FIRST WAR SYNDROME: MILITARY CULTURE, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

by

Austin Long

Counterinsurgency was a persistent and important challenge to military organizations in the second half of the 20th century and seems likely to continue to pose a challenge in the 21st century. This makes understanding how military organizations respond to this challenge both an important policy question and a fruitful area for academic research on military doctrine. The involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom in counterinsurgency in Kenya, South Vietnam, and Iraq are used to test four competing hypotheses on the origin and development of military doctrine. The four hypotheses are doctrine as rational response to environment, doctrine as product of civilian intervention, doctrine as means to deal with generic organizational desires and problems, and doctrine as product of organizational culture. This latter hypothesis is developed extensively by examining the professionalization of military organizations through professional military education, which has its origin in a certain set of experiences termed “the first war.” The next three chapters detail the formation and evolution of culture and professional education in three militaries (U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British Army). The case studies then test how these organizations responded in terms of doctrine and operations to the challenge of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam (U.S. Army and Marine Corps), Kenya (British Army) and Iraq (all three). It then presents, as an additional plausibility probe, a brief shadow case of Afghanistan and Pakistan (all three organizations, plus the Canadian and Pakistani armies). The evidence in these case studies indicates a strong role for organizational culture in military doctrine and operations when information from the environment is ambiguous (as it frequently is, especially in counterinsurgency) but that culture is substantially attenuated in effect when information from the environment becomes unambiguous. It then concludes by discussing both theoretical and policy implications and avenues for future research.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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Chapter 1: Hypotheses on Doctrine and Counterinsurgency

The study of military doctrine is one of the cornerstones of the field of security studies. As part of the military component of grand strategy, doctrine is vitally important to the security of states in the international system. The adoption of doctrine has consequences for both the causes and conduct of war, most notably success or failure in war. Doctrine can also influence both the political and economic behavior of states. Different doctrines may make alliances more or less feasible, or require deficit spending to finance.

Despite its importance, the study of military doctrine was, until relatively recently, not well integrated into political science and international relations. The Cold War provided some impetus for the study of nuclear doctrine, but not until the 1980s were more general theories of the sources of military doctrine elaborated. Since then, several hypotheses on the origin of doctrine have been offered, yet considerable debate continues on the influence of different variables on doctrinal development. At the center of this debate is the question of explaining differences and similarities in the development of military doctrine by military organizations. This literature is usually framed as one about innovation (or lack thereof) in doctrine.¹

One set of theories on doctrine take as its starting point the observation that all organizations resist costly changes in operations. Indeed, the purpose of organizations is to create stability and continuity. Change creates uncertainty, produces “winners and losers” within the organization, and is disruptive of standard operations. Doctrine, which provides a guide for operations, should therefore remain static or nearly so absent some

¹ For a review of the literature which is presented here, see Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, v.29, n.5 (October 2006).
external force. Organizations, in this set of theories, are primarily motivated by a desire to maximize their resources, prestige, and autonomy. Change in doctrine is expected to help with this maximization, and is likely to be as incrementally small as possible.²

The main theorists in this camp are Barry Posen and Jack Snyder. In *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Posen analyzes the development of military doctrine between world wars in France, Germany and Britain. Posen argues that military organizations have certain generic propensities common to all such organizations, such as a preference for offensive operations. Doctrine is formulated to satisfy these desires. However, intervention by civilians, who pay close attention to grand strategy and the international balance of power, can play an important role in the formation of doctrine by countering these propensities. These civilians ally themselves with those in the military organization who seek to challenge the organizational status quo.³

In *The Ideology of the Offensive*, Jack Snyder offers a similar but slightly different argument. Like Posen, he argues that militaries generically prefer offensive doctrines to minimize uncertainty and maximize resources, autonomy and prestige. He also argues that the functional imperative for the offensive can potentially be checked by civilian intervention. He adds a role for the synthesis of interest, bias and belief into an organizational ideology.⁴

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Deborah Avant accepts the main proposition of Posen and Snyder on the need for civilian intervention to ameliorate military parochialism, but adds a role for domestic institutions. In *Political Institutions and Military Change*, Avant argues that differences in political institutions (e.g. unitary parliamentary vs. divided presidential) made civilian intervention more difficult in the United States than Britain. In a divided system, such as the United States, military organizations can play the legislature off against the executive to prevent effective civilian intervention by either branch of government. In a unified system, such as Britain, this strategy is much more difficult, if not impossible. This meant British military doctrine was more readily changeable than that of the United States. 5

A contrasting set of theories argues that organizations are goal-seeking entities often intensely infused with values. Organizations and their members, though resistant to change generally, will accept costly alterations which helps achieve this goal. In these theories, change requires convincing the members of an organization that it will help them achieve this shared goal. 6

Stephen Peter Rosen presents a form of this theory in *Winning the Next War*. He notes that militaries internally generate change to help them achieve their goals when they perceive changes in the strategic environment. Senior leaders facilitate this process

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by generating new promotional pathways for junior officers. Doctrinal change thus often
requires a lengthy gestation period before coming to fruition.\(^7\)

Kimberly Marten Zisk goes even further than Rosen by arguing that militaries can
change with some rapidity when confronted with a threat which is likely to cause existing
document to fail. In \textit{Engaging the Enemy}, she argues that the Soviet military went to great
lengths to change its doctrine as evolving NATO doctrine made existing doctrine
inadequate. These changes were sometimes successful and sometimes not, but the
value-infused organization was ready to make them to preserve its ability to achieve its
goals.\(^8\)

Finally, Elizabeth Kier offers a theory focused on organizational culture. In
\textit{Imagining War}, Kier assesses the development of military doctrine in France and Britain
between world wars. She concludes that culture has significant influence on doctrine,
though she does not argue that the other factors are without impact. Instead, Kier
conceives of culture as an intervening variable between doctrine and the domestic
environment.\(^9\)

The dissertation that follows proposes a cultural theory of doctrine and then tests
it by examining the response of military organizations to the challenge of
counterinsurgency. It argues, like Kier, that organizational culture is a critical
intervening variable between the environment (domestic and international) and doctrine.
Yet culture is not, in the formulation presented here, just a collection of biases. Instead, it


\(^8\) Kimberly Marten Zisk, \textit{Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955-
role for civil-military relations in enabling change.

\(^9\) Elizabeth Kier, \textit{Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars}, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), conclusions on pg. 164-165.
serves both normative and functional ends, helping organizations make sense of an environment that is frequently awash in ambiguous information. It also serves to bind together organizations by providing shared values for the organization’s members.

Thus culture actually improves an organization’s ability to respond to some environmental challenges, tying members together and filtering useful information from a sea of ambiguity. However, culture can also cause organizations to respond poorly to other challenges, filtering out as extraneous information that is potentially important. Three case studies will then be used to test predictions from this culture based against predictions derived from these other theories.

The case studies consist of three parts. The first details the origin of culture in three military organizations: the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the British Army. The second and third parts of each case study explore how the three organizations respond to the doctrinal and operational challenge of counterinsurgency. Insurgency, by its nature presents a murky and ambiguous challenge where cultural values strongly affect doctrine and operations.

Insurgency emerged at the end of the 19th century as a serious challenge to existing armies. The following section provides a brief overview of the origin and nature of insurgency and the theoretical development of counterinsurgency. It then provides predictions for how military organizations should produce doctrine for and conduct operations in counterinsurgency, based on the existing hypotheses on the origin of doctrine.
The central defining feature of insurgency is the use of political and military means by non-state or irregular forces to overthrow or resist state forces. It is generally carried out by blending the forces with the civilian population, from whom the irregular forces draw support (sometimes willing, sometimes via coercion, often a mix). These forces, generally inferior to state forces in conventional battle at least in the early stages, rely on a combination of subversion with hit-and-run operations, particularly against vulnerable elements of state forces (such as rear echelon units).

The concept of warfare carried out by and among the civilian population was not entirely novel in the 19th century. However, just as the emergence of pervasive nationalism and the Industrial Revolution enabled conventional warfare on a new and massive scale, so too did it enable a new form of “people’s war.” Nationalism created a motive force that, if harnessed, was no less potent for non-state forces than it was for the state.

Equally important, the Industrial Revolution made large numbers of highly effective weapons available to non-state forces. Most notable in the late 19th century was the breech-loading rifle, which gave individuals or small groups the ability to attack at long-range from concealment. Dynamite similarly provided a readily portable means to destroy fixed positions. Combined with industrial era techniques of organization and nationalism, these new technologies made “people’s war” orders of magnitude more capable.

The power of modern non-state forces was first observed in the U.S. Civil War, as noted briefly in the subsequent U.S. Army chapter. Southerners armed with rifled
weapons were able to harass Union forces, particularly as Union supply lines grew longer. Though far from decisive, these forces were nonetheless an effective complement to the regular Southern forces.\footnote{See Robert Mackey, \textit{The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865}, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), esp. pp. 113-122 and Lance Janda, "Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880," \textit{The Journal of Military History}, v.59, n.1 (January 1995), pp. 14-17.}

Shortly after the end of the Civil War, the power of non-state forces would be demonstrated even more forcefully. In 1870, the Prussian Army rapidly and decisively defeated the French Army in a series of battles culminating in the Battle of Sedan in September. The French Emperor Napoleon III was captured by the Prussians and surrendered. However, a new Government of National Defense proclaimed itself in Paris and sought to mobilize the population to continue the war.\footnote{Michael Howard, \textit{The Franco-Prussian War; the German Invasion of France, 1870-1871} (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961).}

One of the most effective components of this new \textit{levee en masse} was the so-called \textit{franc-tireurs} ("free shooters"). Originating in civilian shooting clubs, these small groups were armed with rifles and dynamite, which they wielded with lethal effect. Surprising small parties of Prussian soldiers and blowing up key military sites (such as railroad bridges), the \textit{franc-tireurs} proved to be a major challenge to the highly professional Prussian forces despite being relatively few in number, as even some Prussian officers noted.\footnote{See Robert T. Foley, \textit{German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp. 14-37. One notable Prussian/German work on the subject is Fritz August Hoenig, \textit{Der Volkskrieg an der Loire im Herbst 1870 [The People’s War to the Loire in Fall 1870]} (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler and Son, 1897).}

It is important to note that these two early examples of insurgency did not take place in imperial possessions (or lands coveted as imperial possessions). Instead, they took place in two modern industrialized states. In contrast, wars for empire took place
against indigenous forces that lacked modern organization, nationalism, and in at least some cases, armaments. Rather than the difficult fights the Prussians experienced in 1870-1871, where well-armed non-state forces hid among a civilian population, most imperial wars were characterized by a few set-piece battles won by European forces followed by a negotiated settlement.

For example, in the First Ashanti War (1824-1831) the Ashanti relied on the same tribal organization they had used for centuries, massing thousands of tribesmen for attacks on the British. After initial defeats by the Ashanti, the British gathered a force that drew heavily from the tribal enemies of the Ashanti. Armed with Congreve rockets and superior organization, this British force dealt a crushing blow to the Ashanti in 1826. The war was essentially over at this point, though a formal treaty took other five years.\(^\text{13}\)

The superior organization and technology of the modern state continued to dominate in imperial conflict at the end of the 19th century. In the First Dahomey War (1889-1890), the kingdom of Dahomey, relying on traditional organization and outmoded muskets, was routed by a French force (composed substantially of Africans) armed with modern weapons that had allied with enemies of Dahomey. This war was brief, because Dahomey sued for peace after two pitched battles.\(^\text{14}\)

Modern insurgency (and counterinsurgency) was therefore not a part of 19th century imperial policing, with the exception of the Boer War. As noted in the later chapter on the British Army, these wars were radically different and much more difficult than typical imperial policing. It is not surprising that this challenge was posed by

\(^{13}\) See Harold E. Raugh, *The Victorians at War, 1815-1914* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2004), pp. 33-34.

European settlers infused with nationalist fervor and using modern weapons and organization. However, the Boer War would be an exception. As the U.S. Marine experience in the late 19th and early 20th century demonstrated, imperial powers still generally faced non-state forces lacking in nationalism and modern capabilities.

“Wars of National Liberation”: The Diffusion of Insurgency After 1945

The easy dominance of imperial powers would begin to change after World War II. New communications and the spread of education in imperial possessions had at last suffused native populations with nationalism. The war had also weakened imperial powers such as the French and British. At the same time, the war had created enormous quantities of armaments that were readily available to would-be insurgents. Indeed, many nationalist insurgents had been armed and trained by belligerents in the war as proxy armies. Most notable in this regard were the Viet Minh in Vietnam, who the United States supported against the Japanese.

Even as World War II ended, the Cold War began and provided additional impetus to insurgency. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev explicitly endorsed “wars of national liberation” to throw off imperialist yokes. After the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the Soviets and Chinese began to support insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

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This Communist strategy posed the threat of “surrender on the installment plan” to the United States and its western allies as ever more of the world came under Communist domination. Insurgency in the lesser developed world came to be considered a grave challenge by many, prompting an intellectual effort to develop ways to defeat this new threat. The new discipline of counterinsurgency was born in this environment.\textsuperscript{18}

The initial focus of counterinsurgency research was on the problems of modernization and economic development. Scholars observed that in many societies the negative consequences of economic development that the developed nations adjusted to over the course of decades and centuries were being experienced in the space of years by the developing countries. As the economic conditions underlying society began to shift, pressure built on traditional society. This in turn put pressure on nascent governments, many of whom had only recently acquired independence from colonial empires, and on those empires that sought to retain their colonies. In many cases, governmental institutions could not keep pace with societal change, leading to disorder and instability. This instability also left societies vulnerable to external Communist influence.\textsuperscript{19}

Insurgents could thus take advantage of this flux to gain popular support, by promising alternatives to the government. The government, unable to ameliorate the problems of the population, would increasingly be isolated and weakened. The


insurgents could acquire almost everything they needed from the populace, progressively attenuating government authority and creating “counter-institutions” to provide what the government could or would not (taxation, social services, etc.). Eventually, either the government would collapse, unable to separate the insurgents from the people, or the insurgents could form their own armies and defeat the government in battle. This was the essence of Mao’s version of “people’s war,” and many Western scholars adopted the Maoist viewpoint on insurgency.20

It was this two part challenge, the defeat of insurgent forces and the creation or restoration of effective political institutions in turbulent societies, which confronted the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British Army in the 1950s and 1960s. Insurgency would subsequently as a problem for these same militaries in the 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan. It thus provides an important test for theories of military doctrine.

The most critical aspect of insurgency and counterinsurgency for doctrine and operations is the ambiguity of the environment. In contrast to conventional battle between regularly constituted armies, with clear front lines and troops in uniform, insurgents blend in with the population. Local grudges and social networks, which can affect decisions to join with the insurgency or the state, are common and nearly opaque to outsiders.21

Military organizations must deal with this complexity while also facing occasional larger scale attacks from insurgents and attempting to restore the power of the

20 See, for example, Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla War (New York: Praeger, 1961) and Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army: The Vietcong Insurrection Manual For Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Praeger, 1963).

state. The former attacks can often resemble more familiar operations, sometimes resembling total war. Restoration of governance in contrast is totally unfamiliar, not being a major component of professional military education. Finally, counterinsurgency is in some cases (including all those presented in the following chapters) conducted in a foreign country, with language and cultural barriers further complicating the environment. A more complex and ambiguous information environment than counterinsurgency is thus hard to imagine.

**Hypotheses on Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Operations**

Drawing on the literature on military doctrine cited earlier and the theory of military organizational culture proposed in chapter 2, the following hypotheses on counterinsurgency doctrine and operations (the dependent variable, discussed in more detail in chapter 2) can be derived:

**Hypothesis 1:** Organizations should respond rationally to the challenge of counterinsurgency, particularly if current operations are not succeeding. Organizations do not change easily, as they are intended to produce stability and predictability across time, so change will not be instantaneous. However, efforts to grapple with the challenge of counterinsurgency by the organization should be observed. In this period, officers in the organization should be observed to be actively debating the current state of doctrine and the course of operations. New doctrine should then be produced, and operations should then begin, again with some time lag, to conform to the new doctrine.
Crucially, different military organizations should come to similar conclusions about similar threats. For example, the challenge of industrial interstate war in the 20th century resulted in broad convergence by ground forces on a system of combined arms Stephen Biddle has termed “the modern system.” This should be no less true of the challenge of counterinsurgency. Therefore, over time there should be convergence in counterinsurgency doctrine and operations across organizations, both within the same country and across countries, especially in the same environment (e.g. in the same or similar countries).

**H1: Counterinsurgency doctrine and operations should converge over time across military organizations.**

**Hypothesis 2:** As noted above, organizations are difficult to change. Change is costly, disruptive, and can be risky. Therefore military organizations should not be expected to change absent some external pressure. A possible source of this is the intervention of civilian leaders, who are less invested in particular organizational arrangements and doctrines and more attuned to threats from the international environment.

In the case of counterinsurgency, military organizations should resist changing to face this new challenge, but civilian leaders that perceive a threat from insurgency can enable change. When counterinsurgency is perceived to be a serious threat, civilians should both seek to intervene to shape counterinsurgency doctrine and should be more successful, as military officers will themselves be more amenable. Civilians should

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therefore be observed to be debating among themselves about the importance of counterinsurgency and then concluding it is an important challenge. They should then intervene by seeking similarly minded military officers, who they then promote and champion. Other observable implications include the issuing of high-level memoranda on the subject, the creation of special commissions or panels to promote counterinsurgency, etc. This intervention should be effective across military organizations in the same state, thus producing convergence within the military apparatus of a state on the civilians’ preferred doctrine and operations. If counterinsurgency is not seen as a serious threat, this hypothesis is indeterminate. Similarly, if counterinsurgency is perceived as a threat in two different states and civilians in both states have similar preferences in doctrine, then there should be convergence across states. As above, this convergence could be on any combination of the values of the dependent variable, depending on civilian preferences.

H2: When counterinsurgency is perceived as a significant threat to a state, statesmen should intervene to promote counterinsurgency doctrine and operations. This should result in convergence over time in doctrine and operations on civilian preferences across all of that state’s military organizations. A similar convergence should be expected across states if civilians in the two states have similar perceptions about counterinsurgency.

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Hypothesis 2a: As Hypothesis 2 above, except civilians in a unitary government (e.g. a parliamentary system) should be better able to intervene. In contrast, civilians in divided government (e.g. a presidential system) should have less success, as military organizations can pit the legislature against the executive in order to resist intervention. Evidence for this should be observable in testimony to the legislature or internal documents within the legislature indicating expectations of problems with the legislature. Major inquiries critical of the executive’s attempt to intervene and promote counterinsurgency doctrine would be strong evidence for this hypothesis. Convergence would be predicted within unitary systems and divergence in divided systems, if evidence of military organizations playing parts of the government against one another can be found.25

H3: When civilians seek to intervene as in H2, counterinsurgency doctrine and operations should converge in unitary political systems and diverge in divided political systems, via the mechanism of military organizations playing civilians against one another.

Hypothesis 3: Military organizations should create doctrines in order to maximize autonomy, resources, and prestige for the organization or to minimize problems such as uncertainty in planning. Convergence on optimal methods for securing these goods and minimizing uncertainty should produce convergence in doctrine and operations both within states and across states. For example, if the best way to acquire additional personnel for the organization is to adopt doctrine and operations that utilize large units,

then all military organizations within a country should adopt these operations. The same logic also applies to the reduction of uncertainty. If massive and relatively indiscriminate use of firepower is the best way to reduce uncertainty (by simply bombarding areas where the enemy might be) then all military organizations within a country should adopt this approach. Similarly, there should be little variation geographically within a conflict if the primary drivers of doctrine are these organizational benefits. The same logic should also hold across states facing similar counterinsurgency challenges. If choice of doctrine has little impact on these organizational benefits, then this hypothesis is indeterminate.\(^\text{26}\)

**H3: Counterinsurgency doctrine and operations should converge over time across organizations when choice of operations minimizes uncertainty or increases resources, autonomy, or prestige.**

**Hypothesis 4:** Military organizations should create counterinsurgency doctrines and operations consonant with the elements of their organizational culture. The exact composition and role of these elements of culture will be discussed at length in the following chapter. However, to briefly summarize, organizations develop cultures based on their foundational experience, which gives the organization certain beliefs about the nature of war and military organizations. These beliefs shape how organizations prioritize and assess information on threats, opportunities, and constraints presented by the environment. The impact of culture on operations will be maximized when the information environment is highly ambiguous and decrease as the information

environment becomes less ambiguous. Therefore doctrine and operations by organizations with different cultures should diverge (and remain divergent) when information is ambiguous and converge when it is unambiguous. Convergence is expected across states when military organizations have similar cultures and divergence when they are different. When information is ambiguous, cultural attributes dominate doctrine and operations.

H4: When information is unambiguous, operations and doctrine should converge over time across organizations. When information is ambiguous, operations and doctrine should converge over time across organizations with similar cultures and diverge across organizations with different cultures.

Plan of the Dissertation

The next chapter presents the definitions of the variables of interest in this study, principally culture and doctrine, and provides a theory on the origin and roles of culture in military organizations. The subsequent three chapters then detail the origin of culture in three military organizations: the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps and the British Army.

The three chapters after that then provide evidence on how the organizations conducted counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam (for the U.S. Army and Marines), Kenya (for the British Army), and Iraq (for all three). The penultimate chapter conducts an additional plausibility probe by examining the conduct of counterinsurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2009 through short shadow cases on the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marines, the British Army, the Canadian Army, and the Pakistani Army. It then
concludes with discussion on the theoretical and policy implications of the link between culture and doctrine as well as areas for future research.
Chapter 2: Culture, Doctrine and Military Professionalization

The use of culture as a variable has a long history in political science generally and security studies specifically. Theorizing about culture and security studies has progressed through at least three “waves” since World War II. Culture has been used as a variable at the level of global society, individual nation-states, and specific organizations. Cultural theories have also frequently been posited as a challenge to realist and/or materialist theories in security studies and international relations, with some cultural theorists rejecting positivist approaches to social science altogether. Other cultural theorists have more limited ambitions, arguing that culture and, more generally, ideas do not act in a vacuum. Rather, as Max Weber described, ideas are considered critical “switchmen” in mediating material effects. Tracing the evolution of theories of culture and security studies provides a useful starting point for defining and testing culture.

The explicit study of international security and culture began in the 1970s, though discussion of decisionmaking and belief in general are far older. Historian Russell

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29 Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture.”
Weigley introduced the concept of an “American Way of War” in 1973.31 Jack Snyder coined the term “strategic culture” in a 1977 report for the RAND Corporation, and others soon began to focus on cultural variables' impact on strategy.32 By the early 1980s, authors such as Colin Gray began to popularize cultural theories about the effect of “national style” on strategy.33

These theories focused on culture at the level of the nation-state rather than the organization, which raised several problems. Nation-states and even national governments are seldom if ever monolithic. It is difficult to imagine a uniquely American “national style” which encompasses both Curtis LeMay and Arleigh Burke, two respected military figures with widely diverging beliefs about the role of nuclear weapons in the post-World War II world. It is almost impossible to imagine a national style that could explain both the Machiavellian realpolitik of Nixon and the humanitarian vision of Carter. National level cultures are at best diffuse and indeterminate indicators of both preference and behavior.

As the 1980s progressed, postmodern interpretation began to come into vogue. Much of the work done in this period discussed the ambiguous role of symbol and discourse. Rather than positing causal effects for culture, this strand of the literature

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sought to show that language and ideas are used instrumentally to justify or rationalize behavior.\textsuperscript{34} Culture thus had no real, measurable effect on preference or behavior.

This second wave of theory was problematic in assuming that culture was always instrumental. While culture and discourse certainly can be used in this way, it assumes that individuals are not influenced by the discourse. This is a major assumption, as it argues that all statements of belief are at best camouflage for some hidden set of motives that are not affected by belief. Yet even attempts to use culture instrumentally can backfire. Individuals who intended to use culture instrumentally can come to believe their own rhetoric. Alternately, they can become trapped by it as others adopt and use the rhetoric, forcing them to behave as though they believe it even if they do not.\textsuperscript{35}

There were some exceptions to this general trend of purely instrumental culture, authors who sought to demonstrate the effect of the organizational culture of militaries on preference and behavior. Among those against the trend was Carl Builder, a RAND analyst who wrote on the “institutional personalities” of the three major U.S. services, and Andrew Krepinevich, an Army major who wrote on the U.S. “Army Concept” of war.\textsuperscript{36} This strand of the literature was marked by a focus on the United States and a distinctly atheoretic approach to culture. Though useful, its generalizability was therefore limited.


The literature on strategic culture emerged from its postmodern period with a more narrowly conceived and rigorous focus. In the 1990s a number of authors began to utilize ideas about the culture of organizations to explain behavior, particularly in terms of military issues that had previously been the province of balance of power or functional organizational behavior models. These authors are generally cautious about overestimating the autonomous effects of strategic culture and do not totally reject the power of other variables, such as domestic institutions or balance of power.

The business literature also has a long history of organizational culture argument. Beginning at about the same time as the literature on culture and security, business writers have attempted to quantify and evaluate the effects of culture on business. Both national and organizational cultures have been explored in this literature.

With the end of the Cold War, insurgency and related concepts such as civil war became increasingly prominent in security studies, comparative politics, and international relations. Several works appeared that sought to use organizational culture to explain variation in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. Of most interest for the present work are the writings of three U.S. Army officers. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John Nagl explicitly compares U.S. and British Army counterinsurgency doctrine and


practice, and argues that variation is explained by cultural differences.\textsuperscript{39} His study draws on the earlier work of Richard Downie, who compared U.S. counterinsurgency performance in Vietnam and Latin America.\textsuperscript{40} The central argument of these works is that organizational culture either facilitates learning or inhibits it. Learning in turn leads to appropriate and effective doctrine.

Robert Cassidy makes similar points about the culture of the U.S., British, and Soviet/Russian armies in three works. In two books and a monograph, he address the influence of culture on doctrine and practice for the three organizations in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{41} His account of the origin of culture, particularly for the U.S. Army, accords with the account given here.

These officers’ view on the effects of organizational culture on doctrine is largely consistent with the viewpoint presented here (though I do not present the same formalized model of learning). Much of the doctrinal distinctions about counterinsurgency presented later are partly inspired by and parallel theirs. However, Downie and Nagl suffer from a problem similar to Andrew Krepinevich’s earlier \textit{The Army in Vietnam} in that they are all but atheoretic on the origin of culture. They have little explanation for why and how culture is created or how it is transmitted. Nagl, for


example, spends only one short chapter outlining British and U.S. Army culture, with virtually no discussion of how it is transmitted.  

This atheoretic description of culture is a useful starting point, but it is open to the charges of tautology and post hoc storytelling. In order to strengthen the explanatory power of cultural theories, they must include plausible hypotheses about the origin of culture and how it is transmitted. In the remainder of this chapter, I will seek to build on these works by adding a more fully developed theory of the origin of culture and its transmission mechanism. This cultural theory will have specific predictions about how doctrine for counterinsurgency will be developed and why. At the same time, by specifically limiting the role of culture to a critical intervening variable, it bridges the divide between the two schools of doctrinal development discussed in the introduction.

**Challenges to Using Culture as Variable**

Use of culture as a variable faces serious challenges. Avoiding tautology is perhaps paramount: “The French act this way. Why? Because they are French.” A second challenge is that culture is an implicit or tacit phenomenon; it exists in the minds of people, making it hard to study directly. Finally, many proponents of cultural “theories” actually resist theorizing about culture. They argue that each culture is essentially *sui generis*, and can at best be “thickly described.”

Overcoming tautology, disentangling the material from the ideational, and attempting to make generalizable arguments about culture and doctrine requires

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42 Nagl, pp. 35-55.
43 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz, for example, popularized the term “thick description” of culture but is skeptical of a “science” of culture. See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
answering five questions. First, what are culture and doctrine, and how do they differ? Second, how is military culture different from other types of culture? Third, what are culture’s limits as an analytic tool? Fourth, where does it come from? Finally, how is it maintained and transmitted in organizations? Once these questions are answered, the relationship between the material and the ideational should be clear enough to permit further theorizing about how that relationship functions in practice and what evidence is needed to prove or disprove the effect of culture on doctrine.

*What Is Culture?*

Organizational culture is defined as a set of shared beliefs about the organization and its mission. These shared beliefs shape the response of the organization and its members to challenges, opportunities, and constraints relating to their environment and mission. Some responses will be deemed correct, effective, and appropriate based on these beliefs; others will be ruled out or downplayed. 44

Culture is often characterized as simply a source of irrational bias by security studies scholars. Jack Snyder, in *The Ideology of the Offensive*, argues that “organizational ideology” (which is defined in a way similar to the way culture is defined in this chapter) is essentially the synthesis of various biases with some amount of “rational” calculation. If one observes the formation of rational doctrine, then it was the result of rational calculation. Deviation from rationality is the result of the biases that

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44This definition is very similar to Edgar Schein’s. Like Schein’s, it does not include overt behavior and argues that these beliefs are so ingrained as to be taken for granted by an organization’s members. See Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), pp. 8-9.
comprise organizational ideology. In short, ideology or culture is a residual used to explain doctrine that appears irrational.

Snyder also discusses the effect of ambiguous information on the influence of ideology: “Rational calculation will weigh more heavily when the evidence is clear and decisive; it will carry less weight when environmental incentives and constraints are ambiguous.” Ambiguous information is the permissive condition allowing ideology to dominate rationality. Finally, Snyder discusses the importance of simplification of complex problems in the formation of doctrine.

The view of culture presented here is very similar to Snyder’s concept of organizational ideology. The difference lies in Snyder’s belief that an ex ante “rational judgment” of evidence exists, and that ideology can then cause organizations to deviate from this rational judgment. In contrast, this chapter argues that judgment cannot be separated ex ante from the cultural rules which shape perception. In other words, the “rational judgment” of doctrine is often only possible with extensive hindsight, if at all. Note that civilian analysts can and have come to very different conclusions about doctrine as they lack the lens of military culture. However, this is a case of exchanging one lens for another (military culture for academic culture in many cases) rather than civilians being inherently more “rational.”

This view is one that ascribes a positive role to culture, as long as the problem to be addressed is one that the culture is “optimized” for. Instead of being a residual explanation, culture plays an important role for organizations in terms of problem solving. It provides a set of analogies and other heuristics with which to evaluate both

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46 Ibid., p. 30.
47 Ibid., pp. 210-211.
current and future challenges. It also provides a common framework for thinking, reducing transaction costs within the organization. Every challenge does not require a lengthy discussion and evaluation without reference to prior organizational experience. Instead, the organization’s early practices and values which are successful become codified as a template for future problem solving.\textsuperscript{48}

The foregoing is not to argue that military organizations always exist in some post-modern soup of ambiguity and that no judgments of the utility or inutility of doctrine are ever possible. Instead, as Snyder suggests, the ambiguity of information can be viewed as a variable, ranging from highly ambiguous to almost totally unambiguous. For military organizations, peacetime information is probably the most ambiguous while high-intensity conflict is probably the least ambiguous source of information. Culture, acting as a filter, or more accurately a funnel, on ambiguous information, is probably most important in peacetime and least important during high-intensity conflict, particularly if that conflict is of lengthy duration.\textsuperscript{49}

However, even with hindsight the utility of doctrine is often hard to evaluate. For example, Snyder’s condemnation of German strategy and doctrine in World War I as irrational is based on a counterfactual argument that the Schlieffen plan was doomed to fail, yet the evidence for this counterfactual is still contested some ninety years after its employment in war.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, with hindsight it is possible to perceive the importance

\textsuperscript{48} This is similar to the process of value infusion described in Selznick, \textit{Leadership in Administration}, pp. 38-65.
\textsuperscript{49} Thanks to Paul Staniland for suggesting this point, which is alluded to in different ways in Snyder, \textit{The Ideology of the Offensive}, and Rosen, \textit{Winning The Next War} as well as Thomas Mahnken, \textit{Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941}, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{50} Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” \textit{International Security}, v.11, n.2 (Fall 1986) presents the essence of this argument, summing up “The key point for this critique of ‘cult of the offensive’ theory is not how this counterfactual debate is resolved but rather that it exists at all.” See pp.
of indirect fire artillery, which all European armies slighted to some degree before 1914 due to their judgment that artillery existed primarily to provide direct fire support to maneuvering infantry.\textsuperscript{51} In both cases, military judgment did not somehow deviate from some value-free rational calculation. Instead, the judgment of ambiguous evidence was inherently (such as that provided by the Russo-Japanese War) related to the professional logic and values of the organization.\textsuperscript{52} As the war progressed and information became less ambiguous, there was some degree of convergence in doctrine between all belligerents. However, even years into the war, doctrinal variation still existed.\textsuperscript{53}

**How Does Culture Vary?: The Elements of Culture**

Instead of a purely negative or residual role, culture performs two valuable and interrelated functions. The two functions of culture for organizations and their members are similar to the logics of appropriateness and consequences identified by decision theorist James March.\textsuperscript{54} March identifies the logic of consequences as the rational

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} See Jonathan B. A. Bailey, "The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare," in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, UK, 2001), pp. 136-139. The German Army had relatively more howitzers than other armies, as well as super-heavy siege guns for destroying Belgian fortifications, but with their emphasis on maneuver war the Germans still had a paucity of indirect fire assets.
\item \textsuperscript{52} This approach mirrors that of the sociology of technology, which argues that technology and values are inseparable. Two works that explicitly apply this sociological approach to nuclear weapons technology and doctrine are Douglas MacKenzie, *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) and Lynn Eden, *Whole World On Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{53} See Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-1918* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996) and Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981) for evidence of convergence as well as some continuing divergence in British and German tactical doctrine in the second half of World War I.
\end{itemize}
evaluation of the consequences of an action in terms of preferences. This rationality is seldom “purely” rational; instead it is frequently “bounded” in some way (by information available, by decisionmaker attention, etc.). In short, the logic of consequences can be reduced to answering the question “What does taking this action do for me?”

The logic of appropriateness, in contrast, is the application of socially constructed rules of behavior derived from an individual’s identity. These rules of behavior separate those that belong (the in-group) from those that do not (the out-group). Most religions, for example, have explicit rules of behavior for members. This identity-based logic can also include preferences, which are inherently normative. The logic of appropriateness thus seeks the answer to the question “What should someone like me do in this situation?”

March notes that both logics are often at work in decisionmaking. The theory of culture presented here accepts this interpretation, and argues that organizational culture serves as both a set of heuristics for the logic of consequences and as a source of preferences, values, and identity for the logic of appropriateness. More simply, culture provides both an organizational view of how the world works and an organizational view of right and wrong.

Counterinsurgency, as discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter, presents a tough challenge to military organizations. Far more intense than peacetime, but less intense than total war, counterinsurgency presents many familiar elements (violent conflict between armed units) and many unfamiliar (the enemy deliberately blends in with the population, who form the battlefield of a “war without fronts”). The way culture
interacts with the novel and familiar elements of counterinsurgency should provide insight into the formation of doctrine.

Organizational culture is therefore not a collection of irrational or motivated biases. It serves crucial purposes that are vital to all organizations, not just militaries. Culture is a functional response to both the limitations of cognition (both individual and organizational) and the need for values and identity inherent in human beings.

In terms of the first function, culture provides a common set of evidentiary rules and logic of cause and effect that lead from ambiguous evidence to doctrine. Thomas Mahnken argues explicitly that organizational culture shapes military intelligence perceptions of foreign doctrinal and technical developments. The more ambiguous the information for intelligence analysis is the more culture will shape perception.\(^5\)

As an example of this phenomenon, George Hoffman describes how culture shaped the U.S. Army's military judgment of tank performance in the Spanish Civil War. The lesson drawn from Army observers was that antitank guns would always dominate tanks, as the emplaced, immobile antitank gun would be more accurate than tanks, which would be forced to fire on the move. Antitank guns would also be concealed in many cases, enabling them to fire first against tanks moving against them. These conclusions led the observers to recommend the tank be subordinated to the infantry and artillery units.\(^6\)

This misjudgment, based on the cultural beliefs of both attaches in Europe and officers at the Army schools, perpetuated a doctrine which proved wholly inadequate in

\(^5\) Mahnken, pp. 9-11.

World War II. The French Army, with a similar culture to the U.S. Army, came to similar conclusions. In contrast, German officers observing the same conflict drew very different conclusions, which had major doctrinal implications.\textsuperscript{57}

In terms of the second function, culture provides values and preferences for organizations. In his seminal work on bureaucratic politics, Morton Halperin describes the desire of organizations to increase resources, autonomy, and morale/prestige.\textsuperscript{58} Yet these are not generic drivers without preferences behind them, as Halperin clearly acknowledges. There are many ways to increase budget, autonomy and the like, and as such these drivers have little independent predictive value. They can only be used to tell a \textit{post hoc} story about an organizational decision. Further, they cannot explain why an organization would choose to ever forego autonomy or resources, except in cases where these factors trade off with one another (e.g. increased autonomy at the price of lower resources and prestige).

Halperin avoids this problem by arguing that these drivers have a set of preferences behind them, which he terms “organizational essence.” He points out that the U.S. Army’s essence is “ground combat by organized regular divisional units.”\textsuperscript{59} Even when additional resources could be gained by embracing missions outside that essence, they would be foregone. I argue that providing a generally stable organizational essence and its continuity across generations of officers is the function of the normative component of culture. James Q. Wilson makes similar observations about organizational

\textsuperscript{58} Halperin, pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 35.
culture: “People did not always have to be told what to do; they knew what to do, and what is more important, wanted to do it well.”

In addition to the above distinction between logic of consequences (for brevity this will be referred to as “positivist”) and logic of appropriateness (hereafter referred to as “normative”), cultural also has two basic orientations. One is outward-looking at the environment, and the other is inward looking at the organization itself. The first can be termed “strategic culture,” and the second “managerial culture.”

Strategic culture embraces attitudes and conceptions of war, the enemy, the environment and the like. For example, is war limited, akin to a form of violent bargaining, or is it a more total phenomenon? From a normative perspective, if war is total, then all elements of the enemy, from his soldiers to his industrial base to his civilian population are more or less fair game. However, if it is limited, then certain elements are probably not fair game or at least would be counterproductive to strike. From a positivist perspective, total war advocates would agree that, to paraphrase Civil War general Nathan Bedford Forrest, the key to victory in war is to apply maximum force as quickly and spectacularly as possible. Limited war advocates would argue for more graduated escalation in line with political goals. Further, limited war advocates could see positivist reasons to avoid striking some targets, at least initially, as they would be “hostages” to later rounds of the violent bargain.

These distinctions are not idle speculation; they underlie, for example, some of the most significant debates about nuclear strategy during the Cold War. The U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC), for example, advocated a total approach to war that

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included targeting Soviet cities, military facilities, and weapons alike (a countervalue strategy that evolved into a countervalue/counterforce strategy). Further, SAC advocated a "fell swoop" approach which fired all weapons at once as part of what would become known as the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP).

Other military strategists, not steeped in the Air Force experience of total war, advocated more limited strategies as did civilian analysts working for the Air Force (who were also not a part of Air Force culture). These strategies were predicated on not firing all weapons at once, and on firing at Soviet nuclear weapons first (counterforce). Weapons held in reserve could then, if absolutely needed, be fired at Soviet cities. This was violent bargaining at its best (or worst, depending on one's perspective).  

Managerial culture, in contrast to strategic culture, focuses on the internal workings of the organization. For example, what is the nature of military command? This question had both positivist and normative implications. An organization might believe in high levels of initiative at each level of command, giving officers wide latitude for decision and, correspondingly, high levels of responsibility for those decisions. Alternately, military organizations might believe that decisions should be top-down, with junior officers given relatively little discretion or responsibility.

These distinctions have real consequences for doctrine. The U.S. and Soviet/Russian Navies, for example, had very different managerial cultures. The Soviets had a very top-down culture of centralized control; individual ship captains executed orders they were given very specifically. The U.S. Navy was very much imbued with the

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spirit that the ship’s captain was the ultimate arbiter of what his vessel did. In reacting to
the U.S. naval threat, the Soviets adopted a doctrine in the 1950s which relied on firing
large numbers of cruise missiles “over the horizon” at U.S. ships. This meant that the
ship, naval aircraft, or submarine firing the missile could not actually see what it was
shooting at. Soviet commanders would simply be given coordinates and told to fire. If a
friendly or neutral ship was hit as part of the salvo that was too bad, but the lower level
commander would not be held responsible.

In contrast, the U.S. Navy only adopted anti-ship cruise missiles in the 1970s and
had serious concerns about firing over the horizon. Commanders worried about two
things. From a normative perspective, they worried that, as was long-standing tradition,
that whatever happened on their ship would be their responsibility. So if they fired over
the horizon and hit a neutral ship, they would be relieved of command and possibly court-
martialed. From a positivist perspective, they would be reliant on a host of systems for
over the horizon targeting that were apt to fail, reducing their combat effectiveness. As a
result of these concerns, the U.S. Navy’s flirtation with over the horizon anti-ship
missiles was short, lasting little more than a decade from the introduction of the
Tomahawk anti-ship missile to its withdrawal from service (with no replacement).62

These elements of culture will be discussed in more detail in the case study
section. But this should give a general sense of how culture shapes doctrine. Combining
the two types of variation gives the table below:

62 See Jodie Sweezy and Austin Long, From Concept to Combat: Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program
chapter 1 for discussion of the divergent development of U.S. and Soviet cruise missiles.
The above table presents general types of question answered by elements of culture. All of these elements of culture are related to the others, so the division between them is often not totally clear. Nonetheless, by providing a more specific framework for what culture actually does and why, this characterization makes culture less amorphous as well as highlighting the functional strengths and weaknesses of a given culture.

**Defining Questions for Culture**

Below is a list of the central questions used to define the elements of a military organization’s culture. These eight questions are not exhaustive, but provide a good framework for assessing the core values and priorities of the culture. Each is only briefly presented, but will be developed in more detail in the next chapter:

1. Is war frequent/limited or infrequent/total? (Strategic, normative)
2. What are the acceptable targets of war? (Strategic, normative)
3. What are the optimal methods of war (attrition/firepower, maneuver/shock, etc.) and how should they be combined? (Strategic, positivist)
4. What is the relationship between one’s own military and other organizations (foreign, sister services, civilians, etc.)? (Strategic, positivist)

5. What are the primary duties of an officer? (Managerial, normative)

6. What is the appropriate relationship between civil and military authority? (Managerial, normative)

7. What is the basic unit of military organization (platoon, regiment, etc.)? (Managerial, positivist)

8. How should units be controlled (staff intensive, directive control, etc.)? (Managerial, positivist)

*What is Doctrine?*

The distinction between military doctrine and military culture is often quite blurry. Many scholars would consider the provision of heuristics and values to be a function of doctrine rather than culture. Before proceeding, I will more precisely delineate the distinction between culture and doctrine.

Barry Posen’s definition of doctrine is more or less the standard definition and is therefore worth reproducing at length:

I use the term military doctrine for the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means. Two questions are important: *What* means shall be employed and *How* shall they be employed? [emphasis in original] Priorities must be set among the various types of military forces available to the modern state. A set of prescriptions must be generated specifying how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities... Military doctrine includes the preferred mode of a group of services, a single service or subservice for fighting wars. It reflects the judgments of professional military officers, and to a lesser but important extent civilian leaders, about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary. Such judgments are based on appraisals of military technology, national geography, adversary capabilities, and the skills of one’s own military organization.63

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According to Posen, doctrine is generated in order to both set priorities for force structure and to codify how that force structure will fight. This second element, "the preferred mode... for fighting wars," is of particular interest, as it explicitly introduces the concept of preference into doctrine. In a later work, Posen expands on this second element as distinct from the broader concept of military doctrine, referring to it as "operational-tactical doctrine":

By operational and tactical doctrine I mean the way the French army and airforce planned to fight fights, battles and campaigns. This should be distinguished from a higher order concept that goes by many different names: national military strategy, strategic doctrine, political-military doctrine, or 'military doctrine,' (the term I have used in my past work).64

This definition of doctrine is more limited and precise than the first, and thus more useful. Any future references to doctrine refer to "operational-tactical doctrine."

This distinction is important, as it limits and specifies the dependent variable in a way that the first definition of "military doctrine" does not. If everything an organization does or believes is grouped under the rubric of doctrine, then it becomes an almost meaningless catch-all term. By separating what organizations in the aggregate believe implicitly (culture) from what they do explicitly (doctrine), it is possible to gain better understanding of why organizations take certain actions and succeed or fail in accomplishing different missions.65

Posen's definition acknowledges both the role of preference in doctrine and the importance of "the judgments of professional military officers" in doctrinal formation. Yet he does not explicitly discuss the sources of these preferences and judgments; instead

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he subsequently discusses functional imperatives such as minimizing uncertainty and maximizing autonomy. Yet these are not “professional judgments,” per se; instead they are generic organizational desires. I argue that professional judgment requires professionalism, and that culture, the source of shared beliefs about the nature of war and its appropriate conduct, is an inextricable part of professionalism.

Doctrine is thus a consciously articulated and agreed upon method for conducting military operations resulting from the interaction of ambiguous evidence with the preferences, values, and evidentiary rules which comprise culture. The difference between the two is that doctrine is articulated and transmitted through physical means (publications, “best practices” lists, operations orders, etc.). Culture, which provides the framework on which doctrine is built, is not articulated and is transmitted through particular experiences and environments.

It should finally and crucially be noted that the dependent variable is first and foremost about actual practice in the field (i.e. operations conducted), rather than manuals even though manuals are often important evidence of doctrine. While written doctrine and practiced doctrine are often very similar, there can be significant deviation between them. For example, in order to appease civilian leadership, a doctrine could be written that appears to comply with civilian demands. If that doctrine is then subsequently ignored or subverted systematically in combat, then it would clearly have been instrumental. Such instrumental use of doctrine should be relatively rare, but not unheard of.
How Does Doctrine Vary?: Axes of Doctrine

Doctrine, like culture, can vary in many ways. However, three axes of variation in operations and doctrine are of primary importance for ground force military organizations (i.e. armies, though they are not always referred to as such). These are the size of units conducting operations; the level and targeting of firepower; and the integration of operations with other organizations or groups (principally civilians or other militaries). 66

These axes are the most important for two reasons. First, they have tremendous impact on the battlefield. Size of units and level and targeting of firepower can readily capture the difference between, for example, a hostage rescue mission (very small unit, very low firepower with very discrete targeting, close cooperation with civilian authority) from the capture of a city (very large unit, very high firepower with minimal discretion, little interaction with civilian authority). Put another way, these axes can be thought of as a production function for military operations, with the units representing the labor input and firepower the capital input, while cooperation indicates a broader compound production function (for example cooperation with a navy to “deliver” an amphibious operation).

Second, these three axes can be explicitly and clearly observed. The size of units used in operations is routinely recorded as is the firepower expended. The third axis, cooperation, is sometimes less explicit but even it can generally be determined from available record.

66 Doctrine will vary along different lines for air and naval forces, which exist in a very different milieu than ground forces. The central differences are that neither sea nor air is home to human habitation on a significant scale and lack “terrain” in a meaningful sense. Combined with the capital intensive nature of air and naval combat, these differences mean air and naval doctrine are substantially different from ground force doctrine.
The size of units is most simply observed and coded in a binary fashion. For purposes of this study, any operation conducted by a unit of company size or smaller (platoon, squad, etc.) is considered a “small unit operation.” Any operation conducted by more than one battalion (e.g. two battalions, a brigade, etc.) is considered to be a “large unit operation.” Any operation falling between these two ranges (larger than a company through a single battalion) will not be coded either way.

The reason for this coding is that a battalion in modern military organizations is the smallest unit that has a full staff and possesses all of the elements of modern military power (heavy weapons, indirect fire weapons, logistics, etc.). It therefore marks the border between small units with limited organic capabilities and large units that are massive agglomerations of men. More than one battalion in an operation indicates a substantial number of men (more than 400) and concomitant materiel is being employed, which in turn almost always requires a higher headquarters with an even larger staff (i.e. a brigade or regiment) and a senior commander such as a colonel or general.

In contrast, an operation with less than a company indicates few men (less than 100) and little materiel. Command will fall heavily on very junior officers (lieutenants and captains) with minimal staff. This in turn implies a substantial reliance on senior enlisted men (specialists/corporals, sergeants, and staff sergeants) who assist the junior officers and lead very small tactical elements such as squads.

Level and targeting of firepower is, like size of units, easily observed in operations. Firepower takes the form of rounds of ammunition, bombs, shells, and the like expended in operations. Only weapons/munitions larger than small arms (e.g. rifles and light machine guns) will be counted, both because small arms are the basic weapons
of any military operation and for simplicity since these are seldom recorded. However, even with this limitation, firepower is less easily coded than unit size. How would one *ex ante* establish high vs. low levels of firepower? Coding in this case will be based on both objective counts (number/tonnage of rounds) and descriptions in operational reports and by commanders but will admittedly be more subjective than the clear delineation of unit size.

Targeting is a bit easier to code. If firepower is consistently employed near or in civilian population centers or in a manner that covers a very wide area (tens of square kilometers or more) with unobserved fire, it will be coded as indiscriminate. If firepower is generally restricted around civilian population centers and is generally used in concentrated areas with observers, it will be coded as discriminate.

Further, the two aspects of firepower will often co-vary. High levels of firepower tend to be indiscriminate due to scale- it is difficult (though not impossible) to employ vast amounts of firepower in a very small, observed area. Similarly, low levels of firepower tend to be discriminate, as firing a few rounds into a wide area without an observer is ineffectual.

Finally, integration with civilians, locals, and other military organizations is both important and observable. Integration is important as the conduct of modern warfare is often beyond the capacity of single military organizations. Multiple military organizations (armies and air forces for example) may be required to cooperate to conduct effective operations. Crucial political and technical expertise along with intelligence and administrative capability are often resident in civilian organizations. Civilians in this case can be both from the military’s home country and locals from the
country where war is being fought (if the two are not the same). Integration can be coded as high or low by examining records of operations and operational planning to determine who is consulted and involved and how.

Table 1: The Dependent Variable- Doctrine and Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axis of Variation</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of Operations</td>
<td>Large (battalion +)</td>
<td>Small (company -)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Firepower</td>
<td>High (by volume)</td>
<td>Low (by volume)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting of Firepower</td>
<td>Indiscriminate (unobserved)</td>
<td>Discriminate (observed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration with civilians</td>
<td>Disintegrated (lack of consultation/involvement)</td>
<td>Integrated (consultation/involvement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(other agencies and locals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are the Sources of Culture?

The shared beliefs (or mental models as some scholars refer to them) that constitute culture generally emerge from the formative experiences of the organization.67 These mental models are built around analogies to these experiences.68 It thus provides heuristics which facilitate decisionmaking under conditions of risk and uncertainty.69 It

69 Economists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman are two of the most influential authors in discussing why and how heuristics and biases form and how they affect decisionmaking with risk and uncertainty. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
also creates shared preferences for the organization. In effect, the organizational culture is the "personality" of the organization.\textsuperscript{70}

In the case of military organizations, this formative period is that of the period of the professionalization of the military and particularly the officer corps. Prior to this period, military organizations are generally too diffuse to generate an integrated, "total" culture. If shared culture exists in a pre-professional officer corps, it is likely to be based on a common class rather than a uniquely military perspective.\textsuperscript{71} In contrast, professionalism, with its requirement of long specialized training, allows for the creation of an integrated, "total" culture. Further, as discussed below, this professional education becomes a major mechanism by which culture is maintained. The beginning of professionalism is thus the starting point of military organizational culture.

In the literature on the subject, professionalization refers to the process of transitioning a given occupation, where knowledge is gained through on the job training, apprenticeship, specific vocational training or some combination, to a profession. In a profession, knowledge is gained through formal education in a body of abstract theory or specialized technical skills. This education, in turn, gives the members of the profession jurisdiction over matters dealing with their area of expertise. This jurisdiction then gives autonomy to the profession, as its members are uniquely qualified in that sphere of


\textsuperscript{70} Carl Builder even uses the term "institutional personality" rather than organizational culture. The two terms are used here synonymously. See Builder, \textit{The Masks of War}, pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{71} For example, the pre-professional Prussian Army officer corps was drawn almost exclusively from the Junker upper class. See Karl Demeter, \textit{The German Officer Corps in Society and State 1650-1945}, trans. by Angus Malcolm, (New York: Praeger, 1965).
knowledge. For example, doctors have professional jurisdiction over medicine. Professionalization also generates values, norms and a code of conduct. These norms describe the social roles of members, how one treats peers, etc.73

One of the foundational works in the field of military sociology, Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*, provides a succinct summary of the view of professional military officer corps presented in this work. Janowitz notes:

The officer corps can also be analyzed as a professional group by means of sociological concepts. Law and medicine have been identified as the most ancient professions. The professional, as a product of prolonged training, acquires a skill which enables him to render specialized service. In this sense, the emergence of a professional army—specifically, a professional officer corps—has been a slow a gradual process with many interruptions and reversals... one cannot speak of the emergence of an integrated military profession until after 1800. But a profession is more than a group with specialized skill, acquired through intensive training. A professional group develops a sense of group identity and a system of internal administration. Self-administration—often supported by the state intervention—implies the growth of a body of ethics and standards of performance.74

The two elements mentioned above as being integral to a profession, the body of abstract theory/specialized skill and a code of conduct/self-administration, correspond to the positivist and normative elements of culture proposed here. It is therefore not an aberration that the military profession develop these elements of culture; rather it is required that military officers do so in order to even be considered a profession. The difference here is that, rather than arguing for a “military professional culture” that covers all military officers, this theory proposes that military organizations can have distinctly


73 Professions are more than just abstract theory along with values and codes of conduct; they include the other aspects of culture noted earlier such as shared language, rituals, dress, and the like. The most important for doctrine, however, is the theory and the values.

different cultures as the result of different processes of professionalization. Conversely, similar professionalization experiences would be expected to produce similar cultures.

"The First War" and Professionalization

The critical formative experience for military organizations is what I term "the first war," though it need not be a single war. This is the major conflict(s) that the organization takes as its template for developing professional education, and takes place in the period leading to and during the establishment of the professional schools discussed in the next section. In many cases, this war provides much of the impetus for professionalization, so it is unsurprising that it should provide much of the basis for professional education.

For example, the Prussian/German Army’s "first wars" were the Wars of German Wars of Unification, though professionalization began much earlier. The disastrous war with Napoleonic France in 1806 provided the initial push for professionalization, with formation of a Military Reorganization Committee that introduced the beginnings of professionalism into an officer corps previously dominated by aristocrats with minimal education, military or otherwise. By 1810, three new schools had been formed to provide officer training as had a superior military academy which would grow into the famed Kriegsakademie. The next several decades would be a period of proto-professionalization, as the educated officers struggled against the dominant but ignorant

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75 For a recent work that proposes a "military operational code" that covers all professional militaries, see Colin Jackson, "Defeat in Victory: Organizational Dysfunction in Counterinsurgency," (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, PhD dissertation, 2008).
aristocrats. This battle did not culminate until the latter part of the 19th century under the famed Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (the elder). Moltke, a pro-education aristocrat, would add the lessons from the Wars of Unification to the new German army’s culture.\footnote{Barnett, “The Education of Military Elites.” See also Demeter; and Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 38-46.}

The central lessons of this time were the need for a mass mobilization army led by a technocratic officer corps, the utility of directive command rather than detailed orders, and the importance of rapid maneuver to achieve decisive battles of encirclement and annihilation (kesselschlacht).\footnote{On the importance of the mass army, see Posen, “Nationalism, Military Power, and the Mass Army;” on the importance of directive-oriented command, see Demeter; and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance 1939-1945, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); on the battle of annihilation, see Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany, (Hampden, CT: Archon Books, 1975) and Larry Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971).} From the 1860s to the 1940s, these concepts were critical to German Army culture and were the centerpiece of German doctrines and planning. Storm-troops tactics, the operational art of blitzkrieg, and the strategic gamble of the Schlieffen Plan were all tied to these cultural elements.

Different armies can have different early experiences, leading to different organizational cultures. Yet there are probably only a fairly small number of archetypal “first war” experiences, based on a state’s (and therefore its army’s) geostrategic position and domestic society. Each of these archetypal experiences should produce similar (though probably not identical) cultures in those armies that experiences.\footnote{An entire literature has emerged on geography’s influence on the military and state formation. See Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization of the State,” in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European State-Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Europe, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, v.32, n.4 (Autumn 1978).}

This idea of archetypal “first wars” draws upon Samuel Finer’s concept of the “military format.” The military format includes who serves and how (professional
volunteers vs. conscripts), the size and type of forces, and the social make-up of the forces. This format evolves over time as society, technology and the economy evolve.  

In contrast to Finer, however, I argue that once the organizational culture derived from the “first war” is firmly established by the professionalization of the officer corps, little evolution takes place. Military organizations may be confronted with changing society, technology and economy (both at home and abroad) yet they will continue to apply the mental model derived from their formative experience. All of the organization’s subsequent experience is filtered through the lessons of the first war.

However, though culture is enormously “sticky,” one can imagine cultural change if major shifts in the independent variables, both domestic and international, occurred. Shifts such as these should be rare and seldom result in total revision of culture. One example of a partial change in culture, the U.S. Army after Vietnam, will be sketched in the chapter on Iraq. This partial change was only brought about by the combination of two technological revolutions (the nuclear revolution combined with a conventional forces revolution) and, most critically, the elimination of conscription.

Another way to produce change in culture is to destroy/disband the existing military and its education system and start over. This was done with both the Japanese and German militaries after World War II. However, inclusion of many former officers from the old military establishment meant at least some of the culture was carried over to the new organizations.

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As an example of the archetype concept, the German Army experience noted above could be termed the “rapid-limited war” archetype. As Posen describes, the German way of war was based “on mobility above all else.” The Israeli Army’s foundational experience in 1948 and 1956, for reasons of similar geography, fit this archetype and, unsurprisingly has a similar organizational culture. Both armies proved superb in wars conforming to their first war archetype (May 1940 and June 1967 are considered to be the preeminent examples of decisive victory through rapid maneuver), yet were limited in their ability to adapt to other types of war (neither did well in counterinsurgency, whether in the Balkans or in Lebanon).

This work will focus on two of the most prominent archetypes. The first can be termed a “continental army.” Over the course of the 19th century, a new form of warfare emerged from the interaction of the new creed of nationalism with the Industrial Revolution. This type of war, variously termed “total war” or “national-industrial war,” was so potent that it became the military format for most professional armies that, for geostrategic reasons, had neighbors who could potentially invade them (e.g. great powers on the continent of Europe) and, conversely, that they might want to conquer. This is the type of war that most Americans call to mind when the term “war” is used. World War II is the most obvious example of this type of war. It calls for the rapid conversion of much of the industrial economy into war material and its incorporation into industrial-scale military units. Manpower is of limited quality (in comparison to long-service

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82 Posen, Sources, p. 183.

82 In an unpublished manuscript titled “The Evolution of Land Warfare,” Barry Posen uses the similar concept of “mass mobilization-heavy.” Posen, “Nationalism, Military Power, and the Mass Army” provides a good overview of this type of warfare.
professionals) but plentiful. Even more plentiful is capital, particular in the form of firepower.

The tremendous national sacrifice involved in this type of war means that is seldom fought for reasons other than national survival. Threats of this type are both extreme and relatively rare. This need not be an external threat; two of the most prominent examples of this archetype of war, the Russian and American civil wars, were not.

The second archetype can be termed a “maritime army.” As the name suggests, this is associated with an island nation where the ocean, combined with a strong navy, provides the principal defense against invasion. However, the state may nonetheless have overseas interests for which it needs an army. Two principal missions are likely for this type of army: policing an overseas empire and a contribution to coalition warfare on the continent. The former mission is perhaps self-evident, while the latter mission derives from the possibility that a continent dominated by a single hostile power might be able to sever the maritime links to empire or even invade the island nation. It thus must often act as an “offshore balancer” requiring a limited but important continental commitment.

In contrast to the relatively low incidence of national-industrial war, imperial policing is frequent if not continuous. The threat to national existence is minimal, which means only minimal sacrifice may be demanded. Additionally, the domestic arrangements of maritime states are often though not always more liberal (in the classical sense of limited state power to extract resources and control citizens) than continental powers. This combination of factors mean policing the empire must be cheap, at least in
contrast to the gain from the empire, and must not require the state to resort to unpalatable techniques like conscription.\textsuperscript{84}

Both manpower and capital are therefore tightly circumscribed. However, the manpower will almost always be a professional volunteer force and thus relatively high quality. This gives more confidence in the capability of small units while putting more emphasis on small unit leadership. Further, natives of the empire are often incorporated into the policing effort in some fashion, giving additional manpower. Additionally, the empire is generally not managed by the military alone, so civilian resources and expertise (from a colonial or foreign service) are often available.

Even while conducting imperial policing, these armies must prepare for the continental commitment and offshore balancing. However, the continental commitment is always seen as a limited war. This can be contrasted with continental armies, which may sometimes do imperial policing but will always place the total war mission first. The French Army of the nineteenth and twentieth century is an example of this type.

The archetypal first war experience of every military organization will inevitably be tied in some fashion to the particulars of geography and society. As noted, the Israeli and German armies shared a first war archetype due in large part to similar geography. Yet the first war can also be surprisingly idiosyncratic. As the cases will show, the U.S and British armies should have shared a similar imperial policing archetype, as both were liberal states protected by water with little need for massive industrial armies but a strong need for policing their commercially-oriented empires. However, the peculiar experience

\textsuperscript{84} I am grateful to Owen Coté and Brendan Green for many long discussions about the issues of maritime states’ military policy, internal order, and the relationships between the two. For a compelling argument about the influence of the political economy of a modern maritime state on its military policy, see Aaron Friedberg, \textit{In the Shadow of the Garrison State} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
of the U.S. Civil War gave the U.S. Army a wholly different first war archetype, one that would be expected of a continental state such as France or Russia. Japan is similarly idiosyncratic, as the professional Japanese Army of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a continental rather than maritime archetype. In the two tables below, I present the general elements of culture for these two “archetypal” cultures by answering the eight central questions presented earlier.

Note that each example of a given archetype, though similar, will have idiosyncrasies that must be accounted for through “thick description.” For example, the U.S. and Soviet armies during World War II were both national-industrial armies par excellence, but had significant differences. Both heavily emphasized firepower, particularly artillery. The Soviets, however, placed more emphasis than the U.S. Army on armor, particularly heavy armor. Similarly, the U.S. Army’s main unit for operations was the division (though these were invariably parts of corps and army formations) while the Soviets were primarily concerned with larger army and front level formations.86

Upon even closer inspection, another difference in culture was the relative emphasis on aimed fire of personal weapons. In the post-Civil War United States Army, marksmanship of individual soldiers came to be a critical part of infantry culture, as Thomas McNaugher details in The M16 Controversies. This seemingly minor cultural element was very resistant to change despite significant technological and domestic political pressure, and it has not disappeared even today. In contrast, the Soviet Army

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more fully embraced the industrial nature of war and very quickly adopted mass-produced, high volume of fire automatic weapons for individual soldiers. Soviet analyst and U.S. Army officer Lester Grau succinctly sums up this difference:

The standard Soviet assault rifle’s fire selector switch goes from safe to full automatic to semiautomatic. The standard Western assault rifle’s fire selection switch goes from safe to semiautomatic to automatic. The West sees semiautomatic fire as the norm. The Soviets saw automatic fire as the norm. These idiosyncrasies can help explain why armies with the same archetype do not respond in an identical fashion to very similar information from an ambiguous environment.

While I argue that culture does serve a functional purpose, it is important to point out that culture is not just a reflection of underlying function. As discussed below in the section on alternative hypotheses on doctrine, some argue that culture is basically epiphenomenal, a mere reflection of what an organization does. According to this argument, changing what an organization does will change its culture, after some relatively brief period of adjustment due to organizational inertia or lag.

In contrast, I argue that because culture is rooted in an organization’s formative experience and professionalization process, giving an organization a new mission will force the organization to adapt, but its adaptation will remain conditioned by elements of culture. Normatively, the organization values some tasks more than others. Functionally, it has developed a logic that serves to fulfill these tasks well, and radical change is costly if not impossible.

If culture is a mere epiphenomenon of function, then significant change over time should be observed in organizations given a new mission. In the cases under study, the

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organizations, confronted with the same ambiguous environment, should adopt similar operations after at most a few years of war. A somewhat arbitrary but reasonable benchmark is four years, the length of the First World War. All armies in that war made substantial adjustments in the face of organizational inertia and adopted similar practices so this should be long enough for other armies in other contexts if only inertia is at work. If this convergence is not observed or is observed in some areas but not others, then something more than mere organizational inertia must be at work. This important difference will be highlighted in the case studies through comparison across organizations and through observation in multiple time periods.

Table 2: Continental army archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic culture</th>
<th>Managerial Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1: War is primarily about national survival and infrequent</td>
<td>Q5: Officer is a “manager of violence”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: War is total; blurs distinction between enemy military and civilian targets</td>
<td>Q6: Civil-military spheres of competence sharply delineated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positivist</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Maximal application of firepower; maneuver secondary</td>
<td>Q7: Management by industrial methodology emphasizing large units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: Other services secondary to success</td>
<td>Q8: Staffs central to management; supporting arms secondary but vital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Maritime army archetype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic culture</th>
<th>Managerial Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: War is primarily about imperial maintenance and frequent</td>
<td>Q5: Officer is a “leader of professional soldiers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: War is limited and inherently political</td>
<td>Q6: Civil-military spheres often complementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Firepower important but overall infantry-centric</td>
<td>Q7: Small unit leadership paramount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: Dependence on other organizations (natives, sister services, allied nations) normal</td>
<td>Q8: Staff functions and supporting arms distinctly secondary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Transmission of Culture

In order to ensure continuity, culture must be transmitted in some way to future members of the organization. A number of mechanisms can be used to transmit culture in organizations. These can be formal, such as classroom experience or a required uniform. Alternately, they can be informal, such as shared slang, jargon, stories, or folk knowledge.\textsuperscript{89} Shared experiences, such as being a platoon commander or staff officer in a division also can transmit culture.

\textsuperscript{89} For the role of language in organizations, see Martin Meissner, “The Language of Work,” in Robert Durbin, Handbook of Work, Organization and Society, (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1976). Militaries in general and the U.S. military in particular are prone to extensive use of jargon. See Frederick Elkin, “The Soldier’s Language,” and Howard Brotz and Everett Wilson, “Characteristics of Military Society,” both in The American Journal of Sociology, v.51, n.5 (March 1946). This special issue, entitled Human Behavior in Military Society, contains numerous other articles discussing aspects of the social organization and culture of militaries, including the period of adjustment from civilian to military life and the role of status in military units.
In the case of professional organizations, the most powerful mechanism of transmission is probably the formal professional education system. This is unsurprising, given that professional education is the bedrock of professional jurisdiction. For military organizations, the importance of professional education is reinforced by the monopoly on instruction in combat tasks that military organizations generally hold within a given nation-state. For example, if one wants to be a lawyer or doctor, there are usually a number of competitive schools to attend.\(^\text{90}\) If one wants to be a fighter pilot or infantry officer, the appropriate military service school is almost always the only provider.

This does not mean that the informal mechanisms noted above, such as slang and folk knowledge shared in bars, are unimportant mechanisms for transmitting culture. However, it is only in the professional schools that the same experiences are shared by all members of a given military. The other informal mechanisms are more diffuse, varying from unit to unit and from base to base. The schools provide homogenization that the other mechanisms do not.

Studying the evolution of the nature of the fundamental service schools is perhaps the best way to understand the culture of a military organization. These schools are those created to foster professional education (as opposed to the more general education of a service academy) in the early period of professionalization. Understanding who is taught at these schools over time, what they are taught, and how they are taught will provide an understanding of the dominant culture of the organization. In addition to being a

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\(^{90}\) One can also attend professional civilian schools in foreign countries, while with the exception of a few organizations like the French Foreign Legion, modern nation-states generally restrict intensive professional military training to their citizens. The U.S. professional military education system makes a number of exceptions for allies, but these courses are generally too short to fully inculcate the U.S. military culture. The U.S. military also allows non-citizen permanent legal residents ("green card" holders) to serve in the military, but this is generally considered part of an accelerated path to citizenship and is rarely if ever used for officers. See Mary Beth Sheridan, "Wounded Soldier's New Rank: Citizen," *Washington Post*, August 4, 2004.
transmission mechanism for culture, the service schools serve as proxy for the other mechanisms noted above, such as experiences on staffs or shared language. The professional schools are thus both a key transmission mechanism for culture, and a useful indicator of the elements of culture.

The overall school experience rather than exact subjects taught is most important, as culture is not transmitted explicitly. For example, as of October 2008, the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute conducts “staff rides” for the Command and General Staff College for twenty eight battles from the U.S. Civil War. It is less the actual conduct of those Civil War battles than the discussion of the elements from those battles that are definitive of war in the abstract that matters for Army culture. These principles, discussed in more detail later, define both the positivist and normative elements of U.S. Army culture. In contrast, only ten battles from the Revolutionary War and the Indian Wars are given staff rides; even these are of secondary importance.

The importance of professional military schools is reinforced by incentives. Attendance at the professional schools is often mandatory, or at least provides a criterion for promotion boards in evaluating candidates. This provides a major motivation for high assimilation of the cultural norms of the professional schools.

The professional schools are viewed as the locus of professionalism rather than the service academies. The service academies provide a more general rather than purely professional education. This is the reason, for example, that even Marine second lieutenants commissioned directly from the Naval Academy still attend the Basic School.

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for new officers. This is not to say that important cultural elements are not absorbed by those who attend the academies; rather it argues they are not the center of culture.

This is highlighted for the U.S. Army by the profiles of the division commanders in World War II. While only about half were West Point graduates, all had been to the Command and General Staff School. An Army study elaborates:

Fifty-two percent were graduates of the United States Military Academy. Twenty-four percent had college degrees from other institutions, and an equal percent held no college degree. All these officers eventually became members of the combat arms: 44 percent infantry, 28 percent field artillery, and 28 percent cavalry... Amidst all these career variables, one finds a common element in these officers' education: all were graduates of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition, nine of the twenty-five attended the two-year CGS course. This course provided all the officers with basic techniques and procedures, and in a real sense, the officers shared a common military theoretical foundation.

How Is Military Culture Different from Other Types of Culture?

Modern military organizational culture, though sharing the same basic characteristics, is somewhat different from most other types of organizational culture. Military forces are organizations that possess the usual organizational characteristics of specialization, division of labor, standard operating procedure and the like. Yet military service is also a profession, with members of the service having a professional jurisdiction over war in the same way that doctors and lawyers have professional jurisdiction over medicine and the law.

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93 For example, on the more general and often remedial nature of education at West Point in the 1800s, see Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army, (MacMillan; New York; 1967), pg. 104-106 and Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (Oxford University Press; New York; 1986) pg. 269-271.


This duality, noted by Samuel Huntington and others, reinforces the strength of culture within militaries in two ways.\(^9^6\) First, professionals only respect other professionals' expertise as fully legitimate. This means, for example, that modern military organizations promote exclusively from within except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Only those that have been through the same basic set of professional education and experience can be promoted, ensuring a higher level of uniformity in shared beliefs. This can be contrasted with businesses and even many other governmental agencies in which external promotion, even to the highest ranks, is possible. It is thus more difficult for new ideas to be introduced through an infusion of "new blood."\(^9^7\)

At the same time, the organizational demands of military action prevent them from adopting only a loose professional association model as doctors or lawyers have.\(^9^8\)

The American Bar Association and American Medical Association both have tests to certify the professional competency of members, yet after being certified members have


\(^9^7\) This is one reason why interservice rivalry can play an important role in military innovation. Other services must still be accorded some professional respect in a way that civilians do not merit. On the importance of rivalry to innovation, see Christopher J. Savos, "The Irresistible Force vs. the Immovable Object: Civilian Attempts to Force Innovation on a Reluctant Military," (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993), and Owen R. Cote, "The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles," (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996). Of course, this professional respect does not prevent disagreement between services. These disagreements can be incredibly intense as in the Air Force-Navy dispute of the so-called "Admiral’s Revolt" of the late 1940s or the Army-Air Force dispute over Massive Retaliation in the 1950s. See Jeffrey G. Barlow, \textit{Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation 1945-1950}, (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994) and Andrew J. Bacevich, \textit{The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam}, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986). It is also possible that the current U.S. emphasis on jointness, and the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that a joint assignment be a prerequisite for promotion to general officer also helps transmit new ideas between service cultures.

\(^9^8\) This is not to say they do not have such professional organizations, just that they supplement the formal military bureaucracy rather than being an alternative to them. All of the U.S. military services and many of the branches of the services have a professional organization, with the U.S. Navy organization, the Naval Institute, being perhaps the most recognized. These organizations certainly act to reinforce both the overall service culture as well as particular branch subcultures.
considerable autonomy as to practices and beliefs. Members are more or less respected on the basis of experience and demonstrated professional competence, but no formal hierarchy exists.

Military organizations, in contrast, have a rigid hierarchy of command and individual member’s autonomy is limited in many ways. For example, members can be required to conform to standard operating procedures with limited or no ability to deviate. This hierarchy reinforces the set of shared beliefs, as members can be directed to halt activities that do not conform to the military's preferences and beliefs, and punished if they do not comply.

Additionally, this set of beliefs is reinforced by the “total” nature of military organization. Militaries have a level of control over members that far exceeds that of virtually all other organizations. Further, this control is persistent at all times and overrides most other commitments made by members. Exit from military organizations is also usually not entirely discretionary, even for officers.

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99 Many doctors and lawyers do operate in bureaucratic settings such as hospitals or large law firms and so must conform to some bureaucratic requirements. However, an individual doctor or lawyer retains the option of private practice, which military officers do not generally have, though this may be changing with the increasing number of military and security “contractors.” See Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Even in the case of private military activity, bureaucracy is still generally required in some significant form, if only to provide logistics. Further, most individuals in these private organizations gain their initial experience in national militaries.

100 The concept of a “total” organization or institution was formally introduced in Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Press, 1961). For a review of the evolution of the concept see C.A. McEwen, “Continuities in the Study of Total and Nontotal Institutions,” Annual Review of Sociology, v.6 (1980). The term is often applied to asylums, prisons, monasteries, and movements that practice coercive indoctrination or “brainwashing.” The use of this term in reference to professional militaries is not intended as a pejorative, but to convey the difference between military and civilian organizations. Militaries are far more comprehensive in the scope of control of members than all but the most authoritarian civilian organizations. Possible exceptions to this rule might be the German Bundeswehr and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, which were consciously constructed to avoid “totalism” after World War II. See Abenheim and Berger.
This totalism is further enhanced by the almost unique nature of military activity. Members must be prepared to give their lives for the cause of the organization and the country it represents. This requires high levels of belief by members in some or all aspects of the organizational culture, whether this belief be in the strength of the bond between small units of soldiers or a broader ideology on the nature of the self, the military and the enemy.¹⁰¹

The strength of military culture should therefore provide a relatively clear test for cultural theories. If it appears to have little role in the military, it will likely have little effect anywhere. At the same time, military culture should be strong enough to make its influence on doctrine more readily apparent and there should be strong continuity over time.

The Limits of Culture and the Role of Subcultures

Culture, even “total” culture, is not absolute. Individuals are assimilated into culture to varying degrees depending on a multitude of factors. Some may absorb one element of an organization’s culture to very high degree because of personality or prior history, yet not absorb another element due to another idiosyncratic factor. It would be doing a great disservice to professional military officers to suggest that all members of a

¹⁰¹ See Morris Janowitz and Edward A. Shils, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, v.12, n.2 (Summer 1948) and Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Janowitz and Shils present the argument that German soldiers in World War II fought for the respect of their fellow squad or platoon members, while Bartov argues that, at least on the Eastern Front, they fought because they believed Nazi ideology about the Soviet enemy. Nevertheless, both emphasize the importance of belief in a set of ideas stemming from an organization (either the Wehrmacht itself or Nazi propaganda inculcated to some degree by the Wehrmacht). Similar points on the importance of cultural beliefs in the Wehrmacht are also made in van Creveld, Fighting Power; and Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” in Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, (Cambridge, U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 2001).
given service are identical or even nearly so. While culture is pervasive within an organization and can provide significant insight into organizational behavior, it should not be considered a fully deterministic phenomenon.

This uneven assimilation of individuals into culture means that culture should be used with care as an analytic tool. It is best used to explain organizational behavior as an aggregate. It is less useful as a tool to analyze any given individual leader or individual unit performance, as it is too uncertain at this level of detail. However, the basic pattern of organizational culture should be readily apparent when examining the evolution of professional schools and the subsequent actions of most units of that organization on the battlefield.

Further, culture is seldom monolithic. This makes the use of culture as an analytic tool more problematic. Many organizations have subcultures within the broader organizational culture. A subculture, as the name implies, is a subset of the organizational culture. It can be very similar to the organizational culture as a whole or, in some cases, quite different.

In an early work on subculture, Caren Siehl and Joanne Martin have termed these two types of subcultures “orthogonal” and “counter.” Orthogonal subcultures are essentially minor variations on the overall (or “dominant”) organizational culture.

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102 Rosen, Winning The Next War discusses the non-monolithic nature of most military organizations, though he refers to them as branches or communities rather than subcultures.
103 Caren Siehl and Joanne Martin, “Organizational Culture and Counterculture: An Uneasy Symbiosis,” Organizational Dynamics, v.12, n.2 (Autumn 1983). The case they examine is the culture at General Motors. Each of the divisions within GM had its own orthogonal subculture, until John DeLorean attempted to create a new counter subculture at Pontiac. Initially highly successful, DeLorean was eventually fired from GM as the tension between his new subculture and the dominant culture became too great. In the military context, Builder briefly mentions subcultures or “intraservice” distinctions on pg. 25-26.
Counter subcultures, in contrast, may be significantly different from the dominant culture, existing in an uneasy partnership with the larger organization.

In terms of military culture, these subcultures are generally to be found within service branches or other such functional distinctions. In the U.S. Air Force, for example, the dominant culture is pilot-centered. Non-pilots (intelligence officers, ballistic missiles officers, etc.) have their own subcultures. Within the pilot subculture, a further distinction between combat pilots and support aircraft pilots is made, with each having some level of subculture. Finally, even within the combat pilot subculture, further subculture distinctions exist between bomber and fighter pilots. Similarly, the U.S. Navy is considered to have three main subcultures, each related to platform type: surface warfare; aviation; and submarine.

While often orthogonal and exhibiting only a friendly rivalry, branch subcultures can sometimes be counter to the dominant culture. In this case, the tension can be either productive or destructive (possibly even both at different times). Siehl and Martin note that the counter subculture can be a way for the organization to develop new ideas, yet at the same time the dominant culture may punish members of the counter subculture.

The special operations forces of the U.S. military present a good example of counter subcultures in the military context. Often at odds with the dominant culture, the

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special operations forces were so out of favor with the services in the 1980s that Congress eventually took steps to shield these subcultures. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and subsequent Nunn-Cohen amendment created a unified United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to both promote joint operations between the various special operations subcultures and to protect the subcultures from potential punishment from the dominant service cultures. \[^{106}\] While the impact of USSOCOM remains debated, the tension between many in the dominant service cultures (and their orthogonal subcultures) and the special operations subcultures remains. \[^{107}\]

Understanding the various subcultures of an organization and their relationship to one another is therefore vital to using culture as an analytic tool. Doctrine could be readily agreed to by all subcultures or be the result of compromise between them. Alternately, a counter subculture could produce a doctrine radically at odds with the dominant culture, or two subcultures could coexist with different doctrinal emphasis.

The overall impact of subcultures is significant, but limited. Counter cultures are unlikely to have major effect on doctrine for the dominant culture, except at the margins, as they are simply too small and isolated. In contrast, similarly sized orthogonal subcultures can often influence doctrine more significantly, yet because they are so similar the overall impact on doctrine is likely to be seen only at a relatively fine grained level of detail. Only in rare cases will two subcultures with major differences coexist; the

\[^{106}\] For more detail on Goldwater-Nichols, see James R. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, (Texas A&M Press; College Station, TX; 2002). For more detail on special operations culture and efforts to promote it, see Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*, (Brookings; Washington, D.C.; 1997).

\[^{107}\] For example, Army officers who are members of the armor, artillery, or infantry branches will often (though certainly not always) express disdain for Army Special Forces as “cowboys” who “don’t play well with others.” See Marquis, chapters 2 and 3.
case of the United States Marine Corps, as discussed in the case work, is one of the few examples of this. James Q. Wilson describes the Central Intelligence Agency as another example, with the analysts and operators having very different cultures.  

U.S. Army doctrine in the interwar period provides a good example of the role of subcultures in doctrinal formation. As noted previously, the role of the tank in the U.S. Army in the interwar period was heavily influenced by the artillery and infantry subcultures, which were orthogonal variants of the dominant Army culture. These two subcultures agreed that the tank should be used to support the infantry-artillery team. However, some in the cavalry subculture, which was also orthogonal to the dominant culture, had a slightly different view. They saw tanks and armored cars as a way to revitalize the cavalry’s traditional missions of raiding, flank security, and reconnaissance. They fought for and developed a more mobile, less heavily armored vehicle, which they termed a “combat car.”

It could be argued that this was less about culture and more about resources and autonomy for the combat arms. Cavalry officers wanted their own tanks in order to bolster their own resources, while infantry and artillery sought to subordinate the new technology to avoid loss of resources or autonomy within the Army. While there is undoubtedly truth in this simple version of the story, it elides important details that point to the importance of culture. Most importantly, it glosses over the intense ambivalence towards the combat car many in the cavalry felt. Mechanization meant the end of horse cavalry, which was the sine qua non of the cavalry officer. It was only after significant

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and often heated debate that the combat car was embraced, principally because it was seen as a way to accomplish traditional cavalry missions more effectively. Further, none of the Army subcultures was explicitly against the new technology; it was rather a question of how that new technology was best employed. The cavalry subculture’s view of the tank was different from the other two Army subcultures, but not so much that the other two would find cavalry doctrine unrecognizable. The resulting doctrine had some elements of each subculture’s view on armored vehicles.\textsuperscript{110}

In the case studies presented here, some of the most important subcultures are those of the special operations forces of the United States and Britain: the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF), colloquially known as the Green Berets, and the British Army’s Special Air Service (SAS). Though culturally distinct in a number of ways, SF and the SAS are more similar than different. Both focus on a mission that is generally termed “unconventional” or “irregular” warfare. This catch-all includes operations “behind enemy lines” in support of conventional operations, the conducting of guerrilla war, foreign internal defense, and direct action missions intended to accomplish limited but important goals such as capturing an enemy leader.

The central elements of culture in special operations forces are an emphasis on individual and very small unit capabilities, a willingness to work closely with other services and civilian agencies, and frequent interaction with foreigners. As such, it shares many characteristics with the limited war-imperial policing archetype. In fact, the special operations forces subculture can be viewed as an amplification of the limited war-imperial policing archetype, with even more focus on the intense professionalism of

\textsuperscript{110} For a detailed history of both the internal cavalry debates on tanks and the eventual triumph of mechanization, see George Hofmann, \textit{Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of the U.S. Cavalry}, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
individuals. The special operations forces, accustomed to working in small groups in areas in which the reach of government is limited, also see less distinction between “peace” and “war.” Peace in many cases is extraordinarily violent for the special forces community, and war often bears little resemblance to the national-industrial conception of war embodied in the World Wars. The table below summarizes the elements of the SF/SAS subculture (termed unconventional). The case work will demonstrate that the SAS is a generally well-accepted orthogonal subculture of the British Army, while the SF is counter to the U.S. Army’s dominant culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic culture</th>
<th>Managerial Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Line between war and peace very hazy</td>
<td>Q5: Officer is a “leader of professionals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: War is limited and inherently political</td>
<td>Q6: Civil-military spheres often complementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Tactical excellence paramount</td>
<td>Q7: Small unit leadership is critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4: Working well with other services, agencies and foreigners is critical</td>
<td>Q8: Staff functions and supporting arms minimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

Professional military organizations need shared values and ideas about war in order to effectively respond to the numerous threats, opportunities, and constraints of the domestic and international environments. Culture, which has its origins in the
organization’s foundational experiences or “first war,” provides these values and ideas, enabling military organizations to evaluate and prioritize information from an environment that is often highly ambiguous. Culture is principally embodied in and transmitted through professional military education.

“First wars” are frequently dictated by geostrategic position, so there are likely a limited number of broad cultural archetypes. One is associated with total war, a phenomenon most associated with continental powers. Another is associated with limited war and imperial policing, most associated with maritime powers. However, some organizations have foundational experiences that are radically different from geostrategic position, meaning culture is not merely endogenous to this position.

The effect of culture, a filter for reducing ambiguity, will be strongest when information is most ambiguous. Highly ambiguous environments include peacetime or counterinsurgency. Culture will be weakest when information is least ambiguous, such as four years into a major war.

This chapter will argue that the U.S. Army as a professional organization is defined by the experience of the Civil War. Prior to the Civil War the Army had taken steps towards professionalization based on a limited war model informed principally by the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. Given the United States geostrategic position and liberal democratic government, this would be the type of professional Army one would expect it to have, mirroring fellow liberal maritime state Great Britain.

However, the total war experience of 1861-1865 significantly shifted the Army’s conception of both war and itself. After discussing the pre-war Army and the changes in thinking brought on by the Civil War, the chapter will then detail the Army’s post-war process of professionalization, which centered on the creation of a School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth in 1881. This process drew on some of the pre-Civil War ideas about the Army but uniquely fit them to the era of total war. Leavenworth and its conception of war and military professionalism would gradually become institutionalized, a process that could not happen overnight.

However, less than four decades after its founding, the School of Application (renamed the Command and General Staff School) would dominate the thinking of the Army’s officer corps serving as both symbol of and transmission belt for the concept of the Army as an organization dedicated to total war. This Army culture would prove remarkably durable, surviving from the Indian Wars to at least the third decade of the Cold War.
Proto-professionalism: The Old Army 1812-1861

The war of 1812 provided the first impetus to professionalization in the United States Army. Despite ultimate success in the war, the Army had not performed as well as some of its officers had hoped it would. The response attempted by officers such as West Point superintendent Major Sylvanus Thayer and civilians such as Secretary of War John Calhoun was twofold. The first was an attempt to produce a better professional officer corps, principally by refining the curriculum at West Point. As William Skelton notes, this officer corps was quite small and oriented principally on the lessons of 1812.111 In that war, the principal opponent had been a distant European power seeking to project power ashore. The Army’s role was principally to defend coastal cities such as New York, Boston and Washington. This required extensive knowledge of artillery and fortification, which dovetailed nicely with West Point’s general engineering focus. In 1824, the Army also established its first postgraduate institution, the Artillery School of Practice at Ft. Monroe in Virginia, based on the lessons of the war.112

The second response, masterminded by Calhoun, was the concept of the “expansible army.” In this view, the purpose of the small standing Army was to provide a cadre for an influx of citizen volunteers in wartime. There was thus less need for professional enlisted and junior officers and more for field grade and higher officers. Calhoun’s plan was not fully implemented in the aftermath of the War of 1812 but a reasonable compromise was reached. The enlisted strength of the Regular Army was cut in half (roughly 11,000 to 5,550) but the officer corps was barely reduced (roughly 680 to

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West Point graduates completely dominated the officer corps virtually top to bottom except for certain brief periods of expansion when civilian officers were inducted.

This new model army was a clear improvement on the almost haphazard army of 1812-1815 but still left much to be desired. For one, the ability of the Army to actually recruit, train, and command volunteers was made difficult by the existence of the state militia forces that would become the National Guard. Yet the Army was reasonably effective both as a frontier constabulary and in defeating the Mexican Army in 1847 (the latter particularly aided by the highly trained artillerymen). It was also highly effective in preparing for future defensive war with European powers, though this effort was hampered by Congressional unwillingness to fully fund fortification and ordnance purchases.

During this period the Army introduced the first publication that could be considered doctrine, in the form of General Winfield Scott’s *General Regulations for the United States Army* of 1821. However, this document was so broad in focus, incorporating all manner of regulations that had little to do with combat that it does not meet the definition of doctrine presented earlier. Instead, as its name suggests, it was a codification of general practice in the Army.

There was also little effort to plan for the use of large combined arms units in peacetime during this period. Neither divisions nor corps in the War of 1812 had been standardized, with large variations depending on time and place. Scott’s subsequent *Regulations* gave a standard definition based on a power of two (two regiments to a brigade, two brigades to a division, etc.) but between 1812 and 1847 these concepts were

barely used as nothing close to a brigade size was assembled during the period. Further, both brigade and division had only a single staff officer in the form of a chief of staff.\textsuperscript{115}

In the period between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, the Army principally fought various tribes of Native Americans. This proved challenging to the limited war Army, as the tribes would seldom stand and fight anything like a decisive battle. Some foretaste of the methods of the Civil War can be found in this period, such as Colonel William Worth’s successful “pacification” of the Seminole in 1841. After six years of searching for decisive battle and the resulting inconclusive war in Florida, Worth took command. Worth launched a campaign against the Seminoles’ homes and crops during the feverish summer, with the resulting devastation rapidly bringing Seminole resistance to an end.\textsuperscript{116} However, this response is notable for being unusual at the time; most Army engagements with Native Americans sought to bring their elusive forces to battle.

Following the Mexican War, some revisions to the Regulations were enacted. The divisional concept was further refined and for the first time made explicitly a combined arms force of either infantry or cavalry brigades combined with corps artillery and engineering assets. However, the proportions were not defined and the division staff only expanded slightly to a handful of specialized officers (artillery, ordnance, etc.). During the war, it had been difficult to find officers capable of commanding and staffing divisions; yet following the war no peacetime corps or division structure was established meaning the problem would likely reemerge in future conflicts.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{117} Wilson, p. 11-12; Weigley, \textit{History of the United States Army}, p. 182.
The Army in 1861 thus resembled a competent army from 18th century Europe blended with a frontier constabulary. In other words, it was on the path to becoming a maritime army, with the imperial policing role taking place on the American continent rather than overseas. It spent the bulk of its time in protecting settlers from Indians and trying to shore up coastal defenses, and aided by volunteers (with whom it had strained relations) it could defeat other similarly constituted armies. However, the nationalist mass army experience of the Napoleonic period had more or less bypassed it. It had little in the way of doctrine or organization for large scale combat, instead relying heavily on ad hoc field solutions. It had begun to professionalize but the process was far from complete. This nascent professionalization process would be disrupted by the experience of the Civil War, which would radically alter the Army’s conception of war.\textsuperscript{118}

The Army Learns Total War: The Civil War 1861-1865

The Regular Army split (albeit unevenly) into the Union and Confederate Armies in 1861 after the attack on Ft. Sumter. Both armies thus had more or less the same thinking about war: it would be a powerful but limited struggle that would probably be over relatively quickly as both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War had been. This thinking was understandable but entirely wrong. Instead of a short, sharp and limited war, the U.S. Civil War would herald the age of total war as the nationalism of the French Revolution was linked to the economic power of the Industrial Revolution. This

\textsuperscript{118} This characterization of two distinct and different professionalization experiences of the U.S. Army is drawn from Mark R. Grandstaff, “Preserving the ‘Habits and Usages of War’: William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform, and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865-1881, Revisited,” \textit{The Journal of Military History}, v.62, n.3 (July 1998).
experience would have profound and permanent effects on the U.S. Army, transforming it into an organization for total war.

The following section details the initial beliefs of the armies (principally the Union but with some reference to the Confederacy) and the transformation of those beliefs by the end of the war. It does so by defining the Army’s initial answer to each of the questions for defining the elements of culture based on its period of proto-professionalization. It then illustrates how the answer to many (though not all) of these questions changed substantially over the course of the war, particularly in the minds of the most successful commanders. It was these commanders who would then shape the post-war Army and its professionalization, so the lessons they learned are of particular importance.

Strategic Normative Elements of Culture

The first set of beliefs deals with the strategic normative dimension of war. Put simply, was war limited or total and what were the acceptable targets of war? Initially, the Union generals believed the war was limited and that the only acceptable targets of violence (both brute force and coercive) were the enemies field forces. The central experience of previous war for most of the commanders had been the Mexican War, a conflict marked by a few successful victories in the field followed by the seizure of the Mexican capital and a general policy of treating the civilian population well. There had been only a handful of violent clashes between U.S. forces and civilians and these were
not well-remembered by the bulk of the officer corps who instead recalled the skillfully won field battle of Buena Vista.¹¹⁹

These beliefs lead the leadership of the Union Army to initially pursue a policy of conciliation towards the civilian population of the South while seeking to defeat the rebel field armies. Major General George McClellan, commander of the Military District of the Potomac and subsequently the entire Army, was a major advocate of conciliation. McClellan felt that crushing military victories in the field combined with the seizure of several key cities would drive a wedge between the slave-holding elites of the Confederacy and the non-slaveholding majority. The corollary to this policy was that the property and lives of those not in uniform would have to be treated with the utmost respect. This view, held by many other officers, was in essence a classic limited war view: defeat the enemy army and limit war’s effect on the population.¹²⁰

Further, this policy appeared to have worked well for McClellan in the very earliest days of the war. His campaign in western Virginia in the summer of 1861 was a notable success for conciliation and limited war. McClellan had assembled overwhelming military force to defeat rebel field forces while at the same time assuring the population he would respect their lives and property, including slaves. His success had brought forth a loyalist government and set in motion the political process that would lead to the creation of the Unionist state of West Virginia.¹²¹

However, the Army was not monolithic in its views about the strategic normative aspect of war. Some advocated a different and harsher view; many of these officers began the war in the far West, particularly Missouri. While still far from deliberate targeting of civilian life and property, the attitude of senior officers in Missouri was that the population should be held responsible for acts of sabotage. Some of these officers also advocated confiscation of Confederate property and, briefly, emancipation of slaves.\textsuperscript{122}

This period of diversity on strategic normative aspects of war would last for the first 12 to 18 months of the war. By the beginning of the summer of 1862, advocates of conciliation and limited war appeared poised to triumph. The Confederacy had been beaten in a number of engagements and McClellan’s Army of the Potomac was preparing to capture Richmond. However, the dynamic Confederate General Robert E. Lee inflicted a serious reversal on McClellan and the prospect for conciliation began to recede quickly.

One important outcome of Lee’s victory was the shift eastward of several prominent generals from Missouri and their promotion to high positions of command. Generals Henry Halleck and John Pope in particular were given high positions, with Halleck eventually replacing McClellan as Commanding General of the U.S. Army and Pope taking command of the Army of Virginia. They argued for a harsher policy towards the Confederacy, encouraging the passing of a confiscation bill in Congress and allowing the Army of Virginia to requisition supplies without compensation from the rebel population.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{122} Grimsley, pp. 35-39.
\textsuperscript{123} Grimsley, pp. 67-92; and Daniel Sutherland, “Abraham Lincoln, John Pope, and the Origins of Total
From this point forward, the beliefs of the Union officer corps about the strategic normative aspect of war would become both increasingly monolithic and increasingly harsh. This transformation is nowhere more apparent or important than in the changing beliefs of the Union’s two most important generals, Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. Both began the war as almost fervent believers in conciliation, but soon turned to expedients such as foraging and requisitioning supplies.\textsuperscript{124} Yet neither was ready to embrace truly punitive measures in 1862 except in very limited circumstances and in this they represented the view of much of the officer corps.

However, by 1863 the views of Grant and Sherman began to change as did that of the officer corps. The issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1863, set the tone for this transformation; in essence the Union had declared war on the livelihood of the Southern slaveholding aristocracy. Henceforth, the property of Southern civilians would be attacked more and more routinely and in ever increasing scale. Previous economic attacks had been limited largely to railroad and war munitions factories, but in the spring of 1863 Grant and Sherman began to destroy and confiscate non-military supplies. The Mississippi capital of Jackson was occupied not once but twice by the two generals and the second time little was left of economic value.\textsuperscript{25}

The view of strategic normative values continued to move towards the targeting of civilian property as a deliberate strategy and more generally of the war as a total one. For example, in February 1864, Sherman launched an offensive towards Meridian, Mississippi. En route he wrecked much of the countryside as well as what remained of Jackson. Arriving at Meridian, which had been abandoned by Confederate forces,

\textsuperscript{124} Grimsley, pp. 48-58.

\textsuperscript{25} Grimsley, pp. 154-162.
Sherman commanded his men to take a day off and then raze the city. After they worked for five days burning and wrecking, Sherman commented “Meridian...no longer exists.”

Grant’s accession to the position of Commanding General of the Union Army in March 1864 ensured that this view of war would be the one promulgated from the top. He found a number of willing subordinates besides Sherman (who replaced him as commander in the West). Major General David Hunter launched a campaign in the summer of 1864 intended to wreak destruction on the fertile Shenandoah Valley. After some initial success, Hunter was repulsed by Confederate general Jubal Early. As with several Confederate leaders, Early himself had become a believer in total war, at least as a retaliatory measure. After defeating Hunter, he moved into Maryland and Pennsylvania where he burned the town of Chambersburg.

Grant replaced Hunter with Major General Phillip Sheridan, who was ordered not just to defeat Early’s army, but also to complete the devastation of the Shenandoah. Sheridan did both with dispatch, beginning in August of 1864. His forces systematically burned every barn they came across on the march. After defeating Early’s forces in September, Sheridan turned to the systematic devastation of the Valley. Within about a month, Sheridan reported “I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills, filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than

127 Grimsley, pp. 166-167.
3,000 sheep.” He also noted the effect on the population: “The people here are getting sick of the war.”\textsuperscript{128}

Notably, an inextricable component of the campaign against the livelihood of Southerners from Mississippi to Virginia was the effect of Southern guerrillas on the Union Army. As the Union armies supply lines stretched further and they also came to provision themselves more by foraging they grew more and more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks on both supply trains and on small foraging parties. Combined with larger scale partisan actions and conventional cavalry raids, guerrillas posed a significant threat as well as infuriating commanders such as Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. The Southern population had to be targeted not just because it supplied the Southern war machine with men and materiel, but also because its members directly attacked the Union armies out of uniform. Collective guilt of the population for the actions of some of its members also helped fuel the Union’s move to total war.\textsuperscript{129}

The Shenandoah Campaign brought the total war view from the Western theater to the Eastern, but it was merely a prelude to the most famous example of total war ethos in the Civil War: Sherman’s burning of Atlanta and March to the Sea. Sherman successfully marched from Nashville to Atlanta, capturing the city in September 1864. He subsequently ordered all civilians out of the city. In November, his forces destroyed much of the city and marched southeast to Savannah pillaging a huge swath through the

\textsuperscript{128} Both quotations from Grimsley, p. 168.
Southern heartland. After reaching Savannah, Sherman turned north and inflicted a similar treatment on both Carolinas.¹³⁰

Sherman is particularly notable for two principal reasons. First, he was the most audacious of the Union’s commanders in terms of inflicting economic ruin on the civilian population. Yet at the same time, he was one of the most troubled by the morality of his effort and spent considerable time attempting to justify it.¹³¹ Second, as discussed below, it was Sherman who relaunched the Army’s process of professionalization following the war and this process bore the indelible stamp of his values.

**Strategic Positivist Elements of Culture**

In terms of strategic positivist beliefs, the officer corps of the Union was less divided at the outset of the war. Most believed in the utility of the single decisive battle followed by political negotiations based on that battle’s outcome (aided perhaps by the occupation of key territory such as an enemy capital), combined with a belief in the efficacy of firepower particularly in the form of artillery. Both of these beliefs had been validated in the Mexican War and there was little reason to initially question them. War was thus principally about maneuvering to a superior position, especially to employ artillery, and then concluding the decisive battle successfully. Historian Russell Weigley has termed this a “Napoleonic strategy” and it had influence over both northern and southern generals.¹³²

¹³⁰ Grimsely, pp. 186-204.
¹³² See Weigley, *American Way of War*, pp. 102-127 for discussion of Lee and the Confederates search for decisive battle and 133-139 for McClellan and the Union. Weigley argues McClellan and Meade were not truly Napoleonic but McClellan still conformed to more limited warfare models by seeking to seize the enemy capital.
This initial view proved inappropriate to the Civil War. Industrial capability combined with nationalism created armies too large to defeat in a single or even a handful of decisive battles. At the same time, the United States was too big for even these large armies to effectively occupy the bulk of the country and retain the ability to conduct offensive operations. Finally, the size of armies combined with advances in both small arms and artillery and the adoption of entrenchment made the tactical offensive (traditionally the bayonet rush, cavalry charge, and artillery rush) problematic.  

A clear example of the limits of decisive battle in the early Civil War is the Second Battle of Bull Run/Manassas in August 1862. General Lee succeeded in fixing General Pope’s army in place using General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s forces and then delivered a crushing flank attack with General James Longstreet’s corps. The result was to send Pope’s army retreating to Washington after suffering 16,000 casualties. Lee’s forces suffered a little over 9,000, but were unable to pursue and destroy Pope’s army. Further, in percentage terms, Lee’s offensive had cost him almost 20% of his force to Pope’s 13%. Despite achieving as decisive a result as could be hoped for in a single battle, Lee had suffered heavily and not destroyed the enemy army. Russell Weigley is equally critical of many of the Union generals, arguing:

So much did these generals regard “the battle” as synonymous with “the campaign” and even “the war” that when they lost a battle they never knew what to do next and withdrew into paralysis until their replacement came along. It is difficult to believe they would have demonstrated a much clearer notion of what to do next had they ever been fortunate enough to win their battles.  

The solution to the strategic positivist question had three main parts. The first, discussed previously, was to alter the normative component of strategy in order to target

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135 Ibid., p. 135.
the enemy economy and population, a so-called “strategy of exhaustion.” The second was to focus on continual contact with enemy armies in order to attrite and eventually annihilate them, the “strategy of annihilation.” The third, more tactical and operational, was to adapt to the increasing amount of firepower by creating a system of hasty entrenchment and field fortifications that, supported by centralized control of artillery, would allow slow and methodical advance on the offensive or an equally stout defense while the frontal assault was to be used sparingly if at all. Firepower and attrition would substitute in many instances for the decisive charge, though the charge did not disappear entirely.

As with the normative dimension of strategy, Grant and Sherman would be the principal exponents of this new positivist dimension of strategy. Grant in particular grimly prosecuted a strategy of annihilation against Lee in the east. The early months of 1864 saw Grant relentlessly press Lee’s army from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, with Grant’s army sustaining more than 55,000 casualties while causing more than 32,000. When this proved ineffective at breaking Lee’s army, Grant moved to seize Petersburg, the gateway to Richmond in hopes of cutting Lee off from supply and reinforcement. This effort failed to cut the link to the Deep South and the two armies settled into attritional warfare.

Ultimately, Grant accepted a grinding trench warfare east of Petersburg that would last from the summer of 1864 until the end of the war. This period saw the

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137 See Noseworthy, pp. 496-518, and 533-567.
introduction of massive siege guns and mortars as well as the use of underground tunneling to explode a mine under enemy lines (both techniques would be used again in World War I). The resulting Battle of the Crater in July-August 1864 once again demonstrated the difficulty of assaulting troops that were heavily entrenched; it also demonstrated Grant’s willingness to continue attrition warfare in the face of repeated tactical and operational defeats.\textsuperscript{139}

Sherman was less wedded to annihilation, preferring to maneuver around enemy entrenched positions and exhaust the Confederate economy when possible. However, he would fight the grinding annihilation battle when an enemy army presented itself.\textsuperscript{140} He also became the best of the Union generals at the methodical offensive, seizing both Atlanta and Savannah by means of skirmish lines that would move forward and entrench in bounds until they eventually reached the enemies fortification. Backed by artillery, these entrenched infantry would attrite the enemy until they fled or surrendered.\textsuperscript{141}

The Civil War also established the U.S. Army’s view of its relations to other services. The Marine Corps was a tiny force that played almost no role in the Civil War and so did not even register with the Army. The Navy and the Army in contrast were both important in the war but operated almost entirely independently. For the most part the Navy sought to enforce a blockade of the South while the Army fought the Southern armies.


\textsuperscript{140} See Marszalek, pp. 264-284 for examples of both Sherman’s general preference to avoid battle and his willingness to undertake it when necessary, and sometimes foolishly as at Kennesaw Mountain.

\textsuperscript{141} See Hagerman, pp. 293-297. Hagerman notes that Sherman made less use of artillery than Grant did in the same period as he needed to move across greater distances and also faced less entrenched resistance.
The exception to this pattern was the campaign to secure the Mississippi River. Here the Navy and Army cooperate closely through the fall of Vicksburg in 1863. Yet the relationship was always clearly one of Navy support to the Army rather than as co-equals (at least in the minds of Army officers). Without Army troops to seize and hold captured forts and cities, the naval effort on the Mississippi could at best temporarily suppress trade. In contrast, even without the Navy the Army could eventually take and hold all of the important forts and cities along the river, albeit not as easily and at greater cost.¹⁴²

Managerial Normative Elements of Culture

The next set of cultural values influenced by the Civil War defines the identity of the officer and his appropriate role. These normative managerial values describe what an officer is supposed to do and his relationship to society. In the U.S. Army, the Civil War began the redefinition of an officer as a manager of large organizations and as master of a sphere of influence sharply separated from the rest of civilian activity.

The principal problem that confronted the Union Army in the early Civil War was the lack of officers capable of commanding the massive armies the war called forth. Experienced officers at the field grade (major) and below were not in plentiful supply, but combined with an influx of volunteers they did reasonably well. At higher levels of command, there was virtually no experience or training except for the senior commanders of the Mexican war almost fifteen years previous.

Thus the chief lesson about what made a good officer was the ability to lead large groups of men. This required an entirely different set of values than had previously been

¹⁴² See “River Navies in the Civil War,” Military Affairs, v.18, n.1 (Spring 1954) for a brief summary.
understood to be at the core of officership. Before the war, even senior officers needed to know little more than how to lead a company, making command a rather intimate affair. However, the war soon showed that delegation, the ability to focus on broader operational and strategic questions rather than mere tactics, and overall good management were what was required of Union colonels and generals.

This may seem to be incredibly obvious to the modern audience yet in the early period of the war it was not appreciated. Russell Weigley notes that Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, the commander of the entire Army of Virginia, personally led the reconnaissance ahead of his army’s march to Bull Run/Manassas in 1861. Similarly, McClellan personally sighted artillery pieces before the battle of Antietam/Sharpsburg.143 On the Confederate side, the South’s second-highest ranking officer, General Albert Sidney Johnston, was killed while providing tactical leadership at the battle of Shiloh in 1862. His death not only resulted in what had looked to be a Southern victory becoming a defeat but also brought the Union victors, Grant and Sherman, to prominence.144

In contrast to this type of leader, Grant had little interest in tactics. He was bottom of his West Point class in tactics and his tactical guidance during the war was never as good as Sherman’s, who in fact tutored Grant. However, this lack of tactical focus allowed Grant to develop his capacity for operational and later strategic leadership and management.145 In this realm, he was Sherman’s instructor. Grant, for example, ordered his staff officers (whose number he expanded as needed) to not only go to the

143 Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 241.
front to observe and report back to him, but also to urge commanders at the front to take action if it was urgently needed and there was not time to report back to Grant.¹⁴⁶

Sherman was not as skilled at delegation as Grant, yet he too was a ferociously capable organizer. His effort to prepare three armies for the march from Nashville to Atlanta in 1864 was an epic of organization and he showed consistent ability to effectively direct these armies (a total of about 100,000 soldiers). His ability to combine massive foraging with efficient logistics made both the march to Atlanta and the subsequent March to the Sea possible.¹⁴⁷

This ability to delegate and manage rather than provide tactical leadership would eventually be selected for across the Union’s senior leadership. Generals such as Phillip Sheridan, George Meade, John Schofield, James McPherson, and George Thomas showed anywhere from fair to excellent leadership at the corps and army levels, and they were aided by a number of able division commanders. It had taken nearly three years of war and a host of mistakes to select for these commanders, but the proper role of an officer in the era of total war was now clear to the United States Army.

Equally clear was the preferred relationship between the civil and military spheres of authority. The two spheres should be as separate as possible, with the military left to tend its responsibilities with minimal interference. Certainly most officers respected the idea of civilian supremacy over the military, but they were unhappy with what they saw as meddling in their area of professional competence.

McClellan’s well-documented clashes with Lincoln over policy in the early part of the war were the high point of civil-military tension. In essence, McClellan refused to

¹⁴⁷ Marszalek, pp. 259-264.
obey direct orders from the president when he felt they conflicted with his professional judgment. Following McClellan’s relief (and subsequent run for president in 1864), Lincoln’s relations with senior commanders such as Halleck and Grant were considerably better and civil-military questions were muted. Lincoln and Grant more or less agreed on policy and Lincoln trusted Grant enough to give him appropriate autonomy in conducting the war.

However, in the immediate aftermath of the war civil-military dispute would again become an issue. Following Lincoln’s assassination, Vice President Andrew Johnson assumed the presidency and issued orders that began the reconstruction of the South on relatively generous terms. These terms were too generous for Grant and Lincoln’s Secretary of War Edward Stanton, who felt Johnson was not doing enough to punish and limit the powers of former rebel elites and was doing far too little to protect Union soldiers in the South. Over the course of the next three years Grant and Stanton would revolt against Johnson with the help of radicals in Congress.  

Ultimately Congress would in effect split the U.S. Army in two: one part would guard the borders and fight Indians on the frontier while the other maintained a harsher version of reconstruction in the South. The command of this latter portion of the Army was removed from the Johnson’s purview. His subsequent attempt to remove Stanton from power led to Congress attempt to impeach him.

Even as Grant helped lead a revolt intended to carve out significant autonomy for one part of the Army, Sherman took a different approach. Sherman detested both politics and politicians and so sought command in the far West. This part of the Army was

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hardly touched by the storm over Reconstruction and its physical distance helped isolate it further from the machinations of politics.

These responses to major disagreements with civilian leadership would set the future tone for Army civil-military relations. Sherman's response, the rejection of politics, would be the dominant one, as he set up the Army's post-Civil War professional education system. However, Grant's experience of quiet defiance of the President helped further solidify the belief among officers that while civilians might ultimately be supreme they were not to be allowed to interfere in the military profession's areas of competence.

*Managerial Positivist Elements of Culture*

The final set of cultural values the Army derived from the Civil War are those concerning the best practices for the management of military organizations. These positivist managerial values are tied directly to the successful but often problematic experience of the Union Army during the war. Large unit management was what mattered and the central importance of both staff work and combat support was well demonstrated in the war.

As noted, the principal difficulty faced by the Union was commanding large units, yet at the same time total warfare had made those units the principal building blocks of armies. Tactical success or failure by company or regimental commanders would seldom decide a single battle much less the drawn out campaigns needed for operational and strategic success. Further, even brigade sized units at the time were not combined arms units; instead they were pure cavalry or infantry (later artillery brigades as well).
The division was initially the lowest level of organization to contain all arms. This made the division the basic unit of action for the Army, and the building block for the corps and army level formations that Grant and Sherman wielded so adroitly. By 1863, however, further reorganization was needed and the cavalry was reconstituted as an independent corps in the Army of the Potomac and artillery was reconstituted as brigades under the corps headquarters. Following the war, War Department regulations made the division the central element of Army organization, calling it “the fundamental element and basis of organization of every active army.” After significant experimentation with various organizations, the final shift in federal organization of large units took place in 1864 after Grant took command in the East. He established the Army of the Potomac as a force of three corps each with roughly three divisions totaling around 26,000 men per corps.

Running such large units was more than enough to overwhelm any single man so staffs expanded significantly over the course of the war. At all levels from regiment to corps there were increases in the number of staff officers to oversee muster (personnel), subsistence, ordnance and the like. This expansion and the use to which the staff was put varied from commander to commander; however, it was Grant’s system of careful organization of the staff and investing it with considerable authority that proved most successful.

This staff expansion had visible effect on both sides at the corps level as well. James Longstreet on the Confederate side spent considerable effort organizing his staff

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149 See War Department General Order 56, 1866, quoted in Wilson, p. 16.
150 Wilson, p. 14.
and gave them considerable authority. Longstreet is widely regarded as perhaps the best corps commander of the war and his success was in large part due to this able staff.\footnote{See Richard DiNardo, “Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War,” The Journal of Military History, v.66, n.4 (October 2002).}

Additionally, the Union Army came to appreciate the vital role played by supporting arms. In the Civil War these were principally the various independent War Department bureaus and departments such as the Commissary General, the Surgeon General, the Chief of Engineers, the United States Military Railroad Construction Corps and the like. Of critical importance was the Quartermaster Department under Brigadier General Montgomery Meigs, who provided for centralized procurement and auditing as well as providing advice and support to logisticians in the field.\footnote{See Sherrod East, “Montgomery C. Meigs and the Quartermaster Department,” Military Affairs, v.25, n.4 (Winter 1961); Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1989); and David Miller, Second Only to Grant: Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs: A Biography, (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2000).}

Sherman in particular recognized the importance of these organizations. Writing to Meigs while in Georgia in 1864, he noted “... I beg to assure you that all my armies have been admirably supplied by your Department, and I am sometimes amazed at the magnitude of its operations.... And you may always rely upon my cordially cooperating with any system you may establish.”\footnote{East, p. 194.} He gave similar credit for his success in marching on Atlanta to the Railroad Construction Corps: “The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads...”\footnote{E.G. Campbell, “The United States Military Railroads, 1862-1865: War Time Operation and Maintenance,” The Journal of the American Military History Foundation, v.2, n.2 (Summer 1938), p. 89.}

Sherman’s appreciation for both Grant’s staff system and his own understanding of the vital nature of combat support would be incorporated into Army culture.
Preserving the Lessons of Total War: Professional Education, 1865-1898

In the period after the Civil War, the Army was in turmoil. As noted earlier, Grant became deeply involved in politics as commanding general and Sherman went to the West. In 1868, Grant was elected president and named his old friend Sherman to be commanding general of the U.S. Army. Sherman would oversee the foundation of the Army’s professional education system after the Civil War and it would preserve and refine the lessons he had drawn from the Civil War and subsequent consideration of the war.

From 1869 to 1876, Sherman and his close subordinates such as Sheridan and protégé Emory Upton studied the armies and conflicts of Europe while considering ways to preserve what Sherman termed “the habits and usages of war.” However, little could be done in this period as Sherman and Grant had a substantial falling out, with Grant siding with his Secretary of War, William Belknap. Moreover, the commanding general had no authority over many elements of the Army bureaucracy, which instead reported directly to the Secretary of War. Sherman, always considering politics an anathema, had little conception of the political elements of senior command and so did little to help himself in this regard. The situation became bad enough the Sherman once again fled West, moving his command to St. Louis in 1874.

During this period, Sherman wrote his memoirs, which were published in 1875. In the concluding section of these memoirs, “Military Lessons of the War,” Sherman disseminates many of the lessons he had drawn from the Civil War. In it, for example, he describes the Army corps: “The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle,
should have a full and perfect staff, and every thing requisite for a separate action, ready at all time to be detached and sent off for any nature of service. The general in command should have the rank of lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education, equal to anything in war.” He further calls the division “the unit of administration.” In contrast, he remarks little on the smaller subunits, only noting that the company “is the true unit of discipline.”

The Army as Sherman envisioned was one prepared to fight total war again, despite knowing and proclaiming that the Army would not be able to assemble a full unit of regimental size during peacetime.

In addition to his vision of an Army prepared again for total war, Sherman noted the importance of military education. In addition to his admonition to preserve the habits and usages of war, he noted “At the close of our civil ware, lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals, as well as staff-officers, were from civil life; but I cannot recall any of the most successful who did not express a regret that had not received in early life instruction in the elementary principles of the art of war, instead of being force to acquire this knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war.” Sherman clearly wanted to ensure that future officers would have more opportunity to learn before fighting.

Belknap’s resignation in 1876 prompted Sherman to return to Washington and enabled him and similarly minded officers to begin establishing professional reforms. These included the formation of a new professional association and journal, moving

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156 Sherman, all quotes from p. 385
157 Sherman, p. 385
158 Sherman, p. 386.
reformers into key positions such as superintendent of West Point and of the Artillery School, and rewriting Army regulations.\textsuperscript{159}

In 1881, this reform movement culminated in the establishment of the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The School would, over time, become the bedrock of Army professionalism. From the beginning, Sherman explicitly wanted the School to be the training ground for the officers who lead a future expansion of the Army. He had become convinced that Calhoun’s expansible army was the right system for the United States; indeed it was the only system that the American economy and political system would support that would also allow for the creation of armies on the scale of the Civil War. He summed his view up in his report to Congress in 1881:

\textit{The whole theory and practice of the Government of the United States has been, and continues to be, that the Regular Army must be small, as small as possible, and that for great occasions we as a people must rely on the volunteer masses of soldiery. No class of men better recognize this fact than the Regular Army, and as the science of war is progressive, we must keep pace with it... In this sense the whole regular army is a school.}\textsuperscript{160}

Initially, the School trained lieutenants in the most basic elements of the military profession. In the early years, there were in fact two courses. The first taught tactics and organization while the second was almost purely remedial, teaching things as basic history, math, and literacy. The school faced resource shortages, shortfalls of instructors and an extremely uneven quality of students.

However, over time the commandants of the School were able to improve the instruction. They were supported in this by Sherman and his successors as commanding

\textsuperscript{159} This discussion of Sherman and Army professionalism draws heavily on Grandstaff.
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Report of the General of the Army, 1881}, pp. 36-37, as quoted in Grandstaff.
general, Phillip Sheridan and John Schofield. Most notably, Commandant Alexander McCook worked with General Sheridan to create a code of regulations for the School in 1888. This marked the end of what Leavenworth historian Timothy Nenninger referred to as “the kindergarten era.”\textsuperscript{161} The School continued to train lieutenants but of a much higher caliber. Instructors such as Arthur Wagner and Eben Swift imported some German techniques, such as war-gaming, and adapted them for the School.

The School in 1898 was still short of Sherman’s initial vision. Its curriculum now helped prepare students for both command and staff responsibilities and provided a broad base of military knowledge, as Sherman had hope it would. Yet at the same time, it was not fully accepted by the Army; when war broke out in 1898 Leavenworth graduates were not given any additional consideration when assignments were given. Further, the classes were still principally made up of lieutenants who would have little opportunity to make practical use of their broad studies at the School.

\textbf{A Trinity of Combat Arms: Army Subcultures, 1865-1898}

In addition to the creation of an overall Army culture, the period after the Civil War saw the solidification of the three dominant subcultures of the Army. These subcultures were, perhaps unsurprisingly, the three main combat branches of the Army. As the actual fighting components of an organization devoted to war it was almost inevitable that these would be dominant over other communities. Further, given their dependence on one another for overall success in war it is not surprising that the three branches would share dominance over the organization. Finally, this shared dominance

\textsuperscript{161} Nenninger, p. 28.
was mirrored by very similar thinking about the nature of war and the officership. In the language of organizational sociology, these were orthogonal subcultures.

However, orthogonal does not mean identical. Further, the lack of a Chief of Staff and a General Staff in this period gave the head of each of the branches considerable autonomy. The branches also developed (or further developed) their own schools which further helped impart branch-specific distinctions. This section will briefly discuss the differences between the branch subcultures and their evolution in this period as well as debates internal to the branches.

The infantry of the Army in this period was perhaps the closest of the three subcultures to being the *primus inter pares*. It had been the most prominent fighting arm in the Civil War and it was central to the Army: one could at least imagine infantry without cavalry or artillery in a future total war but the opposite seemed impossible. The first school for the infantry dated to the early period of Army professionalization and the establishment of the informal Infantry School of Practice in 1827 at Jefferson Barracks in Missouri. It's rudimentary training and informal nature did not lead to large advances in professionalization but it was a start.

The establishment of the School of Application at Ft. Leavenworth in 1881 marked the new beginning for infantry training. It was thus no accident that the infantry would be at the root of the developing Army culture. The need to absorb and lead large numbers of civilians, while not entirely unique to the infantry, was certainly most heavily felt by that branch.

While there were a number of debates within the infantry during this period perhaps the central one was that of responding to the increasing power and accuracy in
rifled personal weapons. This debate pitted those who felt that the rifle required high individual skill for long range shooting against those who felt that massed fire with relatively low skill soldiers was more appropriate.\textsuperscript{162}

The cavalry had been challenged by the Civil War and reinvigorated at the same time. The challenge came from the same rifled weapons and fieldworks that threatened the infantry. Yet the war had reinvigorated a cavalry tradition that had been weak in the United States. From shortly after the War of 1812 until 1833, the Army in fact had no permanent cavalry organization. In 1833, a Regiment of Dragoons was created along with an informal “School of the Trooper” at Jefferson Barracks. Yet these dragoons mostly fought Indians in a dispersed format, with companies often scattered across the hinterland. The Mexican War saw brief assembly of greater numbers but they had little impact on most of the war (apart from the campaign of the Army of the West against New Mexico).

The Civil War, in contrast, allowed corps sized formations of cavalry with major independent power as raiders and pursuers in addition to reconnaissance and screening missions. Though it would take several years to master the techniques of mass warfare, U.S. cavalry became adept both at massed saber charges and at dismounted fighting with carbines and/or revolvers. These skills were put to effective use in the ways now thought of as traditional cavalry missions: reconnaissance, pursuit, screening friendly forces, harassment of enemy main forces and the charge.

The central element of all these missions is mobility and emphasis on mobility over pure firepower would be the central difference of the cavalry subculture. To be sure

\textsuperscript{162} Russell Gilmore, “The ‘New Courage’: Rifles and Soldier Individualism, 1876-1918,” \textit{Military Affairs}, v.40, n.3 (October 1976)
the infantry and artillery did not eschew mobility and maneuver, but they did value
firepower more highly. The cavalry likewise did not eschew firepower (cavalry troops
being early adopters of breech loading and repeating weapons) but they value mobility
more.

In terms of schools, the cavalry actually had two during this period. The first was
the School of Application at Leavenworth along with the infantry. The second, the
School of Application for Cavalry and Light Artillery was opened at Fort Riley, Kansas,
in 1892, though Congress had appropriated money for it five years earlier. As the
curriculum at Leavenworth became more oriented towards both the infantry and the
general questions of officership, the locus of specifically cavalry training would shift to
Riley.163 The cavalry, as discussed below, was quite active in this period but not in large
masses. Instead, it returned to its previous role on the frontier, albeit in a fashion
modified by the Civil War experience.

The artillery had always been the most technical and schooling intensive of the
branches and this pattern continued after the war. The Artillery School at Fort Monroe
reopened soon after the Civil War and, as noted, above a second school specifically for
light (or field) artillery opened in 1892. These two schools provided a strong basis for
artillery education.

As one would expect, artillerymen were the most ardent advocates of the
firepower elements of Army strategic culture. Yet even they were not monolithic, as this

163 See Boyd Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Historian, (Ft. Monroe,
VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992) pp. 137-138 and Mary Stubbs and
22-23. The school at Riley was also different in that it brought together entire units rather than just
promising individual officers; in some sense it is thus the forerunner of the modern National Training
Center.
period would see divisions in the artillery from those who principally manned the massive guns of the coastal fortifications and those who sought to use modernized field artillery in battle. The field artillerymen were much more concerned with maneuver than their more or less static coastal brethren. Similar divisions emerged between proponents of direct and indirect fire techniques.\textsuperscript{164}

The foregoing brief discussion about subcultures is important for two reasons. First, it shows that even within an overall culture that is highly homogenous differences in thinking based on function can persist. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry, while generally accepting all the same basic strategic and managerial elements of culture, emphasized different aspects of the culture.

Second, at a more fine grained level, even within subcultures the way that culture would interact with specific environmental features (such as technology) to produce doctrine was often contested. A good example of this from this period was the debate within the Army and most particularly the artillery subculture about the organization of artillery. As discussed previously, one of the central elements of culture for the U.S. Army derived from the Civil War was the need for both strategic and managerial reasons to manage large units in order to apply firepower effectively. For the artillery community, the eventual solution established by 1863 had been to establish both an army level concentration of artillery and a corps level concentration, leaving the division denuded of artillery. This enabled senior commanders to rapidly concentrate artillery at a decisive point along the battleline (e.g. to force a river crossing or to support an attack against a weakened part of the enemy’s line).

\textsuperscript{164} Dastrup, pp. 128-129.
This doctrine for artillery had been effective in the Civil War and many in the artillery subculture felt inclined to retain it subsequently. For example, writing in the *Journal of the U.S. Artillery* in 1892, one officer called for doctrine to be that artillery should exist only at the army and corps level. The written doctrine of the time, as embodied in the document *Troops in Campaign*, generally accepted these arguments though not quite to the extreme of banishing artillery from the division entirely. It noted:

> Under ordinary circumstances, from two-thirds to three-fourths of the field batteries will be distributed to the army corps, or to divisions, and in proportion to the strength of those commands. The remaining batteries will be organized into brigades, and will constitute the reserve artillery of the army... The reserve artillery of the army and the artillery brigade of each army corps should, as far as practicable, be kept together; but on the march, or in camp, or when near the enemy, additional batteries may be attached temporarily to divisions, due provision being made for their proper supply.

However, this doctrine was not universally accepted in the Army. New artillery technology had emerged that some felt necessitated a change in doctrine. The Army, mainly for financial reasons, had been somewhat slow to deploy the steel breechloaders that had been seen in Europe almost two decades earlier. By the 1890s this had been rectified with the introduction of the M1885 3.2 inch field gun. This dramatically increased the range at which field artillery could engage targets, and some in the artillery community argued that this meant that the need to physically concentrate to mass fire had been reduced if not eliminated. Instead, artillery could be positioned along the line to rapidly shift fires, making “virtual” concentration not only possible but faster than physical concentration.

The early 1890s thus saw a lively debate between advocates of the old doctrine and a new doctrine, both drawing on the same culture but reacting differently to a new

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167 Dastrup, pp. 131-134.
technological opportunity. The debate was eventually won by those advocating a new doctrine, in part because the Prussian army had been successful using steel breechloaders without an army level reserve in 1870-1871.\footnote{Dastrup, p. 126 discusses Prussian practice.} In 1896, new doctrine, the \textit{Drill Regulations for Light Artillery}, was issued calling for the concentration of artillery at the corps and division rather than army and corps level.\footnote{Cited in Dastrup, p. 136.}

What is important about this vignette is that neither side of the debate within the artillery subculture questioned the basic cultural concepts on the need to mass fire in some fashion and then to centrally direct it. Instead, they argued about how to fit the technology to the framework they had developed during the Civil War. Further, the debate was decided in part by mobilizing evidence from a foreign war between modern great power nation-states.

Yet as the next section discusses, artillery was almost never employed during the period in question. When artillery was used, seldom more than one or two pieces were used at the same time. Nevertheless, the artillery subculture as well as the Army more broadly continued to transmit and refine the cultural model of total war even as it fought enemies that were not even modern nation-states. Doctrine, at both the broader culture and more specific subculture levels, continued to reflect the Army's foundational experience.

\textbf{Total War on the Frontier, 1865-1886}

As Sherman and his successors sought to use education to preserve what they thought they had learned in the Civil War, they were applying many of these precepts
continuously albeit on a much smaller scale. The Indian Wars were not, as some have argued, an entirely different experience than the Civil War, casting the Army as a purely constabulary force. Instead, the Army, now shrunk to a peacetime force of only 25,000, sought to permanently defeat the Indians in the same way that they had defeated the Confederacy—through total war.

Though some significant military action (led by early advocate of total war General Pope) took place before the Civil War had officially ended, the clear beginning of the Army’s war against the Indians was December 1866. In that month, Sioux warriors under the war leader Red Cloud lured nearly a hundred soldiers into an ambush near Ft. Phil Kearny (in what is now Wyoming), killing them all. This shocked the nation and invoked the fury of General Sherman, who declared “We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to the extermination of men, women and children.”170 Though there was a degree of hyperbole in Sherman’s statement, it was not mere idle talk.

Sherman and his subordinates began planning for summer operations against the Sioux even as many civilians sought peaceful solutions to the problem. Elsewhere in the West, Sherman allowed General Winfield Scott Hancock to engage in a demonstration of force intended to awe the Cheyenne and Sioux of Kansas. This demonstration, beginning near a large village on the Pawnee Fork, quickly escalated. The Indians fled, and then apparently went on a rampage along the road to Denver. In retaliation, General Hancock burned the village, despite having no real evidence that the marauding Indians were

indeed the ones from Pawnee Fork. This would be the first of many attacks on the dwellings of the Indians, a direct reflection of the lessons Sherman and others had learned in the Civil War.

After this brief skirmish, a number of peace initiatives sponsored by Congress and the Department of the Interior prevented further significant Army action for two years. Sherman was appointed to serve on a Peace Commission, which he did if somewhat reluctantly. Sherman proved a reasonable negotiator, and in concert with the other members of the commission, signed several treaties. At the same time, Sherman encouraged Congress to make Indian affairs the responsibility of the Department of War rather than the Department of the Interior. In 1868, his wish was indirectly granted when Congress decreed that all money spent implementing the peace treaties be overseen by Sherman.

As these events took place, minor skirmishing and pursuits between small Army units and various tribal raiders took place across the West. Even as Sherman was winding up his involvement with the peace commission and assuming fiscal responsibility for the Indians, a group of disgruntled Cheyenne youths raided white settlements in Kansas. Sherman immediately ordered a response to be headed by General Sheridan.

Sheridan launched a winter campaign against the Indian camps in October 1868, beginning a pattern that would be repeated in future operations against the Indians. The Indians were quite hard to bring to battle in the summer, as they had superior mobility. But in winter they set up camps that would be static for a lengthy period and that would

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171 Utley, p. 108.
172 Utley, pp. 109-121.
be hard to abandon, as the alternative would likely be starvation. Further, these camps concentrated not only the warriors of the tribe but also the old men, women and children, making them rich targets for total war methods.174

A prototypical example from Sheridan’s 1868-1869 winter campaign was the attack by cavalry under George Custer against the village of Cheyenne chief Black Kettle in November. Black Kettle was actually a proponent of peace between whites and Indians, but both he and his wife were killed in the attack. The village was burned, animals taken or slaughtered, winter supplies ruined, and over a hundred men, women and children killed.175

Cavalry and infantry (often mounted infantry) would be the dominant subcultures of the Indian Wars for two related reasons. First, Indian winter camps were nothing like even the hasty fieldworks that confronted the Army in the Civil War so artillery was not needed to destroy or suppress the enemy. Second, it was simply too difficult to move even smaller field artillery and supplies across the vast distances of the American West. Some officers would bring small numbers (usually less than five) artillery pieces for defensive purposes but even this was not common.176 Artillerymen were frequently pressed into service as ersatz infantry or cavalry, though late in this period the adoption of a very light 1.65 inch gun made artillery more useful. This was particularly true in

cases where well-armed Indians were encountered in defensible positions, as in the 1877 battle against Chief Joseph’s Nez Perce at Snake Creek.\textsuperscript{177}

In addition to direct attacks on the Indian population, the Army also launched a more indirect campaign against the Indian’s supplies reminiscent of the strategy of exhaustion. Principal among these supplies were the herds of buffalo that provided much of the Indian livelihood. Writing to Sheridan in May of 1868, Sherman noted the link between the presence of buffalo and the presence of Indians in the central plains “as long as Buffalo are up on the Republican the Indians will go there. I think it would be wise to invite all the sportsmen of England and America there this fall for a Grand Buffalo hint, and make one grand sweep of them all.”\textsuperscript{178} This was no joke, as Army policy subsequently became not only to exterminate the buffalo themselves but also to enable others to do so. As David Smits notes, numerous analogies were made by the Army comparing the killing of the buffalo to Sheridan’s devastation of the Shenandoah.\textsuperscript{179}

The election of Ulysses Grant, somewhat unexpectedly, led to moves toward conciliation with the Indians and a limitation in the Army’s total war. The reasons for Grant’s so-called “Peace Policy” are complex but appear to have more to do with domestic politics (such as Quaker lobbying) than any conviction of Grant’s. Nonetheless, even during the time of the Peace Policy, numerous anti-Indian campaigns took place.\textsuperscript{180}

One prominent example is Sheridan’s campaigning in the so-called Red River War of 1874-1875. He sent multiple columns to converge on the area near the Red River in the Texas Panhandle where Indians of several tribes were causing trouble. Beginning

\textsuperscript{177} Dastrup, pp. 132-133 and Utley, pp. 184-186.
\textsuperscript{179} Smits, pp. 316-317.
\textsuperscript{180} Utley, pp. 188-200.
in the late summer, these columns pursued the bands through the fall with only modest success but as winter drew near many Indians, fearful of being caught in winter camp, surrendered and returned to the reservation. By the spring all of these bands had surrendered.\textsuperscript{181}

The campaign against the buffalo continued in this period as well. In the period 1871-1873, buffalo hunters eager to sell hides to the booming leather industry decimated the buffalo herd in the Kansas region. They did so with the protection and support of most if not all of the Army officers in the region. Some officers were even willing to allow buffalo hunting on Indian reservations, a clear treaty violation, in order to further deplete this vital resource of potentially violent Indians.\textsuperscript{182}

The combination of total war on the winter camps of rebels and the rapid extermination of the buffalo herds worked slowly, as the expanses of the American West are vast and the numbers of soldiers small, but worked incredibly well. By the 1880s, only a very small number of tribes and refused to submit to permanent life on the reservation. The last holdouts, Apaches led by Geronimo, surrendered in 1886.

This experience, though fought against irregular rather than regular opponents, helped confirm the elements of culture (particularly the strategic culture) of senior Army leaders like Sherman and Sheridan. Though the Army continued to plan for war against regular opponents and it was with this in mind that the School of Application was established, the Indian Wars showed that even hardy irregular opponents could be defeated with total war strategic culture. This experience would thus not only help validate the Army’s culture generally, it was also thought to show how well it applied to

\textsuperscript{181} Utley, pp. 170-175.
\textsuperscript{182} Smits, pp. 326-328.
war against irregulars. However, after over a decade at peace, the Spanish-American War would equally show that the Army was not as well prepared for total war as it had hoped.

A Real War at Last: The Army and the Spanish-American War

In 1898, the Army finally got a chance to fight a regular army for the first time since the Civil War when the United States’ disputes with Spain escalated. The Spanish-American War was marked by a number of mobilization challenges that well illustrated that the Army had not fully achieved Sherman’s goal of being an effective cadre for expansion. One of the major mobilization problems for the Army in terms of expansion was the National Guard. The Guard elected its own officers, frustrating the Leavenworth graduates, who believed that Guardsmen should instead be incorporated into units lead by professional officers. The Army had sought to bring all enlistees directly into the Army. Instead, it had to rely heavily on the National Guard units led by non-professionals. This arrangement, an anathema to the Leavenworth graduates, was not particularly successful.¹⁸³

The Regular Army was itself unprepared for the logistics of rapid expansion. This was particularly true of the various staff departments such as the Commissary, which remained independent of any central direction below the level of the Secretary of War. These departments were not well coordinated in their actions and often felt little pressure to change or expedite their peacetime procedures. This pattern combined with

in the South (where transportation networks were underdeveloped) to make mobilization incredibly slow and haphazard.184

Fortunately for the Army, its opponent was perhaps even less competent and was further from the fields of battle in Cuba and the Philippines than the United States. The mobilization problems thus did not impede a fairly quick victory, aided in no small part by the U.S. Navy's successes. The bulk of the fighting in Cuba was done by a relatively small number of Regular Army troops aided by volunteers. Though mobilization had called for the creation of eight corps, the V Corps was the only one sent to Cuba.185

However, it was readily apparent that a more capable opponent would have caused the Army vastly greater difficulty. The response, aided by a general trend of progressivism in the country as a whole, was to rationalize Army organization. This rationalization enabled the Army to at last organize and prepare for total war effectively during peacetime.

The Root Reforms and After: Professional Education, 1898-1918

In response to the mobilization failure of 1898, Secretary of War Elihu Root sought to federalize the militia system as well as to create a true General Staff system. The passage of the Militia Act in 1903 confirmed Root's success, incorporating the Guard into the professional Army. The Army General Staff was also created in the same year. The idea of central control of citizen-soldiers by a professional officer corps and General Staff was now institutionalized, though far from perfected.186

184 Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 299-302.
185 Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 306 notes that V Corps, about 14,400 Regulars and 2,400 volunteers in the Rough Riders and two National Guard regiments conducted most of the fighting.
186 Arthur A. Ekhirch, Jr., “The Idea of a Citizen Army,” Military Affairs, v.17, n.1 (Spring 1953) and
Root also sought to further reform the Army’s education system. Though Leavenworth had briefly closed with the outbreak of war, it was critical that Army education be restarted quickly. The new system would have three tiers. The lowest tier was to be conducted by senior captains at Army posts; the students would be junior captains and lieutenants. The top tier was to be the new Army War College. The critical middle tier was occupied by the branch schools (such as the Artillery School) and the School at Leavenworth, renamed the General Service and Staff College. It was to provide a general education to branch school graduates as well as the best graduates of the lower tier. The intent was that the College would provide professional education to company and field grade commanders and staff officers.\textsuperscript{187}

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell would guide the School through this period. Bell was a telling choice; a former adjutant of the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley, he had respect for military education. He was also a soldier cut from the same cloth as Sherman. As discussed in more detail below, in the Philippines his response to guerrilla warfare was to “make the people want peace, and want it badly.”\textsuperscript{188}

Bell was a vigorous commandant and reformer of the College. He personally encouraged promising officers to attend the College. The College was split into two one year schools under Bell: the first year Infantry and Cavalry School and the second year Army Staff College for high-quality graduates of the first year. Bell worked hard to

\textsuperscript{187} Phillip L. Semsch, “Elihu Root and the General Staff,” \textit{Military Affairs}, v.21, n.1 (Spring 1963). Note that neither act was uncontroversial. Some of the senior officers in the Army (who had not attended the Leavenworth School) were particularly opposed to the General Staff.

\textsuperscript{188} Nenninger, pp. 53-60.

improve the quality of student, making the process of selection to both schools competitive.189

Bell also worked hard to make this kind of education respectable to the Army. Sherman and Grant, though great heroes of the Civil War, were somewhat anomalous in valuing education. Even after the Civil War, many of the senior leaders of the Army of the early 20th century had been the nonprofessional regimental officers of the Civil War. Bell worked hard to change this, in conjunction with the Army’s second Chief of Staff, General Adna Chaffee (who had taught at Leavenworth and was commandant of the Cavalry School at Riley). Bell would leave Leavenworth in 1906 to become the Army’s fourth Chief of Staff and from that position would continue to encourage the development of Army professional education.

The peacetime nature of the Army during this period meant that the spread of “Leavenworth men” to senior positions took place very slowly. Further, the concept of an expansible army was not put to the test; given that Leavenworth was intended to prepare officers for this eventuality it was hard to demonstrate the School’s utility. Yet little by little it made its influence felt. Most importantly it began to homogenize an Army that had been widely scattered geographically, intellectually, and bureaucratically. Line and staff officers got to know each other’s jobs; artillery, cavalry, and artillery officers gained appreciation for the importance of the other branches to combined arms warfare.190

Almost as importantly, beginning in this period Leavenworth came to be central to the production of doctrine, initially in the form of Field Service Regulations. As the

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189 Nenninger, pp. 68-79.
190 Nenninger, pp. 82-130.
producer of doctrine, Leavenworth was able to ensure that its version of Army culture would at least be given a wide audience even among non-graduates. The doctrine it produced was entirely a product to total war culture, even though almost all officers’ experience in this period had been either the Indian Wars or imperial policing as discussed in the next section.

For example, in terms of organization, the 1908 Field Service Regulations clearly state: “The division forms the basis for army organization.” It details the composition of a division (most importantly its combined arms components of three infantry brigades, a cavalry regiment and an artillery brigade) and the division staff (normally at least 13 officers). More importantly, these regulations hammer home the importance of staffs and particularly chiefs of staff:

All military units larger than a company are provided with staffs of commissioned officers, whose number and rank increase with the size of the command. In units larger than a brigade, and in separate forces commanded by a general officer, the staff service is under the supervision of an officer of the general staff designated as chief of staff... The chief of staff of an army should enjoy the complete confidence of the commanding general and a considerable degree of independence in the performance of his ordinary duties. He organizes and supervises the operations of all the staff departments and regulates the details thereof by means of orders issued in the name of the commanding general... He performs such special functions as may be delegated to him by the commanding general. The duties of chief of staff of a corps and of smaller commands are similar to those detailed above. ¹⁹¹

This centralized doctrine clearly reflects the managerial culture of total war as embodied by Leavenworth. It is further worth noting that in this period, as the Field Service Regulations states, the regiment was the largest peacetime organization of the Army.

This doctrine also showed the importance of the strategic elements of culture embodied at Leavenworth. In particular, it heavily emphasized the importance of firepower and the offensive. In the section on combat, firepower is the first concept

¹⁹¹ War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1905 (Amended, 1908), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908.)
discussed after a brief introduction which proclaims the offensive to be the preferred form of battle. The basic conception for offensive battle in this doctrine is to move into position for heavy preparatory fire, continue to maneuver closer while applying more fire, and then make a major decisive effort by infantry and artillery when the infantry is sufficiently close. The cavalry then pursues the defeated enemy or covers the withdrawal of infantry if the attack is unsuccessful.¹⁹²

Yet this doctrine was not particularly well integrated with U.S. grand strategy during the period between the Spanish-American War and World War I. The country, protected by its Navy and weak neighbors, required an Army and a doctrine for imperial policing. The Army was forced into this role yet did not produce doctrine for this mission, as discussed in the next section.

**Total War and Policing at the Beginning of Empire, 1898-1918**

In this period, the United States Army was involved in two principal conflicts, the first being the policing of the Philippines. The Philippine conflict came as a direct result of the successful defeat of the Spanish. Filipinos under Emilio Aguinaldo were already in revolt against the Spanish and, after initial cordial relations, many rose against the United States. From 1899 to 1902, the Army was forced to confront this insurrection.

Army officers, with no operational doctrine, were left to their own devices in responding to this challenge. The result varied from commander to commander but generally had two components. The first was to establish effective if rudimentary government, as the Army had done in Reconstruction or at various points during its frontier experience. The second was to apply the total war methods of Sherman and his

successors. Yet at this point Army culture as embodied in Leavenworth’s School had yet to fully dominate the Army and many were National Guardsmen who had barely heard of Leavenworth, so there was significant variation across the officer corps in balancing these two components of policy. Some officers, already deeply schooled in Sherman’s Army culture, were quite willing to fully apply total war. Other officers attempted to limit the amount of violence and in some cases placed emphasis on governance.

Two officers in particular show the wide range of variance in Army practice in the field during this period. The first was Frederick Funston, a volunteer officer who rose to the rank of Brigadier General and command of a Philippine district. Funston had been rejected from West Point before going to the University of Kansas. He then held a variety of non-military jobs until joining the Cuban Revolutionary Army in 1896. Returning to the United States in 1898, he was commissioned a colonel in the Kansas Volunteers and went to the Philippines with them.

In the Philippines, Funston focused on intelligence, scouting and patrolling as the key to defeating the insurrection. At the same time, he used his charisma to build very strong relations to local elites and to ethnic minorities. Initially somewhat harsh in response to guerrilla provocation, Funston quickly became a believer in amnesty and reintegration of surrendered guerrillas. He limited the reprisal actions of many of his own troops, such as the burning of houses, though some incidents did happen. His methods were sufficiently successful (and unorthodox compared to the professional Army) that it was Funston who succeeded in capturing supreme guerrilla commander Aguinaldo. 193

193 Linn, pp. 70-86.
Funston is emblematic of the limits of Army professionalism in this period. It would later be all but inconceivable to imagine any civilian being inducted into the Army at the initial rank of colonel. At the same time, his practices were successful despite their deviation from Army culture as embodied at Leavenworth.

In contrast to the civilian Funston, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell was a true disciple of the Leavenworth culture. He had spent time fighting the Indian Wars with the 7th Cavalry before joining the faculty at the new Cavalry and Light Artillery School at its founding in 1892. Bell took command of a volunteer regiment soon after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War and then became commander of a district in the Philippines.

Bell, like Sherman, felt that defeating the insurrection would require war on the economic and population bases of the enemy and to that end launched operations to “reconcentrate” the population in to camps as well as harshly punishing suspected collaborators.\textsuperscript{194} Further, he directly attacked enemy food supplies exactly as Sherman would have, sending troops into enemy territory to conduct operations “having for a common object the complete clearing out of every vestige of animal life and every particle of food supply found within the region…”\textsuperscript{195}

Bell’s methods fit in well with the Army’s total war culture, though he was not the most extreme in applying the hard hand of war. General Jacob Smith simply told his subordinates to turn his area of command into “a howling wilderness,” which some of them took literally.\textsuperscript{196} Bell’s methods were not quite so extreme and were more

\textsuperscript{194} Linn, pp. 154-156.
\textsuperscript{195} Linn, p. 157.
successful. He would be rewarded for his efforts by being made the commander of the reconfigured Leavenworth schools and then Chief of Staff of the Army.

The second mission that the Army undertook immediately prior to entry into World War I was involvement in the Mexican Revolution, which had begun in 1911. This revolution immediately south of the United States concerned then President Woodrow Wilson and he ultimately decided to intervene in 1916. General Funston brought the Fifth Brigade of the 2nd Division to occupy Vera Cruz following a naval skirmish and subsequent landing.197

U.S. action at Vera Cruz provoked a raid on New Mexico by Francisco “Pancho” Villa, one of the contenders for power in Mexico. In response, Wilson directed a punitive expedition into Mexico under the command of General John Pershing. The expedition lasted nearly a year and was entirely unsuccessful in capturing Villa. It was more successful in engaging in skirmishes with forces loyal to Venustiano Carranza, who was unfortunately recognized by the United States government as the rightful head of the Mexican government. Pershing’s expedition left Mexico in early 1917 even as another, greater expedition loomed. To the extent that this experience of imperial policing affected Army doctrine, it was only in showing some important aspects of new technology such as the truck.

Almost as soon as Pershing returned from Mexico, the United States entered World War I as a combatant. Leavenworth would prove its utility with the introduction of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to Europe in 1917. The Army performance was not stellar, but was sufficient, given the already battered state of the enemy, to ensure victory. Further, it would not have been possible without the staff and command work of

197 Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 347.
Leavenworth graduates. As AEF commander General Pershing, though not a graduate himself, relied heavily on the expertise of graduates.198

Army Culture Consolidated, 1918-1961

The experience of the Great War served to reinforce the values derived from the Civil War experience that Sherman had created Leavenworth to preserve.199 First, the possibility of fighting a great power war, which had often seemed highly unlikely, had actually come about. This war had looked a great deal like the Civil War, though with newer technology. Second, the idea of centralized and industrial scale management was firmly entrenched. The mobilization of the entire country for war required central control over military and economic issues.200 Third, the Army had been relatively free from civilian interference once overseas, though Pershing would still cause controversy by sending a letter to the Allied high command demanding that the Germans not be given an armistice.

Even as its culture was consolidate after the war, the Army was uncertain during the 1920s and 1930s about where it would fight the next great power war. The most likely candidate seemed to be Japan, and much of national (as opposed to Army) war planning was done on that basis. War plans were color-coded by country, and the plan for war with Japan was known as Plan ORANGE. ORANGE was to be primarily a naval war, with the Army's role limited mostly to the defense of the Philippines. Despite being

198 Nenninger, pp. 134-144.
199 Weigley, The American Way of War, pg. 201-207.
the most likely scenario for future war, ORANGE would not be the Army's planning focus.\textsuperscript{201}

Instead, the Army instead continued to plan for a primary mission of large army warfare. The scenarios centered on the Western Hemisphere or Europe, though both were highly implausible in the 1920s. Training at Leavenworth (now known as the Command and General Staff School or CGSS) continued to focus on the application of mass combat power and to ensure that “the average middle” of officers could manage large armies of citizen-soldiers. The classes were made of more senior officers than the early days of the School of Application, mostly captains and majors.\textsuperscript{202} CGSS sought to produce officers “able to perform duties in either command or staff billets two to three grades above their present ranks, a likely possibility with the expansion of the Army during any mobilization.”\textsuperscript{203}

The small size of the Regular Army made this mobilization a requirement for any great power war and almost any minor conflict. The Regular Army fluctuated around 110,000 men total during the 1920s.\textsuperscript{204} This was only marginally more than the treaty-bound German Reichswehr, which was widely considered an almost useless force.\textsuperscript{205}


\textsuperscript{202} There is considerable debate on the quality of education received at the CGSS, yet most sources agree that what was taught was still focused on the traditional elements of Army strategic culture. The curriculum and composition of the classes at CGSS point had changed over time while still transmitting the tenets of Army culture. For a review of some of the debate and discussion of what was taught, see Timothy K. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School 1920-1940,” \textit{The Journal of Military History}, v. 58, n. 2 (April 1994). Martin Blumenson is somewhat harsher than Nenninger in discussing Leavenworth but makes the same key points, that Leavenworth was the most important educational assignment for rising officers and it exerted a homogenizing influence. See Martin Blumenson, “America’s World War II Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts,” \textit{Parameters}, v.19 (December 1989).

\textsuperscript{203} Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics,” pg. 203.

During the interwar period, the Army also followed the Spanish Civil War with interest as a possible model for a future war in Europe. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, it did not accurately assess events there, leading to underestimation of the potential of armored warfare.\textsuperscript{206} This faulty assessment of armored war was in large part due to the desire of the subcultures for the status quo, combined with the ambiguity of information gathered from a foreign war fought on relatively small scale. Cavalry officers initially wanted to retain their beloved horses rather than be mechanized. After mechanization, they concentrated on highly mobile "combat cars" to conduct traditional cavalry missions. Infantry officers believed that the tank was too vulnerable without very close ties to infantry soldiers. The artillery subculture felt that the power of the anti-tank gun (which was an artillery element) was outpacing the armor of tanks so rapidly that the tank would never be able to challenge a well-crewed and emplaced gun.\textsuperscript{207}

Despite being somewhat unprepared for armored warfare in the early part of World War II, the Army was well prepared overall for massive expansion and the application of this force to offensive operations. The experience of World War II was the

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\textsuperscript{205} The Reichswehr would provide a good cadre of long-service professionals for the later expansion of the Wehrmacht. The U.S. Regular Army would serve much the same role, though there is debate about the relative quality of the two. Van Creveld argues that the Wehrmacht was more effective due in large part to its culture of decentralized command, while Michael D. Doubler, \textit{Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe 1944-1945}, (University Press of Kansas; Lawrence, KS; 1994) casts doubt on Van Creveld's conclusions. See also Russell F. Weigley, \textit{Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944-1945}, (Indiana University Press; Bloomington, IN; 1981) and Geoffrey Perret, \textit{There's a War to be Won: The U.S. Army in World War II}, (Ballentine Books; New York; 1997). Weigley is generally supportive of Van Creveld while Perret is generally supportive of Doubler.

\textsuperscript{206} Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}, pg. 314-316; for discussion of Army interest in the Spanish Civil War see Hoffman, "The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence."

high point of the Army as a total war organization. Fighting on two overseas fronts the Army brought the war to a close in less than four years. It was decided by the mobilization of the entire country towards war, and the application of the resulting combat power in offensive operations. The U.S. Army expanded from the tiny force of the 1920s to almost 9 million men by the end of the war, an amazing feat of mobilization management.

In addition, firepower, particularly airpower, was used lavishly against both military and civilian targets. Both the strategic bombing of German industry and the tactical use of airpower to support troops were quintessential Army applications of firepower. In terms of indirect fire, an unnamed captain of the 12th Infantry Division provides the best summary of the Army culture: “We let the arty fight the war as much as possible.”

The 1950s provided a number of threats, constraints and opportunities for the Army. Even as the Army prepared for war in Europe, the war in Korea resulted in less than total mobilization and an unwelcome stalemate. Following his election in 1952, President Eisenhower began advocating a national policy that marginalized the Army,

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208 Weigley, *The American Way of War*, pg. 317-359 provides a summary of the American war in both theatres; for a more recent analysis of the mobilization which argues that organizational and moral factors contributed heavily to victory, see Richard J. Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, (W.W. Norton; New York; 1996).  
210 Quoted in Weigley, *Eisenhower’s Lieutenants*, pg. 28.  
211 See David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,” *Journal of Military History*, v.61, n.1 (January 1997) for discussion of Army attitudes in the late 1940s and early 1950s, including its plans for a larger standing army. This standing army would still be supplemented by a massive influx of new soldiers in an actual war in Europe. He also points out that even as Eighth Army fought a limited war in Korea, the Army was focused on building Seventh Army for total war in Europe.
relying instead on nuclear superiority embodied in the Air Force (previously the Army Air Corps) and its Strategic Air Command.\textsuperscript{212}

The Army protested as loudly as it was capable, for reasons of both organizational interest and organizational culture. Former generals lambasted the Eisenhower policy of “Massive Retaliation” even as it sought to develop force for fighting on the nuclear battlefield. This included the development of tactical nuclear weapons and helicopter-borne airmobile forces.\textsuperscript{213}

The Army also altered its divisional structure to better cope with a nuclear battlefield. The so-called “Pentomic Division” was built around the concept of using tactical nuclear weapons as a source of firepower to substitute for manpower. Though it was somewhat smaller than previous divisions, the Pentomic Division nonetheless remained a division in terms of most organizational elements.\textsuperscript{214}

Even as it sought to develop a doctrine for the nuclear battlefield, the Army continued to protest against what it felt was the inordinate emphasis of national strategy on strategic nuclear war. The Army received a boost for its position when President Kennedy, influenced by former Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, adopted a policy of “Flexible Response” in 1960.\textsuperscript{215} Yet “Flexible Response” meant different things to Kennedy and the Army. Both agreed on the need for greater conventional forces for


\textsuperscript{214} See Wilson, \textit{Maneuver and Firepower}, chapter 10 for discussion of the concept and evolution of the Pentomic Division.

“limited war.” Yet Kennedy believed limited war included fighting guerrillas in “brushfire wars,” while the Army felt limited war would be a conflict with a great power army (presumably that of either the Soviet Union or China) which was held below the strategic nuclear level through intrawar deterrence.216

The Army’s focus is evident in the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) structure it adopted during the early 1960s. The division remained the central organization of the Army, but under ROAD it moved away from the austere Pentomic model back to something resembling the Army division of the World Wars and Korea. ROAD divisions retained the tactical nuclear capability but with increased conventional firepower as well. ROAD was thus well suited for the Army’s concept of limited war, which had nothing to do with fighting guerrillas, despite the Kennedy administration’s emphasis on that mission.

Kennedy did promote a new subculture within the Army: the Special Forces. However, the domination of the existing subcultures continued. Special Forces became an institutional orphan, never well integrated into Army doctrine, as discussed below.217

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216 The Kennedy and Army conflicting views of limited war are presented in Krepinevich, pg. 28-40. See also Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1957), chapter 10. Osgood’s view of limited war as a conventional/theater nuclear contest below the strategic nuclear threshold is consonant with the Army views.

217 Army Special Forces existed prior to Kennedy, but he was a major champion of the Special Forces and a proponent of a distinct subculture for them. For example, he authorized them to wear the green beret in 1961, distinguishing them from the elite of the regular infantry subculture, which wore maroon (Airborne) and black (Ranger) berets. See Francis John Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies series, (Army Center for Military History; Washington, D.C.; 1973), pg. 2-6 and 160-168. As noted, Special Forces would be classified by Siehl and Martin as a “counter” subculture. Note that another counterculture of the Army, aviation, succeeded in breaking away from the Army into its own service. The increasing autonomy of USSOCOM, which now has its own budget apart from the services, may be indication that Special Forces will eventually do the same.
Special Forces: The Unloved Subculture

The U.S. Army Special Forces are an interesting contrast to the Army of which they are a part. While the regular Army began a professionalization process after the Civil War that is essentially complete by World War II, the Special Forces only come into existence after World War II. Further, the Special Forces have always had more intimate involvement with civilians by virtue of the missions they undertake.

During World War II, missions behind enemy lines and other covert actions were conducted by a civilian agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). OSS would draw on some Army resources and personnel but never fell under Army control. OSS was tiny compared to the massive Army effort, so there was no bureaucratic concern from the Army about supplying these special operators. After the war OSS was disbanded, and then reborn as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA was given responsibility for all paramilitary and covert actions, a position the Army supported as it relieved them of any need to maintain such a capability.218

This initial support for CIA having all special warfare capability would soon change for two reasons. The first was the Korean War, where the Army realized that special warfare could be a useful adjunct to conventional warfare, especially under conditions of limited war. However, CIA had different perspectives on such operations and was not under the control of the Army.219

The second reason was a belief held by some in the Army as well as senior civilians that such special warfare would be useful in a conflict with the Soviets in Europe. Both sabotage behind Soviet lines and the raising of anti-Soviet partisans in

219 Paddock, pp. 69-110.
Eastern Europe seemed useful to an Army confronted by the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. Yet the CIA again had its own goals for Eastern Europe and was still not under Army control.\textsuperscript{220}

The Army's response was to create the 10\textsuperscript{th} Special Forces Group and the Psychological Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg in 1951-1952. The deliberate admixture of Psychological Operations, which had organizational standing in the Army, with Special Forces, which did not, may have been a deliberate attempt to link the Special Forces more closely to the Army. However, this appears to have not been overly successful. Despite the perception of some that Special Forces would be useful in conventional conflict, the 10\textsuperscript{th} Group was not well accepted and had trouble recruiting.

Moreover, 10\textsuperscript{th} Group was a radical departure from Army managerial culture, being a wholly new entity with radically different mission and training. As one history of the Special Forces sums up:

\begin{quote}
In short, the Special Forces Group was not designed to be employed as a tactical entity--as, for instance, a conventional division or brigade might be--but rather was constructed around a cellular concept in which each area, district, and regimental detachment was viewed as a separate and distinct operating unit... Based primarily on the wartime experiences of a few former OSS officers in the unit, the 10th Special Forces Group developed a training program that was entirely new to the Army.\textsuperscript{221}
\end{quote}

This odd structure meant that the colonel who commanded the Group did not so much manage and command his subordinate unit as parcel them out to regions where they then had considerable (if not total) autonomy. This required very lean and decentralized management that was an anathema to the Army. Further, it meant that both officers and enlisted men would be highly trained specialists in small unit actions; a far cry from the Army's normal scheme of homogenous mass units.

\textsuperscript{220} Paddock, pp. 111-140.
\textsuperscript{221} Paddock, p. 150.
The very nature of unconventional warfare was also at odds with Army strategic culture. Far from being able to treat civilians as mere targets or clutter, Special Forces had to live among and understand the populace. In many instances, failure to do so would mean capture or death for the team operating behind enemy lines.

Special Forces officers were very clearly a breed apart from the outset. As one historian notes:

Career management advisors in Washington steered ambitious youngsters away, and still do today... So Special Forces in the early days got a few castoffs and less than a normal percentage of quality career officers. It also got some freethinkers who had never adapted to the spit and polish of the peacetime, palace-guard, 82nd Airborne Division. It got the innovators and imaginative people who wanted to try something new and challenging, who chafed at rigid discipline, and who didn’t care what the career managers at the Pentagon believed or said.222

Even officers who made the decision to join Special Forces were encouraged to rotate through conventional Army units "in order to be accepted and respected by the other line and staff officers with who he has to deal."223

The Special Forces grew in the period 1952-1956 but still remained a relative backwater in an Army preparing for war in Europe. In 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group was created in Okinawa to support the U.S. growing involvement in South Vietnam. That year, the 1st Group went to Vietnam and began training Vietnamese Special Forces under the auspices of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).224 Thus almost from its inception Special Forces was involved in counterinsurgency, even though it had not been originally created for that purpose.

In addition to being prepared to operate alongside locals, Special Forces also required an ability to work with civilian agencies. CIA, the State Department, and the

223 Simpson, p. 22.
224 Kelly, pp. 3-4.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were all frequent partners of Special Forces. In Laos, for example, Special Forces would work closely with CIA from 1959 to 1962 to train Laotian irregulars. Special Forces soldiers also frequently went to work for USAID or CIA after they left the Army, further strengthening the ties to those civilian organizations.²²⁵

A School for Special Forces: The Special Warfare Center and Q Course

The Special Forces, seeking to be the consummate professionals, needed a professional school. This was established at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina in 1952. Initially called the Psychological Warfare Center, it was nonetheless clearly dedicated in its initial mission statement to also preparing Special Forces and was subsequently renamed the Special Warfare Center.²²⁶ This center would thereafter remain the center of Special Forces professional education.

In 1961, the 1St Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) was founded to oversee the ongoing expansion of the Special Forces. This Group would be responsible for what would henceforth be the central professional school of the Special Forces. This was the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) routinely referred to simply as “the Q Course.”

The Q Course is the antithesis of the Command and General Staff College. It includes both officers and enlisted men, and focuses entirely on physical and mental preparation for operating in a twelve man unit known as an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). One graduate of the course in the 1980s describes the first portion of the

²²⁵ Simpson, pp. 22.
²²⁶ Paddock, pp. 230 and 236-237.
course as “focused on land navigation, survival, and patrolling—the basic skills needed to survive as a member of a small team operating behind enemy lines.” The second portion was “like being enrolled in a very bizarre university: we majored in guerrilla war.”

The culmination of the Q Course since 1974 has been a field exercise in which the students practice meeting guerrillas, living among a population (played by civilians), and conducting operations against an opposing army. This exercise, known as Robin Sage, takes place in the pines of the Unwharrie National Forest of North Carolina, dubbed the “Republic of Pineland” for the exercise. It strives for maximum realism, forcing Special Forces officers to meet and establish bonds with local guerrillas that must they must then convert into an effective irregular force.

It is at the Q Course that Special Forces culture is transmitted. Like the Marine Basic School, it focuses on preparing officers to lead a small unit. However, there are three key differences. First, an ODA is a much smaller unit than a Marine platoon. Second, the soldiers that make up an ODA are even more carefully selected professionals. All are airborne qualified, and therefore have made it through the rigors of jump school. They are also more mature, both officers and enlisted men generally having served several years in the Army (officers usually being at least captains at this point). Third, the Q Course explicitly focuses on unconventional warfare, while the Basic School is more general preparation for leading a rifle platoon.

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228 Meara, p. 17.
230 At various times, the Army has authorized a direct enlistment to Special Forces. These individuals, known as “SF babies,” must still pass jump school and the Q Course.
Conclusion

The U.S. Army as a modern professional military organization emerged from the ashes of the Civil War. This first war experience crucially shaped Army culture into the mold of a continental power, even though the United States is functionally a maritime power. Though Army culture made it highly effective in both World Wars, it would cause problems when the Army subsequently confronted the challenge of counterinsurgency. Army Special Forces, in contrast, were culturally opposite of the broader Army, which had a substantial effect on Special Forces operations in counterinsurgency.
Chapter 4: From the Halls of Montezuma: Marine Corps

Professionalization, 1865-1960

The U.S. Marine Corps is a military anomaly. While many other countries have marines and other amphibious forces, none has them constituted as a separate military service that is functionally a second “army” and third “air force.” It has maintained this separate status in large part because of U.S. domestic politics, where an abhorrence of a standing army collided with the need for ground forces to police a nascent empire. The following chapter traces the evolution of this anomaly and its limited war-imperial policing cultural archetype.

The Marine Corps by tradition dates its “birth” to November 10, 1776 when the Continental Marines were established. However, much of the next century was marked by a tenuous existence as shipboard police for rowdy sailors and occasional high profile expeditions, such as those against the Barbary pirates and into Mexico. It did manage to fend off disestablishment by President (and former Army officer) Andrew Jackson, the first of many attempts to fold it into the Army. An 1834 act of Congress established the Marine Corps as part of the Department of the Navy, ensuring its continued independence.231

New Navy, New Marine Corps: The Beginnings of Professionalism, 1880-1898

In contrast to the Army, the Marine Corps played almost no role in the Civil War. The overwhelming naval superiority of the Union limited ship-to-ship combat (with a few exceptions) and little expeditionary landing of the type the Marines had practiced in

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places like the Barbary Coast. The Marines main role through the Civil War period was to serve as shipboard police and aid in blockade enforcement. This early experience of total war, which so deeply shaped Army culture, made little impression on the Marine Corps. 232

Beginning in the 1880s, as the drive to modernize and professionalize the U.S. Navy took place, the shipboard policing role became superfluous and the Marine Corps found itself without a mission. 233 The Marine Corps began to professionalize in response, albeit haltingly. Marine Commandant Colonel Charles McCawley, whose fifteen year tenure as Commandant began spanned the entire decade of the 1880s, sought to make the Marine Corps “an elite guard of the Navy.” 234 He particularly emphasized improving unit performance through standardizing drill and, crucially, more selective enlisted recruitment from a wider base. He increased standards to ensure all recruits were literate and could speak English, a high bar for the time. 235

Even as he sought to improve the enlisted ranks, McCawley began the process of professionalizing the officer corps. He was aided in this by Congressional efforts to rationalize the Navy, embodied in the Naval Appropriations Act of 1882, which limited the induction of new officers. This produced a surfeit of Naval Academy graduates who were unable to find billets in the Navy and some of these turned to the Marine Corps. Though subsequent legislation limited the Marine Corps’ number of officers and therefore the ability to absorb Academy graduates, it set a precedent that Naval Academy

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234 Shulimson, Marine Corps Search for a Mission, p. 40.
graduates could be commissioned into the Corps and also injected some well-educated second lieutenants into the Corps as it sought to professionalize. Overall, however, the service made only very modest gains in professionalization. 236

Luckily for the Marine Corps, the U.S. increasingly took an interest in its “near abroad,” Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1885, the U.S. intervened in Panama “to protect American interests and the lives and property of American citizens...” in the wake of revolutionary violence. 237 Hundreds of Marines (out of a force of only a few thousand) were immediately dispatched to Panama, which was then still a part of Colombia. While nothing particularly new to the Marines, who had been to the Isthmus of Panama on a small scale several times since 1848, it was the size of the operation that was important. It was the largest U.S. foreign military activity since the Mexican War almost forty years earlier. By the time the operation was over, a third of the Marine Corps had been dispatched. 238

The operation accomplished served to illustrate some of the same lessons about modern war at the tactical level that the Army had learned in the Civil War. In a report to the Secretary of the Navy, the Navy commander of the operation stated, “while the Marine Corps is highly efficient and admirably disciplined... their tactics are of a bygone day.” 239 More broadly, Commander Bowman McCalla called for a reformation of the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force that would routinely train for such operations with the Navy. Commandant McCawley angrily retorted with a rejection of the idea of

236 Ibid., pp. 45-54.
238 Musicant, pp. 84-85, 88 and 95; and Shulimson, Marine Corps Search for a Mission, pp. 58-62.
239 Quoted in Musicant, pg. 95.
the Marine Corps as expeditionary force. Nonetheless, McCalla’s report, published by
the Navy Department, at least laid out the case for the Marine Corps to become an
expeditionary force as it professionalized. 240

U.S. foreign policy continued on its more assertive trajectory, particularly in the
Caribbean but also in the Pacific. The publication of Navy Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783* in 1890 was both a sign of
this increasingly ambitious foreign policy and a spur to naval build-up. Of particular
importance was the fact that Mahan was called upon that same year to draw up the United
States’ first contingency plan for war with a European power. Mahan’s plan made
specific reference to the Marine Corps as a landing force for the Navy, calling it “the
backbone” of any landing force. 241

Other naval officers noted the importance of the Marine Corps to the Navy’s
future concept of war. One Navy officer writing in 1890 specifically referenced the
operation in Panama five years earlier. This officer, Lt. William Fullam, would be the
leader of the Navy push to make the Marine Corps a professional expeditionary force.
He noted: “The [Marine] corps would be invaluable as a highly trained, homogenous, and
permanently organized body of infantry, ready at all times to embark and co-operate with
the navy in service like that at Panama a few years ago.” 242

Clearly the professionalizing Navy was seeking to prod the Marine Corps into
embracing its vision of war. Of particular importance was the emphasis on “highly
trained” and “permanently organized” units “ready at all times.” As the discussion in the

242 Ibid., p. 90. See also John G. Miller, “William Freeland Fullam’s War with the Corps,” *U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings* n.105 (November 1975).
previous chapter demonstrated, these were the antithesis of the far-flung and draft-based mobilization Army of the time. Further, a Marine Corps that focuses on the landing mission would relieve Navy sailors of participating in such operations. This was important, because while sailors in the pre-professional Navy could be used in landing parties, the sailors of the new Navy were too technically trained and important to the functioning of warships to be wasted in such a fashion.

Even as the Navy prodded on the Marine Corps mission, some in the ranks of the Marine Corps sought to improve the overall professionalism of the Corps. Most notable were Lieutenant Colonel Charles Heywood, who commanded the Washington Barracks, and one of his staff, Captain Daniel Pratt Mannix. As Commandant McCawley’s health began to fail in 1889, Heywood and Mannix increasingly took responsibility for the administration of the Corps. Mannix was a zealous advocate of Marine professionalization, calling for the establishment of a Marine school of application and declaring the Marine Corps should rouse itself to do more than “hanging on to the skirts of the Army or Navy.”

In 1891, now Colonel Heywood became Commandant of the Marine Corps. His zeal for professionalizing the Corps had not waned. His very first General Order was to establish the Marine School of Application, which opened in Washington, D.C. in 1891. The School was directly under him as Commandant, though its day to day affairs would be run by the director of instruction, a post he gave to Captain Mannix.

243 Ibid., p. 82.
245 Shulimson, Marine Corps Search for a Mission, pp. 100-102.
Heywood and Mannix also instituted promotion boards that emphasized examinations as a further spur to professionalize the officer corps.

The Marine School of Application drew upon the professional experience of its founder as it established itself. Heywood, crucially, had been the commander of the Marine brigade which entered Panama in 1885. The lessons of this conflict were therefore fresh in his mind as the School was created. It initially taught both officers and enlisted a variety of practical skills such as tactics and gunnery. A specific set of instruction that stands out is own “landing and campaigning with the Naval Brigade and the best formation for fighting against superior numbers armed with inferior weapons.”

Even as he acknowledged the Marine role in expeditionary wars such as the one he had been part of, Heywood also felt that a major future mission for the Corps should be to man the secondary batteries on the Navy’s new steel battleships. This would allow the Corps to expand in tandem with the fleet.

The Navy, in contrast, was not interested in this mission for the Marines and continued to emphasize the importance of amphibious operations. In early 1892, a war scare with Chile underscored this importance as the Navy felt that a Chilean port would have to be seized in order to provide a base for blockade. Another war scare in 1895 again raised the issue of seizing bases, this time a diplomatic dispute with Britain that saw war games including a potential seizure of Halifax, Nova Scotia.

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246 Ibid., p. 101.
247 Ibid., pp. 106-110.
248 Ibid., p. 143.
Managerial Culture Develops in the 1890s

Even as its mission remained in question, Heywood and Mannix continued to work to make the Marine officer corps more professional. The School of Application was the locus for this effort, though Mannix died in of stomach cancer in early 1894 and was replaced by Captain Paul St. Clair Murphy.249 Murphy proposed extending the length of time spent at the School as well as adding additional practical study in subjects such as ordnance, which was approved in 1896.250

In addition to professional education, Heywood worked to establish a set of norms of behavior for Marine officers. Though his ability to dismiss officers from service was often constrained by political intervention he was able to reign in the more egregious offenders. Most notable was his year and a half long push to have 1st Lieutenant T. Glover Fillette cashiered. Initially dismissed in January 1893 by a court martial, Fillette’s sentence was overruled by the Secretary of the Navy. Fillette, a scoundrel known for amassing bad debts, gave Heywood another chance to dismiss him when Fillette tried to elope with a high school aged girl despite already having a wife and child. This time political interference did not save Fillette, whom Heywood had the pleasure of dismissing from service in June 1894.251

By 1897, the Marine Corps had made some progress in developing professionalism along the managerial (i.e. inward-looking) axis of culture as competitive examinations and professional education (positivist) became routine for officers along with a code of conduct (normative). However, the strategic (i.e. outward-looking) culture

249 Ibid., pp. 122-126.
250 Ibid., p. 136.
251 Ibid., pp. 127-128. For other examples of attempts to remove poor officers, see pp. 126-127 and 136-138.
was still undefined, as the Navy simply did not want a Marine Corps that manned its secondary weapons systems (while taking up valuable berthing). The Spanish-American War would create a shared strategic mission for the Marine Corps, yet one that was ambiguous enough to create two subcultures oriented around variations of this mission.

**Shock Troops and Police Actions: Two Sides of the Same Corps, 1898-1914**

The February 1898 sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* and subsequent diplomatic escalatory spiral meant that by March planning for war with Spain was taking place in earnest. The Army and Navy were both mobilizing for war, but the Marine role was undefined until early April, when the commander of the Navy’s North Atlantic squadron requested two battalions of Marines for service with the fleet. Commandant Colonel Heywood was so instructed by the Secretary of the Navy, which necessitated the formation of battalions, since the Marine Corps at the time did not normally constitute its forces into battalions. 252

Fortunately, Heywood had commanded the last major Marine expedition and, with supplemental funds and aid from the commander of the New York barracks Lt. Col. Robert Huntington, had a battalion assembled within a week. The Navy Department decided to cancel formation of the second battalion, instead supplementing the manpower of the new 1st Battalion of Marines to 653 enlisted and officers. On April 22, under the command of Lt. Col. Huntington, it embarked on a newly acquired transport for service with the fleet. 253


As noted in the earlier chapter, the U.S. Army’s mobilization was not nearly so rapid. The Marine battalion spent two months at Hampton Roads, Virginia and then Key West, Florida waiting for the Army and Navy to prepare for operations even though war was declared. In the meantime, the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic squadron under Commodore George Dewey scored a crushing victory against the Spanish fleet at Manila, but lacked the men to control the Philippines. A detachment of Marines occupied a Spanish naval station to give the Asiatic squadron a base, but no more could be done pending reinforcements.\textsuperscript{254}

In June, the Marine battalion was given a mission at last: seize and hold Guantanamo Bay as a coaling station for the U.S. Navy. This was quickly accomplished and the Marines linked up with local Cuban rebels, who provided intelligence and additional manpower. After a few days of skirmishing, the Marines essentially held Guantanamo for the remainder of the brief war.\textsuperscript{255}

The Army and Navy, however, were still at odds. It would not be until July that the Army would engage the Spanish and even then the Army and Navy disagreed over strategy. The Navy’s primary goal was to destroy the Spanish fleet while the Army was focused on seizing the city of Santiago. Fortunately the Spanish capitulated rather quickly, but the contentious Army-Navy relationship was uppermost in the minds of many naval officers as the war ended.\textsuperscript{256}

At the same time, the Spanish-American War cemented the U.S. position as a rising imperial power as it now had overseas possessions, including the Philippines. Though Commandant Heywood still believed manning the Navy’s secondary batteries

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., pp. 173-177.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., pp. 184-188.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid. p. 190.
was the primary role of the Marine Corps, he also realized that the burgeoning empire would need policing. In December 1898 he wrote Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, noting that many in the Navy felt “there should be a force of 20,000 well drilled and equipped Marines who could be... sent to any of the many possessions recently captured by the Navy without the necessity for calling on the Army.”

Secretary Long agreed with Heywood’s plan for expansion (initially to 6,000 enlisted Marines) and in January 1899 passed it to Congress. Congress rapidly approved of the plan, which also expanded the officer corps and authorized more senior officer billets for the Marines, including the rank of brigadier general for the Commandant. The plan was signed into law in March 1899 and shortly thereafter Commandant Heywood recommended the institution of an examination for all those aspiring to receive a commission in the growing Marine officer corps. Secretary Long concurred and issued a Navy circular mandating this examination.

In 1900, the Navy once again pressed the Marine Corps to focus on expeditionary warfare rather than naval gunnery. The Navy was looking to both the Pacific and the Caribbean and its officers saw a need for Marines in defending or seizing bases in both theaters. Commandant Heywood cautiously agreed, formalizing a shift in the mission of the Marine Corps to expeditionary warfare rather than naval gunfire.

Yet expeditionary warfare was a broad concept, which had two distinct missions within it. The first was the seizing and defending of advanced bases for the Navy, which appropriately came to be called the advanced base mission. The second was imperial policing, which came to be called the small wars mission. Over the next three decades,

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257 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
258 Ibid, pp.197-200.
two Marine subcultures would form around these differing perceptions of organizational mission. On one side were the advance base advocates. They sought to make the Marine Corps into the shock troops of the Navy, seizing heavily defended beaches and islands. In contrast, the small wars advocates sought to make the Marine Corps a rapidly deployable intervention force for the execution of U.S. foreign policy.

These two subcultures present a twist on the Siehl and Martin distinction between “orthogonal” and “counter” subcultures. The two subcultures differed on the primary mission of the organization, yet agreed on many elements of organizational culture. They were thus simultaneously orthogonal and counter.

On one hand, the two were highly orthogonal, tightly bound by common managerial culture, i.e. what it meant to be a Marine officer. Central to this managerial culture was the infantry ethos embodied in the unofficial Marine Corps motto “every man a rifleman.” No matter what other specialty he might have, every Marine was expected to be a proficient professional infantryman.

In marked contrast to Army managerial culture, the Marine Corps did not focus on the large units (above battalion) of infantry as the locus of professionalism. A standing Marine battalion was not formed until after the Spanish-American War. Permanent regiments were not formed for another decade; larger units would take even longer. The 1st Marine Division was not formed until 1941, and even its constituent regiments (the 1st, 5th and 11th Regiments) had only been formed in the 1910s.260 As noted earlier, the Army of the 1870s, despite being about the size of the Marine Corps of

the 1920s, had adopted the division as its central organization.

The corollary to this focus on small units was a lack of concern about staff functions. This is not to argue that the Marine Corps did not teach or value staff functions. However, it did not consider staff capability the core of professionalism in the Marine Corps.262 This lack of concern about staff functions was further strengthened by the Marine Corps’ relationship with the Navy, which took care of much of the mundane but important work done by staff officers.263 This relative lack of concern about staff work is also evident in the title and headquarters of the senior leader of each service. The Army, after 1903, has been led by a Chief of Staff. In contrast, the Marine Corps has been led by a Commandant. While a seemingly minor semantic distinction, it is indicative of what the two services value in terms of professionalism.

Another related aspect of Marine culture which contrasts with Army culture is the relation between the regulars and the reserves. While the Army, as noted, spent considerable time and effort grappling with the National Guard and trying to acquire a federal reserve, the Marines were unconcerned with the issue. In fact, until just before the outbreak of World War I, the Marines had no reserve component - every Marine, enlisted or officer, was a full time professional. When the U.S. finally entered the war, only 3 officers and 33 enlisted comprised the entire Marine reserve.

Even after developing a reserve, it was small and played a minimal role in the Marine Corps for decades. In 1921, after both services had undergone wartime

262 The argument here is not that the Marines don’t or can’t do staff work at all, merely that it is not a primary part of Marine professionalism. See Allan Millet, “Why the Army and Marine Corps Should Be Friends,” Parameters (Winter 1994-95) discussion of Marine disregard for staff functions. This observation is also noted in numerous anecdotes and conversations with Marine and Army officers, as well as civilian military analysts.

263 Even in the present, for example, Marine medical services are provided by Navy corpsmen and religious/counseling services by Navy chaplains. This dependence on the Navy is one reason why Carl Builder does not include an analysis of the Marine Corps in Masks of War. See Builder, pg. 9.
expansion and a permanent increase in peacetime strength, the Marine Corps had less than 500 reserve officers, while the Army had 66,000. Even considering the size disparity between the two organizations at the time, the Army having about 110,000 men while the Marine Corps was around 20,000, this is a striking contrast. Further, the Marine Corps never had to confront an equivalent of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{264}

The Marine Corps managerial culture was thus one of professional, full-time enlisted men being led by highly skilled junior officers in small units. The overarching infantry ethos also meant the Marine culture was very homogenous in the sense that it lacked the platform or branch distinctions of the Army, or later, the Navy and Air Force. For example, historically, Marines do not generally acknowledge unit (i.e. regiment or division) and branch distinctions in the same way as the Army.\textsuperscript{265}

Despite the shared managerial culture, the two subcultures were also “counter” to one another in terms of strategic culture. The advance base subculture sought a tight relationship with the Navy while preparing for medium and large-scale (i.e. conventional) wars. The small wars subculture, in contrast, did not seek as close a relationship with the Navy, who would be little needed (except to ferry the Marine Corps to and from interventions) in the type of conflicts they believed the Corps should prepare for. The decades between the Spanish-American War and World War I would see continual struggle between the two subcultures, with each dominating in turn even as the Marine education system evolved and cemented the Corps’ managerial culture.


\textsuperscript{265} See Harry Levins, “Forget the Unit Rivalries, Being a Marine Says It All,” \textit{St. Louis Post-Dispatch}, August 28, 2004. Levins does mention a “friendly rivalry” between East Coast and West Coast Marines, yet officers move back and forth between the two coasts with enough regularity to prevent this from developing into a true subcultural distinction.
Note too that the two counter subcultures also agreed on the critical importance of domestic politics to the well-being of the Corps. As discussed below, the Corps was institutionally somewhat insecure, sometimes being threatened with dissolution or absorption into the Army. This insecurity made the Corps attuned to the importance of not only the importance of relations with Congress (the legislature controlling the purse and thus the number of Marines) and of public relations generally. This is particularly striking in comparison to the Army.266

From 1900 to 1903, the Marine School of Application was in a state of flux as the Marine officer corps expanded while simultaneously undertaking new duties in the Pacific. The school had very small classes and often irregular terms as it sought to prepare officers for promotion to the newly authorized senior ranks. The Marine Corps continued to grow in both the officer and enlisted ranks, with Commandant Heywood promoted to major general in 1902 and a further expansion in personnel authorized in March 1903. By the time Commandant Heywood retired in late 1903 the Marine Corps had 255 officers (from a base of 76 five years earlier) and over 7,000 enlisted men.267

Partly in response to the increasing flow of junior officers, the School of Application was relocated to Annapolis in May 1903. Over the next two years its course of instruction was standardized at one year in subjects including infantry operations, small unit tactics, regulations of the service, and gunnery. However, disruptions persisted as the Marine Corps was involved in several ongoing conflicts, which continually pulled

266 See Stephen K. Scroggs, Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse, (Praeger; New York; 2000) pg. 128-132 for comparison of Marine and Army attitudes towards Congressional and public relations.
junior officers out to the field.²⁶⁸

The most prominent of these conflicts was the Philippine Insurrection, which saw the deployment of a brigade’s worth of Marines. The Marine Corps in the Philippines was subordinated to the Army and Marine officers followed the orders of their Army superiors. Most famously, Marine Major Littleton Waller followed the orders of Army General Jacob Smith (discussed previously) to make a “howling wilderness” of the island of Samar. Waller was subsequently accused of war crimes but was acquitted by an Army court martial.²⁶⁹

Waller, probably the preeminent Marine commander of the early 20th century, was also prominently involved in three other Marine operations in the decade after the Spanish-American War. First, he commanded a Marine battalion in the joint Army-Navy expedition to quell the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. During this expedition, Waller operated closely with forces from the other seven nations working against the Boxers, most notably the Russian Army.²⁷⁰

More significantly in terms of small wars, Waller also commanded the Provisional Marine Regiment stationed in Panama in 1904. This unit was deployed in late 1903 to support the breakaway of Panama from Colombia (an echo of the 1885 Panama intervention by the Marines). Both U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt and the inhabitants of the region proposed for the canal had been frustrated by the collapse of talks with Colombia. The Panamanians revolted and the United States quickly recognized the new state and deployed a Marine battalion under Major John Lejeune

²⁶⁸ Metcalf, p. 18.
almost immediately to protect U.S. interests and deter Colombian invasion. By early 1904 the Marine force had grown to the Provisional Brigade (composed of two regiments), which was commanded by Major General Heywood’s successor as Commandant, Brigadier General George Elliot.\(^{271}\)

Relations between the United States and Colombia improved soon after, so that one regiment was quickly withdrawn. Brigadier General Elliot returned to Washington in February and Waller (promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1903) assumed command of the remaining Provisional Regiment. The regiment was reduced to a battalion by the end of the year, but crucially a Marine battalion would remain in Panama until 1914.\(^{272}\)

This battalion protected the construction of the canal but also provided the enforcement mechanism for U.S. interests in its new client state. In 1906, the battalion, augmented by additional Marines, was called upon to prepare to ensure public order was maintained during Panamanian elections for the National Assembly. The U.S. right to intervene to restore order had been established in the Panamanian constitution but there was also an ulterior motive. The U.S. was supporting the political status quo under the Conservative party against the Liberal party, so the Marine battalion served as an overt indicator of U.S. support and as a deterrent to insurrection by the Liberal party. Most notably, when requested by the Conservative president, the battalion moved from the Canal Zone to the edge of Panama City in a very visible show of force. The result was an overwhelming Conservative victory.\(^{273}\)

The actual order to move the Marines in this case came from Charles Magoon, a


\(^{272}\) Millet, pp. 166.

\(^{273}\) Major, pp. 118-121.
civilian who was both governor of the Canal Zone (a U.S. territory) and the U.S. envoy to Panama. The Marine battalion was thus subordinate to a civilian, functioning as his political enforcer. This pattern of political enforcement on behalf of civilian authority would continue throughout the rest of the battalion’s time in Panama, with the Marines involved in overseeing the presidential elections in 1908 and 1912.274

Lieutenant Colonel Waller was dispatched for the third major intervention of this period, the pacification of Cuba in 1906. Civil unrest had erupted there, and the Platt Amendment authorized the United States to intervene to restore order. Like the Philippines and Boxer expedition, this was another joint Army-Navy operation. However, the Marines played a larger role than in those prior expeditions. The Marines were the first units ashore in Cuba and, from an initial improvised battalion landing on 12 September, expanded to an entire regiment within two weeks. Waller and another regiment arrived by 1 October, and Waller took command of a Provisional Brigade comprised of the two regiments. The brigade was comprised of nearly 100 officers and almost 2800 enlisted men, over a third of the entire Corps deployed in the space of a month.275

The Marines were not faced with a dedicated military opposition, as both sides of the civil conflict had reasons to welcome U.S. intervention. Moreover, the rebels were not geographically unified, essentially having a separate eastern and western command. The Marines nonetheless quickly acted to secure and patrol large areas of the country. The Army finally began arriving on 10 October and the Marine brigade was dissolved at

274 Major, pp. 122-132.
the beginning of November. Waller returned to the United States, leaving behind a
Marine battalion subordinated to Army command. This battalion would remain in Cuba
until 1909.276

These operations clearly provided impetus to the evolving small wars strategic
subculture. Most of the junior officers inducted into the Marine Corps served in at least
one of them. However, the operations continued to disrupt the functioning of the School
of Application, with only ten candidates available for 1906; no class was held for 1907.277

These frequent and persistent interventions did provide an excellent rationale for
continued expansion of the Corps. In May 1908, Commandant Elliot received
authorization for another 45 officers. In the same year, the Marine Corps acquired the
former Naval Station at Port Royal, South Carolina and the School was relocated there in
anticipation of at last being able to routinely serve its function of junior officer
training.278

In 1909, the School of Application was renamed the Marine Officer’s School and
had fifty seven students in its class. Instruction was improved and continued to focus on
small unit leadership. Most notably, some enlisted men were available for these junior
officers to lead, which allowed more practical exercises actually leading small units. The
Officer’s School would move again in 1911 to the Marine Barracks in Norfolk,
Virginia.279

Interventions continued, a preeminent example being Nicaragua in 1910. Here
the Marine Corps was called on to intervene rather subtly in a primarily political rather

276 Millet, p. 167.
277 Metcalf, p. 18.
278 Metcalf, p. 18.
279 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
than military role and did so from an existing colonial possession, the Panama Canal Zone. A war between an anti-U.S. government and more pro-U.S. rebels was underway in Nicaragua, and the Taft administration sought some way to tip the balance towards the rebels.\textsuperscript{280}

One of the Marine officers in this intervention was Smedely Butler, a paragon of his generation of officers and a future Marine icon who would win not one but two Medals of Honor. Though later becoming a populist and anti-militarist apostate, Butler in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century exemplified the small wars subculture. Marine officer and historian Merill Bartlett sums up this period: “A generation of Marine Corps officers, typified by the frenetic and ambitious Smedley Butler, became convinced increasingly that the small wars environment… had become the raison d’être for the smaller of the naval services.”\textsuperscript{281}

Yet even as the Corps policed the empire, the advance base mission had not disappeared. The U.S. Navy continued to press for the development of forces to seize and defend the advanced bases it would need for naval warfare, a mission some in the Corps welcomed. Most notable was an early graduate of the School of Application, Captain Dion Williams. Williams commanded a company in the first advanced base exercises, held in 1903 at the Puerto Rican island of Culebra.\textsuperscript{282}

This exercise demonstrated that the concept of the mission was still not fully developed in either the Marine Corps or the Navy. The advance base mission differed from previous experience in that it would necessitate being able to defend and especially

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\textsuperscript{280} Millet, p. 169 and Musicant, pp. 137-138.  
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attack from the sea. In contrast, most previous Navy/Marine landings were essentially unopposed (as at Guantanamo in 1898). Numerous problems emerged and disagreements between Navy and Marine officers in the exercise were common.283

The interventions in Panama and Cuba that limited class size at the School of Application also limited further development of the advance base mission from 1903-1906, though the requirement for the mission did help with Marine Corps expansion. The utility of both small wars and advanced base operations to justify the Marine Corps’ size helped to unify the two subcultures. Even if a member of one subculture felt the other was not consonant with their vision of the Marine Corps, it was still recognized as a selling point of the Corps as a whole. As noted below, sensitivity to domestic political forces would become a hallmark of both Marine subcultures. However, even while resources for the advance base mission were limited, its adherents continued to devote intellectual effort to it. While at the Naval War College in 1905-1906, Captain Williams drew on the lessons of 1903 to write a study on amphibious reconnaissance.284

In 1907, a war scare with Japan, ostensibly over anti-Japanese actions in the United States, gave fresh impetus to the advance base mission both within and outside the Corps. The Marines in the Philippines conducted ten weeks of exercises that doubled as preparation to defend the naval base at Subic Bay. Williams (now a major) referred to the 1907 exercise when drawing up requirements for an advance base force ready for instant deployment.285

The war scare also galvanized the Navy, which though not expecting war to actually erupt in 1907 began serious planning for it. Naval officers including Spanish-

283 Millet, pp. 273-274.
284 Daugherty, p. 88.
285 Millet, pp. 273-274.
American War hero Admiral Dewey and the long-time Navy advocate of Marine reform Commander William Fullam sought to further pressure the Corps to develop the advance base force. In 1908, these reformers successfully argued to President Roosevelt that Marine guards on Navy ships were vestigial and the Marines detailed for that duty could be withdrawn to form an advance base force.\textsuperscript{286}

This infuriated the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, who successfully lobbied Congress to overturn this ruling in 1909. Roosevelt’s decision to remove Marine guards was only his latest step against the Corps; he had previously attempted to merge it with the Army.\textsuperscript{287} These early experiences with capricious executive authority sensitized the Marine officer corps to the importance of good Congressional relations and good public relations in general.

Despite the victory in returning Marines to Navy ships, Commandant Elliot responded to the internal and external pressure to do more with the advance base mission. In 1910, in one of his last acts as Commandant, he established the Advanced Base School at New London, Connecticut (later moving to the Marine Barracks in Philadelphia). This school would train units to perform the mission, as well as deflecting criticism of the Corps.\textsuperscript{288}

While useful for the former, the school only bought brief respite from the Navy. Another war scare with Japan in 1913 gave the Navy’s Fullam (now a Captain and a naval inspector) another opening, as an inspection at the time found the Marine Corps still unready to perform the mission adequately. Fullam castigated the Corps over this failure, prompting the Corps to blame the Navy for failing to provide adequate material,

\textsuperscript{286} Bartlett, pp. 76-77.
\textsuperscript{287} Bickel, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{288} Millet, pp. 276-277.
including transports. The Navy’s General Board and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels intervened to mediate the dispute.\textsuperscript{289}

The result was that Elliot’s successor as Commandant, Major General William Biddle, established the Advanced Base Force as a standing entity in late 1913. In January 1914, two hastily formed and trained advance base regiments, led by Lieutenant Colonel John Lejeune and Colonel Charles Long respectively, formed a brigade under Colonel George Barnett, the Advanced Base School commander. This brigade then took part in a major exercise on Culebra in which it successfully defended the island from an attacking force.\textsuperscript{290}

Less than three months after the completion of the exercise, the new advance base regiments would be called on for war. Following disputes with the Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the Navy and Marine Corps to seize the port of Vera Cruz. Initial landings took place on 21 April and by 24 April the Marines had secured the city.\textsuperscript{291}

Thus by 1914 the Marine Corps had seen development and experience in both the small wars and advance base missions. Overall, the exigencies of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the absence of major war in the Pacific pushed the Marine Corps as a whole towards the small war subculture. By the time the U.S. entered World War I, the Marines had been numerous times to Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Known as the “banana wars,” many Marines grew very comfortable with these conflicts and Corps’ role as de facto imperial police force.\textsuperscript{292}

\textsuperscript{289} Millet, pp. 278-280.
\textsuperscript{290} Millet, pp. 280-282.
\textsuperscript{291} See Jack Sweetman, \textit{The Landing at Vera Cruz: 1914} (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968).
\textsuperscript{292} See Musicant, chapters 1-6 for description of the events of these interventions.
However, neither subculture dominated the Corps. Marines in the small officer corps were frequently called on to perform each mission, often in rapid succession. Colonel Waller, for example, was most associated with small wars yet he was the overall brigade commander at Vera Cruz. Conversely, Captain Williams, the early advocate of advance base missions, had participated in one of the many Panama interventions (this one a minor one in 1902) immediately prior to participating in the first advance base exercises.293

Moreover, the managerial culture remained homogenous, with the school system continuing to emphasize small unit leadership. Practical exercises in minor tactics and topography were among the highlights of the School in 1911-1912. Some administrative instruction, such as basic bookkeeping was introduced in this period, but the focus overwhelmingly remained on preparing officers to lead small groups of men into combat.294

Major Interventions and World War Interlude, 1915-1931

The outbreak of World War I shortly after the Vera Cruz landing operation highlighted a type of war for which neither the small wars nor advance base subculture had prepared. As a result, the Marine Corps paid relatively little attention to the war from 1914-1916. Instead, it was called on for imperial policing missions, most notably in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The intervention in Haiti began in 1915 following an outbreak of civil violence threatening to American interests. Colonel Waller was once again commander of the 1st

293 See Daugherty III, “Brigadier General Dion Williams.”
294 Metcalf, p. 19.
Provisional Marine Brigade, formed from the newly created standing Marine Regiments, the 1st and 2nd. Waller and his brigade arrived on August 15, slightly more than two weeks after the crisis began. Waller was assisted by Major Smedley Butler, whose actions at Vera Cruz the previous year would win him his first Medal of Honor. After an initial period of restoring calm and negotiations in Port au Prince, it became apparent that one side in the conflict, the so-called cacos of Rosalvo Bonabo, would have to be suppressed.295

Waller’s campaign was marked by both the small unit managerial ethos and the developing small wars strategic subculture of the Marine Corps. He dispersed companies into the rebel-dominated areas of northern Haiti, where they established district-level bases. Each company then subdivided the district into regions controlled by a post of 6-9 men. From these posts, patrols were sent out frequently to secure the area and to gather critical intelligence. Manpower was insufficient to cover an entire district with these posts, so the Marines would garrison half the district first, remaining until it was pacified. They would then shift posts to an unpacified area.296 Butler was at the forefront of operations and would win his second Medal of Honor in Haiti.297

However, as overall commander Waller was not focused on simply killing the cacos. As Marine historian Allen Millet describes, he “saw the campaign as a combination of arms-buying, amnesty-granting, and selective attacks against only the most militant leaders and their bands.” This policy combined the carrot of payments and amnesty with the stick of military force in an effective political strategy. When faced

296 Bickel, pp. 80-81.
297 Millet, p. 187.
with military action, most caco leaders accepted amnesty and payments to disband their groups. In December of 1915, Marines recorded a total of only six engagements with small groups of rebels. 298

Waller also realized the importance of working with the locals to provide security, as his manpower, however professional and effective, was limited. Plans to form a Haitian constabulary were drafted in September and Butler was placed in charge of the effort in December. Butler enthusiastically embraced his new command (claiming the Haitian rank of major general) and the constabulary quickly expanded. Officered by 120 Marines (a mix of both officers and NCOs), the enlisted ranks reached 2,600, a large force than the Marine brigade. As the constabulary grew in size and skill, it began to take over the manning of Marine posts and patrols. 299

Butler would remain in command until 1918 when he left Haiti but the Marines would remain for nearly two decades. Their principal function was running the constabulary, which became the shadow government of the country. While the size of Marine forces in country shrank over this period, many Marines rotated through the country ensuring considerable exposure to small wars within the Corps. The Haitian intervention was a critical component in the evolution of the small wars subculture. 300

A similar if less lengthy operation began in the Dominican Republic in May 1916 in response to fighting between factions of the Dominican government. A 2nd Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by Colonel Joseph Pendleton, landed and followed the same pattern as Haiti, attempting to negotiate a solution before launching a military

298 Millet, pp. 186-187 and Bickel 69-71. The amnesty program clearly gains momentum after the November destruction of Ft. Riviere.
299 Millet, pp. 188-190 and Bickel, pp. 80-87.
300 Millet, pp. 189-190 and 196-210.
campaign. The measures used in the Dominican Republic were also similar to those in Haiti, with companies being used to garrison and run districts and the formation of a constabulary officered by Americans. The Dominican intervention ended in 1921, again after many Marine officers had rotated through the troubled country.301

Significantly, the U.S. Army did not play a role in either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. These two long-term colonial occupations were commanded exclusively by Marines working closely with the State Department and the Navy. Overall policy guidance in both interventions, for example, came from the State Department and Navy admirals (the Marines still having a dearth of general officers) though the details of implementing policy went to the Marines on the ground.302

Both missions were also disrupted by the United States entry into World War I in 1917. The Marines were dispatched as a component of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) that the U.S. hastily sent to Europe and many of those sent were pulled away from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Europe, Marines essentially acted as regular infantry. They won considerable fame at the Battle of Belleau Woods for their bravery, though this was at least in part to somewhat skewed journalistic coverage abetted by the public affairs conscious Marine Corps. It also spurred an attempt to create a provisional Marine division in the AEF (quashed by AEF Commander General Pershing). Yet the Marines never subsequently evinced any serious interest in preparing for total war, apart from the advance base mission.303

301 Millet, pp. 190-196 and Bickel, pp. 107-127.
302 Millet, pp. 185-186 and 190-192.
303 See Donovan pg. 16-18 and 24-25 for a short comment on Belleau Woods and Marine involvement in the First World War. He argues that the Marines began to develop capacity for larger unit warfare as a result of Belleau Woods, but continued to focus on the “banana wars” under the leadership of World War I veterans like John Lejeune. See also Bickel, pg. 54-55.
The war predictably disrupted the education system. A huge surge in the officer ranks of the Marine Corps was approved and hastily trained before dispatch to Europe. The school was relocated to Quantico from Norfolk during the war, and would remain there afterward.\textsuperscript{304}

By 1920, the school had regained equilibrium and was more important than ever for two reasons. One was the massive and enduring expansion of the Marine officer corps, which had gone from about 350 in early 1916 to a peak of nearly 2300 in 1919 before stabilizing at around 1100-1200 for the next decade.\textsuperscript{305} Second, the Marines also had to pass the lessons of modern tactical warfare learned in Europe to the officer corps as a whole. These lessons did not change Marine emphasis on small unit leadership, but did require updating for the era of ubiquitous automatic weapons and high explosive weapons like grenades, mortars and artillery.\textsuperscript{306}

The school itself was renamed the Marine Officer School in 1920 and began to teach three separate courses: the basic course, a company commander course, and a field grade officer course. The emphasis remained on small unit operations in the first two courses, with only the third teaching some headquarters staff functions. Even in the field grade course the focus remained on operations of battalion size.\textsuperscript{307}

The basic course was separated and relocated to Philadelphia in 1924. Renamed the Basic School, it trained twenty to thirty junior lieutenants per year in courses of four

\textsuperscript{304} Metcalf, pp. 48-49.
\textsuperscript{305} See Marine History website.
\textsuperscript{306} Metcalf, pp. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{307} Metcalf, pp. 48-49.
to eight months duration for the remainder of the decade. The major disruption to its
function in this decade was another major intervention, this time in Nicaragua. 308

In April 1927, the 2nd Provisional Marine Brigade numbering almost 3000 men
was dispatched to Nicaragua to settle civil conflict arising from disputes over the 1926
election. The Marines were specifically in support of the efforts of a civilian, former
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, to negotiate a settlement. Initially, Stimson was
successful but one member of one faction refused to lay down arms: Augusto Sandino. 309

Sandino and his followers, the Sandinistas, established a base in northern
Nicaragua but neither side took any offensive action. The Marines immediately began
constructing a Nicaraguan constabulary and by July felt the situation in hand. Marines
began to withdraw but Sandino then began launching attacks against the Marines and the
constabulary. Sandino’s men enjoyed the advantage of significantly better training and
equipment than rebels in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. However, the Marines had
added airpower to their arsenal, providing a partially offsetting reconnaissance and attack
capability. 310

The overall Marine response to Sandino’s attacks followed the familiar pattern
derived from the small unit managerial culture and small wars strategic subculture.
Patrolling, intelligence collection, small garrisons in villages and key points, an offer of
amnesty, the constabulary, and assaults on key Sandino bases were all combined into a
political strategy like that seen in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The result was that
within little more than a year the Marines had significantly weakened the rebellion. In

308 Metcalf, pp. 48-50.
309 Millet, pp. 243-245 and Bickel, p. 155.
310 Millet, pp. 247-250 and Bickel, pp. 156-160.
May 1928 over a thousand guerrillas, offered amnesty, surrendered themselves along with thousands of weapons.311

Following a successful supervision of a national election in 1928, the Marines began to reduce force levels, shifting the burden to Marine officered constabulary. By the end of 1931, following a major offensive by the rebels and a counteroffensive led by the constabulary, the rebellion was over. Sandino surrendered the following year after the last Marine combat forces left Nicaragua.312

After leaving Nicaragua, Smedley Butler would continue to exemplify the small wars subculture during the remainder of the 1920s. In 1924, he took leave of absence from the Marine Corps to apply his skills as a politically astute officer and constabulary commander to policing another notoriously corrupt part of the world: Philadelphia. Made Director of Public Safety, Butler battled bootleggers and corruption while working to rebuild the police force along paramilitary lines.313 He returned to the Marine Corps in 1926 and was immediately put to use in another policing role, this time commanding Marines guarding the U.S. mail. The Marines had briefly undertaken this task in 1921 in the wake of a series of mail robberies and were put to that use again in 1926.314

In 1927, Butler was again in the midst of another politically delicate operation. China was in the throes of civil war that had begun in 1925 and the threat to the lives and interests of Americans had led to the dispatch of Marine units to reinforce the legation in

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311 Millet, pp. 250-260 and Bickel, pp. 160-178
312 Bickel, pp. 164-165.
314 Schmidt, pp. 161-162 and 168-172.
By 1927 the threat had grown so ominous that Butler was dispatched to command a Marine brigade dedicated to protecting American interests in China.\textsuperscript{315}

Butler worked closely with the U.S. Minister to China, John MacMurray, to negotiate with Nationalist forces (under the overall command of Chiang Kai-shek) and various warlords leading private armies. The brigade stayed until 1929 and during this period Butler went out of his way to cooperate with the Chinese local commanders in order to keep tensions low.\textsuperscript{316}

**Advance Base Progress and Stagnation, 1915-1931**

The waxing of the small wars subculture in the years before World War I was matched by a waning in the advance base mission. The progress made earlier, with the formation of a school and standing force, stalled. By the end of World War I, the subculture was in danger of disappearing entirely, as the Marine officer corps was extensively utilized in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well as other smaller interventions.

However, the changes in the balance of naval power after World War I created an opportunity for the advance base subculture. Post-World War I, only three global naval powers remained: Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. The U.S. Navy assessed that war with Britain was unlikely (though not impossible). Japan seemed much more likely, given its expansionist aims and the previous war scares. The Navy therefore

\textsuperscript{315} Millet, pp. 220-224.

\textsuperscript{316} Millet, pp. 225-228.
decided to focus its planning and force structure almost entirely around war with Japan, codenamed War Plan ORANGE.\(^2\)

Central to ORANGE was the size of the Pacific. This would necessitate advance bases for both the United States and Japan. The Navy would need forces to seize and hold bases and the Army was not particularly interested in the mission. The Marine Corps was the obvious choice. In 1920, the Chief of Naval Operations asked Commandant of the Marine Corps George Barnett to establish the capability to launch a force of some six to eight thousand men within two days for a campaign in the central Pacific. The Joint Army and Navy Board, at this point a sort of proto-Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the mission as well.\(^3\)

The advance base subculture was given a further boost in 1920 when Commandant Barnett was replaced by John Lejeune. Lejeune had commanded a regiment in the Vera Cruz landing and then subsequently commanded first the Marine brigade and then an Army-Marine Corps composite division in France. The sum of his experiences had made him an adherent of the advance base subculture even if he was not among its intellectual progenitors. He did serve as a patron to many of those progenitors, most notably Earl Ellis, who he immediately assigned to study the problem of war with Japan (already a subject of near maniacal interest to Ellis) from the Marine perspective.\(^4\)

In 1921 Ellis produced what was in essence the Marine version of War Plan ORANGE, known as Operation Plan 712 “Advance Base Force Operations in Micronesia.” Lejeune approved it as the guiding document for Marine planning and


\(^{3}\) Millet, pp. 320-321.

\(^{4}\) Millet, pp. 322-325.
force structure. Ellis died in 1923 under mysterious circumstances while on leave from the Corps, conducting “officially unofficial” reconnaissance in the islands of Micronesia. His plan, however, lived on and guided the Marine Corps advance base mission for the next several years.320

The Marines conducted advance base exercises of increasingly greater size and complexity in the 1920s. In 1922 the first post-war advance base exercise took place at Culebra and Guantanamo Bay using only two companies. In 1924, a major exercise took place in the Canal Zone and Culebra, commanded by advance base pioneers Dion Williams and Eli Cole. In 1925 another large exercise took place, this time on the Hawaiian island of Oahu.321

The year guarding the mail, interventions in China and Nicaragua, and other Marine duties drew away too much manpower to allow further large scale exercises in the remainder of the 1920s. Yet Lejeune continued to promote the advance base mission and its intellectual exponents for the remainder of his nine year tenure as Commandant. He made Dion Williams, now a brigadier general, his assistant in 1928 along with Ben Hebard Fuller, another brigadier general who had spent considerable time working on War Plan ORANGE with the Navy.322

Lejeune was replaced as Commandant by Wendell Neville, a Medal of Honor recipient and veteran of the fighting in France, in 1929. However, Neville had little chance to make his mark before dying suddenly in 1930. The matter of his replacement

320 Millet, pp. 325-326.
would bring to the forefront the previously fairly quiet division between the two subcultures.\textsuperscript{323}

\textbf{Culture Clash and Consolidation in the Corps, 1930-1935}

The obvious candidate to replace Neville was Smedley Butler. In addition to his two Medals of Honor he was now the senior general in the Marine Corps. Butler himself certainly expected it and had spent year since he returned from China as commander of Quantico, turning the base into a showplace for the Marine Corps. However, Butler appears to have been vocally obstreperous too many times to merit the Commandant’s billet. He had also lost critical political patronage when his father, a Congressman and member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, had died in 1928.\textsuperscript{324}

Butler was therefore passed over in favor of Ben Hebard Fuller. Incensed, Butler indulged in various questionable behaviors, including insulting Benito Mussolini in a speech to a private club. However merited Butler’s comments were, insulting a foreign leader in a public speech was unduly provocative. Butler didn’t care as he was already planning his exit from the Corps. He was threatened with court martial over the affair before a compromise of censure and retirement was worked out.\textsuperscript{325}

Fuller had spent the bulk of the 1920s at Marine Headquarters, and so had observed both sides of the cultural ferment. He was not heavily invested in either; he had participated in imperial policing missions but worked extensively on War Plan ORANGE. He had, however, been a graduate of the first class at the School of

\textsuperscript{323} See Marine Corps biography of Neville at:  
http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/Whos_Who/Neville_WC.htm  
\textsuperscript{324} Schmidt, pp. 202-208.  
\textsuperscript{325} Schmidt, pp. 209-214.
Application, which he subsequently commanded. As such, he was committed to the unified managerial culture that had developed in the Corps.\textsuperscript{326}

Almost immediately after becoming Commandant, Fuller was confronted with external threats to the Corps’ well-being. The first was a general retrenchment and decline in U.S. military spending as the Hoover administration, penurious to begin with, struggled to cope with the Great Depression. The Marines’ responsibilities were not curtailed but their end strength and overall budget was. Further, Secretary of the Navy Charles Adams conspired with Army officers, including Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, to have the Corps absorbed into the Army. Congressional support for the Corps quashed this latter attempt, but Fuller nonetheless spent the first two years of his time as Commandant fighting to preserve the Corps.\textsuperscript{327}

While the Commandant of the Corps sought to ensure it did not pass from existence, the Marine Corps Schools Commandant, Brigadier General Randolph Berkeley initiated an effort to “develop and write the text for Landing Operations and Small Wars.”\textsuperscript{328} This decision would effectively validate both subcultures, yet the effort failed (for reasons that are opaque) in 1932. Nevertheless, these two missions were acknowledged as central to the Marine Corps. In this context, a history of the Basic School notes that “…staff and students were intensely indoctrinated in the peculiar mission and functions of the Marine Corps.”\textsuperscript{329}

The same year an Army-Navy Board convened to determine responsibilities in landing operations for the two departments. The result was heavily focused on large-

\textsuperscript{326} Bartlett, pp. 77-82.
\textsuperscript{327} Bartlett, pp. 82-86.
\textsuperscript{328} School Memorandum, June 3, 1932, quoted in Bickel, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{329} Anthony Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools (1945), pp. 39-40 (available at Marine Corps Archives Quantico, Marine Corps Schools History, box 1).
scale advance base type operations and was seen as a major victory for the advance base subculture. However, this advance base triumphalism provoked a strong response from the small wars subculture. Assistant School Commandant Colonel Ellis Miller delivered a pointed lecture calling for the embrace of both subcultures:

Some officers contend that we MUST... take our maximum war effort as our Corps mission, the seizure and defense of advanced bases for the fleet. Those who thus contend forget the long record of constructive achievements and success in minor wars which has conclusively proved that the Marines have operated, during the last century and a half, in the execution of many important missions in no way related to a war with a first class power. Ellis elaborated further on the importance of the small wars mission, and was apparently eloquent enough that Commandant Fuller had bound copies of the lecture distributed to Marine officers.

The teaching of the Basic School at this point was heavily focused on the small unit aspects of managerial and strategic culture that both Marine subcultures had in common. In terms of the size of units, training and exercises included company and smaller operations (platoon, squad, etc.). Officers were trained in hand to hand combat through the use of small arms and crew-served weapons. Patrolling and scouting were heavily emphasized, as were Spanish language, military government, and “bush warfare,” the latter three more relevant to small wars than advance base missions.

However, the following year the advance base school received another boost with the formation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This would serve as a standing and dedicated force for advance base operations on scale previously impossible. Those

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30 Ellis Miller, *The Marine Corps in Support of the Fleet*, bound version of the lecture, June 1, 1933; quoted in Bickel, p. 208
31 See *Basic School History*, pp. 10-11 (Basic School History, box 1, folder 5) and Basic School Pamphlets (Marine Corps Schools box 4, folder 37), both at Marine Corps Archives Quantico.
assigned to the FMF in this period could not be transferred out without the Commandant’s permission, so it was institutionally on firm footing.  

Further, Commandant Fuller retired and was replaced by Major General John Russell in 1934. Russell would be a major advocate for FMF and the advance base school, yet he had considerable small wars experience as well. From 1919 to 1922, he commanded the Marine Brigade in Haiti and then was appointed High Commissioner to Haiti. This position placed him in charge of all U.S. efforts in Haiti, military and civilian. Russell was clearly comfortable in this role, serving until 1930, though an uprising in 1929 may possibly have soured him somewhat on small wars. Regardless, he embodied the Marine Corps’ cultural openness to working with other services and agencies as well as with local civilian and security forces (in this case the Marine-led Haitian Gendarmerie).  

As Commandant, Russell oversaw the final consolidation of the Marine Corps around both the small wars and advance base mission. In 1934, he directed the creation of the first Marine Corps manual for the advance base mission, entitled Tentative Manual on Landing Operations. The following year the new School Commandant, Brigadier General James Breckenridge, oversaw the creation of the Manual for Small Wars Operations.  

From the mid-1930s onward, the Marine Corps would be defined by a unified managerial culture and two strategic subcultures. The managerial culture of small unit operations with relative little emphasis on staff functions was embraced by all, in keeping with the overall “every man a rifleman” ethos. The small wars and advance base

332 Bartlett, pp. 86-90.  
334 Bickel, pp. 211-221.
subcultures would oscillate in terms of relative power within the Corps, depending on the external environment (both international and domestic).

**Marine Culture, 1935-1960**

The Marines experience in World War II, though dramatic, was in many ways similar to that of the First World War. They were restricted to the Pacific theatre, but accomplished their assigned tasks of taking and occupying enemy islands. World War II did cause considerable disruption in the Basic School, as the number of junior officers needed for such large scale war totally overwhelmed the school. The Marine experience in Korea was similar, with notable success in some operations, including the landing at Inchon and the retreat from the Chosin reservoir.

During the early Cold War, the Marines continued to be a relatively small force that operated in conjunction with the Navy to project U.S. influence, rather than a large unit force for conventional operations. This was despite expansion of the Corps mandated by Congressional legislation following the Second World War. The Corps did retain a significant presence in East Asia as rapidly deployable reserves for contingencies such as renewed hostilities in Korea.

The Marines continued to be used for small interventions abroad, a role that the many in the Corps were comfortable with. The U.S. population and much of the rest of the world were relatively comfortable with this role as well, at least in comparison to

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335 Basic School History, p. 22
337 Mandated by legislation at three divisions and three air wings in 1952, the Corps has consistently had an end strength of 170,000 or more since World War II, with the exception of the three years 1948-1950. See USMC History and Museums Division website: http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/Frequently_Requested/End_Strength.htm (last accessed June 27, 2009). The 3rd Marine Division had been stationed on Okinawa since the mid-1950s.
sending the Army. The “Ambassadors in Green” had a deft touch with locals, were less heavily equipped, and they had a history of often leaving soon after arriving (though they made frequent returns).  

In the period immediately prior to the commitment of ground combat forces to Vietnam, the Marines were used in two successful interventions, one in Lebanon and one in the Dominican Republic. In Lebanon, the participants in the ongoing civil struggle welcomed the Marine presence, and order was quickly restored through negotiations without a Marine firing a shot. In the Dominican Republic, the effort to restore peace was more violent, but still successful.

At the same time, the amphibious subculture had waned somewhat in influence within the Corps. The rapidly increasing range and firepower of carrier aviation made the seizing of advance bases obsolete. The Army and Air Force dominated the European theater, leaving little role for the Marines. Finally, the potential for nuclear use raised the spectre of a “nuclear Gallipoli,” making large-scale landings ever more risky. This was the state of Marine culture as the Corps was committed to combat in Vietnam.

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338 “Ambassadors in Green” was a term in common use for the Marine Corps in the 1960s, similar in tone to “State Department troops.” It is also the title of a monograph about Marine involvement in Vietnam. See Tom Bartlett, *Ambassadors in Green*, Leatherneck Association monograph, 1971.


340 Not that the amphibious subculture would give up entirely, launching operations in the Mediterranean in the 1960s in an attempt to find a bigger role in NATO for the Corps. The first, known as Operation STEEL PIKE I, included over 20,000 Marines in an exercise in Spanish waters. See USMC History and Museums Division website: [http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/Frequently_Requested/Basing_Deployment_Pattern.htm](http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/Frequently_Requested/Basing_Deployment_Pattern.htm) (last accessed June 27, 2009). This again points to the enduring power of culture.
Conclusion

The Marine Corps first war was typical of that of the “army” of a maritime power, with close involvement in imperial policing and naval matters. Its culture reflects this experience, with an emphasis on small units and close integration with civilians and other military organizations. However, counterinsurgency would prove a novel challenge for the Corps, presenting a complex and ambiguous environment.
Chapter 5: A Family of Regiments: British Army Professionalization, 1856-1948

The British Army is almost entirely unique among military organizations. It has retained to a degree seen in only a few other organizations the character and tradition of its pre-modern origins. Central to this is the class and especially the educational background of its officer corps, specifically the English “public school.”\(^{341}\) Even in the 1980s, just over half of all entrants into the Standard Military Course at Sandhurst (the gateway to officership in the Army) were from public schools.\(^ {342}\) Moreover, the combat arms, particularly the elite infantry regiments and armor units, were still dominated by graduates of the upper tier of public schools (Eton, Harrow, etc.) in the 1970s.\(^ {343}\)

Other military organizations strongly tied to class have followed similar patterns. As discussed earlier, the Prussian and later German officer corps is perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon. Exclusively composed of poorly educated aristocrats in 1800, by 1870 its officers, now leavened with educated members of the middle class, were the model of technocratic excellence.\(^ {344}\)

However, compared to the British, the German reforms and similar reforms elsewhere on the continent took place more rapidly and were more comprehensive. The

\(^{341}\) Public schools, also called independent schools, are privately funded schools that are generally associated with the upper class and aspiring middle class.


\(^{343}\) K.M. MacDonald, "The Persistence of an Elite: The Case of British Army Officer Cadets," *Sociological Review* v.28 n.3 (1980). Perhaps most striking of MacDonald’s data is that no graduates of state schools became officers in the elite (Guards and Royal Green Jackets) infantry regiments during the period 1976-1978; in contrast roughly one out of five Sandhurst graduates from what MacDonald considers the top fourteen public schools joined one of those regiments.

geography of Britain has provided insulation from the pressure to modernize felt by continental powers. The Royal Navy was always the principal means of defending the homeland, so the Army was not responsible for the survival of the nation in the way the Prussian Army was. This muted the willingness of Britain’s citizens to tolerate intrusive measures like conscription that were the norm on the continent.

Further, the British Army was strongly associated with tyranny, particularly the tyranny of the monarchy, making it a potential instrument of repression. Parliament therefore had little interest in building a large and cohesive Army that might threaten it. Civilians adopted a general attitude of benign neglect towards the Army, which in turn continued on as it had for centuries.

However, British interest in both the balance of power on the continent and in controlling a vast empire eventually forced professionalization on the Army. The basic model for the professional British Army was in place within three decades of two crucial wars. The first, the Crimean War, showed the need to professionalize for coalition war on the continent. The second, the Sepoy Mutiny in India, made the British Army responsible for policing a vast colonial empire. This combination, interacting with the British public school system, produced the culture of the British Army, though full consolidation would not occur until 1947.

**Pre-professionalism: Three Hundred Years of Solitude, 1509-1809**

The antecedent to the modern British Army begins with the reign of Henry VIII. Henry was confronted with both the need to defend the homeland from the Scots (not yet part of the United Kingdom) and his desire to press his claims in France with an
expeditionary force. A levied militia force provided the means to achieve the former, while a mix of English volunteers and foreign mercenaries made the latter possible. This split, between home defense and overseas missions, would remain in place for the next four hundred years. Neither force would achieve anything like a permanent standing presence, in contrast to the emerging national armies of the continent. The same pattern would hold under Elizabeth I, though impressment was used to raise some of the rank and file for expeditions (an early form of conscription but only for the poor and on a limited scale). Many of Elizabeth’s efforts to build the Army were dismantled by her successors.

In 1642, the English Civil War pitted elements of society, none possessing much in the way of military expertise, against one another. After two years of war in which neither side made much progress, the forces loyal to the Parliament were reformed into “a New Model Army.” This at last produced a standardized army on a nationwide basis, which won the Civil War and established a new regime under the Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell.

Unfortunately, the army was the bedrock of the Commonwealth and Cromwell the bedrock of the army. His death was followed by a brief split within the army and then the Restoration, which in turn led to a diminution of the army as a standing entity and a return to a militia system. The standing army had become associated with the tyranny of the late Protectorate period, which would have important and lingering consequences for British Army professionalism. Indeed, from 1660 until the 1750s, England would not

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have a fully recognized “army,” instead Parliamentary estimates referred to “guards and garrisons.”

Beginning about 1740, the British at last began to generate a stable and enduring army establishment. The Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, was opened to train artillerymen and engineers (who had earlier been made a permanent corps) in 1741. Finally accepting that both a militia and a standing army of some sort would be needed, Parliament enabled the Duke of Cumberland, “a soldier in the German School” to establish a standing central command centered in Whitehall at the new Horse-Guards building in 1751.

This army, still leavened with mercenaries, fought reasonably well against the rebellious American colonists but was unable to subdue them, Correlli Barnett concluding that by the time war broke out it was likely “that to restore British authority in America was a problem beyond the power of military means to solve, however perfectly applied.” The years between the end of the American Revolution and the beginning of the Napoleonic wars were a time of rapid demobilization and economy in military spending. It is therefore unsurprising the army did less well in the initial battles against the French after the French Revolution. This would spark several reforms that would lead to proto-professionalization of the British Army.

348 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 111-166, quotation on p. 166.
350 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 175-176, quotation on p. 175.
Proto-professionalism: Sandhurst, Wellington, and India, 1809-1854

The 1795 expedition against the French in Holland of the Duke of York, Commander in Chief of the Army, ended in an ignominious withdrawal. The Duke as a result became interested in army reform and thus looked favorably on a 1799 proposal by one of his subordinates, John Le Marchant, for a national school for officers. However, the Duke felt that the incumbent officer corps would prevent the realization of the proposal.352

One of the central reasons for this resistance was that the British Army officer corps was essentially a rentier class that invested a sum in a position that guaranteed steady returns. Commissions in the British Army were at this point obtained principally by purchase (occasionally by royal favor) and as a result education and capability varied widely. Promotion was also by purchase, when vacancies in a regiment came open, so as one historian notes, this system “often produced twelve-year-old ensigns who, if their parents’ pockets were deep enough, could become colonels at twenty.”353

This was, as can be imagined, not a system likely to produce a highly effective officer corps. Yet the entire officer corps had already invested significant capital in it; an attempt to institute mandatory professional education seemed like an attack on their investment and future prospects. Only an act of Parliament or the monarch could overcome this resistance.

Fortunately, the Duke of York remained committed to the project and formed a special commission, with him as head, to investigate the need for a national military college. Unsurprisingly, the committee recommended that one should be established. As

353 Shepperd, p. 22.
a result, a royal warrant was issued blessing Marchant’s private efforts to educate officers (conducted in an inn at High Wycombe) as “the Royal Military College.” Subsequently, it was agreed that the College be established permanently on the Sandhurst estate.  

However, the Treasury was slow to authorize money for the College, and with the resumption of war with France in 1803 after the one year Peace of Amiens, the College languished. Finally, in 1808 the King issued a new royal warrant supporting and expanding on the previous warrants. The warrant specified that those meeting all requirements of the College for the position of lieutenant would be commissioned without purchase in an infantry or cavalry regiment. That same year, the Treasury was persuaded to provide the funds for building at Sandhurst.  

The British launched another continental campaign in that year as well, this time on the Iberian Peninsula. It was commanded by Arthur Wellesley, soon to be the Duke of Wellington. An able soldier and former politician, Wellington proved a worthy opponent for Napoleon’s armies over the next five years. In particular, Wellington was able to create an effective military apparatus in the field, including adopting a divisional structure for the army.

The campaigns against France also expanded British Army involvement in India. Prior to the late eighteenth century, the East India Company, which maintained its own army and military establishment, had been principally responsible for the subcontinent. However, the alliance of various Indian potentates with the French increased Parliament

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354 Shepperd, pp. 26-29.
355 Shepperd, pp. 29-31.
and the British Army’s interest in securing the region. Wellington himself had participated in one of these wars, the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War.\footnote{Richard Holmes, \textit{Wellington: The Iron Duke} (London: Harper Collins, 2002), pp. 39-50.}

Wellington’s subsequent triumph at Waterloo in 1815 cemented his place in British military legend. Yet his army at that point was still far from a national army; only slightly more than a third were British while the rest were a mix of Germans, Belgians, and other continentals. Following the end of the war, the British Army lapsed back into quiescence and failed to institutionalize many lessons from the war.\footnote{Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, p. 270-271.}

Sandhurst, completed in 1813, had an ample budget for the remaining two years of the Napoleonic War but once peace returned, penury came back as well. The neglect of Sandhurst was not helped by Wellington himself, who loomed over military and political life until his death in 1852, as he was proud of “his success in the field with little formal military education.”\footnote{Neville Thompson, \textit{Wellington After Waterloo} (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 138.} Correlli Barnett more picturesquely describes the British Army under Wellington and his Napoleonic veterans: “Under their ancient and hallowed hands, the army remained preserved like a garment in a bottom drawer, sentimentally loved, but rotted and rendered quaint by the passage of time.”\footnote{Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, p. 282.}

Finally, in 1832 after more than a decade of decline, Sandhurst was cut loose from the public purse. It would survive only by the most stringent economies and the collection of fees from students. In addition to stunting professional education per se, this also had the effect of preventing any increase in homogeneity or “corporateness” in the officer corps of the British Army (apart from class). There was minimal incentive to

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{358} Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, p. 270-271.
\item \textsuperscript{359} Neville Thompson, \textit{Wellington After Waterloo} (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{360} Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, p. 282.
\end{itemize}
pay a fee to attend Sandhurst when one could buy a commission, so there were was no place of instruction to provide a common experience for officers.\textsuperscript{361}

Indeed, it was something of misnomer to refer to a British officer corps or even a British Army. Rather there were a collection of regiments and regimental officers. The regiments were scattered across the countryside and the world with no higher headquarters other than the overall command at the Horse Guards. No brigades or divisions much less corps formations existed, even on paper. The individual regiments seldom exercised units larger than a battalion.\textsuperscript{362}

This lack of corporate identity at the level of the entire army was of minimal concern as long as no fighting was required on the continent and Europe was at peace for decades after the fall of Napoleon. Instead, the regiments were called on to fight in India both against and alongside native forces, who were no more professional and often less well-armed. This experience began to generate regimental identity as well as emphasizing the importance of small unit leadership, including personal bravery, for officers. Even in India, however, the political administration continued to be provided by the East India Company, which retained its own rival army (actually multiple armies).\textsuperscript{363}

Domestic opinion in Britain during this period, though appreciative of heroes like Wellington, also remained concerned about the perils of a powerful and integrated army, particularly one strongly loyal to the monarch. Comments by senior officers, including Wellington, seemed to show that the monarchy retained the first loyalty of the army so civilians remained reluctant to see increasing military professionalism. Even the rather

\textsuperscript{361} Shepperd, pp. 41-44.
\textsuperscript{362} Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, pp. 279-282.
\textsuperscript{363} Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, p. 274-279.
innocuous formation of the United Service Club (a gentlemen’s club in London for senior officers of the Army and Navy) was a cause of concern.\textsuperscript{364}

A Critical Five Years: The Crimean War and The Sepoy Mutiny, 1854-1859

The long “Wellingtonian twilight” came to an end with the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.\textsuperscript{365} This war, along with the subsequent Sepoy Mutiny in India, would be the foundational experience of the professional British Army officer corps. While perhaps not the most strategically sound war, the Crimean War nonetheless fit with the overall pattern of offshore balancing that the British government had pursued for decades. In this case, the perceived threat was potential Russian dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, granting the Russians control of the Bosphorous and thus menace to the route to India.

Alongside the French Army, the British Army, dispatched en masse for the first time in four decades, laid siege to the Russian Black Sea port of Sevastopol. The expedition was, if not a disaster, at a minimum poorly managed. Troops were dramatically short of supply in the initial months of the war, owing to the fragmented and outmoded system of supply and transport (to be fair to the Army, the supply system was entirely in civilian hands at this time).\textsuperscript{366}

Most notably, the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava in October 1854 highlighted the shortcomings of professionalism in the British Army. The Light Brigade was composed of five separate cavalry regiments, dispatched to the

\textsuperscript{364} Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 279 and John Sweetman, War and Administration: The Significance of the Crimean War for the British Army (Edinburgh, UK: Scottish Academic Press, 1984), pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{365} The phrase is from Sweetman, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{366} See Trevor Royle, Crimea: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) for an overview of the war and Sweetman, pp. 41-77 for specifics on transport and supply problems.
front and formed into a brigade under Major General James Brudenell, Lord Cardigan. The brigade itself was paired with a similarly cobbled together Heavy Brigade of cavalry into the Cavalry Division, the division commanded by Lieutenant General George Bingham, Earl of Lucan. The overall commander of British forces was General Fitzroy Somerset, Baron Raglan.

On October 25th, Raglan instructed Lucan to prevent the Russians from withdrawing with naval guns they had emplaced on the Causeway Heights (on the right of the cavalry at that time). When the order was transmitted to Lucan, by a young captain, it was misinterpreted; Lucan believed that Raglan wanted him to seize the guns emplaced at the far end of the valley formed by the Causeway Heights and the Fedyukhin Heights. Lucan in turn ordered Cardigan to charge with the Light Brigade. This initial charge would be followed up by the Heavy Brigade.

The Russians, with artillery on both heights and at the end of the valley, inflicted devastating losses on the Light Brigade. Cardigan survived, though the young captain who relayed the order to Lucan did not. The disaster was subsequently widely publicized in British newspapers, with Lucan and Raglan trading letters trying to scapegoat one another.

This disaster could have been written off as an aberration, except that the three commanders, Raglan, Lucan, and Cardigan, were not at all atypical for British officers at the time. All three were upper class and had attended elite public schools (Westminster and Harrow). All had availed themselves of the purchase system; Lucan was thus a

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368 Woodham-Smith, pp. 223-234.
369 Woodham-Smith, pp. 235-249.
regimental commander at the age of 26. Cardigan became a regimental commander at 35 despite a troubled and combative history; he would subsequently be removed from service, only to be reinstated by the King. Raglan had been a key aide to Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars. All had been Members of Parliament and, demonstrating the tight-knit nature of the upper class at the time, Lucan and Cardigan were brothers-in-law (who detested one another). Of the three, only Lucan showed any dedication to military education through studying military history.371

Further, even in successful battles the British officers often succeeded more due to the professionalism of their enlisted soldiers than any professional skill of their own. At the Battle of Alma in September, an advance of the 1st Division (consisting of the elite Guards and Highland Brigades) under Prince George, the Duke of Cambridge, broke apart due in large part to his lack of military training. However, the disciplined troops of the Grenadier and Coldstream Guards were able to reconstitute and demolish the charging Russians with steady fire.372

Cambridge, a member of the Royal Family, had been made a regimental commander at twenty three and, unsurprisingly, was a believer in the importance of social breeding rather than professional education as the bedrock of officership. His performance, while not disastrous as with Cardigan and Lucan, was not very good. He too apparently misunderstood orders from Raglan and hesitated in deploying his troops at Alma, leading to the problems in the advance of the 1st Division.373 As discussed more below, Cambridge would soon become longest serving Commander in Chief of the

371 See Woodham-Smith, pp. 1-47, 96-99, and 154-160 for biographical details of the three.
372 Woodham-Smith, pp. 185-186.
373 Woodham-Smith, p. 185.
British Army, so his performance and beliefs about military professionalism are highly relevant.

There were a few exceptions to the gentlemanly amateur stereotype. Perhaps the most outstanding was one of Cambridge’s brigade commanders, Sir Colin Campbell. Campbell was born a commoner and enlisted in the service of the Duke of York just before the Peninsula Campaign. He was outstanding in that war as well as the expedition against the Americans in 1814. A devoted student of military science, he would not become a regimental commander until his 40s; he would then go to the East where he commanded units in the First Opium War and the final Anglo-Sikh War. It was for excellence in this latter war that he was knighted in 1849.374

He proved to be an able officer commanding the Highland Brigade in the Crimean War, first at Alma and then later at Balaclava. In the latter battle his resolute defense in the face of a major Russian assault inspired the phrase “the thin red line.” Campbell was a careful, prepared commander as disciplined as his elite troops.375 Like Cambridge, he would be a major figure in the post-Crimean British Army.

The shortcomings of the British Army in the Crimean prompted an array of committees and commissions to review the organization of the Army and War Department. Three of these visited Sandhurst and, upon their recommendation, changes to improve the quality of the College were instituted. Most notably, a Staff College for more senior officers was created and competitive examinations for entry were put in

375 See Woodham-Smith, pp. 215-218. Campbell also provided good advice to Lucan in the early phase of the battle; see p. 213.
place for Sandhurst in 1858. This examination requirement initiated the links between Sandhurst and British public schools that would soon come to define the officer corps.

Even as these changes were being implemented, another dramatic conflict began for the British Army. In May 1857, Indian troops (known as sepoys) employed by the East India Company mutinied on a large scale over pay and perceived abuses, including to their religion. While small scale mutinies had taken place before, those in 1857 were of an entirely different scale. They were a profound shock to the British national psyche, which one author compares to the effect of the attack on Pearl Harbor or September 11, 2001.

Sir Colin Campbell was dispatched in July to command the British effort to quell the mutiny. Arriving in August, Campbell assembled the British Army and East India Company force, including those sepoys who had remained loyal. Campbell, with his usual care, then personally directed those forces against the captured city of Lucknow and, in November, successfully evacuated the city. Campbell then prepared to spend the rest of 1857 clearing and securing other regions, planning to return to recapture Lucknow the following year.

However, the Governor-General of India, Charles (Viscount) Canning, believed that leaving Lucknow to the mutineers “would show there was a viable alternative to British rule and thus encourage all those still fighting against it...” Campbell accepted that as head of government, Canning had the right to determine the direction of the campaign,

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376 Shepperd, pp. 60-61.
379 Heatcote, pp. 154-174.
and a new plan was devised to meet his wishes." Campbell spent the next few months gathering forces and prepared to move in February 1858. However, one of the key local allies of the British, the Gurkha ruler Jang Bahadur, was not yet ready. Campbell and Canning, fearing alienation of a vital ally, agreed to wait. 380

In March, Campbell began moving his troops into position, linking up with Jang Bahadur’s forces. Campbell began methodical clearing operations against Lucknow, by now heavily fortified by the mutineers. In just under three weeks, the city was back in British hands, though many mutineers managed to escape. Campbell was criticized by some for allowing enemy to get away, but he clearly seems to have believed that, having achieved the political objective he was directed to accomplish, it was foolish to risk the lives of his men further. His approach paid dividends, as in the entire operation pitting tens of thousands of men against entrenched defenders, Campbell only lost sixteen officers and 111 men killed. One historian declares this operation “one of the British Army’s greatest feats of arms.” 381

Campbell wanted to finish securing the province around Lucknow, but was directed by Canning to seize Rohilkhand, the last area still fully under mutineer control. Campbell again changed his plans without complaint and began another methodical advance. His caution, born of experience and study, caused some officers to term him “Sir Crawling Camel,” yet his approach time and again proved effective and efficient, as surprise attacks were repulsed and fortifications demolished without loss of British troops. 382

380 Heathcote, p. 174-175, quotation on p. 174.
382 Heathcote, pp. 192-198
In November 1858, the East India Company was dissolved by royal decree and all of its functions directly taken up by the British Crown. The decree also guaranteed amnesty for all rebels seeking it, except for those who had promoted the mutiny or murdered British civilians. By December of 1858, Campbell’s campaigning had driven the last mutineers to flee to Nepal. In January 1859, a group of rebel leaders approached Campbell seeking amnesty; he made a point to receive them with courtesy.\textsuperscript{383}

Campbell would return home in triumph, soon promoted to the rank of field marshal and made a baron; he received thanks from both Houses of Parliament and a generous pension for life. While he would retire the following year and then die in 1863, his India command set an example for a host of British officers who served under him, including thirteen of the twenty-seven non-royal field marshals (not including Campbell himself) appointed from 1862 to 1908. One of these in particular, Garnett Wolseley, a valiant captain during the campaign against the mutineers, would be of major importance to the subsequent professionalization of the officer corps.\textsuperscript{384}

As Campbell enjoyed his success, the dissolution of the East India Company was having a profound effect on the Army. All of the former Company units manned by Europeans were absorbed into the regular British Army. At the same time, the sepoy units were reduced in number and an “Indian Staff Corps” was created to provide British officers for the remaining native units. Even after the reduction in native units, there were still dozens of native regiments in need of officers. There was thus a dramatic expansion in the officer corps and overall size of the Army.\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{383} Heathcote, pp. 204-205.
\textsuperscript{384} Heathcote, pp. 211-213.
\textsuperscript{385} Heathcote, p. 212.
The impact of this expansion on Sandhurst, already seeking to modernize after the Crimean War, was dramatic. The College had only 178 cadets in 1853 but by 1859 plans were made to expand enrollment to 500; space constraints tempered this to 400. New construction began and the entire enterprise was revitalized; one historian calls it “the beginning of a new era.”

These two experiences, the Crimean War and the Sepoy Mutiny, are the formative experience or “first war” for the professional British Army. One additional event, which would prove important in later decades, closed out these dramatic formative years. A war scare with France in 1859 sparked the birth of the “Volunteer” Movement, which would produce a middle class and later working class vehicle for military aspirations. The Militia and Yeomanry, the other options for “citizen-soldiers,” at this point were moribund and moreover dominated by the same upper class elites that dominated the Regular Army. Volunteer units were initially derided as incapable but they created a bridge between the long-service professional soldiers (who enlisted for life) and the untrained mass of British citizenry.

Reform and the Regiments, 1860-1895

While the expansion of Sandhurst proceeded, the core of the Army remained unchanged (other than its expansion) immediately after the Crimean War and the Sepoy Mutiny. Most of the decade following the two events was passed in deadlock between advocates of the status quo and advocates of reform. The former were represented by the Queen’s cousin and now Commander in Chief of the British Army, the Duke of

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386 Shepperd pp. 59-61, quotation on p. 61.
Cambridge. Reformers, to the extent they had a champion, were represented by Major General Jonathan Peel, who served as Secretary of State for War in 1858-1859 and 1866-1867.388

Peel, younger brother of a former Prime Minister, also served on or appointed various Royal Commissions making recommendations for change after the Crimean War and Sepoy Mutiny. While many of the recommendations of these committees were accepted (such as the abolition of the East India Company), one of the most far-reaching, the abolition of purchase of commissions in the Army, was rejected. Peel, an advocate for all officers attending a military college, was unable to push this reform through the opposition of the current officers but he succeeded in laying some of the groundwork for his successor, Edward Cardwell, notably the establishment of a Reserve for the Army.389

Cardwell, who had been a confidante of his predecessor’s older brother, became Secretary of State for War in 1868. A brilliant and experienced politician, Cardwell was able to force many of the reforms Peel and others had been unable to implement. Together these reforms sought to make the British Army capable of fulfilling the twin aims of being able to intervene on the continent and police the empire. One of the lessons of the Crimean War was that continental intervention required more manpower than could effectively be maintained in the Regular Army. At the same time, the Regular Army needed to be able to function in far-flung locales, particularly the nearly one

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389 See Shepperd, p. 77 and Gallagher, p. 19. Note that Peel’s immediate successor in 1867, Sir John Pakington, accomplished little in the way of reform and was quickly supplanted by Cardwell in 1868.
million square miles of British India. All of this had to be accomplished without resort to conscription. 390

The Cardwell Reforms, as they are known, consisted of three central elements: the abolition of purchase for commissions, the localization and standardization of regiments, and the introduction of short-service for enlisted men. The abolition of the sale of commissions was the most contentious of these reforms and at the same time the most vital. Apart from increasing professionalism, the sale of commissions impeded virtually all of his other reforms. At stake was whether a regiment and its men were in effect the property of the regimental commander, who after all had paid for it, or were under the command of the state. 391

Cardwell knew abolition would be deeply unpopular, so he agreed to pay compensation to current officers and induced the Treasury to be rather generous with this compensation. However, after a sharp clash in Parliament, the centerpiece of his reforms, the Regulation of the Forces Bill, failed to pass the House of Lords. Cardwell, perhaps desperate, took the unusual step of asking the Queen to abolish the purchase system by royal warrant. As the entire system rested on earlier warrants this was a constitutional act and the Queen agreed to it. 392

At a stroke, Cardwell had disarmed much of the opposition and the Regulation of the Forces Bill was subsequently passed. The bill gave each regiment a territorial home county, where it would establish a training and recruiting depot. Regiments that did not previously have two regular battalions (many of the non-Guards regiments did not) would be amalgamated to produce regiments that did. This enabled one battalion to be serving

391 Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, pp. 307-308; Gallagher p. 20; and Shepperd, pp. 77-78.
abroad while another remained at home. These regular regiments were then linked to the Militia regiment of their home country, providing a reserve force. The Militia was also transferred fully from the control of the County Lord Lieutenants to the Crown; for all practical purposes it had become an element of the Army rather than an alternative. Cardwell was not fully and completely able to implement change for all regiments, but in 1881 then Secretary of War Hugh Childers completed this reorganization.393

The introduction of short service made Regular Army duty more attractive and also enabled the Reserve established by Peel, somewhat moribund, to be made effective. Infantry enlisted men were now able to choose between terms of service. A “lifer” could enlist for twenty-one years. A short-service enlistment could be either a full six years or three years followed by enlistment in the Reserve.394

In addition, Cardwell expanded on the post-Crimean War reorganization of the War Department. Most notably, the Commander in Chief of the Army, still the Duke of Cambridge, was formally made subordinate to the Secretary of War. This helped allay concerns about professionalization of the Army, for it was now clearly subordinate to Parliament. In practice, the Commander in Chief, still the conservative Duke of Cambridge, had considerable autonomy. Most notably, Cambridge blocked the formation of a British General Staff. Yet overall the concern that the Army would be used as a tool of the monarchy against Parliament or the people began to recede significantly.395

The Cardwell Reforms had a fundamental and indelible impact on the British Army and in particular the officer corps. First, the elimination of purchase required a

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393 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 306-307 and Miller, pp. 24-25.
394 Gallagher, p. 19.
new system not only of entrance into the Army but also of promotion. The method of entrance would be competitive examination. The method of promotion would be seniority within the regiment, tempered by merit. This system therefore placed the career of all officers in the hands of two institutions: Sandhurst (or Woolwich) and the regiment.

Sandhurst, a neglected orphan in 1853, would be central to the British officer corps a little more than two decades later. With the establishment of competitive examinations for commissions in 1871, Sandhurst shifted its instruction to preparing students for the examination. The initial system introduced in 1871 had all newly appointed officers become sub-lieutenants, who would take their examination after a probationary period; however, this proved sub-optimal from a budgetary and effectiveness standpoint.396

Under Cardwell’s successor Gathorne Hardy, the War Office took control of Sandhurst. In order to rectify the initial problems of the new system for granting commissions, Sandhurst would in 1877 become the training ground for all Regular Army officers not entering the artillery or engineers. Prospective officers would enter Sandhurst as cadets and then leave for the regiments as lieutenants. The same system was in place at Woolwich for those seeking entrance to the artillery or engineers.397

The barriers to entry for Sandhurst and Woolwich were high. After passing an initial examination at fifteen or sixteen while still at school, the prospective officer then had to pass the Army Entrance Examination. This examination was intense and geared towards testing that the officer candidate had a good general education, so that he could then be schooled in purely military affairs at Sandhurst or Woolwich. Subjects included

396 Shepperd, pp. 77-79.
397 Shepperd, pp. 81-83.
mathematics, history, Latin, and the like; in essence, those things covered by a good public school education at the time.\textsuperscript{398}

Competition was so fierce that so-called “cram schools” were often used to supplement public school education (though many public schools had “modern” or “Army” courses of study to prepare for the exam). Notes on Sandhurst cadets in 1885 showed that while 85% of cadets had been to public school, 79% had also gone to cram school. This was driven in large part by the fierce competition for cadet slots; from 1876 to 1882 less than one in four taking the examination was given a place at Sandhurst; Woolwich was scarcely less competitive. Achieving entry as an infantry or cavalry cadet was even more challenging. After attending a cram school Winston Churchill passed on his third try as 95\textsuperscript{th} out of 389 and still missed the infantry list (he made it on when a few candidates ahead of him did not take their places).\textsuperscript{399}

Public school, cram school, and even Sandhurst all cost money (though Sandhurst had provisions for adjusting fees, particularly for orphans) so, though outright purchase had been eliminated, family money was still a clear requirement for those seeking to become officers. However, by harnessing the monetary requirement to an education requirement, the reforms of the 1870s ensured that officers would be capable as well as wealthy. This provided an opening to the sons of the wealthy middle class, attracted to the lifestyle and social standing of officership; from 1870 to 1890 the percentage of Sandhurst candidates from the middle class rose from 10% to 37%.\textsuperscript{400}

\textsuperscript{398} Shepperd, pp. 91-92.


The Sandhurst course in this period varied in length from six months (during crises in Egypt) to eighteen months. Students studied tactics, fortification, map-reading, military law and regimental administration, reconnaissance, drill, and riding. Each was thus well-prepared to lead a small unit of men in battle.\textsuperscript{401}

Sandhurst and its intensely competitive examinations were crucial to creating a common culture in the British officer corps, yet as soon as they left the College the new officers entered new and highly individual institutions: the regiments. The process of joining a regiment is not like that in many other armies, where the top students are given a choice of branch and then assigned to a unit. Instead, regiments with vacancies look for candidates that they believe will fit the regimental culture. In many cases, they choose individuals who already have some tie to the regiment, such as being from its territory or having a family member who served in the regiment.\textsuperscript{402}

After the Cardwell Reforms, promotion was within the regiment by seniority, tempered by merit. In practice, this meant that once an officer entered the regiment, he would in most cases be part of it until he retired or was promoted above the rank of colonel. His promotion was thus in the hands of his fellow regimental officers, who could block his advancement regardless of his seniority if he was deemed unsuitable. The new lieutenant, already selected because he was believed to match the regiment’s culture, had every incentive to further assimilate. Regular service in India, where regimental officers formed a small and tight knit social cadre, further strengthened

\textsuperscript{402} See Keegan, pp. 4-7 and Downes, pp. 55-56.
regimental culture. The result was that the British regiment is routinely compared to a family due to the strength of the ties.\textsuperscript{403}  

Many of the various elements of regimental culture are, from the standpoint of doctrine and operations, irrelevant. For example, the Grenadier, Welsh, and Coldstream Guards do not rise when they drink the Loyal Toast to the Queen, because they believe their loyalty is above reproach. In virtually all other regiments this would be seen as an impertinence bordering on insubordination. These units are unsurprisingly the province of graduates of the elite public schools and their officers are exceedingly certain of their social standing. The Royal Green Jackets in contrast were equally elite but its officers are less interested in social standing than “intellectual dexterity.”\textsuperscript{404}  

However, the centrality of the regiment to the British officer corps along with the importance of Sanhurst provides excellent indicators of the managerial culture of the British Army. Officers were trained at Sandhurst to lead small units and then spent their entire careers in regiments, which in turn often operated as battalions on the frontiers of Empire. Larger units, such as brigades and divisions, were rarely used in the field.  

The strategic culture of the officer corps was oriented towards cooperation with other organizations, principally the civilian colonial administrators, the natives of the colonies, and other military organizations. The importance of the civilian partners was always taken for granted; as noted Sir Colin Campbell never questioned the importance of political issues in overall strategy. Civilian officials would sometimes even accompany the Army on expeditions as political officers.\textsuperscript{405} Conversely, senior British


\textsuperscript{404} Barker, pp. 101 and 104.  

\textsuperscript{405} For example the expedition to Sikkim in 1861; see Alistair Lamb, \textit{British India and Tibet, 1766-1910}
officers would often be named as colonial administrators so officers had to be comfortable in that role. Moreover, both army and civil service recruited heavily from same public schools, meaning officer and civilian often had similar early life experiences and outlook, making cooperation easier.

Similarly, cooperation with indigenous forces was of paramount importance. Sir Colin Campbell’s experience in the Sepoy Mutiny, where managing relations with the Gurkha ruler Jang Bahadur was crucial, would provide a lasting example of how to get along with the sometimes fractious princes of India, who were signatories of treaties with the Crown rather than mere subjects. Many British officers also served in the Indian Staff Corps, providing leadership to indigenous Indian units (generally these officers had served in a British regiment before being sent to a native unit). After the creation of the Indian Police Service in 1860, the police were an important partner as well; indeed, until 1893 British Army officers would be seconded to the Indian Police Service to provide senior officers.

Other military organizations included both the Royal Navy and the armies of the continent. The Navy was always going to be the means by which the Army arrived at the battlefield, as the Crimean War demonstrated, so even if the two services did not always agree, Army officers nonetheless were required to know how to work with the Navy. Equally important were relations with allied armies on the continent, also demonstrated in the Crimean War, where the French actually provided the bulk of troops.

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(London: Routledge, 1986), pp. 79-87
406 Barker, pp. 29 and 45-47.
The Army was highly active in its imperial policing role throughout this period. From 1860-1895, the Army launched more than forty campaigns from Canada to New Zealand. Some of these were as brief and uneventful as the Red River Expedition led by Colonel Garnet Wolseley in 1870. This expedition put down rebellion in western Canada without firing a shot. Others were larger and of longer duration; the conquest and pacification of Burma by General Frederick Roberts lasted from 1885 to 1892 (or 1896 depending on when one dates all resistance over).

Wolseley and Roberts, veterans of Campbell’s campaign in the Sepoy Mutiny, were national heroes in this age and had a profound effect on the Army. Wolseley, who earned the nickname “our only general,” was Cardwell’s principal military advisor and one of the most vocal advocates of army reform. Roberts, soon known as “our only other general,” was anti-Cardwell, believing short service and the linked battalions were ineffective for empire.

Moreover, the two officers represented different strategic outlooks towards empire. Roberts, who served primarily in India, was a strong supporter in basing the bulk of the Army forward on the subcontinent. Wolseley, in contrast, primarily led expeditions to Africa and believed the Army should be based principally in Britain and sent forth as needed. Given their differences, it is unsurprising that the two men did not care for one another.

412 Strachan, pp. 96-97. Roberts’ autobiography, *Forty-One Years in India* (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1896) is indicative of both his length of service and attitude towards India.
Both men had groups of associated officers (the Wolseley Ring and the Roberts Ring) that were both protégés and trusted staff. Together, the two Rings dominated the course of the British Army during the period 1875-1895. For most of this period, Wolseley Ring dominated, by virtue of Wolseley’s presence in the War Office while Roberts was in distant India.\textsuperscript{413}

Whatever their differences, both men nonetheless represented the emerging culture of the British Army. Both worked closely with various politicians and colonial officials in addition to serving stints as colonial administrators themselves. Both cooperated with indigenous rulers and commanded local troops, Wolseley raising them during his 1873 Ashanti campaign while Roberts’ entire career was spent commanding or working with indigenous troops in India.\textsuperscript{414}

Finally, in 1895 the champion of the old order, the Duke of Cambridge, left the post of Commander in Chief of the Army after nearly forty years. He was replaced by Wolseley, who was reaching the end of his long career. However, the powers of the Commander in Chief, zealously guarded by Cambridge, were at last reduced. A War Office Council and an Army Board were established and Wolseley began to act as a chief of staff; in effect a proto-general staff had been created.\textsuperscript{415} The last barriers to full professionalization were gone just in time for a major war.

\textsuperscript{413} Strachan, pp. 102-103.
\textsuperscript{414} On Wolseley in the Ashanti campaign, see John Keegan, “The Ashanti Campaign, 1873-1874,” in Bond, ed. Roberts began his career in the East India Company’s Army and his first assignment was to an indigenous artillery battery; see Roberts, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{415} Harold E. Raugh, \textit{The Victorians at War, 1815-1914} (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2004), pp. 105-106.
Empire, Continent, and Reform, 1896-1914

In 1896, Wolseley made an attempt to estimate the needs of the Army for Empire. It seemed clear to him that the Army was well short of the size needed to effectively maintain the Empire and further that one of the major causes of this was the commitment to India. Despite the cost, Wolseley was able to obtain an increase in the size of the Army, but the problem of policing the Empire with an all-volunteer force without bankrupting the country proved intractable. At the end of 1898, Wolseley noted that the expansion of the Regular Army meant in effect that the bottom of the barrel was being scraped for enlisted men. He wrote of the current recruits “over one third are below even the low physical standard laid down for recruits. In fact at this moment over one half of the Home army are unfit to carry a pack or do a week’s—I might perhaps say a day’s—hard work in the field.” 416 It was this Army that would be called on to fight in 1899 in South Africa against an enemy that was well-organized and equipped with modern weapons.

Disputes between the British around the Cape and the descendants of Dutch colonists, known as Boers, had originated in the early nineteenth century but until 1880 had been non-violent. In that year, British attempts to exert control over the newly declared Boer republics led to war. The Boers were not the usual colonial enemy; hardy pioneers armed with rifles and suffused with nationalism, they proved superior to the British forces sent against them, defeating them in a series of battles culminating at Majuba Hill. Rather than commit more scarce resources, Parliament sued for peace though the dispute was not truly resolved. 417

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416 Kochanski, pp. 218-223, quotation of p. 223.
417 Raugh, pp. 49-50.
In 1899, following several tense years after an 1895 attempt sponsored by British magnates Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit to provoke an uprising among British settlers in the Boer-dominated Transvaal, the British once again went to war with the Boers. An expeditionary force of Regular Army troops under General Redvers Buller (a member of the Wolseley Ring, though he had recently had a falling out with Wolseley) was dispatched to join forces already in South Africa. Expectations were for a fairly short war, as the Boers lacked a regularly constituted professional army, instead relying on militia formations, known as commandos, which elected their own officers.418

This expectation proved wrong and from the beginning of the war the Boers proved a tough opponent. At the Battle of Talana Hill/Glencoe in October 1899, the British forced a Boer retreat but took heavy casualties; the Boers were highly effective with their magazine loading Mauser rifles. Tellingly, the British suffered significant casualties in the officer corps, including senior officers, as leading from the front was a major part of the managerial culture. A lieutenant-general and three lieutenant colonels were among those killed at the battle.419

After a major British victory of Elandslaagte, the Boers regrouped and moved against the city of Ladysmith. British forces stationed there were defeated and the city besieged at the end of October. The hopes of a short war were fading but not gone, as the Regular Army expeditionary force had just arrived.420

Following the arrival of General Buller and his forces, the British prepared to go on the offensive. Unfortunately, the subsequent offensives were near-disasters. In the

418 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Cardinal, 1991 [originally published 1979]) pp. 1-9, 94-97, and 105. Bullers, who actually knew Boers, was one of the few British who expected the war to be difficult.
419 Pakenham, pp. 125-132.
420 Pakenham, pp. 133-159.
"Black Week" of December 10 to 15 the British suffered defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso. This latter battle was marked by several batteries of British artillery being pushed too far forward without screening, where they were demolished by Boer rifle fire.421

Rightly or wrongly, Buller was blamed for these failures and Field Marshal Frederick Roberts was dispatched to take overall command of British forces. The Army has now fully dominated by veterans of the Sepoy Mutiny, with Wolseley Commander in Chief and Roberts commanding the major field army. Buller would still command a significant portion of British forces (in Natal), and Roberts brought with him as chief of staff a new national hero, Herbert Kitchener, who had made his career around the Mediterranean and in Egypt.422

The disaster of Black Week also prompted the British government to mobilize the Reserves and auxiliary forces. The latter was done on a strictly voluntary basis, as none of the auxiliary could be compelled to serve overseas. Fortunately, Black Week had stoked British nationalism, so there was no shortage of volunteers. Over the course of the rest of the war, 75,000 men from the Militia would transfer into the Regular Army, while another 45,000 would serve while still in the Militia. More than 50,000 additional men would serve against the Boers in either the Yeomanry or the Volunteers. This was the first major mobilization of citizen-soldiers for overseas conflict, and would have important consequences after the war.423

The first of these reinforcements began arriving in early 1900 and, combined with adjustments in British tactics, the tide of the conventional war quickly began to turn.

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421 Pakenham, pp. 201-241.
422 Pakenham, pp. 241-244.
423 Miller, pp. 55-62.
Advances by the British seized Bloemfontein, capital of the Boer Orange Free State, in March. The capital of the Transvaal, Pretoria, surrendered in June and by November the British had defeated the Boer forces in a series of pitched battles. Victory seemed at hand, so Buller and Roberts both returned to England, leaving Kitchener in command.  

However, this predicted victory was ephemeral as the Boers turned from conventional battle to guerrilla war. This was the first time the British Army had encountered such effective opposition; in most previous colonial campaigns a number of set-piece battles and the seizure of key cities would suffice to force a negotiated settlement. This had eventually been the resolution of the Sepoy Mutiny and Roberts’ march against Kandahar. Even in cases where lengthier pacification was required, as in Burma, the difference in discipline and armaments meant engagements were almost always won easily by the British and major resistance was quickly broken.

Moreover, the British punitive response, a common colonial technique, was counterproductive. Beginning in late 1900, the British under Roberts began burning farms to deprive the Boers of supplies and punish the families of recalcitrant commandos. Looting was also allowed if not actively encouraged. This served to strengthen the Boers resolve rather than forcing them to sue for peace. Bullers, in contrast to Roberts, forbid his troops to conduct burning and looting.

Kitchener continued Roberts’ policy, but also sought a generous and early negotiated settlement including amnesty for the commandos. In contrast, Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner of the Cape Colony and now responsible for the occupied Boer

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426 Pakenham, pp. 440-441, 452-453 and 473. Buller had worked with the Boers and knew many personally, in contrast to both Roberts and Kitchener.
territory, wanted to avoid burning the Boer farms but also wanted a maximalist settlement to incorporate the Boer republics into the Empire. This split, combined with continued intransigence from many Boer leaders, led to a collapse of peace negotiations in early 1901.\footnote{Pakend, pp. 484-500.}

Milner and Kitchener continued to disagree about an acceptable end to the war, but otherwise worked together reasonably well throughout 1901. Milner was responsible for the administration of territory cleared and “protected” by Kitchener’s forces (principally the cities). The solution to the problem of guerrilla war was consonant with the emerging British Army culture, particularly in reliance on local allies and civilian administrators. As Pakenham notes of the winning methods “The new policy was Milner’s, the new weapons were Kitchener’s.”\footnote{Pakenham, pp. 534-536, quotation on p. 536.} However, the strength of Boer nationalism was such that this approach also required tens of thousands of British troops.

Kitchener’s strategy first divided territory into sections by the use of fortified blockhouses, barbed wire, and railroads. He then used mobile columns to clear each of these sections, including destroying food supplies for the commandos. Initially, Kitchener began to relocate the civilian population of Boers in these areas to early concentration camps. However, this policy was later abandoned after an outcry from civilians, including the British public. The destruction of food supplies, however, meant that life was soon worse for Boers (mostly women and children) left on the veldt.\footnote{Pakenham, pp. 493-502 and 536-548}

Kitchener made extensive use of local allies, both white and black. The whites were Boers known as National Scouts. Blacks served extensively as labor but also provide a substantial portion of Kitchener’s troops. Most importantly, as historian
Thomas Pakenham notes “... it was these Africans who were the main source of each column’s intelligence.”

It was ultimately this last aspect of Kitchener’s strategy, the use of blacks, which proved decisive in bringing the Boers to the negotiating table again. Pakenham notes that Kitchener’s arming of the blacks “… struck terror into the Boers.” As the war went on, blacks in the Transvaal, previously oppressed by the Boers, began to rise up. Most notably, in May 1902, Zulus seeking revenge for recent Boer attacks (motivated by Zulu cooperation with the British) launched a reprisal raid on Boers. Ominously for the Boers, “…the women and children in this district had not been molested, but the Zulus had been restrained with difficulty.”

The Boers, though in dire straits, were not military broken at this point; indeed in February and March 1902 the commandos scored their biggest successes. They dealt a smashing defeat to a column of over a thousand men and forced the surrender of a British general. Kitchener almost collapsed when he received this news. Further, there were over 20,000 commandos left at large at this point. Kitchener was desperate to be done with the war. He felt the continued conflict was wrecking the Army and the Empire.

Fortunately for the British Army, the Boer commandos had grim visions of the future that brought them back to peace talks. Kitchener’s blockhouses and sweeps were having an effect. More importantly, the suffering of Boer women and children on the veldt, combined with their vulnerability to black Africans, and a worry that more and more fellow Boers were joining the British cause made continued fighting seem hopeless.

430 Pakenham, pp. 542, 547-548, and 571, quotation on p. 548.
431 Pakenham, p. 548.
432 Pakenham, pp. 566-567, quotation on p. 567.
434 Pakenham, pp. 561 and 571.
The British were now willing to accept less and offer more (including reconstruction money) for peace, so at the end of May 1902 the war was brought to a close.\footnote{435 Pakenham, pp. 563-571.}

The war had been extraordinarily difficult for the British Army. In both men and money, it had been expensive. Moreover, its duration and scale showed the limitations of the Regular Army, particularly when it was confronted with well-armed nationalists. This gave a strong impetus to additional reforms that, when completed, would solidify British Army professionalism.

The assessments from the war were that there were still problems with both the enlisted and officer corps. With the enlisted, the problem remained that only those with virtually no other option, meaning the least developed citizens physically and mentally, signed up for the Regular Army. The various auxiliary units, such as the Militia and Yeomanry, were generally of better quality.\footnote{436 Miller, pp. 58-59 and Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, pp. 342-343.} However, these units often lacked discipline that had been drilled into the regulars; indeed, the embarrassing defeat in March 1902 that almost broke Kitchener’s nerve resulted from the scattering of newly recruited Yeomanry.\footnote{437 Raugh, p. 231.}

With the officer corps, the critique leveled by an investigating committee was that, however competitive entry to Sandhurst was, once a cadet was there he had minimal incentive to work hard. The curriculum itself needed to focus even more on practical exercises. For example, only sixty hours in the course were devoted to tactics, half of which were indoors, and the subject only represented only a little more than 10% of the
final examination (the “passing out” exam). The exam itself, like promotion exams, was judged far too easy. Better qualified instructors were needed as well.\textsuperscript{438}

Finally, at an overall level, it was apparent that however much the reforms of 1860-1896 had prepared the Army for policing the empire it had failed in readying it for larger scale war as would be required in a continental intervention. Both the higher level command and management functions and the size of the force were insufficient. War scares with Germany, with its massive army, underscored the inadequacy of current arrangements. This argued for further changes in the upper ranks of the Army.\textsuperscript{439}

With remarkable speed, given its previous glacial pace, Parliament and the British Army effected changes to address (if not entirely solve) these shortcomings. For the enlisted man, Parliament acted to provide better education for the poor (the 1902 “Balfour” Education Act), better nutrition and medical care for these young students (1906 and 1907 Acts), and better physical fitness training for these potential soldiers (the 1902 Model Course and subsequent revisions). While it would be an overstatement to argue that all of these progressive acts were purely military, they were at the time explicitly tied to national defense and the problems of the Regular Army enlisted.\textsuperscript{440}

For the higher level military functions, the office of Commander in Chief was abolished in 1904 (to the chagrin of the current office holder, the venerable Field Marshal Roberts, who replaced Wolseley in 1900). It was replaced by a General Staff headed by a Chief of Staff. An Army Council was created to handle issues of higher policy but final

\textsuperscript{438} Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 342-343 and Shepperd, pp. 101-104.

\textsuperscript{439} Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 355-359.

recommendations were to be made by the Secretary of State for War. The Chief of Staff would gain an expanded sphere of influence to offer guidance to the forces in the Dominions and India in 1909 when the position was renamed Chief of the Imperial General Staff.441

These early actions post-war were soon supplemented by a set of actions taken by the Liberal Secretary of War Richard Haldane, who took office at the end of 1905. He was most concerned with efficiency in the Army, but only scarcely less with efficacy. The Haldane Reforms explicitly set out to increase the Army's ability to act in coalition with allied powers on the continent.442

His first reform was to prepare an expeditionary force for the continent that would be organized in peacetime. This called for six ready divisions and corps headquarters. All of these were established with an Army Order on January 1, 1907, with the first corps based at Aldershot. These divisions, however, would be built up from the existing regiments (though to save money Haldane disbanded some battalions) so the essence of the Cardwell system was preserved.443

This expeditionary force would need reinforcement and replacements yet with conscription still out of the question Haldane had to rely on volunteers. He therefore sought to reform the existing auxiliary units. After political wrangling, the Militia was converted into the Special Reserve, explicitly under the War Department and part of the

442 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 363-364.
Army, ending the already tenuous distinction between the Regular Army, the Reserve, and the Militia.\footnote{444}{Dennis, pp. 8-12.}

The Yeomanry and Volunteers were amalgamated into a new Territorial Force. Ostensibly this was to defend the homeland while the Regular Army and Special Reserve went to the continent but it is clear that Haldane believed that if war broke out the Territorials would volunteer for overseas duty. The Territorials would therefore be constituted into fourteen divisions, which could be mobilized and sent fairly quickly to support the six Regular Army divisions on the continent.\footnote{445}{Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, pp. 364-366 and Dennis, pp. 13-17.}

The Reserves and Territorials would need someone to train them, and they would need officers as well. The solution to the first was to produce more Regular Army officers, and so the goal became to increase the output from Sandhurst while improving the curriculum. This was quickly done, with Sandhurst seeking to train 650 cadets every eighteen months, dispatching some to Woolwich for lodging. Though the goal of 650 was not reached for budgetary reasons, 420 cadets were at Sandhurst in 1912.\footnote{446}{Shepperd, pp. 104-113.}

By 1907, Sandhurst’s curriculum was much more focused on practical exercises under modern conditions. The tactics course was extended and signaling courses were made mandatory. By 1912, the end of term exams had become substantially more difficult, with some cadets held back for poor performance.\footnote{447}{Shepperd, pp. 109 and 113.}

In addition to requiring more Regular Army officers, the Reserve and Territorials needed their own officers. This led to the formation of the Officer Training Corps at public schools and universities. This Corps, a part of the War Department that

\footnote{444}{Dennis, pp. 8-12.}
\footnote{445}{Barnett, \textit{Britain and Her Army}, pp. 364-366 and Dennis, pp. 13-17.}
\footnote{446}{Shepperd, pp. 104-113.}
\footnote{447}{Shepperd, pp. 109 and 113.}
incorporated previous voluntary organizations, would essentially provide initial military training while students were still in school. Those successfully completing the course and passing an exam would receive a certificate that would reduce the training time required to become an officer in the Reserve (which could be done without having to join the Regular Army) or exempt the holder from all or part of the examinations for becoming a Territorial officer.\textsuperscript{448}

Additionally, the certificate would grant the holder “bonus” points should he choose to take the entrance exam to Sandhurst or Woolwich. This served to strengthen the link between the public schools and the Regular Army, as it gave a substantial boost to the chances of passing the rigorous exam. The public schools embraced the new Corps enthusiastically and by April 1911 there were contingents at 153 schools, as well as 20 universities.\textsuperscript{449}

The combination of the major Cardwell and Haldane Reforms along with other more minor reforms over the fifty years from 1860 to 1910 had at last made an Army well positioned to carry out the twin maritime power imperatives of coalition warfare on the continent and imperial policing. Moreover, the Army was no longer viewed with suspicion by any but the most ardent pacifists. The British Army was in 1914 almost exactly what both the officer corps and its civilian masters wanted it to be: professional, efficient, and voluntary. The culture of the British Army was essentially set. Unfortunately, this proved to be suboptimal for the coming conflict, which was of a scale that made the Boer War seem a mere skirmish.

\textsuperscript{448} Ian Worthington, “Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officers Training Corps,” \textit{Military Affairs} v.43 n.2 (April 1979).
\textsuperscript{449} Worthington, pp. 92-94.
War and the Decline of Empire, 1914-1947

The outbreak of World War I should have been a high point for the British Army. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that went to the continent in August 1914 “was the best equipped, organized and prepared army that Britain had ever sent abroad at the beginning of a war.” The effectiveness of the Regular Army and its Reserves was proved at the Battle of Mons on August 23 when slightly more than nine British battalions held off four German divisions.

However, this victory was followed by a retreat as the BEF commanders realized that their four divisions (two more were initially held in Britain against a possible invasion) were in the path of the strong right wing of the Schlieffen Plan. They, and the French, were being overwhelmed by the sheer mass and firepower of the German 1st Army. After a long retreat the BEF would contribute to the “Miracle of the Marne,” turning back the Germans.

By the end of 1914, after a series of fierce battles, the stalemate on the Western Front was complete. Barbed wire and trenches ran from the Belgian coast to the Swiss frontier and the combatants began to realize this would be a long war fought by armies of a previously unimagined scale. The previously envisioned continental commitment of six Regular and fourteen Territorial divisions would be little more than a drop in the bucket.

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450 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 372.
452 Terraine, pp. 99-199.
453 There is an immense historiography on the war; for an overview see Michael Howard, The First World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
The remainder of the war saw the British improvise a mass army, finally resorting to conscription. A war economy was created to provide for this army and industry began to produce the weapons to arm it. This took time and Fortunately the French were able to provide most of the manpower for holding the front while this new force was generated. The Indian Army made a substantial contribution to the British effort, in both peripheral theaters like the Middle East and, for the first year of the war, the Western Front.

The British Army, like all the combatants, was forced to formulate new tactics to cope with the challenge of mass armies and industrial war. It would do so over time as the information environment became increasingly unambiguous. Frontal assault and massive, lengthy artillery bombardment did little, as the Battle of the Somme illustrated in 1916. Yet the Army learned from these expensive failures. By 1918, the British had developed infiltration tactics, artillery orchestration, and a host of other techniques to deal with the challenges of the Western Front. These tactics were similar, though not totally identical, to those developed by the Germans in response to the same environment.

The experience of industrial warfare made little lasting impact on the British Army. After the war, the officer corps returned “to the life of the regiment, to small wars in hot places and police duties in India and Ireland, and even in the unhappy industrial

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areas of Britain." Sandhurst and Woolwich "were busy ‘getting back to normal.’ Their role was unaltered; their establishments were much the same as at the outbreak of hostilities..." The Territorial Force was reconstituted as the Territorial Army after the war, but its function remained the same though it was also given a role in keeping civil order.

Twenty years after the end of World War I, the Army was again called on to provide a contingent to support continental allies. The experience was similar to that of the earlier war, with the conversion of much of the economy to the war effort and mobilization of the population on a massive scale. The armament, particularly aircraft and tanks, were new and so again new tactics needed to be developed, but as in the previous war the unambiguous information environment of total war led to convergence in doctrine and operations across combatants during the war. However, the British Army was slower to adapt to the challenges of this environment than armies culturally better suited to this type of war.

As with World War I, World War II had minimal lasting impact on the culture of the British Army. However, after the war three major events did lead to peripheral change. The first was the consolidation of Woolwich and Sandhurst, with Woolwich closing and Sandhurst being renamed the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The new Academy opened in 1947 and, though its exact course would change several times over

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458 Shepperd, p. 130.
459 Dennis, pp. 38-85.
the next forty-five years, its focus would remain on preparing junior officers.\textsuperscript{461} As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the links between Sandhurst and public schools, as well as the importance of individual regiments, would remain strong in the post World War II era. As of 1992, the Commissioning Course for almost all Regular Army officers (including women) was consolidated at Sandhurst, with a length of 44 weeks.\textsuperscript{462}

The Army did have a brief experience with peacetime conscription after World War II. From 1947 to 1960, Britain had a National Service system which made all eighteen year old men liable for military service in the Regular Army for up to two years followed by four in the Reserves. Regular Army recruitment continued during this period and the two types of enlisted men were often mixed together. However, this aberration had little effect on the Army.\textsuperscript{463}

The Indian Army came to an end in 1947 as well, with the independence and partition of India. Four regiments of Nepalese Gurkhas were transferred from the Indian Army to the British Army, while all other units were transferred to either Pakistan or India. This removed the largest force where British Army officers led indigenous troops. However, the British Army continued to work with a variety of other local forces throughout the remainder of empire.\textsuperscript{464}

\textsuperscript{461} Shepperd, pp. 158-160.
\textsuperscript{462} Certain specialists such as doctors and chaplains take an abbreviated course; these officers are explicitly second class citizens and the course is accordingly nicknamed the “Vicars and Tarts” course. Territorial Army officers also take an abbreviated course at Sandhurst. See http://www.sandhurst.mod.uk/courses/commissioning.htm (accessed June 11, 2009).
The Special Air Service: An Elite Regiment (But Still a Regiment)

During World War II, the need for high risk raids and other special missions led to the creation of Commando units in 1940. These units transformed into several other special operations units, most notably the Special Air Service (SAS). The SAS, which eventually comprised several regiments, served in North Africa, Italy, and France performing a variety of missions including raids, partnering with local partisans, and reconnaissance.\footnote{Gavin Mortimer, *Stirling's Men: The Inside History of the SAS in World War II* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004).}

The unit was briefly disbanded after the war, but was then reconstituted as a Territorial Regiment, the 21\textsuperscript{st} Special Air Service Regiment (Artists Rifles). This regiment combined the war time SAS with a long standing volunteer unit. In 1952, 21 SAS was used as the genesis for a new Regular Army SAS regiment, the 22\textsuperscript{nd}, though 21 SAS continued in existence as a Territorial unit.\footnote{Anthony Kemp, *The SAS: The Savage Wars of Peace, 1947 to the Present* (London: J. Murray, 1994).}

Unlike U.S. Army Special Forces, the SAS does not constitute a “counter” subculture in the British Army. Its officers are all Sandhurst graduates, often come from public schools, and have served in other regiments. Rotation between 22 SAS and other Regular Army regiments is encouraged (sometimes mandated) and former SAS officers frequently serve in senior general officer positions. For example, in 2002-2003 after a career that included several SAS commands, Lieutenant General Cedric Delves served as senior British liaison to U.S. Central Command; Commander, Field Army (the most senior operational Army command overseeing both Regular Army divisions); and
Commander in Chief, NATO Headquarters Armed Forces North. Delves might have achieved further promotion were it not for a medical discharge.467

The SAS thus illustrates the importance of culture over function for at least certain types of intra-service relations. U.S. Army Special Forces and the SAS perform similar functions yet have very different relations to their respective armies. Special Forces relations with the U.S. Army are at best distant, while the SAS is an integral and accepted regiment within the British Army.

Conclusion

The British Army culture that emerged in the decades after the Crimean War and the Sepoy Mutiny was, not surprisingly, optimized for imperial policing and coalition warfare. The professionalizing Army officer corps, built around education at Sandhurst, while not well prepared for total war, was highly capable working with civilians and natives abroad. The Special Air Service, unlike the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, was well integrated into the broader British Army culture. In the 1950s, the Army would face the challenge of counterinsurgency and it would be in Kenya that this challenge would emerge most powerfully.


This chapter details the response of two and a half “armies” to the challenge of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam over the course of eleven years. Those three organizations are the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army’s nascent Special Forces subculture. It provides evidence on the written doctrine of the organizations and, most critically, the operations conducted by those organizations.

U.S. involvement in South Vietnam actually begins in 1954, with the end of the war between the French and the nationalist Viet Minh. The country was divided into a communist North and a non-communist South. For the remainder of the 1950s the U.S. supported the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in the south. Diem, an authoritarian Catholic in a majority Buddhist country, took no part in the resistance movement to the Japanese and then French. He therefore provoked considerable resistance from both communist and non-communists alike. However, the North Vietnamese leadership, busy trying to establish a functioning state and hoping for peaceful reunification, counseled patience to those agitating against Diem in the south. There was thus no real insurgency against the South Vietnamese government for most of the 1950s (though the country was not tranquil either).

By 1960, however, the southerners, undergoing extensive and brutal repression at the hands of Diem, felt they had no choice but to begin armed resistance. The government in the north had also lost hope in peaceful reunification and at the same time felt secure enough domestically to take action. Cadres who had relocated to the north in
1954 returned south to link up with those who had stayed behind and an insurgency began.

The real challenge of counterinsurgency in Vietnam therefore dates to about 1960. The involvement of U.S. ground troops and the insurgency itself both dwindle to almost nothing by the end of 1971 (the insurgent threat principally replaced by conventional North Vietnamese forces). These years therefore set the boundaries for examination and can be broken into three periods or observations. The first period is 1960-early 1965, years in which officers from each of the three organizations served as advisors to the South Vietnamese forces conducting counterinsurgency. The second period is 1965-early 1968, the period in which U.S. combat forces are introduced to Vietnam through the massive Tet Offensive of 1968. The third period is 1968-1971, the period in which U.S. forces responded to Tet and the realization that the fabled “light at the end of the tunnel” might be an oncoming train.

By comparing the organizational responses side by side in these three time periods, the external environment can be held relatively constant. This increases confidence that any variation in response is due to differences in the organizations. Moreover, the duration of the involvement of these organizations casts doubt on simple alternative explanations such as organizational inertia or “lag.” If significant differences persist in these organizations’ operations after more than ten years of total involvement in counterinsurgency in Vietnam and more than five years of U.S. troops fighting and dying (this latter time exceeding the length of World War II), something more than mere inertia must be at work.
In addition to this broad comparison across three time periods, the next chapter details a natural experiment from the period 1966-1968, where U.S. Army units replace Marine units in the north of South Vietnam. By comparing operations conducted by the two services in a single province additional granularity on variation in operations can be gained, along with further confidence that environmental differences cannot explain variation. This chapter concludes with a microlevel comparison of the experience of two villages in this province.

Counterinsurgency and the Gathering Storm over Vietnam, 1960-1965

With the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, COIN became one of the foremost concerns of the U.S. government. Kennedy believed that insurgency intended to undermine governments friendly to the United States were a major threat to national security. Within a year of taking office, he formed an interagency Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to study the problem. This group, which included the Departments of Defense and State as well as the CIA, produced an overall counterinsurgency doctrine (also called “overseas internal defense”) that would be embodied in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 182 in August 1962.\(^{468}\)

Even before Kennedy’s election, the challenge of insurgency erupted in South Vietnam. Beginning with the first “Tet Offensive” in January 1960, insurgents overran a regimental headquarters, capturing weapons and inflicting humiliating losses on Diem’s forces.\(^{469}\) Other insurgent units assassinated South Vietnamese officials throughout the


country in early 1960.\textsuperscript{470} By January of 1961, when the Kennedy administration took office, both Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence from South Vietnam was gloomy, indicating a rapidly increasing insurgent threat.\textsuperscript{471}

The ideas embodied in NSAM 182 would provide the overarching framework within which early COIN doctrine would develop in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{472} These ideas, influenced by prominent academics and think tanks like the RAND Corporation, focused on the central role of the population and its grievances towards the government. In defining insurgency and the appropriate targets for countering it, NSAM 182 noted:

\begin{quote}
Insurgency is grounded in the allegiances and attitudes of the people. Its origins are domestic, and its support must remain so. The causes of insurgency therefore stem from the inadequacies of the local government to requite or remove popular or group dissatisfactions... The U.S. must always keep in mind that the ultimate and decisive target is the people. Society itself is at war and the resources, motives and targets of the struggle are found almost wholly within the local population.\textsuperscript{473}
\end{quote}

NSAM 182 also described how counterinsurgency should be organized and practiced. It noted:

\begin{quote}
In insurgency situations indigenous military action will be required. U.S. operational assistance may be a necessary adjunct to the local effort. In these situations, U.S. programs should be designed to make the indigenous military response as rapid and incisive as possible while parallel reforms are directed at ameliorating the conditions contributing to the insurgent outbreak... Anticipating, preventing, and defeating communist-directed
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{473} NSAM 182, pp. 6-8 (emphasis in original).
\end{flushleft}
insurgency requires a blend of civil and military capabilities and actions to which each U.S. agency at the Country Team level must contribute.\textsuperscript{474}

This model of COIN would be known as the “hearts and minds” approach, after remarks made about the Malayan insurgency by Sir Gerald Templer. Reform and good governance combined with judicious police and military action were the essence of this approach. Close coordination between military, police, and civil authority was a prerequisite for success.

NSAM 182 thus articulated a vision of what counterinsurgency should be. Backed by the Special Group for Counterinsurgency, which in turn had Kennedy’s personal support, this represented a major effort to produce a coherent doctrine for counterinsurgency in the U.S. government. Further, it did so at a time wherein there was concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government that the challenge of insurgency was real and important. This concern was buttressed by the intelligence community’s alarming reports on the insurgency in South Vietnam, a country where the United States already had more than 800 military advisers (the overwhelming majority from the Army) in January 1961. Moreover, this number would increase almost exponentially in the early Kennedy years, to more than 16,000 at the end of 1963.\textsuperscript{475} Indeed, the Kennedy Administration issued instructions to shore up South Vietnam even before the more general guidelines for counterinsurgency in NSAM 182 were issued. In May 1961, the administration issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52, which among other actions authorized a proposed set of covert actions in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{476}

\textsuperscript{474} NSAM 182, pp. 12-13.
In response to both the direct pressure from the administration and the commitment of large numbers of advisers to a country facing an insurgency, the Army and Marine Corps created doctrinal manuals for counterinsurgency. These manuals should ostensibly have provided guidance on how operations should be conducted. If they in fact did not, then something curious was likely going on. The next section examines what the Army and Marines claimed they would do to confront the challenge of counterinsurgency in this early period.

**Early Army Written Doctrine, 1961-1965**

In defining the problem of counterinsurgency, Army written doctrine embraced the propositions of NSAM 182. In FM 31-16 *Counterguerrilla Operations*, from February 1963, the following definition is used: “The fundamental cause of a resistance movement is the real, imagined, or incited dissatisfaction of a portion of the population with prevailing political, social, or economic conditions.”\(^{477}\) Another variation is used in the Army capstone manual FM 100-5 *Field Service Regulations-Operations*, from February 1962: “The fundamental cause of large-scale irregular activities stems from the dissatisfaction of some significant portion of the population, with the political, social, and economic conditions prevalent in the area.”\(^{478}\)

The U.S. Army’s doctrine generally accepted the organizational and operational methods of NSAM 182, though with a slightly harsher tone. For example, the importance of a reform program is noted in FM 100-5:

Irregular forces lose effectiveness when not supported by the civil population, whether such support is provided willingly or gained through coercion... The irregular force is

\(^{477}\) FM 31-16 *Counterguerrilla Operations*, 1963, p. 3.
\(^{478}\) FM 100-5 *Field Service Regulations-Operations*, February 1962, p. 137.
usually a result and not the cause of the problem. The destruction of an existing irregular force normally does not provide a complete solution. The population must be convinced that the conduct or support of irregular activities will not only fail to gain the desired results, but may result in the imposition of sanctions and actually delay the elimination of the causes of discontent. Irregular forces accompany their operations with extensive propaganda designed to gain support of the local population. As a countermeasure, the local government being supported by the U.S., as well as U.S. forces, must present a concrete program which will win popular support. \(^{479}\)

Similarly, FM 31-16 devotes an entire chapter to police operations and population control which includes a recommendation to establish “pacification committees” at the brigade and battalion level. These committees would include representatives from the military, paramilitaries, and civilian agencies. \(^{480}\)

Army doctrine at the time also emphasized the importance of decentralized operations for COIN:

Combat actions against guerrilla forces are extremely decentralized until sizeable guerrilla elements have been located. Even then, operations are centralized only to the degree necessary to effect the destruction of the located enemy force. A continuous distribution of force in depth is necessary. \(^{481}\)

FM 31-16 also emphasizes small unit patrolling and reconnaissance as well as ambush. It further notes that police/population control operations will often have to take place concurrently with combat operations. \(^{482}\)

FM 31-16 also describes the importance of intelligence to counterinsurgency. It labels attempts to conduct operations against insurgents without sound intelligence as a waste of “time, material, and troop effort.” \(^{483}\) FM 31-16 also comments on the breadth of knowledge of non-military factors needed for COIN:

A basic essential in any type of counterguerrilla intelligence operation is a thorough understanding of the target area and society, in all its aspects, augmented by a complete understanding of the prevailing internal and external forces supporting or subverting the

\(^{479}\) FM 100-5, February 1962, pp. 139-140.

\(^{480}\) FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 38. All of chapter 4 of the manual is dedicated to police operations and population control.

\(^{481}\) FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 49.

\(^{482}\) Ibid., pp. 49-60.

\(^{483}\) FMFM-21, August 1962, p. 17; and FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 92 both use this phrase. FM 100-5, February 1962, pp. 147-148 also discusses the importance of intelligence for COIN.
society... The basic inventory of intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from the areas and country studies supplemented with situational intelligence collected more recently on the scene.\textsuperscript{484}

The importance of social and cultural knowledge for COIN is further noted in FM 100-5, along with both the importance of and a warning about indigenous personnel:

The nature of intelligence operations described above requires a knowledge of local customs, languages, cultural background and personalities not attainable by U.S. personnel in the time allowed. As a result, local police, security and government organizations must be exploited to the maximum extent possible. Liaison personnel, interpreters, guides, trackers and clandestine agents are normally required. The loyalty and trustworthiness of these personnel must be firmly established. Frequently, these personnel cooperate with both opposing forces in an effort to achieve maximum personal gains.\textsuperscript{485} FM 31-16 also makes a similar point on the importance of individual soldiers reporting their observations as intelligence.\textsuperscript{486}

FM 31-16 also comments on the need to coordinate intelligence between the military, police, paramilitary and civilian agencies of both the United States and the host nation. It also notes the need to go beyond traditional military methods of obtaining intelligence, including extensive use of clandestine informer networks. FM 31-16 emphasizes the importance of capturing enemy personnel: “Prisoners of war are taken whenever possible. Every opportunity is given the enemy to surrender, except when the success of combat operations depends on surprise.”\textsuperscript{487}

\textbf{Early Marine Written Doctrine, 1961-1965}

The Marine Corps issued one of its first counterinsurgency manuals in August 1962 (roughly the same time as NSAM 182). Entitled Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)-21, \textit{Operations Against Guerrilla Forces}, it was similar in many respects to the

\textsuperscript{484} FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{485} FM 100-5, February 1962, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{486} FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{487} FM 31-16, February 1963, p. 96.
Army’s FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations. In defining the problem confronted in operating against guerrillas, it noted:

Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined, or incited and is usually centered around a desire for—

1. Political change.
2. Relief from actual or alleged repression.
3. Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.
4. Economic and social improvement.
5. Religious expression.\(^488\)

This definition of the problem was consonant with both the Army definition and the civilian definition (as presented in NSAM 182). Like the Army manuals, it devotes considerable attention to the population, noting:

Commanders must realize that operations against guerrillas will seldom solve the problems of the area in which they occur. The guerrilla force is only a symptom of the overall problem which caused the resistance movement to arise in the first place. Throughout military operations, a positive program of civil assistance must be conducted to eliminate the original cause of the resistance movement.\(^489\)

All of FMFM-21’s Chapter Ten and Appendix B are devoted to population considerations and population control.

The Marine Corps written doctrine also accepted the need for close coordination in counterinsurgency with both other U.S. agencies and the host nation. On U.S. agencies, FMFM-21 notes “close coordination is effected with the diplomatic mission and other U.S. agencies.”\(^490\) On the host government, it states “One of the most important duties to be performed by the commander in an operation against guerrilla forces is to gain the cooperation and assistance of local police and judicial agencies.”\(^491\)

In terms of operations, the Marines focused on battalion and smaller units, with considerable autonomy given to these lower echelon commanders. FMFM-21 describes

\(^{489}\) FMFM-21, p. 72.
\(^{490}\) FMFM-21, p. 14.
\(^{491}\) FMFM-21, p. 16.
battalion task forces (batterions with attachments such as psychological operations units) as conducting operations of an “independent or semi-independent nature.” The units actually doing the bulk of operations were smaller than battalions. The two main operations are described as patrolling and reaction force; the former is conducted by units from squad to reinforced company size, while the latter is conducted by units ranging from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company. Patrols are specifically noted as potentially requiring independent action for a long period of time and also as potentially including civilians such as “local guides, trackers, and members of the civil police.”

FMFM-21 also places an extremely heavy emphasis on intelligence in counterinsurgency. It bluntly notes that “counterguerrilla operations without sound intelligence wastes time, material, and troop effort.” It goes on list the need for more intelligence personnel and interpreters in counterinsurgency than in other operations. It further notes:

Every Marine must have an understanding of the basic techniques and value of intelligence and counterintelligence in counterguerrilla operations. This is necessary because of both his own immediate requirements in many situations and because of the requirements of higher headquarters. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He reports anything unusual concerning the civil population and the guerrilla force, no matter how trivial. Counterguerrilla operations feature many small unit operations, and commanders must be prepared to process, evaluate and act promptly on the observations made by members of his unit. The manual also details the need for the creation of clandestine informer networks, something not typically associated with the Marine Corps.

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492 FMFM-21, p. 31.
493 FMFM-21, p. 32.
494 FMFM-21, p. 17.
495 FMFM-21, p. 17.
496 FMFM-21, p. 20.
Army Doctrinal Rhetoric and Reality, 1961-1965

Doctrine as it appeared in print was thus in broad agreement in both the civilian and military realms from 1961-1965. Army COIN doctrine as written appeared to fully concur with the “hearts and minds,” civilian dominated model of COIN. Yet at the same time, public comments by some senior officers betrayed a hesitance to fully embrace the implications of the written doctrine. Appearing to dismiss the differences between conventional war and COIN, Army Chief of Staff George Decker notably stated, “Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.” His successor, Earle Wheeler, argued, “It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.”

It was in Vietnam that the differences between written doctrine and actual practice would become glaringly apparent. First and foremost, the principal of unity of effort between civil and military elements of the U.S. COIN effort enshrined in written doctrine was not upheld. The 1962 terms of reference for the creation of the position of Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) clearly indicate that, while COMUSMACV might nominally be subordinate to the Ambassador, he was in fact autonomous:

The U.S. Ambassador, whose as representative of the President is the senior U.S. representative in Viet-Nam, will be kept apprised by the Senior U.S. military commander, in advance, of plans in the military field, in order to assure proper coordination of U.S. activities... In case of differences of view, any member of the Task Force would be free to communicate such differences to Washington for decision in accordance with already-existing procedures. While the Ambassador and the senior military commander will keep each other... fully informed on all high-level contacts with the GVN and on major political

and military plans, the operational command of U.S. military personnel will be the direct responsibility of the senior U.S. military commander. 498

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not going to tolerate the subordination of a four star general to an ambassador, doctrine or no. Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick Nolting complained about this command relationship at some length, to no avail. 499

Other deviations from written doctrine were observed in Vietnam. During this period, many observers also felt that the training of South Vietnamese forces was more appropriate to conventional conflict than COIN. President Kennedy’s military adviser Gen. Maxwell Taylor, after visiting Vietnam in late 1961, reported: “It is our clear impression… that, by and large, training and equipment of the Vietnamese armed forces are still too heavily weighted toward conventional military operations.” 500 Roger Hilsman, director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, came to similar conclusions after visiting in early 1963, and further pointed out that this was in part a result of American advice and support:

You have also the impression that the military is still too heavily oriented towards sweep-type operations. There is still the same emphasis on air power as there was before. Almost every operation so far as I can tell still begins with an air strike which inevitably kills innocent people and warns the Viet Cong that they should get moving for the troops will be coming soon. I think… that the Americans are as much to blame for this as the Vietnamese. 501

498 Maxwell Taylor, “Terms of Reference for the Senior United States Military Commander in Vietnam,” Memorandum for Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 12, 1962; available in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume II, Vietnam 1962, document 17, online at: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii_1961-63/index.html, hereafter cited as FRUS. This wording differs slightly from the terms approved at the January 3 Palm Beach conference. However, it is clear in the orders establishing COMUSMACV in February that Taylor’s was the view that prevailed. See FRUS, v. II, documents 9, 18, and 53.
499 Ibid., documents 19, 25, 36, 40, and 52.
This emphasis on conventional over COIN operations by many (though not all) U.S. advisory personnel has been noted by many subsequent observers, as was the overall preoccupation with a conventional invasion from North Vietnam. 502

In addition to the advisors, the U.S. Army dispatched intelligence units to South Vietnam in this period. These units, the first arriving in 1961, were signals intelligence (SIGINT) collectors operating under the cover designation of “Radio Research Units.” One of their primary purposes was to triangulate insurgent radio transmissions in order to locate the elusive adversary. This technique of locating the enemy was, after some innovation to cope with the climate and terrain of South Vietnam, successful. 503

However, there were two aspects of this technique that were antithetical to Army written doctrine on counterinsurgency. First, it was almost entirely focused on larger insurgent units, as they were the only units which transmitted. This was despite Army doctrinal writing that destroying these units was at best a partial solution. Second, this form of intelligence eschewed all of the detailed local knowledge that Army written doctrine proclaimed vital for counterinsurgency. All that was required were certain collection platforms and personnel skilled in operating them. For triangulation, even basic knowledge of the language was superfluous.


Subcultures at War: U.S. Army Special Forces and COIN 1961-1965

Not all U.S. Army operations adhered to the approach described above. The U.S. Army Special Forces sought to put doctrine into practice by providing area security and development. They did so by participating in several CIA programs in South Vietnam that were initiated by Chief of Station (COS) in Saigon William Colby in 1961 shortly after NSAM 52 was issued.

The most notable of the programs, proposed by the Military Operations Section (MOS) of the CIA station, emerged from a meeting between an MOS case officer and “a young volunteer from the [redacted] doing economic development work among the Rhade, the principal tribe around the Darlac provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot.”

This young volunteer, whose full name is redacted but is known to the Rhade as “Mr. Dave,” spoke the Rhade language and was extremely knowledgeable about their affairs. In April 1961, he was debriefed by the MOS chief, Gilbert Layton, who saw a potential to mobilize the Rhade in their own defense by providing for their needs, which the GVN had previously neglected.

Layton’s proposal was accepted and expanded by Colby in May. However, training and arming tribesmen whose relationship to the central government of Vietnam was contentious (at best) was politically sensitive. Colby negotiated an agreement with Nhu to move forward by stipulating the participation of Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) in the program. After securing additional permission from Darlac provincial

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504 Ahern, p. 44.

505 This account of CIA involvement with the Montagnards is drawn principally from Ahern, pp. 44-62 and the official history of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1973), pp. 20-33. The two accounts differ on some specifics principally because Kelly’s history was written at the unclassified level (for example, Kelly does not mention CIA at all, instead referring to the U.S. Mission though clearly meaning CIA) but overall the two are in agreement. See also Christopher Ives, *U.S. Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-1963* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
officials, Layton initiated negotiations with the Rhade using “Mr. Dave” and a U.S. Special Forces medic (Sgt. First Class Paul Campbell, aka “Dr. Paul”) as his interlocutors. The two surveyed the area, providing medical treatment as they sounded out local leaders. In the fall of 1961, the two men suggested the village of Buon Enao as the site to initiate the program.

This program, named the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program by COS Colby in late 1961, brought in a small U.S. Army Special Forces team (an “Operational Detachment Alpha” or “ODA” in military parlance) along with VNSF soldiers to train the villagers. DCI Dulles had also signed off on the program at this point, bringing additional funding. The program, which combined economic and medical civic action with the training of village defense forces, quickly took off, drawing in more U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces over the course of 1962 while remaining firmly under the sponsorship of CIA.\textsuperscript{506}

In addition to the disaffected Montagnards of the Central Highlands, the CIA station and Special Forces engaged the Catholic minority of South Vietnam. Beginning in early 1962, the station armed and trained the followers of militant Catholic priests using CIA resources and U.S. Special Forces ODAs alongside VNSF and, in the case of one ethnic Chinese priest, Nationalist Chinese Special Forces. Known colloquially as “the Fighting Fathers,” this program also grew rapidly throughout 1962.\textsuperscript{507}

In contrast to the larger Army’s emphasis on attacking the insurgent forces, the CIA/Special Forces program sought only to have villagers defend themselves. The

\textsuperscript{506} In addition to the CIDG program proper, CIA initiated another program known eventually as “Mountain Scouts” among the Montagnards. It was more of an offensive irregular warfare program than the essentially defensive CIDG. See Ahern, pp. 64-71 and Kelly, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{507} Ahern, pp. 73-77 and Kelly, p. 33.
Special Forces trained village defenders in basic small arms and they were only expected to fight if attacked. Otherwise they remained at home to live and work. Only a small mobile strike force was trained and paid for full-time operations, and even this was intended to patrol the area between villages or quickly support villages under attack, rather than to conduct offensive operations.

By April 1962, the program had encompassed 28 villages with 1,000 village defenders trained and a 300 man strike force created. At this point, however, the dominant culture of the Army intervened. With the establishment of a full Military Assistance Command (MACV) in February 1962, the Army began to move beyond the relatively small-scale efforts of the previous Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Part of this expansion was to establish a special warfare branch in the operations section of MACV staff. MACV then arranged that both the CIA and MACV jointly control the CIDG program, which was using Army troops (though funded and supported by the CIA). By June of 1962, a decision was jointly reached in Saigon and Washington that the CIDG program had expanded so much that it was no longer covert and should be fully military (i.e. no CIA involvement).

The transfer of the program from CIA to MACV was known as Operation SWITCHBACK, incorrectly implying that the programs had previously belonged to MACV. Attitudes towards the transfer did not neatly fall along bureaucratic lines. Some in CIA felt the transfer should take place, as Saigon station had limited resources and manpower. DCI John McCone was an early advocate of transferring CIA counterinsurgency programs to the military. Officers at the working level of CIA were
split, with some wanting to divest such an overt program while others felt the military would distort CIDG’s mission. However, the ostensible beneficiary of SWITCHBACK, MACV commander General Paul Harkins, felt that CIA should continue to run the program as it was not ready to transition. 508

Harkins was particularly concerned about losing CIA’s sensitivity to political dynamics in South Vietnam and the station’s critical relationships with GVN officials. His concern was echoed by the commander of Special Forces in Vietnam, Colonel George Morton. Morton was also worried about logistics, as he was losing CIA’s flexible and effective support and was forced to turn to the giant bureaucracy of MACV. 509

Ultimately, those fearing the failure of CIDG after SWITCHBACK were proved correct. MACV proved unable to manage the political dynamics required to make CIDG viable. During SWITCHBACK, the number of villages in the program expanded rapidly even as the quality of the training and support fell. 510 This focus on speed of expansion and total number of villages rather than quality of the village militia was consonant with the dominant Army culture’s view of the importance of mass mobilization. In essence, the Montagnards were mobilized in a manner analogous to the Army’s concept of mobilizing American citizen-soldiers: the more the better, the quicker the better.

Buon Enao, the first and most developed of the CIDG sites, virtually fell apart by the end of 1963 as tensions between the GVN and the Rhade were not effectively addressed by the U.S. Special Forces (who lacked the connections and finesse of CIA). 511

508 Ahern, pp. 97-99.
509 Ahern, pp. 102-103.
510 Kelly, pg. 37-41.
511 Ahern, p. 114 and Kelly, pp. 43-44.
In 1964, the situation went from bad to worse, as CIDG Montagnards rose in open rebellion against the GVN in September and December. Though eventually the situation was defused by CIA and U.S. Special Forces officers, it indicated the overall disrepair the program had fallen into.\textsuperscript{512}

Equally tellingly, the emphasis on what operations were to be undertaken as part of the program was reversed. The official history of the Special Forces in Vietnam bluntly states: “By the end of 1964 the Montagnard program was no longer an area development project in the original sense of the term. There was a shift in emphasis from expanding village defense systems to the primary use of area development camps or centers (CIDG camps) as bases for offensive strike force operations.”\textsuperscript{513}

The Special Forces subculture had created a program based on population security by allying with an outside entity, the CIA. When the Army reestablished control, it turned the defensive program into and offensive one and sought to make it larger as quickly as possible. Without the CIA to support and protect them, the dominant Army culture would dictate operations to the Special Forces subculture.

Following the cooptation of CIDG, Special Forces would receive new missions, including reconnaissance both inside South Vietnam and across the border in Laos, and covert operations into North Vietnam. These were conducted by MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG), a bland cover organization created in 1964. MACV-SOG, though military, also worked closely with, and included officers from, CIA.\textsuperscript{514}

\textsuperscript{512} Ahern, pp. 180-182 and Kelly, pp. 63-64.
\textsuperscript{513} Kelly, pg. 33-34.
The cross-border mission into Laos was conducted by OP 35, the Ground Studies Group component of MACV-SOG, initially under Operation SHINING BRASS. OP 35 utilized small reconnaissance patrols, generally composed of a few U.S. Army Special Forces and several locally recruited tribesmen (a total team size of about 12) to locate infiltrators and then call in airstrikes on the targets. Additionally, the OP 35 patrols would emplace sensors, perform bomb damage assessment, and even conduct limited direction action missions to capture prisoners or destroy facilities.515

In addition to the cross-border OP 35, Special Forces camps along the Vietnamese side of the border also provided ability to gather intelligence aimed at interdicting infiltration. These camps grew out of the CIDG program and were known as Projects Delta, Sigma, and Omega, intended to locate insurgent bases inside Vietnam. These operations were also conducted by small teams of Special Forces working with locals.516

Finally, Special Forces continued to train other local irregular forces for CIA, usually at the base at Vung Tau near the coast. Most notable among these were the Counter-Terror Teams, a small unit of what the program’s creator termed “deserters and small time crooks,” which would enter Viet Cong territory to target Communist leaders or installations. These teams were subsequently renamed Provincial Reconnaissance Units and would exist throughout the rest of the war.517

517 Ahern, pp. 121-160, quotation on p. 141.
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency, 1961-1965

In contrast to the Army, which had a major advisory presence in Vietnam, and Army Special Forces, which were committed to CIA operations in Vietnam, the Marine Corps’ direct involvement in Vietnam before 1965 was small. Beginning in 1954, a Marine lieutenant colonel served as advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). This sole officer was supplemented by a couple of captains and a handful of noncommissioned officers later in the decade.\(^{518}\)

With the formation of MACV in 1962, the Marine advisory presence grew to several dozen, including a two-star Marine general who served as MACV chief of staff.\(^{519}\) Marine helicopter units were also dispatched to South Vietnam to provide mobility to South Vietnamese units.\(^{520}\) However, the Marine presence in Vietnam was still relatively small compared to both the size of MACV (over 16,000 by the end of 1963) and the Marine Corps as a whole. For example, by 1964 the Marine helicopter support task unit, based at Da Nang, was only 450 total personnel.\(^{521}\)

Apart from uniformed Marines in South Vietnam, there were also retired Marine officers working in the U.S. Mission. Most notable was Edward Forney, a retired Marine general, who was serving as the Public Safety Advisor in Saigon. Forney had served two years in Haiti during the 1930s and had worked with the Gendarmerie there. In a conversation in February 1963 with Marine Corps chief of staff (and soon to be Commandant) Lieutenant General Wallace Greene, Forney called for an approach similar to earlier small wars experience:

\(^{519}\) Whitlow, p. 47.
\(^{520}\) Whitlow, pp. 55-85.
\(^{521}\) Whitlow, p. 144.
The Marine Corps should get into the Vietnam job with both feet and that it should be a real grass roots level operation, not tied in with the MAAG; but rather an effort to be linked with the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense Corps, and the local Militia in the village and boondock level. This would be similar to the Guardia effort in Nicaragua or the Gendarmerie operation in Haiti and Santo Domingo. The limited Marine contingent of 1963 was unable to execute Forney’s idea, but the idea would be revisited later, as discussed below.

Yet despite this minimal direct involvement in Vietnam, the leadership of Marine units stationed in the Pacific was attuned to the likelihood of their involvement in counterinsurgency. In 1961 Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFP), created a program known as On-The-Job Training (OJT). OJT dispatched Marine officers to South Vietnam for a few weeks at a time to observe the developing situation and demands of counterinsurgency.

The commanders of the 3rd Marine Division, based in Okinawa and the most likely candidate for involvement in Southeast Asia, took the issue of counterinsurgency even more seriously. Major General Donald Weller, commander in early 1961, had been instructed to lead a task force preparing for a possible intervention in Laos. He subsequently gave orders to his staff to begin developing a counterinsurgency program for the entire division to supplement the OJT program.

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523 Whitlow, p. 39.
525 Whitlow, pp. 39-41.
Weller’s successor in late 1961, Major General Robert Cushman (a future commander in Vietnam as well as Commandant), accelerated the development of a counterinsurgency program. Early in 1962, a training program led by graduates of the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaya and the Army Special Warfare School was initiated. The Jungle Warfare School was, crucially, set up by the British in response to the challenge of counterinsurgency in Malaya and the Special Warfare School was the home of the Army Special Forces. The division’s training was thus led by graduates of schools founded by services with maritime or unconventional war archetypes who had recent experience in counterinsurgency in Asia. The training was focused on intense company and platoon level infantry operations in northern Okinawa, with a less involved course for battalion staffs intended to prepare them “to support their companies in a counterinsurgency environment.” Officers with OJT experience in South Vietnam helped prepare the division training.\(^{526}\)

**Assessing Theoretical Explanations for Written Doctrine and Operations, 1961-1965**

The evidence on Army doctrine and operations from 1961-1965 alone provide little that is dispositive in terms of the proposed alternative explanations for doctrine. Hypothesis 1, that military organizations are rational and respond to their environment, appears to be supported based on written doctrine as do Hypothesis 2 and 2a on civilian intervention given that NSAM 182 was produced to explicitly order the Army (and other organizations) to prepare for COIN. Hypothesis 3, that military organizations seek autonomy, prestige and resources appears supported by the resistance to MACV being made subordinate to the Ambassador (despite that being implied by both written doctrine

\(^{526}\) Whitlow, pp. 41-42.
and civilian intent). Hypothesis 4, organizational culture, also has some support, as the Army, through both its advisory mission and dispatch of SIGINT units, focused on preparing ARVN to fight large unit operations against insurgent large units.

What is most interesting about this period in terms of the Army is the deviation from written doctrine made in the statements of senior Army officers and in the actions of advisors on the ground. Why would an organization write manuals it did not actually follow? One possible explanation is organizational inertia—large organizations take time to change, so even after NSAM 182 and FM 31-16, the Army would take time to adjust. Another possible explanation is that the written doctrine was instrumental speech, intended to demonstrate compliance with NSAM 182, which the Army had no intention of following. This first period does not provide sufficient evidence for a dispositive conclusion, but the point will be revisited in subsequent sections.

The evidence from the Special Forces experience in this period appears to lend somewhat more support to Hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypothesis 3 predicts that MACV would seek to expand its resources and control of operations by taking over CIDG. However, this prediction is somewhat undercut since MACV Commander Harkins was actually against SWITCHBACK. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 and 2a receive little support. Civilians supported the original approach of CIDG, which was exactly what NSAM 182 proclaimed to be the essence of counterinsurgency: population security and development.

Hypothesis 4 also receives support since the shift from CIA to MACV support radically changed the nature of the program by decreasing sensitivity to the politics of the program and focusing it on offensive operations rather than securing the population. The
emphasis on very small units working with locals and other agencies remained constant in both CIDG and OP 35. However, there is little here that is dispositive.

As with the U.S. Army in the same period, no firm conclusions about hypotheses on doctrine can be drawn from the Marine experience 1961-1965. The Marine Corps doctrine and practice seemed to be aligned, but the actual practice was on a very limited scale. Hypothesis 1 (military organizations are rational in response to their environment) appears to be supported based on written doctrine and the preparations of FMFP and the 3rd Marine Division. However, the same evidence supports Hypothesis 2 and 2a on civilian intervention given the COIN orientation of the Kennedy administration. Hypothesis 3, that military organizations seek autonomy, prestige and resources, is not strongly supported by this evidence, yet neither is it disproved. Hypothesis 4, organizational culture, has support based on the existence of the Marines’ small wars subculture.

Overall, the period 1961-1965 does little to demonstrate any enduring differences in Army, Army Special Forces, and Marine counterinsurgency operations. Further, any difference observed in this period can be explained by almost all of the hypotheses presented. However, this period provides a necessary initial observation, setting the stage for the next two periods.

Most importantly, it demonstrates that when U.S. combat units were introduced to South Vietnam in 1965 they were not confronted with a challenge or country that their respective organizations had no experience with. Each service or service subculture had officers serving in Vietnam in non-trivial numbers (thousands in the case of the Army) during the 1961-1965 period. Each had previously written doctrine to serve as a guide.
Civilian leadership, including the president, had intervened to advocate a certain doctrine and type of operations for this environment. In short, organizational inertia or friction should have been reduced (though not eliminated) by the experiences of this period, meaning that the combat forces should have been reasonably prepared to adjust operations for the counterinsurgency environment in South Vietnam.

**Across the Rubicon: Counterinsurgency Operations, 1965-1968**

The years from 1963-1965 saw the situation in South Vietnam go from bad to worse. Coup followed coup in Saigon, while the Viet Cong grew stronger throughout the countryside. The complete collapse of South Vietnam seemed at hand despite increasing U.S. efforts. In March 1965, U.S. combat forces were introduced to Vietnam, initially to secure airfields. However, this mission would rapidly expand and by the summer of that year U.S. forces were conducting offensive combat operations. The next section details operations conducted during this period. It begins with a telling episode in this period in which the Army not only rejected its own written doctrine for counterinsurgency, it rejected a plan sponsored by the organization’s highest ranking officer.

General Harold Johnson, who had become Army Chief of Staff in 1964, was one of many deeply troubled by U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. Upon returning from Vietnam in March 1965, Johnson directed a select group of officers to undertake a reappraisal of efforts in Vietnam. This study was completed and issued in March 1966, with the title *A Program for the Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietnam*, and universally referred to by the acronym PROVN.
PROVN was a lengthy and thoughtful study, but provided few if any truly new ideas. It principally sought to put into practice the tenets embodied in the Army’s written doctrine for COIN. In essence, PROVN sought to provide a blueprint for the operationalization of COIN doctrine.

First and most importantly, PROVN reiterated the doctrinal point that development and good governance should be central to all U.S. efforts:

A viable, noncommunist government in SVN is fundamental to the achievement of U.S. objectives. Failure to develop such a public supported political order not only will preclude winning a true military victory, it will ensure losing a negotiated peace... Long-standing and legitimate causes of insurgency are still present. Promises of reform melt into maintenance of the status quo. PROVN readily acknowledged that development required security, but pointed out that security was to enable development rather than being an end in itself.

PROVN also called for a “single manager” for Vietnam, responsible for all aspects of U.S. activity there, and further argued that this should be (at least initially) the U.S. Ambassador. In addition, PROVN stated:

To succeed, we must actually decentralize and delegate to Americans and Vietnamese at district and province levels the requisite resources and authority to accomplish the tasks at hand. Their exercise of this authority must be buttressed and sustained up through the chain of command... Unity of command and effort is required now at province level, with the province chief directing all GVN [Government of Vietnam] activities (military and nonmilitary) in the province. His counterpart, the SUSREP (Senior U.S. Representative), must direct all U.S. activities... This was a directive for actually implementing FM 31-16’s recommendation to establish “pacification committees,” as well as NSAM 183’s call for unity of civil and military effort.

PROVN additionally stressed the importance of language training and knowledge of political and social factors for COIN. It repeatedly notes that wide variations between the situations in different provinces and even between different districts in the same

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527 PROVN, pp. 76-77.
528 PROVN, pp. 61 and 66.
province are to be expected. This variation would require detailed awareness of the specific local environment where those conducting COIN would be assigned.\textsuperscript{529}

Despite being an honest attempt to implement the doctrine that the U.S. government and the military services had promulgated, PROVN did not receive a warm welcome in the Army. The officer who was nominally in charge of the study, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Lt. Gen. Vernon Mock, refused to sign off on it for distribution, saying to the authors, “Why don't you come in early some morning and have one of the cleaning ladies sign it?” PROVN did not receive much more of a welcome from either the JCS or COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland. Others, such as Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, found it to be highly useful, as did civilians like Ambassador Robert Komer.\textsuperscript{530}

Yet the net effect of the PROVN study on the conduct of COIN in Vietnam would be minimal. Instead, as detailed below, the U.S. Army did almost exactly the opposite of what the report recommended. The Army rejected its own written doctrine in the field, instead relying on the guidance provided by its strategic and managerial culture. Further, it did so in the face of a desire for change from its most senior officer, Chief of Staff Johnson. The reason for the resistance to PROVN was that it simply ran counter to the essence of U.S. Army culture. Nor, as the third period of Vietnam will demonstrate, would this be the last time a senior Army leaders plans to alter operations would be frustrated.

\textsuperscript{529} Ibid., pp. 2-47 to 2-50.

The introduction of U.S. ground forces in a combat role in March 1965 began a rapid cascade of U.S involvement in Vietnam. Most significantly for operations, it meant that at last COMUSMACV Westmoreland had combat troops to command rather than to merely advise. He quickly began employing them in operations, yet these operations were not grounded in COIN doctrine as promulgated.

The essence of Army operations from 1965-1968 was to apply maximum firepower to large enemy “main force” units in order to destroy them. By destroying enemy forces faster than they could be replaced, MACV sought to bring the war to a favorable conclusion via attrition. To this end, U.S. forces would seek contact with large units and then destroy them, an approach known as search and destroy.

This approach was premised on the idea of the massive application of firepower. COMUSMACV Westmoreland provided a one-word summary of his anti-guerrilla strategy: “Firepower.”531 In a less terse summary, Westmoreland stated that if the enemy did not quit: “We'll just go on bleeding them to the point of national disaster for generations.”532 Gen. Westmoreland’s operations officer, Brig. (later Lt.) Gen. William Depuy, summarized the MACV strategy in a statement to the press: “We are going to stomp them to death.”533 After being promoted to Major General and receiving command of the 1st Infantry Division, Depuy described the approach in more detail to Daniel

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531 Quoted in Krepinevich, p.197
Ellsberg: “The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm... till the
other side cracks and gives up.” 534

Army operations more than lived up to this rhetoric. Over four million tons of
indirect (air and artillery) ordnance was expended over South Vietnam from 1965 to
1973. 535 Artillery alone expended more than twenty million rounds of all calibers. 536

Much of this firepower employed was not even in direct support of troops, instead being
fired in so-called “harassment and interdiction” missions. This meant firing unobserved
into areas thought likely to contain the enemy. 537 In addition to this indirect fire, vast
amounts of direct fire ordnance were used as well.

In addition to the quantity of firepower, the military spent considerable effort
improving the quality of firepower. It developed new doctrinal guidelines for the
employment of firepower and introduced new technology, such as digital fire control
computers for artillery. 538 Fixed wing gunships were developed from cargo aircraft,
while a panoply of lethal aerial munitions were employed. 539 Strategic Air Command B-
52s intended for nuclear delivery were pressed into service as massive all-weather
conventional bombers (in so-called Arclight strikes). 540

Along with firepower, the Army sought to utilize superior mobility in the form of
helicopters to outmaneuver the enemy. Units would be dispatched in helicopters from

534 Quoted in Sheehan, p. 619.
535 Harrison, p. 256.
537 Ibid., p. 141.
central bases, spend a few hours or days “in the bush” (often quite far away from major population centers) and then return to base. This was hardly consonant with counterinsurgency doctrine, which required significant interaction with the population, both to provide security and to gather intelligence.

However, given that the original goal of airmobility was to provide the ability to rapidly disperse and concentrate against armored forces on the potentially nuclear battlefields of Europe, the inapplicability to counterinsurgency is not surprising. This was another example of the feeling among many in the Army that counterinsurgency was a lesser included case of war. As one of the pioneers of airmobility noted after Vietnam:

A briefing of particular significance took place in the late afternoon of 12 December 1960... At that time the focus in the Army was on the nuclear battlefield. Organic aviation was viewed by the Army as the best means of maintaining combat operations in an area characterized by great depth and frontage with the dispersion of many small self-contained units. The major threat was viewed as a sophisticated enemy attacking with masses of armor on the plains of Europe. Counter-guerrilla warfare at that time was viewed as a secondary mission. Nevertheless, the early planners in airmobility perceived that one of the automatic fallouts in organizing the Army for greater airmobility would be much greater capabilities in the lower spectrums of warfare. Instead of automatically making the Army more capable for counterinsurgency, airmobility actually undercut written doctrine by disconnecting troops from the population.

In addition to emphasizing fire and maneuver over pacification, combat forces in Vietnam were oriented towards centralized large-unit operations rather than decentralized small unit operations. Beginning with the 1st Cavalry Division's battle in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, Army units were consistently employed in multibattalion operations. Operations increased in size, as Operation ATTLEBORO in September


1966 illustrated. Beginning as a search and destroy operation by battalions of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, ATTLEBORO grew to include over 22,000 U.S. and allied troops, including Depuy's 1st Infantry Division. ATTLEBORO would be followed in 1967 with the even larger CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY operations. Both would be multidivisional operations with massive fire support, with JUNCTION CITY utilizing over 25,000 U.S. and allied forces.

Intelligence collection was also dominated by SIGINT. Each Army division sent to Vietnam brought a Radio Research Company (RRC) to provide SIGINT. The division commander would then parcel out the RRC's assets to his subordinate units. U.S. forces were quick to exploit this tactical SIGINT capability. In October and November 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division would use SIGINT assets, which had been upgraded to quickly pass SIGINT to the division's DSU, to target insurgent units in the Ia Drang valley with air strikes. The results were devastating, as the Vietnamese felt "that each time one of their units settled in, an air strike would hit them." Yet as noted earlier, this heavy reliance on SIGINT was contrary to written doctrine, which emphasized local knowledge and patrolling.

In contrast to the exhortations of written doctrine, MACV also significantly slighted pacification and encouraged aggressive, large unit sweeps with high volumes of firepower. This is apparent in the metrics for unit performance and officer evaluation chosen by MACV. The most infamous is the "body count," the counting of enemy dead.

Drang battles, see Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once... and Young: Ia Drang-The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam, (New York: Random House 1992).


545 Hanyok, p. 291; Gilbert, pp. 29-42.

546 Hanyok, p. 306; Gilbert, 35-36.
Far from encouraging the military to provide security to the civilian Vietnamese, the body count often meant they were simply ruled to be the enemy if they were killed.

Jeffrey Record, who was in Vietnam as a civilian, concluded that the body count became such an important metric for success that it corrupted much of the war effort: "amassing kills became the standard of career success for U.S. commanders, and therefore an often irresistible temptation to abuse in both the infliction and reporting of enemy casualties." Another metric which encouraged search and destroy over pacification was "battalion days in the field." This counted number of days each battalion spent conducting combat operations as a measure of performance. While time spent in search and destroy counted in this metric, pacification missions did not. Other measures intended to ensure aggressive action against main force units included number of combat sorties flown, bomb tonnage dropped, ammunition expended, and ratio of U.S. deaths to enemy deaths.

Finally, civil-military integration would was not well developed in this period. Not until 1967 was a real organization established to manage all civilian efforts and to attempt to integrate them with military efforts. This organization, known as Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), was headed by Robert Komer who was made a deputy to COMUSMACV Westmoreland. While a step forward in integration, Komer still had limited ability to affect how U.S. forces would be employed. Rather than the civilians being supported by the military, or at a minimum the military and civilian aspects being co-equal, the military (actually the Army) was now firmly in

547 Record, p. 84.  
charge. This was clearly not the desired arrangement advocated in doctrine and articulated in PROVN.550

Army Special Forces Operations, 1965-1968

Special Forces operations changed little in this period. Unlike the regular Army, which had been unable to conduct combat operations until the introduction of combat troops in 1965, Special Forces had been conducting small unit operations for years. This period saw a modest increase in number of Special Forces operations but little change in the type.

Living with and running irregular units of locals (CIDG), training locals for CIA (PRU), and small unit reconnaissance, both in South Vietnam and in Laos, continued to be the bread and butter of Special Forces. The Laos mission was expanded in scope and renamed Operation PRARIE FIRE in March 1967 but remained a small unit operation conducted in conjunction with locals (either Montagnards or ethnic Chinese known as Nungs). The same year similar cross-border reconnaissance into Cambodia, Operation DANIEL BOONE, was initiated.551

There was also a different sort of expansion of the small unit reconnaissance mission. In September 1965, 5th Special Forces Group began a program to train newly arriving Special Forces soldiers in long range reconnaissance patrolling techniques in Southeast Asia. Upon learning of this course, COMUSMACV Westmoreland directed a study of the need for additional reconnaissance capabilities, which determined that this

550 See Robert Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970) and Hunt, pp. 99-120.
would be useful. Westmoreland tasked the 5th Special Forces Group commander to establish a school to train volunteers from conventional units in these techniques.\footnote{United States Army Vietnam, “Long Range Patrol Conference Summary,” September 26, 1968, p. 48. (available at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive). Recondo was apparently an amalgam of the words reconnaissance, commando, and doughboy.}

This school, known as Recondo School, was created in September 1966 at Nha Trang. The graduates of the school were returned to the divisions they originated from, where they were formed into Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Companies and Detachments. They would then be used as division or brigade-level assets or sometimes detailed back to 5th Special Forces Group. LRRPs would operate in very small units during actual operations, generally less than a dozen men.\footnote{United States Army Vietnam, “Long Range Patrol Conference Summary,” September 26, 1968, p. 7.}

LRRPs represented something of a half-step or perhaps bridge between Special Forces and regular Army cultures. Drawn from conventional units, LRRPs were expected to be highly motivated and exceptional soldiers; those who were not were washed out of Recondo School. Lieutenant General William Peers, commenting on the program at a LRRP conference in 1968 bluntly stated “In my judgment, not every soldier, not every combat soldier is qualified for LRP duties for several reasons. The first reason is that an individual must be qualified both physically and psychologically.”\footnote{United States Army Vietnam, “Long Range Patrol Conference Summary,” September 26, 1968, pp. 14-15.} His remarks were echoed by Colonel Harold Aaron, 5th Special Forces Group commander and Recondo School Commandant.\footnote{United States Army Vietnam, “Long Range Patrol Conference Summary,” September 26, 1968, pp. 14-15.}

Yet despite being volunteers with exceptional qualifications, LRRPs were not quite Special Forces either. They had not been through the Q Course, which was much
more extensive than the three weeks of Recondo School. Though operating in small
units, LRRPs were clearly adjuncts to the large Army units from which they were drawn.

This “special, but not Special Forces” status for LRRPs would begin to be
resolved when LRRP Companies were redesignated Ranger Companies in 1969. After
the war, these companies formed the basis of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Ranger
Regiment was (and is) considered a “special operations” force yet officers are still highly
competitive in the regular Army as light infantry officers. However, the connection
between Special Forces and the Rangers has attenuated as a result. 556

The Special Forces interaction with the regular Army was contentious throughout
this period. MACV, and particularly commander Westmoreland, considered SOG and
Special Forces to generally be a sideshow at best. 557 Even in choosing commanders for
SOG, the Army tried to pick officers who also had good credentials in the regular Army.
For example, the third commander of MACV-SOG, Colonel Jack Singlaub, was an
experienced special operator dating back to covert operations during World War II.
However, he also had impeccable regular Army credentials including command of
infantry units. 558

In addition, Special Forces Group command and MACV SOG were the highest
ranking billets the Army created for Special Forces officers in Vietnam. Yet these were
billets for colonels, effectively shutting Special Forces out of the general officer ranks.
Moreover, few colonels in these billets were promoted to general officer. Singlaub, with
his regular Army credentials, would make general but many others would not. For
example, Francis Kelly, commander of 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1966-

557 Schultz, pp. 275-280.
558 Schultz, p. 72.
1967, was shuffled off to a National Guard posting in 1970 before retiring as a colonel in 1972.\footnote{See Kelly, p. iv.}

**Marine Counterinsurgency Operations in Vietnam, 1965-1968**

Two battalions from the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) landed at Da Nang in March 1965, initially to provide security for the large airbase there. These units were the first U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. The 9th MEB was commanded by Brigadier General Frederick Karch, the assistant division commander (ADC) for the 3rd Marine Division. In addition to the two battalions, Karch had two helicopter squadrons and some associated support units for a total of nearly 5,000 Marines.\footnote{Shulimson and Johnson, pp.}

Karch was initially forbidden from conducting operations against the insurgents. His battalions could only defend the airbase and the terrain immediately adjacent to it. A partial exception was the continuation of the Marine helicopter support to the South Vietnamese; Karch’s helicopter units could and would ferry ARVN units into battle.

The Marines began immediately attempting to form relations with South Vietnamese security forces. One of the battalions tried to set up a joint checkpoint with the local Popular Forces (PF) militia unit. However, this effort was unsuccessful as the PF unit showed up at the checkpoint but then wandered off. Though frustrated by this lack of discipline, the Marines continued to try to build ties to the South Vietnamese.

The limited Marine mission would come to end quickly, following a decision by President Johnson in April that “approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established
and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.”

In late April, the Marines began conducting joint patrols around Da Nang and Phu Bai (a nearby airfield and intelligence collection post) with ARVN units. Johnson also decided to reinforce the Marines, so that by the end of April Karch had four battalions, four aircraft squadrons (two helicopter and two fixed wing) and additional support units totaling nearly 9,000 Marines.

The Marine presence would expand again in May, as Johnson approved another set of reinforcements. These reinforcements landed at Chu Lai, a newly established Marine base. This brought the total Marine units in South Vietnam to seven of the nine battalions of 3rd Marine Division, plus the division artillery, most of a Marine Air Wing, and additional supporting units. The 9th MEB was therefore replaced by the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), a standard Marine organization consisting of a Marine division and air wing, under Major General William Collins.

The expanding Marine presence and loosened operating guidelines enabled Marine battalion commanders to finally initiate counterinsurgency operations. The first major operation was initiated by Lieutenant Colonel David Clement, commanding 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment (3/2). 3/2 held an area overlooking the village of Le My, as cluster of hamlets eight miles northwest of Da Nang. Conversations with the Vietnamese district chief revealed this village had been swept by ARVN several times but security was never maintained.

Clement resolved to provide security to the village. In early May (less than two months after Marine combat forces entered South Vietnam), he accompanied the district

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officer to visit the village, accompanied by 3/2’s S-2 (intelligence officer) and the S-2’s scouts. This exploratory trip led to a skirmish with the Viet Cong in which one of the scouts was killed. Clement realized the village would have to be cleared and a week later, one of 3/2’s companies returned and occupied the village. The company then enlisted the villagers in clearing traps and destroying insurgent bunkers. After three days, the PFs, supported by Regional Forces (RFs), occupied the village proper while the Marines moved to provide security around the village.

In addition, Clement’s battalion began working to improve the village. His Marines trained the local PFs, built village defenses, and initiated civic action programs such as medical stations and school building. The goal of this activity, in the words of 3/2’s S-2 (who doubled as civil affairs officer), Captain Lionel Silva was “to create an administration, supported by the people, and capable of leading, treating, feeding, and protecting themselves by the time the battalion was moved to another area of operations.”

Senior Marine officers enthusiastically supported 3/2’s approach to counterinsurgency. III MAF commander Major General Collins remarked that the “Le My operation may well be the pattern for the employment of Marine Corps forces in this area.” On a visit to III MAF in mid-May, the commander of FMFP, Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, described the operation at Le My as “...a beginning, but a good beginning. The people are beginning to get the idea that U.S. generated security is a long term affair.”

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562 Quoted in Shulimson and Johnson, p. 38.
563 Both quoted in Shulimson and Johnson, p. 39.
Major General Collins was replaced as III MAF commander by Major General Lewis Walt in June. Walt also embraced the pacification mission, famously noting about Da Nang “that over 150,000 civilians were living within 81mm mortar range of the airfield, and consequently, the ‘Marines were into the pacification business.’”564 Walt, though a veteran of high-intensity conflict in World War II and Korea, explicitly claimed affiliation with the small wars subculture, recalling “that as a young officer he learned the fundamentals of his profession 'from men who had fought Sandino in Nicaragua or Charlemagne in Haiti.”565 Walt was an equally strong proponent of Marine small unit managerial culture, which was to be expected as he had been the Commandant of the Basic School from 1954 to 1956.566

Some of Walt’s battalion commanders also embraced the small wars subculture. In addition to Clement, Lieutenant Colonel William “Woody” Taylor, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment (3/4) at Phu Bai, also emphasized the importance of the population. In June 1965, Taylor, acting on advice from his adjutant/civil affairs officer, negotiated with the local ARVN division commander for authority to work with the PFs to secure villages in Zone A, an area north and east of Phu Bai.

Taylor received permission and limited operational control of the PFs in July. His executive officer drew up plans to incorporate a Marine squad into four of the six PF platoons in Zone A. Taylor then briefed the plans to his superiors, including Major General Walt, who gave him permission to proceed and detailed a Vietnamese speaking

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564 Shulimson and Johnson, p. 46.
565 Shulimson and Johnson, p. 133.
566 Basic School History, p. iv (available at Marine Corps Archives Quantico, Basic School History box 1, folder 5).
Marine 1st lieutenant named Paul Ek from headquarters to assist him in establishing a “joint action company.”

The Marines who participated in the joint action company (which Commandant Greene would recognize as an echo of retired Marine general Forney’s 1963 suggestion) were all volunteers. Each was personally vetted by 1st Lieutenant Ek, who would command the joint company. He also spent several weeks instructing the Marines about Vietnamese life.

The company was joint but American-dominated. In practice, the Marine squad leader became the combined platoon commander, with the PF commander his deputy. Ek also had a South Vietnamese warrant officer as his deputy. However, the Vietnamese district chief retained administrative responsibility for the unit, while each platoon had to work with the chief of the village they were securing. The Marine platoon commanders were therefore called upon “to maintain harmonious relations among his subordinates, the village chief, and his PFs.”

The unit, renamed the “combined action company” in October, engendered loyalty in both PFs and Marines, with several Marines volunteering to extend their tours to remain with their PF comrades.

Other Marine units also began to work with Vietnamese local forces, including the PFs and the RFs. General Walt was a supporter of all these efforts, considering the PFs in particular to be critical to security despite their poor training and equipment. He noted of the PF:

He had a signal advantage over all others; he was defending his own home, family, and neighbors. The Popular Force soldier knew every person in his community by face and name; he knew each paddy, field, trail, bush, or bamboo clump, each family shelter, tunnel, and buried rice urn. He knew in most cases the local Viet Cong guerrilla band, and it was not uncommon for him to be related to one or more of them by blood or other family ties.

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567 Shulimson and Johnson, p. 135.
Walt also persuaded the ARVN corps commander to release more PFs to Marine operational control in November, and then persuaded the general to expand the combined action approach to all three Marine areas in January 1966.\textsuperscript{568}

In addition to working closely with South Vietnamese government and security forces, the Marines also sought to integrate with U.S. civilian agencies in South Vietnam. In August 1965, Walt met with his civilian equivalent, Marcus Gordon, the regional director for the Marine area (known as I Corps) for the United States Operations Mission (USOM). They agreed to form a Joint Coordinating Council (JCC) that would include Gordon, the deputy U.S. advisor to the Vietnamese corps commander, and the III MAF civil affairs officer. Walt then persuaded General Tri, the ARVN corps commander, to send a representative as well.\textsuperscript{569}

The I Corps JCC soon became the central coordinating mechanism for counterinsurgency. Walt considered the JCC important enough to appoint his deputy as his personal representative in November. Gordon would subsequently praise Walt and the JCC for ensuring that coordination of U.S. military, U.S. civilian, and South Vietnamese activity took place. Walt also restructured the staff of the MAF and its subordinate regiments and battalions by creating a G-5/S-5 section for “civic action” in order to ensure adequate support for these activities.\textsuperscript{570}

The Marines also undertook larger scale operations in this period, including a two battalion operation that combined an amphibious landing with a helicopter blocking force. Known as Operation STARLITE, this operation in August 1965 was initiated based on SIGINT that located a Viet Cong regiment on a peninsula south of Chu Lai.

\textsuperscript{568} Shulimson and Johnson, p. 138, as is Walt quotation.
\textsuperscript{569} Shulimson and Johnson, pp. 142-143.
\textsuperscript{570} Shulimson and Johnson, pp. 143-144.
The Marines encountered stiff resistance from insurgents operating from well-defended positions and SIGINT subsequently determined that the operation only succeeded in disrupting the enemy regiment’s communications for a few days despite the casualties the Marines inflicted. The insurgent regiment had recovered sufficiently by November to launch offensive operations against Vietnamese RF positions.\textsuperscript{571}

Walt continued to pursue the same basic course in 1966: cooperation with the Vietnamese and U.S. civilians to secure the population, with sporadic larger unit operations. He pursued this course with the full support of Commandant Greene and FMFP commander Krulak and against the opposition of COMUSMACV Westmoreland. Westmoreland sought to get the Marines to undertake more large-scale search and destroy operations. Greene and Krulak did what they could to protect Walt, defending him against both Westmoreland and an impatient Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze.\textsuperscript{572}

The institutional Marine Corps also took the war in South Vietnam seriously. In August 1966, the “Southeast Asia Village” was opened at the Basic School. A replica of villages that many of the junior officers at the Basic School would soon be fighting in, the village was used for the conduct of small unit exercises.\textsuperscript{573} The staff of the Basic School also sent detachments to observe operations in South Vietnam in 1967 in order to ensure the curriculum was successfully preparing officers for operations there.\textsuperscript{574}


\textsuperscript{573} Basic School History, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{574} Basic School History, pp. 30-31. The curriculum was deemed mostly adequate, though more map reading was added as small unit patrols relied heavily on this skill.
The Marines in I Corps made extensive use of intelligence collection from both patrolling and local sources. Though they also used SIGINT collection, this was generally a supplement to other sources in the early part of Marine involvement in Vietnam. One of the most notable of these sources took advantage of an existing program, the Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") amnesty program, which allowed guerrillas to defect from the insurgency and "rally" to the government without penalty.

In the spring of 1966, several insurgents turned themselves into Marines west of Danang. Local insurgents claimed these defectors were killed by the Marines, but the Marines countered by having the defectors go talk to locals. This convinced both Marines and U.S. civilians in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) that these defectors could be useful for their detailed knowledge of the insurgency and local conditions. The Marines and civilians began working together to create a viable program. USAID produced some money to pay the defectors and they began working with Marine units as intelligence sources and scouts; the program was named the "Kit Carson Scouts" by Major General Herman Nickerson, commander of the 1st Marine Division.575

For the remainder of 1966, the program expanded across Marine units. In 1967, the funding was picked up by MACV and broadened to cover all units operating in South Vietnam. However, through the end of 1967, Marine units recruited the vast majority of scouts- 171 of the 244 Kit Carson Scouts were in I Corps.576

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The Marine Corps also developed very different metrics for evaluating units and the progress of the war. Unlike the Army, which focused on metrics to assess firepower employed and offensive operations, the Marines developed a matrix for evaluating the pacification of villages. Initiated in February-March 1966 and using metrics such as efforts to develop economic opportunities for villagers and level of village security, the Marine matrix was an attempt to systematically measure the inputs to pacification in the same way the Army sought to measure the inputs to attrition. This matrix would form the basis for the Central Intelligence Agency created Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). 577

The Marine Corps continued to expand the combined action program in 1966, focusing on the platoon element of the program, known as the Combined Action Platoon (CAP). 578 Walt set a goal of 74 CAPs for the end of 1966. However, the desired rate of expansion was not reached. The central limiting factor was not Marine willingness or personnel, though as discussed below other demands on personnel emerged in 1966. Instead it was PF recruitment and the unwillingness of many Vietnamese province and district chiefs to participate in the program that explained the limited expansion of CAP. 579

However, the Marines faced a new challenge beginning in early 1966. Large units of PAVN began to launch attacks across the border between North and South

Vietnam, known (without irony) as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The first attack was by two PAVN regiments against a remote U.S. Army Special Forces camp in March 1966.\textsuperscript{580} Three months later, intelligence indicated that roughly 5,000 men of the PAVN 324B Division were south of the DMZ in Quang Tri province. A three division offensive across the DMZ was expected.\textsuperscript{581}

General Walt had little choice but to shift forces north to handle this new, conventional threat. He moved the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Marine Division north to the border, leaving the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Division (which had been sent to reinforce III MAF) to continue operations against insurgents further south in I Corps. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Marine Division and the 1\textsuperscript{st} ARVN Division launched Operation HASTINGS against these regular PAVN units in July 1966. The largest U.S. operation in the war up until that point, HASTINGS preempted the PAVN offensive. Yet the threat from guerrillas in southern I Corps had not vanished.

Marine historian Jack Shulimson summarizes the essence of the emerging Marine problem in I Corps:

By the end of 1966, the two Marine divisions of III MAF were fighting two separate wars. In the north, the 3d Marine Division fought a more or less conventional campaign while the 1st Marine Division took over the counter-guerrilla operations in the populous south. Although by December 1966, III MAF numbered nearly 70,000 troops, one Marine general summed up the year's frustrations, "... too much real estate--do not have enough troops."\textsuperscript{582}

The lament of not enough troops pointed to another major effect of the commitment of Marine combat forces to Vietnam, the rapid expansion of the Corps. The


\textsuperscript{581} Pearson, p. 9 and Hennessy, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{582} Jack Shulimson, "The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam 1965-1971," paper presented at Texas Tech Vietnam Center symposium, 1996, p. 3. The quote is from Brigadier General Lowell E. English. English was the assistant division commander for the 3rd Marine Division, and, as West notes in \textit{The Village}, had rejected the option of removing one of the first CAP units from its village following an attack by a main-force insurgent unit. See West, pg. 131.
Marine Corps end strength expanded from 190,000 in 1965 to 261,000 in 1966. The Marine Corps had to rely on draftees for the first time since World War II and was further forced to accept some of the so-called “New Standards” men, who could not meet normal enlistment criteria. The ethos of the Corps, built around the volunteer professional nature of both enlisted and officer corps, began to erode in the face of these pressures. The Sergeant Major of III MAF in 1967-1968 and 1970-1971, Edgar Huff, commented “If I were asked to sum up the ‘Marine Experience’ in Vietnam, I would say that the Corps grew far too fast and that this growth had a devastating impact on our leadership training and combat effectiveness.”

As 1967 opened, the III MAF continued to confront the two front war, with differentiation in approach. In opposing the large conventional PAVN units, the Marines were forced to shift to larger scale operations, sometimes including multibattalion operations, as exemplified by the PRAIRIE series of operations (I-IV). These operations in northern Quang Tri province began in late 1966 and continued through 1967.

Yet even against PAVN, the Marines would often rely on smaller units. Long-range patrols by well-trained small units (platoon or smaller and drawn from the reconnaissance battalion organic to a Marine division) were used to make contact with larger PAVN units and then target them with artillery and air support. This tactic, known as STINGRAY, was widely used against both PAVN units and larger guerrilla formation and highly effective. STINGRAY demonstrates that even when evidence from the

environment became increasingly less ambiguous (besides larger formations, PAVN soldiers even wore uniforms that clearly distinguished them from southern guerrillas), the Marine approach nonetheless differed to some degree from the Army response to the same information.\textsuperscript{586}

In the southern part of I Corps, the Marines continued to emphasize small-unit pacification operations, though with fewer personnel given the demands of the conventional war along the DMZ. Nonetheless, programs such as CAP expanded, numbering 75 CAP units in mid-1967, reaching Walt’s earlier goal for the end of 1966 only six months late in spite of the difficulties the program encountered.\textsuperscript{587} The Marines also continued to cooperate with civilians through the JCC, with Walt “exercising personal suasion” to ensure a coordinated civil-military pacification campaign.\textsuperscript{588}

Walt himself continued to emphasize the importance of non-military operations in South Vietnam. In remarks to the class at the Basic School in early 1967, he emphasized the importance of the “political and psychological aspect of the Vietnamese conflict, in addition to the military considerations…”\textsuperscript{589} As Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, he would reiterate this same point to another class of the Basic School in 1969.\textsuperscript{590}

In June 1967, Lieutenant General Walt was replaced as III MAF commander by Lieutenant General Robert Cushman. Cushman, who as noted earlier had heavily promoted counterinsurgency as 3\textsuperscript{rd} Marine Division commander, retained Walt’s focus on pacification. He also typified the Marine managerial culture, preferring to issue general instructions to subordinates and avoiding intensive staff work. This caused friction with

\textsuperscript{586} Hennessy, pp. 123-124.
\textsuperscript{587} Hennessy, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{588} Hennessy, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{589} Basic School History, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{590} Basic School History, p. 36.
MACV Commander Westmoreland, who was equally typical of Army managerial
culture, with detailed plans and heavy reliance on staff. Westmoreland often felt
Cushman was complacent, while Cushman sought to mollify Westmoreland without
actually conceding any autonomy.\textsuperscript{591}

However, the war with PAVN attracted increasing attention from the Army-
dominated MACV command staff. This had serious consequences for the Marines, as the
injection of large numbers of Army forces into I Corps would constrain Marine autonomy
(previously substantial). It would also shift the location of Marine forces within I Corps,
away from the southern pacification effort and towards the frontier battles with PAVN.

The initial Army entrance \textit{en masse} (there had been a few scattered battalions
previously) into I Corps was Task Force (TF) Oregon, a provisional division cobbled
together in the spring of 1967 from units of the 101st Airborne Division, the 196th Light
Infantry Brigade, and 25th Infantry Division. TF Oregon was stationed at Chu Lai in
southern I Corps and was given responsibility for that area. This freed Marine units to be
shifted north towards the DMZ and the emerging frontier battles.\textsuperscript{592} The move also gave
the Army responsibility for pacification in part of I Corps and the approach was notably
different, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The Marines, now concentrated in northern I Corps, confronted an increasingly
well-armed conventional threat. Marine fire bases were established along the DMZ, the
western anchor being the base at Khe Sanh near the Laotian border. PAVN artillery
based in North Vietnam, including new 152mm guns, pounded these bases as well as

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\textsuperscript{592} Pearson, pp. 13-16.
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Marine efforts to secure the DMZ itself. Some PAVN troops were reported to be equipped with flak vests and even flamethrowers, hardly the hallmarks of a guerrilla force.\(^{593}\)

In September 1967, the Marine fire base at Con Thien was besieged by units of the PAVN 324B and 324C Divisions. The PAVN units relied principally on indirect fire, firing more than 3,000 rounds of rocket, artillery, and mortar at the base from September 19 to September 27. The response from U.S. forces was a multiservice air campaign, known as Operation NEUTRALIZE, against the artillery positions. Whether due to the aerial bombardment or strategic calculation, the PAVN units made no attempt to overrun the fire base and the siege lifted in October.\(^{594}\)

Even as pressure on Con Thien eased, SIGINT (which had grown in importance as the Marines faced conventional units on the border) detected PAVN units massing near the Marine firebase at Khe Sanh. By January 1968, regiments from three PAVN divisions had been detected on all sides of the base. The stage was set for a major conventional PAVN offensive, which opened on January 21 with skirmishes in the hills around the base followed by an artillery barrage against Khe Sanh.\(^{595}\)

The battle around Khe Sanh was unambiguously conventional, though taking place in rough terrain. PAVN units made lavish use of artillery, including the newly deployed 130mm field gun, which had nearly double the range of the U.S. 155mm howitzer. The North Vietnamese also employed armor in Laos and South Vietnam for the first time. Infantry supported by PT-76 light tanks (which were more effective in the

\(^{593}\) Pearson, pp. 15-18.
\(^{595}\) Shulimson, et. al., pp. 258-261 and Hanyok, pp. 320-323
mountainous jungle than heavier tanks) overran the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei west of Khe Sanh on February 7. \footnote{Shulimson, et.al., pp. 265-268 and 273-275. See also John Prados and Ray Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991).}

The U.S. response was the most massive use of aerial bombardment for tactical purposes in history. Planning for this air support, known as Operation NIAGARA, was based on Operation NEUTRALIZE and had begun early in January, enabling a rapid response. Beginning on January 22, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aviation (including B-52 heavy bombers) all participated, hammering PAVN artillery positions with 95,000 tons of ordnance over the next six weeks. \footnote{Shulimson, et. al. pp. 471-477.}

Even in the middle of this unambiguously conventional fight, the Marines continued to pursue some of the programs for building local security forces they had initiated. Most notably, there were platoons from a Combined Action Company of Marines and Popular Forces militia guarding Khe Sanh village proper and some of the approach routes to the fire base. These units put up a tough resistance to the conventional PAVN assault for a few days before withdrawing from the village. \footnote{Shulimson, et al., pp. 261-264.}

Marine forces continued to move north, as more Army units moved into southern and central I Corps. As this shuffle of forces took place, MACV commander Westmoreland, whose low opinion of Cushman had not changed, felt that another headquarters was needed in I Corps. On January 25, 1968, Westmoreland instructed his deputy, Lieutenant General Creighton Abrams, to establish MACV-Forward to oversee the clash with PAVN in northern I Corps. MACV-Forward would allow Westmoreland (via Abrams) “to observe, direct, and if necessary, control operations in the threatened...
northern provinces.” In short, the large unit war had at last been found and Westmoreland did not trust Cushman to run it.

Only days after Abrams began working to create MACV-Forward, the Tet Offensive erupted across South Vietnam. In I Corps, all provincial capitals were attacked but the major enemy efforts were assaults on Quang Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri province, and Hue, the old imperial capital. Both assaults, though initiated by sappers who had infiltrated the two cities, were essentially conventional efforts.

In Quang Tri City, the attack was launched by the 812th Regiment of the 324C Division and the 808th and 814th Main Force Battalions. Nominally Viet Cong units, the 808th and 814th had been heavily leavened with PAVN troops sent from the north. The assault was also supported by rocket artillery, likely from the 54th Artillery Regiment. The defenders, including city police, Regional Force paramilitaries, and units from the ARVN 1st Infantry Division, put up stiff resistance. A rapid counterattack was arranged by the 1st Cavalry Division (one of the Army units shifted into I Corps) and within 24 hours the attack had been substantially repulsed with heavy PAVN losses.

Hue proved to be a much more ferocious conventional fight, as PAVN had assembled the equivalent of at least fourteen battalions around the city. Armed with everything from rocket artillery to brand new RPG7 anti-tank weapons, this strike force (which merited the formation of its own special command, the Hue City Front) rapidly overwhelmed many of Hue’s defenders. PAVN forces would only be dislodged after

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599 Pearson, p. 66.
more than three weeks of intense conventional urban fighting by U.S. Army, Marine, and ARVN units. 601


The evidence from this period, combined with evidence from the earlier period, favors Hypothesis 4, organizational culture, over the alternatives. There appear to have been significant and persistent differences in Army, Army Special Forces, and Marine operations in this period. Further, these differences were greatest in areas where information was ambiguous and least where information was most clear (e.g. the border battles with PAVN), though the differences never disappear entirely.

For the Army, Hypothesis 1 appears quite weak based on this evidence, as by 1968 the Army had been writing COIN doctrine and advising COIN operations for nearly seven years and conducting its own operations for nearly three. Yet the gap between written doctrine and practice remained huge and the lack of effectiveness of that practice appeared obvious to many, including the Army's most senior officer, as the response to Chief of Staff Johnson's PROVN initiative showed.

Hypothesis 2, civilian intervention, also appears quite weak. President Kennedy had died in 1963, but his successor, Lyndon Johnson, kept many key officials in place such as Secretary of Defense McNamara, so there was strong policy continuity. Further, Johnson's interest in the war increased throughout this period until it eventually consumed him, causing him to not seek reelection in 1968.

One would expect this level of civilian intervention to have had significant effect after nearly seven years of continuity and threat. Instead, the main effect that civilian

intervention appears to have had was on written doctrine, which served a purely rhetorical function. The single major success in terms of civilian interventions was the creation of CORDS, yet far from making the military and civilian efforts co-equal, CORDS merely confirmed the supremacy of the military.

Hypothesis 2a, civilian intervention modified by non-unitary government, at first appears to have some possible support. If the attempt to intervene in military doctrine was stymied by Congress, then this would be excellent support for the hypothesis. Unfortunately, both the executive and the legislative branches were in the hands of the same party.

Further, throughout most of this period the bulk of Congress was highly supportive of the executive. The chairmen of the critical Armed Services Committees, Senator Richard Russell and Representative Carl Vinson (later Representative Mendel Rivers), were supporters of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. They were unlikely to strongly challenge the way the executive branch was handling the war even if they had misgivings. The only substantial criticism on strategy from both the House and the Senate was the need to shorten the war as much as possible, and bomb more heavily in the North to do so. Even the main proponent of this hypothesis is forced to concede that “...both Kennedy and Johnson enjoyed general support in Congress for their activities on behalf of unconventional warfare. Congress seems to have had little active role in the story.”

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603 See Gibbons, pp. 220-221 for comments by Rivers and Russell. These comments were echoed by such Republican leaders as Representative Gerald Ford and Senator Leverett Saltonstall. See Gibbons, p. 800 for Ford and p. 220 for Saltonstall.

604 Avant, p. 73.
Hypothesis 3 also appears weak. The Army gained little in the way of additional resources for the way it fought the war. For example, until 1968 its requests for troops were essentially always granted, yet there is no evidence this was uniquely a product of adopting a large-unit, firepower intensive approach. Deploying hundreds of thousands of troops to provide area security appears to have been just as viable a way to obtain resources as deploying them in search and destroy operations.

Similarly, the Army does not appear to have benefited from any increased or decreased autonomy based on its choice of operations. For example, the decision to make COMUSMACV independent of the U.S. Ambassador had been made in 1962. This would have continued regardless of the type of operations conducted.

One could, however, argue that the operations conducted were simply a reflection of some generic military propensity for offensive operations. However, evidence presented elsewhere tends to undermine this proposition. First, Chief of Staff Johnson felt these operations were the wrong approach. Second, the evidence on Marine Corps operations argues that not all ground forces responded to counterinsurgency in an identical way.

Another potential alternative explanation, organizational inertia or friction, is also vitiated by the combination of evidence from 1960-1965 and 1965-1968. By early 1968, U.S. Army officers had been advising ARVN units conducting counterinsurgency for nearly eight years and conducting counterinsurgency with Army units for nearly three. The senior commander, Westmoreland, had been in place for nearly four years (and before becoming commander had been deputy commander). Other senior commanders had also been in Vietnam for an extended period. William Depuy, for example, had been
in Vietnam as MACV Chief of Staff for nearly two years when he took command of the 1st Infantry Division in 1966.

Hypothesis 4 best fits the evidence, as it explains both why the Army conducted the operations it did and wrote the doctrine it did not follow. The operations conducted are fully predicted by the Army culture derived from the Civil War and reified in the Command and General Staff College: firepower, indifference to or active targeting of civilians, large-unit operations, management of mass mobilization, and the like. The doctrine, in contrast, was a smokescreen to limit civilian intervention in actual operations. This was a response to the domestic environment as mediated by culture in the same way the actual operations were a response to the international environment mediated by culture.

Evidence from this period on Army Special Forces operations tends to support Hypothesis 4 as well. It seems clear that Special Forces did things very differently from the regular Army, as many of its operations were covert, it worked very closely with locals and with civilian organizations like CIA, and its basic operating unit was the tiny ODA, barely the size of a regular Army squad. However, this could also be explained by Hypothesis 3 as a means to gain more resources (which Special Forces did) or even Hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, it is telling that Army Special Forces operations, with their small size and local orientation, tended to more closely resemble Marine operations rather than the rest of the Army.

Combined with the evidence from the period 1960-1965, the evidence on Marine operations from the period 1965-1968 most strongly supports Hypothesis 4, organizational culture as an explanation for doctrine. However, Hypothesis 1, doctrine is
a purely rational response to environment, is almost as strongly supported. The Marine response to the bifurcated war in I Corps seems entirely rational, with small-unit support to local forces predominating in the south and larger units with artillery and air support predominating in the north.

This convergence in the two hypotheses is a result of the unambiguous signal sent by the large PAVN units in northern I Corps. The complex political-military-social phenomenon of insurgency was almost entirely absent in this part of the war, so the effects of culture tended to be least operational here. However, as approaches like STINGRAY patrols illustrate, even here managerial culture still had some effect as Marines used small unit approaches to the big unit war.

Hypothesis 2 and 2a receive some support as well, given the Kennedy administration’s desire to promote COIN. However, in the post-Kennedy period senior Marine leaders like Commandant Greene and Fleet Marine Force Pacific Commander Krulak were forced to defend General Walt’s approach to COIN against attacks by impatient civilians such as Secretary Nitze.

Similarly, Hypothesis 3, organizational imperatives for autonomy, resources and prestige, receives little support. Marine autonomy was guaranteed early in the war by exclusive control of I Corps, which was independent of the Marine approach to COIN. Autonomy eroded later for reasons equally independent of the Marine approach to COIN. Resources were equally abundant regardless of approach. Moreover, the Marines actually grew in end-strength more rapidly than the organization would have liked, further indicating the indeterminacy of generic propensities.
Evolution of Written Doctrine in the Army and Marine Corps, 1967

By March 1967, U.S. combat forces had been engaged in Vietnam for two years. New doctrine manuals began to appear in this period and as one might expect, there had been some evolution. For one, the new manuals were longer. The March 1967 version of FM 31-16 was about 25% longer than the February 1963 version. Some shifts in terminology are also visible; FM 31-16 uses the term “internal defense and development” rather than counterinsurgency; this shift is also seen in the September 1968 version of FM 100-5:

The term “counterinsurgency” is used by the joint services, other governmental agencies, and many foreign countries. Within the U.S. Army, depending on the context, use of “stability operations” or “internal defense and internal development” is preferred to “counterinsurgency.”

Yet despite these cosmetic differences, the doctrine produced in this period is fundamentally similar to earlier doctrine. For example, the 1967 version of FM 31-16 notes the primary importance of the population and the need for civil-military integration:

Since the essence of the counterguerrilla campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government, the importance of civil affairs is paramount... in internal defense operations, because of the importance of isolating the guerrillas from the people, civil affairs becomes one of the primary missions of the counterguerrilla force. This is because all internal defense operations plans must be based on an integrated civil-military approach designed to progressively reassert host government control and gain the trust, confidence, and active cooperation of the people.

Similarly, the 1968 version of FM 100-5 describes the roots of insurgency much as earlier versions did: “Government ultimately depends on the acquiescence if not the active support of its citizens... Thus, the basic causes of insurgency are the existence of one or more grievances and lack of faith in the government’s ability or desire to correct them.”

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605 FM 100-5, September 1968, p. 13-1.
In terms of organization for COIN, the 1967 FM 31-16 reiterates the call for the establishment of pacification committees, though they are renamed “area coordination centers” or ACC. It goes into somewhat more detail on this organization than the earlier version; it specifically calls for the establishment of ACC at all levels of political organization, especially the province, district and village levels. The membership of the ACC is also enumerated with the military, intelligence agencies, paramilitary, and police being the foremost members. FM 31-16 also calls for Civil-Military Advisory Committees (CMAC) to be established to advise the ACC, with members including judges, religious leaders, labor unions, and other respected members of the community.608

In terms of operations, the revised doctrines of the late 1960s are still similar to their predecessors, though again often with more elaboration. FM 31-16 reasserts the importance of the population and provides a caution on the use of firepower:

Military operations must take into account protection of the civilian population. This is a problem in counterguerrilla operations because the guerrillas usually hides himself in the civilian population and fights from that base of support. Bringing artillery or airpower to bear on a town from which sniper fire was received may neutralize the guerrilla action, but it will almost certainly alienate the civilian population as result of casualties among noncombatants.609

FM 31-16 also devotes sections to the importance of consolidation (also known as clear and hold) operations as well as civil affairs.610

Doctrine in this later period continued to emphasize the critical importance of intelligence for COIN. Cultural, political, and economic intelligence was still seen as important alongside traditional order of battle. In addition, FM 100-5 states that the need

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608 FM 31-6, March 1967, p. 32-33
609 FM 31-6, March 1967, p. 36.
610 Ibid., pp. 63-69 and 83-90.
for and staffing requirements of intelligence in COIN are higher than in normal operations.\textsuperscript{611}

Besides the formal and general doctrine produced by the Army, MACV also began to produce its own COIN doctrine specific to the conflict. One example is the *Handbook for Military Support of Pacification*, published in February 1968. This guide provides descriptions of pacification and the military role in supporting pacification, as well as numerous specific TTPs for COIN. The beginning of its introduction provides perhaps as clear and succinct a definition of COIN as can be found:

Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in the government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion... The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.\textsuperscript{612}

It also provides guidance on how many of the other elements of COIN doctrine relate to the specific environment of Vietnam. Yet practice continued to diverge from doctrinal rhetoric.

Marine written doctrine evolved in response to the Vietnam experience but did not fundamentally change. In December 1967, the basic guidance for COIN, FMFM-21 was reissued with a new title, FMFM 8-2, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. The new manual was approximately 50\% longer than the previous one, yet this was principally elaboration on the same themes presented in FMFM-21.

\textsuperscript{611} FMFM 8-2, December 1967, p. 28 and FM 100-5, September 1968, p. 13-5.
In terms of the basic concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency, FMFM 8-2 used the same definition as FMFM-21 essentially verbatim.613 It also reiterated the importance of intelligence collection, noting that requirements were higher in COIN than in conventional war.614

The new manual did expand significantly on the importance of small unit operations. It devoted an entire chapter to the subject, summarized as:

Operations against guerrillas are characterized by small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area . . . . The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although overall patrolling policy and certain special patrols may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and need for rapid response makes it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalions, companies, or platoons may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration.615

The managerial locus of Marine COIN clearly remained at the battalion and below level.


The Tet Offensive of 1968 finally provided Westmoreland a chance to effectively apply the firepower he had amassed in Vietnam. The results were devastating to the Vietcong, but the mere fact that the Vietcong could launch such a major effort after almost three years of search and destroy was equally devastating to Westmoreland. He was “kicked upstairs” to become Army Chief of Staff, while his deputy, General Creighton Abrams, replaced him in July 1968.616

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613 See U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, December 1967, p. 3.
614 FMFM 8-2, p. 28.
615 FMFM 8-2, pp. 72–74.
616 See Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1999) for a positive treatment of Abrams time as COMUSMACV.
Army Counterinsurgency, 1968-1971

Abrams’ understanding of the war was clearly different from Westmoreland’s. After observing the war for several years he had come to accept, as written COIN doctrine elaborated, that pacification was a more appropriate strategy than search and destroy. Abrams found many of the recommendations in PROVN to be very useful as well. He therefore began acting to shift operations towards small unit action and more restraint in firepower. Some credit him, along with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and the CIA’s William Colby with shifting the Army to effective pacification, which was undone by the 1972 and 1975 conventional offensives of the NVA. 617

Closer inspection of what actually took place after Tet reveals change was more apparent than real. Even a commander as senior and well-respected as Abrams was unable to alter Army operations substantially. Abrams’ bemoaned the inability of various subordinates, including battalion and division commanders, to change their conception of the war and thus the actual conduct of operations. 618 This was in part because battles like Khe Sanh and Hue, in which the enemy stood and fought rather than running, appeared to validate the large unit/firepower intensive operations the Army had been pursuing.

Those of Abrams’ senior subordinates who accepted his shift in approach experienced similar frustrations in attempting to change the conduct of their own subordinate units. Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais, commander of the XXIVth Corps in 1969-1970,

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617 *Ibid.* See also Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Vietcong,* (Naval Institute Press; Annapolis, MD; 1997) and William Colby, *Lost Victory: A firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen Year Involvement in Vietnam,* (Contemporary Books; Chicago; 1989).
described many of his subordinate units as “thrashing around spending untold thousands of man-hours looking for an elusive enemy.” He similarly noted a failure by his division commanders to make their own brigade and battalion commanders “understand our pacification goals and developed proper attitudes with Vietnamese officials and other personnel in populated areas.” 619

Of course, less than eight months prior to his complaints about his division commanders, Zais himself had commanded the 101st Airborne Division when it launched a bloody attack on the strategically unimportant Hill 937. This attack, in May 1969, was conducted during Operation APACHE SNOW, an attempt to clear the A Shau Valley using three battalions of the 101st. The attack on the heavily fortified Hill 937, dubbed “Hamburger Hill” by those who fought for it, was consonant with earlier firepower-intensive search and destroy operations. Zais himself was forced to admit this; an official Army history notes: “Defending the operation, the commander of the 101st, Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, acknowledged that the hill’s only significance was that the enemy occupied it. ‘My mission,’ he said, ‘was to destroy enemy forces and installations. We found the enemy on Hill 937, and that is where we fought them.’” 620

Other accounts reinforce the view that despite Abrams’ efforts to force change from the top, Army operations changed little. Robert Graham, an infantry sergeant in the 4th Infantry Division during 1969-1970, candidly noted that “unofficially, attrition remained in force.” 621 Graham further noted “we relied heavily on firepower... It was

standard practice for American units upon contacting the enemy to sit tight and summon fire support." 622

The career under Abrams of Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell is a good example of the limits of change. Ewell commanded the 9th Infantry Division in the densely populated Mekong Delta in 1968-1969, where his obsession with body counts and kill ratios earned him the nickname “Delta Butcher.” Informed of Abrams’ desired shift in approach, Ewell is alleged to have protested “I have made my entire career and reputation by going 180 degrees counter to orders such as this.” 623

Ewell, aided by his division Chief of Staff Ira Hunt, would subsequently make plain the 9th Infantry Division approach. Writing in 1973 in an Army official publication, Ewell and Hunt defended search and destroy:

> When one first observes the fighting in Vietnam, there is a tendency to assume that the current tactics are about right and that previous tactics were rather uninspired if not wrong. The first conclusion is probably correct, the second is probably wrong. For example, one hears much criticism of the Search and Destroy Operations which were extensively used in 1967 and before. However, if one looks at the situation then existing and what was actually done, the tactics were pretty well chosen and did the job. Any reasonably effective commander, after observing the enemy operate a while, can cope with him reasonably well. 624

Elsewhere in the same publication, he derides pacification via development:

> “More often than not, units in Vietnam emphasized pacification by stressing civic action efforts. In our opinion, this was a mistake as long as the enemy retained even a modest military capability. In the 9th Division, we always stressed the military effort.” 625

As for the negative effects of firepower, Ewell states that he was careful to avoid civilian casualties. Yet it is telling that in a volume devoted to statistical assessment of

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622 Ibid., p. 134.
623 Quoted in Hunt, p. 213.
625 Ewell and Hunt, p. 160
performance that includes a quarterly breakdown of kilometers of road constructed by the
9th Infantry Division on the previous page, Ewell is unable or unwilling to provide a
numerical estimate of civilian casualties, merely claiming “we had only moderate civilian
casualties and damage.”\textsuperscript{626} That an officer so enamored of operations research would not
bother to track this number (or having tracked it would not want to include it) says much
about Ewell’s real priorities.

Moreover, Ewell conducted Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS, a massive six month
operation using three brigades of the 9th Infantry Division. From December 1968 to May
1969, the operation used massive amounts of firepower, including over 3,000 airstrikes.
The official body count claimed by Ewell was a staggering 10,899 enemy dead. Yet only
748 weapons were captured; subsequent reporting indicates that SPEEDY EXPRESS was
perhaps the most brutal and indiscriminate U.S. operation of the entire war, with some
suggesting that the toll of civilian deaths may have been half of the reported body count.
Moreover, this took place in the Delta, an area where large insurgent units were rare and
PAVN conventional units essentially absent.\textsuperscript{627}

One would not expect an officer advocating such an approach to prosper if
operations actually changed significantly under Abrams. Yet Abrams praised Ewell and
promoted him to command II Field Force, an Army corps command, where he continued
to serve under Abrams in 1969-1970.\textsuperscript{628} He would subsequently serve as a military
adviser at the peace talks in Paris. Whatever Abrams himself may have believed about

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{626}{Ewell and Hunt, pp. 180-181; quotation from 181.}
\footnotetext{627}{On SPEEDY EXPRESS, see Kevin Buckley, “Pacification’s Deadly Price,” \textit{Newsweek}, June 19, 1972; Hunt, p. 189; Hunt, p. 189; and David Hackworth, \textit{Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts} (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p. 370. Hackworth was a battalion commander in the 9th Infantry Division during SPEEDY EXPRESS.}
\footnotetext{628}{See Hunt, p. 320, n. 23 and Buckley.}
\end{footnotes}
COIN, much of the rest of the Army continued to do more or less the same type of operations it had undertaken under Westmoreland, and continued to reward those who did it well.

Other operations followed the same pattern as SPEEDY EXPRESS, if somewhat less egregiously, through the end of the war. For example, as late as February 1970, the Americal Division launched a multibattalion sweep of the Batangan Peninsula known as Operation NANTUCKET BEACH. Army historian Richard Hunt concludes that operations such as this and the offensive at Hamburger Hill “challenged the notion that U.S. forces were operating differently under Abrams.”629 He further notes that there is little evidence “that subordinate commanders heeded Abrams’s new operational precepts.”630 Despite a concerted effort by a widely respected four star operational commander, Army operations did not change substantially over the course of the war.

Marine Counterinsurgency Operations, 1968-1971

In the wake of the Tet Offensive and Khe Sanh, the Marines began working to restore order to the countryside. However, the two subsequent Communist offensives (the so-called “Mini-Tets” of May and September 1968) and the enduring PAVN threat on the border limited progress. The latter in particular limited Marine ability to do more in terms of counterinsurgency, as General Cushman later lamented.631

Among other effects, the demands of the border war had limited expansion of the CAP program. The target for the end of 1967 had been 114 platoons but only 79 were

629 Hunt, pp. 231-232; quotation from p. 232.
630 Hunt, p. 233.
631 Shulimson, et. al., p. 607-608.
However, post-Tet the Marines resumed expansion (albeit slow) of the program. By July 1968, there were 93 platoons in the program. By the end of the year there were 102 platoons.

In addition to the border war with PAVN and continuing problems recruiting Popular Forces for the program, the expanding Army presence in I Corps limited the growth of CAP. MACV-Forward was converted to a Provisional Army Corps in March 1968, which then became the XXIVth Corps in August 1968. This corps was given responsibility for the border war, effectively controlling tactical units in northern I Corps. While it was nominally subordinate to III MAF, like the Americal Division earlier, XXIVth Corps had substantial autonomy. Note that this created the curious phenomenon of an Army three-star general being responsible for many Marine units in the north, while Army units in the south reported to a Marine three star general.

Neither the Army corps nor its subordinate divisions had much use for CAP. The Army’s 1st Cavalry Division sought to keep CAP Marines out of its area of operations in early 1968. Later in the year, Lieutenant General Richard Stilwell, the XXIVth Corps Commander, was reported to be “very vociferous to his staff with respect to the CAP Program . . . [and later] voiced strong objections to having them [Combined Action Platoons] placed along the LOCs [lines of communication].” As CAP units had to rely on local U.S. units for support if attacked, this Army disdain led Cushman to cancel plans to expand CAP in the Army area of responsibility between Hue and Quang Tri.

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634 Shulimson, et. al. p. 625.
635 Pearson, p. 74.
637 Shulimson, et. al. p. 625.
638 Shulimson, et. al. p. 625.
In the areas of southern I Corps where Marines were still operating, small-unit COIN remained the template for operations post-Tet. An example is Operation ALLEN BROOK, which began as a two company operation in Quang Nam province in May 1968. Launched after STINGRAY patrols began making frequent contact with enemy units, the operation focused on Go Noi Island, a long-time Communist stronghold. Both local guerrillas and PAVN regulars were suspected to be massing there for what would become the first “Mini-Tet.”

After the two Marine companies and other STINGRAY patrols made substantial enemy contact, the operation was reinforced by an additional two companies. At this point, the Marines executed a tactical deception, appearing to end the operation by withdrawing by helicopter but then marching back on to the island under cover of darkness. Over the course of the remainder of the operation, the Marines encountered at least one enemy battalion operating from prepared defensive positions, leading to additional companies being committed. The operation eventual destroyed a regimental headquarters and was credited with spoiling the planned Communist offensive in the area during the May “Mini-Tet,” as no major attacks took place in Quang Nam in this period.

Operation ALLEN BROOK was marked by very active small unit reconnaissance through STINGRAY patrols rather than simply pursuing a large enemy unit. Further, it had a goal (spoiling an offensive to improve pacification) apart from merely running up a body count. However, the Marines in this operation were, like their Army counterparts, quite willing to use artillery and air support.

Marine operations for the remainder of the war continued to combine larger unit actions against PAVN forces near the border with small unit actions against local guerrilla forces around population centers. The larger unit operations decreased in 1969, as PAVN units became less active while recovering from the intense fighting of 1968. A Marine operational summary for September 1969 notes that the Marines conducted fifteen battalion or larger operations that month without making significant contact.641

One of these large unit operations, DEFIANT STAND, was an exception in that it was not on the border. Instead it was a major amphibious combined operation with the Korean Marine brigade against an island south of Da Nang, proving that the advance base subculture was still alive and well. The nearly superfluous nature of this amphibious operation is clear even in the official account, which notes that the landing was unopposed and encountered no large enemy units.642 Operation BOLD MARINER in January 1969 was similar; an amphibious operation conducted jointly with the Americal Division’s RUSSELL BEACH on the Batangan Peninsula. BOLD MARINER, like most Marine amphibious operations during Vietnam, was not particularly successful yet the Marines kept at them.643

Despite the pressure on border, which was reduced but not absent, the Marines continued to conduct small unit operations. The Marines conducted over 4,000 small unit patrols and 249 company-size operations in September 1969, despite Marine troop withdrawals begun earlier in the year. In addition to these small unit operations near
population centers, the Marines continued to maintain frequent STINGRAY reconnaissance patrolling in outlying areas.644

The Marines also continued to maintain the combined action program, though the programs expansion remained slow due to continuing shortages of personnel, both Marine and PF though more the latter. The program reached 114 platoons in August 1969, remaining at that level through March 1970. The number of platoons in the program peaked at about 120 before beginning to decline in July 1970.645

This is particularly noteworthy because Marine troop withdrawals from Vietnam had begun in 1969, indicating the Marines remained committed to the program even as available manpower fell. The 3rd Marine Division was one of the first units to leave Vietnam, completing its redeployment to the United States in November 1969.646 In March 1970, the command arrangement for III MAF and XXIVth Corps was reversed to reflect the plummeting number of Marines in Vietnam.647 Now under the direction of an Army higher headquarters, Marine autonomy, which had previously been high, was constrained. It is therefore not surprising that by the end of 1970, the combined action program had contracted to only 38 platoons before being formally ended in May 1971 as the final Marine units left Vietnam.648

Marine total end strength peaked in 1969-1970 at almost 310,000.649 This was the largest the Marine Corps had been since World War II and the strains on the force were

high. Commandant Leonard Chapman, who had replaced Greene in 1968, oversaw a rapid decrease in Marine Corps end strength, explicitly embracing the return to small unit professionalism that was central to Marine Corps culture. By 1972-1973, Marine end strength was down to 198,000. It would fluctuate only modestly around this number for the remainder of the Cold War (the low being just over 185,000 and the high just under 200,000) even though defense budgets varied widely.

**Assessing Theoretical Explanations for Doctrine and Operations, 1968-1971**

The evidence from this period further supports Hypothesis 4 while providing little support for alternative explanations. Hypothesis 1 does particularly poorly, as the senior operational commander, Abrams, decides to shift the operational approach yet was unable to do so despite considerable evidence that old approach was failing. Hypothesis 2 and 2a do not receive support either, though the change in administration that took place in January 1969 presumably meant that civilian intervention waned.

Hypothesis 3 is similarly unsupported- the Army had by 1968 received all the resources it was going to get to fight the war. This was made clear to Westmoreland, whose request for additional troops was turned down before he was kicked upstairs. Moreover, the Army had been forced to reduce operational readiness in Europe in order to fight the war in Vietnam. Far from bringing in new resources, Army operations in Vietnam had cannibalized the force.

Given the political constraints of limited war, any alternative Army approach to operations in Vietnam might similarly have cannibalized the force. Yet if resources and

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650 Millet and Shulimson, pp. 406-408.
operations were not linked, then Hypothesis 3 is indeterminate and thus provides little in the way of explanation. Put another way, it seems likely the Army was going to have 300-400,000 troops to fight the war in Vietnam regardless of how it chose to conduct operations. Some other factor must explain the choice of operations.

Hypothesis 4, organizational culture, appears strongly supported by the evidence. Many in the Army continued to conduct operations as they had, buoyed by the border battles like Khe Sanh where the enemy, sometimes even wearing uniforms, did choose to stand and fight conventionally. Further, operations such as SPEEDY EXPRESS are clear echoes of the “hard hand of war” philosophy that emerged from the Civil War and incorporated into the Army’s professional education.

These types of operations further went in the face of attempts by senior commanders, many of whom had conducted search and destroy operations themselves, to impose change. At the same time, written doctrine continued to proclaim an entirely different approach than that actually used, in response to previous and ongoing (though less intense) civilian intervention. This suggests more than mere organizational inertia.

The evidence from the period 1968-1971 most strongly supports Hypothesis 4, that organizational culture is the strongest determinant of doctrine. The Marine Corps continued to emphasize and conduct small-unit operations. It further continued to focus extensively on cooperating with local forces and other organizations, most notably though the combined action program. As with the earlier period, there is some support for Hypothesis 1, rational response, but the practice of Army units in I Corps in the same period casts doubt on this hypothesis.
There is no support for Hypothesis 2 or 2a, though this is not surprising as there is little civilian intervention in this period. There is equally little support for Hypothesis 3, as Marine resources and autonomy in Vietnam declined during this period, but for reasons exogenous to Marine doctrine. Indeed the Marines maintained the combined action program in spite of this decline, though the number of platoons contracted in size after the Army began the senior command in I Corps.
Chapter 7: A Natural Experiment in I Corps, 1966-1968

As briefly noted earlier, in 1967 large Army formations were introduced into I Corps for the first time, beginning in southern I Corps. This provides an excellent natural experiment for comparing Marine and Army counterinsurgency operations, as the Army units replaced Marine units shifted northward to the DMZ and Laotian border. Army units would therefore begin operating in the exact same terrain and presumably against the exact same enemy the Marines had. Any differences in operations must come from differences in the two organizations rather than environmental effects.

The following section will focus on operations in a single province of I Corps, Quang Ngai, in 1966-1968. Quang Ngai provides an excellent environment for a comparison of the two services, as it was the southernmost province in I Corps yet the Vietcong political-military infrastructure was very strong in it. Therefore, unlike northern I Corps it was not attacked by large PAVN divisions presenting an unambiguously conventional threat, nor was it an area with only a handful of guerrillas with little presence in the local villages.

This chapter will proceed by briefly describing the geography and history of Quang Ngai before turning to Marine operations in the province in 1966-1967. It then contrasts this with Army operations there in 1967-1968. It concludes with a brief micro-level comparison during the same period of two villages, Binh Nghia and Son My, located in adjacent districts in northern Quang Ngai.

Quang Ngai is located along the South China Sea coast of Vietnam. Now roughly at the mid-point of unified Vietnam, it was one of the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In the 1960s, much of the population was close to coast, which has many rivers
and good land for rice cultivation. West of the coast, the land becomes higher and hillier as it climbs into the Annamite Mountains; population density is much lower in this region. The province was buffered from infiltration (particularly of large PAVN units) from the west via Laos or Cambodia by neighboring provinces Kontum and Quang Tin. The large Marine base and airfield of Chu Lai was just across the northern border of Quang Ngai in Quang Tin province. 652

Quang Ngai had allegedly been known for strong sympathy with North Vietnam and the insurgency since 1954. While there is some debate about exactly how strong insurgent presence was before 1964, it was clear to all observers that by 1964-1965 the insurgency was extremely well-established in the province. According to several, it had replaced the government in most if not all villages, leaving the province capital, Quang Ngai City, and the smaller district capitals islands in a hostile sea. 653

As noted earlier, this part of I Corps was the last to see the introduction of Marine forces, which took place with the establishment of Chu Lai in May 1965. Operation STARLITE, the first amphibious assault of the war, took place in Quang Ngai three months later. However, Marine operations in this area for most of 1965 were limited principally to establishing a perimeter around Chu Lai, though some training of local PF troops took place. 654

This would change in 1966, as the Marines expanded personnel and operations in the area. The 1st Marine Division was deployed to Chu Lai early in the year and the

653 Schell, pp. 195-197 and Interview with Major Edward Tipshus, United States Marine Corps History and Museums Division Oral History Project, January 12, 1966 (available at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive). Tipshus had served as an artillery advisor to the ARVN division in Quang Ngai in 1964.
654 Shulimson and Johnson, p. 138.
division commander, Major General Lewis Fields, was given responsibility for all forces in the Chu Lai AO, which included Quang Ngai. At the same time, III MAF commander Walt received permission from the Vietnamese to introduce the CAP program into the Chu Lai AO.\footnote{Shulimson and Johnson, p. 138.}

**Marine Operations in Quang Ngai, 1966**

One of the first Marine operations of 1966 was ordered by MACV as part of a larger offensive (according to one source, this was an intentional move on the part of COMUSMACV Westmoreland to force the Marines to participate in a large unit offensive).\footnote{Edward Murphy, *Semper Fi: Vietnam, From Da Nang to the DMZ Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965-1975* (New York: Random House,), p. 45.} This offensive, Operation Masher/White Wing, would be the first to cross corps area boundaries and would involve Marines, soldiers, Korean Marines, and ARVN soldiers.\footnote{See David Ott, *Field Artillery, 1954-1973* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), pp. 98-101.} The U.S. Marine component was Operation Double Eagle, which would be the largest amphibious assault since Korea, ultimately using four battalions.

DOUBLE EAGLE would be conducted in the southernmost district of Quang Ngai, known as Duc Pho, beginning on January 28th. The Army's 1st Cavalry Division would launch its portion of the operation across Quang Ngai's southern border in the province of Binh Dinh on the 24th. The ARVN and Korean Marines would provide additional support.\footnote{Murphy, pp. 45-46.}
The Marine operation combined both the advance base subcultures proclivity for landing operations with the small unit emphasis of the entire Corps. Realizing that the enemy would likely avoid contact, the Marine commander for the operation, Brigadier General Jonas Platt, deployed small reconnaissance teams to a Special Forces camp in the inland hills of Quang Ngai on January 12th. These units immediately began patrolling, sighting several insurgent units and, in STINGRAY patrol fashion, would often call air or artillery strikes on them.\footnote{Murphy, p. 46 and Headquarters, 3rd Marine Division, “Commander’s Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons Learned’ Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I and II,” p. 4 and 9-10 (available in the US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection at Texas Tech Vietnam Archive). DOUBLE EAGLE II was a redeployment of the forces used in DOUBLE EAGLE to Quang Nam province immediately after DOUBLE EAGLE ended.}

The amphibious assault, though plagued by bad weather, was unopposed. The Marines sweeping inland encountered no significant enemy resistance. B-52 Arclight strikes scheduled by MACV for January 30th took place despite Platt’s request to delay them until he could make better use of them. The Marines turned south in February, sweeping to the province border in several teams composed of two rifle companies with an 81mm mortar platoon. General Platt apparently found this operation not particularly effective, choosing to close it on February 17th even as the 1st Cavalry to the south continued attempting to find and fix the enemy.\footnote{Murphy, p. 47-48.}

The after action report for the operation noted that the insurgent units previously confirmed to be in the area (likely through SIGINT though the report does not specify the source) were apparently aware of the impending operation and had withdrawn at least three days prior. The after action report then notes “…planning for operations in this environment must be executed quickly and under the most stringent security measures in...
order to achieve tactical surprise.” Yet the report indicates that not much more could be
done in terms of security, as it describes the planning for DOUBLE EAGLE as close hold
and kept at the TOP SECRET level until the operation launched. It also describes the
rapid dispersal of Marines across wide areas in attempt to make contact with large enemy
units, ultimately with out success. 661 Perhaps the most telling sign of Marine
dissatisfaction with DOUBLE EAGLE is the fact that no similar large unit operations
would be launched by Marines in this area of Quang Ngai. 662 All would be smaller and
much shorter.

Even as DOUBLE EAGLE was conducted, many small unit operations were
being conducted in Quang Ngai. In the month of February 1966, the three battalions of
the 7th Marine Regiment conducted a total of 1306 small unit patrols and ambushes. This
represented 10% of all small unit actions conducted by all U.S. ground forces in Vietnam
during that month. 663 7th Marines would be responsible for Quang Ngai for the rest of the
Marines’ time in the province, though the battalions in the province would change, as
discussed below.

The following month, the Marines conducted three large unit operations in Quang
Ngai: UTAH, TEXAS, and INDIANA. These operations were in northern Quang Ngai.
Each was small and brief relative to DOUBLE EAGLE, involving only two Marine

661 “Commander’s Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons Learned,” Operation DOUBLE EAGLE I
and II,” p. 1
662 See Fleet Marine Force Pacific Western Pacific Situation Report, May 12, 1967, 2 (C), which notes that
Task Force Oregon initiated Operation MALHEUR in the same area previously covered in DOUBLE
EAGLE I (available in OP MALHEUR Folder in the US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War
Documents Collection at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive).
small unit operations were much smaller than a company, generally ranging from a four man fire team to a
platoon. This and all other cited Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam records are
available in the Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam Folder, Marine Corps History Division
Vietnam War Documents Collection at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive).
battalions each and lasting from three to six days. Tellingly, TEXAS and INDIANA were launched in response to an attack by a large enemy unit on a South Vietnamese unit (a fairly unambiguous signal). Only UTAH was launched offensively, based on intelligence on the location of a main force unit (likely through SIGINT). The Marines, while generally seeing little profit after DOUBLE EAGLE in simply beating the bush for large enemy units, were willing to respond to large enemy attacks with equal or greater numbers.

At the same time, small unit actions were still conducted intensively. There was a slight drop, as each of the three battalions of 7th Marines was involved in the three large unit operations. Nonetheless, 1178 small unit operations were conducted in Quang Ngai. Note that the small unit totals only include actions by Marine line infantry battalions. They do not include STINGRAY-type patrols, which were conducted by separate Marine reconnaissance units.

In April 1966, two large unit operations were launched in Quang Ngai. The first was Operation NEVADA, which sent two Marine battalions to the Batangan Peninsula where Operation STARLITE had been conducted. It lasted only six days and, by Marine assessment, produced few results. The second, Operation HOT SPRINGS, was launched when a defector gave the location for an insurgent regimental headquarters in the area where the three operations from the previous month were conducted. Two reinforced Marine battalions were dispatched and overran the headquarters in the course of a single

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day, though the operation officially lasted four days.\textsuperscript{666} Small unit operations in the province for the month increased to 1219.\textsuperscript{667}

The month of May saw the introduction of an additional Marine battalion to Quang Ngai. Four large unit operations (of unknown size but none apparently noteworthy) lasting from two to six days each were launched in the province. The number of small unit actions increased dramatically to 2073.\textsuperscript{668}

June saw the departure of the extra battalion, leaving the three battalions of the 7th Marines alone in Quang Ngai. Only one large unit operation was conducted lasting only three days. Small unit actions dropped back to 1346.\textsuperscript{669} July had only one large unit operation, a return to the Batangan Peninsula, lasting four days. Small unit operations for July totaled 1167.\textsuperscript{670}

In August, Korean Marines took over responsibility for a large portion of Quang Ngai and one battalion of 7th Marines was shifted north to focus on Quang Tin province. As a result, Marine small unit operations in Quang Ngai dropped dramatically. Only 437 were recorded, though some of the data appears to be missing. Only one large unit operation, Operation JACKSON, was conducted. JACKSON used two Marine battalions in northern Quang Ngai and only lasted three days.\textsuperscript{671}

In September, no large unit operations were launched. However, the entire 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment was deployed in Operation GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1 to protect the rice harvest in Quang Ngai from insurgent taxation. The Marines considered

\textsuperscript{666} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, April 1966, pp. 11-17.
\textsuperscript{668} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, May 1966, pp. 11-17.
\textsuperscript{670} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, July 1966, pp. 7 and 17.
\textsuperscript{671} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, August 1966, pp. 21 and 32.
the operation very successful as it forced the enemy to engage or else cede vital rice supplies. The battalion was commanded by Littleton W.T. Waller II, the grandson of one of the first generation of small wars Marines. Small unit action for the month totaled only 583. However, this was relying on only 3rd Battalion. The reason for this was that 2nd Battalion had been dispatched to fight on the DMZ.672

The next month saw no large unit operations but the sole Marine battalion responsible for the province, now 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, conducted 1187 small unit operations.673 November likewise saw no large unit actions with the battalion initiating 892 small unit actions.674 The year closed out with another month of no large unit operations and the battalion conducting 987 small unit operations.675

In parallel to the efforts of the line Marine units, the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept was also employed in Quang Ngai. CAPs were introduced to Quang Ngai province in the summer of 1966. One of the first was at the village of Binh Nghia, with Marines entering the village on June 10th.676 Other CAP units were created in the province throughout the remainder of 1966.

CAP came to the province relatively late (nearly a year after the first CAP units were formed) for three reasons. First, the Chu Lai base, from which CAP Marines for the province would be drawn, became operational somewhat later than the other bases. Second, permission to expand the program to the area around Chu Lai was given by the ARVN corps commander in January 1966, but he was then fired in March (for unrelated reasons). His firing provoked an intense political crisis, with large protests in the cities

673 Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, October 1966, pp. 20 and 34.
676 West, p. 14.

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and a fear of troop mutiny, in the region that lasted until June. The controversy required
mediation by the III MAF commander and essentially halted CAP expansion from March
to May as no decisions could be made. Finally, Quang Ngai, as noted, was heavily
pro-insurgent, making it difficult to find PF units willing to participate. Nonetheless,
there were fourteen CAPs in the vicinity of Chu Lai by the end of September 1966
(unfortunately these are not broken out by province, but at least one was in Quang
Ngai).  

Marine Operations in Quang Ngai, 1967

In late January 1967, Marines in Quang Ngai initiated a new operation that
differed from both the lengthy large unit sweeps that the Marines used sparingly and the
small unit patrols and ambushes that formed the bulk of operations. This operation, DE
SOTO, was a relief of an ARVN battalion in the Duc Pho district of Quang Ngai (south
of the Korean Marines). This ARVN unit would be transferred elsewhere, leaving the
Marines responsible for its former area of operations.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was chosen to replace the ARVN battalion. This
battalion had been one of those responsible for Quang Ngai until its focus was shifted
north to Quang Tin and participation in the battles near the DMZ. DE SOTO would
represent a new type of operation for the Marines because the entire battalion would
remain in the former ARVN position (a hill near the village of Nui Dang) rather than

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677 For discussion of this crisis, see Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, April 1966,
was most intense and long-lasting in Hue; see Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam,
June 1966, pp. 32-33.
679 Murphy, p. 98.
conducting operations from Chu Lai or outposts near the large base. This posed significant logistical challenges (all resupply for the entire battalion was done by helicopter from either Chu Lai or a Navy ship offshore) and would expose the battalion command post to attack. However, Marine leadership deemed a longer term presence in this area sufficiently important to make this challenge and risk worthwhile.680

DE SOTO began on the 26th of January and would continue through early April. During that time, additional companies or even battalions would enter the area of operations, making it a large unit operation. However, with two major exceptions, the activity undertaken as part of DE SOTO took the form of small unit patrols and ambushes. Operating from Nui Dang, small units of the 3rd Battalion patrolled and “set up numerous ambushes every night.”681

The first exception to this pattern of small unit activity came in the initial phase of the operation. The ARVN battalion had rarely ventured forth from Nui Dang, so insurgents had been able to establish fortified positions in nearby villages. Marine companies attempting to search these villages encountered heavy enemy fire from concrete bunkers. Despite heavy use of indirect fire assets, including air strikes and naval gunfire, 3rd Battalion’s rifle companies took substantial casualties.682

As a result of this fierce resistance, two companies from 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment were brought in as reinforcements. After nearly two weeks of intense fighting, during which the battalion command post at Nui Dang was attacked by an insurgent unit,

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680 Murphy, pp. 98-99.
681 Murphy, p. 100.
all of these heavily fortified villages were cleared. The Marines were then clear to shift to small unit operations, gradually expanding the area patrolled.\textsuperscript{683}

The second exception to small unit activity came about ten days after the last fortified village was cleared. This was a separate operation conducted by Marine amphibious forces in the same region as DE SOTO. Known as DECKHOUSE VI, this amphibious operation was conducted in the southern tip of Quang Ngai where a spur of the Annamite Mountains runs to the coast.

The initial intention of DECKHOUSE VI, launched on February 16\textsuperscript{th} by the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 4\textsuperscript{th} Marine Regiment, was threefold. First, it was to clear and secure this area so that a CIDG camp (CIDG was, as discussed elsewhere, the Special Forces program with the Montagnards) could be established. Second, it was to determine if the area was suitable for a harbor and/or airfield to relieve logistical pressure on forces operating in southern Quang Ngai. After these first two tasks were accomplished, the battalion would sweep north to link up with the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion near Nui Dang.\textsuperscript{684}

These three initial goals of DECKHOUSE VI met little resistance and were accomplished by February 26\textsuperscript{th}. The senior Marine leader in southern I Corps, Brigadier General William Stiles, then decided to use this battalion, along with another battalion from 5\textsuperscript{th} Marines, to trap insurgent units believed to have fled the area of DE SOTO. This attempt failed and both additional battalions departed Quang Ngai by March 3\textsuperscript{rd}.\textsuperscript{685}

DE SOTO ended a little more than a month later when TF Oregon assumed control of southern Quang Ngai. For this remaining period of DE SOTO no other large unit operations took place in the province. At this point, Revolutionary Development

\begin{footnotes}
\item[683] Murphy, pp. 99-100
\item[685] Murphy, p. 101.
\end{footnotes}
teams were able to operate in this region of Quang Ngai, which had been far too
dangerous for them before.\textsuperscript{686}

While DE SOTO was underway in southern Quang Ngai, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 7\textsuperscript{th} Marine
Regiment continued to conduct small unit operations elsewhere in the province. In
January it conducted 1,223 small unit operations.\textsuperscript{687} In February it reached 1,472 and in
March 1,706.\textsuperscript{688}


Marine operations in Quang Ngai after DOUBLE EAGLE (which was at least
partly imposed on them by MACV) heavily emphasized small unit actions and minimized
large unit operations. From February 1966 to March 1967, Marine battalions conducted
nearly 17,000 small unit operations in the province (not counting those conducted as part
of DE SOTO). In contrast, during the same period it conducted only seventeen large unit
operations in the province, none larger than two battalions. These operations lasted on
average between three and four days each, with only one, DECKHOUSE VI, lasting
longer than a week. There was also a five month period (September 1966-February
1967) in which no large unit operation was conducted.

Moreover, it is telling that the Marines kept sufficiently detailed records of small
unit operations that such precise figures can be produced for the province. This is also
something of an undercount, as it does not include patrols and ambushes conducted by

\textsuperscript{686} Murphy, p. 101 and Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March 1967, pp. 16.
Revolutionary Development teams were Vietnamese cadres intended to live in villages and develop pro-
government sentiments. They had some self-defense capability but were easily overwhelmed by even
modest insurgent forces.


\textsuperscript{688} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, February 1967, p. 28 and Operations of the III
Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, March 1967, p. 27.
reconnaissance Marines, such as STINGRAY patrols. These operations were clearly important to the organization.

The use of firepower was more varied. At one end of the spectrum, the early battles of DE SOTO were marked by extraordinary levels of firepower against heavily fortified positions. Similarly, the STINGRAY patrol concept was predicated on firepower. At the other end of the spectrum, CAP units rarely if ever relied on firepower other than that of their organic small arms unless they were in danger of being overrun by a massed enemy.689 Indeed, in 1970 an after-action report from the Americal Division, the Army division that emerges from TF Oregon in southern I Corps, noted “Few artillery fire missions were requested by CAPs because team members were inexperienced and lacked confidence in the capabilities of artillery to support them.”690

This variation in firepower was principally a result of target sets. The Marines were willing to use firepower extensively in environments that unambiguously required it, such as the DE SOTO fights against an enemy in concrete bunkers. In other contexts, the key distinction was the civilian population. STINGRAY operations took place “in the hinterland... on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops far inland, in areas where the enemy least expects contact with out forces.”691 The combination of remote location and observed fire meant there was little risk to the civilian population from STINGRAY. Likewise, CAP Marines eschewed firepower as it was far too likely to harm the population they were protecting.

689 See West, pp. 42-43.
This is not to argue that the Marines never caused civilian casualties or created refugees by destroying homes. Over the course of 1966, the Marines reported that 117,000 new refugees were displaced in I Corps.\textsuperscript{692} A substantial portion of these refugees were doubtless due to Marine operations, particularly in the northern provinces where the heaviest fighting took place. Overall, however, the Marines worked to secure the population rather than target it.

The Army Takes Over, 1967-1968

TF Oregon units began arriving at Chu Lai on April 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1967, quickly settling in to the base. On April 26\textsuperscript{th} the Marines turned the southern part of I Corps, including Quang Ngai, over to the Army. TF Oregon, under the command of Major General William Rosson, wasted little time in getting to work.

The first operation, MALHEUR (supposedly named for a town in Oregon rather than for the French word for bad luck), was initiated on May 11\textsuperscript{th} in Duc Pho district, near where DE SOTO and earlier DOUBLE EAGLE had been conducted. The operation was large, using all three battalions of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade, 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division plus an additional battalion each from the 196\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Brigade and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, 25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division as a ready reserve at Chu Lai and Duc Pho. The units would air assault into target areas and conduct search and destroy operations.\textsuperscript{693}

MALHEUR was the largest operation in Quang Ngai since DOUBLE EAGLE. It was also the longest, lasting until June 8\textsuperscript{th} (a total of 29 days-a week longer than

\textsuperscript{692} Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, December1966, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{693} Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Report, May 12, 1967, section C. Unless otherwise noted, all cited operational records on MALHEUR are available in OP MALHEUR Folder in the US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive.
DOUBLE EAGLE).\textsuperscript{694} This was despite (or perhaps because of) the recent DE SOTO operation in the area.

MALHEUR was also marked by massive use of firepower, particularly artillery. Operational records listing number of artillery rounds used in the operation are available for 19 days of the operation. The total for those days was 23,368 rounds, with a low on the first day of 360 rounds and a high of 3,506 rounds on May 31\textsuperscript{st}. The average was 1,230 rounds per day.\textsuperscript{695}

These numbers tell little absent context. If the fighting resembled the tough fights of the early part of DE SOTO or were conducted against large enemy units in the hinterland as with STINGRAY patrols, this would readily resemble Marine operations. However, this does not appear to be the case. For example, on May 31\textsuperscript{st}, the day of peak artillery expenditure in available records, contact with enemy was reported as "light." This contact apparently consisted of a single U.S. company and no mention is made of fortified positions.

Even more tellingly, on June 5\textsuperscript{th} 954 rounds were fired. This was a day of "negative contact" with the enemy. Nor were any casualties reported for either side. TF Oregon had expended more than 75\% of the daily average number of rounds for the operation on a day in which no enemy were observed.\textsuperscript{696}

This hardly seems discriminate and in all likelihood it was not. In August 1967, a reporter visited the Fire Direction Center of the Army unit that occupied Duc Pho district

\textsuperscript{694} Ibid., and Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam Report, June 8, 1967, section B.
\textsuperscript{695} These numbers calculated from Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Reports for 19 days between May 11 and June 5. The total and average are likely an understatement, as at least one day for which contact was listed as "moderate" and artillery was used does not list a total number of rounds. See Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Report, May 29, 1967, section 6 (A). All are available in OP MALHEUR Folder in the US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive.
\textsuperscript{696} Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Report, June 5, 1967, section 6 (A) and (B).
after MALHEUR was completed. He noted that of the 7,116 fire missions (each mission averaging about eight rounds) the unit had fired, 6,266 (88%) were “harassment and interdiction” or “H&I” fires. These missions were fired almost randomly into large areas to keep the enemy off-balance, but with little regard to civilians outside of major cities. 697 This is a probable explanation for the 954 rounds fired on a day of negative contact during MALHEUR.

Two days after MALHEUR ended, on June 10th, TF Oregon began Operation MALHEUR II. This operation used the same units as MALHEUR (plus one additional cavalry troop, the equivalent of an additional company) but shifted those forces northwest from Duc Pho into the Song Ve valley. This operation would last until August 1st, a total of 53 days. 698 It was therefore both slightly larger than the Marine DOUBLE EAGLE a year and a half earlier and more than twice as long in duration. The Army was thus clearly committed not only to MALHEUR II specifically, but also the type of large unit operation it represented.

In terms of firepower, MALHEUR II was comparable to MALHEUR, perhaps even slightly higher. In terms of artillery fires, the daily average was lower. For the forty-eight days for which data are available, the average was about 818 rounds per day. 699 However, the use of airpower appears to have been more extensive, with 671 sorties flown by fixed wing tactical aircraft in support of the operation by July 31st. Moreover,

697 Schell, pp. 216-220; numbers from p. 219.
699 This information is derived from forty-eight Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Reports from June 10 to August 2.
thirty naval gunfire missions and nine B-52 Arclight strikes were used to support MALHEUR II.\textsuperscript{700}

Like MALHEUR, the fighting in MALHEUR II also does not appear in most cases to have been against a heavily entrenched and/or massed enemy. For example, on July 17\textsuperscript{th}, a day of “light contact,” three insurgents were killed by small arms fire in three unrelated incidents and no U.S. casualties were reported. Yet despite this minimal resistance, 1,240 rounds of artillery were fired.\textsuperscript{701}

After MALHEUR II, TF Oregon immediately launched Operation HOOD RIVER. The brigade of the 101\textsuperscript{st} moved north again, this time operating in the Song Tra Khuc valley. The operation would last until August 13\textsuperscript{th}, and was similar in size and execution to MALHEUR I and II.

According to the brigade’s after action report for the operation “... the same techniques of artillery employment that have proven successful in the past were employed.” This report lists 3,838 artillery rounds expended for the entire operation, yet this is appears to be an underestimate of the firepower employed.\textsuperscript{702} Based on counts from nine days of available operational records, over 7,500 rounds were fired, averaging 835 rounds per day.\textsuperscript{703} In addition, by August 11 the operation had used 126 fixed wing air strikes.\textsuperscript{704} Further, a reporter observing the last two days of the operation noted that

\textsuperscript{700} Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam Report, July 31, 1967, section C.


\textsuperscript{703} This is based on counts from nine Fleet Marine Force Pacific Situation Report, from August 1 to August 11, 1967, available in OP HOOD RIVER Folder in the US Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive. The discrepancy is likely due to the after action report counting only rounds expended by the brigade’s organic artillery while the situation reports include artillery from all sources, such as TF Oregon’s division artillery.

\textsuperscript{704} Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam Report, August 11, 1967 available in OP HOOD
"...troops, and the artillery and aircraft that supported them, did, however, destroy most of the villages in the river valley and on the coastal plain at its mouth." 705

Additional evidence suggests that this expenditure of firepower was not only lavish but that it was at a minimum indiscriminate and may have been intentionally targeted on the general population. The surge in number of refugees generated in MALHEUR I&II and HOOD RIVER was described as “meteoric” by the U.S. civilian official responsible for refugees in Quang Ngai. He reported the creation of 31,888 refugees in Quang Ngai between mid-June and the end of August, completely outstripping U.S and South Vietnamese capacity to provide even minimally for those displaced. 706 Three U.S. Army operations in a single province had in roughly two and a half months created more than a quarter as many refugees as the Marines had reported in all of I Corps for an entire year. Put another way, the Army appears to have been creating refugees at least five times faster than the Marines did the year before. 707

This refugee explosion was not accidental. In MALHEUR II, the U.S. Army evacuated more than 5,000 Vietnamese from the Song Ve valley. It then destroyed their homes and sprayed the area with chemical defoliant before declaring the entire area open to H&I fire. 708 According to one U.S. civilian official in Quang Ngai, the H&I fire served the dual purpose of hampering insurgent movement and discouraging civilians from returning to the area. The same official noted that when a mortar attack was determined to be coming from inside one of the haphazard camps, TF Oregon, despite

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705 Schell, p. 263.
706 Schell, pp. 248-249.
707 The Marines averaged about 10,000 refugees a month for five provinces in 1966. The Army was generating about 12,000 a month in one province.
708 Schell, pp. 240 and 244.
being informed that the area was full of refugees, blasted the area with counterbattery artillery fire with devastating results.\(^7^0^9\)

After HOOD RIVER, the units of TF Oregon shifted operations north again, this time into Quang Tin province. In September, TF Oregon was reorganized as the 23\(^{rd}\) Infantry Division (Provisional), also called the Americal Division. No large units operations were conducted in Quang Ngai that month or in the next two.

The Army did not totally eschew small unit operations in I Corps. According to III MAF records, of the slightly less than 36,000 small unit operations in I Corps during October 1967, Army units conducted fewer than 4,000 (about 11% of the total).\(^7^1^0\) While this is not zero, it is quite small considering that in that month the Americal Division represented between a third and a quarter of the combat power in I Corps.

Moreover, Marine units were increasingly concentrated along the DMZ and Laotian border in Quang Tri province, where they faced conventional PAVN divisions. Those units conducted relatively few small unit operations. The vast bulk of Marine small unit operations (29,000 in October 1967) were conducted around Danang, where the enemy was still principally an insurgent force.\(^7^1^1\) The Americal Division was facing a similar enemy in southern I Corps yet conducted far fewer small unit operations despite having more combat power available than was available at Danang (which was less than a full Marine division).

On December 24\(^{th}\), units from the Americal Division launched Operation MUSCATINE in northern Quang Ngai. Initially the operation was conducted by the

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\(^7^1^0\) Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, October 1967, p. 39.

\(^7^1^1\) Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force Vietnam, October 1967, p. 39.
198\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Brigade (using all three of its battalions) but in early January 1968 the operation was taken over by the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade, 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division. Near the end of January, the 198\textsuperscript{th} again took over the operation before relinquishing it to the 11\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Brigade in early February. The operation would continue until June, a total of nearly six months.\textsuperscript{712}

Throughout this period contact with the enemy was light, with most U.S. casualties coming from mines and booby-traps.\textsuperscript{713} Nevertheless, U.S. Army operations appear to have still relied heavily on massive firepower, even in populated areas. An after action report of the operation from one of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Brigade’s battalions notes “Artillery support for the operation was timely, massive, and very effective.” It also commends support from both helicopter and fixed-wing units.\textsuperscript{714} The Americal Division artillery standard operating procedure from this period also makes clear that the civilian population was at best a secondary consideration:

Hamlets and villages may be attacked without warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces, and if in the opinion of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning… None of the above controls abridge the right of self-defense, and artillery may be fired without clearance at the request of any unit in contact. The decision to do so will be made by the senior officer present.\textsuperscript{715}

Despite the shift of Marine infantry battalions to the north, the CAP program remained in place in Quang Ngai. The CAP Marines relations with the Army units tended to vary from cordial if formal to simply poor. In general, the CAP Marines simply


\textsuperscript{713} Peers Report, p. 3-11 to 3-12 and Headquarters, 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry, “After Action Report (Operation MUSCATINE),” June 20, 1968, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{714} Headquarters, 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry, “After Action Report (Operation MUSCATINE),” June 20, 1968, p. 1-2, quotation on p. 1.

preferred the Army, like artillery, stay away from their villages unless a massive attack was underway. The Army units also made no attempt to emulate CAP.


Army operations in Quang Ngai province were substantially different from Marine operations in 1966-1967. The principal differences were size of operations, level of firepower, and targeting of firepower. Moreover, there was no convergence towards the Marine operational model over the course of the fourteen months from April 1967-June 1968.

In terms of size of operations, the Army concentrated overwhelmingly on multibattalion operations of long duration. MALHEUR I&II, HOOD RIVER, and MUSCATINE were all brigade size operations using at least three battalions. The operations varied in duration from two weeks to over six months. The only period in which the Army did not conduct large unit operations in Quang Ngai, September to November 1967, was because those large units were committed in Quang Tin province to the north. Small unit operations were neglected, with the Army conducting a small fraction of those conducted by the Marines.

In terms of firepower, the Army consistently used high levels of firepower in all operations, almost regardless of level of enemy resistance. As noted, even on some days with no contact Army units made extensive use of artillery during MALHEUR. In other cases, minimal contact was met with the full array of firepower, including massive B-52 Arclight strikes.

716 West, pp. 280-281, 325-328 and 332.
This firepower was also targeted with either minimal concern for the civilian population or with the intent of forcing the population to relocate. Whether targeting insurgent mortar units in the middle of a refugee camp or using H&I fire to prevent refugees from returning home, the Army viewed civilians as at a minimum an almost irrelevant nuisance to operations. In other cases, civilians were ruled a legitimate target as they provided active or passive support to insurgents. No attempt was made to actually protect or isolate the population from the insurgents by living among them as in the CAP program.

It is important to note that by the mid-point of MUSCATINE, roughly March 1968, the Army was no stranger to Vietnam, counterinsurgency, or even I Corps. The Army had an advisory presence in Vietnam beginning more than a decade earlier; combat troops had been deployed there for nearly three years. The first civilian push to develop capability for counterinsurgency had come nearly seven years earlier. TF Oregon had entered I Corps nearly a year earlier. The ongoing dissimilarity between Army and Marine operations was unlikely to stem from mere organizational inertia.

Two Villages, 1966-1970

As a final demonstration of the difference in operations between the Marines and the Army in Quang Ngai the experience of two villages in the northern part of the province are contrasted. The first is Binh Nhgia in Binh Son district, located south of Chu Lai airbase. The second is Son My in Son Tinh district, the district immediately south of and adjacent to Binh Son. The two villages are roughly twenty kilometers apart
cross-country, and roughly thirty kilometers apart by road (on the map below, Binh Nghia is roughly two kilometers north of Binh Son City).

The two villages were quite similar in many ways. They had a population in the mid-1960s of between five and ten thousand. Both were bounded by rivers on two sides and were located either on or very near the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{717}

The two villages are therefore as nearly similar in geography and population as two villages are likely to be. Yet the two had radically different experiences with the U.S. military. Binh Nghia would eventually become one of the most secure villages in Quang Ngai while Son My would become the scene of the infamous My Lai massacre. The central difference between the two was that Binh Nghia’s experience was principally with the Marines while Son My’s was with the Army. A brief summary of each is below.

In mid-1966, both Binh Nghia and Son My were under the control of the insurgency. Son My, located in an area under the control of ARVN, generally experience benign neglect from U.S. forces during 1966. This is not to say U.S. forces were entirely absent. Marine operations in the area beginning with STARLITE focused on the Batangan Peninsula immediately to the north of Son My. Yet there is no evidence that Marine firepower from these operations affected Son My.\textsuperscript{718}

Binh Nghia, in contrast, was in the Marine area of operations around Chu Lai. A CAP unit was introduced into the village in July 1966. This unit would remain in place until October 1967, well after the shift north of Marine line battalions. For the first year,
the CAP unit fought a series of small unit actions with the local insurgents. Under the tutelage of the Marines, the PF unit grew more and more competent and confident.\textsuperscript{719}

By August 1967, the area around the village was so secure that the insurgents essentially ceased contesting it. In October 1967, after more than two months without sighting an insurgent, the Marines in the CAP unit were relocated to work with another PF platoon.\textsuperscript{720} While the insurgency was not eliminated in the area, it had certainly been weakened greatly. Moreover, this had been accomplished by the Marines and locals through small unit actions with minimal firepower.

This same time period saw the first experience with the U.S. military in Son My, though in this case it was the Army. Units from the Americal Division moved through the village on at least three occasions in late 1967 and early 1968. During one operation, part of the village was destroyed by napalm.\textsuperscript{721}

The Tet Offensive in January-February 1968 was a turning point of sorts for both villages. Local insurgent forces from both Binh Son and Son Tinh districts were massed and directed to assault Quang Ngai City, where they were mauled by U.S. and ARVN firepower. These forces then retreated back to their home districts.\textsuperscript{722}

\textsuperscript{719} West, passim.
\textsuperscript{720} West, pp. 319-321.
\textsuperscript{721} Hammer, pp. 57-58.
\textsuperscript{722} West, p. 331 and Hammer, p. 59.
Map from Peers Inquiry, p. 3-13.
For Binh Nghia, this proved to be the beginning of the end for insurgent presence. The badly damaged insurgent unit reconstituted itself but, with the exception of a single major attack in the spring of 1968, was never again a significant force around Binh Nghia. By 1970, the area was so secure that it was designated a “rest and recuperation area” and the PF platoon was relocated to another nearby village.²²³

The Tet Offensive proved the beginning of the end for Son My as well, but in a much more tragic way. In March 1968, units from the 11th Brigade of the Americal Division were sent to Son My as part of Operation MUSCATINE. They were sent to find the local force units that had fled there after the assault on Quang Ngai City yet encountered no resistance. With a combination of artillery, helicopter gunships, and small arms fire, these units destroyed Son My in the space of a single day. Roughly five hundred of the inhabitants were killed; the rest became refugees.²²⁴ In 1970, the inhabitants were still refugees; many were located in a camp near the remains of their village. The camp was, perhaps ironically, guarded by a CAP unit.²²⁵

While the conduct of the units at Son My, which involved the killing at close range of obvious non-combatant civilians, was not representative of the norm, the operation itself certainly was. The Army had been destroying villages and creating refugees throughout Quang Ngai for almost a year by March 1968. The village of Son My would likely have been destroyed and the citizens made refugees even absent a massacre.

The strongest evidence for the importance of Hypothesis 4 is the small-scale natural experiment provided by the introduction of TF Oregon/Americal Division to

²²³ West, pp. 332-334 and 343-347
²²⁴ Hammer, pp. 115-149.
²²⁵ Hammer, pp. 19-20.
southern I Corps in 1967. This Army unit was placed in exactly the same insurgency environment as the Marine units who had just been shifted north. Yet its approach to COIN was, according to independent observers, radically different. The Army provisional division relied extensively on often indiscriminate firepower and depopulated the area through the creation of massive flows of refugees. Further, the division developed little connection to the ARVN units in its area, much less the local security forces such as the PFs the Marines had embraced with the CAP program. 726

This shift in COIN approach seems inexplicable by the other three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 would predict continuity in at least overall approach between the Marines and Army in southern I Corps, as both organizations would be expected to respond similarly to the same environment. Hypothesis 2 and 2a would make a similar prediction, as civilian intervention applied equally to both services. Hypothesis 3 would predict that the Army might use a different approach if it increased autonomy, resources or prestige, yet there is little evidence that the Americal Division was rewarded (or expected to be rewarded) by any of these things for its alternate approach.

Indeed, the autonomy of the Americal Division was guaranteed regardless of its approach to COIN. The division commander, Major General Samuel Koster, “maintained a rather informal command relationship with General Cushman. Several years later, Koster remembered that he would visit the III MAF commander at Da Nang once a week ‘to tell him what we were doing.’ Although nominally under the operational control of the Marine command, the Army division commander stated, ‘I got the distinct feeling that [I was] to work my TAOR as I saw fit.’ General Cushman later asserted that he treated the Army division the same as he did Marine units, but admitted that General

726 Shulimson, et. al., p. 85.
Westmoreland would not ‘let me move his Army divisions without there being a plan that he’d okayed.’ In other words, Army autonomy in I Corps preceded operational methods, rather than the reverse.

**Conclusion**

The U.S. Army, U.S. Army Special Forces, and U.S. Marine Corps, confronted with the murky military-political challenge of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, pursued very different operations. In contrast, when confronted with the unambiguously conventional PAVN divisions on the border, Army and Marine operations converged, though even they did not become identical. This indicates that the structure of the information environment seems to have some effect on operations, yet some other factor is required to explain variation.

The Army’s response to counterinsurgency is the most puzzling of the organizational responses. It promulgates a doctrine for counterinsurgency in the early 1960s, which it subsequently revises, yet ignores it throughout the war. This in spite of having sent thousands of officers to advise the South Vietnamese before 1965 and then participating with combat forces from 1965-1971. Further, both the senior Army officer (Chief of Staff Johnson) and the senior operational commander (COMUSMACV Abrams) try to force compliance with this doctrine yet both fail.

In contrast, the Marines and Special Forces, while confronting various obstacles in their counterinsurgency operations, seem to have little internal dissent about those operations. Senior leaders supported subordinates close cooperation with locals (CIDG, Kit Carson Scouts, and CAP) as well as the extensive use of small unit operations. Both

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727 Shulimson, et. al. p. 84.
cooperated closely with civilian agencies (CIA and USAID) at all levels. They appear to have accomplished all this with little or no organizational friction, except for the Marines rapid expansion in personnel.

None of the existing hypotheses on military doctrine and operations can fully account for this pattern of behavior. Hypotheses on the role of the external environment, both international and domestic, cannot account for this pattern. If doctrine and operations are a rational response to the international environment, the operations of Army and Marines should have converged across South Vietnam, not just on the border. If doctrine and operations respond to the intervention of domestic civilians, then there should have been convergence across the organizations at least during 1961-1969. Virtually the same senior national security civilians were in place, with the exception of the president, for almost this entire period. Further, these civilians were not indifferent on counterinsurgency; rather they had views expressed in NSAM 182.

Similarly, explanations that focus on universal or generic aspects of organizations cannot account for this persistent variation. If doctrine and operations are chosen to maximize resources, there should have been convergence on a common set of resource maximizing operations. An organizational drive for autonomy might explain variation, yet in Vietnam autonomy for the Army and Marines preceded choices about operations.

In the case of the Army, it was the written doctrine that provided insulation from civilians so that it could conduct the operations it preferred, rather than operations providing autonomy. The Marines, with only a few modest exceptions like the cross-boundary WHITE WING/MASHER/DOUBLE EAGLE, were similarly free to conduct operations in I Corps as they saw fit. Similarly, once the Army units that comprised TF
Oregon/Americal Division entered I Corps, they had autonomy to choose how to conduct operations, rather than choosing operations to gain autonomy.

Finally, organizational inertia or simple lag is not a convincing alternative explanation given the duration and scale of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. By 1971, the U.S. military had been in South Vietnam for a decade either advising South Vietnamese forces conducting counterinsurgency operations or conducting those operations with U.S. forces. Both the Army and Marines had similar written counterinsurgency doctrines for seven years at that point, which each had updated, and MACV had produced its own written guide to counterinsurgency specific to Vietnam. Moreover, organizational inertia should predict no convergence in any operations, when in fact the border operations against PAVN look quite similar for the Army and Marines.

The only hypothesis than can explain the variation observed in operations is that of organizational culture. This culture had the greatest effect in the ambiguous information environment of counterinsurgency and the least impact in the unambiguous conventional border battles. Therefore, it explains both the variation and convergence in operations.
Chapter 8: Out of Africa: British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya, 1952-1956

The end of World War II began the unraveling of the British Empire. As noted, India was given independence in 1947 and soon anti-colonial movements were multiplying across the globe. One of the first was in Malaya, where a Communist movement among the Chinese minority began fighting the colonial government in 1948.

Most of the scholarship on British counterinsurgency during the Cold War has focused on Malaya. It is perennially cast as an example of the “right” way to conduct counterinsurgency and contrasted with efforts by the French and Americans in Indochina. For example, John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* is built around contrasting the British in Malaya and the Americans in Vietnam. Robert Cassidy refers to it as “in many ways the archetypal counterinsurgency campaign.”

However, Malaya is in many ways “an easy case” for a counterinsurgent. Many ethnic Chinese, often squatters, were easily won over to resettlement programs. The conflict was isolated by virtue of Malaya’s island/peninsular nature, limiting outside support or sanctuary. Economic growth in the country, based largely on tin and rubber exports, boomed with the beginning of the Korean War and a spike in American demand.

This relative easiness of the campaign combined with the extensive coverage of the conflict make counterinsurgency in Malaya a less fruitful case for exploration. In

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contrast, the British experience in Kenya is both understudied and, in some ways at least, was more challenging than counterinsurgency in Malaya. The presence of British settlers in large and influential numbers, for example, greatly complicated the political aspect of the conflict and the sprawling slums of Nairobi forced the British to confront urban insurgency that was almost entirely absent in Malaya. Moreover, lessons from Malaya led to creation of written doctrine for counterinsurgency. Kenya thus provides a way to observe the convergence or divergence between counterinsurgency operations and written doctrine. This chapter describes British Army counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in Kenya from 1952-1956 and uses that evidence to evaluate the four hypotheses on military doctrine.

**British Rule in East Africa, 1888-1952**

The British Empire came relatively late to the part of Africa that would eventually be called Kenya. In 1888, the British East Africa Company began to develop the territory between Mombassa on the coast and Lake Victoria (which included both modern Kenya and Uganda), principally by building a railroad to connect the two. The territory lacked some of the mineral resources of South Africa but proved to be good crop land, especially for coffee.\(^{731}\)

However, the British East Africa Company was not as adroit as some of its predecessor companies and had a much shorter lifespan. The British Crown declared a protectorate over the territory in 1894-1895, and a commissioner was appointed to governor the new protectorate. In 1907, the capital was moved inland, from Mombassa.

to Nairobi. White settlers (almost all British) also began to move into the interior, setting up lucrative plantations and ranches on land grants.

Following World War I, the protectorate was reorganized, with Kenya and Uganda becoming separate colonies. The years between World War I and World War II were tumultuous, with the worldwide boom of the 1920s followed by the Great Depression mirrored in Kenya. Labor shortages and rapid expansion in the economy gave way to unemployment and contraction as agricultural prices collapsed; only government intervention in the 1930s prevented greater economic dislocation.

The coming of World War II once again drove demand up but the depression had revealed how dependent on cheap labor the agricultural economy was. This labor was provided by Africans, who were the overwhelming majority of the population yet had little political representation. While this imbalance in power had earlier been acceptable to many Africans, particularly the class of chiefs who had been empowered by the British colonial government, a group of educated nationalist Africans began to emerge in this period. This emerging nationalist movement, embodied initially in groups such as the Kenya African Union (KAU), was opposed by the white settler community, which rightly saw it as a challenge to their privileged position.732

After World War II, the British colonial administration, led from 1944 to 1952 by Sir Philip Mitchell, was essentially tasked with managing the inevitable conflict between the nationalists (who were not entirely unified) and the coalition of white settlers and African beneficiaries of the colonial order. Mitchell advocated a “multi-racial” Kenya that gave Africans greater status, yet his policies, based on the need for cheap African

labor and a paternalist view of the Africans, increased rather than decreased tension between nationalists and the old guard. Mitchell’s policy ran against the emerging policy in the Cabinet office of the Colonial Secretary, which sought to give more political representation to Africans, yet absent a crisis London was reluctant to force the issue. Crisis would come just as Mitchell was leaving Kenya in 1952, with the bloody eruption of the Mau Mau rebellion.\footnote{33}


The Mau Mau movement had its roots in the nationalist KAU, which began to mobilize more and more Africans in the period 1947-1952. The KAU’s strongest constituency was the Kikuyu tribe and from the beginning it was often difficult to categorize Mau Mau aims. There was no doubt a strong African nationalist element of the movement, yet it was equally true that the vast majority of support for the movement came from a single tribe.\footnote{34}

Further, there was a division between those who advocated non-violent political mobilization and more militant nationalists. The former were represented by leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta, a missionary educated Kikuyu. The latter were exemplified by the “Forty Group,” an urban criminal gang with ties to nationalist politics.\footnote{35}

Mau Mau (the name the British gave to the movement) was born out of this combustible mix of motives and factions. It began with the administering of oaths of loyalty to the Kikuyu tribe among various communities in the late 1940s. These oaths

\footnote{34}{Gordon, pp. 113-114.}
\footnote{35}{Anderson, pp. 28-41.}
were said to have mystical power, so a quasi-religious aspect was also injected into the
movement.\textsuperscript{736}

By 1950, the colonial government was concerned enough about the spread of
oathing among the Kikuyu to outlaw the movement. From 1950 to 1952, the suppressed
movement continued to spread, though the British initiated “counter-oathing” ceremonies
as well. This struggle remained non-violent until May 1952, when militants killed a
village elder and a police informer. More deaths followed as militants killed those who
refused to take oaths or worked to support the colonial regime.\textsuperscript{737}

The new governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, arrived at the end of September 1952 and
within days “the most senior African official under Kenya’s colonial administration,”
Chief Waruhiu wa Kungu, was found murdered. Baring determined that violence in
Kenya was in danger of getting out of control but that the situation was not irreparable
with swift decisive action. He asked London for permission to declare a state of
emergency, which was approved.\textsuperscript{738}

**Early Emergency, October 1952- May 1953**

The state of emergency was declared on October 20, 1952. Simultaneously,
Operation JOCK SCOTT was launched by the Kenya Police, including the intelligence
gathering Special Branch, supported by the British Army. This operation sought to arrest
all suspected Mau Mau leaders. This list included both true militants and moderates like
Kenyatta; unfortunately, leaks within the government meant that many on the list were
prepared. Groups of militants fled to the dense forest regions while the moderates were

\textsuperscript{736} Maloba, pp. 99-113.
\textsuperscript{737} Anderson, pp. 41-53.
\textsuperscript{738} Anderson, pp. 54-62.
arrested. Rather than decapitating Mau Mau, JOCK SCOTT empowered the militants by removing the moderates and also aided Kikuyu mobilization by the insurgents as it provided a major symbol of colonial oppression. 739

British Army involvement in this early period of the emergency was limited. The Army command in Kenya was a relative backwater in 1952, with no European units. Instead, the Army was represented by the Kenya Regiment, a Territorial Army unit which recruited white settlers, and the King’s African Rifles, which recruited Africans from across British colonies in Africa. At the beginning of the emergency, a battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers was flown to Kenya from the Suez Canal zone, principally to reassure the white settlers. 740

It was the Kenya Police and the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) that were initially responsible for operations against the Mau Mau. Both were white settler-dominated organizations, though the police would be supplemented by contract officers from Britain. The KPR were police auxiliaries drawn from the white settlers, most of whom only worked part-time for the KPR. 741 These forces were supplemented beginning in November 1952 by African loyalist militia units known as Home Guard (also called Kikuyu Guard). 742 Recruitment for these units, bolstered by incentives such as the issuance of weapons and an exemption from poll tax, expanded rapidly. Writing about this period, historian David Anderson notes “For the first eight months the British

740 Quotation on Anderson, p. 239; see also Anderson, p.85 and Frank Kitson, Gangs and Countergangs (London: Barrie and Rockcliff, 1960) p. 11.
741 Anderson, pp. 76 and 85; Clayton, pp. 44-45.
742 Clayton, pp.45-46; Anderson, pp. 239-243. For clarity Home Guard will be used throughout this chapter.
military stood back and let the white highlanders, the police and—increasingly—the Home Guard get on with it."^743

This proved deeply problematic, as the KPR in particular consisted of armed white settlers with little discipline. This indiscipline combined with settler hostility to any manifestation of African nationalism, which threatened their privileged position, led to rampant abuse. Further, the settlers were no more willing to compromise on any political issues than they had been earlier. This combination only strengthened Mau Mau, as the security forces were seen by many Kikuyu not as protectors but as oppressors.^744

During this period Mau Mau developed two principal strongholds. The first was in the highland forests around Mt. Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains. It was to here that many of the Mau Mau leaders fleeing JOCK SCOTT had traveled and initially it proved to be an extraordinarily good insurgent base. Heavily forested and with an elevation of over 8,000 feet, these highland forests were difficult terrain. At the same time, the forests were close enough to Kikuyu population concentrations that the guerrillas were able to obtain food and supplies.^745

The second base was urban, principally in the African neighborhoods around Nairobi. Known as Eastlands, these neighborhoods varied from public housing estates to shantytowns. Many parts of Eastlands had, in the years before the Emergency, become almost lawless. Many of the gangs associated with Mau Mau, such as the Forty Group, were based here so it was natural that this area became home to the urban resistance.^746

^743 Anderson, p. 239.
^744 Anderson, pp. 84-86 and 111-118.
^746 Anderson, pp. 35-38 and 181-190.
Mau Mau quickly demonstrated its power and resilience through operations in and around both base areas. In November 1952, barely a month into the emergency, one of the major leaders of moderate middle-class Africans in Nairobi, Tom Mbotela, was murdered in Eastlands.\textsuperscript{747} In March 1953, guerrillas operating from the Aberdare forest massacred loyalist African families in the village of Lari in Kiambu District; the Home Guard and KPR immediately launched a retaliatory massacre.\textsuperscript{748}

Both Governor Baring and the government in London were shocked into further action by the rising tide of violence. In January 1953, Major General W.R. Hinde was dispatched to act as staff officer to Baring to provide more high-level professional leadership. Hinde, unfortunately, had relations among the white settlers with whom he sympathized. Combined with his very general brief from London, which was simply to “jolly things along,” his settler sympathies meant Hinde proved ineffective as a leader. His position was clarified early in April 1953 when he was made Director of Operations but his performance as a leader apparently still left much to be desired.\textsuperscript{749}

In addition to the dispatch of Hinde, additional Regular Army units were sent to support the security forces. In April 1953, 39 Brigade, consisting of a battalion from two regiments (The Devons and The Buffs) arrived in Kenya to provide additional military capability. In addition, two additional battalions of the King’s African Rifles under 70 Brigade had been moved into the country, bringing the total to six battalions. Yet despite this build-up, the Army continued to remain on the sidelines, principally acting in a defensive role.\textsuperscript{750}

\textsuperscript{747} Anderson, pp. 190-192.
\textsuperscript{748} Anderson, pp. 118-139.
\textsuperscript{749} Anderson, pp. 179-180 and Clayton, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{750} Clayton, pp. 23-24.
British Written Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, 1952

By 1952, the British experience in Malaya had produced a written doctrine of sorts for counterinsurgency. It was entitled *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations, Malaya* (generally referred to as ATOM) and sought to encapsulate lessons from the ongoing conflict in Malaya. This manual was written for distribution outside Malaya to spread operational insights from the conflict.\(^{751}\)

ATOM differed from previous colonial policing and colonial internal security but in ways that were consonant with those previous experiences. For example, one of the central lessons from Malaya was the need for using “pseudo-guerrillas,” either loyal natives who could appear to be guerrillas or former insurgents who had turned against the cause. These units, presenting the appearance of guerrillas, could then operate in the jungle to locate insurgents and their strongholds.\(^{752}\) While this was novel in the sense that it was creating pro-government guerrillas, it was entirely in keeping with British Army cooperation with and use of locals in India and Africa.

In addition to the pseudo-guerrillas, ATOM emphasized the importance of integration with civilian agencies (the colonial administration and police) and small unit patrolling. It also noted the importance of controlling food supplies and concentrating the population in order to deny support to the insurgency. “Home Guards,” locals who were recruited to protect villages part-time, were to be used to protect the population from the insurgents.\(^{753}\)

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\(^{753}\) Jones, p. 136.

In May 1953, the Commander in Chief for the Middle East visited Kenya and, after conferring with the War Office in London, decided to establish a separate military headquarters for Kenya. The officer chosen for the position was General George "Bobbie" Erskine. Erskine was a veteran of both World War II and interwar India. A product of public school, Sandhurst, and a Rifle regiment, he was highly representative of the British Army officer corps (and thus its culture). 754

When offered the job, Erskine initially wanted powers similar to those held be Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya. This would have made him the “Supremo” over both the security forces and civilian administration. While this was turned down, he was given operational control over the non-military security forces. Further, he was given a letter authorizing him to declare martial law if he believed it warranted. This letter gave him considerable leverage over the colonial administration; he reportedly carried it in his glasses case and would toy with the case during contentious meetings. 755

Erskine’s arrival meant that the Army was now firmly in command of security force operations and changes began to take place almost immediately. Erskine emphasized the political nature of the conflict and that its solution would be political as well as military. This would require careful organization and administration of the political-military campaign. He sought to combine improved intelligence collection with offensive operations in order to break up the guerrilla bands in the forest. Unsurprisingly,

754 Clayton, pp. 6-7.
he requested copies of ATOM almost as soon as he arrived (and would request more copies later in the year). Erskine’s assessment placed much of the blame for the insurgency on the colonial administration, initially attributing all the problems of Kenya to “rotten administration… in my opinion they want a new set of civil servants and decent police.” He also took a very dim view of the white settlers. In his letters home to his wife, he called Kenya “a sunny land for shady people.” He later wrote “I hate the guts of them all… they are middle class sluts.” Yet he was equally aware that he would have to work with the settlers as well as the colonial administration. Improving the civilian side of administration and integrating military efforts were thus one Erskine’s first priorities.

The system of counterinsurgency administration that was initially put in place in 1953 was similar to that in Malaya. At the top was the Colony Emergency Committee, whose membership included the Governor, the Deputy Governor, a representative of Erskine, several other colonial administrators and a representative of the settlers, Michael Blundell. This body made policy decisions, which were then implemented by the Deputy Director of Operations’s Committee.

This arrangement at the top would be streamlined further in March 1954, after the promulgation of a new constitution that enabled a multi-racial government for Kenya. The new organization was termed the War Council and consisted of only Governor Baring, the Deputy Governor, Erskine, and Blundell, with support from a dedicated staff.

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758 Quoted in Anderson, p. 85.
759 Quoted in Anderson, p. 260.
760 Clayton, pp. 7-8.
This arrangement further increased high level policy coordination between the security forces, colonial administration, and the white settlers. In terms of the latter, the clear intent was “to co-opt and to use the advice of the more moderate Europeans—and to bring home to them the realities of both the military and the wider political situation—and to isolate the more militant.”

Below this level were provincial, district and divisional level Emergency Committees. The district level committees were actually created first; the membership of these committees included the District Commissioner, senior police and military officers in the area, and relevant colonial officers. The settlers wanted to control these committees by appointing both chairman and executive officer to them. A compromise was reached whereby a settler would be appointed executive officer, but the chairmanship remained firmly under the civilian colonial administration.

There was, perhaps unsurprisingly, frequent friction between the military and those committees most dominated by white settler influence. The settlers were interested in preserving their economic livelihood, while the military was focused on eliminating the insurgents. Differences emerged over such issues as static protection of farms (the settler preference) versus patrolling (the military preference). However, despite this friction, the system of extensive political-military integration was never abandoned.

In addition to political coordination, Erskine also believed discipline and professionalism were critical elements of the campaign. Within a month of taking command, he issued orders banning the practice of paying “bounties” to soldiers for

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763 Clayton, pp. 8-9.
764 Clayton, pp. 9-10.
killing Africans and declaring he would personally be involved in the investigation of any outside complaints of abuse by the security forces. He dismissed the brigade commander of the King’s African Rifles for allowing indiscipline and abuse in his troops and court-martialed a captain in the unit for gross abuse of prisoners.765

Erskine also launched military offensives against the insurgents. His initial military efforts to engage Mau Mau units in the forest, undertaken with the police and Home Guard, proved deeply frustrating. Operations PRIMROSE, BUTTERCUP, and CARNATION swept into the forests in July-August 1953 with only modest success. After these initial offensives, Erskine requested and received additional British battalions in September 1953. The Lancashire Fusiliers were replaced by the more elite Black Watch (a regiment of the Highlanders). 49 Brigade, consisting of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Inniskillings, was dispatched as well bringing the total number of British battalions to five; in November the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry would arrive for a total of six British battalions (the maximum level attained) not including the battalions of the King’s African Rifles. Erskine then launched more offensives, seeking to pursue the insurgents by constant patrolling.766

Firepower was limited in these operations. Most firepower was provided by mortars integral to infantry units. Erskine’s main source of heavy firepower was provided by outmoded aircraft, principally Harvard light bombers and Lincoln heavy bombers. However, these were only used deep in the forest areas, which were all but uninhabited (apart from the insurgents). Additionally, Erskine had one artillery battery and an armored car squadron which were used as a mobile column in open terrain.

766 Anderson, pp. 262-263 and 391; and Clayton, pp. 24-25. The Buffs rotated out in November 1953, replaced by the Royal Bucks.
Neither the aircraft nor the mobile column were thought to have much military utility.\textsuperscript{767} Over the course of the entire Emergency only about 24,000 rounds of artillery were fired by the battery.\textsuperscript{768}

In addition to political-military integration and offensive operations, Erskine greatly expanded intelligence collection. This required extensive integration of Army officers with police, local informers, and turncoat insurgents. In order to improve intelligence, Erskine and his intelligence staff began sending sergeants from the Kenya Regiment to supplement Police Special Branch activity. These sergeants were termed Field Intelligence Assistants (FIA); as natives they were believed to have good local knowledge that would make them excellent collectors. However, some level of oversight was needed, so Regular Army officers were soon dispatched as District Military Intelligence Officers (DMIO) to provide that oversight and ensure that intelligence was properly integrated.\textsuperscript{769}

One of those British Army officers selected to be a DMIO was Captain Frank Kitson. Kitson had the same background as Erskine: public school, Sandhurst, and a commission in the Rifle Brigade. He was thus an equally typical example of the British Army officer corps; however, unlike Erskine, Kitson had no colonial experience. Before Kenya, his entire Army career (1945-1953) had been as an infantry officer in Germany. In addition, he had no background in police or intelligence operations.\textsuperscript{770}

\textsuperscript{769} Clayton, pp. 33-36 and Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, pp. 18-19.
Kitson arrived in Kenya in late August 1953 and, after briefing, was assigned as the DMIO of Kiambu District in the Central Province. This district was strongly contested by the insurgents, as it was located between the southern end of the Aberdare Forest and Nairobi. It was thus a key link between the insurgent rural sanctuary and the urban resistance in Nairobi. Kitson was subsequently made responsible for the neighboring district of Thika as well as Nairobi itself.\textsuperscript{771}

Kitson was given high levels of autonomy in his role as DMIO; he essentially defined his own job and could carry it out as he saw fit. Kitson, despite his lack of training in intelligence, quickly realized that he would have to build an intelligence collection network with the limited resources assigned him.\textsuperscript{772} In his memoir of this period he writes:

\ldots I had no idea of how to get information because I had no training on the subject and knew no language other than English. This was a sobering fact which led me to decide that my only logical course was to organize other people to collect information for me\ldots I only had one part-time K.P.R. officer, one full-time K.P.R. officer, and a recently married sergeant of the Kenya Regiment to do the collecting for me. They could only pick up a small proportion of the information I wanted. As a result I decided that I should have to collect information from every single person who came on it. Soldiers, policemen, district officers, Kikuyu Guard officers and the C.I.D. [Criminal Investigation Department] all had some. Until I had a larger organization of my own I would have to get it from them. The only way to do this was by visiting them often and making friends with them.\textsuperscript{773}

Even after he received additional personnel, Kitson continued to work closely with all other elements of the security forces.

Operations in late 1953 continued to consist principally of small unit activity. Kitson describes one on Christmas Eve, 1953. A patrol from a company of the Black Watch received intelligence about the location of a group of insurgents and set out in

\textsuperscript{771} Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, p. 17 and Anderson, p. 241. Kitson was initially disappointed because not much overt activity was taking place in Kiambu, yet later realized "virtually everything that happened in Kiambu or Thika had ramifications in Nairobi." Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{772} Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, pp. 19 and 28-29.

\textsuperscript{773} Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, p. 29.
pursuit, accompanied by a squad of police. After catching the insurgents, a brief engagement took place and the British took casualties, including the Black Watch company commander. Trapping the insurgents in a small valley, the Black Watch unit called for reinforcements, which were principally from the KPR though supplemented by “most of the Black Watch company” and police. The KPR District Commander arrived and took charge of the situation, yet he too was killed. Control passed back to the military when a replacement company commander arrived from the Black Watch. No indirect fire was used against the trapped insurgents, and the Black Watch assaulted the insurgent position the following morning.\footnote{Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, pp. 39-43, quotation on p. 40.}

The British Army also made extensive use of amnesty and former insurgents who changed sides. Erskine launched a surrender offer known as “Green Branch” in August 1953, over settler objections. It met with limited success but would be followed by other efforts.\footnote{Anderson, p. 273 and Clayton p. 25.} Eventually both rank and file and insurgent leaders would be incorporated in the British effort.

One of the most notable leaders the British sought to use was Waruhiu Itote, known by the nom de guerre General China. One of the most prominent insurgent commanders, China was captured in January 1954 and interrogated extensively before being sentenced to death. However, he was offered a chance to help negotiate the surrender of Mau Mau forces in exchange for a pardon. China accepted and several months of negotiations with other insurgent leaders, called Operation WEDGWOOD, commenced. Though the surrender negotiations eventually collapsed, in part due to
suspicion from within both the government security forces and the insurgents, China nonetheless proved an excellent source of intelligence.\footnote{Anderson, pp. 232-234 and 273-277; Clayton, p. 34; and Maloba, pp. 84-85.}

In April 1954, Kitson interrogated a captured insurgent who proved willing to defect and begin working with the government. This provided not only intelligence but also the idea that Kitson could form his own groups of faux insurgents (termed "pseudo-gangs"). These pseudo-gangs, led by whites but principally composed of both former insurgents and loyal Africans, would be sent out to interact with real insurgent groups to gather intelligence. Pseudo-gangs were very small unit operations, consisting of only a handful of men. Kitson felt this was the most effective intelligence gathering technique, and it was soon expanded to other areas of Kenya.\footnote{Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, pp. 73-104 and 170; Anderson, pp. 284-286; Clayton, p. 35; and Maloba, pp. 94-96.}

April 1954 would also prove to be a turning point against the urban resistance in Nairobi. Following months of planning, the British Army in conjunction with the Police, KPR, and Home Guard, launched Operation ANVIL. This operation sealed off three of Eastlands' housing estates and slums with five battalions of British troops and a battalion of the King’s African Rifles along with hundreds of police, KPR, and Home Guard. The total force numbered about 20,000, making this the largest operation of the conflict.\footnote{Anderson, pp. 200-211; Clayton, pp. 25-26; Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs}, pp. 78-82; and Maloba, pp. 86-87 and 124-125.}

Once the areas were sealed, search teams led by a combination of colonial administration district officers, colonial labor officers, and the KPR began to sort through the inhabitants. Those who were lacking documentation, lacked a place of residence in the city, or identified by informers as Mau Mau were detained. In total somewhat more
than 20,000 men were detained as part of ANVIL. They were then sorted and classified in detention camps.\textsuperscript{779}

Lasting from April to July 1954, Operation ANVIL broke up much of the Mau Mau apparatus in Nairobi, though it did not entirely eliminate it. The struggle between insurgents and the government would continue until late 1955. However, it had principally become a contest between the police, particularly Special Branch, and very small numbers of insurgents. Some of these insurgents would be those released from the detention camps after being incorrectly classified as uninvolved with the insurgency, indicating that the intelligence apparatus was far from infallible.\textsuperscript{780}

In addition to Operation ANVIL, the British also sought to concentrate the population in secured areas controlled by the Home Guard. Fortified camps were constructed and much of the rural population in Kikuyu areas was resettled in them. By early 1955, hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu were resettled as part of the “villagization” strategy. This strategy hinged on the existence of loyal Home Guard and chiefs willing to work for the colonial administration, as the British Army provided only minimal oversight through the Emergency Committee system.\textsuperscript{781}

Following ANVIL, Erskine turned operations towards securing the areas around Nairobi and isolating the insurgents in the forest sanctuaries. Ditches were dug with forced labor along the forest edges; the ditches were kept under observation by the Home Guard. Offensive operations were launched along the forest borders as well.\textsuperscript{782}

\textsuperscript{779} Anderson, pp. 201-204; Clayton, p. 25; and Maloba, pp. 86-87. The number of detainees given is from Anderson, who had best access to historical archives. The numbers are given as 16,500 in Clayton and 30,000 in Maloba.

\textsuperscript{780} Anderson, pp. 212-214 and 220-224.

\textsuperscript{781} Anderson, pp. 268 and 294-295; Clayton, pp. 26-27; and Maloba, pp. 90-91.

\textsuperscript{782} Anderson, p. 268-269.
An example of the type of operations conducted during this period is an engagement to the northwest of Nairobi in October 1954. The security forces in the area were informed by a young African worker that a large group of insurgents was camped in a swampy area on a nearby plantation. A platoon of police surrounded the insurgent base and attacked but was repulsed. The police commander then called for reinforcements, which took the form of Kenya Regiment officers leading Kikuyu Guards, more police, and a platoon of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. After a surrender offer was made to the insurgents and rejected, the Fusiliers shelled the enemy position with mortars before assaulting in the morning, while the other security forces maintained the cordon.783

Erskine at this point felt confident enough in how operations were progressing to create his own equivalent to ATOM. Thus in 1954, his command issued *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*. Based on ATOM, it also incorporated the specific context and lessons of Kenya. It emphasized the importance of civil-military cooperation, population security, isolating the insurgents, and the use of small units, including pseudo-guerrillas.784

By late 1954, the forest sanctuaries were deemed sufficiently isolated to launch a major offensive against them. Operation HAMMER was launched against the Aberdare forest sanctuary in December 1954. It was intended to take an “inside-out” approach against the insurgents; British forces would begin in the very high moorlands of the mountain range and seek to force the insurgents down towards the barriers set up along

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783 Anderson, pp. 214-216 and Kitson, *Gangs and Countergangs*, pp. 140-142. Kitson was present at the battle but the numbers of combatants he gives, based on initial estimates, are incorrect.
the forest edge. Operation FIRST FLUTE, using a similar approach, began around Mt.
Kenya in February 1955.785

Even as British offensive operations took place in the forests, Erskine prepared
another amnesty offer. This offer was made in conjunction with a major effort to reform
and reorganize the Home Guard, which had been a source of abuse of the population and
in some cases now seemed to be prolonging rather than ending the conflict. In January
1955, “insurgents were told that they would not be prosecuted for any terrorist offenses
(even those liable for the death penalty) though they would be detained, and the Home
Guard were told of the forthcoming reorganization and assured that no action would be
taken in respect of the past but strict discipline would be required for the future.” The
offer was to be open through July 1955; roughly 1,000 insurgents surrendered leaving an
estimated 4,500-5,000 in the forests.786

Erskine’s tour as commander ended in May 1955. At that point, the insurgency
had been broken. The insurgents in the forests were forced to break up into small bands
constantly on the move. The areas outside the forest and in Nairobi were much more
secure, if not entirely safe. This increased security accelerated the process of drawing
down the British Army units in Kenya, which began in 1954, in the last few months of
Erskine’s tour.787

Assessing Theoretical Explanations for Counterinsurgency Operations, 1953-1955

British Army operations in Kenya under Erskine were characterized by small unit
operations, close cooperation with locals and civilian organizations, and limited use of

786 Clayton, pp. 28-30, quotation on p. 30; Maloba, p. 94; and Anderson, pp. 269-271 and 392.
787 Anderson, pp. 269-270 and 391-392.
firepower. In terms of operations, Erskine only had at most six British and six African battalions for the entire country. Operations using more than one battalion were extremely rare; the main exception being Operation ANVIL. Instead the focus was on operations of battalion size and smaller, including the very small pseudo-gang operations begun by Kitson.

From the beginning, the British Army worked closely with locals (in the form of the Kenya Police, KPR, and Home Guard) as well as civilian organizations. This was most clearly exemplified by the system of committees instituted at the national, provincial, district, and division levels of government. Firepower was very limited outside of the forest areas, and even in the forests was considered an auxiliary to sweeps and patrolling.

There was also little difference between written doctrine and operations. Initially taking ATOM as written doctrine, Erskine and his subordinates implemented most if not all of the guidance in that document. After gaining additional experience with the unique circumstances of Kenya, Erskine’s command created a handbook based on ATOM to give specific doctrinal guidance for operations against the Mau Mau.

Hypothesis 1, military organizations respond rationally to their environment, is supported by the evidence from this period of British Army counterinsurgency in Kenya. Erskine’s operations proved extraordinarily effective against the insurgency, reducing it from a rising threat across the country to scattered bands in the forests in barely two years. Hypothesis 2 and 2a receive little support, as apart from approving Erskine’s appointment as the commander of forces in Kenya, the civilian government of Britain did nothing to direct operations. Hypothesis 3 also receives little support; Erskine was given
significant autonomy (including the freedom to declare martial law) and resources as soon as he was appointed. His choice of operations had little effect on either. Finally, Hypothesis 4 is also supported by evidence from this period, as operations conformed to the maritime army cultural archetype.

Mopping Up: Lathbury and Counterinsurgency, May 1955 to November 1956

Erskine’s replacement was Lieutenant General Gerald “Legs” Lathbury. Lathbury was, like Erskine, a public school and Sandhurst product. He was commissioned into the Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Regiment before being intimately involved in the creation of British Parachute units in 1941.\(^{788}\)

The environment he inherited was one that was simultaneously much more secure and more difficult than the one Erskine had found in 1953. Both Nairobi and the rural areas outside the forests had been all but totally pacified. The rebel bands in the forests were increasingly fragmented, poorly supplied, and all but incapable of mounting major offensives. Yet the very fragmentation of the insurgent groups, combined with the skill they had developed in evading security forces, made finding and eliminating them much more difficult.

Lathbury’s response to this environment was to initially continue with Erskine’s policies. He left the amnesty offer made early in 1955 open for another month while continuing to reorganize and demobilize the Home Guard. He also continued the

\(^{788}\) Oxford Biography, online at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31335. Lathbury was one of the brigade commanders during Operation MARKET GARDEN; he was injured and captured by the Wehrmacht before escaping and linking up with U.S. Army forces.
offensive operations in the forest regions, beginning with Operation GIMLET at the end of May 1955.789

The operations for the most part remained small unit patrolling in the forest regions. For example, the Gloucestershire Regiment rotated in to Kenya in April 1955, and, after establishing a base at Gilgil, its “various companies were allocated areas of responsibility in which they set up temporary camps. These were frequently on European owned farms, where they were made very welcome. Companies actively patrolled their areas with the help of local guides, looking for Mau Mau gangs.” The companies in turn dispatched platoon size patrols in the forest and its boundaries.790

In June 1955, the British also took steps to enable the creation of an alternative to Mau Mau by legalizing African political organizations at the district level. Both the Governor and Lathbury felt that as the Emergency was ending as a military crisis, a political solution was more vital. Lathbury noted “that gaining the fullest possible information on African political activity, particularly among the Kikuyu, is now and will be an intelligence task of equal if not greater importance than keeping track of the terrorist.”791

With the expiration of the amnesty offer in July, Lathbury decided to increase pressure against the forest strongholds. In July and August, Operations DANTE and BEATRICE would be launched against both the Aberdares and Mt. Kenya regions, respectively. DANTE was one of the largest operations since ANVIL, using four battalions of troops (three British and one King’s African Rifles), who would surround an

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789 Percox, pp. 88-89.
area know to contain insurgent groups. This area would be bombed and shelled, with the intent to drive insurgents towards ambushes set up by the battalions. This part of the operation would last seven to ten days, after which the troops would move in towards the center of the area. 792

DANTE was marked by only modest success. The plan worked to some degree with over thirty engagements by the ambushing units in the first four days. However, the number of insurgents killed was very small, as the insurgents apparently broke contact quickly in the dense forest. Kitson, who was present during the operation, also noted that the troops, many of who were National Service draftees, were not very good marksmen. 793

DANTE would be the last large unit operation for the British Army in Kenya. Lathbury would subsequently reorient the Army in Kenya towards training for “silent movement, the use of trackers [surrendered Mau Mau] and tracker dogs, and quick and accurate shooting,” the latter apparently confirming Kitson’s critique of the soldiers’ marksmanship. Lathbury also felt that the need for battalion size formations was decreasing. Accordingly, he announced at the beginning of September 1955 that a brigade headquarters and roughly 3,500 British Army and King’s African Rifles soldiers would be withdrawn over four months. 794

Central to this new approach was small unit action by the pseudo-gangs pioneered by Kitson. These units were renamed Special Forces Teams and centralized as an element of Special Branch under Assistant Police Superintendent Ian Henderson.

793 Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs, pp. 195-196 and Kitson, Bunch of Five, pp. 52-53.
794 Percox, pp. 88-89
Crucially, Lathbury and Henderson decided to allow the Special Forces Teams, unlike the pseudo-gangs, to operate without any white oversight despite being composed mostly of former insurgents. They would be armed and sent autonomously out into the forest to hunt their former comrades; clearly the level of trust in these locals was extraordinarily high.\textsuperscript{795}

Lathbury also implemented further restrictions to limit the insurgents’ access to food and supplies. This included prohibition of food cultivation within three miles of the forest sanctuary. By December 1955, the insurgents were desperately short of food and ammunition, even as the small units harried them. Only 2,000-2,500 insurgents were estimated to be left.\textsuperscript{796}

These remaining insurgents, however, showed no signs of surrendering as of January 1956. This was likely due to a combination of fear of being subjected to the death penalty and the continuing presence of powerful leaders among the insurgents. Most notable among the leaders was Dedan Kimathi, who had been one of the main commanders in the forest throughout the insurgency. Kimathi was the most nationalist of the Mau Mau leaders, an inspiring symbol and effective insurgent. As long as he remained at large, it seemed that the insurgency would sputter on.\textsuperscript{797}

Even as Kimathi continued to elude capture, the Special Forces Teams and small unit operations by the British Army eliminated other leaders. From January to July 1956, roughly 1,400 of the remaining insurgents were accounted for, leaving an estimated 500 in the forests. Over this period, Lathbury reduced the British Army presence by two


\textsuperscript{796} Percox, p. 89 and Maloba, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{797} Percox, p. 89 and Anderson, pp. 286-287.
more battalions, and “planned to transfer responsibility for the conduct of day-to-day
operations from the army to the police between October and the end of the year.”

Finally, on October 21, 1956, a concerted manhunt by Ian Henderson and his
Special Forces Teams cornered Kimathi in the forest. He was wounded and captured
while trying to flee; at this point estimates were that there were only 450 insurgents
remaining. Both the Governor and Lathbury took this as a sign that the Army was no
longer required so on November 17, 1956 the Army was withdrawn from operations in
Kenya.


British counterinsurgency operations in Kenya in 1955-1956 were essentially the
same as those from 1953-1955. With the exception of Operations BEATRICE and
DANTE, they were focused on small unit operations. Indeed, after those two large
operations, the British under Lathbury redoubled efforts to conduct effective small unit
operations. Firepower would also remain limited. DANTE was the last use of heavy
firepower such as artillery and airpower in Kenya.

Cooperation with both local natives (African and whites) and civilian authorities
continued to be a vital part of British Army counterinsurgency. By 1956, Lathbury was
relying heavily on Special Forces Teams composed of former insurgents under
Henderson’s civilian police Special Branch. He would certainly give credit to

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798 Percox, p. 89 and Maloba, p. 96; quotation in Percox.
799 See Henderson, passim; Percox, pp. 89-90; and Anderson, p. 288.
Henderson, noting “Ian Henderson has probably done more than any single individual to bring the emergency to an end.”

As with the first period of operations, this period gives support to both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4. The British Army’s operations were very effective and adjusted to the environment as it changed, as the abandonment of anything other than small unit operations in mid-1955 demonstrates. Hypothesis 2 and 2a is untested as there was no civilian administration in British Army operations or personnel. Hypothesis 3 remains indeterminate, as British Army autonomy, resources, and prestige remained unrelated to success. However, the decision by Lathbury to abandon large unit operations and to give the Special Forces Teams to the police seems to cast doubt on the hypothesis. In both cases he was foregoing prestige and resources by reducing troop levels and giving special units to the police.

Conclusion

Kenya presented a difficult and ambiguous challenge to the British Army. It was forced to function in both urban slums and forested highlands, working among a population with both hostile and loyal elements. The white settlers provided valuable allies but also were the primary source of the political and economic grievance fuelling the insurgency.

The British Army responded to this ambiguous challenge in ways that were often highly coercive, yet always consonant with the elements of British Army culture. Operations in Kenya were based principally around small unit operations, close

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800 Henderson, p. 30.
cooperation with locals and civilians, and limited firepower. Ultimately this combination proved highly successful, though Kenya would subsequently be given independence.
Chapter 9: Counterinsurgency in the Land of Two Rivers: The Americans and British in Iraq, 2003-2008

The decision of a U.S.-led coalition, which included a substantial British element, to invade Iraq in March 2003 rapidly reintroduced the three organizations discussed in the foregoing chapters to the challenge of counterinsurgency in a foreign land. This provides an opportunity to further test the hypotheses on doctrine for each organization. The conduct of counterinsurgency by each of the three in the same country at the same time also allows for the control of many variables including the terrain, weather, language, and to a somewhat lesser degree, population and enemy.

The following chapter presents evidence on two phenomena. The first phenomenon is cultural change and continuity for each of the three organizations in the period between the end of its experience in counterinsurgency in Vietnam or Kenya and the beginning of the Iraq war. The second phenomenon is counterinsurgency doctrine and operations conducted in Iraq during the period 2003-2008.

There are, however, limits to what can be conclusively demonstrated about the organizations’ activities in Iraq at present. Most publicly available information is derived from news reporting, which is by its nature somewhat fragmentary. Much history remains to be written, particularly as presently classified documents become available. The following discussion of Iraq is therefore much more tentative than the previous discussions of Vietnam and Kenya.

Fortunately, the author is able to draw on two sets of information that amplify news reporting and current histories. The first is conversations and briefings with U.S.
military and intelligence personnel on Iraq throughout the period 2003-2009. The second is the author's own experience as a civilian analyst and adviser to U.S. forces in Iraq, which totaled roughly nine months from August 2007 to August 2008. This additional information should add some level of granularity to this account that would otherwise be lacking, particularly for U.S. forces.


The year 1973 was the low water mark of the U.S. Army in the 20th century. The Army had not brought the Vietnam War to a successful conclusion yet had reduced readiness in Europe to fight the war. Discipline was shaky, morale was low, and combat-effectiveness poor at best.

In terms of Army culture, there were three major developments in its environment in this period. The first and most important development was the end of the draft. It was to be replaced by an all-volunteer force (AVF), as the Vietnam experience had made the draft, never well-liked by the American public, untenable.

The end of the draft struck at one of the bedrocks of Army managerial culture. No longer could it count on simply requisitioning huge masses of manpower (with little prior military experience) that would be turned into corps, divisions, and brigades.

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801 Unfortunately, none of these personnel can be identified by name. Unclassified briefings will be cited by title and date where possible.
802 Author, through contracts with the RAND Corporation, served in two different military organizations. The first was with a joint task force, Task Force-134/Detention Operations, which enabled travel to U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, British, and U.S. special operations forces facilities in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Basrah provinces. The second was with Multinational Force-West, the Marine Corps senior command responsible for Anbar province, which enable interaction with U.S. Marine, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Operations Forces.
Instead, it would have to persuade and cajole young Americans to join up of their own free will.

The second development was the evolving U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. Until the 1960s, U.S. superiority in strategic nuclear systems was the centerpiece of deterrence in Europe. By 1973, the era of nuclear parity had arrived as the Soviets had a large and relatively survivable strategic force along with their own tactical and theatre systems. This cast doubt on the credibility of nuclear deterrence, yet at the same time made conventional forces more important to the United States and NATO.

The third development was the evolving nature of the technology of conventional war. From communications to lasers and precision-guided weapons, technology was increasing the mobility and firepower of conventional units at a rapid pace. Of course, this new technology was often complicated and so required well-trained personnel to optimally utilize.

At precisely this moment, the U.S. Army witnessed another army, surprised and outnumbered, fight off two determined Soviet trained and supplied armies. This was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which the Israeli Army faced the Egyptian and Syrian Armies. The central lessons of the Yom Kippur War appeared to be that modern combat was incredibly lethal, but that a smaller, well-equipped, and well-trained force could defeat larger armies even when beginning from a disadvantageous position. The U.S. Army,

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traditionally centered on deliberate mobilization, would have to be able to mobilize and win quickly.\textsuperscript{806}

These three factors, particularly the end of the draft, combined with the Israeli example to shift Army culture over the course of the next fifteen years. The Army began to change in terms of managerial culture, as labor was no longer a free good. In particular much more emphasis was given to producing units with high quality rather than just in quantity.

The changes to meet this requirement were extensive. Briefly summarizing, the Army sought to buy higher-quality equipment in somewhat lower quantity, while vastly improving training for units. On the acquisition side, this meant the so-called Big Five systems, including what would become the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, as well as additional systems, such as the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS).

On the training side, the Army constructed the high-technology National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and emphasized improving the quality of individual recruits. Personnel, no longer free, had to be maximized in quality, even if this meant paying more per soldier. However, even this shift was limited. The Army continued to emphasize planning in terms of units of battalion size and larger, particularly divisions. NTC was tailored to prepare battalion and brigade size units for high-tempo mechanized warfare.

The end of the draft may have forced some adjustment in Army managerial culture, but it remained limited.807

Additionally, the Army began attempts to increase coordination with the Air Force for the central European battle. Traditionally, Air Force and Army cooperation had been limited and contentious, with a few notable exceptions in wartime. However, the Air Force was going through its own post-Vietnam changes, and many in the service felt that improving relations with the Army was important. In addition to working to develop joint doctrine for fighting in central Europe (eventually termed AirLand Battle), the Air Force purchased its first modern dedicated close air-support aircraft, the A-10. While all problems were not solved, there was nonetheless a real increase in cooperation.808

As with the shift on unit quality, this shift to a more cooperative attitude towards other services was also limited. AirLand Battle remained more a goal than a working doctrine, as would soon be demonstrated. While the Cold War ended in 1989 with no shots fired along the European Central Front, within a year the new model Army and Air Force would be called upon to fight a mostly Soviet equipped army after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

The result was spectacular, with U.S. casualties minimal and the devastation of the Iraqi Army nearly total. However, the two services actual execution of AirLand

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Battle was quite poor; leading some to observe that there was “Air Battle” and “Land Battle,” but not AirLand Battle. In effect, the Air Force and Army simply divided up the battlefield in space (via the Fire Support Coordination Line) and time. Each was given free reign in the time and place designated, hardly a sign of deep cooperation.\textsuperscript{809}

U.S. Army culture in 2003 was therefore, despite significant changes in both its domestic and international environment, remarkably similar. The end of the draft had the most effect, as it removed a central element that Army culture had rested upon. This caused a modest change in managerial culture, focusing on improving the quality of both labor and capital to be managed. The overall strategic culture remained focused on employing large units and extensive firepower in high intensity conflict while minimizing involvement with other services and agencies.\textsuperscript{810}

**Heavy Metal vs. the Strategic Corporal: The U.S. Marine Corps, 1973-2003**

The Marines, who had been the first combat units into Vietnam, were the first service to be fully withdrawn from the conflict, with the last Marine units leaving in 1970. It thus had something of a head start in planning for the future while the other services continued to be engaged. Further, as noted, the Marine Corps had only briefly had to rely on the draft during World War II and Vietnam, so the subsequent shift the AVF impacted it the least.


\textsuperscript{810} In an unpublished manuscript entitled “The Evolution of Land Warfare,” Barry Posen describes the Army in this period as being a new military format, which he refers to as the “thorough exploitation of science and technology” due to its adoption of high technology methods of training as well as improved equipment.
Despite these advantages, the post-Vietnam period was still challenging for the Corps and its two strategic subcultures. Defense budgets were tight and the U.S. appetite for small wars had reached its nadir, while there was little resurgence in the need for or viability of amphibious operations. The country was refocusing on the threat posed by the Soviets, particularly to Western Europe. All three of the other services were focusing heavily on what their contributions to NATO would be in a future war. The Marine Corp thus began seeking a piece of the NATO mission.

Marine interest in NATO missions was not entirely new, as large exercises in the Mediterranean dated to the 1960s. However, a 1970 joint Norwegian-U.S. defense study provided a new opportunity. This study concluded that NATO’s “northern flank” needed additional protection, particularly Norway’s far north. The Marine Corps leapt at the opportunity. In 1975, a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) conducted maneuvers in Norway and Germany, the Marines’ first NATO operation away from the Mediterranean. By the end of the 1970s, brigade sized maneuvers were being conducted by the Marines in Norway.\footnote{Sean Maloney, “Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response, and the Cold War,” \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies}, v.27 n.4 (December 2004); Barry Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” \textit{International Security} v.7 n.2 (Fall 1982); and Linton Brooks “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” \textit{International Security} v.11 n.2 (Autumn 1986).}

Even as it found a quasi-amphibious mission for the advance base subculture in NATO, the Marine Corps was seeking other regions to play a major role. One of the most notable national security debates in the late 1970s was on the need for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to quickly move to reinforce states threatened by Soviet expansion. By the late 1970s, the principal area of concern was the Middle East, as Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean appeared to be increasing even as the Soviets...
moved into Afghanistan to prop up their client state. Previously the United States had relied on a friendly Iran as its bulwark in the Persian Gulf, but the ouster of the Shah changed the strategic environment dramatically.

Some in the Marine Corps, such as General P.X. Kelley, embraced the RDF concept as another mission for which the Corps was well-suited.\textsuperscript{812} However, confronting a Soviet Motor Rifle Division was going to be challenging for a force that was traditionally organized for either a relatively brief amphibious assault or for more low intensity conflict. The Marines would be forced to increasingly resemble the Army (though still conducting a form of amphibious operation) if it was to seriously embrace this mission, so Marine participation in the RDF was contentious. Even as these debates took place, the Marine Corps continued to be the force of choice for small scale U.S. interventions.

The end of the Cold War came as many of the debates from the post-Vietnam era became increasingly heated. On one side were the heirs to the advance base school, which advocated the heavier, RDF-oriented force structure.\textsuperscript{813} These advocates felt that the Marines, operating from prepositioning ships and with Marine organic fixed wing aviation for close air support, were in a strong position to execute the kind of truly integrated all-arms operation that the Army aspired to conduct with AirLand Battle.

One the other side of the debate the small wars Marines. They argued that low-intensity conflict was the most likely form of warfare the Marines would be called on to


wage in the future and should therefore be the focus of preparation and doctrine. Rather than getting heavier, the Marines should stay relatively light and avoid heavy reliance on prepositioning and the massive logistical requirements that were the hallmark of the Army.

This debate was embodied in the two Commandants of the late Cold War and early interwar period. P.X. Kelley, Commandant from 1983-1987, was a major proponent of the RDF and a modernized advance base mission, which was developed during his tenure. His successor, Alfred Gray, Commandant from 1987 to 1991 was much more focused on low-intensity conflict and took steps to reign in Kelley’s embrace of heavy units. Gray, for example, decided to cut back heavily on Marine acquisition of the M1 tank.

However, just as Gray seemed in position to shift the Marine Corps away from maneuver warfare, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait. In the space of only a few months, the advance base subculture advocates of the RDF saw their concepts validated as the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions surged to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM. Further, the argument that low-intensity conflict was to dominate Marine deployments in the future, though not disproved, did not appear supported by the short, intense and successful Gulf War. Among other things, this led to expanded Marine acquisition of the M1 in the early 1990s.

However, the small wars Marines did not lose all influence in the 1990s. Charles Krulak, Commandant from 1995 to 1999, continually stressed that the Marine Corps was about producing skilled Marines rather than relying heavily on technology. A common refrain among Marines was that the other services “man their equipment” while the Marine Corps “equips its men.” Krulak also promulgated such concepts as “the strategic corporal” and the “three block war,” which focused on low intensity conflict and the importance of skilled personnel.

In 2003, Marine culture was therefore unchanged. The advance base subculture and small wars subculture continued to oscillate slightly in terms of who dominated the Corps at any given time, yet neither was any closer to establishing a durable hegemony. At the same time, the Corps continued to embrace the importance of small unit leadership, with the Basic School essentially unchanged in role and focus.

Revitalization of the Quiet Professionals: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1973-2003

After Vietnam, the decline in interest in small wars led to a fallow period for the Special Forces. However, three events at the very end of the 1970s would reinvigorate Special Forces’ vitality. By 2003, Special Forces would be more capable and autonomous than ever before and would play a major role in Iraq.

The first event was the beginning of a Communist insurgency against the government of El Salvador. U.S. policy was to support the government, but to do so with as few U.S. forces as possible. The Special Forces would provide many of the advisers to

816 See for example, Charles Krulak, “Commandant’s Planning Guidance Frag Order,” Marine Corps Gazette, v.81, n.10 (October 1997)
the Salvadoran military, ensuring the vitality of the Special Forces unconventional warfare mission. This would last throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{818}

The second event was the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran. This prompted efforts to ensure that the U.S. would have capabilities to conduct special operations more effectively in the future. Among other things, a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was created in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{819}

Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted a general resurgence in U.S. interest in unconventional warfare. U.S. aid to Afghan rebels was principally handled by CIA, but CIA links to Special Forces remained strong. Special Forces personnel apparently provided training to rebels in some instances.\textsuperscript{820}

The increasing importance of special operations eventually resulted in major bureaucratic change. The Defense Authorization Act of 1987 act established the Special Operations Command (SOCOM): a four star unified command with responsibility for all special operations activities. Though this reorganization stopped short of making SOF a true fifth service, it did result in the unification of all special operations under a major command. The creation of the MFP-11 budget program in 1989 put SOCOM on the road to limited budget autonomy. The combination of a separate command and limited


\textsuperscript{819}On this period, see Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putnam, 1988).

\textsuperscript{820}Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003).
funding autonomy gave SOCOM greater latitude and clout than it had ever enjoyed previously. 821

Special Forces were only one small component of SOCOM, but nonetheless they benefited from the increase in budget and autonomy. The end of the Cold War thus had less impact on Special Forces than the broader Army. Throughout the 1990s, Special Forces conducted unconventional warfare operations in both the Balkans and Somalia. 822

One emerging problem, however, was the division between Special Forces and other special operations forces, including the so-called “Special Mission Units” (SMUs) in SOCOM. SMUs were created to conduct missions similar to the Iranian hostage rescue and operated under JSOC. In addition, Navy SEALs and Army Rangers, elite commando-oriented forces, also existed under SOCOM.

These other forces, with only a few exceptions, had a different strategic culture than Special Forces. While Special Forces sought to integrate closely with locals, these other forces focused on conducting so-called “direct action” missions, essentially commando raids. While these orientations were not necessarily mutually exclusive, as Special Forces were also effective commandos, these differences meant that even within SOCOM the Special Forces often felt marginalized. 823

In 2001, Special Forces working with CIA were the spearhead of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. CIA and Special Forces partnered with local forces (the so-

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822 Robinson, pp. 136-190.
called Northern Alliance) and were able to combine these forces with U.S. airpower to rapidly defeat the Taliban.\textsuperscript{824} At the same time, Special Forces began training and supporting the Philippine military in counterinsurgency operations against Muslim rebels.\textsuperscript{825} By 2003, Special Forces were in a position to become a major part of the Iraq war.

\textbf{An Army on the Rivers Rhine, Foyle, and Lagan: The British Army, 1960-2003}\textsuperscript{826}

Following the end of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the British government began to liquidate ever more of its imperial possessions and overseas bases. This was accelerated by the Harold Wilson Labour government in 1967, which formally announced a withdrawal from commitments “east of Suez” beginning with Aden (in what is now Yemen). Formal requirement for the British Army to defend the empire vanished along with the empire (or so it seemed as the Falkland Islands campaign of 1982 proved otherwise).

Even with the end of empire, the British Army was not left without a mission; it actually had two. The first was the British continental commitment in support of NATO, embodied in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The second, from 1969 on, was in Northern Ireland, where the conflict between Protestant Republicans and Protestant Unionists had resulted in a nasty civil war.

BAOR, along with the Berlin Brigade in West Berlin, represented a substantial commitment to the continent (averaging nearly 60,000 men for most of the 1960s and

\textsuperscript{825} Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines Overview Briefing, February 2008.
\textsuperscript{826} The Rivers Foyle and Lagan are associated with Londonderry (or Derry) and Belfast respectively.
1970s). Moreover, with the end of National Service in 1960, the British Army was once again a volunteer force. Apart from the manpower, BAOR required heavy equipment to face the mechanized forces of the Warsaw Pact; three of the four divisions committed to BAOR were armored divisions. Besides the expense of modern armored units, these divisions had to be based in Germany as part of NATO strategy, a break in the traditional British model of offshore balancing.\textsuperscript{827}

Even as the British Army ended the imperial commitment and became accustomed to the challenge of forward deployment in Germany, it was called on to mediate in Northern Ireland. First deployed in 1969 to keep the peace between Catholic and Protestant, the Army was soon fighting extremists from both factions. The Army would remain in Northern Ireland until 2007, though after the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) in 1998 this presence was mostly symbolic.

Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland would be extraordinarily difficult for the Army. One of the central reasons for this was that the civilian and local partners the Army was so accustomed to supporting were either absent or compromised by partisanship. The Parliament of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Ulster Special Constabulary (the so-called “B Specials”) and essentially all aspects of the government were dominated by the Protestants.\textsuperscript{828}

The Army was thus massively handicapped in the initial years but eventually began to make progress as civilian partners were reformed or eliminated. The B-Specials were disbanded in 1970 but real progress was not made until 1972 when the Parliament


of Northern Ireland was eliminated and replaced by direct rule by the British Parliament. From 1972, the Army began to make progress against the insurgency through the use of amnesty (including the so-called “supergrass” informers), coordination with the police (which were at least partially reformed), census taking, and generally discriminate use of force.\textsuperscript{829}

Operations were generally conducted by small units, initially company and platoon size but shifting to four man patrols known as “bricks” after 1972. There were a few exceptions to eliminate “no-go” areas fortified by the republicans, such as Operation MOTORMAN. MOTORMAN used more than 20,000 troops backed by armored vehicles; as a result it cleared the “no-go” areas almost without resistance.\textsuperscript{830}

The Army was also confronted by the problem of conducting counterinsurgency at home rather than abroad. Methods that had proved acceptable in previous counterinsurgency campaigns did not survive the scrutiny of democratic society. Interrogation techniques such as forcing individuals to stand for prolonged periods, sleep deprivation, exposure to “white noise” and the like were explicitly permitted as recently as 1967. However, these techniques, termed “interrogation in depth,” produced immense controversy in Northern Ireland before Prime Minister Heath finally disallowed them in 1972.\textsuperscript{831}

Detention without trial proved similarly untenable. Initial internments were launched in 1971 under the name Operation DEMETRIUS. Over 1,000 individuals were

\textsuperscript{830} Mockaitis, pp. 107-108.
\textsuperscript{831} Mockaitis, pp. 103-104.
interned over the next few years. However, like interrogation in depth, the practice provoked an outcry and was suspended in 1975.832

Even as the British Army was pulled deeper into Northern Ireland, it was also conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in Oman. In this case, however, it had almost ideal civilian partners. The old sultan, whose archaic attitudes had provided fuel to an insurgency that had begun about 1965, was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his energetic son, Qaboos in 1970. Qaboos, who was a graduate of Sandhurst and had served in the British Army, made the ending of the insurgency his first priority and had the authority of an absolute monarch to accomplish that goal.833

Qaboos called upon the British for aid and received more than four hundred officers, either seconded or on contract to the Sultan, to act as advisers. He also received SAS teams, who created and led local paramilitaries. Qaboos also proved willing and able to carry out the reforms the British advised. Together with his British advisers, Qaboos oversaw an integrated military and development campaign that ended the insurgency by 1975. The campaign, like the American campaign in El Salvador, was almost entirely fought by locals; however, Qaboos, probably the closest to an enlightened despot the 20th century produced, proved a much more capable and adaptable local partner than the government of El Salvador.

By the 1980s, the situation in Northern Ireland had stabilized or perhaps stalemated. The republicans had been reduced to terrorism rather than full-scale insurgency in the cities, where a tense and hostile peace punctuated by low-level shootings and occasional bombings reigned. In the south along the border with Ireland

832 Mockaitis, pp. 102-103.
proper, particularly in South Armagh, cross-border operations by snipers, bombers, and hit and run squads produced a higher level of violence, though one still relatively limited. Finally, the republicans also launched a terror campaign in Britain proper as well as attacking servicemen in the BAOR in Germany.\textsuperscript{834}

In the 1990s, the BAOR came to an end, replaced by the much smaller British Force Germany. At the same time, fitful negotiations between the factions began in Northern Ireland, culminating in the Belfast Agreement. The pace of violence dropped significantly during this period, with less than a dozen fatal casualties for the British Army after 1993 (out of a total for the entire war of just over 700). It was this force that would be committed to Iraq in 2003.

**COBRA II and After: The U.S. Army in Iraq, 2003-2005**

The results of the initial invasion of Iraq looked strikingly similar to that of the 1991 Gulf War. While this campaign, codenamed COBRA II (a reference to COBRA, the breakout from the Normandy beach head in 1944), was more ambitious in scope and did not go quite as flawlessly as 1991, it was nonetheless a massive triumph. In scarcely a month, Army units moved from southern Iraq to Baghdad, collapsing the regime.\textsuperscript{835}

However, the collapse of the regime created a dangerous void, which was only partially filled by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the hastily constituted occupation government. Vast quantities of weapons scattered around the country in many cases

\textsuperscript{834} Mockaitis, pp. 108-110.
totally unsecured. Large numbers of aggrieved former regime officials with military experience were still free. Foreign Sunni Islamic extremists began entering the country and linking up with domestic Sunni extremists. Infighting erupted inside the southern Shia Islamic community while in the north the Kurds sought to secure a quasi-independent Kurdistan.\footnote{See, inter alia, George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Knopf, 2006); and James Dobbins, et. al. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).}

A Sunni insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition quickly emerged in this void. It consisted of former regime officers, nationalists (who often combined moderate Islamism with nationalism), domestic and foreign Sunni extremists, and pure criminals. By 2004, part of the Shia community began fighting the coalition as well.

The next section describes U.S. Army responses to this insurgency in terms of doctrine and operations. It begins with a description of Army written doctrine for COIN in 2003. It is then followed by a discussion of some Army operations through 2005.

In February 2003, just before the invasion of Iraq, the Army issued a new version of FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, which included counterinsurgency. This edition (over 200 pages long) is not specifically and exclusively about COIN, but it contains many familiar elements from previous COIN doctrine. It uses the term “foreign internal defense” (FID) rather than COIN in many instances, but nonetheless devotes an entire chapter to COIN.

In discussing stability operations generally, it makes the following comment on intelligence:
Stability operations and support operations demand greater attention to civil considerations—the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an area of operations (AO)—than do the more conventional offensive and defensive operations. Commanders must expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain but may be restoring basic services or influencing public support. Cultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the operation. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in tactics or even strategy. Biographic information and leadership analysis are key to understanding adversaries or potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the contingency underlying the deployment are vital to mission success...

This manual also stresses the importance of the population and of coordination between civilian and military efforts.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, \textit{Stability and Support Operations}, February 2003, p. 2-3. The format for FM numbering can be confusing— it is chapter and then page number within chapter, so 2-3 is not the first and second pages of the manual. Rather it is the third page in chapter two.} The chapter devoted to FID presents the following summary of COIN:

Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, mobilizes groups and forces around them, and develops programs that solve problems of relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and economic development. Security operations by military and police forces, combined with effective and legitimate administration of justice, provide the necessary secure environment in which development can occur.\footnote{FM 3-07, p. 2-15.}

The chapter then discusses the need for amnesty programs, the importance of police and paramilitaries, the need to avoid using excessive force, and the need to remain on the strategic defensive (but tactical offensive) in COIN.\footnote{FM 3-07, p. 3-4.} Though comparatively brief, the same basic discussions found in earlier Army COIN doctrine are present. The manual also contains appendixes on making interagency coordination work (Appendix A) and the nature of insurgency (Appendix D).

\footnote{FM 3-07, pp. 3-4 to 3-7.}
Thus, the U.S. military that entered Iraq in 2003 did not lack at least general doctrinal guidelines for COIN. However, the 2003 version of FM 3-07 was not ideal. It covered such a broad range of operations that it did not provide sufficient detail on COIN. It was further limited by its assumption that U.S. forces would typically provide advice and support rather than conduct combat operations themselves.

By the end of 2003, the U.S. Army realized that it needed a new doctrine manual more specific to COIN. The result, released in October of 2004, was the Army’s Field Manual–Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. FMI 3-07.22 elaborated on previous concepts (such as the importance of insurgencies that attempted to form a “counterstate” to replace the existing authority) but basically retained the same definitions and prescriptions for COIN. In discussing why insurgency happens and why the population is important, the manual notes that

> the desire to form a counterstate grows from the same causes that galvanize any political campaign. These causes can range from the desire for greater equity in the distribution of resources (poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to sustain an insurgency) to a demand that foreign occupation end. Increasingly, religious ideology has become a catalyst for insurgent movements. The support of the people, then, is the center of gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to sustain the insurgent movement (or, contrariwise, to defeat it).

FMI 3-07.22 repeatedly asserts that the population is the center of gravity in COIN. Additionally, it argues that intelligence must cover cultural, social, political, and economic issues. The importance of civil-military coordination is similarly emphasized.

In discussing COIN combat operations, the FMI reprises familiar points from earlier doctrine. One example is the possible negative consequences of firepower:

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842 FMI 3-07.22, pp. 4-2 to 4-5.
843 FMI 3-07.22, pp. 2-10 to 2-13.
The American way of war has been to substitute firepower for manpower. As a result, US forces have frequently resorted to firepower in the form of artillery or air any time they make contact. This creates two negatives in a counterinsurgency. First, massive firepower causes collateral damage, thereby frequently driving the locals into the arms of the insurgents. Second, it allows insurgents to break contact after having inflicted casualties on friendly forces.  

Other examples include the need for small-unit decentralized operations and the importance of patrolling out among the populace. The FMI also has a section that discusses the importance of “clear and hold” operations (during which insurgents are driven from an area that is subsequently secured and developed); these are essentially pacification operations.

The U.S. Army’s actual conduct of COIN in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 seldom matched the written doctrine in either FM 3-07 or FMI 3-07.22. One of the most often noted examples of deviation from written doctrine was the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Major General Raymond Odierno in 2003-2004. The division was operating north of Baghdad along the Tigris River Valley, an area that included Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit.

This area would rapidly become the epicenter of the Sunni insurgency, posing the most difficult challenge in Iraq. Odierno’s response, as related by one of his former subordinates, was to “increase lethality.” While perhaps understandable in the face of mounting attacks, such a response was not what any of the Army’s COIN doctrine from Vietnam onward called for.

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844 FMI 3-07.22, p. 3-10.
845 FMI 3-07.22, p. 3-9.
846 FMI 3-07.22, pp. 3-11 to 3-14.
Odierno revealed a considerable amount about his operational approach in an interview soon after returning from his tour in Iraq with the 4th Infantry division. First, he made extensive use of multibattalion operations:

We ended up conducting 11 major offensives during the next 10 months we were in Iraq. The first was "Peninsula Strike" on a peninsula formed by the Tigris River near Balad, just north of Baghdad. The mission was to defeat noncompliant forces still conducting operations against Coalition Forces. We conducted a combined air-ground assault with a 4,000-man heavy-light force. It included our 3d Brigade out of Fort Carson [Colorado] and the 173d Airborne Brigade out of Vicenza [Italy], which was OPCON to [under the operational control of] Task Force Ironhorse, as well as support from Special Operations Forces [SOF] and the Air Force. 850

Odierno also discussed his attitude toward firepower:

During Ramadan, I made a conscious decision to conduct some lethal operations. For about a three-week period, we used artillery and mortar H & I [harassing and interdiction] fires, CAS [close air support], and tank and Bradley direct fire on specific targets we knew were conducting these operations. Because of the amount of firepower we employed, the operations got a lot of play from the media. Using lethal operations was very important for a couple of reasons. One, we went after very specific targets and were able to take down a large number of insurgents by doing this. Secondly, it sent the right message: "We are here to help the Iraqi people, and anytime we need to, we can raise the level of conflict to lethal." 851

H&I fire, the firing of artillery in areas where the enemy is suspected to be, was directly from the Vietnam era Army’s mode of operation. Odierno further noted:

We used our Paladins the entire time we were there. Most nights, we fired H & I fires, what I call "proactive" counterfire. One of the enemy's techniques was to try to shoot mortars or rockets at large forward operating bases [FOBs] that had a lot of our Soldiers on them. We identified areas from which we knew the insurgents were shooting mortars and shot H & I fires into those areas... We also shot a lot of counterfire. We had free fire areas and became very good at clearing fires--good enough to respond with counterfire in less than a minute. We were careful about collateral damage. 852

According to one officer serving in Iraq, Odierno’s claim of concern about collateral damage is overstated, noting that insurgents “would come up from Fallujah, set up next to

851 Hollis, p. xi, brackets in original.
852 Hollis, pp. xi-xii, brackets in original.
a farmhouse, set off a mortar, and leave. And the 4th ID would respond with
counterbattery fire.\textsuperscript{853}

Odierno apparently felt he needed substantial and varied artillery for his mission,
noting:

So, artillery plays a significant role in counterinsurgency operations... I had four 155-mm
battalions, including 1-17 FA from the 75th FA Brigade out of Fort Sill [Oklahoma] and
my three Paladin battalions, plus mortars. That and our divisional MLRS battalion--the
combination was probably okay for our battlespace. In November when we were
conducting many lethal operations, we even fired several ATACMS [Army tactical missile
system missiles] at specific targets. The targets were out in the desert, and whenever we
tried to conduct raids on them, they saw us coming and moved out. So, finally, we attacked
the targets with ATACMS--very effective.\textsuperscript{854}

This indicates Odierno felt that four 155mm tube artillery battalions plus a rocket artillery
battalion and mortars organic to other units was merely an "okay" level of firepower for
counterinsurgency. Further, he felt the need to use ATACMs missiles, which dispense
hundreds of submunitions at a range of 80 miles.

Even in discussing information and psychological operations, it is clear Odierno’s
use of firepower was extensive:

Because we were so careful about collateral damage and maximized IO, over time, we
found the Iraqis, for the most part, understood what we were doing and why, even when we
conducted lethal operations. Let me give you an example. We tried firing H & I less and
less frequently, as long as we were not receiving mortar attacks. At one point, we went
three weeks without firing H & I, the longest we had gone. But then we received some
rocket attacks. So we went to the Iraqi leaders and said we were going to start firing H & I
fires again--that we didn't want to have to do that, but we couldn't allow rockets to be fired
at our forward operating bases.\textsuperscript{855}

Despite Odierno’s protestations to the contrary, it seems unlikely that Iraqis were
particularly sympathetic to H&I fire of such volume that three weeks represented the
longest time it was not used.

\textsuperscript{853} Ricks, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{854} Hollis, p. xii, brackets in original.
\textsuperscript{855} Hollis, p. xii.
Nor were these beliefs limited to Odierno alone in the 4th Infantry Division. Many 4th ID commanders, including battalion commander Lt. Col. Steve Russell and brigade commander Col. David Hogg, were reported to have embraced the same methods of operation. Only a few 4th ID officers, such as brigade commander Col. Frederick Rudesheim, were reported to have not fully embraced this operational approach.\(^{856}\)

However, the influence of commanders like Rudesheim was apparently minimal. One of his subordinates, battalion commander Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman, embraced the Odierno approach, later admitting he began essentially ignoring Rudesheim’s guidance to the contrary. “We are going to inflict extreme violence” he is reported to have told subordinates. Sassaman’s unit lived up to this statement in a variety of ways, including destroying the family homes of individuals suspected of being insurgents, in effect making refugees of their families, and using white phosphorous mortar rounds to burn down wheat fields used by insurgent snipers. Sassaman would subsequently be discharged from the Army for helping cover up the drowning of an Iraqi one of his subordinate units had detained.\(^{857}\)

Odierno’s division may have been an outlier, but other divisions in 2003-2004 conducted operations that did not conform at all to written doctrine. The 82nd Airborne Division, operating in Anbar province west of Baghdad in 2003-2004, was also quite reliant on firepower and violent raids rather than population security. This was most notable around the city of Fallujah.

Almost from the beginning, the 82nd Airborne was quick to use significant firepower in dealing with Iraqis. On April 28, 2003, a demonstration in Fallujah

\(^{856}\) Ricks, pp. 233-238.  
\(^{857}\) Filkins, “The Fall of the Warrior King,” quotation from p.2.
confronted soldiers from the unit, who were provoked until firing on the crowd, killing between six and seventeen Iraqis (accounts vary) and wounding many more. The exact nature of the provocation is unclear, but all of those killed appear to have been unarmed.\textsuperscript{858}

A similar incident took place two days later, when a convoy of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} encountered another group of demonstrators. The convoy was provoked into firing on the crowd with crew-served weapons (reportedly including a .50 caliber machine gun). Accounts of the casualties and provocation in this instance also vary.\textsuperscript{859}

In September 2003, after some unit shuffling, the city was passed to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade of the 82\textsuperscript{nd}. This brigade pursued a very raid-intensive strategy in the early months of its deployment, allegedly relying heavily on firepower like the previous units of the 82\textsuperscript{nd}.\textsuperscript{860} However, the unit is reported to have subsequently decreased patrolling the city proper, increasingly giving responsibility to the hastily created Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).\textsuperscript{861} This shift, while reducing the use of firepower, essentially abdicated securing the population.

Detainee abuse was also common in some units of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade. Some of the soldiers of the unit were reported to be nicknamed the “Murderous Maniacs” by the population of Fallujah for their abusive approach to detainees, in large part born out of frustration.\textsuperscript{862} A sergeant in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade during this period subsequently reported that fellow soldiers would volunteer to guard detainees in order to work out frustration on

\textsuperscript{858} Ricks, pp. 138-140.
\textsuperscript{859} Ricks, pp. 140-142.
them, though there were apparently some limits: “Broken bones didn't happen too often, maybe every other week.”

This pattern of raids and firepower rather than the population security and development called for in written doctrine continued. Two operations from November 2005 demonstrate the Army’s disregard of its own COIN doctrine. Operation KENNESAW DRAGON, launched on November 14, 2005, involved Iraqi Army units, which cordoned the town of Ad Dawr, and the U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, which air assaulted to the outskirts of the town. After a one-day sweep that encountered little resistance, the units returned to Forward Operating Base Wilson.

Operation CLEAN SWEEP, which occurred nearly simultaneously in southern Baghdad, was similar to KENNESAW DRAGON, lacking only the air-assault element. Neither operation provided any enduring security to the population or did much to garner its support. Indeed, the area covered by CLEAN SWEEP had been “swept” only a month before, yet continued to be problematic.

In addition to heavy use of firepower and brief raids and sweeps, the Army relied extensively on detention of “military aged males” (MAMs). MAMs were all males from roughly the age of sixteen to sixty. Though sometimes driven by intelligence on specific individuals, detention was often less discriminate as a Department of Defense review in August 2004 noted “…units conducting raids found themselves seizing specifically

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863 Human Rights Watch, p. 12.
864 Both operations are described in “Iraqi, Coalition Forces Catch Suspects with Munitions,” American Forces Press Service, November 17, 2005.
targeted persons, so designated by military intelligence; but... they reverted to rounding up and all suspicious looking persons—all too often including women and children.\(^{865}\)

Detainees were introduced into a system that was capricious at best. Army battalions and brigades could only hold detainees for two weeks without additional authorization from higher headquarters. In that time, detainees were interrogated and a decision would be made on whether to release the detainee or send them along to the theater detention system, which included large facilities such as the Abu Ghraib prison west of Baghdad, Camp Cropper near Baghdad International Airport, and Fort Suse in northern Iraq. At the theater level detainees were sometimes interrogated further but for the most part were simply “out of circulation.”\(^{866}\)

Mass detention enabled the Army to conduct an easy sorting of an ambiguous environment. In effect, a detained Iraqi was no longer the unit’s problem. The detainee population swelled rapidly as a result of the embrace of detention. By October 2003 there were 7,000 detainees at Abu Ghraib alone.\(^{867}\)

The scandal associated with abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib acted to curb the use of mass detention to some degree, but did not end the practice. By August 2005, despite large releases from the theater level facilities, the number of detainees had reached almost 11,000.\(^{868}\)

Finally, the “body count” once again became a significant metric for the Army in Iraq, despite senior leadership specifically arguing early in the war that the body count would not be used. In November 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in an interview


\(^{866}\) Author observations while working in detention operations, August 2007-January 2008.

\(^{867}\) Schlesinger Report, p. 11.

said bluntly “We don’t do body counts on other people.”869 Before the Iraq War began, General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, had made a similar statement.870

Yet the metric inevitably returned, as operations were focused on killing and capturing insurgents. Despite senior leadership efforts to the contrary, Army culture drifted back to this metric. The body count (and the related statistic of number of detainees taken) was in use internally to the Army by June 2003.871 By 2005, it had become common practice to publicly report a number of enemy killed or detained with every operation.872

The foregoing is not to argue that no Army officers understood and attempted to implement COIN doctrine as written. One example of a senior officer attempting to do was Major General David Petraeus, commanding the 101st Airborne Division in 2003-2004, in northern Iraq around Mosul. Enabled by a relatively benign security environment, Petraeus emphasized the security and development approach called for by doctrine.873

However, assessments of the 101st experience suggest that the environment was extremely calm, making the operation more akin to humanitarian relief than counterinsurgency. One history notes that the 101st encountered “a spate of small firefights” in its first week in Mosul, but little real resistance.874 In some areas around

869 Transcript of Donald Rumsfeld on FOX News Sunday, available online at: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101956,00.html.
874 Ricks, p. 229.
Mosul, such as the Sinjar region, soldiers of the 101st encountered essentially no resistance throughout the 101st deployment.\textsuperscript{875}

At the next lower echelon of command, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (3rd ACR) Colonel H.R. McMaster embraced COIN with zeal, conducting extensive predeployment training that, as doctrine would support, focused nearly as much on language and culture as fire and maneuver.\textsuperscript{876} This would enable 3rd ACR, which benefited from a small surge of other U.S. and Iraqi forces, to conduct operations in Tal Afar in western Iraq during 2005-2006 that would be held up as a model of COIN.\textsuperscript{877}

Yet for every McMaster or Petraeus, there seemed to be several commanders who did not embrace written COIN doctrine. At least a partial explanation for McMaster and Petraeus’ deviation from Army culture is that both had spent considerable time away from Army education in civilian graduate schools. Petraeus had earned a PhD in international relations from Princeton, while McMaster held a PhD in history from the University of North Carolina. Moreover, both had written dissertations on the U.S. Army and Vietnam, indicating they had spent far more time reflecting on the problem of counterinsurgency than the vast majority of their peers.

As in Vietnam, the Army did undertake a substantial advisory mission with the Iraqi Army. A major subordinate command of MNF-I, known as Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), was created in June 2004. This command would

\textsuperscript{875} See Kayla Williams, Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).
eventually be responsible for training all Iraqi security forces, including the military, police, and some of the intelligence services.

MNSTC-I’s overall effectiveness is difficult to estimate at this point. Rebuilding an army that had been disbanded and much of its officer corps disqualified from service, if not actively in the insurgency, was always going to be extraordinarily difficult. The decision to forego conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force posed additional problems.

However, whatever success the Army had with the Iraqi Army was absent with local security forces like police. This was most notable with local police (Iraqi Police Service or IPS), which are separate from the more paramilitary National Police. IPS units were often either absent or infiltrated by militias and insurgents. The lack of involvement with the IPS and the problem of insurgent infiltration were noted in the October 2005 *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* report, a Congressionally-mandated quarterly report. This report, generally known for its highly optimistic tone, noted:

> Insurgent infiltration is likely a more significant problem in Ministry of Interior forces than in Ministry of Defense forces. Because the police are often recruited by local police chiefs with little Coalition oversight, infiltration tends to be somewhat higher in the police than in the military and paramilitary forces. Although infiltration harms the ability of the police to combat the insurgency, it does not render the forces incapable. The exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown at this time; the topic is addressed further in the classified annex.\(^{878}\)

This problem, as discussed in the next sections, was faced by all military organizations in Iraq. However, each dealt with it differently. The U.S. Army in 2003-2005, by its own admission, did little with local security forces like the IPS.

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Assessing Explanations for Army Doctrine and Operations, 2003-2005

The evidence for the period 2003-2005 is somewhat inconclusive from the perspective of hypotheses on doctrine is but nonetheless instructive. Hypothesis 1, rational response, receives little support. As with Vietnam, the Army’s written doctrine and actual operations bore little resemblance, suggesting that either written doctrine or operations or perhaps both were curiously ill-suited to the problem of counterinsurgency.

Hypothesis 2/2a, civilian intervention, is impossible to test in this period as there was very little intervention. Senior civilians such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initially refused to use the term “insurgency” to describe the problems in Iraq. Even after accepting that an insurgency was underway, the leadership did little to pressure the Army to adopt new doctrine.

Hypothesis 3, generic organizational imperatives, does not seem to be particularly supported. There is little evidence that the Army’s rejection of its own written doctrine in conducting operations generated autonomy, resources, or prestige. Indeed, the lack of civilian intervention indicated that the Army had a high degree of autonomy to decide its actions. Similarly, the main constraint on resources was available manpower, and this seems to have been a constant in this period regardless of what doctrine the Army chose to follow. In other terms, the Army was able to requisition billions of dollars a month for the war, and no evidence indicates that this was dependent on choice of doctrine. Finally, Army operations contributed to events like the Abu Ghraib scandal that actually reduced Army prestige.

Hypothesis 4 receives some support. The Army continued to focus on large unit operations, such as 4th ID’s PENINSULA STRIKE, and relied heavily on the use of
firepower. Granted the scale of both units and firepower was less in Iraq than Vietnam, but the pattern remained the same. More importantly, this pattern was again almost exactly opposite of the Army’s own written doctrine, a paradox difficult to explain unless some set of causal beliefs and norms about war supersede the written doctrine.

**War along the WERV: Marines in Al Anbar, 2003-2005**

The Marine Corps would have a major part in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as the eastern part of the push to Baghdad would be undertaken by the Marines’ I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), under Lieutenant General James Conway. The major elements of this press were Task Force Tarawa, commanded by Brigadier General Richard Natonski, and the 1st Marine Division. This division was led by Major General James Mattis, who had recently commended Marines in Afghanistan. The Marine drive to Baghdad was the longest Marine armored movement in history.  

Marine forces in Iraq were drawn down rapidly in the summer of 2003. As the insurgency worsened in the fall, planning to send I MEF back to Iraq began. Mattis began preparing the troops of the 1st Marine Division for counterinsurgency operations, as the Marines would be dispatched to Anbar province, which sprawled along the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV). I MEF arrived in Anbar in March 2004, taking responsibility from the 82nd Airborne and other detached Army units.

The killing and mutilation of four security contractors in Fallujah on March 31, 2004 highlighted the growing lawlessness and violence in Anbar. At this point Fallujah had become a bastion for the insurgency and was essentially not under control by either

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the provincial government or the Coalition. I MEF attempted to restore order in Fallujah in April with Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. However, tough insurgent resistance in the urban environment meant that the city was being destroyed and civilians killed. After a few days, the operation was halted and by the end of the month the Marines withdrew entirely from Fallujah proper. An attempt was made to use an Iraqi unit cobbled together from various tribes to secure Fallujah. This attempt was doomed from the start and Fallujah remained an insurgent stronghold through the summer of 2004.880

In November 2004, the Marines along with U.S. and Iraqi Army units, launched a second offensive, Operation PHANTOM FURY (also referred to by the Arabic AL FAJR “THE DAWN”), to retake Fallujah. This massive force was opposed by heavily entrenched insurgents.881 After more than a month of intense urban combat that devastated the city, the insurgents were forced out after taking massive casualties. Insurgent operations shifted west along the WERV, operations which the group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) increasingly dominated.882

The nationalist insurgents and tribesmen who had previously supported the religious fundamentalist group AQI began to have second thoughts beginning in early 2005. Many of the nationalists in this period were beginning to consider participation in the political process, as the alternative seemed to be more battles like Fallujah to no gain.

Tribesmen were increasingly angry as AQI took over their lucrative grey and black market activities, such as smuggling. 883

The first open break between AQI and Anbaris came around Al Qaim in early 2005. Backed by the Albu Nimr, the Albu Mahal from the area formed a paramilitary unit known as the Hamza Brigade (later known as the Desert Protectors). Initial attempts to establish a partnership between the Hamza Brigade and the Marines were unsuccessful, apparently due to miscommunication. A May 2005 Marine offensive, Operation MATADOR, damaged the city and killed members of Hamza Brigade, ending attempts at cooperation for several months. In August, however, the Coalition began to support the Hamza Brigade with airpower, but this was insufficient. By September 2005, the Hamza Brigade has been driven out of Al Qaim and was forced to retreat to the small desert town of Akashat. 884 In November 2005, a major partnership between the Hamza Brigade and the Coalition was arranged. This partnership led to the launch of a major offensive around Al Qaim called Operation STEEL CURTAIN, which eventually drove AQI out and secured the town. 885

Around Ramadi, other Anbaris began attempting to fight AQI. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi, a tribal smuggler, gathered some fighters but they were crushed by the superior organization of AQI. Nationalist insurgents in Ramadi also decided to turn against AQI at some point during mid- to late 2005. These nationalists, operating under a new umbrella organization called the Anbar People’s Council (APC), fought

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against AQI and also sought to help the Marines protect the elections for the new national government in December 2005.\(^{886}\) The Marines by 2005 were thus both able and willing to cooperate with local security forces, even those that were former insurgents.

**Assessing Explanations for Marine Doctrine and Operations, 2003-2005**

As with the Army, there is little that is dispositive about this early period of Marine involvement in Iraq. Hypothesis 1 receives some support given that Marine operations varied from the massive conventional PHANTOM FURY in Fallujah to cooperating with tribal fighters in Al Qaim- this could be a rational response. As with the Army, Hypothesis 2/2a does not receive a test as civilians were not interested in forcing operational change.

Hypothesis 3 receives little support, as Marine operations, like those in the Army, were not tied to the level of resources or autonomy. Like the Marines in I Corps during Vietnam, the Marines in Anbar had very high levels of autonomy from MNF-I. I MEF (and subsequently II MEF) constituted Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) a major subordinate command of MNF-I analogous to the role played by III MAF in Vietnam.

Hypothesis 4 receives support as Marine operations varied with the information environment. In Fallujah in 2004, the Marines confronted an enemy and environment that most resembled Hue in 1968. Insurgents in Fallujah, as at Hue, occupied fortified urban positions in large numbers. The response was unsurprisingly similar. However, elsewhere, the Marines cooperated with locals and conducted small unit patrols.

“Masters of Chaos”: Army Special Forces Operations in Iraq, 2003-2005

Army Special Forces were a major component of the initial invasion of Iraq. Operating independently in western Iraq, with Kurdish peshmerga, the CIA, and a few conventional units in the north, and supporting conventional units in the south, Special Forces were ubiquitous across the battlefield. After the invasion, Special Forces supported efforts to provide security in the chaotic environment.\(^{887}\)

Special Forces organization in Iraq had some similarities to organization in Vietnam, but there were a few key differences. Like Vietnam, the senior Special Forces officer was only a colonel, the commander of the 5\(^{th}\) or 10\(^{th}\) Special Forces Group (Airborne). However, this commander was placed in charge of Combined Joint Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), which commanded all special operations forces in Iraq that were not detailed to JSOC.\(^ {888}\) JSOC maintained a separate task force, focused on targeting “high-value individuals.”\(^ {889}\) CJSOTF-AP thus oversaw Army Special Forces, NAVY SEALs, and other elements of Army Special Operations. The CJSOTF arrangement gave Special Forces considerable autonomy. The commander CJSOTF-AP reported directly to the commander of Multinational Corps and Multinational Force and was responsible for special operations forces across all of Iraq.

CJSOTF subordinate commands were based on regions within Iraq and reported directly to the CJSOTF commander. This gave them near total autonomy to conduct

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\(^{887}\) Robinson, pp. 191-340 provides an extensive overview. See also see Michael Tucker and Charles Faddis, *Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2008).


\(^{889}\) This task force was generically known as OCF-1 (Other Coalition Forces Iraq), and carried a three number designation that changed from time to time. In 2008, according to a public statement by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen, this designation was Task Force 714. See Mullen transcript, June 10, 2008 [http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DWG/Documents/2008/061008mullen.pdf](http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DWG/Documents/2008/061008mullen.pdf) and Max Boot, “Can Petraeus Pull It Off?” *The Weekly Standard*, April 30, 2007.
operations as they saw fit. Sometimes these operations were closely coordinated with local commanders, sometimes less so.\(^{890}\)

One example of Special Forces operations in this early period was securing Ar Rutbah in western Anbar province. A Special Forces company secured the town, worked with local leaders, and began building local security. Unfortunately, the unit rotated out and was not replaced.\(^{891}\)

In late 2003, Special Forces began to train Iraqi special operations forces (ISOF). This mission would expand to include training Iraqi police Special Weapons and Tactics (ISWAT) teams. This training took place across all parts of Iraq.\(^{892}\) These training missions, when done by Special Forces, were conducted by a 12-man ODA, which remained the central unit of Special Forces.\(^{893}\)

Special Forces units also built local intelligence networks throughout Iraq, using sources to locate insurgents and understand local dynamics.\(^{894}\) The CJSOTF-AP commander was one of only two officers (the other being the MNF-I C2, the senior intelligence officer in Iraq) who could authorize the wearing of civilian clothes by military personnel.\(^{895}\) This was presumably to enable better blending in with the local population for intelligence collection.

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\(^{893}\) Some missions were undertaken by SEALs; over time the SEALs came to be responsible principally for Anbar province. This began in roughly 2006; by mid-2008 the CJSOTF task force in Anbar was all SEALs.

\(^{894}\) See Robinson, pp. 291-294.

\(^{895}\) See MNF-I Memo 11-1, Annex R, MNF-I Uniform Wear, Appearance, Conduct and Standards (September 2008).
Assessing Explanations for Special Forces Doctrine and Operations, 2003-2005

As with the Marines, Special Forces operations in 2003-2005 appear to support both Hypothesis 1 and 4. Special Forces operations could have been a rational response to the environment, but were also consonant with the Special Forces subculture. Hypothesis 3 receives little support, as CJSOTF-AP had very high autonomy from the very earliest days of the war. Hypothesis 2 is indeterminate, as there was no civilian intervention.

All Quiet on the Shatt al-Arab?: The British Army, 2003-2005

The British Army was, like the U.S. Marine Corps, a major component of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It contributed over 40,000 personnel to its component of COBRA II, known as Operation TELIC. This operation was no less successful than any of the other components, and the British rapidly occupied the far south of Iraq, including the populous city of Basra and the vital Shatt al-Arab waterway to the Persian Gulf. In total, the British would be responsible for four provinces: Maysan, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Basra (a province as well as a city).

The British Army, like the U.S. Army, had a written counterinsurgency doctrine when the invasion began. Encapsulated in publications such as the 2001 Counterinsurgency Operations, the doctrine was not dissimilar to that of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. It was somewhat more up to date and lengthy (nearly 300 pages), unsurprising given the ongoing British experience with counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland.

The manual defined insurgency as “the actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change. It is an organized armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse.”

It drew further distinctions among insurgencies based on the work of an American academic at the U.S. National Defense University.

Intelligence is also given an entire chapter in the manual. It opens with discussion of “the preeminence of intelligence” in counterinsurgency:

Good intelligence is vital in any phase of war. In counterinsurgency operations it will be in constant and continuous demand. Operations require steady success, built up over time, which will wear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale. Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision, reducing the detrimental effect on the local population and minimising casualties among friendly forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among the security forces and raise their standing with the civilian population. Effective and precise use of force will earn respect; vital in the campaign for hearts and minds. Ill-directed and indiscriminate use of force will serve merely to alienate any local population.

This prescription thus notes both the importance of intelligence and the need for discriminate use of force, with minimal collateral damage.

The manual also gives six principles for counterinsurgency: political primacy and political aim; coordinated government machinery; intelligence and information; separating the insurgent from his support; neutralizing the insurgent; and longer term post-insurgency planning. The section on coordinated government machinery makes clear the importance of civilian agencies and the need for close coordination with them, potentially in a committee system. It notes that the best approach

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899 Counterinsurgency Operations, p. B-6-1.
is for the government to give one person overall responsibility for the direction of the
government campaign allowing differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by
an impartial Director. This could be a soldier, but is more likely to be a politician or civil
servant; in any case he will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control.
What should be achieved is a joint command and control structure.\textsuperscript{901}
The manual also discusses the importance of police and police auxiliary units.\textsuperscript{902}

The British would clearly seek to implement their doctrine in southern Iraq.
Within weeks of the invasion, the British Army was seeking to partner with locals and
work with civil authority. By mid-April the British were recruiting police and conducting
joint patrols south of Basra.\textsuperscript{903} Violence against the British was initially quite limited,
though mass looting took place (as it did across Iraq). By the summer, civil disturbances
and lethal attacks against British troops began to occur. However, it remained mild
compared to the burgeoning insurgency to the north.\textsuperscript{904}

Violence erupted in Basra in early 2004, as the British were confronted by
militiamen loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr.\textsuperscript{905} The British battled sporadically with militias,
principally Sadr’s, throughout the south for the remainder of the year. British operations
were marked by restraint and concern for collateral damage, as well as continued efforts
to work with both local police and politicians.\textsuperscript{906}

Unfortunately, the attempt to support locals was doomed, because the locals with
power were all affiliated with militias or criminals (if there was a distinction).\textsuperscript{907}

\textsuperscript{901} Counterinsurgency Operations, p. B-3-4.
\textsuperscript{902} Counterinsurgency Operations, chapter 7.
\textsuperscript{903} Tom Dunn, “First British-Iraqi Police Patrols Begins,” April 13, 2003,
\textsuperscript{904} See BBC new report, “British Military Police Killed in Iraq,” June 24, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3137779.stm; and “British Soldier Killed in Basra,” The Guardian,
\textsuperscript{905} BBC news report, “UK Troops Clash with Basra Gunmen,” May 8, 2004,
\textsuperscript{906} Michael Knights and Ed Williams, “The Calm Before the Storm: The British Experience in Southern
\textsuperscript{907} One of the best overviews of the criminal-militia nexus in Basra is Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias,
Restraint actually appeared to represent lack of will to many Iraqis. One exchange noted by a British civilian official captures this dynamic. After the British refused to fire on an unarmed mob that was seeking to loot a government building, the governor of the province demanded to know why the British had allowed the ransacking of the building:

One of us replied, “Governor, maybe it is better that a little computer equipment gets stolen than more people get killed.” And he said: “What are you talking about? Would you let the mob go stampeding into your office and loot your computer equipment?” We had no answer. Of course we would have shot anyone who tried to break into our compound. ⁹⁰⁸

British efforts to build police were frustrated, as militias simply infiltrated the new force en masse. Police jobs in fact become a form of patronage for militia leaders and politicians. Attempts to cooperate with tribes turned into “barely concealed protection rackets,” where payments were all but explicitly made to prevent attacks on the British and the nascent Iraqi government. ⁹⁰⁹

In mid 2004, Iraqi sovereignty was returned and the British Army found itself lacking civilian partners. A 2007 analysis of British operations notes that prior to the return of sovereignty Coalition civilians and military officers had worked together “to intervene in local politics.” However, after the departure of many British civilians “the rotating Basra and Maysan battle groups stepped back from involvement in Iraqi factional politics in the autumn of 2004 and instead focused on a range of necessary missions concerned with their own force rotation, logistical sustainment, force protection, and reconstruction support.” ⁹¹⁰ The British Army culture, so dedicated to supporting civilians and working with local forces, found itself adrift without them.

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⁹⁰⁹ Knights and Williams, p. 25.
⁹¹⁰ Knights and Williams, p. 22.
The British Army presumably still had support from the British intelligence community. Reports indicate that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the British CIA equivalent, and other British intelligence organizations maintained a presence in southern Iraq. However, these organizations are limited in size, particularly compared to their American brethren, and were also committed to Afghanistan. It is likely that they were unable to fully provide the support the British Army needed. The SAS and related special operations units were also present.911

By early 2005, Basra was all but lawless, a haven for criminals and militias, while Maysan province to the north was dominated by Sadr’s militia. Both levels of violence generally and attacks against the British specifically continued to increase. These attacks increasingly took the form of lethal armor-defeating roadside bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). The British were forced to devote more and more effort to force protection, for example, by shifting from single vehicle patrols to multi-vehicle convoys and to rely less on Land Rovers and more on heavy vehicles such as the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. The British also began to spend more time on their bases, where they were nonetheless subjected to mortar and rocket bombardment.912

An event in September encapsulates the situation the British were in by late 2005. On September 19, two SAS soldiers operating as human intelligence collectors (and out of uniform) were arrested by Basra police affiliated with one of the militias. They were taken to a Basra jail, where the British began to negotiate for their release. This proved fruitless, and the British launched an assault on the jail using Warriors. Though

911 On intelligence presence, see Mahan Abedin, “Britain, Iran playing with Iraqi Shi’ite fire,” Asia Times, October 1, 2005.
successful, the raid provoked a violent riot and a major outcry from the provincial
government.\textsuperscript{913}

Little is publicly available about SAS operations in southern Iraq. However, it
has been reported that the SAS was a major component of the JSOC-led special
operations task force focused on high value individual targeting. The SAS apparently
commanded the subordinate task force responsible for southern Iraq, known as Task
Force BLACK.\textsuperscript{914}

Even as the British Army in southern Iraq shifted to an increasingly defensive
posture (beginning to resemble the U.S. Army’s elsewhere in Iraq), others in the British
Army chided the U.S. Army for its heavy-handed tactics. Most notable was an essay by a
British general officer, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who had served with MNF-I in
Baghdad in 2004. Published in the U.S. Army’s journal \textit{Military Review}, the essay
argued that the American approach made more enemies than it eliminated.\textsuperscript{915}

While not explicitly pointing out the British approach as a superior alternative, the
tone of Aylwin-Foster’s essay made this argument implicit. Yet the dissonance between
Aylwin-Foster’s view of British counterinsurgency and the actual posture of the battle
groups in southern Iraq in 2005 was striking. This was immediately pounced on by
those seeking to defend the U.S. Army, including Colonel Kevin Benson, one of the
planners of the initial invasion.\textsuperscript{916}

\textsuperscript{913} Blomfield and Harding.
\textsuperscript{914} See Sean Naylor, “SpecOps Unit Nearly Nabs Zarqawi,” \textit{Army Times}, (online version), April 28, 2006
and Sean Naylor, “More than Door Kickers,” \textit{Armed Forces Journal}, March 2006,
\textsuperscript{915} Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” \textit{Military Review}
(November-December 2005).
\textsuperscript{916} Kevin Benson, “OIF IV: A Planner’s Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster,” \textit{Military Review} (March-April
Assessing British Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Operations, 2003-2005

The evidence on British Army counterinsurgency doctrine and operations, like that of the Marines, supports both Hypothesis 1 and 4 to some degree. While initially pursuing their written doctrine, the British adjusted operations in accord with the environment. There is little evidence supporting Hypothesis 3, as the British Army, also like the Marines, had a very high degree of autonomy in its area of operations. There is no evidence of civilian interest in the specifics of doctrine, so Hypothesis 2 is not tested.

The dissonance between Aylwin-Foster’s implicit view of British Army operations (or at least what those operations should have been) and the change in the actual conduct of operations in Basra from 2003 to 2005 is important evidence for Hypothesis 4. Aylwin-Foster clearly had a set of beliefs about how counterinsurgency should be conducted. His beliefs appear to have matched both British written doctrine and the early operations of the British Army in the south.

However, those early operations, so predicated on police and civilian agencies that were absent, anemic, or infiltrated, resulted in an environment that was increasingly chaotic and hostile. By late 2005, the British were forced by increasingly lethal attacks to adopt many of the same measures Aylwin-Foster decried in his essay and even to attack the very police force it had been working to construct. Rod Thornton of the Joint Services Command College aptly summed up this central dissonance in a memorandum to the House of Commons Defence Committee, noting that in most of the British Army’s previous counterinsurgency campaigns:

...there would be an extant police force and public administration run by fellow-countrymen. There would be people who knew how to run the countries and how best to deal with the indigenous populations. Intelligence would be available, there would be a high degree of cultural awareness, and there would be many people who spoke the local
languages. In essence, all the Army had to do was to use its military muscle in aid of a
civil power who would know how to target such muscle. Thornton noted that the British lacked all of these assets in Iraq. Yet operations were
conducted as though they were, despite increasing evidence throughout 2004 and early
2005 that they were ineffective. The result was an environment becoming so
unambiguously violent that the British Army had little choice but to adopt extensive force
protection measures.

SAS operations, to the extent anything can be said about them, appear to conform
to Hypothesis 4 as well. The SAS worked effectively with both the British Army and
with American special operations forces. SAS operations were very small unit (in the
September 2005 incident, only two men) and heavily oriented towards intelligence
collection.

Grand Army of the Tigris: Army Doctrine and Operations, 2006-2008

General George Casey, the commander of the overall coalition command known
as Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), noted the failure of commanders to adhere to
written doctrine. Frustrated, in 2006 he opened a “COIN Academy” (officially called the
MNF-I Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence) at Camp Taji north of Baghdad in
order to try to ensure that all commanders fully absorbed COIN doctrine. As MNF-I
commander, Casey exercised his authority to make attendance compulsory for all officers
going to command in Iraq.  

917 Rod Thornton, “British Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq,” in House of Commons Defence
Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations, Sixth Report of Session 2004-05, v.2,
pp. 141-42; quotation on p. 141.
918 Thomas Ricks, “U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mind-Set,” Washington Post,
February 21, 2006.
In addition to training and education, this academy produced a guide similar to MACV’s *Handbook for Military Support of Pacification*, entitled simply MNF-I *Counterinsurgency Handbook*. It provides a significant amount cultural and historical context for Iraq and gives reasons for why this knowledge is important for COIN operations.\(^{919}\) It also provides a brief discussion of both COIN and FID, particularly noting the importance of avoiding “kinetic” only operations focused just on killing insurgents.\(^{920}\) It also devotes an entire chapter to intelligence in COIN, reiterating the importance of concepts like “every soldier an intelligence collector.”\(^{921}\) Finally, it notes the vital importance of the population and civil-military operations and coordination.\(^{922}\)

Despite the opening of the COIN Academy, operations in Iraq still showed limited acceptance of written doctrine. For example, in March of 2006, the 101\(^{st}\) Division, under the command of Major General Thomas Turner, launched Operation SWARMER near Samarra. This operation, conducted jointly with substantial numbers of Iraqi troops was described as the largest air assault operation since the initial invasion. Though touted by many as a success, Operation SWARMER appears to have been a brief sweep through an area, encountering little resistance. U.S. and Iraqi forces departed after rounding up suspected insurgents and some weapons caches.\(^{923}\)

Even a cursory look would suggest that Operation SWARMER was not doctrinal COIN, and that it did little to improve the security situation around Samarra.\(^{924}\) Further, Operation SWARMER, far from being unique, was only the largest and most notable of

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\(^{920}\) Ibid., pp. 20-29 and 59-63.

\(^{921}\) Ibid., pp. 38-52.

\(^{922}\) Ibid., pp. 64-70.


this type of operation. As MNF-I spokesman Major General Rick Lynch noted at a
subsequent press briefing, “Operations like this continue all across Iraq. This happened to
be a brigade-level operation in the Salahuddin Province…”

Army metrics also continued to focus on number of alleged insurgents killed or
detained. One variation from the body count in Vietnam was a greater focus on insurgent
networks and leadership. For example, a briefing giving in December 2006 focused on
about thirty senior and mid-level leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a Sunni insurgent
group, detained or killed in 2006. In the briefing, MNF-I spokesman Major General
William Caldwell made the link between killing/capturing and success clear: “The more
we can bring down al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations, the greater probability of
reducing violence.”

Even as COIN operations continued in Iraq, new doctrine was produced. In June
2006, the Army and Marine Corps issued the final draft of a new joint manual, FM 3-
24/FMFM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. This draft shows more nuance in definitions and
descriptions than previous manuals, in part because it incorporates significant input from
academics. Yet the basic substance remains similar. In defining the objective of
COIN, the joint manual states that

[t]he primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective
governance by a legitimate government. All governments rule through a combination of
consent and coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the
consent of the governed, while those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or
entirely on coercion.

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927 See Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of
928 U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Field Manual 3-24/Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-
24, Counterinsurgency, final draft, June 2006.
The manual also devotes a chapter to the importance of civil-military integration, highlighting in particular the need for unity of command and unity of effort:

For all elements of the U.S. government engaged in a particular COIN mission, formal command and control using established command relationships within a clear hierarchy should be axiomatic. Unity of command should also extend to all military forces supporting a host nation. The ultimate objective of these arrangements is for local military forces, police, and other security forces to establish effective command and control while attaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within the society. . . . All elements supporting the COIN should strive for maximum unity of effort. Given the primacy of political considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts.929

The draft provides several examples of mechanisms for civil-military coordination, including Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, host-nation Country Teams, and Civil-Military Operations Centers. It also notes two models employed in the field, the Provincial Reconstruction Team pioneered in Afghanistan and CORDS in Vietnam.930

The importance of intelligence is also highlighted in the draft in both a chapter and a more-detailed appendix. The manual notes that COIN is an intelligence war. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and insurgents, so commanders can best address the issues driving the insurgency. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents require an effective intelligence capability to be successful. They attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks while trying to neutralize their opponent’s intelligence capabilities.931

The official version of FM 3-24 was released in December 2006; the Marine Corps official designation was changed to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5. It is substantially similar to the June 2006 draft; indeed, the only major change appears to be the incorporation of an appendix on intelligence into the main body of the text.932 Like the draft manual, it emphasizes the importance of intelligence, civil-military operations, population security, and legitimate government.

929 FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24 draft pp. 2-2 to 2-3.
930 FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, pp. 2-9 to 2-13
931 FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, p. 3-1.
932 Compare FM 3-24/FMF 3-24, draft Chapter 3 and Appendix B, to U.S. Department of the Army and
In January 2007, General Casey was replaced by General Petraeus, the former 101st commander. Petraeus had in the interim between 2004 and 2007 overseen much of the writing of FM 3-24. He intended to change how the Army was conducting operations in Iraq, seeking compliance with written doctrine. He would also benefit from a decision made in late 2006 to send additional troops to Iraq (the so-called “surge”).

Petraeus had some success in adjusting Army operations, principally in Baghdad. It was to Baghdad that the bulk of “surge” troops would go, with four out of the five additional brigades being deployed either in the city or to its immediate south. Petraeus used these troops, in conjunction with Iraqi security forces, to launch an ambitious campaign to secure Baghdad.

This campaign, initiated in February 2007, was called Operation FARD AL QANOON (ENFORCING THE LAW in Arabic). A principal part of the plan was to open joint security stations and combat outposts throughout the city to secure the population. By May, sixty-five of these small bases were operating in the city.933 This new approach was hailed by some as the Army finally “getting” counterinsurgency.

Closer examination suggests that results in Baghdad were more mixed. Soldiers at the new outposts did not necessarily act any differently than they had before. Several complained that they still felt they were just a “show of force” with no purpose as they had not been given guidance on the purpose of being at the new bases.934 Another noted “[t]hey say we are spending more time 'in sector,' which we are doing -- we live here...
But we aren't spending the time patrolling.”935 Another junior officer commented “I just know it's not much different than it was seven months ago... We are retaking the same ground every day.”936

Moreover, whatever success Petraeus achieved in ensuring Army compliance with written doctrine in Baghdad was not repeated outside the capital. This is perhaps unsurprising given that Petraeus’ headquarters was at Camp Victory just outside the city. As with Abrams in Vietnam, he could at least observe and cajole commanders near him. Operations “far from the flagpole” of the commander would remain unchanged.

In contrast to Baghdad, Diyala province, which received the fifth of the “surge” brigades, provides a good illustration of the Army continuing to perform operations having little accord with written doctrine. In June 2007, the Army launched a massive offensive around the city of Baqubah, using roughly 10,000 troops from four brigades, known as Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER. The operation began with a night air assault and relied heavily on firepower from attack helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.937 The operation concluded in July and was followed in August by the equally large-scale (16,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops) Operation LIGHTNING HAMMER in the Diyala River Valley.938 LIGHTNING HAMMER II was launched in September with 12,000 U.S. and 14,000 Iraqi troops.939

These operations were reported to be highly successful in driving insurgents out and disrupting networks. However, the continued violence in Diyala and particularly

936 Barnes, p. 2.
Baqubah in 2008 tends to cast doubt on the success of these operations.\textsuperscript{940} Moreover, by focusing on attacking insurgents rather than securing the population, the Army continued to ignore its own written doctrine.

Anecdotal evidence suggests any protection of the population was transient and ineffective. The author visited Diyala province in November 2007, shortly after the conclusion of LIGHTNING HAMMER II. While there he interviewed five members of an Iraqi family from a village about 10 kilometers from Baqubah about their recent experiences. They said that around August 2007 (the time frame of ARROWHEAD RIPPER and LIGHTNING HAMMER) U.S. troops had occupied an abandoned house in their village.\textsuperscript{941}

While the villagers had no problem with this and got along with the soldiers, the U.S. unit left sometime in September or October. Almost immediately after, masked gunmen from AQI came to the village and ordered the villagers not to cooperate with the Coalition forces. Further, AQI sought to recruit young men from the village, and according to the villagers, when they were unable to entice any young men to join, AQI cut off the water supply of the village (by controlling a sluice gate for the irrigation canal).

The villagers, who were Sunni, also noted that anti-Sunni Shiite militiamen made travel to sell their agricultural produce extremely hazardous. They felt extraordinarily insecure, feeling trapped between AQI, Shiite militias, and U.S. forces. The latter was

\textsuperscript{940} For example, a year after ARROWHEAD RIPPER, the Governor of Diyala was almost assassinated outside the Governance Center of Baqubah even as Iraqi forces conducted another major operation to secure the province. See “Suicide bomber kills 1, injures 9 in Baqubah,” Multi-National Division-North press release, August 12, 2008.

\textsuperscript{941} Author interviews, November 27-28, 2007, Diyala province, Iraq.
due to the possibility of being killed by U.S. firepower, as one of their cousins had been, or being detained by U.S. forces.

This second concern, detention, is supported by the booming number of detainees in U.S. custody in 2007. By April 2007, the total number of detainees in U.S. theater facilities at Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca (south of Basrah) had reached 18,000. A thousand of those detainees were reported to have reached the facilities in March alone.942 By August, that number had reached nearly 25,000.943

The body count and number of detainees taken also continued to be tracked by the Army throughout 2007. While it is impossible at this point to tell if the inflation of the body count that took place in Vietnam was taking place in Iraq, a suggestive trend can be observed. From January 2007 to September 2007, the monthly number of reported enemy killed was two to five times the number of enemy reported injured, which is almost the inverse of the normal pattern of wounded to killed in combat. Between two and three thousand detainees were taken each month as well, though not all ended up being sent to the theater facilities at Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca.944

Author visited both Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca multiple times in late 2007 and early 2008. The detainee population at both facilities had substantial numbers of individuals for whom records had little indication of reason they should be detained. It was apparent to both author and others working in detention operations that at least a quarter of the population had either been detained in a mass sweep or because they had merely been in the “wrong place at the wrong time.”

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944 Giordono and Burgess, “Insurgent ‘Body Count’ Records Released.”
Operations in 2008 continued to follow the same pattern. Multi-National Division-North launched Operation IRON HARVEST, spearheaded by a U.S. brigade, in late December 2007. The operation, part of a larger set of division and brigade operations directed by Multi-National Corps-Iraq known as Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, was reported to have detained or killed “hundreds” of insurgents by February 2008, indicating the body count was alive and well in 2008.945 In July 2008, four squadrons of U.S cavalry were committed in support of more than 30,000 Iraqi Army and police in the Iraqi-led Operation BASHAER AL-KHEIR (AUGURS OF PROSPERITY in Arabic).946

Army culture also had significant effect on other areas of counterinsurgency. Two in particular, development of local security forces and intelligence, will be discussed in more detail in the next section on the Marines in Iraq. It is in these two areas that the Army and Marine cultural differences stand out most starkly in Iraq, making presentation of the two side by side important.

Assessing Explanations for Army Doctrine and Operations, 2006-2008

The evidence from the second period of U.S. Army operations in Iraq provides much stronger support for Hypothesis 4. Despite the publication of new doctrine and a new senior commander with a different understanding of the war, change in operations was modest and mostly in Baghdad. In Diyala, the Army continued to conduct large

operations that interacted only briefly with the local population. Even in Baghdad, where
Petraeus was headquartered, the shuffling of soldiers out to smaller outposts appears to
have produced only limited operational change. This argues strongly that doctrine, as in
Vietnam, was used more for instrumental purposes than for actual operations.

**The Tide Turns along the WERV: Marine Doctrine and Operations, 2006-2008**

AQI’s response to Anbarīs turning against the organization was ruthless and
devastating. AQI assassinated key leaders, including the well-respected Sheikh Nassir al-
Fahadawi in February 2006. Others were intimidated and cowed by these actions. Many
sheikhs also fled to Jordan or Syria. The combination of assassinations (often carried out
by members of the same tribe), intimidation, and sheikh flight began to undermine the
power of the tribe. 947

Attacks against Marines were astronomical in this period, outside of a few areas
like Al Qaim where local cooperation was effective. In Ramadi, according to Marines
stationed there in this period, attacks ranging from mortars to ambushes to suicide truck
bombs were almost continuous. Despite this, Marine firepower was, if not insignificant,
at least discriminate. Two of the weapons of choice for fire support were the Guided
Multiple Launch Rocket, a GPS-guided 227mm rocket and the laser-guided Maverick
missile. Both enabled very effective attacks on insurgent defensive positions with
minimal collateral damage. 948

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948 Conversations with Marines stationed in Ramadi from February to September 2006.
In the summer of 2006, tribal leaders around Ramadi, including Sheikh Sattar, formed anti-AQI movement that would eventually be called the Anbar (later Iraqi) Awakening (know by its Arabic acronym SAA, later SAI). Under Sattar, tribesmen began cooperating with Marine forces against AQI, which at this time dominated much of Ramadi. In cementing this alliance, the Marines worked closely with special operations forces, and, it seems likely, CIA.

The situation was so dire in all of Anbar that an August 2006 Marine Corps intelligence assessment deemed that social order had all but collapsed and AQI held sway over most of what was left. However, as with the Desert Protectors in Al Qaim, the combination of Marine capability with the tribal leaders’ local knowledge rapidly began to reverse the situation. SAI affiliates and copy-cats began to appear in other parts of the province. Around the Haditha Triad, Marine forces partnered principally with members of Albu Jughayfi and Albu Nimr; in Karmah it was with local tribesmen led by the Albu Jumayli.

Note that this interpretation of the origin of the Awakening is at odds with the current public narrative, which gives credit for the Awakening to the Army brigade commander in Ramadi in 2006, then-Colonel Sean MacFarland. Based on

951 “State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar.”
953 For MacFarland’s version of the origin of the Awakening, see Niel Smith and Sean MacFarland, “Anbar
conversations with U.S. personnel familiar with the origin of the Awakening and with the Marines’ embrace of tribal fighters around Al Qaim nearly a year earlier, I believe the initial driving force was not Colonel MacFarland. Crucially, my initial conversations on this subject took place immediately after these personnel rotated back from Iraq in the fall of 2006, before there was any publicity for the Awakening (indeed the term was not even in common use). I believe my interpretation is further supported by the rapidity and manner with which Marines elsewhere in Anbar began working with local tribesmen, in contrast to the Army response noted below. However, it will be some time before declassification makes a definitive history possible.

The year 2007 saw almost all of AQI’s gains in Anbar reversed. Though successful in assassinating some key leaders including Sheikh Sattar, AQI’s intimidation failed this time, as the Marines continued to support resistance. Sattar’s brother, Ahmad, replaced him as leader of SAI. In Fallujah, there was no equivalent to the Awakening, but a strong police chief, Colonel Faisal Ismail al-Zobai, also worked with the Marines to secure the city. He was himself a former nationalist insurgent. His brother Karim Ismail al-Zobai, another former insurgent commonly know as Abu Maruf, became a prominent leader of anti-AQI forces around Zaidon. By the end of 2007, Anbar was, if not secure, nonetheless radically safer.

During this period, the Marines also focused on intelligence collection and analysis of economic and political intelligence. Realizing the importance of the local

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relationships and dynamics that made the Awakening possible, Marine intelligence officers wrote intelligence collection plans to gather this information. Not one but two elements were created to assess this intelligence under the MEF G2. The first was the Economic and Political Intelligence Cell (EPIC), formed in the MEF Intelligence Battalion. The second was the Security, Governance, and Economics (SG&E) section formed in the MEF Radio Battalion.

In the author’s experience, U.S. Army units in Iraq had no comparable organizations, much less two. Army units may have collected and analyzed similar information but it was not readily apparent that they did. If this information was collected and assessed, based on author and colleagues’ attempts to access the information from the Army, it was not readily available and therefore likely not to have been of high importance.\(^{958}\)

A partial exception to the Army’s relative indifference was the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Coalition Analysis and Control Element (CACE). CACE analysts did produce some political and economic analysis. However, CACE was not an Army-only organization; it was, as the name suggests, a Coalition organization and thus both multinational and multiservice. Further, CACE analysts were based in Baghdad and thus were dependent on analysis and collection from units in the field. Given the limited interest in collection on political and economic topics of Army intelligence units, there was not much for these analysts to go on.

Marine intelligence collection and analysis in turn supported engagement with local civilians conducted by Marines. The MEF created a section to handle economic and political engagement and reconstruction, known initially as G3 CMO (for Civil

\(^{958}\) Author observation, Fallujah, Iraq May-August 2008.
Military Operations) and later reconstituted as G9. G9 personnel, in addition to conducting engagements, also supported very senior level engagements by one of the two Deputy Commanding Generals of the MEF (the other focused on combat operations, producing a division of labor).959

The intelligence support to political engagement was mirrored at lower echelons of the Marines as well. At the regimental level, the S-2 or one of his subordinates conducted engagements with locals and also supported engagements by the regimental commander.960 This was also practice with at least some Marine battalions as well.961

In 2007, after the Marine success with the Awakening had become widely appreciated, the Army began to adopt similar strategies. This unsurprisingly began around Baghdad, where Petraeus began to push Army units to emulate the Marine approach. However, there were critical differences in the two approaches.

In the Marine case, the local forces were incorporated into the formal Iraqi state as quickly as possible. Tribal fighters were encouraged to join the police or police auxiliary units known as Emergency Response Units (ERUs) or Provincial Security Forces (PSFs), which they did. The Marines were able to accomplish this due to their high levels of effective engagement with locals supplemented by intelligence collection about local dynamics and Marine relations with special operations and other government agencies.962

960 This arrangement was very clearly the case in both Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT 5) and Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT 1) in 2008, though there were variations. In RCT 5 in western Anbar, the regimental commander, supported by the S-2A (regimental targeting officer), conducted many of the engagements. In RCT 1 in eastern Anbar, the S-2 conducted more engagements himself.
961 Based on briefings, this was certainly the model for 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines in 2006.
962 See, for example, reporting on the area around Karmah- Sam Dagher, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, January 19, 2009; Achilles Tsantarliotis, “Karmah Sheikhs Committed to Progression,” Regimental Combat Team 1 blog, October 10, 2008, online at:
In contrast, the Army essentially paid insurgents to shift from attacking U.S. forces to acting as militias. These groups, which were referred to as Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) and then Sons of Iraq (SOI), were not in any way tied to the formal Iraqi state and were paid directly by the Army. Further, the Army often lacked the detailed knowledge of local dynamics the Marines had gathered. In November 2007, when the program had more than 70,000 fighters on the payroll, Army spokesmen were admitting they had problems with vetting. \(^{963}\)

Indeed, according to some reports, the Army simply paid elites and asked few questions. One brigade commander south of Baghdad in late 2007 commenting on the program noted “…a lump sum is provided by U.S. military to local Iraqi leaders that is then divided among all the CLCs. The intent is to encourage Iraqis to keep the number of CLCs down, so that each man's salary does not suffer.” \(^{964}\) The Army approach was clearly very hands off, as it apparently left all hiring decisions to the locals. Given apparent Army indifference to collecting intelligence on local political dynamics, a hands-off approach is unsurprising.

Other independent assessments also noted that the Army had done a generally poor job with the IPS. The Congressionally-mandated Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, headed by retired general James Jones, noted in September 2007 that the military effort with the IPS had not been effective and recommended transferring


the police training mission to the State Department. Yet it also singled out the Habbaniyah training center in Anbar as “a model for police training in Iraq.”

**Assessing Marine Operations and Doctrine, 2006-2008**

As with the Army, Marine operations in this second period of Iraq support Hypothesis 4. Marine operations were much more focused on engaging and securing the local population than Army operations. This was particularly true in terms of intelligence collection and analysis. The Marines also worked more closely with civilian agencies and other services, particularly special operations forces. This was despite the two services having co-authored a joint counterinsurgency doctrine. Even when the Army deliberately sought to mimic Marine operations, as with the CLC/SOI program, the result was substantially different, as Hypothesis 4 would predict.

**“By, With, and Through”: Army Special Forces Operations 2006-2008**

There was relatively little change in Special Forces operations in this second period in Iraq. CJSOTF-AP continued to train ISOF and ISWAT units, collect intelligence, and conduct small unit raids. The latter raids were often conducted with the ISOF and ISWAT units, in keeping with the Special Forces approach calling for working “by, with, and through” partners. If there was a change in Special Forces operations in this period, it was an increase in the discretion of targeting and detention.

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However, issues began to emerge during this period internal to the Special Forces community. Some in that community believed that Special Forces were becoming increasingly “kinetic,” focusing too much on direct action missions rather than working with locals. This was attributed to a combination of the exalted status within SOCOM of JSOC, the rapid expansion in the number of Special Forces soldiers after 2001, and most crucially a reported change in attitude of instructors at the Q Course.

JSOC maintains a virtual lock on command of SOCOM. Current SOCOM Commander Admiral Eric Olson was formerly commander of the Navy’s JSOC component. Almost all previous SOCOM commanders have been either commander or deputy commander of JSOC or one of JSOC’s component commands.

This dominance only expanded after 2001. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld became a major proponent of JSOC during his tenure. The commanding general of JSOC was promoted to three stars (the billet had previously been a two star) during this period. Budget priority and prestige within SOCOM followed accordingly.

Second, Special Forces began a rapid expansion after 2001. This brought in large numbers of new personnel, some with no previous Army experience through the “18X” military operational specialty. In 2008, 5th Special Forces Group added a new battalion, created from scratch, and the other groups planned to do likewise over the next few years.969

Finally, some individuals familiar with the Q Course have noted a change in the attitude of instructors. They claim that the focus has shifted from working with locals to conducting direct action missions. While this cannot be confirmed directly, it fits with

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the observations and concerns of former Special Forces officers expressed during this period.\textsuperscript{970}

\textbf{Assessing Special Forces Operations, 2006-2008}

Special Forces operations, like Marine operations, tend to support Hypothesis 4. There appears to have been significant divergence between Special Forces operations and that of the Army, while there was some degree of convergence between Marine and Special Forces operations. Indeed, the Anbar Awakening appears to have been a result of extensive cooperation between Special Forces, Marines, and, likely, CIA.

The signs of a cultural shift in Special Forces are not definitive. However, if true, the fact that much of it seems to stemming from change in the core professional education school, the Q Course, underscores the importance of professional education to culture. By changing what the surge of new Special Forces soldiers are taught, the culture of the organization could possibly be changed, perhaps even dramatically, over the course of the next decade.

\textbf{Dunkirk on the Persian Gulf: British Army Operations, 2006-2008}

The environment the British Army faced in southern Iraq grew yet more hostile in early 2006. Iraqi officials in Basra formally suspended cooperation with the British in February, allegedly in response to evidence and allegations of British abuse of Iraqis. This cooperation was not resumed until May; in the mean time a British Lynx helicopter

was apparently shot down by surface to air missiles. The downing of the helicopter was followed by violent riots against the British forces seeking to reach the crash site. \(^971\)

By the end of May 2006, Basra was in virtual anarchy, forcing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to declare a state of emergency there. \(^972\) The environment only worsened in June, with the British Armed Forces Minister noting “I am conscious of the fact that the first time I visited Iraq I was on the streets with our soldiers who were in soft hats, no body armour. I don't think that could happen now.” \(^973\) British casualties continued to mount over the summer, even as the Army turned over control of Muthanna province to the Iraqis in July. \(^974\)

The transfer of Muthanna was quickly followed by the transfer of Dhi Qar province to the Iraqis in September. \(^975\) Muthanna and Dhi Qar had been relatively quiescent, in large part because they were dominated by relatively pro-Coalition affiliates of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). In contrast, Maysan, dominated by affiliates of Sadr, and especially Basra, remained violent and anti-British.

The British therefore used many of the troops freed up from Dhi Qar and Muthanna to launch Operation SINBAD in Basra in late September. SINBAD was intended to break the militias hold on the city and was conducted jointly with Iraqi forces.


The operation concentrated on attempting to clean up the police force, yet also sought to demonstrate the British commitment to reconstruction.\textsuperscript{976}

SINBAD’s ambitious goals were scaled back with two weeks of its launch, as Basra politicians complained and militias counterattacked. Some questioned whether there was ever any intention to actually achieve the original ambitious goals. A British defense analyst and Territorial Army officer who had served in Iraq earlier in 2006 believed SINBAD was “almost a last attempt to be seen to be doing something.”\textsuperscript{977}

As the scope of the operation was reduced, the tactics became larger and more dramatic. In December, the British launched a major multibattalion attack lead by Warrior IFVs on the same police station they had raided in September 2005. The station, home to a police unit alleged to be little more than a militia front, was demolished after more than one hundred Iraqi prisoners were freed.\textsuperscript{978}

These occasional dramatic efforts, like similar large-scale U.S. Army efforts, produced only ephemeral gains. By February 2007, the British were under near total siege. A reporter in Basra summed up:

Today, life has become so precarious for the British that all movement of personnel is conducted by helicopter and at night. The main palace complex, which houses soldiers and government officials, is permanently under siege from rockets and mortars. Every building is protected by sandbags or blast-proof concrete walls. Helmets and body armour are compulsory. Diplomats are not allowed to leave the compound. Soldiers rarely venture beyond the perimeter in anything less conspicuous than a large armoured force, usually only deployed in battle… Even mundane missions are difficult, dangerous and costly. The patrol we joined, which led to the soldier being shot by a sniper, was providing protection for a small police training unit checking on an Iraqi police station. At the cost of one near fatality and the resources of dozens of troops and two helicopters, a local police commander received money to buy mattresses for his officers.\textsuperscript{979}

\textsuperscript{976} Damien McElroy, “3,000 British troops Try to Tame Basra,” \textit{Daily Telegraph}, September 28, 2006.
\textsuperscript{978} BBC report “UK Troops Storm Iraqi Police HQ,” December 25, 2006; \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6208535.stm}.
\textsuperscript{979} Richard Beeston, “British Soldier Shot in the Chest During Routine Patrol in Basra,” \textit{Times (London)}.
SINBAD ended in March 2007; in April Maysan province was transferred to Iraqi control despite the continued dominance of Sadr affiliates.980

Over the summer of 2007, the environment in Basra remained unrelentingly hostile. By August, the majority of British troops had pulled out of bases in the city proper to the air station outside of town.981 At the beginning of September, the British left Basra Palace, their last base in the city. While the Army sought to portray this move in the most positive light, several independent commentators noted it could hardly be called anything other than “a defeat” or “a strategic retreat.”982

This withdrawal also marked a de facto end to significant British operations inside Basra. Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced British troops would begin substantial withdrawals in the spring. In December, the British passed control of Basra to the Iraqis, despite the province’s manifest instability.983

From January until March, Basra remained anarchic. In late March, the Iraqi government launched a massive assault on the city to restore order. Known as Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS (SAULAT AL-FURSAN in Arabic), the operation was led by Iraqi Army, ISOF, and ISWAT units (the latter two working with U.S. Special Forces) with no British participation. The battle proved difficult, and after four days the

983 See BBC news report, “UK Troops to Be Cut to 2,500,” October 8, 2007; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7034010.stm and MNF-I Press Release, “Ceremony Marks Iraqi Control,” December 16, 2007. Author visited Basra airfield several times between September and December 2007 and observations there and at Camp Bucca to the south confirm the view that the British withdrawal was little short of a retreat.
British began to provide artillery support for the Iraqis. By April the British, alongside Americans, were providing both advising to Iraqi troops and air support in addition to artillery. However, British combat forces were not directly committed to the operation inside the city.

While regular British Army forces may have been increasingly defensive during this period, the SAS, working with U.S. special operations forces, remained active. Few details of these operations are publicly available. However, incidents reported in the media provide some insight into these operations.

The first of these incidents for this period was the capture in early 2007 of a senior Lebanese Hezbollah officer in Basra. This officer, Ali Musa Daqduq, was in Basra to provide advice and training to militias supported by Iran (Hezbollah’s patron). He was captured in a targeted raid that also detained two of his associates along with substantial physical evidence. While the SAS were not specifically noted as being part of the operation, it is likely that the regiment at a minimum helped provide intelligence supporting it.

The second was an SAS operation in Baghdad in 2008 against an AQI cell. This operation was publicly praised by MNF-I commander Petraeus. Additionally, SAS soldiers were killed in raids in or near Baghdad in November 2007 and March 2008.

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The rest of the British Army in Iraq (with the exception of a small contingent also in Baghdad) remained confined to Basra airfield and its environs for the remainder of 2008. British Defence Secretary Desmond Browne’s visit to Basra in May 2008 was a major exception, as it was escorted by British troops; but this was clearly not a combat mission. The visit by his successor John Hutton in October was a similar exception (though one report indicates Hutton’s security in the city was provided by Iraqis).

Assessing British Operations, 2006-2008

The British Army in this period made one last attempt to execute the kind of operations it had been trying since 2004. With extra forces available after turning over other provinces, SINBAD was a last ditch effort to clean up the police and it failed. Thereafter, the British essentially ceded the bulk of Basra to the militias.

This period provides some additional support for Hypothesis 4, as the British persist in conducting the same type of operations from 2004 to 2007 despite mounting evidence that those operations are ineffectual. Further, once it became indisputable that these operations weren’t working, the British launched a few large operations (such the assault on the police station in December 2006) before giving up.

Ironically, the Iraqis proved willing to launch exactly the sort of assault on Basra the British had been unwilling to conduct. It ultimately proved effective, even though the

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British refused to commit combat troops. The British Army was then able to salvage some of its reputation as security had improved markedly by the end of 2008.

Conclusion: Military Culture and Iraq, 2003-2008

The preliminary evidence from Iraq generally supports the cultural hypothesis. The U.S. Army’s experience was markedly similar to that of Vietnam, including large operations and heavy firepower followed by a new senior commander who wanted to change the conduct of operations. Improvements in security in Iraq, like Vietnam circa 1970, have been attributed to that commander and his changes in operations.

However, closer inspection reveals that changes in operations in Iraq, as in Vietnam, appear to have been more apparent than real. The improvement in security stemmed largely from other factors, one of the major ones being a decision by many Sunni insurgents to ally with U.S. forces against AQI. This decision was aided and the alliance initially consummated by Army Special Forces and the Marines working closely with other government agencies while looking for local allies. This pattern is also as the cultural hypothesis predicts.

The British attempt to do likewise in southern Iraq met with some initial success in 2003 but after the removal of much of the civilian apparatus began to fail. Local allies in Basra proved unreliable and the enemy highly effective, in part due to Iranian support. Operations in Basra thus resembled the early days of Northern Ireland, only more violent.

The British Army continued its effort to build civilian and police capabilities in Basra even as the lethality of the environment forced ever greater levels of force protection. However, even redoubled effort (embodied in SINBAD) to produce effective
local allies in late 2006 failed, principally because there was no threat to the militias comparable to AQI for the Sunnis. Absent this threat, the militias saw little need to seek external allies like the British.

Culture thus led the U.S. and British Army’s down two very different operational paths in Iraq, yet neither ultimately proved particularly successful. The Marines were more successful than either in the long-run but from 2004 to 2006 the Marines appeared to be the least successful, even according to their own intelligence assessments. Only a fortunate alignment of Marine culture and a shift in calculations by Anbaris resulted in success, and even then it is a success that is subject to reversal. Culture, though it determines in large part how an organization operates, does not guarantee triumph.

Even as the Iraq invasion began in 2003, the Americans and British were drawn into counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Initially relatively peaceful after the collapse of the Taliban regime following the U.S.-led invasion after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan was becoming increasingly violent in 2003. The following chapter summarizes the events in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 and then presents a very brief overview of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan conducted by the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, British Army, and U.S. Army Special Forces from 2003-2009.

In addition, it describes the organizational culture of two additional armies, the Canadian and Pakistani, as well as their counterinsurgency operations in the same period. The Canadians were drawn into the Afghan province of Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold, while the Pakistanis have faced a growing insurgency on their side of the Afghan-Pakistan border (defined by the Durand Line agreed upon by the British envoy Mortimer Durand and the King of Afghanistan in 1893). These “shadow cases,” while very far from definitive, provide an additional plausibility probe of the organizational culture hypothesis proposed earlier.


The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon prompted a very rapid U.S. response. Once it became clear that the Taliban regime, dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, would not hand over Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the United States initiated plans to topple the regime. Central to these plans was the use of local allies supported by CIA and Special Forces along with massive use of airpower.
The local allies, referred to as the Northern Alliance, were a collection of mostly non-Pashtun warlords, such as the Uzbek Rashid Dostum and the Tajik Mohammed Qasim Fahim, who were locked in a losing war with the Taliban.\footnote{991}

This combination of locals, CIA, Special Forces, and airpower proved devastating to the Taliban. Organized for conventional operations but not of any particular impressive skill, Taliban forces were routed in a few months and suffered devastating losses to precision air power. Bin Laden himself managed to escape to Pakistan as did Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but their respective organizations were in utter disarray.\footnote{992}

However, neither gave up the fight. Operating from sanctuary in Pakistan’s periphery in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as well as the semi-governed Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), the two men began to rebuild. By 2003, the Taliban, along with allied groups such as the organization of former anti-Soviet guerrilla leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and the Party of Islam lead by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (known by the acronym HIG), were ready to begin a serious insurgency in Afghanistan.\footnote{993}


\footnote{993} Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) and Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).
While the Taliban were rebuilding, the U.S.-led coalition had overseen the creation of an interim government led by Pashtun Hamid Karzai, though with strong representation for the Tajik and Uzbeks who had made up the Northern Alliance. Under a United Nations Security Council Resolution, a separate International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established to help rebuild Afghan institutions. Subsequently led by NATO, from 2001-2003 it did not operate outside Kabul.

This left the bulk of security and combat operations outside Kabul to the Americans. However, American military planners were occupied with plans for Iraq and few forces were committed to Afghanistan in this period. This left most of the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, which bordered Pakistan, up for grabs at the beginning of 2003 as distracted American and international forces were suddenly confronted by a Taliban-led insurgency in those areas.


In 2003, the new commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, recognized that the reconstituted Taliban and other groups were an insurgency (as opposed to terrorists or criminals). He reorganized his forces into two brigade formations, known as Regional Commands (RC) one operating in the east (RC East) and one in the south (RC South). The two commands had various battalions committed to them to conduct counterinsurgency operations as well as supporting organizations known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which combined military and
civilian personnel. RC East was the main focus for the Army, where it was the dominant force, with RC South a mix of British, Dutch, Canadian and other NATO forces plus some Army units.

The operations conducted in 2003 were principally large unit sweeps, though some level of small unit patrolling did take place. Examples of the former are Operations WARRIOR SWEEP and MOUNTAIN VIPER in July-September 2003. WARRIOR SWEEP used a total of more than 1,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and U.S.-led coalition personnel, including soldiers from the 82nd Airborne, to clear the Zermat Valley in Paktia province. MOUNTAIN VIPER was a similar operation conducted in Zabul province using ANA and soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division. In neither operation did forces appear to stay in place for long, instead engaging enemy forces, destroying insurgent caches when found, and moving on.

In December 2003, the U.S. Army launched Operation AVALANCHE, using about 2,000 soldiers in southeast Afghanistan. AVALANCHE was the largest U.S. operation since Operation ANACONDA in the closing days of the initial invasion. It was marked by substantial levels of firepower from fixed wing aircraft and one of the first widely publicized incidents of airstrikes killing civilians in Afghanistan. AVALANCHE was succeeded by Operation MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD in January 2004,

In 2005 and 2006, this pattern of large unit sweeps continued. For example, in northern Kandahar, soldiers from the 82\textsuperscript{nd} and 173\textsuperscript{rd} Airborne along with ANA and other coalition forces conducted Operation DIABLO REACH and DIABLO REACH BACK in May and June. These operations, in the Shah Wali Kot district, involved more than a battalion of U.S. troops alongside several companies of ANA yet as discussed below in the section on Canada did not establish an enduring presence in the district.\footnote{Jacob Caldwell, “Diablo’ Weakens Taliban Mountain Stronghold, \textit{Army News Service}, June 28, 2005.} In April 2006, more than 2,500 coalition and ANA personnel launched Operation MOUNTAIN LION in Kunar province.\footnote{“Coalition Launches ‘Operation Mountain Lion’ in Afghanistan,” \textit{American Forces Press Service}, April 12, 2006.}

In June, a force of roughly 11,000 U.S., British, Canadian and Afghan troops launched the largest operation of the war, Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST (an infelicitous name choice). This operation lasted through July and spanned four provinces (Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan). As with the other large unit operations, it did not leave any substantial forces in place at the conclusion of the operation. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 87\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment, for example, deployed to a newly built forward operating base (FOB) Little Round Top in Helmand province for the duration of
operations before returning to their normal location at FOB Salerno in Khost province.\textsuperscript{1001}

The large units operations continued in 2007-2009. In October 2007, a reinforced battalion of U.S. and ANA forces May 2008 launched Operation ROCK AVALANCHE, a six day sweep of several valleys in Kunar province.\textsuperscript{1002} In May 2008, a similar force undertook a ten day sweep of the Chowkay Valley, also in Kunar. Known as Operation ROCK PENETRATOR (another suggestive operation name), it was apparently compromised and had little result.\textsuperscript{1003} In July 2009, Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE, a battalion size operation, was launched in Nuristan province.\textsuperscript{1004}

The operations above are particularly noteworthy because U.S. force levels were much lower than in Iraq, much less Vietnam. In Iraq, force levels were about 120-160,000 for most of the period 2003-2008, while in Vietnam they were in excess of 200,000 (up to about 500,000) for most of the period 1966-1970. In contrast, Afghanistan ranged from less than 10,000 in 2002 to 32,000 in 2008.\textsuperscript{1005} It is therefore all the more telling that despite very low force levels, operations of battalion size or larger still took place with some frequency, though clearly less than Iraq or Vietnam.

As in Iraq, dissatisfaction with the state of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan led to the creation of a Counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy. Established in

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\textsuperscript{1005} Voice of America report, “U.S. Will have 140,000 Troops in Iraq at End of ‘Surge,” February 25, 2008, online at: \url{http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/2008-02-25-voa60.cfm?CFID=292805288&CFTOKEN=86202238&jsessionid=6630c0cfd458b1451a5762763737412447a}.
\end{footnotesize}
2007 at Camp Julien on the outskirts of Kabul, the COIN Academy was intended to provide training to U.S. and other forces in counterinsurgency theory and practice. As in Iraq, it appears to have had minimal effect on actual operations and it is not well-resourced.\textsuperscript{1006} While not definitive, this pattern suggests a broad similarity in Army counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. A final aspect of U.S. counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Team, will be discussed in more detail below in the section on the British Army.

**Southern Comfort: The U.S. Marine Corps and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003-2009**

The Marine role in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was fairly limited from 2003 to 2008. It did dispatch a few units but they were sent piecemeal for short periods. For example, in 2004, the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed to Afghanistan for four months. In 2005-2006 the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Marine Regiment spent roughly six months there. It was relieved by the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Marine Regiment, which was deployed for a similar period. Some Marine special operations units were also deployed to Afghanistan in this period.\textsuperscript{1007}

These Marine units worked for Army higher headquarters, either the Regional Command or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSTOF-A). They therefore lacked the operational autonomy experienced by the MAF in Vietnam’s 1 Corps or the MEF in Anbar. The combination of lack of autonomy and low numbers

\textsuperscript{1006} Author visited the COIN Academy in July 2009.
means Marine operations in this period provide little insight into the question of doctrine and operations. However, in 2008-2009 more Marines began to be shifted into Afghanistan as operations in Iraq drew down. While it is too early to assess these operations in any systematic way, at least some of the available evidence accords with the cultural hypothesis.

The first piece of evidence is the Marine embrace of a program similar to the CAP program from Vietnam. Beginning in late 2008 or early 2009, Marine enlisted men were embedded with ANA platoons in remote outposts. One such outpost, Firebase Vimoto in the Korengal Valley, had a corporal and lance corporal alongside a platoon of Afghans. 1008

The second is a major influx of Marines into Helmand province that began in the summer of 2009. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) had been deployed to Helmand in the summer of 2008, a foot in the door but still only a reinforced battalion in terms of combat troops. This presence expanded to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in 2009, with the MEB moving into Helmand in early summer. Under the command of a one star general and with a defined area of operations, the Marines in Helmand appear to have more autonomy than their battalion-sized predecessors. The Marines then launched Operation KHANJAR (SWORD STROKE in Pashto) in conjunction with the ANA and Afghan police in July.

KHANJAR involves most of a Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT), so it is clearly a large unit operation. However, at least initial reporting makes the operation sound more like the Vietnam era DESOTO, which used a large unit to occupy an area and then conduct small patrols, rather than a transient sweep. One report notes the

Marine units “are under orders to set up outposts in the villages and stay there to convince local people that the Taliban will not be allowed to return and that it will be safe to take part in next month's presidential elections.”[1009] The MEB commander, Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, declared “…where we go we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”[1010]

Subsequent reporting seems to support Nicholson’s assertion. A report from September describes a Marine company that has been in place in the village of Mianposhteh since early July. The company commander, faced with nearly continuous daily combat (six engagements in one day in late August), has still made time to attempt to build rapport with locals. Moreover, the commander partnered with a Pashtun-speaking British Army captain serving as an adviser to the ANA, making him the Marines’ “ambassador” to the locals.[1011] As with the evidence on the U.S. Army, this is hardly definitive but also seems to suggest similarity in Marine operations between Iraq and Afghanistan.


Unfortunately, even less is publicly available about Special Forces operations in Afghanistan than Iraq. One major exception covers the operations of CJSOTF-A in 2004

is the monograph *One Valley at a Time*. Written by a Special Forces officer, it provides very good, if overly optimistic, insight into operations during this period at least. 1012

In describing the 2004 campaign plan for CJSOTF-A, the monograph makes clear the small-unit focus of Special Forces. “Five named operations were conducted with most of the effort oriented all the way down to the SF Operational Detachment-A. These were a series of major operations conducted across Afghanistan employing small units in large areas of operation.” 1013 It further details that one of these named operations, INDEPENDENCE, involved just two ODAs (twenty four men total), one on each side of the Baghran Valley in July 2004. The monograph also indicates that Special Forces continued to work with local forces, including tribal militias. 1014

This pattern seems to have continued after 2004, though available evidence is fragmentary. For example, it is alleged that in 2009 U.S. Army Special Forces were working with a local partner force in Kandahar province. Unfortunately, the reason this has been publicized is that this force was involved in a shootout with police that killed the provincial chief of police. 1015

In western Afghanistan, Special Forces and Afghan partners provide most of the coalition’s combat power, as conventional force presence is low. Around Herat, for example, a single ODA with local partners appears to cover a fairly wide area (at least Shindand district). While demonstrating both the affinity for local partners and small unit emphasis, this economy of force has sometimes conflicted with restraint on firepower. In

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1012 Adrian Bogart, *One Valley at a Time* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2006).
1013 Bogart, p. 58.
1014 Bogart, pp. 60-66.
August 2008, while attempting to capture an insurgent leader, the combined Special Forces and Afghan force encountered stiff resistance in the village of Azizabad. They called in air support, which inflicted substantial (estimates from thirty to over one hundred) civilian casualties. The ODA that rotated in to replace the one responsible for the strike has nonetheless worked assiduously to build relations with the community.\textsuperscript{1016}

Finally, U.S. Special Forces are central to an effort to replicate the Anbar Awakening in Afghanistan (though it also owes much to CIDG in Vietnam). Known as the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), the program trains local villagers to provide their own security and also enables them to call for support from the coalition. Special Forces provide most if not all the trainers and advisers to AP3, which began operations in Wardak province in June 2009.\textsuperscript{1017}

The Not So Great Game: The British Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2002-2009

After dispatching nearly 3,000 troops to Afghanistan in the spring of 2002, British Army force levels dropped precipitously later in the year as preparations for Iraq began in earnest. By late 2002, only 300 British soldiers remained, mostly in Kabul.\textsuperscript{1018} However, the emergence of insurgency in 2003 forced the British government to recommit more forces to Afghanistan, despite the ongoing war in Iraq.


The initial commitment to the counterinsurgency campaign was a reinforced battalion-sized force known as the Afghanistan Roulement Infantry Battalion (ARIB). This force, based in Kabul, rotated roughly every six months and was responsible for three main tasks. First, it committed a company to patrolling Kabul. Second, it formed the Afghan National Army Training Team. In this latter mission, the British had an advantage over and above the cultural in the form of the Gurkhas. Still recruited from Nepal, Gurkha enlisted and NCOs speak Hindi, which is in turn comprehensible to Urdu-speakers. While Urdu is not an official language of Afghanistan, many Afghans speak it, particularly in the border region with Pakistan.1019

The third task was providing the military element to a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs) that the British established in the northern Afghan province of Balkh at Mazar-i-Sharif in 2003, with responsibility for five northern provinces. The PRT concept was intended to unify civil and military capabilities for counterinsurgency, particularly focusing on developing Afghan capabilities for security and governance. The British PRT in Mazar included representatives of the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign Office in addition to elements of the ARIB. Another PRT was opened in Maimana, the capital of the northern province of Faryab, in 2004 with a similar composition.1020

The PRT was not a uniquely British invention, though it clearly harkened back to the civil-military committees of Malaya and Kenya. Other ISAF nations, including the

United States, also created PRTs during this period. However, not all PRTs were created equal and there was substantial difference in the British and U.S. implementation of the concept.

The U.S. model was, like CORDS in Vietnam, dominated by the military. Moreover, it was often the combat units operating in an area that dictated to the PRT rather than the reverse. An interagency assessment of U.S.-led PRTs in 2006 noted:

While interagency guidance gave civilians from USAID and DOS the lead on governance and reconstruction, PRT culture, people, and resources were predominantly military. Military dominance was reinforced by force protection and security concerns, and by the collocation of several Coalition PRTs with maneuver units. Moreover, subordination of PRTs to maneuver units threatened to dilute a core focus of the PRT, which was to strengthen the Afghan government’s capacity to address issues underlying instability and support for insurgency.1021

In contrast to the military dominated U.S.-led PRTs, the British PRT in Mazar was a more truly integrated civil-military team. It also included an expert on the security sector detailed from the Afghan government. Moreover, there was no British combat unit operating in Mazar, further ensuring that the military did not dominate. External observers gave the British model high marks, with a vice president of the non-governmental organization International Crisis Group stating:

Our assessment is that the British have done an excellent job in the north. Their model of running a PRT is the one that we endorse with the focus on security, stabilisation, for the most part keeping out of the development sphere and the humanitarian sphere. We particularly support the fact that they have operated mobile observation teams and have spread the security blanket throughout the area because this is a very important way of showing support for the Afghan government institutions... In terms of the development focus, we support the British view, which is that ideally you establish security which allows room for others or a better place to do development. The problem you see with the approach of some of the U.S. PRTs, for instance, is that you build a school but there are no teachers there because you have not integrated your development efforts with the rest of the development work that is going on, or you build a well, but who is there to maintain a well if it is not part of a cohesive approach? So the approach adopted in Mazar, which is

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the security blanket but enabling NGOs and/or the Afghan government to carry out development, is a better approach. The period 2003-2005 was therefore one of British success in northern Afghanistan. However, the environment was relatively non-violent to begin with, far from the burgeoning insurgency in the south and east. The next year would be different as British forces were dispatched to the thick of the fight.

By late 2005, it had become clear to senior ISAF leaders that Helmand province in southern Afghanistan was in dire need of additional effective troops, as the mix of narcotics, tribal militias, and the insurgency was spiraling out of control. The British government decided (or was convinced) to dispatch a brigade-sized task force to Helmand in the spring of 2006. At the same time, the PRTs in Mazar and Maimana were handed off to the Swedes and the Norwegians, while the British assumed control of the PRT in Helmand, based at the capital Lashkar Gah.

The British effort in Helmand was intended to be much like the effort in northern Afghanistan, with an emphasis on developing Afghan governance and security. The British Task Force Helmand and the PRT rapidly discovered that they had been handed a hornets’ nest, a real insurgency to combat rather than the more peace-keeping oriented environment in the north. Combat throughout the summer was ferocious as the British sought to establish a presence in district centers in northern Helmand.

This so-called “platoon house” strategy, apparently requested by the provincial governor but supported by the British Army commander, sent a company to occupy and defend government buildings in district centers such as Musa Qaleh and Sangin.

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However, the insurgents massed forces and began launching frequent attacks on these outposts, harassing them almost continuously and attempting to overrun them in several instances. The British had only suffered two fatal casualties in Afghanistan in 2003-2005 but by the end of 2006 they had taken more than thirty additional fatalities, with a substantial number of injuries.\(^{1024}\)

In October 2006, the provincial governor and British Army accepted an offer from tribal leaders around Musah Qaleh to form a tribal militia to keep the insurgents out. In exchange, the British troops left the district center. This local agreement was treated with disdain by U.S. military and civilian officials but apparently kept the town free of insurgent influence until January 2007, when a massed insurgent force retook the town.\(^{1025}\)

The British nonetheless did not abandon the hope of negotiations with local tribes and insurgent commanders. The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also referred to as MI6, is reported to have negotiated with local commanders throughout the summer of 2007, supported by the British Army. In October, successful negotiations, led by the Afghan government but supported by the British Army (and probably SIS as well), resulted in the defection of Mullah Abdul Salaam, a tribal leader supporting the insurgents in Musa Qaleh.\(^{1026}\)

\(^{1024}\) See Fergusson; James Meek, “In Their Minds, All They Want to Do Is Kill English Soldiers,” The Guardian, October 14, 2006; Defence Committee, House of Commons, Thirteenth Report 2006-2007 session, chapter 3 “UK Operations in Southern Afghanistan.”


Even as it continued to support negotiations, the British Army shifted to participating in larger scale operations in parts of Helmand. The first large unit operation was Operation ACHILLES, which brought together more than a thousand British, Canadian, American, Afghan, Dutch, Estonian, and Danish forces. Begun in March 2007, ACHILLES sought to secure Sangin, one of the areas where the platoon house strategy had foundered the year before. A major British component was Operation SILICON, which would eventually involve more than a thousand British troops, in addition to Afghan security forces.  

ACHILLES ended in May but was almost immediately succeeded by Operation LASTAY KULANG (PICKAXE HANDLE in Pashto). LASTAY KULANG used basically the same forces as ACHILLES, including roughly a thousand British soldiers. It operated in adjacent areas around Sangin. Ending in June, LASTAY KULANG was almost immediately succeeded by Operation GHARTSE GAR (MOUNTAIN STAG). GHARTSE GAR was smaller in scale but still a large unit operation, with some 400 ISAF and Afghan troops.  

GHARTSE GAR was followed by another larger offensive, Operation CHAKUSH (HAMMER). With more than 2,000 ISAF and Afghan troops (1,500 of which were British) this July 2007 offensive took place in the Upper Gereshk Valley. It apparently did little to bring permanent security, as it was followed in September 2007 by

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the slightly larger Operation PALK WAHEl (SLEDGHEHAMMER BLOW in Pashto) in the same area. 1029

In late November, following the defection of Mullah Abdul Salaam, ISAF command decided the time was right to retake Musa Qaleh. This led to Operation MAR KARDAD (SNAKE PIT), which used more the 4,000 ISAF and Afghan troops, including more 1,200 British soldiers. This was a clearly conventional battle, as estimates indicated that roughly 2,000 insurgents held the town. After weeks of intense fighting, the town was finally cleared in mid-December. 1030

The battles of MAR KARDAD were followed by an apparent lull in major operations until the following summer. In June 2008, Operation OQAB STURGA (EAGLE’S EYE), was launched south of Musa Qaleh using hundreds of British, Afghan, and Dutch troops. This was followed in September by Operation OQAB TSUKA (EAGLE’S SUMMIT), wherein roughly 4,000 ISAF (about 2,000 of which were British) and Afghan troops guarded the transport of massive hydroelectric generators to the Kajaki Dam. 1031

The large unit operations did not indicate a complete abandonment of the earlier platoon house strategy. Throughout 2007 and 2008 companies were forward-deployed at small compounds in northern Helmand. These bases remained in constant danger of being overrun as well as taking frequent indirect fire. For example, Forward Operating

Base (FOB) Inkerman at the upper end of the Sangin Valley was renamed FOB Incomin’ by its occupants. First occupied in 2007, beginning in 2008 it was manned by an Afghan National Army company in addition to the British company. Inkerman is one in a series of such bases across northern Helmand.  

EAGLE’S SUMMIT was followed in November by Operation JANUBI TAPU (SOUTHERN VULTURE), which brought over four hundred British troops into Kandahar province. The operation was, as discussed below in the Canadian section, one of many intended to clear the Zhari district. JANUBI TAPU was in turn followed by larger operations in central Helmand, including Operation SOND CHARA (RED DAGGER) in December and Operation DIESEL in February 2009. Both involved more than seven hundred ISAF and Afghan troops.  

This pattern of operations in central Helmand continued with over seven hundred British, Danish, and Afghan troops in Operation AABI TOORAH (BLUE SWORD) in March. In May, focus shifted to neighboring Kandahar province with Operation SARAK (ROAD). This operation dispatched over five hundred British soldiers along with an ANA company across the provincial border help secure the road connecting the two provinces. Later in the month Operation MAR LEWE (SNAKE WOLF) sent a similar mixed British and Afghan force to clear an area just south of Musa Qaleh.

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British troops expanded the platoon house strategy into several of the areas cleared by operations in early 2009. For example, an outpost known as Patrol Base (PB) Argyll, containing a British company alongside an ANA company, was established in the area cleared by Operation SOND CHARA. The unit stationed there also worked closely with the district governor, among other things holding a weekly “security shura.”

In June, the British launched Operation PANCHAI PALANG (PANTHER’S CLAW) in the area north of Helmand’s capital Lashkar Gah. The operation began with an air assault by over three hundred soldiers supported by additional ground troops. Over the next five weeks the operation grew as it continued through several phases, eventually employing over 3,000 British, Afghan, Danish, and Estonian troops.

British operations in Afghanistan appear to support the cultural hypothesis and provide additional fidelity on how culture interacts with the information environment. In northern Afghanistan from 2003-2005, British operations conformed to cultural expectations, with an integrated civil-military team working closely with local allies to expand government capability. When operations shifted to Helmand, the British Army immediately attempted something similar with the platoon house strategy.

However, as with Basra in Iraq, the British in Helmand found themselves without effective local allies. Moreover, the Taliban massed and attempted to overrun the platoon houses. After about six months, it became clear that the number of enemy and their

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method of operation were much closer in many cases to a conventional army. This was particularly true around Musa Qaleh, where a British-backed tribal deal collapsed in the face of a reported 2,000 insurgents, who seized the town and constructed extensive defenses.

The British response to this fairly unambiguous signal, while not abandoning the platoon house approach, was to shift to more large scale operations. The main operations of each year 2007-2009 (MAR KARDAR, SOND CHARA, and PANCHAI PALANG) each sought to clear an area so that platoon houses could be established there while negotiations with tribal leaders and even some insurgents continued. The results of this shift were mixed and essentially were confronted with the same problem as Operation SINBAD in Basra: without local allies, aggressive operations were unable to hold areas that were cleared. In Musa Qaleh, local allies appear to have been more attainable than in other areas, such as Sangin.

**Maple Leaf Over the Arghandab: The Canadian Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003-2009**

The culture of the Canadian Army, while not identical to that of the British Army, is derived from the same foundation. Formed following the British North America Act of 1867, which established Canada as a dominion of the British Crown, the Canadian Army was patterned on the British Army’s regimental system and for the first six decades of existence it was functionally a subsidiary of the British Army. Only after the passage of
the Statute of Westminster 1931, which gave the dominions legislative independence, did the Canadian Army gain independence as a military organization.\textsuperscript{1037}

Even after 1931, it remained culturally akin (though far from identical) to the British Army. This was reinforced by Canada’s geography and politics—like the United States and Britain, it is functionally a secure maritime power. Canada’s army is therefore culturally a maritime army, though of an odd sort since Canada is not a particularly impressive naval power. However, given Canada’s extraordinarily intimate security relations with the two largest naval powers in the world, this has not proved a great handicap to the Canadian Army.

The Canadian Army’s involvement in Afghanistan closely parallels that of the British Army. From 2003 to 2005, the Canadian Army’s Operation ATHENA provided a major component of ISAF in Kabul. Like the British Army, it was convinced to deploy a substantial force in 2005-2006 to the southern province of Kandahar—the heartland of the Taliban.\textsuperscript{1038}

The Canadians replaced a U.S. battalion, though U.S. Special Forces units would remain in the province. The Canadians opened at PRT in Kandahar City in mid-summer 2005 and deployed a battlegroup to the province in August. In 2006, the Canadians and ISAF assumed responsibility for the province from the Americans.\textsuperscript{1039}

The Kandahar districts of Zhari, Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, and Maruf were areas of major insurgent activity, but there was insurgent presence almost everywhere to some


\textsuperscript{1038} See Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, \textit{The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar} (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007).

\textsuperscript{1039} The Canada ISAF contribution is known as Operation ATHENA; see Canadian Expeditionary Force Command Operation ATHENA website: http://www.comfoc-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/athena/index-eng.asp.
degree. This included Kandahar City, which had an urban guerrilla presence supported in part by a “ratline” (infiltration route) from Zhari (the district west of Kandahar City). This urban presence would assume major importance in the fall of 2005 as the Taliban launched a wave of suicide bombing attacks in Kandahar City. These bombings in many cases targeted key government supporters. Maruf, in the far east of the province along the border with Pakistan, was a natural logistical area, while insurgent ambush and improvised explosive device (IED) operations were centered in Zhari, Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, and Ghorak districts.

As 2006 began, the Taliban continued to use suicide attacks in Kandahar City and IEDs in outlying districts, along with rocket and mortar attacks on ISAF bases such as Kandahar Airfield. However, during the summer Coalition forces began to detect changes in tactics indicating that the insurgents might be massing for larger operations. The Zhari-Panjwayi area appeared to be the focus, as it provided both a direct threat to Kandahar City and there were also local disputes (principally over construction and transport contracts) the Taliban could use as a lever to establish strongholds in the area.

The indicators of insurgent activity were initially of the negative kind, with areas of the two districts showing very little violence while areas nearby saw high levels of violence. This indicated to some that these might be base areas. In July 2006 the first tangible confirmation of this hypothesis appeared during Operation ZAHARA, a

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1040 Zhari was created from parts of Maywand and Panjwayi districts in 2005.
Canadian-Afghan joint security operation in Zhari. These forces encountered entrenched Taliban resistance, a change from the previous pattern of IED, indirect fire, and hit and run attacks.\textsuperscript{1043}

In August, more evidence appeared of the massing of insurgent forces in Zhari-Panjwayi. A Canadian company dispatched to observe from Masum Ghar, one of the two major mountains in the area, was quickly attacked by a force estimated as several hundred insurgents. While the attack was repulsed without loss, it indicated the extent to which the insurgent strategy and capability had changed. Elsewhere in the area, Canadians encountered other pockets of stiff resistance during August. This, combined with the other more subtle indicators, led the Canadian command to begin preparing a spoiling attack into the area.\textsuperscript{1044}

Known as Operation MEDUSA, this offensive was among the largest of the post 2002 operations in Afghanistan. Using Canadian forces supported by Afghan, U.S., Dutch, and Danish elements the operation began in early September 2006. Almost immediately it encountered massive and heavily entrenched opposition around the village of Pashmul (known as Objective RUGBY). It would take ten days of tough conventional fighting to seize the objective. MEDUSA would continue until mid-September, yet even after the operation Canadian road-building efforts in the area during October were attacked. The tactical victory of MEDUSA had apparently done little to improve security.\textsuperscript{1045}

\textsuperscript{1043} Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command news release, “Canadian Soldier Killed in Afghanistan,” July 9, 2006.
MEDUSA was followed in December by Operation BAAZ TSUKA (FALCON SUMMIT) in the same area. Intended to be an effort to win over the population as well as convince local Taliban fighters to switch sides and join the Afghan Police, BAAZ TSUKA did not have the same intensity as MEDUSA. However, there were still several engagements, principally around Sperwan Ghar.\textsuperscript{1046}

In early 2007 the Taliban began to shift back to the hit and run strategies it had pursued before mid-2006. However, it continued to have freedom of movement, including the ability to launch attacks in Kandahar City. Zhari-Panjwayi continued to be a major stronghold for the insurgency, despite occasional success in capturing Taliban leadership there.\textsuperscript{1047}

In May 2007, Coalition forces finally succeeded in killing Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban’s senior commander. Combined with the deaths of other senior Taliban leaders, the death of Mullah Dadullah had a disruptive effect on the insurgency. However, the Taliban then rapidly returned to the offensive, overrunning the district center of Ghorak, where Afghan forces were weak, in June. Canadian and Afghan forces recaptured the district center five days later but the attack demonstrated the Taliban’s continuing ability to mass forces, particularly in the outlying districts away from the ISAF base at Kandahar Airfield. The Taliban also continued to use IED, indirect fire, and suicide attacks throughout the remainder of 2007.\textsuperscript{1048}


\textsuperscript{1048} Maloney, p. 212; Griff Witte and Javed Hamdard, “Taliban Military Leader Killed,” Washington Post,
In the fall, the Taliban began to occupy Khakrez district, west of Kandahar City and north of the Arghandab River. Following the death from a heart attack of the anti-Taliban Alokozai tribal leader Mullah Naqib in October, the way was open from Khakrez into Arghandab district. A joint Afghan and ISAF counteroffensive blunted the move into Arghandab in early November but with local resistance weakened after Naqib’s death the area remained insecure.1049

In 2008, insurgents continued the same pattern of IED and indirect fire attacks but also launched larger attacks on the population. In February, a bombing in Kandahar City killed nearly one hundred Afghans, including the intended target, Abdul Hakim Jan. Jan was, like Mullah Naqib, an anti-Taliban leader from the Alokozai tribe. He had incorporated his militia into the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, an organization intended as a bridge to bring militias into the formal security structure. Several other bombings across the province in February demonstrated the ongoing capabilities of the insurgency.1050

By the late spring of 2008, Ghorak, Arghandab, and Khakrez districts remained insecure, as did the old insurgent stronghold of Zhari-Panjwayi. The insurgency demonstrated its continued ability to mount large-scale operations in June, when it attacked Sarposa Prison in Kandahar City. On the night of June 13, a massive assault

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began when a tanker truck loaded with explosives demolished the main gate of the prison. Dozens of insurgents on motorcycles then freed more than 800 inmates, at least 300 of whom were linked to the Taliban. The freed prisoners and other insurgents then massed in Arghandab district, causing many residents to flee. ISAF dispatched additional troops to secure Kandahar City and forestalled any major insurgent offensives, but the prison break completed Arghandab’s transformation from relatively secure district only a year before to one of the least secure in the province. ¹⁰⁵¹

The overall level of insecurity in the province prompted the dispatch of a U.S. infantry battalion to support the Canadians. It was placed under the operational control of the Canadian commander of Task Force Kandahar, who dispatched it to Maywand district. Maywand, in the far west of the province, had previously had minimal ISAF presence and had become an insurgent logistics area supporting operations in Ghorak, Zhari-Panjwayi, Khakrez, and Arghandab, all of which it bordered. It was also a gateway for insurgent movement into and out of Helmand province, which it also bordered. ¹⁰⁵²

The additional forces were welcome but not decisive. Operations in the fall in Zhari-Panjwayi and Maywand districts disrupted insurgent activity there, but the Taliban was nonetheless able to attack the district center of Ghorak yet again. The insurgents also continued assassinating government officials. ¹⁰⁵³

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In addition to the military events, a political change took place in 2008. Canada dispatched a senior civilian to oversee the activities of Canadian civilian agencies in the province. Known as the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (with the felicitous acronym of RoCK), the position was intended to bring greater coordination both between the different civilian agencies and between the civilians and the military. However, the civilian agencies still reported back to their respective higher headquarters in Ottawa, limiting the power of the RoCK. The RoCK reports to the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, but also receives policy guidance from Ottawa.  

During this period, the Canadians also worked hard to develop and integrate with Afghan security forces. In particular, Canadians sought to develop the Operational Coordination Center-Provincial (OCC-P) of Kandahar. This center brought together all Afghan security and intelligence forces in Kandahar along with the Canadians. There is a weekly meeting of a Provincial Security Steering Committee consisting of the Afghan side of the governor (who chairs) and representatives of all the security services. On the Coalition side, it includes the commander of Task Force Kandahar, the RoCK, a representative of the United Nations Mission, the senior Canadian officer in the OCC-P, and a few others. This organization sets policy guidance, which is then passed to a Provincial Security Working Group consisting of the deputies of the above officials plus the PRT. The working group meets weekly to convert the policy guidance from the steering committee into concrete operational guidance.  


1055 Author interviews and observations, Kandahar, July 2009.  

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The OCC-P also has a weekly Joint Intelligence Meeting, with attendance by the relevant intelligence organizations, and a Joint Patrol Planning Meeting-Kandahar City. The former develops a joint intelligence reporting summary and situational awareness briefing. This is used to brief the latter, which develops the weekly patrol matrices for Kandahar City. The joint patrol planning is a step beyond what the Anbar Operations Center (AOC) did in Anbar, but is in keeping with the decision in 2009 to focus security on Kandahar City and its environs. The situational awareness briefing is also used to brief the Provincial Security Steering Committee. Finally, the OCC-P maintains a joint operations room which is manned with a representative from each security organization to ensure the rapid dissemination of information. 1056 The Canadian investment in the OCC-P has been substantial both in time and attention from senior leaders.

As 2009 began, the same patterns of both insurgent and Coalition operations continued. ISAF and Afghan forces continued working to disrupt insurgent operations in Zhari-Panjwayi with Operation PANCAR (CLAW) in December 2008 and Operation SHAHI TANDAR (ROYAL STORM) in Khakrez and Shah Wali Kot in January 2009. However, insurgents continued to have relatively free movement in Ghorak, Khakrez, and Shah Wali Kot. 1057

The Canadian response to events in the first half of the year was to shift from emphasizing disruption operations in the less populated districts to focusing security efforts on Kandahar City and its environs, where the bulk of the population of the

1056 Author interviews and observations, Kandahar, July 2009.
province was concentrated. As part of an overall campaign known as Operation KANTOLO, in June Task Force Kandahar and the PRT began securing and building one district at a time. The first district chosen for what was designated Operation KALAY I was Dand district and its district center, the village of Deh-e-Bagh, which was readily accessible from Kandahar City. Predictably, the insurgency soon launched attacks on the village, though as of July none had penetrated the ISAF and Afghan checkpoints surrounding the village. Subsequent operations in the KALAY series were planned for securing and building in additional districts.1058

Canadian counterinsurgency in Kandahar has thus been strikingly parallel to British efforts in neighboring Helmand. Small unit operations and efforts to partner with locals in many districts of Kandahar were confronted with an enemy that was developing the capability for massed attack and entrenched defense that was almost conventional in nature as well as a population that often had few if any potential partners. The Canadian Army, receiving this clear signal from the environment, was forced to shift to large unit operations such as MEDUSA, yet did not abandon the small unit and local partner initiatives. Further, in areas where local partners were viable, such as Arghandab district before the deaths of allied tribal leaders or Dand district in 2009, the Canadians were able to effectively implement the approach they culturally preferred.


The Pakistani Army has been playing a complex double game since 2001. The Taliban, its proxy in Afghanistan, was smashed by the Americans, who then pressured Pakistan to cut ties with the remnants of the organization. Instead, the Pakistan Army has continued supporting and providing haven to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents such as the organizations of Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. At the same time, it has also aided the United States, arresting several senior associates of the Al Qaeda organization, allowing the United States to collect intelligence in Pakistan, and permitting unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in its territory.\textsuperscript{1059}

This double game has had consequences in addition to those described in the preceding section on Afghanistan. The most notable of these consequences is to foment insurgency against the Pakistani state on Pakistani territory. The following section briefly describes the organizational culture of the Pakistani Army and its response to the challenge of counterinsurgency in its Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Like the Canadian Army, the Pakistani Army emerges from the shadow of the British Army. Unlike the Canadian Army, it emerged from that shadow almost directly into a massive conventional civil war of sorts with the new state of India. This first war experience, rather than the legacy of the British, has been the foundation of Pakistani Army professionalism. Subsequent wars with India, including one in 1971 that removed East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the state, have only reinforced this conventional war focus.\textsuperscript{1060}

\textsuperscript{1059} Seth Jones, \textit{Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

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The Pakistani Army is therefore a continental army, focused almost obsessively on the potential war with India. It is therefore not surprising that in many respects, the Pakistani Army officer corps is quite similar to the other continental army in this study, the U.S. Army. Its central professional education institution, the Command and Staff College at Quetta, mirrors the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College by educating mid-career captains and majors who will go on to battalion staffs and then possible battalion command. The three combat arms form distinct but related subcultures that dominate the service, just as they do in the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{1061}

However, the Pakistani Army, despite broad cultural similarity, is distinct from the U.S. Army in two key ways. First, the officer corps is heavily skewed towards Punjabis, resulting in a certain amount of Punjab-centrism in Army thinking. Second, civil-military relations are quite different between the two countries. In Pakistan, Army intervention has been frequent, though both countries are democracies and the Pakistani Army always relinquishes power back to civilians. The combination of these variations with the overall continental army culture of Pakistan explains counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan from 2003 onward.\textsuperscript{1062}

In the first two years after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Army’s double game had minimal domestic effect. However, the Pakistani alliance with the United States forced it to begin publicly disavowing many of its former Islamist and/or tribal proxies, such as the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a


\textsuperscript{1061} On the class selection, see the Command and Staff College website: \url{http://www.cscquetta.com/}. See also Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment,” New America Foundation report, September 2009.

\textsuperscript{1062} On these two points see Paul Staniland, “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective,” \textit{Security Studies}, v.17 n.2 (April 2008).
militant group that had dispatched hundreds of volunteers from Pakistani to fight the United States in Afghanistan. By 2004, these former proxies began to ally with tribal fighters, many of whom were angered by Pakistani acquiescence in U.S. strikes in Pakistan (which appear to have begun sometime that year). Pakistani support to groups such as the Taliban and Haqqani network helped unintentionally accelerate this process, as the various militant groups appear to have sometimes cooperated, sharing information and techniques. \(^\text{1063}\)

From 2004 to 2007, the Pakistani Army fundamentally ignored these armed groups, outlawing them in some cases but taking no little action. For example, after some skirmishing with the newly formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in FATA in 2005-2006, the Army signed a ceasefire agreement and withdrew from areas under TTP control. Elsewhere in Pakistan, the Army turned a blind eye to militants as well. \(^\text{1064}\)

The organizational culture of the Pakistani Army was the principal reason for this lack of concern for two related reasons. First, the focus on conventional war with India made the Pakistani Army denigrate the capability and therefore threat from these groups. Compared to India these militants in FATA seemed inconsequential. Similarly, the Punjabi officer corps cared little about the periphery of the country, which had always been restive. As long as the area was not dominated by India or other outside forces, Pashtun region was of marginal importance.

In 2007, the Pakistani Army was spurred into action in Islamabad by the increasingly aggressive militants located at the Lal Masjid (“Red Mosque”). These militants posed a much clearer threat to areas of interest to the Pakistani officer corps,


finally provoking the Army to storm the mosque. This in turn reignited conflict in FATA and NWFP, but the Army’s response remained half-hearted.\textsuperscript{1065}

For example, TNSM militants occupied the Swat Valley of NWFP in the fall of 2007. The Pakistani Army launched a brief offensive with several battalions that nominally drove TNSM out. However, there was no follow up security and by late 2008 TNSM essentially controlled the area again. Another deal was struck with the militants in early 2009, this time calling for the implementation of Islamic (sharia) law in Malakand district (adjacent to Swat).\textsuperscript{1066}

This deal collapsed when TNSM almost immediately began expanding into Buner district, south of Malakand and closer to the Punjab. At the same time, the Pakistani Army recognized the growing connection between militants on the periphery like TNSM and TTP with Punjabi militants such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ). This combination of territorial expansion and increasing linkage with the Punjab at last appears to have caused the Army to consider the peripheral militants a threat.\textsuperscript{1067}

The response was a massive operation into Buner and Malakand districts in April-May 2009. Known as Operation TOAR TANDER (BLACK LIGHTNING), the operation used both Army and paramilitary Frontier Corps units, though principally the latter. The operation made lavish and often fairly indiscriminate use of firepower, creating tens of thousands of refugees, technically termed “internally displaced persons” or IDPs.\textsuperscript{1068}

\textsuperscript{1066} “Religious Parties Now Demand Sharia Across NWFP,” \textit{Daily Times} (Pakistan), April 10, 2009.
\textsuperscript{1068} “26 Killed as Troops Hit Taliban Hideouts in Dir,” \textit{Daily Times} (Pakistan), April 29, 2009.
TOAR TANDER was then followed by the equally large RAH-E-RAAST (STRAIGHT PATH). It sought to clear the Swat district and used similar techniques. The two operations resulted in one of the largest migrations of IDPs in decades, with more than two million Pakistanis fleeing the areas of fighting. This at a minimum suggests that Pakistani Army techniques were similar to but probably even less discriminate than U.S. Army operations in South Vietnam, such as those in southern I Corps in 1967-1968.1069

The above is merely suggestive, as there could be other explanations for the Pakistani Army’s operations. For example, the militants in the affected areas may have been so heavily entrenched that any army would have been forced to adopt these techniques. However, when combined with the evidence on the timing of Pakistani Army actions, the evidence on refugee flows becomes somewhat more compelling. Only when the Punjab was threatened did the Army take any action, yet when it acted it did so very quickly, suggesting that militants, at least in Buner, had little time to entrench.

Conclusion

The shadow cases provide only a rough plausibility probe for the cultural hypothesis. In the case of the three organizations previously studied, there does seem to be similarity between operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The British Army sought to do the same kind of operations in both northern and southern Afghanistan that it sought to do in Kenya and Iraq. In northern Afghanistan, the approach was successful as local partners were readily available. In southern Afghanistan, as in Basra, the approach was

1069 "News of Baitullah’s Death Encourages IDPs to Return," Daily Times (Pakistan), August 9, 2009.
less successful as local partners were unavailable and the enemy was much more robustly organized into large quasi-conventional units.

With the U.S. Army, the same pattern as in Vietnam and Iraq appears to obtain. The focus of operations has consistently been on large units and firepower. This is particularly telling given the troop limitations the Army faced, which meant multibattalion operations would be difficult to assemble. Yet the Army nonetheless conducted at least a dozen such operations from 2002 to 2009.

Army Special Forces in contrast operated in small units in close cooperation with Afghan local forces. This pattern remained constant from 2001 to 2009. The emphasis on small units would sometimes conflict with limiting firepower, as the enemy in many cases would mass and oppose the Special Forces units in inhabited areas. U.S. Marine operations, which only began on a large scale in 2009, offer the least evidence but generally seem to support the plausibility of the cultural hypothesis.

In the case of the two other organizations, the Canadian and Pakistani armies, the very different counterinsurgency campaigns waged by those armies seem to conform to the predictions of the cultural hypothesis. The Canadian Army, like its parent the British Army, partnered extensively with locals, both in the Afghan government and security forces. Forced to conduct large unit operations against entrenched and massed enemy units, it nonetheless remained committed to small unit operations as in the Dand district center in 2009. The Pakistani Army in contrast conducted almost exclusively large unit operations with very high levels of firepower. While neither case is dispositive, both support the plausibility of the cultural hypothesis.
Chapter 11: Conclusions

In the foregoing, I have attempted three principal tasks. The first is to develop a theory of the origin of culture in military organizations. The second is to delineate how that culture shapes military doctrine and operations. Third, I have tested that cultural hypothesis against other competing explanations on the origins of military doctrine and operations. Case studies of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British Army involvement with counterinsurgency in both historical and contemporary periods provide the means for accomplishing these tasks.

Culture is defined as a set of shared beliefs about the organization, its mission, and how that mission is best accomplished. Doctrine, as defined here, is the organization’s explicit guide to the conduct of operations such as campaigns and battles. It often exists in the form of manuals and other tangible guides.

As described herein, culture has its origins in the foundational experiences of the organization, which I term “the first war” though it need not be a single war. These experiences provide the values and logics about war that the organization uses to establish itself as a professional organization, most notably building them into the organization’s central school of professional education. This process of professionalism typically takes several decades. New members of the organization (in this case military officers) are inculcated with these cultural beliefs through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms, but professional education is the most important.

Culture, once established is extremely resilient, remaining remarkably constant across decades despite changes in both the domestic and international environment. Moreover, while the professionalization process is frequently affected by geostrategic
position, culture is not merely endogenous to geography. However, the frequent similarity of foundational experiences for countries with similar geostrategic positions means that certain broad archetypes of foundational experiences and the resulting cultures are observed.

Culture, once established, affects doctrine and operations in two principal ways, which are in turn oriented both internally to the organization (managerial culture) and externally to the environment (strategic culture). First, culture provides the logic and evidentiary rules by which an organization evaluates the best means by which war is made (the positivist role of culture). Second, culture provides the values by which an organization decides what is appropriate and acceptable (the normative role of culture).

In addition to a general overarching culture, large organizations frequently develop subcultures within them. These subcultures can be slight variations on the overall culture, termed orthogonal subcultures. Alternately, they can be very different from the broader culture, termed counter subcultures.

The combination of the above elements of culture affects the doctrine and operations of military organizations. However, the degree to which culture affects doctrine is mediated by the information available to the organization on the threats, opportunities, and constraints of the environment. When information is highly ambiguous, such as during peacetime, culture’s effect is highly potent. When information is highly unambiguous, such as several years into a major high-intensity war, culture’s effect is greatly attenuated.

For organizations that emerge from foundational experiences of total war (termed a continental archetype), culture will dictate doctrines oriented towards large units,
massive and unrestrained use of firepower, and minimal coordination with other organizations such as civilian agencies or other military services. For organizations that emerge from foundational experiences such as imperial policing that are more limited (termed a maritime archetype), culture dictates doctrines oriented towards small units, limited firepower, and frequent coordination with other organizations.

There are three principal alternative hypotheses to the cultural hypotheses proposed here. The first is that military organizations are basically rational, changing doctrine relatively quickly and effectively in response to the environment. The second is that military organizations generally change doctrine only in response to the intervention of civilians. A variant of this is that some political systems give civilians a better ability to intervene than others. Finally, a set of genetic organizational imperatives such as the search for resources, prestige, and autonomy or the need to minimize uncertainty may affect the formation of doctrine in organizations.

These hypotheses were tested by examining the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British Army in both historical and contemporary settings. These cases enable control of several potential other variables, such as general regime type and geostrategic position, as both have relatively similar democratic regimes and are essentially maritime powers who face little prospect of invasion for the past 150 years. This control gives greater confidence that the hypotheses being tested are not confounded by omitted variable bias.

The first part of each case study described the professionalization of each of the three organizations. The U.S. Army professionalizes in the aftermath of the Civil War, the first modern total war. In addition, the U.S. Army develops a counter subculture in
the form of the Army Special Forces, which emerges from unconventional warfare during World War II and the Cold War. The U.S. Marine Corps professionalizes alongside the U.S Navy, intervening in a series of “banana wars” while preparing to seize bases for the Navy. The British Army professionalizes in response to the problems of limited continental intervention illustrated by the Crimean War and the need to police the empire, as demonstrated by the Sepoy Mutiny.

The U.S. Army is thus an example of a continental archetype, though the United States is not a continental power. This demonstrates that culture is not merely endogenous to geostrategic position. In contrast, the U.S. Marines and British Army are both examples of the maritime archetype.

The subsequent parts of the case studies explore how the three organizations respond to the challenge of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is an important test for the hypotheses as it appears to be a perennial problem for modern military organizations. Understanding why organizations respond to the challenge in the way that they do thus will have ongoing theoretical and policy relevance. It is also a crucial test for the cultural hypotheses presented here, as it is a highly ambiguous environment. If culture has no effect here, it is unlikely to have effect anywhere.

For the U.S. Army, its Special Forces subculture, and the U.S. Marine Corps, the historical case is the long counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Despite promulgating very similar written doctrines, the Army and Marines conducted very different operations in Vietnam. This was demonstrated by examining the general operations of the organizations in Vietnam in three different periods. The Army generally conducted large unit operations with lavish, often indiscriminate firepower and little involvement with
other organizations. The Marines generally conducted small unit operations with restrained firepower and frequent involvement with other organizations, as did Army Special Forces. The exception to the above pattern of divergence was in instances in which the information environment was unambiguous, such as border battles against large, heavily equipped North Vietnamese Army units. Here there was, as predicted, convergence in operations between the Army and Marines.

In addition to the more general examination of the operations of the Army and Marines, an additional chapter focuses on a natural experiment in a single South Vietnamese province. Here Marines conducted operations in 1966 and 1967 before turning over the province to the Army, who conducted operations in 1967 and 1968. As the terrain, enemy, local government and essentially all other variables are held constant, this natural experiment allows any differences in operations to be attributed to organizational differences with high confidence. Both Army and Marine operations conform to the predictions of the cultural hypothesis, with no convergence in the operations.

For the British, the historical case was Kenya, where a combination of rural and urban insurgency presented a substantial challenge. Two periods of British Army operations were examined. The British Army response supports the cultural hypothesis, as its operations were generally small unit, were restrained in terms of firepower, and made extensive use of cooperation with other organizations, such as the Kenya Police and local paramilitaries such as the Home Guard.

The contemporary case for each of the three organizations is counterinsurgency in Iraq. As each organization was conducting counterinsurgency in the same country at the
same time, the Iraq case allows for the control of some potentially confounding variables from the historical case, such as time period, different terrain, or dissimilar enemies. Each organization responded generally as the cultural theory predicts, though with highly varied results. The U.S. Army generally conducted large unit operations with major firepower and little involvement from other organizations. This changes to some degree under General David Petraeus, but even then the changes are limited. In contrast, the U.S. Army Special Forces conducted small unit operations in extensive cooperation with other organizations.

The U.S. Marines and the British Army responded in similar ways, with small unit operations, generally restrained firepower (except in the unambiguously fortified urban environment of Fallujah in 2004), and extensive cooperation with other organizations. However, in Anbar province the Marines were able to forge alliances with locals that eluded the British Army’s best efforts around Basra. The result is that a similar approach eventually proved highly successful in Anbar while failing in Basra.

Shadow cases in Afghanistan and Pakistan provide an additional plausibility probe. The operations of the U.S. Army and its Special Forces subculture along with that of the British Army appear to conform to the cultural hypotheses. The operations of both the Canadian and Pakistani armies also appear to at least plausibly support the cultural hypothesis.

The cultural hypothesis seems to offer the best explanation for the observed variation in doctrine and operations. The other hypotheses are indeterminate or do not explain this variation. The geopolitical environment, level of civilian intervention, and structure of democratic institutions all vary across the cases yet seem to have little effect.
For example, civilian intervention in the United States to promote a certain type of counterinsurgency doctrine has minimal effect on the Army. Nor do the Army and Marine Corps ever experience substantial convergence in operations when information is ambiguous, despite conducting counterinsurgency in two countries for many years. Despite having different domestic political institutions, the British Army and U.S. Marine Corps conduct similar counterinsurgency operations. The end of the Cold War seems to have had little effect on how any of the three confronted the challenge of counterinsurgency.

Other explanations are simply indeterminate. For example, in Vietnam the Army and Marine Corps had substantial autonomy that preceded conduct of operations. The British Army’s access to resources in Kenya similarly seems to have been unaffected by choice of doctrine. All three organizations faced the same imperative to minimize uncertainty, yet the U.S. Marine Corps and British Army accomplished this in a way significantly different from the U.S. Army.

The cases studied thus present a critical yet strong test for the proposed cultural theory. If culture had little influence in the ambiguous environment of counterinsurgency, it would likely have little effect anywhere. However, because the cases allow for control of many other possible variables, the fact that the evidence accords with the cultural hypothesis gives high confidence that it, rather than an omitted variable, is providing the explanation for observed variations.

This has two major implications, one for theory and one for national security policy. Theoretically, culture provides a fruitful way of understanding variation in military doctrine and operations, most prominently in ambiguous information
environments. It does in ways that are more predictive than generic organizational theories, which can at best tell *post hoc* stories of organizational decision-making. By referring to the organizational culture the general outlines of a military’s response to an environment can be predicted *ex ante*.

As organizational culture will matter significantly when information is ambiguous or absent, it will be very important during extended periods of peace or during limited war. The observed decline in major interstate war since the nuclear revolution implies culture will continue to be very important in the future. At the same time, this decline makes the continental armies increasingly out of step with the environment they exist in.

A related implication is that if change is to take place in military culture, it must affect military professional education. Without changing not only the content but context of professional education, it is unlikely that culture will change substantially. Related changes in promotion policy and force structure (such as shifting the focus of command training to platoons or companies rather than brigades or divisions) will also be required.

The policy implication is perhaps even more important, as it provides insight into the limits of the military tools available to policy-makers. Continental armies, powerful as they may be against other armies, have distinct limitations in contexts and environments that do not match their cultural elements. Most notably, the ambiguous environment of counterinsurgency is a persistent mismatch to continental armies. They will therefore interpret that environment in ways that are often problematic, focusing on large units and purely military action to the exclusion of other aspects including cooperation with locals and civilian agencies. Maritime armies, in contrast, have cultures much better suited in general to counterinsurgency. They will tend to interpret the
ambiguous environment in ways that highlight the importance of small unit operations, relatively limited firepower, and cooperation with locals and civilians.

However, maritime armies, despite a better generic fit, are not guaranteed success. The British Army in Kenya did extraordinarily well as it had numerous effective local and civilian partners. However, the Marine experience in Vietnam was less successful, as was its effort in Anbar until 2005-2006. Only the emergence of local partners in that period enabled Marine success in Iraq. Finally, the British Army in Iraq, despite nearly five years of persistent effort, was never able to find effective local partners and thus did quite poorly despite following the same set of practices that had proved successful before. Similar patterns appear to hold in Afghanistan as well.

This last point indicates the limits of counterinsurgency more generally. In the cases studied, it is the presence of effective local allies along with civilians with extensive local knowledge as in Kenya that appears to be the major determinant of success. The British Army in that case was vital for providing “muscle” and discipline, but absent the Home Guard, KPR, colonial administration and the like would have had a much more difficult if not impossible time quelling Mau Mau.

This indicates a line of future research on the causes and consequences of local allies. Why were the Marines able to find effective partners in Iraq while the British were not? How was the Army able to copy to some degree the Marine success? Will the Army’s SOI program ultimately provide an enduring success?

Another line of future inquiry would be to examine additional cases. Three cases that would provide substantial additional leverage are the Japanese Army, the French Army, and Soviet/Russian Army. The Japanese Army would be useful for two reasons.
First, despite being the army of an island nation, it develops into a continental army focused on total war and conducting it during World War II in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands. It is therefore, like the U.S. Army, an example of the non-endogenous nature of culture. Second, it undergoes a dramatic restructuring after World War II that might illuminate the steps needed to radically change culture.

The French Army would be useful because its domestic environment, while democratic during the professionalization process, was substantially different from the British and American systems. Most notably, it was associated with conservative elements and was involved in several coups or near-coups. Further, France was a continental power yet it had a substantial overseas empire as the French Army professionalized. It therefore had to perform a complex balancing act in terms of what lessons of warfare it sought to incorporate into its professionalization process; it had to be ready for war both with potential continental foes like Austria and Germany and with various tribes and ethnic groups overseas.

The Soviet/Russian Army would be useful as it began to professionalize in a domestic environment of hereditary autocracy. However, this domestic environment changed radically in 1917 and then again in 1991, becoming a one party totalitarian system before transforming into a democracy (of sorts). These transformations and the wars associated with them, from the Russian Revolution to the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya, would be a useful way to explore the effect of radical domestic change on organizational culture and military doctrine.

A final line of additional inquiry would be to examine other archetypes, such as the German/Israeli archetype noted in the theory chapter. The German Army, like the
Japanese Army, undergoes a radical restructuring that might show the limits of cultural continuity. Other archetypes might include those such as Indonesia that focus principally on internal security rather than interstate war or the Swiss Army that is essentially a guerrilla force in waiting.

Professional military organizations in the 21st century seem likely to spend much of their time in ambiguous environments. Major conventional wars are increasingly rare, meaning that these organizations will either have little information during times of peace or will be confronted with murky environments like counterinsurgency. This means that for the foreseeable future culture will have a profound effect on military doctrine and operations. It therefore behooves military analysts and political leaders to understand the culture of these organizations as they plan strategy.