MARXISTS IN THE NIGERIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE FAILURE OF IDEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science on 16 January 1967 in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

This thesis is concerned with ideological prediction and verification. Prediction is taken to mean, the derivation of a set of propositions about the future from an implicit or explicit set of assumptions. Verification is taken to mean the matching of the prediction to events. It is suggested that political development varies with social learning which in turn depends upon prediction and verification. A fruitful approach to the study of political development, therefore, may lie in studying how political actors predict the future and verify their predictions.

A case study of these processes became possible when Marxists in the Nigerian labour movement, colloquially known as the "Youths," launched a labour party after the general strike of June 1964, and tried to contest in the Federal election of December 1964. The strike was an event from which Marxists made inferences about the nature of Nigerian politics, and from which they imputed motives to the strikers. The launching of the labour party was an attempt to act on the predictions derived from the strike. The performance of the labour party in the Federal elections, and the Youths' explanation for it constituted the verification of the predictions.

The case study showed that although the Youths correctly assessed the workers' motive for striking, they falsely predicted the workers' commitment to a labour party. The Youths made wrong predictions because their conceptual system was overly simple and because they were receiving invalid information from the workers. The conceptual system falsely assumed a one-to-one relationship between motives and actions, while information failed to reflect the fact that workers were cross-pressured and willing to support rival parties.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political Learning and Political Development

Implicit in a theory of political development, as opposed to a theory of social change in general, is the understanding that development means change with respect to a goal. One can say development takes place, if changes facilitate approach to the goal. One can speak of the failure to develop, if changes are taking place, yet the goal is not approached. A goal can be approached in either of two ways; by a random process, or by a process of learning, that is, of trial-error-adjustment-trial.¹

Let us not concern ourselves here with random processes and the attainment of goals by unintended consequences. Rather, let us consider the processes of learning and in particular, political learning.

Political learning can be divided into three sub-processes: prediction, action, and verification. By prediction, I mean the derivation of a set of propositions

¹This perspective on political development is similar to that of Karl Deutch. See his The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 254-255. It should be noted that we are using the terms "goal" and "development" in terms of the actor and not of the observer. What may be "development" for the actor may be retrogression for the observer, and conversely.
about the future from an implicit or explicit set of assumptions. If the assumptions are explicit, I shall call the prediction "ideological," keeping in mind that by ideology is meant something akin to political theory. By action in this context, I mean goal oriented behavior, and by verification, I mean the matching of the prediction to events taking place in the real world. If the matching is close, one can speak of having verified the prediction and attained the goal. When the matching is not close, that is, when predictions fail, then verification is most important and determines whether social learning has taken place.

When predictions fail, politicians are challenged to account for the failure and perhaps review certain postulates or axioms of their ideology. Following this review, social learning and therefore, in part, political development have taken place if, in the subsequent attempt at prediction and action, these processes have more closely approximated the stated goals of development.\(^1\) But these considerations still beg the following question: If development is dependent on social learning which, in turn, is dependent on prediction and verification, what are prediction and verification dependent upon? In order to deal with this question, we need to study some concrete cases of political prediction and verification. This thesis concerns itself with one such case.

\(^1\)Assuming, of course, that other non-ideological factors have remained unchanged.
The Case Study

On August 15, 1964, two months after a general strike and four and one-half months before a federal election, a group of Marxists in the Nigerian labour movement, colloquially called the "Youths," launched the "Nigerian Labour Party." Having waited for a demonstration of labour unrest for over fourteen years, the Youths found great significance in the strike and in the fact that it closely preceded the election. In the strike they saw the end of their long and painful powerlessness; and in the election, the opportunity to begin recouping the political losses of fourteen years.

Their plan was to support a number of candidates across the nation, and especially Michael Imoudu, president of the Nigerian Labour Party, in his bid for election from the Lagos North constituency. Because they were a new party and poor, the Youths did not expect to win national power. However, being Marxists, the Youths had faith in the future of their cause. If they could win in Lagos, they said, they would ultimately win in the country, because, writ small, Lagos was the Nigeria of the future. It so happened that, in the Federal elections, the Nigerian Labour Party failed, leaving the Youths to account for a false prediction.

1At one time, the Youths had been of some importance in the early nationalist movement, but with the eclipse of the Zikists, the Youths became irrelevant to Nigerian politics from the early nineteen fifties until the general strike of 1964. (See Chapter II below.)
The elements of the case study relate to the larger problem in the following manner: the Youths, as political theorists, apply Marxism, their ideology, to the events of the strike, in order to make predictions about the outcome of the coming elections. The launching of a labour party, together with the explanation the Youths give after the election, is their way of acting and verifying their ideology. The timing of the strike, so close before the Federal election, provides an excellent opportunity to study the process of ideological prediction and verification in a developing country.

In this study of the Youths, I am concerned with why the Youths failed to predict the fate of their party more accurately and how they rationalized their failure after the election. If their predictions were wrong simply because they had a bad theory, one could dismiss them as another crank group, like those predicting the end of the world. At best, one could study them as a special case in the history of Marxism. But predictions are true or false, not only as a function of whether theories are good or bad, but also according to how the theories are applied to the real world. This, in turn, depends on the information the theorists have and their skill in matching their theories to what they perceive.

For example, let us consider the possibility that the Youths predicted inaccurately because they were getting
false information about the nature of their support. If only the Youths receive such false information about Nigerian politics, then, once more, they could be dismissed as of only marginal interest. If, however, the misinformation the Youths received from their supporters is symptomatic of defects in information linking other actors to the polity, this would be a fact of considerable importance about Nigeria. Although we mention this point in passing only, it is possible that, given the present stage of Nigerian development, no politician gets accurate information about the Nigerian polity.

This possibility raises some questions for scholars interested in the theory of political development. If politicians lack reliable information, they can neither bargain nor plan. Ignorant of their support, they cannot know with what resources they confront their adversaries. Without valid information, politicians can build neither the "good" nor the "bad" society and politics is left to the forces of unintended consequences.

In so generalizing about the difficulties of the Youths in predicting the fate of the Labour Party, I raise what may be a fundamental theoretical problem about the application of beliefs or ideology to politics: the problem of ideological prediction and verification. Having briefly

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1For a brief but lucid review of such theories, see Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 31-49.
introduced the problems and the case study with which this thesis will be concerned, I turn to a discussion of ideology and in particular, to aspects of ideological prediction and verification.

**Ideology**

For students of this or that "ism," an ideology is a static entity, but in real life, this is not so. In reality, what happens is not ideology, but "ideologizing," a process, a way of applying theories to politics. More precisely, as will be shown below, it is a way of applying theories to information about politics. In these pages, I shall say something about this process and the men involved in it, using examples, not only from politics, but from science and the scientific method as well.

As a starting point, an ideology, like all belief systems, combines a cognitive model of reality with statements of value and feeling. Let us begin our discussion of the application of ideology to politics with the cognitive model. A useful way of discussing the application of this model to politics is in terms of the familiar "transmitter-channel-receiver" paradigm.¹ Thus, after the

¹See C. Osgood, P. Tannenbaum, and G. Suci, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1957), chapter 7. We adopt this terminology to emphasize the interactive nature of the cognitive process. Briefly, we see it as a transmitter sending information through a channel to a receiver. If the receiver is hooked to the channel and the information is perceived, it is then available for conceptual and especially ideological "decoding" or pigeon-holing.
general strike of June, 1964, the Youths made a series of predictions about the future behavior of the workers. In particular, they predicted that the workers would support Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party in the December Federal elections. In terms of my scheme, the workers (transmitters) sent information through various channels (mass meetings, riots) to the Youths (receivers). The Youths perceived this information, conceptualized it in ideological terms, and derived predictions. Since I am interested in why the Youths failed in their predictions, let us consider somewhat more closely: (1) the process of information transmission, and (2) perception and conceptualization.

Transmission of Information to the Receiver

If it is true that a prediction about the course of events depends on one's perception of such events, and that perception depends on the information one has, it follows then, that a source of invalid predictions may be the invalidity of the information one is receiving. Assuming

1Although a rather obvious point, it should be noted that perception is viewed here as varying with information, not with "real" events. A general makes his plans on the basis, not of what is happening in battle, but of what he thinks is happening. The latter depends upon the information he gets about the battle. If it is false or otherwise inadequate, there is a good chance that he will make wrong inferences about the course of the battle. Similarly, the Youths made inferences, not on the basis of what was happening in the workers' minds, but on the basis of what they thought was happening, and this was a function of the information they were getting about the workers.
that the channel through which information flows is clear, a transmitter can send false information to a receiver in at least two ways. First, he can lie or deceive him. Secondly, he can transmit unreliable, inconsistent, and unstable information without intending deception. For example, in informing the receiver about his own preferences, he himself may not "know his own mind." Similarly, if he is not committed to his preferences, or likely to change them, everything else being equal, the receiver is likely to get false information.

These considerations apply to Nigerian workers at the end of the general strike and on the eve of the Federal elections of 1964. It seemed to everyone, especially the Youths, that the workers were strongly in favor of a labour party led by Michael Imoudu. However, few people realized that the workers were being crosspressured and in fact, masking inconsistent and unstable loyalties. I discuss these points in Chapters X, XI, and XII. There, I indicate how ideological failure can begin with the transmission of information to politicians and need not be due to the conceptual framework into which the information is cast for prediction. However, the conceptual framework also may lead to false predictions.
Perception and Conceptualization

Having briefly discussed the relationship between the transmitter and the receiver, it is now possible to discuss the cognitive processes of the receiver. Here, let us make a rough distinction between two stages of perception, to account for the difference between the first selective perception of a piece of information and the translation of this perception into some ideological or conceptual framework. The first stage we shall call "the ordinary language stage of conceptualization" and the second, "the ideological stage." What interests us here is the application of the terminology of the second stage to the first.

An example from science may clarify these notions. Imagine, for example, that you see a stone falling. If you are pre-Newtonian, you say to yourself "a stone is falling." If, however, you are post-Newtonian, you are also in a position to say "a mass is falling." Recognizing that a "stone" is a "mass" has important consequences for your understanding of the behavior of the stone, because from the Newtonian hypothesis, \( F = MA \), you will be able to

\[ F = MA \]

1 Our data do not lend themselves to any finer distinctions, although we are aware of the psychologist's warning that "all perceptual experience is necessarily the end of a categorization process." See Jerome S. Bruner, "On Perceptual Readiness," Psych. Rev., 64 (1957), pp. 123-152.
derive the force with which the stone will hit the earth, knowing only its weight and acceleration.

If you have a theory or ideology, familiar objects expressed in ordinary language can be renamed in terms of a conceptual system. In general, such systems are composed of at least the following elements: primitive terms ("mass"), operations (mathematical multiplication), a set of axioms (mass remains constant during the fall), a set of hypotheses \( F = MA \), and criteria for verification. The power of the system lies in fitting ordinary observations into much more general primitive terms and these into the deductive scheme of axioms and hypotheses. Thus, when speaking of it in terms of "mass," it is not necessary continually to observe the stone, because the behavior of "masses" can be predicted quite well from the hypotheses of the system.

In its general form, this interrelationship between ordinary language and conceptual systems in involved in ideology as well. Most Nigerian Marxists would agree with the view that Nigerian workers represent a new political force and a new morality. They would argue that the worker **qua** worker, finding himself separated from peasant technology and independent of peasant authority, necessarily is a carrier of a new set of attitudes ("consciousness") appropriate to his new technological relations and authority figures. Here, too, there are primitive terms, such
as "workers," "technology," "class," etc., and hypotheses, like "the workers' attitudes are different from those of the peasant as a function of his changed relation to technology."

Nevertheless, the example from physics and that from politics differ importantly in the translation of ordinary language terms into the primitive terms of the conceptual scheme. What is "class" in Nigeria and how does one determine who belongs to what class? I shall examine how the Youths apply these terms to Nigerian politics in Chapters VII and VIII. Here, let us note that another source of error in ideological prediction lies in the selection of information to be ideologically "named" and the inferences drawn from such naming.

Thus, for example, after the strike of June, 1964, it was clear to everyone that workers had gone on strike because they were angry with the difference in wages between what they were receiving and what their rulers were getting. Workers also were disappointed with the way Nigerian politics had developed since independence. Pre-disposed by their long history of failure in Nigerian politics, the Youths saw in these motives more than was said. When workers spoke of "gap," Youths translated "class struggle"; when workers spoke of "corruption in high places," or "loss of trust in government," Youths translated "post-independence crisis." Class struggle and post-independence crisis were clear indications to
the Youths that workers would support a labour party which would defend their "class" interests. It turned out that the workers did not support the Youths. The Youths did not realize (and perhaps did not want to realize) that there is no one-to-one correspondence between action and motives. Spotting some motives correctly, they generalized and renamed them and wrongly inferred certain actions.

While the Youths failed in their ideological predictions, could they have learned and did they learn anything from their failure? Observations I have made about the two types of failure in ideological prediction introduce another problem concerning ideology, namely, ideological verification. Turning to this question, let us again rely on science to serve as illustration and criterion for comparison.

Verification

In an ongoing science, axioms are revised, added, or dropped. The Newtonian axiom that light travels at an infinite speed was revised by relativity theory. If axioms change, so does the structure of hypotheses derived from such axioms. Sometimes, primitive terms are revised; for example, the discovery of the neutrino changed the number of objects that physics concerns itself with. Sometimes, a discovery in the operations of the science, such as the invention of the calculus or tensor algebra changes the science.
In practice, scientists build their science and go along without verifying it, until they have a backlog of hypotheses, data, and instruments for measuring so that they can conduct a critical test. Their reasoning seems to be something like this:

We are all agreed that hypotheses one through ten seem to be true; hypothesis eleven, derivable from the first ten hypotheses, leads to an unobvious conclusion. That's interesting. Now, if we can show that hypothesis eleven is true (not false within an area of certainty) we shall be satisfied (for the moment) that we are on the right track and that hypotheses one through ten are also true.

This procedure goes on until a critical test shows that a hypothesis derived from some well-established body of work is false, at which point revisions take place at a number of points in the science.

For a sociologist of knowledge interested in comparing an ideology with a science, the point at which a hypothesis is shown to be false in a science highlights the difference between an ideology and a science. If a hypothesis is disproved in a science, two possibilities are open: (1) the test is rejected or (2) the test is accepted and the hypotheses on which it was constructed are changed to conform with the new results. At times, as in relativity theory, all hypotheses including axioms are seriously revised. Whether the first or second possibility occurs depends on the social structure of the science. It will depend, for example, on the authority of the scientists involved, the importance
of the theory, the number and weight of the hypotheses over-thrown, the elegance of the theory, and so on.

Changes occur in a science whenever hypotheses fail to satisfy certain agreed upon cognitive criteria. However, an ideology, as we have indicated, includes not only a cognitive model of the world, but also statements of value and feeling. The difference between science and ideology lies in the former restricting its criteria of verification to the cognitive type. This is clearly not the case in ideology, where statements are accepted into the belief system, not only on cognitive grounds, but from considerations of value and feeling. Ideologies change, or remain stable, not only because they are false or true, but also because they satisfy certain evaluative and emotional criteria. I shall call these criteria, "goodness of fit," "success," and "affective coherence."

The term "goodness of fit" refers to the correspondence of ideological statements with the real world, and is akin to the term "confidence level" in science. The term "success" refers to the evaluation placed on ideologically guided actions in attaining certain values in politics.

\footnote{That the growth of science as a human activity is dependent on a certain value orientation is not disputed here, but it seems clear that the statement "F = MA" is relatively value free and affect free. It should be noted, however, that the difference between a science and an ideology is a matter of degree, not of quality. Both types of statements are beliefs subject to evaluative and affective criteria. One need only refer to the case of Galileo to note that the reduction in importance of non-cognitive criteria in science is a fairly recent development.}
An ideology is then said to lead to "success" in politics. In our use of the term, "success" need not only denote the attainment of power, but can be applied to the attainment of any valued object. Finally, the term "affective coherence" is meant to connote the observation that beliefs are often held to maintain emotional balance in the believer.¹

Truth and Falsehood, Success and Failure, and Changes in Ideology

An analogue to hypothesis testing in the evaluative dimension of ideology lies in determining whether an ideological statement led to success or failure in maximizing values. If an ideological prediction is felt to lead to success in maximizing values, then that prediction is more likely than not to remain unchanged. By this I mean that the primitive terms ("class"), operations ("class struggle"), and predictions ("ultimate triumph of the proletariat") will remain unchanged.

Although in theory, it should be quite simple to determine under what conditions an ideology changes, in practice, the situation is much more ambiguous because it is not always simple to determine success or failure in attaining valued ends. This is so because at least three

¹For example, the view that beliefs are held as reaction formation, ego defense, or cognitive consonance are essentially views of beliefs as maintaining or restoring states of emotional equilibrium. See I. Sarnoff, "Psychanalytic Theory and Social Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1960, pp. 251-279; and L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson, & Co., 1957).
criteria of verification exist. Since goodness of fit is only one such criterion, used to evaluate an empirical situation, it can be abandoned or changed in order to satisfy the other two criteria. For believers, a failure of prediction, at the least, must be explained in a way that does not offend basic values and commitments. The simplest way of doing this is to reinterpret the failure. This can be illustrated in what happened to the Youths after the failure of the Nigerian Labour Party in December 1964-January 1965. Although the Youths, after the strike of 1964, had predicted that the Nigerian Labour Party would demonstrate that it had a popular following in Lagos, it became clear to this observer that it did not. If the election had proceeded as planned, the party presumably would have succeeded or failed in getting Imoudu elected from the Lagos North constituency. But the Federal elections did not go as planned. One of the nationalist parties (UPGA) boycotted the election and voters stayed home. Imoudu and the NLP had started out in opposition to UPGA, but by the time of the boycott, they were acting ambiguously enough that their allegiance or opposition could not be determined. Was this because they realized that as the election neared, they were losing support because their ideology was misapplied? Or did they

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assume that in a political crisis, it was tactically wiser "from the long range point of view" to support the nationalist party? How did the fact that they avoided the political test affect their ideology? I discuss these points in Chapter XIV.

Having discussed the problems of ideological prediction and verification and indicated the groups of major concern, let us proceed to the last two sections of this introduction; the plan of the thesis and a discussion of the methods used in collecting data.

**The Plan of the Thesis**

The thesis is divided into two main parts. In the first part, it is primarily concerned with locating the Youths in the context of Nigerian politics and labour. The first part can be seen as consisting of three sections. In the first section (Chapters II and III), the thesis introduces the reader to the major parameters of the Nigerian political system and the labour movement. The Youths, as Marxists in the labour movement, straddle both politics and labour and their role is delineated at the intersection of these two spheres of Nigerian life. The second section (chapters IV-VI) comprises the history of the emergence of the Youths in the two spheres of labour and politics. This section not only traces the Youths over time, but serves as a partial explanation for their anti-governmental motives. In the third section (Chapters VII and VIII) the thesis
describes the ideology of the Youths. It does this by ex-
aming the writings and biographies of five Youths, each
of whom represents a major faction among Marxists in the
labour movement.

In the second part, the thesis turns to the case study
of ideological prediction and verification. Here, four
sections can be distinguished. In the first section (Chap-
ter IX) is described the general strike of June, 1964. In
the second (Chapters X and XI), relying partly on what the
Youths said and partly on the description of ideology in
Chapter VIII, the thesis describes how the Youths misunder-
stood the motives of the workers for going on strike and
falsely predicted the support the workers would give to the
Labour Party. In the third section (Chapters XII and XIII),
the thesis turns to the second source of ideological failure,
that is, the kind of information the Youths were getting
about expected support. Here it accounts for ideological
failure by referring to the quality of information and not,
as in section two, by referring to the kinds of inferences
the Youths made. In the fourth section, the thesis recapit-
ulates briefly the experience of the Nigerian Labour Party
and turns to how one of the leaders accounted for its fate
in the Federal elections of December 1964. In describing
the Youths' account, it is concerned with the question of
ideological verification.
Methods

Since in this thesis I am interested in making inferences to the process of prediction and verification in ideology, I deal with two groups, those who transmit information to the ideologists, and the ideologists themselves. In particular, I deal with workers who communicated with Youths and with the Youths.

Studying the Youths

Although criteria for selecting a respondent varied with the phase of the problem, the Youths were selected on the basis of organizational membership, position within the organization, reputation and self-identification. No random sample of Youths was attempted; I tried to interview all Youths who were seriously involved first in the general strike and later in the Federal elections of 1964.

In the period May, 1964 - July, 1965, the period of the study, there existed the following Marxist organizations either inside the labour movement or closely allied to the labour movement. These were the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP), the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), and the Nigerian Labour Party (NLP). There were other organizations, the central labour bodies, such as the Labour Unity Front (LUF), the United Labour Congress (ULC) and the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC) which were not explicitly Marxist but in which some Marxists held leadership positions.
In the period of the study, I tried to interview all the leaders of the unambiguously Marxist organizations. These usually included the President or Chairman of the organization, the General Secretary and the members of the "Central Committee." In the non-Marxist organizations, I would try to interview those members of the leadership who had a reputation (especially among leaders of the explicitly Marxist organizations) for being Marxists. A well known and good example of this second type of Youth is Gogo Chu Nzeribe, General Secretary of the Post and Telegraph Workers Union and General Secretary of the non-Marxist Labour Unity Front. In this manner I interviewed fifty-two Youths.

The interviews lasted anywhere from two hours to a week. Most were repeated three or four times during the period at issue. Questionnaires C - F\(^1\) were used to get background material but on the whole I relied on open-ended questions. Since I am interested in what the Youths thought about politics, most questions of the open-ended category were directed to the then current political scene. I have tried to codify the results of some of these interviews in Chapters VII and VIII below.

**Studying the Workers**

I was interested in specific groups of workers, namely those who communicated with the Marxist leaders whose beliefs we were studying. I drew seven non-probabilistic quota

\(^{1}\)See Appendix.
samples of workers. The characteristics of the quota were such as to increase the chances that the respondent would be in touch with Youths. Since the Youths were labour leaders it was assumed that workers who were wage earners, and high in the hierarchy of their trade unions would be more likely to interact with Youths than, for example, non-wage earners or trade unionists low in the hierarchy of their union.

Following only this logic, however, would have limited the sample to trade union executives (members of their executive committees) in the central labour bodies such as the NTUC and LUF which were more likely to be run by Youths.¹ But the Youths mixed not only with persons of their own ideology but with workers, trade unionists, and labour leaders who were not Marxists. For this reason, I included in my sample of "workers" trade unionists in all the central labour bodies including those not run by Youths. From Table 1.1 it can be seen that I drew six samples of trade union executives and one survey of non-executive trade unionists. My remarks are limited to the first category only.

The Characteristics of the Samples

Because they are similar to D, I shall not review the characteristics of all the seven samples drawn. Below I present the characteristics of the two sub-samples which

¹See Chapter III, pp. 60-72.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire</th>
<th>Method of Distribution</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Position of Respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Handed out at meeting</td>
<td>July 1964</td>
<td>University of Ibadan meeting</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Handed out in class</td>
<td>October 1964</td>
<td>ULC</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Mailed**</td>
<td>December 1964</td>
<td>Nigeria-wide</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Handed out at meeting</td>
<td>June 1965</td>
<td>University of Ibadan meeting</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Handed out at meeting</td>
<td>April 1965</td>
<td>LUF</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Handed out at meeting</td>
<td>April 1965</td>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Direct interview by team of interviewers</td>
<td>May 1965</td>
<td>Railway Quarters Ebute-Metta</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>Non-Executives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See Appendix

**Based on a list of 556 trade unions kept by the registrar of trade unions. He estimates that of these only about 300 are extant. This gives a return of about 17% on the mailed questionnaire.
make up sample D. The characteristics are listed in terms of social background and include: (1) Central Labour Body (whether union belongs to a central labour body controlled by the Youths or by non-Youths), (2) position of respondent in branch union, (3) regional background of respondent, (4) occupation, (5) religion, (6) age, and (7) education.

It is clear from the simple background data presented that the workers who get the ear of the Youths (this particular group was interviewed at an annual meeting in Lagos) are hardly representative of the Nigerian population which is mostly Northern, Muslim, and illiterate. And in terms of education (primary certificate only is required for most wage paying jobs) they are hardly representative of the wage earning population. For a more extensive discussion of the wage earning population as a whole we direct the reader to Chapter III.

TABLE 1.2--Percentage of Respondents Who are Members of Unions in Central Labour Bodies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Labour Body</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by Youths</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not controlled by Youths</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1.3 - Position of Respondents in Branch Unions in Per Cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President or Chairman</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Executive</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Executive</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1.4 - Regional Background of Respondents in Per Cent.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Background</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Majority</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Minority</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Majority</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Minority</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Western Majority</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Western Minority</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Majority</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Minority</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99 (89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*I list the regional background of the respondent instead of his tribe because in terms of political orientation, the designation of a tribal name bears much less information in the regionalist context than does the designation of the respondent by region and by whether or not he belongs to the majority or minority ethnic group. It is clear that by Eastern Majority here is meant, Ibo; by Western Majority is meant, Yoruba, and by Northern Majority is meant Hausa and/or Fulani. At the time of writing Mid-Western Ibos seemed to be most influential in the Mid-West, consequently Mid-West majority is Ibos. Table 1.4 accurately reflects the greater frequency of Southern as against Northern workers and trade unions.
### TABLE 1.5--Occupation of Respondents in Per Cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Time Trade Unionist</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Worker</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, Trader, Craftsman, or Artisan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.6--Religion of Respondents in Per Cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.7--Age of Respondents in Per Cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 or over</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Sources of Data

I used three other sources of data: published or filed materials in public and private archives, newspapers, and participant observation. Besides having the use of the national archives of Ibadan, I had access to the files of the Nigerian Railway Corporation and of the United Labour Congress. Chapters IV, V, and VI dealing with the early history of the labour movement and of the emergence of the militants could not have been written without such data. In addition to these, I was given access to some of the published and unpublished pamphlets and memoranda in private possession of individual respondents. Chapter VIII, which tries to construct a Marxist interpretation of Nigerian politics, is based on such materials.

I relied on participant observation whenever this proved to be possible. Arriving two weeks before the general strike of June 1964, I formulated some of my first questions and wrote some of the first notes during automobile trips in which I chauffeured trade union leaders from Ibadan to Lagos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Only</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Secondary</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(89)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the rest of the field trip, having moved to Lagos in October, I observed the predictions and the outcomes of the predictions that friends among the Youths had made in June.
CHAPTER II

THE REGIONALIST SYSTEM

Initial Conditions

By the end of the Second World War and the emergence of the nationalist movement in Nigeria, for the British administration the problem arose of reconciling the desire for representation with the power of the imperial government; the efficiency of the civil service, with the integrity of traditional rulers. The solution, a rather simple one which came to be known as "Regionalism," was to divide the representative electoral system into as many units as the administrative system and to make it congruent with these units.¹

Since the civil service itself had been linked under indirect rule wherever possible to the traditional rule of native authorities, a corollary of Regionalism was the division of Nigeria into three regions which more or less corresponded to the major Nigerian nationalities. Thus, the Northern Region came to stand for a system of representation based on the Hausa and Fulani peoples, and linked to a Northern civil service;

similarly for the Western Region and the Yoruba people, the Eastern Region and the Ibo people.

From the Richards constitution\(^1\) to the London conference of 1953, when measures were begun to implement regionalism, the system was thought to have a number of sanguine effects. It preserved the Emirate system of the North. It prevented the Legislative Council from being too large and unwieldy. It blocked the formation of an unofficial majority without responsibility.\(^2\) Moreover, giving representation to the regions powerfully strengthened the hands of the traditional rulers, since nationalists would have to appeal to them to construct winning electoral coalitions. Thus, regionalism was thought to have the desired effect of, according to Governor Richards, checking the "absurdly predominant influence of Lagos."\(^3\)

One should not infer that only the Imperial administration supported regionalism, because, in fact, the system had backing from a number of indigenous sources.

**Regionalism and the Nationalist Parties**

Although the beginnings of nationalist support for regionalism can be traced further back, the initial point

\(^1\)The Richards Constitution of 1946 was named for Sir Arthur Richards then Governor of Nigeria. This constitution, "brought about not only further administrative devolution but a political and budgetary regionalization as well . . ." See Coleman, pp. 322-323.

\(^2\)Coleman, p. 274.

\(^3\)Coleman, p. 275.
which concerns us here is the founding of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1936.¹

The Nigerian Youth Movement

From its inception in 1936, the NYM was an organization of elite Lagosians, mostly non-Ijebu Yorubas, many of whom were King's College alumnae. We are interested in the NYM because the beginnings of Southern regionalism and division in the nationalist movement can be traced to the split of the NYM into two factions: one which followed Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik) out of the organization and another which stayed and was led by subsequent leaders of the Action Group (AG), such as Chief Obafemi Awolowo, H. O. Davies, and S. L. Akintola.

Although at first Zik was a successful member of the NYM, he soon found it too elitist and provincial, not in tune with the more radical, national plans he had for Nigeria.² It was only a matter of time before he or someone like him would discover that besides the patricians of Lagos, another source of electoral power lay with the crowds of students, petty traders, market women, and wage earning workers.

¹See Coleman, p. 218.

²"Azikiwe had spoken of the natural right of self-determination and had demanded self-government within fifteen years from 1943; but the leaders of the NYM were less emphatic..." Coleman, p. 263.
The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)

On August 26, 1944, with Herbert Macauley of the populist Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and Zik behind the scenes, the Nigerian Union of Students calls for an inaugural meeting of the "National Council of Nigeria."\(^1\) Over forty organizations, among them the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN), are "... to work in unity for the realization of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British Empire."\(^2\) It is not surprising that the NYM and its leaders boycotted the National Council, seeing it "as a stratagem of Azikiwe and Macauley to seize control of the nationalist movement."\(^3\)

By 1946, getting an overwhelming mandate, the NCNC contested election to the legislative council in Lagos and defeated the NYM.

Leaders of the defeated NYM such as Obafemi Awolowo learned well the lessons of the popular NCNC. By March 1951 they inaugurated a new political party called the Action Group (AG). Its base of support lay in the Western region among the Yoruba.\(^4\) Its techniques were those of the

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\(^1\) Coleman, p. 264. \(^2\) Ibid. \(^3\) Sklar, p. 57. 

\(^4\)"The new organization received its strongest support from the old Yoruba families and the Yoruba professional class of Lagos, from the growing Yoruba middle class based upon the cocoa trade, from Yoruba chiefs ... from Yoruba intellectuals opposed to the NCNC ... and from selected leaders of minority groups in the Western region ... ." Coleman, pp. 349-350.
mass party but its audience was, in the beginning, mainly limited to the Western Region.

At the same time as a division of the nationalist movement was beginning to take place in the South, a nationalist party, the Northern Peoples Congress, was inaugurated in December 1949 in Kano partly as a reaction to Southern incursions and partly out of the opportunities provided by regionalism. Similar to the AG which wanted to further the cultural integrity and the ruling groups of the Yorubas, the NPC organized to protect Islam and the Emirate system of the North.¹

Once the AG and the NPC demonstrated majority support in the West and North respectively, the hand of the regionalists in the NCNC was greatly strengthened. They argued that, since the leaders of the other parties had become premiers of their regions, Azikiwe, the one "truly national leader in Nigeria, should become Premier of the East, where the NCNC had control. "These considerations prevailed, and the political center of gravity in the NCNC shifted to the East while central direction of the party organization as a whole lapsed seriously . . ."²

The flow of political attention and activity from the national to the regional level in the early fifties left

¹Coleman, p. 358.
behind the Zikists, the first organized opposition to the regionalist system. It is an irony of history that the movement founded in the name of the greatest African nationalist was to be repudiated by him as the locus of power shifted from the center to the regions.

The Zikists

From its inception in Lagos in February 1946, the Zikist movement formed the militant youth wing of the NCNC. "The Zikists were the angry young men of postwar Nigeria."¹ They were anti-regionalist, anti-tribalist, and strongly favored a unified centralized Nigeria. If need be, they said, they were willing to lead a revolution against the imperial power.

Already by 1948 it became increasingly clear to the Zikists that regionalism challenged their unitarian beliefs. The Zikists also realized that groups such as the Ibo State Union and other tribal unions which had increased in

¹Sklar, p. 73. The term "Zikism" was first used by A. A. Nwafor Orizu in his book, Without Bitterness. Although the Zikists were at first followers of Dr. Azikiwe, and later they were to repudiate him, the term always meant more than simply a congerie of Ziks followers. Richard Sklar quoting Orizu notes:

His choice of the term "Zikism" was not intended to create a personality cult around the figure of Azikiwe; the latter was merely an "exceptional character" whose life was an inspiration to others. "Zik," he explained, is derived from the "African name Azikiwe . . . which can be translated: 'the Youth is overwhelmingly indignant,' or 'The New Age is full of revenge.' . . ."
influence in proportion to the regionalization of Nigeria challenged their influence within the NCNC and with Dr. Azikiwe.

To stem the tide of tribalism and regionalism the Zikists decided on a strategy of direct action which they called "positive action." It was decided by the "Central Committee" of the Zikist movement to precipitate a crisis which would result in revolution. Their tactic was to invite Azikiwe to a meeting during which Zikists would make seditious speeches. Azikiwe would be arrested. Free Zikists would seize on the arrest to make a martyr of Zik, and the revolution would start.

Things did not turn out as the Zikists had hoped. They set the stage by calling for a mass meeting of the NCNC for 7 November 1948. The mass meeting was to be attended by the cabinet of the NCNC including Zik. As had been planned, H. R. Abdallah, President of the Zikist movement made a seditious speech:

We have passed the age of petition. We have passed the age of resolution. This is the age of action, plain, blunt, positive action. . . . This iniquitous British Government is determined to keep us slaves forever . . . the only way out as I see it and as I know it is for every one of us to declare himself free and independent and be resolved to stand by that declaration and damn the consequences.1

But Zik did not show up. The Zikist leaders were jailed, and when Dr. Azikiwe disassociated himself from the movement, many Zikists turned against him and against the NCNC.2

1Sklar, pp. 75, 99. 2Sklar, p. 76.
The Youths

One should not be under the impression that all radical young men in southern Nigeria gravitated to the NCNC or to the Zikist movement. Some refused to join the NCNC "because it was mainly for Ibos." But they would not join the pan Yoruba NYM "because it was run by the big guns among the Yorubas and a talkative young man like me had no chance to express my views." Once the AG came along many of the more radical young radicals joined up.

Nevertheless, more than any other Nigerian party, the early NYC was a pan-tribal, congress type organization dedicated to unitary nationalism. With regionalism, the radical factions of the NCNC declined in power. Some radicals had their teeth drawn, some left the NCNC to found the AG, or the NPC, still others left the NCNC for the labour movement.

It should be noted that even before their disenchantment with the NCNC, leaders like Nduka Eze in the Zikist movement were also militant trade unionists. Eze's "object since 1946 had been to link the labor movement to the Zikist movement for revolutionary action." After their disenchantment with the NCNC many radicals turned to the labour movement in the hope that out of the workers they could create a truly antiregionalist, radical, and Marxist party. This group of radicals in the labour movement

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1Phrase used by a Lagosian Youth in a personal interview.
2Ibid.
3Sklar, p. 76.
The regionalist system may have begun as an administrative and constitutional expression, but in time it took on economic and political life. We turn now to a description of how the system worked. At its base was the connection between money and power.

**Money and Power**

Under indirect rule, the regions had been administrative expressions; with the constitutional changes of the Richards and MacPherson constitutions,\(^1\) they became constitutional and political units, and after the London conference, they became economic units as well. This was done by dissolving the commodity marketing boards and creating new multi-commodity regional marketing boards. The purpose of these boards was to accumulate surpluses by selling commodities at a profit on the world market in order to provide funds for development in their respective region.

In principle, the marketing boards were to provide capital to regional development corporations which were, in turn, to initiate agricultural and industrial projects. Without going into the details of the operation, in practice the regional marketing boards, the development corporations and their subsidiaries proved to be a rich field for patronage and corruption. The party, through its control of the legal and representative apparatus of each region, would

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\(^1\)Coleman, p. 311.
appoint its supporters to responsible positions on the boards or corporations. In return, the appointees would facilitate the granting of loans to party supporters and to the party itself. Conversely, by controlling the flow of capital and licenses, the party could bring considerable economic pressure on its opponents.¹

In the absence of a developed private sector, the party through the regional marketing boards had considerable influence on the distribution of economic opportunities within each region.² In the modern sector, this distribution had profound effects on the social stratification system. He who had something to give to the party and who was loyal to it could expect to improve his life and to climb; he who was not loyal either was irrelevant or fell from whatever position he had been able to reach.

The parties' influence over the social stratification system of a region had a serious effect on the organization

¹The ideal model of the tie-up between party and regional marketing board is best documented for the Western Region, but good evidence exists to assume that essentially the same pattern repeated itself in the East and North. For the West see Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1962).

²See Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire Into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them (London: Report Cmnd 505, 1958). According to the Willink Commission, the relative distribution of amenities and funds was argued, surprisingly, to be just. But, according to the report, this view was not shared by the minority witnesses to the commission. One should perhaps reformulate the point to say that minorities perceived that they were being discriminated against.
of groups and inter-group conflict within each region.
First and most obviously, the party rewarded those groups
which kept it in power. It would therefore be more likely
to reward the majority group, exacerbating in this way
communal tensions between majorities and minorities.¹
Second, since its electoral power lay in the regions and
since traditional authorities were more likely to bring out
the vote, the party limited its appeal to cultural volun-
tary organizations, such as tribal unions and town unions;
trade unions and other economic interest groups were ex-
cluded as irrelevant. Third, the party alienated a
cross section of the population, especially within the civil
service, which had been recruited on achievement criteria.
Junior civil servants would often point to a politician,
and say with some bitterness, "Why I knew that man when he
was hawking newspapers. Look at him now."

Thus, even by treating each region in isolation from
the others, it could be seen that the link-up between party,
majority nationality, and regional marketing board en-
gendered opposition from minority groups, economic interest
groups, and a cross-section of the population fed up with
corruption and low positions in the social stratification
system. However, regions did not exist in isolation from
each other, or from the Federal government, and, on the

¹The Northernization policy of the NPC and the Lagos
University crisis of 1965 are only two examples of party
policy exacerbating communal tensions.
contrary, whatever conflicts there might have been between
the political stratum and the rest of society in the region
were greatly exasperated by inter-regional conflict.

The Growing Power of the Federal Government and
the Breaching of Regional Security

Had each region been an independent nation, the three
regions would simply have increased by three the number of
one party states. However, since the regions were part of
a federal structure, they were forced to interact. In par-
ticular, regionally based parties, such as the AG and the
NPC began to look for allies within the other regions and
the NCNC reactivated its nationalist wing as inter-party
competition for control of the federal government became
more intense.

Inter-party competition intensified as a function of
the growing power of the Federal government. By 1956, the
powers of the Federal Parliament, enumerated in the "Ex-
clusive Legislative List" were (1) External affairs, (2) De-
defense, (3) Citizenship, (4) Immigration, (5) External trade,
(6) Monetary exchange control, (7) Customs and excise duties,
(8) Currency, (9) Mining, (10) Maritime shipping, (11) Prin-
cipal modes of communication and transportation. Consti-
tutional power which were to be shared jointly by the Federal
Parliament and the regions on the "Concurrent Legislative
List" were: (1) Public order, (2) Prisons, (3) Labour
development. The Federal constitution had supremacy over
regional constitutions in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction. The Federal Supreme Court had the right to interpret the regional constitutions. Residual areas were reserved to the regions.¹

From the above list, it should be noted that the Federal Government had a great deal of constitutional authority in the economic field² (and therefore, over relative development of each region), in the military, and over the legal system.

No one claims that constitutional power adds up to real power, but in a number of test cases, each of which precipitated a crisis, a portion of the population turned against the regionalist system, and it became increasingly clear to the party leaders that there could be no regional security without control of the center.


²Federal control of development funds was modified by the system of regionally reallocating such revenues. An indication of the economic power of the Federal Government, however, can be gauged by noting that in 1963 it provided 70% of the Regional governments' revenue. Also, one wonders if it is an accident that in 1963, the year of the Western Region Emergency in which the Federal Government intervened in the Western Region, 57% of the Western Regional government's revenue had a Federal source whereas in 1962, the year before the emergency, and in 1964, the year after the emergency, 69% of the Western Regional Government's revenue had a Federal source. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics), Table 11.1 and 11.2, p. 115.
**Crises of the Regionalist System: The Action Group Crisis and the Western Region Emergency**

When Chief Awolowo and the Action Group (AG) became the Federal parliamentary opposition in 1959, they revised their theory of regional security and began an aggressive and partially successful attempt to break the monopoly of the other two parties over their respective regions, by appealing precisely to those elements which had been excluded by the regionalist division of the spoils. And so, in 1959, the Action Group was able to ally itself with minority dissident parties in the Northern region and thus, capture sizable portions of the minority vote, particularly in the Middle Belt areas. At the same time, the party moved ideologically to the left, a move which evoked response from sections of the Marxist labour movement and especially the Yoruba Zikists.

Awolowo's attempt to break out of regional confines and capture the center by breaking the monopoly of power in the other regions threatened the NPC and NCNC. Taking advantage of rivalry for leadership of the Action Group between the Awolowo and the Akintola factions, the Federal Government (read "NPC-NCNC coalition") stepped in to discredit Awolowo. The upshot of this struggle was the imprisonment of Awolowo and some of his lieutenants on charges of plotting.

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a coup, and the emergence of the Akintola faction as the dominant power in the Western Region. The lesson of this episode was clear to all: the Federal government could use the army and the police ultimately to work its will upon the regions. In effect, this meant that the North, which was able to gain control of the Federal Government by its preponderant voting strength, had very real power to wield through the neutral civil service and the neutral army. (Ultimately, the army refused to stay neutral.)

Crises of the Regionalist System:
The Census Issue

In another way, the lesson that the AG learned from the Western Region Emergency was to be relearned by the NCNC in connection with the "Census Issue." Briefly, the conflict between the NCNC and the NPC was based on the fact that the allotment of seats in the Federal Parliament is a function of population. The census, a statistical device, became a subject of political controversy, when it was shown, truly or not, that the North had enough people to maintain the electoral hegemony of the NPC over the Federal Government.

What had started out as a Federal coalition of a Southern party with a Northern party against a Southern party, after the census controversy, became a line-up of

\footnote{See John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 547. Census day was May 13, 1962, but the issue was politically relevant only by 1963 and especially by December 1964, the Federal election.}
North (with its Southern agents) against South (with its Northern agents).

The General Strike of 1964

Sequentially, the next crisis for the regionalist system is the general strike. Although the strike will be discussed at greater length below, it should be noted that this was the first mass manifestation of something going wrong with the system. This was no matter of a party leader breaking with another in a moment of pique; close to 800,000 people participated in the strike.

The Federal Election Crisis of 1964-65

Like theater, event followed event with some inexorable logic, leading to the destruction of the constitutional system. With the census issue still hot in the minds of the NCNC, with the Yorubas growing daily more alienated from a Western Regional Government, which represented a small elite section of the population, and above all, was an agent of the Northern NPC, with the cities of the South still recovering from the general strike, the nation prepared itself for the first Federal election since independence.

By the fall of 1964, the Northern party, the NPC, with its Southern ally, the NNDP, formed an electoral coalition

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2 Mackintosh, p. 545.
calling itself the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA); at about the same time, the remaining Southern parties formed a coalition called the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The issue, of course, was control of the Center. When the NNA announced that 68 candidates from the North were running uncontested elections, within weeks of voting day, it became clear that UPGA would lose, and so UPGA decided to boycott the election. It was rumored that UPGA expected, with or without the help of the President, Dr. Azikiwe, to stage a coup, but after sounding out the army, it decided against this move, and the boycott turned into a political fiasco for UPGA. The NNA emerged on top.

The Western Region Uprising and the Coup

The victory of the NNA proved to be a pyrrhic one. With constitutional means blocked, Southern politicians began seriously to consider extra-constitutional measures to redress the balance between North and South, and especially, to prevent Southern wealth (oil in the East particularly) from being used to develop the poorer North.

The final test case for constitutionalism was to be the Western Region Election scheduled for the summer of 1965 actually taking place later in October 1965. Observers recall that UPGA was convinced that it would win this election and that if it did not, "blood would flow in the West." The

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1See *West Africa*, January 9, 1965.
NNDP claimed that "the AG is a dead party." Ultimately, both proved to be correct.

As it turned out, the NNNDP government in power in the West rigged the election, and the UPGA, as it had promised, took terrible revenge. When it was rumored that Ahmadu Bello, leader of the NPC, and S. L. Akintola of the NNNDP were going to use the Army to crush the UPGA, the Army, that mortician of constitutional rule, shot them, ended the strife and the old order.

The story of the regionalist system and its demise is still to be told. What concerns us here are not the political party elites of that system but the young men like the Zikists who had been opposed to the regionalist system from its inception. With the banning of the Zikist movement and with the apparent success of the nationalist leaders in winning independence, many Zikists and other radicals made their peace with regionalism and tribalism. A group of young men did not. Since 1950 they have worked in various organizations but especially within the labour movement keeping intact the belief in a unified Nigeria. Among these were the Marxist Youths.

The Youth have at least three characteristics. They are anti-regionalist, they are Marxists, and they work in the labour movement. While neither their anti-regionalism, Marxism, or labour affiliation posed any serious political threat to the regionalist system and the major parties involved with it, the Youths, in their attempt to launch a
political base explicitly on these elements, become an interesting case study in the political implementation of ideology. Our primary goal in this study is to describe and explain the political mind of the Youths, but before we can talk about what the Youths thought of politics, it is necessary to turn to the site of their work, the labour movement. In discussing the labour movement we are interested in three questions: (1) what is the Nigerian labour movement and who is in it? (2) how did people in the labour movement become aware of political issues and in particular who are the radicals in the labour movement? (3) how did the Youths get involved with the labour movement? Once we touch on these three questions we shall be in a position to discuss what the Youths think of politics and how they view the labour movement as fitting into their political calculations.
CHAPTER III

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

We shall discuss the labour movement under four headings: (1) The Workers, (2) The Trade Unions, (3) The Central Labour Bodies, and (4) The Labour Parties.

The Workers

Here by "workers" we mean "wage earners." The significant political fact about wage earners is that they make up a tiny fraction of the Nigerian population. However, if one assumes that most wage earners live in urban centers, then as we show below, workers make up a sizable fraction of the urban population. These two observations have some relevance for a discussion of the workers in the regionalist system. The discussion of the workers we shall subdivide into four subsections: (1) Wage Earners in the Regionalist System, (2) Employers, (3) Occupational Groups, (4) Earnings and Cost of Living.

Wage Earners in the Regionalist System

As of 1963, about 8000,000 to a million Nigerians are wage earners; about 4,000,000 or 10% of Nigerians live in
towns with a population of 20,000 or more. ¹ If one assumes that most wage earners live in towns, about one-quarter of the urban population consists of wage earners. These figures can be broken down by region as follows:

TABLE 3.1--Employment Trends by Regions, 1958-1960*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>95,600</td>
<td>94,900</td>
<td>94,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>96,300</td>
<td>97,300</td>
<td>133,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>150,800</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>144,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>98,100</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>128,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>440,800</td>
<td>433,400</td>
<td>499,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.1 is adapted from Table IIC of Manpower Situation in Nigeria 1963, p. 7. The discrepancy between the one million figure and the statistics of Table 3.1 and Table IIC is accounted for by the statistics of Table IIC being those of "establishments employing ten or more workers." See p. 7 of Manpower Situation in Nigeria, 1963.

Taking only urban areas defined as towns with a population of 20,000 or more, wage earners constituted 30% of the Lagos population, 5% of the Western Region urban

¹ The 800,000 to a million figure is quoted by National Manpower Board, Manpower Situation in Nigeria, 1963. Lagos. The 4,000,000 figure is used by the Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1963, Lagos. The population figure assumes a rate of growth of between 2 and 4 per cent from the 1953 census figures. In 1953 the population of Nigeria was to the nearest ten million, 30,000,000 and the population living in urban areas of 20,000 or more was to the nearest million, 3,000,000.
population, 20% of the Northern urban population, and 20% of the Eastern urban population.¹

Thus although the wage earning population constitutes at most 3% of the Nigerian population as a whole, in urban centers such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Zaria wage earners constitute a more sizeable proportion of the population.

Simple numbers tell us a great deal about the political significance of the workers. From the perspective of political parties who need numbers to win elections, it is clear that the workers were not an important segment of the population. It comes as no surprise therefore that in the full bloom of regionalism, workers and their leaders carried very little weight in the deliberations of the major regionalist parties. From the perspective of the Youths, had they complete support from all the workers, they would still have had the support of only 3% of Nigeria. However, as we shall see below, what was significant for the Youths was that 30% of Lagos consisted of wage earners, and according to the Youths, Lagos was the shape of the future. If they could capture the wage earning vote in Lagos the Youth could be confirmed in their belief that they were the vanguard of things to come.

¹These figures are correct to the nearest ten per cent. Assuming a rate of growth of 2 to 4 per cent they are derived from the 1953 census. The low figure for the Western region can be explained by two factors. First, Lagos draws many Yoruba wage earners. Second, the Yoruba Western region unlike other regions of Nigeria is largely populated by traditional towns whose growth preceded the modern wage-earning economy. The generalization, that about one-fourth of urban centers consists of wage earners is therefore not true for the Western region without Lagos.
Employers

Judging from Table 3.2, the principal employer of the workers are the governments: Federal, Regional, Local, and the Public Corporations. The next major employer of workers are the commercial firms.

TABLE 3.2--Employment in 1962 by Type of Employer*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employer</th>
<th>No. of Persons Returned</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>48,073</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>74,605</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>72,554</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Corporations</td>
<td>75,800</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Firms</td>
<td>200,309</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Agencies</td>
<td>47,464</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>518,805</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table is adapted from Table 3.6 of the Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964. Lagos.

We note that 54% of Nigerian wage earners come under the ken of one of the governments or one of the public corporations (ultimately run by ministries of the Federal Government), and that 38% work for commercial firms. The first number alerts us to the fact that industrial relations in Nigeria will necessarily include government as employer. Workers ask, "It is Nigerian government, why do the politicians not raise our wages?" Imagine what happens if
government cannot raise wages but at the same time insists on paying European-type salaries to higher civil servants and to elected representatives. The second figure alerts us to the fact that the second largest employer after the governments are the commercial firms. But the commercial firms are largely European owned or controlled. If the government does not support the workers in their demands for higher wages in the private sector, it lays itself open to siding with Europeans against Nigerians.¹ Accusations of corruption and neo-colonialism are right around the corner. The vulnerability of government stemming from its heavy involvement in the economy is not lost on the Youths.

Occupational Groups

From Table 3.3 we note that the great majority of Nigerian workers belong to the category of unskilled, "General Labour."

It is clear that when the Youths speak of the "workers" they mean above all the third and perhaps the second categories. These categories are most important not only because between them they account for 94% of the wage earning force but because, since independence, they have been most agitated by the difference in wages between themselves and elites of the upper civil service and political parties. We shall

¹It is no accident that many of the most anti-regionalist Youths such as A. Ikoró and Wahab Goodluck head trade unions in the private sector.
return to this point again when we discuss the General Strike of 1964. Let us turn to the question of wages.

**Table 3.3: Occupational Groups***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and administrative</td>
<td>32,793</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor professional, skilled, clerical,</td>
<td>134,667</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General labour</td>
<td>351,345</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>518,805</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Table 3.4, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964. Lagos.

**Earnings and Cost of Living**

If 68% of the Nigerian wage earning force consists of general labour, let us consider how much these people earn, how well they have done over time, and how wage gains compare to the rise in cost of living. The difference between the two last variables should give us another indication of conflict from which the Youth can profit.

The figures in Table 3.4 are, after all, average figures; many are lucky to earn up to $100.0. To get the political significance of these figures consider that some senior civil servants and ministers earn more than $3000.0 per year and that the cost of living has been rising. Let the situation of hewers working for the Nigerian Coal
Corporation serve as an example. In the period 1956 to 1962, wages went up about 20% from £14.8.2 to £17.10.2. In this same period the average cost of living index in Enugu, the site of the mines, rose by 33% from 112 to 149 and in some cases the index doubled during the same period.\(^1\)

**TABLE 3.4--Average Yearly Cash Earnings by Type of Employer (in £’s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Average Cash Earnings 1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>242.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Corporations</td>
<td>243.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Governments</td>
<td>192.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governments</td>
<td>120.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>174.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Employees</strong></td>
<td><strong>186.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table adapted from Table 3.8, p. 30 of Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964. To convert to dollars, multiply pounds by 2.8.*

Of course it is difficult to argue from wage statistics to political consequences. One needs the intervening effect of perceptions. Did the workers and their leaders perceive discrepancies between what they earned and what others earned and between what they earned and the cost of living? To both questions the answer is, certainly. The Joint Action

\(^1\)Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964, Tables 5.3 and Tables 10.11.
Committee quoted similar statistics. We present this fact not as further evidence of economic trends, but as evidence of felt or perceived injustices.\(^1\) One of the reasons trade unionism has grown so quickly in Nigeria lies precisely in this perceived injustice in wage differences. Let us then turn to a discussion of trade unions.

**Trade Unions**

We shall discuss trade unions under four headings:

1. The Origins of Trade Unions,
2. Trade Union Organization,
3. The Number of Youths in the Trade Unions, and
4. Strikes.

**The Origins of Trade Unions**

Although here we are concerned with the history of the trade union movement only insofar as it touches on identifying the Youths and in clarifying what they do, we must note that trade unionism in Nigeria represents one of the earliest forms of modern social organization.

The first firm evidence of the rise of modern trade unionism is provided by the formation of the Nigerian Civil Service Union Monday, 19 August 1912. This inaugural meeting . . . was called "in order to consider the ways and means of inaugurating a league of Civil Service officials."\(^2\)

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\(^1\)The Joint Action Committee was a committee of trade unionists formed in September 1963. This committee led the General Strike of 1964. See page below.

But the early unions were composed mostly of white collar workers who had banded together to improve conditions of service, not to bargain radically over wages and certainly not to go on strike.

During the meeting of 15 November 1912 a proposed amendment to the draft rules and regulations that the objects of the union should include the discussion of all matters affecting the Native staff "with a view to common action being taken" was lost. The founders of the union seemed satisfied that their objects could be met by provisions for "periodical contributions--lectures and addresses--to be delivered from time to time."

Until the second World War and the passing of the Trade Union Ordinances on April 1, 1939, the history of the Nigerian trade union movement was largely the history of three unions: the Nigerian Union of Teachers, the Nigerian Civil Service Union, and the Nigerian Railway Workers Union. After 1939 the pace of unionization quickened.

By 1940 there were fourteen registered unions, representing 4337 workers. By 1941 the number of unions increased threefold, the number of members increased fourfold and the number of strikes increased sixfold. Under the impetus of the Labour Secretary and following wage agitations for increased Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), amalgamation grew apace. In October and November of 1941, four civil service unions joined to form the African Civil Service and Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU), with L. A. Nkedive, President, and M. Imoudu, Vice-President. In November 1942, the first

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1Ibid., p. 35.  
2See pp. 85-90 below.
Trade Union Congress (TUC) is formed with T. A. Bankole, of the Land and Survey Workers as Chairman, S. O. Coker, of the Railway Workers' Union (RWU) as Vice-Chairman, and N. A. Tokunboh, of the Railway Station Staff Union as General Secretary.¹

The statistical story of trade union growth is summarized in Table 3.5 below. We shall return to the historical aspects of trade union development when we deal with the rise of militancy in the trade union movement in Chapter IV. Let us now briefly turn to trade union organization keeping in mind especially what consequences it has for the Youths.

Trade Union Organization

As of 1964 an estimated 30 per cent of wage earners or about 300,000 workers are members of trade unions, and about 60 per cent of wage earners in establishments of ten or more people are members of trade unions.²

Trade unionization has occurred in all industries as can be seen from Table 3.6 below. It is estimated that 37 per cent of trade unionists belong to craft unions, 45 per cent to industrial unions and about 16 per cent to general unions. The remaining 2 per cent belong to guilds. The

¹Herbert A. Tulatz, Die Gewerkschaftsentwicklung Nigers (Hanover: Verlag Fur Literatur Und Zeitgeschehen, 1963).

²These estimates are based on rounding-off the number of trade unionists to 300,000 and on assuming the existence of 1,000,000 wage earners and 500,000 wage earners in establishments of 10 or more workers. The 300,000 figure is based on Yesufu's report of 235,742 corrected for population growth.
TABLE 3.5--Trade Union and Strike Statistics in Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Registered Unions</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>No. of Strikes</th>
<th>No. of Strikers</th>
<th>Work Days Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,337</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17,044</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,338</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26,156</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>5,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>27,621</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>55,871</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52,747</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>76,362</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17,416</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>90,864</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>109,998</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>577,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144,389</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31,987</td>
<td>286,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>152,230</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6,930</td>
<td>20,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>143,282</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11,855</td>
<td>59,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>153,089</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10,024</td>
<td>26,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>165,130</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6,602</td>
<td>12,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>175,987</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>89,522</td>
<td>901,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>198,265</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23,623</td>
<td>61,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>234,742</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>63,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>254,097</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19,046</td>
<td>73,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>259,072</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23,072</td>
<td>70,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33,731</td>
<td>157,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>276,677</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18,673</td>
<td>57,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>282,800</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
<td>N.D.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964(June) 556***</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Gen.Strike 300,000-</td>
<td>5,200,000-</td>
<td>1,000,000-</td>
<td>14,600,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964(June 14- Sept.)</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>18,194</td>
<td>68,375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N.D.* = No Data

**This estimate assumes that the number of strikers varied between 300,000 and 1,000,000 which is the estimated number of wage earners. The strike lasted for fourteen days (see Chapter IX below).

***This figure is based on a listing kept by the registrar of trade unions. The actual number, estimated by the registrar, is 300.

figure of 45% membership in industrial unions masks the fact that 80% of these are house unions. Like an industrial union, the house union is composed of workers in the industry, but unlike the industrial union the house union limits its membership only to those workers working "in the house," usually for one employer.

TABLE 3.6--Trade Union Organization by Industry, 1958.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Total No. of Unions</th>
<th>No. of unions Rendering Returns</th>
<th>Membership Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Water, Sanitation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Industries</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>235,742</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Yesufu, p. 41

The Number of Youths in the Trade Unions

The fact that a great number of workers belong to house unions has multiplied the number of unions in Nigeria far beyond the needs of organization. As of 1965, there were about 600 unions registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions. Assuming that of the approximately 600 about 300 were operative and considering that every union had about 10 men on its executive, this would mean that there existed about 3,000
executive trade union positions. This may be an underesti-
mate since some of the larger unions such as the Post and 
Telegraph Workers Union include branch unions with their own 
executive committees. On the other hand, this may be an over-
estimate since any five men could join to register a union. 

Limiting ourselves to the executives of trade unions, 
it can be estimated that about one-third or about 1,000 exec-
utive positions could be occupied by Marxists,¹ but a smaller 
number would actually be in control of the Youths who com-
manded the central labour bodies.

Strikes

One notes from Table 3.5 that since the 1940's the strike 
has been a frequently used weapon in Nigeria. All major 
strikes such as those in 1945, 1955, and 1964 were strikes 
over wages. It is noteworthy that none were settled by 
existing industrial relations machinery, but by committees 
and "Commissions or Arbitrations."² Thus, for example, after 
the general strike of 1945, the Tudor Davis commission is 
appointed to deal with the problem of the Cost of Living Al-
lowance (COLA). In 1955 the Gorsuch Commission is appointed 
to inquire into conditions of employment of the established 
staff of all the Governments. In 1963 the Morgan commission 
is appointed to inquire into conditions of service and wages 
in both governments and private employment.

¹Out of 300 possible responses to a mailed question-
naire, we received 56 replies; of these, one-third were from 
trade union executives in the two central labour bodies which 
were then currently influenced if not controlled by Youths. 
It is on this basis that we estimate the number of positions 
possibility open to Youths to be at least one-third of the total 
number of positions. One-third is an underestimate because 
Marxists would be less likely than non-Marxists to respond to 
an "American social scientist."

²Yesufu, p. 59.
Appointing commissions to deal with labour issues has been a consequence of conflict between government and labour, but it has also caused conflict between government and labour. It should be noted that government as employer can change the wages and conditions of service of its workers but it cannot do so by fiat in the private sector. However, workers in the private sector have never accepted this division of responsibilities. Consequently whenever there is an adjustment in wages in the public sector, agitation for a wage adjustment takes place in the private sector. This accounts for the great number of work days lost. For example, in 1955, after workers in government service got a raise, workers in private establishments also demanded their "Gorsuch." Note, also, that in 1964, there were 68,375 days lost after June 14, when the General Strike was already over. This is accounted for by disputes between workers in private establishments who insisted on their "Morgan," and employers who refused to follow government in raising wages.

We shall discuss general strikes in greater detail in Chapters V and IX. Here let us note that one cannot understand about the timing and the organization of general strikes without reference to central labour bodies. It is to these that we next turn.

The Central Labour Bodies

We shall discuss the central labour bodies under seven headings: (1) Organization, (2) Youths and Neutralists, (3) International Affiliation, (4) ANTUF, (5) Break in ANTUF
Due to International Affiliation, (6) After ANTUF, (7) Youths in the Central Labour Bodies.

**Organization**

Constitutionally the Nigerian central labour bodies beginning with the first Trade Union Congress are modeled after the British TUC. They have a full time staff most of whose members are elected at the annual or biannual conferences. The staff tries to coordinate efforts of the member unions with the central labour body by means of appointed field secretaries. The purpose of the central labour bodies is to coordinate member unions in joint efforts beneficial to the labour movement. In practice this has largely meant that the elected and appointed staff is left without very much to do until a movement for a major strike develops.

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1 Some issues with which one central labour body, the United Labour Congress (ULC) sees itself concerned are as follows:

Resolutions passed at ULC Lagos District Council meeting, Nov. 23, 1962, in observance of Labour Week, 1962:

1. ULC directs letters to all the political parties . . . expressing disappointment at the reception which the problems of workers . . . and the claim for improved wages has received from the various governments . . .
2. ULC undertakes . . . organization of all grades of workers, including agricultural and other self-employed . . . sponsors . . . amalgamation of all unions with the same identity . . .
19. ULC reiterates its support . . . in matter of Britain's entry into common market
20. . . . ULC shall remain affiliated with the ICFTU, but the Congress shall take all reasonable steps to relieve that organization . . . of financial obligations connected with routine expenses of Congress.
Although, constitutionally, the full time staff of the central labour bodies is to be supported by the membership dues of the member unions, it had been reported that, in practice, up to 90% of the salaries, rent, mail and other expenses are paid by foreign support.

**Youths and Neutralists**

Although there appear to have been many central labour bodies called by many different names in Nigeria, closer examination reveals two major factions divided by two issues. The two are the Youths and for want of a better term, the Neutralist faction. Unlike the Youths who are anti-regionalist and Marxist, the Neutralists have accommodated themselves as best they could to the regionalist system, and they have supported alignment of Nigerian trade unions to the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and opposed the Youths in their bid to affiliate Nigerian trade unions to the pro-Eastern World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

It should be made clear in what sense the Neutralists are neutral. They are neutral in the sense that they allow individual trade unionists to join political parties of their choice, but they are not neutral with respect to the political party alignment and the international alignment of the central labour bodies and the trade unions.
Domestically they insist that the labour movement be independent of all parties. Thus, for example, the United Labour Congress, the direct descendant of the very earliest neutralist faction, lists in its constitution the following proviso:

The United Labour Congress seeks to fight against the projection of capitalism, communism, fascism, and national political partisanship in the Nigerian Labour Movement, but without prejudice to the rights of individual trade unionists to believe in any brand of political ideology or belong to a political party of his own choice.¹

This article, if seriously meant, places the ULC at odds with a group such as the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, all of whose officers are officers of the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party, a Marxist party. The aims of the NTUC are not only those of trade unionism but are those of establishing "scientific socialism" in Nigeria. Moreover if seriously meant, this article precludes political activity and precludes the challenging of the regionalist parties by the ULC.

Internationally, the Neutralists are not neutral. Article 2, Section 15 of the constitution states:

The ULC seeks to maintain fraternal relationships or affiliate with international trade union organizations as shall be determined by the Congress in accordance with this constitution.

Since 1956 the Neutralists have affiliated with the "Anti-Communist" International Confederation of Free Trade Unions."²

¹Draft Constitution of the United Labour Congress of Nigeria, Article 2, Section 12.

²It should be noted that since 1956, publicly, the Youths have denied that they are trying to affiliate trade
The two issues of anti-regionalism and international affiliation did not divide the two factions at the same time. The first issue to separate the two factions was the issue of political alignment and anti-regionalism. Thus the first Trade Union Congress which had been founded 31 July, 1943 was split after the strike of 1945 into a faction of militants who wanted to align unions to the NCNC and a faction which opposed the alignment of the TUC to any political party. The militant group called itself the Nigerian National Federation of Labour. The NNFL was the forerunner of all the central labour bodies that the Youths were to control subsequently. When we conclude the discussion of the strike of 1945 we shall touch on the formation of the NNFL.\(^1\) Here let us deal briefly with the issue of international affiliation and its consequences for the division of the Nigerian labour movement. The issue of international affiliation becomes salient with the end of the second World War and the emergence of the Cold war.

**International Affiliation**

There have always been international forces at work on Nigeria but never with such frequency and intensity as

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unions to any world body. It has been said, however, that the Youths have received support and funds from Ghana and from countries of the Eastern bloc. It was rumoured that on the eve of the Federal Elections, the Socialist Workers and Farmer Party received \(\text{£}50,000\) from East Germany.

\(^1\)See pages 119-122.
during and after the second World War. Students, returning soldiers and especially labour leaders became involved in international politics after the war. For example, by 1945, E. E. Esua of the Nigerian Union of Teachers was sent as an advisor on colonial matters with the British delegation to the international labour conference. In February of the same year, President Bankole and General Secretary Tokunboh of the Nigerian TUC attended the congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Since then hundreds of Nigerian trade union leaders affiliated to one or the other faction have traveled to the East and West.

On 28 November, 1949, the World Federation of Trade Unions split into an anti-communist wing calling itself the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and a pro-communist wing retaining the old name. This split was to have important consequences for the unity of the Nigerian central labour bodies for it precipitated the splintering of the ANTUF, the central labour body under which the NNFL and the TUC factions had come together in the early fifties.

**ANTUF**

The All Nigerian Trade Union Federation (ANTUF) was founded by 29 unions on July 31-August 2, 1953.\(^1\) The new

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\(^1\) Preceding the creation of the ANTUF, in July 1952, Youths and Neutralists formed a committee to prepare the foundations of the new federation. The Chairman of the committee was M.A.O. Imoudu and the secretary was L.U. Agonsiboty of the Nigerian Railway Workers Union. Others on the committee were H.P. Adebola of the Railway Station Staff Union, M.I. Ajorgbor of the Nigerian Civil Service Union,
central labour body was formed when the Youths, especially the former Zikists among them, were discredited by Azikiwe and broke with the NCNC. At this time the labour leaders of the TUC and the NNFL ceased quarrelling over affiliation to the NCNC. Moreover, the Youths were still not fully committed to the formation of a labour party. Hence, the two factions could unite and did in the ANTUF. But the coalition of factions was a restless one ready to break over another issue. This other issue was international affiliation.

**Break in ANTUF Due to International Affiliation**

On April 1956 the Council of ICFTU Affiliated Trade Unions with L. U. Agonsi, secretary, was set up by the ICFTU in Nigeria. Five unions and a federation of unions in mercantile houses joined the Council. A few months later the Enugu Council of Labour and the Nigerian Civil Service Union, formerly independents, applied for admission to the Council and to the ICFTU.

In November 1956, at the fourth annual conference of the ANTUF, which took place in Ebute-Metta, the Youths put together an amendment giving Imoudu greater powers and doing away with the position of the Chairman and vice-Chairman. The opposition took the opportunity to reject "communist" tactics, and tried to pass through a motion calling for

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N. A. Cole of Nurses Union, Chief Fagbenro-Beyioku of the Marine Workers Union, Gogo Chu Nzeribe of the Union of Post and Telegraph Workers and Ayo Ogunsheyed of the Nigerian Union of Teachers.
affiliation with the ICFTU. This motion was defeated 62-58. A new split was in the offing.

In January 1957, H. P. Adebola, L. L. Borha, N. A. Cole, N. A. P. Nwana and O. Egunwoke resigned their executive posts in the ANTUF and "these decidedly anti-communist leaders" as they were to be called by an ICFTU representative formed the National Council of Trade Unions-Nigeria (NCTUN).¹

Since 1957 when the ANTUF split the rhetoric of division between the Youths and the Neutralists was put into the terms of communist and anti-communist, but one should not confuse rhetoric with underlying conviction.⁰ There is a group of Youths who are Marxist in the sense of also supporting the Soviet Union and increasingly China in

¹Sec/Gen to Minister of Labour, April 20, 1957, ref. no. NCTUN. 2/1/57:

The inaugural Congress of the Council held on 17th of April . . . was attended by delegates from the following trade unions: Asso. of Loco Drivers, Nigerian Coal Miners Union, Nigerian Union of Seamen, RTSA, Amal Union of Customs and Excise Workers, NUNS, Nigerian African Mineworkers Union, Holts African Workers Union, R&PTSU, Union of Asiatic Workers, ATMN African Workers Union, Likomba Plantation Workers Union, NESCO Workers Union, SCOA Workers Union, Dutch African Workers Union, Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, BEWAC African Workers Union, PZ African Workers Union, Marine Flating Staff Union, NPA Clerical Staff Union, and Union of Printers and Allied Workers of Nigeria . . .

international conflicts, and there are Neutralists who look to the United States and Britain. But the majority of Youths are Marxists with respect to interpreting internal Nigerian politics and like their Neutralist friends they have come to concern themselves with international relations because they have become dependent on foreign money to keep the battle going or to build their own influence within the labour movement.¹

After ANTUF

After ANTUF and before independence, there are a few attempts at unity but they all fail. Thus in 1959, the ANTUF and the NCTUN combine in the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, with Michael Imoudu as President and Lawrence Borha as General Secretary. The TUCN lasts for a few months but again over the issue of international affiliation the Youths break with it, and form the Nigerian Trade Union Congress. In 1960, after months of effort by the Mbadiwe Unity Committee,² the two wings fail to unite, but in the process they change their names into the United Labour Congress (Neutralists) and the Independent United Labour Congress (Youths).

¹With the introduction of the check-off system (Labour Code [Amendment] Act 1960) it was believed that some of this dependence might decrease.

²Named after Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe, at the time, Federal Minister of Commerce and Industry.
From independence in October 1960, to the Federal Elections of December 1964, the situation changes remarkably. The British are out and the party Nationalists are in power. Increasingly the Neutralists in the trade union movement find it difficult not to turn against the regionalist system and the party nationalists. As an anti-regionalist faction begins to grow in the Neutralist camp, a basis for unity begins to develop between the Neutralists and the Youths. By September 1963, rapprochement between the two wings has gone so far as to lead to the formation of the Joint Action Committee and the joint prosecution of the General Strike in June 1964.¹

Ironically, after independence as rapprochement proceeds between the two factions, internally the two factions begin to splinter into sub-factions. On the Neutralist side dissension between the General Secretary, Lawrence Borha and some of his Assistant Secretaries leads to the formation of a breakaway faction led by N. Chukwurah. By 1963, the Chukwurah faction gets outside financing from the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (an old non-communist rival of the ICFTU) and founds the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC). The NWC holds its first conference in the spring of 1965.

On the Youths' side there develops a crisis between two factions. The first faction is led by Michael

¹See Chapter IX for more extended discussions of this process of rapprochement.
Imoudu, Chairman of the IULC and Amniefule Ikoro, the General Secretary of the IULC. The second faction is led by Wahab Goodluck, President of the IULC and S. U. Bassey, Assistant Secretary of the IULC. The dispute begins as a struggle over the General Secretaryship but soon develops into a crisis which splits not only the IULC but the Nigerian Youth Congress and the Socialist Workers and Farmers party.¹ On the labour side Goodluck and Bassey take over the IULC, while Imoudu and Ikoro join Gogo Chu Nzeribe in a loose confederation calling itself the Labour Unity Front.

**Youths in the Central Labour Bodies**

The Youths have more than a set of beliefs and values in common. We shall note below that they had no strongly institutionalized parties, but they were in touch with one another and they did command some scarce organizational resources in their labour movement. Thus the Youths were not randomly scattered throughout the labour movement but on the contrary one would be more likely to find them in association with, and against another of, the central labour bodies.

For example, on the eve of the General Strike of 1964, one would be more likely to find them in the NTUC than in the ULC and in the LUF than in the NWC. It should be noted however that although the leadership of the NTUC

¹For a discussion of these organizations and of the split, see Chapter VI below.
was controlled by Youth and the Secretary of the LUF was a Youth this does not mean that all Youths were in these bodies or that all persons in these bodies were Youths. On the contrary, for example, in the LUF the largest unions such as the Nigerian Union of Teachers, the Civil Service Union, and UAC Workers Union were not controlled by Marxists.

To be precise one must go beyond merely identifying certain labour organizations with the Youth; one should keep in mind that the real unit of organization among the Youths was never an organization such as a trade union or a central labour body, but a faction or a series of factions. Each faction was connected to the other by shared elements of belief and each was divided from the other by allegiance to this or that leader.

To identify the factions of Youths in the labour movement one has to step outside the trade union movement and the central labour bodies, and look at the labour parties that Youths were trying to launch. More often than not if there were two or more labour parties outside of the trade union movement, the Youth wing of the trade union movement would be divided into factions following this or that labour party. Let us now consider the Youths and the formation of labour parties.
The Youths and the Formation of a Labour Party

Before Independence

Since the general strike of 1945 there have been frequent attempts to form a labour party (both Marxist and non-Marxist) in Nigeria. Thus, in 1947, F. O. Coker, one of the militant leaders of the strike of 1945, tried to launch a labour party but was rebuffed both by Azikiwe and by Imoudu. In 1949, Nduka Eze and other Zikists, such as Ikenna Nzimiro, launched the Convention Peoples Party of Nigeria. After some internal fights, Imoudu, Eze, and Coker broke off to found the Nigerian Labour Party. The NLP was the political wing of the Nigerian National Federation of Labour and its successor, the Nigerian Labour Congress.

With the banning of the Zikist movement and after the debacle of the UNAMAG strike in 1950, the attempt to found a labour party is separated from the labour movement and concentrated in Marxist "study groups." Although they give themselves names such as Talakawa Party and the United Working Peoples Party, these are not parties but groups of free floating intellectuals, labour leaders, and politicians.

1 Much of the information in this section is repeated in later chapters. We include this section to provide the reader with an overview of some of the attempts to found a labour party.

2 Not to be confused with the NLP founded by Imoudu in August, 1964.

3 See Chapter VI.
who come together to exchange ideas and to publish manifestos. In the forefront of such groups are labour leaders such as Gogo Chu Nzeribe, A. Ikoro, and Michael Imoudu.¹ It is not until after independence that prospects for launching a labour party again seem good.

After Independence

On the eve of independence in October 1960, old Zikists like Mokwugo Okoye, and new Zikists call on "progressive" youths to join an organization called the Nigerian Youth Congress. By the spring of 1961, the NYC holds its first conference. Although at first the NYC is mostly an educational arrangement for an organization of like-minded Marxists, their followers, and students, it takes on life after the Lumumba riots in Lagos, February 16, 1961. The Nigerian Youth Congress was the forefront of the riots that took place in front of the Belgian and American embassies.² Gogo Chu Nzeribe read the funeral oration:

Patrice Lumumba, Mopolo and Okito are dead! What is dead? Is our respect for Lumumba and his associates dead, or our love for them as comrades, patriots, or our understanding for the ideas they lived and died for dead? Has the feeling and warnings of the neo-colonialist danger they aroused in our hearts vanished, or our knowledge of them as honest, courageous men? Surely, these can never die. True, Lumumba's lips may be dead, his words

¹See p. and p. below.

²The riots were led by the Nigerian Joint Action Committee for the Congo. The NJACC was sponsored by the Nigerian Youth Congress, the NTUC, the Nigerian Union of Students, and the Pan Africanist Movement. Besides the American embassy there were a number of expatriate firms which were damaged. See Nigerian Daily Times, 18 February, 1961.
and deeds shall live on in the hearts of us all!¹

Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe recall how exhilarated they felt that at last, after years of study-group work, they were involved in direct action and no longer isolated.

But the unity and seeming relevance of the NYC was to be short-lived. A factional dispute which had been brewing in the labour movement and which was to affect the NYC as well as other groups erupted in 1963. This factional dispute to which we turn below was based on ideology as well as personality and was to divide the labour movement throughout the period of the General Strike of 1964 and the Federal Elections of 1964.

Factional Disputes Among the Youths Before the Strike of 1964

The post-independence factional dispute among the Youths begins with a contest for power between the A. Ikoro, Michael Imoudu faction and the Wahab Goodluck, S. U. Bassey faction for control of the Independent United Labour Congress (IULC) which by 1962 is the most current name for the central labour body and the group of unions over which the Youths have some influence.

Concomittantly as the two factions are jockeying for power within the IULC, each is also laying the ground-work for the foundation of a labour party. Secretly the Ikoro-Imoudu

¹Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Funeral Oration Delivered on the Ocaaision of Mourning of the Brutal Murder of the Late Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo.
faction is sounding out Youths and other trade unionists for support of what they were planning to call the Revolutionary Socialist Labour Party. The Goodluck-Bassey faction is sounding out support for what they were going to call the Labour Party.

In the spring of 1962 at the Jos Conference of the IULC, having been accused of misappropriating funds, Ikoro is removed as General Secretary, S. U. Bassey takes his place and the Imoudu-Ikoro faction quit the IULC. A few months later most of the faction joins with Gogo Chu Nzeribe's union and with some other big unions to found a loose confederation of unions, calling itself the Labour Unity Front.

When news of the rift reaches the NYC, Eskor-Toyo, one of its influential secretaries, steps into the breach to offer his services in reconciliation. Prompted by Eskor-Toyo and other neutral Youths, the Central Council of the NYC passes a motion in favour of seeking to unite the warring factions, but it goes even beyond this step. The Secretariat is asked to call a meeting of all factions in the labour movement and of Marxist factions outside of the labour movement in order to study the possibility of launching a Marxist party under whose wing all factions could work.

Despite some tensions the conference which is held on April, 1963, is a success. The delegates support the
foundation of a Marxist-Leninist party which is to be called the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP). The Conference concludes its business with the setting up of a secretariat for the party, naming a committee of twenty-five to prepare the manifesto and the constitution, and calling for a resumption of the conference in August.¹

No sooner had the April conference completed its business that conflict develops between the two factions. It turns out that out of the Imoudu-Ikoro group only Ikoro is elected to the constitutional committee. If this is not bad enough, when the committee meets it is discovered that Ikoro's name has been left out, and he is refused a seat.

These developments Eskor-Toyo explains by suggesting that Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, the President of the NYC, had all along been in league with the Goodluck-Bassey faction of the IULC, and that he and his friends used the opportunity afforded by Eskor-Toyo's peace keeping efforts to read the Imoudu-Ikoro faction out of the Marxist movement.

If this interpretation is correct, the tactic of the Goodluck-Bassey-Otegbeye faction boomeranged. A split which had divided only the IULC now carries over into the NYC itself and threatens the unity of the SWAFP. By August of 1964, two months after the general strike the

SWAFP is itself split, and Imoudu, Ikoro, and Eskor-Toyo found the Nigerian Labour Party.

The "London Group" and the "Professional Revolutionaries"

Underlying the Imoudu-Ikoro and Goodluck-Otegbeye split within the left during the sixties are two important issues: one is the question of roots, and the second is the question of strategy with respect to the regionalist parties. Turning to roots one notes that almost everyone in the Imoudu faction is either a former Zikist or an early Marxist. Almost no one except for Ikoro, who stayed in Ghana for six years, has been away from Nigeria. On the contrary, the Otegbeye group is filled with young men who instead of pursuing "revolutionary" work in Nigeria, left Nigeria during the doldrums of the fifties for training abroad. Thus the epithet "London Group" thrown at them by Eskor-Toyo, who accuses them of "opportunism" and "reformism."

It must be stated here that the Otegbeye-Goodluck group and their petty bourgeois "London Group" professionals [Otegbeye is a Doctor] do not like to see Imoudu, Ikoro, Khayam, Jonas and other of their type, precisely because these elements are more revolutionary, more ready to make sacrifices, less opportunistic . . . . This group is a hardened group of devoted and professional revolutionaries. . . .

It is only to be expected that "old Youths" such as Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo who have been in the movement since the

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1 Eskor-Toyo, p. 8.
General Strike of 1945 and before, would be reluctant to share positions in the movement with new Youths such as Dr. Otegbeye and Wahab Goodluck.

Turning to the issue of strategy with respect to the regionalist parties, one notes that there are at least two positions a Marxist can take. He can choose the more "progressive" party or a wing of a party and join in a united front, or he can oppose all regionalist parties. On the eve of the General Strike and the Federal Elections of 1964, the Otegbeye-Goodluck faction chose the "united front" line, and the Imoudu-Eskor-Toyo-Ikoro group chose the line of opposition and non-cooperation.¹

Thus, in 1964, in an obvious allusion to the UPGA, Dr. Otegbeye wrote:

The party must learn the fine art of winning allies and supporting the forces which stand on progressive positions in local conflicts.²

Referring to Otegbeye's call for a united front, Eskor-Toyo, said in rebuttal:

Rather than seek ways of bringing the devoted revolutionaries around Imoudu... into the party, Otegbeye is more interested in bourgeois groups like the NCNC, and Action Group.³

... Bourgeois democracy in Nigeria is limited by colonial and feudal survivals and by imperialism. ... The

¹This was to change with the Electoral crisis of 1964, see Chapter XIV.


³Eskor-Toyo, p. 9.
struggle for national democracy . . . has to be waged . . . by the workers and peasants. . . . The revolution . . . can and must lead at once to the building of socialism.¹

The Relative Strengths of the Nigerian Labour Party and Socialist Workers and Farmers Party

Because the two parties were short lived it is difficult to estimate their relative strength. Nevertheless, we do have election returns for the Federal Election of December 1964 and March 1965.

Turning to the SWAFP first, in March 1965 it received 18,141 votes out of a total of 1,549,659 cast in the Eastern Region. In December 1964, it received 676 out of 410,841 in the Midwest and 1,530 out of 1,437,429 in the Western region. It is not possible to estimate the strength of the SWAFP in the North and in Lagos.

In the North the SWAFP was in favor of the Northern Progressive Front but it did not contest elections on its own ticket. The Front won 258,913 out of 2,363,554 votes cast. In Lagos, the UPGA boycott was so successful in December that only 500 votes were cast. In March, UPGA swept the field in Lagos, receiving 82,153 votes out of 90,150 cast.²

Taking the results of the Eastern Region as being least ambiguous, it is possible to note that SWAFP was able to poll about 1% of the votes cast. In Enugu, where it

¹Eskor-Toyo, p. 10.
²For electoral figures see Mackintosh, pp. 597, 598, 601, 603.
was most successful it was able to poll 540 out of 14,765 votes cast. One estimates therefore that about 4% of the votes cast represents the upper limit of the SWAFP support in the period we are considering.¹

Total support for the NLP is even more difficult to estimate. The party had an even shorter life than the SWAFP and its candidate in Lagos, Michael Imoudu was prevented in showing his real strength by the boycott of December 1964. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, 10% of a sample of trade union leaders indicated unambiguous support for Imoudu. Assuming the total wage earning population of Lagos at 120,000² and assuming that an upper limit of 10% would vote for Imoudu if given a chance we can place an upper limit of 12,000 supporters of Imoudu in Lagos. Since the NLP was rudimentary in its organization in other cities one would expect that the 12,000 figure represents an upper limit for all of Nigeria in the period June 1964 to December 1964.

We shall resume the story of the two factions, the SWAFP and the NLP. We now turn to a discussion of the emergence of the Youths in the labour movement and in Nigerian politics.

¹Mackintosh, p. 313.

²Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964, Table 2.3. The upper limit of 12,000 assumes ordinary wage-earners would vote the way trade-union leaders would vote.
CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE OF THE YOUTHS I: IMOUDU AND
THE RISE OF MILITANT TRADE UNIONISM
ON THE RAILWAYS

Having introduced in Chapters II and III some of the actors and parameters of the regionalist system and of the labour movement, we are ready to turn to the question of the emergence of the Youths. As was stated earlier (Chapter II) the Youths are anti-regionalist, Marxists, and affiliated with the labour movement in Nigerian cities. This combination of characteristics is not incidental, but the product of Nigerian history giving rise to militancy in the trade unions, political involvement by labour activists with the regionalist NCNC, and political disappointment with the NCNC turned regionalist. We tell the story of the emergence of the Youths in the labour movement in two ways. First, we examine the rise of Michael A. O. Imoudu, a militant trade union leader on the railways. Second, in Chapter V we shall examine how this leader and other leaders became politicized --became more than simply trade unionists--during and after the general strike of 1945.

Michael Imoudu, the Grand Old Man of the Union

The emergence of militant trade unionism in Nigeria revolves about a few dedicated men such as Michael Imoudu, the President of the Nigerian Railway and Ports Workers
Union; Nduka Eze, the former President of the Zikist Movement, Amnefule Ikoro, once advisor to Kwame Nkrumah and one of the secretaries of the Nigerian Labour Party; and Gogo Chu Nzeribe, the General Secretary of the Posts and Telegraph Workers Union. Of the four, Imoudu is the oldest and most prominent. His life spans the very inception of militant trade unionism. It is for this reason that we begin the story of the Youths with the story of Michael Imoudu, known as "Number One," or "the Old Man."

Imoudu is the Old Man for three reasons. In a society which respects age he is the Old Man because he is older than most leaders—he was born on November 10, 1902. He is an Old Man because he is an old activist and one of the early nationalists. Finally, he is the Old Man because in the stories and legends of the early labour movement, he stands out as the genuine article: the impoverished, unskilled worker who founded a union and successfully fought the white management. When he is being pretentious, he walks about town in the manner of an Oba, shaking a fly whisk, the symbol of authority. Yet, his "people" are not the Ora of Ishan province where he was born, but those whom he calls "the workers" and "the youth," and they come from many different tribes to the city. And in still another sense, Imoudu is called "the Old Man." Imoudu is not an "intellectual."

When he refers to himself, jokingly using pidgin, he says, "I no read book;" and the young men laugh, some with affection, others with scorn.

Among the old men and the "Youths" of the nationalist period, there are few like him. Unlike him, they came to
the city to earn money and left the city when they became old, or when they made enough to live in style in their villages. Imoudu, once he came to Lagos, never left it. He raised his children there and never bothered to send them "home." Although he belongs to the Ora town union¹ in Lagos, he does not take a leading role in it. Satisfied with being a patron of the union, he leaves the running of it to younger men.

Imoudu's militancy on behalf of the trade union may be due to his being a town man--no longer a man of the "bush"--committed to city men. How did this come about? Why do some men live in the city with their bodies, but with their minds inhabit the country and run to it at the first opportunity, while others come to the city and become metropolitans, city men? Imoudu's past gives us some clues.

Conditions for the Self-Selection of a Militant

As Imoudu tells the story, when he was a boy and heard of his father's exploits in the outside world, he was overcome by a yearning for adventure and ran away. He was so cunning in eluding his people, that he was not brought back for many days. Unlike other men in the city and labour force in general, farmers, artisans, or traders, that is, men who made their living in and from the village,

¹"Town unions," "progressive unions," "family unions," are all terms designating voluntary associations in the city whose membership is based on common kinship or at least common ethnic ties.
Imoudu's father was a soldier who, during the war of 1914, saw something of the outside world in East Africa. Could it be that because his father was the first to break the crust of village life, Imoudu did not, in guilt perhaps, have to return to it? His father had set Imoudu free for the city. Being the second generation to have close contact with the city and its ways, Imoudu is similar to many of the much younger Youth. A break with the village allows a man like Imoudu certain freedoms even his younger followers find radical. For example, Imoudu has had three wives, but only the second is an Ora from his village. The other two are Bini-speaking and not acquainted with his people.

In 1922, both his parents died on the same day, and the young man was left as a houseboy in the family of one of his father's relations, Izeke, a linesman of the railways. Taking Imoudu along, this Izeke traveled from Benin to other cities in the Midwest and East. In his early twenties, Imoudu lived in cities like Warri, Sapele, and Onitsha. His school fees paid by his relative, Imoudu began his education at the Sapele Christian Missionary Society (CMS) Grammar School and completed Standard Six at Agbo Government College, Onitsha. In the meantime, he had also become a Catholic, and learned fluent Ibo. In his socialization by a "Metropolitan" relative, his early traveling, his acquisition of an education far from his native region, his learning of other Nigerian languages, Imoudu is once again surprisingly typical of Youths in the labour movement.
One suspects that in general, education, early travel, foreign languages, early contact with a citified relative are all preconditions for becoming a leader of city people. It is in having a father who had broken with the village that allows a man to esteem city people and become a city man.

**Formation of Political Attitudes: Africanization on the Railways and the Emergence of Militant Leaders**

In 1929, at the age of twenty-six, Imoudu came to Lagos looking for work. He stayed a year with James Ajemai, a townsman, before he found work as a laborer on the railways at 3 shillings a day. A year later he became an apprentice turner and thus began his career on the railway.

Imoudu says that it was during his seven-year apprenticeship that he began to sense the injustices of some of the practices on the railway. For example, labourers were hired and when no longer needed, they were sacked regardless of how long they had been working. He sensed the all-pervasive fear and insecurity of the African workers on a white-run line. He called this fear, "the ugly ghost."\(^1\) A few months after qualifying as a turner, he was involved in his first strike action, "to protest the arrogant treatment by the European foreman."\(^2\) Accustomed to ready acquiescence, if not indeed dependence from trade unions, a paternalistic management could not accept new types of

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\(^1\) Personal interview. \(^2\) Ibid.
leaders like Imoudu, who went out of their way to be arrogant, to create troubles on the railways. Consider that as late as December 31, 1940, the secretary of the African Civil Service Union on the railways, could end a letter to the General Manager with the words: "My association is delighted to feel that the relationship between them and the Honourable General Manager are fast assuming those of a son and father, a ward and guardian."\(^1\) And now one understands the consternation of one Mr. T. B. Welch, who on December 1, 1943, wrote to the Chief Mechanical Engineer:

> At 9:55 a.m. I witnessed the works manager calling Imoudu back from the carriage and wagon shop. . . . Imoudu turned round but took no notice whereupon the works manager sent his messenger to call him back. Imoudu informed the messenger, "I am not going back." About three minutes later, I saw Imoudu outside the office . . . and stated that either Mr. Duggan was the Manager of the workshops or Imoudu. [To this the cheeky Imoudu replied,] "He may be the Manager of the shops, but I am the Manager of the men."\(^2\)

Sixteen years later, Imoudu led his union on a strike in the railways which culminated in the resignation of the expatriate General Manager and his replacement by a Nigerian, for the first time in the history of the Nigerian railway.

The practice of using the strike for quasi-political purposes was initiated by Imoudu and others in the semi-nationalist, semi-industrial struggles against the white

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\(^2\)NRC File SC 24.12, Vol. 2; RWU, Nigerian Railway Corp. Lagos.
imperial management. That these militants were able to call the workers out on strike over issues which began with "arrogance" and ended in the series of strikes in 1959, leading to the resignation of Sir Ralf Emerson, the General Manager, is a development stemming only partly from the capacities of the leaders or the degree of their militancy. It is important to turn now to the changes in industrial relations on the railways, to understand why there existed a "market" of workers' interests which could be "sold" the anti-imperialist appeals of the leaders.

Differentiation of the Industrial from the Traditional Sector and Integration of Blue Collar Workers into Trade Unions

If the two processes which characterize modernization are differentiation and integration of institutional spheres, structures, and roles with respect to values of achievement and universalism, then the history of trade union growth on the railways shows symptoms of modernization.

The development of trade unions seems to have had two sources. One was the white management, which needed better relations with its staff, and the other, the African workers who needed more money and better conditions of service to live well in the city. As would be expected, the management thought it better to begin with the literate and "docile" clerks, than with the illiterate and unruly, semi-rural, daily-paid workers. Thus, in April, 1919, we have a note sent to the General Manager of the railways, reading:
We are requested by a meeting of the railway employees at EB [Ebute-Metta, Lagos] Headquarters to inform you that a union of Native Staff of Nigerian Railway has been formed which will be worked on similar lines to the NCSU\(^1\) in Lagos . . .\(^2\)

In the same year, the First Annual Report of the Nigerian Railway Native Staff Union (as the NSNR came to be called) bears the entry: "It was also agreed that unskilled labourers are not eligible."\(^3\)

The first officers were elected by a meeting of "Senior and first class clerks of all departments."\(^4\) The President, N. P. Williams, the Vice-President, A. S. Coker, and the Secretary, J. D. Akihanmi were Africans. The critical post of treasurer was co-opted by Mr. Faulkner Shaw, an officer of the railway, and an Englishman.\(^5\)

Although the first signs of unionization were "cordial meetings" in the General Manager's office, called at the behest of Mr. Faulkner Shaw, something was soon heard from the "unskilled labourers." We have the following entry, dated January, 1920:

There was a strike of some workmen on daily wages in the Loco Department at EB which . . . spread rapidly throughout the line and affected Ibadan, Offa, Minna, Zaria . . . also members of menial staff of the Traffic Department. The workmen in the Public Works and the Marine Departments at Lagos and Apapa struck at the same time.

\(^1\)Nigerian Civil Service Union, founded 19 August 1912.


\(^3\)Ibid. \(^4\)Ibid. \(^5\)Ibid.
The cause seems to have been "discontent" due to "insufficiency of wages, the cost of living having abnormally increased."¹

Although the workers went on strike because of a wage issue, it is interesting to note that in 1920, neither their organization, nor they themselves were as yet segregated from traditional influences:

A general mass meeting of mechanics and labourers . . . was held at Lagos where Faulkner Shaw, N. F. Williams, A. S. Coker, J. M. Okuyiga, and J. D. Akihanmi addressed the workers, pointing out that the strike was not constitutional and urging the men to return to work . . .²

At this meeting Chief Oluwa, of Lagos and another white-capped chief, as delegates from Prince Eleke were present. They also addressed the meeting.

The conditions under which the workers would return were conveyed to the General Manager by Chief Oluwa who led the men to the railway yard. A labour board of enquiry was formed . . .³

During the strike of 1964, when Prince Oyekan, the Oba of Lagos, asked the workers to go back to work he was listened to politely and then ignored. In a little over a generation, the workers had learned to differentiate between the spheres of traditional and industrial authority.

Paralleling the differentiation of industrial from traditional authority, there occurred differentiation within the industrial sector itself. The dimensions of differentiation usually coincided with the needs of the workers

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.
and the opportunities open to them. First, as we have seen, the management introduced the distinction between the white collar clerks and the blue collar skilled and unskilled workers. Between 1920 and 1938, there were a number of strikes from which sprang short-lived organizations. The first ongoing organization directed and composed of lower echelon workers was the Workmen's Association, founded in 1938. The Railway Workers Union, (as the Workmen's Association came to be called), founded by Michael Imoudu, then differentiated further by job category into the Station Staff Union and Loco Drivers Union, leaving the mechanics and daily-paid workers in the RWU. It has survived to the present, despite the fact that it differentiated again along dimensions of skill. (The Railway Technical Staff Association's break with the RWU is an example.)

Labour and Nationalist Politics

Although much of the history of trade unionism on the railways can be seen simply as the differentiation of industrial relations from tribal affairs, another important element enters the process when one considers that the management of the railways represented, not only the economic interests of management, but also the political interests of whites and of the Empire. In reaction to these political interests, there arose on the railways,
as in other industries, a leadership which became increas-
ingly involved in the nationalist struggle and carried that struggle from industry into politics and back.

The history of workers' agitation on the railways and elsewhere gives us a broader understanding of the nationalist movement. Until now, scholars like Coleman had emphasized the role of the elite, the clerks, businessmen, journalists, etc. in launching the movement. This is probably true, if the nationalist movement is seen principally in terms of party organization and activity. The history of the RWU would indicate, however, that limited, sullen, but none-
theless, effective anti-Imperial and anti-white struggle grew out of the interaction of African workers with imperial management some years before 1944, when the NCNC was founded. Moreover, the struggle, to the extent that it was a struggle in which ordinary men participated, occurred in the cities where the workers and their leaders played a salient role. Thus, it is understandable that labour leaders who had participated in the nationalist movement feel cheated of its victory.

The differentiated unions led by militant, second gen-
eration metropolitan leaders engaged the railway management in struggles, whose causes were not simply industrial, but overlapped with quasi-political and anti-imperial causes. Anti-imperial activity, of course, was not limited to the labour movement. Dr. Azikiwe and his early followers, a section of the elites of Lagos, had started a series of
actions and protests, described so well by Coleman and Sklar, which were to lead to the founding of the NCNC and the launching of the nationalist struggle in its party form. At the founding meetings of the NCNC, trade union leaders like Imoudu, Alhaji Adebola, N. A. Cole and others were present; the nationalist movement had woven together its two strands.

Since independence and before, the two strands have become untangled. The old nationalist labour leaders, like Imoudu, have either gone into opposition, or, like Alhaji Adebola, into restless accommodation. What happened? To understand this, we must once more tell the story of the nationalist period, but this time from the point of view of the labour leaders.

In 1942, while extending his trade union activities to the United Africa Companies (UAC) and Public Works Department (PWD) workers, Imoudu, with Dr. Azikiwe's backing in the West African Pilot, launched what was to be the first of a series of industrial actions which should be understood as part of an incipient national protest movement. In one such action, in December 1942, Imoudu led a march of railway workers to protest the firing of some workers and the over-staffing of the railways with white men. "The march began in Ebute-Metta and soon we collected a crowd. At the race course, we hold a mass-meeting . . . (Governor)
Bourdillon was annoyed.\textsuperscript{1} For such activities, threatening the "peace of the colony,"\textsuperscript{2} Imoudu was banished first to a prison in Benin (where he organized a strike of prisoners) and then to Auchi, thirty-six miles from Ora. In a way, by banning Imoudu, Bourdillon played right into Dr. Azikiwe's hands. With consummate skill, the Pilot made Imoudu, the labour leader, into a martyr of the nationalist movement. This public relations work was to yield rich dividends when, in June of 1945, a section of the TUC with the backing of the NCNC began a general strike, lasting for thirty-seven days.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.} \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}
CHAPTER V


The general strike of 1945 had important consequences for the politicization of the labour movement and for the permeation of the nationalist movement with labour people.

The strike elevated labour leaders like Michael Imoudu to national and even international prominence. These radical labour leaders were of great importance to a nationalist movement which had not yet decided whether to pursue its goals by peaceful or violent means.

If independence was to be gained by peaceful means then the significance of the radical leaders and their followers who were willing to riot or join military movements would not be very great. On the other hand, if independence was to be gained by violent means, radical leaders in touch with the masses would then be badly needed. Showing that they had made contact with the masses during the strike of 1945, labour leaders greatly enhanced their prestige and credibility in a nationalist movement not yet decided on its strategy.¹

¹As late as April 5, 1948, Dr. Azikiwe threatened to use violent means:
Below we shall merely touch on the causes of the strike and we shall briefly indicate who were the main actors. We wish to demonstrate that in the period 1945-1950, the period of the strike and for five years after, the leadership of the labour movement formed an important wing of the nationalist movement. It is the regionalization of Nigeria and the awareness that independence will come by peaceful means which destroys the labour-nationalist alliance and sets the stage for the Youths' own venture into politics. Since then the Youth have been opposed not only to the leadership of the nationalist movement, but to the very structure of Nigerian government.

Discussing the causes of the strike of 1945, Coleman points to a series of factors associated with the Second World War and its consequences on Nigeria. Among these were direct involvement of the government in the economy, the military experience, urbanization, trade unionization, and inflation. Without repeating his discussion of the

In reading through certain excerpts from one of Barere's speeches during the French Revolution, I ran across the following: "The tree of liberty grows only when watered by the blood of tyrants." In view of what has happened in the history of many countries, it saddens my heart to think of gaining the independence of our country in this inhuman way. In truth, my faith in Great Britain has waned and I am compelled to admit openly my belief that freedom for Nigerian and the Cameroons can no longer be expected to come to us easily without tremendous sacrifice.

(From a Presidential Address to the annual convention of the NCNC which was held at the Rex Cinema, Kaduna, April 5, 1948. Zik: Selections from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Cambridge University Press, 1961, p.165.)
interaction of these factors, suffice it to say that the period of the Second World War had a profound effect in terms of modernizing Nigeria and socializing her into the world culture.¹ In the political sphere, these global forces provided opportunities for the emergence of radical nationalism, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his party, the NCNC, and in the labour sphere these global forces provided opportunities for the emergence of militant trade unionism.

On the eve of the strike, nationalist politics was divided between the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the more "radical" NCNC. Although other approaches are available, in what follows, we shall examine the strike from the perspective of the nationalist movement, as manifested in the inter-penetration of the labour and political spheres. Two sources for such an inquiry are the Daily Service, organ for the NYM, and the West African Pilot, organ of the budding NCNC. From these papers, taking different positions on the same event, supporting some leaders and opposing others, one gets a sense of who in the labour movement was for whom in the party fight and vice versa.²

¹Coleman, pp. 230 ff.

²Newspapers in Nigeria and especially Dr. Azikiwe's West African Pilot played an important role in mobilizing nationalist sentiment in the early forties. Contrasting the Pilot to older Nigerian Newspapers, Increase Coker notes:

For the first time the smiling face of a Third Class Clerk in the Government or commercial houses appeared side by side with that of a lawyer or a politician. Gone, clearly, was the day when newspaper publicity
The Initiation of the Strike and the Coming of Imoudu

Whatever the ultimate causes of the strike, in the first instance the issues were articulated as a demand for increased wages, or Cost of Living Allowance (COLA). "During the period 1939-1942, the cost of living rose by 50 to 75 per cent in urban centers."¹ In the forefront of these demands were the recently formed TUC and African Civil Service and Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) led by men such as T. A. Bankole, President of both organizations and A. S. Coker, Vice-President of the TUC and President of the Federated Unions of Native Authority Staff (FUNAS).²

Protests were made, not only by the umbrella organizations, such as the TUC and ACSTWU, but also frequently by spokesmen for the individual unions. For example, in the January to June period, 1945, both the Nigerian Civil Service Union was the prerogative of only those at the top of society. The mass appeal of the Pilot was faithfully reflected in its circulation. Three years after its debut [on November 22, 1932, the first issues appeared], it boasted a daily circulation of 12,000 by far the greatest in the history of the Nigerian Press.


¹Coleman, p. 256.

²When, on June 13, the ACSTWU made its demands for COLA, the following were co-signers: NRWU, Land and Survey Technical Workers Union, Government Press Technical Workers, Post and Telegraph Workers, P & T Linesmen, Electrical Workers Union, Marine Workers Union, Medical Dept. Workers Union, FWD Ijora Sawmill Workers Union, Nigerian Union of Nurses, Lagos Town Council Workers Union, Locomotive Drivers Union, FWD Workers Union, P & T Telegraph Inspectors, and Railway Station Staff Union. On June 19, the Amalgamated Union of Mercantile Workers, the Printers and Technical Workers Union, and NUT came out in support.
and the Nigerian Locomotive Drivers Union demanded that a commission be named to investigate salaries. On February 21, the NRWU voted "no satisfaction" in the Railway Labour and Welfare Office.

Although at first the strike was articulated in non-political, neutral terms, the quality as well as the intensity of the demands were to change however when Governor Bourdillon, hoping to avert the strike, released Imoudu from detention at Auchi. Zik, with the help of Herbert Macauley, organized a reception for the now legendary labour leader. When Imoudu arrived at the Ebute-Metta station in Lagos, on June 2, 1945, an ordinary clerk wrote in ebullient language:

> there was indeed an outburst of enthusiastic cheerings of all kinds of people irrespective of political affiliation, different walks of life or calling, status, creed or religion.¹

The procession wound down Agege Motor Road to the Oke-Awo playground which was packed with

- cosmopolitan crowds of sight-seers and merry makers, including school boys, expsoldiers, market guild-women, all-wage earners, pensioners, money-lenders, Omolanne-men, brickmakers, including independent artists, artistes, and artisans, bookbinders, printers, carpenters, and also Ministers of religion and Ministers of State, Jurists, Legislators, Actuaries, and Auctioneers.²

The city folk, roused by Zik and the Pilot, in a mood of great expectancy after the war, rallied behind Imoudu and the labour leaders of the TUC.

²Ibid.
All mustered strong to see and welcome the deported, exiled, banished, detained, and restricted Hero, Imoudu, whom much had been said and done and whom they so long expected riding on the White Horse back. ¹

The white horse was Zik's idea.

The coming of Imoudu gave Zik, the NCNC, and the Pilot, a lever and a spokesman within labour ranks on the eve of the strike. From June 6-12, the Pilot runs a front page series "by our staff reporter" and a series of inside page editorials on Imoudu. The following are sample headings:

"Imoudu Recounts the Story of his Early Struggle in the Railway Yard" (June 6)

"Imoudu Gives the Inside Story of his Confinement in Benin Prison" (June 7)

"Imoudu Says Quest for Proper COLA Just Beginning" (June 8)

"Imoudu Tells How He Marched with 2000 Workers to the Government House . . . Fateful Lockout of 1941 Recalled" (June 9)

"Imoudu Concludes Dramatic Series on Events Preceding COLA; Says Government Will Have to Rescue Workers" (June 12)

The Daily Service, speaking for the NYM, is conspicuous in omitting any mention of Imoudu.

No sooner had the strike been called for midnight, June 21, and the workers mobilized, that Erinle and Osindero, of the ACSTWU executive, issued a bulletin postponing the strike for 14 days, ostensibly because further negotiation was possible. But it was too late to stop the strike now:

¹Ibid.
At 12 Midnight, the Loco Drivers gave the signal by blowing the whistles. So far as the Government Technical Workers were concerned, it was a total war.  

A mass meeting of the ACSTWU voted no confidence in its leaders, Bankole, Erinle, Abosede, and Bosah, and decided to go ahead with the strike. The Joint Executive of the ACSTWU and TUC was forced to resign, claiming that "the masses of the workers had misconstrued the good intentions of their leaders."  

Clerical-Technical Split

Similar repudiation involving votes of no confidence in the existing leadership took place in the RWU (where workers hoot Bankole, Erinle, Bosah, and Osindero off the platform), in the Lagos Town Council Workers Union, the Posts and Telegraph (P & T) Marine Workers Union, and the Government Press Technical Workers Union (an affiliate of ACSTWU). However, workers employed in the private sector, represented by the Amalgamated Union of Mercantile Workers (AUMW), decided to give the employers more time to consider the demand for more COLA.  

Two attempts are made to halt the strike and restore the old leadership. First, the ousted leaders, headed by A. S. Coker, form the "June 1945 Strike Conciliation

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1 Luke M. E. Emegulu, A Brief History of the Railway Workers Union, Lagos, p. 53. Emegulu was a secretary of the Railway Workers Union and a leading figure in the strike.  

2 West African Pilot, June 22, 1945.
Committee," which tries to negotiate with the Commissioner of Labour, but "Mr. Coker made it clear that the leaders . . . represented nobody as they had been removed from office by the entire working mass."¹ A second attempt at reconciliation and cessation of the strike is made on July 4 by Dr. Akinola-Maja, President of the NYM and future father of the Action Group. Under Dr. Maja's impetus, an "All-Nigeria Workers Goodwill Committee" is formed. On July 5, the ANWGC, also known as the "Maja Peace Committee," issues a resolution proposing that: (1) the workers return to work, (2) the Lagos community guarantee that the strikers would not be penalized, and (3) the Peace Committee try to get those union leaders then under arrest discharged.² On July 6, however, a mass meeting of all technical workers denounced the Maja Peace Mission, and the old leaders stayed out for the duration of the strike.

The new group, styling itself the "Nigerian Technical Workers Union," is led by F. O. Coker, of the P & T Workers Union, and Imoudu, of the RWU.

The strikers' committee held their meetings in President Imoudu's house. Sometimes meetings were held in the office of the RWU . . .³

¹Daily Service, June, 27, 1945.
²The resolution was signed by S. Bosah (RWU), M. A. Abosede (GPTWU), N. O. Awolowo (R. Typographical Society), L. B. A. Wey (NMWU), T. A. Onitiri (RRSU), O. Okagbue (Land & Survey Workers), A. S. Coker (Postal Workers Union), A. O. Bassey (PWD Electrical Workers), and J. Ajayi (LTC Workers).
³Emejulu, pp. 57-59. The committee was: Imoudu, F. O. Coker, S. A. George, J. Okaka, T. O. Ododu, and L. Emejulu.
The formation of these two committees, one led by Bankole of the ACSTWU, and one led by Imoudu of the RWU, highlights the division between radical blue-collar technical workers, such as those in the Locomotive Drivers Union, and the more moderate, white-collar workers, of, for example, the Railway Civil Service Union.

After the strike, on September 4, 1945, Azikiwe editorialized in the _Pilot_ on the role the trade unions had played. His attack on the TUC and Bankole is interesting in that it seeks to identify the leadership of the civil service unions as inadvertent puppets of the government itself. He accepts into the nationalist movement only those leaders without a history of cooperative negotiation with the government which means mostly the technical unions. Azikiwe also calls attention to the sporadic nature of the strike and the lack of any real central leadership. It appears from this editorial, that the skeletal central organization that _did_ manage to emerge was chiefly due to the RWU and its comparatively superior organizational structure. To quote Azikiwe:

The main point is that the trade unions in Nigeria are government sponsored . . . it explains the peculiar psychology of those at the helm of our Labour Department and the labour organizers of Nigeria who feel a certain amount of inhibition and indecision in the execution of their duties as trade union leaders. Added to this is the fact that most trade unions are badly organized and lacking funds . . . The TUC, due to its financial embarrassment, became a sort of Cinderella subject to the vagaries of the colonial administration. It is not to be wondered at that when matters came to a crisis the very leader who had challenged government
had to swallow his word when the official showdown came and he relinquished leadership of the TUC voluntarily.

. . . The main trade unions which went on strike were not country-wide, with the possible exception of the railway workers whose organization and administration stand out as almost perfect.¹

From the above discussion, one sees that the relationship between the clerical unions and the colonial administration represented the following dilemma: on the one hand, the unions needed and wanted government recognition, not to speak of financial assistance. But, at the same time, peaceful co-existence with the government removed these unions from active leadership in the nationalist movement.

The Effects of the Strike

The strike ended on 3 August 1945, thirty-seven days after it had begun. It signified a victory for the militants who had kept it going in the sense that the Government agreed to call a commission to investigate the structure of wages in the government sector.²

The strike demonstrated that workers of various tribes could come together for joint industrial action; it raised the saliency of the provinces in the thinking of militants in the labour and nationalist movements; and it forged a

¹West African Pilot, 4 September 1945.

²The Tudor Davies Commission which was appointed as a result of the strike found that the "trade unions were fully justified in expecting" that the Cost of Living Allowance keep up with the rise in the cost of living. See Tijiani M. Yesufu, Industrial Relations in Nigeria (Published for N.I.S.E.R. by Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 93.
temporary but effective alliance between the NCNC and the militants. We end the discussion of the strike by turning to these three topics.

Tribalism

Since so much of Nigerian politics is interpreted in terms of an ethnic calculus, it might be of interest to consider whether the technical-clerical split in the trade union movement did not in fact mask some sort of ethnic struggle. The leaders' names are significant, because from them, it is possible to infer their ethnic origins and thus, test the hypothesis that the division between the technical and general workers on the one hand, and the clerical civil servants on the other, was an ethnic one.¹

This hypothesis can be rejected out of hand. If Ban-kole of the ACSTWU, A. S. Coker of FUNAS, Onabanjo of the Locomotive Drivers, and Adio-Moses of the TUC were among the Yorubas who were isolated by the events of the strike, so were Bosah of the RWU, and Erinle of the ACSTWU, but the latter two were Ibos. If Imoudu, Emejulu, and provincial leaders in Enugu who were non-Yoruba came into prominence in the ANTGWU, so did Yorubas like F. O. Coker, Olukoya

¹We do not have corresponding information for the workers as a whole; nevertheless, thinking it too great a coincidence that the technical-clerical split should have corresponded to a tribal division, we reject the proposition that the split was tribally based. One should note, however, that the frequency of Ibos being newcomers to Lagos would be expected to be greater among technical than among clerical workers.
(PWD Workers Union), and Olojo (Secretary of the Workers Federation in Zaria.)

In short, the strike splits the ACSTWU and TUC, the old alliances of technical (blue collar) and clerical (white collar) workers. What is of special importance here is that the industrial conflict in the labour movement did not seem to coincide with any ethnic divisions. The exigencies of organization and industrial conflict engender their own allegiances. This is not to say that once new divisions are formed, they will not converge with old political or cultural divisions outside the labour movement proper.

The Role of the Provinces

Since the strike was a national one, the All-Nigeria Technical and General Workers Union (as the Nigerian Technical Workers Union came to be known), had to co-ordinate its activities in Lagos with the East and North. One must remember that communications from the strikers' central committee in Lagos to the provinces, to Enugu, Port Harcourt, Zaria, Kaduna, and other towns were virtually non-existent.

Emejulu points out: "The Joint Committee did not notify the workers there and they had to rely mostly on heresay about the strike."¹ Zik's press was then a prime, if not the only means of communication. A striking example of the Pilot's role is an incident which Emejulu reports in detail:

When the strike was about ten days old, certain members of the NYM took advantage of the Goodwill

¹Emejulu, p. 54.
Committee, then holding its meetings at the house of Bosah, to end the struggle . . . the then workers' leaders decided to call off the strike unconditionally, without consulting the rank and file. . . . Mr. Emejulu and seven members of the African Locomotive Drivers Union went to the Pilot and issued a statement that any notice to call off the strike was unauthorized. The message was relayed to the Comet. . . . They begged Enahoro, editor, to see to it that his paper came out in time to counteract the publicity of Bosah's group in the other sections of the Press.¹

Obscure provincial trade unionists in Port Harcourt, Onitsha, Enugu, Kaduna, and Zaria, now rose to temporary prominence and became part of a national struggle. Among them were men like Anyanwu, of the RWU in Port Harcourt, S. A. George, of the Post & Technical Workers Union in Kaduna, J. O, Okaka, of the Post & Telegraph Workers Union, and Oparaekte, of the RWU and President of the Workers Federation in Enugu. As a prominent Nigerian leader reported to Coleman: "the general strike of 1945 marked the beginning of racial and political consciousness in the North, although only a few northerners had participated in it."²

Zik and the Strike

Exactly what part did the political groups of the time, in particular, Azikiwe and the NCNC, and the NYM, play in the clerical-technical split with its subsequent shifts of leadership? We have already called attention to the strong support for Imoudu as a popular labour leader given by the Pilot, in contrast to the Daily Service.

¹Emejulu, p. 57. ²Coleman, p. 259.
The Daily Service editorials, during and immediately after the strike, support the hypothesis that trade union conflict was mirrored by the two opposing political parties in Lagos, the Pilot constituting itself as champion of the strikers, the Service hesitant, if not anti-strike, and clearly pro-Bankole and the disavowed unionists.

On July 2, 1945, a Daily Service editorial demands a referendum on the current deadlock between government and workers . . . both are employees of the taxpayers. . . . As arranged by the Lagos Committee, a mass meeting will be held tomorrow where the taxpayers will state their attitude.¹

On July 6, in its editorial, the Service quite clearly states its position:

The Government had been able to meet the leaders of the people half-way. . . . We cannot expect only one side to make all the concessions. . . . We were shocked to see some workers denouncing the men who had called the strike off. . . . Every leader they have they turn down.

By way of contrast, note the Pilot editorial of the following day, July 3, 1945:

The Government should do something more practicable now . . . it is no use hoping the workers would crack. . . . A ways and means committee, composed of neutral observers, should be formed by the government . . . this is essential now that the workers have denounced most of their leaders.

It is not unlikely that Azikiwe had himself in mind as the "neutral observer," for the next day, July 4, his column, "Inside Stuff," is entitled: "If I were Governor of Nigeria." His program would be to:

¹The meeting refers to the Maja Goodwill Committee, headed by the "father" of the NYM, who was one of the "conservative" forces which the workers repudiated.
hold a parley with trade union leaders to ascertain the wishes of the wage-earners, invite leaders of various schools of thought to exchange views with me, summon an executive committee of all government departments, and repair to a lonely hideout to think deeply. . . . I would be guided by a fair and impartial decision.

From the material available it would seem that there are several cases of Dr. Azikiwe's direct involvement in the strike. One concerns the role of the mercantile unions in the strike. As mentioned earlier, they alone seemed to share the hesitancy of the old leaders to go through with the strike. The Amalgamated Union of Mercantile Workers (AUMW) at its general meeting on June 19, 1945, passed a resolution in support of the ACSTWU demand. The General Secretary of the union, Makanju, blamed the Pilot for giving its workers the impression that the executive had decided to go on strike. The Pilot's June 19th headline in fact reads: "20,000 Mercantile Workers Endorse All Demands of Technical Workers Union." After Makanju had accused the Pilot of inciting the workers, the editorial reply was:

Some of the mercantile workers have gone on strike as a result of that resolution. . . . If anybody feels some of the mercantile workers had been misled, it is the fault of the leaders of the AUMW, not of the West African Pilot.

Another incident involved an interview allegedly given the Pilot by the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Nigerian Railways. The interview sharply criticized the disavowed trade union leaders. The PRO denied giving any such interview, and in the subsequent banning of the Pilot and Comet
(also owned by Zik's Press), the government cited this incident as the immediate cause. The following is the Pilot's account of the interview:

The PRO maintains that the present crisis has proved the incapability and inefficiency of the trade union leaders. He emphasized that the cause of the labour crisis had been due to the leaders not being well-read in the laws binding workers.¹

It is impossible to ascertain on the basis of the papers alone, whether in fact Azikiwe did incite mercantile workers to strike in spite of their executive's hesitation, and whether the PRO, Mr. Fletcher, in fact did criticize Bankole and the old ACSTWU leadership so strongly. What is certain is the popular feeling that Azikiwe was championing the strike. The banning of the Pilot and the Comet on July 8, 1945 assured Azikiwe of his role.

The workers were convinced that it was due to the support given them by Zik's Press that had brought the vengeance of the government upon them. The "crime" of Zik's Press as workers saw it was none than writing pungent editorials and articles which portrayed their correct views.²

Now, one of the conditions put down by the workers for ending the strike was lifting the ban on the Pilot. However, later "this was not insisted on, since the Defender was transferred to Lagos and for all practical purposes, the Pilot was being published again."³

¹West African Pilot, July 6, 1945.
²Emejulu, pp. 59-60.
³Emejulu, p. 62.
The **Daily Service**, on the other hand, was branded as an outright opponent of the strike. Emejulu again expresses the workers' opinion:

The *Daily Service* called them (the strikers) all uncomplimentary names imaginable and the workers resolved to boycott that newspaper.\(^1\)

When Adedoyin, Olu Alikija, and Akintola offered their service in negotiating with the government on the workers' behalf, they were turned down because, as Emejulu put it, "Olu was a member of the NYM and its organ was not with them."\(^2\) The net result was to identify the momentarily triumphant new leadership of the trade union movement, Imoudu, F. O. Coker, and their lieutenants, with the NCNC and against the NYM.

The logic behind the NCNC's support of the militant strikers and the NYM's support of the discredited moderates follows from the very nature of the early NCNC and NYM, their aims and positions in the community. The NCNC was a radical congress organization, trying to bring under its umbrella the radical nationalist forces in all sectors of national life. By contrast, the NYM, toward the end of its existence, came more and more to represent the gradualist segments of non-Ijebu Yoruba elite. It was only after the NYM had been incorporated into the nationalistic AG, that

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\(^1\)Emejulu, p. 57.

\(^2\)Emejulu, p. 60.
Yoruba labour radicals began to divide into those who stayed with the NCNC and those who opted for the nationalist AG.¹

¹It was partly in reaction to Zik's populism, that the more nationalist Yorubas of the NYM founded the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a Yoruba cultural organization, which linked the remaining nationalists of the NYM to the chiefs and "obas" of the Yoruba people. Organizing the Yoruba political market by means of cultural groups, these nationalists were then successfully to found the Action Group and to articulate the doctrine of regionalism.
CHAPTER VI

THE EMERGENCE OF THE YOUTHS III: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LABOUR-NCNC ALLIANCE

Although at first the strike had divided the TUC into a militant wing of technical and a moderate wing of clerical workers, by 1946, the two factions are once more in the TUC.\(^1\) But the union of the rival factions was a papering over of fundamental issues concerning the relations of these factions and concerning the relations of the TUC to the nationalist party, the NCNC.

In what follows we shall describe how between 1945 and 1950, when the NCNC was a unitarian and not a regionalist party, the militants of the labour movement stayed allied to the NCNC. After 1950, when the NCNC began increasingly to become a regionalist party and as others parties such as the AG came to claim labour radicals, the NCNC-labour alliance collapsed, and an anti-regionalist, Marxist group, the Youths, came to the forefront of the labour movement.

\(^1\)After the strike the militants of the Nigerian Railway Workers Union together with the Nigerian Technical and General Workers Union (ANTGWU) formed the Supreme Council of Nigerian Workers in competition with the TUC, then led by N. A. Cole. But by June 1946, the Pilot reports friction between Coker and the rest of the Council and Emejulu writes: ". . . several unions felt that now the strike was over, the ACSTWU should be resuscitated. The membership of the ANTGWU had been reduced to the barest minimum and the government refused to accord it recognition." (See Emejulu, p. 67).

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Three examples illustrate the nature of the Labour-NCNC alliance. These are: (1) The \textit{Pilot-Service} Rivalry and the boycott of the \textit{Service} by the militants, (2) F. O. Coker's attempt to form a labour party, (3) the attempt to make of the TUC the labour wing of the NCNC. The banning of the Zikist movement and the failure of the UNAMAG strike will illustrate the collapse of the Labour-NCNC alliance.

\textbf{Boycott of the Service}

The December 1945 election to the Lagos Legislative Council intensified the press war between the \textit{Pilot} and \textit{Daily Service}. The NYM backed Alakija; the NCNC backed Olorun-Nimbe. In the heat of the struggle, there rose the issue of which party distributing which paper had been most supportive of the strike. Underlying it, of course, was the deeper issue of political affiliation.

The \textit{Service} accused the \textit{Pilot} of being a yellow sheet that would not stop at lies to get the support of the strikers:

\begin{quote}
We did not just dish out news because it would rejoice the heart of the worker. We now appeal to the people of Nigeria to reread most of the stories by Zik's group of newspapers and point out how many of them time has not falsified.\footnote{\textit{Daily Service}, editorial, January 12, 1946.}
\end{quote}

The strike leaders, F. O. Coker, George, and Emejulu retaliated with a decision to boycott the \textit{Service}.\footnote{Other signatories to the boycott were: Abosede (Government Press Technical W. U.), N. O. Awolowo (Typographical Society), E. A. Wey (Maritime Workers Union),}
be expected, letters opposing the boycott were drafted by Makanju on behalf of the Federation of Mercantile Workers, and by A. S. Coker, for FUNAS. A. S. Coker wrote:

My union is no party to a resolution . . . boycotting the Service. We cannot antagonize any section of the press . . . members of a trade union read newspapers as private persons and not as members of a union.¹

Imoudu, F. O. Coker, and Emejulu saw no such subtle distinctions and refused to segregate their industrial from their political roles.

Politicians were not slow in declaring publicly that they sympathized with workers' aspirations . . . the workers declared for the NCNC and were very proud of it . . . It was the days of Zik-Nimbe-Adedoyin.²

_Coker's Labour Party_

A second example of the link between a section of labour and the NCNC is the rejection of F. O. Coker's bid to found a Labour Party outside the NCNC. In September 1946, F. O. Coker announces plans to form a Labour Party with Imoudu as Protem President. His decision to launch a party and contest in the upcoming elections of February, 1947, is challenged by Emejulu and the NCNC. Notwithstanding Imoudu's involvement, the RWU denounces Coker's Labour Party.³ "Tearfully confident that the acting President of the NCNC cannot fail to voice workers'


¹Daily Service, February 19, 1946.
²Emejulu, p. 69
³Ibid.
grievances of a political nature,"¹ Azikiwe himself puts pressure on Coker to back out; "... perhaps my friend Coker will see the light and beat a hasty and honorable retreat."² Finally, Imoudu comes around:

President Imoudu hit the mail right on the head during his speech at the Democratic Party's ratification meeting. He said the Labour Party is not properly constituted... We would advise the Labour Party to return to its shell, rather than emerge into the adult world of politics.³

The effectiveness of this opposition to Coker is evident from the election results. Coker, running as an independent, got 308 votes to Zik's 3573 votes. By defeating its first bid for independent influence, the controversy had the unintended effect of tying the militant wing of the labour movement even closer to the apron-strings of the NCNC.⁴

This development was, of course, not lost on those like Adio-Moses and Bankole who wanted to keep the labour movement neutral, or on others who had NYM sympathies. The issue of political affiliation was to come to a head in a series of developments initiated by the nearly simultaneous annual conventions of the NCNC (April) and TUC (March) in 1948.

³West African Pilot, February 1, 1947.
⁴Some unions are by this time openly for the NCNC. Among these was the old standby, the RWU, and a new union, the UAC Workers Union, headed by the militant Zikist, Nduka Eze.
The Question of Political Affiliation and the First Politically Inspired Split in the TUC

In October, 1947, a few months before the TUC convention in 1948, H. O. Davies, a powerful figure in the NYM, made known that notwithstanding the opinion of many, the TUC is not a member of the NCNC. This letter coming on the eve of the TUC conference initiated a whole series of moves and counter moves within the TUC on the issue of affiliation to the NCNC. The TUC divided itself into three factions: the prc-NCNC faction of Eze, Imoudu, Emejulu; the faction of those like N. A. Cole, then President of the TUC, and Alhaji H. P. Adebola, then General Secretary, who were NCNC sympathizers but thought it wiser to keep the TUC politically neutral; and finally those like Ogudiya of the NYM, the Assistant Secretary, who wanted the TUC to move closer to the NYM position.

Sympathetic to the NCNC but wanting to save the TUC, Cole wanted to give his executive time to consider the matter and so made an equivocal statement to the press. From this the Pilot gathered that the TUC was a member of the NCNC; the Service that it was not. In fact, when the TUC had been invited to participate in the founding of the NCNC in 1944 it had sent two observers, A. A. Adio-Moses, and I. S. M. O. Shonekan. They never formally affiliated to the NCNC but Dr. Azikiwe took the fact of attendance for
a declaration of affiliation. "Since then, the NCNC has been publishing the name of the Congress as a member-union."\footnote{H. P. Adebola, "Annual Report of General Secretary at 8th Annual Conference of the TUC." March 19-23, 1948. NRC Files, Vol. 3.}

On November 29, 1947, the General Council, meeting before the Conference, took the decision that since the executive had kept silent until now, the TUC was bound to consider itself a member of the NCNC. The former ACSTWU people and especially Ogundiya threatened to split the TUC. Cole appealed to the individual unions to put the question to a vote at the Conference.

At the Conference held on March 19, 1948, Emejulu and other NCNC people wanted the decision to be made by "block-voting," voting strength to be proportional to the numerical strength of the union. Had this measure been adopted the TUC would have stayed in the NCNC since most of the big unions were pro-NCNC. But the measure was defeated, the big unions like the RWU walked out and the resolution to remain independent of the NCNC was taken by the smaller unions alone.

It is interesting to note that not all NCNC partisans necessarily wanted the TUC to affiliate to the NCNC. Already at this early date, H. P. Adebola who is to play a role of ever increasing importance on the side of the politically "neutral" wing of the TUC explains the decision not to affiliate to the NCNC in the following terms:
It is necessary to request the Conference to consider what relationship should exist between workers and political parties. . . . Unwarranted association with non-labour political parties tends to diminish the enviable positions which workers should occupy in the scheme of things. Instead of political parties soliciting for support of workers, the workers are soliciting for support of political parties whose political ideologies are at variance with those of labouring class. Instead of affiliation I recommend full collaboration . . . not [to] tie ourselves so that in the face of any disagreement we may be able to part company without embarrassment.¹

This position of political neutrality as shrewd as it seemed when first propounded, once the regionalist system became institutionalized, seemed tacitly to support the regime and openly to oppose the radical nationalists who wanted to use the labour movement to break the regime.

The pro-NCNC stand taken by the radicals was to have a payoff the very next month, April 1948 at the Annual Convention of the NCNC held at Kaduna. Out of twenty-one members of the NCNC cabinet five were trade unionists or radical young men who called themselves Zikists. These were F. O. Coker, Publicity Secretary, Luke Emejulu, Assistant Federal Secretary, Raji Abdalah, Asst. Field Secretary, Nduka Eze, Asst. Publicity Secretary, and M. A. O. Imoudu, Asst. Field Secretary.²

The leaders who walked out of the TUC conference, Imoudu, F. O. Coker, Nduka Eze and Emejulu formed what they

¹Ibid.
called the Committee of Trade Unions which was supported by the NCNC and the Zikists. On 17 March 1949 the Committee renamed itself the Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL) with Imoudu as President and Nduka Eze as General Secretary. In addition to the RWU and the UNAMAG (colloquialism for the Amalgamated Union of the U.A.C. African Workers), twenty other unions affiliated to the NNFL. In May 1950, the NNFL absorbed the old TUC in a new organization called the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC).

The NLC proved to be the high-point of labour's interaction with a political party, for within the year of the founding of the NLC, the Labour-NCNC alliance broke down. The militants of the labour movement whose power was predicated on a nationalist and unitarian NCNC were left out in the cold.¹

The Breakdown of the Labour-NCNC Alliance

To understand the causes of the sudden rise and fall of the NCNC-Labour alliance one must be aware of certain developments taking place in the regionalist system as a whole, in the NCNC and in the labour movement.

As was noted in Chapter II, in the late forties and early fifties regionalism was formed by a series of constitutional reforms. The effect of constitutional regionalization was to create a market for regional

¹In 1949, there occurs the Enugu Colliery shooting which for a year keeps the idea of a unitary nationalist movement alive. In retrospect, however, this incident merely delayed the collapse by one year. See Sklar, p. 83.
politics and consequently to pose a challenge to all political organizations to enter this market. It followed that a nationalist party such as the NCNC which had been until then unitarian in its outlook had to take an interest in contesting elections on the regional level. It also followed that, within the NCNC, the fortunes of politicians and groups which were regionally well connected via the tribal unions rose, while the fortunes of politicians like the Zikists fell.

Believing constitutional advances a subterfuge, opposed to regionalism and convinced that independence would come only by way of revolution, the more radical wing of the unitarian nationalists especially the Zikists decided on direct action.¹ Revolution would put an end to constitutional subterfuge, weaken the hand of the regionalist party in the NCNC, accelerate the pace of independence. In trying to start a revolution in Nigeria the Zikists failed. Moreover, by not being able to carry Zik with them, the Zikists isolated themselves from the NCNC. Then in February of 1950 a common labourer claiming allegiance to the Zikists tried to assassinate Sir Hugh Foot, the Chief Secretary to the government and the Zikists were proclaimed an unlawful society.²

Regionalism proved a disaster to the political fate of the unitarians in the NCNC, but the unitarians and

¹Sklar, p. 79. ²Ibid.
especially the Zikists still had prestige in the nationalist movement stemming from their connection to the labour movement, their successful launching of the NNFL and their presumed control over the strike weapon. This too was to be taken away from them by 1950.

The UNAMAG Strike

Not taken in the police roundup of the Zikists in February of 1950, Nduka Eze, the brilliant strategist of the NLC and General Secretary of the Zikist movement, decided on a series of strikes. His first move was to call a strike of the Amalgamated Union of the U.A.C. African Workers (UNAMAG).\(^1\) He struck twice, the first time, in August of 1950, the strike was a success and workers won an increase in wages. In December he struck again but this time the workers were not prepared to follow. In ten days the strike was crushed and with it the credibility of Eze’s influence over the workers. Ironically because Eze and the Zikists had crossed Zik, support among member unions vanished. Anti-regionalism had not as yet become a popular issue.

For a while Eze and the Zikists carried on. Eze and a splinter group of Zikists and radical labour leaders formed in January 1951 the anti-regionalist Freedom Movement. The Movement was one of the first of the many attempts to found a Marxist, anti-regionalist labour party outside of the framework of cultural organizations and ethnic pressure groups.

\(^1\)Sklar, p. 76.
When the Movement failed in its goals and Eze was being hounded by the colonial regime, he relinquished his post in the Nigerian Labour Congress, the Freedom Movement and UNAMAG. Without Eze, the UNAMAG and the Freedom Movement disappeared and no federation of UAC unions appeared again until 1956. The events of the 1950's turned the militants against Zik and the NCNC. Many of them turned to Marxism, some out of conviction and some out of friendship for those who were convinced. For the Youths, as we have called them, the period of isolation from Nigerian politics had begun. It was to last for thirteen years. Not until the strike of 1964 did the Youth think that their vigil had come to an end.

Conclusion

The strike of 1945 propelled Imoudu and other labour leaders to national prominence. Above all, they had the confidence of Zik. Leaders like Imoudu and Adebola, Cole, Nduka Eze, and others were part of the inner clique of the NCNC. To this group were attracted radical students like Ikenna Nzimiro and Mogwuko Okoye, and talented young workers like Kolagbode. Some of these men were to become the core of the Zikist movement, the fighting and incipient guerrilla wing of the NCNC. This alliance of elite nationalists, headed by Herbert Macauley and Zik, with the labour movement and the radical youths, was based on three assumptions.
The first was that their cooperation was part of a nationalist movement dedicated to driving the British out of Nigeria. The second assumption was that the British would not leave Nigeria by peaceful means and that strike action and even guerrilla war might have to be applied to drive them out. The third assumption was that the radical leaders had the confidence of the labour movement as a whole, and could call the workers out on strike if they so desired. The last two assumptions proved to be incorrect. When this became apparent, the Zikists left the NCNC, labour leaders declined in power and relevance to the nationalist movement, and many like Imoudu went into opposition, not against nationalism, but against Zik and the leaders of the movement.

After Coleman's work, there is no need to go into the details of how the imperial government released Nigeria by way of negotiations, rather than struggle. Suffice it to say, the end result was a federated, regionalized Nigeria, with bases of power in the parties. These began to represent the interests of the various ethnic groups comprising the regions. The labour people and the Zikists were bypassed, for their sacrifices were no longer needed. This very irrelevance of labour and the Zikists in the later phase of nationalist activity considerably weakened the command such groups had over the workers and the instrument of the strike. The test case came in the second UNAMAG strike of December 1950, which was engineered by
Eze with the support of Imoudu and the Zikists. The strike failed dismally. The workers went back to work and the credibility of the trade unionists' power was destroyed. The Zikists and the radical labor leaders retreated in sullen bitterness.

Loss of power and irrelevance to the burning issue of nationalism go a long way in explaining why Imoudu and the Zikists opposed Zik and the regional parties. The most passionate men were left out and the political arena was left to moderates, or even opportunists, who, until the last, were ambivalent about seeing the British leave Nigeria. However, this does not explain why Imoudu and some of the Zikists then turned to Marxist ideology and the Soviet Union and China in their pursuit of politics. We shall turn to this question in Chapter VII.

In Imoudu's own case it is believed that this resulted partly from the logic of being in the opposition to a pro-West government. The logic of opposition is the latent structure underlying much of his and his followers' views about present-day Nigeria. Its fundamental postulate is that Zik and the party elites have not attained true independence; that, on the contrary, they have conspired with the colonial power to keep Nigeria dependent. For Imoudu, this dependence is economic; it is maintained because government leaders are corrupt and willing to take bribes in return for the economic exploitation of their country. "The new
industries coming to Nigeria are not true industries," says he.

Take a bicycle spoke, for instance, that is a part which is assembled with other parts to make a bicycle. But is it made here? No, it is imported from Britain or Germany. Placing parts together is not real industry."

Overseeing trade unions is not realy power.

Imoudu's opposition to the status quo should not be exaggerated. First of all, he himself is powerful and well-connected, not only in the trade union movement, but in industry and politics as well. (Some have rumoured that Dr. Ikejianni, the former General Manager on the railways was in alliance with Imoudu. This seems to have some substance, because when the railway was threatened with investigation, Imoudu threatened a strike in protest.) Secondly, although there is bitterness toward Zik and the NCNC, it is the bitterness of a spurned friend who, in his old age, can recall the past with some affection. Imoudu recalls when Zik used to live a few blocks away from him of Herbert Macaulay Street:

The young men would come at all hours to discuss politics with him. If you had any complaints, you would go to him and he would flash it in the Pilot. He was on our side then. Things aren't that way now. He is the President and we never see him again.

Imoudu was not the only militant labour leader not to see Zik again. In the following chapter we shall turn to the question of who were the Youths and of how they understood Nigerian politics.
CHAPTER VII

LIFE-PATHS TO IDEOLOGY

In Chapter VII we do two things. First, we try to answer the question asked at the end of Chapter VI, why did some of the militants in the labour movement turn to Marxism. Secondly, the discussion will serve to introduce Chapter VIII in which we construct a model of Nigerian Marxism. In order to accomplish these goals we turn to biographical data which we call "Life-Paths to Ideology."

Turning to the problem of why militants became Marxists we will argue that with the regionalization of the NCNC militant labour leaders became interested in Marxism as an alternative to nationalism, and Marxists who had been in the NCNC became interested in the labour movement as an alternative to the political base in the nationalist movement. Since the early 1950's these have been the two main origins of Marxism in the labour movement.

If anti-regionalism is a necessary condition, it is not, however, a sufficient condition for adopting Marxist views in the labour movement. Although we have no theory stating the sufficient conditions, it may be of interest to consider the biographies of five Youths, leaders of
their various factions, to note at which point in their lives and for what reasons they became Marxists.

Turning to the introductory function of Chapter VII, we note that in Chapter VIII we shall try to construct a cognitive and an evaluative model whose primitive terms are usually associated with a Marxist point of view. Here, in Chapter VII, we turn to the question, whose model is it that we are constructing? What factions among the Youths would subscribe to the model?

To deal with the second set of questions, biographical data are useful for two reasons. First, we can determine the thought of a faction by asking what the thought of the leader of a faction is, and for our purposes we shall assume that the Marxism of the leader of a faction is equivalent to the Marxism of the faction. Second, biographical data can tell us something about the intensity of commitment with which these five Youths believe in Ideology. This will be especially important for subsequent chapters where we shall try to relate Marxist beliefs to perception and to action. A word about commitment to ideology is important.

There can be no doubt that by the time of the general strike of 1964 the labour movement including the Marxist wing had attracted to it not only persons who were committed to the movement but scoundrels and charlatans who were making money out of the communist issue either by posing as true Marxists and getting money from the Eastern bloc
or by posing as true anti-communists and getting money from the Western bloc. Consequently, it is important that when one speaks of Youths applying Marxist categories to Nigerian politics, that one keep in mind which Youths and how firmly committed to the theory they were. Of course, it would be fascinating from an empirical point of view to have surveyed the opportunists in the labour movement and to have noted how persons who are completely uncommitted to a theory apply that theory. (To some extent we shall try to do just that when we discuss the inconsistents in Chapter XII below.) But here we are interested in identifying Youths who were truly committed to the theory and in noting how they applied that theory. It could be expected that if they were not committed to the theory there would be no behavioral consequences to their theory.

In what follows we concern ourselves, therefore, with five Youths whom we judged to be committed to a Marxist interpretation of politics. We based our judgment on the following factors: (1) They are all Youths who have been involved with the Marxist model for a number of years; (2) they are all men who have either lost financially by committing themselves to the model or they have nothing to gain financially by committing themselves to the model; (3) they are men who have a reputation within their various factions of being serious and committed. Their positions and prestige within the factions depends on their commitment
to the model and to what they are willing to suffer in order to continue in their belief. This will be an important point to remember when we turn to changes in ideology in Chapter XIV.

The five leaders are Gogo Chu Nzeribe, now secretary of the Labour Unity Front and Secretary of the Post and Telegraph Workers Union. In 1953-56 he was secretary of the ANTUF and founder of the Nigerian Peoples Party; Asuqua Ita (known as Eskor-Toyo) founder and secretary of the Nigerian Labour Party; Tunji Otegbeye, Secretary of the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party and President of the Nigerian Youth Congress. Joseph T (a pseudonym which is used here on the request of the interviewee) a Trotskyite (part of a group of young men Eskor-Toyo calls, "Left-Wing Communists" and Dr. M. E. Kolagbodi, an assistant secretary in the Nigerian Labour Party in which Eskor-Toyo is secretary and Imoudu is President. Dr. Kolagbodi spent thirteen years in East Germany.

Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo and Joseph T are examples of Youths who easily could have become part of the privileged class of the Nigerian regionalist system but did not. Gogo did not because he gambled early on the side of the Zikists against the NCNC, Eskor because his life in business contrasted too strongly with his beliefs, and Joseph did not because he is a mystic. Consider first Gogo Chu Nzeribe. Why he became a Marxist and the intensity with which he is a Marxist is related to why he rejected the NCNC.
Gogo Chu Nzeribe

Gogo Chu Nzeribe, the General Secretary of the Post and Telegraph Workers Union, was born in 1932 into the royal lineage among the Oguta, an Ibo speaking people. Because his grandfather had been a paramount chief, Gogo's father was among the first to be educated. After finishing secondary school, the father became trading representative for John Holt Company in the Eastern region.

Thus, Gog is born into a respected, relatively well to do and well educated compound. Gogo spends the first six years living with his mother in Oguta, and, except for a short time, he spends the next six years living with his father in Aba. Upon the father's death in 1944 when Gogo is twelve, the family decided to send Gogo to the elite King's College in Lagos. At King's College Gogo excels. He becomes first class debater and college librarian. Meanwhile he and some friends become intensely interested in the nationalist movement and in politics. All read Zik's Renascent Africa, and some participate in a socialist study group organized by a journalist who works for Zik's West African Pilot. As his interest in politics develops Gogo spends his library hours reading such books as Baers' Fifty Years of Socialism and Dr. Hughlett Johnson's The Socialist Sixth of the World. Already at fifteen Gogo is impressed by the socialist ideas which he thinks are much superior to the Fenner Brockway type of Fabianism. At about
this time he reads Burnham's critique of socialism, *The Managerial Revolution*, but "I was not impressed."

Coinciding with the strike of 1945, Gogo and forty-one other students are expelled from King's College for nationalistic activities such as organizing for Zik and for storing arms within the college.

The subsequent period for Gogo is a period of intense political activity within the Zikist movement and of ideological development within study circles which he organizes with other similarly displaced and interested young men. Meantime, of course, he needs to support himself. He enters a surveyors school in 1949 and promptly gets himself elected General Secretary of the Survey Workers Union. Through the union he meets other young radicals in the labour movement.

The dominant power in the labour movement of the late forties was the NLC run by Imoudu, Eze and the Zikists. "They of course were not Marxists but simply nationalists. Their bible was Zik's *Renascent Africa,*" says Nzeribe, somewhat patronizingly. "They knew nothing else." But not all Zikists were unideological. Certainly not the group which hung around Nduka Eze. With Eze as guru Gogo Nzeribe and others in the group learned the doctrine that the workers and the working class were in the forefront of social and political revolution. If he was not convinced immediately, subsequent history and especially the break with Zik (which he and other Youths consider a betrayal)
convinced him that real revolution lay not with Ziks and the constitutional nationalist but with Eze and the working class.

Eskor-Toyo

Eskor-Toyo's real name is Asuqua Ita. "Eskor-Toyo" he uses as a nom de plume "the way Bernstein used Trotsky" he says, but in the movement he is known as "Eskor."

Like Gogo, Eskor was born into a relatively well to do and well educated Effik family. In 1930, when the boy is one year old, his father dies and he is sent to live with his father's brother, a notable in Calabar politics.

Like Gogo, Eskor finishes secondary school and like Gogo winds up in the radical wing of the NCNC. In the late forties he "moves with" people whom he is to know for the next twenty years. In this group are Nduka Eze, Amafule Ikoro, Aniedobe, Gogo Chu Nzeribe, and Ola Tokunboh ("the most intelligent of us all"). "We Youths would meet in bookshops around Tinubu square. We would buy books. Borrow books. Lend books. We would talk, talk, talk. And argue." According to Eskor the books that made an impression were Crossman's Government and the Governed, Joad's Introduction to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics, Laski's Introduction to Politics, Lindzey's The Modern Democratic State, Cobbans' The State and Nation from Idea to Reality, and Row's The Ship of State. "I became fascinated with the
French Revolution, with the ideas of La Salle, with German anthropology. I was torn between politics and continuing my reading."

Between 1949 and 1956 Eskor-Toyo taught school and participated in some of the organizational experiments of the Youths. Thus in 1949 he joined the NNFL and the Marxist Study Circle. In retrospect, Eskor-Toyo labels as ideologically immature the many attempts to found labour parties in the late forties and fifties. He notes that most such parties had a tendency to "left-wing communism." They had no public support. No one contested elections. No activist or guerrilla cells were organized." He finally became disenchanted with these attempts when the United Workers Peoples Party (UWPP) split due to personality differences among leaders.

With the break-up of the UWPP, Eskor-Toyo drops out of the socialist movement. He resumes his studies for an external degree in economics, which he received from London University in 1957. He is perseverant enough so as to gain his Masters in 1959. In the same year that he gets his Masters, he is hired by the Nigerian branch of Lever Brothers as a Personnel Manager, and is soon promoted to Planning Manager. He succeeds very well. Too well." "After all Lever Brothers is the most obvious example of monopoly capital in Nigeria and here I was working for them." This situation became especially intolerable when the friends who had dropped out of sight after the UWPP debacle began once more
to meet and to discuss post-independence politics. Soon after independence Eskor-Toyo quits to devote himself fully to party activities.

**Joseph T**

Joseph T is the pseudonym of a Youth who has very little power, who is at the head of no party, who commands almost no following. He is of interest to us because, like Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Eskor-Toyo he has abandoned a comfortable life for the rigors and uncertainties of the Marxist labour movement, but unlike Eskor-Toyo and Gogo Chu Nzeribe who have learned to become "mature Marxists" over the years, in the sense that they both realize the limitations on their powers and are both fairly cautious and pragmatic in their tactics, Joseph T is much more of a purist. Instead of gradually moving closer to an accommodationist position with the regionalist parties, he has, on the contrary, veered steadily leftward until today he considers himself a Trotskyite. He would be the first to start a Chinese wing of the Marxist party in Nigeria if only the Chinese were not pro-Stalinist. He argues that the Chinese position is much closer to the Trotsky position than to the Stalin position. His early religious experience may be a source of his later left-wing puritanism.

Joseph T was born in Ghana to a Ghanaian mother and an Ijaw father. His father was one of the first Africans to reach high position in the Ghana civil service, and
so Joseph T went to the elite Achimoto college in Ghana from which he received his higher school certificate. He was expected by everyone to go on to a university degree. But this was not to be.

Perhaps it was the influence of his maternal grand-father, the Reverend, perhaps it was the early traveling or his parents mixed marriage, but from an early age, Joseph was a dreamer, subject to religious meditations. He recalls with a smile that his mother used to call him, "Joseph, the dream boy." Like other young men of religious talents, Joseph experiences a crisis in the one year between leaving Achimota and coming to London to study engineering.

I was a very religious Catholic and a celebrant at Mass. I used to believe the teachings of Christ most literally and longed for the chance to prove my faith. One day I noticed for the first time in my life the misery of poverty and especially of beggars. Of course I had seen many beggars before but for some reason I had taken them for granted, now I was shocked. This did not have to be, I thought. Immediately I went home and prayed to God to make beggars rich. I prayed for many days and after prayer I would go to the market to see if my prayers had been answered. As I was praying I wanted to see results, but it seems that the more I prayed the more beggars there were.

(During this period Joseph T would spend long hours in religious exercises and meditations. One such exercise was to spend long hours concentrating on the image of the Virgin in the hope that "if the father would not raise the beggars, then the mother would.")

Joseph T's interest in religion was overtaken by a growing awareness that there were great things happening
on the Gold Coast. The UGCC\textsuperscript{1} had invited Dr. Nkrumah home and asked him to assume the secretaryship of the party. The boys at Achimota were to get to know the General Secretary well for in addition to coming to the school to lecture, Dr. Nkrumah was able to maintain direct contact with some of them through the various secret clubs organized on campus. Joseph T was one among the boys who was very much taken by the inspiring young leader. "I realized that when Nkrumah spoke to us about poverty and weakness and about the future of Africa that he spoke the truth. It was through action I would see the end of poverty and beggars." Before leaving for England Joseph T managed to meet Dr. Nkrumah and from him he got a letter of introduction to a professor of Economics at Birmingham. Upon arriving in England he met the professor who then urged him to join the young Communist League. "There you will be trained to cure the disease that makes beggars," said the professor.

In England, Joseph T lived the life of a gay young African student who went about in his own car, who was attractive to women and who seemed little concerned with politics. Nevertheless, his activities in the YCL became known to his father. After a few warnings his father cut off his allowance, but Joseph did not quit the YCL. From living the life of a young blade, Joseph T was forced to take on a series of hard and sometimes humiliating

\textsuperscript{1}United Gold Coast Convention
odd jobs in order to exist. At one time or another he was
a miner, a labourer, a sweeper, but he stuck to the YCL.
He found that all his friends belonged to the league and that
his once rich social life was curtailed only to that of the
league. After some two years of this precarious existence
Joseph T was only too glad to receive a scholarship through
the YCL to study engineering in Moscow.

He remained in Moscow for four years but ironically
it was in Moscow that he became disenchanted with Soviet
communism. Most of his friends were bitterly anti-Stalinists.
He witnessed one of his best Russian friends being arrested
for what seemed to him innocent political talk. From Moscow
he traveled to China and returned to Britain after the
20th Congress of the Communist Party.

Once in Britain he quit the party for about a year,
but he found his interests in Marxism rekindled when a
Nigerian friend urged him to read Trotsky's Revolution Be-
trayed and The Theory of Permanent Revolution and urged
him to join the Socialist Labour League, a Trotskyite organ-
ization. Before the split in the BCP the League was con-
sidered to be a puerile organization (left-wing communist);
after the 20th Congress and the split, however, some people
who had been in the BCP now joined the League. Joseph T
found in addition to his Nigerian friend many of his old
friends in the League. He too joined.
Throughout his period abroad Joseph T had made contacts with Nigerian trade unionists including Michael Imoudu. Already during his Moscow period he had written to Imoudu and had gotten a reply inviting him to come to Nigeria to work in the Imoudu wing of the labour movement. After a few months of activity in the League, he took up Imoudu's invitation and came to Nigeria where he has been active in both the party and trade union wings of the movement.

**Dr. Mayirue E. Kolagbodi**

Unlike Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo, or Joseph T, Mayirue E. Kolagbodi is not born into a family headed by a literate and well to do father. He and Dr. Otegbeye were both born into families where the father was a peasant. This point is not lost on Kolagbodi, he is proud of the fact that while he was in school he was able to get double promotions, "while sons of clerks and lawyers had to stay behind." Dr. Kolagbodi's commitment to Marxism cannot be inferred from his giving up opportunities. His and Otegbeye's commitment cannot be inferred from original conditions of conversion but from his long term involvement with the movement and from his living a life consonant with the movement. Thus, whatever his earlier reasons for Marxism, it is clear that his living in East Germany for thirteen years and his marrying a German girl have had some effect on the seriousness of his purpose.
Kolagbodi was born in Warri in 1926 but he schooled in Lagos. He was able to attend four years of secondary school but because of lack of funds he had to quit. At nineteen the proud and bitter young man goes to work for the Public Works Department as a messenger. While in the PWD he joins Porbeni's Public Utilities Technical and General Workers Union and is soon made an organizing secretary for the union.

There is not much information about his early organizational activities but he exchanged a few letters with the General Secretary, F. Porbeni. These letters seem to indicate that Kolagbodi was quite sensitive to status distinctions. For example, in 1949, Porbeni sends around a circular to his organizing secretaries. On this circular he lists Kolagbodi's name after that of an organizer's from the North. Kolagbodi promptly called this to Porbeni's attention:

I still appeal to you in respect to my relative condition as an employee. I was engaged before my comrade-in-arms, the Northern District Organizer, as a matter of fact I was his coach; but yet the Circular letter under reference makes him my senior . . . I may also add that in the list of the names, my Northern comrade's name came before mine.  

Coinciding with his work in the trade union movement Kolagbodi develops an interest in politics and Marxism. He joins the Zikist movement and like so many other Youths he becomes one of Nduka Eze's acolytes. In 1949, the East

\[1\text{M. E. Kolagbodi, district organizer, Lagos and Colony District, to the Working Committee of the PUTGWU (29/12/49) PUTGWU Files.}\]
German government distributes a few scholarships to the Zikists for study in East Germany. Among those chosen by Eze is Kolagbodi.

In East Germany he studies economics and related subjects at the Humboldt University and the Karl Marx University. He completes university work in four and one half years and in 1955 he visits the Soviet Union and in 1959, China. Upon his return from China he resumes his studies and begins writing a dissertation on "The Problem of Freedom in Nigeria."

Unlike Josept T, who changed his attitudes on Marxism after his trip to the East, Kolagbodi is reinforced in his Marxism. It is indicative of his seriousness that not even the death of Stalin or the 20th Congress changed his views. For example, after some of the dictators excesses are made public, many of Kolagbodi's friends in East Germany felt greatly disillusioned and shocked. His reaction is, "they were sentimental. I have never been a hero worshipper."

In 1963 Kolagbodi, his wife and children, come to Nigeria. He notes with satisfaction that there is a growing "class consciousness among the workers" and he feels good to be back. "Of course I am a Marxist; I do not need to work only in Nigeria. I could work anywhere, in Cuba, or in Europe for that matter." Commenting on his relationship to Nigerian workers, however, Dr. Kolagbodi remarked his presence had raised the morale of the movement. "After all they know that I started as a mere messenger. They know that I am one of them."
Dr. Tunji Otegbeye

Like Dr. Kolagbodi, Tunji Otegbeye is born into a poor farmer's home but unlike Dr. Kolagbodi his involvement with Marxism is fairly recent. Former Zikists, among them Eskor-Toyo and Gogo Chu Nzeribe, are not on the best terms with Dr. Otegbeye and the group of Youths he has created around himself in the Nigerian Youth Congress and the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party. Unlike the former Zikists, Dr. Otegbeye is not familiar with a certain nostalgia for the Zikist days and a certain lingering affection for Zik. To the radicals in the labour movement it is a bit galling to see the leadership of an important faction in the movement pass to a man who had not known the bitter years of waiting and frustration, when the labour movement was completely isolated from politics. While Eskor-Toyo and Gogo Nzeribe were doing the organizational work in Nigeria and keeping the hope of a Marxist party alive, Tunji Otegbeye was studying at the university of Ibadan and getting his MD in London.

Tunji Otegbeye was born in 1929 in Ilaro, Western Nigeria, a few miles from Abeokuta. The people of Ilaro though closely related to the Egbas form part of the Egbado group. Both his parents but especially his mother were eager that he become well educated. His father though illiterate in English was semi-literate in Yoruba and a deeply committed Anglican. Tunji was made to spend many hours in prayer and meditation.
Although the parents were poor, Tunji was an extremely gifted child and won scholarship after scholarship, first to secondary school at the Government College, Ibadan and later at Ibadan University where he first became interested in politics. Otegbeye entered Ibadan to study agriculture but his main interest was student activities. Although coming from deeply religious parents, Tunji himself was only nominally religious; nevertheless, he did participate in Church sponsored activities. He became a member of the Student Christian Movement and represented Ibadan University at debates and conferences.

His second year at Ibadan he joined a select group of students calling themselves the "Thinkers Club." It was while having to prepare a paper on communism for the club that Tunji got interested in the subject.

In 1952 Otegbeye left for London to study medicine. In London he became active in African student affairs. He was made an executive member of West African Student Union and President of the Nigerian Union of Students. In London he made friends with young Yorubas who were to play an important part in Action Group activities. Also in London he made friends with a young lawyer, Kunle Oyero with whom he would work closely in the Marxist movement.

In 1957, his studies in medicine completed, Dr. Otegbeye came home. Until 1960, he did not join any parties but kept up contacts he had made in London with friends who were
returning home for independence. Meanwhile he was working as a government doctor and getting to know such personalities as Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Joseph T, and Wahab Goodluck of the NTUC. In 1960, the Zikists called a meeting to establish a socialist body which would bring together young Marxists irrespective of their party position. The body was to be called the Nigerian Youth Congress. To his surprise Dr. Otegbeye was elected to the executive of the Congress. After his election to the executive of the Congress, Dr. Otegbeye joined the Goodluck faction in a fight against Imoudu, Ikoro, and Eskor-Toyo.

Life Paths to Ideology: Some Observations

The five Youths we have discussed are all committed to their individual interpretation of Marxism. We have no theory which will explain why a particular man chose a particular belief system and why he believes in its elements with the intensity that he does. We can, however, make some observations which may be valid not only for the five persons we have discussed but for other Youths. Our observations can be divided into two classes. One we shall call "knowledge is power" and the other we shall call "rejection and regionalism."

Under the label of "knowledge is power" we would place the following observations. The committed Youth is a man who places great value on ideas, education, and learning. He is also extremely critical of ideas and beliefs
which he does not consider valid and applicable directly to his problems. Ideas for the Youth do not have merely theoretical meanings; ideas are evaluated on what practical consequences they might have. One cannot understand the long history of the Youths trying to form study groups and parties without understanding that the Youths were convinced that by thinking through political problems they would come up with a solution which would then give them immediate power to change their environment.

For the Youths it is axiomatic that if one has correct ideas, one will then be able to change one's environment and conversely, if one does not have the right ideas, one will not be able to change one's environment. Joseph T was by no means the only Youth who had abandoned Christianity for Marxism because Christianity had "not worked." And Dr. Otegbeye noted:

The intellectual is faced with two broad choices to support the present regime however reactionary. . . . Or to study society, analyse the forces and by summarizing the experiences of the struggle of the people and use the intellects [sic] to guide the masses along the path of progress.¹

Turning to "regionalism and anti-regionalism," we recall that Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Eskor-Toyo were either in the Zikist movement or were closely connected to the Zikist movement. We also recall that the Zikists and other unitarian nationalists became irrelevant to the

¹Tunji Otegbeye, Ideological Conflicts in Nigerian Politics (Lagos: Socialist Workers Farmers Party Publica-
nationalist movement in proportion to the strength of regionalism. Consequently, Youths like Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Eskor-Toyo rejected regionalism and were in turn rejected by the regionalist parties. One can understand the fascination with ideology not only because knowledge is power but also because between 1950 and 1964 knowledge and ideology had to be power, it was the only power available to the Youths. What was this knowledge that the Youths had and how did they formulate it? We turn now to describing and explaining what the Youths believed.
CHAPTER VIII

WHAT THE YOUTHS BELIEVED ABOUT NIGERIAN POLITICS

In the introduction, following other writers, we have pointed out that all belief systems can be analytically divided into cognitive, evaluative, and affective dimensions. This means that to be fully understood any proposition in any belief system must be assigned cognitive, evaluative, and affective values. Thus a proposition such as "the NPC is a feudal party," can be fully understood only with reference to the more fundamental cognitive beliefs from which the term feudal derives its meaning, from the value system which stipulates rules of behavior with respect to "feudal parties" and from the emotional processes which assign positive and negative valences to the terms of the proposition.

Although all statements are three dimensional in this sense, some statements are more clearly cognitive while others are more clearly evaluative or affective. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, therefore, we have chosen two sets of statements, the first best illustrating the cognitive meaning and the second best illustrating evaluative meaning. For the first we have chosen mainly
to examine, Dr. Tunji Otegebeye's *Ideological Conflicts in Nigerian Politics* (published by SWAPP, Lagos, 1964), and Gogo Chu Nzeribe's, *The Manifesto of the Nigerian People's Party* (Private Mail Bag 1050, Yaba, 1961). And for the second or evaluative set of meanings we have chosen, Eskor-Toyo's, *The Crisis in the Nigerian Youth Congress* (a Nigerian Labour Party Publication, 1964) and Kunle Oyero's *Role of Youth in Republican Nigeria* (N.Y.C. Publication No Date). In places where we find it appropriate we shall rely on interview material with other Youths to clarify a point.

Except for noting that the four Youths in question are committed to their beliefs (have affective investment in their beliefs) we shall not discuss the intensity of the affective dimension of meaning since we do not know how valences were assigned to published statements.

**Cognitive Meanings**

In discussing the cognitive dimension of the Youths beliefs about Nigerian politics we shall assume that the stage of translation from ordinary perception to ideological conceptualization has taken place. We shall be looking at how the primitive terms of Marxist theory are constructed to fit Nigerian conditions. We shall be looking at the application of this terminology to a model of the present which we divide into the emergence of "the neo-colonist system,"

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1 Kunle Oyero was one time President of the Nigerian Youth Congress.
and "post-independence struggle between classes and ideologies." We should warn, that here we are not looking for logical consistency or valid insight. There may be little consistency or there may be many insights. We are not concerned how "well" Youths applied Marxism but with how they applied Marxism.

The Neo-Colonialist System

The following description, thought typical of the Youths, of the neo-colonialist system was culled from an interview with a nineteen year old trade unionist and cadre of the Nigerian Youth Congress. Asked what he meant by the "neo-colonialist system," he replied that "the neo-colonialist system is a product of historical forces which go back to the colonialist period." The conceptual scheme in terms of which he understood this period follows:

In prehistory the Nigerian peoples lived in peace and plenty. In some places like the North there was Feudal exploitation by the Fulani invaders but the Fulani were not Africans and so one can't speak of exploitation in terms of African social relations. Then the Europeans came and began raiding for slaves. These they took to America where even now they are persecuted. But the Europeans brought with them new methods of production and the markets system which together with slavery, conquest and attendant humiliations destroyed the traditional order. Together with their economic and military power the whites brought with them Christianity and education. Taking advantage of education some of the wealthier bourgeois were able to send their children to school. These educated young became the men who led the nationalist fight for independence. Among these were Azikiwe, Awolowo, etc. The nationalist movement was a success as far as it went, but basically it was only a stage in the process of African development. For the nationalist leaders soon divided the spoils of the
old regime (after first having been duped by the British to accept regionalization which effectively divided the country and made it accessible to control from outside). Political office now means corruption pure and simple. A politician gets into power to get rich quick. And how does he get rich? By becoming an agent of the United States government which has come to Africa to colonize economically the way Britain colonized politically. But of course since economics is politics it really amounts to the same thing. We are given the trappings of independence but the substance is denied us.

Echoing this view, Dr. Otegbeye notes that real power, economic power is kept in the hands of the "colonialists" who are able to rule through their intermediaries, the Nigerian politicians:

Although, Nigeria won independence in October 1960, thanks to the struggle of the masses of our people led by men of the calibre of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, colonial ideology has not been wiped out. . . . Nigerian economy was and remains an appendage of monopolies, an area of colonial exploitation, a market for the sales of manufactured goods and a source of profits . . .

The Post-Independence Struggle Between Classes and Ideologies

The period of independence marks a period of the struggle for power by various groups and by the "ruling circles."

The "ruling circles" are divided into two warring groups, "capitalists" and "feudalists."" Capitalists" are

1 Otegbeye, p. 9.

2 Although throughout this subsection we are quoting from Dr. Otegbeye's pamphlet, compare this to Gogo Chu Nzeribes warning that: "The Nigerian People's Party fully recognizes the immense dangers inherent in the setup where an indigenous Nigerian Capitalist Feudal class has emerged as the virtual successor to the British colonialists." Gogo Chu Nzeribe, p. 2.
southern businessmen, professionals, politician and civil servants, whose interests are represented by southern political parties such as the NCNC and the AG. Feudalists are the Northern Emirs whose interests in turn are represented by the NPC. In contrast to the "ruling circles" there exists the farmers and the workers who are not represented by the parties of the "ruling circles." Quite on the contrary, the workers and farmers have only recently been able to organize such parties as the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party which defends their own interests. "Everyone of these parties seeks to reap the fruits of independence."¹ It follows from this that every party in Nigeria has a class base and represents an ideology. Thus the NPC is the party of the feudal class and the carrier of feudal beliefs. The NCNC and AG are parties of the southern capitalists and are the carriers of capitalist beliefs. The socialist parties are representative of the view of the workers and are the vanguard of socialism. From this premiss, the characteristics of the parties and beliefs follow.

The Feudal NPC cannot be compared to the socialist parties because they are diametrically opposed, but it can be compared to the capitalist parties. Once the comparison is made, however, it is clear that its ideology is even more backward than that of the capitalist parties. It goes without saying that the NPC cannot usher in socialism but it

¹ Otegbeye, p. 10.
cannot even organize a simpler form of social relations namely democracy.

Feudal nobility the world over, have no respect of or understanding of democracy. They establish nepotic, despotic and arbitrary rule and oppose any attempt by the people to extend democracy.¹

Eloquently citing instances of NPC misrule, Otegbeye proposes the following to be true: Emirate system is feudal and therefore undemocratic, the NPC represents the interests of the Feudal nobility, therefore the NPC is undemocratic.

"Is it strange" he asks, that

... only a handful of selected people have controlled the fortune of the NPC which has held no congress or election for over five years? Is the abolition of individual liberty and the abolition of women's suffrage strange? Is it any stranger that the Emirs and their immediate relations control the Native Administrations and the law courts. ... No, these things confirm the character of the NPC as a party of Feudal nobility. ...²

Having marshalled his facts about the NPC and having therefore "proven" his point about the NPC's being a feudal party, Otegbeye, like the mathematician proving the validity of a theorem creates a climate of valid assumptions about his antecedent arguments linking the colonial period to the feudal nobility and the feudal nobility to the NPC. Turning to the "capitalist" parties he creates a climate of expected veracity about his subsequent statements criticizing the NCNC and the AG.

¹Otegbeye, p. 11.
²Otegbeye, p. 12.
Dr. Otegbeye has few nice things to say about the NCNC. "The NCNC, formerly a mass movement . . . has degenerated into an instrument of unbridled capitalism . . ."¹ He imputes to the party a philosophy of "pragmatic socialism" which is the philosophy of "business circles in the United States."² This philosophy or ideology of pragmatic socialism has some real consequences for political action and for political morality:

By its failure to recognize the objective difference between truth and falsehood and by identifying truth and utility, pragmatism encourages unprincipledness and enables the governing class to justify any profitable lie and every criminal act . . .³

Just as the ideology of feudalism has led to the "backwardness and despotism of the NPC" so pragmatism has led to the opportunism and callousness of the NCNC.

If bad groups lead to bad ideology and bad parties then good groups lead to goo ideology and goo parties. This is the basis for rejecting the "ruling circles" and their parties and for supporting the "workers" and their parties. Thus both Gogo Chu Nzeribe and Dr. Otegbeye identify the Youth and the workers as the vanguard of progress and the representatives of the correct point of view. Gogo Chu Nzeribe points out that the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) "has emerged out of the experience and devotion of several years of practical activity, research and study of the Nigerian political scene."⁴

¹ Otegbeye, p. 12. ² Otegbeye, p. 13. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Nzeribe, p. 3.
On the working class, Dr. Otegbeye writes, "In Africa the working class is the most rapidly developing class. The historic mission of this class is to become the leading force in the struggle for socialism." By "socialism" Otegbeye means,

... the public or communal ownership of the means of production and distribution with a view to ending the exploitation of man by man... equalizing opportunity and making real democracy possible.

... We socialists aim at abolishing class distinctions and all social inequalities...

The Marxist Model

Briefly to summarize, the Youth think that membership in what they call "class" determines one's belief and that one's beliefs determine political action. There are progressive classes and retrogressive classes. Retrogressive classes are outdated not only by their relationship to the means of production, "feudal means" and "capitalist means," as the case may be, but also by their beliefs. What makes the workers progressive is both their inevitable rise to power and their capacity to believe in progressive programs. And their capacity to believe in progressive programs stems from their work experience during which they become "skilled and educated as they become acquainted with the technology of modern production." Most importantly, unlike the feudal

1Otegbeye, p. 21.  
2Otegbeye, pp. 20-21.  
3Otegbeye, pp. 21-22.
and the capitalist classes who have created tribal discord in order to further their own ends, "the sentiments of tribal discord are alien to the working classes." Applying these terms to Nigeria, we have (1) the NPC represents the feudal classes, and has a feudal ideology, (2) the NCNC and AG represent the rising professional and business classes in the South and they have a capitalist ideology, (3) the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party represents the poor farmers and workers and it has a socialist ideology. Workers and farmers are not tribalist and therefore safe from the tribalistic appeals of the feudalist and the capitalists. This last inference was to cost dearly when some Youths predicted that "workers" would support a "socialist party" after the General Strike of 1964.

The reader will note that we have very briefly sketched out the cognitive point of view of the Youths. We could have been more detailed in outlining the various positions that Youths took with respect to the nationalist parties. For example, from Otegbeye's denunciation of the NCNC and AG one would think that the last thing he would consider would be an alliance with them in the forthcoming elections. But one would be wrong because that is precisely what Otegbeye was proposing in the very pamphlet we quoted. In this he was opposed by Youths such as Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo who, although viewing Nigerian politics from the same

\[\text{1Ibid.}\]
perspective, inferred non-cooperation with the Southern parties. Eskor-Toyo quit the Nigerian Youth Congress precisely on this point\(^1\) and denounced Otegbeye for being an "opportunist."

Whatever meaning is given the primitive terms of Marxism and however inferences are drawn, it is clear that the way Youths apply the Marxist terms does give them a first approximation to what is happening in Nigeria. Whether or not they can refine this approximation depends on what predictions they make with what success. The applications of conditions we shall see in Chapters X-XIV. We turn next to Eskor-Toyo's writings to discuss the evaluative and specifically the moral dimensions of the Youths concerns.

**Morality and Ideology**

In discussing the morality of the Youths we shall have to distinguish between their moral critique of the regionalist system from a self-criticism. The former contains an implicit code of conduct with respect to the political system and the latter with respect to the individual Youths. Thus the Youths wish Nigeria to follow certain goals and to do this by using certain means. The Youths also expect that they themselves fulfill certain personal goals by certain means. But personal goals and means in their way of thinking are not to be thought of as being independent from

\(^1\)See Chapter III, pp. 74-80.
public goals and means. The Youths discipline themselves in personal ways in order to be able ultimately to affect the public goals and means of Nigeria. In what follows we shall briefly sketch out the public morality of the regionalist system, the Youths criticism of it and the self-discipline they demand in order that they might act politically and thus restore, or better, create a moral order.

Morality of the Regionalist System

In parts of traditional Nigerian society one allied oneself with one's family against the rest of the village, with one's village against the rest of the province or district, with one's nationality against other nationalities. This principle seems to have been extended to present Nigerian society. Within the region a "Nigerian" supported his townsmen against other towns, his district against other districts, at the interregional level, he supported his region against other regions and especially he supported his own language group and nationality against other nationalities. At the local or village level the system of segmentary morality made gentle by tradition may have protected local institutions and powers. At the national, urban, federal level it produced unchecked conflict known colloquially as "tribalism."

Other Nigerians need not have been acquainted with the segmentary system of morality to react similarly at the inter-tribal level. And thus, whatever the traditional
mores of the Nigerian acting in the city, in the modern market place, in politics, his actions were governed by few explicit norms.

Tribalism, however, was only one of the phenomena of normlessness.¹ There were other types of interaction in Nigeria which were not necessarily based on ethnic loyalties, but which were also essentially normless. Thus there existed no moral code between the rich and the poor, the rulers and the ruled. Powerful unscrupulous men rose to the top.

Whatever one thinks of the Youths rhetoric and of their understanding of Nigerian politics, the Youths retreated neither into privatism nor did they make their peace with normlessness. Driven by a moral vision of a puritan and powerful society, the Youths have been able to survive, in spite of (or because of) the discrepancies they see between what they wish Nigeria to be and what she is.

Gogo Chu Nzeribe, for example, laments that:

The ravages of colonialism and foreign rule have left behind a legacy of filth and squalor, poverty and degradation and disease . . . bribery, corruption, and graft have become the main features of our every day life.²

¹It should be made clear that the term refers to norms with respect to the national system and with respect to the role of "citizen of Nigeria." We do not mean to imply that political actors did not have values. For example, the espousing of "regional security" by some actors could be interpreted as a national value. But on the whole, the scope of values and norms included most often only the ethnic group. It is a bitter irony of Nigerian politics, however, that the strong moral code governing intra-ethnic relations was not generalizable to the nation.

²Nzeribe, p. 2
"Looking at the Nigerian situation," Dr. Otegbeye sees:

the political jobbery of the politicians in power,
the grab and corrupt practices leading to the primitive accumulation of wealth by a few at the expense of the masses, the ten percent on contract of the "pay me" before you come in to foreign infestors, the taxation on second hand clothing, the refusal to increase wages and salaries of workers . . . the fabulous allowances and salaries of parliamentarians and their hangerson . . .\(^1\)

The Youth see their mission as primarily that of transforming the way Nigerians and Africans in general perceive themselves and their own society. In a basic way, all Nigerians must go from "docility" to "dynamism." Thus, for example, Gogo Chu Nzeribe writes:

The Nigerian Peoples Party recognises the fact that formal independence is not enough. Nigeria will remain backward, economically dependent, and politically docile, unless a vast process of change, a transformation, reaching deep down into and stirring and changing the lives of the great masses of slumbering rural and "tribal" peoples is rapidly set in train . . .\(^2\)

Not only the "masses" but also the "intellectuals" have been affected by "psychological defeatism and . . . humiliation" as a result of colonial rule ("these years of spite"):

Our intellectuals [are] . . . hampered from developing their full stature and initiative as a result of the social disadvantages of age long complex imposed on the African and on the black race by years of colonial rule and white supremacy aimed at destroying the confidence of the African in the future ability . . . of his peoples and race.\(^3\)

The solution to this humiliation and docility is seen to lie in "dynamism." The word has many connotations but in this setting it implies energy, and action for the sake of action, sometimes divorced from any moral restraint. Thus, some

\(^1\)Otegbeye, p. 20.  \(^2\)Nzeribe, p. 1.  \(^3\)Nzeribe, p. 5.
young cadres would exclaim that they admired Hitler or Stalin because they were resolute and destroyed their enemies. They were "dynamic" leaders. Mature leaders like Gogo Nzeribe or Eskor-Toyo would, of course, not use the word in that amoral sense but there is an element of this desire to tap sources of "free energy" even among those who are better versed in Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

A similar theme to that of "docility and dynamism" is one revolving about the two poles of trust and mistrust. According to the Youths to be naive is to be duped and to be at the mercy of more sophisticated people. It follows from this that Nigeria (which has been docile and duped in the past) must be cunning and sophisticated. The world in which Nigeria operates is above all a world of neo-colonialism, a world in which appearances are deceiving, in which only those trained to see latent under manifest content can hope to survive. An example of what Nigerians must learn to mistrust is the government's claims of having produced economic development.

A Youth noted:

We are told that Nigeria is growing economically but we know that the industry coming here is not real industry. Take the bicycle assembly plant at Apapa. That's not real industry because the wheels, the body, the steering wheel and so on are made in Britain. We are used only to put the thing together again. And anyway the profit all goes abroad to the corrupt politicians.

Real industry would be industry which would break the link between the Western white countries and Africa. The Youth see all interdependence in terms of exploitation.
A common theme through this moral vision is that of Africa as being completely at the mercy of external manipulators whether they be colonialist or neo-colonialist. The theory of corruption of politicians fits, in the sense that, it saves the old theory of exploitation. Because if politicians were not corrupt how else could the neo-colonialists control events. And if they were not corrupt the nationalist movement would then have been the be all and end all of politics. There would be no more room for those who can see the latent content beneath the manifest.

The only answer to powerlessness and mistrust is a socialist state. There workers will be taken care of and will live like brothers under a government which "will treat us like our fathers." Above all the socialist state is seen in welfare terms: a worker remarked "children have education and medical care, all men have the right of employment, housing and transport are provided for." Also there will be no need to be mistrustful because a socialist state is free of all conflicts. "People work together for the future like brothers. There is no conflict" because there are no traitors, like Krushchev "who want to compromise with the capitalists."

The Good Youth

Since their criticism of the regionalist system gives us only an indirect idea of how Youths should act, we turn to Eskor-Toyo's criticism of Dr. Otegbeye's leadership in
the NYC and Kunle Oyero's pamphlet on the "Role of Youths in Nigeria" briefly to sketch out how a leader should act, and how a young cadre in the movement should act.

The context in which Eskor-Toyo attacks Dr. Otegbeye is the conflict that develops in 1963 between the Eskor-Toyo- Ikoro-Imoudu faction and the Otegbeye-Goodluck-Bassey faction.\(^1\) Eskor-Toyo who is the type of leader who will share his home and his income with the young men who follow him is among those Youths most convinced of the ethical content of socialism. Confronted with the observation that the Youths have no developed theory of economic development, he countered by saying, "I am not interested in building skyscrapers in Nigeria. In fact, socialism stands for principles or it is nothing." It is not farfetched to substitute the term "ethical standards" for the term "socialism" in the following context.

It was obvious that the young men who gathered at the NYC Convention of 1961 to elect scientific socialism as their ideology knew very little of anything of its principles. What they did want was something that could effectively challenge feudal and bourgeois ideology.\(^2\)

Retreating from a normless society, the young men sought rules of conduct within the NYC. Eskor-Toyo who is a teacher by profession, saw himself as exemplar and a

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\(^1\)See Chapter III, pp. 74-80.

teacher of socialism which would challenge this normlessness. In his words:

My mission in the Youth Congress was to create Marxists out of non-Marxists... for there can be no socialist change and therefore no real freedom and democracy where there is not a large body of Marxists.¹

But however he defined his own mission in the NYC, Eskor-Toyo claims that Dr. Otegbeye, the president of the NYC, did not live up to socialist principles of leadership.

Specifically Eskor-Toyo makes five charges against the then President.² These were in essence that

(a) Otegbeye had come in possession of substantial funds belonging to the NYC without acquainting the Secretariat...
(b) ... Otegbeye ... had property ambitions embarrassing to the socialist movement;
(c) ... disposing of other property of Congress without reference to the Secretariat;
(d) ... he had been conducting a one-man bureaucratic style of leadership which was incompatible with the principle of collective leadership;
(e) ... he had bourgeois connections embarrassing to the socialist movement.³

One notices from this list that three of the five charges made against Otegbeye deal with the question of money and property. It goes without saying that the NYC was not the only organization in Nigeria having troubles over the control of money; however, we have already noted how the socialist movement differentiated itself most strenuously from the "corrupt" political parties. Consequently, it was a grave accusation indeed for Eskor-Toyo to accuse the

¹Ibid. ²Eskor-Toyo, p. 2. ³Ibid.
President as he did. In effect he was pointing out that Otegbeye was not any different from the regionalist politicians. To be worthy of being a socialist leader Eskor-Toyo warns one must be able to live without property and security:

... the hunt for super-security, the scramble for bourgeois property in the highest bourgeois style is incompatible with the role of a general secretary of a socialist party [SWAFP]. ... If a man has got plots of land and is ambitious to build them, then he will either have little time for revolutionary activity or will run away from such activity when it threatens his property ambitions.¹

Unlike the leaders of the regionalist parties like Zik and others after him, a socialist leader must be careful not to emphasize his personal qualifications and decisions. He must put the collective decisions of the party above his own interpretations and ambitions. In the phrase current among the Youths of the time a socialist leader must eschew, "personality cult."

Personality cult must not be allowed to take root in our movement and young people who come over to socialism from the Zikist Movement, the Awo Brigade, the Okpara Brigade and so forth must be told in plain language that there is not room for any-one's brigade in the Socialist Movement.²

From Eskor-Toyo's charges and his comments it is possible to list what a socialist leader should be:

¹Eskor-Toyo, p. 5. The reference to plots of land is based on a rumour to the effect that Dr. Otegbeye was building houses and buying land on Ikoyi Island, the very bourgeois quarters of politicians, rich whites and higher civil servants.

²Ibid., p. 6.
honest, self-sacrificing, and austere. Above all he should be selfless, substituting the goals of the party for his own.

Moral lessons are, of course, not limited to the leadership of the socialist movements, they are above all addressed to the young cadres who are looking for directions. But in essence the morality appropriate to cadres is the same as that which Eskor-Toyo applies to leaders. That such consensus on morality exists can be seen from readings and observations of the activities of the anti-Eskor-Toyo camp. In the following, Kunley Oyero, a Lagos lawyer, at the time of writing President of the NYC, and close friend of Dr. Otegbeye's, lays down principles for the younger cadres which are almost identical to the principles of Eskor-Toyo.

Younger Cadres

Throughout his lecture on the "Role of Youth in Republican Nigeria," Kunle Oyero emphasizes the puritan virtues such as frugality, cleanliness, dignity of manual work, and promptness. In his pamphlet he mentions the following precepts:

1. On Frugality and Austerity:

The new Youth should abrogate all forms of ostentatious living. A happy life is our aim. But when enjoyment reaches the beginnings of orgies, of superfluity, or excesses then it cannot be an attribute of the economical, pushful and decent Youth out to eradicate the showiness and false life and sense of value plagueing our country . . .
2. On Hard Work:

The new Youth, . . . [should] strive towards perfection in each individual field of labour and study; to work hard and indefatigably, in every place they find themselves, be scrupulously honest, firm, fair, and friendly in carrying out their jobs, whatever these are . . .

3. On the Dignity of Manual Labour:

. . . to acclaim the dignity of labour not by word of mouth alone but also with practical examples and unconscious acceptance of the fact; for example that sweeping our houses, front steps, gardens or office or carrying our own boxes, mats or bags of shopping is no disgrace and that all who feel self-conscious while doing these or escape from doing them for fear of "lowering their status" are not among the true youths, the New Youth that can take over in their hand the morality of this nation and clean it.

Presumably frugality, austerity, hardwork, cleanliness, and respect for manual labour are virtues applicable to all phases of life. There are certain virtues however such as self-discipline, punctuality, self-sacrifice and selflessness which are especially of relevance to the party. Thus we can continue the list of virtues keeping in mind that what follows is especially needed within the party.

4. On Discipline and Punctuality:

. . . to be disciplined not only in our manner of living but also in our minds, and in our work is the mark of the New Youth. [The New Youth] should be regular and punctual at meetings, at subscriptions, at activities of the organization . . .

5. On Self Sacrifice:

The New Youth need in their ranks boys, girls, women, and men who will from day to day prove their loyalty to their organization by unselfish and fearless sacrifices and be prepared for reverses and even persecution.
6. On Selflessness:

To act as an individual author of precepts of rules, or of directives is to kill the organisation. To refuse to accept the majority decision or act on it, to bring "self" into the affairs of the organisation, to seek for positions, . . . to criticise outside the meeting of the organisation, to fail to criticise oneself as an individual . . . with genuine intentions are to reject the basis of the New Youth.

We conclude this section with the observation that for the old Youth and for the new Youth, the party represents not only an instrument for gaining power but is an arena in which to sort out a normative code and is a refuge from the normlessness of the wider society.

Ideological Factions Before the Strike

Having briefly outlined the cognitive and evaluative orientation of the Youths and having indicated that among them we are considering people who are committed to their beliefs we can now turn to see how and why Youths applied their beliefs to the general strike of June 1964 and the Federal Elections of December 1964.

Although the Youths agreed in general terms that the strike indicated the beginning of the end for the regionalist system, different factions derived different strategies from their interpretations. Three factions straddling three positions can be distinguished. The Otegbeye-Goodluck-Bassey faction and their followers in the SWAPP, NYC, and NTUC thought that the strike coming so close to the Federal election, could give them bargaining power within the Southern
alliance (UPGA) with which they wanted to form a popular front of socialists and capitalists against the "Feudal" NNA. The Eskor-Toyo-Imoudu faction and their friends were opposed to "opportunistic" alliances with the regionalist parties. They, of course, had no illusion that they would win national power in the forthcoming elections, but they reasoned that if Imoudu could get elected on a Labour Party platform in a workers quarter of Lagos then time indeed was on the side of a class-oriented politics against the tribally based regionalists parties. A third group of Youths saw revolution to be imminent. They banded about Joseph T, and tried to get funds and weapons. To their dismay, however, they were betrayed by a prostitute and were all arrested in the week following the strike.

In subsequent sections when we shall be discussing how the Youths acted on their understanding of the strike and the election, we shall be concerned above all with the Eskor-Toyo-Imoudu faction. This is the faction which could be best studied, it was on the one hand not submerged in the UPGA and on the other hand, it was not as secretive as the more revolutionary factions.

Before we return to the Youth and the strike, it is of interest to consider how the strike began and what were the issues involved.
CHAPTER IX

INITIATION OF THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1964

Having discussed what the Youths thought about politics and why they thought as they did, we now turn to the problem of how they verified their thinking in the real world of politics. The period from June 1964 to December 1964, from the general strike to the Federal elections, gave the Youths the opportunity to verify their views of politics and the observer an opportunity to understand how they went about it.

The antecedents of the strike date back to 1963 and earlier. We will briefly describe them later. Our real interests, however, do not lie in describing the causes of the strike, but in seeing how the participants understood it. Since Youths, non-Marxist labour leaders, and workers all participated in the strike, at least three different perspectives may emerge.

The Youths are of special interest because they have a theory about the strike; one, moreover, which purports to explain the motives and perceptions of the other participants. Simply stated, the theory says: The strike was possible because the participants were aware of their class interests and have turned against the political regime. From this the Youths infer that the striking workers will follow
a labour party representing the worker's viewpoint and opposed to that of the political regime. Were the Youths right? By following just six months after the strike, the Federal elections allowed the Youths to put their plans of launching a labour party into practice. Before discussing the fate of that party and in general, the political consequences of the strike, it may be of interest to describe how the strike itself came about.

In what follows, we shall describe: (1) the changed political climate after independence, making possible joint action among the various labour factions; (2) the events of September, 1963 and the formation of the Joint Action Committee (JAC) and of the Morgan Commission; (3) the JAC memorandum to the Morgan Commission, and the sequence of events leading up to the strike action itself. Following this discussion, we shall return to ideology and turn to the political consequences of the strike.

**Independence and Forces for Unity in the Labour Movement**

The peaceful struggle for independence had some unforeseen and unintended consequences for post-independence politics. The colonial system left behind, not only regionalism, the administrative and political structure highly resented by the unitary nationalists, but also a class of privileged civil servants and parliamentarians. Ironically, many of their privileges were won by popular strikes in
the forties and fifties. With the exit of the colonial power, the difference between the standard of living of this privileged class and that of the mass of Nigerian workers became a point of great resentment among the workers and their leaders.

During the 1950's, most of the leaders of the neutralist faction had been accommodist toward the regionalist system and supporters of their ICFTU connection, which paid their salaries. By the early sixties, however, the neutralist ULC split into two factions, both still pro-ICFTU, but one increasingly anti-regionalist. The issue uniting Youth and neutralist and indeed the whole labour movement was the gap in wages and life styles between the ordinary workers and the political class profiting from the regionalist system.

Therefore, it is not surprising that, by 1962, barely seven months after independence, the ULC, the faction affiliated to the ICFTU and opposed to the Youths, published a pamphlet indicating that, at least on domestic issues, its views were not far from those of the anti-ICFTU and anti-regime factions:

Independence Day, October first 1960, freed us from colonial domination. It did not, unfortunately, free us automatically from colonial institutions. The edifice of privilege remains; only its proprietors are different. . . . This situation, in which a senior official may receive fifty times the salary of a

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¹For example, the "Emerson Must Go" strike of 1959 led to the retirement of Sir Ralf Emerson as chairman of the Nigerian Railway Corporation and his replacement by a Nigerian, Dr. Ikejianni. Imoudu led the strike. See Report of the Elias Commission of Inquiry, Government Printer, Lagos, 1960.
junior official, or a daily labourer, is politically explosive and economically intolerable. . . . The U.L.C.N. will fight against the continuation of this exploitation of class by class as fervently as it fought against imperialism . . . 1

When articulated in terms of economic class, rather than straight politics, all factions can unite on a program and they do.

The Formation of the Joint Action Committee

In the month of September 1963, the ULC, the Youths in the NTUC and LUF, and others came together to form the Joint Action Committee (JAC). JAC pressured the government to form the Morgan Commission, whose terms of reference included wage structures in the governmental and private sectors of the economy.

The formation of the JAC came after a year of trying to get the Federal and regional governments to negotiate a new wage agreement. By September 1963, the ULC decided "to prepare for industrial action:"

We know from experience that very often Nigerian employers including government, will always wait for workers' patience to be exhausted and attract industrial action before the workers are taken seriously about their demands . . . 2

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2ULC memorandum, September 6, 1963. Signed by L. L. Borha. The memo was distributed to all central labour bodies, including the NTUC and LUF. It called for a meeting of "all unions to signify their support for a country wide industrial action."
By September 12th, representatives of all labour factions met at the invitation of the ULC at their headquarters and agreed to form "a joint action committee in order to prosecute the wage issue."¹

By that time, too, the ULC had made a distinction, crucial in this context, between the "government" and the "authority of the state:"

The Governments are unwilling to grapple courageously with the basic and fundamental question raised by the Congress' demands . . . it is necessary to re-emphasize that the Congress did not address its demands to the Governments necessarily as employers, but as the authority of the state which not only has direct responsibility to protect workers in all sectors [this is an allusion to the private sector] . . . but also the obligation to bring about a more rational economic structure the first steps towards which in our view is a complete overhaul of the existing colonial wage structure . . .²

By making this distinction, the ULC came closer to the position of the NTUC and the Youths in general. Labour was now ready to confront the government, not as an employer, but as "the authority of the state." Under such a slogan, both

¹Memorandum from H. P. Adebola, President of the ULC, to affiliated unions, September 1963. Note that on September 12, the term, "joint action committee" is still used informally, but by September 17, a meeting is called under the direction of the Joint Action Committee. From September 21, the informal alliance between the ULC and the other central labour bodies is called "JAC." Ref: JAC 1/63. Note that on the initial "memorandum committee" of the JAC, at least four of the ten members were Youths. The committee consisted of W. O. Goodluck (Chairman), L. L. Borha (Secretary), S. U. Bassey, G. Nzeribe, F. N. Kanu, A. Kalejaiye, Senator Chief Fagbenro-Beyioku, E. N. Okongwu, S. O. Oduleye, and Dr. M. E. Kolagbode.

the Youths who wanted to destroy that authority and the less radical unionists could join, and did.

By September 19, 1963, the ULC, with JAC's concurrence, called on the government to appoint:

- a high-powered commission for the carrying out of an upward revision of salaries and wages . . . the complete overhaul of the existing colonial wage structure . . . the introduction of a national minimum wage and the abolition of the zonal wage-rates and the daily rated labour systems.

JAC warns that if such a commission is not called by 25 September it would call on all its member unions to go out on strike "with effect from 00 hours 27 September 1963." With excellent public relations, the JAC rejects all of government's proposals and calls for a strike for the week preceding the anniversary celebrations of Nigeria's Independence Day.

The Strike of September 1963

On 26 September 1963, without consulting JAC, the Ministry of Labour publishes the terms of reference of the committee which is to study the JAC demands. Next day Borha receives a letter from the Permanent Secretary, chastising him for not going to a meeting with the Minister of Labour. "The purpose of the meeting was to explain the terms approved by the government." ²

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² Federal Ministry of Labour, Ref. No. ML.Co/128/Sec 80. Signed A. I. Obiyan, 27 September 1963. The terms of reference that the government proposed were as follows: (1) To examine the principles and system of wage fixing in all parts of Nigeria and to make recommendations with a view to removing any defects, including the differentials between
In answer to the letter from the Ministry of Labour, Borha, the Secretary of the ULC, but writing in the name of the JAC, has this to say:

You . . . released to the general public the terms of reference before they were brought to the notice of this committee. You will admit in all honesty that your action constitutes a serious breach of faith.¹

Contrary to the terms of reference suggested by the government, Borha in the name of JAC makes the following demands:

There should be appointed a high-powered Commission to be assigned the task of carrying out . . . (a) an investigation into the existing colonial wage structure, remuneration and other conditions of service . . . (b) an examination of the demands for (1) a general upward revision of salaries and wages of junior employees in both Government and Private Establishments [Author's underline]; (2) the abolition of the daily wage system and the introduction of a national minimum wage. (c) On the basis of (a) and (b) above the Commission should make recommendations . . . ²

In this letter, Borha again states a principle, which is to become the major theme of the General Strike of 1964:

The Commission's work should result in the complete overhaul of the existing wage structure arbitrarily drawn up by colonialist exploiters of the past so


² Ibid.
that the politically dangerous and economically and socially harmful effects inherent in the balance between the foreign oriented upper stratum and the domestic-oriented lower stratum vis-a-vis the national economy may be permanently removed.

Special attention should be given here to the explicit nature of the JAC's demands for an upward revision in wages which includes the private sector. This is quite important because from the beginning, a major bone of contention between JAC and the government is the inclusion of the private sector in future negotiations. By the very nature of the JAC it claims to represent all unions including those in the private sector. But the government is legally not empowered to negotiate in the name of the private sector. JAC solves this problem with the distinction we have already listed between "government" on the one hand and "the authority of the state" on the other. Thus when Borha makes demands on the government he is making such demands on the authority of the state. Too much should not be made of this wording, but one should note that because JAC was trying to represent all the workers, it was placing the government in the embarrassing position of insisting on the law and risking a major strike, or not insisting on the law and having to risk its already weakened authority.

At first the government rejects the terms of reference suggested by JAC. For his own part Borha, "regrets" that the strike "will proceed to take effect in certain sectors and may spread unless our demands are met without further delay."

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1 Ibid. 2 Ibid.
Some unions are alerted to go on strike by 30 September 1963. The government backs down. On 3 October 1963, Borha announces, "Country-wide strike called off." Negotiations take place between the JAC and representatives of the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Establishments and the Ministry of State in the office of the Prime Minister: "The governments have agreed to set up a high powered commission for the purpose of revising wages and salaries on terms of references to be agreed upon." ¹

The Formation of the Morgan Commission

On 14 October 1963 the Government in consultation with the regional Governments appointed a commission of inquiry to be chaired by Sir Adeyinka Morgan, Chief Justice of the Western Region Supreme Court. The terms of reference of the Morgan Commission were as follows:

(i) To investigate the existing wage structure, remuneration and conditions of service in wage-earning employments in the country and to make recommendations concerning a suitable new structure, as well as adequate machinery for a wages review on a continuing basis.
(ii) To examine the need for (a) a general upward revision of salaries and wages of junior employees in both Government and private establishments; (b) the

¹See ULC files 1963. In the circular of October 3, Borha commends the following unions for effective action during the September strike warning: Railway and Port Transport Staff Union (Alhaji Adebola's union in the ULC), Lagos Municipal Transport Workers Union (Bus drivers in the ULC), Aeronautical Workers Union (ULC branch), but significantly he also singles out Wahab Goodluck's, Meteorological Workers Union (NTUC) and the John Holt's African Workers Union (Private Sector ULC).
abolition of the daily-wage system; and (c) the introduction of a national minimum wage; and to make recommendations.¹

The Commission held a private meeting in Lagos on the 23rd and held its first public meeting on 24 October 1963.

The JAC Memorandum to the Morgan Commission

The Morgan Commission listened to a variety of witnesses and deliberated for seven months. In a memorandum to the Commission the JAC stated its case. Since some of the Youths, especially Gogo Chu Nzeribe, Eskor-Toyo, and Dr. Kolagbode, participated in the working of the memorandum we can infer that they and through them the other Youths shared the views of the memorandum. Above all, the memorandum argued, there exists an income gap between the very rich and the bulk of Nigerian workers. The memorandum strongly argues for "closing the gap."

As an illustration of what is meant by income gap, the report notes that

in the Federal Ministry of Works . . . 6 watchmen and gatekeepers earn between them £710 . . . by contrast the Minister of Works earns £2700, the Director of Federal Public Works £3,180 and the Technical Engineering Office £3,640 . . . earnings of salaried persons range from more than £10,000 p.a. to less than £48 p.a. in Nigeria.²


²The Joint Action Committee Memorandum to the Morgan Commission. ULC 1963, p. 10.
The report traces the beginnings of the gap to the colonial period and to "prestige factors." Administrators had to be induced to join the colonial service and do service in Nigeria. Part of this inducement was high salaries and allowances. The colonial administrators and other European civil servants created a privileged caste in colonial Nigeria. It was one of the goals of the independence movement to make this caste permeable to Nigerian ambitions.

When Nigerians became Ministers of State and Parliamentarians they argued that they should maintain a social status at least equal to that of the top colonial higher civil servants. Again when Nigerianization started, Nigerian officers insisted on not being paid any incomes lower than those of their expatriate equivalents.¹

While Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Senior Civil Servants had replaced the Europeans as a new privileged class, ordinary workers were still living on their colonial wages. The problem was not only in income but in style of life and in relations between the two groups:

There was a pronounced master-servant relation expressed not only in a prestige income structure but in social snobbishness. All this has been carried into the new period. The task of the Commission ... is to overhaul this structure.

In order to close the gap, JAC recommends a minimum annual wage of £180 and an upper income scale varying between £500 and £960. This reorganization of the wage and salary structure should be done by cutting salaries, and by establishing the principle that, "Nigerians can and should earn less than expatriates of equal skill and experience."²

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.
The Strike

Having heard evidence from JAC, the Government, Nigerian Employers Consultative Association (NECA)\(^1\) and various experts, the Morgan Commission together with two minority reports presented its findings to the government in April. It was now up to the Government to publish a White Paper on the report, but this the government continually delayed until on Monday, 1 June, JAC called the workers out on strike. The General Strike had begun.

Within a week the Government published its White Paper. The wage increases that the White Paper suggested were well below those demanded by JAC and recommended by Morgan. Consequently, the recommendations of the White Paper were rejected out of hand by the JAC and the strikers. The strike did not come to a halt for another week until it was finally agreed to hold tripartite negotiations among JAC, representatives of all the Governments, and NECA.

The results of the Okotie-Eboh negotiations (as the negotiations came to be known after the Chairman, the late Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance) were favorable to the strikers. One can compare the Morgan, the White Paper and the Okotie-Eboh recommendations in Table 8.1 below.

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\(^1\)NECA is an employers association formed in 1957 in Lagos. "The Association aims at providing a means for consultation and exchange of information on questions arising out of relation between Employers and their work people, and promoting co-operation . . . between Associations of Employers . . . and between individual Employers." (See NECA News, January 1965.) The significant point about NECA during the Okotie-Eboh negotiations was its lack of constitutional or any other powers either to enforce or even to represent
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Agreed Zones</th>
<th>Previous Rates</th>
<th>Morgan Recommendation</th>
<th>White Paper</th>
<th>Final Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Month</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Per Month</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I Lagos</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>8 100</td>
<td>12. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. II Ibadan, Benin, Burutu urban areas</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. II Western Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria excluding 2</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. II Port Harcourt urban area</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. II Enugu, Aba, Onitsha and Umuahia urban areas</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. II Eastern Nigeria excluding 4 and 5</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. III Kaduna and Kano urban areas</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. IV Jos (including mines field) and Zaria urban areas</td>
<td>5. 1.10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. IV Sokoto, Gusau, Bauchi, Gombe and Lokoja urban areas. Katsina, Benue and Kano Provinces (excluding urban areas above) Kabba Div.</td>
<td>5. 1.10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. V Zaria, Plateau, Sokoto and Bauchi Provinces (excluding urban areas above) Gashaka/Mambilla N.A.</td>
<td>4. 8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. VI Northern Nigerian excluding 7, 8, 9, and 10</td>
<td>4. 2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government and the General Strike

We can discuss the political meaning of the strike from the perspective of the Government and its enemies within and without the Labour movement or from the perspective of the actors in the strike.

From the perspective of the Government and its enemies, the very magnitude of a general strike such as the Nigerian strike of 1964 is of significance. Since no collective bargaining machinery existed to deal with a general strike, the magnitude of the general strike, including approximately 800,000 workers both in government and the private service, precluded any responses based on collective bargaining machinery. The government was forced to negotiate at levels high enough to ensure authoritative decisions which would satisfy the strikers and stop the strike. Thus, the responsibility for dealing with the strike shifted dramatically from the office of permanent secretaries to that of the Minister of Labour and Establishment and finally to the office of the Prime Minister and then to the Prime Minister himself.

In his response to the strike, the Prime Minister was not at his best. He miscalculated the seriousness of the various employers in Nigeria. NECA sent representatives only on the insistence of the Government after it itself had been warned by the JAC that it would not come to a meeting unless employers in the private sectors were also represented. Once NECA did attend the post-strike meetings, JAC argued that the raise in wages accepted by the Government was equally binding on all employers who were NECA members. Many employers refused to accept this interpretation, and in the private sector strikes went on for another two months.
event and the fortitude of the strikers. When he issued an ultimatum demanding that the workers return to work, no one budged and the JAC started to issue its own ultimatum to the Government. This was not the first nor the last in a series of blunders which seriously placed in question the wisdom of the Government.

The events of the strike filled the radio and the newspapers and thus raised the saliency of the issues involved to national issues and focused national attention on the leaders of the strike: Borha, Goodluck, Imoudu, Adebola, Gogo Chu Nzeribe, and others on the JAC. It was lost on only a few that the JAC was led by Southerners who represented predominantly Southern workers who were confronting a Northern dominated government.

Indeed as the strike progressed into its second week it began to attract not only Youth, but dissident elements from everywhere in the regionalist system. Thus, for example, dissident NCNC and AG and members of the Zikists National Vanguard who were in opposition to the NPC-NCNC coalition began to converge on the JAC headquarters in all the regions. They brought with them not only advice and

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1 On June 9, the late Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa warned the strikers: "In the present circumstances, my Government will be failing in its duty to the nation if it does not take all necessary steps in its power to avoid a dislocation of the economic life of this country. . . . The present position cannot be tolerated any longer," Daily Times. In response, the Western Nigerian Branch of the JAC called on the Prime Minister, "To resign within 48 hours." Daily Times, 10 June, 1964.
support but money and cars essential to keeping the strike going.¹

Finally, without exhausting the list of political meaning the strike could have for the political regime, it should be noted that by including the private sector the JAC and the Youth placed the government in an embarrassing position of having to choose between Nigerian workers and expatriate employers. The Youths had a field day in pointing out how the government was "pocketed" by "Imperialists." For the duration of the strike the Government had to defend itself against accusations of "neo-colonialism."

¹We infer such party activity from personal observation in Ibadan and Lagos. We cannot vouch however that the same pattern repeated itself in the East, in the North, and in the Mid-West.
CHAPTER X

IDEOLOGICAL PREDICTION I: THE POLITICAL MEANING OF THE GENERAL STRIKE

Having discussed some of the events and issues leading up to the General Strike, we shall now return to the main line of the argument. We are concerned less with the causes of the strike than its perception by the Youths and what consequences the Youths inferred from their perceptions.

To understand the meaning of the strike for the Youths we should keep in mind some of the cognitive and evaluative standards which the Youths applied to Nigerian politics as a whole. For the Youths the strike is a specific event which can be understood only with respect to the general moral and cognitive principles of their beliefs.¹

To the Youths the timing, extent and discipline of the strike are most important. That the strike comes so soon after independence seems to the Youths to verify their theory about Nigerian politics entering a phase of revolutionary class conflict. That the strike comes so

¹See, for example, Wahab O. Goodluck, "Nigeria and Marxism," The African Communist, 19 (Oct/Dec., 1964), 184
near to the Federal elections seems to the Youths near Imoudu, an excellent opportunity to launch a truly anti-regionalist labour party. The Youths imputed motives to the workers which they derived from observation and from the Marxist model discussed in Chapter VII.

The Meaning of the Strike for the Workers

Let us consider two motives which the Youths saw as fundamental to the strike and which fit in with their theory of what was happening in Nigeria.¹ The two motives for going on strike can be paraphrased as follows: (1) the workers went out on strike because they withdrew consent or affect from the political system and (2) the workers went out on strike because they were opposed to the gap in wages and life styles which existed between them and the politicians and the senior civil servants. For the sake of our discussion let us call these two motives, "withdrawal of consent" and "egalitarianism," respectively.

For the Youths it followed that if one had gone out on strike because one had withdrawn consent from the political

₁An example of the rhetoric of the time taken almost at random comes from a pamphlet distributed at a mass meeting in Ibadan:

The Nigerian Labour Party wants you to come forward and join its ranks because you are also a suffering worker. You are always thinking of how to free yourself and your family from slave wages. . . .

We are convinced that Workers of this generation can form the Government and rule this country. . . . Or do you still want to suffer more. Is the cup of your suffering not long overflowing?

"Workers Here Is The Way!" Issued by the Bureau of Workers Agit-Propo, Lagos Area Committee of the Nigerian Labour Party.
system and because one was egalitarian then one was class conscious and one was ready to support a labour party. The Youths were right about the workers' motives but wrong in the inferences that they drew from such motives.

In order to understand how the Youths derived ideological meaning from their ordinary perceptions, let us consider what the workers communicated to the Youths. But since any communication the workers transmitted to the Youths would be based on the perception of their own experience, what the workers perceived to be their own motives for going on strike was the information transmitted to the Youths.

In discussing the motives of the workers consider three questions: (1) did workers perceive themselves as having withdrawn affect from the political system after independence, (2) did workers perceive themselves as having withdrawn affect from the political system after the strike, (3) what did the workers perceive as being the causes of the strike.

Withdrawal of Consent After Independence

In September 1964, when we asked our questions, evidence for a post-independence crisis in Nigeria was so manifest that one could be quite direct in asking questions gauging its existence. Respondents were asked: "What is

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1We call the reader's attention to Questionnaire B in the Appendix. The group on the basis of which we generalize to "workers" (recall that the "workers" that concern us are not the universe of Nigerian workers but those who were most likely to be in contact with the Youths, see Introduction) are a class of thirty-eight ULC trade-unionists who were taking a course in industrial relations at the ULC headquarters in Lagos. A possible source of bias is this group's unrepresentativeness of the type of workers communicating with the Youths. But since these are
your opinion about politicians (senior civil servants, government, trade unionists) now that Nigeria is independent?" They were given three options which were:
(1) I trusted our politicians (senior civil servants, government, trade unionists) more before independence than now, (2) I trust our politicians (etc.) the same way as I did before independence, (3) I trust our politicians more now than I did before Independence. The same question with the same options was repeated for "senior civil servants," "Government," and "trade union leaders." The results are listed in Table 10.1.

We note that, on the whole, workers trusted politicians and Government less after independence than before. With respect to the least political category, the senior civil servants, 47% felt that their trust had increased or stayed the same. These results bring us to the conclusion

ULC trade unionists and not "Marxist" trade unionists one would expect that their motives would be less likely to reflect (1) withdrawing affect from the political system after independence, (2) withdrawing affect from the political system after the strike, (3) going on strike for reasons of "class struggle." Consequently we suggest that to the degree that this group does show motives 1-3 above, it is representative of the more radical workers who would presumably be in touch with the Youths, and who would even more strongly articulate the motives cited.
that workers trusted government less after independence than before and that they trusted the political aspects less than the more neutral civil service aspects.

Table 10.1--Workers' Views of Politicians, Senior Civil Servants and Government After Independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage saying</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Senior Civil Servants</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust since Independence has Increased</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remained the Same</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99(38)</td>
<td>100(38)</td>
<td>100(38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, after independence, workers said that they trusted politics less than before, did workers seem to be turning to their own leaders?
From Table 10.2 it would seem that the beneficiaries of workers' mistrust of politics after independence were their own leaders, the Youths among them. What was the effect of the strike on this turning away from government and party politics toward workers' representatives?

Withdrawal of Consent After the Strike

There are at least three possibilities. The strike could have had a cathartic effect driving workers closer to government and politicians; it could have had no perceivable effect either way; it could have driven workers even further from the political regime.

Consider the first possibility, the strike was a success for the workers, and 52% thought so as against 34% who thought that it was neither a success or a failure. It is not out of the question then that having fought successfully with government, strikers would have been appeased.
and felt more sanguine about politics. One could argue in terms of the second possibility, because one could claim that workers saw the strike in neutral economic terms. Here, however, we shall be testing the third possibility. One gets the general impression that on the whole workers were driven further away from the government and politicians after the strike and that the workers who indicated a drop in trust after independence were more likely to perceive that the strike had alienated them even further. In this sense the strike had an accelerating effect on the delegitimization of the political system after independence.

Paralleling the set of questions we asked about trust after independence, we asked the same sample of respondents questions about trust after the strike. Thus we asked respondents, "Now that the strike is over do you trust politicians more than before the strike?" Respondents were given the options: (1) more than before the strike, (2) the same as before the strike, or (3) less than before the strike. We asked the same questions with respect to "senior civil servants," and "government." As in Table 10.1, our results are listed below in Table 10.3.

From Table 10.3 we can surmise that indeed the strike did have an effect on the attitudes of our respondents. In particular the strike was perceived as having more frequently decreased trust in politicians and government than in having increased it or in not having affected it either way. With
respect to civil servants, the least political category, the strike was seen as having least effect in reducing trust.

TABLE 10.3--Workers Views of Politicians, Senior Civil Servants and Government After the Strike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Saying that Trust Has</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Senior Civil Servants</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100(38)</td>
<td>100(38)</td>
<td>100(38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post Independence Crisis and the General Strike

We have already indicated that the strike came on the heels of the Western Region emergency, the break-up of the NPC-NCNC coalition and the census crisis, and that it was followed five months later by the Federal election crisis of 1964 and 1965. Each of these crises were indicators as well as causes of a deep-seated malaise which came upon Nigeria after independence. The question arises, was the strike part of these post-independence crises in the minds of the workers, or was it perceived as an independent event?

On the face of it the timing of the strike and its success seemed to indicate that it was not an independent
event. Nevertheless, one could argue that unless workers felt that it was part of the chain of political crises and unless they acted in terms of their feelings, its coincidence in time with the other crises was coincidental.

We deal with this problem in two ways. First we know already that a majority of our sample felt that the strike further alienated them from politics and we know that a majority of our sample felt a decrease in trust for politics after independence. To what extent do the two groups intersect? If they do, Youths could claim that the strike was part of the decrease in trust for politics after independence and that it accelerated this decrease. Secondly, we can ask workers the direct question, "What do you think were the major causes of the strike?" And we can see to what extent political, especially recent historical crises, are cited. Let us consider the first procedure for the three categories of our former discussion, "politicians," "senior civil servants," and "government."

Instead of discussing separately the results for each of the three categories, it is simple to group the results together in Tables 10.4, 10.5, and 10.6 below.
TABLE 10.4--Trust Toward Politicians After Strike by Trust After Independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust After Strike</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 10.5--Trust Toward Senior Civil Servants After Strike by Trust After Independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust After Strike</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 10.6--Trust Toward Government After Strike by Trust After Independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust After Strike</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is possible to conclude from the above results that the strike exacerbated the workers' mistrust of politics after independence.\(^1\) Noting that the frequency of "decrease" is greater than the frequency of "increase" one can say in broad terms that the strike was felt to be part of widespread mistrust of politics after independence.

If workers withdrew affect from politics after independence and after the strike, did they channel this affect toward their labour leaders?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust After Strike</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 10.7, we further conclude that the stock of trade union leaders rose after independence but we are less sure that the strike contributed to the rise.\(^2\)

\(^1\) By eliminating the "same" category, three 2 x 2 tables were constructed, and Fisher's exact test applied. For Table 10.4 the probability of a distribution of frequencies under \(H_0\) is \(P = .02\). For Table 10.5, \(P = .03\) and for Table 10.6, \(P = .001\).

\(^2\) In Table 10.7 with "same" eliminated \(P = .02\). Thus, we accept \(H_0\) and conclude that with respect to labour leaders, post-independence and post-strike attitudes are not related.
Few understood better than the labour leaders themselves, and especially the Youths, that the stock of labour leaders was high. After the strike, as Imoudu and the Youths were ready to launch a labour party, the question arises for us as it did for them, could they transform workers' support into political power? The Youths were convinced and rightly so that for the workers the strike signified a withdrawal of affect from the political system. But why did the workers go on strike, and could their motive for going on strike be transformed into allegiance for a labour party?

To the Youths, drawing on their Marxist model, the answer seemed obvious: the workers went on strike because of the "gap," the difference in wages and life styles that existed between them and the ruling elite. In terms of their analysis, it followed that the workers would support a party that would abolish the elite and in abolishing the elite, abolish the gap. To test their first proposition it was a simple matter of asking the workers why they went on strike. We shall test the second proposition in Chapter X, below.

**Radical Egalitarianism and the General Strike of June 1964**

The JAC, that marriage of convenience between activists, Youths, and neutral trade unionists, invented the slogan of the "gap," and carried it to the workers. To what extent did this slogan find resonance? That is, how did the workers and their immediate representatives view the strike? Table 10.8 carries the story.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Saying the Strike was Caused by</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Census Issue</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corruption in Government</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Low Salary of Workers</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bad Treatment of Minority Groups</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Arrogance of Those Who are on Top</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. High Salaries of Senior Civil Servants as Compared to What the Workers Get</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Crisis in the Western Region**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. High Salaries of Politicians as Compared to What the Workers Get</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>(N=38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The actual question we asked was, "Which do you think were the most important causes of the recent general strike?" The question was closed and the items were presented in the order of the above table. Note that percentages add to more than 100% because respondents were allowed more than one choice.

**We have reservations about the wording of this question (especially alternative 7), but results are in the expected direction.

What is of special interest is that in spite of the strike coming after the Western Region Emergency, the Census Issue, and other national political issues, these issues are cited with extremely low frequency. On the other hand, issues which are purely economic such as the "low salary of workers," 92%, and issues which refer to the "gap" such as the "High Salaries of Civil Servants as Compared to What the Workers"
Get," 79%, and the "High Salaries of Politicians as Compared to What the Workers Get," 77%, are cited with greatest frequency.

Thinking that the strike may be a special case of their involvement with public issues, we were curious to see if, in a different role the same respondents would view current political and party issues more from the perspective of regional politics. Thus they were asked: "As a citizen of Nigeria which issues make you particularly angry?" As many as 65% were concerned about "the high salaries and allowances of those who are on top."1

In articulating the issues of the "gap," the JAC and the Youths found an issue with resonance in the rank and file. It can be surmised that the perception of the discrepancy between what "those who are on top" earn and what they should earn had some consequences for mobilizing the workers. However, what is of interest to us here is not whether this egalitarianism "caused" the strike, but whether this perceived grievance is translatable into political terms. Are those who are most opposed to the political class also most likely to support the Youth and a labour party?

It would seem that in the post-strike workers the Youth had found a movement which could be used for political ends. For

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1 31% indicated that they were concerned with the bad treatment of minority groups, 21% with the census issue, 8% with the freedom of the press, and 0% with the Western Region Emergency.
example, out of 38 respondents surveyed, 70% thought that no regionalist party represented their views. Out of 61 other respondents surveyed, 88% answered that they would support a labour party and only 5% indicated unequivocal support for one of the regionalist parties.

In summary we can say this about what the workers thought about the strike: (1) they perceived it as further withdrawing their consent from politicians, (2) they thought of the strike as an expression of their opposition to the gap and to privilege, (3) they seemed to reject strongly regionalist political parties and to encourage a labour party; but, (4) they did not see that the strike was connected to the other crises besetting the Federation at the time. Item (4) should have been a clue that perhaps the strike was not being perceived in clear-cut political terms. But the Youths were not doing surveys. They were content with the post-strike climate of opinion which seemed to indicate that the workers had radically rejected the regionalist parties and that they were evidently waiting to support their labour leaders and a labour party.

1 See Questionnaire A in the Appendix. The sixty-one trade unionists cited above were sent by their unions to attend a series of lectures given by the extra-mural staff at the University of Ibadan.
Failure of Ideology: The General Strike and
The Failure of the Nigerian Labour Party

From what we have learned about the General Strike of 1964 we conclude that it was both an indicator and an accelerator of the deligitimizing of the regionalist system. The political stock of politicians and Government fell, that of trade union leaders rose. By staying away from their jobs in thousands workers had demonstrated better than any survey their dissatisfaction with their conditions of work, with their low standard of living, with the growing and unjustified gap in standard of living between themselves and their rulers, and with the morality of their rulers. One would have thought that all this could have been further translated into political action, into a support for a labour party. So it also seemed to Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo and the other Youths who broke with the SWAFP. Using Imoudu's great prestige as rallying point and catalyst they formed a labour party in preparation for the December Federal Elections. Eskor-Toyo wrote:

There is not the slightest doubt that in going into the next stage of the Morgan struggle the working class will be immensely helped by the emergence of a real workers' party. . . . It is a matter for happy reflection that the workers themselves during
the strike saw in their hundreds the need for such a party.\textsuperscript{1}

The Youth felt that they were being pulled into power by the vacuum of the disintegrating political system and pushed into power by the real force of egalitarianism of their followers. "A good party grows out of a real need," said Eskor.

And so indeed it seemed in the period right after the strike and preceding the Federal elections of December, 1964. In July, a month after the strike, 88% of a group of trade-unionists indicated that they would support a labour party in the Federal elections.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{The General Strike and the Federal Election of 1964}

Coming as it did on the heels of the general strike, the Federal election of 1964 proved to be an excellent opportunity for the Youths of the Nigerian Labour Party to test their theories of politics and attempt to win power at the polls or at the very least to show themselves to be more than a splinter or crank group. If Imoudu could be elected from his district in Lagos or even if he could show that he had a political following then there was some meaning to their theories. It would be verified that class struggle was an incipient force in Nigeria, that workers would not follow their ethnic leaders. Once they had acted

\textsuperscript{1}Eskor-Toyo, \textit{Internal Memo}.

\textsuperscript{2}Of sixty-one trade-unionists interviewed, see \textit{Questionnaire A} in the Appendix.
in concert and proved their strength in the strike, workers would reject their ethnic leaders at election time and follow their true friends, the Youths and Imoudu.

What happened during the election is now history. We know that the political divisions between North and South which had been deepening since the Western Region Emergency and the breakup of the NCNC-NPC coalition was transformed into an electoral struggle. The two sides were divided between the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), composed of the NPC and its Southern allies, and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), an electoral coalition of the NCNC and the AG.

We also know that a true contest never took place. Appalled by the conduct of the election and faced with impending victory of the NNA at the polls, UPGA leaders decided to precipitate a crisis by boycotting the election. Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party never had a chance to prove their mettle. Nevertheless from the Nigerian Labour Party's conduct during the election and from survey data, we have some indication of how well Imoudu and the Youths succeeded in mobilizing the workers during the period June - December, 1964.

Given this data we shall ask what was the political meaning of the strike. Since it seemed that the strike was among other things an indication of withdrawal of consent from the regionalist system and the regionalist parties and politicians, was the Nigerian Labour Party, by appealing to the workers as workers not as tribesmen, an alternative for
the workers and their trade union leaders? Secondly, since the strike seemed to be an indication of protest against the gap in income and life styles between the workers and the emerging elites of the civil service and the political parties, was this protest, call it "egalitarianism," translatable into political support in December?

Limiting ourselves to survey data, the answer to both questions is "no." No, Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party did not serve as a political alternative to the workers; no, egalitarianism was not translated into political support in December.

Let us first consider in more detail the second question of egalitarianism.

**Radical Egalitarianism, the Youths and Support for a Labour Party**

Radical egalitarianism as it was manifested in the general strike is a political attitude derivable from the situation of the Nigerian worker. It was there for all to see, including the Youths and the Nigerian Labour Party, that Nigerian workers in the junior service category and in the daily-paid category were unhappy with their wages and with the differences in wages between what they earned and what the politicians and the senior civil servants earned. This kind of egalitarianism had nothing to do with tribe, or primordial sentiments, but was it political?

Of course the strike had already shown that the "gap" is translatable into political terms. By simple logic, if the gap was instrumental in mobilizing the strike, and if
the strike further withdrew consent from the political regime, then the gap was instrumental in decreasing the legitimacy and stability of the political regime. But was the gap translatable into party terms? For the Youths this was a crucial question.

For the Youth the term "gap" was always a euphemism for "class consciousness" and the strike was of course an expression of class struggle. It followed therefore that since "class consciousness" existed in Nigerian society and since success during the strike was a verification of its existence, the "gap" could now be translated into political party terms, and the Youths, the vanguard of the "proletariat" would lead the party.

Were the Youth correct? Was resentment of privilege, seemingly manifest in the strike, translatable into a political force in support of the Youths and the Labour Party? We went about trying to answer this question by constructing a measure of egalitarianism and by proposing that workers who were higher on the scale of egalitarianism would be more likely to support a labour party than were workers lower on the scale.

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1 Some writers on labour affairs seem to want to limit the term "political" to electoral or political party affairs; the term of course has a much wider meaning. See, for example, the use of the term in Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, "Trade Unions," Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 340-381.
In order to find those who are most opposed to privilege we asked the following two questions:

1. "How much do you think an average politician earns in a year?"

2. "Many people have suggested that the salaries of politicians should be reduced. What should be the salary per year of a politician?"

Dividing the response to Question 1 by the response to Question 2 gives us the factor by which the politician's salary is felt to be in excess of what it should be.

We think that this factor which we shall call "egalitarianism" is an index of class opposition to the political regime. This may not be so for every political system but from an inspection of how grievances are articulated in the Nigerian labour movement, the gap in salary between the worker and the politician and between what the politician earns and what the politicians should earn is as we have seen the most frequently ascribed reason for opposition.

Dividing our sample into two groups, those who suggested that the salaries of politicians should be cut by a factor of at least one-third and those whose cut was less drastic, we were able to compare how the first group, "the high egalitarians" differed from the second group, "the low egalitarians," with respect to support for a labour party (Table 11.1).

1For a description of the sample and the questions used to elicit political party allegiance see the Introduction and Questionnaire D in the Appendix.
TABLE 11.1--Support for a Labour Party by Egalitarianism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Labour Party</th>
<th>Per Cent High Egalitarians</th>
<th>Per Cent Low Egalitarians</th>
<th>Per Cent Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unqualified support for Labour Party</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Labour Party or Support for Regionalist Party</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100(45)</td>
<td>100(23)</td>
<td>100(14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results must be a disappointment to any who thought that egalitarianism is translatable into electoral power. Of course one would expect that 33% of the "highs" as against 26% of the "lows" would support a labour party, but what is of significance here is the result that 67% of the "highs" would not support a labour party. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that egalitarianism, as we have defined it following the clues of the "gap" and the strike, was not translatable into support for a labour party.

Support for a Labour Party and Support for a Regionalist Party

Turning to the question of Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party, we asked workers' representatives to indicate which parties they were supporting in 1964 and

\footnote{Note that here we did not ask who supported Imoudu's Labour Party, but who supported a labour party in general. Presumably fewer respondents would support a specific labour party.}
whether or not they supported Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party. Our results follow from Tables 11.2 and 11.3.

**TABLE 11.2—Support for Regionalist Parties by Allegiance to Imoudu's Labour Party.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Regionalist Parties</th>
<th>Allegiance to Labour Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Cent Support Imoudu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Regionalist</td>
<td>58 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose Regionalist</td>
<td>29 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 We call the reader's attention to Questionnaire C in the Appendix. The questionnaire was distributed to two groups which make up the quota for the above discussion. The first group of 56 were respondents to the mailed questionnaire sent out in December, 1964, and the second group of 18 were respondents attending a University of Ibadan lecture series on industrial relations, in June, 1965. Except for the difference in timing, both groups were made up of trade unionists and especially members of the executive committees of their unions. The salient difference was in the timing of administration of the instrument. In order to account for the timing we changed the tenses of the verbs in Questionnaire C. For example, instead of, "Which parties are most helpful to the workers in 1964?" item 52 was changed in June, 1965, to read: "Which parties were most helpful to the workers in 1964?" Similarly, item 63a, reading, "Do you think Mr. Imoudu's labour party is useful for workers? Why?" was changed to read, "In December of 1964, did you think that Mr. Imoudu's labour party was helpful for workers? Why?" The reader is cautioned to note that in the responses
From Table 11.2 we note that at the least 10% (7/72) of our sample indicated support for Imoudu and that at the most 33% (24/72) indicated support for Imoudu. From Table 11.3 we note that at the least 30% (22/72) of our sample supported a regionalist party and that at the most 61% (44/72) supported a regionalist party.¹ We also note that 19% (14/72) indicated support for both options. It is clear that by December, when this quota was drawn, even if all those indicating support for both options had voted for Imoudu, it still would not have given Imoudu majority support among the workers. Assuming in this context "support" means "vote," we conclude that the Youths' prediction that the Nigerian Labour Party would be able to elect Imoudu or show strong support among workers was false. In this sense we can say that the Youths failed in their ideological predictions, and that the majority of workers by December were returning their support to the regionalist parties.

Before we arrive too quickly at the conclusion that the strike had no electoral consequences (we have already indicated what other political consequences the strike had) we should examine our survey results not from the

of the second group there may be bias stemming from a selective rearrangement of memory or from simple forgetfulness.

¹In this context, support for a regionalist party meant overwhelming support for UPGA. Of the 44 respondents declaring support for the regionalist parties, only 8 indicated support for the NNA.
TABLE 11.3--Support for the Labour Party by Regionalist Party Allegiance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Party Allegiance</th>
<th>Regionalist Party Allegiance</th>
<th>Per Cent Support Regionalist</th>
<th>Per Cent Oppose Regionalist</th>
<th>Per Cent Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support Imoudu</td>
<td></td>
<td>32 (14)</td>
<td>37 (7)</td>
<td>33 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose Imoudu</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 (22)</td>
<td>47 (9)</td>
<td>22 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 (8)</td>
<td>16 (3)</td>
<td>44 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (44)</td>
<td>100 (19)</td>
<td>99 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=72

perspective of the Youths who were hoping for an overwhelming support from the workers but from the perspectives of the regionalist parties and the nature of the support that the regionalist parties got from the workers. After all, 32% of those who indicated support for a regionalist party did at the same time register support for the anti-regionalist Imoudu, while only 30% of the total sample (22/72) indicated unambiguous support for a regionalist party. In a conflict between ethnicity and class, the workers chose ethnicity but they chose it under special circumstances and they chose it without great enthusiasm. To the extent that the Youths made their anti-regionalist and anti-elite message felt they succeeded in weakening the already weak allegiance of the workers, not to ethnicity,
but to the men and the structures which represented ethnicity.¹

The Failure of Imoudu's Labour Party: Segregation of Loyalties and Politics

There are at least two explanations for the evaporation of Imoudu's support. First and most obviously one turns to the election and its issues, and second, one considers in somewhat more detail the nature of Imoudu's support.

The Federal Election of 1964

From 1959 until the fall of 1963 Nigeria was ruled by a coalition of a northern party, the NPC, and a southern party, the NCNC. After the census-issue crisis, the coalition began to come apart so that by the time of the Federal Election of 1964, the UPCA (a coalition of the NCNC, AG and their allies) faced the NNA (a coalition of NPC, NNDP and their allies). By the time of the election, the anti-regionalists including Imoudu's supporters had a choice of backing Imoudu all the way and thereby weakening the UPCA or strengthening the UPCA against the NNA. Even the more doctrinaire Youths saw the point of the dilemma, and some eschewing the arguments for southern loyalty could argue their support for UPCA on ideological grounds. Dr. Otegbeye and his group for example cooperated with the UPCA because they saw the

¹That this was the case can be clearly seen from the enthusiasm with which most southern workers supported the anti-regionalist military coup of January, 1966.
issue in terms of a "bourgeois" party struggling against the "feudalistic" NPC.

But we believe that this explanation falls short of the truth, because one could argue that even had the NCNC stayed in coalition with an unpopular NPC, and had it not wooed the labour vote, workers whose hometowns were in NCNC areas, in spite of the strike and in spite of registering support for Imoudu, would nevertheless have not supported Imoudu and would have voted NCNC. We are saying that the nature of the crisis aggravated an already fundamental separation between labour and politics. It was the workers' capacity for separating their labour attitudes from their political attitudes and not their calculating election odds which evaporated Imoudu's support.

We cannot use the Federal elections as a test case, but we can use survey material gathered a few months after the election when the issues were less salient to elucidate our point.¹

"Do you believe trade unionists should support political parties?" our respondents were asked. The options open to them as well as the distribution of answers is given in Table 11.4. By inspection, note that respondents choose least frequently to translate labour identifications or attitudes into support for an existing political party, and that on the other hand they most frequently choose to separate, segregate, or compartmentalize "not mix" their labour

¹Questionnaire D was administered in April, 1965, to eighty-nine respondents. Fifty-two were trade union executive members in Gogo Chu Nzeribe's union, the Union of Post and Telegraph Workers, and thirty-seven of a similarly constituted group meeting at the same time were trade union executives in the N.W.C.
identifications with their party identifications. Since their party identifications converge or stand for their ethnic identifications, this result demonstrates that most of our respondents try to segregate their ethnic from their workers' role.

TABLE 11.4--Labour Opinion on Support for a Political Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentages Who Say</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade unionists should form a labour party</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, trade unionists should support one of the</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existing political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unionists as trade unionists should not</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mix in politics although they may do so as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent responses (combinations of the</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three options)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100(86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that workers did not define their choices as narrowly as the Youths had. To the Youths the alternatives seemed to be obviously those between supporting a labour party and supporting its opposite--a regionalist party. If they were aware of the choices open to them, and not all workers were, then a majority had a simple way of reconciling this conflict in loyalty. As workers they would
support their leaders. For example, they might support the Youths in a general strike, but as "sons of the soil" of this or that ethnic group, they would support the regionalist party which best represented their nationality in the Federation.

The Nigerian general strike was for Nigerian Youths and Marxists, on a smaller scale, what the First World War was for European Marxists: a demonstration of the weakness of occupational ties when in conflict with ties of ethnicity or nationality.

Given the strong nature of ethnic ties in Nigeria and the polarizing effect of the election, in retrospect, it seems peculiar that the Youths thought that a labour party could succeed in winning workers' votes and coming to power in Nigeria. Why did the Youths not see what everyone else seemed to see, namely that the workers would vote for the regionalist parties? The answer lies in what the Youth were prepared to see and what they were allowed to see.

Youths were not unwilling to believe that after the strike the workers would abandon class consciousness for "tribalism" and support a regionalist party. If reality were that simple then the Youths could verify their theories and note that their support had dissipated. What the Youths were not prepared for, however, was the possibility of workers communicating support both for labour parties and for regionalist parties.
CHAPTER XII


In asking why did the Youths not see that the Nigerian Labour Party could not win, we are asking what the Youths perceived, how they perceived it, and why did they perceive as they did. But perception is only the second half of a process which starts with the transmission of information from a source. In asking why the Youths perceived that the workers would support them we must ask what information did the workers transmit to the Youths and how did the Youths understand this information. In particular let us consider how the workers indicated their political allegiances to the Youths.¹

¹Throughout this chapter we are assuming that Youths had access to information similar to the survey information from which we infer workers' support for a labour party. The reason for making this assumption follows from the method by which we selected Sample D. Recall (Introduction) that Sample D consists of 89 respondents. Fifty-two were executive members of a trade union run by Gogo Chu Nzeribe, a Youth (for Nzeribe's background see Chapters VII and VIII). Thirty-seven were executive members meeting in Lagos at the same time. Although the second group was not controlled by Youths, in Lagos these and other workers mixed freely without regard to the ideological position of their leaders. We and the Youths, therefore, had access to the same workers. From this we conclude that we both had access to the same transmitters of information. With some reservations, therefore, we conclude that we both had access to the same
Consider again Table 12.1 (below). Note the third option. If Nigerian workers are placed in a situation of a conflict of loyalties, they choose most frequently the option to segregate, "not mix," their workers and their political roles. In that sense they answer like "cross-pressured" voters\(^1\) who indicate that they are not sure how they will vote in a forthcoming election, or that they don't know, or that they have not as yet decided. Without more information about the Nigerian political system, all that one could say is that those workers who choose to compartmentalize their roles do not volunteer information about their loyalties. The "compartmentalizors" of course represent an element of latency in political calculations but it is important to note that they do not give false information about the system. In America they would not be the ones who would say I support Truman believing really

\(1\) "Cross-pressures are combinations of characteristics which, in a given context, would tend to lead the individual to vote on both sides of a contest." Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al., Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 283.
that they support Dewey, nor would they be the ones who would be so misinformed about an election that they would say that they will vote both for Dewey and for Truman.

TABLE 12.1--Labour Support for a Political Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Who Say</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade unionists should form a labour party.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the existing political parties (regionalist).</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should not mix in politics although they may do so as private citizens.</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inconsistent responses: (a) trade unionists should not mix in politics and they should support a labour party, (b) they should not mix in politics and they should support an existing party, of (c) they should support a labour party and they should support a regionalist party.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. N. A.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But, for argument's sake, assume that the cross-pressured bloc can be divided into two groups, the compartmentalizers who keep their views to themselves and the inconsistents who do not keep their views to themselves but, on the contrary, seeing no contradiction in supporting both
candidates, they support both candidates and to an outside observer say they will vote for both.

Assume further, for argument's sake, that American politicians are more or less rational men who do not believe it possible for voters to support both parties at the same time and especially to vote for both candidates at the same time. And assume further that the voters who support both candidates do not volunteer information to both parties that they are being inconsistent but that on the contrary, to Dewey supporters they say that they will support Dewey, and to Truman supporters they say that they will support Truman. One should not be then terribly surprised to find that both candidates believe that they have the votes of the inconsistent.

Depending on how the inconsistents will behave during the election, both candidates may be deceived or one candidate may be deceived. Both candidates will be deceived if the inconsistents do not bother to vote, or if they equally split their vote and one candidate will be deceived if most or all of the inconsistents support his rival after having said that they also support him.

Presumably the voting studies found so few inconsistents that they did not bother to divide the "cross-pressured" into two groups. One should not classify the two groups together. Although both groups may ultimately behave the same way, during the decision making period they transmit
quite different information to politicians. It is to the information the Nigerian inconsistents transmitted to the Youths that we now turn.

From Table 12.1 it is seen that the cross-pressured or undecided group among the workers can be divided into two sub-groups: those who indicate that they "do not mix" their political and workers' roles (without, however, indicating how they will vote or what party they support), and the inconsistents (option 4) who indicate possible contradictory opinions.¹ We call the reader's attention to option 4, named here the "Inconsistent responses." This category has appeared throughout this study. For example, we indicated that after the strike, 88% of a group of trade unionists indicated support for a labour party. We should have also mentioned that 75% of the labour party supporters at the same time indicated support for a regionalist party.

The reader will recall that in Table 11.2 we indicated that 58% of Imoudu's supporters also supported a regionalist party. The frequency varies (and below we shall try to show how) but the pattern remains the same: ask workers if they support a labour party and a not insignificant number will tell you "yes" but a fraction of that number will be at the

¹We call attention to item 32 in Questionnaire D. It may be that what we call "inconsistents" is a by-product of the question. It is possible that not understanding the question, workers ticked-off options in a random fashion. We argue against this interpretation by noting below that however options were chosen, the group doing the choosing did not behave in a random fashion. For example, the frequency of Inconsistents declines the nearer our sample is to the Federal elections (see p. 226 below).
same time supporting a regionalist party. Here lies the clue to the Youths' misreading their support. Let us first consider, however, in what sense we mean the "Inconsistent responses" to be inconsistent.

The Inconsistency of the Inconsistents

In the literature on attitudes and attitude change, four types of inconsistency may be distinguished: (1) logical inconsistency, (2) psychological inconsistency between two attitudes, (3) psychological inconsistency between an attitude and an action, and (4) informational inconsistency. The first case is clear. For a discussion of the second and third case, see the literature on cognitive dissonance or cognitive balance or congruence. For example, Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (California: Stanford University Press, 1957), Chapter I.

In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the last case. By "informational inconsistency" we mean inconsistency as perceived by receivers of information. This type of inconsistency may be a function of the predispositions of the perceiver, and the information transmitted to the perceiver. If it is a function of the information transmitted, then that information itself is inconsistent as a function of logical or psychological inconsistency in the mind of the transmitter or the mind of the channel. However, for inconsistent information to be received by the receiver, it need not be so perceived by the transmitter. Let us turn
to a discussion of the interpretations that Youths gave
to possibly inconsistent information.¹

There are of course contradictions and contradictions.
From the point of view of the Youths, who opposed all region-
alist parties, to support Imoudu and to support the region-
ist Action Group or NCNC was not consistent and therefore
not possible. But from the point of view of the individual
worker it was not so contradictory to say that one supported
the fiery Imoudu (keeping in mind that one would not vote
for him) and that one supported the NCNC (since one's towns-
men were voting for it, keeping in mind that one would vote
for it).

From the point of view of the Youths, there were at
least two reasons why it was inconsistent and therefore not
possible to say that one would not mix one's worker's loyalty
with one's political loyalty and still insist that one
supported a labour party. First, it was inconsistent because
at the very core of the Youths' Marxist model, if a worker
chose not to mix his worker's and his political role he had
not acquired "class consciousness" and consequently would

¹Here we refer the reader to Chapter VIII and es-
pecially the discussion of the cognitive model of the Youths.
Although we do not have data directly referring to a Youth's
decoding the message of a worker, we do make inferences
such as the ones below based on the already mentioned cog-
nitive model. For example, Otegbeye divides Nigerian poli-
tics into ruling circles and workers. It is conceivable
in Otegbeye's system to be a duped worker and support the
ruling circles, but once one gains class consciousness,
supports a labour party, one is then opposed to ruling
circles. There is no room here for being both class con-
scious and supporting ruling circles.
not support a labour party. Secondly, it was clear that the option "trade unionists should not mix in politics" was at the core of the political program of the ULC and of the government. "A politically neutral trade union force" they called it. And so to declare at the same time that one was supporting a labour party was to be inconsistent with the well known ULC position.¹ The way the Youths saw it, one could not support the Labour Party and its enemies at the same time, but many workers did not seem to see the point.

At issue here is what the Youths perceived and what they were ready to perceive as Youths and as Marxists. Two predispositions affected the Youths' perception: the one was a logical application of Marxism with its divisions into "conscious" workers and those who were still tied to rural life and the second was the selectivity of partisans who were predisposed to view contradictory information as favoring their own side. Both predispositions so operated on the Youths so as to enable them to perceive that any indication of support whether consistent or not tended in their favor.

To the Youths caught up as they were in the political struggle, any sign of support was of course not questioned

¹Nevertheless, a worker whose union belonged to the ULC and who felt some allegiance to Alhaji Adebola, the President of the ULC, might say that workers should not mix in politics. On the other hand, the same worker out of admiration for Imoudu might say that workers should support a labour party. Informational inconsistency need not be so perceived by the transmitter of inconsistent information.
for its hardness and validity. If a worker said he supported a labour party, that was enough. To question his real motives would be taken as a sign of mistrusting the workers and of being a defeatist. As Marxists the Youths were not prepared to deal with inconsistency in a worker's allegiance. A worker either was conscious of his rights and of his role (i.e., he supported a labour party) or he was still a dupe living out "the idiocy of rural life" (i.e., he supported a regionalist party). But that a worker would be both in support for a labour party and for a regionalist party—that was clearly out of the question.

The Political Consequences of the Inconsistents

The relevance of the inconsistents to the perception of political support lay in their representing a sizable fraction of the total distribution. Clearly, if the inconsistents formed a tiny fraction of labour support, their effect on the over-all distribution would be tiny, but they formed a sizable fraction, 19%, and given the relative division between the respondents who consistently supported the labour party and consistently chose to say that they would not mix in politics as workers, the inconsistents played the role of the swing vote in an American election. This changeability of the inconsistents need not have interested the Youths, had the 19% swung ultimately in favour of a labour party, but this was not to be the case. Let us
now consider the relative importance of the inconsistents for the distribution of labour party support.

We must now show two things. First, we must show that the inconsistents form the swing vote which affects the distribution of labour party support, and second, we must show that in fact they did so swing. To show that the inconsistents form the swing vote consider two hypothetical cases: one in which all those who hold "contradictory" attitudes finally indicate that they support the "not-mix" option and one in which they indicate support for the "labour party" option. Turning to the first hypothetical case, Table 12.1 then looks as follows:

TABLE 12.2.--Trade Unionists' Support for a Political Party with Those Holding Inconsistent Opinions Choosing the "Not Mixed" Option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Who Say</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade unionists should form a labour party.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the existing political parties.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should not mix in politics, although they may do so as private citizens.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. N.A.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 12.2 we see that the "not mix" option out-numbers the "labour party" option almost two to one and constitutes 60% (51/86) of the sample. On the other hand,
if the contradiction is resolved in the direction of the labour party, Table 12.1 looks as follows in Table 12.3

TABLE 12.3--Trade Unionists' Support for a Political Party with Those Holding Inconsistent Opinions Choosing the "Labour Party" Option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Who Say</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade unionists should form a labour party.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the existing political parties.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. &quot;Not Mix.&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. N.A.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99 (86)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although they constitute only 19% of the sample, the effect on the distribution of attitudes of those who hold contradictory opinions can be gauged from the two tables. In one limiting case, 60% of trade unionists seem to advocate not mixing in politics while only 30% advocate the setting up of a labour party. In another limiting case, only 38% of trade unionists advocate not mixing in politics while 50% advocate the forming of a labour party.

In the two limiting cases of inconsistents going to the labour party and inconsistents going to the "not mix" option, the relationship between the distribution of those who hold a contradictory view and those who choose the labour party or the "not mix" option can be seen in Table 12.4. If the inconsistents move toward the labour party, the
distribution reflects labour party preponderance; if the inconsistencies move toward the compartmentalized option, the distribution reflects a compartmentalized option.

TABLE 12.4--Resolution of Inconsistency by Support for Labour Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Inconsistency is Resolved Toward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party Supporters</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Mix Option Supporters</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 5.5 \]
\[ P < .01 \]

In theory, at least, it has been shown that the inconsistencies could form the swing vote. How they resolve the inconsistency of supporting a regionalist and labour party could determine which party or parties are most popular. But the limiting cases which we have discussed above are "ideal types." What remains to be shown is that the inconsistencies do in fact swing together in systematic ways, and do not opt out of politics or do not distribute their choices equally between the "not mix" and the "labour party" options.

The Inconsistents are the Changers

Like the rich Irish American, the Nigerian worker of whatever nationality was cross-pressed between his ethnic
allegiances and his economic situation. Most Nigerian workers by choosing the "not mix" option consistently opted out of the pressure by not recognizing that their occupational roles had any political correlatives. Some Nigerian workers, those we have called the inconsistents, did not resolve this strain as simply.

From Berelson and Lazarsfeld we know something about how American voters act under conflicting loyalties. A major finding of their study shows the frequency of cross-pressured tended to decrease with the election and that the cross-pressured changed in the direction of the pressure which was most in line with their primary groups. The cross-pressured are the changers.

Let us apply this thinking to our sample. Since the general strike of 1964 increased the saliency of occupational groups and the desirability of a labour party, one should expect a high frequency of support for a labour party right after the strike. Since in Nigeria, however, primary groups were linked by means of tribal unions to the parties, one would expect that as the saliency of the Federal elections increased and the saliency of primary groups increased, both types of cross-pressured voters, the compartmentalizers and the inconsistents shifted in the direction of the regionalist parties. With rising saliency of issues, inconsistents would perceive their inconsistency and shift their allegiance.

1Berelson estimates that a "quarter to a third" of the electorate is cross-pressured, p. 320.
The timing of the general strike and the Federal elections, one coming in June, the other in December, provides us with an approximation to the laboratory situation in that we can test these ideas. Please consider the results in Table 12.5. We note that the frequency of inconsistencies (we do not have data for the compartmentalizers) decreased from 69% of the sample right after the strike in July, to 19% of the sample by the time of the election; and that the frequency of persons rejecting a labour party and declaring only for a regional party increases from 5% in July to 41% in December. The inconsistencies like the cross-pressured are the changers.

TABLE 12.5--Attitudes to Politics under Varying Saliency of Occupational and Primary Group Identifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Who Say</th>
<th>Occupational Identifications Salient (General Strike, July 1964)</th>
<th>Primary Group Identifications Salient (Federal Elections, December 1964)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour only</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional only</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Labour and Regional: Inconsistent</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Labour Row 3 + Row 1</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Regional Row 3 + Row 2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100(58)</td>
<td>99(72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aBased on Sample A
bBased on Sample C
cSee Table 11.2, Imoudu supporters (7) + oppose Imoudu and regionalist (All SWAFP) (9) = 16, 16/72 = 22%.
Conclusion

Consider the political market place from the point of view of a political entrepreneur such as Imoudu and the Youths. In July, Imoudu would ask his friends, trade union acquaintances, and fellow workers whether or not they would support a labour party, and he would get the impression that an overwhelming majority (from Table 12.5 our estimate is 88%) would say yes. By December, should he, however, ask the same question, he would find his support drastically reduced (41% would say that they supported a labour party, 22% would really support some labour party, and only 10% would support Imoudu himself). Thus, what seemed like a viable proposition in July turns into a rout in December, and this miscalculation is at least in part due to the changeability of the inconsistents.

The inconsistents are changers in two ways. From the point of view of the individual they are changers because they are more likely to change their minds and their support for a labour party. They are changers from the point of view of the group because by changing their mind in a systematic way they affect the distribution of attitudes, and thus the political market place of the labour force. By oscillating in their private views, they make the political market oscillate between seeming to indicate that a labour party could succeed and that a labour party would fail.
We should like to call the readers' attention to an important distinction between the inconsistents and those who compartmentalize their roles. The inconsistents say that they would support a labour party but they don't deliver, those who compartmentalize their role do not say they would support a labour party. This does not mean that the compartmentalizers do not represent latency in politics. It does mean that they do not give out information that can be falsely perceived by political actors. The inconsistents, perhaps because they do not perceive inconsistency the same way as "logical" Marxists do, communicate false information.

Here lies the root of the problem for the Youths and perhaps for all ideological thinking about Nigeria. To an ideologue "X" and "not X" are mutually exclusive in theory and therefore not tenable in real life. But in real life of course "X" and "not X" need not be "mutually exclusive."

An example from another area of thinking may perhaps be illustrative. Babatunde, a Yoruba friend, was sometimes a Muslim and at other times a Christian depending, of course, on the holiday and what part of his family was participating in what festival. To the rigid Muslim or to the rigid Christian this would, of course, be inconsistent and therefore "not possible," but it was possible for 'Tunde.

It is a minor point to note that Marxism as a theory does not have an effective way for discussing social psychological phenomena such as cross-pressure, role
segregation, and the existence of persons who hold on to contradictory points of view. And it would be an even more minor point to note that because the Youths were Marxists they were cognitively unprepared for the inconsistents. The point is that perhaps no ideology, whether Marxist or non-Marxist, selectively assuming logical consistency in received information, could have correctly translated the information communicated by the inconsistents.

To understand why the Youths grasped at this information, one must keep in mind that they were politicians who had staked their fortunes on the possibility of ideological politics in Nigeria. The general strike coming as it did on the eve of the Federal election left them no "out," they had finally to test their theory of Nigerian politics or face the reality that their planning and scheming beginning with the fiasco of the UNAMAG strike in 1950 had no political relevance.
CHAPTER XIII

WHO ARE THE INCONSISTENTS?

The inconsistents make ideological prediction difficult in Nigeria. In terms of the introduction the presence of the inconsistents can be called the encoding problem in countries with underdeveloped systems of interest aggregation and articulation. Their ultimate significance in terms of this thesis is in their role of preventing ideological prediction and ultimately political learning and political goal seeking. Before turning to the last Chapter dealing with how some of the Youths verified their predictions after the election, it may be appropriate to devote one more chapter to the inconsistents.

In what follows, we shall be looking at what could be some factors making for inconsistency.\(^1\) For data we

\(^1\)In contrast to Chapter XII, here we are interested in what goes on in the minds of workers (transmitters) such that inconsistent information is communicated to the Youth (receivers). For example, Festinger (above) calls psychological inconsistency "dissonance" and he defines it as follows: ". . . two elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other." Festinger's basic hypothesis is "the presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce dissonance." In what follows, we shall be relying on this theory in a heuristic way only. We are, above all, interested in factors facilitating or impeding the recognition or perception of logical inconsistency. We are not set on proving or disproving the existence of strain to reduce dissonance.
shall rely on a sample D of workers and on a case history of Peter A, a Youth and a member of the NLP. In turning to A. we note that inconsistency is not limited to "ignorant" workers but can become the style of political communication of a rather sophisticated Youth.

Inconsistency and Knowledge

There are at least two reasons for being inconsistent. First, one is inconsistent because one does not notice that one is, and second, one is inconsistent because one is not committed to being consistent. Let us consider the first case first.

To be aware of inconsistency one must be aware of the issues involved. A worker who supports both Imoudu and a regionalist party must realize, for example, that Imoudu does not belong to the regionalist party. A number of workers thought that Imoudu, who had at one time been a founding member of the NCNC, still belonged to the NCNC, and so for them there would seem to be no inconsistency in supporting Imoudu and the NCNC. Many workers were unaware of the arguments over "ideology" between the Youths of the NLP and the officials of the ULC. One could be in the ULC, subscribe to the motto of the ULC, "not to mix in politics" and yet admire Imoudu and therefore say that one supported the Nigerian Labour Party.
One would imagine that awareness of the issues and therefore consistency would vary with accessibility to information, and that accessibility to information would vary as a function of education on the one hand and duration in the labour movement on the other. Consider the results in Table 13.1.

TABLE 13.1--Consistency of Political Attitudes by Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Cent Primary Only</th>
<th>Per Cent Some Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>28 (10)</td>
<td>13 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>72 (26)</td>
<td>87 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (36)</td>
<td>100 (46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 2.2 \]
\[ P < .08 \]

Note that the rate of inconsistents is more than twice as great among those with primary education only as it is among those with some secondary education.

In Table 13.2 note that the rate of inconsistents is more than three times as great among those with less than five years experience in the labour movement as it is among those with more than five years experience.

It comes as no great surprise that an ordinary worker who is not up on the latest ideological quarrels within the labour movement is inconsistent. But what is of interest is
that some workers and especially some Youths who were well aware of such quarrels and who ostensibly belonged to one or the other side were also inconsistent. This second type of inconsistency comes not from a lack of knowledge but from a weak commitment to the issues involved. In the discussion below we shall tell the story of Peter A to illustrate the point of a Youth's being inconsistent. Concomitantly we shall try to show how ideology is most frequently not associated with friendship and thus of limited importance to Peter A and the other Youths, those whom Eskor-Toyo called the "opportunists."

TABLE 13.2--Consistency of Political Attitudes by Duration in the Labour Movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration in the Labour Movement</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under Five Years</td>
<td>Five Years of Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>36 (11)</td>
<td>10 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>64 (19)</td>
<td>90 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (30)</td>
<td>100 (52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
X^2 = 7.2
\]

\[
P < .01
\]

Inconsistency and Commitment

One is inconsistent because one is unaware of the inconsistency or because one is not committed to being consistent. Presumably one tolerates inconsistency either because one must
(one likes and dislikes one's relatives) or because one is so weakly committed to the objects of one's beliefs that inconsistency is not much of a strain. Consider the case of Peter A., a Youth, who called himself a communist but who contested elections for the NCNC. First consider how A. became "communist."

A. was born in 1935 in the Midwest not far from Imoudu's home town. He attended secondary school in Warri where he graduated in 1949. In 1951 he came to Lagos where he worked as a journalist for the Nigerian Daily Times. In 1953, his brother who was working in Accra wrote him to come to Ghana, promising him a scholarship at the University. Upon arriving in Ghana he found, much to his chagrin, that the scholarship had been awarded to someone else. Having to make a living he became a clerk in an agent's office in Kumasi. Because he was well educated and passionate he was elected to become a secretary of the union in his office. During agitations for independence his union was called out on strike by the CPP. For his activities during the strike, A. was "given the sack," but he was lucky in that the Ghana TUC gave him a job as a full-time trade unionist.

In 1956 the Ghana TUC awarded him a scholarship to study in Israel where he spent eighteen months. He liked Israel and was impressed by the cooperatives, "where everyone is happy being taken care of by the state." After

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1 Questions were based on Interview Schedule F which in turn was based on the "Dogmatism scale" of Milton Rokeach. See his The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 71-80.
coming back and working for a few more years in Ghana, in 1960 he returned to Nigeria. Upon his return to Nigeria A. looking for a job, approached Lawrence Borha, General Secretary of the ULC. Because Borha is also a Bini speaker from the Midwest and because of his long experience with the TUC in Ghana, A. felt sure that Borha would give him a job. But Borha refused, and called him a communist and an agent of Nkrumah. Rejected by Borha he went to see Imoudu, also a Bini speaker. Imoudu was glad to see him. With Imoudu and the Youths his Ghana experience gave him prestige. People called him "comrade" and assumed that he was a Marxist. "That's when I became a Marxist," says A. And that's how A. became a Marxist.

What is the meaning of "Marxism" for Peter A.? At the very least it is the rhetoric with which he defends his trade union friends in the NTUC and the Labour Party against their enemies in the labour field. Thus when asked to comment on the statement: "It is said that the NTUC and the ULC have nothing in common," Peter A. answered: "That is true, they are miles apart in ideology and Adebola (the President of the ULC) is an upper class somebody earning up to £2000 per year. "It is not inconceivable that had he received his first trade union job from Borha, the General Secretary of the ULC, he would have segregated the two groups just as sharply but would have criticized Imoudu or Goodluck instead of Adebola.
Asked whether Marxism allows one to understand the present state of Nigeria and to predict the future, Peter A. answered as follows: "Yes, Marxist-Leninist literature such as *State and Revolution* is very useful in understanding present day Nigeria." He gives the following example:

Look at the Railway Corporation. They have been losing money because they have competition from private transport such as lorries, etc. In a socialist state such competition would be regulated. The railways would be saved and the workers would not have to fear unemployment.

Asked whether people fail because of their own faults or because of the system in which they live, he answered, after some hesitation, "They fail because of the system." Asked if it is true that some of the hardest battles man has to fight are against his own nature, he answered, "It is true that some of the hardest battles a man must fight are against his own weaknesses, but the question is, are there alternatives for him?" Asked if he was fearful of the future, he answered, "It is not natural to be fearful of the future, but I am fearful of the future." By predicting the future, Marxism diminishes its fearsomeness and in allowing A. to make predictions, it gives him a sense of control over a system which is unjust, and full of conflict. All this is familiar enough from more committed Marxists, it is in the next set of questions that A. leaves the familiar pattern.

Turning to questions of ideological consistency and rigidity, he warned rather lugubriously that within the party, "One should be very careful of traitors within one's own
ranks. Charity begins at home as well as death. A party which tolerates too many differences will be destroyed." And yet Peter A. is an example of a person who is rather successful in "tolerating differences." Asked whether there is only one true philosophy, he answered, "Since I do not know all the philosophies in the world how can I tell that there is one one which is correct?" Asked if one should leave all important decisions to "leaders and experts," he answered, "No, one should not leave all decisions to leaders and experts. One should always promote discussion." Asked whether the present generation should be sacrificed for the sake of future generations, he answered, "No, I do not believe in that. One should not sacrifice the present generation for the sake of the future. We all must live well."

We already have some indications that Peter A. is not one of the most strongly committed Marxists, and like other inconsistents (remember A. says that he also supports the NCNC) he does not demand ideological congruence from his friends. Asked, "Is it your view that best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own?" A. answered, "Not at all. What does friendship have to do with politics. As a matter of fact, I am now staying with my best friend (a townsman). He does not believe as I do. Of course I might persuade him that my views are right." Unlike those of true-believers, A.'s easy attitude toward ideology is shared by other inconsistent within the ranks of the Youths.
We asked the same question of a group of trade unionists: "is it your view that the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose political beliefs are the same as one's own?" Respondents were given the following options:

1. I always choose friends whose political beliefs are the same as my own
2. Although I prefer people who share my beliefs, most of my friends need not hold the political beliefs that I do
3. My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs

In asking this question, we had in mind the following proposition. In general, we thought that a person who tries to homogenize his political environment is more committed to his political beliefs as against a person who does not. Being more committed to his beliefs a person who chooses friends whose political beliefs are the same as his own would be less likely to be changeable in his political allegiances. Consider the results in Table 13.3.

The results are in the expected direction. One notes that consistents are three times (38%) as likely to choose ideological friends as are the inconsistents (11%) but the inconsistents are five times as likely (41% to 8%) to be inconsistent not only with respect to party choice but with respect to friendship. That is, inconsistents on party choice tend to say that (1) "I always choose friends whose political beliefs are the same as my own" together with (3) "My

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1 Quota Sample D, see Appendix and Introduction.

2 See Berelson, "The Political Conviction of the Individual is closely bound to the political character of his personal relations--or at least his perception of their political complexion." p. 98.
friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs." In passing, one should observe that both inconsistents and consistents most frequently indicated that friendship and ideology were independent. Both groups chose with greatest frequency option (3) "My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs." This last result dovetails with the result of Table 11.4 in which it was indicated that persons most frequently prefer to compartmentalize their workers' roles from their political roles.

TABLE 13.3--Ideological Friendship by Inconsistent and Consistent Commitment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Who</th>
<th>Inconsistent</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choose ideological friends, or prefer ideological friends</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think friendship independent of politics</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictory: Always choose ideological friends but think that friendship independent of ideology</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100(17)</td>
<td>100(65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results further confirm our belief that the inconsistents like the cross-pressured are the changers, because if they do not make friendships based on a firm commitment to ideology they are free to change from political
opinion to political opinion, from supporting a labour party to saying that they are opposed to workers mixing in politics.

But friendship is only one way that the inconsistents differ from the consistents. We would expect that if the inconsistents do not have a firm commitment to their beliefs that they would be less likely to have a strong commitment to norms of behavior. One is reminded of Eskor-Toyo's warning against "opportunism" in the labour movement. For example the same Peter A. who answered that his friendship with a man had little to do with his friend's beliefs, told the following story:

A. tried to contest in the last Federal election. He went to his home town where he addressed a meeting of his clan. He would be a great help he explained in getting amenities for the town. He distributed £500 in gifts and since no one in the clan challenged him, he expected to get the NCNC nomination. All his adult life he had been a member of the NCNC and had been a member of the Zikist movement from its inception. He was changrined, therefore, when he discovered that the local NCNC refused to endorse him. When A. heard that someone else had been endorsed by the NCNC, he hurried to get the endorsement of the opposition party, an ally of the NNA! The point of the story is how irrelevant ideology or loyalty to the party was to A. He switched to the opposition as soon as it became clear to him that the NCNC would not win. He did this during an election which was said to pit socialism and capitalism against the "feudal" North!
If it is possible to generalize from this story we propose that one may be more likely to be inconsistent if one is not committed to a normative or moral view of the world. Peter A. was no Eskor-Toyo.

After the election, Peter A. came back to Lagos to try to organize workers. But K. of the ULC had turned management against him such that it became impossible for him to go to the site. When, in spite of that, he tried to organize, he was imprisoned and warned not to come back. As an unemployed Youth he has much time for rumination. He was born a Catholic but he has long since given up his father's religion. He feels that there is much truth in Rosicrucianism, because, as he puts it, "men in general have many forces and potentialities, but we do not use them."
CHAPTER XIV

ACCOUNTING FOR FAILURE: A STUDY OF IDEOLOGICAL VERIFICATION

In our discussion of ideological prediction we noted that the Youths failed to predict accurately the fate of the Nigerian Labour Party and the nature of their support in the Federal Elections because they drew the wrong inferences from the perceived motives of the workers and because they were misinformed about their support. In this chapter, we turn to the question of ideological verification, in particular we deal with how the Youths of the Nigerian Labour Party accounted for their predictions.

It will be recalled that at the end of the general strike of June, 1964, the Youths made a prediction and a commitment. They predicted that Imoudu would either win election in Lagos or at least that the NLP would successfully show that it had strong popular appeal. They made a commitment to a strong anti-regionalist strategy. This commitment could itself be viewed as a type of prediction: the NLP said that unlike the SWAFP it would not join in any united front with so called progressive parties.¹ To an

¹See Chapter III, pp. 72-81 below.
outside observer neither type of prediction came true. But here we are not concerned with views of outside observers; we are concerned with how the Youths accounted for the events of the election and whether in fact they perceived that they had failed. We proceed as follows: first we shall recapitulate briefly the role of the NLP in the elections, second we shall turn to the reaction of the NLP to the events of the elections and third we shall consider an explanation that Eskor-Toyo gave for the election and for the role of the NLP in the election.

**The Nigerian Labour Party and the Federal Election**

It will be recalled (from our discussion of the Regionalist System in chapter II), that the Federal Election of December, 1964, was scheduled to take place at a critical time in the evolution of the Nigerian political system. The party system had started out as a coalition of the Northern NPC and the Southern NCNC against the Western Action Group. By 1964, however, the NPC-NCNC coalition was dead. The Action Group had been split in the Western region into a branch, the NNDP, in collusion with the NPC, and into a branch, still calling itself AG, which out of necessity allied itself with its old rival, the NCNC. The end result of these crises and maneuvers was to polarize Nigerian politics between a Northern and a Southern party alliance. The Federal election took place under special circumstances.
The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) decided to boycott the election, because it charged the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) with fraud and with rigging the election. Neither the labour movement as a whole, nor the Nigerian Labour Party were exempt from the effects of this polarization.

By the middle of December Imoudu himself made it clear where his sympathies lay, and on the eve of the UPGA boycott he made statements to the press indicative of his changed position. "The rigging of the election by the NNA has precipitated a national crisis."¹ At the UPGA rally in Lagos announcing the boycott of the election, Imoudu was present as were representatives of the SWAFP.² And then on December 29, Imoudu speaking in the name of the Joint Action Committee calls for a general strike in support of the UPGA boycott.³

The General Strike of December 1964

For the Nigerian Labour Party and for the other Youths who had called it, the general strike of December 1964 was a failure. After the call on December 29, A. Ikoro and four other Youths traveled to the Western and the Eastern region seeking support from local unions and local leaders. In Ibadan, for

¹Daily Times, December 27, 1964.
²Daily Express, 28 December, 1964.
example, the Secretary of the Western Region Branch of the ULC (who did not consider himself a Youth but was a strong NCNC supporter) called on the General Secretaries and the Presidents in the Ibadan area to come to a meeting where going on strike would be debated. From the beginning, the meeting was divided into those who had pro-UPGA and those who had pro-NNA sympathies. Depending on which faction one believes, two decisions were made at that meeting. The first was to go on strike and the second was not to go on strike. The result was no strike in Ibadan. With some variations the story repeated itself in the East and the North.¹

There were various reasons why the strike failed. The Youths claimed that it failed because Alhaji H. P. Adebola, President of the ULC, refused to support the strike. Others claimed that the workers were not ready to go on strike again so soon after the general strike of June. But whatever the causes,² the failure of the strike converging with the electoral failure of the party, had significant consequences on the solidarity of the NLP and on the explanations given for the failures.

¹ Most Southern workers in the North were members of the ULC; when the ULC did not call its workers out on strike, the strike did not materialize.

² Following the Festinger model, Professor Paul Hiniker has suggested that Imoudu may have called a strike as a way of reducing the dissonance of the electoral failure.
The Reaction of the Nigerian Labour Party

After the December election,¹ The Nigerian Labour Party fragmented into two factions. The first faction, maintaining the name of the NLP, rallies about Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo and supports their interpretation of the events of December. The second faction, calling itself the Revolutionary Nigerian Labour Party (RNLP), rejects the Imoudu and Eskor-Toyo interpretation, denounces the UPGA, rifles the files of the NLP and opens its own branch in Ibadan.

It is interesting to note that from our observations there were very few renunciations of ideology by formerly committed people. The one example of possible renunciation, an exception which proves the rule, is Peter A. whose case we discussed in chapter XIII above. But Peter A. was so inconsistent and uncommitted that his recent flirtation with Rosicrucianism is no more serious than his first flirtation with Marxism. The majority of the NLP stayed with Imoudu but it is our impression that they did not perceive the importance of the events of December. One young man, for example, stopped talking about Nigerian politics because most of his attention had been taken up with the forthcoming World Youth Congress in Algeria. Those who did perceive the events of December as needing an explanation were satisfied with Eskor-Toyo's explanation (see below). And it

¹It was later agreed to postpone the December Federal election until March, 1965, in Lagos and in the Eastern region, but by March the NLP was not contesting in Lagos.
seemed to us they were further confirmed in their beliefs by this explanation.

The group that split from the NLP did not accept this explanation, and did perceive the events of December as failures for the NLP, but instead of reinterpreting events and changing the primitive terms of their ideology as Eskor-Toyo did, the RNLP reaffirmed in even stronger terms the necessity for non-cooperation with the "bourgeoisie." Ironically they seemed to take some pleasure in the failure of the NLP. This failure meant that as before they, as "mature Marxists" would have to endure powerlessness. They seemed to welcome failure and the stance of men outside and above politics "like Lenin in Switzerland." The failure proved that tactics not ideology were wrong, electoral outlets in Nigeria were of no use, revolution and coup d'etats were the roads to socialism.

Eskor-Toyo's Explanation

Eskor-Toyo unlike many Youths did perceive what happened and tried to give an explanation for the events of December. Our comments are based on an article he wrote for the Labour Vanguard entitled, "Is Nigeria's Crisis Really Over."¹ In order to understand the quotes we have lifted from his article it is necessary to keep the following

¹Labour Vanguard, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 25, 1965). The paper was first founded by the NLP after the general strike of June, 1964.
points in mind. Eskor-Toyo had to "solve" two "problems": (1) he had to explain why his and the NLP's early commitment not to join united fronts was violated during the election. After all, his bitter denunciation of Dr. Otegbeye was based on just this point. Otegbeye and SWAFP gave UPGA their support from the beginning; Eskor-Toyo and the NLP at first refused to give this support. (2) He had to explain why it was that the NLP did not get the popular support expected after the general strike of June, 1964.

In looking at Eskor-Toyo's explanation, let us keep in mind in what respects his ideology changed and how it remained the same. He begins his analysis by making a crucial distinction:

. . . . the bourgeois class has been growing relatively fast and becoming differentiated into tycoon bourgeois and under-dog bourgeois, in other words compradore bourgeois and national bourgeois.1

From this differentiation of the primitive term "bourgeois" Eskor-Toyo draws far-reaching conclusions and "solves" both failures of the NLP:

After having made the distinction in "bourgeois," the "solution" to the problem of the NLP's supporting the regionalist UPGA is first to equate "UPGA" with "bourgeois" (which is one of the postulates of the theory) and then to differentiate UPGA just as bourgeois had been differentiated. Thus there are two types of "bourgeois" and two types of UPGA and the importance of the distinction lies in there

1Ibid.
being a bourgeois UPGA of positive qualities and a bourgeois
UPGA of negative qualities. Thus,

The compradore bourgeois, to preserve his gain, has
to strengthen the feudal-bourgeois governmental
alliance and the connections with imperialist finance
monopoly.

But the underdog bourgeois are no longer satisfied
with the arrangement. They are eager that the bourgeois
class as a whole should throw off the feudalists or
weaken their power and rule with little or no obstruc-
tion or challenge from the feudalists.¹

Having gone this far, it is now possible to explain how it
was possible that the Youths and the "nationalist bourgeois"
formed an alliance during the election. The "solution" is
this: It was not the Youths who formed an alliance with
the "nationalist bourgeois"; it was the nationalist bourgeois
who formed an alliance with the Youths! By the time of the
election:

... the underdog bourgeois were at the end of their
resistance and had to accept the working class into
a progressive alliance ... ²

Having "explained" the alliance between the Nigerian Labour
Party and the UPGA it is now possible to explain the failure
of the NLP:

The working class itself, whilst demonstrating clearly
that it stood for the defence of the democratic rights
of the people against feudal reaction, yet showed it-
self ill prepared ideologically and organizationally
for struggle against feudal-compradore reaction. The
bourgeois underdog and working class resistance had
to collapse, and it did collapse.³

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.
The failure of the Nigerian Labour Party is accounted for by the failure of the UPGA. It is no longer an isolated phenomenon but part of the more general collapse of the united front.

From this analysis, further propositional changes in ideology are not necessary. The shoe lies on the other foot. It is not the ideology of the NLP which must change, it is the UPGA:

What is needed is that those in the NCNC, Action Group, NEPU, UMBC, and other parties who really want a progressive regime in Nigeria should abandon their "Zikist," democratic "Socialist," and pragmatic illusions. They should boldly accept the bankruptcy of these "nationalist" ideas which the crisis has exposed.

They should join with the Nigerian Labour Party for a fundamental and basic change in the social system.

What can we learn from Eskor-Toyo's analysis which is relevant to our concerns? What changed?

The axioms of the model did not change. There are still Bourgeois, and Feudal and Working class, and each is opposed to the other group. There are still imperialist and neo-colonialist profiting from all this struggle:

The struggle for democracy, as we have now "discovered" implies a struggle against imperialism, the main force backing feudal and tycoon reaction in Nigeria.

What did change were the semantics of the model. The relationship between the primitive terms and the objects in the real world changed. The terms "Feudal" still apply to the NNA and the terms "bourgeois" to the UPGA but differentiating the term bourgeois allowed the NLP to speak of two factions.

\[1\] Ibid.  \[2\] Ibid.
within the UPGA, the "compradore bourgeois" and the "nationalist bourgeois." Transformed into the terms of the ideology, it is the "compradore bourgeois" who fit the axiom of struggle between "working class" and "bourgeoisie." The nationalist bourgeoisie is made to fit a new set of axioms dealing with those who are not all bad but who are living in a world of illusions. Because they are not all bad it is possible to enter into temporary alliances with the nationalist bourgeoisie, and because they live in illusion, it is necessary to try to reform them and to make them see the true nature of Nigerian politics.

Eskor-Toyo's interpretation fits into the general notion that ideological verification must satisfy criteria taken from reality, values, and affect. That Eskor-Toyo did try to deal with the events of December, and that he did admit that the "working class . . . showed itself ill prepared ideologically and organizationally"\(^1\) testifies to his sense of reality. His linking the failure of the NLP to that of the UPGA and his explanation of the NLP's working with the UPGA preserved the illusion that there had been no failure and opened up the possibility of the Youths being reabsorbed into one of the nationalist parties.

In closing this section one should note that it took a sort of creativity to differentiate the UPGA and to link this differentiation with the fate of the NLP. From the larger perspective of Nigerian politics, however,

\(^1\)Ibid.
Eskor-Toyo's feat did nothing more than bring the Youths into the camp of the UFGA, something that most Southerners were doing anyway.
CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

Findings

In this study we were concerned with the two processes of ideological prediction and ideological verification. Turning first to prediction, the findings of the case study can be summarized as follows: According to the Youths, the workers participated in the general strike out of motives of egalitarianism and out of disappointment with post-independence politics. From a correct perception of these motives, the Youths predicted that the workers would support Imoudu and the Nigerian Labour Party in the forthcoming Federal elections. This was not to be the case; there is evidence to show (Chapter XI) that neither egalitarianism nor a withdrawal of consent led workers to abandon the regionalist parties and to support the labour party. This in a nutshell is what happened. Two questions come up: why did the Youths fail and what did they learn from their failure?

The two reasons for the failure of the Youths predictions are first, the way the Youths translated their perceptions into the primitive terms of their Marxism, and second, the false information that the workers were transmitting.
to the Youths. First, the Youths were predisposed by their ideology to translate, "egalitarianism" into "class struggle" and "withdrawal of consent" into "post-independence crisis." It followed from this translation, from the primitive terms, and from the axioms of the theory that workers were abandoning the regionalist ("bourgeois") parties and flocking to the Nigerian Labour party. Second, the Youths were "decoding" information from the workers which indicated that the workers were strongly in support of a labour party. But the information was false; it did not correspond to the inconsistent motives of the workers. Workers' motives were inconsistent in the sense that a critical number of workers supported both the regionalist and the workers parties.

The significance of the inconsistents is derived from the distribution of responses on the question of support for a labour party. It turned out (Chapter XII) that about a third of the respondents indicated support for a labour party, somewhat over a third indicated that they did "not mix" their political and their occupational ties, and a fifth were inconsistent. Forming about a fifth of the distribution, the inconsistents could affect the over-all distribution by giving the impression either that most workers supported a labour party (one-third + one-fifth) or that most workers were not willing to mix in politics (one-third + one-fifth). The inconsistents represented, therefore, a potential for
false information about the attitudes of the workers. This the Youths could not at first foresee or discriminate.

Turning to the question of how the Youths verified their prediction, we noted (Chapter XIV) that the NLP did not, by the Federal election, oppose UPGA, one of the regionalist parties. Eskor-Toyo, Secretary and spokesman for the NLP accounted for the events of December by differentiating the primitive term "bourgeois" into two terms" "compradore Bourgeois," and "nationalist bourgeois." This differentiation allowed him to account for the failure of the NLP by linking it to the failure of the UPGA. One can speak of "political learning" as having taken place for the Youths in the sense that Eskor-Toyo's differentiation will presumably allow him to make new predictions. In the light of the types of insight necessary for Nigerian development, however, Eskor's is a very small victory.

Having discussed the findings of the case study we turn to the relevance of these findings to the question asked in the introduction: what are prediction and verification dependent upon?

The Relevance of the Findings

Ideological prediction varies with theory and with information. One way in which theories are more of less sophisticated and predictions are more or less ture is the extent that they do not impute a one-to-one relationship between motives and actions. Going on strike for reasons of
egalitarianism does not necessarily mean that this motive is generalizable beyond the strike. Assuming that it is generalizable, it may or may not be translatable into a sentiment of class consciousness.

Predictions also vary with the truth, stability, and consistency of the information on which they are based. From false information true predictions can be made only by chance. But information need not be false to be misleading. For example, if the relationship between messages and events is unstable, then the relationship between prediction and future events is true only for a time but ceases to be true when the information is "out of date." In the case studied, it was found that reliability of information depends on the consistency of motives of the encoder or communicator. If the political communicator does not perceive or does not care to perceive that he has mixed motives he will be misleading in the impressions that he leaves with politicians.

In general it may be suggested that, when attitudes tend to consistency over time, ideological experimentation ultimately homes-in or discovers those coalitions over which prediction and persuasion is possible. Once prediction and persuasion is possible, political institutions can be built, and political development can take place. If attitude markets are not consistent, as they are not in Nigerian labour, ideological experimentation cannot serve this creative function.
Generalizing from the findings on verification it may be suggested that to the extent politicians like Eskor-Toyo are willing to recognize failure and differentiate their perception of the political process, political verification serves to change ideology and may allow for creative new political insights and predictions. But the question remains, did Eskor-Toyo move toward the UPGA because he realized that his support was unstable and inconsistent or did he change his course and his ideology because he thought it wise to support a "nationalist" bourgeoisie against the Northern "feudalists." We suspect that it was for the second reason and that in fact politicians are not aware of (or refuse to be aware of) the unpredictability of their own politics.

The problem that the Youths had with their "Marxist" theory of the Nigerian political system points up the serious problem of what sociologists call the "institutionalizing of ideology" or what Apter has called the "transfer of institutions" in the new states. If politicians cannot rely on the information they get from the polity how can they adjust their models or ideologies to reality, and if they cannot predict support or persuade voters (because they do not know what the voters think) does this not mean that they are left with no alternative but to rely on force? After the election of 1964, one Youth remarked "it is no use for us to launch political parties, here in Nigeria, we can only come to power through revolution."
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The following bibliography, by no means complete or exhaustive, is based on materials found pertinent to the writing of the thesis. For easy reference the bibliography is divided under four major headings: (1) Concept Formation, Ideology, and Political Development, (2) Africa and Nigeria, (3) Labour and Politics, (4) Newspapers and Periodicals.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Robert Melson was born in Warsaw Poland in 1937. He came to the United States in 1947 and became a citizen in 1952. From 1955 to 1959 he attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he studied Humanities and Mathematics. Graduating from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a S. B. in 1959, he did a year of graduate work in Anthropology at Yale University. In 1961, he returned to Massachusetts Institute of Technology to do graduate work in Political Science. Accompanied by his wife, Gail, from 1964 to 1965, he did field-work in Nigeria where he was a research fellow of the Institute of African Studies of the University of Ife. His work was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation, from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, and from the National Science Foundation. He is publishing a chapter, "The Nigerian General Strike of 1964," in Robert Rotberg (ed.), Protest Movements in Africa, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in press).

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QUESTIONNAIRE A
RESEARCH INTO LABOUR IN NIGERIA

Your answer will enable us to complete our research into the relationship between Labour and Government in the young country of Nigeria. You are free to indicate your name or not to indicate your name as you please.

Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can.

Thank you for your kind help.

ROBERT MELSON
U.C.I.
1. What do you think was the root cause of the recent general strike?

2. Do you think that the JAC should remain?

3. What union are you representing?

4. How old are you?

5. What is your position in the union? Are you a member of the executive?

6. About how many members does your branch union have?

7. In what year did your union register?

8. If someone holds an executive position in your union, how often does he have to stand for election?

9. How long have you occupied your present executive position in your union?

10. What was the last class you attended in school?

11. What other educational qualification do you have?

12. What is your present occupation?

13. About how much do you earn per year?

14. Would you say that your chances for advancement are:  
   good______  
   not bad______  
   very bad______

15. What is your tribal affiliation?

16. What is your religious affiliation?  
   Catholic  
   Protestant (Please state which branch, for example, Baptist)______  
   Muslim______  
   Other______

17. What was your father's occupation?

18. In general would you prefer to work for government or for private industry?

19. Did you believe that before you went back to work during the strike other regions of the nation were returning to work? Which regions?
20. How were you able to check this information?

21. Does your union belong to
   NTUC
   ULC
   LUF
   NWC
   If it belongs to some other National body please note the name. If it belongs to no National body please write down, "none."

22. How does it help your union to be a member of such an organization (National body as listed above)?

23. Does the National body which your union belongs have the power to call out on strike any union in the National body?

24. Has the National body to which your union belongs ever disciplined a general secretary of your union?

25. Did your union go out on strike before or after you were given orders to do so from your National body executive?

26. Would you say that on the whole your union is independent and free to pull out of any National body and join any federation that it pleases?

27. What would be some of the penalties that a union would suffer by pulling-out of a National body?

28. How many times in the last two years has your union called on the National body to help you? Is your union affiliated with an international body such as:
   ICFTU
   WFTU
   AATUF
   CAATU
   PAWC

29. Do you believe that affiliation with international bodies is useful or harmful to the Nigerian Labour Movement?

30. Which political party did you vote for in 1959?

31. Have you ever held or do you now hold a post in a political party or in the government? Which post?
32. What do the initials SWFP stand for?

33. What do the initials NYC stand for?

34. Have you ever belonged to the Zikist movement?

35. Did everyone on your executive survive the strike or were some people asked to resign by the workers because they refused to go out on strike?

36. What do the initials FLAC stand for?

37. Have the Whitley councils been effective in your industry?

38. Do you want to make a career in the Labour movement?

39. Are you going to cast your vote in the next national election?

40. Do you feel that a man like you has little influence with government people?

41. Do you feel that things are getting worse not better?

42. Do you feel that government should instruct parents how to bring up their children?

43. How long does it take you to get home to your town or village?

44. How often in a year do you get home?

45. When you get home do people respect you as a big man?

46. When you get home do people ask you for advice about politics?

47. Which party do you think behaved with most friendliness towards the workers during the strike?
   NPC
   NEPU
   NCNC
   AG
   NNDP
   SWFP
   DYNAMIC PARTY

48. Which newspapers or Radio did you trust to give you honest reporting during the strike?

49. Did your union have the use of a telephone during the strike?
50. Have you ever met anyone who holds high position in government?

51. Is this person related to you by family or is he a close friend?

52. Have you ever met anyone who holds a high position in industry?

53. Is this person related to you by family or is he a close friend?

54. Do you feel that Government should control rents and prices?

55. Would you support a Labour Party.
QUESTIONNAIRE B
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR LEADERS

Dear Sir,

Your opinions on the vital issues of Labour and Government are of great importance to all men who are interested either in improving industrial relations or in furthering the study of industrial relations in Nigeria.

The answers to the questions below will be treated statistically. I mean that once I have all the answers before me, of all the people who answered, I can make statements such as "30% of Union Leaders have held their post for a year or more." The important thing to remember is that your personal answers will not be quoted: it is the group's answer that we are after.

Let me say a word about how to answer the questions below. You will see that for almost all questions, the answers are already provided for you. Of course no answer that I can suggest will be exactly the one you would have given. You are asked to choose those answers which come nearest to your own point of view.

The best way to answer is to put one or more checks (✓) next to the statement or statements which come nearest to your own. For example, I ask the question:

20. How old are you?
   1. Below 20
   2. Between 20-30
   3. Between 30-40
   4. Between 40-50
   5. Between 50-60
   6. Over 60

Let us imagine that you are 43 years old. You would check statement 4 above.

Of course you are free to answer as you please and to answer as many questions as you please. It is of the utmost importance however that you answer frankly and as many questions as possible. Remember unless you write down your name no one can possibly know who answered a particular question. I can assure you that in any case—even your nameless answers—will be held in strictest confidence.

Of course if you do wish to write down your name and address you may do so. This would help me considerably in contacting you to ask for more of your opinions.

Thank you for your co-operation.

Robert Melson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Ibadan.
1. What is your position in the union?
   1. Secretary____
   2. President____
   3. Treasurer____
   4. Vice-President____
   5. Other Executive Office____
   6. Non-Executive Union Member____

2. In how many other Unions are you an executive officer?
   1. One other union____
   2. Two other unions____
   3. Three other unions____
   4. More than three other unions____

3. What is your occupation?

4. Do you work for
   1. Government____
   2. Private Nigerian Industry____
   3. Private Expatriate Industry____

5. About how much do you earn per year from your union duties?

6. What is your total income per year?
   1. Less than 100 pounds____
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds____
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds____
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds____
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds____
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds____
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds____
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds____
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds____
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds____
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds____
  12. Over 1000 pounds____

7. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
   1. Less than 100 pounds____
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds____
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds____
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds____
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds____
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds____
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds____
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds____
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds____
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds____
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds____
  12. Over 1000 pounds____
8. How much do you think you will be earning five years from now?
   1. Less than 100 pounds
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
  12. Over 1000 pounds

9. What was your father's occupation?

10. Was your father literate?
   1. Literate
   2. Not literate

11. Does your senior brother earn more than you do?
   1. I have no senior brother
   2. He earns more than I do
   3. He earns the same
   4. He earns less than I do
   5. I am the senior brother in my family

12. To which tribe do you belong?

13. In which region were you born?

14. In which region do you live now?

15. What is your religion?
   1. Catholic
   2. Protestant (Anglican, Baptist, Methodist and so on)
   3. Muslim
   4. Other
   If you checked-off "other" what is the church to which you belong?

16. What was the last class you attended in school?
   1. Primary I
   2. Primary II
   3. Primary III
   4. Primary Four
   5. Primary Five
   6. Primary Six
   7. Secondary I
   8. Secondary II
   9. Secondary III
  10. Secondary Four
  11. Secondary Five
  12. Secondary Six
  13. University
17. Have you been able to obtain?
   1. WASC
   2. GCE (OL)
   3. HSC
   4. GCE (AL)

18. What will be your occupation five years from now?

19. Will you still be a union leader five years from now?

20. How old are you?
   1. Below 20
   2. Between 20 and 30
   3. Between 30 and 40
   4. Between 40 and 50
   5. Between 50 and 60
   6. Over 60

21. How long have you been a member of your trade union?
   1. One year or less
   2. Between 1 and 2 years
   3. Between 2 and 3 years
   4. Between 3 and 4 years
   5. Between 4 and 5 years
   6. Between 5 and 7 years
   7. Between 7 and 10 years
   8. Between 10 and 15 years
   9. More than 15 years

22. How long have you been in your present executive position?
   1. One year or less
   2. Between 1 and 2 years
   3. Between 2 and 3 years
   4. Between 3 and 4 years
   5. Between 4 and 5 years
   6. Between 5 and 7 years
   7. Between 7 and 10 years
   8. Between 10 and 15 years
   9. More than 15 years

23. Have you ever held a position in a political party?
   1. Yes
   2. No

24. Have you ever held a position in government?
   1. Yes
   2. No

25. Will you in the future want to hold a position in a political party?
   1. Yes
   2. No

26. Will you in the future want to hold a position in government?
   1. Yes
   2. No
27. Do you agree with the following statement: "A man like me has no chance of advancement in the political parties of today"
   1. I agree  2. I disagree  3. I don't know

28. Did you vote in the Federal election of 1959?
   1. Yes  2. No

29. Will you vote in the Federal election of 1964?
   1. Yes  2. No

30. Do you think that there is a party in the Federation which cares for the workers?
   1. All parties care for the workers
   2. There is at least one party which cares for the workers
   3. No party cares for the workers
   4. I don't know

31. Which do you think were the most important causes of the recent general strike?
   1. The census issue
   2. Corruption in government
   3. Low salary of workers
   4. The bad treatment of minority groups
   5. Arrogance of those who are on top
   6. Too high salaries and too many allowances for senior civil servants as compared to what the workers get
   7. The emergency in the Western Region
   8. Too high salaries and too many allowances for politicians as compared to what the workers get
   9. I don't know

32. As a citizen of Nigeria, which issue makes you particularly angry?
   1. The high salaries and allowances of those who are on top
   2. The census issue
   3. The Western Region emergency
   4. The bad treatment of minority groups
   5. None of the above
   6. Freedom of the Press
   7. I don't know

33. Do you think the strike has been a success or a failure?
   1. Success
   2. Failure
   3. Neither
   4. I don't know
34. What is your opinion about politicians now that Nigeria is independent?
   1. I trusted our politicians more before independence than now
   2. I trust our politicians the same way as I did before independence
   3. I trust our politicians more now than I did before independence

35. What is your opinion about senior civil servants?
   1. I trusted them more before independence
   2. I trust them the same way now as I did before independence
   3. I trust them more now

36. What is your feeling about trade union leaders?
   1. I trusted them more before independence
   2. I trust them the same way now as I did before independence
   3. I trust them more now than I did before independence

37. What is your opinion of government?
   1. I trusted government more before independence
   2. I trust government the same way as I did before independence
   3. I trust government more now than I did before independence

38. Now that the strike is over, do you trust politicians?
   1. More than before the strike
   2. The same as before the strike
   3. Less than before the strike

39. Now that the strike is over, do you trust senior civil servants
   1. More than before the strike
   2. The same as before the strike
   3. Less than before the strike

40. Now that the strike is over do you trust union leaders?
   1. More than before the strike
   2. The same as before the strike
   3. Less than before the strike

41. Now that the strike is over, do you trust government?
   1. More than before the strike
   2. The same as before the strike
   3. Less than before the strike
42. What are the things that you wish government would do for the citizen?
   1. Government should provide for education
   2. Government should provide for transport
   3. Government should provide for housing
   4. Government should provide for burial
   5. Government should provide medical aid
   6. Government should provide employment
   7. Government should do all of the above
   8. Government should do none of the above
   9. I don't know

43. Do you think that your position has been strengthened or weakened because of the strike?
   1. Strengthened
   2. Weakened
   3. Neither
   4. I don't know

44. What is your position in society? Are you
   1. Lower class
   2. Middle class
   3. Working class
   4. Upper class
   5. There are no classes in Nigeria
   6. I don't know

45. What about politicians? Are the
   1. Middle class
   2. Working class
   3. Upper class
   4. Lower class
   5. There are no classes in Nigeria
   6. I don't know

46. What about senior civil servants? Are the
   1. Lower class
   2. Middle class
   3. Working class
   4. Upper class
   5. There are no classes in Nigeria
   6. I don't know

47. What about trade union leaders? Are they
   1. Middle class
   2. Lower class
   3. Working class
   4. Upper class
   5. There are no classes in Nigeria
   6. I don't know
48. What about doctors? Are they
1. Middle class____
2. Upper class____
3. Lower class____
4. Working class____
5. There are no classes in Nigeria____
6. I don't know____

49. What about merchants? Are they
1. Middle class____
2. Lower class____
3. Upper class____
4. Working class____
5. There are no classes in Nigeria____
6. I don't know____

50. What about farmers? Are they
1. Upper class____
2. Middle class____
3. Lower class____
4. Working class____
5. There are no classes in Nigeria____
6. I don't know____

51. If two men were running for office, one came from your hometown another was a trade unionist whom would you vote for?
1. I would vote for my townsman____
2. I would vote for the Trade Unionist____

52. Which party do you think is most friendly to workers?
1. NFC____
2. NCNC____
3. AG____
4. NNP____
5. SWPF____
6. Dynamic party____
7. Labour party (Imoudu)____
8. Other party____
9. No party____
10. I don't know____

53. To which national body does your union belong?
1. ULC____
2. NTUC____
3. LUF____
4. NWC____
5. None____
6. Other____

If you checked "other" please note below the national body or federation to which your union belongs.

54. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
1. There's little use in talking to public officials because often they aren't really interested in the problems of the average man.
   Agree____ Disagree____
2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.  
   Agree_____  Disagree_____ 

3. Inspite of what people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.  
   Agree_____  Disagree_____ 

4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future.  
   Agree_____  Disagree_____ 

5. These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on.  
   Agree_____  Disagree_____
QUESTIONNAIRE C
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LABOUR LEADERS

Dear Sir,

Your opinions on the vital issues of Labour and Government are of great importance to all men who are interested either in improving industrial relations or in furthering the study of industrial relations in Nigeria.

The answers to the questions below will be treated statistically. I mean that once I have all the answers before me, of all the people who answered, I can make statements such as "30% of Union Leaders have held their post for a year or more." The important thing to remember is that your personal answers will not be quoted: it is the group's answer that we are after.

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The best way to answer is to put one or more checks (✓) next to the statement or statements which comes nearest to your own. For example, I ask the question:

20. How old are you?
   1. Below 20
   2. Between 20-30
   3. Between 30-40
   4. Between 40-50 ✓
   5. Between 50-60
   6. Over 60

Let us imagine that you are 43 years old. You would check statement 4 above.

Of course you are free to answer as you please and to answer as many questions as you please. It is of the utmost importance however that you answer frankly and as may questions as possible. Remember unless you write down your name no one can possibly know who answered a particular question. I can assure you that in any case—even your nameless answers—will be held in strictest confidence.

If you do wish to write down your name and address you may do so. This would help me considerably in contacting you to ask for more of your opinions.

Thank you for your co-operation.

Robert Melson
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research,
University of Ibadan
1. What do you think were the most important causes of the recent general strike?

1a. Did your union go on strike in the recent general strike?

2. Now that the strike is over, do politicians respect you
   1. More than before the strike____
   2. The same as before the strike____
   3. Less than before the strike____

3. Now that the strike is over, do senior civil servants respect you
   1. More than before the strike____
   2. The same as before the strike____
   3. Less than before the strike____

4. Now that the strike is over do workers respect you
   1. More than before the strike____
   2. The same as before the strike____
   3. Less than before the strike____

5. Now that the strike is over, does government respect you
   1. More than before the strike____
   2. The same as before the strike____
   3. Less than before the strike____

6. From where did you get most of your information during the strike?
   1. Radio____  4. From Trade Union Handouts____
   2. Newspapers____  5. Other people____
   3. Television____

7. From which of these human sources did you get most of your information during the strike?
   1. Family____
   2. Trade union friends____
   3. Trade union leaders in Lagos____
   4. Fellow workers____
   5. People in my political party____
   6. People in my tribal (clan) union____
   7. Townsmen____

8. What newspapers did you find most reliable during the strike?
   1. The Citizen____  6. Irohin Yoruba____
   2. Daily Mail____  7. Daily Sketch____
   5. The Nigerian Tribune____  Sentinel____
9. Port Harcourt Guardian
   2. West African Pilot
   3. Daily Express
   4. Nigerian Daily Times
   5. Morning Post

10. Where do you get most of your information about the election?
   1. From the radio
   2. From newspapers
   3. From television
   4. From party handouts
   5. From other people

11. What kind of people are most informative about the election?
   1. My family
   2. Trade Union Friends
   3. Trade Union leaders in Lagos
   4. Fellow Workers
   5. People in my Political Party
   6. People in my Tribal (clan) union
   7. Townsmen

12. Which newspapers do you find to be most reliable during the election?

13. What is your position in the branch trade union?
   1. Secretary
   2. President or Chairman
   3. Treasurer
   4. Vice-President
   5. Other Executive Office
   6. Non-Executive Union Member

14. In how many Branch Unions are you an executive officer?
   1. One other union
   2. Two other unions
   3. Three other unions
   4. More than three other unions

15. To which national body does your union belong?
   1. ULC
   2. NTUC
   3. LUF
   4. NWC
   5. None
   6. Other

If you checked "other" please note below the national body or federation to which your union belongs.
16. What is your position in the national body?
   1. National General Secretary
   2. National President or Chairman
   3. Member of national executive
   4. Regional Secretary
   5. Regional President or Chairman
   6. Member of regional executive
   7. Non-executive member

17. What is your occupation?

18. Would you say that your chances for advancement in your present job are
   1. Very good
   2. Good
   3. Satisfactory
   4. Bad
   5. Very bad

19. Do you work for
   1. Federal Government
   2. Private Nigerian Industry
   3. Regional Government
   4. Private Expatriate Industry
   5. Local Government
   6. Statutory Corporation

20. Would you prefer to work for
   1. The Federal Government
   2. Private Nigerian Industry
   3. Regional Government
   4. Private Expatriate Industry
   5. Local government
   6. Statutory Corporations

21. About how much do you earn per year from your trade union duties?

22. What is your total income per year from your job?
   1. Less than 100 pounds
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
  12. Over 1000 pounds
23. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
   1. Less than 100 pounds____
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds____
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds____
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds____
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds____
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds____
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds____
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds____
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds____
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds____
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds____
  12. Over 1000 pounds____

24. How much do you think you will be earning five years from now?
   1. Less than 100 pounds____
   2. Between 100 and 150 pounds____
   3. Between 150 and 200 pounds____
   4. Between 200 and 250 pounds____
   5. Between 250 and 300 pounds____
   6. Between 300 and 350 pounds____
   7. Between 350 and 400 pounds____
   8. Between 400 and 450 pounds____
   9. Between 450 and 500 pounds____
  10. Between 500 and 700 pounds____
  11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds____
  12. Over 1000 pounds____

25. What was your father's occupation?

26. Was your father literate?
   1. Literate____
   2. Not literate____

27. Was your mother literate?
   1. Literate
   2. Not literate

28. To which tribe do you belong?

29. Where were you born?

30. What is your religion?
   1. Catholic____
   2. Protestant____(Anglican, Baptist, Methodist and so on)____
   3. Muslim____
   4. Other____

If you checked-off "other" what is the church to which you belong?
31. Where do you live now?

32. What was the last class you attended in school?
   1. Primary I
   2. Primary II
   3. Primary III
   4. Primary Four
   5. Primary Five
   6. Primary Six
   7. Secondary I
   8. Secondary II
   9. Secondary III
   10. Secondary Four
   11. Secondary Five
   12. Secondary Six
   13. University

33. What certificate do you have (if not listed, please write it below)
   1. WASC
   2. GCE (OL)
   3. HSC
   4. GCE (AL)
   5. I have no certificate

34. What other education have you had?

35. What will be your occupation five years from now?

36. If tomorrow you had to look for another job what sort of work do you think you would be most qualified to do?

37. Will you want to be a Trade union leader five years from now? Why?

38. How old are you?
   1. Below 20
   2. Between 20 and 30
   3. Between 30 and 40
   4. Between 40 and 50
   5. Between 50 and 60
   6. Over 60

39. How long have you been a member of your trade union?
   1. One year or less
   2. Between 1 and 2 years
   3. Between 2 and 3 years
   4. Between 3 and 4 years
   5. Between 4 and 5 years
   6. Between 5 and 7 years
   7. Between 7 and 10 years
   8. Between 10 and 15 years
   9. More than 15 years

40. How long have you been in your present executive position?
   1. One year or less
   2. Between 1 and 2 years
   3. Between 2 and 3 years
   4. Between 3 and 4 years
   5. Between 4 and 5 years
   6. Between 5 and 7 years
   7. Between 7 and 10 years
   8. Between 10 and 15 years
   9. More than 15 years
41. Have you ever held a position in a political party?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

42. Which position?

43. Have you ever held a position in government?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

44. Which position?

45. Did you even belong to the Zikist movement?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

46. Will you in the future want to hold a position in a political party?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

47. Which position?

48. Which statement comes closest to your own view?
   1. A man like me has a good chance of advancement in the political parties of today____
   2. A man like me has some chance of advancement in the political parties of today____
   3. A man like me has no chance of advancement in the political parties of today____

49. What parties in your opinion were most helpful to the workers during the recent general strike?

50. What parties were most helpful to workers in 1959?

51. Will you vote in the Federal election of 1964?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

52. Which parties are most helpful to the workers in 1964?

53. Are you voting for the same party now that you voted for in 1959?
   1. Yes, same party____
   2. No, different party____
   3. I did not vote in 1959____

54. Are you personally doing anything to help your party win the election?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

55. Did you work actively for your party in 1959?
   1. Yes____  2. No____
56. Do any of your closest friends disagree with your political opinions?
   1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know

57. Do any of your trade union friends disagree with your political opinions?
   1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know

58. As a citizen of Nigeria, which issue makes your particularly angry?
   1. The high salaries and allowances of those who are on top
   2. The census issue
   3. The Western Region emergency
   4. The bad treatment of minority groups
   5. Freedom of the Press
   6. Neglect of workers by government
   7. Government's not taking trade unions into its confidence

59. Are most people in your trade union going to vote the way you are?
   1. Most persons in my trade union will vote the way I do
   2. Most persons in my trade union will vote differently from me
   3. I don't know which way my fellow trade unionists will vote

60. Do you think it will make much difference to the trade union movement which party wins the forthcoming election?
   1. Great difference
   2. Some difference
   3. No difference
   4. I don't know

61. Will it make much difference to your own life which party gets elected in the forthcoming election?
   1. Great difference
   2. Some difference
   3. No difference
   4. I don't know

62. If the same man for whom you voted for councillor in 1959 were running for political office today would you vote for him again?
   1. Yes, I would vote for him again
   2. No, I would not vote for him
   3. I have no choice in the matter
   4. I don't know
63. If the same man for whom you voted for member of the regional house of assembly in 1959 were running for political office today, would you vote for him again?
1. Yes, I would vote for him again____
2. No, I would not vote for him again____
3. I have no choice in the matter____
4. I don't know____

63a Do you think that Mr. Imoudu's labour party is useful for workers? Why?

64. If the same man for whom you voted for a seat in the federal parliament in 1959 were running for political office today would you vote for him?
1. Yes, I would vote for him again____
2. No, I would not vote for him____
3. I have no choice in the matter____
4. I don't know____

65. Are things getting better or worse for the ordinary worker?
1. Much better____
2. Somewhat better____
3. The same____
4. Somewhat worse____
5. Much worse____

66. Are things getting better of worse for the trade unionist?
1. Much better____
2. Somewhat better____
3. The same____
4. Somewhat worse____
5. Much worse____

67. Are things getting better or worse for Nigeria?
1. Much better____
2. Somewhat better____
3. The same____
4. Somewhat worse____
5. Much worse____

68. Are things getting better or worse for your hometown?
1. Much better____
2. Somewhat better____
3. The same____
4. Somewhat worse____
5. Much worse____

69. Are things getting better or worse for you?
1. Much better____
2. Somewhat better____
3. The same____
4. Somewhat worse____
5. Much worse____
70. What are the things that you wish government would do for the citizen?
1. Government should provide for education
2. Government should provide for transport
3. Government should provide for housing
4. Government should provide for burial
5. Government should provide medical aid
6. Government should provide employment
7. Government should keep people from being sacked
8. Government should provide for old age
9. I don't know

71. Which statement comes closest to your own point of view?
1. A man like me has a great deal of influence with the senior civil servants of today
2. A man like me has some influence with the senior civil servants of today
3. A man like me has no influence with the senior civil servants of today

72. As a trade unionist what do you wish government would do?

73. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what do you wish government would do?

74. What is your position in society? Are you
1. Lower class
2. Middle class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know

75. What about politicians? Are they
1. Middle class
2. Working class
3. Upper class
4. Lower class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know

76. What about senior civil servants? Are they
1. Lower class
2. Middle class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know

77. What about trade union leaders? Are they
1. Middle class
2. Lower class
3. Working class
4. Upper class
5. There are no classes in Nigeria
6. I don't know
78. What about doctors? Are they
1. Middle class  4. Working class
2. Upper class  5. There are no classes in Nigeria
3. Lower class  6. I don't know

79. What about merchants? Are they
1. Middle class  4. Working class
2. Upper class  5. There are no classes in Nigeria
3. Lower class  6. I don't know

80. What about farmers? Are they
1. Upper class  4. Working class
2. Middle class  5. There are no classes in Nigeria
3. Lower class  6. I don't know

81. How much do you think an average politician earns in a year?

82. How much do you think an average man earned before he became elected to office?

83. How many people have suggested that the salaries of politicians should be reduced. What should be the salary per year of a politician?

84. What kind of people most fit your conception of "upper class"
1. The very rich
2. The very influential
3. The very respected
4. Those who are highly placed in public life
5. Good people
6. Bad people

85. Who are upper class?
1. Obas
2. Big Farmers
3. Politicians
4. University graduates
5. Senior civil servants
6. Businessmen
7. Doctors
8. Lawyers
9. Trade unions

86. Which statement comes closest to your own views:
1. Upper class people don't move with lower class people
2. I have many friends who are upper class
3. Upper class people live in their own part of town
4. Upper class people live in the same part of town that I live
5. Upper class people control the government
6. The people of Nigeria control the government
87. Do you move with upper class people?
   1. Yes, I move with upper class people often
   2. Sometimes I move with upper class people
   3. I seldom move with upper class people
   4. I never move with upper class people

88. Is there any member of your family who is upper class?
   1. My brother (by the same mother) is upper class
   2. My brother (by different mother) is upper class
   3. My father's brother is upper class
   4. My mother's brother is upper class
   5. The son of father's brother is upper class
   6. The son of mother's brother is upper class
   7. The son of father's sister is upper class
   8. The son of mother's sister is upper class
   9. Nobody in my family is upper class

89. Please check the statements with which you most agree:
   1. There is no use in talking to public officials because they are not interested in the problems of the average man
   2. Most public officials are very helpful
   3. In order to get ahead you should work hard and plan for the future
   4. The life of the average man is getting worse not better
   5. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because you can't tell what tomorrow will bring
   6. Things are so bad that I don't want to bring up anymore children
   7. Each day things are getting better and better for the average man
   8. I believe that my children will have a much better life than I have had
   9. You simply cannot trust most people
   10. Most people can be trusted

90. Do you belong to a tribal or to a clan union?
   1. I belong to a tribal union
   2. I belong to a clan union
   3. I do not belong to any association based on tribe or clan

91. Frankly speaking, what comes first?
   1. A man's loyalty to his trade union or to his hometown?
      Trade union Hometown
   2. A man's loyalty to his region or to his trade union?
      Region Trade Union
   3. A man's loyalty to his political party or to his trade union?
      Trade union Political Party
4. A man's loyalty to his trade union or the Federal Government?
   Federal Government____  Trade Union____

5. A man's loyalty to his tribal or clan union or to his trade union?
   Trade Union____  Tribal or Clan Union____

92. Do you own a radio?
   1. Yes____  2. No____

93. How often do you listen to the radio?
   1. Almost every day____
   2. Two or three days a week____
   3. One day a week____
   4. Less than one day a week____

94. What are your favorite kinds of programs?
   1. News____
   2. Music____
   3. Discussion programs____

95. About how often do you go to the films?
   1. Once or more a week____
   2. Once or twice a month____
   3. Three or four times a year____
   4. Less than three times a year____

96. What countries have you visited?

97. What was the purpose of your trip?

98. If for some reason you could not live in Nigeria, what other country would you choose to live in?
   1. Great Britain____  6. China____
   2. Ghana____  7. Egypt____
   3. Israel____  8. Germany____
   4. United States____  9. Other____
   5. Soviet Union____

100. About how many books do you read a month?

101. What sort of books do you like best?

102. Could you name the three books that have influenced your life most?

103. What authors do you respect most?

104. If you were to write a book what would be the most likely subject that you would write about?
105. What would you say about it?

106. There is much talk today about the different things that Nigeria could learn from foreign countries. What do you think it could learn from Britain?

107. From Russia?

108. From China?

109. From the United States?

110. From Ghana?
QUESTIONNAIRE D
TRADE UNION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is your position in the branch trade union?
   1. Secretary
   2. President or Chairman
   3. Treasurer
   4. Vice-President
   5. Other executive officer
   6. Non-executive Member

2. To which national body does your union belong?
   1. U.L.C.
   2. N.T.U.C.
   3. L.U.F.
   4. N.W.C.
   5. None
   6. Other

   If you checked "Other" please note below the national body or federation to which your union belongs.

3. What is your position in the national body?
   1. National General Secretary
   2. National President or Chairman
   3. Member of national executive
   4. Regional Secretary
   5. Regional President or Chairman
   6. Member of regional executive
   7. Non-executive member

4. What is your occupation?

5. Would you say your chances for advancement in your present job are
   1. Very good
   2. Good
   3. Satisfactory
   4. Bad
   5. Very bad

6. Is it your opinion that:
   1. There is no use in talking to public officials because they are not interested in the problems of the average man.
      Yes, that is my opinion
      No, that is not my opinion
   2. In order to get ahead you should work hard and plan for the future.
      Yes
      No
   3. The life of the average man is getting worse not better.
      Yes
      No
   4. Most public officials are very helpful.
      Yes
      No
   5. Most people can be trusted.
      Yes
      No
6. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because you don't know what tomorrow will bring.
   Yes ____ No ____

7. Each day things are getting better and better for the average man.
   Yes ____ No ____

8. You simply cannot trust most people.
   Yes ____ No ____

7. What is your total income per year from your job?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds

8. What was your father's occupation?

9. Was your father literate?
1. Literate ____ 2. Not literate ____

10. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds

11. How much do you think you will be earning five years from now?
1. Less than 100 pounds
2. Between 100 and 150 pounds
3. Between 150 and 200 pounds
4. Between 200 and 250 pounds
5. Between 250 and 300 pounds
6. Between 300 and 350 pounds
7. Between 350 and 400 pounds
8. Between 400 and 450 pounds
9. Between 450 and 500 pounds
10. Between 500 and 700 pounds
11. Between 700 and 1000 pounds
12. Over 1000 pounds

12. To which tribe do you belong?

13. What is your religion?
1. Catholic
2. Protestant (Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.)
3. Muslim
4. Other
14. What was the last class you attended in school?
1. Primary I
2. Primary II
3. Primary III
4. Primary IV
5. Primary V
6. Primary VI
7. Secondary I
8. Secondary II
9. Secondary III
10. Secondary IV
11. Secondary V
12. Secondary VI
13. University

15. How old are you?
1. Below 20
2. Between 20 and 30
3. Between 30 and 40
4. Between 40 and 50
5. Between 50 and 60
6. Over 60

16. How long have you been a member of your trade union?
1. One year or less
2. Between 1 and 2 years
3. Between 2 and 3 years
4. Between 3 and 4 years
5. Between 4 and 5 years
6. Between 5 and 7 years
7. Between 7 and 10 years
8. Between 10 and 15 years
9. More than 15 years

17. Are you a member of a tribal union and do you go to meetings?
1. I am a member of a tribal and I try to go to all meetings
2. Sometimes I go to meetings of my tribal union
3. I belong to a tribal union but I very seldom go to meetings
4. I do not belong to a tribal union

18. As a trade unionist what do you wish government would do?

19. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what do you wish government would do?

20. When discussing social issues with your townsmen which of the topics listed below are you most likely to talk about? (Please pick 4 topics)
1. Need for school buildings
2. Foreign aid
3. Socialism
4. Low wages
5. Congo situation
6. High taxes
7. Zik
8. Elections to parliament

21. Do you work in your hometown or do you work away from your town?
1. I work in my hometown
2. I work away from my hometown
22. Where did you register to vote in the last federal election?
   1. I registered to vote in my hometown
   2. I registered to vote in the town where I presently work
   3. I registered, neither in my hometown, nor in the town where I presently work
   4. I did not register to vote in the last election

23. When discussing social issues with your trade union friends, which of the topics listed below are you most likely to talk about? (Please pick 4 such topics)
   1. Need for school buildings
   2. Socialism
   3. Low wages
   4. Foreign aid
   5. Zik
   6. High taxes
   7. Elections to parliament

24. How much do you think an average polician earns in a year?

25. How much do you think an average man earned before he became elected to office?

26. Many people have suggested that the salaries of politicians should be reduced. What should be the salary per year of a politician?

27. People have said that the ULC and the NTUC have nothing in common, what do you think?

28. Some people have said that the NTUC and the LUF have nothing in common, what do you think?

29. Which book has most influenced your life?

30. Is it your opinion that the only way we can know what is going on in the world today is to rely on leaders and experts who are better informed than we are?
   1. We should always rely on our leaders
   2. We should partly rely on our leaders and partly on other information
   3. Our leaders should not be trusted
31. Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose political beliefs are the same as one's own?
   1. I always choose friends whose political beliefs are the same as my own
   2. Although I prefer people who share my beliefs, most of my friends need not hold the political beliefs that I do
   3. My friendship with a man is not at all dependent on his political beliefs

32. Do you believe trade unionists should support political parties?
   1. Trade unionists should form a labour party
   2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the existing political parties
   3. Trade unionists as trade unionists should not mix in politics, although they may do so as private citizens

33. What countries have you visited?

34. If for some reason you could not live in Nigeria, what other country would you choose to live in?
   1. Great Britain
   2. Ghana
   3. Israel
   4. United States
   5. Soviet Union
   6. China
   7. Egypt
   8. West Germany
   9. East Germany
   10. Other

35. In your opinion who is the greatest African leader?
   1. Tafawa Balewa
   2. Jomo Kenyatta
   3. Patrice Lumumba
   4. Abdul Nasser
   5. Kwame Nkrumah
   6. Julius Nyerere
   7. Haile Selassie
   8. Leopold Senghor
   9. Sekou Toure
   10. Nnamdi Azikiwe
   11. Other

36. Who is the greatest living Nigerian leader?

Thank you for your cooperation.

Robert Melson
N.I.S.E.R.
University of Ibadan
QUESTIONNAIRE E
WORKERS QUESTIONNAIRE

Name of interviewer________ Place of interview____ date____

1. What is the name of your trade union?
   1. Name_____ 2. Doesn't know_____

2. How good are the chances of advancement in your present job?
   1. Very good____ 4. Bad____
   2. Good____ 5. Very bad____
   3. Satisfactory____ 6. Doesn't know____

3. Are you a technical or a clerical worker?
   1. Technical____ 2. Clerical____ 3. Other____

4. Are you a craftsman, an artisan, or an apprentice?
   1. Craftsman____ 3. Apprentice____
   2. Artisan____ 4. Other____

5. Next I am going to read to you 8 statements. After each statement I shall pause and ask you your opinion about the statement. I shall ask you whether or not you agree or disagree. Please don't think that the statements that I shall read to you are my own opinion. They are merely points of view with which anyone can agree or disagree. Here is the first statement.

   1. There is no use in talking to Government officials because they are not interested in the problems of the average man. What do you think?
      Yes, I agree____ No, I disagree____

   2. In order to get ahead you should work hard and plan for the future.
      Yes____ No____

   3. The life of the average man is getting worse not better.
      Yes____ No____

   4. Most Government Officials are very helpful.
      Yes____ No____

   5. Most people can be trusted.
      Yes____ No____

   6. It doesn't pay to plan for the future because you don't know what tomorrow will bring.
      Yes____ No____

   7. Each day things are getting better and better for the average man.
      Yes____ No____

   8. You simply cannot trust most people.
      Yes____ No____
6. What is your occupation?

7. What is the name of your General Secretary?
   1. Name______
   2. Doesn't know______

8. What is your total income per year from your job?
   1. Less than 100 pounds______
   7. Between 350 and 400______
   2. Between 100 and 150______
   8. Between 400 and 450______
   3. Between 150 and 200______
   9. Between 450 and 500______
   4. Between 200 and 250______
   10. Between 500 and 700______
   5. Between 250 and 300______
   11. Between 700 and 1000______
   6. Between 300 and 350______
   12. Over 1000 pounds______

9. Who is Dr. Otegbeye?
   1. S.W.F.P.______
   3. DR.______
   5. Other______
   2. Some Party______
   4. NA______

11. What was your total yearly income five years ago?
   1. Less than 100 pounds______
   7. Between 350 and 400______
   2. Between 100 and 150______
   8. Between 400 and 450______
   3. Between 150 and 200______
   9. Between 450 and 500______
   4. Between 200 and 250______
   10. Between 500 and 700______
   5. Between 250 and 300______
   11. Between 700 and 1000______
   6. Between 300 and 350______
   12. Over 1000 pounds______

12. How much do you think you will be earning five years from now?
   1. Less than 100 pounds______
   7. Between 350 and 400______
   2. Between 100 and 150______
   8. Between 400 and 450______
   3. Between 150 and 200______
   9. Between 450 and 500______
   4. Between 200 and 250______
   10. Between 500 and 700______
   5. Between 250 and 300______
   11. Between 700 and 1000______
   6. Between 300 and 350______
   12. Over 1000 pounds______

13. Who is the president of your trade union?
   1. Name______
   2. Doesn't know______

14. To which central labour body does your union belong?
   1. ULC______
   3. NTUC______
   5. IULC______
   2. LUF______
   4. TUCN______
   6. Doesn't know______
   7. Other______

15. Who is Mr. Michael Imoudu?

16. What central labour body does he lead?
   1. ULC______
   3. LUF______
   5. IULC______
   2. NTUC______
   4. TUCN______
   6. Doesn't know______
   7. Other______
17. What tribe is Mr. Imoudu?
1. Ibo  
2. Hausa  
3. Yoruba
4. Bini  
5. Afemai  
6. Ivbiosakon
7. Ora
8. Other

18. To which tribe do you belong? What part of _____ do you come from?

20. Who is Alhaji Haruna Adebola?

21. What central labour body does he lead?
1. ULC  
2. NTUC  
3. LUF
4. TUCN  
5. IULC
6. Doesn't know
7. Other

22. What tribe is Alhaji Adebola?
1. Ibo  
2. Bini  
3. Hausa  
4. Yoruba
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS, YORUBA, PLEASE ASK HIM THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: What part of Yorubaland does Mr. Adebola come from?

23. What does Mr. Imoudu tell the workers? PAUSE HERE AND LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION. WHEN HE HAS ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN GO ON TO THE THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management? Yes  
2. Does he urge them to join a certain political party? Yes
3. Does he advise them to strike? Yes
WRITE RESPONDENT'S OTHER ANSWERS BELOW.

24. What does Alhaji Adebola tell the workers? PAUSE HERE AND LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION. WHEN HE HAS ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN GO ON TO THE THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management? Yes  
2. Does he tell the workers to join a certain political party? Yes
3. Does he urge them to strike? Yes

25. What is your religion?
1. Catholic  
2. Protestant (Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.)
3. Muslim
4. Other
26. What was the last class you attended in school?
   1. Primary I  7. Secondary I
   2. Primary II  8. Secondary II
   4. Primary IV  10. Secondary IV
   5. Primary V  11. Secondary V
   6. Primary VI  12. Secondary VI
   13. University

27. How old are you?
   1. Below 20  4. Between 40 and 50
   2. Between 20 and 30  5. Between 50 and 60
   3. Between 30 and 40  6. Over 60

28. Who is Mr. Wahab Goodluck?

29. What central labour body does he lead?
   1. ULC  3. LUF  5. ILUC
   2. NTUC  4. TUCN  6. Doesn't know
   7. Other

30. What tribe does Mr. Goodluck come from?
   IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS YORUBA, PLEASE ASK HIM THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
   What part of Yorubaland does Mr. Goodluck come from?

31. What does Mr. Goodluck tell the workers?
   PAUSE HERE AND LET THE RESPONDENT ANSWER THE QUESTION.
   WHEN HE HAS ANSWERED OR IF HE HAS NOTHING TO SAY THEN GO ON TO THE THREE QUESTIONS BELOW:
   1. Does he tell them to cooperate with management?
      Yes  No
   2. Does he tell the workers to join a certain political party?
      Yes  No
   3. Does he urge them to strike?
      Yes  No

32. How long have you been a member of your trade union?
   1. One year or less
   2. Between 1 and 2 years
   3. Between 2 and 3 years
   4. Between 3 and 4 years
   5. Between 4 and 5 years
   6. Between 5 and 7 years
   7. Between 7 and 10 years
   8. Between 10 and 15 years
   9. More than 15 years
33. Are you a member of a tribal union and do you go to meetings?
   1. I am a member of a tribal union and I tried to go to all meetings___
   2. Sometimes I go to meetings of my tribal union___
   3. I belong to a tribal union but I very seldom go to meetings___
   4. I do not belong to a tribal union___

34. Where do you plan to settle when you retire from work?
   1. Lagos___ 3. Other___
   2. Hometown___ 4. Don't know___

35. Many people talk about socialism. What is it? What countries have it?

36. Now speaking as a man who represents your people, what do you wish Government would do?

37. Next I am going to read you 8 topics of conversation. PROCEED TO READ THE 8 TOPICS. What I would like you to do is to pick 4 of the 8 topics which would be the most likely subjects of conversation with your townsmen:
   1. Need for school buildings___ 6. High taxes___
   2. Foreign aid___ 7. Zik___
   3. Socialism___ 8. Elections to parliament___
   4. Low wages___
   5. Congo situation___

38. Where did you register to vote in the last federal election?
   1. I registered to vote in my hometown___
   2. I registered to vote in the town where I presently work___
   3. I registered neither in my hometown, nor in the town where I presently work___
   4. I did not register to vote in the last election___

39. How much do you think an average politician earns in a year?

40. How much do you think an average man earned before he became elected to office?

41. Many people have suggested that the salaries of politicians should be reduced. What should be the salary per year of a politician?
42. Next I am going to read you 8 topics of conversation. PROCEED TO READ THE 8 TOPICS. What I would like you to do is to pick 4 of the 8 topics which would be most likely subjects with your worker friends.

1. Need for school buildings
2. Socialism
3. Low Wages
4. Foreign Zid
5. Zik
6. High taxes
7. Elections to Parliament
8. Congo situation

43. Do you believe trade unionists should support political parties?
1. Trade unionists should form a labour party
2. Yes, trade unionists should support one of the two existing political parties
3. Trade Unionists as trade unionists should not mix in politics, although they may do so as private citizens

44. In your opinion who is the greatest African leader?
1. Tafawa Balewa
2. Jomo Kenyata
3. Patrice Lumumba
4. Abdul Nasser
5. Kwame Nkrumah
6. Julius Nyerere
7. Haile Selassie
8. Leopold Senghor
9. Sekou Toure
10. Nnamdi Azikiwe
11. Other

45. Who is the greatest living Nigerian leader?

46. Do you support Dr. Otegbeye's or Mr. Imoudu's Party in the last Federal Election? (which?)

47. Which Party has been most friendly to workers?
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE F
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The Belief and Disbelief Dimension

Accentuation of differences between the belief and the disbelief system:

1. Do the ULC and the NTUC have anything in common?
2. Do the ULC and the LUF have anything in common?
3. Do the LUF and the NTUC have anything in common?
4. Some people have said that Ghana and Nigeria have nothing in common, what do you think?
5. Some people have said that the United States and the Soviet Union have nothing in common, what do you think?

Irrelevance

6. In the discussion of political or economic problems affecting the union, you often find that members of your executive bring up irrelevant issues not connected to the point under discussion?

Contradictions

7. Some people have said that in order to safeguard such democratic practices as freedom of speech and freedom of association in Nigeria, the government should put a stop to tribal politics in the trade unions. What do you think?

Knowledge

8. Have you found that your reading of Marxist-Leninist literature enables you to correctly interpret Nigerian society?
9. Since Marxism-Leninism gives the correct interpretation do you find that it is a waste of time to read bourgeois literature?
Differentiation within the Disbelief System

10. Do you find any differences between the NNA and the UPGA?

Central Dimension

11. From your own experience have you found that most people cannot be trusted?

12. Do you find it natural of a person to be fearful of the future?

13. What do you think of the saying that "it is better to be a dead hero than a live coward."

Conflict with the Self

14. Do you find that the hardest battles that a man must fight are those with his own weaknesses?

Inferiority

15. Many people get the feeling, "I am no good at all." Do you find that true for your own self?

Self Aggrandizement

16. Would you say that the main thing in life is to want to do something important?

17. If you had to choose between becoming a great man and being a happy man, which would you choose?

Paranoid

18. Do you find that most people simply cannot be trusted?

19. Would you say that most people are failures because of the system in which they live?

Authority

20. It has been said that in the history of manking there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers. What do you think?
Cause
21. It has been said that a man who does not give himself heart and soul to a political or social movement has not really lived. What are your own views about this?

22. Is it your view that of all the philosophies in the world there is only one that is correct?

Renegades
23. Is it your view that in times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas voiced by people in one's own camp than against those of the opposite camp?

24. Do you find that a group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long?

Disbeliever
25. It has been said that there are two kinds of people in the world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. What is your own opinion?

Party line
26. Is it your opinion that in this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going in the world is to rely on leadership or experts who can be trusted?

Narrowing
27. Is it your view that the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

28. There is no use wasting your money on newspapers which you know in advance are just plain propaganda.

Future
29. Courageous leadership if need be must sacrifice the welfare of the generation that is now alive for the sake of the future generations.
30. To one correctly trained in scientific socialism it is an easy matter to predict future events.

31. Force cannot be ruled out as a method for putting into action one's ideology.