

The politics of peace process in cities in conflict: The Medellin case as a best practice

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
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
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
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
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Abstract

In the 1990s, at same time that the United States was bombing Baghdad, Medellín was the most dangerous city in the world. Since 2003, the city has undergone an internationally renowned urban transformation, part of a controversial nationwide peace process. Implemented under Sergio Fajardo's term as Medellín mayor (2003-2007), the city, now perceived as a totally different place with a homicide rate 10 times lower, is seen as an example of how to engage with conflict and violence as urban peace process. The policies involved were physical and programmatic interventions in violent neighborhoods through the planning and construction of new facilities. This thesis seeks to understand if these physical and political policies and practices are directly related to the reduction of homicides in Medellin during the same period. The main objective of this research project is to explore the real success or failure of these policies, in a search to find successful strategies that can be implemented in other cities around the world with similar manifestations of conflict and violence.

Thesis advisor: Dennis Frenchman

Reader: Diane Davis

Dedication

To my (emotional and intellectual) partner Tamera Marko that helped me to follow these dreams and supported me at every step of the way.

Bibliographical Note

Jose Jaime Samper Escobar (Jota Samper) is a graduate student at MIT in Urban Studies and Planning. A Colombian, Samper has been a leading urban design practitioner and activist, with extensive practical experience in Latin America and the United States. He has considerable knowledge of Medellin, where he was schooled before entering MIT, and his Master's thesis focuses on the city and violence, and he has helped lead a project on Medellin at Duke University for the last three years. Samper has won several awards for his work in urban planning and design.

Jota (jose) Samper has been working as an architect and artist for 10 years and was a professor of architecture and urban design at NC State. He was born and raised in Medellin. He studied architecture at the Universidad Nacional de Medellin. Since then, he has done art and architectural projects in five countries: Colombia, Panama, the United States, Mexico, and France. His work has won more than 5 national and international awards.

Along with his work as a teacher of architecture in North Carolina he's is co founder of DukeEngage Medellin, Colombia a civic engagement abroad program since 2007. Were students from duke University along with architects and Historians help communities to collect their memories in their own words.

Acknowledgements

Sincere thanks to the many interviewees that were part of this study, Planers architected politicians and the many community members that open their private lives. People that lived during large periods of violence and where witnesses of the “process of transformation of Medellín” especially those that were beyond the line of duty and risk their lives to provide me with invaluable information.

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Lastly thanks to my parents that thru those amazing efforts allude to follow my dreams.

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Introduction

In the 1990s, at same time that the United States was bombing Baghdad, Medellín was the most dangerous city in the world. Since 2003, the city has undergone an internationally renowned urban transformation, part of a controversial nationwide peace process. This transformation, implemented under Sergio Fajardo's term as Medellín mayor (2003-2007) and continued under his predecessor's term, includes spending 52% of the city budget on education programs and facilities. Education here is understood in a broad way (schools, library parks, transportation, social programs, museums, more prepared teachers, roads and bridges, parks, public parks and buildings, technology, nutrition, and micro-credit to name a few). More than 200 buildings, public parks, and public gardens have been built in the Medellín neighborhoods that for up to forty years have been the city's most isolated from infrastructural resources due to geography, violence, and poverty. At the end of 2007 the city had a homicide rate 10 times lower than when this urban transformation began nearly five years earlier. Because of this, this kind of urban transformation process is seen as an example of how urban projects can successfully engage with conflict and violence. Even with recent academic and media publications citing a rise in violence in some of these neighborhoods in the past few months,¹ Medellín is still, I would argue, a model "best practice" case study. In fact, this recent increase in violence also increases the need for the kind of critical analysis I am doing in this project.

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The question

This thesis seeks to understand if these policies and practices, which have both political and physical implications in the urban context, influenced (or even caused) the reduction of violence (number of homicides) in Medellín during the same period. The main objective of this research project is to explore the real success or failure of these policies implemented in the city of Medellín, in a search to find successful strategies that can be implemented in other city, regional, and national contexts around the world where there are similar manifestations of socio political conflict and violence.

¹ Hugh, Bronstein. "Colombia's Medellin hit by new wave of drug violence | Reuters." *Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News* | Reuters.com. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20434908> (accessed May 6, 2010).

Methodology

This project evaluates the policies and projects that the Sergio Fajardo's administration applied in Medellín during the 2003-2007 period with the campaign mission they called "*Medellín, la ciudad mas educada*" (Medellín, the most educated city). I have conducted 25 interviews with community members and the politicians and planners who implemented the policies and practices. Juxtaposing the perspectives among these two groups (politicians and technocrats versus community members), sometimes in disagreement with each other, makes it possible to decant which, if any of these implemented policies, were effective.

Findings

One important dimension of the Medellín case is that its core project involves both policy and physical planning. An important finding of my research involves identifying the key elements that make these two strategies work together. Here, it is important to understand the dynamics of conflict in Colombia and the singularities of these dynamics in the context of the city of Medellín. My research and interviews in Medellín have shown:

First, the dynamic of violence evidenced by the number of homicides has followed different patterns than the ones seen in the rest of the country. Medellín has seen a larger reduction of violence between 2003 and 2007 than any city in the rest of the country. This grants a sense of credibility to the efficacy of the local policies.

Second, Medellín's dynamic of violence is fueled by the national political conflict, but at the city and neighborhood level this dynamic behaves in a different way (than in the national context). I propose viewing the city of Medellín's violent history as a **continuum of violence**. In Medellín, the manifestations of violence are continuous and the actors are constantly changing alliances with different violent groups. These two issues include:

1. The illegal armed actors enter and leave and change alliances within the violent scene, and;
2. The environment that generated the conflict is still intact and will reactivate the violence once the group in power has left. Similar to what Collier calls "The Conflict Trap."²

² Collier, Paul. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

These two conditions imply that there exists within the environment of these usually informal settlements in Medellín that make their spaces prone to being controlled by competing organizations that are state-like but not of the state (Guerrilla, Paramilitary and Drug Cartels). The isolation from the beneficial aspects of the state (such as security) and the lack of political, economical and social recognition from the rest of the citywide community, fosters the conditions for the multiplicity of organizations to contest the state's authority to in turn act as providers of state-like services (such as security and taxation). This sustains the cycle of illegal arms groups entering and controlling these areas.

Key Hypotheses

One large hypothesis that grows from this thesis is that the soldiers and the fighters have always been youth (the filmography section brought glaring light to this point) and that the 2003-2007 policies specifically targeted these youth. The physical implications of the policies that have attacked the environment where these youth move and interact (from public space to public buildings) and the policies targeted to engage youth into productive legal activities (like ex paramilitary helping in the building of the new transportation of the neighborhood) have been the key reasons for the reduction of violence. The interviews with community brought more light on this subject.³

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The other important hypothesis is that the aesthetic value of the interventions played an important role in the success of them. As stated by the then mayor of Medellín (Fajardo), it is not only the opportunity to go to school but that the school offered is the best designed school that the city can offer. This qualitative aspect is one that cannot be measured by traditional statistical approaches, yet fulfills a central role in the success of the intervention in Medellín. The neighborhood interviews are important in confirming these claims.

This case study not only helps generate a deeper understanding of one example of best practices for other contexts around the world; it also validate the value

³ This information was collected as part of an Historical Memory Project (in the Parques Bibliotecas) that Latin Americanist Historian Tamera Marko and I conducted in 2008 to engage community members under-represented in traditional histories of the city. We interviewed people to tell their own life story before, during, and after the main periods of violence and demobilization. Some individuals recalled how members of the community "los muchachos" (Paramilitary reinsertados or "reinserted") as part of the demobilization program worked for the construction company to build the new metro cable line in their own neighborhood. This was the case in the barrio Santo Domingo Savio (Comuna 1). This is not recorded in the official logs as a concrete project and many companies that employ these demobilized youth do not publicize this fact for fear of retaliation by the general public. This is proof of the complexities of the demobilization and the need for a more public and transparent process.

of physical planning along with political planning and ways that this dual application can be an instrumental tool in the resolution of social and political issues in urban areas of conflict.

I have divided this thesis into six chapters.

Chapter one “Context, Conflict and History of Urban Development in Medellín (1930 to 2009)” explores ways that the city developed over the last century generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and susceptible to the contestation of its territories by armed illegal actors. This contestation has occurred at the local and at the national scale since the early years of the violence 1950s. Understanding the consequences of this contestation helps to show the value of the projects and practices implemented in Medellín since 2003 as a way to combat violence in Medellín.

Chapter two “Medellín Plan and Unplanned History and Consequences” explores how city planning in Medellín developed since its foundation in 1675. Here, I contest the idea that the city of Medellín has not been planned.⁴ I also show that a specific time frame of the last 40 years generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and susceptible to the contestation of its territories by the armed illegal actors. Specifically, I explore the conditions in which informal settlements in Medellín developed over the last four decades in contrast to the previous three centuries of urban planning in the city.

One important issue to understand about the informal city is that sections of cities developed informally and they did so thanks to the absence of the state (negligence) and it is this state negligence that allowed the informal city to thrive. This absence of state is also the source of many of the entire city’s problems. It is this paradox that the communities who lived in these areas found themselves. This phenomenon is not unique to Medellín. This is a global phenomenon that is acquiring more relevance today because of the scale of these kinds of new informal cities. Mike Davis in his book *Planet of Slums* (2006) put the scale of the problem in perspective. “Residents of slums [what I prefer to define as the informal city] constitute a staggering 78.2 percent of the urban population of the least developed countries and fully a third of the global urban population.” These numbers reveal a necessity to discover new ways within the planning profession to deal with the built environment. This search is part of the large motivation of this study. We need to understand this sophisticated process

⁴ Irazábal, Clara. "Revisiting Urban Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean." UN-HABITAT. Home. <http://www.unhabitat.org/> (accessed May 6, 2010).

of the informal cities' formation and subsistence to be able to make sustainable and effective interventions.

Chapter three “Medellín, la Ciudad Mas Educada / Medellín, the most educated city: the policy interventions” describes the main components of Fajardo’s policy, “Medellín, la ciudad mas educada.” This chapter does not cover all aspects of the Mayor’s administration, but instead analyzes the new policies that led to physical practices put into action by his administration and how they were instrumental in the transformation of social behavior in the urban sphere. I focus specifically on those strategies that seem to have influenced the decrease in levels of insecurity and violence in the city. I summarize the political party ideology led by Sergio Fajardo during his campaign for Medellín Mayor and after he had been elected (2002-2007). Then I outline Mayor Fajardo’s political policies that worked in tandem with the urban-planning as peace process in Medellín from 2003-2007.

Chapter four outlines the physical projects built as part of the Fajardo regime and explains in detail the most relevant projects undertaken during the years 2004-2007. All of these projects were planned and executed by the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano EDU (Urban Development Enterprise). EDU’s most important interventions were in the city’s most marginalized areas. These interventions are called Proyecto Urbano Integrado (PUI of Integrated Urban Projects).

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Chapter five analyzes what people in Medellín, who have lived through this urban planning as peace building process, say and think about it. What, if anything, do they find successful? What, if anything, do they regret? Would they do it again? What strategies do people think would work in other contexts? I conducted all 25 of these interviews—in person—in Medellín in January 2010. I interviewed two groups of people. The first group I interviewed is planners and politicians who have been involved in this urban planning project before, during, and now after it is well underway. The second group I interviewed is community members who have lived in Comuna 13, 1 and 2, the three neighborhoods most impacted by these urban interventions because they were identified as one of the most underserved by state services and were among the city’s most violent before 2003. All of these community members have lived in these neighborhoods before, during, and after the policies and physical projects were implemented.

Chapter six explores the possibility of applying the case of Medellín as a best practice to other similar contexts of cities in conflict. In particular, I believe that it is possible to apply the Medellín case in cities where there are longtime informal settlements (10 years to 60 years) that have lacked a consistent state

Introduction

presence, an issues which has permitted other non-state organizations to challenge the state authority over the territory.

The “Best Practice” then is a way to reclaim the sovereignty of the state over the territory while respecting the urban and cultural systems put in place by the residents who built these communities in the first place. This “Best Practice” does so by modifying the physical conditions of the space and connecting its territory and their inhabitants to the benefits of the formal productive structure of the city.

Context Conflict and History of Urban Development in Medellin (1930 to 2009)

This chapter explores how the way in which the city developed over the last century generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and susceptible to the contestation of its territories by armed illegal actors. This contestation has occurred at the local and at the national scale since the early years of violence in the 1950s. Understanding the consequences of these contestations helps to show the value of the projects and practices implemented in Medellin since 2003 in terms of being a way to combat violence in Medellin.

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I have divided this chapter into two sections:

- **Colombian Violence** explains the temporality and multiplicity of actors engaged in the Colombian violence throughout the last 60 years of internal armed conflict. I discuss the effects of this national violence on the development of the city of Medellin.
- **Medellin in the context of Colombia** analyzes my compilation of homicide rates in five Colombian cities, including Medellin, over the span of 2002-2008. This surveys ways the city of Medellin experienced a drastic drop in violence (homicide rate) as compared to the other four largest cities (in terms of population) in the nation. During these six years, the policies and projects of the administration of Fajardo were implemented in Medellin. This suggests a correlation between the Fajardo regime's policies and practices (in the context of Colombian President Uribe's national defense policies) and a dramatic drop in violence in the city.

Colombian Violence. “La Violencia” mythologies of armed conflict in Colombia and their consequences on urban space in the city of Medellín

This section is an overview of the roots of political conflict in Colombia and surveys ways that these lines of conflict affected the territory of the city of Medellín. It is impossible to understand why the Fajardo policies and projects were effective without a basic understanding of the multiplicity of actors engaged in this conflict. This section is not a complete survey of Colombian history. This is a compilation of important inflexion points that I consider crucial background for understanding why and how the Fajardo projects and policies were effective. Many important dates and references have been omitted in this story in my effort to provide a clear and effective way to communicate the complex historical process of a country and city that as longtime historian of Colombia David Bushnell writes in his 1996 book *Colombia: A Nation In Spite of Itself*, Colombia does not have an official national history.¹

I have divided this section into six chronological timeframes (1850-2003). Some of these periodizations I have created based on this research and others parallel periodizations (with which I agree) of other scholars:

- **1850-1950 Two political parties in the new nation** were formed in the early 1850s and rivalry between the two political parties in Colombia resulted in bloodshed ever since. These bloody rivalries finally lead to the period called “La Violencia,” or “The Violence.”
- **1948-1958 La Violencia**, which erupted in this period nationwide, marks the end of the period call the “*Liberal Republic*” (Bushnell, 1996).² This decade is generally known as the age of “*The Violence*,” coinciding with an increase in homicide rates related to an irregular war between liberals and conservatives that worsened after the killing of the liberal then Presidential Candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. (Guzmán Campos et al., 1962)³ This period marks the beginning of an undeclared civil war with consequences up to the present day.

¹ Bushnell, David. 1993. *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

² Ibid.181

³ Guzman, German. 1962. *La violencia en Colombia; estudio de un proceso social*. Colombia. Universidad, Bogotá. Facultad de Sociología. Monografías sociológicas, no. 12. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional.

- **1959 The Revolutionary Left** in Colombia is born from guerrilla groups that were not able to participate in national politics. The guerrillas appeared because the National Front, which was founded in 1959 and was created in the name of peaceful inclusion, did not allow much room for another political agenda or party beyond the Liberals and the Conservatives. Furthermore, the Liberal and the Conservative parties were led, by and large, by elite members of Colombian society. The National Front was an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties to alternate government leadership every term (no matter which party was actually elected by popular vote).
- **1970s Narcotraffic + the new armed actors** in Colombia from 1979 to 1991 spawned the greatest peak of homicide rates recorded in the nation in that century. This peak coincides with an increasingly complex political-military conflict that involved an armed confrontation between extreme left-wing guerrilla groups and the government, which in turn led to the mass killings of civilians (massacres) by extreme right-wing paramilitary organizations often supported by parts of the government's military and illegal drug traffickers. (Franco, 2003)⁴ This period also includes the first Colombian government peace agreement with a guerrilla group, the M-19. This resulted in the M-19 guerrilla group and the official national government co-writing and co-signing a new national constitution.
- **1999–2002 Peace Process was a failure.** It intensified the conflict at the national level and created the conditions for a further escalation in violence with the national government initiating a massive military offensive.
- **2002-2010 Plan Colombia and President Alvaro Uribe** both implemented security policies that were supported financially by the U.S government through the Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia financed a major increase in military operations in the Medellín territory and the government-run Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process with the rightwing paramilitary group the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). This all occurred just months before Sergio Fajardo became Mayor of Medellín.

⁴ Franco, S. 2003. "A Social-Medical Approach to Violence in Colombia". *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH*. 93: 2032-2036.

1850-1950 Two political parties in the new nation

Liberals/Conservatives

The territory that is now known as Colombia won independence from Spain in 1819.⁵ Conflict between Colombia's two political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, has existed since these Wars of Independence. Colombia, since its foundation as a nation in 1848, has been a 2-party system (until recently) in formal politics.⁶

Conservatives are traditionally allied with the spiritual, economic and political power of the Catholic Church and traditional wealthy commercial enterprises. The Liberals are traditionally against the Catholic Church (they expelled the Jesuits more than once from Colombia) and, like the Conservatives, are allied with and part of the merchant class. These distinctions between these two parties, however, are so blurred you cannot really make a clear dividing line based on these categories. When the parties began, the Conservatives may have been a little bit wealthier in terms of commerce than the Liberals. But actually there was more division in terms of regional issues. In both Liberal and Conservative families there were merchants, professors, lawyers, priests and nuns. Conservatives and Liberals are actually not as different as one might think, given their history of fighting. Many families, in fact, include both Liberals and Conservatives. My own family, for example, is a case in point. My father's mother was a Conservative and his father was a Liberal. My father remembers standing on his roof with his own father catching Molotov cocktails (glass bottles filled with gasoline) being thrown by the police, controlled by the Conservative party. My own mother is from a Liberal family that is deeply tied to the church; two her of her siblings are a Catholic Priest and a Nun. This is not an uncommon political family history throughout Colombia.⁷

1948-1958 La Violencia

The conservative party maintained power until the beginnings of the 20th century when presidential power was obtained by the liberals under a democratic process Bushnell (1996) explains that these long periods of power and the arbitrary and later retaliations from the party in power against the other party generated revolts and generalized violence over the entire

⁵ The period between 1819 (Independence) and 1848 (Foundation of the nation) is known as "La Patria boba." This literally translates as "the stupid nation." This term refers to the period in which Colombia gained independence but then lost its independence as Spain re-conquered Colombia. See Bushnell, 1993.

⁶ 1848 Liberal Party is created

⁷ I thank Tamera Marko, an historian of Latin American family and childhood power as nation building, for pointing this out to me.

Colombian territory. This violence was suppressed by the military order of the party in power. At the beginning of the 1940s, the Conservative party received the presidency in the elections and this started a new process of retaliations and persecution. Many cite as the defining moment of this latest wave of violence as being when the liberal candidate for the next session of (Liberal) presidential elections Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in Bogota on April 9, 1948. Gaitán was a type of populist president candidate with a social agenda in the sense that he supported union workers and peasant rights. News of his assassination by a Conservative caused an eruption of a generalized rebellion and series of riots in cities and countryside throughout Colombia. It began in Bogota and that is why it is called *El Bogotazo*. The nonstop rioting lasted a couple of days. The destruction of property during the riot included destruction of all public transportation systems of the major cities. This included the trolley lines and other transportation systems internal to Colombia. This day marks the death of train public transportation between Colombian cities.




Figure 1 Bogotazo riot. Picture of a trolley destroyed during the riots in the front of the Colombian National Congress. This was the same day that international representatives were meeting in this Congress building to establish the Organization of the American States in 1948.

The *bogotazo* started a period simply call "**La Violencia**". Many authors tie the beginning of "the violence period" to earlier dates but what is clear is that after the "*bogotazo*," the nation was involved in a massive national conflict that involved these two parties. This undeclared civil war generated massive casualties from both sides "between 1948 and 1966 that claimed nearly 300,000" lives⁸ and massive migrations from the feared countryside to the relative secure urban centers. The number of people who migrated, known as

⁸ Gutiérrez, Pedro Ruz . "Bullets, Bloodshed And Ballots; For Generations, Violence Has Defined Colombia's Turbulent Political History." *Orlando Sentinel* (Florida), October 31, 1999.

desplazados or displaced peoples, is estimated in the millions. To put these numbers in context, by 1950 the population of Colombia was estimated to include 11 million⁹ inhabitants.

The Revolutionary Left

The conservatives maintained power until a military coup led by the liberal-aligned Dictator **Gustavo Rojas Pinilla** (1953-1957). Rojas Pinilla had a major socialist agenda. In 1957 industrialists organized a national strike in which all workers stopped working for several days throughout the country, mainly in the big cities. Rojas Pinilla stepped down from power to end the strike and this is when an alliance between the liberals and conservatives finally ends the “progressive dictatorship” of Pinilla. This alliance is called the National Front / Frente Nacional 1958–1974, which in basic terms means that the two main parties would share and alternate power. At that moment, any other political alliance outside the liberals and conservatives lost their footing within this National Front political system. This gave birth to the Guerrilla movements in Colombia.

In the 1964, the **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC** (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) and the **National Liberation Army ELN** (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*) are founded. In the same year 1964, the **19th of April Movement** known as **the M-19** (*Movimiento 19 de Abril*) is born. The M-19 was inspired by the Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro, whose regime supported this Colombian guerrilla group with training and materials.¹⁰

The M-19 did not have its roots in a peasant movement, unlike the FARC and the ELN, which were both a more common Latin American model of left wing guerrilla terrorist activity. In the M-19, combatants were mostly middle class youth in their 20s and 30s. The Movimiento de 19 Abril took its name from the date of the 1970 elections in which Rojas Pinilla, then a presidential candidate supporting a social agenda, “lost” the presidency. Some groups thought the election had been stolen and thought it showed that it was impossible to bring changes to Colombia except by violent revolutionary action. The M-19, as Bushnell puts it, cultivated a Robin Hood image with actions that included stealing food and milk and distributing it among the poor. They staged attacks against strongholds of the Colombian government and its allies. The M-19 strategically geared their attacks toward attracting mass media coverage, such

⁹ "COLOMBIA: population growth of the whole country." *Population statistics: historical demography*. <http://www.populstat.info/Americas/colombic.htm> (accessed April 30, 2010).

¹⁰ Startts - Colombia: An ageless war, <http://www.startts.org.au/default.aspx?id=257> (accessed April 5, 2010).




Figure 2 Army taking control of the Palace of Justice in Bogota (Colombia) held by the April 19 Movement members " (M-19)." November 6, 1985. Source: Manuel Cepeda Atarraya

as their kidnapping of officials of the U.S. embassy, bank robberies, and assassinations of key political figures.

In 1985, an M-19 detachment seized the Palacio de Justicia, the Supreme Court building located one block away from the presidential palace and the congress building in Bogotá, within hours leading to a controversial escalation of the conflict when army tanks and soldiers took back the palace by explosive force. The Supreme Court had been in session inside; all its members were held hostage for this day-long conflict. By the end of this conflict, one-half of the members of the Supreme Court were killed.




Figure 3 Siege of the Palacio de Justicia by the M-19 in 1985. Source: *El Mundo*

The FARC, the ELN and the M-19 succeeded in establishing a series of large and isolated rural zones in Colombia, zones in which guerrilla organizations controlled or at least prevented the state from establishing authority. People living in these zones of conflict became enmeshed in a network of guerrilla power supported through kidnapping, extortion, or forced recruitment. Businesses and landowners in revolutionary zones had to pay a revolutionary tax to guerrilla groups or risk being kidnapped or worse.

Outside the zones within which these guerrilla groups were based and operated, their actions both greatly impacted everyday life of Colombians throughout the country while at the same time did not put into effect a total state of war. While economically, people throughout the country felt the impact of guerrilla presence, it was an indirect impact due to international businesses pulling out of the country for fear of violence and instability. Businesses within the country

were targets of violence as well. This caused there to be fewer options for employment. This did not cause, however, the kinds of moments of escalating inflation rates that have occurred in many other countries in Latin America. So in the cities, people adapted their everyday lives to living and working in this state of non-declared war. This alone reveals a strong socio-economic culture of resilience. This resilience is even more evident when considering the ways people negotiated the emotional impact of living everyday life in an undeclared state of war. Seemingly every family member, including my own, in Colombia has a story about a relative or loved one being kidnapped, killed or disappeared during this time.¹¹ Yet, families continued to celebrate births, birthdays, marriages, Catholic rites of passage, and school graduations.

These economic strains of the late 1970s, including the lack of growth in coffee prices and the effects of globalization on the Colombian protectionist economy, combined with the general instability of the country, further crippled the Colombian state's ability to control the urban areas and rural countryside. This created the perfect space for the beginning of the Colombian drug bonanza. Colombia has never been a major grower of coca, the leaf from which cocaine is made. Colombia, however, became a central location for the processing of the coca leaf into cocaine. Colombians became the link between coca growers, production of coca and criminal networks in the United States. Massachusetts native George Jung is responsible for organizing the import of more than 80% of all processed cocaine from Colombia into the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. Jung, known as "Boston George," made his first Colombian drug contacts while in jail with a Colombian immigrant Carlos Enrique Lehder Rivas. People such as Lehder Rivas had become involved in gang networks in the United States and then, upon returning to Colombia, became cocaine industry processors and distributors.

Narcotraffic + The New Armed Actors

Pablo Escobar was born in 1949 in Medellín. He was born into a poor family and his entire childhood was during *La Violencia*. He studied political science but dropped out of school early. In 1975, he started developing a cocaine operation. At some point, he accumulated so much wealth that he offered to pay off the Colombian U.S. debt.¹² (The U.S. declined this offer). In 1989, *Forbes* magazine

¹¹ My colleague Tamera Marko emphasizes these family stories of violence in her work on the emotional culture of violence and resilience in Medellín.

¹² Bowden, Mark. 2001. *Killing Pablo: the hunt for the world's greatest outlaw*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Narration of the negotiation between the Colombian government and the Drug Cartel: "it was a generous offer, even if didn't include (as was erroneously reported later) a pledge to pay off Colombia's \$10 billion national debt" (47).

estimated Escobar to be the seventh-richest man in the world with a personal wealth of close to \$25 billion.¹³ He was involved in politics and was elected as a deputy alternative representative to the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia's Congress, as part of the Colombian Liberal Party.¹⁴ When news about his criminal record came to scandalous public light, he was expelled from the Congress. As retaliation for this expulsion, Escobar ordered the assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Colombian Minister of Justice. A few weeks later, the Minister was assassinated on April 30, 1984.¹⁵ This event fomented the Colombian national government to formally declare an alliance with the U.S. War Against Drugs, in this case specifically against the Colombian drugs cartels. This war, fought mainly in Colombia's urban areas, cost thousands of deaths. Escobar founded gangs comprised of poor youths, called *sicarios*, who received a reward for killing police officers. More than 600 officers died in this way.¹⁶ The three cities most affected by this war were Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. In 1993, Pablo Escobar was killed in Medellín in what was the end of a long and costly man hunt. Escobar's death represented the end of the old Cartels in Colombia. Over the course of the next few years, many narco-traffickers were killed, imprisoned or extradited to the United States. The demise of the powerful cartels left the drug trafficking open to be appropriated by the guerrilla groups and the newly formed paramilitary groups.

The New Colombian Constitution of 1991 was the result of a national peace process with the M-19 in which this guerrilla group renounced their armed struggle and become a political party in return for the opportunity to participate democratically in the rewriting of the constitution. To do this people, including M-19 leaders had to be democratically elected to participate in the forum that rewrote and signed the new constitution. This is the same year that the confrontation between the Colombian government and the drug cartels reaches its peak as measured by the death toll. One of the peace treaty's themes of negotiation involved the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the United States, a fate greatly feared by leaders of armed drug cartels. *The Extraditables*, or in English roughly translated as "Alliance of Cartels," published their motto in flyers distributed to the public and in letters to the media and government representatives: "Death in Colombia is better than jail in the United States."

¹³ Ibid. Bowden 2001

¹⁴ Guillén, Gonzalo . "Así conocí a Pablo Escobar." *Artículo Impreso Archivado*. Semana.com, Análisis de actualidad. http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=103338 (accessed May 3, 2010).

¹⁵ His killing (Rodrigo Lara Bonilla) created a powerful backlash against the Medellín cartel, one that now erupted into open warfare" Bowden, Mark. 2001. *Killing Pablo: the hunt for the world's greatest outlaw*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 44.

¹⁶ Karl Penhaul (05-09-2003). "Drug kingpin's killer seeks Colombia office". *Boston Globe*.

At the same time, drug lords and landowners, seeking to protect their interests, founded private security forces that by the end of the 1990s, would form paramilitary groups. These paramilitary groups included the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Between 1997 and 2006, the AUC, a far-right paramilitary group reached an estimated 20,000 militants. The AUC was led by Carlos Castaño Gil, son of a wealthy agricultural family in Antioquia whose father was killed by FARC. The AUC supports itself by income from narco-traffic and donations from its sponsors which includes large landowners and industrialists. There are many allegations that the national government supported the AUC, even if it was by looking the other way. The U.S. government was also involved—one of its most controversial involvements is the lawsuit against the Chiquita Banana Corporation for paying “security taxes” to the AUC. The AUC led a massacre of workers on these Colombian banana plantations who were, in the AUC view, connected to left-wing groups. This accusation was based on the workers demands for higher wages, a larger receipt of the profits of the banana sales, and better working conditions. In 2007, the U.S. government was ordered to pay 25 million dollars in reparation to this group of workers.¹⁷

1999–2002 Peace Process

In the Colombian presidential elections of 1998, two items were prominent on the ballot. One was the Presidency itself. The other one was the "Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, la Vida y la Libertad" or the "Citizen Mandate for Peace, Life and Liberty."¹⁸ This Mandate was a call to the future elected president and the nation to find a peaceful solution to the Colombian conflict. The Mandate itself was not more detailed than a general call for peace but it was a binding contract that the new President had to abide by in terms of finding a peaceful end to bloody conflict in Colombia. This Mandate was, to no surprise, overwhelmingly well received by the public and passed by a great majority of votes. The alternative, of course, would seem to be that individuals would vote for the continuation of the path of violence and destruction. This Mandate became law for the elected Colombian President Andres Pastrana.




Figure 4 Map of Colombia with the "Zona de Distención" highlighted. Source: Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz

¹⁷ Larson, Erik. "Chiquita Must Face U.S. Suit Over Colombian Terrorist Murders - Bloomberg.com." Bloomberg.com. <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a6MYnLaN7PFs> (accessed May 17, 2010).

¹⁸ *El Tiempo*. "Ciudadanos Proponen Mandato Por La Paz." *El Tiempo*.com Archivo. www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-554724 (accessed May 3, 2010).

As part of this political environment, on November 7, 1998, President Pastrana granted FARC a 42,000 kilometers² (16,200 square miles) of land in the San Vicente del Caguán, located in the tropical rural area located in the northern internal part of Colombia (see Figure 3). In addition, the Colombian military by order of the President, was not allowed to enter this safe haven. In addition, the Colombian military throughout the rest of the country lessened its attacks against the FARC.




Figure 5 plots yearly kidnappings and guerrilla attacks per capita (in the y axis) and over time (in x axis) from 1990 to 2002. Source: Sanches et al. (2003), based on data from the national police, the ministry of defense, and Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DANE.

The FARC-dedicated land was a safe haven that was meant to build trust among the FARC with the national government so they could continue peace negotiations. In general, this peace process failed to build such trust as measured by increased levels of FARC-led insecurity and violence in the entire national territory. The FARC, it seems, became stronger and fiercer with this grant of land. Colombia became the country with the highest kidnapping rate (led by the FARC and other leftwing guerrilla groups) in the world. The failure of the peace process produced the opposite reaction in the next elections. Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancour, as part of her campaign, flew to a town in this FARC-dedicated area. The Colombian authorities had warned Betancour that the FARC would kidnap her if she met with the FARC in their territory. This, in fact, is what happened. Betancour was one of the FARC's "emeralds" or most powerful hostages in their bargaining chips with the government. In the summer of 2008, Betancour, along with 14 other hostages, including three U.S. military contractors, were rescued from the FARC strongholds.¹⁹

¹⁹ Johnson, Reed. "Betancour, U.S. hostages rescued from Colombian rebels | La Plaza | Los Angeles Times." <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2008/07/betancour-us-h.html> (accessed May 3, 2010).

In the 2002 election succeeding Pastrano's regime, Alvaro Uribe— a member of the highest ranks of the Colombia elite class whose father was killed by the FARC—was elected president. His election campaign was based on clear, unwavering rightwing armed confrontation with all illegal armed groups, including the FARC.

2002- 2010 Plan Colombia and Alvaro Uribe

The policies selected by Uribe's regime and the national government intended to achieve a series of objectives. Among the two most predominant of these objectives were "demobilizing illegal groups and increasing defense spending."²⁰

This new policy of active defense spending was supported by millions of dollars of funding provided by the United States through the Plan Colombia.²¹ This makes Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. aid (Israel and Egypt are the first two). Plan Colombia actively modified the characteristics of the conflict in Colombia. First, armed conflict by all groups intensified migration from rural areas within Colombia to major cities throughout the country like Medellín. Second, the intensification of the armed conflict took the war from the rural areas to the interior of cities. This was most visible in Medellín. By 2002, Comuna 13²², one of the groups of neighborhoods in the city, was an extreme example of places where conflict (waged among paramilitaries and guerrilla urban groups) that usually had been situated outside of the city was now actively fighting inside of it. In 2002 the national army initiated *Operación Orion*²³ during which military and police forces swarmed the neighborhoods of Comuna 13 by helicopter, tank, and troops. For four days, the neighborhoods of

²⁰ Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C.. "Democratic Security and Defense Policy."

http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visita_bush/documentos/security.pdf.

www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visita_bush/documentos/security.pdf (accessed February 4, 2010).

²¹ This aid initiative was originally proposed by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango, included U.S. military/counter-narcotics aid, but was not limited to it. The plan was conceived between 1998 and 1999 by the administration of President Andrés Pastrana with the goals of ending the Colombian armed conflict and creating an anti-cocaine strategy.

²² Comuna is a territorial distribution of the urban areas of the city of Medellín. Each comuna is comprised of a number of neighborhoods (5 to 10). Contrary to many news records, comuna is not a synonymous of poor neighborhood of informal settlement as the case of "favela" or "slum" (though in popular use among middle class and elites who do not live there it has developed this connotation in popular understanding). The wealthiest sector of the city, is also a Comuna but is rarely referred to it that way and instead is just called "El Poblado." The city of Medellín has 15 comunas. The comuna territorial divisions are similar to the French term *arrondissement* a territorial distribution of the city of Paris. Each comuna has his own Junta Administradora Local (local administrative group) JAL that represent the territory to the municipality.

²³ Rozema, Ralph. 2007. "Paramilitares y violencia urbana en Medellin, Colombia". *Foro Internacional*. (189): 535.

Comuna 13 became a battleground.²⁴ In this single space of the city, you were able to find three different armed groups, each fighting the other to take control of the country.

The other policy involved demobilization of illegal armed groups. The first part of this process involved 850 paramilitary members of the AUC paramilitary group known as *Bloque Cacique Nutibara* (BCN) giving up their weapons in a publicized ceremony in 2003.²⁵



Figure 6 plots yearly homicides per 100,000 people in Colombia (in the y axis) over time (in the x axis) from 1946 to 2002. The figure identifies two high-violence periods: the first one before 1962, and the second one after 1984. Sanches et al. 2003

Concluding thoughts

By 2003, most of the illegal armed paramilitary groups had become unified under the umbrella paramilitary group of the AUC. These groups in 2003 demobilized. This process started in Medellín. These nearly six decades of violence and attempts at peace negotiations, on a national and citywide scale, is the historical context in which the administration of Sergio Fajardo began his term of mayor in Medellín.

²⁴ This kind of army presence was not seen before, even in the mist of 1990's *Bloque de busqueda* operations (the search for Pablo Escobar).

²⁵ *Amnesty International Colombia*, "The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization?" "On 25 November 2003 television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860 paramilitaries belonging to Medellín's Cacique Nutibara Bloc (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid down their arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries. The apparent neutralization of the BCN appeared to vindicate the government's decision to officially begin talks with the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), to which most paramilitary groups belong, including the BCN, following the announcement of the AUC's unilateral ceasefire in December 2002."

Medellín, in the context of Colombia:

A positive change

This section focuses on how Medellín experienced a larger reduction in violence than experienced in urban areas throughout the rest of the country between 2003 and 2007. This suggests that the policies the new mayoral regime implemented in the territory made positive effects in the reduction of violence in Medellín.

These conclusions echo those of Gutiérrez et al. 2009.²⁶ They arrive to similar conclusions after studying the relationship between the political campaigns and security (lower homicide rates) during the same time periods in three major cities: Medellín, Bogotá, and Cali. They conclude that the moments when security in the city improved coincides with moments when the city had “clean” (noncorrupt) taxation economies and that these taxation economies were linked to individual mayors and not to the traditional political parties. Sergio Fajardo, it is important to point out here, was not part of the Liberal or Conservative parties, but leader of an Independent party.

I have divided this section into four sections:

- **National Armed conflict in Medellín** shows that the characteristics of violence in Medellín was higher than those in the rest of the country and that this was the result of a series of political and armed actors that had specific impacts on the city.
- **Medellín Versus Four Other Colombian Cities (Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena y Barranquilla)** tests the claims of the Fajardo-led mayor’s office in Medellín that their policies led to the reduction of violence in that city and compares homicide rate trends, the DDR process, and city spending on education in these other four cities. In general, I conclude that it is in Medellín where there is a greater reduction in violence as compared to the other four cities. This suggests that the Fajardo policies could be, in part, responsible that reduction.

²⁶ Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez 2009. *Politics and security in three Colombian cities*.

London: [London school of economics and political science] (LSE). Development studies institute (DESTIN). Crisis states research centre (CSRC)].

- **The continuum of violence** explains the complex exchanges of diverging armed groups fighting over Medellín's impoverished neighborhoods. There are different armed groups that enter and leave the neighborhoods; these groups are responsible for perpetuating the violence. Further complicating the situation, these actors often switch sides of the conflicts. This reveals a gap between the ideological political roots of the conflict and the people who actually fight in the conflict.

This implies that there is an environmental condition in the neighborhoods that make them prone to conflict and thus, the violence will reactivate once the group in power has left and been replaced by a new illegal actor. This environmental condition is that they are totally separated from the state. This is similar to what Collier calls "The Conflict Trap."²⁷

- **This urban context then is an accomplice of the continuum of violence.** Informal settlements are, by formal definition, illegal. When everyone who lives in a neighborhood or territory is illegal, then they are cut off from receiving the benefits of the state. Furthermore, all who live in these informal settlements are labeled (by law and middle class and elite moral code) as criminals. I conclude that this explains why focusing on providing resources to areas of the city that have been informally settled and have been prone to the worst of violence can have positive effects on the overall security of the neighborhood and city.

National Armed Conflict in Medellín

Since the mid 1980s Medellín has been an extraordinarily violent city in the context of Colombia. In the last wave of violence between 1989 and 1994, Medellín experienced 25 percent²⁸ of all public order problems in the entire country. This represents that in a country with a history of violence and an internal civil war, Medellín was the territory where those consequences were among the most visible. See Figure 7. The narcotraffic network based in

²⁷ Collier, Paul. 2003. *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. A World Bank policy research report*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

²⁸ "With 7% of the national population, the city reported 25% of public order problems in the country in 2001" Betancur, John J.. "Approaches to the Regularization of Informal Settlements: the Case of PRIMED in Medellin, Colombia." *Global Urban Development Magazine*, November 2007. <http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag07Vol3Iss1/Betancur%20PDF.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2010).

Chapter 1

Medellín played an important factor in this increase of violence, an increase that peaked in 1991.




Figure 7 Death rate in Colombia VS. Medellín since 1975 to 2002 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y ciencias Forenses, Regional Noroccidente. *Boletín de prensa* 2002

The fact that violence in Medellín is higher than in the rest of the country, is in my opinion, the spillover effects of a series of local and national conflicts occurring in the larger national sphere.

Mayor Sergio Fajardo as part of the publicity regarding the implementation of “Medellín, the most educated city,” presented a chart that shows the drop in homicide rates in Medellín from 1991 when the city was known as the “most dangerous city in the world)” to the year 2007, the end of his term.

I have added to his time line photographs of a series of key figures who play an important role in shifting homicide rates in Medellín and in the overall phenomenology of violence. These key figures are:




Figure 8 Homicide rate per year in Medellín from 1991 to 2007 and relevant actors. Homicide rate per 100.000 Based on data from the Alcaldía de Medellín.

1. Pablo Escobar, dies in December 1993
2. Andres Pastrana President of Colombia 1998-2002
3. Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia 2002-Present
4. Paramilitar DDR in Medellín 2003
5. Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of Medellín 2004-2007

1. **Pablo Escobar, dies in December 1993** (homicide rate 381-311). The war against narcotraffic peaks in violence in 1991 in Medellín. The death of Escobar in 1993 was part of a national offensive against the known leaders of narcotraffic. In Medellín, Escobar armies were absorbed by other organizations, including urban guerrillas or organized crime. These groups also took control of Escobar's territories.
2. **Andres Pastrana President of Colombia 1998-2002** (homicide rate 154-184) spearheaded the failed peace process, which in turn intensified the amount of kidnapping and the escalation of the confrontation between right wing paramilitary groups and the guerrillas. This caused the increase of the urban conflict. Colombia became the world's capital of kidnapping.
3. **Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia 2002-2010** (homicide rate 184-98) enacted two policies of security: one increased military action at the national level and the second one was the DDR with the AUC. In Medellín, the first was the Operacion Orion in 2002, which exterminated left-wing guerrilla urban groups in Comuna 13 and those living in the Medellín territory under the power of the AUC. The second, the DDR process, started in Medellín with the demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara in 2003.
4. **Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of Medellín 2004-2007** (homicide rate 98-26) marks the period during in which "Medellín, the most educated city" was enacted.

All of these events happening at the national level in Colombia impacted the way violence manifested in the city of Medellín. This also shows that the reduction in violence between 2004 and 2007 coincides with the Sergio Fajardo administration. It is important to see this in the national context to understand if, and at what level, this is influenced by the national and/or by the local conflicts.

Medellín Versus 4 Colombian Cities (Bogota, Cali, Cartagena y Barranquilla)

This section tests the claims of the Fajardo-led mayor's office in Medellín that their policies led to the reduction of violence in that city and compares homicide rate trends, the DDR process, and city spending on education in these other four cities. In general, I conclude that it is in Medellín where there is a greater reduction in violence as compared to the other four cities. This suggests that the Fajardo policies could be, in part, responsible that reduction.




Figure 9 Death rate in 5 major cities of Colombia 2000 to 2007. Source: data provided by the Instituto Nacional de Forencis

I found that there is a relationship between the high spending on education in Medellín and the reduced homicides in the city. These reductions are different to what other similar cities in Colombia are experiencing. I also found that my prediction that cities with the largest numbers of demobilized individuals would also have fewer homicides. However, I found that this was not true. I conclude that this variable of the demobilization policies is not sufficient. We need a new variable.

The relationship between homicide rates and investment in education is expressed in the follow equation I created. I applied this formula for five cities in Colombia: Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Medellín.

$$\text{HRate} \approx \text{RPEdu} + \text{citic}$$

When education spending (RPEdu) and homicide rate (HRate) are equated to each other for these five cities, I found that there was a moderate good R-Squared. When plotted on a matrix, Medellín appears as an outlier because it is at the extreme of both the homicide rate levels and education spending in the other four cities. It is clear that the higher spending on education is followed by a seemingly proportional reduction on homicide rate in Medellín.

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
 -57.277 -18.393 -9.686 18.989 56.711

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	4.942e+01	4.831e+00	10.231	2.45e-12 ***
citie	1.095e+02	1.430e+01	7.653	3.89e-09 ***
RPEdu	-4.336e-04	7.206e-05	-6.017	5.96e-07 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 27.13 on 37 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.6193, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5987

F-statistic: 30.1 on 2 and 37 DF, p-value: 1.740e-08

There is reason, perhaps, to believe that there is a relationship between the higher reduction of homicide rate and the increase in the educational budget in the years 2004 to 2007 in Medellín. But what is clear is that Medellín spent more on what the city called infrastructural education (buildings and other infrastructure related to education) than in any other city in Colombia.

The expectation that the national policies of pacification could explain some of the discrepancies between cities was not confirmed by this same data. The number of demobilized groups did not correlate with a reduction in homicide rates. On the contrary, my matrix reveals that in some cities during the same time period there is a large number of demobilizations and an escalation of homicide rates.

This seems to confirm Spagat's (2007) analysis of the DDR process and outcome in two different regions in Colombia. In Antioquia, Spagat found that the violence decreased after the DDR process there while in Nariño he finds that violence escalated after the DDR process there. He concludes that: "They (paramilitaries) have drawn down their arsenal substantially over the last year, handing in almost 17,000 high-quality (often factory fresh) weapons through the DDR process, but almost certainly retain a significant stockpile. For the foreseeable future we must assume that many demobilized paramilitaries are,

or can become on short notice, well armed and dangerous.”²⁹ He concludes that this population is volatile and this could explain why we could see totally different homicide rates change in both regions (Nariño and Antioquia). I would add to this that Antioquia and specifically the capital city of Medellín added support to the national DDR programs (that did not occur in the Narino region) and that this extra funding and policy could explain some of those diverging outcomes.

This survey, while not conclusive, initiates an important discussion regarding the relationship between the application of those policies implemented in the “Medellín, the most educated city” campaign and the reduction of violence Medellín. The following section explores the urban contexts in which these policies are implemented in historically marginalized communities. It explores the idea that there is a relationship between their marginalization and the manifestation of violence in Medellín. This, in turn, also implies that the policies and projects implemented in these areas can be responsible for the reductions of homicides rates there.

The Continuum of Violence

This section focuses the complex exchanges of diverging armed groups fighting for control in Medellín’s impoverished neighborhoods. There are different armed groups that enter and leave the neighborhoods. These groups are responsible for perpetuating the violence. Further complicating the situation, these actors often switch sides of the conflicts. This fluctuation of a conflict group’s presence in a neighborhood, as well as changing conflict group affiliation, reveals a gap between the ideological political roots of the conflict and the people who actually fight in the conflict.

This implies that there is an environmental condition in the neighborhoods that make them prone to conflict and thus, the violence will reactivate once the group in power has left and been replaced by a new illegal actor. This environmental condition is that they are totally separated from the state. This is similar to what Collier calls “The Conflict Trap.”³⁰

I propose viewing the city of Medellín’s violent history as a **continuum of violence**. In Medellín, the manifestations of violence are continuous but the

²⁹ Michael Spagat; *Colombia’s Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success*; Department of Economics Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC. 2007

³⁰ Collier, Paul. 2003. *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy*. A World Bank policy research report. Washington, DC: World Bank.

actors are constantly changing. Moser (2004)³¹ concludes that in the Medellín case it is the direct relationship of crime as a political action and the fact that security is not run by the state, but instead by the private sphere, which fuels the conflict. She builds on the work of Gutierrez and Jaramillo³² to explain the continuous presence of armed political groupings in Medellín, Colombia, over the past 20 years. Gutierrez and Jaramillo argue “While social exclusion is a strong indirect catalyst of urban violence; it is the conjuncture of the politicization of crime and the privatization of security that is the predominant causal factor.”³³

Gutierrez and Jaramillo conclude that with continuous intervention from the municipal and national government authorities to broker peace accords “with all their positive aspects, the peace accords have only reshuffled the security personnel that proliferate in the city.”³⁴

Ralph Rozema (2007)³⁵ supported this idea of “reshuffled” private security forces in the city. He writes that when the paramilitary group *Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN)*³⁶ expelled the other paramilitary group *Bloque Metro* from Medellín, the BCN incorporated some of the Bloque Metro fighters into its own group. This reshuffling of security personal as the only way of the individual fighters’ (and their family’s) economical subsistence is also reinforced by Suarez et al 2002.³⁷ They explained that from 1999 to 2002, “what marks this period is the political decision of the guerrilla to urbanize the war and the transfer of the actions of the autodefensas [right wing paramilitaries] to the city. The guerrilla groups use the different militia groups, and the autodefensas used the neighborhood gangs.” Angarita 2002³⁸ confirms that “by 2000, the paramilitary groups had absorbed or/and control of most of the larger armed illegal gangs and had important battles with different armed factions of the insurgency [guerrilla].”

³¹ Moser, Caroline O N. 2004. "Editor's Introduction: Urban violence and insecurity: An introductory roadmap". *Environment and Urbanization*. 16 (2): 3.

³² Gutierrez Sanin, Francisco, and Ana Maria Jaramillo. 2004. "Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security -- The case of Medellín, Colombia". *Environment and Urbanization*. 16 (2): 17.

³³ *Ibid.* 6

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Ralph Rozema, "Medellin in Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America." In Kees Koonings, Dirk Kruijt, eds., Zed Books, 2007:58.

³⁶ The Cacique Nutivara Bloc (in Spanish, Bloque Cacique Nutibara, or BCN) was a Colombian paramilitary bloc founded by Diego Murillo Bejarano, affiliated with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary umbrella group.

³⁷ Suárez Rodríguez, Clara; Giraldo Giraldo, Carlos; García García, Héctor; López López, María; Cardona Acevedo, Marleny; Corcho Mejía, Carolina; Posada Rendón, Carlos. "Medellín entre la muerte y la vida. Escenarios de homicidios, 1990-2002." En publicación: *Estudios Políticos*, No. 26. Instituto de Estudios Políticos: Colombia. Enero - Junio. 2005 01215167.

³⁸ Pablo Angarita. 2002 "Conflictos violentos en Medellín: reflexiones". *Las Ciudades entre fuegos y exclusiones. Memorias del Seminario*.

Medellín has been the site of these factions' fighting with each other for control over territory since the 1990s. Francisco Gutiérrez and Ana María Jaramillo, made a "reconfiguration of the city's security map" by means of what I am calling a continuum that ranges from gangs and hit killers (*sicarios*), through left-wing militia to right-wing paramilitary."

One element that helps to understand this fluctuation of affiliation between groups, mainly among the youth, is Moser's 2004 analysis³⁹ of Rubio's argument that in Colombia:

Perverse social capital refers to networks and the legal and reward systems that encourage rent-seeking behavior and criminal activity. ... Rubio alludes to the fact that criminal activities may have sophisticated organizational structures that provide more viable alternatives to legitimate or productive activities, particularly for youth.

There is a lack of political, economic, and social structure in specific neighborhoods of Medellín; barrios that come from a tradition of informal settlements that have not been reached by the political social and cultural infrastructure of the city.⁴⁰ It is this predominant **spatial scale** that permits the necessary isolation for the proliferation of a multiplicity of armed violent groups.

A key idea I am exploring in this thesis and elsewhere is that to understand conflict and peace process it is crucial to understand that the actors who feed the lines of conflicting groups also exchange sides, which permits a separation between the historical political ideological roots of the conflict from the motivations of the soldiers who perform the acts of violence in the neighborhoods. The documentary *La Sierra* is a good example of the ways that paramilitary groups become absorbed into other groups and also how members switch sides of the conflict. For example, a leftwing urban guerrilla soldier can later become part of a rightwing paramilitary group or a member of a criminal organization.

³⁹ Moser, Caroline O N. 2004. "Editor's Introduction: Urban violence and insecurity: An introductory roadmap". *Environment and Urbanization*. 16 (2): 3. Page 4.

⁴⁰Is interesting understand that in Medellín this barrios had been reach by basic infrastructure of water energy and sewer that is different to many other cities in Colombia and Latino America

I think this concept of **violence as a continuum** where actors get inserted, leave and re-insert is the most striking difference to any other conflict city. This also could explain why some of the policies targeted to improving the living conditions of areas that feed the armed lines of the conflict can be effective. If people are dedicated to armed groups not as an ideological motive, but rather a purely economic one, than it makes sense that bringing education and infrastructure to communities, which in turn lead to employment, might actually further peace process. The transformation of the physical environment is also important because there are elements of the physical environment that are part of the continuum of violence. For example, the *metrocable* (or cable metro, a gondola-like structure that carries people up and down the neighborhoods as far as 2,000 feet up the Andes mountains surrounding Medellín) which linked certain neighborhoods directly to the metro system that runs from one end of the city to the other, removed the isolation of that neighborhood from the rest of the city.

The Urban Context: Accomplice of the Violence Continuum




Figure 10 Death rate per Comuna 1994 – 2009 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses

Informal settlements are by formal definition, illegal. When everyone who lives in a neighborhood or territory is illegal, then they are cut off from receiving the benefits of the state. Furthermore, all who live in these informal settlements are labeled (by law and middle class and elite moral code) as criminals. I conclude that this explains why focusing on providing resources to areas of the city that have been informally settled and have been prone to the worst of violence can have positive effects on the overall security of the neighborhood and city.

Cardona et al. (2005) explains that the “Characteristics of homicides in Medellín have remained unchanged since the 1980s, when the most violent period in the city’s history began. The most heavily affected groups are young males who live and die in poor neighborhoods, and the murders are individual acts that leave no wounded behind.”⁴¹ This places the acts of violence geographically and in terms of class, gender and age. To confirm Carmona’s statement I have plotted homicide rates per Comuna from 1994 to 2009 to provide a more detailed picture of criminality over the territory. I chose to begin with 1994 because when I requested this information from the department in Bogota that gathers all the homicide rate information throughout Colombia, they informed me that for Medellín, they only have this information at the Comuna level starting in this year. At the comuna scale the historical evolution of the phenomenology of violence shows a similar tendency toward the deaths of young males in poor neighborhoods of Medellín that Cardona et al. 2005 concludes. Furthermore, the poorest comunas presented higher levels of homicides than in wealthier comunas.

The only exception to this is El Centro (Candelaria), downtown, (*comuna* 10 candelaria) that presents higher levels of violence. This challenges the hypothesis that the poorest comunas are the only ones with higher levels of homicides. Perhaps, this violence in downtown Medellín could be explained for two reasons. One is because downtown is a shared space between all armed actors and the police and the forces of the state which makes it a powerful space of confrontation. The second one is because the downtown area has the largest concentrations of informal economies in the city. Betancur (2007) presents a picture of how the illegality of basic informal economies (street vendors) creates spaces for further criminalization. We have to be careful not to apply Betancur’s idea of criminalization as a blanket statement applied to all informal economies and the actors who participate within it. However, this idea deserves consideration in this case.

⁴¹ Cardona, Marleny, Hector Ivan Garcia, Carlos Alberto Giraldo, Maria Victoria Lopez, Clara Mercedes Suarez, Diana Carolina Corcho, Carlos Hernan Posada, and Maria Nubia Florez. 2005. Homicidios en Medellín, Colombia, entre 1990 y 2002: actores, moviles y circunstancias. *Cadernos De Saú de Pública* 21 (3): 840-851.





-  Informal settlements
-  High risk of death
-  Elevated risk of death
-  Medium risk of death
-  Low risk of death
-  No data
-  Topography

Figure 11. Map of informal settlements in Medellín at 2009 over areas of risk of death and areas with larger number of homicides. Sources: Informal settlements: the author/ risk of death and areas: Cardona 2005.

At the neighborhood scale, this survey shows that most of the areas considered high risk (in terms of high numbers of homicides) intersect with areas of higher concentrations of informal settlements in Medellín. This suggests the informal developments are spaces that provide the conditions that make it more prone to its criminalization.

Informal settlement areas are usually populated by new migrants who settle in the only spaces available for individuals without resources in the city— the Andes mountain hillside edges and in the high-risk areas next to the flood plains of the rivers. These populations do not get absorbed by the job market and become part of the growing informal employment market.

It is important to clarify, however, that this does not mean that new migrants bring with them the violence. In fact, these migrants are usually escaping from violence in rural areas and many of them have fled their land with a moment's notice, leaving them no time to pack and carry with them their documents, money, and other possessions. They arrive to the city without resources in a search not only for a safer space in the urban centers; they arrive in an attempt to survive. What this implies is that the social, political and economic conditions

Chapter 1

in which these arriving populations settle and raise their families in these poor neighborhoods permit their victimization and criminalization.

This survey suggests a connection between the spatial conditions of the informal settlements in Medellín and the phenomenology of violence in the city. It is important then to understand the historical planning development conditions that produced those informal settlements in the city of Medellín, to in turn, find what is or if there is a connection between the policies and projects of the Sergio Fajardo administration and the reduction of homicides in Medellín. It is also important to understand whether these projects and policies have had real success in the reducing or eliminating the continuum of violence.

Medellín Plan and Unplanned History and Consequences

This chapter explores how city planning in Medellín developed since its foundation in 1675. Here, I contest the idea that the city of Medellín has not been planned.¹ I also show that a specific time frame of the last 40 years generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and susceptible to the contestation of its territories by the armed illegal actors. Specifically, I explore the conditions in which informal settlements in Medellín developed in the last four decades in contrast to the previous three centuries of urban planning in the city.

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I have divided this chapter into two sections:

- **History of planning in Medellín** tracks the evolution of planning ideas and practices in Medellín that lead to the final form of the city. I also show how the city planning strategies were consistent with its growth, until the last 30 years of the 20th century, when exponential informal growth and economic crisis are responsible for what is today perceived as an unplanned city.
- **Non-Planning in Medellín history and consequences** explains the process of informal settlements in the territory of the city, a consequence of the national armed conflict and the inability of the city to cope with its growth during the economic crisis of its city's industry.

¹ Irazábal, Clara. "Revisiting Urban Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean." *UN-HABITAT*.: Home. <http://www.unhabitat.org/> (accessed May 6, 2010).

History of Planning in Medellin

Books and articles published about the history of urban development in Medellín each focus on a piece of a complicated puzzle of social, economic, political and urban planning in Medellín. These sources, between 1675 and 2007, range from themes of conquest, the foundation of colonies during the colonization of Antioquia and the growth of the city after independence, to the industrialized city.² Each study includes a section of the overall scope of how the city of Medellín developed into its present urban form, and how that development created the marginalized areas that is the focus of this study. Botero (1996) has an interesting study about the relationship between the private sector and the state in the shaping Medellín's contemporary urban form. His point about private enterprise using planning as a strategy to control real estate and private economical interest is illuminating in terms of showing how engaged the private interests were in shaping the future of the city. They were interested in shaping the future city not only as a way to accommodate (economic) needs in (what was then) their present, but to also think about the future. Patricia Schnitter (2007) explores Wiener and Sert's pilot plan for Medellín in 1950. This study confirms this continuation of the by the then modern city leaders' attempt to cope with its growth through the creation of a comprehensive development plan for the city. This is also the moment that the modernist ideals are imprinted onto the urban form of the city. It is also interesting that this the last time that the city engages in a general re-conception of its physical form and that this happens at the moment of its largest demographic explosion. This helps to understand why the city was not prepared to cope with the gigantic population growth that happened over the next 20 years. Schnitter explains that it was difficult to implement the goals of the pilot plan under the political turmoil that the country was in that decade. Betancur John J.'s case study about informality reveals a remarkable point. He maps the relationship that existed between the NGO's and the State in the interventions in the marginalized areas of Medellín. These marginalized areas by law and/or neglect impeded the local governments from operating in the areas of invasion by newly arrive poor people. Instead, the creation of alliances

² This section is compiled from the following sources: Fernando Botero Herrera (1996) and Beatriz Jaramillo (2005) and Roberto L. Jaramillo and Veronica Perfetti (1993) and Victor Alvarez (1996) to name a few.

between NGOs and local government created the bases of the governmental and NGO partnerships, like the Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Informales PRIMED that serve also as a base for the today practices under the “*Medellín la mas educada*,” the Sergio Fajardo mayor case study.

However, it is crucial to view all the historical snapshots of the city of Botero, Jaramillo, Alvarez, Schinitter, and Betancur together because they give a clear idea of the relationship between the planning development of Medellín and some of its consequences for the social and urban form of the city today. Here, I put these pieces together in one narrative compiled from several sources.³

The city of Medellín is a case which also contradicts some general themes that appear in the planning history of Latin America. Contrary to what many scholars believe, Latin- American cities do not lack a planning history, at least not in the broad sense, and Medellín is definitely not the exception. Medellín, a city founded in a valley inhabited for at least 15 centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards, is a city founded following the precepts of the “Leyes de Indias” (The Law of the Indies) a city that since its foundation followed a path of continuously evolving planning processes. The success or failure of each one of these evolutions of planning strategies is open for discussion. But what is clear here is that the political elite have always been critical forces engaged in the physical transformation of the city. Then the question arises: why does a city with a long history of planning or at least of forward thinking about the city’s physical form, allow those giant pockets of informal city (squatters) to appear in its periphery, a periphery that the topography makes so visible? (The limits of the city are visible from any point in the valley).

³ Patricia Schnitter. 2007. *Construcción fragmentaria característica del crecimiento metropolitano de la ciudad de Medellín Colombia. Lectura cartográfica de tres momentos significativos* Castellanos, Patricia Schnitter. 2002. *José Luis Sert y Colombia: de la carta de Atenas a una carta del Hábitat* Barcelona: Escola Tècnica Superior d’Arquitectura de Barcelona, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya

Jaramillo, Roberto Luis, and Verónica Perfetti 1993. *Cartografía urbana de Medellín 1790-1950*. Medellín: el Concejo.

Álvarez, V., 1996. “Poblamiento y población en el valle de Aburrá y Medellín, 1541-1951.” *Historia de Medellín*, J. O. Melo, Editor. Compañía Suramericana de Seguros. Medellín. pp. 5784.

González Escobar Luis Fernando. 2007. *Medellín, los orígenes y la transición a la modernidad crecimiento y modelos urbanos 1775 - 1932*. Investigaciones, 27. Medellín: Univ. Nacional de Colombia, Escuela del Hábitat CEHAP.

Jaramillo, Beatriz A. 2005. *Medellín, construcción de una ciudad*. Medellín: Editorial Marín Sierra.

This section explores those evolutionary physical planning processes and generates perspectives about why the city appears in its current form. This section is divided into eight historical planning eras that I have compiled.

1. **The Foundation** of the small town in the Aburra Valley during the Spanish colonization.
2. **The Republic** is the transition from a small town to a city under the newly liberated republic.
3. **The Industrial City** marks the transition from an agrarian center of the state of Antioquia to an industrial capital of the country.
4. **The Medellín Futuro Plan** supports the private interests in the planning process of the city.
5. **The Plan Piloto** embodies modernist ideals and becomes incorporated into the city's master plan.
6. **The decadence**⁴ of violence-caused migration and globalization effects to derail all planning projects.
7. **The Metropolitan City** is the regional city and the reintroduction of mass transportation.
8. **The constitutional city** marks the era of a new national constitution which generates changes in the administration of the city, the election of mayors and the POT (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial) as an instrument of planning.

1. Foundation

Medellín is the capital of the department of Antioquia in the Republic of Colombia. The city is located at the center of the Department, in the Aburra valley, formed by the central Andes mountain range. The city is crossed by the Medellín River and is situated at an altitude of 1539 meters above sea level. With a territory that measures 376 km², the city of Medellín has a population today that ranges from two million to four million inhabitants (including the metropolitan area).

There is a debate among scholars as to when Medellín was founded. Many scholars mark the beginning of the city of Medellín as being in 1675 with the foundation of the colonial villa. Others link the city's founding to the period of Spanish conquest during the 1541 "Spanish discovery of the valley" and the

⁴ Betancur, describes the period between 1970s to late 1980 as the "decadence" of the industrial city. Betancur, J.J. 2007. *Urban Challenges in Latin American Cities: Medellín and the Limits of Governance*.

formal foundation of *La Villa de Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria*. It is important to note that “based on archeological research, the valley had been populated at least fifteen centuries before the arrival of the Europeans.”⁵

Jorge Robledo is the first Spanish explorer on record to visit the valley and was preceded by his captain Jeronimo Luis Tejelo who he had sent to explore the land before the arrival of Robledo. This initial expedition ended in a large battle in which up to 3,000 indigenous people fought against a small group of armed Spaniards. The battle for the valley ended swiftly in a massacre of indigenous people.

Robledo’s expedition did not make any new settlement and the Valley of Aburra was not officially populated until 1675. Medellín’s late foundation is linked with its lack of gold, which was a principal industry in the times of conquest. Furthermore, Medellín was not the capital of the state. The capital was Santa Fe de Antioquia, a city more strategically connected to the large Cauca River and to gold mines.

In 1616, by order of the Viceroy Francisco Herrera Campuzano, a *resguardo* (a type of indigenous reservation) called San Lorenzo de Aburra is founded. In 1675 the street grid of the *Villa de Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria* was set by Maestro Alarife Agustín Patiño⁶ along with the first census of the villa. This street grid was patterned after the new towns and cities of the Spaniards called the “Leyes de Indias.”⁷ The Laws of the Indies are the entire body of laws issued

⁵ Alvarez M, Victor M, *Poblamiento y Poblacion en el Valle de Aburra y Medellin, 1541-1951* Compañía Suramericana de Seguros (Medellín), Jorge Orlando Melo, Patricia Londoño y Nora Hincapié, Nora Helena Jiménez and Oscar Torres. 1996. *Historia de Medellín*. Santafé de Bogotá Compañía Suramericana de Seguros

⁶ José Antonio Benítez. *El Cojo Carnero de Medellín*, Ediciones de Autores Antioqueños volumen 40, 1988. Pag 30

⁷ The Laws of the Indies (Leyes de Indias in Spanish) are the entire body of laws issued by the Spanish Crown for its American and Philippine possessions of its empire. They regulated social, political and economic life in these areas.

Recopilación de las Leyes de los Reynos de Indias, Mandadas a Imprimir y Publicar por la Magestad Católica del Rey Don Carlos II. Madrid, 179. Libro III, Título 7. De la población de las ciudades, villas, y pueblos. Lviij. Que el sitio, tamaño y disposición de la plaza sea como se ordena. Ordenanza 112, 113, 114 y 115. Below is an excerpt from the Laws of the Indies for how the colony should be planned, starting with the main Plaza.

“La Plaza mayor donde se ha de comenzar la población, siendo en Costa de Mar, se debe hacer al desembarcadero del puerto, y si fuere lugar mediterranea, en medio de la población: Su forma en quadro prolongada, que por lo menos tenga de largo una vez y media de su ancho, por que sea mas a proposito para las fiestas de á caballo, y otras: Su grandeza proporcional al número de vecinos, y teniendo consideracion a que la gente pueda ir en aumento, no sea menos, que de doscientos pies en ancho, y treientos de largo, ni mayor á ochocientos pies de largo y quinientos treinta y dos de ancho, y quedará de mediana y buena proporcion, si fuere de seis cientos pies de largo, y quatro cientos de ancho: De la Plaza salgan quatro calles principales, una por medio de cada costado; y demas de estas dos por cada esquina: las quatro esquinas miren á los quatro vientos principales por que saliendo así las calles de la Plaza no estarán expuestas á los quatro vientos que será de mucho inconveniente: toda en contorno, y las quatro calles principales, que de ella han de salir, tengan portales para comodidad de los tratantes, que suelen concurrir; y las ocho




Figure 1 Map of Medellín 1700 Source: The Author

calles que saldrán por las quatro esquinas, salgan libres, sin encontrarse en los portales, de forma que hagan la acera derecha con la plaza y la calle."

by the Spanish Crown for its American and Philippine imperial possessions. These laws regulated social, political and economic life in these areas. They also regulated the physical shape of the new cities the disposition of the public spaces and the streets and important public and religious buildings.




Figure 3 Mapa de la Villa de Medellín, Jose Maria Giraldo, 1790

Count Pedro Portocarrero y Luna, President of the "Consejo de Indias," the Indies Council, asked the Monarchy to name his town, Medellín of Extremadura. His request was accepted in modified form on November 22, 1674 when Regent Mariana of Austria proclaimed it be given the name the "Villa de Nuestra Señora de Medellín." The official proclamation was given by the Governor Miguel Aguinaga y Mendiogoitia on November 2, 1675.

By 1775 Mon y Velarde ordered the survey of the villa to obtain data for the future planning of the city in the form of general *padrones*⁸ or censuses. These censuses measured the number of inhabitants, who owned what land and the quality and use of this land. The goal here was to produce a territorial plan.⁹ By 1788, a new police code was written to control the construction of new buildings and a moratorium of improvement of any structure outside of the urban area with the goal of concentrating the population. Aside from the Leyes de Indias, this constitutes the first specific codes and planning ideals (other than a villa) of the city.

⁸ Census

⁹ González Escobar, Luis Fernando. 2007. *Medellín, los orígenes y la transición a la modernidad crecimiento y modelos urbanos 1775 - 1932*. Investigaciones, 27. Medellín: Univ. Nacional de Colombia, Escuela del Hábitat CEHAP. Pag 21




Figure 4 Map of Medellín in 1800. Source: the autor

1800

The Republic

By the time Colombia became a Republic independent from Spain in 1885, the city of Medellín had achieved the level of political importance that it has today.

It became the capital of the State and one of the most important cities of the country after Bogotá. Since its foundation in the 16th century until the end of the 18th century, Medellín was more of a small populated town and a place to stop in travels between the interior of the country and the coast. As a result of the independence campaigns in 1813, Medellín by decree became a city and by 1826 had become the capital of the state. Between 1780 and 1851, Medellín transformed from a small villa to the fourth largest city in the country. Also during this time, the state of Antioquia grew from representing 3.8 percent to 13.5 percent of the national population.¹⁰




Figure 5 Plano topográfico de Medellín_1875_Francis H. Parra, Manuel J. Escobar, Manuel hoyos y Fabriciano Botero. Students of civil engineering at the Universidad de Antioquia in 1875.

Between 1826 and 1868, Medellín became the center of state power including serving as the central political, economic and religions administration of the state. Medellín became the Episcopal chair of the Catholic Council of the state of Antioquia in 1868. Medellín also had the largest concentration of all higher education in the state of Antioquia.

¹⁰ González Escobar, Luis Fernando. 2007. *Medellín, los orígenes y la transición a la modernidad crecimiento y modelos urbanos 1775 - 1932*. Investigaciones, 27. Medellín: Univ. Nacional de Colombia, Escuela del HábitatCEHAP.




Figure 6 Map of Medellín in 1847. Source: the author




Figure 7 Demography Medellín 1900 to present Source: DANE

The Industrial City

The city moved from being the capital of an agrarian district to becoming the most important industrial center of the country. Thanks to the capital accumulated by the initial agrarian burgess, the city captured the nascent national industry. This production-oriented change has had important repercussions on the form of the city.

The mule-drawn tramway began operation in Medellín on January 23, 1887.¹¹ Correa 2003 mapped the introduction of public transportation by tram in Medellín by the elites in the first decades of the 20th century and links this project as supporting industrialization and the construction of the working-class neighborhoods in the periphery. “The elite’s progressive perspective combined advancing their private interests with a concern for public welfare and the needs of a growing urban area.”¹²






Figure 8 Mule-drawn tramway at El Eden around 1914. Source: Juan Santiago Correa

Some of those institutions and important changes occurred in 1895, including the “Compania Antioquenia de Instalaciones Electrica,” the state electric company founded in 1897 and with which the first public illumination was inaugurated in 1915. The phone service was inaugurated in 1919. By 1955, the “Empresas Municipales,” Municipal Company of Services created under the supervision of the Consejo de Medellín” became autonomous from the Consejo

¹¹ Correa, Juan Santiago. “Urban development and urban transport: the Medellín tramway, 1919-1950.” *COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL* 3739 (2003): 96.

¹² Ibid Correa 2003.



Medellin. Vista General.

Figure 9 View of the city of Medellín by 1904 Source: Fhor, Pirce & co-published by the Alcaldia de Medellín

Figure 10 Map of Medellín in 1889. Source: the author

de Medellín with the name of Empresas Públicas de Medellín.¹³ This is important because this system— administration of public services in which it is autonomous from the state and regulates itself but whose assets are owned by the city—remains intact until the present. As I will discuss later, this challenges the idea that privatization of public services is the only way to develop a city. In 1875 bids began to build the Ferrocarril de Antioquia, the railroad which was built in 1914.

The Medellín Future Plan





Figure 11 *Plano Medellín Futuro* (Map Future Medellín) by Jorge Rodríguez la Linde. Source: Jaramillo and Perfetti, 1993

In 1899 the Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas (Society of Public Improvement)¹⁴ was born. The goal of this philanthropic organization was “as these organizations were in the civilized centers of the world, to create a group that

¹³ Jaramillo, Beatriz A. *Medellín, construcción de una ciudad*. Medellín: Editorial Marín Sierra, 2005. Page 67

¹⁴ Jaramillo, Roberto Luis, and Verónica Perfetti 1993. *Cartografía urbana de Medellín 1790-1950*. Medellín: el Concejo. Page 19



1905* Population 59,815



Figure 12 Plano de la Ciudad de Medellín 1908. Source: Spearson & Son Limited (London)

1909

oversaw the ornamentation and beautification of the city.”¹⁵ This private partnership served as a parallel entity with the municipality, with whom it shared similar goals. Sometimes this Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas served as lobby group for new ideas and other times members of this lobby group would become part of the city council or the mayors or even the President of the country. Members of the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas were formed by leaders of the Medellín economic elite and they ensured that the transformation from small town to city was in accordance with their private economic interests. Medellín by 1905 had a population of 40,000.¹⁶


This new entity established a private link between the private interests and the municipality. A pivotal moment for the foundation of the city involved the competition called “Medellín Futuro.” This was an effort to control what by that point were considered the big problems of the physical form of the city. This competition was an effort to acquire a coherent master plan, inspired by the master plans of the city of Washington D.C. which were observed by member of the Sociadade de Mejore Publicas Ricardo Olanda during his trip to the Library of the Congress in the United States. Upon his return from the United States in 1908, Olanda organized a competition, funded by the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas and the Consejo de Medellín, for the best map of a “Medellín Futuro” or Future Medellín. This open competition, intended to show how the city should grow, was won by the engineer Jorge Rodriguez Lalinde. Based on this winning plan, the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas began creating a succession of other plans, incorporating other competitors’ ideas that would be recorded in the final plan. This plan, in the end, was a compilation of several political and private groups’ visions for the city. The final plan was approved in 1913.¹⁷ Most of the goals of this plan were achieved by the 1930s. By 1917, the city was already the most important industrial center of the country. By 1923, the president of the Republic Carlos E. Restrepo who also had been the founder of the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas mentioned in one of his presidential speeches that “all the transformations in the last 20 years of the city of Medellín... are directly or indirectly being influenced”¹⁸ by the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas.

¹⁵ Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. *Medellín, su origen, progreso y desarrollo*. Medellín: Servigráficas, page 184 translation of the autor “el de que a aunando los esfuerzos y concentrando las voluntades se organizase una junta encargada de velar por el ornato y embellecimiento de la ciudad”

¹⁶ Ibid Jaramillo and Perfetti 1003.

¹⁷ Acuerdo 56 de 1913, Municipio de Medellín.

¹⁸ Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. *Medellín, su origen, progreso y desarrollo*. Medellín: Servigráficas



1928* Population 120,044





Figure 13 Plan of Future Urban Development dated 1932. Source: Guillermo Palacios. Published by the Alcaldia de Medellín

1932



Figure 14 The October 1940 edition of *National Geographic Magazine* contained an article entitled "Hail Colombia!" which included the color photograph below. The trolley, known as Birney 37, was climbing the hill on Calle 55. Source: Luis Marden.


Some of the important goals achieved by the *Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas* included:

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The channelization of the Medellín River that opened large plots of land on the flooded valley plains, the botanical gardens, the routes connecting Medellín with the National Capital of Bogotá, and the Medellín Futuro Plan.

The Plan Piloto / Medellín Master Plan

By the 1940s, Medellín needed an update of the 1913 city plan and so the society of Mejoras Publicas invited famous architect Karl Brunner to create a new plan for the city, but the city was never able to hire him. In 1948 architects Paul Lester Weiner and José Luis Sert accepted the invitation from Medellín's Mayor to create the "Plano Regulador" or Regulator Plan. This project which these architects created in Boston and New York, was known as the Plan Piloto or in English the Medellín Master Plan (MMP), was done in collaboration with the then newly created office of the regulator plan directed by Nel Rodríguez, a prominent Colombian architect of the city.



1951* Population 358,189

Figure 15 9 Map of Medellín in 1950. Source: the author

1950





Figure 16 El Plan Piloto 1950 Wiener y Sert . Source: CIAM 8¹⁹

The Medellín Master Plan (MMP) of the city that focuses on all the municipalities in the vicinity of Medellín and in this sense was the first planning study of the entire Aburrá Valley. This led to the creation of the first metropolitan area in Colombia. The main features of the MMP included the channelization of the Medellín River, restricting new settlements up to a certain point of the Valley slopes, the creation of an industrial zone in the Guayabal District, the construction of a main sport facilities zone with the city stadium, and the relocation of the historic administrative center to the site of the old railroad in La Alpujarra.²⁰ All of these features were intended to imprint on the city the new modern planning ideals at the time. Medellín, in fact, was a showcase of these modern ideals at the 8th International Congress for Modern Architecture (CIAM) in 1951.

By 1951 the city had 358,189 inhabitants and only 20 years later in 1973, the population had almost tripled to include 1,071,252 inhabitants. The Master Plan had only anticipated the city to grow to a population of 500,000. This demographic explosion had several consequences for the MMP: the urban limits

¹⁹ International Congress for Modern Architecture. 1951. CIAM 8. 8th International Congress for Modern Architecture. "The core."

²⁰ Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. *Medellín, su origen, progreso y desarrollo*. Medellín: Servigráficas



1964* Population 772,887





Figure 17 Stadium and Neighborhood areas as it is today and how it was planned in the MMP
Source: Patricia Schnitter

1955



1985** Population 1,468,089

Figure 19 9 Map of Medellín in 1985. Source: the author

1985

on traditionally protected markets, the socio political instability of the rural areas is also displacing large amounts of the country's population, who left without any other resources, flee to the urban centers, including Medellín.

So by 1970s the "harmonious" contract between state and elites in the construction of the future of the city is lost due to the collapse of the industries. All planning efforts at this stage are dwarfed by the state's inability to cope with the unexpected exponential acceleration in population growth and the economic stagnation of the city's industries. At this point all arriving population found most sources of formal employment in crisis.


Also during this time the state via the (Instituto de Credito Territorial) ICT, experimented with successful low income housing projects that did reach some poor populations, but not those populations who were newly arrived to the city and living in extreme poverty. The scarcity of affordable housing units for everyone made it even more difficult for residents in the city's poorest communities to access it. In the 1980s, the state suspended this affordable housing effort. Instead of building houses, the state continued facilitating loans to buy homes. The planning department also focused on road infrastructure. These projects were what might be termed as politically more accessible parts of the regulator plan. This trend of focusing on transportation and infrastructure instead of other planning aspects (such as housing) had continued until Fajardo.

The Metropolitan City

Medellín expansion and connection to the other municipalities of the Aburra Valley, generated the necessity to think of the city in terms of a region. The city in 1980 created the Metropolitan Area (Area Metropolitana). Based on the initial idea of the Plan Piloto, this type of regional institutional body was the first of its kind in the country. This changed the mentality of the city leaders from thinking about Medellín as an isolated town to understanding the Valley as an entire Metropolitan Area. One of the infrastructural changes that most reflects this town-municipality shift in mentality was the Metro de Medellín. In 1984, Metro de Medellín began construction of a rapid transit railway, which after construction stagnated due to political battle between the national government and the local municipalities about the release of funds, was finally inaugurated on November 21, 1995.²³

This new piece of infrastructure connected most municipalities in the valley and transformed the traditional central structure of the city into a linear one that

²³ Morrison, Allen. "THE TRAMWAYS OF COLOMBIA." *ELECTRIC TRANSPORT IN LATIN AMERICA*. <http://www.tramz.com/co/me/me.html> (accessed May 3, 2010).



2005** Population 2,223,078



Figure 20 Aerial photo Medellin. Source: Google Earth

2007

follows the logic of the topography and hydrology of the valley. One of the most important achievements of this new transportation system is that it opened transportation opportunities to the entire region and more importantly to the poor neighborhoods and cities of the north.



Figure 21 Exchange station line A and B in downtown Medellín. Source: Metro de Medellín

The Constitutional City

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The 1991 new national constitution removed the requirement that city mayors be selected by the state governor or by the country's president. Under the new constitution, mayors had the opportunity to be elected by popular vote. Popular elected mayors need to respond to their constituencies and not only to their political affiliations. This has modified the ways in which the mayor's office operated and in turn has modified the relationship of the mayor office with its citizens. The overall power structure and image has shifted from an authoritarian approach to a more citizen-oriented policy. This new democratic route to Mayor has allowed members of Independent parties, such as Mocus in Bogotá and Fajardo in Medellín, to become city mayors. This opened the possibility of experimenting with new ways to understand and modify the territory as explain by Gutiérrez et al 2009.²⁴

The constitution created a new law called "Ley Territorial" or Territorial Law.²⁵ This law is the first time that public participation is included in the planning process in the sense that they need to be included in the planning process via

²⁴ Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez 2009. *Politics and security in three Colombian cities*. London: Crisis States Research Centre.

²⁵ Ley de Desarrollo territorial, Ley 388 de 1997 el 18 de Julio

Chapter 2

communication and input. The Territorial Law has a planning instrument called the *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* POT of 1999 or the Plan of Territorial Order.

The Sergio Fajardo administration projects built on the legacy of the POT. Before Fajardo, none of the previous mayors had engaged with the conclusions of the POT.

Non-Planning in Medellín History and Consequences

This section explores the consequences of the development of informal settlements in the city of Medellín and highlights the relationship between the state (municipality and national government staff) and the inhabitants of these informal territories.

Here I explore the informal settlements in three sections

- **The informal city (informal settlements)** provides a global framework for the process and practices of informal settlement formation.
- **The informal city in Medellín** explores the informalization of Medellín after the 1970 post-globalization effects on the Colombian industry.
- **The Case of Villa del Socorro** explores the development of an experimental housing project in the 1960s in Medellín as the first step in the development of the large informal settlement of Comunas 1 and 2 in Medellín, the regions of study for this thesis.

The informal city (informal settlements)

Informal settlement can be defined as an area which has developed without legal claims to the land and/or permission from the authority; as a result of their illegal status, housing provision infrastructure and services are usually inadequate.²⁶

One important issue to understand about the informal city is that sections of cities developed informally did so thanks to the absence of the state (negligence) and it is this state negligence that allowed the informal city to thrive. This absence of state is also the source of many of the entire city's problems. It is this paradox that the communities who lived in these areas found themselves. This phenomenon is not unique to Medellín. This is a global phenomenon that is acquiring more relevance today because of the scale of these kinds of new informal cities. Mike Davis in his book *Planet of Slums (2006)*

²⁶ Srinivas, Hari. "Defining Squatter Settlements." *GDRC | The Global Development Research Center*. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 May 2010. <<http://www.gdrc.org/uem/define-squatter.html>>.

puts the scale of the problem in perspective. “Residents of slums [what I prefer to define as the informal city] constitute a staggering 78.2 percent of the urban population of the least developed countries and fully a third of the global urban population.”²⁷ These numbers reveal a necessity to discover new ways within the planning profession to deal with the built environment. This search is one of my main motivations for this study. We need to learn to understand the sophisticated process or formation to subsistence that residents of informal communities enact to make sustainable and effective interventions.

Development of all informal settlements in the world follows some similar appropriation techniques and consolidation processes. They vary by culture and political system and construction techniques, but some generalizations about this informal city process can be made. The urbanization by informal city residents use the minimal resources available (political and economic) to accomplish the largest manmade objects—cities. This is a social enterprise because individuals alone do not have the necessary power or resources. The state is also complicit in this informal city process—by pointed acknowledgment that they should have a role in informal cities, or due to the fact that the state actually does not have the resources to address informal housing problems, such as sudden mass migrations of people to the city. Informal cities also reveal the incompetence of the state to maintain control over the territory and the incapacity of the formal economic system to include all members of society into the productive system. (Betancur 2007) “Constructed through land partitions, invasions, and self-help, these squatters became a living testimony of to the absence and indifference of the state and society.”²⁸



Figure 23 Process of creating an informal city. Source: Jota Samper at estudio teddy cruz.

First, a pirate urbanizer finds land available for invasion and then leads an invasion with others to this land. The invasion happens over the course of one day. The territory is claimed with precarious material that is brought by the invaders. There is a series of stages in which layer by layer, as budget or

²⁷ Davis, Mike. 2006. *Planet of slums*. London: Verso.

²⁸ Betancur.

construction techniques allow, the people transform a precarious shelter into a house.



Figure 24 Mankurd North. Mumbai, India. Squatter development from 2000 to 2009 Source: The Author aerial images Google

I see the development of squatters, slums or informal cities more as complex development strategies to build a city without the necessary resources. My research explores these complex strategies.

Betancur (2007) acknowledges the benefits that other authors see in informality as a way for underdeveloped societies to cope with the consequences of globalization, but he also cites the dangers in the intrinsic separation between the state and the individual. "One of the economic benefits of informality is

flexibility, but it represents a deep social dilemma. Operating outside or in violation of the rule of law severs ties with the material and social basis of citizenship, legitimacy, and recognition.”²⁹ Furthermore, Betancur sees informal citizens, through their status as informal, as likely to become criminals.³⁰ I would argue that the fact that informality is illegal is what makes the line between legal and illegal very difficult to locate. Being a resident of an informal settlement or city automatically deprives you of your rights to citizenship to the formal state. A similar argument between legal and illegal, informal and formal citizen are employed against illegal immigration in the United States. We have to be careful when we make a connection between a citizen being informal and being a criminal.

The absence of the state in the area of informal settlements makes these areas perfect environments to be appropriated by groups who are contesting the authority of the state. In Colombia, we have a complex situation. On one hand, as much as 64 percent³¹ of the population lives below the poverty line and a large percentage of this population lives in informal settlements. On the other hand, in Colombia and in Medellín, there is a long list of illegal armed groups who operate outside of the state (paramilitaries, guerrillas, narcotraffic groups, and other crime organizations). These informal spaces are necessary for the survival of these armed groups. Informal neighborhoods become contested territories among these warring armed groups.

The Informal City in Medellín

“Most low-income immigrants to Colombian cities availed themselves of housing through land invasion or acquisition of illegal land partitions and self-settlement in the urban periphery. Thus, illegal forms of tenure, precarious dwellings, and violations of established regulations and codes characterized most of their settlements. Local governments could not intervene because they

²⁹ cite page number.

³⁰ cite the Betancur example of informal vendor in downtown area switching from legal goods to illegal drugs.

³¹ United Nations Development Programme, Population living below national poverty line (%), most recent year available during 2000-2007. Human and income poverty: developing countries / Population living below \$1.25 a day (%), Human Development Report 2009, UNDP, accessed on December 19, 2009.

would be violating private land property rights or their own rules. Hence, improvements depended largely on settlers. Eventually, government developed a mechanism of intervention based on the distribution of construction materials and the loan of heavy equipment to settlers who then carried out the work. Meanwhile, government policies addressing the housing needs of the poor evolved from direct development of public housing to the provision of subsidies. “

Betancourt 2007

Both comuna 1-2 and 13 have large pockets of informal development. These two areas, which represent 15% of the Medellín urban territory, have housing and infrastructure that have been developed informally. These structures were built by the residents. The government later followed up by consolidating public services like water, energy, sewer, telephone and paving of main roads as well as governmental institutions such as schools, sports facilities and police stations. But all these interventions are afterthoughts and not part of coordinated planning strategy of the planning department. The comprehensive Plan or Plan Piloto of the 1950s considered most of these areas unbuildable and did not incorporate them into the urban perimeter of the city.




Figure 25 Comuna 1 and 2 from 1950 and 1990 showing current locations of MetroCable. Source: PUI Nororiental EDU.

It is important to understand this relationship between the state and the communities that occupy these territories. In the case of the PRIMED,³² Betancur (2005) explores this relationship in the Integrated Slum Upgrading Program of Medellín (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales en Medellín or PRIMED). First, he brings to light the legal impediments that the nation and local state had imposed on itself that prevents it from engaging with the large illegal settlements in the city. Betancur also maps a succession of institutions through which the state, formally or informally, intervenes in the informal city. He also examines a succession of entities that begin independent of the state, such as the Casitas de la Providencia, the NGO that build the first neighborhood of the comuna 1 called "Villa del Socorro." This NGO evolved into more complex public private partnerships like the Corvide³³ that later would lead the PRIMED project. This PRIMED project then served as the EDU base from which the PUI operated during the Fajardo Administration.

This process also shows how the legalization of property tenure (granting of titles) allowed the state to be more engaged in improving the conditions of these neighborhoods. This process also reveals that this long (more than 40 years) evolution of partnership provided experiential knowledge of how (and how not) to work in and with these communities. This process is ongoing and in 2002 the CORVIDE became an integral part of the municipality. By 2004 the city create the FOVIMED, *Fondo Municipal de Vivienda de Interes Social* during the the Fajardo Administration and in 2008 this institution was transformed into the ISVIMED,³⁴ an autonomous decentralized institution with its own budget. have The ISVIMED has the same institutional structure of a company in which the initial funding comes from the municipality but after this company begins to produce its own profits, it runs own funds and budget and produces money for the municipality and itself. This is similar to other successful "municipal companies" in Medellín such as the EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellín), which manages water, energy, and phones and cable television and internet.

For decades, the neighborhoods where these policies were applied in the city of Medellín were isolated from the city's general population and in some cases even from the police or army. Today, after the application of the projects during the Fajardo's regime, these same areas are being advertised as tourist attractions of the city. This corroborates the Mayor's office idea that there is a relationship between the policies and projects they implemented and the

³² Integrated Program for Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellín.

³³ CORVIDE substituted Casitas de la Providencia (1975) Betancur 2007

³⁴ Instituto de Vivienda y Hábitat de Medellín, ISVIMED.. "Viviendas con Corazón." *Viviendas con Corazón*. <http://www.viviendasmedellin.gov.co> (accessed May 3, 2010).

reduction of violence. While not enough time has passed to know if this reduction in violence is temporary or permanent, it still is significant.

The Case of Villa del Socorro

I have concluded that the areas of this study comprise a large portion of the city's territory, and territory that has not had significant intervention of the state. Other institutions besides the state engaged in the construction of the environment. This is the case of Villa del Socorro, one of the neighborhoods that form Comuna 1. Today, the inhabitants development of their housing units make it look like the rest of the neighborhoods in the Comuna, but in reality it is part of one of the first experiments in the world in core housing,³⁵ a prototype that is based on the informal citizens' strategy to build their homes and environment through incremental development.

This concept was born in 1960 as a solution to the improbability of supplying an entire unit, given the economical restrictions of their occupants. This experimental housing complex provided 397 core units to initiate a process of construction, through which over time they would build a more complete house. Today, after more than 40 years since this core housing project began, the goal has been achieved. The houses in Villa del Socorro have developed beyond their core to more complete units, and most of them have even added second and third levels to the units. These interventions also created a winding road path that negotiated the steep topography (winding because the straight roads in the Andes mountain neighborhood were so steep they could not be climbed by car). This path also left open spaces for the future placement of service and cultural infrastructure, infrastructure which later was provided by the state. Many of the inhabitants of these units came from other informal communities located close to the center of the city. This project took the problem of informality that existed in the downtown of Medellín and transferred it to the periphery of the city. Because the government did not follow up with infrastructural services, this initiated a process in which this area of the periphery was vulnerable to being informal. This then created a type of economic, social, and physical segregation of its inhabitants and environment from the rest of the city.

³⁵ Caminos, Horacio, John F. C. Turner, and John A. Steffian. 1969. *Urban dwelling environments; an elementary survey of settlements for the study of design determinants*. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press.

This example is interesting for two reasons. First because it shows that, in a way, it actually was the state that initiated the process of urbanization of this steep and isolated portion of geography, and it did so in a way that generated a path to follow—an economically, geographically and culturally segregated path. Second, this first attempt was not followed by others in the private state-oriented projects that either corrected or continued this path. No substantial interventions happened, for nearly 35 years, until the PUI in 2004. The entire infrastructure in place at this moment in 1969 became the formal structure of the entire community that we see today.




Figure 27 Villa de Socorro in 1969. Source: Urban Dwelling Environments

Layout: The subdivision system is determined by the topography, which is very steep (25 per cent slope). A main vehicular road winds from the bottom to the top of the locality following a 10 per cent maximum slope. Pedestrian sidewalks, running perpendicular to the contours, serving the lots. (The straight street shown on the map, running perpendicularly to the contours, is accessible only by pedes-

Figure 26 Legend of map of the villas del Socorro project






Figure 28 Villa de Socorro Before (as a plan) and today Comuna 1. Source: Urban Dwelling Environments and Area Google Earth 2010

The limits of the infrastructure of this project became the limits (borders) with the city. From this border, all material to develop new housing, churches, steps and roads, were carried up the hills to the invasion territories.

Luz Marina Saldarriagam, in my interviews with her, narrated the process in which she, her family and other families invaded the territory. She also talked about purchasing the illegal title to the land (from an urbanizer pirate) and the fights to keep from being evicted from the state authorities. In a narrative that could be a chapter in a Gabriel Garcia Marquez story she said, “at that time [in the 1970s] the mayor had ordered for this land to reclaimed [by the state] and sent the military to expel us from here...the Captain [of the Fourth Brigade] ordered their soldiers to not evict any family that had the Colombian flag raised... and we knew about that... the next day we made flags out of our clothing and that was the way that we were able to stay here.”³⁶

This contestation of the tenure of the territory, the constant threat of eviction by the authorities marked the initial and continued relationship of this community with the state. This contestation and open knowledge of illegality, are, in my consideration, important elements that facilitated the birth, conquest and contestation of authority of this territory. The state acknowledges the existence of this community and their illegal appropriation of the territory, but at the same time the state also lacks the power or will to deal politically with the consequence of evicting people from their homes. This delaying of resolution

³⁶ Luz Marina Saldarriaga, interview in “Proyecto Histórico de Memoria” la Violencia no es toda la Historia, 2008 DukeEngage Medellín, Tamera Marko and Jota Samper, 2008.

stops further improvements of the territory, and the ones that are made are to address problems that have already spiraled out of control such as the proliferation of violent groups and storm-induced landslides that cause dozens of homes and lives lost. Nongovernmental actors in this case have replaced the state. Priests like Padre Gabriel Diaz,³⁷ organized the *convites*, meetings in which community members assemble to do projects for the larger community, like building latrines or making a street. At these *convites*, members of the Santo Domingo community built roads, bathrooms and other infrastructure. These actions fulfilled the mission of the first leaders of the community and around figures like him the communal physical projects were done. These kinds of actions are also followed by further community projects by NGO's and institutions alike. NGOs, like the Servicio Paz y Justicia en América Latina SERPAJ directed by Hildegard Goss-Mayr (Pax Christi USA Pope Paul VI Teacher of Peace Award in 1986)and founded by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (Nobel Peace Prize 1980) held their first meeting in this territory in 1974.³⁸ As this case shows, international (nongovernmental) groups were working in these territories even when the Colombian state was not.



Figure 29 Santo Domingo Savio. Neighborhood Source: Album Padre Gabriel Diaz courtesy of the *Sala Mi Barrio*

³⁷ Interviews "Proyecto Histórico de Memoria" *la Violencia no es toda la Historia*, 2009 DukeEngage Medellín, Tamera Marko and Jota Samper, 2009.

³⁸ Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Hildegard. "WORLD-WIDE ASIAN-EURASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM." September, 16th, 2006. <http://word.world-citizenship.org/wp-archive/715> (accessed 2010 april). "Her companion Adolfo Pérez Esquivel was at the time the coordinator of the nonviolent Christian organization Service for Peace and Justice (Servicio Paz y Justicia, SERPAJ). This human rights organization, which worked under the most difficult of conditions, was founded in 1974 in the Colombian city of Medellín during a meeting organized by Hildegard and Jean Goss. In 1976, as Pérez Esquivel was collecting documents for an international campaign against human rights violations in Latin America."

In my interviews, people narrate ways that these conditions of extreme poverty and the state's lack of accountability catapulted the first waves of what might be called "regular crimes"—home robberies, vandalism, pick pocketing. These crimes quickly escalated to organized crime waged by different criminal gangs that by the 1980s become formalized as the *Sicarios* (assassins) who worked directly with drug lords. These *Sicarios* would come to terrify the city throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the main narcotraffic networks in the city of Medellín were dismantled in the early 1990s, these criminal groups were absorbed by other illegal groups that challenged the authority of the state.

In a series of essays based on a compilation of stories told by members of the neighborhoods of the northeastern section of the city, "*Somos Historia Comuna Nororiental*," 1991 where the comuna 1 and 2 are located, narrates part of this process. They talk about how urban guerrillas used the opportunity to take over the *comunas* territories after the gangs of *sicarios* had lost their leadership. A member of the then new MP (*milicias populares*) talks about this process of absorption: "We executed many of the bosses and members of the gangs of the *Sicarios*. We did not have any alternative— they were rotten people and we knew that they would never rehabilitate."³⁹ These executions were sufficient to make an example of the other small groups, to make them understand that we were talking seriously."⁴⁰ To the presence of a new armed groups in these neighborhoods, the General Pardo from the Cuarta Brigada, a battalion located in Medellín's National Army responds, "These new organizations had their umbilical cord attached to the Coordinadora Guerrillera (guerrillas), that has taken advantage of the social decomposition in the *comunas* to collect the harvest in a field fertilized by violence and narcotraffic."⁴¹ Similarly violent and non-violent process of absorption will follow to the contestation of the territory by the paramilitary groups in the late 1990s.

⁴⁰ Estrada C., William, and Adriana Gómez V. 1992. *Somos historia: Comuna Nororiental*. Medellín, Colombia: this an extract from the revista *Semana*, abril 9, 1991

⁴¹ *Ibid* Estrada. 1992. page 172



Figure 30 Comuna 1 and 2 in 2006 Source: EDU

What this section is trying to reveal is the connection between the formation and consolidation of the physical territory with the manifestations of violence and social and economic segregation. This helps understand why any intervention on the physical space can help bring closure to that limbo relationship of state and community that the condition of informality had created. Changing these spaces in these ways could also be a way to condition and modify social behaviors. It is clear that a direct relationship between the modification of the physical space and the change in violent behavior cannot be expected, but that the first (intervention that makes the area a less isolated physical environment) is an important condition to make the second (less violence social behavior) happen is clear.

This shows the evolution of the physical space (community self-constructed public and private space) along with the political implications and consequences of that evolution (the recognized condition of illegality imposed on an entire community and the inability or neglect of the state to legally intervene in the resolution of physical and social issues)— all in an environment of extreme poverty. This is a recipe for the incubation of criminal activities and further escalations of violence in a country like Colombia where multiple illegal groups contest the power of the state.

By declaring the occupation of the territory illegal, the state removed the citizenship of the community members. Every day that this illegal condition is maintained, further distances the citizens from their participation in society at large and further creates the aura that each inhabitant is, by de facto, a

criminal. This criminalization of the existence of the community is not removed once the state concedes the titles of property to those who live there. The physical atrophy that the neighborhood has suffered through decades of neglect corroborates this idea of the inhabitant as a third-class citizen.

The next chapter explores the policies and projects implemented in Medellín from 2003 by the Sergio Fajardo administration. This intervention targeted many areas of the city, but focused specially on traditionally marginalized areas in Medellín. This is a strategy that seeks to address the disparity between the formal and the informal city, through not only policies but also and primary through the modification of the physical space of the informal settlements that make them prone to violence and insecurity.

“Medellin, la Ciudad Mas Educada” Medellin the most educated: the policy interventions

Background

The city of Medellin has gone through a major social and physical transformation during the last 7 years (2003-2010). To understand the nature of this transformation, we must consider that since the late 1940s, Colombia has experienced extreme levels of violence caused by a complex web of armed groups. Various simultaneous conflicts occurred among guerrilla, paramilitary, and military groups, further complicated by police forces and gangs. Traffic of narcotics, especially since the 1970s, provided the funding that perpetuated these conflicts. However, between 2003-2007, the levels of conflict have decreased drastically—by 50 percent—throughout the city. This change has a close relationship with changes that have happened at the national scale. An especially important change was the 2001 presidential election. Contrary to the previous policy of focusing on diplomacy (through dialogue with various warring groups), the new president Alvaro Uribe 2002-2010 implemented an armed solution to the conflict. The new national government policies were driven by two predominant objectives: “demobilizing illegal groups and increasing defense spending.”¹

This policy of active defense spending modified the characteristics of the conflict in Colombia. First, greater levels of security in the urban areas encouraged more migration from rural areas within Colombia to major cities like Medellin. Second, the intensification of armed conflict took the war from the

¹ Democratic security or Democratic security policy refers to a Colombian security policy implemented during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). It was unveiled in June 2003. Colombia unveils security plan". BBC.com. 30 June 2003. McDermott, Jeremy." BBC NEWS | Americas | Colombia unveils security plan." *BBC NEWS* | News Front Page. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3030768.stm> (accessed May 18, 2010).

rural areas to the interior of cities. This was most visible in Medellín. By 2001, Comuna 13 was an extreme example of places that had become battlegrounds among paramilitaries, guerrilla urban groups and gangs groups. In 2002, the national army's campaign, *Operación Orion*, took over the neighborhood Comuna 13.² The operation lasted 4 days. In this military operation officials reportedly confiscated arms (including 50 kilos of explosives, 1 machineguns, 4 rocket launchers and 4 rifles, as well as a bus with explosives that they deactivated). At least 243 people were arrested, 23 convicted as head of the militias (urban guerrilla), and 72 kidnapped individuals by the guerrilla were also liberated. In the military operation, 4 soldiers from the national army, one civilian and 4 insurgent (guerrilla) died.³ More than 20 individuals were injured based on official reports.⁴ Other sources reported up to 70 disappeared individuals at the hands of the paramilitary groups that used the opportunity to establish control over the comuna 13.⁵ Some sources report extrajudicial executions by the national armed forces, deaths that official reports claimed as friendly fire.⁶ This complex event shows how, in this particular place in the city, three different armed groups were trying to obtain control over the territory. Each one of these groups fighting the other were the same groups that were fighting at the national scale, largely in rural areas, trying to take control of the country. This type of urban manifestation of the national conflict is what makes Medellín an important place to study.

Another policy initiated by the new national government involved demobilization of illegal armed groups. This involved a two-pronged strategy. On one hand, individuals were given amnesty if they deserted guerrilla groups. On the other hand, the government engaged in a peace process with the right-wing paramilitary groups, including the larger *Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia* AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). The first success of this process involved 850 paramilitary members giving up their weapons in a publicized

² This kind of army presence was not seen before in Colombia, even in the midst of the 1990's Bloque de búsqueda operations (the search for Pablo Escobar).

³ Emisora del Ejercito Nacional. "Ex alcalde de Medellín habló sobre la Operación Orión - Colombia Estereo." Emisora del Ejercito Nacional - Colombia Estereo. <http://www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=582> (accessed May 18, 2010).

⁴ BBC. "BBC Mundo | AMÉRICA LATINA | Medellín: tercer día de enfrentamientos." BBC NEWS | News Front Page. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_2339000/2339065.stm (accessed May 20, 2010).

⁵ Ibid

⁶ El Tiempo. "Ciudadanos Proponen Mandato Por La Paz." El Tiempo.com Archivo. www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-554724 (accessed May 3, 2010).

ceremony in 2003.⁷ This larger demobilization process was in full swing when a new city administration took power in 2004 led by Mayor Sergio Fajardo's party *compromiso ciudadano*. This was a new political party and one that had no affiliation with the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) that had for decades fought for power, a fight that can be tracked to the beginning of the nation and to the non declared civil war of the 1950s, known as (La Violencia) that give birth to the contemporary guerrilla. Fajardo's new plan of action was called "Medellín, la ciudad mas educada" (Medellín: The Most Educated City). This plan of action focused on developing soft and hard infrastructure throughout the city and doing so mostly through education. In Sergio Fajardo's words this campaign engaged with the concept of "education in the biggest sense of the word," schools, health clinics, museums, parks, libraries, and recreation centers. It is important to understand that in Medellin, basic infrastructure (water, energy, transportation) was for the most part not affected by the conflict. In general, however, these educational infrastructural projects were overdue long before this latest wave of conflict.

I have divided the Mayor's initiatives into two categories: policies and physical transformations. This division separates the policies that do not have apparent physical representation in the territory to more clearly highlight and better understand those policies directly tied to physical interventions. This chapter does not cover all aspects of the Mayor's administration, but instead analyzes the new policies put into action by his administration and how they were instrumental in the transformation of social behavior in the urban sphere. I focus specifically on those strategies that apparently have influenced the decrease in levels of insecurity and violence in the city.

Sergio Fajardo and his political discourse

⁷ "On November 25, 2003 television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860 paramilitaries belonging to Medellín's Cacique Nutibara Block (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid down their arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries. The apparent neutralization of the BCN appeared to vindicate the government's decision to officially begin talks with the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), to which most paramilitary groups belong, including the BCN, following the announcement of the AUC's unilateral ceasefire in December 2002." Amnesty International. "Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? | Amnesty International." Amnesty International | Working to Protect Human Rights. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005> (accessed May 18, 2010).

Sergio Fajardo, a mathematician with a doctorate from the University of Michigan, founded his own political party in 2003 called *Compromiso Ciudadano*. This group originally was comprised of a mix of academics, members of NGOs, and leaders drawn from the private sector. Their goal was in Fajardo's own words to solve two basic problems of the city, which they identified as: (1) Social inequality, which created a "social debt" between the rich and the poor, and (2) violence, which had deep roots in many areas of society. Sergio Fajardo explained the character and effects of violence in his public lectures. "The combination of social inequality, historical social debt, and violence in Colombia is unique." Fajardo explained, "The violence encloses, the violence divides us into atoms, breaks all links between citizens. Because we start to move in restricted circles of our city, we only relate with people who are similar to us. Fear is part of society. We become survivors but not participants of society." The solution to this isolation problem, he concluded, was to create spaces where individuals feel safe. "So we need to encounter each other," Fajardo said, "and the place for this has to be public space."⁸




Figure 1 Sergio Fajardo at the Santo Domingo Neighborhood in 2006. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin

From the beginning of his mayoral campaign, the solutions to the city's social problems were identified as problems with the city's physical structure. The

⁸ Fajardo, Sergio. "Medellin, Del Miedo a la Esperanza." Keynote speech, XXIX Reunion Anual de Consejeros from Tecnologico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico, January 15, 2009.

solutions, therefore, were to target that structure. “So in places where before there was violence and destruction ... we arrive with the best physical buildings of the city. All the problems that we are solving are inequality and violence,” argued Fajardo. In this way physical infrastructure and architecture became the tools for transforming the city and bridging the gap between inequalities. All new infrastructure and architectural interventions are seen as educational projects.⁹ As a result of this thinking, the city of Medellín invested 52% of its 2004-2007 investment budget¹⁰ into programs affiliated with education, including physical development, a total of 1.8 Billion Colombian pesos, \$936,582,657.70 U.S. dollars. Sergio Fajardo said in a lecture about the Medellín campaign at a lecture in Monterrey, Mexico in 2008 that

“[a]rchitecture plays an esthetical role, the most beautiful for the most humble. This sends a message of hope against the inequality. We created spaces never dreamed of in the most humble neighborhoods of the city. And all new spaces have a program related with education and knowledge in a larger sense... Quality in education has to start with the quality of the space. So the poorest kid of the city has to go to a school as good as the one of the richest kid of the city.”¹¹

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Figure 2 Medellín, la ciudad mas educada (Medellin, the most educated city) logo. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

The political discourse of Sergio Fajardo in the media, official mayoral office reports, and dozens of conference presentations around the world, is filled with references to how improvement of the aesthetic conditions of physical space will provide the necessary dignity to bridge Medellín’s the social gap. This discourse, even as inclusive as it tries to be, is basically unidirectional. The venues of community participation in the planning process were defined with a strong top-down approach. “Education” becomes a way to provide larger opportunities and the way to pay for the social debt that the city owes to its poorest communities. This approach was not part of a community consensus— Mayor Fajardo did not ask the community their input on this. Sergio Fajardo explained,

⁹ Regarding this strategy implemented in Medellín, Dennis Frenchman pointed out that a “similar strategy of linking education and physical renewal was used in Lowell, Massuchessets in the last decade as a way to overcome disinvestment.”

¹⁰ Investment Budget is the portion of the budget left over after overhead and other recurrent payments.

¹¹ Ibid (Sergio fajardo in a conference at the Tecnológico de Monterrey México 2009)

We bomb Medellín, but in a different way—with opportunities and hope. This is a project of transformation of social debt. It is not an issue of settling scores. The entire community is proud of the new infrastructure put in place. So that way we all win.¹²

This new wave of “bombs”¹³ “exploded” in Medellín from 2003 to the present (2010), constituted one of the most radical urban transformations in the city’s history. It can be compared to the scale and impact of the introduction of the elevated metro de Medellín that transverses the entire city, a planning and building process which spanned more than fifteen years. The Ciudad Mas Educada campaign, in three years, included renovating existing city parks, adding a new interactive museum, building ten Colegios de Calidad (new quality schools) and renovating another 122 schools, adding 64 Ludotecas (public-run free day care), increasing the capacity of city universities by 200% and building nine new free computer centers, nine CEDEZOs (small entrepreneurial centers in low-income neighborhoods) and a new performing arts center, redevelopment of large areas in three urban neighborhoods Proyecto Urbanos Integrales (PUI), (Integral Urban Projects) a new Center for Justice and 20 CAI (neighborhood small police centers), five new parks, five new street improvements a new line cable car line connected to the metro along with additional system of Metro Plus lines for all the city (the BRT of Medellín not yet operational). This also included five Parques Bibliotecas, new library parks or community centers that are multi-level, architecturally internationally award-winning spaces where community members, free of charge, can read, use the internet, watch movies, take workshops, play, and just be. These physical interventions were executed, along with a number of diverse education oriented policies such as increasing the student capacity of public education facilities, educational subsidies for the tuition of low income students, food subsidies for students enrolled in educational facilities run by the city, student transportation subsidies, health services and programs oriented to populations at risk, scholarships for college and a series of events aimed at making the students in all schools more

¹² Ibid. (Sergio fajardo in a conference at the Tecnológico de Monterrey México 2009)

¹³ During the end of the 1980,s and the beginning of the 1990s, Medellín suffered a large wave of terrorist attacks as part of the war against narcotraffic in the nation. This period of terrorist attacks, that many times accounted for more than 1 bomb explosion per day, are part of an entire chapter in *Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb*. Davis, Mike. 2007. London: Verso.

competitive. It also included policies to support the national Disarmament and Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process.

So many physical and policy initiatives and projects were generated in this period that they are difficult to accurately quantify and track. The city has not kept consistent records of the process in a single place, and different departments of the city tell different accounts of the same process that all came to be called “the transformation of Medellín.”

I have selected from among hundreds of projects and policies that intersect with the territory of this study (located in Comuna 13, 1 and 2). I also chose to highlight these projects and policies because they represent the type of interventions that were innovative and have the best possibility for future application to other contexts. I have divided these strategies into two groups—policies and physical transformations—but it is the intertwining of both approaches, in my opinion, that makes these strategies successful.

Policies underlying the “transformation of Medellín”

“I never imagined in my life that I would think that we need more police.”

Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of Medellín (2004-2007)

The purpose of this section is to review the policies that were created during the administration of Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo. Understanding the scope of the policies is important for the evaluation of (see chapter 5). Of all the policies implemented during the mayor’s administration from 2004-2007, I have selected the six that I consider most relevant for this study based on fact that the mayor’s office application of them directly influenced this study’s research area. These policies are:

- Process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR), a national Peace Process policy supported by the municipality that had important repercussions on the Medellín territory and in the neighborhoods of this study.
- Presupuesto Participativo PP, Participative Budget PP, a planning and decision making process that shared the municipal budget and responsibilities with the community.
- Banco de los Pobres (Bank of the Poor), a new finance banking structure from the municipality that provided micro credits in marginalized areas of the city and promoted entrepreneurial projects.
- Selection of the interventions: Índice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH) Índice de Calidad de Vida (ICV) (the quality of life survey), the measuring tools that help justify and evaluate the location of the investment of the territory of the city.
- Urbanismo Social (Social Urbanism) is the philosophical framework that explains social implications of the physical interventions that the city was making in the poorest neighborhoods.

- EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellín (Enterprise Of Urban Development -EDU), is the institutional framework that permitted the city to execute the projects and negotiate diverse state entities and public and private partnerships.

SEGURIDAD Y CONVIVENCIA (Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security) Process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR)

At the end of the Fajardo mayoral era in 2007, Medellín had reduced the homicide rate below that of the level in Colombia nationwide. This had not happened in more than 20 years. Furthermore, it was lower than that of many cities in Latin America. The percentages of other felonies also were reduced as incidences of burglary, extortion, and personal injuries declined. The process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration with ex members of illegal armed groups (with the AUC) was at this moment the model being put in force in Colombia. The city had absorbed and complemented the national policy of reintegration. By 2007 in the city of Medellín the DDR process had resulted in 4,164 demobilized members of the AUC from which 2,782 were in educational programs and 3,532 were under psychological treatment and 1,825 had been assigned job placement.¹⁴ As part of a new policy of security, an increase of national police was put in place and also 20 new small police stations were created and distributed throughout the city. The city signed 24 *pactos ciudadanos* (citizen pacts) as part of the strategic projects of the city. These pacts created partnerships of community groups, youths and the municipality that permitted the construction or executions of projects in the territories where these communities lived and also their sustainability in the future.

The background of the DDR process begins on June 15, 2003, when the Alto Comisionado para la paz, members of the exploratory commission, and delegates from the Catholic Church met with representatives of the right wing paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The result of that meeting was the initiation of a national DDR process with the AUC that would be put into official practice five months later on November 25 with 850

¹⁴ Informe de calidad de vida 2004 - 2007, Medellín Cómo Vamos (2007,c)

paramilitary members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN, (a branch of the AUC) “giving up their weapons in a publicized ceremony.”¹⁵ The then outgoing mayor of Medellín Luis Pérez Gutiérrez (2001-2003) and the national government made an agreement for the city to be a partner in the peace process. The continuation of the process would then be assumed by the next municipal administration (Fajardo) that entered office three months later on January 1, 2004.

Medellín, by the end of the DDR process in 2007, had 13% of the total national demobilized personnel. See table 1. The new administration made a commitment to reinforce the national DDR process. This reinforcement came in the shape of educational and medical assistance. Education was intended as a tool to incorporate this population into productive activities, since many of the demobilized members lacked even a minimal education necessary to enter the job market. See table 2. Medellín over the next three years became the model of the DDR process for the rest of the country. In the end, with contested and controversial results, Medellín suffered fewer (negative) side effects than other regions that also participated in large-scale demobilizations. For example, the state of Nariño saw increases in violence allegedly caused by demobilized members. (Sapat, 2009). The overall program of DDR in Colombia has become a controversial and politicized project that is far from a complete success story.

Illegal, armed, and paramilitary groups are not a new phenomenon in the conflict history of Colombia. (Bushnell, 1993)¹⁶ Bushnell describes continuous periods of resurgent paramilitary groups back to the years of “La Violencia.” These contemporary paramilitary groups originated with territorial fights between guerrilla groups in Colombia and the new narcotraffic leadership in the late 1980s. This territorial fight between narcotraffic networks and what became known as paramilitary groups is also supported by Bowden (2001) in his narration of the hunt of Pablo Escobar by CIA and Colombian authorities.¹⁷ Bowden links some of the AUC Leadership (Carlos Castaño) as being associated in the beginning with members of the cartel organizations in Colombia.

¹⁵ “On November 25, 2003, television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860 paramilitaries belonging to Medellín’s Cacique Nutibara Bloc (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid down their arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries.” Amnesty International. “Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? | Amnesty International.” Amnesty International | Working to Protect Human Rights. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005> (accessed May 18, 2010).

¹⁶ Bushnell, David. 1993. *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

¹⁷ Bowden, Mark. 2001. *Killing Pablo: the hunt for the world's greatest outlaw*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

To understand the nature of the paramilitary conflict in the city of Medellín it is important to understand that the paramilitary group *Bloque Cacique Nutibara BCN* entered into the DDR process as the result of an amalgamation of a multiplicity of actors and groups. (Alonso and Valencia 2007)¹⁸ They define this process as a complex process of annihilation, negotiation, absorption, domination and contracts between the four lines of the war in Medellín: the *auto defensas*, the narcotraffic, the *bandas* (gangs) and the militia-linked guerrillas.

These illegal armed groups that were and are part of the national conflict had historically used the social capital of youth (youth gangs) in poor neighborhoods in Medellín as a way to supply their armies and control their territories. In 2000 it was estimated that there were around 8,000 youths linked to criminal gangs in Medellín.¹⁹ The total population of Medellín in 2000 was short of 2 million. That is one gang member per 250 inhabitants.

This population of youth gang members would change affiliation from the organized *sicarios* (hitmen or hityouth) of Pablo Escobar (1989-1993) to the *Oficina of Envigado* (1991-present) to the militias of the FARC (1994-2002) to the multiplicity of paramilitary groups that colonized Medellín (1999-2003). National and local armed organizations derived their soldiers from the same source: gang youth in Medellín. Amnesty International (2005) denounced this process of recruiting gangs as operatives of larger political armed groups.²⁰ This also exposes the fragility of the AUC power structure and explains some of the failure of the DDR process in maintaining demobilized members' commitment to the DDR goals.

The use of youth in poor neighborhoods as capital for armed organizations has been documented by many others. This phenomenon of the fragmentation of the illegal arm groups is what Alonso (2008) calls *competencia armada*²¹ and helps to explain some of the failures of AUC-DDR process and also the lack of political control over the nature of the violence in Colombia and in particular in

¹⁸ Manuel Alberto Alonso Espinal, Germán Darío Valencia Agudelo Balance del proceso de Desmovilización, Desarme y Reinserción (DDR) de los bloques Cacique Nutibara y Héroes de Granada en la ciudad de Medellín. Universidad de Antioquia. Instituto de Estudios Políticos ISSN 0121-5167 N° 33, Medellín, July December 2008, 11-34.

¹⁹ Juan Carlos Vélez Rincón, "Conflicto y Guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellín," *Estudios Políticos*, January-June 2001.

²⁰ Amnesty International. "Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization?" Amnesty International. "Amnesty International | Working to Protect Human Rights. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005> (accessed May 18, 2010).

²¹ Romero, Mauricio, and León Valencia 2007. *Parapolítica: la ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos*. Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Intermedio.

Medellín. The single negotiation process missed the roots of the conflict; it did not deal with the fact that individuals aligned with these organizations are prone to change affiliations because their alliances are more economical than political. Their alliances are based on individuals seeing illegal organizations as a way to provide a means of subsistence through the “rent seeking”²² approaches of the political armed organizations. This explains in part why in Medellín members of the AUC continue some of the same rent seeking practices but with new apolitical affiliations. One important element that allowed this fluctuation of new armed organizations within the urban sphere is the lack of state presence and control over the territories where these youth live. This state isolation of these areas from the state facilitated control by repressive means of new groups explained in chapter 2.

Beyond the multiple critiques of the DDR process in Colombia, and the confirmed irregularities of the process, Spagat (2006) concluded that “One key result of this work is that the average demobilization, of which there have been 37 so far, lowers the homicide rate by (a statistically significant) 13% in the area of operation of the demobilized group. A further calculation indicates that between 1400 and 2800 homicides have been averted so far due to the cumulative effect of all completed demobilizations. Thus, paramilitary DDR has paid dividends for Colombia.”²³

Conclusion

In general the DDR process in Medellín was not an isolated event in history. The continuous existence of gangs that affiliate or are absorbed by prevalent illegal armed groups make these areas prone to eruptions of violence in the present and in the future. What is clear is that the majority of the demobilized members inhabit the neighborhoods where the policies and projects were implemented (Comuna 1 ended with 527 demobilized members with 527) See table 4. Thus, these policies and projects are an important factor in the lowering levels of conflict. The pacts that were agreed upon in the beginning of the Fajardo administration resulted in a reduction of conflicts, permitting the development of strategic municipal projects. The reinforcement program that followed the

²² Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity, such as by gaining control of land and other pre-existing natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other government decisions that may affect consumers or businesses.

²³ Spagat, Michael. "COLOMBIA'S PARAMILITARY DDR: QUIET AND TENTATIVE SUCCESS." CERAC Centro de Recursos para el Analisis de Conflictos. 2006. www.cerac.org.co/pdf/UNDP_DDR_V1.pdf (accessed January 13, 2010).

individuals in the DDR process had mixed results, but compared with other areas of the country it appears to have significantly reduced the negative aspects associated with the DDR process in Colombia.

DDR and Amnesty (De-mobilization in Colombia)

	AUC	%	FARK, ELN, others	%
Colombia	31.637		16.238	
Antioquia	8.727	28%		
Medellín	4.320	13%	851	5%

Table 1 National policy on reinsertion. Source: Alcaldia de Medellín.²⁴

Level of Education Achieved	%
Not finished Primaria	14
Primaria	25
Not finished High school	44
High school	14
Technical school	2
College	1

Table 2 Level of education of the participants in the DDR process. Source: Alcaldia de Medellín.²⁵

Modelo de Intervención: Regreso a La Legalidad

Intervention Model: Return to Legality

²⁴ Resumen General Marzo de 2009 Secretaría De Gobierno: Programa Paz Y Reconciliación, Modelo de Intervención "Regreso a La Legalidad," *Reintegración Social Y Económica. Jóvenes En Alto Riesgo Población Carcelaria y Pospensados*. Jorge Gaviria Vélez

²⁵ Ibid Jorge Gaviria Vélez

DDR AUC paramilitares

		%
Ex AUC Total	4316	
Ex AUC active in program	3723	86.3
Detain	189	4.4
Expelled	86	2.0
Dead	258	6.0

Other Process of de-militarization

Desmovilizados (Guerrilla)	851
Jóvenes en Alto Riesgo	1178
Población carcelaria (Internas)	387
Población carcelaria (Internos)	5639
Población Excarcelada y Pospenados	359

Table 3 Medellín: location of demobilized population as of December 2007

Comuna	Bloque Cacique Nutibara	Bloque Héroes de Granada	Others	Total
Comuna 1	176	245	106	527
Comuna 13	21	68	90	179
Comuna 8	99	117	108	324
Comuna 3	97	275	118	490
Comuna 5	8	36	168	212
Comuna 6	46	51	151	248
Comuna 7	0	1	11	12

Table 4 Distribution of Demobilized and Amnesty Individuals per Comuna. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007.

Planning and Decision Making Process for Public Projects: *Presupuesto Participativo PP, (Participative Budget PB)*

A second set of policies important to the implementation of the Medellín transformation was the policy of public budgeting, Fajardo's administration publicized its work as collaboration between the citizens and the administration. The Participative Budget PB was one of the two tools that the administration used to achieve this goal.

The strategies of the PB were first implemented in Brazil in the municipality of Porto Alegre in 1986. This project was widely publicized as a best practice and became popular in many European and Latin American cities. The first PB experience in Medellín was implemented from 1997 to 2000 but some failures of the procedure did not permit their sustainability. In 2004 it was re introduced in Medellín.²⁶ In the context of Colombia, the PB strategy had been introduced in different scales since 1986. At the moment these strategies were implemented in Medellín, the PB had already been implemented in cities like Pasto, Bogota, Caramanta, Risaralda, Tolima and others.²⁷ The introduction of a participative budget in Medellín has had mixed results.

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The PB tried to accomplish the goals of the new development plan of the city: Legality and self regulation of the state, administration transparency and fight against corruption, efficacy and sustainability, social inclusion, integration of the community with the city and democratic governability. The PB is seen as a way to strengthen local democratic organizations such as the Junta de Accion Comuna JAC, Environmentalist groups, NGOs.

²⁶ The PB is an "instrument of annual planning, to help prioritize the demands of the city, providing in theory universal access by the population to the decisions of the city. It is a space of "co-gestión," a term which means the community and the municipality together decide a portion of the investments. PROGRAMA DE PLANEACION Y PRESUPUESTO PARTICIPATIVO 2004-2007. Alcaldia de Medellín

²⁷ Gómez Hernández Esperanza. 2007. *El presupuesto participativo entre democracia, pobreza y desarrollo*. 15: 0121-3261.

Methodology

The PB is implemented in 5 different phases over the period of one year in each comuna. Not all comunas participated in the PB, but rather only those that already had an organizational system like the JAC, such as Comuna 1, 2 and 13.

Phase 1	Participation of the community in the City Development Plan and institution of the PP team	
Phase 2	Systematization of the diagnostic of the territory	
Phase 3	Analysis and diagnostic of the territory (Comunas and Corregimientos). Creation of organizational support	Creation of the Consejos Consultivos Comunales y Corregimentales (CCC-C)
Phase 4	Prioritization and approval of the operational budget for the next year	Democratic elections of delegates.
Phase 5	Evaluation and systematization	

Table 5 Phases of PB Source. Alcaldia de Medellín.

Operational structure

All local organizations (NGOs, churches, minority racial groups, sport teams, etc) that operate in the territory of the Comuna or Corregimiento²⁸ were invited to participate in the PB as part of the Consultive Council CCC-C. This served as a democratic process that prioritized and distributed the funds allowed per year to their comuna or corregimiento. The CCC-C submit their decision to the Municipal council of the participative budget that authorizes the relinquishing of funds through contracts to the organizations that fill the contractual requirements established by law and that are approved by each CCC-C. The budget of the PB was 7% of the city budget. Carolina Gómez (2007) evaluated the process of the PB in Medellín and made conclusions at three levels operational, methodological and political.

²⁸ Corregimiento: is another territorial distribution of the city similar to the comuna. It is a designation on an area outside of the urban areas of the city.

Operational Level

Gomez highlights that in the planning process of the PB the communities could have direct contact with the mayor and that there were a series of methodologies of communication that enabled participation. Gomez (2007) concludes that the most critical aspect was the executions of contracts, because the process necessary to use the funds of the state required the companies to execute the projects with a level of expertise that only benefited companies like NGO's and universities. And also, there were not efficient ways to measure the relative success.²⁹

Methodology

Gomez concludes that the policies created to implement the PB were written by experts and required special technocratic knowledge to understand them. This condition made it possible for the technocrats of the municipal administration to maintain all control over the participative process.³⁰ My interviews in January 2010 reveal that organizations actively participating in the PB have long-term visions and that many PBs had opted to use funds to generate local plans that were guided toward a long-term interventions in the territory.³¹ This then contradicts Gomez's findings.

Political Level

The PB created a consultative space where the community prioritized their needs. This space is different from the ones previously allowed by the state. In general,³² there is a significant correlation between what was agreed in the CCCC with the priorities of their respective comunas. Although Gomez is cautioning that the needs identified in the PBs are quite general like housing, health, education, etc.

²⁹ Success of the projects cannot be measure because the initial conditions were not appropriated measured. The only way to officially measure was through the evaluations of results of the participations of the type of proposals and the distribution of resources of the 7% of the municipal budget of 60.000 millions in 2005 increased to 62.000 in 2006.

³⁰ Gomez concludes that the PB reactivated the Consejo Consultivo de Comunas y Corregimientos (CCC-C) like the efforts of the CEAP, but that the year-long methodology undermined long-term planning. This in turn weakened these institutions.

³¹ Also, even as the influx of budget came in year-long time limits, the allocation of funds seemed also to be recurrent to specific local projects. This undermines Gomez conclusions about the lack of a long term vision.

³² The community interviews conducted by Gomez's showed that 43% of the community investments meet satisfactorily priorities established by the PB.

The Comuna 1 for example used \$570 million pesos of their PB on 110 scholarships for college education. All scholarships are condonable (they are not paid if the student obtains his/her degree) and students have to commit to do 120 hours of community service each semester.³³ Gomez critiques this approach in two ways. One critique is that the technocratic development of the strategies sometimes directs these initiatives to fulfill goals established by the state³⁴ rather than neighborhood goals. (García, Veeduría de Medellín, 2005)³⁵ The second critique is that the PP is fulfilling functions that should be covered by the state, like paying for community planning where 80% of the investment went.

Conclusions

The PB was instrumental in the process of transformation of the city in 3 ways:

The planning instrument of the PB helped to empower those organizations that were working in the community or the political order like JAC, or traditional neighborhood NGOs. Individuals associated with these groups often expressed satisfaction with the PB process, because provide support for the continuation of their organizational goals. These organizations required the economical support of the PB, however, interviewees did not feel this was a major factor in their support for the program. Rather, they support the program because it “has had a lot of influence in the way leaders of the neighborhood interact with each other, leaders and groups that did not like each other now have to work together and this has changed the mentality of the leaders from the closed circle of their action to think in terms of *comuna*. We know and acknowledge each other.”³⁶ This in my opinion is the most important goal achieved by the

³³ CVN Centro Virtual de noticias. "CVN - Gracias al presupuesto participativo, 110 jóvenes de la comuna # 1 podrán financiar sus estudios de educación superior." Untitled Document. <http://www.mineduacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/article-88220.html> (accessed May 18, 2010).

³⁴ This goals of the state are in return ways to comply with the goals imposed by international organizations like the World Bank and others,

³⁵ Veeduría de Medellín. (2005). Entrevista a Orlando García. En: *Programa radial OJO a Nuestra Ciudad*. Julio 8. Medellín. Documento memoria. “inicialmente el presupuesto se fue todo para Educación Técnica y Tecnológica, pero nosotros lo que queríamos era que avanzáramos hacia que esta comunidad también tuviera universitarios en las distintas universidades, tanto públicas como privadas.”

³⁶ Carmona , Juan David . Interview by author. Personal interview. Comuna 13, Medellin, Colombia, January 11, 2010.

program. On the other hand, the complexity of the policy, the technocratic design, and the contracting requirements to access the PB funds makes it virtually impossible for individuals outside of knowledgeable organizations to access the funds on their own, and so the program can not include the entire population of the affected area. From this point of view, it has become a segregation tool.

Banco de los Pobres –A New Finance Strategy

A third set of policies important to the transformation of Medellín is the *Banco de los Pobres*, or the bank of the poor. This is a new banking structure created by the municipality that provides micro credits in marginalized areas of the city and promotes entrepreneurial projects. The goal of this Bank has been to create and strengthen the productive activities of people who are in a lower income bracket.

This project of the Alcaldía de Medellín, was managed through the Social Development Secretary. It seeks to grant alternatives to financing community member projects by means of small credits that can be paid in flexible time frames. This financing provides the generation of income and the improvement of the quality of life of the communities that belong to high vulnerability areas in the municipality of Medellín. The credits assigned by the *Banco de los Pobres* are directed to owners of small businesses or a business district of usually informal economies. To have access to the credits, users must be from lower socio-economic levels (1, 2 or 3) and be residents of Medellín.³⁷

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The Banco de los Pobres has four strategies that, as a whole, work to strengthen microcredit:

- Credit lines
- Center of Business Development of the Zone, CEDEZO (Spanish)
- Microcredit Network
- Seed Capital Contest

³⁷ "This bank program started in 2002 and as of March 2010 has 5,300 credits for a total of 11,400 million pesos (US\$4,222,000) from those credits. Eighty-five percent of the bank's users have never had any other history of credit. The bank calculates that these credits have benefited a population of more than 25,000 people. The credits fluctuate between \$129 to \$1,296 dollars. The project is self sustainable thanks to the annual interest rate of 11% that covers overhead of the bank." Ciudades para un Futuro más Sostenible, Departamento de Urbanística y Ordenación del Territorio, Escuela Técnica Superior de Arquitectura de Madrid -- Universidad Politécnica de Madrid -- Ministerio de Vivienda, 2004

Conclusion

This project is important because it provides financial coverage for populations that not have access to formal credits. One of the large achievements of this *Banco de los Pobres* was that it has been awarded the qualification of good practice in 2004 by the Best Practices Database of the UN-Habitat. But at a close look the achievements of the program at the scale of the neighborhood is not easy to measure, but it is observed that during the urban transformation of neighborhoods that were part of PUI and focus of this study, local business along important corridors of the comunas grew by 300%. This shows an important increase in the number of entrepreneurial companies. But a direct correlation of this influx of new micro business and the flux of small credits is not clear.

Social Urbanism (Urbanismo Social)

Another important policy During the Sergio Fajardo Administration was the creation of a new urban philosophy called; *Urbanismo Social* (Social Urbanism) this term was coined at the Company of Urban Development EDU. This term was appropriated to describe the social implications of the physical interventions that the city was making. It is important because this concept explains the change in the physical investment strategy of the city. The next chapter (4) surveys those physical interventions that are a part of this social urbanism concept thinking.

I examine this concept of “*Urbanismo Social*” or Social Urbanism as applied to the socio-political and urban transformations performed from 2003 to the present in the city of Medellin. Under this umbrella term of social urbanism, I combine the political line that created *Medellín, la ciudad mas educada* with the thinking of other groups and institutions who are not affiliated with this political line but sympathize with its goals. Urbanismo Social is a concept that tries to universalize the learning experiences of the case of Medellín so that it can be exported in terms of its basic principles to other contexts worldwide.

The term Urbanismo Social was coined by Alejandro Echeverry, then Fajardo’s newly appointed Director of the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano, or EDU.³⁸

³⁸ Alejandro Echeverri, architect (Medellín, 1962), graduated in 1987 from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana (UPB) in Medellín (Colombia) and studied from 1998 to 2000 in the Urban Studies Doctoral Program at the Barcelona Advanced Technical School of Architecture (ETSAB). He was a professor at the UPB and director of the UPB Architectural Studies Group, as well as a

Echeverry is a well known Medellín architect who was also politically affiliated with Fajardo and his Independent Party. Echeverry and European-educated urbanist and professor of architecture at the Univesidad Pontifica Bolivariana in Medellín, had lead a research team studying what role architecture should play in the improvement of living conditions in poor neighborhoods. For years, he explored how to use physical forms to improve informal communities and incorporated previous experiences of governmental and NGOs projects in these Medellín communities. To do this he led studios of students who designed projects for these informal communities. These projects were not intended to be built, but rather to create theoretical models to study. His diverse group of researchers, professionals and students came from multiple disciplinary backgrounds. Echeverry,³⁹ sees architecture as a fundamental tool to make transformations at many levels in the city. “In the transformation of the city there are many components and one really important one is the physical one,” he says. “It [the physical component] is not the most important, but it is a really important one. It is a great tool to activate the participation of the community, and to generate places of encounter.”⁴⁰

A core issue in Echeverry’s thinking is the quality of the architecture. This perception of quality and how quality will affect the feelings of the inhabitants where the interventions were to be implemented became a central component of the social urbanism discourse “To us,” said Echeverry in an interview for this study, “the issue of dignity and pride was one of the most important elements of the interventions. Building in the poorest parts of the city with the highest quality and with the best architects was not an issue of secondary importance.”⁴¹

visiting professor in Urban Studies at ETSAB in 1999. His work received recognition in 1996, when he was awarded the Fernando Martínez Sanabria National Architecture Prize in 1996 from the Colombian Architecture Society, the same year in which he won honorable mention at the X Panamerican Biennial Architecture Exhibition in Quito, Ecuador. He has won several national architecture and urban design contests, the last of which is a first place award in the National Contest for the Reorganization of the Aburrá River basin and the Tres Aguas park, in Caldas Antioquia, in 2006. He has been on the jury panels of several national and international contests, including the XVIII National Architecture Biennial of the Colombian Association of Architects in 2002, in the Architectural Design and Urban Design categories. He has spoken at national and international conferences and worked as a private consultant in the fields of architecture, urban design and territorial planning for several Colombian cities. He was Director of Urban Planning for the municipality of Medellín from 2005 to 2007 and General Director of the Enterprise for Urban Development (EDU) of the municipality of Medellín from 2004 to 2005, during the administration of Mayor Sergio Fajardo.

³⁹ Echeverry, Alejandro . Interview by author. Personal interview. Poblado, Medellín, Colombia, January 7, 2010. Translations from Spanish to English are by the author unless otherwise noted.

⁴⁰ Ibid. (Alejandro Echeverry Ex director of the EDU 2004-2007)

⁴¹ Ibid . (Alejandro Echeverry Ex director of the EDU 2004-2007)

In addition, the architecture and urban interventions were seen as a way of democratizing or homogenizing the city through having equitable distribution of public infrastructure, breaching the social gap. “When we review the territory of Medellín, we realize that the territory is segregated in terms of [differing] levels of opportunities provided to the population. In the places where there are the least opportunities, are the populations who are the most marginalized of the city.” (Echeverry, 2010)⁴² This mapping of opportunities, or lack thereof, in the territory became the navigation chart that guided where and how the interventions needed to be implemented.

In emerging literature about this Medellín case,⁴³ “Urbanismo Social” is understood as a philosophical approach to interventions in the city that are aimed at improving the conditions of poor neighborhoods through high quality architecture and urban design that is the result of a bottom-up design strategy. This approach in Medellín represents the first time the community has been involved—in direct collaboration with the government—in the process of decisions making of their environment.

In reality this “Urbanismo Social” is indeed a re-urbanization strategy that intends to deliver a higher quality of architecture and urban interventions to the city in general but particularly to the poorest areas of the city traditionally abandoned by the state. While citizens are involved, and there are many levels of participation in the Urbanismo Social, it is far removed from the idea of a bottom-up approach as might be defined in wealthier countries with high levels of community participation as part of the planning process. The *Urbanismo Social* is still a “top down” design approach, performed by the educated elites guided toward the poor. Nevertheless, this process, in the context of the city of Medellín is radical. It is radical in the sense that the government is working directly and intensely with residents of poor communities building public infrastructure with a higher level of quality than the state has ever done before.

⁴² Juan Diego Lopera, Sub director departamento de Planeación Medellín. Lopera, Juan Diego . Interview by author. Personal interview. Alcaldía de Medellín, Medellín, Colombia, January 7, 2010.

⁴³ Gérard Martin , and Diego Corrales. "Urbanismo Social." In *Medellín: transformación de una ciudad*. Medellín: Alcaldía de Medellín., 2009. 106.

Selection of the Interventions: Índice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH) Índice de Calidad de Vida (ICV)

Social Urbanism intends to distribute homogeneous opportunities throughout the geography on the city in terms of equal access to the city public infrastructure. To understand which areas in which the city was required to invest to achieve this homogenous city infrastructure, the city needed an index to evaluate levels of equity in the territory.

In an *Acuerdo*⁴⁴ enacted May 31, 2004, the Consejo de Medellín adopted the Development plan for the 2004-2007 period which declared that it would use two measures to verify whether proposed project initiatives were improving the quality of life of the citizens: The Índice de Calidad de Vida ICV (quality-of-life index) and Índice de Desarrollo Humano IDH (Human Development Index).

This *Acuerdo* established that when these indicators are mapped over the territory of the city, the city resources should be geared toward the areas with lower IDH and ICV, to maximize their impact. In other words, priority should be given to those areas with the lowest indicators to obtain larger marginal benefits. This statement gave *cart blanc* to the mayor's office to intervene in those areas of the city where the state had never intervened before. This radically changed the investment pattern that the city had followed for decades.⁴⁵

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Gomez (2007) critiques the process of use the IHD and ICV as instrumental figures to decide and evaluate the success of the strategies implemented by the administration.⁴⁶ She concludes that there are significant limitations in using these techniques to evaluate the actual success or failure of the administration, given the fact that the surveys' measurements are performed in areas where

⁴⁴ An *Acuerdo* is a law at the Municipal level.

⁴⁵ See chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of the history of state involvement in these parts of Medellín and its surrounding municipalities since the city's foundation.

⁴⁶ Lo que se logra inferir es que el gobierno municipal sustenta su gestión en indicadores universales, como el IDH y el ICV, y de datos del Departamento Nacional de Planeación-DNP, que son aplicados en la encuesta de calidad de vida, y retoman las recomendaciones del programa MECOVI del BID, del Banco Mundial, la CEPAL y el DNP para medir educación, salud, vivienda, medio ambiente, servicios públicos, etc., mediante una encuesta de percepción ciudadana con individuos de diversos estratos sociales, con la cual no se logra saber qué ha pasado en las personas en situación de desplazamiento, los sin vivienda, sin empleo, sin acceso a salud pública, etc., porque las informaciones del gobierno son en términos de gestión, mas no de evaluación comparativa con la situación inicial.

there are economically heterogeneous groups. These surveys hide the opinions of those who are more marginalized.




Figure 3 ICV and IDG 2002 Medellín. Lighter colors represent less quality of the indicator measure in both diagrams. Comunas 1 and 2 appear to have the lowest level in terms of these indicators of quality. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín.

This measuring strategy has been instrumental in bringing larger resources of the state to areas neglected for decades; but it has its limitations. These limitations include the one that Gomez argues above as well as others I have encountered in my own research. The measurements of the territory are made at a Comuna scale and not in terms of smaller neighborhood divisions. Therefore, the measurement favors more economically homogenous comunas like 1 and 2 that only had lower estratos 1 and 2,⁴⁷ but in areas with a more heterogeneous estratos like the comuna 13, where you can find up to estrato 4 (upper middle class), this disparity cancels the actual measure. This makes difficult to assess the effectiveness of the projects implemented and also hides

⁴⁷ Estratos: Socio economic strata: is a tool of the Colombian government (Ley 142 de 1994, Artículo 102) to classify real estate properties in accordance with the classification of the DANE that evaluate the real estate unit based on poverty level, public services, location, indigenous population and others. This classification determines the level of taxation, the fare of public services (water, energy, phone and gas), access to the free health services, fares at public universities, poverty alleviation programs etc. In most cases estratos 1 and 2 get service subsidies from the upper estratos 4, 5 and 6.

the actual lack quality of life in communities with mixed incomes levels (estratos). This contradiction in the measurement is acknowledged in my interviews with individuals in the City of Medellín Planning Department.

The limitation of the scale of measurement of the Indexes also justifies why the city intervenes more strongly in the comunas 1 and 2 than in other areas like comuna 13 because these comunas (1 and 2) being at the bottom of all indexes and homogeneous in their composition the mayor office can show more clearly measure the improvement. In the end, this has meant that the PUI of the comuna 13 (a more diverse and politically sensitive area) is still being executed and planned, making in my opinion the projects implemented there less effective.

Conclusion

The instrument of the IHD and ICV has been important in directing where the intervention of the city needs to be placed. But it has limitations in mapping the real situation of the territory. Besides the flaws in survey techniques that other authors have highlighted, the scale of the measurement generalizes heterogeneous territories and thus hides valuable information. I concluded that it is necessary to find tools of measurement that account for simultaneous and diverse scales that could produce a clearer image of the actual state of the territory. The scale of the neighborhood could provide a more accurate measure, but other scales should also be evaluated and contrasted with each other.

Also, this kind of territorial measuring tool hides interactions at the borders of the neighborhood polygons and the overspill effects of the interventions in adjacent areas. It is indifferent then whether the strategic infrastructure is placed on the border of regions or in the polygon's center. The inability of the current indexes to measure these nuances, in my opinion, has permitted the placement of some infrastructure (like the case of the Parque Bibliotecas San Javier in Comuna 13) in areas that are better off than the rest of the neighborhood. While this intervention of a Parque Biblioteca provided much-needed resources to the area, it is important to point out that it was not built in the areas with absolute lack of state services where the project would have had a larger positive impact.

EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellín (ENTERPRISE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT -EDU-)

Once the areas of the city where infrastructure was needed were selected, the Mayor's office needed an institution to plan and execute the infrastructure projects. For this task the city of Medellín selected an already existing entity that had a bad reputation (because its institutional independence had permitted corruption) but that had the necessary institutional independence to be able to negotiate with the multiplicity of actors, groups, companies and institutions that needed to make projects on the selected territory. This entity was the *EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellín* (Enterprise of Urban Development - EDU).

The EDU was created originally in 1993 to develop a parcel of land remaining from a failed urban renewal project in downtown Medellín. Modified in 1995, the ENTERPRISE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (EDU) the city endowed it with administrative and financial autonomy and with its own assets to undertake development of urban and real estate projects "for the improvement of the city of Medellín and the welfare of its citizens."⁴⁸

This kind of institutional autonomy is similar to the one applied to other successful companies owned by the municipality, the EPM, which is the 7th most profitable company in Colombia and has the 2nd largest number of assets in the country. This permits the companies to compete for the profits of the market and benefits from the support of the municipality as a partner. In return, profits from these companies get reinvested in the company or enter into the budget of the municipality.

At the moment Sergio Fajardo became mayor of Medellín, the EDU institutional autonomy became a perfect instrument to make possible the intense urban transformation he and his team intended. A large percentage of the administrative positions at the EDU are filled by academics from the architectural schools of Medellín, especially the private architecture school the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, and members of the research team lead by Alejandro Echeverría. The decision to use the EDU (which before Fajardo was considered a beacon of corruption) as a vehicle for the Mayor's policies was

⁴⁸ EDU. "Origen." EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellín . www.edu.gov.co/ (accessed February 4, 2010).

made because the agency had contractual autonomy. This contractual autonomy permitted the company to be exempt of many bureaucratic restrictions that the *departments* and *secretarias* of the municipality have. And the ability of the Mayor to appoint his director and personnel gave this office the necessary communication mechanism and the ability to maintain the necessary control over it. This move in turn would reduce bureaucracy and decrease planning and development time of the projects.

The objectives of the EDU are:

- Develop and Execute Integral Urban Projects, strategic for the realization of the Development Municipal Plan (POT).
- To carry out the articulation of the different sectors and the inter-institutional coordination.
- Promote the participation of the private sector in real estate projects.
- Promote citizen participation.
- To be an efficient, effective transparent and profitable company.

This strategic move created an autonomous company with the power and academic knowledge of decades of research of its new directors and administrative staff to transform the city. Today the EDU has more than 400 employees in 14 different locations all over Medellín. The EDU is in charge of developing all projects of the city included the integral urban project (PUI). The next chapter focuses on each one of the projects developed by the EDU that have relevance for this study because they were implemented in the most marginalized and violent areas of the city.

Inside the EDU works very similar to an architectural company, because most of its employees (70% approximate) and administrators are in fact architects, designing and administrating the construction of a multiplicity of projects. The other group of professionals at the EDU—lawyers, social workers and engineers—are a minority. This reflects the power relationships involved in the inner-workings of the EDU company. The architectural discourse and jargon (more in favor of the object than the social or legal) dominate the communications with the public. Frequently these EDU architects use the English word “render” to talk about computer generated three-dimensional images.

From the policies reviewed, I concluded that the DDR, even as a failed project contributed to the lower homicide rate in Medellín and opened the door to a series of projects and polices implemented during the Fajardo administration.

Chapter 3

The new tools to measure the needs of the city (the ECV and the ICH) engaged with the mission of the Fajardo political party to invest in infrastructure in the city's poorest communities and the reinforcement. The independent company of the EDU made it possible for the Mayor's office to implement these projects by being able to bypass many bureaucratic procedures that a state entity would have had to wade through.

“Medellín, la ciudad más educada” Physical Transformations

Along with the policies described in the previous chapter a fundamental strategy of the Sergio Fajardo administration was the use of physical projects to transform—socially and physically—the city. This chapter describes the projects most relevant for this study that were undertaken between 2004 and 2007. These projects, planned and executed by Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano EDU (Enterprise of Urban Development), are described below:

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1. **Parques Bibliotecas (Library Parks)** represent every goal that the program of *Medellín, la ciudad mas educada* was trying to achieve. They became the flagships of the Mayoral campaign’s intervention.
2. **Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools)** and the relocation or renovation of schools reveal this campaign’s new approach to educational facilities’ quality in terms of design, building materials, and location.
3. **Centro de Atención Inmediata CAI (Center of Immediate Attention CAI)** are police centers which exemplify the new approach to security, a project which was actually the rebirth of an old but previously failed idea.
4. **The CEDEZOs Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal Local (Centers for Enterprise Development)** are a non aggressive presence of the state in the informal settlement territory.
5. **Proyecto Urbano Integral PUI (Integral Urban Project)**, large-scale integrated urban projects (PUI) in the city’s most marginalized areas, is the most important physical interventions in the case of Medellín.

Parques Bibliotecas PBs (Library Parks)

The Parques Bibliotecas (PB) projects became the flagship for Sergio Fajardo's campaign. They represented every goal that the program of "*Medellín, la ciudad mas educada*" was trying to achieve—physical interventions in the most poor communities with the best standards that the city can produce—providing educational services to the community free of cost and revitalizing newly created public space.

What are the Parques Bibliotecas? These are not your average libraries. The 5 Parques Bibliotecas are state-of-the-art spaces with internet rooms, reading lounges, theaters, and outdoor open plazas with 360° views of the Andes mountains encircling the city down below. They have been built in communities that for as long as forty years had been isolated from educational resources. Now, they are where community learns, socializes and finds moments of quiet peace. They are a spaces open to everybody.

The Parques Bibliotecas are buildings that contain a small collection of books and that operate as community centers that provide space and activities 365 days of the year and over extended hours. These services are targeted to all age brackets; most of the educational services are geared toward providing spaces and activities to fill after-school time for the grade-school population, and to provide entertainment and training and community space for the rest of the population. Each parque biblioteca is visited by a staggering 1,500-2,000 people per day. The parques are also hubs to deploy multiple programs of the different *Secretarias*¹ of the municipal administration. The installations of the Parques are used by the community, but also by the city in general as a network for events at the city level. For example, the BID (International Development Bank) convention in 2009 that included visitors such as the former U.S. President Bill Clinton, was held in all of the 5 parques bibliotecas. The city has a plan to build 5 more parques bibliotecas; 3 of them start construction in 2010.

The 5 Parques Bibliotecas used 5 percent (186,000 million Colombian pesos or \$93 million U.S. dollars) of the 5-billion pesos investment budget of the city and were designed through a public competition among some of the most renowned architects of the city and country. This assured a level of quality of the design that has not been seen ever in these communities. The Parque Biblioteca España, designed by the architect Giancarlo Mazzanti, won the 2008

¹ A *Secretaria* is a department branch of the Municipality. The Medellin Mayor's office has 10 *Secretarias* and 1 Department.

Iberoamerican Architecture Biennial award.² This award in a way confirms the Mayor's claims that these buildings were the best buildings that the city could produce.

Upfitting funding for the *parques bibliotecas* came from different sources like the Japanese government for the Belen *parque biblioteca* and the Crown of Spain for the library in Santo Domingo. In the latter case, Spain sent the King and Queen of Spain to the inaugural day and naming of the library. This was the first time the Royal Crown—in the entire history of colonization—had ever travelled to Colombia. They climbed the hills of Comuna 1 and 2 (historically the most dangerous neighborhood in what had been the world's most dangerous city) in the recently opened Metro Cable. This involved 400 men from the Spain Secret Service and the re-routing of all metro trains in the metropolitan area. In the interviews for this study, a community member remembered this day as "when the King and Queen came here . . . and they did not really come to Medellín, they came here to Santo Domingo."³ Other libraries received equipment donated from large private companies in Medellín.



Figure 1 Parque Biblioteca España, park at the entrance of the library source: Jota Samper

All libraries are administrated by the network of *Cajas de Compensacion Familiar*, or FAMILY COMPENSATION FUNDS, a Colombian type of government-regulated NGO. A Caja de Compensacion is a nonprofit company whose objective is social disparity reduction through the redistribution of a percentage of the income of all employees of the country. A *caja de compensacion* receives a percentage of all employee incomes, and with that pool of money provides public services that include healthcare, education, cultural programming, housing, recreation, social loans, and job training. Over the Colombian territory there are multiple *Cajas de compensacion* that compete with each other for employers and employees subscriptions. All Colombian employees need by law to subscribe to a Caja de Compensacion. The *cajas* grew out of partnerships between the labor unions of the industrial companies in Medellín in the 1950's and the local and then later national governments. The first *Caja* was COMFAMA. The success of the project extended to the entire Colombian territory.

² Broome, Beth. "Parque Biblioteca España | Project Portfolio | Architectural Record." Architecture Design for Architects | Architectural Record. <http://archrecord.construction.com/projects/portfolio/archives/0811parque-1.asp> (accessed May 1, 2010).

³ The social contradictions of this type of cultural re-conquest or at least imperialism of the Spanish Crown in this visit to one of its long lost colonies are a worthy subject of a larger discussion that is absent from this study.

This decision regarding what mechanism would be the most efficient to manage the *Parques Bibliotecas* made sense given that the *Cajas de Compensación* already provided most of these services to the income bracket where the areas of the PB were located. The *Cajas* already operated in areas where there had never before been a permanent presence of the state or the legal security services. COMFAMA staff had negotiated with community and local armed groups. This allowed them, over the years, to build facilities and create important community alliances and to gain the expertise and the trust of both the municipality and the communities where the *Parques Bibliotecas* were placed. The PBs are different from the facilities managed and owned by the *Cajas de Compensación*, where services are provided for charge or subsidized based on worker's affiliation. *The Parques Bibliotecas* offered for the first time the opportunity to access services of education, internet and recreation without any cost and without restrictions given to one's economic status. Being able to access, for the first time in their life, training on how to use and then actually use a computer, without being judged for their economic background, is a recurrent theme in my on-the-ground interviews. Unemployment rates in Comuna 1 and 2 reach as high as 60 percent and main sources of employment are informal. This makes the majority of the population ineligible to be affiliated with *cajas de compensación* because they do not have formal employment. The introduction of a state-funded public building like a Parque Biblioteca, specifically in the area of study (Comuna 1 and 2) that provides access to the entire community without cost, generates the necessary space for encounter and deliberation and decision making about the collective. Also the negotiation process between the government and different community groups regarding the building of this PB in these Comunas (the Mesa de Trabajo Unidos por Santo Domingo, Asociación de Comerciantes y el Comité Visión Nororiental) "had empowered such groups"⁴ Restrepo et al. (2007) and positioned them as valid and legal organizations in the neighborhood territory with sufficient power to leverage municipal interest. In reality, this leverage is more a perception than a real equivalence of power between the community (represented by local organizations) and the municipal state (represented here by the EDU) in the Integrated Urban Project PUI. But it is important to understand that a negotiation process about the modification of the physical space in this comuna




Figure 2 Five Parques Bibliotecas: Ladera, Spain, Madera, Belen and San Javier. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin.

⁴ Restrepo, Eliana. *Thesis Parque Biblioteca España, Como Aporte Al Desarrollo Local*. Medellín: Institución Universitaria Colegio Mayor De Antioquia, 2007.

is happening for the first time through these interactions.⁵ This negotiation and agreement process between the state and the community became the document the *Pacto Ciudadano* (Citizen Pact) where negotiations about the naming and initial contents of the libraries were decided.

The Parques Bibliotecas also replaced existing obsolete and historically repressive infrastructure, like in the case of the Parque Biblioteca Belen and Parque Biblioteca Ladera where the DAS (the Colombian equivalent of the U.S. FBI) jailed political prisoners was replaced by Parque Bibliotecas. In Madera and San Javier, the Parques Bibliotecas were placed in empty lots where before gangs had occupied the spaces for illicit activities in the neighborhoods. The Parque Biblioteca España in Santo Domingo, by contrast, displaced up to 50 families from a high-risk area next to a creek. This area is high risk because of the danger of rain-induced landslides. The city had to find a place for the relocation of these families. This process generated controversy and the Citizen Pacts here were also instrumental in the final placement of the infrastructure and relocating the families.

Each park generates its own zone of influence where an increased perception of safety is generated. It also gave clear use to contested spaces that lacked real security and were used for illicit practices. Today, before entering the Parque Biblioteca España, the public needs to cross a small park with a fountain. This area is recalled in my interviews with community members of the Comuna 2 as the place where dead bodies appeared and killings were committed. "There was so much violence in this neighborhood, there was so much death, that place there," said one community member, pointing at the park where kids were playing, "that was a dangerous hole. If this park could speak, it would say so many terrible things."⁶

⁵ Historically only wealthy neighborhood have been able to leverage power over project decisions in their territory. In 1996, the Poblado (comuna 14) neighborhood stopped a new road infrastructural project. Proyecto Transversal Intermedia.

⁶ Marin de Mesa, Luz Elena. Interview by author. Personal interview. Santo Domingo Savio, Medellin, Colombia, July 21, 2009.




Figure 3 Park in front of Parque Biblioteca Espana 2008. Source: Hector Javier Cruz

Finally, new policies and programs of the municipality were and continue to be launched from these *Parques Bibliotecas* because of their strategic placement inside the communities. Programs at national and local scales are run out of the offices inside the *Parques Bibliotecas*, such as the *Familias En Accion*, economic and social subsidies for low-income families at a national level and a similar local subsidies programs like *Medellín Solidaria*. This association between these beneficial programs of the municipality with the physical structure of the buildings formalized a new positive relationship between the state and the marginalized communities.

Conclusions

- The *parques bibliotecas* became an extension of the power of the state in the areas where the state has never before had a permanent presence. Even more importantly, this new permanent presence is non-aggressive and non-repressive.
- The quality and city image that these buildings create made them ideal places to hold important events at city scale like the BID (International Development Bank) conference. These events incorporate these

marginalized territories into the productive activities of the city. In this way, these areas are recognized as vital to the wellbeing of the city in general.

- The Parques Bibliotecas have replaced some of the negative areas in terms of violence or repression (by the state and illegal groups) with non-aggressive, inclusive public spaces and buildings.
- The Parques Bibliotecas are seen as safe spaces vitalized by the constant influx of people thanks to programs that happen in them during extended hours. These PBs maintain an active street and public space around them.
- The *parques bibliotecas* as a physical space benefits the community through the implementation of its (physical) space, programs and policies of the state, which in turn, become an extension of programs that legitimize the authority of the state in the neighborhood.




Figure 4 Location Parques Bibliotecas overlaid on the ICV index. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools) and reformed schools

The Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools) and the relocation or renovation of schools reveal the Sergio Fajardo mayor campaign's new approach to educational facilities' quality in terms of design, building materials, and location. This section describes the physical transformations of the traditional physical structures of education and their new approach to quality of design. Two of the most important examples of this approach were the new type of large-scale

schools distributed throughout the city territory and the renovations of 141 existing schools to comply with new state standards of quality of education.

The Quality Schools were ten new schools built throughout the city with funding from the service company EPM (energy, sewer, water, gas, phone, cable) which is owned by the municipality. They are large educational facilities that overshadowed in scale and design any of the existing public educational facilities of the city. They set a new standard to which all existing public schools would need to be upgraded to meet. In Colombia, public education usually is located in and teaches members of poor communities. This new standard of public education represented the first step in positioning public education at the same level than private schools (which target families with medium and high incomes).



Figure 5 Quality School San Antonio de Prado. Source: EDU

In 2005, the Empresas Públicas de Medellín (Public Businesses of Medellín),⁷ was celebrating its 50th year of existence. The company offered Mayor Fajardo

⁷ Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) is a Colombian company that provides public services such as water and gas. It was founded in 1955 and is the property of Medellín itself. It is the largest

the possibility of making a gift to the city. The Mayor decided to use the funds to create 10 new large schools in the city. Placement of these schools was again based on the ICV and IDH indexes. The 10 Colegios de Calidad were the first new public built schools in the city in 20 years. The scale of the schools was also larger than previous facilities in the city. Ten schools is not a high percentage of all public owned schools of the city. What is important about the introduction of these new facilities is that they are a new way of understanding how the quality of the education facilities should be measured and why.



Figure 6 Colegio de Calidad Comuna 1. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

Architects for these 10 schools were selected by the Mayor himself. Fajardo's father was an architect and many of Fajardo's colleagues from his university and professional life were architects. Fajardo asked the architects up front to only charge for the schematic design fees. The Mayor later gave the EDU the task of completing the design and administration of the construction of the projects.

public service company of its kind in Colombia. Also, it is the Colombian company with the 7th highest income, receiving 3,05 billions of COP. It also is the company with the second highest assets, after Ecopetrol. Source: Empresas, Supersociedades, Supervalores y Cámaras de Comercio.




Figure 7 Location Colegios de Calidad over ICV index, Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

141 Reformed Schools

The Mayor's office also included a campaign to revamp 141 existing schools, the ones that were the most dated in the city. This involved interventions at various dimensions. Most of the schools were located in the poorest areas of the city. Many of the schools by that point required maintenance or complete reconstruction. The public schools system in Medellín, for many years, had been neglected.



Figure 8 Before-and-after picture of reform school at Sergio Fajardo Conference in Boston, MA 2008. Source: Sergio Fajardo Medellín del miedo a la esperanza.

These schools fill two basic categories of neglect. (1) Schools that were from the start placed in facilities inadequate for the purpose of education, especially of

children. Such schools had been originally placed in buildings that before had been homes built by informal community members inside the informal settlements (2) Also complicating the problems of public schools in Medellín was the fact that these schools had not been maintained for long periods of time because the city did not invest the resources in them.⁸

These two types of projects changed the way the spaces for public education were understood in the city of Medellín. The interest in the quality and appearance of the school made them undistinguishable from private education facilities and in some cases even superior.




Figure 9 Location of 143 reformed Schools over the ICV index. Source: Alcaldia de Medellín

Centro de Atención Inmediata CAI (New Police Stations: Center of Immediate Attention CAI)



Figure 10 Small Police station CAI
Source: Policía Nacional

The Fajardo administration also implemented many security strategies. The Center of Immediate Attention CAI (Center of Immediate Attention CAI) is a decentralized police unit, intended to maintain continuous police contact with the community. The CAI main goal is preventing criminality and to supply

⁸ I personally went to a school that is an example of the state's lack of interest in the quality of public school facilities. My school was sold to a private company and then the public school was moved to a smaller and improvised building where it is still located.

security services and a pacific coexistence by providing efficient and timely resources of the National Police by having police forces inside the community instead of outside of it. A special quality of these small new buildings is that most of the CAIs were placed in neighborhoods based on the requests of the community. The community needed apply to have the station placed in their neighborhood. Thus, this is not an imposed (state or otherwise) security measure, but instead one that the community requests.

This idea of the CAI is a Colombian police strategy that began in the 1990s and which communities embraced during the first years of its implementation. The program added new units in all major Colombian cities. By 1992 the war against the leaders of the narcotraffic organizations had changed this situation; the war against the cartels had made the national police to be the actual target. Pablo Escobar offered a monetary reward for each policeman killed, paying as much as 2 million pesos (\$1,000 U.S. dollars per policeman). The decentralization of the CAIs made them an easy and static target. Drive-by shootings and bomb attacks made the CAI's very insecure locations, for police and citizens alike. By the end of 1992, many CAI's had been officially abandoned "because they did not offer security to the officer in them,"⁹ according to an official statement of the Colombian national police.



Figure 11 Small Police station CAI. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

⁹ *El Tiempo*. "Antioquia: Otros 3 Atentados Dinamiteros." *El Tiempo.com* Archivo. www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-238387 (accessed February 3, 2010).

Twelve years later, by 2004, the Colombian situation had changed again. The war against the drug cartels—as seen in the early 1990s— was over. The police were not necessarily the target of terrorist attacks. The CAIs again were seen as a good strategy to distribute a desired police force over the territory. The Fajardo administration supported this plan of increased police security and many of the new CAI occupied the abandoned infrastructures of the 1990s. A series of new ones, especially in the areas where there never had been a permanent presence of police force were constructed. These new or renovated ones have a surface area of 30 square meters and are built in reinforced concrete and with bulletproof windows and doors. These new security additions to the buildings were made to prevent the failures of the past. Each CAI cost 110 million pesos (\$55,000 U.S. dollars). In total, Medellín invested 120,000 million pesos (\$60 million U.S. dollars) in security infrastructure between 2004 and 2007.¹⁰ This is a significant cost but it is important to place this in context: this investment in police forces is still 30 million U.S. dollars less than this administration spent building the Parques Bibliotecas. In the end, they built 14 new small police stations and renovated 2 police stations.

These new police stations provided security where it was needed and required by the community, eliminating the negative aspects of a repressive institution that the police can represent in marginalized and informal areas. They are a permanent presence of the security legal forces that claim the space of the neighborhood and made it more difficult for the illegal armed groups to contest their authority. The actual efficiency of this model of security requires further study, but its value, in my view, resides in its (at least attempt at) non-repressive presence in the neighborhoods




Figure 12 New police CAI and police stations over the ICV index. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

¹⁰ *Del Miedo a la Esperanza*, Alcaldía de Medellín 2004 /2007 pag 60

CEDEZOs Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal

(Local Centers for Enterprise Development)

The structure that represented the Fajardo administration's physical economic support policies was the CEDEZOs. These new buildings were conceived as physical spaces in the comunas to promote the development of small and new enterprises in these areas. Fransico Noguera (2008) explained that, "In essence, a *CEDEZO* is the place where business ideas turn into successful micro enterprises and SMEs." *CEDEZOs* are located alongside the Public Libraries in the poorest neighborhoods, hosting a microfinance initiative called *Red de Microcredito* (The Microcredit Network), which is comprised of the government-funded *Banco de las Oportunidades* (Opportunity Bank), as well as another fourteen private microfinance institutions. The Microcredit Network allows each entrepreneur to be directed to the institution(s) that can best serve them, according to his or her particular needs, credit history and previous experience.



Figure 13 CEDEZO comun 13
Source: EDU



Figure 14 CEDEZO Santo Domingo comuna 1. Source: EDU



Figure 15 CEDEZO Santo Domingo comuna 1. Source: EDU

On a regular basis, *CEDEZO* staff will invite the citizens from their area of influence to attend *Credit Fairs*, which are meant to offer information about the financial and non-financial services offered by the different members of the Microfinance Network. This associative and client-centered approach allows the microfinance industry to work in a coordinated manner; the entrepreneurs benefit from having different alternatives available at a single location and are thus able to make better choices regarding their needs for financial and mentoring services.

Besides providing access to credit through the Network, *CEDEZOs* promote Medellín's entrepreneurial culture through a larger number of innovative initiatives. *CEDEZO* staff, alongside participating NGOs, is available to help citizens to complete a business plan. New entrepreneurs also receive special attention and mentoring to incubate their business ideas in a physical space provided by *CEDEZOs*, until they become ready to take the next step and become independent.¹¹

The entrepreneurial component of the *CEDEZOs* has proven to be important in distributing the policies of the municipality in terms of credit and support to small companies, providing venues to improve income conditions of the majority of informal companies that exist in these areas. But a fundamental achievement of the *CEDEZOs* that is not expressed by the municipal administration advertisement is that the *CEDEZO's* buildings are property of the Mayor's Office and thus a micro-Mayor-office. The centers become extensions of the power of the state in these areas where the state has never been before. Even more importantly, this new permanent presence is not only non-aggressive or non-repressive, just as in the case of the Parques Bibliotecas, the *CEDEZOs* also comprise some of the benefits provided by the state for the marginalized communities. This provision of services legitimizes the authority of the state. Also like the Parques Bibliotecas, the *CEDEZOs* and the security forces around them, provide new secured spaces controlled by the state. In my opinion the only short coming is that contrary to the Parques Bibliotecas, the *CEDEZOs*, like many financial buildings only provide services during limited business hours and not the extended services that keep the street active. So their contribution is that they provide immediate access to those credit services of the state and a perception of the extended presence of the state.



Figure 16 CEDEZO comuna 13 Source: EDU

¹¹ Noguera, Fransisco . "Medellin's Promising Transformation: "Cultura E" (as in Entrepreneurship) | Blog | NextBillion.net | Development through Enterprise." NextBillion.net | Development through Enterprise. <http://www.nextbillion.net/blog/medellins-promising-transformation-cultura-e-as-in-entrepreneurs> (accessed April 19, 2010).




Figure 17 New CEDEZOs over the ICV index. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

Proyecto Urbano Integral PUI (Integral Urban Project PUI)

Beyond individual projects, large-scale, integrated urban projects (PUI) were also undertaken. These in my opinion are the most important contribution of the physical structures of the Medellín case. This type of PUI projects bring together all the different initiatives that have been explained in the last two chapters (policies and physical projects) and applied them in a short period of time (two years) throughout the most marginalized areas of the city. The PUI are in my opinion the most important strategies that can be implemented from the Medellín case to other contexts. The PUI are large urban projects that involve multiple community, state and private partnerships in the poorest areas of the city. All of those independent initiatives, like the parques bibliotecas, the CEDEZOs and the new and renovated schools, all became components of the larger urban project that was the PUI.

The PUI is a physical urban project strategy in the most marginalized areas of the city. These areas needed large infrastructure investments to incorporate them into the city's productive activities.

Two particular territories of the city were most affected by this type of project: Comuna 1 and 2 and Comuna 13. The impact of such projects is larger here because these areas were the least developed in terms of government services

and programs implemented in the last 40 years. These areas were developed by and large informally, which began a community within a condition of abandonment and poverty of informal settlements. Besides being the least served, these areas were considered the most dangerous and violent in a city considered the most violent and dangerous in the country. These two conditions (poorest and less-served) epitomized in the city territory many of the issues of the National Colombian conflict. These PUI were and still continue being implemented by the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano EDU (Enterprise of Urban Development).

Previous experiences

The EDU based this new approach to intervention in marginalized areas is called Proyecto Urbano Integrado (PUI) on three basic previous experiences. One of them was an international project called the Favela-Barrio (The Slum Neighborhood Program) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The other two are Colombian: the Programa de Desmarginalización (De-marginalization Program) in Bogotá and the PRIMED (Program of integral improvement of subnormal neighborhoods in Medellín), a NGO project in Medellín supported by the German government.

Favela-Bairro (The Slum Neighborhood Program) is a Strategic Plan for Rio de Janeiro, promoted by the Municipal Housing Secretary promoted in 1993 as part of the city housing policy. It began urban improvements to urban infrastructure and the creation and access provision to urban facilities, involving around 253,000 residents in 73 communities. “The objectives intended to generate social benefits that consecutively could contribute to the integration of the favela (a term used in Brazil when referring to shantytowns) into the urban fabric and convert it into a regular neighborhood. In 1995, the International Development Bank (IDB) provided part of the financial resources.” (Blanco, Kobayashi, 2009, 12)

The experiences learned from the Favela-Barrio program were transferred to the PUI. Today the experiences learned from the PUI are being re-introduced to Brazil through the support exchanges of the EDU and diverse planning departments in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. This could generate a circular *retroalimentacion* or “retrofeed.”

¹² Carolina BLANCO; Hidetsugu KOBAYASHI. 2009. Urban Transformation In Slum Districts Through Public Space Generation And Cable Transportation At Northeastern Area: Medellín, Colombia.

Programa de Desmarginalización (De-marginalization Program). Bogotá, Colombia is a program and operated from 1998 to 2001, with the objective to solve problems of marginality in the city of Bogotá. The program tried to solve problems of physical infrastructure and the social sector of the inhabitants with the lower income. The project was developed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano (IDU), members of the Bogotá Mayor's Office and the community members. The IDU selected the areas to intervene in and the type of intervention: water, sewer, roads, parks, schools, hospitals. Followed by social programs designed to enforce community participation, which included collection of funds from the *Juntas de Accion Comunal* JACs of the 25 neighborhoods. (IDU, 2006).

The EDU approach to participation techniques and inclusion of JACs and other local actors local is model on the IDU program.

Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Bairros Subnormales en Medellín PRIMED (Program of integral improvement of subnormal neighborhoods Medellín) was instituted in 1993 by the city of Medellín in cooperation with Germany government (Ministry of Finances with the support of the KFW bank group) to create the PRIMED. PRIMED's objective was to deal with issues of illegal tenancy and with informal construction in areas of high risk, unemployment, school desertion, low quality of housing, lack of public services, hygiene, violence and insecurity, collective space and to improve on the lack of trust to governmental institutions. Funding for this project was proved by the Nation, Department along with the Program of the United Nations for Development (PUND)¹³

The PRIMED intervened in (built or renovated) 9,400 housing units in comunas 4,6,9, and 13, benefiting 11,000 families. This project initiated one of the first participative methodologies in the city and "gave the state recognition that came from the respect that the citizens felt that the needs were heard and that solutions were dealt between the state and community that resulted in an increased quality of life of these areas." (Consejería Presidencial para Medellín, 1993). Blanco, Kobayashi (2009) pointed out that this was one of the first programs with an integral approach to face the reality of the informal urban sectors in Medellín. The program was awarded "Best Practices" at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements held in Istanbul, Turkey. In 1996 the project, according to Blanco, marked a remarkable antecedent in the country, especially because it was not limited to the physical component of upgrading,

¹³ The coordination of the project was done by the corporation Corporación de Vivienda y Desarrollo Social del Municipio de Medellín (CORVIDE), a mixed (public and Private) NGO.

but included a complete social perspective that included training and community building strategies.

The PRIMED had an interdisciplinary approach that combined multiple state local organizations and also academic support from the local universities.¹⁴ Initial members of the PRIMED were also members of the research group at the Universidad Bolivariana, who later became part of the new staff of the EDU under mayor Fajardo's Administration. This proved that there was a transfer of knowledge and a continuity of the successful practices.

Metodology PUI

The PUI methodologies were first implemented by the EDU during their work in the Northeastern area (comuna 1 and 2) and later would become a model to be replicated in other areas of the city. The PUI project contains 3 main components that are supposed to reach the highest standards available:

- Inter- Institutional coordination
- Social component of community participation and
- Physical component, which includes public space, environmental recovery, housing and transportation.

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Institutional Coordination

The EDU, through the PUI, became a link that coordinated the different initiatives that the departments of the Municipality (Secretaries) had in the areas of intervention. It also, through the feasibility studies, started a process of communication to attract external investment and social acceptance. This, in turn, permitted the project to make strategic alliances with the public and philanthropic sector, NGOs, and universities. Multidisciplinary groups and discussion tables were organized as a way to specify the goals and the best ways to achieve results without duplicating efforts. This allowed the Mayor's office to search for external funds from diverse entities that included private companies and partners such as the Royal Crown of Spain that donated the collection for the Library Park in Santo Domingo.¹⁵

¹⁴ Fernando A. Avila Cortés (El Vale) at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, sede Medellín, directed the Office of the PRIMED from the Facultad de Arquitectura.

¹⁵ Some entities that collaborated in the development of the PUI from the EDU showed the level of inter-institutionality necessary to make these projects possible. Says Oscar Santana: "There were several groups that intervened in this project: the Medellín Mayor's Office through the Planning Administration Department, the Estate, Public Works, Education, Social Welfare, Social

This strategy of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary coordination is one of the most important achievements of the program. As Juan Diego Lopera, Sub Director Departamento de Planeación Medellín explained, “It is not that before there were not investments. It is that these were guided by other interests (political) and did not generate the necessary impact. The lack of coordination sometimes resulted in redundant interventions by different branches of the municipality.”¹⁶ These strategies of the PUI made the process more difficult to be controlled by individual political interests and created a good network of communication between different branches of the Municipality.

The PUI and EDU and their relationship with the other branches of the Municipality

The PUI is a tool that permits all the different departments (*secretarias*) of the Mayor’s office, in unison, to achieve their physical goals imposed by the general plan of the city (POT) over a specific territory. See Figure 13



Figure 18 PUI Nororiental with all projects by all secretarias and other partners highlighted. Source: EDU

Development, Citizen’s Culture, Environmental Secretaries, the Urban Development Company. The contributing partners were: the Spanish government, Comfama, Comfenalco, Aburra Valley Metropolitan Area, EPPM Foundation, Biblioteca Pública Piloto, Empresas Públicas de Medellín, UNE –EPM Telecommunications”.

¹⁶ Juan Diego Lopera, Sub Director de planeación Medellín. Interview with author in January 2010.

Figure 19 Map of relationships between the different Secretarias, Departments and government institutions at the municipal level that intervened in the final result of the PUI. Source: Author.

Social Component

The goal of this component is to introduce community participation into the planning process. For that goal, a structured system of public meetings was generated to create lines of communication between the EDU-State and the community. The EDU used two kinds of community groups' networks to communicate with the general community: the political leaders represented by the individuals who are politically affiliated in the area or linked with networks inside the Juntas de Accion Comunales (JACs), and the other were EDU-selected groups of individuals called "Leaders" who enacted an exponential system of communicators. These two kinds of groups helped to collect the community members to the meetings and to distribute information about the development of the diverse programs.

Figure 20 Area of the PUI Nororiental divided in the three project zones. Pinpointed are all 12 neighborhoods affected by the project. Source: EDU

The PUI Nororiental defined areas of interventions through community workshops, such as one of the initial workshops: *talleres de imaginarios* or Imaginaries' Workshops. These were meetings to gather ideas from the communities about specific areas of the neighborhoods. These workshops helped to identify places of intervention and the types of public equipments needed. At these meetings assistants are asked by the EDU staff to tell and draw how they "Imagine (Dream) their future neighborhood." Here decisions about the naming and use of the areas of projects are also selected. See Figure 15.

Participation in these meetings is extensive, usually gathering community members by the hundreds per sector. Each PUI area is divided into sectors by the EDU to make these larger meetings manageable and also because the area of the project was so extensive. These sector divisions also make the participants engage in the discussions about projects that would affect them more directly. Questions and answers collected in these workshops include: How do I imagine my park? What does this place mean to me? Which memories does this place bring to me? What would I like the park (building, public space, etc) to have? What would I name my park?




Figure 21 “Imaginary Workshops” with the community held in 2005. Source: Urban Development Enterprise EDU - Medellín Mayor’s Office

The information gathered at the imaginaries workshops is processed at the other EDU offices and transferred into the final presentation of the project in which the “renders” of the project are presented to and approved by the community members. This communication strategy is maintained during the entire planning and development process and long after it has culminated. Teams of social workers inside the EDU maintain these networks and continue communicating about developments of the different programs. It was through this initial network that it was also possible for me to interview individuals in the community that have participated on the project.

The methodology of participation in the PUI might not strike one as particularly innovative in terms of public participation in the development of large urban projects. Compared with the techniques employed among communities and governmental institutions in the United States, it looks very similar to standard techniques. What is revolutionary in this process in Medellín, is that it is employed, for the first time and on such large scale, and probably is one of the first introductions of it’s kind in Colombia. Also it is important that it was done

in the area with the lowest quality of life indexes. From the perspective of an outsider, EDU participation techniques seem a far cry from a revolutionary or real participatory process. As with the Participative Budget PB, this process is extremely hierarchical. It is really clear that the power to make the decisions is in the hands of a specialized group of technocrats who run the participatory process and who also prepared the plan back at the offices of EDU, where the most important decisions are made. At the public table, small but symbolic decisions are taken. The recurrent cycles of participation create a satisfactory illusion of participation and empowerment, and as a result a large majority of individuals felt that what was represented in the project “renders” resemble a realistic image of what they proposed in the “imaginaries” workshops and subsequently they also agreed to the final product as long it was finished.

In general, the understanding of the achievements of the social area of the PUI is less tangible. A study from the Departamento Nacional de Planeación DNP/ The National Department of Planning concluded that: “In the social order the delivery of projects is not as clear like in the case of the physical component, but it is observed that the communitarian organizations have been successfully empowered and that also a successful network of communication had been increased.”

Physical Component

There are four lines of physical intervention in the PUI: Public facilities, housing environment, and public space and transportation.



Figure 22 Relocation housing project along the small river
Juan Bobo. Source: EDU

a. Public equipment and facilities provided collective spaces and new structures for policy programs implemented by the city. Many of the public programs initiated by the *secretarias* had a physical representation that created a permanent presence of non-repressive and, in most cases, state institutions. Each program initiated by the Secretaria will contract the EDU to perform the physical component of their program and the inclusion in the PUI.

b. Housing

This section includes new dwellings and upgrades of existing ones as well as legalization and securing of tenure processes. These last two followed the learned experiences from the work of the PRIMED. In Colombia and Medellín there existed a culture that gives preference to owning a housing unit over a rent option. The ability to obtain title and legal ownership of the housing units is an important factor in the success and sustainability of the transformation process. This controls negative aspects of urban development such as

gentrification. Urban improvements of the neighborhood impact the value of existing units that are legalized, increasing their value. This added value goes to the resident owner and in this way it benefits the entire community that had been granted a title.



Figure 23 Relocation housing project along the small river Juan Bobo. Source: EDU

c. Environment.

This component mainly involved the recovery of the multiple small rivers that represent an environmental hazard and physical risk to adjacent structures. Medellín's topography and location in the Andes Mountains generates a multiplicity of small rivers call *quebradas*, a total of 35 small streams collecting water from the top of the mountains to the Medellín River at the center of the valley. In rain intense periods, these small rivers on the steep hill become hazardous areas for any construction on their vicinity. (See figure 16.) The creation of green corridors along the multiple small rivers is one of these strategies to collect illegal sewer deposits in these streams.




Figure 24 Rivers in the in the city of Medellín and their slopes (orange red and brown represent risk slopes)
Source: EDU

d. Public space and transportation

Priority was given to pedestrian mobility over car mobility and to the creation of a network of public spaces and boulevards. Also, there was the integration of the metro system with the new Metro Cable, executed by the Empresa Metro de Medellín as part of their expansion plan.



Figure 25 Metrocable and public spaces and parks along the small river. Source: EDU

The Metro cable (cable car), with a capacity of 64,000 trips a day, is a clever strategy to deal with issues of scarce space and the elevated topography, which makes mobility in these areas extremely complex. The Metro Cable was put in place by the administration previous to Fajardo and executed during Fajardo's term. It was the result of years of planning and discussion in the inner circles of the planning department and the Empresa Metro de Medellín. "That idea of the cable was created here at the Planning Department. The Cable (Metrocable) was made by Luis Peres (Ex Mayor). What changed with the cable is that all this lack of public infrastructure gets connected by the transportation."¹⁷ But what already existed in this PUI became the standard for all the other ones to have this transportation system as part of their overall project. But what was a pre-set project in the PUI Nororiental became a strategic tool for all other PUIs. The PUI of the Comuna 13 includes one metro cable plan, executed during Sergio Fajardo's administration. The future PUI Centrooriental includes three different lines of Metro cable with a connecting trolley line.

Implementation

The development of the project (Gestion) followed 3 main stages: design, execution and operation, which in turn were divided in ten stages. These stages range from the initial survey to the final occupation and appropriations of the users of the diverse spaces.




Figure 26 Timeline of the PUI project from design to operation. Source: EDU

Conclusion

The ability to coordinate all initiatives from the municipal branches (Secretarias) along with private and public funding from different sources in a myriad of (sometimes more than 200 individual physical projects) all executed in a short

¹⁷ Juan Diego Lopera, Sub director Departamento de Planeación Medellín. Interview January 2010

three-year period is what makes this project so effective and important to study. This is especially true in terms of the project's ability to modify the physical public structure of a neighborhood where the state has not had any important presence. This project empowered in a positive way the introduction of the absent state into the community. Also the opportunity to make these projects as a continuum of a single large urban project allowed the implementation—instantaneously—throughout the existing neighborhood of a new network of publicly connected amenities that created a series of connected safe spaces. These are safe spaces for both the community and the state.¹⁸ These new areas permitted these once isolated communities to maintain open lines of communication that are based on the necessary physical human and architectural presence of the state. And lastly, the new buildings and infrastructures compete in quality and style with any new project executed anywhere in the city. This empowers the communities who up to this moment have been approached by the interventions of the state as second-hand citizens.




Figure 27 Map of Urban Integrated projects PUI in blue. Source: Alcaldía de Medellín

¹⁸ Conditions of safety in these areas at intense moments of increased violence impede the normal executions of any project of the state or any other organization. Maintaining those lines of communication at those moments is important for the sustainability of any kind of long-term initiative.

PUI Nororiental (PUI Northeastern Area), Medellín

The territory

Based on the Indexes of (IDH) and (ICV), the municipality selected a series of areas that required immediate intervention. One of those areas was the Northeastern Area of the city where comunas 1 and 2 are located within a territory characterized by an intricate topography, lack of good transportation systems and the presence of thousands of squatters who have formed illegal settlements over a period of more than 60 years. This combination of factors generated their isolation from the productive and control systems of the formal city. This, as I explained in the previous chapter, created the ideal conditions for illegal armed groups to target the territories and use youth has social capital for their armies. The Comunas 1 and 2 combined saw, by 2003, the largest number of demobilized paramilitary entering the DDR process with the national government and also the largest number of urban militias that self demobilized. This amounts to a total of 530 demobilized individuals in government programs by 2007.


The limit of the established PUI nororiental is an area that covers 12 neighborhoods in the two comunas 1 and 2. The line of the Metro Cable K became the center or spine along which all the other interventions were placed.

The PUI Nororiental was subdivided in 3 sectors. This division intentionally dealt with the territory in fragments or smaller sections to make the public meetings more manageable in scale and also to make sure that the community that was going to be benefited for the projects developed in their vicinity. See figure 15. Public meetings for the development of the PUI included hundreds of participants per meeting.



Figure 28 Area of the PUI Nororiental in relationship with comunas 1 and 2 with all projects highlighted. Source: Author, based on EDU information

As explained in chapter 3, each secretaria (department of the mayor's office) that has projects in the area of the PUI in terms of physical or policy oriented coordinated with the EDU for their inclusion in the PUI. The following maps show how each secretaria distributed its programs over the area of the PUI project. They give an accurate picture of the distribution and the scale of the interventions of the PUI. Not all interventions of the secretarias were physical projects but I have included them in this section because it shows their distribution over the territory and the relationship with the most significant build projects. It shows a correlation between application of the policies and the distribution of the projects. This permits us to visually understand the scale of the project.



Secretaria Social Welfare

- Infant protection
- Program BUEN COMIENZO – BUEN VIVIR
- School Restaurant
- Food Provision
- Food for Seniors
- Unit for criminal youth
- Unit for Homeless youth
- Program Homeless POR UNA VIDA MAS DIGNA
- Unit for Displaced population
- Unit fro senior homeless
- Unit for attention to the Senior population
- Senior housing
- PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL AL ADULTO MAYOR
- Center for senior homeless
- Attention to disable population


Figure 30 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Social Welfare. Source: EDU



Secretaria Health

- Population covered by government subsidies**
179,500 subsidies
- Population not covered but affiliated**
80,000 individuals
- Family and community health**
11,955 families – 52,217 individuals
Poor health: 489 families treated
Malnutricion: 1284 children atented
Salud Oral: 6493 familes treated
- Health Programs at schools**
Salud Oral: 11887. individuals
Salud visual: 13,000 students treated
Salud Auditiva: 11,800 students treated
Nutrición: 11,000
- Sex education at scholls**
1800 students
- New hospital**
Unidad Hospitalaria Santa Cruz


Figure 29Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Health. Source: EDU



Secretaria Government

- G** Program of follow up with DDR Members
- G** Surveillance, control and training for the use of public space
- G** Assistance for population affected by Human Rights violations

Figure 32 Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Government. Source: EDU



Secretaria Citizen Culture

- C** Program of comunity self regulation
- C** Program MEDELLÍN CIUDAD MULTICULTURAL
- C** Cultural Program MEDELLÍN UN GRAN ESCENARIO
- C** Program of Libraries and colection of cultural history
- C** Preogram for youth MEDELLÍN CIUDAD JOVEN
- C** Gender equality Program
- C** Participative Budget


Figure 31 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Citizen culture. Source: EDU



INDER (Recreation)

-  Daycare facilities LUDOTEKAS
-  Recreation
-  Sport schools
-  Program adopt a park
-  Aerobics
-  Program CLUBES DE VIDA

Figure 33 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the INDER a independent institution that manages all recreational programs and facilities own by the city. Source: EDU



General Projects

-  Metro Line A
-  Metro Cable line K
- Public Space and movility**
-  Street Improvement Urban Roads type A
-  Street Improvement Urban Roads type B
-  Continuity of urban Roads
-  Connections between neighborhoods
-  Street Improvements Neighborhood Roads
-  New and improve Pedestrian Roads
-  New Bridge (pedestrian and Cars)
-  New Bridge (Pedestrian)
-  New Sector Park
-  New Park along river
-  New Neighborhood Park
-  New Small Park (mirador)
- Housing**
-  Resettlement plan (Housing)
-  New park terraces
-  New Mixed use buildings
- Public Buildings**
-  Improvement o public buildings
-  New public Buildings
-  Improvement Neighborhood center
-  New Neighborhood center
-  Expansion

Figure 34 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all General Public Works. Source: EDU



Secretaria Education





-  Quality Schools
-  Public Schools
-  School remodel.
-  School remodel (with EPM funds)

Figure 36 Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria de Educación. Source: EDU



Figure 35 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions all interventions. Source: EDU

The project highlighted above (Figures 23 to 29) show this multiplicity of initiatives, most of them developed in the span of 3 years.

In Table 1, I outline the scale of the most relevant physical projects of the PUI in the Nororiental. In Appendix 1, I provide a graphic description of these projects. This table shows the multiplicity of the physical projects creates the web of initiatives executed during the PUI Nororiental.

Concluding thoughts

I consider the PUI project to be the most important contribution of all the physical projects in the Medellín case. This is because it is the result of refining efforts over a long process of small and sometimes unsuccessful interventions that tried to resolve the infrastructure problems of informal settlements and marginalized areas. These include the multiplicity of projects from public and private sectors, the invention of the institutional structure that allowed those institutions and projects to coexist, and the idea of quality design as necessary for the intervention.

Also the PUI small interventions created a context where the more significant interventions, such as the Parque Biblioteca or the MetroStations, could attach and expand their area of influence. Not performing such accompanying interventions would have undermined the real impact of these citywide projects. When governments and institutions around the world want to work in informal communities, they usually just focus on improving housing conditions.¹⁹ This important move also permitted a focus on quality instead of simply the maximum number of units produced, an approach that usually produces poor quality housing conditions and just transfers the original problem to a new location with the added issues of social capital lost in the process of relocation.

To understand the real success of the reviewed strategies implemented during the Sergio Fajardo Administration, Chapter (5) "Evaluating the intervention, *'Medellin, la ciudad mas educada'*" takes into account the physical and policy interventions described in this and the previous chapter and evaluate their effectiveness based on my personal interviews with community members, politicians and technocrats (planners).

¹⁹ The Darhavi slum redevelopment in India is one of those examples. Where authorities are concern with create new housing for the residents of Daravi in a search to obtain the land for other real estate purposes. Ridge, Mian. "In Asia's largest slum, free new digs are scorned." *The Christian Science Monitor* - CSMonitor.com . N.p., 21 Mar. 2007. Web. 6 May 2010. <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0321/p01s04-wosc.html>>.

		Cost in Million COP	Area m2	Area Public space	Constru tion period	
	Buildings					
3	Parque BIBLIOTECA SANTO DOMINGO	14.000	5000	15.000 m2	May 2006/M ay 2007	Public library and community center
2	CEDEZO CENTRO DESARROLLO EMPRESARIAL ZONAL	375 (secretaría de desarrollo social)	400	404.5 M2	Sept 2005/D ec 2005	Entrepreneurialshi p center
19	UNIDAD DEPORTIVA DE GRANIZAL	1.992 (Inder)	577	9320M2	Mar 2007/ Dec 2007	Sports facility
	Centro de Salud Santo Domingo Savio	1.609			N/A	Medical center
1b	Restaurante Institución Educativa La Candelaria				N/A	Community dinner next the school.
	2 CAI	230			N/A	
	Public Space					
1ª	PASEO PEATONAL DE LA CALLE 106	413 (secretaria de obras públicas)		2895M2	Apr 2005/ Jul 2005	Pedestrian Street to the Parque Biblioteca Espana
1ª	PARQUE LA CANDELARIA	260 (secretaria de obras públicas)		1630m2	Ago 2004/D ec 2004	Park next to the Metro Cable station
1ª	PARQUE MIRADOR Y PARQUE DE LOS NIÑOS	170 (secretaria de obras públicas)		1260m2	Ago 2004/D ec 2004	Small park

Chapter 4

1a	PASEO URBANO106A	460 millions		1853M2	May 2007/Nov 2007	Pedestrian street scape
6	Corredor vial 42B	2415 (secretaria de obras públicas)		8840 m2	N/A	Projects along the streed 42B
6	Mercado barrial		350		N/A	Neighborhood market
6	Carrera 42C			550	N/A	Projects along the streed 42B
6	Jardín Los Pozos			790	N/A	Fountain in the place of an outdoor laundry over a small river
6	Parque Paulo VI			1.100	N/A	Park
6	Parque Lavaderos			550	N/A	Fountain over a small river
1a	PASEO ANDALUCÍA CALLE 107	3250 (Secretaria de obras públicas)		13645 m2 Árboles sembrados: 159	Sep 2005/ Jun 2006	Street improvement
7	PARQUE BALCON DEL AJEDREZ	159 (secretaria de obras públicas)		950m2	Jan 2006/ Apr 2006	Park part of the improvements along the Metro Cable Line
10	PARQUE DE LA PAZ Y LA CULTURA	94 (secretaria de obras públicas)		1330m2	Oct 2005/ Dec 2005	Open-air theater next to metro station
13	PARQUE DE LA IMAGINACIÓN	136 (secretaria de obras públicas)		690m2	Jan 2006/ May 2006	Park in the neighborhood Villa del socorro

	PARQUE PRIMAVERAL NUESTRA SEÑORA CAMINO	DEL	166 (secretaria de obras públicas)		500m2	Nov 2006/ April 2007	
	BRIDGES						
14	BRIDGE PEACE	OF	405 (secretaria de obras públicas)	35ml	2195m2	Dec 2006/ Jun 2007	Pedestrian Bridge
11	BRIDGE MIRADOR		1600 (secretaria de obras públicas)	64 ml	2265m2	Dec 2006/ April 2007	Pedestrian Bridge connecting two neighborhoods Andalucía and la Francia with rival gangs
20	BRIDGE GUADUA	OF	246 (Secretaria de obras públicas)	66 ml	5560m2	Jun 2007/N /A	Pedestrian Bridge
	Medio Ambiente						
	PARQUE LINEAL QUEBRADA LA HERRERA		\$2404 (área metropolita na) \$3200 (sec. Medio Ambiente)	280	18.324m 2	N/A	Park along the River Herrera
	Housing						
19	PROYECTO DE CONSOLIDACIÓN HABITACIONAL EN LA QUEBRADA JUAN BOBO		8000	5054 new housing 108 improved 115 units	5606 m2	N/A	Housing relocation and renovation along the River Juan Bobo

Table 1 PUI Nororiental Most relevant Physical projects

Evaluating the intervention, “Medellin, la ciudad mas educada”

Methodology

This chapter tells the story, by analyzing what people in Medellín who have lived through this urban planning as peace building process say and think about it. What, if anything, do they find successful? What, if anything, do they regret? Would they do it again? What strategies do people think would work in other contexts? I conducted 25 of interviews in Medellín on January 2010. I interviewed two groups of people: 1) planners and politicians who have been involved in this urban planning project before, during, and now after it is well underway, and 2) community members who have lived in Comuna 13, 1 and 2, the three neighborhoods most impacted by these urban interventions. The neighborhoods were identified as the most underserved by state services and were among the city’s most violent before 2003. All of the community members interviewed lived in these neighborhoods before, during, and after the policies and physical projects were implemented. Having these two perspectives—politicians and technocrats versus community members—which sometimes are opposed to each other, makes it possible to decant which, if any, of the policies implemented were effective and why.¹

With this series of interviews, I sought to explore the period of urban planning as peace process (2003-2007), an issue not covered in a range of literature about the Comunas. This literature includes published oral histories of the Comunas, from the perspectives of those living in the Comunas (Estrada and Gomez 1992; Boyd 2008² and Aricapa 2005).³ The role of city planning is also absent from recent publications about violence and peace process in Medellín.

¹ I had originally intended to interview community members who were present during the national program of Disarmament, *Demobilization* and Reintegration (DDR), but at the time of my interviews meeting with these DDR participants proved to be too dangerous and needs to be left for future research.

² Aricapa Ardila, Ricardo. 2005. *Comuna 13: crónica de una guerra urbana*. Medellín: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia.

(Roxema, 2006; Bouvier, *Making Peace in a Time of War*, 2009).⁴ Aricapa's local narratives of the process of consolidation of Comuna 13 before during and after the Operation Orion in 2002 compile firsthand accounts of that neighborhood's living conditions and manifestations of violence, but do not account for the application of the new policies implemented in the seven years directly afterward.

In addition to these publications, there have been other efforts to collect oral histories from these neighborhoods that do include residents' reflections on the impacts these policies have had in their lives. For this thesis, I examined a group of sources compiled as part of the program run through the Parques Bibliotecas called "Sala Mi Barrio" (My Neighborhood Livingroom). These compilations include newspapers published inside the Comunas, family photo albums, and short essays written by members of the community as part of historical memory and writing workshops that took place in the Parques. I also drew on interviews and the same kinds of neighborhood sources I have been creating as part of an Historical Memory Project (in the Parques Bibliotecas) that Dr. Tamera Marko and I conducted in 2007-2009.⁵ This included five community documentary videos I co-directed that document these specific communities since 2007 (Samper and Marko, *Medellin la Violencia no es toda la Historia*, 2008 and 2009).⁶ The "Sala Mi Barrio" histories and our "Medellin la violencia no es toda la historia" project intends to offer a more complete perspective on the geography of violence than appears in academic publications, media, and Hollywood and Colombian film. It does so not by focusing on the perpetrators of the violence or their victims, but instead by focusing on the urban and social context in which these (violent and peace) acts happen. I put my most recent January 2010 oral interviews in conversation with these other oral histories in the following pages.

Below are the interview approach and the kinds of questions I asked all the interviewees. A list of all the interviewees appears in Appendix 2.

³ Estrada C., William, and Adriana Gómez V. 1992. *Somos historia: Comuna Nororiental*. Medellín, Colombia: s.n.

⁴ Boyd, D. 2008. "Riano-Alcala, Dwellers of Memory: Youth and Violence in Medellín, Colombia". *Oral History Review*. 35 (2): 206-207.

⁵ Tamera Marko and Jota Samper. *(Hi)story telling as peace process. Historical Memory Project DukeEngage Colombia (Medellin) Social Equality Through Education*.

⁶This work helps communities in underrepresented neighborhoods in Medellín to document the stories of their neighborhood in their own words to larger audiences and map neighborhood resilience through the continued waves of violence. For sample video clips, see <http://dukeengagemedellin.blogspot.com> & <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzwPAd19p4> & <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzwPAd19p4>.

Interview Group One

a. Politicians. This group of interviews included the ex Director of the EDU Alejandro Echeverry, who from the beginning has been a politically powerful figure in ex Mayor *Sergio Fajardo's* cabinet. I also interviewed the Sub Director of the Medellín Planning Department Juan Diego Lopera who was also a central part of Fajardo's campaign.

b. Planners I interviewed six staff members (architects, social workers, educators, and administrators) working on EDU. I also interviewed three planners in the Medellín Planning Department.

Interview Group Two

This group of interviews included 17 community members from comunas 1,2 and 13 (community leaders, members of local NGO's, Women head of Family, community members in general). These community members where invited by public flyers posted on the parques bibliotecas, or identified as community leaders by members of EDU or where part of the large network of community that participated in the "Medellín la Violencia is not the whole story" project.

Interview Outline

All interviews followed a similar format intended to guide discussion that moved beyond just the opinion about the policies implemented to focus on specific ways their lives have been impacted by the policies. I designed these questions with the hope of inspiring narratives that provide a larger experiential background and context each person had with these policies. In this sense, I wanted interviewees to share their (personal and professional) lived experiences in Medellín with the *reasons* for these policies and how these lived experiences were modified by the implementation of the projects and policies. The interviews here were recorded and each person granted permission for their names to be used and comments to be quoted in this thesis. All interviews were performed in Spanish and translated into English by the author.

The interview outline was as follows:

1. Interviewees were asked to identify themselves and to briefly describe the broad nature of their involvement with the neighborhood in which they live, and for how long have they lived in this neighborhood. *These permitted identifying precedence (if he or she had migrated from other areas of the country and under which circumstances) of the interviewee and to understand where he or she stands in the community.*
2. Interviewees were asked to cite a brief history of their experience in Medellín and specifically in his or her neighborhood prior to the study period and developments of interest in 2003. *These questions try to map the*

history of the neighborhood but from the perspective of the interviewee and not the history. It serves as a place of reference for map changes after 2003.

3. The interview focused on events after the 2003 period, specifically with the new projects developed, such as the new public libraries, parks, transportation and new educational facilities. The interview also focused on soft infrastructural projects, which include public events, financial or other incentives that were given. Soft infrastructural projects also include new governmental or non governmental institutions that were initiated or reinforced during this period, such as microcredit banks, subsidies, participatory budget etc. *Here I am looking for interviewees' experience in the process of transformation of his or her community in relationship with the policies and practices implemented by the mayors office.*
4. If the interviewee recalled any of the previous interventions, the interviewer asked the interviewee to discuss how they perceived the impact, if any, of each one of the projects or policies implemented in his/her neighborhood. The interviewer asked interviewees to be as specific as possible during this phase of the interview.
5. As a concluding portion of the interview, the interviewer asked the interviewees to provide additional information or perceptions about the policies implemented in Medellin as a whole. This concluding section was also an opportunity for the interviewer to ask any remaining questions about specific policies that were not sufficiently expanded or that were more illustrative to the research.

Of the 25 interviewees, 17 were community members and the other 8 were politicians and planners and architects. I located the community members to interview in two different ways. One way involved a social worker in the EDU who contacted community leaders who had been involved in the planning process in the neighborhoods I study. The second way involved my own historical memory project doing oral histories for the past three years in these neighborhoods.⁷ Finally, while 17 community members is a relatively small percentage of the total population in the communities I studied, it is among the first series of interviews about the perceived outcomes of the project. The procedures were simple in the sense that the community members' roles in the project were bounded by the planning techniques. The technocrats had the power and leverage to control the dimension of participation the community members had. What is remarkable about this, however, is that not one community member I interviewed mentioned this bounded control as being an

⁷ Eliana Restrepo EDU social worker. Restrepo, Eliana. Interview by author. Personal interview. Parque Biblioteca San javier, Medellin , Colombia, January 7, 2010.

issue or that they even sensed it was happening. I conclude that the community members did not notice this. These interviews and my analysis of their responses in this study are intended to raise more questions than answers. The uniformity of responses, however, across the 17 community members in three Comunas, is worthy of further attention.

Interviews: Evaluating the intervention

During the more than 30 hours of interviews among the total of 25 interviewees for this project seven main themes emerged. In examining the responses, I examined the ways the perspectives of politicians and technocratic planners, challenge, contradict or reinforce the views of community members. In their responses to the above questions, people perceived and defined the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the policies and physical projects implemented during the administration of Sergio Fajardo (2003-2007). The seven themes that emerged as being important to the transformation are as follows:

- **Community Participation** – Making the community a participant in the decision-making process about the transformation of their environment.
- **The Participative Budget**⁸ -- Making more transparent the finances of the municipality as a tool to support local organizations and to force negotiations and collaboration between divergent local groups.
- **Social debt (*Deuda Social*)** -- The recognition that the state is partly responsible for changing the environmental conditions of marginalized communities.
- **Institutional Support (EDU and the PUI)** -- The institutional bridge between state and community and the concerted instrument of intervention on the territory.
- **Illegal Armed Groups** -- The presence and negotiations with armed actors in the territory, the DDR process, and its consequences.
- **Infrastructure As Security** -- The use of the new projects and their amenities as a way to increase perceived and real security of the neighborhood.
- **Projects Changing The Perception of Security Through Design** -- The properties of good design as a way to de-marginalize not only the environment, but also the community who occupies that environment.

⁸ See Chapter 3

1. Community Participation

All interviewees—community members and politicians, architects and planners—expressed satisfaction with the participation procedures of the planning process. The fact that the community members are satisfied with the participation procedures increases the likelihood that projects can be built and will be sustainable in their neighborhoods.⁹ One of the dimensions they were satisfied with was being part of the planning process of the Proyecto Urbano Integral (PUI) project, which the state entity EDU implemented. The EDU and the PUI involvement, from the project's very beginning, was instrumental in the signing of internal peace contracts between warring factions in the community. These peace contracts permitted the planning process that opened the door to the physical projects.

The community members and the EDU were involved in two main community groups. The first group included the JAC. Each Comuna has a JAC, Junta de Accion Comunal. These JACs are comprised of longtime community leaders who now are the community representatives who communicate with the municipality. The JACs have always been and still are more allied with the traditional political parties (the Liberals or the Conservatives). This means they are a kind of lobbying structure, economically and politically supported by the traditional political parties. The EDU created another community network which they called the *Lideres Comunitarios* (Community Leaders). The EDU invites individual community members to become the link between the EDU participative process and the rest of the community. They spread word in their communities about EDU meetings and about the progress of the project. They do this via word of mouth and through posters they put throughout their neighborhoods. One of the first phases involved EDU staff attending community meetings in the neighborhoods.¹⁰ This, of course, could lead to jealousy among JAC members who now are involved with another community leader structure. While it was clear that there were some tense disagreements in opinion between the two JAC members and 15 Community Leaders I interviewed, all of them expressed that they were very pleased with their perception of their role with EDU in the project participation process.

⁹ Peace negotiations.

¹⁰ See Chapter 3 "Imaginarious workshops."

Another core technique of participation that EDU implemented in the initial planning phases was the “Talleres de Imaginarios” or “Workshops of Imaginaries.” First, they invited JAC and Community Leaders to meet as a group with EDU leaders and staff. After these meetings, the JAC and Community Leaders put out an EDU call for a larger meeting with community members of any age and gender or economic status. At these meetings the community members gave their input about what they wanted to see change in their communities and why. Sometimes people expressed this in verbal exchange and other times they drew with pencils, crayons and markers what they wanted to see in their communities. The EDU members also told them about projects that the municipality already had mind for their community, such as the Library Parks. EDU members then collected the notes and drawings from these meetings and after determining which projects were viable,¹¹ created three dimensional images of them in the form of computer generated “renders.”



Figure 1 Workshops of Imaginarios and final render of a Parque Biblioteca Source: EDU and Alejandro Echeverría.

¹¹ In this case viability depended on many factors, including geography, city planning codes, budget and interest from the branches of the municipality.

EDU members, at another community meeting, then presented these renders and the reasons for their viability to the same community members. Viability was based on EDU budget and the projects that the municipality already intended to build in the communities. All of the determination of viability is done by architects, urban planners, politicians, engineers and lawyers through the EDU. No community members are part of this closed decision-making. This, of course, means that to some extent the community participation in terms of creating their own dream projects is part illusion. On the other hand, it is more community inclusion with these state projects than anything that had existed before or that had been implemented in the city at large.

Although not all of the community ideas were rendered, all of the renders eventually became built projects. This relation between the community members' input and its appearance in EDU members' translation of it into complex three-dimensional computer renders, represented in the eyes of the community that they were listened to and that they were partners in the decision-making process. In addition to the renders, another fundamental aspect of inclusion for the community members was that the EDU members fulfilled their promise to return to the communities after the workshops. The traditional way would be that the politician would come, involve the community in a project, and then they would never return. Luis Horacio Galeano, 58, a community member who has lived in Comuna 13 for more than ten years, said,

The EDU has something great. They not only tell us what they are going to do; they also tell us that you can participate. I participated in the *imaginarios* about how we wanted the *Unidad Deportiva* (sports facility) to be. We are doing the same thing for the construction of the *El Parque de La Memoria* [Park of Memory] that deals with the tragedy of *El Socorro*.¹² I have the image [of the final render] in my cell phone of how this space is going to look.

¹² El Socorro, is a neighborhood in Comuna 13 where there had been landslide due to torrential rains that destroyed five houses and killed many of the family members inside. These landslides are common in the hillsides up and around the city, where homes lack strong foundations and slide down the hills during heavy rains. As part of the PUI of Comuna 13, they worked with the community on what they wanted to do with this space. Part of the idea behind the project was to create something in that space that would be more protected against a future landslide. "Fueron 28 los muertos por tragedia de El Socorro | ELESPECTADOR.COM." Noticias | ELESPECTADOR.COM. <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/articulo-invierno-medellin-deja-tres-personas-muertas> (accessed May 6, 2010).




Figure 2 Luis Galeano's Cell phone with the image of the render of the new park in commemoration of the tragedy of El Socorro. The render image displays the icon of the Mayor Administration. Source: Luis Galeano.

As Galeano alludes to here, the *Talleres de Imaginarios* generated broad definitions of what the projects were supposed to be. They involved hundreds of participants drawing and discussing in an effort to create a broad consensus about a project name and the general aesthetic qualities. These decisions were made in a space where clearly the EDU members have the intellectual and institutional authority. The community members are free to describe what they want included, but every section of the workshop is guided by members of the EDU. Only a few of the EDU members, mostly the social workers, live in the communities being work shopped. The architects, politicians, and urban planners are usually from high to middle income neighborhoods, not from the communities being work shopped. Many of the EDU staff are youth, newly graduated from architectural school. Thus, people who have never lived in the communities and who are a generation or two or three younger than the community leaders, sometimes led these community workshops. This permeates the entire workshop process with longstanding classed power dynamic that in many ways runs counter to the spirit of equal collaboration promoted by the EDU. My impression, from observing some of these workshops, is that the community leaders are well aware of these class dynamics but are also aware that this is the only option they have at the moment to obtain something from the state for their neighborhood. None of the interviewees' for this project indicated that they perceived that they as community members had a lack of authority. On the contrary, they were firm in their assertion that *they* made the decision on approving the "renders" that EDU presented to them. The community members, in fact, always referred to "renders," a word that architects in Colombia borrow from the English language to mean what they would call in Spanish, "computer generated image." The community members' ubiquitous use of the word "renders" also highlights how

powerful it is that they see their ideas in three-dimensional image created by professional architects.

Second, the participation of the community in the planning process empowered and continues to empower the community members in the sense that it creates an aura of leverage in their negotiations with the state about how and what about the projects are imagined, designed and implemented.

I conclude that the community members perception of having (rather than lacking) in the planning process is the result of this being the first time that this level of community-city official planning strategies were implemented in Medellín, and also that this is the first time that the state (represented here by the EDU) was involved in a real transformation of their environment. According to community members, this transformation and EDU's involvement in this context, did not involve an expropriation. The community perceived they were informed of, and in some ways, collaborated with at each step that the city took in a non-aggressive environment. This created a sense of transparency and this is what created the community's final compliance with the projects. If the community had not trusted this process, they could have blocked the entire project, as they have blocked the state trying to evict them from their houses for forty years.




Figure 3 Participation at the workshops in the PUI Comuna Nororiental. Source: Modelo Medellín, Alcaldía de Medellín.

2. The Participative Budget

Mayor Fajardo's office implemented the participative budget, process inspired from Brazil,¹³ to make more transparent the finances of the municipality and to comply with international requirements that "asked" the state to increase levels of community participation in governance. This is required by all international development aid agencies giving support to Colombia, including the World Bank, the International Development Bank (IDB), and the PNUD (UNDP United Nations Development Programme).¹⁴ From these interviews, I conclude that the Participative Budget has been successful in terms of two main categories. It is a way (1) to financially support the already existing community organizations,

¹³ The strategies of the PB were first implemented in Brazil in the municipality of Porto Alegre in 1986. This project was widely publicized as a best practice and became popular in many European and Latino American cities.

¹⁴ Gómez Hernández, Esperanza. 2007. *El presupuesto participativo entre democracia, pobreza y desarrollo*. 15: 0121-3261.

such as the *Junta Administradora Local* (local administrative group) JAC and NGOs and (2) to force negotiations and collaborations between divergent community groups that finally create a consensus on a priority of needs at the *comuna* level to begin a common path.

Members of both the Planning Department and the communities who participated in the planning agreed that the Participative Budget was a good arena to consolidate divergent voices of the community into a common goal. One EDU member, a social worker who lives in Comuna 6 and is participating in the PUI for Comuna 6 and 7 said,

The PB [Participative Budget] has created important alliances between other neighborhood groups that would have never negotiated with each other, and created a singular vision of community that goes beyond the local vision of the neighborhood... [so] then there can be different neighborhoods that can join resources that will benefit the entire comuna.

Another community member Juan David Carmona, who lives in Comuna 13 where he is a leader of an NGO, said,

The PB has had a lot of influence in the way leaders of the neighborhood interact with each other. Leaders and groups who did not like each other now have to work together and this has changed the mentality of the leaders from a closed circle [who care only about their own] to think in terms of *Comuna*. We know and acknowledge each other.

On the other hand, the community organizations that profit from the projects of the PB are dependent on funding from this PB mechanism to maintain their programs. I see this as a positive aspect. This competitiveness maintains the quality of the community-generated projects and because of the yearly application for funding; the community members themselves evaluate their effectiveness as a function of a consensual priority. If everyone does not feel they are profiting from the project, they as a community could cancel the funding, and thus the project. Other authors critique this one-year based process of funding as a shortcoming that does not allow the community to think long-term, but I think because this yearly process requires constant consensus, it does in some ways allow the community to maintain control over the

effectiveness of the projects. Juan David Carmona also shares this dual praise and concern for the PB yearly funding process: when he said “we still are not self sustainable, we still depend economically on the PB.”

Esperanza Hernández Gómez (2007) critiqued the PB process as a technocratic endeavor that was easily manipulated by the municipality.¹⁵ Gomez found that the PB attracted already organized groups but its planning and contractual complexity left out single individuals who tried to benefit from the program. Many of the community members I interviewed who did not belong to large or longstanding community groups mirrored the critique by Gomez. Community member Amparo Torres H. said, “I have known about the *presupuesto participativo* [PB], but I have not been able to participate.”

Gomez also argues that it is a waste of resources when as a result of the PB, the community decided to use funds in planning strategies as opposed to materials for building the projects or giving it to a specific project already underway in the community. I agree that this is in part a result of how technocrat the PB process is but it is important to be clear that many of the community projects already underway are much smaller in scope and involve far fewer community members than the PB-funded projects. I also see that this PB process that requires consensus provides the opportunity for the community to generate a plan of greater scope by the community for the community.

The PB requires a higher level of consensus across many different groups and this is why the PB was implemented in certain *Comunas* first. Community member Juan David Carmona said

The *Comunas* with a higher understanding of the participatory system are *Comunas* 13, 1 and 6. These *comunas* pioneered the plans of local development [in 2004] along with the initiatives of the *Presupuesto Participativo*.

They had NGOs with longstanding experience in the community, they had community groups, and these groups had already started their own community planning process but they did not have the financial resources to implement their goals such as publishing their own newspapers, institutions for hosting their own cultural events and sports activities, documenting their own history, literacy projects and computers. These are the kinds of projects that people in *Comuna* 13 were able to immediately implement with PB funding. Without this funding, this would have been impossible.

¹⁵ Gómez Hernández, Esperanza. 2007. *El presupuesto participativo entre democracia, pobreza y desarrollo*. 15: 0121-3261.

3. Social Debt (Deuda Social)

The “social debt” concept advances the idea that the state is, in part, responsible for the neglect of the marginalized areas of the city and for improving the conditions of those marginalized communities. This idea is what Sergio Fajardo’s political discourse calls “*Deuda Social*,” or “Social Debt.” Community members have confirmed this glaring gap—a problem of separation— between the formal development of the city and the informal development of the neighborhoods included in this study. Community members narrate how they themselves built housing and neighborhood infrastructure including roads, churches, sewers, and electrical hook-ups. Furthermore, the political discourse of the Mayor and planning officials confirmed the idea that the new administration was trying to change the approach toward these areas that have long been neglected, some for more than 40 years.

This separation of these communities from state provided resources created, in my view, three critical conditions that are reflected in the interviews.

- **Illegal groups as state-like actors:** The long absence of the state provided the space for illegal armed groups to fulfill state-like actions, along with their own political and financial activities, in the territory.
- **Settlers as second-class citizens:** The aura of illegality in which these communities developed transfers that illegal status to their inhabitants. This acquired second-class status is reflected (and reinforced) in the way the inhabitants of other parts of the city perceive the inhabitants of these areas and in how these communities perceive themselves in relationship to the responsibility of the state with them.
- **Physical interventions seen as transformative actions:** The communities felt that the new physical interventions were the way that the municipal state started to close the gap between the state and the community in this territory.

Illegal groups as state-like actors

Often, community members described how their community’s “independence” from the formal state permitted other armed organizations to fulfill state functions, such as security and dispute resolution. This ability to perform these authoritarian actions often was supported by the absence of the state. Community member Juan David Carmona said that in his community,

the guerrilla had been the authority since 1990. They [the guerrilla] arrived in the early 1980s but consolidated authority in 1990. The police would arrive here and leave... [the guerrilla] intervened in all internal disputes in the neighborhood. All community leaders at some point would need to negotiate with the authority [guerrilla].




Figure 4 Map of Gangs of Comuna 5 & 6 at January 2010 showing the multiplicity of armed groups fighting control over territory. Source: Protected (provided upon request)

Carmona is part of an NGO that specializes in community communications. They have their own TV station and they publish the first newspaper to exist in Comuna 13 about Comuna 13. This existed long before the PB funding, but currently is funding by the PB. Carmona argued that this media would have to negotiate with the guerrillas to determine what photographs and information could be published. Carmona adds, "Many were affected by this. When the paramilitary (another armed illegal group) arrived to Comuna 13, all community leaders were targeted as collaborators" because they had had to negotiate their media communications via the guerrilla groups. These community journalists then were either killed by the incoming paramilitary or they fled their neighborhood. Carmona inherited the NGO when the paramilitary arrived because the old leaders had to flee. Carmona was 18 years old. At 19, he was negotiating with the PB to fund the communications project. Another youth who works at this NGO is the founder and star of a Comuna 13 cable show

called “Live With Super Jake!”¹⁶ It is dedicated to community programming and all filming takes place in a studio built in the second floor of the house where the NGO is based. After Operacion Orion, a community member standing in the midst of the chaotic military “sweep” in Comuna 13 of “guerrilla collaborators,” accused Jake of being a FARC Commander. Jake was one of the 240 community members arrested during this four-day Operacion. In fact, Jake had never been involved with the FARC. According to Jake, the person who accused him was actually jealous because Jake was then dating the accuser’s ex girlfriend. Jake was in jail for three months. He was 18 years old. When I interviewed him, he said he returned to Comuna 13 because it was his home and because he felt it was important to record cultural life there.



Figure 5 Santo Domingo Savio 1960s Source: Photo album of the Padre Gabriel Díaz at the parque biblioteca Spain

Settlers as second-class citizens

(D Mitlin 2003) writes about the process known as “land invasion” in Latin American countries in which people newly arrived from the countryside fleeing violence and poverty. In Latin America, “[m]ost low-income households in urban areas ... lack secure tenure because acquiring land through formal channels, or purchasing or renting accommodation on legally developed land, is beyond their means.”¹⁷ The result, Geoff Payne writes, is that “non-formal tenure has become the most common single form of land development in most cities.”¹⁸

My interviews with community members made it very clear that the newly arrived population who live in Comunas 13, 1 and 2 are in this category and that the state of illegality imposed limitations and constant insecurity on their living conditions, including the constant threat of evictions, lack of access to water, sanitation, drainage, health care, schools and other forms of infrastructure and services along with the inability to exercise citizen rights and access government programs for the poor (including grants and mortgages to improve their homes). All of this further distances them from changing their status as second-class citizens and increasing their access to basic life services. Maria Leonisa Gomez, a resident of *Comuna 2*, said

When we arrived to Medellín [in the 1970s] there was no water.
No electricity. There were no roads. We would get lost coming

¹⁶ Interview video “la violencia no es toda la Historia comuna 13”

¹⁷ Mitlin, D. 2003. “A fund to secure land for shelter: supporting strategies of the organized poor”. ENVIRONMENT AND URBANIZATION. 15: 181-192.

¹⁸ Payne, Geoff. 2002. Land, rights and innovation: improving tenure security for the urban poor. London: ITDG., pages 3–22.

to our homes. There were just a few shanties [*tugurios*]. The transportation would only arrive up as far as the barrio Villa del Socorro [because the road ended there, a half-mile away from their home up a steep muddy mountainside]. There were just a few families. There were no schools or churches. We made the church of the *Divina Providencia*. That was the first church with the Priest Federico ... There were around 100 houses but [they were] separated from each other.



Figure 6 First shelters at Santo Domingo Savio 1967. Source: Photo album of the Padre Gabriel Díaz at the parque biblioteca Spain.

Gomez said that the priest provided food for the residents as they were building the church and other infrastructural projects. In this way, the priest was serving a function similar to the NGOs. While at face value to an outside, this might look like it is simply mirroring the Catholic Church's colonial conquest exploitation of poor residents; these were very different kinds of priests. Many of the priests working in poor neighborhoods in the 1970s were aligned with Liberation Theology.¹⁹




Figure 7 Padre Gabriel Díaz, Priest at Santo Domingo Savio church 1967 Source: Photo album of the Padre Gabriel Díaz at the parque biblioteca Spain

¹⁹ Araya, Victorio. 1983. *God of the poor the mystery of God in Latin American liberation theology*. Maryknoll <New York>: Orbis Books.

Sirley Natalia Cifuentes of the same *Comuna*, talking not about the 1970s but the 1990s, “before (PUI) we collaborated selling food [*empanadas*] to build the infrastructure of the neighborhood the streets and the sewer.”

Another example of how separated these communities are from the most basic elements of citizenship in the formal city and the nation is exemplified in the Colombian identification card: the *cédula*. In Colombia, the only way to enter state buildings, educational facilities, banks, and other basic needs, including the right to vote, is with this identification card. Without a *cedula*, an individual loses all his or her rights. Non possession of a *cedula* at “random” check points common in Medellín is punishable by jail. An individual without a *cedula* is by legal standards less than a citizen.

Many residents of these communities are not even aware that they, as Colombian citizens, have the right to obtain a *cedula*. In middle and upper income families, when you are seven years old, your parents take you with your birth certificate to the *Registraduría de la Nación* for your first identification card. When you are 18 years old, you follow the same process but you can go yourself to receive your permanent *cedula*. The entire process for obtaining both *cedulas* is free. Some residents of low income neighborhoods do not have birth certificates, let alone knowledge of this bureaucratic process. Other residents who have just fled their homes due to violence in the countryside had to leave their documents behind or lost them along the way. This is yet another dimension of separation between the formal and informal development of the city.

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In 2009, Department of Social Welfare (*Secretaría of bienestar social*) began hosting events in which 300 people at a time would complete the process to get their *cédula*.²⁰

Physical interventions seen as transformative actions

How did the interviewees view the projects actually built in their communities? All 25 interviewees believed that the physical interventions were the way that the municipal state started to close the gap between the state and the community in these territories. Community member Maria Leonisa Gomez said

²⁰ Interviews at the *secretaría of Bienestar social* (social welfare)

When they started talking in a meeting about the cable project²¹ I thought, knowing how terrible this neighborhood is, “Who will bring that here? No one is able to get in here and then for what? We will not be able to have access to it” ... and then we had the opportunity to have it and how many other things I will be able to see now.

This statement reveals not just a community member being satisfied with the state project but the incredulousness with which community members originally met the ideas of the state provided infrastructure *because the state would be afraid of entering there*. Once the physical intervention happened, it opened the possibility to imagine a different kind future state-community relationship. Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz, a resident of Comuna 13 said

They [children] have access to things that we were not able to have before like the computers and the internet. We the less economically favored now have access to the technologies, that gift that they [the state] gave us ... I would not even know how to start or turn off a computer... the metro cable has been strategic. It is great because the image and the physical space around the stations has improved.

This reinforces that the project that seemed impossible to arrive, arrived. Furthermore, the services that were provided to the community were open to everyone in the community and opening more possibilities for the inhabitants. In this case the resource was computer literacy which can dramatically change the youth’s performance in school, access to the job market, and through the internet to the outside world. I am not arguing that a child having access to a computer automatically has all of these things. I am arguing that the community members believe this and this changed what they believe to be relevant actions and involvement with the state.



Figure 8 Parque Biblioteca Belen, internet Room Source: Modelo Medellin, Alcaldia de Medellin.

²¹ First public meetings in Medellín about the implementation of the metro cable system.

4. Institutional Support EDU and the PUI.

The interview produced many comments from EDU members and the community members about the effectiveness of EDU as an institutional bridge among public and private partners, as well as about the PUI process. I have divided my findings into two categories: the institutional dimension of the EDU and the intervention, or action, in the field of the PUI.

Institution (EDU)

- The EDU is an autonomous and efficient branch of the state, whose independence helped to negotiate the bureaucratic process of the different state organisms responsible for the territory of the study area.
- The community sees the EDU as the most visible representation of the state during the Fajardo Administration. The EDU was seen as a non-repressive organism of the state, which has achieved a permanent presence on the territory.

Intervention (PUI)

- The PUI was a concerted effort of all branches of the state at once that intervened in a short timeframe (about 3 years) that made positive and significant changes in the areas of action.
- The PUI provided a new democratic planning framework that provided legitimacy to the physical interventions.
- The efficient delivery of the high quality projects agreed upon by the PUI by the EDU, changed the relationship between the state and the community in the sense that it built trust among the communities for the EDU and the PUI and by extension the state.

Institution (EDU)

Camilo Restrepo, an architect who participated in some the *mesas de trabajo*, planning ideas meetings at the citywide level. These are open to everyone and operate in terms of not just individual communities but the city at large. He was the architect of large city projects including the renovation of Medellín's Botanical Gardens. Restrepo said,

10 years ago there were talks about the violence happening in these areas of the city but there was never a plan for it. And this city, in relation to other Latin American cities, is a really planned one. That was the contribution of the PUI.

José Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo, Director of the PUI in Comuna 6 and 7, mirrors the above statement.

Before the EDU, planeación [the Planning Department] would intervene in the city but only in terms of partial projects, never as a coordinated infrastructure. As an example you have the PRIMED.²² The PRIMED was an entity that tried to improve the quality of the stock of housing already existing mainly in high slope areas, and that today under the PUI is one of the factors in which we intervened. At the PRIMED, there was the *Instituto de credito territorial* [Territorial Credit Institute]. That was only for new housing. But they were never interested in relocating from zones of high risk. That [relocation] is also included in the EDU. So the administration already had the tools to intervene but before this idea of EDU, they existed but acted independently from each other. What the process and the methodology has done is put together all those tools and enriched them with some others that did exist but were not efficient.

Intervention (PUI)

Alejandro Echeverry, the first Director of the EDU under the Fajardo Mayoral administration. He part of the Mayoral political movement and was instrumental in changing the structure of the EDU and selected a group of people, mainly academics to administrate the EDU. He is the person who coins the term “urbanismo social” (social urbanism) which defines the goal of the PUI and the EDU to bring physical infrastructure to low-income areas as a way to more equitable social conditions. Echeverry says about the PUI as a tool to

²² *Regularization of Informal Settlements in Medellin. Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Informales.* PRIMED (Integral Program for the Informal Settlements Improvement of Medellin).

integrate all actions of the states in the community territories. It is not just the state, but the state doing physical projects. He said,

We the [EDU] are the ones with the mission to incorporate all those elements together by using the tools of the administration and to involve the community in the process so they [community members] believe that this will happen and actually become effective. To integrate all actors interested in the territory: the one who administers [the state], the one who operates [the entities who make projects such as state funding agencies, NGOs] and the ones who live there [the community]. Being able to integrate this vision is what makes this project successful.

This view of the EDU as an integrator bringing many different actors into one single project is corroborated by the community member Carmona. When I asked Carmona what, if any, projects had been instrumental in improving the quality of life in his neighborhood in Comuna 13, he said the *"PUI, has made parks, the house of justice and will start to make a series of projects, there is no question that this has affected the lives of people."* When I asked this same question to the other community members I interviewed, they said "yes." While they did not elaborate with specific examples as Carmona did, this is not uncommon when the response is positive.

5. Illegal armed groups

All the interviewees talked about the state of security and power in the areas of study before the interventions. Their narratives explain, with different emphasis, who possessed the power or authority in these areas. The discourse on this subject did not substantially differ among the planners and the community members. Planners did focus on national and citywide security policies in terms of a more academic, broad and abstract understanding of the National conflict. Community members, on the other hand, were more aware of specifically who and when people threatened security, how a power force entered their neighborhood, and ways these illegal actors exercised their acquired power.

The Assistant Director of the Planning Department Juan Diego Lopera, about ways that national security issues impacted security issues in the city. He explained how the failed peace process between the national government and

the FARC leaders under then President Pastrana's leadership impacted the security in the city of Medellín:

We reached a new critical point from 2001-2003 because the violence had risen, because there was an increase in the number of guerrilla groups that were in the city. Thanks to the [Presidential] peace process, they [the guerrilla] were able to get to the urban center, and inside the city they financed [themselves] through extortion, selective kidnappings.

These selective kidnappings are different to mass kidnappings that happened in the rural areas. Lopera argued that

That [Presidential] peace process reduced the economic possibilities in the city, and also it was the moment that external investment left the city along with a large group of Colombians. We were in a peace process that generated a lack of governability given the rise of violence by these groups. Also this justified the creation of what were called Paramilitary groups and this was reflected in the city of Medellín in the poorest and more isolated communities at the edges of the city.

He is referring to armed actors in the neighborhoods where the community members live. The youth in these communities are deeply impacted by the presence of these armed actors in these neighborhoods. For these youth, it becomes a possible source of income where income is hard to come by. The architect Restrepo said "Living with the violence in this country, is living in a non-declared war, where being paramilitary or Guerrilla is a job."

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

In terms of the DDR process, all the interviews reflect a general lack of satisfaction with the outcome. The planning department and politicians agreed that the process was not totally successful but did consider some dimensions of the process to be effective. Juan Diego Lopera, the Assistant Director of the Medellín Planning Department explained that,

the city of Medellín was the only one that has programs and resources to reincorporate this population [ex paramilitary members]. If you look at other areas of the country the national government offered some of the resources [for re-insertion], but Medellín also had a program to continue with this process.

Unlike the national government program, the city of Medellín went beyond just disarmament with impunity; it also provided education, healthcare, and job training. “This was important,” Lopera said, “because at the end this population will if they come from other places stay here, and if we were able to do it right this will be really beneficial for the city.”

Jose Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo the Director of the PUI Noroccidental, considers that the DDR process was largely a failure, due in great part to the change of political ideology with Alonso Salazar, the new Mayor who succeeded Sergio Fajardo Marin. Marin says that this is because the community has lost trust in the DDR process because of its failure in the sense that violence is on the rise again. He said that the EDU is working in these communities with physical projects but the new Mayoral administration has not followed up these new projects with social projects aimed at helping the community negotiate peace accords.

This kind of discontent with the DDR process can be more acute in communities in which people live with the consequences of the failed peace process. Eliana Restrepo, a resident of Comuna 6 for three decades, her entire lifetime said of the DDR process,

this one is a demobilized but still walking the neighborhood with a gun in his pocket? So what was left of the demobilization? It was left in a paper trail. We the inhabitants do not believe in that process.

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The territory of Comuna 1 and 2 had been divided in pieces of territories or turfs by the multiplicity of gangs fighting each other to conquer the vacuum left by the DDR dismantling of the large paramilitary AUC and *Oficina de Envigado* extortion and drug network. See Figure 4. With the ex leader of the AUC or other groups either extradited or dead, each gang would claim its territory sometimes as small as a single block. Restrepo said that this is “why Medellín lives in a new process of violence where there is an internal dispute for power, they are killing themselves from the inside out.”




Figure 9 DDR Process with the AUC Medellin 2003-2007. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin

What is interesting about the perceptions of the DDR is that during my interviews two years before with community members in 2008,²³ the responses about the ongoing process were more positive, irregularities were not evident when asked of community members. They would point out specific successful examples and of reintegration that would not be recorded in official media, such as the participation of ex-militants as construction workers during the construction of the Metro Cable in Santo Domingo. Today those stories have been erased. It shows that the DDR process while originally successful, has failed to be sustainable because the political leaders were not vigilant about making sure the exmilitants were complying with DDR rules and the lack of compromise in which the government did not publicly acknowledge the DDR reinserted into the labor pool and into civil life. A major case in point is that 60% of the metro cable in Comuna 1 and 2 were built by reinsertados but the company responsible for building it did not want this information to be public because of the negative image that the reinsertados have of being criminals and dangerous. The company feared this fact would damage its reputation. As in the EDU-run Imaginary Workshops in the Comunas in the initial stages of planning, this company desire to hide its reinsertado source of labor from the general public reveals ways that an underlying class dynamic complicates and works against the goals of complete re-integration of these groups into the middle and upper income sectors of Medellín society.²⁴

In my opinion, the fragmentation of the conflict between a multiplicity of gangs that we see today can be seen as a partial success of the DDR program, but not one that was expected. It was successful because it dismantled the large power

²³ *La violencia no es toda la Historia, historical Memory Project.*

²⁴ Marko, Tamera. "Invisible Workers: youth, power & nation-building as negotiations of peace in Medellín, Colombia." Unpublished manuscript. 2008.

structure of the paramilitary network. However, this dismantling process failed to micro-manage the multiplicity of smaller, largely youth-run gangs that the larger paramilitary organization had absorbed during their attack on the territory. These gangs (known as *combos*) are the ones operating today in the territory and are responsible for the new rise in violence there.

This failure of the DDR process reveals a positive dimension of the city's physical interventions in the territories, a positive dimension that is perhaps one of the most important findings in this study. This new gang violence reveals that the new physical projects established during the PUI, maintain their autonomy from illegal groups during this resurgence of violence. These physical spaces, in fact, were safe havens where I performed my interviews in Comuna 1 and 2. They maintain the legitimate presence of the state with the neighborhood and continue operating under these circumstances. Furthermore, the public transportation links (metrocable linked directly to the metro line) are the only way to bypass the mobility restrictions imposed on the inhabitants by the fighting groups.

It is clear that in the near future, the strength of the state's presence alone will not be the final solution. Restrepo who lives in Comuna 6 articulated in poignant fashion these preconditions that are necessary for the future sustainability of the project:

There should be a new process of negotiation with these groups, a process that generates opportunities, but not only for the ones who are armed [but also] for the ones who are not armed so we don't have this problem again in five years.

6. Infrastructure as Security

I questioned community members about security issues. All community members responded by either stating directly or inferring ways that the physical projects increase security in their neighborhood. These interviews provided a vision of the new projects and their amenities as tools to modify the perception of security.

The programmatic and design qualities of the new projects created new safe areas inside the neighborhood that are accessible to all members of the community where the state and legal security forces are always present. The new security forces provide a passive authority that is not contested by the

present armed actors in the neighborhood. Juan Diego Lopera, the Assistant Director of Planning said,

The public infrastructure— schools, libraries, high schools, sports facilities, the new police stations— seek to become places of encounter. When we acquire the land to make this project we usually found that the people who would use the public space around these places were the illegal arm groups. Today these are the places where now the entire community have events that occur in this place.

The new projects (Parques Bibliotecas, public parks, schools and metro stations) provided a network, new nodes of safe heavens. This happened because each one of these new investments in infrastructure were accompanied by security measures to protect those investments. Each metro station in Medellin had the presence of the national police force. Other types of infrastructure were equipped with the traditional private security. In the Parque Biblioteca España , for example, the *Caja de Compensacion Comfama*, uses the same private security company to guard all their buildings and they do so also in the Parques Bibliotecas.

What is special to each one of these cases is that before the insertion of these projects, these security forces were not present, and if they did they were seen as repressive strategies and because of that did not create safe areas. One key example of a repressive security force is in Comuna 13 where a new military installation was put in place after the *Operacion Orion*. These forces patrolled the neighborhood and continue repressive physical and psychological²⁵ techniques of repression over the territory and, thus made permanent the siege of the area.

This and other fortresses like it have bulletproof walls and windows and blast-protection devices and holes in the wall where people on the inside can shoot back at people on the outside. These fortresses, in security terms, are hermetically sealed and not inviting for the public. The mission of these

²⁵ Like riding in motorcycles around the neighborhood in large groups, similar to the tactic used by police forces in east L.A. to repress the Black Panthers.

fortresses is to establish the *repressive* state presence. In contrast, these new physical spaces are not fortresses, like most of the traditional police stations that are located in these periphery neighborhoods. In and around the new physical spaces, the security forces are minimal and their mission is to protect the assets in the neighborhood. The security measures in these projects are the same security measures implemented in any public building or public space throughout the city. A key value of these security forces is that they are not seen by community members as a repressive force.

The other important factor of these surveillance-as-safe-havens is that they are located in environments that encourage loitering. They are places designed for people to occupy them, but not necessarily with the intention to do a specific activity. In other words, they are public spaces in the traditional Greek sense. The real value of this condition is that especially in marginalized neighborhoods like the ones in Comunas 13, 1 and 2, loitering in public space, such as the street (more specifically a street corner) is synonymous with criminal activity. Poor youth gathered on a street corner in Medellín is seen as a sign of youth involved in a criminal activity and this context of loitering usually inspires repressive police force.



Figure 10 Routine enforcement of security on the streets in Medellín. Source: *El Universo*.

This is in stark contrast to large groups of middle and upper class youth who loiter in public spaces outside cafes, restaurants and bars and residences and shopping malls in other neighborhoods throughout the city, especially on Friday

and Saturday nights. These youth are not seen as criminals, but rather consumers.²⁶

The metro stations and the Parques Bibliotecas are open every day and for extended hours beyond the typical 9-to-5 workday. This provides an extensive and secure flux of activity in these public spaces and even when these spaces are closed the areas around them have surveillance 24 hours a day. This is why even regarding moments of new or mutated violence, all the community interviewees responded to my question about whether the projects had contributed to lowering violence in their neighborhood, with an affirmative response. This affirmation came even when community members disagreed with other policies implemented in their neighborhoods or even when they were opposed to specific new projects built in their neighborhoods.

Maria Leonisa Gomez, age, resident of Comuna 1 comments about this,

We are really happy now that there are police. It is better that the mayor has helped us a lot. For me everything has been really good ... This has also helped to improve a lot of things and has avoided many other problems. Now you are able to see the law [police] walking around. Before, the police were not in the neighborhood and if you would call them, they would be afraid to come. Now at least you can see them; before we could not count on them. And if we said anything they would not come, and if they came everything had already happened and there was nothing to see.

In January 2010, Medellín saw an increase of violence among small gangs fighting for territorial commercial power that had opened up by the extradition of Don Berna,²⁷ a paramilitary leader in Medellín. Once again gangs divided these neighborhoods into small territories they could control, sometimes at the scale of a single block. This made free mobility through the neighborhood difficult. When interviewing for this thesis project, I conducted many of the interviews inside public buildings such as the Parques Bibliotecas, and PUI offices, and/or in the public spaces dominated by these buildings where interviewees felt that it was safe for them and for me. Sometimes as part of the interview we would venture beyond the public spaces up to the limits where interviewees were, by the new armed groups, not allowed to cross.

²⁶ Marko, Tamera. "Invisible Youth."

²⁷ Hugh, Bronstein. "Colombia's Medellin hit by new wave of drug violence | Reuters." *Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News* | Reuters.com. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20434908> (accessed May 6, 2010).

What this shows is that even where other pacification strategies such as the DDR fail and create (or allow space for) new bursts of violence, the claimed public spaces continue offering the safe havens where the state administration and the community mixed.




Figure 11 Safe Heaven interpretation based on an interview survey. (White outlined areas represent new project areas that are also safe heavens) Source: The Author.

7. Projects changing the perception of security through design

The state of many of the schools at the time of the new physical projects required maintenance or complete reconstruction. Juan Diego Lopera, Assistant Director of the Planning Department of Medellín, explained the way the state had traditionally perceived its role in the school installations and the new philosophy intervention there. He said,

... sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between a school and a hen house. This was because many educational facilities in these areas started with the state buying a single house and placing in it a teacher. So, there was not a consciousness of

what an educational facility was ... in this administration they (the Sergio Fajardo team) understood that the public buildings had to be of good quality so the state could get recognized, respected [among people in the community] and for this intervention to generate a sense of pride and belonging.

This response is very similar to how Sergio Fajardo describes the repositioning of schools. He shows the “before picture” of a school, where a man is urinating on the outside school wall. Then “the after picture,” a modernized, totally rebuilt school. In his words:

Think about the kid who went to that school, and who now goes to this one. Think about her mother who left her in that school and today leaves her in this one. Think about the teacher who taught there and now does so on the best chalkboard that the city can offer. Think about the community... we arrive and we eliminate violence ... the man on the street he does not go there [to urinate] anymore. And inside we have a traditional project of improving the quality of education. But the quality of education starts with the dignity of the space.



Figure 12 Before and after school picture at Conference del Miedo a la Esperanza of Sergio Fajardo (Man Urinating on the street). Source: Sergio Fajardo.

The exercise of modifying the physical space of the criminalized neighborhood is not only an exercise in changing the internal perception of the community about themselves. More importantly, it is a way to remove the blanket stigma of criminal that people outside these neighborhoods place on the people who live

inside them. In Medellín, (as in many other cities in the world), belonging to this type of communities brings an automatic stigma that limit the residents' access to opportunities, such as jobs in an already difficult national market. Interviewees narrate how difficult it was to access some jobs when they disclose in which neighborhood they lived.

The PUJ projects, have at some level, eliminated the scope of this perceptual criminalization. At least 50% percent of the community members interviewed acknowledge a change in outsiders' perception of the population in general about their community. They support this claim largely through their increased access to employment. All interviewees from the community and the planners and politicians most often mentioned the Parques Bibliotecas as playing a role in this changing perception.

Camilo Restrepo is the architect of the new pavilion at the Botanical Gardens, part an urban project called the new north (the north of Medellín is the poorest area) that revitalized old entertainment and educational infrastructures. About this urban project he said,

A great paradox of this process is that the neighborhood association of El Poblado [Comuna 14 is El Poblado, the richest neighborhood in Medellín where some homes have six-car garages and apartments with a swimming pool for each floor] has lobbied to obtain a meeting with the Mayor and the planning department because they find it terrible that this neighborhood does not have a library (a Parque Biblioteca). The paradox is that this is a neighborhood that has everything, where there are the most opportunities in the city. Here there is the desire to have the same infrastructure as that of the neighborhood that historically has not had anything.

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It is this desire to have the same level of opportunities as the poorest neighborhoods that is striking about this statement. It shows that areas not usually part of the city as places of reference for coveted *infrastructure* and *spaces* have the potential to make changes in middle and upper-class perceptions of low-income *inhabitants* of these neighborhoods. Alejandro Echeverry, the former EDU Director and the one who coined the term "urbanismo social" said,

If you understand how the conflicts developed in the territory, the modification of that territory from the physical point of view is a really potent strategy but not the only one. That's why I think that we were right to place the projects where we did, where we put the Parques Bibliotecas and with which projects they are connected.

Echeverry emphasized that while “these projects were made with a competition open at the national level” and that this competition resulted in high quality projects, the real “success of the projects is where they are placed and with what they are connected and what you put next to them. Those are the urban decisions.”

Sirley Natalia Cifuentes, a resident of Comuna 1, also framed these projects as responsible in some ways for transforming the neighborhood.

After the construction of the physical projects there was an effect on the amount of violence in the neighborhood, it was a very large change...The metro cable has improved the neighborhood a lot.

A resident of another neighborhood, Comuna 13, Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz said of the Parques Biblioteca in his community,

That was a spectacular impact, you can see that many of the kids of the neighborhood use the Parques Bibliotecas and spend less time on the street. They have access to things that we were not able to have before like the computers and the internet. We the least economically favored now have access to the technologies, that gift that they give us. I would not even know how to start or turn off a computer. The community has appropriated that space in an impressive way. You see kids of all economic levels (*estratos*) in the Parques Bibliotecas. There is no discrimination for the way you dress. They treat everyone as equal. [This provides the] capacity that the kids need to acquire to get out of the conflict.

I see this *unidad* [sports facilities, another project] is occupied at all times. The good thing about that is that there the young kid or adult has his time occupied instead of being on a corner looking at people and at what kind of crime he is going to commit. Eight years ago these areas that did not have any function... [now] people will do their things in these spaces.

Juan David Carmona, a resident of Comuna 13 believes the key projects that have transformed his neighborhood especially include the metro cable, PUI, the PB, and the Parque Biblioteca. He also said that he believes that the *fondo EPM* (university grants) and the *tiquetes estudiantiles* (transportation subsidies for students) have had a great impact in Comuna 13 specifically and throughout the entire city in general.

Several community members also mention the metro cable as transforming their neighborhoods and daily lives in significant ways. Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz says,

The metro cable has been great. Transportation has improved by 95%. The comuna, the metro cable has been a great strategy because the image and the physical space around the station has improved. Also because it has created spaces that are secure and protected and are not isolated areas, places where you can gather, but it is also the transportation that is a great thing.

Juan David Carmona, another community member, said about the food stands and craft vendors outside the metro cable and lining the walkway up to the Parque Biblioteca entrance that “the metro cable created an economic resurgence of community-owned projects around this project. We have not seen that before. Lopera, the Assistant Director of Planning said,

Before the cable there was not a single bank in Santo Domingo [Comuna 1 and 2]... You can see how tourism has changed in the city, the hotel industry in Medellín used to take vacations [close] during holidays. That says a lot about the [tourist] industry in the city and that has changed completely now.

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The other way of measuring successful changes in perception is the inclusion of the northern territories in the touristic maps that represent the city of Medellín. Until 2007, all representation of the touristic city maps did not show the entire urban area. They limit their representations of the city to the historical center and wealthier areas of Laureles and El Poblado.



Figure 13 Tourist maps of Medellín before and after the interventions in red is the comuna 1 and 2 with the metro cable and the Parque Biblioteca España mark. Source: www.medellininfo.com and Alcaldía de Medellín.

Since the introduction of these new infrastructures, the north of the city has become part of this map. This inclusion is because of the impact of the new scenic transportation system (metro cable) and because of the introduction of the building infrastructure at a city scale, such as the PB *parques bibliotecas* that continue receiving up to 2,000 visitors a day. These hordes of tourists are not really interested in visiting poverty, as with traditional tours of *favelas* in Brazil or the Darhavi “Sum” in India. On the contrary, the tourists are there for the experience of what to them is this new and strange transportation system that gives them the opportunity to enjoy stunning views of the city and because they want to visit the Parques Bibliotecas as architecturally interesting pieces. They are there in the comuna 1 and 2 to see these citywide infrastructure projects that cannot be seen in any other areas of the city and that represent the unique experience of the “transformation process of Medellín.”

This indirect exposure that the community receives, not for their lack of resources as in the case of poverty tourism, but instead in terms of the resources that they do have and which are desirable and unique, is important. It makes these communities, once invisible, now visible in the eyes of an entire community and makes the tourists participants in the productive activities of the city in general.

The next chapter will explore ways in which the themes found in my interviews can become lessons learned from Medellín as a Best Practice case study.

Medellin Case as a “Best Practice”

What are the lessons learned?

This section explores the possibility of applying lessons learned from the Medellin case as Best Practice to other similar contexts. These contexts especially focus on cities where longtime informal settlements (in existence from 10 to 60 years or more) have lacked a consistent state presence, a situation, which in turn, has enabled other organizations to challenge state authority over the territory. Lessons learned here might be meaningful, for example, to the current struggle with informal communities and narcotraffic wars in cities throughout Mexico.

These are the preconditions that help to identify the territories and community where this practice might be implemented.


- Extreme poverty. These communities live (often well) under the poverty line. Because of this they are not able to access to the formal housing market, which forces them to appropriate and build their environment illegally.
- Isolation from the state. This condition of illegality generates a situation in which the informal community lives in a kind of public services limbo that impedes the state (by negligence or lack of resources) from delivering the full scope of its services.
- Forced Migration. These communities, often relatively unexpected and in massive and sudden numbers, arrive to the city but lack the resources and network connections to access the formal city and to become part of the formal productive core. Later generations of these migrations will still lack the possibility of access to those networks because the physical space of the informal communities to which they come reinforces the economic and social isolation of such communities.
- The condition of isolation from the state and its public services permits other actors to challenge the authority of the state. This intensifies levels of insecurity in the community and in the city at large.

The “Best Practice” is a way to reclaim the sovereignty of the state over the territory by modifying the physical conditions of the space and connecting its territory and their inhabitants to the benefits of the formal productive structure of the city. By physically modifying the territory, the projects guarantee a network of formal structure that will make it more difficult for armed illegal actors to challenge the sovereignty of the state. The projects return what I call “apparently lost citizenship” of the community affected. They are an attempt to modify the way these individuals are perceived in the eyes of the overall community. The integration of the informal city with the productive city and the provision of all state services open a window of opportunities for the community to participate democratically and economically in the decision making process of their community and of the future of the city.

This best practice tries to eliminate the conditions of marginalization through the implementation of physical projects that are complemented by policies learned from the Medellin case. Of course marginalization and social inequality are larger issues at a macro and micro scale that cannot only be removed by the implementation of a project like this. The resurgence of violence in the last year (2010) in some of the communities of this case study in Medellín is an example and warning of the limitations of some of these practices.

Concluding lessons

Here I have created six concluding best practice lessons that I see emerging from the intersected themes of this study. This is an initial idea for the creation of a best case practice that can be applied to other contexts.



- **Participation of the community in the process of transformation** of their environment and as a way to create sustainable partnerships and participative planning.
- **Legitimization of the community** which removes the illegal conditions of the environment in which the inhabitants lived and also removes the repercussions of how this illegal status modifies the way community members are perceived by the broad community (City and Nation) as illegal and thereby criminals.
- **Institutional and Project Coordination** between the different organizations that operate in the territory. These organizations should be a combination governmental and non- governmental. Their actions need to be a collective effort throughout the territory in a concise time frame such as three to five years.
- **Security Strategy** involves negotiations with all actors who are harmful to the community security to create momentum for the possibility of the introduction of a different kind of security force through the use of new physical infrastructures. This is a passive strategy because of its focus on negotiation and invitation from the community to obtain higher levels of security not just provided outside the community from the state, but with state police sources within the community itself.
- **Presence of the State** uses the new projects to introduce a permanent presence of the non-oppressive branches of the state. This is an attempt to close the gap between the state and the community that leave spaces for armed actors to challenge state authority in the territory.
- **Design as an Agent of Social Change** is a tool that makes all interventions visible and effective. It is the motor that changes the perceptions of the larger community about the inhabitants of the marginalized communities where the projects are placed and it is the tool that guarantees community improvement through providing of a higher quality environment.

1. Participation in the Process of Transformation

At the PUI, community involvement became a fundamental instrument of communication and to secure the sustainability of the projects. In Medellín, the EDU used simple planning participation techniques and while I see them as not enough, the community in general did not see them as a failure. This happened because processes like this had not been implemented before by the state and because this process built on the same communication strategies that NGOs, that did have a strong presence in the communities, had previously (and

sometime currently) employed there. The community's sense of agency and investment in participating with the state and other actors and make decisions about their community's future was fundamental for the initiation, completion and sustainability of the projects.

There are two main components of this strategy that are crucial to consider. The first is the process of the participation in the intervention and the second is a longer process of participation in which the community actually takes control of their own future. In Medellín, I saw an initial stage of this reflected in the Participatory Budget.

Participation in the intervention. Steps necessary to achieve the participation goals of the project:

- **Increase the level of community participation in the territory.** The present state of power that the community possesses in the area of interventions is that what was effective about the Medellín case is that the type of participation that existed in the community was increased. It is not that it is enough, but because nothing had been done before, to do anything seemed like a giant increase. This relatively low benchmark must be increased incrementally once the process starts. It is important for the community to feel that they have achieved more control over their future than they had before. This moving up the "Ladder of Citizen Participation" ¹ Arnstein (1969) is not only beneficial for the community as they participate more in the decisions of their future but also distributes the responsibilities for the result of the project among all actors (State and Community).
- **Negotiation with all actors** in positions of authority (illegal or otherwise) in contested spaces is crucial. The community and armed actors alike must play a fundamental role in the signing of necessary peace contracts necessary before any project can arrive to the area. This process of contracts and peace negotiations should serve as the starting point of a larger pacification process. In the case of Medellín, the non-armed actors were left out in later stages of the peace (security) negotiations process, which removed a crucial partner that could have helped to make the

¹ Arnstein, Sherry R. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," *JAI/P*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969, pp. 216-224.

contracts between the state and the armed groups more sustainable. This isolation of the non-armed actors from the process also created the perception that only those who challenge the authority of the state benefited. This creates an incentive to become part of an illegal armed group. In the case of Medellín, it was the community that first understood that there were irregularities (breaches in contract) in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DDR process. Making the non-armed community members participants throughout the process can serve a system of control and alert about irregularities and a disincentive to re-arm.

- **Use of local channels of communication** is essential in any planning process. In the Medellín case, the use of already existing local channels of communication along with parallel new local channels created a cohesive network that kept the community informed and aware of all advances of the project. This communication also removed or at least mitigated the uncertainty about the intentions of the state toward the community (the constant fear of eviction of informal settlers). These communication channels need to be functional before, during and after the intervention. They serve as a link between the community and the institution of the state responsible for the modification of the space. After concluding the project, institutional support for them need to morph into permanent institutions.
- **Continue a clear participatory process** with multiple checks and balances where the community can execute their leverage as decision makers. Visual agreements proved to be successful in transferring community input into project designs. In other words, community members in the “imaginaries workshops” drew their ideas, which were then collected by the EDU staff and made into computer renders. Another element in this role is that the community named the buildings and public spaces after members of their own communities. In Medellín, as in many Latin American countries, traditional state infrastructure practices name projects after politicians who participated in them. For example, the government-built neighborhood Carlos E. Restrepo in Medellín is named after an exPresident Carlos E. Restrepo. It is important to point out that in the Fajardo regime’s case in Medellín, the community named the spaces not just after those in positions of authority from the state or outside NGOs, but also after members and groups they recognize in their own communities.

- **The Participatory Budget** allowed two general goals. One is that the process of prioritizing and negotiating between sometimes competing community factions established positive lines of communications that generated a more cohesive community. The other goal is that it provided funding to local NGOs that otherwise could not support themselves in a community prioritized (not state) framework (plan).

This process of collaboration between differing factions over a sustained long-term process provides the basis for a community-based future plan that can compete or inform the city wide plan. This strategy is similar to Paul Davidoff's (1965) "Advocacy Planning."² Advocacy planning is a theory that argues not for creating one master plan but for creating multiple plans by multiple actors throughout the city. These plans then compete with each other to find the best solution for the city. With the communities using their funds from the Participatory Budgets to create plans was the starting point of what might be considered community planning.

The practice of a participatory budget is contradictory in the sense that it is a highly technocratic planning practice that requires political and technical expertise to be applied in the territory. Therefore, tools need to be put in place to make the participative budget more accessible to the general community—and also less controllable by the interests of the technocrats.

The following changes need to happen for the practice of participatory budget to be truly participative:

- Accessible to the community at large and not only to large community organizations
- Instruments of evaluation that control its autonomy from the state
- Third-party administration of the participatory budget that is impartial to both the state and community.

2. Legitimization of Informal Settlements:

Removal of the illegality of the informal settlement is crucial to provide the community not only legal shelter but also to access their rights as citizens. Land tenure is a pre requisite to any intervention in the area and it is also a way to control any process of gentrification by upgrading of the neighborhood in ways that, through cost of living increases, pushes the original community members

² Davidoff, Paul. *Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning*. Stein, Jay M. 2004. Classic readings in urban planning: an introduction. Chicago: APA Planners Press.

out. Tenure removes the label of illegal from the population and also assures that all economical benefits of the project go to the community and its members.

Legitimization of informal settlements is a complex project. Some of the conditions that need to be achieved to comply with this strategy are:

- **Evaluations of the existing conditions**, including surveying the level of tenure as well as the quality and risk of housing units.
- **Legalization of tenure** requires negotiating with landowners and the community members to carry out proper legal procedures expedite the process and issue titles. This is challenging, not only because it requires negotiations with multiple disagreeing parties, but also re-negotiations of existing land legislation and land condemnation.
- **Determine the areas of high risk** to then develop an infrastructure of stabilization and environmental control in ways that also promote the proper technologies and practices to mitigate risk.
- **Home improvement** is fundamental through the granting of land tenure, and providing technical and economic support to upgrade the housing units to the level acceptable living conditions.
- **Housing relocation** is the most sensitive project. Time frames for the construction and delivery of the units need to allow the community to be relocated before all other projects (such as public buildings, parks) are concluded. The success of the overall project will measure the efficacy of these deliveries. Members of the community to be relocated should be placed in areas as close to their original homes as possible because members that get relocated to other areas of the city will suffer the sacrifice of being severed from their roots and community, plus they will not benefit from the improvements of the coordinated network of interventions organizations (such as the PUI) bring to their community out of which they were relocated.

These strategies deal with the legal definitions of illegality based on the status of tenure. Other strategies are directed toward removing the stigma of illegality that the city at large applies to members of informal communities.

3. Coordinated Network of Interventions

As exemplified by the PUI, to be able to bring to the territory a massive amount of numerous projects and revamp the image of an entire neighborhood in a span of a few years, it is fundamental to include the community members themselves. These interventions need to come from different governmental and

non-governmental institutions and should all be coordinated in a way that fulfills a single objective. To do so it is important that the institution that oversees the larger project has the agency to do the projects and the autonomy to coordinate all multiple actors.

Two different strategies need to be accomplished to create this network of intervention: the institutional coordination and the coherent project.

Institutional coordination is a process in which the state is required to have an independent entity that has the autonomy and political leverage to negotiate with all state branches intervening in the territory and also with other partners like NGOs and other state level organizations and private partners.

This entity must have the knowledge base necessary to plan and implement the project.

- **Acquired local knowledge** is fundamental. In the case of Medellín, the EDU benefited from the incorporation within its institution of multiple groups who brought with them already acquired knowledge. (For example, a research group studying the physical projects for informal settlements in Medellín at the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, fieldwork and community participation of a state organization like the PRIMED). It was this combination of academic knowledge and the effectiveness of a proved practice that created the necessary resources and foundation to plan and implement the project along with the community.
- **Institutional independence** from bureaucratic responsibilities is necessary to execute the project.
- **Interdisciplinary and inter-institutional collaboration** is essential. The organization coordinated all this needs to communicate with a multiplicity of diverse individuals and organizations. Their staff needs to reflect that diversity. One failure that I found in the EDU was that the majority of its staff was comprised of architects, which narrowed the ability to deal with other dimensions of the complex environment in which they are working.
- **Political Leverage** is necessary to be effective when in negotiation with multiple state and private partners. This institution needs sufficient support of the political base in government power. Without this political leverage, it will be difficult to negotiate the complexity of internal power disputes.

The coherent project is a single project that creates a swift positive change in the conditions of the area of intervention. With this project, the state declares its commitment to the community that it had neglected. The projects and its programs represent this commitment; the projects quality guarantees their acceptance by the community and, in return, the sustainability of the new relationship between the state and the community. The application of physical

urban strategies that accompany citywide policies need to achieve a series of requirements.

- **Multiple actions within a single project** involve public and private partners that act throughout the territory of the intervention. This multiplicity of actors in a single project increases the project's effectiveness and reduces the potential for redundancy of initiatives.
- **Concrete and short time frame** is crucial for the project's success requiring that the planning, design and execution of projects have clearly defined boundaries of space and time.
- **Physical projects should lead all interventions after peace negotiations** because they are the most visible actions of the state and the ones that are easier to measure for success. This success is necessary to maintain their momentum and apply all the initiatives.
- **Open and Sustainable Programs** within the projects need to be sustainable over time and increases that the chances that the space in which the state has entered does not get challenge by other actors.

4. Security and Public Space

The security in marginalized areas needs to be understood in two scales: One that deals with the community in general and with the armed actors in the territory specifically and the second eliminates some of the conditions that make the physical urban space prone being appropriated by these armed illegal groups. This idea of the importance of physical design in controlling human behavior is first explained by the studies of Newman (1973) in terms of what he calls "Defensive Space."³ In the case of Medellín, not only was there a clear designation between public and private, as in Newman's theory but also that the public space lacked the legal frame to work as such. The inexistence of a state had made the public space a battlefield in which various armed groups fought over the authority of the state.

³ Newman, Oscar. 1973. *Defensible space; crime prevention through urban design*. New York: Collier Books.

Negotiation with armed actors

If something can be learned about the failed DDR peace process with the Autodefensas in Medellín it is that failed negotiations are better than no negotiations at all. Lives have been saved as shown in the conclusions of Spagat (2006). The initial success (reduction of violence) of the DDR process created a space for the swift implementation of a multiplicity of projects and policies that required a more complex implementation plan if the initial agreements were not being reached. Based on that perspective, negotiation is a way to open the door to implementation. When the peace processes seem to have failed and new armed groups attempt to gain power over the territory, the safe areas that have been created by the projects serve as strongholds to maintain the link that had been created between the state and the community.

Based on the Medellín case, a way to improve peace negotiations in this kind of territory would be for the incentives given to armed actors for (re) entering into civil society, also need to be extended to include the broader community. They need to happen at different scales with three types of populations to make it sustainable: (1) illegal armed actors, (2) populations at risk of being included in illegal armed groups, and (3) the rest of the civil community. These negotiations should provide concessions and opportunities to each group based on their needs.

Urban Physical Security

Security is also obtained by the design of all new public space. Secured new public spaces reduce the possibilities of armed actors to engage in violence in and around the spaces. This also increases mobility in and around the new spaces, in sharp contrast to the mobility in the rest of the community. This creates safe spaces where all citizens— locals and foreigners—can interact.

- a. **Public buildings add public space** as required by the projects. These public facilities need to be non-exclusive (open to all) and to service extended hours. Those two conditions maintain the vitality of the public realm and confirm that they are open to the entire community.
- b. **Fragmented nonaggressive security**, through public or private provision, is also extended to their public spaces. These non-repressive security forces throughout the territory in a sustainable way (paid by each new project's budget) will generate a better sense of security than the usual sporadic and coordinated military terror strategies usually implemented in urban areas that have been recognized as violent.
- c. **Location of new infrastructure** must also recognize that the neighborhood already has a public network structure in which important places and buildings play a fundamental role in the

mental, spiritual, economic, and social structure of the neighborhood. New infrastructure (buildings, roads, public spaces) needs to be aware of the existing public network structure's existence and navigate their already intrinsic power to build on the new infrastructure.

- d. **Revive negative spaces** with new physical structures through type of use and design. In Medellín, many spaces that were used for summary executions, because they were areas not owned and secured, later became the public spaces such as parks and plazas) the decision about changing these spaces should come from the participatory planning process with the community. But the success of the project would arrive with a high quality design that invites these spaces to be owned and occupied by the community that before had feared these same spaces.

5. Permanent Presence of the Non-Aggressive State in the Territory

It is important that physical non-repressive forms of the state get grounded permanently in the neighborhood. These are highly symbolic pieces of infrastructure that demonstrate a contract between the community and the state. They are a physical link that will maintain the sustainability of those relationships in the future.

- **Physical presence** of the state is needed. In the Medellín case some of the new projects in the territory became physical extensions or branches of the state that claim permanent presence on the territory.
- **Long-term viability** is necessary. This new public project needs to be sustained on a long-term basis.
- **To be accessible to all members of the community** or be a multiplicity of structures that, in aggregate encompasses all members of the community.

6. Design as an Agent of Social Change

The case of Medellín has taught us that good design is the tool that makes all interventions visible and effective. It is the motor that changes the perceptions of the larger community regarding the inhabitants of the marginalized communities where the projects are placed and is the tool to provide an environment with a higher quality of life.

- a. **Design as the tool that makes all interventions visible and effective** is most important. Without idea of high quality, all of these efforts and projects by the state or any other organization would have been invisible. A lower quality project would have just reaffirmed the second-class citizenship stigma linked with the inhabitants. In the case of Medellín, 143 schools were already in place but lacking in quality. The repositioning of some of them make them visible and improve the livelihood of all the community not only of the students and teachers. While the quantitative assessment of these improvements did would be marginal compared with the momentum for further change which they generated.
- b. **Design as the motor that changes perception** of the quality of the space, measured in terms of the commitment of the state to the marginalized community. This also sends a message to the city at large or regional community, as well as toward the newly perceived acquired citizenship of the inhabitants of the area.

Enhancement of the community provides a higher quality environment. Good design is the tool to incrementally improve the quality of the environment in which the community lives.

- Quality of design can be ensured when the projects are open competition for all new important projects. This is an easy strategy to obtain quality of design and to publicize the projects.
- Replace improvised state infrastructure with careful and high quality planning and design.
- Use of Innovation ideas in good design can be a way to bridge between the intrinsic difficulties of working in an environment of urban developed informality.

Implementation methodology

Based on the previous learned lessons this section explains a tentative sequence in which those lessons need to be implemented.

a. **Identify where to act**

- Identify the territory of the city where the state does not have a legitimate presence.
- Define its boundaries.
- Select those areas with the most needs. Evaluate at multiple scales and with multiple variables the type of needs in the territory in comparison to rest of the city.

b. **Identify actors in the area of work**

- Illegal armed groups. All organizations that challenge the authority of the state in the marginalized territory.
- Populations at risk, especially youth.
- Marginalized community – all members of the community
- State and all their dependencies that need to work on the territory
- Citywide as a unified project
- Other partners

c. **Create leadership** for the project

Create institutional support for the execution of all future projects and build a knowledge base. Use the local knowledge already explored and explores new interacting possibilities.

d. **Negotiate truces**

e. **Concerted Planning process**

- Understand the present level of participation and improve on it
- Create a clear and concise planning process that improves the present level of participation
- Create long-range strategies for future increase in community participation in decisions about the environment governance.

f. **Identification of projects**

- **Identify risk areas in the present territory** and map of project areas that need to deal with the ambiguity of ownership of public space and the possibility of challenging state authority by armed actors.
- **Identify existing public structure** so the new projects can build on them.
- **Create a network of new infrastructure** that connects all previously identified areas.

g. Control for quality

- Competition
- Innovation

h. Implement as swift as possible and under a clear and achievable schedule.

i. Create sustainability strategies. This consolidates, in the long term, the presence of the state and their involvement on the future of the area of study.

Conclusion

This study has six important initial findings:

1. There is an apparent relationship between the conditions of informal settlements and how they become prone to conflict. Informal settlements' isolation from (usually) all state institutions makes it easy for other state-like actors to access and control its territories. The case explored in this thesis suggests that would be more cost effective to for the state take these extensive approaches applied "quickly" over the span of even just three years. This includes legalization of land tenure for members of informal communities, and provisions of basic and good quality infrastructure. This, approach, I believe can be applied to other cases in the world.
2. The perception of increased participation with state decisions, especially in their own communities, makes the community feel included in the development process.
3. Making coordinated interventions over a reduced amount of time and space produce a cohesive change momentum. This permits addressing t large failures caused by, in great part, the lack of state presence in informal settlements.
4. The quality physical interventions make all the other interventions visible. The lack of high quality physical interventions makes all those efforts invisible.
5. "Urbanismo Social" is indeed a re-urbanization strategy that intends to deliver a higher quality of architecture and urban interventions to the city in general but particularly to the poorest areas of the city traditionally abandoned by the state. While citizens are involved, and there are many levels of participation in the Urbanismo Social, it is far removed from the idea of a bottom-up approach as might be defined in wealthier countries with high levels of community participation as part of the planning process. The *Urbanismo Social* is still a "top down" design approach, performed by the educated elites guided toward the poor. Nevertheless, this process, in the context of the city of Medellín is radical. It is radical in the sense that the government is working directly and intensely with residents of poor communities building public infrastructure with a higher level of quality than the state has ever done before.

6. State secure public buildings are instrumental in conquering unsafe spaces for the use of the community. The security that these projects provide, plus the beneficial programs that they contain, together make the areas where they are implemented safe for all inhabitants and foreigners. This combination of non aggressive security and provision of state services in a high quality envelope provide the legitimizing presence of the state in areas where its sovereignty has been contested.

Applicability of the case of Medellín to other contexts

The Medellín case provides methodologies that can be applied to two types of contexts: violent urban conflicts and informal settlements.

Urban violent conflict

In Medellín, the strategies implemented by the administration of Sergio Fajardo. were performed in the context of a national negotiation of peace process with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The policies implemented by the local administration supply support for those implemented at the national level and permitted a longer period of apparent stability (around 3 years) until the accords of the peace process were “broken” and a new and modified situation violence resurged. What in today in Medellín is called the “la Guerra de Combos.” The space that this truce created permitted the implementation of a multiplicity of projects.

The Medellín case provided examples of methodologies of negotiation on situations of urban conflict. Also the Medellín case proves that applying policies and projects on these truce periods generated positive results even when violence and conflict reappeared in the urban context. The infrastructural interventions (public spaces, buildings, transportation stations) generated new safe spaces in the interior of the communities that maintain the sovereignty of the state even after new (or modified) aggressors started military actions in the territory. This network of safe spaces had permitted other institutions and organizations affiliated or not with the state to maintain their actions in the conflicted areas. This provided a larger sense of security than the one that existed before the application of the policies.

Informal settlements.

The Medellín case provides information about how to deal with the complex situation of informal settlements in the world. Its approach does not center on the provision of housing as a solution for the informal settlement problems. This

approach provides a new positive perspective on a topic and one that had generated the desirable outcomes.

In today's international views of how to deal with the growing population that lives in informal settlements in the world, the Medellín case provides an important lesson about the importance of building on the social and physical capital that these informal communities had. This specific case provides value on how physical infrastructural projects that focused on the quality of facilities in which the state provides services to the community produces better outcomes than traditional resettlement projects that focuses only on housing infrastructures. The value of quality of intervention over the quantity is in Medellín the example that can easily be applied to informal communities were close to a billion of people lived around the world. Thus, this single learned experience can be the most influential and decisive tool that can be applied elsewhere in the world and even outside of the realm of the informal communities to the basic quality of living improvement of any community around the world.

For Further study

More detailed interviews with a larger percentage of members of all groups involved are necessary to confirm the initial findings of this study. A quantitative series of interviews and documentary research of the territories in a more detailed scale (such as an entire neighborhood or even block) will provide a more clear perspective about the real changes that the physical interventions had on the change in the phenomenology of violence in Medellín. This would also provide a better understanding of which projects could be more effective on other contexts.

This study focuses closely on the complex situation within Medellín and places this city's situation in the national context of Colombia. Further study is imperative that places this citywide and national context within a global political and economic context, especially the consumption patterns role in narcotraffic flows (with the United States being the world's largest consumer of processed cocaine from Colombia) and other international policies such as Plan Colombia (which makes Colombia the recipient of the third largest sum of U.S. aid in history, behind only Egypt and Israel.)

A comparative study of urban conflict areas in other countries and these areas' relationship with its informal settlement growth are necessary to confirm some of these initial findings and also to create the basis for a best practice mode to

Conclusion

which the Medellin case can be applied. Some initial places that could be important to compare are Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez in Mexico. These cities are suffering some of the initial stages of the phenomenology of violence that Medellin went through in the early 1990s, prompting some people to call Tijuana and Juarez "the new Medellín."

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
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


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Carmona , Juan David . Interview by author. Personal interview. Comuna 13, Medellin, Colombia, January 11, 2010.

Appendix 1: PUI Nororiental most relevant Physical projects (graphic description)



Projecto Urbano Integral PUI Nororiental (Integral Urban Project IUP Northeast)




Planta localización, obras ejecutadas.

1a Street Puerto Rico / street 106 / parque de la candelaria



School and Comunity Dinner 1b







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
CEDEZO



Parque Biblioteca España - Santo Domingo Savio- Comuna 1 - Giancarlo Mazzanti- Medellín- transformación de una ciudad




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Parque Metrocable 2




Biblioteca Sto Domingo 3




6 Lavaderos Comunitarios Jardin de los pozos




Parque Pablo VI 7





10 Parque de la Paz





Puente Mirador Andalucía – La Francia



12 Paseo Andalucía Calle 107





Parque PARQUE DE LA IMAGINACIÓN 13
Villa del socorro



14 Puente La Paz Andalucía – Villa del Socorro



Parque Villa Niza






- TRATAMIENTO VIVIENDAS
- RECONSTRUCCION
 - PARA ABANDONADOS Y RIESGOS
 - COMPLEX DE PASADIS
 - PARA VIVIENDA SOCIAL
 - RECONSTRUCCION EN SITIO
 - USTADOS DE VULNERABILIDAD
 - ESTADO DE RECONSTRUCCION









Vivienda Q. Juan Bobo



19 PARQUE DEPORTIVO Y RECREATIVO GRANIZAL



PUENTE DE GUADUA



21 Metro Calbe



Colegio de Calidad Antonio Derka.

Appendix 2: Interviewees

Individuals that were interviewed in Medellín and that permitted their names to be recorded as part of this study.

Alejandro Echeverry	Ex Director of EDU and Ex Director of Planning Department
Juan Diego Lopera	Sub director departamento de Planeación Medellín
Luisa Botero	Architect at the Planning Department
José Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo	Director PUI Noroccidental
Camilo Restrepo	Architect Botanical Gardens
Oscar Santanta,	7 years in the EDU 3 different Mayors
Eliana Restrepo	Social worker EDU
Lida Lopez Montoya	architect at EDU
Carlos Alberto Marin Herrera	architect at EDU
Marco Aurelio	Community member comuna 13
Amparo Torres H.	Community Leader comuna 1
Juan David Carmona	Director Corporación siglo XXI comuna 13
Maria Leonisa Gomez	neighborhood founders Comuna 1
Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz	Comuna 13 san Javier el Socorro lived for 33 years
Sirley Natalia Cifuentes,	Community Leader comuna 1
Luz Marina Saldarriana	Director Sala mi Barrio, parque biblioteca Spain
Luz Elena Marin de Mesa	Founder Santo Domingo Savio Neighborhood
Oscar Arbelaez	Corporacion siglo XXI comuna 13
Jake Thomas Randall	Musician and community TV presenter in Comuna 13
Mateo Jaramillo Patino	community member
Rocio Vasquez	had live in the comuna
Stalin de Carlo Pinzon Serpa	Community worker at comuna 13
Hernando Ramos Sanchez	Community Leader

Acronyms/Abbreviations/Terms

	Spanish	English
AM	Area Metropolitana	Metropolitan Area
EDU	Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano	Urban development company
PUI	Proyecto Urbano Integrado	Integrated Urban Project
PP	Presupuesto Participativo	Participative budget
PD	Plan de Desarrollo	Development Plan
POT	Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial	General Plan
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística	
PJL		Peace and Justice Law,
DDR		Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
PRIMED	Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Informales	Integral Program for the Informal Settlements Improvement of Medellín
BCN	Bloque Cacique Nutibara	
CCCC	Consejo Consultivo de Comunas y Corregimientos	
BID	Banco Internacional de Desarrollo	International Development Bank
ICV	Índice de Calidad de Vida	
IDH	Índice de Desarrollo Humano	
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación	
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)	
BNC	Bloque Cacique Nutibara	
	Alto Comisionado para la paz	High commissioner for peace
CCC-C	Consejos Consultivos Comunales y Corregimentales (CCC-C)	Consultive councils per comunas and Corregimientos
PNUD	<i>Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo</i>	UNDP United Nations Development Programme
ICT	Instituto de Crédito territorial	Institute of territorial credit
NVC	Núcleos de Vida Ciudadana	
FOVIMED	Fondo Municipal de Vivienda de Interés Social	
ISVIMED	Instituto Social de Vivienda y Hábitat De Medellín	
CORVIDE	Corporación de Vivienda y Desarrollo de Medellín	Housing and Social Development Corporation of Medellín

Terms

Estrato socio-economico	<p><i>Socio economic strata</i>: is a tool of the Colombian government (Ley 142 de 1994, Artículo 102) to classify real estate properties in accordance with the classification of the DANE that evaluate the real estate unit based on poverty level, public services, location, indigenous population and others. This classification determines the level of taxation, the fare of public services (water, energy, phone and gas), access to the free health services, fares at public universities, poverty alleviation programs etc. In most cases estratos 1 and 2 get subsidies from the upper estratos 4, 5 and 6. Although an economical measure based in solidarity principles which is positive, there is a negative effect of estratificación with a direct impact in the urban morphology and segregation of Colombian cities. It has also tended to create stereotypes depending on the residential area from the citizens and their associated strata level.</p>
Casas de Compensacion Familiar	<p>FAMILY COMPENSATION FUND, is a Colombian type of government regulated NGO a Caja de Compensacion is nonprofit company whose objective is social disparity reduction thru the redistribution of a percentage of the income of all employees of the country. A <i>caja de compensacion</i> will receive a percentage of all incomes and with that pool of money provide services of health, education, culture, housing, recreation, social loans, and job training. Over the Colombian territory there are multiple Cajas de compensacion that compete with each other for employers and employees subscriptions. All Colombian employees need by law to be subscribe to a Caja de Compensacion.</p>
rent seeking	<p>Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to <u>productivity</u>, such as by gaining control of <u>land</u> and other pre-existing natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other <u>government</u> decisions that may affect consumers or businesses.</p>
Comuna	<p>Comuna is a territorial distribution of the urban areas of the city of Medellín. Each comuna is comprised of a number of neighborhoods (5 to10). Contrarie to many news records comuna is not a synonymous of poor neighborhood of informal settlement as the case of “favela” or “slum” the city of Medellín has 15 comunas. The comuna territorial divitionis similar to the French term <i>arondissement</i> a territorial distribution of the city of Paris. Each comuna has his own Junta Administradora Local (local administrative group) JAL that represent the territorial division to the municipality.</p>
SISBEN	<p>Is a proxy means test index widely used as a targeting system for social programs in Colombia. It serves as an indicator of households’ economic well-being and is based on a crossection sample of Colombian households. The SISBEN index is a function of a set of variables related to the consumption of durable goods, human capital endowment and current income. SISBEN was created with the purpose of simplifying, expediting and reducing the cost of targeting individual beneficiaries of social programs at the various government levels. The system has been very successful and has generated high demand both in municipalities and departments, presumably due to its low operation costs and also to the social benefits being brought to participating communities. SISBEN has expanded quite rapidly. It is currently used in a wide range of subsidized social programs, most heavily by those that benefit from health subsidies established by Colombia’s Social Security Law. An Economic Interpretation of Colombia’s SISBEN: A Composite Welfare Index Derived from the Optimal Scaling Algorithm, By Carlos Eduardo Vélez, Elkin Castaño and Ruthanne Deutsch, November, 1998</p>