MOBILIZING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
A CASE STUDY OF STATE DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP IN BUILDING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR A LEADING U.S. ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1944-1945

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This paper examines a critical case of Executive Branch leadership during the creation of the United Nations. Before his death, President Franklin Roosevelt hoped that the wartime alliance would become the cornerstone of postwar international security. The U.N. charter, ratified in July 1945, marked the end of the State Department's four-year effort to reinvent the League of Nations and promote postwar peace and security. This case study explores the State Department's public leadership efforts—in the form of a concerted, nationwide campaign to educate the American people and their leaders in Congress about the merits of U.S. involvement in the new international organization.

In its effort to commit the American people to multilateral engagement in the postwar world, the U.S. government distributed some 2.1 million educational publications through over four hundred citizen groups. It conducted a nationwide series of public meetings, speeches and national radio broadcasts, and created the State Department's first public affairs office to monitor public opinion and to coordinate outreach.

In describing the campaign, the case study addresses a number of important questions for students of leadership and public policy, including: How did the State Department respond to specific challenges that it faced throughout the campaign? How can leaders promote a greater interest in and knowledge about policy decisions that affect American interests in the world? And how can leaders reach their target audience?
INTRODUCTION

On July 2, 1945, President Harry S Truman hand-delivered the United Nations (U.N.) Charter to the United States Senate. He asked the Senate to affirm the legacy of the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt and ratify the Charter without delay. This was the final step of a four-year, American-led effort to reinvent the League of Nations and conclude a new international charter for the promotion of postwar peace and security.

Twenty-six years earlier, President Woodrow Wilson had attempted to bring the United States into the League and convince the Senate to ratify the ambitious League Covenant that was attached to the Versailles Treaty. Republican opponents of the President, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, rejected the treaty and denounced Wilson’s vision for U.S. participation in international organization. Lodge and his fellow opponents to the League saw inherent dangers in the U.S. leading such an organization and feared foreign influence over the destiny of the American people. They rejected the costs and commitments of worldwide responsibilities and resented what they saw as Wilson’s usurpation of executive control over American foreign policy. Many of them believed that the President was attempting to force commitments upon the people and Congress without regard for public opinion (Ambrosius, 1987: x).

The United States would never join the League, and the events of the 1930s only confirmed the worst fears of those who believed it would be a largely ineffective organization. In 1935, Roosevelt remarked, “The League has become nothing more than a debating society, and a poor one at that” (Roosevelt, 1933: 254-55).

When war broke out in September 1939, American diplomats were generous in their assignment of blame. According to an official State Department history, the declarations of war by Great Britain and France were a pivotal moment in U.S. history:

The general war had come as the culmination of an Axis policy of planned aggression... The facts and the lessons of experience with insecurity between the wars had been but partly assessed by the American people and the rest of mankind. One instant meaning of the war, however, was clear: American efforts, the League’s efforts, and all other efforts to prevent it had utterly failed. To think out the lessons of that experience and to conceive a way to restore and keep international peace were vital future tasks (U.S. Dept. of State, 1949: 15).¹

Over the next three years, Roosevelt directed the State Department to draft the charter for a new international security organization. From 1942-45, teams of diplomats reviewed the League’s failures and drafted the provisions of a new structure to remedy its defects. When a first comprehensive draft had been completed, U.S. negotiators convened talks with British, Soviet, and Chinese diplomats at Dumbarton Oaks. They resolved remaining issues of contention over the next five months, and in June 1945 met with nearly four dozen additional delegations at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization (U.S. Congress, 1945: 7118-19).

The vision at the heart of the plan was simple. Roosevelt decided that the wartime alliance should become the cornerstone of postwar international security. He reasoned that if the military power of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union could be harnessed after the war and directed towards a common agenda for promoting international security, then the three powers would preside over a new era of peace and prosperity.² Roosevelt was also convinced that the essential difference between the League and
the United Nations would be the United States’ willingness to join and lead. To the commander-in-chief of the largest military force in the history of the world, continued U.S. engagement was essential to world peace.

Roosevelt directed his diplomats to negotiate strong provisions for military action to prevent and counter international aggression. The U.N. Charter specified strict guidelines for the use of force, including rules for when and by what means states could take military action to defend national and collective security interests.

From the beginning, U.S. officials knew that such provisions would infringe on closely guarded prerogatives of national security. They, therefore, provided Congressional leaders with closed-door briefings on key decisions and forthcoming diplomatic negotiations. Given the concerns of many congressmen and the contentious nature of certain consultations, U.S. policymakers anticipated serious political objections during public discussion and Senate debate of the final Charter.

To create a more supportive environment for these debates, the Roosevelt Administration adopted the broad challenge of convincing the American people and their leaders in Congress that U.S. leadership in a new United Nations was a vital national interest. In particular, top officials at the State Department devised strategies to mobilize public support and prevent the Charter from meeting the same fate as Wilson’s League Covenant.

This paper explores the State Department’s public leadership efforts, defined here as a concerted, nationwide campaign to educate the American people and their leaders in Congress about the merits of U.S. involvement in international organization. In describing this campaign, the study tells a specific story and raises fundamental questions for students of public policy:

- How can the government’s foreign affairs agencies cultivate greater interest in and knowledge about policy decisions that affect U.S. interests in the world?
- How can those agencies reach their target audience?
- In devising a political strategy for ratifying treaties, where does the State Department draw the line between public education and activities that can be construed as lobbying?
- Should it stifle criticism of Administration policies and proposals?
- How can it reward key allies and important converts to its cause?

The case study also raises a set of important secondary questions. For instance, to what extent should executive agencies coordinate public education campaigns with special interest groups that may represent a small minority of public opinion? Might this alienate the minority views in Congress whose support the Administration might also require? Should executive agencies educate the public about the processes by which policies are developed in addition to the policies themselves?

The reader might consider how Roosevelt’s outreach campaign approached all of these questions. It may also be useful to consider how the State Department responded to specific choices and challenges it faced throughout the campaign. The paper will demonstrate that all of these questions raised difficult choices for policymakers and created dilemmas that still exist today. Students are encouraged to consider whether the campaign under examination could be replicated in the future.
“Making the State Department an Instrument of the People”

On October 9, 1944, after seven weeks of intense negotiations between U.S., British, and Soviet diplomats, the first U.N. draft charter, entitled the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,” was released to the public (New York Times, 1944; Daily Herald, 1944). The Proposals were the first comprehensive blueprint for an institution that would replace the League of Nations. They called for an organization composed of a General Assembly of all member states, a Security Council of five permanent members and six rotating seats elected by the Assembly, an Economic and Social Council to address the conditions leading to war, and an International Court of Justice to resolve legal disputes between states (U.S. Dept. of State, 1944).

The Proposals addressed the League of Nations’ principal weakness by providing the organization with the authority and means to project military power. Replicating the model of the Grand Alliance command structure, U.N. planners conceived a permanent Military Staff Committee (MSC) to organize collective action under the authority of the Security Council and prevent, deter, counter, or punish international aggression. The MSC was designed to enable direct and continuous contact among the general staffs of the Soviet, British, and American military commands (Reynolds & Hughes, 1976: 26-28).

The Roosevelt Administration’s influence was clear; the Proposals contained all of the essential provisions of a draft prepared by the United States before Dumbarton Oaks (Stettinius, 11 Sept. 1944). In October, Roosevelt declared that agreement on the Proposals was a major U.S. achievement and hailed a future U.N. “with the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force” (Rosenman, 1950: 350). After driving the U.N. planning process for almost three years, the time had come for the more difficult task of winning public approval.

In a book published in late 1944, historian Walter Johnson captured the prevailing public mood:

While many Americans seem convinced of the need for an international organization of nations with the power to enforce its commitments, many of the same voices that told America that “it is not our war” in the days before Pearl Harbor are still doing their best to take America along the road of isolationism once the war is over (Johnson, 1944: 235).

Roosevelt remained deeply concerned about isolationist movements, particularly the virulent strain that had always sought to block American leadership in international organization. Writing in the National Record, Robert R. Reynolds summed up the view of staunch isolationists: “I am a thousand times more isolationist today than I was before we became engaged in this war. But that is my privilege. However, I prefer to be referred to as an American Firster, or a Nationalist” (Johnson, 1944: 238). The mainstream influence of isolationists, even towards the end of the war, is evident in the fact that the writer was not merely a citizen with isolationist views. Reynolds, a Democrat from North Carolina, was chairman of the Senate’s Military Affairs Committee.

Whether the opponents defined themselves as isolationists, nationalists, or members of the America First Party, they shared the same worldview. They saw U.S. treaty commitments to international organization as a dire threat to “American independence.” During the League debates, Miles Poindexter, the outspo-
ken Senator from Washington state, said that membership in international organizations would require the American people to “become a party to all the international complications arising from diversity of race and language and conflict of interests of the various peoples of Asia, Africa, and Europe” (Ambrosius, 1987: 90-91). It would also require a willingness to use military force. This entailed obligations that were opposed by Republican and Democratic isolationists alike.

Roosevelt and his relatively inexperienced Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, planned to counter these arguments with a nationwide campaign to explain why the United States had to remain engaged in the postwar world and assume a leadership role in the new United Nations. Their first challenge, of course, was to decide the best means of mounting such a campaign. During the early years of the war, the State Department had given little attention to public relations and focused instead on the enormous diplomatic challenges abroad. As a result, the public had come to see the Department as a largely opaque institution engaged in secretive statecraft. In early 1944, with the post-Dumbarton Oaks challenge on the horizon, the Department took significant steps to improve its outreach efforts with the American public. In February, the Department established the Division of Public Liaison with a mandate of giving “people closer insight into the operations of the Department” and to conduct “continuing studies... relating to public attitudes...on current foreign policy questions” (RDS, Undated A).

In the context of U.N. planning, the establishing guidelines articulated a revolutionary new goal for an agency that had never concerned itself with public opinion. It was “to make the Department an instrument of the people.” The Public Liaison Division was, therefore, responsible for reaching out to “all sections of the nation to discuss with the people everywhere the meaning and limitations of the proposed U.N. organization and our expectations concerning it” (Hull, 1948: 1711).

Even with such clear goals, senior diplomats had great difficulty deciding how the Department should meet the challenge of public outreach and education. In fact, they faced a unique dilemma. The State Department was responsible only for the formulation and implementation of the President’s foreign policies; it had to be very careful managing issues that commanded strong domestic political constituencies. As President Wilson had so painfully learned, the question of U.S. participation in international organization had a long and contentious history in the halls of Congress. Because the U.N. treaty required congressional ratification, the Roosevelt Administration would have to strike a fine balance between reasonable public education efforts and activities that would appear politically motivated to influence Congress. The dilemma for State Department leaders, therefore, was how to cultivate the public and congressional support that Roosevelt needed, without appearing to meddle in domestic politics.

The Administration’s approach to this dilemma was a sophisticated one. Rather than waging a direct campaign that might quickly attract the scrutiny of isolationist lawmakers, the State Department began to identify a wide range of private groups and associations with which to partner. In 1944, Department outreach experts observed that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) committed to business, labor, and religious advocacy had become “a major force in the field of public opinion” during the war. For both economic and political reasons, many of these groups had become “entirely, or to a large degree, interested in the field of foreign affairs.” Stettinius noted that their total membership included tens of millions of Americans; their influence, amplified by national press coverage, would have “a definite effect on general public opinion” (RDS, Undated A).

In working with NGOs, the State Department sought to alter the popular image of diplomats as secretive mandarins conducting sinister business and shielding it from public scrutiny. The Department hired John S. Dickey, a renowned public relations consultant, to address this very issue. Dickey immediately
identified the need for greater departmental transparency, increased visibility of diplomatic leaders, and more frequent interaction among policymakers, NGO leaders, and sympathetic audiences (RDS, 10 July 1943). As a first step, Dickey recommended instituting a series of public outreach efforts, including appearances, speeches, interviews, off-the-record discussions, radio interviews, and the filming of at least two documentaries on American diplomacy (RDS, 11 Nov. 1943).

Following these recommendations, Dickey was also put in charge of the State Department’s first public affairs office, which would monitor public opinion and coordinate NGO outreach. The office was designed to forge relationships with large constituency groups and particularly influential sections of the population. Such groups included the American Federation of Labor, the American Legion, the Congregational Churches of America, the Federal Council of Churches, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Methodist Church, the National League of Women Voters, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Universities Committee on Post War Problems (RDS, May 1944).

Dickey undertook this work with great success through the fall of 1944. As Dumbarton Oaks concluded, he was well prepared to meet with NGO leaders to discuss ways of winning their support for the proposed international organization and the Administration’s strategy to sell it. After initial consultations, Dickey told Stettinius that a large group of NGOs was arranging to meet in New York in October to plan “a coordinated campaign of popular education.” NGO leaders had asked Dickey, however, what the State Department’s public education strategy would be. In Dickey’s view, the leaders were so supportive of the State Department’s goals that they did not want to proceed without knowing the plans of his Office of Public Affairs (RDS, 25 Sept. 1944).

Dickey’s NGO consultations raised a whole new set of choices for State Department leaders. They had to decide whether the thrust of public outreach should be undertaken in the weeks immediately following Dumbarton Oaks or only after all participating states had signed the Charter at the final drafting conference in San Francisco. Roosevelt was resolved to host this follow-up conference as soon as possible and, preferably, before the end of 1944. He also planned to submit the Charter to the Senate before the final surrender had been obtained from Germany.

State Department planners, therefore, had to assume that both the period prior to San Francisco and the period prior to Senate debate would offer a fairly limited window of opportunity for public outreach efforts. Dickey also had to decide what form the education campaign should take and how the Administration could best shape public debate about the Charter. Among the questions he sought to answer were the following:

- Would Americans be more receptive to U.N. plan before or after all the world’s governments had signed the charter?
- If the Department tried to limit discussion of the Proposals before San Francisco, would political opponents seize the initiative in framing the public debate?
- Would continued secrecy undermine existing public support for international organization?
- If the Department chose to stimulate interest in the Proposals, could it control the manner of public debate?
- Should the Department align itself with all large, private associations willing to discuss the Charter or only those with relatively supportive views?
Dickey and his staff spent considerable time sorting out these political and tactical issues and formulating recommendations to Secretary Stettinius. On October 1, in a confidential memo to the Stettinius, Dickey offered the following analysis of how the Department should proceed:

The period between the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks results and the formulation of a definitive treaty by a United Nations conference will determine whether a helpful or harmful opinion will be developed on those issues which will be settled in the treaty. Once the treaty is prepared and submitted for public and Senate approval the range of useful public debates on issues is greatly narrowed; at that time the issue must be, so far as we can influence it, “Are you for or against this treaty now?” [emphasis in original]...It is inevitable that between the announcement of the Dumbarton Oaks results and the United Nations conference these issues will be actively debated and public opinion will either take a set one way or the other or it will get all snarled up which of itself would be highly unfortunate. It is therefore, to our advantage, to have these issues clearly understood, and the most favorable public opinions possible established on them before we enter the final negotiations for a definitive treaty. There is little time so it is necessary...to have a very intensive educational program. Under these circumstances one of the most important aids in this task will be the organized groups which are experienced in and geared to this sort of public educational work (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944).

In his memo, Dickey concluded that NGOs supportive of Administration policy should be given maximum support from the State Department and detailed background guidance on Roosevelt’s diplomatic and political strategy. After four years of designing the U.N. framework in secrecy, Dickey was proposing a strategy to use American NGOs as field battalions in a broad campaign to defeat isolationist opponents and their supporters in Congress.

**TAKING THE STRATEGY FORWARD**

“Lending All Possible Aid”

Stettinius read Dickey’s recommendations and approved a course of action immediately. The Secretary of State knew that America’s entry into the U.N. was Roosevelt’s highest priority after defeating the Axis. He endorsed Dickey’s strategy of giving maximum support to NGO education efforts and approved the first three tactical steps in that strategy.

First, the State Department would print hundreds of thousands of copies of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and provide them to all large organizations prepared to distribute them. Second, the Department would deploy senior officials to major NGO conferences so that they could frame the Proposals in the most positive light. Finally, between releasing the Proposals and convening the San Francisco conference, the State Department, would adopt a policy “of lending all possible aid to public educational undertakings on this subject.” Stettinius assigned senior officials to ongoing, off-the-record discussions with all “responsible and important” organizations involved in this effort (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944). Within weeks, diplomats mobilized a formidable citizen army by informing more than 96 national organizations that the Department would provide “any help” it could render (AAUN, 06 Oct. 1944).

Some of these organizations—such as the National League of Women Voters, the American Federation of Labor, and the National Grange—maintained fairly mainstream political positions and remained rela-
tively neutral on the question of U.S. participation in international organization. Many more represented a small but vocal minority of advocates for international organization.

One of the more vocal advocacy groups, Americans United for World Organization (AUWO), told Stettinius that its coalition of 24 organizations had begun “a very extensive political action program by which they hope[d] to bring about greater Congressional support for effective world organization.” AUWO was founded in June 1944 as the “only national, militant group of men and women formed to urge political action upon members of Congress in behalf of world organization” (RDS, 04 Oct. 1944).

The State Department was not only prepared to support such organizations in countering isolationist arguments, but it did so enthusiastically. On October 16, Stettinius convened an off-the-record Washington planning session with the leaders of some 100 organizations that supported the Administration’s policy. AUWO Chairman Ernest Hopkins later wrote to Stettinius about the NGO response to this highly public and pro-active approach:

There can be no overestimating the appreciation which they had....Enthusiasm was almost unbounded among the representatives of the different organizations.... Again and again men came to me expressing appreciation for the attitude of the Department....Precedent is a heavy hand in departments of government, and I can well understand the difficulties which had to be overcome by those of you who were interested in this conference (Stettinius, 14 Oct. 1944).

In fact, Stettinius’s primary challenge was approving a public outreach strategy with no precedent at all. As one historian observed, the AUWO response shows the importance of this “unprecedented and carefully planned action by the Department of State, and suggests the value of the new approach to the public” (Robins, 1960: 64).

The Department convened four additional strategy meetings between late October and Christmas 1944. Teams of diplomats fanned out as part of the national campaign to generate support for the Administration’s U.N. policy. In the first two weeks of the campaign, more than 60 Department representatives met with key groups, distributed printed materials, and helped communities train their own speaker panels (RDS, 22 Nov. 1944).

The early success of this campaign created its own momentum. Between October 1944 and June 1945, the State Department convened 335 separate meetings with NGO leaders in every major population center of the country (RDS, Undated B). This list of selected meetings demonstrates the broad nature of the Administration’s outreach effort:

Meeting with leading magazine editors and writers, New York: December 8, 1944
Meeting with regional school principals, Baltimore: December 21, 1944
Briefing at national conference of mayors, Miami: January 2, 1945
Conference of labor leaders, Washington, D.C.: March 27, 1945
Meeting with national religious leaders, Washington, D.C.: April 3, 1945
Meeting with business leaders, New York: April 11, 1945
(RDS, Undated B).

These private meetings, which took advantage of private sector contacts and focused on NGO leaders, served several important purposes. First, they were the most efficient means of explaining the State Department’s somewhat technical reasoning behind certain provisions of the U.N. proposals. Second,
they gave Department officials an opportunity to hear the particular views of individuals and organizations on whom the Department would rely for timely information-sharing and effective rebuttal of opposing arguments. Third, the meetings were an opportunity to work out misunderstandings and differences of opinion that might undermine public enthusiasm.

The private meetings gradually led to more frequent public-speaking activities. Historically, however, public speeches had not been a popular tool for public diplomacy. Previous administrations had, of course, made frequent use of presidential statements on foreign policy and Cabinet-level statements to the press. Before 1944, however, speeches by senior State Department officials were not common. In fact, most speeches were not public addresses at all. Over half of the engagements arranged by the State Department in October 1944 were off-the-record.

The Department chose not to reach the entire population directly. It focused its efforts on NGO leaders and opinion-shapers, who, in turn, were expected to tailor their arguments and wield a powerful influence on specific groups and communities. It also gave critical, isolationist media outlets fewer official government statements to parse and criticize.


“Historically, however, public speeches had not been a popular tool for public diplomacy.”

There were occasional exceptions. Roosevelt and Stettinius used the bully pulpit to launch “Operation Soapbox” on Columbus Day, 1944; they broadcast their remarks on international organization to the entire nation by radio. The concerted use of radio, however, was not undertaken until the beginning of 1945. Even then, the great majority of foreign policy addresses were not made available to broadcasters, but rather pitched to more limited audiences.

One reason for this early caution was the Administration’s lack of public polling data to assess mainstream public opinion. Polling methods were still fairly primitive in 1944, and Roosevelt had very little idea how the average constituent would respond to a major public presentation on international organization. All he knew, from witnessing President Wilson’s experience, was that he only had one opportunity to make his public sale. As one historian wrote, it was “the most momentous of all American foreign policy projects”—the building of an international political organization in which the United States would play a major part (Edel, 1979: 187).

OPPOSITION, DISSENT, AND DISINFORMATION

The “Dumbarton Hoax”

In order to understand that State Department leaders faced a major persuasive challenge, one need only glance at the widely divergent views of NGOs and media commentators across the political spectrum. Mainstream editorial commentary tended to support the proposals while focusing on specific parts of the plan. State Department surveys revealed that the veto ranked first among the most contentious issues, with discussion of whether Congress should approve in each specific case the use of military forces placing second. There was also considerable interest in the protections afforded to small states, the status of existing regional security arrangements (including the Monroe Doctrine), and the prospect of U.S. accession to the organization only after a peace settlement had been reached.

Most criticism was intended to be helpful, and State Department public opinion analysts found plenty of encouragement to continue their efforts. In their reading of public attitudes, three points were consistently emphasized: The public’s appreciation of wide-scale dissemination of the U.N. plan; an urgent
desire to establish the organization prior to the final peace settlements; and continued support for the Administration’s efforts to ensure prompt Senate debate and ratification (RDS, 21 Oct. 1944).

Expectedly, strident criticism came from isolationist-nationalist quarters, broadcasting through the McCormick-Patterson press, which owned the Chicago Tribune and the New York Daily News. Writing in the Tribune on behalf of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, Captain John Trevor described the “grave peril” posed to the country if it should “give power over” to “any international body.” He said that the Dumbarton Oaks plan “repudiated basic principles of this country” and demanded that Congress resist. Trevor’s comments, and those like it, were consistent themes in the pages of both newspapers and the Congressional Record during this period.

A second type of general criticism came from “idealists” and “world federalists”—such as Grenville Clark, Ely Culbertson, and the editors of The New Yorker. For these influential critics, plans to improve upon the League of Nations failed to go far enough towards world disarmament and the creation of a new framework for international society that was based on more egalitarian structures.

The heaviest opposition, however, came from those who believed that the process of drafting the U.N. plan itself was “undemocratic,” privileging the interests of the Great Powers and catering to on-going “power politics” in Europe. Among this group were Norman Thomas, members of the Post-War World Council, and John Foster Dulles, adviser to 1944 Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey (RDS, 17 Nov. 1944). In what was seen as “political warfare,” Dulles criticized “Washington aloofness” about Soviet policies in Greece and Poland, insinuating that Roosevelt was prepared to abandon a principled approach to postwar European order in order to get the U.N. built.

In December 1944, the Christian Science Monitor issued an editorial that was typical of the period, arguing that “The Dumbarton Oaks world security treaty is going to have tough going” in the Senate, because of the “mood of sour, cynical, disillusionment which recent inter-Allied disputes have produced.” The newspaper named 23 senators, six “die-hard isolationists,” and six others “almost certain” to vote against any strong international organization that “seemed to lend American prestige to the new spheres of influence” being carved out by Churchill and Stalin.

By mid-winter 1945, events in the European theatre led State Department officials to conclude that such criticism would fuel opposition to the plan. Between late November and January, conditions on the war front deteriorated rapidly. The Battle of the Bulge, the last desperate thrust of the Nazi armies, battered the Allies. In Eastern Europe, the satellites fell, as Soviet troops penetrated west and south. The British-Soviet dispute over Poland continued to evoke great concern in Washington.

Throughout this period, the Roosevelt Administration felt increasing pressure to stifle criticism of the Dumbarton Oaks plan, while many NGO partners felt insufficient support in generating debate. In January, Leland Goodrich, Director of the World Peace Foundation, commented to Stettinius that, “While the Department says the Proposals are open to free discussion and criticism, that is not quite the case.”

Comments like this demonstrated that, if it insisted on unqualified support, the Administration would face a great deal of antagonism. Another danger lay in the inference that NGOs might draw from such a posture: That further discussion of the plans was pointless. The public might also conclude that statements welcoming wide discussion were disingenuous. The Administration feared that a disillusioned citizenry might rally to the call of the Chicago Tribune, which was to “Reject the ‘Dumbarton Hoax.’”
It is clear that Stettinius and senior staff members appreciated these dangers. An important strategy memo advised Stettinius to avoid the suggestion “of shutting off discussion or wanting organizations to rubber stamp our activity” (Dickey, 01 Oct. 1944). From this point forward, there is no evidence of State Department officials asking NGOs to restrict public discussion or refrain from qualifying their support.

Of course, the same officials were never enthusiastic about public opposition to the U.N. proposals. They simply created as many opportunities as they could to convince the public that their decisions were in the nation’s best interests. From October 1944 until April 1945, outreach officers turned down few opportunities to meet with groups of every variety. Appendix B indicates that no important category was overlooked.

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The same variety is characteristic of the more than 300 speaking engagements filled by officers of the State Department during the seven-month campaign. Groups concerned primarily with international relations competed for the greatest number of Department speakers; educational institutions were a close second. Organized labor, agriculture, and religious associations also played an important role. But these three groups were of far less priority than the fourth major interest group: Business. Regional chambers of commerce and leading corporate representatives played a vitally important role in sponsoring advocacy events and hosting Administration officials.

The record suggests that State Department leaders sought out well-educated audiences and groups with whom they already enjoyed personal or professional relationships. The chief requirements for high-level outreach were as follows: (1) The would-be sponsor’s sincere desire for authoritative information and greater understanding; (2) an audience of “appropriate importance,” in terms of either numbers or influence; and (3) the availability of outreach officials.

The State Department campaign always had the full support of the White House; the only real constraint on Departmental outreach was a limited number of qualified personnel. The Department endorsed some 500 speaking engagements during the seven-month period between October and April 1945, compared with 57 speeches given in the first six months of 1944. It seems extraordinary that the 500-event campaign was undertaken with only a tiny increase in Department personnel.

Given the limited pool of available speakers, the State Department was in no position to accept all invitations and had to reject almost 200 in the first four months of the campaign. However, the distribution of agreed appearances reflects the Department’s shrewd use of limited resources. Of the total number of appearances between October and April, more than two-thirds were in states in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic regions. Almost 80% of those appearances occurred in cities of over 100,000 people. The Department rarely visited smaller cities more than once, while more than half of the larger cities had return engagements. Some towns with populations of less than 10,000 received more than their share of speakers; many of these small communities were home to colleges or universities.
THE PRINT CAMPAIGN
“A Blizzard of Paper”

While Operation Soapbox swept across the country, a complementary program emerged as the larger part of a two-front campaign. As officials took to the streets, they carried a great deal of paper with them. The State Department’s Public Affairs Office published four distinct publications describing the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the reasons for U.S. participation in international organization. The official publications included a schematic chart of the U.N. plan, an eight-page flier featuring answers to “frequently asked questions,” and a printed text of the entire document. For NGOs that wanted more detailed information, the Department also prepared study guides and discussion outlines.

Early distributors of these publications included the national headquarters of the Young Men’s Christian Association, the National Council for Social Studies, and the National Education Association. With aid from the State Department, articles were also prepared for publication by the National Association of Secondary School Principals, the Junior League, the Young Women’s Christian Association, Kiwanis, and the National Farmer’s Union (whose magazine alone circulated some 800,000 copies).

In order to ensure that small communities would not be overlooked, the White House asked the Office of War Information (OWI) to help the State Department reach rural newspapers. Press summaries announcing the merits of international organization were sent to some 9,000 weekly newspapers and over 1,000 small town dailies (RDS, 22 Nov. 1944). Using a Department draft, OWI prepared 2,200 mats for rural newspapers with an estimated circulation of close to 3 million subscribers. Another 12 million readers were targeted through the labor press.

Over the last six months of the education campaign, the Roosevelt Administration targeted nearly 20 million Americans for Dumbarton Oaks information handouts. Almost 2.2 million official State Department publications were distributed to public and private groups throughout the country. Seven national organizations distributed more than 50,000 publications apiece, including the League of Women Voters, the Federal Council of Churches, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Roosevelt also ordered other executive agencies to assist diplomats in papering the country with pro-U.N. materials. The Department of Agriculture offered the assistance of its Extension Service, the Office of Education covered schools and libraries, the Federal Security Agency took care of all units of the United Service Organizations, and the OWI sent the Dumbarton Oaks wall chart to airline and bus terminals, radio stations, banks, shipyards, war plants, U.S. employment offices, and other public venues where people concentrated in large numbers. In all, executive agencies distributed an additional 400,000 copies of State Department publications. One veteran of this publication blitz said, “It was a virtual blizzard of paper related to Dumbarton Oaks and over time Roosevelt hoped it would eventually float down and the merits of international organization would soak into every corner of the country” (Cheever, 1995).

After the initial run, large NGOs followed the State Department’s lead and published documents with identical or similar formats. The National League of Women Voters published a pamphlet entitled “Opening Gun of Campaign for Support of United Nations Organization,” which included an eight-page “question and answer” brochure to accompany the Dumbarton Oaks text. These were mailed to some 600 local leagues throughout the country to encourage household discussion.

Life magazine published an attractive wall-chart of the Proposals and received 46,000 orders in the month thereafter. As these publications reached broad segments of the American public, follow-on edu-
cational efforts were launched with the State Department’s full support. Senior officials sought to clarify key issues and did so by enlisting professional organizations—such as the American Legion, the American Bar Association, and the American Association for University Women. In each case, national organizations distributed State Department materials through local chapters and provided teaching guides to stimulate discussion (RDS, Undated C).

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) was probably the most significant State Department ally in these efforts. CSOP distributed tens of thousands of Dumbarton Oaks pamphlets to such organizations as the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, and the American Jewish Congress.

WORKING WITH CONGRESS
“A Turning Point”

With the public fully informed and increasingly mobilized, the Administration turned to the challenge of cultivating support in Congress. It was there that Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to sell the League had failed most egregiously. Wilson had stubbornly refused to acknowledge the power of the U.S. Senate to rein in the President’s most ambitious instincts on foreign policy. Wilson had long regarded the presidential power to negotiate treaties as “very absolute” and one that “virtually committed” the Senate to approval (Ambrosius, 1987: 4). As one historian has noted, “From 1919-20, Republican senators refused to play the role assigned to them. Despite modest efforts to influence them through management of public opinion...[Wilson] lost the treaty fight. The Senate demonstrated that the president’s power to control American foreign relations was less absolute than Wilson thought” (Ambrosius, 1987: 4).

Roosevelt was a much shrewder politician in his relations with the Congress. In December 1944, he authorized the creation of a new State Department position, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and he promoted Dean Acheson to occupy it. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary with special responsibility for liaising with Congress sent a strong signal to lawmakers about the Administration’s commitment to working together on foreign affairs. It replaced periodic contacts with a permanent channel for consultation and created a central clearinghouse (still in place today) for the efficient administration of routine diplomatic business on Capitol Hill.

The practical challenge of securing Republican support for U.N. plans re-emerged in the weeks immediately following Acheson’s appointment. On January 10, the notorious Michigan isolationist, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, finally reported his position on the Dumbarton Oaks plans, which had circulated for three months. Although the Senator offered very principled criticism of the extraordinary privileges reserved to the Great Powers, his statement gave measured support to U.N. plans and provided an enormous opportunity to the Administration. The challenge now became one of forging a bipartisan coalition by capturing Vandenberg’s moderate colleagues and drawing on the public swell of support for the U.N.

Within two days, Acheson took the decisive step of engineering a return gesture. A bipartisan foreign policy conference was called for January 12, with Vandenberg among the Republicans invited to the White House for privileged discussions with the President. This conference was followed by diligent State Department diplomacy on Capitol Hill, which produced further progress. On January 23, all of the newly elected members of the Senate signed a letter promising the President full support for his U.N. program. Given the combination of Republican and Democratic signatures on the letter, the Administration became even more assertive. The White House quickly rolled the letter out in a January 24 press release to demonstrate bipartisan support for U.N. planning.
The response to this press release was still more encouraging. Within 24 hours, the newly elected Democrats of the House sent to the White House a similar pledge of cooperation with 59 signatures appended. The House Republican Caucus held out the longest, but, on February 28, 17 of the Party’s freshmen representatives signed a carefully worded letter of support.

The White House then produced the pièce de résistance. To lock in Republican support for the final stages of U.N. planning, Roosevelt appointed a high-profile, bipartisan delegation to represent the United States at the conference to revise the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and conclude the final U.N. Charter. Mindful of President Wilson’s battles with Congress, the list included the two most senior figures from both parties on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg. Roosevelt did what could only have seemed unimaginable to isolationist opponents of the day: The President reached out to the man who might possibly represent the greatest threat to his vision and signed him onto his team. In doing so, Roosevelt greatly diminished the chances of facing his own Henry Cabot Lodge.

“The President reached out to the man who might possibly represent the greatest threat to his vision and signed him onto his team.”

The delegation also included both parties’ leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representatives Hal Bloom and Charles Eaton. It balanced a military officer and former governor, Harold Stassen, with a prominent woman, Virginia Gildersleeve, the Dean of Barnard College. In a final act of bipartisan outreach, Roosevelt approved the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Special Adviser to the delegation.

In February, the President returned from the Yalta summit, where he had finally struck an agreement with Stalin on the veto, and announced that the long-delayed spring conference would now be convened in April 1945. At Yalta, American, Soviet, and British diplomats worked out the remaining details of the United Nations conference. Invitations would be issued in the name of the five future permanent members of the Security Council. Roosevelt also approved Stettinius’s idea to hold the conference in San Francisco.

Upon his return from Yalta, Roosevelt reported to Congress that the summit marked “a turning point” in international relations. The President returned to the bully pulpit one last time and used a joint session of Congress to tell the American people that they would soon face a stark choice over whether to join and lead a new international organization. The President framed the issue in the bold language of a politician convinced of final victory. The Senate’s fateful decision, said Roosevelt, would:

...[d]etermine the fate of the United States—and of the world—for generations to come. There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict....
The Crimean conference ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join (Rosenman, 1950 (13): 573; 585-586).
FINAL PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN
“Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks”

Even after the government had mobilized an army of NGOs, educated public opinion, and secured a bipartisan coalition within Congress, the Administration redoubled its efforts in the final three months before San Francisco. In March, Roosevelt allocated additional funds to meet the costs of publicizing and disseminating information related to U.S. aims at the conference.

State Department presses geared up publication once again, and officials held an increasing number of public engagements during the spring. Perhaps more important than the speaker and print campaign, the State Department took to the nation’s radio airwaves. Press releases and audio speech transcripts were widely distributed to radio stations during the late winter. In February, Assistant Secretaries of State Archibald MacLeish and Dean Acheson, kicked off a Saturday evening radio program with the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC); the programs continued each Saturday thereafter until San Francisco opened.

The content of these broadcasts echoed the thrust of the Administration’s policy during this period. Department leaders stressed the primary responsibility of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States for prosecuting the war and, therefore, organizing the peace. They also emphasized the importance of diplomatic and humanitarian efforts by all states to build a better postwar world and the need for continued public support to make the promise of international organization a reality.

While Roosevelt and Stettinius had forged agreements at Yalta, a program entitled “Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks” echoed the Administration’s home-front peace aims. The radio series gradually focused discussions on particular elements of international cooperation. State Department leaders also endeavored to address remaining opposition and satisfy those who maintained doubts. To do this, they employed a shrewd public relations ploy; senior officials raised questions that appeared most worrisome to the public, occasionally identifying them as “favorite mailbag questions” (RDS, 21 Feb. 1945).

For example, the Department told those who doubted that the U.N. would be any more effective than the League of Nations that there would no longer be a “unanimity rule” for military action and that the U.N. would be provided armed forces to enforce its resolutions. Questioners who feared for smaller nations’ rights were told of member-state equality in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Subsequent programs dealt with topics such as “World Trade and World Peace” and “It’s Your State Department.”

Even in the absence of contemporary polling technology, the Administration went to great lengths to gauge the impact of the combined speaker, print, and radio campaigns. State Department records estimate that “Building the Peace” broadcasts reached an unprecedented audience of 10-15 million listeners. To emphasize bipartisan unity, members of the San Francisco delegation were also sought out by the major radio networks; and Stettinius actively encouraged their participation. Virginia Gildersleeve worked with the Mutual Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and Senator Connally participated in at least one on-air “Town Meeting” for the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

Washington also reached out to Hollywood, which was more than eager to produce optimistic pictures after four and a half years of war. The State Department, OWI, and Hollywood’s War Activities Committee produced a 15-minute documentary on U.N. planning entitled “Watch Tower Over Tomorrow.” This cooperative venture of the Hollywood Screen Directors Guild was distributed in late March, and the film was
sent to over 16,000 theatres with a strongly worded note from industry officials: “I know you will do every-thing humanly possible to get maximum exhibition by playing it at every performance and stimulating pub-lic interest and attendance” (RDS, March 1945). The movie-going public was also primed by a constant flow of newsreels previewing the San Francisco conference.

The impact of the San Francisco campaign is as difficult to measure as it is easy to quantify. For example, it is known that a minimum of 3-5 million pieces of literature found their way to individuals throughout the country. It is equally certain that articles in newspapers and magazines were circulated among at least 10-20 million potential readers. It is estimated that another 15-20 million viewers saw film and newsreel clips intended to increase public support. The mass media coverage was so complete that an untold number of people even had adverse reactions. One newspaper editorialist complained that all he saw “at the newsreels was Secretary Stettinius explaining Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco” (New York Daily News, 01 March 1945).

The vast majority of communities responded in more positive ways. The final San Francisco push culmi-nated in a national Dumbarton Oaks Week. During the week of April 17, 1945, local NGO branches throughout the country sponsored community education events—such as mass meetings, rallies, radio forums, window displays, parades, and other special events. To kick off the week, a consortium of NGOs bought evening airtime on the MBC radio network. The broadcast was inspired by the State Department series and featured a radio dramatization written by the acclaimed Norman Rosten of the Writers War Board.

To reach school children, the National Education Association sent a letter to 30,000 school principals and superintendents urging a weeklong focus of study on plans for international organization. Special school assemblies were called for the morning of April 25, the day the San Francisco conference was scheduled to open, and the Federal Council of Churches called upon “the entire nation to hold special services on Sunday, April 22.”

PUBLIC EDUCATION OR “NATION-WIDE PROPAGANDA”?

The culmination of this extraordinary, government-led campaign had a profound effect on public opin-ion. One San Francisco veteran described the national mood as “nothing less than euphoric.” One NGO leader summed up the public mood in a memo to his colleagues throughout the country: “The San Francisco Conference may go down in history as the greatest event since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Make sure that our delegation goes to San Francisco confident that the support of the American people is with them in the setting up of a United Nations Organization” (RDS, 29 March 1945).

The “delegation” in question was an NGO group that the State Department had rewarded for its efforts by accrediting them official consulting status at San Francisco. To acknowledge NGO partnership throughout the seven-month campaign, the State Department had convinced the White House to invite a representative group and designate them as observers and informal advisers to the U.S. delegation.11

Of course, for all the many campaign allies that were rewarded, the Administration had plenty of detrac-tors. When the question of “Dumbarton Oaks propaganda” was raised in a spring meeting of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, State Department officials testified that their campaign was merely to disseminate public facts and not to “sell” the concept of international organization.
Administration critics like Republican Senator Robert Taft did not attack “the purposes” of the Dumbarton Oaks plan directly, but they did take issue with “the deliberate policy of nation-wide propaganda adopted by the State Department and the Treasury with relation to these measures” (U.S. Congress, 1945: 4125). Taft even suggested that the allocation of public funds for such products as the Dumbarton Oaks publications, the film, and the radio programs violated federal law, as they were intended to influence the Congress contrary to legislation prohibiting expenditures made with this intent (United States Code, 1946). State Department lawyers disagreed, but Taft stopped short of demanding an investigation or proposing a resolution to censure the Department.

There is little evidence in media coverage of the period to suggest that the public regarded the Administration’s campaign as propaganda. Presumably, most people consumed the available information and formed opinions accordingly. However, the results of the Administration’s efforts were only too clear. By the time San Francisco opened, State Department samples of public opinion showed that an astounding 60% of the surveyed public had heard or read about the proposals for international organization.

More significant still, 81% of the polled population had answered “yes” to the question: “Do you think the United States should join a world organization with police power to maintain world peace?” Of the “yes” responses, a shocking 83% thought it was “very important” for the U.S. to join (RDS, 19 June – 21 July 1945: 16-30 June 1945: 28-74; Undated D).

**POSTSCRIPT**

In the end, the Roosevelt Administration’s campaign was a resounding success. The American public welcomed 50 national delegations to San Francisco and applauded the final product—a United Nations Charter, revised in minor respects, but containing the basic elements of the Dumbarton Oaks plan, which they had come to know so well.

When the San Francisco Conference ended on June 26, 1945, members of the U.S. delegation wasted no time making their case to the public. In New York, John Foster Dulles told reporters that, before San Francisco, many Americans supported the United Nations as a “matter of duty.” With full knowledge of the Charter’s contents, they now wanted to join as a “matter of choice.” Dulles revised his earlier views and now said that the Charter was “a people’s document” and the product of a democratic process. In Minnesota, Commander Stassen told a group in St. Paul that the Charter was no less than a “bridgehead on the shores of peace.” Senator Vandenberg reiterated his pledge to support prompt ratification “with all the resources at his command.” Senator Connally promised that the Senate would ratify the Charter without delay; he cautioned the press, however, not to raise overly high expectations for instant action.

Despite Connally’s cautious optimism, all signs pointed to overwhelming support and a desire for prompt action. A poll by the Associated Press, taken just after San Francisco, indicated that 52 senators were ready to ratify the Charter; none of the 75 senators interviewed expressed any opposition (RDS, 19 June – 21 July 1945: 16-30 June 1945: 28-74; Undated D).

The efforts of the Administration’s nine-month campaign were bearing their final fruit. In response to San Francisco, the State Department received letters from the public at a rate of 20,000 per week. As San
Francisco ended, the Senate was pressed to ratify by the Federal Churches of Christ in America (an organization of twenty-five Protestant denominations representing some 25 million members), the Church Peace Union, the National Peace Conference, Americans United for World Organization, Americans Associated for the United Nations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, among others (RDS, 19 June – 21 July 1945: 66-74).

It should be emphasized that the responsiveness of civil society to this campaign was not a limited blip on the government’s radar. According to one social historian, “After the United States signed the Charter, no school or club program was complete without at least one United Nations or world affairs event. The conclusion seems clear. The Dumbarton Oaks era initiated wide-scale and continuing public consideration of the problems of world affairs and American foreign policy” (Robins, 1960: 97). One week after San Francisco, Truman delivered the Charter to the Senate and asked its members to affirm the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt, who had died on April 12, 1945. After a short period of cordial debate, the Senate approved the U.N. Charter by a vote of 89-2 (U.S. Dept. of State, 1945: 1). An overwhelming public majority had responded to Roosevelt’s vision, and the long effort he described as his “crowning achievement” was now complete. When Truman signed the act of U.S. ratification, he turned a new page in the history of American foreign policy: The United States had finally agreed to take its place at the table of nations.

Even though Roosevelt did not live to enjoy this victory, he had clearly succeeded where Woodrow Wilson, one of the most popular presidents in history, had failed. Roosevelt had broken a pattern of U.S. disengagement from world affairs following the end of major conflicts. He had also convinced the American people to accept permanent responsibility for a leading role in international efforts in hopes of maintaining global peace and security.

Roosevelt’s success cannot be attributed to any single factor. The American public was similarly exhausted and wary at the end of both world wars. Wilson and Roosevelt shared the same passion and conviction for bringing about international organization; and both waged vigorous, personal campaigns to sell their visions to the people. As well, in each case, the presidents had to battle latent isolationist sentiment and reasonable objections to treaty language. However, there is no evidence that substantial differences between the Covenant and the Charter account for the converse outcomes. What, then, might account for one president’s success and the other’s failure?

Roosevelt’s first advantage was his ability to declare that the League had failed without U.S. participation and to convince the American people that the U.S. would have to play a greater role in the postwar settlement. However, he also had to overcome 20 years of popular disdain for the League and the very real weaknesses of the organization. It did not take long for Roosevelt to conclude that the League’s reputation was beyond resurrection and that a new institution would need to be built. That effort required a whole new campaign to inspire the public’s imagination about the future, to validate the public’s disgust for war, and to offer the American people a vision of postwar order for which their representatives in Congress could vote.

For Roosevelt, who had served as Navy Secretary during World War I, there was no hope for world peace without committing the United States to aggressive policing beyond its borders. As President, he oversaw the projection of U.S. military power into every corner of the world, and he believed that the promotion of international security would require maintaining global U.S. military capabilities after the war. In Roosevelt’s view, the Security Council would give the U.S. a legal framework for maintaining a large
peacetime military and intervening in defense of global, strategic interests that he considered synonymous with the interests of world peace.

In essence, Roosevelt made American entry into the United Nations a national referendum on the postwar posture of the United States and its willingness to prevent World War III. Roosevelt understood well that this was not simply a decision that could be made by executive prerogative, as Wilson had argued, but a political commitment that required public debate and pressure on Congress. His brilliance was to inspire the State Department’s campaign at precisely the right moment in time—as an exhausting war ground to a conclusion, but before postwar disputes might alienate the people against continued engagement with Europe. In so doing, Roosevelt managed to capture the public’s imagination and create a “euphoric” ideological movement that swept along everyone in its path.

As has been argued, this movement was not the result of a single speech or even a series of government initiatives. It was the successful culmination of a nation-wide campaign of government outreach, public education, and mediated debate about the merits of joining the United Nations and playing a leadership role in the new organization.

Roosevelt’s success obviously required strong, decisive leadership, a genuine willingness to work with Congress, and an organized and effective bureaucracy backed by a generous expenditure of resources. But the essential difference between success and failure was State Department leadership and the unique partnerships it brokered.

Stettinius’s Department clearly benefited from steady support from the White House and the cooperation of other executive agencies. Yet the wisdom of his approach was to forge a sustained partnership with the strongest institutions of American civil society: A network of private, voluntary associations that connected with the diverse interests and needs of the entire citizenry. This partnership should be seen as the most innovative aspect of a long-forgotten historical case. The continued existence and vibrant membership of many of these associations should stimulate new thinking about the prospect for new public-private partnerships to interest, educate, and mobilize citizens in support of U.S. foreign policy.

The history of America’s public diplomacy is a checkered one. Yet, as the U.S. contemplates the challenge of a new international era and unprecedented commitments overseas, students of public policy should take note of the Roosevelt Administration’s extraordinary leadership efforts and learn from its experience of reaching out to the American people.
APPENDIX A

Eighteen Private Organizations that Collaborated Under the Umbrella of Americans United for World Organization

(Americans United had active local or state organizations or affiliates in 31 states)

American Veterans Committee
Catholic Association for International Peace
Church Conference on International Economic Union
Church Peace Union
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Committee for National Morale
Council for Social Action
Federal Union
Food for Freedom

Freedom House
Friends of Democracy
League for Fair Play
Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace
Southern Council on International Relations
Union for Democratic Action
Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace
World Alliance for International Friendship Through Churches
World Citizen Movement

APPENDIX B

Select List of Nongovernmental Organizations Represented at October 1944 Meeting with Officials of the Department of State

American Academy of Political and Social Sciences
American Association of Advertising Agencies
American Association of University Women
American Bankers Association
American Bar Association
American Council on Education
American Farm Bureau Federation
American Federation of Labor
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish Committee
American Legion American Legion
Auxiliary American Library Association
Advertising Agencies American
Society of International Law
American Unitarian Association
American Veterans Committee
Americans United for World Organization
Brookings Institution
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Catholic Association for International Peace
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Church Peace Union
Citizens Conference on International Economic Union
Cleveland Council on World Affairs
Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Common Council on American Unity
Congregational Churches
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Council for Democracy
Daughters of the American Revolution

Disabled American Veterans
East and West Association
Federal Union
Food for Freedom
Foreign Missions Conference of North America
Foreign Policy Association
Friends Peace Committee General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
General Federation of Women's Clubs
Institute for International Education
Institute of Pacific Relations
Junior League of America Kiwanis International
Lawyers Guild
League for Fair Play
League of Nations Association
Lions International
Methodist Church-Women's Division
Military Order of the Purple Heart
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
National Association of Manufacturers
National Catholic Welfare Conference
National Conference of Christians and Jews
National Council of Catholic Women
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Negro Women
National Council of Protestant Episcopal Churches
National Education Association
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs
National Foreign Trade Council
APPENDIX C

Types of Private Organizations Represented at October 16, 1944 Meeting with the State Department
(354 Organizations Total)
(Compiled from records of the State Department Division of Public Liaison, Fall 1944)
**APPENDIX D**

*Distribution of Publications*

(Compiled from State Department Opinion Reports, April 1945)

**PUBLICATIONS**

- Local Organizations
- National Organizations
- Government Agencies

**APPENDIX E**

*Private Organizations Represented by Consultants at the United Nations Conference on International Organization*

San Francisco, April-June 1945

(Source: Dept. of State Press Release No. 323. 10 April 1945)

- American Association for the United Nations
- American Association of University Women
- American Bar Association
- American Council on Education
- American Farm Bureau Federation
- American Federation of Labor
- American Jewish Committee
- American Jewish Conference
- American Legion
- American Section, International Chamber of Commerce
- Americans Veterans Committee
- Americans United for World Organization, Inc.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Catholic Association for International Peace
- Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
- Church Peace Union
- Congress of Industrial Organizations
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Disabled American Veterans of World War II
- Farmers Union
- Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
- Foreign Policy Association
- General Federation of Women's Clubs
- Kiwanis International Lions International
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
- National Association of Manufacturers
- National Catholic Welfare Conference
- National Congress of Parents and Teachers
- National Council of Farmer Cooperatives
- National Education Association
- National Exchange Clubs
- National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.
- National Foreign Trade Council
- National Grange
- National Lawyers Guild
- National League of Women Voters
- National Peace Conference
- Railway Labor Executives Association Rotary International
- Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
- Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace
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ENDNOTES

1 This volume, unlike the subsequent series entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, is written as a narrative with very few footnotes. It contains select documents in the annex, but the volume rarely mentions the government documents that inform the narrative.

2 The addition of China and France as permanent member of the U.N. Security Council was something of an afterthought. The Soviet Union was so opposed to China’s participation in the creation of the U.N. that it refused to meet with Chinese delegates at Dumbarton Oaks. Following the Yalta Summit of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in February 1945, France was invited to become a sponsoring member of the San Francisco Conference but declined. Delegates from China and France only became active in Charter drafting at San Francisco.

3 Given its reference in a concluding section to the creation of the Division of Public Liaison, this memo was most likely prepared in early February 1944. The Doris Cochrane files, named after a member of the Public Liaison Division, include valuable memos, letters, reports, printed materials, and press releases relating to the U.N. campaign.

4 By Department order, Dickey was designated a Special Consultant ‘with such duties as may be assigned to him by the Secretary’ (U.S. State Department. 1943. Bulletin. Vol. IX: 6).

5 The American Association for the United Nations later changed its name to Americans United for the United Nations, and then to the Americans United for World Government. In 1946, it merged itself with the United World Federalists.

6 AUWO was formed by the merger of six political action organizations and collaborated with 18 others. The big six were: American Free World Association; Citizens for Victory; Committee to Defend America; Fight for Freedom; United Nations Association; and United Nations Committee for Greater New York. The other 18 organizations are listed in Appendix A.

7 Appendix B lists all the organizations represented at the 16 October 1944 meeting. Appendix C consists of a pie graph that breaks down meeting participation according to organization type.

8 The meetings were held on 20 October, 03 November, 17 November, and 27 December 1944.

9 Of these speaking engagements, 200 were filled in the East, 48 in the South and Southwest, 58 in the Midwest, and 23 in the Far West.

10 The bar graph in Appendix D breaks down the distribution of these publications according to publication and type of organization targeted. The table does not include newspaper mats distributed through the Office of War Information to weekly and rural press. By April 1945, the State Department estimated that at least 30 percent of the larger papers in the country had published these mats.

11 The organizations represented in this group are listed in Appendix E.
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