SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
LEADERSHIP THAT FACILITATES SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION—
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

Sarah H. Alvord, L. David Brown,
and Christine W. Letts

This study provides a comparative analysis of seven cases of social entrepreneurship that have been widely recognized as successful. The paper suggests factors associated with successful social entrepreneurship, particularly with social entrepreneurship that leads to significant changes in the social, political and economic contexts for poor and marginalized groups. It generates hypotheses about core innovations, leadership, organization, and scaling up in successful social entrepreneurship. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for the practice of social entrepreneurship, for further research, and for the continued development of support technologies and institutions that will encourage future social entrepreneurship.
INTRODUCTION

The concept of entrepreneurship, long hallowed in the context of business and economic ventures, has been increasingly applied to the context of social problem-solving (e.g., Dees, 1998a; 1998b; Thake & Zadek, 1997; Emerson & Twersky, 1986). The challenges of finding effective and sustainable solutions to many social problems are substantial, and solutions may require many of the ingredients associated with successful innovation in business creation.

However, solutions to social problems—such as sustainable alleviation of the constellation of health, education, economic, political, and cultural problems associated with long-term poverty—often demand fundamental transformations in the political, economic, and social systems that underpin current stable states. The test of successful business entrepreneurship is the creation of a viable and growing business, often embodied in the survival and expansion of a business organization. The test of social entrepreneurship, in contrast, may be a change in the social dynamics and systems that created and maintained the problem; the organization created to solve the problem may get smaller or less viable as it succeeds.

While the concept of social entrepreneurship is relatively new, initiatives that employ entrepreneurial capacities to solve social problems are not. We have found a variety of initiatives—particularly focused on the problems of poor and marginalized populations—that have transformed the lives of thousands of people around the world. As in other areas of social action, the practice of social entrepreneurship may be well ahead of the theory.

This paper seeks to identify factors associated with successful social entrepreneurship. We focus on social entrepreneurship that leads to significant changes in the social, political, and economic contexts for poor and marginalized groups—in other words, social entrepreneurship that leads to social transformation. We begin with a brief description of different perspectives on social entrepreneurship and the working definition that guides our analysis of an informal sampling of seven cases. We then describe our methods of inquiry and the issues we use to focus attention across the seven cases. The next section reports the results of comparisons across the cases and formulates hypotheses about core innovations, leadership, organization, and scaling up in successful social entrepreneurship. The final section discusses implications for the practice of social entrepreneurship, further research, the continued development of support technologies, and institutions for future social entrepreneurship.

BACKGROUND

The concept of entrepreneurship has a long history in the business sector. A major theme has been the creation of value through innovation (Schumpeter, 1951; Drucker, 1985). As applied more recently to social concerns, the concept has taken on a variety of meanings.

Some, for example, have focused on social entrepreneurship as combining commercial enterprises with social impacts. In this perspective, entrepreneurs have used business skills and knowledge to create enterprises that accomplish social purposes, in addition to being commercially viable (Emerson & Twersky, 1996). Not-for-profit organizations may create commercial subsidiaries and use them to generate employment or revenue that serves their social purposes; for-profit organizations may donate some of their profits or organize their activities to serve social goals. These initiatives use resources generated from successful commercial activities to advance and sustain their social activities.
Others have emphasized social entrepreneurship as *innovating for social impact*. In this perspective, attention is focused on innovations and social arrangements that have consequences for social problems, often with relatively little attention to economic viability by ordinary business criteria (e.g., Dees, 1998b). Social entrepreneurs are focused on social problems. They create innovative initiatives, build new social arrangements, and mobilize resources in response to those problems, rather than in response to the dictates of the market or commercial criteria.

Still others see social entrepreneurship as a way to *catalyze social transformation* well beyond the solutions of the social problems that are the initial focus of concern. From this perspective, social entrepreneurship at its best produces small changes in the short term that reverberate through existing systems to catalyze large changes in the longer term (Ashoka Foundation, 2000). Social entrepreneurs in this tradition need to understand not only immediate problems but also the larger social system and its interdependencies; this understanding allows for the introduction of new paradigms at critical leverage points that can lead to cascades of mutually-reinforcing changes that create and sustain transformed social arrangements. Sustainable social transformations include *both* the innovations for social impacts and the concern for ongoing streams of resources that characterize the other two perspectives on social entrepreneurship. They also lead to major shifts in the social context within which the original problem is embedded and sustained.

While we believe that all three approaches to social entrepreneurship have considerable utility, we are particularly interested in the perspective that emphasizes social entrepreneurship as a catalyst for social transformation. More specifically, this study focuses on social entrepreneurship that creates innovative solutions to immediate social problems and also mobilizes the ideas, capacities, resources, and social arrangements required for long-term, sustainable, social transformations.

Before exploring a large number of social entrepreneurship cases that vary in location, size, and focus, we chose a small group of cases to give us some initial data with which we could begin generating hypotheses. These cases are widely recognized as meeting the above social entrepreneurship definition—viz., they are all innovative efforts to solve persistent social problems of poverty and marginalization that, to some extent, have been successful in increasing their impacts and catalyzing social transformation. In comparing the cases, we have focused on four aspects of their experience: The nature of the innovations they have articulated, the characteristics of their leaders, the organization of the initiatives, and the paths chosen for scaling up their impacts.

First, most definitions of social entrepreneurship emphasize the innovative character of the initiative. In comparing the cases, we will examine the *nature of the innovation* in some detail. Not all provision of goods and services amounts to social entrepreneurship, of course. In many cases, replication or expansion of existing services is a valuable solution to a social problem but does not necessarily require social entrepreneurship. When the resources or capacities to duplicate existing services for poor and marginalized groups are not available, creative initiatives that reconfigure existing resources or services for more effective or wider delivery are imperative to serve wider populations (e.g., Uphoff, Esman & Krishna, 1997, 1998). Such creative initiatives represent social entrepreneurship. We will be interested in the patterns of innovation that appear across cases: Is there a single pattern for success? Are there a variety of forms of innovation that appear to be associated with different kinds of problems or contexts?

Second, we will look closely at the *characteristics of leadership* of socially entrepreneurial ventures. Much of the literature on leadership focuses primarily on individuals and their personal skills or attributes (e.g., Gardner, 1995; Heifetz, 1994); certainly in Western experience, individuals have made major contribu-
tions to entrepreneurial ventures. On the other hand, in some contexts, leadership groups may be more important than individuals, and focusing primarily on individuals may obscure essential aspects of the initiative (Paul, 1982; Thake & Zadek, 1997). We believe that leadership—whether group or individual—is important in the success of social entrepreneurial ventures. What are characteristics of leaders who initiate entrepreneurial social ventures? How do they respond to the challenges that emerge over time and as the initiative grows?

A third set of issues for investigation is the organizational and institutional features of social entrepreneurship. Substantial evidence suggests that, as initiatives face the challenges of expanding their impact and sustaining their initiatives, organizational and institutional features are important factors (Tendlar, 1989; Paul, 1982; Uphoff, et al., 1998). We will examine the organizational and institutional aspects of successful initiatives to see if we can identify common patterns. To what extent are there “best practices” that appear across many different cases? How do initiatives expand their operational capacities or evolve their strategies in the face of shifting task and environmental challenges?

Finally, we are also interested in the paths by which entrepreneurial ventures expand and sustain their impacts and transform larger systems in which they are embedded. Some studies of expansion of development impacts suggest that routinizing technology (Tendlar, 1989) is critical to reaching larger constituencies, and that the careful creation of a sequence of gradually expanding projects and programs is critical to successful scaling up (Rondinelli, 1983). Other studies suggest that we can identify a menu of different patterns for scaling up impacts and that the key issues in scaling up involve organizing to fit the strategy chosen (Uvin, 1995; Uvin, Jain & Brown, 2000). To what extent are different approaches to scaling up visible across the cases? Are there patterns of scaling up that are particularly successful in catalyzing long-term changes in social arrangements that shaped and sustained initial problems?

METHODOLOGY

This study provides a comparative analysis of cases of social entrepreneurship that have been widely recognized as successful. This study seeks to identify patterns and regularities among these successful initiatives. It is a hypothesis-generating rather than a hypothesis-testing approach to a complex and not yet well-understood topic. Comparative analysis can be a useful way of generating hypotheses about cases that combine complex phenomena, long-term dynamics, and difficulties in access (Yin, 1984). Case descriptions provide the type of information that allows recognition and assessment of unexpected patterns that would not be captured by more constrained methodologies. The cost of such richness and flexibility is the increased difficulty of making systematic comparisons and drawing unambiguous conclusions.

The cases used in this study are drawn from existing literature, which limits our ability to gain precisely comparable data and subjects us to the biases of multiple observers. We are willing to accept these limitations for a hypothesis-generating study because the costs of collecting original data for a study that spans four continents would be very high. When similar patterns emerge in diverse cases, we can be more confident that those patterns are relatively robust. In our analysis of the cases described here, we will compare and identify patterns across cases by using tables and matrices, a tool used extensively in multiple case analysis (Yin, 1984; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
We compiled information about the cases from published and unpublished reports, Internet resources, and interviews with organization members and informed observers. We first used these data to identify patterns related to our four areas of interest in each case and then constructed matrices that allowed us to compare patterns across cases. The results of this process should be considered tentative concepts and hypotheses.

The cases were chosen to meet the several criteria:

- They are widely regarded as successful examples of social entrepreneurship on behalf of poor and marginalized communities.
- They come from diverse regions, including Asia, Africa, Latin America, and North America.
- They have been described in available literature sufficiently to answer our key questions.
- They have exhibited at least some potential for catalyzing transformations in the social contexts within which they have been implemented.

Table One provides a brief overview of the cases and their impacts as background to the analysis in later sections. In the next section, we will present more detailed data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1 THE SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BANGLADESH RURAL ADVANCEMENT COMMITTEE (BRAC)</strong> was established in 1972 by Fazle Abed, a Bangladeshi corporate executive, in the aftermath of the Independence War. Over the past 30 years, BRAC has focused on breaking the cycle of poverty in Bangladesh. Starting as a relief and resettlement organization, BRAC pioneered the development of comprehensive, locally organized approaches to rural development and poverty alleviation. It provides a range of services—rural capacity-building, education, health services, micro-credit—to 2.6 million rural people, and it has been exceptionally successful in developing projects that contribute to its own financial sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP CASES</strong> was established in 1976 by Muhammed Yunus, a Bangladeshi economic professor, and his colleagues. Convinced that poor borrowers might be worthwhile credit risks, they demonstrated that landless women in mutually accountable borrower groups achieved very high repayment rates. The Grameen Bank forms small groups of five people to provide mutual, morally binding group guarantees in lieu of collateral. Past participants have proven to be reliable borrowers and astute entrepreneurs; as a result, they have raised their social status, lessened their dependency on their husbands, improved their homes, and provided better nutrition for their children. These borrowers developed the social development guidelines known as the “Sixteen Decisions,” which have formed the basis of village group meetings throughout the Grameen system. Today, over 90% of the millions of micro-credit borrowers around the world are women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE GREEN BELT MOVEMENT (GBM)</strong> was established in 1977 by Wangari Maathai and the National Council of Women in Kenya. The Movement organized small groups of poor community members in both rural and urban settings to grow, plant, and care for trees in “greenbelts” on public and private land. The Movement has organized more than 6,000 groups in poor villages and urban areas throughout Kenya and has planted over 20 million trees. Over the last 10 years, GBM has adopted a “conscientization” approach to mobilize community consciousness for self-determination, equity, improved livelihoods, and environmental conservation. It has helped hundreds of grassroots leaders to advocate for social, economic, and political justice. Internationally, GBM has begun to facilitate a Pan-African Network to assist “green conscious” and social justice groups in other African countries in developing similar approaches to community mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE HIGHLANDER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER (HREC)</strong> was founded by Myles Horton in 1932 in a rural Appalachian mountain community in the Southern United States. The Center is dedicated to eliminating poverty and promoting genuine democratic participation for all people. HREC provides educational support and research assistance to grassroots individuals and organizations working to address communities’ political, cultural, and economic inequities. HREC’s efforts began with the labor and civil rights movements; the Center has also worked on many other struggles in Appalachia and the Deep South. It currently focuses on eliminating economic injustice and increasing democratic participation in the United States and abroad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLAN PUEBLA (PP) was initiated in Mexico in 1966 by a small group of agricultural researchers who recognized that Mexican agricultural research did not address the needs of small subsistence farmers. The initiative sought to improve maize production techniques and transfer this new technology to small subsistence farmers, in hopes of improving the general welfare of rural farm families. The project gained momentum with support from the newly established International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. After 10 years, private funding of the initiative ended, and the Mexican government took over the project. The model has been replicated in Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and other areas in Mexico. The project has enabled the creation of the Cholollan Regional Cooperative—a credit union founded in 1993 by former Plan Puebla staff—and the Center of Rural Development Studies in Puebla.

- **Essential Innovation:** Improves crop production by focusing on small, farmer-oriented cooperatives and providing support activities, rather than simply improving agricultural technology.
- **Scope:** Increased maize production by 62% among 47,000 Mexican farmers in the Plan Puebla region. Educated poor, small subsistence farmers about income diversification and facilitated a 252% increase in family income.

THE SELF-EMPLOYED WOMEN’S ASSOCIATION (SEWA), founded in 1972 by Ela Bhatt, is a trade union of women who earn their livelihoods in three broad occupational categories that, historically, have been very difficult to organize: Hawkers and vendors, home-based producers, and manual laborers and service providers. Their initial programs focused on improving members’ working conditions through influencing the actions of local police and policy makers. Later, SEWA provided a variety of services that were otherwise unavailable to their members. With approximately 315,000 members, SEWA is the first and largest trade union of informal sector workers. In addition to its unionizing activities, SEWA has several “sister” institutions, including a bank that provides financial resources, an academy that provides teaching, training and research, and a housing trust that coordinates housing activities for its members. SEWA has become an international force, working with women’s and labor movements worldwide.

- **Essential Innovation:** Organizes groups of women that are atomized and have little reason to cooperate for political change, or otherwise address economic, social, and health issues. Builds local leadership capacity to scale up organization and movement.
- **Scope:** Organized 315,000 self-employed women as union members. Improved working conditions, access to health care, credit, and savings for the more than 90% of India’s self-employed/unorganized, female laborers. Influenced the creation of self-employment labor division in the Indian government. Influenced the International Labor Organization to pass standards for home workers (including minimum wage and working conditions). Co-founded international network to support the work of women in the informal sector (Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing, WIEGO).

SE SERVIR DE LA SAISON SÈCHE EN SAVANT ET AU SAHEL (SIX-S) was established in 1976 by Bernard Ledea Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso) and Bernard Lecomte (France) The organization’s goal is to promote community development from a peasant perspective, particularly during the dry season when jobs are few and far between. Six-S has organized networks and councils of villagers in several West African countries. After a village has worked with Six-S to develop an organization, started a savings program, and built management capacity, it can propose projects to solve local problems. A council of representatives from the network of villages allocates project resources according to a few simple rules that reduce the likelihood of misuse of funds. Six-S has negotiated arrangements for such “flexible funding” with a coalition of donors who have been pleased with the results.

- **Essential Innovation:** Instituted “flexible funding” for local projects approved by regional networks of village elders. Promoted capacity-building to prepare villages to use resources effectively. Promoted network-building within regions and countries to foster more information-sharing.
- **Scope:** Involved 2 million people in village projects across nine countries in the West African Sahelian region. Assisted villagers in 1,500 villages to develop self-sustaining, income-generating projects. Organized 6,500 village groups to strengthen village infrastructure and capacity for project development.
PATTERNS IN THE CASES

This section examines the patterns identified across the seven cases and across the four aspects of each initiative identified earlier: Characteristics of innovations, characteristics of leaders, organizational arrangements, and approaches to scaling up. In the analysis that follows, we provide tables with brief descriptions of the characteristics of each case and the dimensions that emerged as important for each of these characteristics. We briefly discuss the concepts that emerge from this analysis and formulate initial hypotheses to describe the links between those factors and initiative success.

Characteristics of Innovations

The innovations described in Table Two are very diverse. They range from micro-credit services provided by the Grameen Bank, to agricultural and tree-planting support from Plan Puebla and the Green Belt Movement, to support for grassroots social movements from SEWA and Highlander, to village development initiatives by BRAC and Six-S. It is not immediately obvious that these innovations have much in common, since they focus on different groups and concern various issues.

The first column of Table Two contains a brief description of the basic form of the innovation. The seven initiatives often built upon their core innovations by adding other programs as they grew and evolved, but most began with a basic form that shaped their central identity. This pattern of ongoing fidelity to an initial identity and frame has been observed in other civil society organizations (e.g., Ebrahim, 2001). We have identified three such forms among these cases: Building local capacity, disseminating a package, and building a movement.

Building local capacity involves working with poor and marginalized populations to identify capacities needed for self-help and helping to build those capacities. This approach is based on the assumption that, given increases in local capacities, local actors may solve many of their own problems. Examples include the systemic village development programs of BRAC, Six-S, and (less clearly) the Green Belt Movement. This approach involves working closely with local groups around issues that those groups deem important.

Other innovations focus on disseminating a package of innovations that serve a widely distributed need. An underlying assumption of this approach is that information and technical resources can be reconfigured into user-friendly forms that will make them available to marginalized groups. Examples include the demand for small loans met by the Grameen Bank and the demand for improved maize technology met by Plan Puebla. The construction of such packages may require considerable expertise and creativity to adapt existing materials and resources for low-cost diffusion to many users; however, once that development work is done, the package's dissemination may occur through channels requiring comparatively less expertise.

A third approach is building a movement that mobilizes grassroots alliances to challenge abusive elites or institutions. The assumption underlying movement-building is that increasing the political voice of marginalized groups can help solve their major problems. Examples include SEWA's campaigns against police abuse of vendors and Highlander's support for the union and civil rights movements. Movement-building is often a highly politicized activity that involves challenging powerful antagonists and, thus, may subject the initiative to high risks and repressive challenges.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Innovation Pattern</th>
<th>Mobilizing Assets and Capabilities of Poor</th>
<th>Emphasis on Continuous Learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRAC</strong></td>
<td><strong>Build Local Capacity</strong>: Create village groups that can solve local problems and provide a variety of services and supports for village development.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Shift from relief and service delivery to building local organizations and capacities for self-help, with particular attention to women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAMEEN BANK</strong></td>
<td><strong>Micro-credit Package</strong>: Provide group loans for poor and marginalized people to develop income-generating activities; follow up with other development programs.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: From the start, focus on improving the capacity of poor and marginalized people, especially women, to participate in small businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREEN BELT MOVEMENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>Build Local Capacity</strong>: Use tree-planting and civic education programs to build local skills and organization for self-help activities.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Focus on building villagers’ capacity to work together to solve problems, such as remediying deforestation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGHLANDER CENTER</strong></td>
<td><strong>Build Local Movement</strong>: Use adult education to empower and organize local unions, civil rights groups, and others to confront abusive elites.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Use participatory adult education to help marginalized grassroots actors (e.g., labor, civil rights groups) organize and campaign effectively for their rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLAN PUEBLA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agriculture Package</strong>: Develop and promote innovations in maize production that enable subsistence farmers to improve family welfare and increase income.</td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Emphasize technology to improve agricultural productivity of small farmers; further improvements depend on outside experts and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEWA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Build Local Movement</strong>: Mobilize self-employed women to campaign for policies to support work activities and to develop services adapted to their work and overall welfare needs.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Focus on building capacities of poor, self-employed women to organize and secure economic and legal rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIX-S</strong></td>
<td><strong>Build Local Capacity</strong>: Support village projects to improve sustainable local resources, increase income-generating activities, and build village capacities through networking of village organizations.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Provide non-financial resources for village groups. Serve as intermediary between donors and village organizations that demonstrate initial effectiveness in securing financial resources for improvement projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
building is often a highly politicized activity that involves challenging powerful antagonists and, thus, may subject the initiative to high risks and repressive challenges.

Over time, many initiatives added programs that supplemented their core innovations: The Grameen Bank added many other services to its micro-credit package, and SEWA added capacity-building services to its movement-building. However, the initial core innovations of these seven cases reflected quite different analyses of the underlying problems and very different roles for the marginalized groups involved:

Hypothesis 1: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives can take at least three forms, including:

- building local capacities to solve problems;
- providing “packages” needed to solve common problems; and
- building local movements to deal with other powerful actors.

It is not a surprise, given our criteria for case selection, that these innovations focus on improving the lives of poor and marginalized groups. What is striking, however, is how much they focus explicitly on mobilizing existing assets of marginalized groups to improve their lives, rather than delivering outside resources and services. Thus, in the second column of Table Two, we have rated and briefly described the extent to which the initiative focused on helping clients use their own assets to solve problems. A rating of “high” reflects primary reliance on the assets and capacities of local actors for self-help; a rating of “medium” indicates emphasis on self-help combined with continuing outside resources; a rating of “low” indicates that outside resources and services are essential to improvements. All but one of these cases was rated “high” on mobilizing local assets.

Mobilizing grassroots assets takes various forms in these initiatives. Some focus on organizing village people and resources to solve local problems: Six:S and the Greenbelt Movement focus on village development, and BRAC organizes poor groups to improve local services. Others such as the Grameen Bank and the Plan Puebla emphasize helping individuals or small groups to participate more effectively in local economies. Still others, like SEWA and HREC, help grassroots groups organize themselves to be more effective in influencing other actors and political forces. To a large extent, however, they all treat the assets and capacities of the marginalized groups as vital to the development initiative. Without the willing cooperation of local partners, the initiative would fail. Sharing control and mobilizing resources with the local partners increases the likelihood of sustainable change because of its grounding in local commitment and capacities.

Hypothesis 2: Successful social entrepreneurship involves innovations that mobilize existing assets of marginalized groups.

The third column of Table Two describes the initiatives’ emphasis on continuous learning by individuals and organizations. The issue of learning in development initiatives has received considerable attention (Korten, 1980; Uphoff, et al., 1998). Individual learning by staff and partners is clearly important if the initiative seeks to improve its performance on complex projects. Organizational learning that goes beyond individual development to enhance organizational capacities is also critical in addressing the volatile and conflicted contexts of development (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Senge, 1990; Smillie & Hailey, 2001). The second column of Table Two rates emphasis on learning as “high” for systematic investment in individual and organizational learning; “medium” for investment in individual or organizational learning; and “low” for little systematic investment in learning. Relevant individual and organizational learning varies considerably across these initiatives. All of the initiatives emphasize individual learning by
their staffs and clients, as might be expected of organizations that are innovating in the face of complex problems. Significant investment in organizational learning is less common, particularly when initiatives face problems of scarce resources and struggle to make ends meet. It is probably not coincidental that the initiatives characterized by “high” levels of organizational learning—BRAC, SEWA, and Highlander—all operate at a large scale or seek to influence others who operate on a large scale.

Hypothesis 3: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives emphasize systematic learning by individuals and by the organization, if they operate on a large scale.

CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS

The founders of these initiatives come from rich and poor backgrounds, from industrialized and developing countries. Some founders are individuals, and some are teams; some are men, and some are women. They include lawyers, professors, managers, and grassroots organizers. No immediately obvious and highly visible characteristics distinguish these leaders by background, country of origin, gender, occupation, or even as individuals or groups. Comparing these cases, what characteristics emerge as being associated with successful social entrepreneurship?

Table Three presents summary data and ratings across the cases on two dimensions of leadership that seem characteristic of successful social entrepreneurs in these cases: (1) Bridging-capacity that enabled leaders to work effectively across many diverse constituencies; and (2) adaptive skills that enabled them to recognize and respond to changing contextual demands over a long term. Note that we have reorganized the rows in Table Three to reflect the characteristics of the three types of innovations identified in the last section, so that it will be easier to identify characteristics associated with these different forms of core innovation.

The first column of Table Three rates and describes each initiative in terms of its leadership’s ability to understand the perspectives of and work effectively with constituencies whose concerns and resources were critical to the initiative. In many cases, individuals have experiences and skills that enable bridging capacity with very diverse stakeholders; in others, the leadership is comprised of a team that possesses the necessary skills and resources. We rated the leadership “high” when it could understand and work effectively with all of the stakeholders that are central to the organization’s strategy; “moderate” if it had the skills to work with most key stakeholders; and “low” if it was ignorant of or at odds with stakeholders critical to its success. While this aspect of leadership emerged from our examination of the cases, it is consistent with the challenges posed by settings in which success turns to effective dealing with many different constituencies (e.g., Brown, 1993; Moore, 2000).

In most of these cases, the social entrepreneurs—whether individuals or groups—had backgrounds and experiences that enabled them to build effective links with very diverse actors. The leaders of BRAC, SEWA, and Grameen Bank, for instance, were members of national elites who were committed to work with marginalized groups; the founder of Highlander came from poor circumstances but gained access to elite constituents through education; the founders of Six-S had diverse backgrounds that collectively enabled them to understand and connect with very different perspectives. The two initiatives whose leadership had less success in bridging diverse stakeholders had more difficulty in expanding the impacts of the initiatives. The founder of the Green Belt Movement has been challenged by tribal politics, tensions with government actors, and lack of long-term donor support. The leadership team of Plan Puebla focused on building relationships with local farm communities, academic colleagues, and targeted gov-
## Table 3: Characteristics of Initiative Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Build Local Capacity</th>
<th>Bridging Capacity</th>
<th>Adaptive Leadership Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRAC</strong></td>
<td>High: Founder was international business executive who committed himself to reducing poverty in his country. Developed close contacts with grassroots communities and activists as well as with government officials, business leaders, donors, and development NGOs.</td>
<td>High: Founder has led organization for 30 years and guided transition from doing relief work to serving as a grassroots development catalyst, partnering with government and international coalitions, and developing into a successful market competitor. Founder understands political context and utilizes key political relationships effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIX-S</strong></td>
<td>High: Founding team of two development activists from France and Burkina Faso have been able to understand and work across North-South boundaries as well as with villages, donors, and governments.</td>
<td>Moderate: Co-founders led organization for 15 years and managed its building of regional networks and instituting of non-program based funding patterns with international donors. Managed political context to avoid sabotage. Data not available on leadership succession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREEN BELT MOVEMENT</strong></td>
<td>Moderate: Founder was biology professor who grew up in Kenyan village. Has good relations with grassroots groups, environmental activists, and international groups. However, has had difficulty building broad coalitions for expanding impacts. Founder has not maintained strong donor relationships.</td>
<td>Moderate: Founder has led initiative for 30 years, expanded organization to many villages, but has not developed a large-scale strategy or infrastructure to carry it out. Uses key political relationships to maintain safety and subdue threats to organizational existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAMEEN BANK</strong></td>
<td>High: Founder was an economics professor who grew up in Bangladesh and completed graduate education in the United States. Over the years, has built strong and lasting relationships with business leaders, government officials, donors, academics, and poor villagers, both men and women.</td>
<td>High: In place for 30 years, founder has led expansion from small, local experiment to nation-wide organization with branches in other countries, twelve different businesses, and close ties to government and international donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLAN PUEBLA</strong></td>
<td>Moderate: Founding team of four young researchers worked with universities and farmers, but did not develop networks with broader constituencies. Government officials with less bridging capacity succeeded them.</td>
<td>Moderate to Low: Founders have worked for 10 years to translate agricultural research results to small-scale farmers successfully. After private funding ended, founders were able to gain government support for program but discontinued their own involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGHLANDER CENTER</strong></td>
<td>High: Founder grew up poor in rural Appalachia, but his schooling afforded links to elite intellectuals and opportunities for international experience that inspired founding of Highlander to support grassroots self-help and advocacy. Had few relationships with donors and depended on networks and colleagues to connect donors to the initiative.</td>
<td>High: Founder led the initiative for nearly 50 years and maintained involvement until his death. Had strategic relationships with academics, social activists, union leaders, and political leaders. Overcame multiple serious challenges to the survival of organization and campaigns from “Red Scare” anti-communists and segregationists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEWA</strong></td>
<td>High: Founder born into high caste and trained as a lawyer in social activist family (e.g., India’s independence movement). Maintained relationships with elite officials, professionals, and social activists while convening disparate groups of very poor, self-employed women around common issues.</td>
<td>High: Founder led organization for 25 years to be successful local and national movement. Facilitated rise of new leaders and international association. Utilized relationships with key political leaders and government officials to support campaigns and to overcome challenges from opposing constituencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ernment officials; but the team’s inability to cultivate relationships with a variety of outside donors or other development organizations resulted in reduced funding and an eventual government takeover that undermined many of its social change and community improvement goals.

Hypothesis 4: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives are often founded by leaders with the capacity to work with and build bridges among very diverse stakeholders.

The second column of Table Three focuses on the long-term adaptive capacity displayed by the leadership of these ventures in response to the changing contexts and circumstances. Many of these leaders or teams expanded their repertoires to provide new visions for growing organizations over many years. Some have also fostered leadership succession processes that put appropriate new talent in place. Long-term adaptive capacity was rated “high” when leadership successfully catalyzed initiative adaptation to internal and external changes or organized successions to deal with challenges over the long periods required for scaling-up these initiatives; “moderate” when leadership adapted with some difficulty to new organizational or contextual challenges; and “low” when problems of adaptation or succession undermined the effectiveness or expansion of the initiative. While this definition of adaptive capacity grew out of examination of these cases, the concept resembles aspects of leadership identified by analysts who have looked at the phenomenon in other contexts (e.g., Heifetz, 1994).

The leadership of most of these initiatives exhibited impressive longevity. Five of the seven were led by their founders for 25 years or more, and even Six-S and Plan Puebla had the same leadership teams for 10 years or more. Launching and expanding successful social entrepreneurship ventures is not a short-term effort. The adaptive challenges facing these initiatives varied across forms of innovation. For capacity building initiatives, many of the challenges involved evolving understanding of local development demands and the need to create organizational arrangements and donor alliances to support expansion. BRAC was extremely successful in creating systems to deliver programs to thousands of villages over a long term. It is less clear that Six-S and the Green Belt Movement were able to create the kinds of alliances needed to expand their impacts over the long-term. For innovations that focused on building development packages, the Grameen Bank was more successful than Plan Puebla in developing a package that could be disseminated widely over a long period. In movement-building initiatives, adapting effectively to political challenges was critical to long-term effectiveness; both SEWA and Highlander leaders were able to respond creatively to continuing political challenges. Many initiatives adapted program components to fit their core innovations to emerging contextual challenges, such as Grameen’s partnering with non-Islamic women to teach Islamic women observing purdah; Highlander’s integration of blacks and whites in residential education programs in the teeth of local segregation laws; and SEWA’s addition of economic development and support services to its initial political organizing program.

Each of the three initiatives whose adaptive capacity is rated “moderate” had difficulties responding to a major contextual challenge. Six-S groups, overwhelmed by an influx of funding, ignored necessary village capacity-building processes and became too focused on quick successes and impacts valued by donors. The Green Belt Movement did not build the federations and coalitions required to address the broader scale issues of government corruption effectively. Plan Puebla did not demonstrate to government and other constituencies the importance of sustainable social change program components.
Hypothesis 5: Successful social entrepreneurship initiatives have leadership that is characterized by:

- long-term commitment to the initiative; and
- capacity to catalyze adaptation to emerging contextual challenges.

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The organizational arrangements of these initiatives vary considerably. Some sort of infrastructure is critical to having impacts on a large scale, but the alternatives offered by these cases cover a wide spectrum. In Table Four, we have focused on two aspects of organizational arrangements: (1) Operational organization, which refers to the actors (e.g., staff, volunteers) involved in the implementation of the initiative’s fundamental activities; and (2) external relations, which refer to connections with actors outside the organization who are essential to its strategy.

The organization and management literatures are full of discussions about the best ways to organize to carry out various tasks, and similar analysis also has been applied to development programs (e.g., Paul, 1982; Jain, 1994). We might expect that the different forms of innovation—building local capacity, sharing packages, and building movements—would require different arrangements for operational organization. We have focused on four aspects of operational organization that appear to be important to the success of these innovations: Size, management systems, staff development, and monitoring and evaluating activity.

The initiatives displayed in Table Four are extremely diverse in their operational organizations, as described in the first column. Their size ranges from tens of thousands to dozens. This diversity in size does not appear to be organized by the type of initiative: There are very large or very small core organizations in all three categories. In some cases, expansion has taken the form of a large organization whose operations affect hundreds of thousands of people, such as SEWA, GB, and BRAC. In others, the initiative cooperates with networks of local actors to carry out program activities, as do Six-S, GBM, and Plan Puebla. In still others, the initiative becomes a resource to larger movement organizations, as Highlander did with the labor and civil rights movements. In the latter two approaches, the initiative may remain quite small, since the impact of program expansion depends on allies rather than on direct operational capacities.

These initiatives also vary considerably in the attention they have devoted to building their organizational capacity—specifically along such dimensions as management systems, staff development, and performance evaluation systems. Some, like BRAC, GB, and SEWA, have invested heavily in management systems—such as financial and technical systems, clear divisions of responsibility, and leadership succession plans—that are critically important to running large agencies. Others, like Highlander or the GBM, have focused much less attention on management and management systems. The initiatives vary considerably in their attention to staff development systems as well. The organizations with the largest staffs—BRAC, GB, and SEWA—also have strong commitments to staff development. PP and HREC are less explicitly invested in staff development, in part because they do not have to recruit as many initially low-skilled workers to fill out a large organizational complement. For similar reasons, the initiatives also vary substantially in their development of performance evaluation systems. BRAC, GB, SEWA, and PP have all developed such systems; the other initiatives track some impact data but lack a more comprehensive system. In general, the creation of sophisticated organizational systems and arrangements is correlated with organizational size in Table Four: The larger the organization, the more resources it tends to devote to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUILD LOCAL CAPACITY</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>PRIORITIES ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>SIZE: Very Large. Staff delivers programs.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Village organizations and federations of poor. • Resource providers: Donor coalitions. • Government partners in program delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: High. Comprehensive delivery structure, strong financial systems, many feedback systems.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Alliances with other NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: High. Commits significant budget for training, promotes from within, highly values education.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: High. Formal research and evaluation unit provides impact information for all programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX-S</td>
<td>SIZE: Small. Staff works with local activists.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Village organizations of poor for projects. • Donors that support undefined projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: Medium. Councils and zones oversee grant-making. Little data on financial, technical systems.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Government actors related to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: High. Train staff and trainers for local work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: Medium. No formal evaluation unit but does track beneficiary and impact data.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN BELT MOVEMENT</td>
<td>SIZE: Small. Staff works with village representatives.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Village organizations of poor. • Police, government, abuser targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: Low. Strong leader, lack of middle management. Weak financial and planning systems.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Alliances with other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: Medium/Low. Training for field levels but not at middle and upper management levels.</td>
<td>LOW PRIORITY • Resource providers for future support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: Low. Weak systems for tracking impact data. No formal research and evaluation unit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAMEEN BANK</td>
<td>SIZE: Very Large. Staff delivers services to borrowers.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Village borrower groups that use package. • Agencies that deliver the package elsewhere. • Resource providers that fund package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: High. Comprehensive micro-lending and other service delivery, strong financial systems. Other enterprises have separate management systems.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Government actors on financial services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: High/Medium. Trains staff, but without formal system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: High. Research and evaluation unit tracks data on micro-lending/credit activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN PUEBLA</td>
<td>SIZE: Small. Staff and consultants develop package.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Village-level subsistence farmers of maize. • Agencies that deliver package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: Medium. Management relies on technical consultants; bureaucratized after government takeover.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Government agencies interested in maize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: Low. No formal staff development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: High. Initial leaders committed to research and evaluation activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHLANDER CENTER</td>
<td>SIZE: Small. Staff provides TA to activists and allies.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Grassroots partners (poor and marginalized). • Allies in influence campaigns. • Corporations, police, elite targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: Medium. History of weak management systems, recent two decades of improvement.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Resource providers outside movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: Medium/Low. Little attention to staff development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: Medium. No formal tracking systems until research evaluation function started in 1980s.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEWA</td>
<td>SIZE: Large. Staff works with members on campaigns and to deliver services.</td>
<td>HIGH PRIORITY • Potential members (self-employed women). • Allies in policy campaigns. • Target actors: Police, policy makers, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SYSTEMS: High. Well-developed governance and management systems. Organizing done by trade.</td>
<td>MEDIUM PRIORITY • Resource providers outside movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAFF: High. Training from SEWA Academy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M&amp;E: High. Academy research and documentation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organizational arrangements. Developing operational capacity is associated with building larger and more sophisticated core organizations for some kinds of scaling-up.

**Hypothesis 6a:** Social entrepreneurship initiatives may expand their operations through:

- organizational growth to expand the coverage of their programs;
- small organization in alliance with clients; and
- small organization that offers technical assistance to larger organizations.

**Hypothesis 6b:** Social entrepreneurship initiatives that expand their impacts by organizational growth must invest in management, staff development, and monitoring and evaluation systems.

For many of these initiatives, external relations have become increasingly important as the initiative itself becomes more visible and potentially controversial. Key external stakeholders include: (1) Constituents intended to benefit from the initiative (e.g., poor and marginalized people); (2) resource providers who offer financial, technical, or political resources; (3) allies who help carry out programs; and (4) actors who are targets of programs or campaigns.

From the column on the right of Table Four, it appears that the priorities assigned to external actors vary across forms of innovation. For initiatives focused on building local capacity, for example, external relations with client groups are high priority across all of the cases, although they vary in the priority they accord to other external stakeholders. For BRAC, the most successful example of capacity-building, relations with coalitions of resource providers and with allies to deliver programs have high priority. Six-S has worked closely with donors but has paid less attention to government actors. The Green Belt Movement has not built close relations with resource providers (thereby compromising its growth and sustainability), but it has paid attention to policy influence targets. In order to expand their programs, capacity-building programs need links to resource providers as well as close relations to client groups.

Innovations that focus on package adoption place high priority on finding stakeholders that can use their packages. Some expand their own organizations to broaden coverage, like the Grameen Bank’s operations in Bangladesh; others ally with other organizations to make the package available, as did Plan Puebla and the Grameen Bank outside of Bangladesh. Package development may be supported by resource providers that differ from those that support dissemination, as in the case of Plan Puebla where private donors supported package development and then the government supported dissemination. Packages are designed to be adopted by other organizations more easily than capacity-building programs.

External relations activities for movement-building initiatives focus more on building relations with allies and finding ways to influence targets than on building relations with resource-providers. Mobilizing political support from allies and members is more important to movement success than access to the resources central to capacity-building or to package development and dissemination. SEWA, for example, is more concerned with mobilizing effective campaigns and gaining credibility with key targets than with mobilizing extensive financial support. Highlander focuses more on its relationships with movement allies and grassroots partners than on building extensive donor relations. The success of movements depends more on widespread political support than on financial or technical resources.
Hypothesis 7: External relations of social entrepreneurship initiatives vary across innovation forms:

- Capacity-building emphasizes attention to local constituents and resource providers;
- package dissemination emphasizes attention to package users and disseminators; and
- movement-building emphasizes attention to members, allies, and target actors.

SCALING-UP AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The patterns of scaling-up and the social transformation impacts of these cases are summarized in Table Five. While all of these initiatives have been successful in expanding and sustaining their impacts to some degree (or they would not have been selected for this study), there are substantial differences in the extent to which they have been able to do so.

Prior analyses of scaling-up have identified three major patterns for widening the impacts of successful social entrepreneurship initiatives: (1) Expanding coverage to provide services and benefits to more people; (2) expanding functions and services to provide broader impacts to primary stakeholders; and (3) initiating activities that change the behavior of other actors with wide impacts and scale-up impacts indirectly (Uvin, 1995; Uvin, Jain & Brown, 2000). The first column of Table Five focuses on the initiatives’ uses of such different strategies for scaling-up.

The selection of scaling-up strategy appears to be related to the form of the innovation. For capacity-building programs, for example, initiatives first developed a combination of services and functions that enhanced village or group capabilities for self-help or asset use. They then expanded their activities to cover many client groups with that combination. Thus, BRAC, Six-S, and the Green Belt Movement all developed programs of activities that enhanced client group capacities and then scaled up the delivery of those programs to serve large populations of villages or groups. The package dissemination programs, by contrast, have created more narrowly defined interventions that can be applied to individuals: The Grameen Bank can make small loans to a village residents and Plan Puebla can improve the maize technology of a few subsistence farmers without affecting the rest of the village. For package-disseminating initiatives, a range of follow-up services may come after the package delivery, as in the various supplementary services provided by Grameen and Plan Puebla. For movement-building initiatives, the scaling-up impacts often depend on the actions of other actors, such as policy influence targets or campaign allies affected by the initiative’s work. Thus, Highlander provides technical assistance to union and civil rights movements, and SEWA campaigns with many other actors to reshape the policies of municipal governments and national policy-makers.

Hypothesis 8: Scaling up strategies vary across forms of social entrepreneurship:

- Capacity-building initiatives build on local concerns and assets to increase capacities for group self-help, and then scale up coverage to a wider range of clients;
- package dissemination initiatives scale-up coverage with service easily delivered by low-skill staff or affiliates to individuals or small groups; and
- movement-building initiatives expand and indirectly impact campaigns and alliances to influence the activities of targets or allies.

The second and third columns of Table Five briefly describe the social transformation leverage and impacts of these initiatives. Transformation leverage refers to different arenas of primary stakeholder experience that can be affected by socially entrepreneurial ventures. For some initiatives, the primary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCALING UP STRATEGY</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATION LEVERAGE</th>
<th>OVERALL IMPACT OF THE INITIATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **BRAC**            | • Develop programs for village development.  
                      • Expand coverage by expanding organization.  
                      CULTURAL Organize village capacity for action on development problems.  
                      ECONOMIC Establish micro-credit for business.  
                      REACH High  
                      TRANSFORMATION Economic—High  
                      Political—Low  
                      Cultural—High |
| **SIX-S**           | • Develop programs to prepare villages.  
                      • Expand coverage by building larger network of local partners.  
                      CULTURAL Build village capacity to manage own development projects.  
                      ECONOMIC Create jobs for young people in dry season; identify new resources.  
                      REACH High  
                      TRANSFORMATION Economic—Medium  
                      Political—Low  
                      Cultural—High |
| **GREEN BELT MOVEMENT** | • Develop program for skill building with village groups.  
                          • Expand coverage by training more villagers.  
                          CULTURAL Organize village for tree-planting and other local problem-solving.  
                          POLITICAL Build local organization for voice on key issues.  
                          REACH Medium  
                          TRANSFORMATION Economic—Low  
                          Political—Medium/Low  
                          Cultural—Medium |
| **GRAMEEN BANK**    | • Create and test micro-credit package.  
                      • Expand coverage via large organization.  
                      • Follow-up with support functions.  
                      ECONOMIC Provide capital for small business development.  
                      CULTURAL Support women in new economic and business roles.  
                      REACH High  
                      TRANSFORMATION Economic—High  
                      Political—Low  
                      Cultural—Medium |
| **PLAN PUEBLA**     | • Create new maize technology.  
                      • Expand coverage via government service.  
                      • Support functions as needed.  
                      ECONOMIC Increase farmer productivity.  
                      REACH Medium  
                      TRANSFORMATION Economic—High  
                      Political—Low  
                      Cultural—Low |
| **HIGHLANDER CENTER** | • Build grassroots education program on movement issues.  
                         • Expand by giving adult education services to larger movement actors.  
                         POLITICAL Empower local actors to exert political voice.  
                         CULTURAL Improve civic engagement; reduce racial violence and prejudice.  
                         REACH High  
                         TRANSFORMATION Economic—Low  
                         Political—High  
                         Cultural—High |
| **SEWA**            | • Mobilize members for policy influence campaigns.  
                      • Provide support services otherwise unavailable to members.  
                      POLITICAL Empower poor women for voice on harassment.  
                      ECONOMIC Improve business climate for self-employed women.  
                      CULTURAL Legitimate new roles and choices for poor women.  
                      REACH High  
                      TRANSFORMATION Economic—High/Medium  
                      Political—High  
                      Cultural—High |
arena of innovation impact is economic (e.g., the Grameen Bank provided heretofore unavailable working capital). In initiatives characterized by economic leverage, the first impacts of social transformation are likely to be visible in changing incomes and economic status of primary stakeholders. For other initiatives, the primary transformation leverage is in the political arena (e.g., SEWA mobilized street vendors to protect themselves from abuse by municipal police and bureaucrats). With initiatives that utilize political leverage, critical initial impacts may involve changes in policy formulation and implementation. For still other initiatives, the transformation leverage is primarily cultural (e.g., BRAC’s organization of women and landless people into groups acting effectively to solve local problems changed cultural norms, roles and expectations). Cultural change initiatives can reshape the awareness and efficacy of marginalized groups in ways that fundamentally alter their problem-solving efficacy and the quality of their lives.

The second column of Table Five identifies the initiatives’ original goals for generating social transformation and includes other foci that emerged as the initiatives evolved. The third column of Table Five assesses the initiatives’ overall impacts in terms of reach and transformative effects in the economic, political, and cultural arenas. The reach of the initiative refers to the number of people affected by its programs. “Low” reach indicates an impact on fewer than 10,000 people; “medium” indicates impact on between 10,000 and 1 million people; and “high” indicates impacts on more than 1 million people. Since these cases were included in this study based on their success, it is not surprising that most have reached more than 10,000 people and that many have reached more than 1 million.

In the second column of Table Five, activities with leverage for economic transformation are very common: Five of the seven initiatives made use of them, as might be expected for programs focused on poor and marginalized populations. Leverage from economic interventions is particularly characteristic of the package delivery initiatives. Packages that are relatively easily disseminated have been developed to improve individual economic results. Thus, the Grameen Bank focused initially on micro-lending that enhanced the viability and growth of micro-enterprises for millions of poor entrepreneurs. It also quite quickly developed additional services that fostered cultural change for its borrowers. Plan Puebla provided subsistence farmers with improved technology for maize growing and, in so doing, substantially improved their economic status. Activities with potential for economic transformation were used (though not primarily) across many initiatives: BRAC, SEWA, and Six-S all carried out programs focused on economic change in addition to their primary programs.

Leverage for political transformation was used less frequently, although political transformation was the primary focus for both of the movement-building initiatives. The Highlander Center, for example, focused on educational interventions designed to empower local actors struggling with powerful adversaries, such as mining corporations or white power structures. SEWA mobilized women in the informal sector to influence decision-makers in many contexts. Political transformation was more visible as a potential outcome for other initiatives: The Green Belt Movement emphasizes strengthened political voice as a possible outcome, but it is less visible as an interest of other initiatives.

Finally, activities that used leverage for cultural transformation were also common among many initiatives but were particularly characteristic of capacity-building initiatives. BRAC’s village capacity-building programs, for example, alter the abilities of marginalized groups (particularly poor women) to solve local problems and build sustainable livelihoods. Participation in these programs allows women to address

“Cultural change initiatives can reshape the awareness and efficacy of marginalized groups in ways that fundamentally alter their problem-solving efficacy and the quality of their lives.”
local issues while reshaping cultural assumptions about the roles and appropriate behaviors of women. Six-S builds village organizations and capacities to solve regional problems they identify and focuses particularly on problems that undermine the viability of village life during the dry season. Changes in village infrastructure parallel changes in residence patterns and increased senses of efficacy among those who no longer have to leave during the dry season. Similarly, the Green Belt Movement uses organizing for tree planting to provide a generalizable model for village organization and voice on local problems. Many capacity-building initiatives impact the economic and political arenas as well. But reshaping cultural assumptions and norms about how to take initiatives, use local assets, and solve local problems appears to be most characteristic of this form.

The third column of Table Five suggests that the overall impact of these initiatives tends to be closely associated with the types of transformation leverage emphasized in their initial activities and by their forms of innovation. Thus, the economic leverage of the package-based initiatives was reflected in high impacts in the economic realm. The capacity-building initiatives had high impacts on cultural transformation in two of the three cases, though the Green Belt Movement appeared to only medium impact in that arena. As expected from their primary leverage, movement-building initiatives had high impacts in the political sphere, but also had high impacts in the cultural arena. We may attribute this overlap to the fact that marginal groups’ political success would necessarily reflect changes in cultural norms and expectations associated with their previous passivity.

**Hypothesis 9:** Social transformation leverage and impacts vary across forms of social entrepreneurship:

- Capacity-building initiatives that alter local norms, roles, and expectations can transform the cultural contexts in which marginalized groups live;
- Package distribution initiatives that provide tools and resources to enhance individual productivity can transform economic circumstance; and
- Movement-building initiatives that increase the voice of marginalized groups can transform their political contexts and their ability to influence key decisions.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this research has been to identify common patterns across a small set of successful social entrepreneurship initiatives. The data suggests several patterns, which we have framed as preliminary hypotheses. Three general observations are important to further learning about social entrepreneurship and social transformation.

First, we recognized differences across the seven cases in the forms taken by the innovations. The characteristics of the three forms we identified—building local capacity, disseminating a package, and building a movement—are quite different. To our knowledge, these patterns have not been identified as clearly in other studies of social entrepreneurship. Identifying other forms and clarifying the differences among these three are important avenues for further exploration. The more we know about the range of forms that social entrepreneurship may take and the contexts within which such forms are effective, the more it will be possible to design initiatives to fit circumstances in the future.

These data already suggest that there are important correlates of the choice of innovation form. Capacity-building initiatives were associated with attention to local groups and resource providers, an emphasis on scaling-up by group organizing and cultural change leverage, and transformational impacts on cultural
norms and expectations. Package dissemination initiatives paid attention to user and disseminator stakeholders, emphasized scaling-up through packaged services to individuals that enabled their use of economic leverage, and had transformational impacts on economic outcomes. Movement-building initiatives emphasized external relations with allies and political targets, used indirect scaling-up strategies that affect large-scale actors, and used political leverage to have transformational impacts on both political and cultural contexts. Further research might clarify how these differences and other attributes of various forms of social entrepreneurship innovations can shape outcomes and successes in different contexts.

Second, the data also suggest that some factors are common across initiatives, regardless of innovation form. All of the initiatives sought to mobilize and build upon the assets of the poor constituencies they served. As a result, they were able to leverage relatively small investments in sustainable activity resourced in large part by poor and marginalized groups.

And third, capacities for bridging and adaptive leadership appeared to be present in most successful management teams across all three forms of innovation. Leaders must identify the key stakeholders that will both assist them and challenge them in creating the kind of transformational change they envision. They must develop strategies for overcoming challengers and strengthening allies—whether they lead capacity-building innovations, package delivery programs, or build larger movements.

All three innovation forms demonstrated the potential for reaching millions of people and catalyzing high levels of social transformation in at least one (and often more than one) of the cultural, economic, or political arenas. Four initiatives—BRAC, Grameen Bank, SEWA, and Highlander—were characterized by both high reach (millions of people) and high transformational impacts. In the first two cases, the initiatives created increasingly large and sophisticated NGOs as vehicles for expanding their impacts. In the third, SEWA created local, national, and eventually international alliances of membership organizations to mobilize women in the informal sector and respond to their concerns. In the fourth case, the Highlander Center remained small and organizationally unsophisticated, but it built close alliances with much larger and more organizationally complex movements that could use its support to affect major political and cultural changes. High reach and high transformational impact may be achieved through many organizational arrangements, depending on the issues and the roles to be played in expanding the initiative.

This exploration leaves many questions unanswered. We do not know, for example, when or how strategically timed financial support can make a pivotal difference to the emergence of a successful social innovation, though the importance of leadership-bridging capacity suggests that initiatives may benefit greatly from early access to financial, technical, and political support. We do not know what contextual patterns encourage or hinder the emergence of different kinds of innovations—although it is probably not accidental that our two movement-building initiatives emerged in India and the United States, where the dominant political traditions tolerate some degree of political challenges by relatively low power groups. We believe that these results suggest intriguing avenues for further exploration by social entrepreneurship practitioners and researchers. The intent of this analysis is to provoke further exploration of the emerging phenomenon of social entrepreneurship, which we believe can make a great difference in the next century of human and societal development.
REFERENCES AND BACKGROUND MATERIALS


WEBSITES:

BRAC: www.brac.net

Grameen Bank: www.grameen-info.org

Green Belt Movement: www.geocities.com/gbmovement

Highlander Center: www.hrec.org

SEWA: www.sewa.org
SARAH H. ALVORD is a Senior Program Officer at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where she also served as the primary research associate for the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship Project. She currently manages the Center’s largest grant and oversees domestic and international projects of several Center-based faculty as well as the Center’s Doctoral and Faculty Fellowship programs. Alvord has spent ten years working in the nonprofit and social service sectors, with specific background in both philanthropy and mental health. In addition, she is a board member of two local nonprofit organizations. She holds a MA in Counseling Psychology from Boston College.

L. DAVID BROWN is Lecturer in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he also serves as Director of International Programs at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations. Prior to coming to Harvard he was President of the Institute for Development Research, a nonprofit center for institutional research and consultation for development, and Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Boston University School of Management. His research and consulting interests have focused on organizational change and inter-organizational relations that foster social transformation and sustainable development. Brown’s publications include The Struggle for Accountability: NGOs, Social Movements and the World Bank, with Jonathan Fox (MIT Press, 1998); Managing Conflict at Organizational Interfaces (Addison-Wesley, 1983); and Learning from Changing: Organizational Diagnosis and Development, with Clayton Alderfer (Sage Publications, 1975). He has been a Fulbright Lecturer in India and a Peace Corps community organizer in Ethiopia.

CHRISTINE W. LETTS is Rita S. Hauser Lecturer in the Practice of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Leadership at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, where she also serves as Associate Director of the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations. She is the co-author of High Performance Nonprofit Organizations: Managing Upstream for Greater Impact, with William Ryan and Allen Grossman (John Wiley & Sons, 1999). After receiving her MBA from the Harvard Business School, Letts spent 12 years in manufacturing management at Cummins Engine Company in Columbus, Indiana, starting as a foreman and moving to Vice President of Cummins’s plant operations. Her final assignments with Cummins were as Vice President of Corporate Responsibility and as President of the Cummins Engine Foundation. She then spent four years in the Indiana State cabinet of Governor Evan Bayh, first as Commissioner of Transportation, and then as First Secretary of Family and Social Services. Letts’s current research includes the impact of donor behavior and funding models on nonprofit organizational capacity.