ONE OF US
SOCIAL IDENTITY, GROUP BELONGING
AND LEADERSHIP

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The title of this paper suggests a paradox. Leaders are simultaneously separate from and the same as their followers. They have higher status, greater influence, and more power, and occupy a different role, but they are also members of and identify with the same group as their followers. George W. Bush, as president, is certainly quite separate from most Americans, but he identifies himself as an American, and he spends a great deal of time making sure all Americans know this. However, if we take a fairly common type of definition of leadership as “a process of social influence through which an individual enlists and mobilizes the aid of others in the attainment of a collective goal” (Chemers, 2001, 376), then we can see that Bush is only really a leader to those who will follow—those who share his definition of American and therefore those who share his identity, group membership, and collective goal.

The example of American political leadership is particularly relevant to the theme of this article because of the post-November 2004 sense of a nation irreconcilably divided into two groups along ideological grounds—there are red states and blue states, and many believe the Republican leadership is leadership of red states not blue ones. The key point here is that leaders lead groups of people, and therefore the scope of effective leadership is bounded by the parameters of group membership and social identity: our leader shares our social identity and is “one of us.” A leader of one group can of course exercise power over people who do not share his or her group membership, but coercion and the exercise of power is not leadership (e.g., Chemers, 2001; Hogg, In Press A; Raven, 1993). Leadership is fundamentally a process of group influence.

Theories of leadership have always tended to focus their attention on the leader and what makes him or her special and different from other people: for example, theories of transformational leadership that place an emphasis on charismatic and visionary leaders (e.g., Avolio & Bass, 1987; Bass, 1985; Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002). Another focus is on interactions and relationships between the leader and individual followers or subordinates, for example, transactional leadership theories (e.g., Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978), which include leader-member exchange (LMX) theory (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997) and path-goal theory (e.g., House, 1971, 1996).

Other analyses of leadership have focused on followers’ or subordinates’ schemas of leadership and their perceptions of leaders, and how these may facilitate or hinder effective leadership: for example, implicit leadership theory (Hollander & Julian, 1969), leader categorization theory (e.g., Lord, Foti & DeVader, 1984; Lord & Maher, 1991; Lord, Brown, Harvey & Hall, 2001), role congruity theory (e.g., Eagly, 2003; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 1983), and expectation states and status characteristics theories (Berger, Fisek, Norman & Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Wagner & Zelditch, 1985; Ridgeway, 2003).

One thing missing or underemphasized in these analyses of leadership is an explicit focus on the role of group membership and shared identity in leadership effectiveness. The aim of this article is to redress this imbalance by describing a relatively recent theory of leadership that has emerged from the mainstream social psychology of self-conception, group processes, and intergroup relations—the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001a; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003).

Grounded in the social identity approach in social psychology (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; see Hogg, 2003, for a recent formulation), the social identity theory of leadership has, in a short time, energized a significant amount of new leadership research in social psychology that focuses on the role of group membership and social identity (see Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003a; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, de Cremer & Hogg, 2004). This social identity research represents part of a wider new interest that social psychologists seem to be taking in the study of leadership (e.g., Chemers, 1997, 2001; Eagly, Karau & Makhijani, 1995; Eagly, Makhijani & Klonsky, 1992; Hogg, In Press A; Lord & Brown,
2004; Lord, Brown & Harvey, 2001; Messick & Kramer, 2005; van Knippenberg & Hogg 2003b; van Knippenberg, et al., 2004)—a new interest informed by developments over the past 30 years within social psychology in our understanding of social cognition and group life.

After a brief introduction to the social identity approach, the body of the paper is a description of the social identity theory of leadership. To bring the research base for this theory to life, I describe some key and recent studies, focusing primarily on those that my colleagues and I have done. The paper closes with a brief summary and an outline of ways in which social identity based leadership may, under certain circumstances, be hierarchical, autocratic and unprincipled. I have tried to write this paper in a style that is relatively accessible to social science scholars outside the discipline of experimental social psychology; however some specialist language is necessary (for example the concepts of salience and prototype).

THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH

The social identity approach, or social identity theory, was first developed at Bristol University in the United Kingdom by Henri Tajfel and John Turner and their colleagues (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; see Hogg & Abrams, 1988), and has subsequently been extended, modified and fine-tuned; for most recent formulations and coverage, see Hogg (2003, In Press B, In Press C). Here I only introduce key features, and those that are most relevant to the social identity theory of leadership.

Social identity theory is a social psychological analysis of the behavior of people in groups—what happens within groups and what happens between groups. It is a general theory that applies to the entire range of groups from small, interactive task-oriented groups such as work teams, to large-scale social categories such as ethnic groups. The fundamental tenet is that the groups we are in define a crucial aspect of who we are, our collective self-concept, our social identity. The interaction of social-cognitive (e.g., social categorization), motivational (e.g., self-enhancement), social-interactive (e.g., social influence), and macro-social (e.g., intergroup beliefs) processes associated with the construction, expression, and management of social identity generate behaviors that are characteristic of groups and people in groups: for example, conformity and normative behavior, ethnocentrism and ingroup favoritism, outgroup stereotyping and discrimination, ingroup cohesion and solidarity, and so forth.

People cognitively represent social groups in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a “fuzzy set” of attributes, such as people’s attitudes and behaviors, which defines and evaluates one category and distinguishes it from other categories. If I say the word British to you, what comes immediately to mind is a prototype. Prototypes capture similarities within a group as well as differences between that group and other groups; they make groups appear like coherent and clearly distinct entities. In technical language, prototypes maximize meta-contrast and enhance entitativity. Because prototypes of social groups are influenced by comparisons between groups, they can change, depending on which groups are being compared. For example, your prototype of Britons is slightly different if you are in a context where the comparison is with French or with Germans.

When we categorize a person as belonging to a particular group, one that we ourselves belong to (an ingroup) or one that we do not belong to (an outgroup), we assign to that person, to varying degrees, all the attributes of our prototype of the group, and thus view them through the lens of the prototype. This is a process of depersonalization in which, rather than viewing someone as an idiosyncratic individual
(with whom we may or may not have a close personal relationship) we view them as more or less prototypical members of an ingroup or an outgroup. We assign that person a group membership, social identity, and all the attributes associated with the identity. Because group prototypes are tied to specific intergroup relations, people in one group tend to have shared prototypes of their own and other groups. Thus, prototype-based depersonalization underpins the more commonplace but more restricted perceptual term, *stereotyping*.

One of the key insights of the social identity approach is that just as we categorize other people we categorize ourselves, and self-categorization has the same effects as categorizing others: we assume a social identity and depersonalize ourselves (our attitudes, feelings and behavior conform to our ingroup prototype). Since our perceptions and evaluations of other people are almost always comparative, and generally speaking we are concerned to locate ourselves and understand who we are with respect to others, social categorization processes almost always involve self, directly or indirectly. Thus self-categorization is intricately intertwined with social categorization in general, and together they govern how we think, feel, and behave as members of a specific group.

Since the groups we belong to furnish us with a social identity that defines and evaluates who we are, we struggle to promote and protect the distinctiveness and evaluative positivity of our own group relative to other groups, thus protecting or promoting a favorable self-evaluation. The way in which this struggle for positive distinctiveness and positive social identity is played out is guided by our understanding of the nature of the relations between our own and other groups, and what strategies and behaviors seem possible. Social identity processes are not motivated only by self-evaluative concerns, but also by a basic human concern to reduce uncertainty about ourselves, the world we live in, and our relations and interactions with others; distinctive, high entitativity groups with clearly prescriptive and consensual prototypes are particularly good at reducing self and self-related feelings of uncertainty.

The social identity effects described above occur only when a specific social categorization of self and others becomes psychologically real, when it becomes the subjectively *salient* basis for how we conceptualize and view ourselves and others in that context. Categories become salient, in this sense, if they readily, frequently, and spontaneously come to mind (they are *chronically accessible* in memory because we use them often and they are important to who we are), if they are perceptually obvious to us (they are *situationally accessible* to our cognitive-perceptual system), if they make good sense of people’s behavior and of similarities and differences among people (there is good *normative* and *comparative* fit), and if they reduce uncertainty and reflect relatively positively on self. Overall, people identify with some groups more strongly than others, and thus these group memberships produce social identity effects more readily, more often and more strongly.

Two additional aspects of social identity theory that are particularly relevant for the theory of leadership described below are its analyses of interindividual liking and of social influence in group contexts. When group membership is psychologically salient, as described above, liking is regulated by prototypicality: we tend to like fellow members who are more prototypical more than those who are less prototypical, a process called *social attraction* (Hogg, 1993). Because prototypes are shared, this process tends to make prototypical members popular; i.e., they are consensually liked by other group members. Social influence in salient groups is also governed by prototypicality (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner & Oakes, 1989). We conform to the prototype, which is our cognitive representation of the group norm, and pay attention to and are more influenced by information that is most informative about the prototype, typically the behavior of highly prototypical members.
Social identity theory has become well established in social psychology and enjoys substantial empirical support; in addition to the references above, for recent empirical reviews see Abrams & Hogg (2001); Abrams, Hogg, Hinkle & Otten (2005); Hogg (2001b); Hogg & Abrams (2003); and Hogg, Abrams, Otten & Hinkle (2004).

The Social Identity Theory of Leadership

The social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001a; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003a; also see van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer & Hogg, 2004) is based on these social identity processes, and focuses on leadership as a process that occurs within groups that people identify more or less strongly with. The key point is that as people identify more strongly with a group, they increasingly base their evaluations, perceptions of, and feelings for fellow group members on how prototypical those members are. In high-salience groups, prototypical members are more influential and find it easier to be effective leaders, and leaders are more effective if they are prototypical and play up their prototypicality credentials. In low-salience groups that people do not identify so strongly with, leadership is less affected by social identity processes and relatively more affected by other influences on leadership. There are many factors that affect how strongly people identify with the groups they belong to. For example, identification is stronger with groups that are central to overall self-definition, groups that saturate one’s day-to-day life, and groups that in a particular context experience a real or anticipated threat to their status and prestige or to their very existence as a distinct entity. Identification is also stronger if people cannot (psychologically or in reality) leave the group, and if people have few other, or few other favorable, social identities. Identification may also be stronger if people feel very uncertain about themselves, their future, their place in the world, and the circumstances that surround their lives. Under these circumstances, in extreme cases, they may identify with very distinctive and homogeneous groups that have orthodox belief systems and hierarchical internal structures (e.g., Hogg, 2000, In Press D)—a point we take up at the end of this article.

Influence, Popularity and Compliance

Group members who are highly prototypical, by definition embody central and desirable aspects of the group more than do other members. As such, their behavior is the standard for other members’ behavior: other members appear to conform to prototypical members’ behavior, and thus prototypical members appear to be the source, rather than target, of influence over the group. Prototypical members appear to influence the rest of the group more than they themselves are influenced by the group.

As we saw above, prototypical members are also consensually liked by the rest of the group—they are socially liked, popular in group terms (Hogg, 1993). Consensual liking has at least two effects. The first is that prototypical members are more able than marginal members to get others to comply with their initiatives (suggestions, ideas, and so forth), because people tend to comply more with suggestions from people they like (e.g., Berscheid & Reis, 1998). The second effect of consensual liking is that it maps out or reinforces a perceived status differentiation within the group, in which the leader has higher status than the rest of the group, further rendering highly prototypical members/leaders more influential (cf. Ridgeway, 2003).

Trust and Innovation

Trust plays a key role in leadership: witness current concerns about corporate corruption and distrust of our business and government leaders (e.g., Boyle & Tkaczyk, 2004; Kellerman, 2004). Leaders are expected to be innovative in coming up with creative new ideas that will benefit and transform the group.
Clearly, if we are to follow our leaders we need to be able to trust them not only to be making wise decisions, but also to be acting in the best interest of the group—not in their own selfish best interest.

Social identity processes are very effective at building trust (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Hogg, In Press E). In general we trust ingroup members more than outgroup members (e.g., Macy & Skvoretz, 1998; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), and within the ingroup prototypical members are trusted more than less prototypical members (e.g., Hogg, In Press C; Tyler, 1997). Prototypical members are trusted more because they are assumed to be unlikely to harm the group, as their identity is tightly meshed with the life of the group. They have a greater investment in the group and thus are more likely to behave in group-serving ways. They embody group norms more precisely; they are more likely to favor the ingroup over outgroups, to treat ingroup members fairly, and generally to act in ways that promote the ingroup. These behaviors confirm their prototypicality and membership credentials and cause group members to trust them to be acting in the best interest of the group, even when it may not appear that they are doing so—they are furnished with legitimacy (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; see Platow, Reid & Andrew, 1998). It is assumed that whatever prototypical members do, however bizarre, must be in the best interest of the group.

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Elevated trust in prototypical members produces the paradox that prototypical members, who best embody the essence of the group, are also allowed the greatest latitude to diverge from group norms, and thus to be innovative (e.g., Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). Less prototypical members need to work hard to gain the group’s trust—they need to conform tightly to group norms in order to demonstrate their membership credentials and their loyalty to the group. Because innovation, a benchmark of effective leadership, is less tolerated, marginal members find it difficult to lead.

This analysis of prototypicality, trust, and innovation builds on and extends Hollander’s (1958) earlier notion that leaders who conform to group norms on the way up earn idiosyncrasy credits that can be spent when they reach the top.

The Social Construction of Charisma

In salient groups, people scrutinize prototypical ingroup members’ behavior closely because it is perhaps the most reliable and effective source of information about what the group stands for and how to behave as a group member. The group’s attention is drawn to prototypical members, who seem to stand out against the background of the rest of the group. Because prototypical members stand out in this way, their qualities (i.e., being influential, popular, high status, innovative, and trustworthy) are more likely to be attributed by the group to underlying dispositions that reflect invariant properties, or essences, of the individual’s personality, than to external situational or contextual factors. This reflects a basic social-perceptual bias, variously called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), correspondence bias (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995), or essentialism (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 1998), which is more pronounced for target individuals who are perceptually distinctive (e.g., figural against a background) or cognitively salient (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978). There is evidence that this tendency to make dispositional attributions is especially strong for attributions about leaders (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich, 1985).

In this way, a charismatic leadership personality is constructed for highly prototypical leaders, further fuelling their leadership effectiveness. From a social identity perspective, charisma certainly facilitates leadership—which is consistent with transformational leadership research that places an emphasis on
the role of charisma (e.g., Avolio & Bass, 1987; Bass, 1985). However, whereas the latter literature treats charisma as a relatively enduring personality constellation that people bring to leadership situations (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1998; House, Spangler & Woycke, 1991; Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002), the social identity perspective focuses on charisma as an emergent property of leadership situations, not as something that people bring with them (e.g., Haslam & Platow, 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001).

Managing Prototypicality

Because prototypicality is critical for effective leadership in high-salience groups, leaders of such groups pay close attention to how prototypical they are perceived to be. Prototypical leaders are invested with charisma, status, and so forth; they have considerable resources to maintain their position of leadership, and they are very effective prototype managers. They engage in prototypicality management strategies that rest on communication (Reid & Ng, 2000), or what can be called “norm talk” (Hogg & Tindale, 2005). Language and communication play a key role in prototype and identity management (e.g., Fiol, 2002; Gardner, Paulsen, Gallois, Callan & Monaghan, 2001). Indeed, one of the key attributes of an effective leader is precisely this visionary and transformational activity: a leader is able to change what the group sees itself as being and can be considered an “entrepreneur of identity” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2003). More specifically, prototypical leaders can talk up their own prototypicality and/or talk down aspects of their own behavior that are non-prototypical. They can identify deviants or marginal members to highlight their own prototypicality or to construct a particular prototype for the group that enhances their own prototypicality. They can secure their own leadership position by vilifying contenders for leadership and casting the latter as non-prototypical. They can identify as relevant comparison outgroups those outgroups that are most favorable to their own prototypicality: that is, they can manipulate the social comparative context and thus the prototype and their own prototypicality. They can engage in a discourse that raises or lowers salience: if you are highly prototypical, then raising salience will provide you with the leadership benefits of high prototypicality; if you are not very prototypical, then lowering salience will protect you from the leadership disadvantages of not being very prototypical.

Research suggests that all these processes are used by leaders to manage their prototypicality (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 1996, 2001, 2003). Generally, leaders who feel they are not, or are no longer, prototypical, strategically engage in a range of group-oriented behaviors to strengthen their membership credentials (e.g., Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001).

SOME RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY OF LEADERSHIP

Research directly on or relevant to the social identity theory of leadership is overviewed in a number of places (Hogg, 2001a; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003a; also see Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, de Cremer & Hogg, 2004). In this section I describe in more detail some examples of key and recent studies, mainly from my own lab.

A First Study

The first direct test of the social identity theory of leadership was a laboratory experiment by Hains, Hogg & Duck (1997). It tested the most basic and fundamental idea that as group membership becomes increasing salient and people identify more strongly with the group, evaluations of leadership effectiveness are increasingly influenced by how prototypical of the group the leader is perceived to be. We used a standard social identity research paradigm, the minimal group paradigm, in which participants are
assigned to a group by a relatively minimal criterion but do not know who else is in their group and do not actually interact with fellow members—the group is only minimally a group.

Student participants \((N = 184)\) anticipated joining a small discussion group ostensibly formed on the basis of attitude similarity among members. The psychological salience of the group (high versus low) was manipulated by always referring in instructions and explanations to groups, or to loose aggregates, of individuals, by having participants consider commonalities within the group, or differences among members, and by referring to themselves in group terms or only in individual terms. Participants were also informed that a group leader for the discussion had been randomly appointed from among the members. Information was given that revealed the leader to be either group prototypical or non-prototypical (group prototypicality) in terms of the attitude dimension on which the group was formed, and to have a behavioral style (on the basis of a pretest) that was either congruent or incongruent with a very general schema of effective leadership (leader schema congruence). Thus the experiment manipulated three independent variables (salience, prototypicality, schema congruence) in a 2x2x2 design.

In anticipation of embarking on the interactive group discussion phase of the study, participants were asked a number of questions about how they felt about their group and about their leader. These constituted our dependent measures. Of most relevance here were an 11-item scale \((\alpha = .87)\) measuring group identification (e.g., “how much do you feel you identify with your group”), and a 10-item scale \((\alpha = .88)\) measuring anticipated leader effectiveness (e.g., “how effective do you feel your leader will be”); all items measured on 9-point scales: 1 not very much, 9 very much.

**FIGURE 1** Hains, Hogg & Duck (1997): Leader effectiveness (1-9 scale, 10-items, \(\alpha = .88\)) as a function of group salience, and group prototypicality of the leader \((p < .001)\).
As intended, when group membership was salient, people identified more strongly with the group. As predicted, high-salience participants felt a prototypical leader would be much more effective than a non-prototypical leader; whereas low-salience participants did not differentiate between prototypical and non-prototypical leaders (Figure 1). Although leader schema congruent leaders were perceived overall to be more effective than schema incongruent leaders, this effect disappeared among high salience participants on one leadership effectiveness item measuring the extent to which the leader was anticipated to exhibit leadership behavior (Figure 2). Although social attraction was not explicitly tested, the 10-item leadership effectiveness scale contained an item measuring liking for the leader. Thus, as predicted, perceived leadership effectiveness was associated with group-membership-based liking for the leader.

Some Replications and Extensions

Hains, et al.’s study is a well-controlled laboratory experiment in which causal questions are unambiguously addressed. However it suffers from being abstract, unrealistic, and divorced from the usual contexts of leadership and leadership research. It seemed important to replicate the study in a naturalistic setting: this is what Fielding & Hogg (1997) did. They conducted a naturalistic field study of leadership in small interactive “Outward Bound” groups where real leaders emerged to lead real groups in demanding wilderness and outdoor experiences.

There were 13 mixed-sex groups of young adults, mainly in their 20s, from around Australia (N = 143). Each group had approximately 11 members and stayed together for three weeks. Hains, et al.’s laboratory experiment was replicated closely, but in a measurement-based regression format. Leadership schemas, group identification, and leadership effectiveness perceptions were measured a week to 10 days apart. We were also able to measure social attraction directly. As predicted, (a) as the group became more cohesive over time, members identified more strongly, developed stronger social attraction for their leader, and rated him or her as a more effective leader; (b) more socially attractive and more prototypical leaders were considered to be more effective than less socially attractive and less prototypical leaders, and
“More socially attractive and more prototypical leaders were considered to be more effective than less socially attractive and less prototypical leaders.”

this effect was amplified among high identifying participants; and (c) leaders who were considered to match general leader schemas were considered to be more effective than those who did not, but this was not affected by identification.

Another replication is a study by Platow & van Knippenberg (2001). They conducted a measurement-based study \( (N = 216) \) in which multi-item scales were used to measure identification, leader prototypicality, and leader schema congruence. Leader endorsement was measured as participants’ willingness to vote for the leader to remain as leader. A regression analysis replicated Hains, et al.’s (1997) findings. Leader prototypicality was more strongly related to leadership endorsement as members identified more strongly with the group, whereas the relationship between leader schema congruence and leader endorsement became weaker as members identified more strongly with the group.

Finally, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg & van Dijk (2000) conducted an experiment in which they manipulated whether a group was faced by an ambiguous decision-making task; and thus in need of leadership, or by a clear-cut decision task where the decision was self-evident and leadership less necessary. In both conditions there was a salient comparative outgroup, so it can be assumed that social identity was relatively highly salient. As predicted from the social identity theory of leadership, when the decision task was ambiguous prototypical members were more likely to take the lead and non-prototypical members were less likely to take the lead than when the task was unambiguous.

Allowing Members to Determine Their Leader’s Prototypicality

Hogg, Hains & Mason (1998) conducted two rather complex minimal-group laboratory experiments \( (N = 82 \text{ and } 164) \) based on Hains, et al.’s methodology. The key feature of these studies was that rather than simply telling participants how prototypical their leader was, participants were left to make their own prototypicality inferences based on a manipulation of who the leader was being compared with. Perceptions or evaluations of whether someone is prototypical or a leader are actually perceptions of how prototypical or how much of a leader someone is relative to other people. Across these two studies we found that leadership schema congruence became a less influential, and group prototypicality a more influential determinant of leadership endorsement in more cohesive groups with which people identified more strongly.

Demographic Attributes and Local Group Norms

Another way that group members make prototypicality judgments about their leader is via demographic stereotypes; for example a leader’s demographic group membership (his or her gender, race, ethnicity, and so forth) generates stereotypic expectations among members that affect perceptions of how well the leader matches the local group norm or prototype. This idea was used by Hogg, Fielding, Johnson, Masser, Russell & Svensson (2005) who conducted a minimal-group-style experiment \( (N = 257) \) building on that of Hains, et al. (1997).

Participants anticipated taking part in a small interactive discussion group, under conditions in which the group and their membership of it was made highly salient, or salience was played down. Participants were given information about their group that described it as having a norm that captured either instrumental or expressive behaviors, and they were given information that their leader was either male or female. In this way we could manipulate whether the leader’s demographic attributes (male vs. female)
were stereotypically congruent with the group norm (i.e., how prototypical of the group the leader was): for participants with traditional sex-role attitudes, males were congruent with an instrumental norm and females with an expressive norm, and the opposite for participants with less traditional sex-role attitudes.

This left us with a design in which we could examine the effects of membership salience and leader-norm congruence on measures of leadership effectiveness. Our key measure was a 16-item composite leadership effectiveness scale ($\alpha = .80$) comprising measures of perceived leader effectiveness and group performance under the leader’s guidance (all measured on 9-point scales). As predicted we found that high-salience participants found leaders who matched the group norm (i.e., prototypical leaders) to be more effective than leaders who did not, whereas low-salience participants did not show this preference (Figure 3). Salience markedly improved the perceived leadership effectiveness of prototypical leaders.

**FIGURE 3** Hogg, Fielding, Johnson, Masser, Russell & Svensson (2005): Leadership effectiveness (1–9 scale, 16 items) as a function of group salience, and leader norm congruence of the leader ($p = .012$).

Duck & Fielding (1999) conducted two laboratory experiments that simulated equal status subgroups nested within a larger organization ($N = 328$). They measured strength of subgroup identification and evaluations of leaders who were randomly appointed from the participants’ own or the other subgroup. Ingroup, i.e., prototypical, leaders were more strongly endorsed than outgroup, i.e., non-prototypical, leaders, and this effect was more pronounced among participants who identified strongly with their own subgroup.
Van Vugt & de Cremer (1999) conducted an experiment on leadership preferences in social dilemmas ($N = 96$). Social dilemmas are situations in which personal short-term benefits conflict with collective long-term benefits for the group. Social dilemmas are very difficult to resolve, often requiring the appointment of a leader to manage the behavior of group members so that they conserve rather than compete over a shared resource. Van Vugt & de Cremer experimentally manipulated how strongly members identified with their group by setting up or not setting up a salient intergroup comparison. They then assessed preferences for different types of leaders, including an ingroup versus an outgroup leader. Consistent with the social identity theory of leadership, they found that participants generally preferred ingroup (i.e., prototypical) over outgroup (i.e., non-prototypical) leaders, and that this preference was more pronounced among high than low identifiers. Van Vugt & de Cremer also found that members preferred elected over appointed leaders and argued that the latter can be considered more prototypical of the group than the former (also see, Haslam, McGarty, Brown, Eggins, Morrison & Reynolds, 1998).

**Leader-Member Relations**

Leader-member exchange (LMX) theory argues that effective leaders need to differentiate among members and develop high-quality personalized relations with as many members as possible (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). The social identity theory of leadership suggests a qualification. Where members identify strongly with a salient and cohesive group, personalized leader-member relations may be viewed as fragmenting the group and undermining group solidarity and members’ sense of shared identity. Instead, members may prefer to have their commonalities as group members reflected in more depersonalized leader-member relations that treat all members relatively alike in terms of their prototypicality.

This idea has recently been tested by Hogg, Martin, Epitropaki, Mankad, Svensson & Weeden (In Press). We conducted two questionnaire studies, in organizational contexts in Wales ($N = 439$) and in India ($N = 128$), in which participants indicated, on multi-item scales, how effective their work group leaders were, how much they themselves identified with their work group or found it to be salient, and the extent to which their leader related to them as unique individuals (personalized style) or as relatively interchangeable members of their group (depersonalized style).

**Figure 4** Hogg, Fielding, Johnson, Masser, Russell & Svensson (2005): Leadership effectiveness (1-9 scale, 16 items) as a function of group salience, and leader norm congruence of the leader ($p = .012$).
Regression analyses supported our predictions. In the Welsh study we found that the general perception that personalized leadership was more effective than depersonalized leadership was significantly weakened among participants who believed their work groups were highly salient (Figure 4). In the Indian study participants who did not identify very strongly with their work group (low identifiers) did not find personalized leadership to be more effective than depersonalized leadership, and high identifiers actually reported significantly greater leadership effectiveness for depersonalized over personalized leadership (Figure 5).

**SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND AN IMPLICATION**

In this paper I have described the basic principles of the recently developed social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). Predicated on the assumption that leadership is a group process where some members are able to influence others to internalize and act on new norms representing what the group believes, feels, and does, the key insight is that leadership is influenced by different social-cognitive and social interactive processes in salient groups that members identify strongly with, as opposed to less salient groups that members identify less strongly with.

Specifically, in salient groups the extent to which the leader is seen to be prototypical of the group assumes cardinal importance. Prototypical leaders are able to be influential and innovative because of a number of social identity processes that operate in high salience groups. Because they best represent the group’s attributes, prototypical leaders are more of a source than target of conformity and social influence processes. They are relatively consensually liked by the rest of the group—they appear popular in group terms, thus have higher status than the rest of the group, and are therefore able to gain compliance with their initiatives. Because they are central members they are perceived to be closely tied to the group, to be very much “one of us;” thus their membership credentials are not called into question and they are trusted to be acting in the best interest of the group as a whole. This trust frees them from slavish con-
formity and permits them latitude to be innovative and transformational. Finally, precisely because they are most informative about what is and what is not prototypical of the group, prototypical leaders are the focus of members’ attention: they are perceptually and cognitively salient. This strengthens inferential processes that cause members to attribute the leader’s attributes (being influential, popular, trusted, and innovative, having high status, and so forth) internally to the leader’s enduring dispositions, thus constructing a relatively charismatic leadership personality for the leader.

The social identity theory of leadership differs from most other leadership theories in placing group members’ collective self-conception, their social identity, and associated social-cognitive and social-interactive processes, center stage. The processes and dynamics associated with effective leadership change as members identify more strongly with their group. The social identity theory of leadership has attracted substantial attention in recent years and has played a part in a new interest in leadership research taken by mainstream social psychologists. It has also attracted fairly robust empirical support for many key features (see Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003a; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, de Cremer & Hogg, 2004). In this paper I focused on only a handful of studies, mainly from my own lab, and mainly for illustrative purposes.

Prototype-based leadership in high salience groups has all the attributes of effective leadership – prototypical leaders are able to be influential, innovative, and transformational because their followers like them, afford them high status, trust them, and view them as relatively charismatic. However, there is a dark side to prototype-based leadership that remains to be fully explored empirically. A core motivation for social-identity processes is reduction of feelings of uncertainty, particularly uncertainty about and related to self (Hogg, 2000). To varying degrees people find self-conceptual, and self-related uncertainty aversive, so they try to reduce or avoid it. Social identity reduces uncertainty because it defines self and prescribes perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors, and it clearly circumscribes one’s place in relation to other people.

One implication of this idea is that if uncertainty or fear of uncertainty is particularly acute or chronic, people will strive to belong to groups that have very clear and prescriptive prototypes, groups that are relatively homogeneous and distinct entities with clear boundaries and a sense of common fate and that possess orthodox and ideological belief systems (Hogg, 2004, In Press D). These groups are also likely to be clearly structured internally in terms of roles.

These attributes, in conjunction with the fact that members also identify very strongly with such groups, may generate conditions that are, paradoxically, conducive to hierarchical and relatively autocratic leadership arrangements (Hogg, 2001c; Hogg & Reid, 2001)—the sort of leadership we might associate with extremist groups such as cults, or orthodox religious or political ideological groups. Under these circumstances leaders have substantial power and are somewhat isolated from and out of touch with the group as a whole. They may lose touch not only with what is and what is not best for the group, but also may confuse self-interest with group interest, having few constraints to help them make moral decisions (Hogg, In Press F).

Note

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