and attacked targets in small units or individually. This dispersion helped set off the modern army from previous incarnations: the new military required increased skill and effort by the individual soldier, who were no longer simply cannon fodder. Technological developments in the 20th century have furthered this. Modern-system defense and modern-system offense—Biddle’s terms to describe the cooperative and complex tactics that emerged in World War I—require high levels of skill, coordination, and in-the-moment ingenuity. Increasingly, the 20th century came to focus on small units, maneuvering and performing with increased independence, creating stressors on both morale and technique.

These technological and tactical developments of modern warfare brought with them a change in military recruitment. Starting in the 19th century, modern armies came to rely on citizens and national troops, rather than the custom of multinational forces recruited from foreign volunteers. The increased need for skill and effort no doubt made military planners more attuned to issues of loyalty. As

Alexander George puts it: "Modern weapons have only exacerbated a long-standing problem of warfare: the task of getting everyone to engage effectively in combat and the related task of maintaining the cohesion and performance of the combat unit under the shock, danger, and cumulative stress of battle." 35 A turn to recruiting national armies, in parallel with the development of a common national identity, was a logical way to answer this challenge. In his discussion of the move from limited war to the possibility of total war, Von Clausewitz concurs that the face of war was changed as the forces of nationalism moved war beyond the strict purview of governments and into the realm of the people. Discussing the French revolution, he writes:

"People at first expected to have to deal only with a seriously weakened French army; but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens... This juggernaut of war, based on the strength of the entire people, began its pulverizing course through Europe... There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects. Various factors powerfully increased that vigor: the vastness of available resources, the ample field of opportunity, and the depth of feeling generally aroused... War, untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had broken lose in all its elemental fury." 36

The crux of the mass army is its ability to cheaply and quickly motivate a large number of people to high degrees of battlefield resilience. The modern professional army seeks to do the same with a much smaller group of soldiers and officers. This incurs higher costs and requires more training. The problem of instilling motivation in soldiers resembles the difficulties faced by any large organization. Organizational theorist James Q. Wilson stresses a bottom-up rather than top-down understanding of large bureaucracies: understanding a bureaucracy's

effectiveness requires understanding its members personal beliefs, interests, and conception of the organization's culture. Obtaining compliance within these organizations—à la resilience in a military—requires providing incentives for those members, whether through "a sense of duty and purpose, the status that derives from individual recognition and personal power, and the associational benefits that come from being part of an organization." That third source, also called solidarity, resembles the explanation given for military resilience by small-unit effectiveness theorists. The first obviously resembles the wholesale theory. An economy of incentives determines the degree of compliance. Ideology, Wilson argues, will particularly matter in jobs where job tasks are most weakly defined and enforcement is most diffuse. This, of course, resembles the environment created by the dispersion and tactics of modern war—where solidarity may be insufficient without a higher sense of purpose.

Regime legitimacy can impact the resilience of soldiers in a modern army in two ways, which speak to the passive and active components of resilience, respectively. First, a legitimate government will have less difficulty obtaining compliance with its requests. The creation and maintenance of a military requires extracting from a society both costs and manpower. Governments can use either coercion or persuasion to obtain these sacrifices—with persuasion made possible through the manipulation of beliefs, whether religious, nationalistic, or otherwise. A government that lacks legitimacy will find resilience inhibited by citizens' views that the government is not appropriate and therefore not worthy of voluntary sacrifice. This should extend to all aspects of raising a military: taxes, recruitment

through draft or volunteer forces, and maintaining troop compliance on the battlefield. Soldiers in an illegitimate regime will be less likely to volunteer for military service, more likely to resist drafts, and more likely to engage in some form of disintegration.

Second, legitimacy affects resilience in a more active, positive sense. Soldiers who view their regime as legitimate are likely to go above and beyond the minimal expectation. This is an advantage of wholesale rather than retail motivation. Particularly in defensive engagements, where the shared belief that created the legitimacy is perceived as being at risk, soldiers who share a sense of legitimacy should be highly resilient. This may help explain why states sometimes attempt to couch all actions—including offensive ones—in defensive terms. In the second case in this thesis, concerning foreign units in World War II, Baltic conscripts fought most effectively when they felt they were defending their homeland from Russian invaders, not when they were on the offensive on behalf of the Germans. This may be attributable simply to the fact that the defense is easier than the offense, a cornerstone principle for Clausewitz and other military theorists. 40 The research design of this thesis cannot adequately test the wholesale theory against this alternative explanation. Still, while the relative ease of the defense may explain some variation, states can make efforts to spin combat as defensive or offensive to serve broader purposes. The fluidity of the eastern front in World War II makes it nearly impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive operations on a purely tactical level; indeed, military leaders play a significant role in shaping soldier and officer attitudes regarding the purpose of their military activity.

To at least some extent, perceptions of legitimacy can be affected by deliberate

40. Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 328
state behavior. Even the most authoritarian regimes have often sought to legitimate their behavior. The manipulation of shared ideologies is possible, at least according to scholars who view nationalism as generated by elites. The creation of legitimacy is commonly part of the process of nation-building, as distinguished from state-building. A modern nation has a sense of community and identity or shared consciousness, which are not necessarily attributes of a state. It may be easier to purvey forces that increase legitimacy to certain populations. For instance, in the World War II case study, Nazi leaders were very effective at infusing German SS units with a racist ideology, but less effective—even with similar training—at infusing that ideology in non-German SS units. Since leaders can manipulate both conceptions and definitions of nationality—as well as the degree to which a population identifies itself with a given nationality—the wholesale theories carry prescriptive utility.

**Testing the Theory**

**Hypotheses and Predictions**

The wholesale and retail theories of military resilience generate two divergent hypotheses about how resilient armies should be built:

H\textsubscript{w1}. Legitimacy—whether generated through nationalism, patriotism, ideology, or otherwise—increases the resilience of military units. As units view their regime as increasingly illegitimate, they become more likely to disintegrate, decreasing resilience.

H\textsubscript{r1}. Small-unit cohesion, well-supplied units, extensive training, and professionalism increase the resilience of military units.

Both hypotheses may well hold simultaneously; however, each theory makes

an argument about the relative resilience of armies motivated through the two methods. The wholesale view holds that in the toughest battle situations, shared purpose will generate the most tooth-and-nail fighting, evidencing active rather than passive commitment; the retail school does not see legitimacy as relevant to resilience:

\( H_{w2} \). Armies whose resilience is built on legitimacy rather than on retail factors are more likely to exhibit active commitment.

\( H_{r2} \). Armies built using retail factors do not need legitimacy or ideology to keep troops actively committed in battle, and their military resilience will not be significantly affected by changes to legitimacy or ideology.

Fully testing the wholesale theory would also require further examination of two other constituent hypotheses, concerning the causes of legitimacy and the relevance of military effectiveness. Neither hypothesis is unique to the wholesale school, though testing them is not necessary for the retail theory:

\( H_{w3} \). When elites purvey forces like patriotism, ideology, and nationalism, they manipulate and increase legitimacy.

\( H_{w4} \). All other factors held equal, increased military resilience will increase military effectiveness.

There is also a cost-benefit argument implicit in the wholesale theory, which is not tested in this thesis:

\( H_{w5} \). Generating legitimacy creates an economy of scale for building a military. It is cheaper and quicker to purvey ideology or patriotism to a mass army than it is to train an equivalently powerful professional army.

We can make a number of empirical predictions about what we should observe in our test cases if the wholesale theory is accurate. Several predictions concern the behavior of military forces and are expected to be seen in the case data
if $H_w$ is true:

- Units composed of men who do not view a regime as legitimate will be more likely to disintegrate, through desertion, surrender, or disorganized battlefield behavior. They are most likely to do so at points when an army is stressed to the breaking point—e.g., battles towards the end of a war when defeat is increasingly likely, or any battle where loss is likely—for two reasons. First of all, at that point, the personal costs of compliance (danger of dying) are at their highest. Secondly, methods of coercion are most difficult to apply in the heat of battle. Resilience is a factor that normally compels soldiers to fight even when loss is a likely outcome.

- When competing loyalties are pitted against each other in a particular combat situation, soldiers should resort to fighting for the regime—or at least defecting so they are not opposing the regime—that holds the most legitimacy to them.

- A shock to legitimacy should inspire a marked change in battlefield resilience. A legitimation crisis may come during a sudden regime change, including the takeover of a country by an invader.

- In terms of the observable secondary effects of this theory, we should expect to find statements—diaries, interviews, correspondence—of soldiers in regimes with low legitimacy that reveal questions of their ability to faithfully execute the commands of higher officers. Reluctance to fight because of illegitimacy is likely to be a self-conscious decision.

A range of other predictions applies to elites of states who may seek to alter their behavior based on the influence of legitimacy. These suggest that elites are operating on the belief that $H_{w2}$ is true. To make these strong predictions for the theory, we should not only see elites follow these patterns of behavior—which could
simply mean they are operating on a misguided basis—but also evidence that the behavior is successful.

- States should use methods to instill a sense of legitimacy when engaged in defensive combat and a sense of ideological fervor when on the offense. This may be done through several of the methods that increase legitimacy discussed above; it may also take the form of propaganda, the mixing of ethnic forces to dilute and diffuse those with questionable loyalty, or the use of volunteer rather than conscript forces (who are more likely to join for ideological reasons).

- States may try to make their engagements appear defensive rather than offensive, to suggest to soldiers that the shared source of legitimacy is at stake.

- If legitimacy is low, states should employ more coercive means (military police, court-martials, etc.) to ensure compliance and increase resilience.

- If leaders are aware that certain units have little respect for the regime's legitimacy, they should be less likely to deploy those units in the most difficult battles, introducing a potential selection effect.

Research Design

The case-study method is appropriate for a preliminary test of this theory. We are attempting to assess one necessary criterion, not all sufficient criteria, for military resilience. Case studies are ideal at the task of identifying scope conditions (less so at identifying relative causal weights).42 Both cases utilize the method of difference, though with slightly different research designs. The first case compares SS units with similar values for many factors that might affect resilience—training,

battle conditions—but sharply different values on the study variable, legitimacy:
some of the units are German while others are foreign and largely unsympathetic to
Nazi causes. In the second case, the comparison is longitudinal rather than across
different units; it examines the resilience of a single army over a period of time in
which the study variable experiences a sharp change, the result of the fragmentation
of the Yugoslav state and reconstitution of its army.43 The two different research
designs compensate for two distinct challenges in doing controlled comparisons to
test wholesale theories of military resilience. The first case compensates for the
difficulty in holding both raw military power and battlefield conditions constant
over time, by using pairings of forces fighting under similar conditions. The second,
longitudinal design compensates for the fact that variation in legitimacy is hard to
operationalize and thus difficult to compare across multiple regimes. It instead relies
on the sudden variation of legitimacy for a single actor within a single regime.

Selecting cases for extreme values on the independent variable—i.e., looking
at states where legitimacy is highly in question—is appropriate here because it
allows for testing unique and certain predictions.44 Changes to the study variable
may be found by looking for shocks to legitimacy. These are easily seen in a strand
of cases consisting of artificial or proxy militaries, where a military is fighting on
behalf of a third-party regime and questions of legitimacy and loyalty are apparent.
This yields a rich set of potential cases from conquest and colonialism, including the
quisling militaries that fought for Nazi Germany or Cold War-era armies involved in

43. This longitudinal controlled comparison resembles what Van Evera calls a type-two congruence
procedure, which uses multiple data points across a single case. In this method, the researcher
determines whether the paired observations covary as the theory expects. See Van Evera, Guide
to Methods, p. 61. However, congruence method generally refers to what Van Evera calls a type-
one congruence procedure: the comparison of the theoretically expected relationship between
IV and DV with the observed relationship in a single case. See George and Bennett, Case Studies

44. For more on this strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science
proxy wars during periods of weak or puppet regimes (e.g., the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the U.S., or the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union). Since they do not involve an army being rebuilt from scratch, they also provide the necessary continuity for within-case process-tracing: a European unit forced to fight for the Nazi cause will have relatively constant levels of objective military capability, but soldiers' perceptions of regime legitimacy may change dramatically.

Cases

The two cases share a shock to legitimacy, though the sources of this shock are opposite: integration through conquest in one case and fragmentation through nationalism in the second. In both cases, elite behavior, at least initially, did not successfully compensate for the sudden decrease to legitimacy created by the shock. In World War II, the German military, increasingly desperate for manpower on the Eastern front, built up foreign legions comprised of soldiers from occupied countries. In the elite Waffen SS, half a million foreigners served by choice or by draft; every one of that force's divisions had some non-German representation. A theory based on regime legitimacy helps explain the varying levels of military effectiveness between the foreign legions observed by World War II historians: by and large, the foreign legions underperformed relative to their Germanic counterparts—even when accounting for differences in training and combat conditions. Moreover, they performed at their best when there was a sense of national purpose—a key

generator of legitimacy—to their actions: the Baltic states defending against further Soviet occupation, for instance. Since German military performance is also the case from which most small-unit effectiveness theories were inductively generated, the failure of this theory to explain relative military performance on the eastern front provides a strong and infirming test.

The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s provides a second test case, though in this case nationalism was not pitted against an occupying force, but instead provided the impetus for states to break away from a loose federation. During the first secessions—of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia in the early 1990s—the longstanding Yugoslav People’s Army, widely regarded as a powerful and well-trained military, vastly underperformed, while the relatively ragtag armies of the seceding states generated significant success with limited equipment and manpower. The Yugoslav People’s Army remained committed to an idea of pan-Yugoslav communism rendered defunct by the secessions, which caused it to operate essentially on behalf of Serbian nationalists. This in turn alienated non-Serbian members of the army, who defected or deserted, heavily decreasing the military’s combat performance. Significantly, when the army was reconstituted as a largely Serbian army under the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it regained much of its prior combat effectiveness. In the late 1990s, it performed well even when vastly outmatched by NATO firepower and finances.

These cases have some limitations. First of all, as mentioned previously, it is difficult to distinguish between an explanation for resilience based on shared ethnicity and an explanation based on (more manipulable sense of) shared legitimacy. Because the legitimacy divisions in these cases occur along ethnic lines—German versus non-Germanic soldiers, Serbian versus non-Serbian soldiers—they
may not provide enough data points to fully distinguish between, for instance, patriotism and ethnicity as explanations for resilience. Moreover, since defensive engagements tend to be associated with higher legitimacy, some of the variation might be explained by Clausewitz’s idea of the relative ease of the defense. A second limitation is the data available about the Yugoslav case. Without primary-source materials, the case does not offer much evidence for testing the retail theory. However, in both cases, the emphasis is on testing the wholesale theory against a null hypothesis. This is because our hypotheses state that if the retail theory fully explains military resilience, a shock to legitimacy—if accompanied by no other changes—will not affect resilience. Thus, a demonstration by these two cases that legitimacy affects resilience contradicts retail theory. Thirdly, a lack of detailed on-the-ground evidence makes it difficult to distinguish between a wholesale theory as the original or proximate cause of military resilience. For instance, shared ethnicity may lead to resilience for the simple reason that everyone wants to make it home safely, an idea that shares much in common with small-unit cohesion and retail theory—with the notable difference that the cohesion is not created through training and professionalism but through wholesale factors. Finally, the evidence used does not speak to all of the generated hypotheses: while H_{w1}, H_{w2}, and H_{w3} receive relatively strong tests, H_{r1}, H_{w3}, H_{w4}, and H_{w5} would all require additional case material. However, despite these limitations, the case work serves as a strong plausibility probe for the revival of wholesale arguments and also suggests that the retail school’s theories are insufficient to explain at least these two cases.
2. Foreign Soldiers in the Waffen-SS, 1940-1945

The all-out fighting on the eastern front made it easily the bloodiest, most vicious theater in World War II. There, total war was fueled by a combination of manpower and belief—fierce racism and irreconcilable ideological collision between the Nazis and Soviets. The front opened with a massive, and remarkably successful, surprise attack on June 22, 1941, involving three million German soldiers, half a million allied soldiers, 600,000 horses, and 2700 war planes. But the Soviet’s remarkable ability to continually replenish their troop strength ensured that a ruthless war raged until May 1945. It was, of course, the decisive front in the European theater. For a war so defined by racial hatred, it is perhaps surprising that a great deal of Hitler’s military might derived from non-German soldiers, the foreign soldiers who volunteered or were conscripted into Wehrmacht and particularly elite Waffen-SS units. Particularly among the draftees, many of these soldiers did not share in Nazi ideals. This enables a strong method-of-difference test for explaining the varying resilience of units: the case provides roughly constant battle conditions and training methods across units, which differ mainly in their vastly different views of Nazi legitimacy.

A legitimacy-based explanation provides the best tool for understanding the relative military resilience of divisions fighting for Nazi Germany. Amidst an army noted for its cohesion and resilience even at the war’s twilight, in the face of near-inevitable defeat and in the harsh conditions of the eastern front, the foreign legions—those with the lowest perceptions of legitimacy of the German regime—underperformed relative to German divisions. This is true even when battle

conditions, skill, and training are taken into account. In those cases where the foreign legions were resilient, a sense of national legitimacy was maintained: for instance, Latvian legions fought in separate national divisions, motivated in large part by a desire to prevent the return of Soviet occupiers. Even though fighting under German command, the foreign legions remained in many ways essentially nationalist divisions. Moreover, Western units comprised of volunteers performed better than Eastern units comprised of conscripts, a discrepancy that cannot be accounted for by retail explanations alone.

This chapter begins with a historical overview of the *Waffen-SS*, Hitler's elite military branch; more than the rest of the German military, SS units were indoctrinated and infused with Nazi ideology. It then provides a chronology of the decision by Nazi officials to bring in half a million foreign troops over the course of the war, initially in multiethnic divisions and later in primarily national divisions. Next, the core of the chapter examines military histories for evidence of the relative resilience of foreign and German units. Because the secondary literature on these units is relatively spotty, the chapter does not perform the ideal controlled comparison, two units paired with largely identical training, leadership, equipment, experience, and battle conditions. Instead, it makes use of the available sources to amass evidence of the relative resilience of broad types of units—German, multiethnic, Western volunteer, and Eastern conscript—holding other factors constant wherever possible. The case of the Latvian legion, which is useful in ruling out alternative explanations, is explored in relatively greater depth; however, limited military history hinders an alternative research design, which would consist of a full longitudinal study of this unit alone. The chapter concludes by arguing that this evidence supports the wholesale hypotheses for the difference in resilience.
across types of units, and that other explanations fail to fully explain these anomalies.

**THE WAFFEN-SS**

The majority of the German *Wehrmacht*’s might was concentrated in the *Heer*, or regular Army. Smaller, more obscured by history, but in many ways more elite and effective, were the troops provided by the Nazi party’s *Schutzstaffel*, run by Henrich Himmler. The SS today is most remembered for its infamous role in perpetrating war crimes, creating a brutal police state, and running concentration camps, a mission undertaken by the *SS Totenkopfverbände*. But it also played a major military role in the war, through its *Waffen-SS* (armed SS), under the operational command of the *Wehrmacht* but separated both in training and in its members’ heightened commitment to Nazi ideology. The *Waffen-SS* was marked by a kind of “mental totalitarianism...an ideology based entirely on obedience to orders,”[^47] and was particularly effective and ruthless in offensive actions throughout the European theater.

The SS originated in the 1920s as a protection service for Hitler, but its unique character began to develop after Himmler took charge in 1929. First employed in combat during the annexation of Czechoslovakia, three full and one half *Waffen-SS* division were used in the invasion of France, where they showed a “toughness and determination that bordered on the reckless.”[^48] That determination


became even more visible on the eastern front, where the ideological and racial nature of the war were a perfect mesh for the attitudes inculcated by SS leadership. Its effectiveness was increased by the high physical barriers for volunteer selection, combined with extensive training, elite leadership, and attention from Hitler that brought funding for state-of-the-art equipment. This battle success in turn improved frosty SS relations with the Wehrmacht, which felt acute competition for both manpower and equipment. “The more savage the war became, the more the fighting qualities of the SS stood out,” writes George Stein.  

Unlike the Heer, whose training relied more on inculcating unit cohesion, the SS was a force built heavily around ideology. Recruiting criteria centered on race, physique, and character, not intellectual or social characteristics. Though initially conscription was limited only to the SS’s non-military units, by the end of the war, the need for more and more soldiers on the eastern front turned the Waffen-SS into a force increasingly resembling a mass army. More than half of its soldiers were drafted. Ideologically, Himmler saw the SS as having broader ends than purely military: Nazi notions of racial superiority, Lebensraum, and religiousness were inculcated in its members through speeches, training, propaganda, newsletters, and recreational activities. Subsequent interviews with SS members—who have mounted a fairly active propaganda campaign designed to absolve themselves of responsibility for the most heinous of Nazi Germany’s war crimes—have tended to downplay the role of ideology, arguing that the Waffen-SS was as non-political as most conventional armed forces. However, most historians look on such accounts skeptically. First of all, before the introduction of conscription, those joining the SS

would have been well aware of its ideological separation from the rest of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, the extensive program of indoctrination and propaganda would have made it hard for any soldier to remain fully non-political or non-ideological.52

The Evolution of Foreign Legions

Many historians have noted that the Waffen-SS might be history’s best example of a multiethnic mass army.53 By the conclusion of the war, half a million foreigners—volunteers and conscripts—comprised more than half the Waffen-SS’s manpower. Half of its 38 divisions were primarily foreign legions, and no divisions remained comprised in their entirety of native Germans. The bulk of the foreigners were from eastern Europe, along with 125,000 western Europeans, the latter mostly volunteers.54 The decision to recruit foreigners was driven in part by competition for manpower with the Wehrmacht, which had more power in conscripting German troops.55 Broader political objectives may also have underlaid Himmler’s request for and Hitler’s authorization of foreign recruits: the notion that once the war was won, the Waffen-SS would serve as the basis of a multinational army for a German empire. This helps explain why recruitment was focused on those of racial and ethnic descent compatible with Nazi ideology.56 Despite the ever-increasing need for troops due to the constant slaughter on the eastern front, the Waffen-SS continued to welcome only those of Germanic descent; French, Croatian, and Spanish soldiers

56. For the most complete fleshing out of this argument, see Mark P. Gingerich, "Waffen SS Recruitment in the ‘Germanic Lands,’ 1940–1941," Historian, vol. 59, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 815–831. See also Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 351.
were, at least initially, only allowed in non-SS components of the Wehrmacht.  

Who were these non-German Europeans, and what motivated those who volunteered? The initial recruits came primarily through local collaborationist groups with Nazi sympathies, like the national socialist parties in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The SS Nordland and SS Westland comprised the first Germanic but non-German regiments. The Western European volunteers were largely "ideologically motivated by Germanic concepts of the New Order, pan-Germanism, and anti-Bolshevism, as well as the apparent desire to escape the declining circumstances of their native homelands," argues Kenneth Estes, based on memoirs and interviews with soldiers and officers. In a 1948 survey of over 400 non-Germans who fought for the Nazi military, the majority—176 out of the 282 who were members of a national socialist party—attributed their decision either to duty to the national socialist party or to idealism; of the 150 who were not members of a national socialist party, most cited domestic concerns (food shortages for 71, poor situation at home for 19). German leadership, particularly training mastermind Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner, emphasized the pan-Europeanism of the Waffen-SS to build loyalty among these new recruits.

The SS Wiking was formed as the first major multiethnic division, and it played a major role in the 1941 invasion of Ukraine and 1942 combat into the Caucasus. However, replacement troops—increasingly assigned without regard to nationality, subject to less training, and having had less time to develop unit

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58. Gingerich, "Waffen SS Recruitment."
cohesion—proved less effective; German officers complained that they would “cry like babies.” As a result, Himmler increasingly emphasized separate national legions over multinational divisions. 60 With the Waffen-SS having suffered 43,000 casualties by 1942, it began heavy recruitment in the east, forming divisions for Romanians, Yugoslavians, Latvians, Estonians, and others. Insufficient numbers volunteered, leading to the use of coercive propaganda and finally to outright conscription in the east, starting in 1943. These foreign legions, though considered full Waffen-SS divisions, generally did not wear the signature SS runes, using national emblems instead. Some of the divisions were used primarily for local counterinsurgency operations, as with the SS Prinz Eugen (ethnic Germans—Volksdeutsche—from Yugoslavia), while others existed primarily for propaganda value and never saw combat—the Indian Legion and British Free Corps being notable examples. 61

**Resilience of the Waffen-SS’s Foreign Legions**

Two generalizations may be made regarding the combat performance of the Waffen-SS’s foreign soldiers. The first is that their resilience, never particularly high, only declined over the course of the war. Uncommitted fighting, disintegration, surrender, and mutiny were common, particularly as German chances at victory decreased. This is consistent with the first hypothesis (Hw1), and first empirical prediction, of the wholesale theory. The second generalization is that the Western European volunteer troops tended to be much more effective than the Eastern European conscripts. This gradient in resilience parallels the degree to which these troops felt they were fighting for a shared, legitimate cause, again supporting the

60. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 2, para. 22.
wholesale theory, both $H_{w1}$ and $H_{w2}$. SS soldiers were trained to lead and operate in small, high-powered units that could deploy quickly, independently, and inflict heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{62} The foreign troops initially were able to perform on par with German SS members, particularly in settings where German and non-German (but of Germanic descent) troops were mixed, like the SS Wiking. They could also be as ruthless as the purely German divisions. The SS Prinz Eugen, a Yugoslav Volksdeutsche division formed in 1941, was put in charge of counterinsurgency operations in the Balkans against communist partisans. One partisan who remembered fighting against the Prinz Eugen said later that “the German SS men were better fighters, but the traitors in the SS were ruthless, killing prisoners always.”\textsuperscript{63}

However, despite such scattered military successes, the foreign legions produced more than their share of headaches, from resignations to outright mutiny—key evidence of low resilience. Ineffective fighting is not necessarily evidence of low resilience, but in most of these cases, historians have argued that the foreign legion’s unusual ineffectiveness stemmed from disintegration rather than from, say, inadequate skill or poor leadership. Many of the concerns centered around morale issues, as when SS leaders would attempt to extend service lengths of those who expected to be returned home. Language barriers also caused numerous problems. Defection was not uncommon, in keeping with both the first and second empirical predictions from the introduction. A Norwegian and a Dane deserted the SS Nordland in 1942.\textsuperscript{64} In 1943, 206 Croat members mutinied from the same Prinz Eugen division that had been so ruthless in fighting partisans.\textsuperscript{65} December

\textsuperscript{64} Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 2, para. 19.
1944 saw a series of mutinies in the 19th Waffen Grenadier SS (2nd Latvian). 66 Even larger numbers simply resigned: of the initial 166 Norwegians who volunteered for the SS Wiking, 72 requested their release within a few months; a quarter of the 9,000 Dutch volunteers were dismissed that fall; and in 1943, nearly all the Finnish volunteers attempted to leave the SS Wiking. Nearly 6,000 Germanic volunteers had resigned from the Waffen-SS by summer 1943, representing more than a fifth of all the volunteers thus far recruited. 67

The wholesale theory also finds support from data consistent with the prediction that defensively-framed operations may generate a higher sense of legitimacy. Aside from regional counterinsurgency operations like those performed by the Prinz Eugen, military historians have noted that the Germans tended to find foreign troops most useful in defensive operations. To be sure, this could also be because defensive operations are tactically simpler than offensive, and less resilient troops would logically be deployed in such situations; the research design of this thesis does not attempt to test a Clausewitzian competing explanation. In the Wehrmacht, the Spanish division was useful as a second-tier infantry force in "limited offensive and static defensive missions," since its large size gave it the ability to quickly replace troops in difficult fighting. When reconstituted as a smaller legion in 1943 as part of the Waffen SS, it quickly crumbled and retreated in 1944 in the face of very light opposition from a Soviet offensive on the Volkhov front. Even while very hard-pressed for troops, the German command forbade it from fighting and returned it to Spain by April 1944. Also in the Wehrmacht, the Walloons—French-speaking Belgians—were useful in the defensive, while they had only one major

offensive success. A strong indicator that this relates to legitimacy is their outsized reputation for nationalistic and ideological cohesion under the leadership of Léon Degrelle, who convinced them that fighting for the Nazi cause was the best way to ensure the Belgians a leadership role in a newly unified Europe. The French legion was small and lacked resilience even in the defensive.

Consistent with the elite-centered predictions of wholesale theories of resilience, German leaders showed sensitivity to manipulating the sense of legitimacy. In particular, the decision to keep divisions ethnically separated is evidence that Himmler and his colleagues realized that legitimacy could be an issue in maintaining military resilience. In fact, Hitler commented directly on the matter in a 1945 conversation. “After all, why should they still fight? They are far from their homeland,” he said. “If one had them for six or ten years and controlled their homelands as the old monarchy did, they would naturally become good soldiers. But if one gets them when their homelands lie somewhere over there—why should they be expected to fight?”

A consistent pattern emerges among those historians who have studied the battle record of foreign SS divisions: these divisions were not resilient, even in similar battle conditions and given similar training and organizational structure as other SS units. Stein is withering in his views of the eastern foreign legions’ utility. “The eastern SS—numerically many times larger than the western SS—was, with the exception of the three Baltic divisions, nearly useless in regular warfare...[They], with very few exceptions, seem to have been more of a liability than an asset.”

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68. Degrelle was a prominent Rexist—the Belgian fascist movement—and has written a disturbingly enthusiastic account of his service: Léon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen SS on the Eastern Front, (Torrance: Institute for Historical Review, 1985). Another account is Eddy de Bruyne and Marc Rikmenspoel, For Rex and For Belgium: Léon Degrelle and Walloon Political & Military Collaboration, 1940–1945 (Solihull: Helion, 2004).
69. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 3 and ch. 5.
western legions had scattered successes, perpetuated, Stein argues, by a sense that there was no return to their homelands, except perhaps to be tried for treason. In a striking demonstration of resilience, the steadfast final defenders of Berlin, even after Hitler's death, included Danes, Norwegians, French, and Latvians. Wegner is similarly critical of the foreign units' performance, focusing on the frequency of desertion and the instances where eastern European formations "fail[ed] completely in combat." Through an analysis of Knight's Crosses, awarded to SS members for bravery, Wegner argues that the classical, German divisions consistently outperformed the newer divisions, and that the disproportion of awards must at least be partially attributed to military effectiveness, including resilience, not difference in combat situations, troop strength, or award bias. Estes, focused only on the Western volunteers, is slightly more sympathetic to the foreign legions' battle resilience, arguing that legions "spanned a wide range of quality," with some—particularly larger ones like the *Wiking* and Spanish divisions in the *Wehrmacht*—performing satisfactorily. John Keegan concludes that the non-multiethnic foreign SS divisions were "too poorly motivated to count for anything in events of the scale in which they found themselves involved," and attributes the occasional resilience of Latvian and Estonian divisions to "fighting in the defence of their own homelands."  

The Case of Latvia

The military resilience that did exist can be explained through the wholesale theory, as demonstrated by the Latvian legion. Many of the foreign legions, even

while fighting under Nazi command as part of the *Wehrmacht*, maintained at least some proto-nationalist sense of identity, responsible for what little legitimacy remained. In particular, this was the case with the Latvian units, which included roughly 30,000 soldiers, mostly drafted and formed into the 15th and 19th *Waffen SS* divisions. The Baltic soldiers initially performed better than most eastern European troops, but they did not share in the bulk of Nazi ideology. Without a prevalent national socialist party in Latvia, racism and ideology do not appear to be significant motivations for their combat on the eastern front. Instead, fear of a return to Soviet rule—under which Latvia had been given even less sovereignty than Nazi occupation, which at least permitted a puppet government led by locals—appears to have been the primary motivation. Perceptions of legitimacy were higher for the Baltic soldiers than for some of the other foreign legions, but not because they saw the German government as legitimate. Rather, they believed they were fighting in the defense of Latvian "independence" and legitimacy—in ethnically separated divisions that maintained significant autonomy from the German troops.

As a result, congruent with the second and third empirical predictions in the first chapter, Latvian legion fighting resilience declined significantly in 1944, concurrent with the increased implausibility that Latvia could prevent Soviet occupation. A legitimation crisis occurred when Soviet troops finally overran Nazi troops and entered Latvia. Though the divisions had been resilient up until that point—suggesting that retail factors such as training are inadequate to explain the change—the occupation resulted in a series of December 1944 mutinies by the 19th. The 20th Division, comprised of Estonians facing a similar fate, fared similarly: it was reliable until Soviet occupation became inevitable, and it disintegrated when

deployed into combat in Silesia in early 1945. Consistent with a wholesale explanation’s fourth prediction, related to written diaries and letters, records of postal censors reveal that Latvian troops regarded their combat with German troops as primarily designed to defend Latvia from further Soviet occupation. The 15th Division’s commander, Oberführer Adolf Ax, acknowledged this in a January 1945 report:

“They are first and foremost Latvians. They want a sustainable Latvian nation state. Forced to choose between Germany and Russia, they have chosen Germany, because they seek co-operation with western civilization. The rule of the Germans seems to them to be the lesser two evils. Latvia’s occupation deepened hatred of Russia. They consider the fight against Russia to be their national duty.”

Indeed, because of the lack of effective ties between such divisions and the Nazi cause, the Nuremberg military tribunals specifically ruled out charges against conscripted Waffen SS members, including the vast majority of Latvian soldiers. As instructive as the Latvian case is, Clausewitz’s notion that the defense is generally easier than the offense may go some way to explain it. However, the eastern front can rarely be analyzed so neatly, and the perceived difference between defense and offense appears to have strongly affected soldiers’ views of the legitimacy of their struggle.

The evidence on the relative legitimacy and resilience of unit types is summarized in Table 1, which shows that the two variables covary across the types of German units. As described in the introduction, resilience can be assessed primarily through two types of data, both cited previously in this section. The first is objective data indicating disintegration—desertion rates, prominent defections, and

77. Quoted in Feldmanis and Kangeris, “The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia.”
78. Feldmanis and Kangeris, “The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia.”
military court-martials. The second takes the form of a more holistic assessment based on military histories, including scholars’ evaluations of how units held together relative to expectation.

Table 1. Resilience and Legitimacy of German Wehrmacht Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT TYPE</th>
<th>RESILIENCE</th>
<th>LEGITIMACY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German SS</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (heavily indoctrinated into Nazi ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiethnic SS</td>
<td>Medium (high resilience early on diminished over course of war)</td>
<td>Medium (constituted earlier so contained more volunteers than conscripts; inclusion of Reichsdeutsche meant that overall perception of legitimacy would average higher)</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.g., SS Wiking</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Volunteer</td>
<td>Medium-Low (higher resilience evidenced by Spanish divisions early on, but ultimately disintegrated)</td>
<td>Medium-Low (tended to be motivated by leaders with nationalist sentiments and ideological sympathy to the spread of Nazism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g., Walloons, Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Conscript SS</td>
<td>Low (generally poorly committed and prone to disintegration except in defense of homeland against Soviet incursions)</td>
<td>Low (little ideological solidarity with the Nazis, except for anti-Soviet motivations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g., 19th Waffen Grenadier (2nd Latvian)</td>
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**Competing Explanations for the Lack of Resilience**

A variety of factors may have contributed to the apparent disintegration of these units: conscription and low barriers to recruitment, battle conditions, poor training, ethnic tensions, and illegitimacy. With the exception of wholesale explanations, based on relative perceptions of legitimacy, most do not hold up under scrutiny. The retail concept of small-unit cohesion does not appear to have much explanatory power on the eastern front, strongly weakening $H_{82}$. The high casualty
rate, frequent replacement of troops, and repeated splitting and reorganizing of
divisions on that front meant that the “primary groups” which Shils and Janowitz
focus on would have disintegrated by the time the German army was fighting the
hardest. For the German troops fighting the Soviets, the primary motivations for
what cohesion was maintained were a combination of racial hatred and ideology—
wholesale factors—alongside extreme coercive methods, including extrajudicial
punishment for cowardice. Moreover, should punishment not occur at the hands of
the Germans, surrender to or capture by Soviet troops was a likely death sentence.
However, even these coercive incentives to fight proved insufficient in the final
measure to preclude disintegration.

Explanations that focus on material factors—the raw quality of foreign troops,
the provision of training, and the increasingly tenuous military balance—are not
satisfying because they do not explain the overwhelming difference between
German and non-German military resilience. It is true that as the war proceeded,
manpower needs resulted in conscription, lowered physical standards, and a
shortened training period; it is also true that the lowest-numbered and thus earliest-
created Waffen SS divisions tended to hold together better than the younger
divisions. Still, even seasoned recruits—those with past military expertise, who
entered early enough to go through full SS training—who were not natively
German tended to lose their resilience. The Freikorps Danmark included 1000 Danish
volunteers, of whom at least 40% had prior military service; in summer 1942,
fighting with the SS Totenkopf, they were specially cited by the Germans for their
effectiveness, killing 1736 enemies and capturing 103. But disintegration followed:

79. This argument is fleshed out in great detail in Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 30–38. See also Fritz,
”We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World”
80. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 97–102
the majority of them quickly quit, only to be replaced by the Latvian legion by February 1943, less than a year after joining.\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, even with German defeat nearing in 1944 and 1945, many Wehrmacht and SS divisions remained resilient. Challenging battle conditions are thus insufficient to fully explain foreign legions' military ineffectiveness. If anything, it seems German high command tended to use foreign legions in the least challenging possible battle situations, where disintegration still occurred. This selection bias actually strengthens the evidence in favor of a legitimacy-based explanation and hypothesis H\textsubscript{w2}. An explanation for declining military resilience based simply on bandwagoning is similarly unsatisfactory, since units were not joining the winning side—in fact, they were risking death at the hands of Soviet captors and occupation of their homelands by Soviet forces in surrendering, not hoping to take part in the victor's spoils.

Harder to disprove are explanations based on the multiethnic nature of the fighting forces. When foreign soldiers' presence was more diffuse, as in the multiethnic and primarily Scandinavian SS Wiking, resilience was higher. Native German soldiers were included in the ranks which could have made overall legitimacy higher. By contrast, most of the non-multiethnic foreign legions tended to maintain mixed loyalties, also seeing themselves as fighting for national pride. Minister-President of Norway Vidkun Quisling, notorious for rallying Norwegian soldiers to the Nazi cause, was at least in part making a political play for Norwegian power in a German Reich which he saw as inevitable; a Norwegian legion would provide the basis for a standing Norwegian army.\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, Germans were often quite hostile to foreign recruits. Language tensions were prevalent; foreign leaders

\textsuperscript{82} Estes, \textit{European Anabasis}, ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{83} Estes, \textit{European Anabasis}, ch. 2, para. 42.
were frequently fired and replaced; and the Germans had a tendency to arbitrarily extend service dates for volunteers.\(^{84}\) Likewise, explanations that see military disintegration as the result of ethnic tensions are difficult to rule out, because they are covariant with legitimacy arguments. Foreign legions that were not ethnically mixed had two competing sources of legitimacy: the Germans and their own national party. Anecdotal evidence suggests that nationalist pride and even national defense, rather than a belief in Nazi ideology or the German Reich, was the strongest factor in motivating commitment in combat. Wegner writes:

"Foreign volunteers were motivated to fight for different reasons than their Reich-German counterparts. The result of this was that often their deployment could only occur in certain areas and only against certain enemies. In so far as these volunteers fought for the independence of their native countries—or at least for what they considered their 'independence'—their combat readiness dissipated the moment their homelands were overrun by the enemy. These and similar difficulties considerably reduced the military quality of those units."\(^{85}\)

This helps explain the high-profile role played by nationalist leaders like Quisling and Degrelle, who convinced soldiers under their command that national pride and power could only be enhanced by serving the Nazi military.

By and large, the relative perceptions of the legitimacy of Wehrmacht engagements appear to covary neatly with the military resilience of the various Waffen SS divisions, in congruence with H\(_{\text{w1}}\). The earliest constituted divisions, comprised primarily of German soldiers, fought effectively until the end. The divisions of Western European volunteers were moderately effective; they chose to fight out of some combination of the belief that the German Reich was itself legitimate and out of a sense of national legitimacy—a desire to ensure that their

\(^{84}\) Stein, *The Waffen SS*, p. 154, p. 158

country would play an important role in the new pan-European system. Even so, their resilience eroded as German chances eroded, which is consistent with the theory's predictions—the shared sense of purpose no longer seemed a plausible motivation. The non-multiethnic divisions of Eastern European conscripts were the least effective; where they were effectual, they had a sense that they were defending the remaining legitimacy and independence of their regime from invading Soviets. Retail theories of resilience are not capable of generating specific predictions to predict the varying resilience the conscripts, whose resilience varies almost exclusively along legitimacy lines. However, retail theories may have had some explanatory power for the western European volunteers, who had not only higher legitimacy, but also used that legitimacy to bolster their group identity, which could have led to small-unit cohesion and cast doubt on H_w2. Moreover, Clausewitz's principle that the defense is generally easier than the offense may be a viable competing explanation, and is not fully tested here: still, it should be noted that it generates less clear predictions than the wholesale theory, since it is difficult to determine the nature of each engagement on a granular level on a front as fluid as the eastern front.
3. The Yugoslav People’s Army and Yugoslav Army, 1991-2001

The series of wars between the former republics of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2001 offer a useful laboratory for exploring the effects of legitimacy on military resilience. The ethnic basis of the conflicts meant that legitimacy was continually in question as national units broke off and reshaped themselves. Delegitimation occurred as Yugoslavia moved from a tight federal coalition, as it had been under Josip Tito for nearly four decades until his death in 1980, towards increasingly independent, nationalistic regions. The secession of states in 1990s was the result of a failure to solve this legitimacy crisis at the federal level. Slobodan Milosevic’s power grab came in the vacuum left by a failing collective leadership system, where the presidency of Yugoslavia was meant to rotate among the member states. In place of a federation, five separate environments emerged—multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina and nationalistic Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (including Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro), and Macedonia—with Milosevic’s parliamentary tricks ensuring that the power was increasingly concentrated in Serbia. Rising fears of civil war in the late 1980s gave way to all-out conflict with Slovenia’s and Croatia’s attempts to secede in 1991. Milosevic stated that secession was only permissible if Serbia maintained control of Serb-inhabited portions of the provinces—an incitement to war because the fluidity of ethnic borders made this demand unrealistic. Fighting continued with the secession of Bosnia in 1992, ultimately prompting NATO’s intervention. Though the federation had ceased to exist, the region had not seen the end of conflict, with the eruption of the war in Kosovo in the second half of the 1990s.\(^\text{86}\)

\(^{86}\) A (rare) nonpartisan version of the history, as well as the argument that a legitimation crisis was at the core of the federation’s collapse, is provided in great depth by Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic* (Boulder:
This chapter argues that evidence from the Yugoslav case supports $H_{w1}$, the hypothesis that legitimacy generates military resilience. This chapter uses a longitudinal method of difference, comparing the performance of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) before and after its reconstitution as a Serbian army. The JNA suffered mass desertion by soldiers and officers, as well as other forms of disintegration, during wars with the seceding provinces of Croatia and Slovenia. This appears to be explained in large part by the fact that there was no legitimate regime tied to the JNA, because the JNA maintained unusual political autonomy, because the pan-Yugoslav federation it had been assembled for was crumbling, and because it was seen as a Serbian puppet by those of non-Serb ethnicity. The JNA had been created around a fiction of a federated Yugoslavia, held together by communist ideology and requiring protection from external forces, but the fiction no longer stood up as the military threats came from within rather than without. By contrast, the much smaller, poorer, less trained Croatian and Slovenian remained highly resilient in battle, in part because soldiers there had newly legitimizing regimes and a burgeoning sense of nationalism to motivate them. That provides very strong support for the hypothesis that compares retail and wholesale sources of resilience, $H_{w2}$. The test case then offers a second data point for comparison: the JNA was reconstituted in 1992 as a largely Serb army for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Tied thusly to a regime that many found worth fighting for, it held together against vastly superior NATO firepower, with limited desertions or other evidence of low resilience. However, the second component of the case provides a relatively weaker test because the clash with NATO did not include a ground war as in the first case, meaning the second war required less resilience.

**THE JNA AND THE SERBS**

In 1991, when war with Croatia and Slovenia broke out, the federal state’s military power was concentrated in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), then one of the largest armies in Europe. Its resources included 205,000 active-duty personnel, 1,150 battle tanks (and 700 older ones in storage), 500 armored personnel carriers, 2,000 pieces of artillery, nearly 500 fixed-wing combat aircraft, and 165 combat helicopters—compared with 34,000 lightly armed police and militia in Croatia and 20,000 relatively untrained soldiers readily available to Slovenia. The JNA’s troop strength included a significant number—estimated at 110,000—of conscripts from Yugoslav ethnic groups, including Croats and Slovenians. Despite the public focus on the genocide and war crimes which resulted from the conflict, the conflict with Croatia was largely traditional in nature, with the JNA’s strategy dominated by heavy regular units that could consolidate control of territory, helicopters that could back up ground combat, and naval units that could blockade arms imports. In addition to its vastly superior firepower, the army had unusual political rights and independence within the federation. It was represented in national government bodies as if it were an autonomous province and controlled its own hardline communist party, which the JNA had founded in response to the increasing democratization in Yugoslav provinces.

87. Norman Cigar, “Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 16, no. 3 (Sept. 1993), p. 310. Given the relatively sparseness of English-language scholarship on the subject, Cigar’s article provides one of the most detailed military histories available for the early part of the Yugoslav wars. Where possible, I have used press accounts; however, in several cases I have used Cigar, in particular where he cites foreign-language news sources.
Despite the fact that the JNA, and particularly its officers, were primarily Serb, the army's purpose had not solidified around the idea of Serbian nationalism. Indeed, by and large most officers' primary goal remained a centralized, communist Yugoslavia, not a "Greater Serbia." The JNA had been organized around the notion of a single Yugoslav nation for decades beginning with Tito. The secession of Croatia and Slovenia, of course, belied this long-held notion that Yugoslavia's enemies were external. This inconsistency between the stated goal and the effect of such a goal—supporting Serbia alone against other secessionist provinces—helps explain the shock to the JNA's sense of legitimacy. The JNA began to take on a distinctly Serb ethnicity: commanders fired Slovenian and Croatian officers and promoted Serbs in their place, and drafting of non-Serbs had largely ceased by the middle of 1991; by the end of 1991, the JNA was nine-tenths Serb. The JNA also became increasingly dependent on the Serbian government for enforcing its draft and providing its funding. The JNA also moved to confiscate Slovenian and Croat weapons, and trained non-JNA paramilitary units in Croatia for anti-secessionist combat. Attempts by Slovenian and Croatian members of the federal government to reign in the army or to eliminate non-Serbian funding of the JNA failed. Part of the JNA's motivation in fighting, some believe, was to maintain army autonomy, particularly in advance of threats to fire top Serb officers, made by the Croatian who was next set to take on the Yugoslav presidency.

Despite its vastly superior firepower, the JNA nearly disintegrated in combat operations. "The JNA was a far less formidable fighting force than most had

expected it to be," writes Norman Cigar.96 Its inability to decisively win at first gave Croatia time to organize and build up a 200,000-man army, and ultimately stalemate the JNA.97 A ceasefire was possible in part because a reversal of military fortunes seemed most likely if the war continued.98 Both active and passive disintegration was common in the JNA’s ranks, largely along ethnic lines. Draft-dodging was widespread, with only two draftees showing up out of 3,000 in one city; some have estimated that 15,000 avoided the draft, while tens of thousands more moved away to avoid serving.99 Many refused to serve past the 45 required days; 2,600 reservists deserted in one single action; and it was difficult for commanders to get anyone to serve on the front lines. Non-Serb officers defected to the Croatian side; dozens of Serb Air Force officers defected to Croatia because they had Croatian wives. Seceding Slovenia used the legitimacy garnered by its declaration of independence and associated nationalism to ask Slovenian troops to desert; it recalled troops from the JNA the same day it announced its secession.100 Within days of combat, Slovenian officials announced that they had captured 500 Yugoslav soldiers, including 65 officers, along with another 250 deserters. The JNA’s air force commander resigned unexpectedly before fighting began; and the commander of Slovenian air space, Colonel Drago Brencic, resigned the day after fighting began.101 A high-ranking JNA naval officer committed suicide, leaving a note that attributed his decision to his Croat roots.102 In response to the ongoing

101. Tony Barber, “Army High Command ‘In Confusion.’”
disintegration, most prevalent among conscripts, the JNA had to form units comprised solely of officers and volunteers to serve in the hardest battle situations.\(^\text{103}\)

The JNA had been infused with the idea of protecting a federated Yugoslavia from external threats; the situation that faced it was not congruent with this sense of purpose. This helped create the legitimacy crisis affecting the JNA.\(^\text{104}\) It was no longer clear on behalf of which regime’s legitimacy it was fighting: the maintenance of the original Yugoslav state, or a Serb-dominated state. In short, the previous regime—the idea of a federated Yugoslavia—had been delegitimated. However, unlike in the secessionist provinces, where a democratization process had created a new sense of legitimacy, no new idea of government had been accepted by the people. This left it unclear what the JNA’s soldiers were fighting for, a fact specifically named as a concern by many reservists.\(^\text{105}\) Moreover, the JNA’s Serb loyalties—whether intentional or simply the inevitable result of opposing secession—proved problematic in maintaining loyalty among non-Serbs, who saw the army as legitimate only for those it seemed to represent, the Serbs. But the army had not explicitly reshaped its identity and rhetoric around a Serbian nationalist cause. Finally, the military’s high degree of political autonomy allowed it to remain arbitrarily disconnected from any other actor—and thus from any source of legitimacy—in the disintegrating federation.

Sources of military disintegration and non-resilience other than illegitimacy do not adequately explain the outcomes in this case. Lack of small-unit cohesion is not a sufficient explanation for why the poor resilience was seen primarily among


\(^{104}\) For historical background on civil-military relations in Yugoslavia, in an account that largely leaves off when the 1991 wars began, see also James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992).

\(^{105}\) Cigar, “Serbo-Croatian War,” p. 318.
those of particular nationalities. If anything, small-unit cohesion likely made it
easier for entire groups of non-Serbs to desert together. Differences in training and
experience are also inadequate as explanations. Even senior officers defected or
deserted. Moreover, in Croatia, where soldiers were less armed and possibly less
trained (at least in the form they were now fighting in), the military outperformed
expectations and showed unusual resilience under high pressure.\textsuperscript{106} This is
consistent with the theory’s prediction of resilience for troops serving in the
defensive, in support of a clearly defined regime that had legitimacy—due to
ongoing democratization, the emergence of nationalism, and shared ethnicity.

**Reconstituted as the Yugoslav Army**

This test case offers a second benefit: in the wake of its poor performance in
the Slovenian and Croatian wars, the JNA was abandoned and reconstituted as the
Yugoslav Army (VJ). This new force was nearly entirely ethnically Serbian and
tightly controlled by the Serbian government, which dominated the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (which also contained Montenegro). In May 1992, many
officers, including 38 generals, were retired, with some tried for incompetence and
treason; this purge ensured that the army’s loyalty would be to the cause of Serbian
nationalism, rather than to a pan-Yugoslav communist ideal. One army officer called
on personnel to “love, above all else, their unit, their army, and their homeland—
Serbia and Montenegro.”\textsuperscript{107} The army, of course, retained much of the same
equipment, personnel, and doctrine as before. As such, it offers a useful test—similar
in most respects except for the study variable—for how relegitimation of the regime

\textsuperscript{106} Cigar, “Serbo-Croatian War,” p. 319.
being served affects resilience.

This reconstituted army held up very well in subsequent combat, even though it was smaller and more poorly funded than it had been as a pan-Yugoslav army. In its war in Kosovo, it was severely underequipped compared to NATO, with defense budgets 300 times that of Yugoslavia. Conflict against NATO thus required to be willing to suffer in order to inflict punishment on the invader sufficient for deterrence, by reducing the marginal benefit of a ground attack.\textsuperscript{108} However, as the war with NATO never turned into a full-scale ground attack, this component of the case does not provide as hard of a test for the wholesale theory as the early Yugoslav wars. (Further research might examine Serbian counterinsurgency efforts and ground conflict against non-NATO forces during this same time period.) The VJ was effective prior to NATO’s intervention, and continued to hold up well after air strikes began. Coordinated tactical measures were used to reduce the efficacy of NATO bombing, including tracking of U.S. stealth aircraft, cluttering missile guidance system with radar reflections off of farm machinery, building dummy objectives and fake tanks, and flying low combat missions over Kosovo that were undetectable by NATO AWACS.\textsuperscript{109} Such cooperative methods require active commitment by soldiers, a component of resilience. The Yugoslav Army did not collapse quickly, as repeatedly predicted by NATO commanders.\textsuperscript{110} The ability to garner such sacrifice is even more striking given the difficulty acknowledged by the VJ air force commander in paying sufficient salaries for officers; he specifically attributed the willingness of officers to continue fighting to legitimacy—in particular

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{109} “Tactics Employed by the Yugoslav Army to Limit NATO Air Strikes Effectiveness,” Associated Press, November 18, 2002
\end{flushright}
a sense of patriotism and constitutional duty.\textsuperscript{111}

The most tangible data point evidencing non-resilience in the JNA was desertion and disintegration; now, defections were highly limited compared to the 1991 epidemic. The majority of deserters were from Montenegro, which was largely resistant to Serb aggression in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{112} This poses no difficulty for a legitimacy-based theory of resilience. Moreover, the few desertions that did occur were primarily late in the war, only after NATO bombing began, threats of a NATO ground war loomed large, and resistance seemed increasingly futile.\textsuperscript{113} Though played up by NATO spokespeople, the desertions were not seen as particularly crippling: since they involved only reservists, not regular troops, the troops affected were primarily support personnel including drivers. Given the unlikelihood of a full-scale ground war, a smaller military—comprised primarily of the volunteer professionals who increasingly dominated the Yugoslav Army and were not part of the defecions—was not seen as a risk to overall military effectiveness by military analysts at the time.\textsuperscript{114} The increased legitimacy of the reconstituted Yugoslav Army—specifically, that it was tied to a regime of which there was a single, shared conception and an ethnonationalist desire to protect—seems to have helped hold it together. This is in stark contrast to its prior incarnation fighting on behalf of the defunct, delegitimized concept of a Yugoslav state. However, relatively limited English sources makes it difficult to check for all of H\textsubscript{w}’s predictions at the unit level.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} “Three Yugoslav Reservists Jailed,” Reuters, June 1, 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{113} “Serbian Troops Desert as NATO Bombs Hit Morale,” Financial Times, May 20, 1999. Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokespeople denied the desertions, claiming the men in question were merely reservists who were being demobilized: “Official Denies Army Desertions, Blasts Moderate Leaders,” Associated Press, May 21, 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{114} “Desertions Serious But Not Crippling,” Financial Times, May 21, 1999.
\end{itemize}
4. Conclusion

Militaries will tend to disintegrate and lose their resilience as they become disentangled from the regimes they serve. A sense of legitimacy provides an effective link between a regime and its armed forces; that shared sense of purpose enhances military resilience. Legitimacy may dissolve in a number of ways: conquest and empire (as in our World War II case), fragmentation and disintegration caused by nationalism (as in Yugoslavia), or the delegitimization of a government (as in a failed state). In such cases, soldiers lose motivation as their shared purpose declines. The idea goes back to Clausewitz’s notion that war is “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”¹¹⁵ Devoid of an effective link to a regime perceived as legitimate, the purposiveness of war fades, along with soldiers’ willingness to sacrifice themselves in conflict. Throughout modern history, developed states and their militaries have emerged together and mutually constituted each other. Waging war leads to creating states, which in turn require war-making capabilities. Fragmentation and conquest interrupt and reverse this process—frequently destroying or converting a regime without concurrent substantive changes to the armed forces.

In modern warfare, soldiers’ commitment to battle is crucial. This goes beyond the mere avoidance of desertion and disintegration, though both our case studies have demonstrated how a political situation may make these likely at great expense to military effectiveness. Modern warfare also requires small units to operate relatively independently, thus requiring not just passive but active resilience to be truly militarily effective. In both the case of the Waffen-SS and of the JNA,

¹¹⁵ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 605. He continues: "War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."
military success was seriously hampered by instances where even trained troops would enter battle and, despite not deserting or surrendering, provide commitment seriously lower than expected levels.

For statesmen, this means that attention must be paid to how military resilience can be enhanced following a shock to legitimacy. Several methods might be used to create greater resilience in the absence of a perception by soldiers that their regime or cause is inherently worth fighting for. Retail factors may provide a basic glue against unit disintegration, but may at times fail and may never induce positive commitment. Similarly, methods involving coercion may never produce resilience in its positive sense. For instance, conscription might be broadened significantly beyond desired force strength, on the assumption that a certain percentage of troops will desert. Military discipline—from a regular code of military justice up to extremely harsh, extrajudicial executions of those who may desert—can be applied, to minimize the expected value of resistance to a soldier. Significantly higher salaries might be paid to increase the attractiveness of compliance. Though such methods—conscription and military discipline—were employed by organizers of the Waffen SS, active sacrifice was scarcely seen among those who did not believe they were fighting for a legitimate regime or cause.

The other option for statesmen is to decrease the need for either retail factors or coercive methods by attempting to increase or reestablish legitimacy. This can take a number of forms. First, one can attempt to avoid shocks that will tend to disentangle such preexisting ties. For instance, in empire-building, some degree of member-state autonomy can be maintained—thus allowing soldiers from the colony to reserve a sense of loyalty to their original regime. Relatedly, inculcating a sense of loyalty to a new regime among top officers of the old regime can suggest to lower-
ranked soldiers that the military continues to serve a legitimate regime. In World War II, the units commanded by Vidkun Quisling showed remarkable resilience, in part because Quisling entered with Norwegian nationalist credibility and framed loyalty to the Nazi cause as loyalty to Norway. Finally, statesmen can seek to create effective ties by bolstering patriotism and nationalism. Strategies for creating nationalism include the creation of a shared culture through enhancing literacy, teaching a shared history, and spreading ideology through mass media.116 Such methods may require a longer term commitment.

LESSONS FOR IRAQ?

Iraq reflects a case where a regime has experienced the kind of legitimacy shock expected to depress resilience. Building resilience will require that policy-makers shape a shared sense of purpose—or at least a shared sense of threat, which implicitly suggests that a legitimate cause exists and needs defending. The Coalition Provisional Authority’s early decision in May 2003 to disband the Iraqi army has come under heavy fire as a pivotal mistake by U.S. policy-makers.117 The decision has been seen as a key reason why devolving security responsibilities on the new Iraqi army has proceeded more slowly than expected. Resilience appears to be low. One of the battalions of the new army simply refused to fight in Fallujah in spring 2004.118 In January 2007, Bush announced that Iraqi forces would control all 18 Iraqi provinces by November of that year, but as of April, they controlled only 9. In

118. Subcommittee on Oversight, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” p. 13
March 2008, the Pentagon said it had trained 197,000 soldiers, but 27,000—the equivalent of two divisions, or 14% of the total army strength—went AWOL in 2007. Most recent estimates by Pentagon officials suggest that internal security responsibility will not be fully devolved until 2012, and external security in 2018.119 The original CPA policy has also been held responsible for providing fodder for insurgent forces, by depriving trained and armed soldiers of gainful employment.

Efforts to build a new Iraqi army have been largely disconnected from the process of state-building, except insofar as both are led by the United States. Since it is not yet clear what final state the Iraqi regime will take, there can be no effective link between regime and military purpose. U.S. planning documents have focused on the building of security forces as a challenge of training and equipping, rather than as a challenge of state-building and the generation of legitimacy. The reconstruction process appears to ignore the longstanding historical links in modern society, operating in both directions, between military functions and state creation. Moreover, if anything, the issue of legitimacy should be of unusual significance in Iraq. A significant portion of the Iraqi military’s task will be ensuring internal security. Military experts have widely argued that counterinsurgency missions require attention to legitimacy.120 Internally, illegitimacy helps create the rationale for an insurgency and a government weak enough to be vulnerable to one. Military responses to that insurgency can in turn alienate civilians from government soldiers, in turn strengthening the insurgency, which is fueled by support from the local population, and thus further inflate subsequent military responses. This cycle of endogeneity exacerbates the degree to which illegitimacy incites disintegration.

120. See, for instance, Andrew Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
If wholesale theories carry significant explanatory power, policy-makers in Iraq need to foster links between the military and the idea of an emerging Iraqi regime. Saying that an effective military is necessary merely to create conditions of security in which a regime can form—as often seems the case—is insufficient. Creating security forces to create security to create a regime reverses the progression of state-building; it disentangles the mutual constitution of military and government. A stable, loyal Iraqi army is not viable without a regime for it to serve; such a military is likely destined to disintegrate or, worse, provide a security threat to an eventual regime (i.e., a coup). At the moment, what resilience the Iraqi army has can be attributed to successful leadership by U.S. Transition Teams, who are generally in command on challenging assignments.

Absent a fully shaped regime, inculcating a sense of “Iraqi patriotism”—attachment to the idea of a unified Iraq, whatever its form—is one alternative strategy for ratcheting up the possibility of a resilient military. The extent to which this can be done is a matter for future research. However, creating a shared sense of purpose and a shared sense of threat are likely to be crucial tasks for U.S. trainers. Already, there is evidence that meshes with the elite-focused predictions of wholesale theories, in particular the prediction that military leaders will attempt to sell all activities as being in defense of legitimacy. U.S. policy-makers have clearly and repeatedly emphasized the degree to which all internal threats are externally generated, for instance in arguing that Iranian or “foreign Al Qaeda” influences are responsible for the security problem and insurgency.

121. Subcommittee on Oversight, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” p. 4
122. Subcommittee on Oversight, “Stand Up and Be Counted,” chapter 7.
Other Cases and Further Research

Several other cases present themselves as plausibly supporting wholesale theories of military resilience. Research into letters and diaries written by soldiers on both sides of the American Civil War has demonstrated that principled feelings concerning slavery provided an important source of motivation.\(^\text{124}\) Counterfactual research into the Warsaw Pact suggests that most member regimes were not likely to have been resilient in the event of a Soviet offensive.\(^\text{125}\) Stalin increasingly turned to nationalistic and patriotic messages, rather than focusing on communism, in the early stages of World War II.\(^\text{126}\) The Army of the Republic of Vietnam could be an example of a military fighting on behalf of a puppet regime; further research could assess whether this is partly responsible for the low views of its military performance.\(^\text{127}\) As has been mentioned, the French army after the revolution provides an obvious test case for further research.\(^\text{128}\) The wholesale argument may also have evidence from pre-modern warfare: Herodotus has argued that mercenaries fought less hard than local soldiers in the Greco-Persian wars because they were not fighting in defense of fatherland.\(^\text{129}\) The American Revolutionary War was heavily ideologically infused and demonstrates unusual resilience by an outmatched army.\(^\text{130}\)

\(^\text{125}\) See Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems.*
\(^\text{130}\) See Paret, *Understanding War,* p. 30–32
Aside from the rich set of additional test cases, further research might also use a more robust research design. In particular, process-tracing could be employed, using careful examination of diaries and letters of soldiers, as well as service and military tribunal records. This method would help identify the degree to which servicemen saw the legitimacy of the regime they served as a reason for resilience—or that illegitimacy was truly a rationale for desertion. That helps avoid the obvious pitfall of constructing just-so stories about the source of non-resilience. It would also help deal with the alternative explanation from Clausewitz, largely bracketed by this research design, that defense is easier than offense. Process tracing could also shed light on the exact methods by which illegitimacy creates non-resilience: for instance, what is the relative influence of officers versus enlisted troops in the disintegration of a unit? Other research could also test the remaining hypotheses from the introduction. Finally, policy-relevant research would investigate which strategies are most successful at creating legitimacy, and what limitations exist on statesmen’s ability to manipulate their population’s sense of legitimacy.
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