MAOISM, RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN CHINA:
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

The area of study examines the process of political socialization, in contemporary Maoist China—that is, how the Chinese masses are taught and learn correct political attitudes and behavior. Specifically, our major concern is what determined "correctness" during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. That is to say, we are concerned with the identification of the standard upon which the process of political socialization was based, and how that standard functioned.

The major propositions resulting from this study are the following:

1) that Maoism can, at a certain point in time, be viewed as a religious belief system in that it addresses the ultimate, eschatological questions; presents a set of values, morals, or orientations to life; and generates what can be identified as religious experiences; and, more importantly,

2) that Maoism, when viewed as a religious belief system, functions as a standard upon which the process of political socialization can be based, in that it serves as a basis for symbolism, as a basis for sanctions, and as a basis for role-models by ultimately determining what is correct and what is incorrect.

The thesis develops and tests these propositions utilizing a functional analysis as the method of study and four of the eight model revolutionary theatrical works as a primary data source.

Thesis Supervisor: Lucian W. Pye

Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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PART ONE

MAOISM AS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul. The ideological remoulding carried on in the past was necessary and has yielded positive results. But it was carried on in a somewhat rough and ready fashion and the feelings of some people were hurt--this was not good. We must avoid such shortcomings in the future.¹

On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People

Mao Tse-tung
February 27, 1957

Mao Tse-tung's observation in 1957 indicated a reassessment of the nature of ideological remoulding and political socialization. The poignant emphasis placed upon having a "correct political point of view" implies that incorrect political attitudes were still impeding progress on the road toward socialism, even after eight years of struggle. The importance of correct political attitudes through the task of ideologically remoulding the masses is highlighted by the potential negative effects it can have on the ultimate goal of political socialization.

That ideological remoulding could not be considered totally successful by 1957 is supported by the "anti's" campaigns (i.e., the Sanfan and Wufan movements) launched in the early and mid-fifties.² Mao's statement was part of the
forecast of a change in the political socialization process—
a change in the ideological remoulding techniques which we
began to see in the early sixties and which culminated with
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-69.

The general area of concern of this thesis is an explana-
tion of political socialization in the People's Republic of
China during the 1960's with particular attention to the
period surrounding the Cultural Revolution. Our study will
identify and characterize those factors which constitute
"correctness" in political attitudes and behavior, which delineate
the changes in the process of ideological remoulding, and which were
made to "avoid the shortcomings" of the past. In more specific
terms, our study will suggest that Maoism, as it evolved in
the 1960's, can be viewed as a religious belief system
which functioned both as a standard for determining "correctness"
of political attitude and behavior and as a basis for symbols,
sanctions, and role-models in the political socialization
process.3 Our principal focus here is an examination of the
function of the Maoist religious belief system within the
process of political socialization. Only in our conclusions
do we address the question of the effectiveness of Maoism in
this function. Before we develop this discussion further, it
is perhaps more important to establish first what we mean by
the term "religious belief system" and how we shall use it
here.

Within the context of this study, it is particularly
important to view the term "religious belief system" in its
broadest sense. Such a view facilitates the understanding of the concept and nature of religion from the Chinese perspective. In both traditional and contemporary China, references to religion imply an all-encompassing power, rather than a theistic being, as is the usual inference in the West. Association with this power source was all important in traditional politics. As C. K. Yang observes in a discussion of religion and its power in traditional China:

... the basic factor was the overwhelming power of Heaven and its forces. There was no more readily observable symbol of supremacy above man than the mysterious limitless heights of Heaven. The regular movements of the heavenly bodies symbolized Heaven's regulative power to keep the universe in stable order. And the power of the heavenly forces to produce the proper succession of seasons was of particular importance to an agricultural people. ... Any individual or group that succeeded in convincing the people that they were the earthly representatives of such forces would enjoy, in the public mind, superhuman power.4

Traditionally, as well as contemporarily, the omnipotent parallel between the forces of Heaven and its guardians (the political leaders) on Earth was accepted by the Chinese. The nature of the ultimate and absolute control of the religion over its believer was transferred to the relationship between party members and political ideology. In assessing religious qualities in contemporary Chinese communist ideology, Yang observed:

The unconditional nature of such a command (the command of Communist ideology) is based on the believer's absolute certainty that the Communist ideology is the only guidance to man's inevitable destiny, the only infallible road to national strength and economic development.5
The political ideology's believer learned to feel with all certainty that the ultimate outcome of all things important to him was determined by the ideology—a concept which parallels the modus operandi of religious belief.

A review of the literature, concerning the broad and general nature of religion and religious belief indicates that the term "religious," although usually defined as that which pertains to God or a theistic divinity, can also be defined in a broader sense. That is, the term religious can also include that which pertains to the sacred ultimate or to what L. R. Brown simply characterizes as a set of values or orientations to life. Thus, by combining the broad definitions established by scholars of theology and religion, we can identify as "religious" any belief system which addresses the ultimate eschatological questions of life and death; presents a set of values, morals, or orientations to life; and generates what can be identified as religious experiences (i.e. intense, total responses to what is experienced as ultimate reality). The underlying generalization is that any individual, group, object, or system can assume this religious character if it can be perceived as having the power or insight to control, interpret, or predict the outcome of what is considered to be ultimate. For example, within the framework of this understanding of the term religious, money can be perceived as a god in a Capitalist system just as the masses of people can be perceived as a god in a Socialist system.
What is important in this definition is that we view religion in terms of the individual's perceptions of the sacred or ultimate, and how he then responds to these perceptions. In other words our primary concern is with the potential function of religion as a belief system, rather than simply with the content of various religious dogma. We focus our attention in this study on the function of a religious belief system in the political sector of the social environment. In traditional China particularly, as we will explore in later chapters, we observe this general definition of religion and religious belief systems in a political framework.

There is growing support in the fields of political science and sociology for the proposition that religion in general can serve an important function in the political process, particularly with regard to political participation and political socialization. Donald Smith writes:

... religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not; but religion can be used to make politics meaningful. Religious values are also an important influence on political culture, and predispose individuals and societies toward certain patterns of political life.10

In addition to a general role in the political socialization process, religion can be used to stabilize an ideology or to mobilize a society. The works of Gerhardt Lenski11 indicate that religion can serve an important role in establishing and perpetuating political attitudes from generation to generation. Observations of C. K. Yang show, in the other hand, that religion
can function in "integrating large numbers of individuals into an organized group capable of collective action." With regard to contemporary China, we will address in this study the role of religion in the theoretical effectiveness of the political socialization process. We will seek to point out the functional effectiveness, rather than the empirical success, of a Maoist religious belief system functioning as a standard for ideological correctness.

It is not our intent in this thesis to suggest that Mao or party leaders of the sixties intentionally established Maoism as a religious belief system, or that Maoism should be viewed solely as a religious belief system. The former supposition can only remain a speculation without substantiating evidence. As for the nature of Maoism posed by the former point of view, we recognize it as a political ideology and as an influential component of contemporary Chinese political culture.

With regard to its impact on political culture, an observation critical to our study is that Maoism, particularly in its function as a religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution, should be recognized as a continuum of Chinese political culture from two perspectives. First, the Maoist religious belief system continues the same functional interrelationship between religion and politics observable in traditional China. Similar to the function that the Mandate of Heaven served for all Confucian Emperors throughout Chinese dynastic history, the Maoist religious belief system attempted to legitimize and perpetuate Mao's political power (when it is
most in question), and attempted to instigate and mobilize
the Chinese masses so that they would rid the political
system of its "corrupt" influences.

Secondly, the Maoist religious belief system can be
recognized as an attempted merger of the divergent traditional
religious influences of Confucianism and Taoism into one
religious belief system. As we shall see in Chapter II,
individuals (both official and peasant alike) in traditional
China often shifted back and forth in the expression and prac-
tice of these two religions. Although the two religions
shared certain characteristics, such as discipline from the
believer, they diverged in many ways. Confucian doctrine
espoused egocentrism (within the framework of exemplary life
style) while Taoist doctrine preached brotherly love and a
sense of community. Maoism, in its function as a religious
belief system attempted to incorporate these divergent character-
istics of each religion into one religious belief system,
thus adding a new influence on Chinese political culture,
rather than creating a new political culture as some might
argue. What we will argue however is that to view Maoism
functionally as a religious belief system adds a new dimen-
sion to the understanding of the nature of Maoism and of its
role in contemporary Chinese politics, particularly viz. the
socialization process.

The socialization process in China has been given atten-
tion by three noted scholars in the field. Richard Wilson's
study has focused on the role of education in the political socialization of children in contemporary Taiwan. Both Lucian Pye and Richard Solomon, on the other hand, have examined the influence of traditional Chinese political culture on the political socialization process in contemporary China. Both their studies were aimed toward the characterization of Chinese political culture. If we for the moment take the view that political culture is cumulative, our study will examine one time slice of its continuum (i.e., a Maoist religious belief system in the 60's). By the 1980's, we may well view a Maoist religious belief system, relative to political culture in China, as a component of political culture much in the same way we view Confucianism today. The aim of our study though is not to validate the cumulative nature of political culture, or to determine the position Maoism will take within the political culture of China. Our aim is to examine from our new perspective, at a relatively more rudimentary level, how Maoism, the religious belief system, functions as a basis for the socialization process of contemporary China.

As we suggested earlier, we will not attempt to measure the degree of impact upon the Chinese political socialization process, of its having as its basis a Maoist religious belief system, or the degree of effectiveness experienced due to this basis. We can and will, however, describe how political socialization functioned in the People's Republic of China in the 1960's. On the basis of these observations, we will, in our conclusion,
attempt to describe the socialization process and discuss why it may or may not have been effective, given China's socio-political history and the socio-political realities during the 1960-1970 period.

Maoism as a Marxist Ideology and as a Religious Belief System

At the basis of this assertion that Maoism is a religious belief system lies a question critical to our study. Simply stated it is: Can what is viewed as a political ideology from one perspective be viewed as a religious belief system from another perspective? We answer this query in detail in Chapter III of this work. Let it suffice for us to state here that such a dual observation is valid, particularly when one introduces the notion of function.

What we are in fact stating throughout this study is that Maoism, though recognized as an interpretation and application of Marxist political ideology, from the perspective of policy directives and official public statements, can, when studied from the perspectives of its function within contemporary Chinese society, be simultaneously viewed as a religious belief system. The underlying basis for this argument is found in the recognition of the fact that at a functional level the Chinese have made Maoism transcend the realm of a secular political ideology and have allowed it to enter the sacred domain of a religious belief system.

We gather this conclusion partially from our observation
of the operation of the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung which surfaced during the height of the Cultural Revolution and partially from the various official attempts (through media and officially established drama communication channels) to create an ethereal, all-powerful illusion around the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. The thoughts of Chairman Mao, as we will discuss in Chapter III, were attributed to providing (i) meaning to life and death (much in the same way as Western eschatological religious doctrine); (ii) answers and miraculous solutions to personal and natural catastrophe; and (iii) intense emotional experience (which we will explain in Chapter IV to be religious experience).

In conjunction with the dual (if not multifaceted) nature of Maoism, one must concurrently ask: Can Maoism which is professedly Marxist in its ideological world view be simultaneously religious? Many Marxist and non-Marxist would immediately assert a negative response. Marxism represents materialism, scientific thinking and atheism to the core. And Mao, as a professed Marxist, would automatically assume these responses. We do not suggest by our proposition that we can observe Maoism functioning as a religious belief system wish to negate the Marxist influences in Maoism. With the patience of those who might think that this is what we indeed are doing, we would like to offer our interpretation of Marxism, particularly, the Maoist interpretation of Marxism as it concerns the nature and function of religion in society.
We will offer an explanation for how Maoist interpretation and implementation of Marxist ideology altered the ideology to make it applicable to and effective in the context of contemporary China. If one bears in mind Marx's understanding of religion and its function in society, our recognition of an application of Marxist ideology functioning as a religious belief system within this particular context does not contradict Marxist thinking on that nature of religion and its application or the nature of Marxism.

Although Marx devoted much attention to an historical review of the content of various religions, particularly Christianity, his primary concern seemed to be, as ours is, the function of religion in society. Marxism defined religion as "the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural force." (We note here that Marxist notions of religion as a reflection in men's minds is not far from our generalized definition of religion as man's perceptions of the supernatural or of divine force.)

Marxism is not as concerned with these "fantastic reflections" in men's minds, as he is with the reasons men hold so dearly to these reflections. Man clings to his religious feelings because 1) his inability to comprehend and therefore to deal effectively with the forces of nature and 2) the inability of the oppressed segment of the population to endure
and comprehend the reasons for oppression (which Marx asserts is the result of the development of classes within the society). Once man overcomes nature with science (or more specifically a dialectical materialism) and after he destroys classes, thus putting an end to oppression, Marxism held that religion would automatically disappear. There would no longer be a human need for dependence on the illusion of all powerful, superhuman forces.

We feel that Marxist thinking was opposed to the reasons for the existence of religion rather than to religion itself. Further substantiation for this conclusion is gained when we examine remarks concerning the function of religion as the opiate of the people:

Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people.

That religion is "an opiate" is not though the only view that Marxism takes of religion. We also note Marx's observation that religion is (or perhaps can be) an expression of protest against real distress (oppression). Marx saw institutionalized religions as the bulwarks of the status quo. Though, they, in conjunction with the class of secular oppressors, used the religious feeling in the masses to reinforce their power to oppress, Marx points out the religion could also be used by the masses as a means to mobilize against oppression.
The sentiments of the masses were fed with religion to the exclusion of all else; it was therefore necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious guise in order to produce an impetuous movement. 20

We see here the functional potential of religion as an impetus for mass movement.

Although there has been a tendency to regard Marxism as an absolute atheistic ideology, it is not clear to this author that such an observation is wholly accurate. We have seen in our above discussion that Marxism regarded the religious image of the divine as an illusion in the minds of the oppressed or unpowerful. At a basic level this can be recognized as atheistic. Yet, Marxism was seemingly as opposed to the potential of atheism (and ideology) to function as opiates within the society: "Atheism, ideology and religion must be superseded by science of thought and its laws--formal logic and dialectics." 21

We will not attempt here to answer the question, if Marxism is not an atheistic ideology, then what is it? What we see here is a realization, internal to Marxism, that atheism, ideology, and any of man's manners of thinking or perceptions can also function as opiate-like. Further, we observe the realization that religion or "functional religion," though opiums, can also provide the impetus for change, manipulation of mass movement and the expression of protest.

At this point let us turn to Mao the Marxist. Can Maoism be both Marxist and religious? Our response based on the above discussion is yes. Maoism is Marxist in its view of society,
history, the need for revolution, dialectical materialism, etc. Yet, Maoism is also religious (even within a Marxist framework) in its empirically observable attempts to create illusions of superhumanness through the personality cult of Mao and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and in its use of religious-like fervor to manipulate mass movements. In other words, we view Maoism as Marxist in content (although as the reader will see in Chapters III and IV of this study, we also can identify certain religious themes in Maoism which transcend Marxist thinking) and religious in function during the period of the Cultural Revolution.

As we view this study as principally an examination of the function of Maoism rather than of the Marxist content of Maoist thinking, our treatment of the Marxist qualities and influences of Maoism will be scarce throughout the remainder of this work. However, the reader should not infer from this omission that we do not recognize Maoism as Marxist or that we do not deem important this characteristic of Maoist thinking. To the contrary, Maoist interpretations of Marxism add yet another interesting and important dimension to the understanding of Maoism, but that discussion is regarded by the author to be beyond the scope of this study of the religious function of Maoism.

Method of Inquiry and Analysis

In order to systematically describe the functioning of the socialization process in contemporary China, the method of
inquiry chosen will be based upon a structural-functional analytic framework. Karl Deutsch provides us with a definition of the key terms—system, structure, and function—of this method:

A system is a set of parts or sub-systems which interact in such a way that the components tend to change so slowly that they can be treated temporarily as constant. These slow-changing parts can be called structures. Their interactions and transactions with each other are such that their basic structural characteristics persist; if these transactions turn out to be conducive to maintaining or reproducing the system, they are called functions.23

Our discussions will be on two levels of functionalism. As mentioned earlier, the broad concern of this thesis is how political socialization functioned in the People's Republic of China during the period of the 1960's. At a more specific level, we are interested in what function a Maoist religious belief system serves in the socialization process. We do not concern ourselves with further establishing that political socialization is conducive to maintaining or reproducing the political system. Political scientists such as David Goslin, Richard Dawson, and Kenneth Prewitt24 have contributed greatly to establishing this point and further inquiry is beyond the scope of this investigation. We will establish that Maoism during the 1960's, however, when viewed functionally as a religious belief system, was conducive to maintaining or reproducing the political socialization process and inferentially the political system. We will establish this point by explaining the process by which Maoism functioned as
a religious belief system and how the Maoist religious belief system functioned in the political socialization process. An orderly mechanism through which we can identify and discuss these functional relationships is structural-functional analysis.

Carl Hempel recommends a structural-functional analytic framework as an important methodological tool in explaining systemic phenomena. He provides a basic model for utilizing functional analysis as an explanatory device. The model abstractly defines and relates the components of a system, and, most importantly, establishes a method of identifying the presence of functional relationships which perpetuate the system.

(a) At t (a certain time t), s functions adequately in a setting of kind c (characterized by specific internal and external conditions);

(b) s functions adequately in a setting of kind c only if a certain necessary condition, n, is satisfied;

(c) If trait i were present in s then, as an effect, condition n would be satisfied;

(d) (Hence) at t, trait i is present in s.

Relating this schema to our study, t is Maoist China in the 1960's; s is political socialization; c is Maoist China with its historical traditional relationship between politics and religion; n is a standard of correctness upon which political socialization can be based; and trait i is Maoism viewed as a religious belief system.

With this basic pattern, we can operationally define the process of political socialization and establish the validity of the functional inter-relatedness of the Maoist religious
belief system and political socialization during the period of the sixties. We do so, however, with slight modification to the basic Hempel model. Hempel argues, in his discussion of the logic and application of structural-functional analysis, that the basic pattern presented above is logically valid solely when item (c) asserts that i is the only trait by which n can be satisfied in setting c. If this assertion cannot be made, one is required to identify the alternatives which might equally satisfy requirement n. In contemporary China, the former would mean that absolutely the only standard for correctness, in the political socialization process, is a Maoist religious belief system. We recognize that a political ideology, a political culture, and historical experience are also traits from which a standard for correctness for the political socialization process can be derived.

As a result, we can merely infer that condition n is being satisfied in some way or other at time t by at least some one trait i in a Class I of all identifiable functional equivalents of i. It is this refinement of the original model which characterizes the political socialization process in contemporary China. Hempel provides us with another basic pattern for conducting a functional analysis to deductively explain a Class I phenomenon:

(a) At time t, system s functions adequately in a setting of kind c;

(b) s functions adequately in a setting of kind c only if requirement n is satisfied;
(c') I is the class of empirically sufficient conditions for \( n \), in the context determined by \( s \) and \( c \); and \( I \) is not empty;

(d) Some one of the items included in \( I \) is present in \( s \) at \( t \).

With our utilization of the Class of I, we do not wish to merely infer that "in some way or other" a standard for correctness exists in the political socialization process in China during the 1960's. We wish to examine the subsequent implications that a Maoist religious belief system is some one of the items included in Class I that we can observe to be functionally present in the political socialization process, particularly during the period of time surrounding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Methodological approaches similar to the one we consider here have been deemed superficial in certain areas of political science. However, in the field of Chinese Politics, where extensive field research and data gathering in the country is restrained to all but a few, and where survey inquiry is practically limited to refugees whose orientations and interpretations are often biased, we feel this approach lends itself to an objective assessment of the ideas in discussion. Through this method we can carefully observe, operationally describe, and insightfully interpret the meaning or implications of current activities and events in China.

Data Source

As the intent of this study is the observation and description of functions within a process, the reliability of
data was critical to the validity of our conclusions. To be sure, the primary data base for any study is critical to the conclusions drawn. However, as we indicated earlier primary data sources available from and about the People's Republic of China are scarce. From our vantage point, the principal data source available which, with varying degrees of reliability, provide insights into the functioning of the political process, is mass communication. We refer here primarily to communication which is transmitted from the political system to the population. In a study of the political socialization process such as the one undertaken here, an examination of mass communication can provide the researcher with responses to two levels of inquiry. The first level concerns a questioning of the effects of mass communication on the political socialization process, while the second level of inquiry allows the researcher to utilize mass communication to mirror the political system and thereby examine a political socialization process from a distance. In the latter instance, an examination of mass communication which emanates from the political system allows one to observe the function of variables which the political system deems important to the political socialization process. The assumption here is that the political system utilizes mass communication to transmit the correct political attitudes which are to be learned by the population during the political socialization process. We have utilized this second level of inquiry provided by our examination of
mass communication in our study of political socialization in China.

There are various types of mass communication which the researcher can examine to study the political socialization process. News media (both printed and broadcast), official political statements, and as we shall see the arts, particularly drama and the theatre are usually accessible data sources for investigation. The type of mass communication we utilize as our data source for this study was, in some manner of speaking, self-selective.

The data source that we employ to functionally analyze the political socialization process is contemporary Chinese revolutionary theatre. Unlike news media, and official political statements by party officials emanating from the People's Republic of China—which tend to be highly esoteric in order to confuse and sidetrack certain audiences outside China's borders—contemporary revolutionary theatre was intended solely for the masses. The primary function of the revolutionary theatre particularly during the 1960's was to remould the ideological thinking of the masses or, in the words of Mao Tsetung, to "educate and politicize." As we shall see, great care was taken during the Cultural Revolution to make certain that the theatre, dominated by model revolutionary operas and ballets, communicated correct (Maoist) political attitudes and behaviors to the masses. The actors on the stage, through the characters they portrayed, became the principal political socializing agents during this period.
Our plan is to use four model revolutionary Peking Operas\textsuperscript{30} to characterize how Maoism functioned as a religious belief system during the period surrounding the Cultural Revolution and to observe how the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a standard for correctness in the political socialization process during this period. We will accomplish this by examining the texts of these operas for both content (explicit and implicit) and style (plot devices, use of characters, etc.).

Lois W. Snow reminds us of the potential use of the theatre as a mirror of the political process. It is easy to overlook the fact that all art, particularly theatre, is political, and that, whether it is intended to be or not, theatre especially is a reflection of the society that sponsors and controls it. In the case of Chinese theatre, Lois Snow points out that the purpose of its existence and use is "for a precisely guided moral-political education, not for box office profits."\textsuperscript{31} Mao Tse-tung himself spoke to the significance of revolutionary literature and art in May 1942 when he said:

\begin{quote}
We do not favour overstressing the importance of literature and art, but neither do we favour underestimating their importance. Literature and art are subordinate to politics, but in their turn exert a great influence on politics. Revolutionary literature and art are part of the whole revolutionary cause . . . they are indispensable cogs and wheels in the whole machine, an indispensable part of the entire revolutionary cause. . . . If we had no literature and art . . . we could not carry on the revolutionary movement.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}
Within the realm of revolutionary theatre the four model Revolutionary Peking Operas received particular emphasis in the political socialization process of the 1960-1968 period. These operas dominated the stage to the exclusion of all other productions during the Cultural Revolution and represented the direction of theatre in the new China. These four operas are *Shachiapang* and *The Red Lantern* both revised collectively by the Peking Opera Troupe in May, 1970; *Taking the Bandits Stronghold* or *Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy* revised in 1963 by the Peking Opera Troupe of Shanghai; and *On the Docks*. Prior to our examination of these scripts in Chapters VI and VII we will present brief synopses of these works to acquaint the reader with the principal characters, setting and plot for each opera.

To further clarify our approach to this thesis, it is important to discuss at this point the methodological issues associated with using the literary mode of theatre as an investigatory device. The primary issue of concern to us in utilizing revolutionary theatre as a data source is the question of reality. Chinese drama, particularly the modern revolutionary theatre of China, presents a symbolic interpretation of reality. Literature and other symbols, in China, as Kenneth Burke observes, are a form of action, a real response in symbolic terms to a real situation experienced by the author. Etienne Balazs succinctly describes in his reference to the fable of the yellow Millet Dream, what can be thought of as the goal in the portrayal of the relation between symbol
and reality in traditional Chinese literature:

The story is remarkable, because it contains the dream of happiness shared by all Chinese and expresses it with the utmost conciseness, yet without leaving out a single salient feature. It is as if the writer had striven to put all his experience into a nutshell, and in so doing, he has summarized two thousand years of history.\textsuperscript{34}

The literary and artistic guidelines for the relation between reality and symbol, with regard to contemporary art, were laid down by Mao at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art in 1942:

Works of literature and art, as ideological forms, are products of the reflection in the human brain of the life of a given society. Revolutionary literature and art are the products of the reflection of the life of the people in the brains of revolutionary writers and artists. The life of the people is always a mine of the raw materials for literature and art, materials in their natural form, materials that are crude, but most vital, rich and fundamental; they make all literature and art seem pallid by comparison; they provide literature and art with an inexhaustible source, their only source.\textsuperscript{35}

Revolutionary art and literature draws its substance from the masses and is carved out and moulded by revolutionary artists and writers. Mao writes that revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism are combined by the revolutionary artist and writer to generate revolutionary truth. This truth is defined by Mao to be "life as reflected in works of literature and art on a higher plane, more typical, nearer the ideal, and therefore more universal than actual every day life."\textsuperscript{36}

Reality in this framework is truth—and the objectives of the revision of the works of the theatre were to ensure this truth was conveyed. Our view of the four selected model revolutionary operas will be that they are an interpretation
and statement of ideal reality. To support this point of view, let us briefly review the environment and circumstances surrounding the emergence of these model revolutionary works.

As we have stated earlier, we have identified the years just preceding and during the Cultural Revolution as one period of time when a Maoist religious belief system can be observed as functioning as a standard for correctness in the political socialization process. During these years, as had been the case in the years before the communist takeover, the theatre played a vital role in re-moulding the political attitudes of the Chinese masses. As we shall see, great pains were taken to revise existing Peking operas and throw out what was not ideologically salvagable for the new regime. Mao's fourth wife, Chiang Ching, assumed primary responsibility for this task of supervising and reviewing the rewriting and revisions produced by dramatic troupes all over China.

Through hindsight, we might surmise that the purpose of revolutionary theatre during the period was to be a cathartic vehicle for transporting the masses through the traumas of the Cultural Revolution. In the model theatrical works we see a total emotional commitment of the heroes that can be likened to a religious fervor, and can transmit religious fervor to an audience. Lois Snow recalls her emotion and that of the audience while watching another model theatrical work:

I was especially touched with Hsi-seh returns to her village and meets the friend who helped her escape from the landlord's house . . . the
In addition to total emotional commitment, participation in a revolution requires a commitment of self-sacrifice even to death. Eric Hoffer observes that without the elements of make-believe, ritual, or ceremony, there is nothing on earth or in heaven worth the self-sacrifice of death.

It is only when we see ourselves as actors in a staged (and therefore unreal) performance that death loses its frightfulness and finality and becomes an act of make-believe and a theatrical gesture. . . . It is one of the main tasks of a real leader to mask the grim reality of dying and killing by evoking in his followers the illusion that they are participating in a grandiose spectacle, a solemn or light-hearted dramatic performance.39

As we shall see further on in this study, the model Revolutionary Operas not only provide this element of make-believe, they reinforce the notion of individual and group commitment to self-sacrifice and death for the sake of Maoism.

We view the heroes and heroines of the model revolutionary operas as ideals, to be likened to saints in Christianity. They are models, toward which the masses should strive. It is a given that every Chinese must be willing to give up his or her life for the masses--and most importantly for the achievement of the reality of a Chinese socialist state. The model revolutionary operas depict the symbolic bases of that reality.40

This study is presented in two parts. We begin our
analysis in Part One with a review of the historical functional relationship between religion and politics in traditional China thus suggesting an historical continuum in the Chinese political culture which validates our observation of the functional characteristics of Maoism during the Cultural Revolution. We next explore the origins of the Maoist religious belief system during the period between the Long March and Yenan. There are certain characteristics of Mao’s experiences and of the contexts which influence Mao's thinking during this period which influence certain key themes which are identifiable (and assist us in identifying) in the functional attributes of the Maoist religious belief system. In Chapter IV we examine these themes more closely and discuss their role as functional characteristics of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution. In the final chapter of Part One we explore, within a theoretical framework, the political socialization process in China during the Cultural Revolution. Our emphasis here is on political learning, and most specifically on the function of the Maoist religious belief system in promoting political learning.

Part Two of this study presents our examination of the model revolutionary Operas. In two chapters we identify and discuss passages or character portrayals in the opera scripts which illustrate our assertions about the nature and function of the Maoist religious belief system. We will take the
contents of the operas at their face value. That is to say, we have made every effort to let our conclusions flow from the actual text of the operas, rather than taking our conclusions to the data source. We will not concern ourselves with questions of whether or not the operas contain the political intentions of the Chinese leadership of the 1960's. We will also not attempt to assess how the masses received the works. These questions are beyond the reach of this study.

In our final chapter we present our views concerning the effect of the Maoist religious belief system on the outcome of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution. We conclude with a speculative discussion of the impact of the political socialization process in the sixties on the Chinese socio-political process of the seventies, with particular attention given to the status of the Maoist religious belief system since Mao's death in October, 1976.
CHAPTER ONE

FOOTNOTES


2 These anti-movements of the 1950's were campaigns to stop corruption, waste and bureaucracy within the Party and to purge those elements which could not be re-educated to the new ideals of the Maoist political ideology.

3 It should be noted that these terms are the analytical framework of the author, rather than derived from empirical observation or inference. Social science literature is the primary source of this analytical framework. We would refer the reader to the following: Political Socialization, Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Little, Brown, Boston, 1968; and Handbook of Socialization Research and Theory, edited by David A. Goslin, Rand McNally, Chicago.


5 Ibid., p. 385.


9 We refer here to the fable of "The Foolish Old Man Who Move the Mountain" in which Mao states: "Our God is none other
than the masses of the Chinese people."


13 As we shall see, even though avid Taoists led hermetic lives removed from society's confinements of social codes and laws, we sense an expression of brotherhood and community among Taoist believers. We identify manifestations of this brotherhood and sense of community in secret societies which had Taoism as their religious foundation.


15 Rather than attempt to distinguish between the Marxism of Marx and the Marxism of Engels, Lenin, etc., we will simply regard our references cited in this section as representative of the accepted genre of Marxist thinking.


18 To present an extensive discussion on the definition and understanding of dialectical materialism in Marxist thinking is beyond the scope of this study. We will simply state that Marxists would define dialectical materialism simply as man's reliance on the experiences of his life process (which are both human and material) to arrive at a meaning for that life process. For a further discussion of this term we would refer the reader to: Karl Marx and Friederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. One, International Publishers, New York, 1968; Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, 1959; A. James Gregor,


21 Ibid.

22 We refer the reader to the appendix of this work for a further discussion of our methodological approach, its benefits and shortcomings and its applicability to political science inquiry.


26 Ibid., p. 191.

27 In their work, "Functionalism in Political Science," William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman identify three forms of functionalism: eclectic functionalism, empirical functionalism, and structural functionalism. They conclude that most functionalists "have not as yet offered more than a loose analytic approach to the study of political systems" and that functionalism does not "qualify" for a major role in political analysis.

We have not included three additional model works—the revolutionary ballets "The White-Haired Girl" and "Red Detachment of Women," or the revolutionary symphonic composition "Shachlapang"—in our data sources because they lack texts from which we can gather explicit quotes to elucidate our points. In addition, we do not include the model revolutionary opera "Raid on White Tiger Regiment" in our review because it is no longer available in the west. However, we may make reference to these works when we feel such a reference will increase understanding of a particular concept or statement.

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Mao Tse-tung talks at the Yenan Forum, op. cit., p. 18 of Conclusion.

L. Snow, op. cit., p. 36.

Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Grove Press, New York, 1968, pp. 122-124. Snow observed in 1936: "There was no more powerful weapon of propaganda in the Communist movement than the Reds' dramatic troupes . . . and none more subtly manipulated. . . . when the Reds occupied new areas, it was the Red theatre that calmed the fears of the people, gave them rudimentary ideas of the Red Program, and dispensed great quantities of revolutionary thoughts."

Here we rely on Lois Snow's first hand experience as she observes the reactions of an audience during a performance of "The White-Haired Girl"; op. cit., p. 211.


We identify at least three changes in the nature of symbolism in post-1949 China. In the early 1950's, we see the first stages of symbolism in the new China's constitution, flag, and slogans. We refer to this stage as nationalistic
symbolism. The second change, religious in nature, occurs in the 1960's, particularly around the period of the Cultural Revolution, the symbolism of the Cult of Mao, and the model revolutionary theatrical works. The third stage of symbolism, represented by the Lin Pio-Confucius campaigns, is identified as political symbolism. For further clarification of the use and meaning of symbolism as we employ it here, we refer the reader to "Learning and Legitimacy" by Richard Merleman, American Political Science Review, Volume LX, September 1966, pp. 548-561. Merleman suggests that symbols of legitimacy are learning aids, in that such symbols become gradual reinforcements in a six stage paradigm of the learning (political socialization) process.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN TRADITIONAL CHINA

As was discussed in the previous chapter, our intent in this study, is to examine the functioning of a Maoist religious belief system, as a standard for correctness in the political socialization process in China, during the period 1966-1969. We have identified this period around the Cultural Revolution as one in which the relationship between religion and politics is readily observable. The implication of our focus on this particular period, however, does not deny the existence of such a relationship in other periods in traditional or contemporary Chinese political history. In fact, when we historically scan Chinese political culture, we see evidence that the relationship between religion and politics is a basic and influencing element of that culture.

As we scan through the dynastic cycles, we will find evidence of religion functioning as a legitimizer for the political authority of the emperor, through the concept of Mandate of Heaven. By exploring the basic tenets of certain secret societies and the rebellions they inspired, we will be able to observe religion from another viewpoint—in the form of various religious belief systems—functioning as a mechanism for unifying or legitimizing political dissent in traditional China. These
observations and others are important as they will establish the historical continuum of a functional relationship between religion and politics within the Chinese political context. We will, as an implication of this historical continuity, propose that the functional relationship we now observe in contemporary Maoist China is not necessarily a unique phenomenon but is representative of a trend of Chinese political culture. Further, we will propose that the Maoist religious belief system, as it operated during the Cultural Revolution, was an attempt\(^2\) to blend the contending religious influences of Confucianism and Taoism into one belief system which allowed the contemporary Chinese individual to be both egocentric (Confucianist) and altruistic (Taoist) without suffering the personal disequilibrium of such a paradox. Though secondary to our main thesis, the latter proposition will be a useful contributor to our understanding of the Maoist religious belief system on a functional level as we shall explain at a later point in this work.

In this chapter therefore, we will examine the functional interrelation of religion and politics as it was manifest through the Mandate of Heaven, through select secret societies, and through rebellions in traditional China. Our first task is to establish the nature of religion in traditional China. In this discussion the historical continuity of religion in Chinese political culture will be delineated. We will then explore the role of religion in political socialization by examining a model of socialization of children in traditional China. It will prove useful,
however, before addressing the historical relationship which exists between religion and politics, to point out briefly the nature of politics in traditional China; and then to enter into a discussion—in some detail—of the nature of religion in traditional China.

An Overview of Politics in Traditional China

When one refers to politics, the concern is with the nature of the governmental process. One might simply ask—(1) Who gets the rule to rule? or Who rules? and (2) How do they rule? This latter query would incorporate concepts such as technique, process, and style. In reviewing the politics of traditional China, the answers to these two questions describe well the governmental process.

From the Ch'in dynasty (221-206 B.C.) to the early Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty just prior to Western impact, Chinese political history could be described as an aristocratic (hereditary-monarchial) centralized bureaucracy, bounded within the framework of the dynastic cycle. In particular, from the Han dynasty on, we see a pattern of strong central political control alternating with periods of disunity and chaos. The kings and later emperors perpetrated their political authority in despotic empires until that authority was challenged. While in power, they relied, in varying degrees, on eunuchs, vassals, military leaders, and a bureaucracy produced through a civil service examination system, to interpret and enforce their imperial edicts. The governmental
structure was highly specialized, with agencies and public offices constituting a bureaucratic administration which handled judicial, economic, domestic, and foreign policy matters. Government policy theoretically originated in the Imperial Court and was passed through a Council of State--made up of agency officials--and through various administrative channels and ministries until it was finally received by provincial and local officials. In return, policy suggestions were to be submitted by local officials via the same channels to the Imperial Court, in an effort to communicate the policy needs of their districts. However, in actuality what we observe is a decentralized political structure in which provincial authority often functioned autonomously. The excessive time factor involved in receiving policy directives from the Imperial Court and communicating local response resulted in a decrease of the influence of the Emperor and his council at the local level. Consequently provinces usually administered their own revenues and, in the more remote areas, performed state functions such as policy formation (based on local needs) and foreign relations with border territories. The provincial governors in such provinces had only to communicate support for the Emperor and render the local tax obligations through the district magistrate and their autonomy was relatively secure. In this system of local self-government, the provincial governor had power proportional to the Emperor. He served as the local representative of the Son-of-Heaven (Emperor) and thus, it would seem, shared the "divine"
legitimation of his political authority with the emperor. In order to assure the necessary checks and balances on power, at all governmental levels, the Censorate operated as an investigatory and critiquing body, scrutinizing policy directives and implementation even up to the Imperial Court. Confucianism, which served as the socio-political ethos beginning in the Han dynasty, functioned as an additional mechanism of checks and balances in traditional political history. According to the principles of Confucius, governmental officials were responsible for the public welfare. The emperor was required to perform his duties to the best of his abilities so that he would set an example that would inspire all those under his authority. No person or group was to usurp or impede the authority or responsibility of another in carrying out governmental processes. Lucian Pye observed of the Confucian order, "... it set forth the remarkable ideal that government should help the individual to realize his full moral potential."  

Whether or not the political system functioned according to these ideals and principles is a question for historical and political analysts and beyond the scope of this study. We do know however that the Chinese of this period—and today as well—"believed that they had devised man's most perfect system of government"; their system of government endured for centuries. Politics and the political system, as we pointed out, was pervaded by bureaucratic structures which both interpreted and enforced imperial edicts, and supported and reinforced all aspects
of the political process. In general, political socialization to certain values was strong. The Chinese population was expected to revere the political leader, on one level as the divine link with Heaven, and, at a more earthly level as a paternal parent. Total obedience and compliance with governmental policy was mandatory. In return, the political leader had the responsibility to rule benevolently and exhibit exemplary qualities of social conduct. Yet, the Chinese masses were not passive in their compliance with political decrees. When a political leader flaunted corruption or malevolence (evidenced by drought, famine, barbarian invasion, etc.) the masses responded with dissent and rebellion. This was the only form of political participation available to China's masses. The population learned compliance, on the one hand, and on the other, learned dissent. As we shall see in the section below, China's traditional religious trends contributed to this dichotomous political socialization.

An Overview of Religion in Traditional China

To present a succinct historical scan of religion in traditional China is not easy. We mentioned earlier that in traditional China religion was conceptualized as an impersonal power rather than a theistic being. In general this is an accurate description. However, to fully appreciate the nature of religion in pre-modern China, we must incorporate in this description the influences, both individually and as an intermingled whole, of ancestor-worship, Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Mohism,
animism, and the broader realm of Heaven and its powers upon religious practices, beliefs, and experiences. Also, we must differentiate between religion—as it was perceived—at the official, literate level; and religion—again, as it was perceived—at the popular level, without creating artificial and unrepresentative divisions between the two.

Bearing in mind the risks of over-simplification, we might venture to say that each of the religious influences cited above have one common trend in traditional China—an animistic focus on cosmic and earthly order and disorder. For example, among ancestor-worshippers, it was believed that to venerate and pay homage to deceased ancestors, particularly those who had held high family status in life, would guarantee that the ancestors would maintain the balance between the cosmic and earthly worlds and might intercede for the living family with certain deities to prevent misfortune or calamity. Even the Emperor, the physical link with Heaven would offer "prayers" to his ancestors to bring rain in times of drought. A very brief review of the key doctrines of the three most identifiable religious influences will further elucidate this trend.

Taoism:

Taoism, founded by the mystic philosopher Lao Tzu (circa 604 B.C.), generated the belief that "the way," Tao was the unchangeable course of nature and that man must flow with nature without attempting to interfere with its course. To the Taoist, wu wei ("non-action") assured true equilibrium between cosmic and earthly forces. Wu wei did not mean passivity, but rather a
spontaneous responsiveness to natural phenomena and processes.

We see this concept illustrated by a ninth century Taoist poet:

Following our own bent
Enjoying the Natural, free from curb,
Rich with what comes to hand,
Hoping some day to be with God.
To build a hut beneath the pines,
With uncovered head to pore over poetry,
Knowing only morning and eve,
But not what season it may be . . .
Then, if happiness is ours,
Why must there be action?
If of our own selves we can reach this point,
Can we not be said to have attained?12

Taoists perceived society and all its institutions, especially government, as creating artificial "curbs" on the natural flow of "the way." (Tao) This perception was in direct opposition to Confucianism, which sought to initiate and maintain moral and social order with rules for correct behavior and moral codes. For the Taoist, this initiative was regarded as a frontal assault on Nature and could only result in chaos and catastrophe. The Tao Te Ching (the Classic of the Way and Its Power), presumed to be authorized by Lao Tzu, served as the sacred text of Taoism and contained verses, thoughts, and stories that could transcend the reader beyond the chaos and catastrophe of society. Yet for many Taoist, even the Tao Te Ching could not capture the mysticism and flow of Tao. Tao was an intuitive feeling to be unhampered by written description. One poet, so inspired by this "feeling" critiqued the Tao Te Ching and its author with a verse:

"Those who speak know nothing;
Those who know are silent."
These words, I am told,
Were spoken by Lao-tzu.
If we are to believe that Lao-tzu
Was himself one who knew,
How is it that he wrote a book
Of five thousand words?¹³

Above all, Taoism with its transcendental mysticism also
functioned as a response to the Confucian political state. As
a religion it provided a justified escape from the inhibiting
social codes of Confucianism (to be explored below). Many
Taoist physically removed themselves from society and politics
living hermetic lives in caves. However, most Chinese idealized
this escape through their practice of Taoist ritual and magic.
Although Taoism, as we have described it above, promoted an
individualistic approach to life uncluttered by social codes of
interaction, it also generated a sense of camaraderie and
cooperation among the masses of Chinese who evidenced their
dissent against the elite Confucian state by their adherence
to the principles and doctrine of Tao. A verse written by Tu Fu,
one of "eight immortal" poets illustrates this sense of brother-

Thinking of My Brother on a Moonlit Night
The war drum booms: all roads are bare.
One wild goose clangs: 'tis Autumn there.
Our nightly dews hence will be white.
On our old home this moon is bright.
Brothers have I all scattered far.
Homeless, how know if still they are?
Letters I send: but none reply.
Is this not War's sad tyranny?¹⁴

In the above verse, Tu Fu expresses not only the sense of brother-
hood, implicit in Taoist believers, but also their sense of
outrage at and their criticism of politics (particularly war).
We will examine this latter dimension of Taoism in our discussion
of secret societies and their role in political dissent further on in this chapter.

Confucianism:

Confucianism, as was mentioned above, was initially conceived as a code of ethics, ordering society and its process of government. Confucius (551 B.C. - 479 B.C.) lived during the turbulent Chou dynasty, a period of unending feudal wars and rivalries. Confucius' doctrines (later collected as The Analects) were a response to the corruption and human discord of this period. Confucius intended to provide guidelines for human action and interaction, based upon his belief that all men were basically good, but that power corrupts and must be therefore controlled by ethical codes of moral responsibility for all levels of society.

Confucius attributed this inherent good in man to Tao. In this regard his understanding and usage of Tao was much like that of the Taoists. However, Confucius felt that Tao could be influenced, unlike the Taoists. Confucius believed that virtues (teh) were the tools of Tao. In other words, to succeed in life depended on Tao, yet one could influence Tao by a virtuous life exemplified by good qualities. To this end, Confucius organized a system of five virtues which, when applied to one's life brought success. These virtues were Jen (仁), benevolence; yi (義), righteousness or justice; li (禮), correct behavior and ritual; chih (智), knowledge or wisdom; and hsin (信), faith or loyalty. Of these five virtues li
has received the most attention and emphasis. This is due primarily to the fact that the virtue li served as the basis for Confucius' ordering of Chinese society, particularly at the levels of interpersonal behavior. This social ordering dictated how the ruler should treat his subject, how the father should trust his son, how the husband should treat his wife and so on.

As can perhaps be seen from the above, Confucianism had implicit in its core a superiority/dependence relationship structure which produced a fear of authority which determined (and, perhaps still does) how the masses of Chinese people responded to its political leadership. Confucianism nurtured this fear by its interpretive applications of the political leaders' divine link with Heaven.

Although Confucianism can be considered a pragmatic, philosophical societal code moderating behavior and interaction, its religiosity cannot be questioned. That Confucius was more concerned with and prioritized finding solutions to order the chaos of his earthly environment should not exclude a belief or concern with the supernatural. As Yang observes:

A close examination of the Confucian doctrine as conceived by Confucius and Mencius . . . will disclose that it contained a subsystem of religious ideas based on belief in Heaven, a predetermination, divination, and the theory of Yin-Yang and the Five Elements.17

He further explains:

The subsystem began with the belief in Heaven as the anthropomorphic governing force of the universe, including the human world. Hence the belief in fate or in predetermination as a course of events preordained by Heaven as the supreme ruling power. Divination and the theory of Yin-Yang and the Five Elements were both devices for knowing Heaven's wishes and for peering into
the secrets of this preordained course so as to help men attain well-being and avoid calamity.  

One can perhaps argue whether or not Confucianism should be recognized as an official, state religion in traditional China. However, it is clear to this author that Confucianism at the very least, should be recognized as a political religion. Confucius disavowed some forms of ancestor worship, yet he was neither agnostic nor atheist as we have seen above. Both human virtue and political power were vested in the divine.

Buddhism:

Buddhism, though of foreign origin, was sinicized into the traditional Chinese religious concept of Heaven and Earth and the influences of each on cosmic and physical order. It was first introduced to China from India in the first century A.D. as a result of the silk trade across Central Asia. Initially, the religious severity and frugality of Indian Buddhism was not well received in Han China. However, as sinicization occurred, Buddhism flourished politically and economically until the T'ang dynasty. Even after this period, Buddhism penetrated Chinese religious life.

Buddhism was amalgamated into a conglomerate of China's animistic religious practices and beliefs, which incorporated the cult of ancestor-worship, Taoism, Confucianism, and a respect for the cosmic order of T'ien (Heaven). One author noted of the influence of Buddhism in thirteenth century China:

The whole of China had become permeated by Buddhism, but it had gone so deep that many people, even among the upper classes, were no longer conscious of it . . .
the Confucian ethic and Buddhist morality, mingled indistinguishably.22

Kenneth Ch'en provides more detail of this process as he explains the metamorphosis of Indian to Chinese Buddhism is a discussion of the deity Maitreya:

Very early in the Pali tradition Maitreya appears as the future Buddha waiting to be reborn on earth to purify the religion in some distant future... on the whole he does not play an important role in Indian Buddhism. Only after he was introduced into China did he become an important figure. By the fourth century A.D., there was a Maitreya cult in which the devotees vowed to be reborn in Tushita Heaven in order to see Maitreya face to face. After the seventh century the cult declined... When Maitreya reappeared in the thirteenth century, he took the form of a fat, laughing image, and he was referred to as the Pot-Bellied Maitreya or the Laughing Buddha. It appears that this image of Maitreya was based on legends surrounding the life of a tenth century Chinese monk with a wrinkled forehead and a mountainous belly.23

Ch'en further observes that the latter additions of a "bevy of children" climbing over Maitreya make this Buddha representative of the Chinese life ideals of prosperity and a large family, denoted by the fat belly and the children. We see through this an illustrative example of the process of sinicization of Buddhism.

As Chinese Buddhism evolved, the Chinese acquired a more defined understanding of cosmic (T'ien) and physical order and disorder. Buddhism revealed that physical disorder was an inevitable consequence of man's sins and that man's proper place in the cosmic order (rebirth as a deity or human rather than in animal or demonic form) could only be attained by piousness and self-sacrifice. From the Chinese perspective, Buddhism gave
substance to the mysticism of Taoism and animism; rationale to the societal ethical codes of Confucius; and legitimacy to the cult of ancestor-worship (particularly if ancestors could be reborn as a deity of a human).

Yet, the result of this interface of religious tendencies is a pattern of religious beliefs and practices in traditional China in which each religious influence is vaguely distinguishable, and no religious influences can be clearly defined as a separate entity. Thus, we can observe ancestor-worshippers throughout traditional China seeking Tao; paying homage to river and house deities; regularly requesting that a particular Buddha intercede for them in a Tushita T'ien (Buddhist Heaven where Maitreya resided); and religiously abiding by Confucian ethical codes—all this without any readily observable conflict or chaos in their religious experiences.

There is, however, one very important distinguishable feature of religion in traditional China. As cited earlier, from a sociopolitical point of view, we can differentiate between official, literate religion and popular religion. What we see is a polarization of religious belief, practice, and experience. If we look from the top down, we see Confucianism influencing the religion amalgam outlined above; and if we look from the bottom up, we see Taoist influences. From this perspective we observe what we identify as an idealization/practice paradox of Confucianism and Taosim. The elite believed in the ideals set forth in Confucianism (the virtues, social behavior codes, etc.) but also practiced "wu wei" in their daily lives. The
masses, on the other hand, believed in the ideals of Taoism (free flowing, unstructured, mysticism, etc.) yet in their daily life practiced Confucianism through their hard work, discipline, and adherence to social codes. However, from a class perspective the paradox is explained somewhat in that the elite were free in their exercise of idealization and practice, while the masses, no matter what their ideal, were compelled to practice Confucianism in their daily lives. They had no choice but to live and outwardly aspire to be Confucian men in a Confucian society ruled authoritatively by Confucian elites.

Earlier in this chapter, we identified the antithetical relationship of these two religious influences. That the educated elite embrace Confucianism and the peasant masses, Taoism, further adds to this antithesis and should further indicate the complexity and dimension of religion in traditional China. Yet, in some ways, this religious dichotomy may not only make sense in the context of traditional China, it may serve to illustrate the dynamics of societal interaction. What we observe is that those in power, the educated elite, espoused a religious pattern that legitimized their social position and maintained social status divisions. Confucianism not only prompted social order but gave the officials as much explicit control over the social order--with the Emperor having the most control--as it did over the religious order.

One author observes, about the religious control endowed in the Emperor:
Confucianism taught that the Emperor was the religious as well as the political head of the state since upon him depended in large part the beneficient cooperation of the universe with man. . . . He could admit, promote, and demote divine beings in the official pantheon and upon him devolved the duty of performing the religious ceremonies which further the smooth coordination of the universe with man. 25

Couple this imperial religious power base with the primary tenet of Confucian principles--submissiveness to authority--and one can appreciate the socio-political benefits of Confucianism.

At the other end of the spectrum, we observe the masses of illiterate, uneducated peasants seemingly attracted to Taoism. Tao mandated that those who attempted to influence or control social and cosmic order would be rendered powerless and those who submissively yet purposefully flowed with the Natural 26 would have power. For the large segment of the traditional Confucian social structure which was unable to control their own destiny, this concept of power, no matter how illusional, must have been uplifting.

From the surface, the intricacies of traditional China's religion blur. From a western perspective, it is difficult to determine where ethics and philosophy stop and religion begins--if one even sees a religious pattern of beliefs and experiences. Nonetheless, religion is apparent in traditional China and, as we shall discuss, functioned significantly in the political process of traditional China.

Religion and Political Authority

The primary function of religion in traditional Chinese
politics was twofold. On the one hand, religion served to
legitimize the political authority of the emperor. On the
other hand, it functioned as a legitimizer of political rebel-
lion and dissent. Both of these functions, although divergent,
were encompassed in the concept of the Mandate of Heaven (t'ien
ming). The use of the Mandate of Heaven as a legitimizer
of the political authority of the emperor originated with the
Chou dynasty (1122 - 221 B.C.). The Chou had as their chief
deity, T'ien (Heaven) which was recognized as the force of
nature and determined the fate of man. When the Chou leaders
toppled the Shang, they justified their overthrow of the Shang
by saying that the Shang rulers were not responding to the Will
of Heaven by carrying out their religious, administrative,
and political duties with religious piety, wisdom, and justice;
and, therefore, had lost the Mandate of Heaven to rule. The
Shu Ching (Book of History) of the Chou aptly explains both
the concept of the Mandate and how the Mandate of Heaven was
lost and gained:

God sent down correction on Hsia, but the sovereign only
increased his luxury and sloth, and would not speak kindly
to the people. . . . He kept reckoning on the decree of
God in his favor, and would not promote the means of
the people's support. . . . The first cause of his evil
course was the internal misrule, which made him unfit
to deal well with the multitudes. Nor did he seek at
all to employ men whom he could respect. . . . Heaven
on this sought a true lord for the people, and made its
distinguishing and favoring decree light on T'ang,
the Successful, who punished and destroyed the sovereign
of Hsia. From him down to the emperor Yi, the sovereigns
all made their virtue illustrious, and were cautious
in the use of punishments; thus also exercising a stimulat-
ing over the people. . . . It was the case that the last
sovereign of your Shang was luxurious to the extreme of
luxury, while his schemes of government showed neither purity nor progress, so that Heaven sent down such a ruin on him.

The passage continues,

Heaven for five years waited kindly, and forbore with the descendant of T'ang, to see if he would indeed prove himself the true ruler of the people, but there was nothing in him deserving to be regarded. Heaven then sought among your many regions, making a great impression by its terrors (either refers to rebellion or a natural calamity such as drought or famine) to stir up one who might look reverently to it, but in all your regions, there was not one deserving of this regard. There was, however, our kings of Chou, who treated well the multitudes of the people, and were able to sustain the burden of virtuous government, and to preside over all services to spirits and to Heaven. Heaven there upon instructed them, and increased their excellence, made choice of them, and gave them the decree . . . to rule over your many regions.

By the Later Chou dynasty and the time of Confucius (551 B.C.), the concept of the Mandate of Heaven had been accepted as the vehicle by which political legitimacy and power was transferred from ruler to ruler. When an emperor ascended the throne, his first duty was to perform an impressive ritual with imperial sacrifices to consecrate himself as the Son of Heaven and recipient of the Mandate, thus solidifying the link between Heaven and his throne.

Confucius further reinforced the concept by emphasizing the divine character of the position of Son of Heaven and of the political power associated with the position. However, the divine Confucian emperor maintained a unique position as religious and political leader. The emperor could promote and demote deities at will and could admonish them when through prolonged droughts or excessive bandit raids they caused
misfortune among the people. Yang observes that "when sacrifices and prayers failed to halt a prolonged drought," the local official, presumably empowered by the emperor, "might thrash the ch'eng-huang (local deity) image or expose him under the scorching sun to induce rain." 28

Regarding the unique position of the traditional Chinese emperor, one scholar has commented:

... the emperor was raised to a dignity far transcending his temporal powers; he performed cosmic functions as the central figure in the triad of Heaven, earth, and man, and as the bearer of Heaven's mandate, he possessed an aura of divinity worthy of a true Son of Heaven. Indeed the whole hierarchic order of the universe focused on him, for upon the emperor depended not only the political administration of a vast empire, but also the very fulfillment of man's being and the harmonious functioning of the forces of nature.29

It is important to note that the Mandate of Heaven applied to the position of emperor, as well as to the person who became emperor. As was cited above in the Shu Ching, the man who aspired to political leadership had to first be chosen by Heaven. The fact of his selection was indicated by his success in attaining the throne, either through leading a rebellious uprising against the current emperor or some other political stratagem. In other words, succession to the throne was thought to be a fate predetermined by Heaven; and success or failure in seeking political leadership and power was considered evidence of Heaven's choice. Once an emperor assumed the throne, he no longer had to justify his claim to the throne or that of his heirs. Because of the religious predispositions of the peasants
in traditional China toward unequivocally accepting that one's fate was determined by the designs of heavenly forces, and because of the Confucian ethic which dictated that the emperor as religious and political leader be venerated, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven became entrenched in China's traditional political history.

The problem with the original concept of the Mandate of Heaven—as fashioned by the Chou—was that, given the universal power of the emperor, complete with solidifying divine sanctions, only death could precipitate a change in leadership. There were no provisions for attacking the political power and legitimacy of an emperor who no longer seemed to hold the sanction of the Mandate. Surely, no mortal man, no matter how daring or righteous, would challenge Heaven's choice of leadership. Mencius (372-289 B.C.), who was a disciple and primary interpreter of Confucius' teachings, clarified and expanded the concept of the Mandate of Heaven to include the rights of the people in establishing and revoking the mandate of a ruler. He declared that the people must accept Heaven's choice of a ruler in order for the Mandate to be in effect. In clarifying the dual acceptance by Heaven and by the people, he stated:

He (the emperor) was appointed (by Heaven) to preside over the sacrifices and all the spirits were pleased with them: that indicated his acceptance by Heaven. He was then placed in charge of public affairs and they were well administered and the people were at peace: that indicated his acceptance by the people. 30

When referring in particular to the people's right to revoke the
Mandate, Mencius expounded:

He who outrages humanity is a scoundrel; he who outrages righteousness is a scourge. A scourge or a scoundrel is a despised creature (and no longer a King). I have heard that a despised creature called Chou was put to death, but I have not heard anything about the murdering of a sovereign. 31

Thus, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven provided a lawful means of replacing an unworthy "Son of Heaven." It dictated that the people had the Heaven-granted right to rebel against an emperor. However, as was previously mentioned, Heaven's predisposition to the legitimacy of the rebellion could only be established by its results. If a popular rebellion succeeded, then Heaven had passed on the Mandate to the victor and the new emperor or dynasty gained immediate political legitimacy. If, on the other hand, the rebellion failed, it was perceived as an indication that those holding political authority remained in Heaven's good graces through their just and moral rule. Thus the Son of Heaven would maintain his legitimate right to rule. The emperor then had the "divine" right to exercise, what we shall call, a paternalistic repression of his antagonists and their supporters. Attempting to maintain his Confucian virtue of benevolence (seldom successfully as history records) the ruler assumed the task of "correcting the evil" often tortuously. The unsuccessful rebels would then be left to determine which ancestor or deity they had angered and, if they survived the "repressions" of the emperor, make amends. Simply stated, if you won, you were recognized by all as emperor, Son of Heaven. If you lost, you were recognized by all as a
Religion and Political Dissent

In the above discussion, we have established how the concept of the Mandate of Heaven served to religiously legitimize political authority and political dissent in traditional China. However, the focus was on the legitimization of political authority. In this section, we focus on the function of religion in political rebellion and dissent in traditional China.

Although the Mandate of Heaven, as expanded by Mencius, legitimized popular dissent and rebellion against an unworthy emperor, the guidelines and organization for dissent and rebellion in traditional China were often found within the framework of secret societies (hui-t'ang). Secret societies primarily attracted the vagabond and other disenfranchised elements of the Chinese peasantry. Their core membership consisted of individuals who were considered bandits by local and central governmental officials. Jean Chesneaux identifies most secret society members as "people whose social existence was denied by the cultivated literate." Generally, secret societies were characteristically an amalgam of political and social dissent from the established Confucian order, nurtured by a religious fervor and righteousness based on Taoism, Buddhism, and/or animistic beliefs. However, most importantly, the secret societies stressed a sense of "community" and "brotherhood." And, it was perhaps the influences of Taoism which facilitated this kind of communalism. While Taoism did not stress "brotherhood"
in its doctrine, as a religion it transcended the believer beyond the realm of the real world. In the case of the traditional Chinese believer that the real world was dictated by Confucianism which stress individual ethic and ecocentrism rather than brotherhood and community. At a level of Taoist mysticism, one could transcend the real world with its artificial restraints on interpersonal relationships and experience a new mode of interpersonal behavior not defined by Confucian ethics. Thus, a form of social dissent was exhibited by secret society members, evidenced by their brotherly code of loyalty which superseded a member's family kinship—a direct confrontation with the Confucian concept of filial piety (hsiao ). Once an individual was accepted and initiated into a secret society association all outside kinship ties were supposed to cease to exist. The new member took on all society members as his family. All individual assets (land, personal possessions, etc.) were surrendered to the common till for communal ownership by all society members. The homage and respect given to one's genetic ancestry was transferred to martyred society members.

Political dissent was manifest by rebellion and peasant uprisings challenging the political authority of the emperor or seeking to establish a new socio-political order, founded in the religious principles or belief systems adhered to by the secret societies. The religious foundations of secret societies usually varied according to the influences of Taoism or Buddhism, or a mutant blend of both. Most religiously-based secret society leaders claimed some messianic duty or divine
lineage or association. They often believed that they had the divine-inspired power to heal the sick and wounded and cast out sin or demons from the possessed. Religious ceremony and ritual preceded all major undertakings and usually accounted for most of the time of meetings. These ceremonies sometimes included exercises which placed members in a trance-like state and convinced them that they were invincible to death and pain (usually performed before going to battle) and orgiastic rites of initiation.

We have identified two religious-based secret society groups active in traditional China to further our discussion of the role of religion in political dissent—the Yellow Turban (Huang-chin) sect, who figured prominently in the downfall of the Han Dynasty in 184 A.D., and the White Lotus Society (Pai-lien-hui) which operated intermittently from the fourteenth through the eighteenth century. In the case of both secret societies cited here religion (Taoism in the former instance and Buddhism in the latter) significantly figured in the rationale for rebellion. Although we briefly review the major events of the key rebellions attributed to these secret societies to provide context for the reader, what is important to note here is how religious doctrine, particularly Taoism, functioned in legitimizing political dissent.

The Yellow Turbans were members of a sect which sought T'ai-p'ing-tao (Great Way of Peace and Prosperity). They rose in rebellion against the Han leaders from a base in Chu Lu on the Shantung peninsula in Northern China. Their religious
basis was Taoism. They had as their chief deity the Taoist Huang-ti (Yellow Emperor). Prior to the rebellion, members of the sect practiced faith healing and preached among the local peasantry. The success of the faith-healing is unknown. However, the doctrine of the Tao and T'ai-p'ing-tao (especially the principle of an egalitarian society) must have been well received by the poor peasantry because the sect had amassed a relatively large following by the outbreak of the rebellion.

As was previously mentioned, the T'ai-p'ing-tao sect rose in rebellion against the Han in 184 A.D. They received their name, Yellow Turban, from the yellow scarves they wore on their heads in battle. They were led by Chang Chueh (d. 184), a Taoist fanatic who had messianic visions of delivering the peasantry to T'ai-'ping-tao. He believed that by uttering magic words of Taoist origin over water, he could change the water into a medicine that would cure disease. He also assured his followers that they could never be killed by any sharp-pointed instrument such as an arrow or sword. It is said that Chang signaled rebellion by allowing a rumor to circulate among his followers that the blue heaven (the Han emperor) was dead, and the yellow heaven (Chang Chueh's allusion of his associations with the Taoist Yellow Emperor) would reign.38

The fighting began somewhere around April 14, 184. Chang's plot was discovered by local officials and thwarted. He escaped and quickly organized another rebellion with a following of approximately 500,000 peasants and sect members. Although this second attempt at rebellion took the political administration by
surprise, central and local government forces effectively countered the rebels, and the Yellow Turbans were defeated within a year. Although the Han forces succeeded in quelling the rebellion, the impact of the Yellow Turbans and others\(^3\) caused the Later Han empire to collapse under the strain of domestic turmoil and the Three Kingdoms period (220 - 280 A.D.) began.

The Yellow Turbans were one of the first religious based secret societies (chiao hui-t'ang\(^{30}\)) to be directly associated with a rebellion against political authority in traditional China. This fact is significant in understanding the functional dimensions of the Mandate of Heaven in traditional Chinese politics. Although documentary records on the Later Han and the causes of the Yellow Turban rebellion are scanty, we cannot assume that the Yellow Turbans under Chang Chueh were as concerned with unseating an unworthy Son of Heaven--as the Mandate of Heaven would dictate--as they were with creating a new social order. Their allegiance was not toward the Confucian social order. In fact, they were very much opposed to the mandarin elite who justified their privilege with Confucian doctrine. They adhered to the doctrine of the Tao, which as cited earlier was in direct opposition to Confucianism and thus functioned as a counterculture. As they did not believe in Confucianism, they therefore would not evoke the Mandate of Heaven to legitimize their dissent, not to mention the political authority of the emperor.
The White Lotus Society (also called the White Water Lily Society, Incense Swelling Sect, and White Yang) originated from the Buddhist T'ien-t'ai sect of the sixth century. The White Lotus religious belief system combined a belief in the Eternal Mother (Wu-shang lao-mu) creator of all life, with the Buddhist Maitreya, and Manichaean concepts of Darkness and light. This latter doctrine held a messianic promise to the world that a King of Light (ming-wang) would appear after three cosmic eras or Kalpas: the era of the Blue Sun (Ch'ing-yang) when the Jan-teng Buddha reigns; the era of the Red Sun when the Sakyamuni Buddha reigns; and the era of the White Sun when the Bodhisattra Maitreya, Buddha of the Future reigns and signals final salvation and the end of the universe. White Lotus Society members believed that when the Maitreya Buddha had descended on earth, the King of Light would be born with the messianic duty of instituting a state of T'ai-p'ing. Consequently, the leaders of the Society assumed messianic characteristics, as had the Yellow Turban leaders centuries before them, and vowed to deliver their devottes in T'ai p'ing. With this religious doctrine functioning as a legitimacy base for political dissent, White Lotus members claimed freedom from secular political control and continually challenged the political authority of the emperor. Elizabeth Perry, in her study of White Lotus influences in political rebellion, has described the preoccupations and characteristics of the Society in the following way: "Its practices included medical healing, sitting and breathing exercises, martial arts, and chanting of spells and charms." She
further observed that "the Society was a haven for poor and disaffected peasants of the North China plain. It provided a source of material aid and an otherworldly refuge from their difficult lives."\textsuperscript{42}

The White Lotus Society has been linked, directly and indirectly, to a number of political rebellions against central and local governmental authorities. It is accepted that the White Lotus operated as a secret society from about the seventh century. However, the first evidences of White Lotus challenges to political authority occur during the Yuan dynasty (1260-1367) ruled by the alien Mongols. Han Shan-t'ing, a White Society member and practicing Buddhist, declared himself a direct descendant of the Northern Sung emperor, Hui-tsung (1101-1125), and therefore claimed the throne as emperor. He went about announcing the coming of the Maitreya Buddha, and, thus, prophesying the end of the Yuan dynastic rule. He was arrested by Mongol government forces in 1351 and executed after a short imprisonment. Although his preaching was short-lived, its impact on White Lotus members, coupled with his martyrdom, was apparent. Han's son, Han Lin-erh, was proclaimed emperor and recognized within the White Lotus as the incarnation of Maitreya. This association resulted in the father and son being recognized as the Major King of Light (Ta Ming-wang) and the Minor King of Light (Hsiao-Ming-wang) respectively. When corruption, internal disputes, peasant unrest, and floods and famine resulted in the Mongol collapse, Chu Yuan-chang (1328-1398) founded the Ming dynasty.
There is no substantiated evidence that Chu was a member of the White Lotus. However, the fact that he named his dynasty Ming leads one to suggest that he was either a member of the society or was greatly influenced by the preachings of Han Shan-t'ing and his son. Whichever the case, Chu realized the strength of organization within the Society and its religious mission to create a new social order, complete with a new form of political structure. Once Chu assumed the throne, he singled out the White Lotus Society as a heretical organization which was leading its followers astray. One might presume from this observation that the new emperor viewed the White Lotus as a subversive threat to his imperial power. In 1420, the Ming dynasty, in fact, was challenged by a White Lotus inspired rebellion led by a Shantung woman, T'ang Sai-erh.

Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the White Lotus Society remained active both at the local and state levels. Around 1774, a White Lotus member, Hsu Hung-ju, led a local peasant uprising calling himself Chung-hsing Fu-lieh-ti (Renaissance Great-Blessedness Emperor). In the 1794-1804 period of Ch'ing rule, the White Lotus again rose in rebellion against political authority. During this uprising, they attacked imperial and administrative corruption and called for an end to the Ch'ing and a return to the Ming. Finally, there are suggestions of White Lotus influence in the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868).43

We have chosen to focus our above discussion of secret societies on the Yellow Turbans and White Lotus because they
provide good examples of the historical relationship of religion and political rebellion in traditional China. However, these two societies are only representative of broader "rebellious" attacks on the socio-political Confucian order which were founded on religious belief systems. James T. C. Lin has identified five reasons for the significance of religion in political rebellions, either secret society inspired or otherwise: 1) practicality--religion placed emphasis on everyday problems rather than philosophical and theistic matters; 2) religions emphasized the use of magic and sorcery (which was particularly useful in promoting a fanaticism which convinced rebels that they were invincible to pain and death); 3) official proscription--the more a government prohibited a religion, the more that religion (and perhaps the secret society based in that religious doctrine) gained popularity among the peasants; 4) communal organization--the strict discipline and mutual aid (usually found in secret societies) helped in the economically difficult times; and 5) novelty--the newness of the new religion attracted peasants who may have been disappointed or disillusioned with aspects of the orthodoxy of Confucianism both as a socio-political structure and as a religion. C. K. Yang observes that, in general, rebellions in traditional China usually identified their political cause with the divine mission of universal salvation.

We might conclude our discussion of religion and political rebellion by expanding Yang's premise and suggesting that
rebellions, whose organization and inspiration can be either directly or indirectly attributed to secret societies, had as their underlying principle the creation of a new social order which would replace the Confucian world order, and that this was clearly seen as their divine mission. A more contemporary evidence of this assertion can be seen in the T'ai-p'ing rebellion which in the nineteenth century represented still another religious based group of rebels (brought together under the auspices of a secret society) who sought to destroy the Confucian world order as a divine mission.

The Role of Religion in Political Socialization

In the preceding pages, we have discussed the role of religion in legitimizing political authority and political dissent in traditional China. Nonetheless, our historical analysis could not be considered complete without a brief look at the role of religion in the political socialization process of traditional China. We are concerned here with the mechanism paradoxically, involved, on the one hand, with generating the norm in political behavior and attitudes considered correct in the orthodox Confucian state; and, on the other hand, with both nullifying the prevailing orthodox political norm and providing a new norm of correctness. We maintain that religion can be identified as that mechanism which performed the dual function of legitimizing two contradicting political norms (political authority and political dissention) throughout traditional China's political history. Let us first examine political socialization in
Fred Greenstein distinguishes between political socialization to determine "politically relevant aspects of personality development" and political socialization to influence "specific political learning." The first notion refers to the development of basic dispositions, beliefs, and attitudes about politics in general; the second notion refers to particular attitudes about and knowledge of "formal" political life including such items as the recognition of governmental officials and symbols (e.g., who presently holds political offices, the significance of a national flag, etc.) and the functioning and interrelatedness of governmental institutions. Our focus on political socialization in traditional China will be limited to a brief examination of the first classification of Greenstein. We present here a view of what political dispositions, beliefs, and attitudes seemed to be prevalent in Confucian China prior to the nineteenth century. To accomplish this immediate end, we will concentrate on socialization within the family unit.

In traditional China, as in other traditional societies, the family functioned as the basic socio-political unit. Within the framework of Confucian society, it was the family which served as the model for establishing correct political norms, both in terms of attitude and of behavior. In the Hsiao Ching (Classic of Filial Piety), we read: "the filial piety with which the superior man serves his parents may be transferred as loyalty to the ruler." John K. Fairbank, in
a discussion of the traditional socio-political order of Confucian China observes:

Their solution (to politics) began with the observation that the order of nature is not egalitarian but hierarchic. . . . In effect, this was a doctrine of obedience, to be manifested through the virtues of filial piety, chastity and loyalty. . . . Within the family, the patriarch was like an emperor, while ordinary family members, each in his own status, depended on the group for their livelihood.51

Family interpersonal dynamics not only modelled the citizens' attitudes and behavior toward government, it also served as a training mechanism of future public officials: "(the superior man's) regulation of his family may be transferred as good government in any official position,"52 and "the ruler, without going beyond the family, completes the lessons for the state."53 Elsewhere, we read: "(the emperor) wishing to order well his state must first regulate his family."54

What should be emphasized in particular, as a result of these observations, is the Confucian concept of filial piety as seen in the relationship between father and son.55 We find, within this relationship, the political notions of authority, legitimacy of authority, obligations to authority, and the like. In a study of political socialization of Chinese and American children, Richard Wilson56 notes that, in traditional China, sons unquestionably obeyed their fathers and that one achieved authority over subordinate members of the household "legally, ideally, and actually" by the mere fact of fatherhood.

The authority relationships between the father and son figures was absolute. It has been observed that in the family-
relationships of traditional societies, the child was regarded "less as a potential equal than as a person who must learn to conform and to rise only slowly in the hierarchy and who must never expect to live in other than superior and subordinate relationships with others." We see an example of this lesson in A Chinese Childhood:

On the New Year's Eve of my twelfth year ... my father called me into his study and sent me to ask my grandfather whether I might be shown the family clan book. It is traditional in China for a child to be told, on reaching a certain age, something of the history of his family ... my grandfather gave his consent.

Further in the passage, we read:

Father passed quickly over the first few pages ... but he raised his voice and made a gesture of respect when the first name appeared. 'This,' he said, 'so far as the records show, was our first ancestor.' He did not speak the name ... because it is not customary in China for a person to address or speak of an elder by name; he called him 'Yuan-ching Kung.' Yuan-ching was another name for our first ancestor, and Kung was a respectful term used in referring to elders. Actually the first ancestor's full name was 'Chiang Hsu' ... No member of my generation would be permitted to name him thus, and I only do so here to make the matter clear to my readers.

In both passages, we can observe the socialization of a young boy in dominant/subordinate authority relationships within his family. In each instance, the son observes his father in a subordinate role to an elder, while maintaining a dominant relationship with the son. These examples might serve as reasons for Wilson's definition of traditional Chinese socialization as an authority-dependent relationship, where interrelationships are "highly structured hierarchically" and the subordinate
is "excessively dependent" upon those above him in the hierarchic chain.  

From the subordinate's point of view, fear prevailed in the relationship. Within the family, the son generally feared his father, particularly when punishment for wrong doings was in order, and would often rely upon his mother to intercede for him with his father. Pye, Solomon, Hiniker, have indicated that this fear of authority resulted in an ambivalence toward authority and power where the individual either avoided the authority figure or immediately complied with his wishes. Again, we see this learning took place at an early age. Chiang Yee describes an episode in his early childhood when he and other cousins disobeyed his grandfather's decree and listened as a maid recounted her encounter with a Manchurian:

Grandfather was about seventy-four at this time. He was always good-humored and very fond of his grandchildren, and I, being a favorite of his, played in his quarters more often than the others of my age. After the maid episode I did not dare to go there for some time. I had begun to realize his nature and to think that he might not like me to play.  

Within the traditional Chinese family, one's relationships with one's peers--an extension of the family relationship--also served as a basis for political socialization. Richard Solomon notes that "in the Confucian family there was no behavior which was more likely to result in swift punishment than when a child quarrelled or fought with another sibling or neighborhood playmate." Among one's peers neither hostility nor self-assertion and aggression was acceptable. In instances when the
child exhibited such tendencies, shame and ridicule was utilized to reinforce the negativeness of the behavior.

The notion of filiality within the family facilitated the individual's transition between interacting within his family (or peer) structure and interacting in the political system. The individual simply transferred the same deference, fear, or compliance one had given one's father to the political authority. Abbe Huc observed of the place of filial piety in traditional China:

All means are made use of to exalt (sic) this sentiment (filial piety), so as to make it an absolute passion. It assumes all forms, mingles in all action, and serves as the moral pivot of public life. Every crime, every attempt against authority, property, or life of individuals is treated at filial disobedience; while on the other hand, all acts of virtue, devotion, compassion toward the unfortunate . . . or even valor in battle, are referred to as filial piety . . . to be a good or bad citizen . . . is to be a good or bad son.64

Wilson, more recently, writes of the nature and origin of political attitudes in traditional China:

We know that in traditional times there was a fear of government . . . manifested in a desire to stay out of the magistrates's yamen. These general avoidant feelings seem also to have been felt by most people with regard to their fathers as well.65

If we can conclude then that the nature of political socialization in traditional China was to promote fear, avoidance, and lack of self-assertion of the individual towards government, the importance of religion in either perpetuating or negating this predisposition toward authority patterns is apparent. On the one hand, religion provided the emotional
fervor and moral correctness to perpetuate the authority relationship of dominance and subordinance. The religious cult of ancestor worship and a pious Confucian code of social order gave celestial credence to the superior/subservant relationship between Emperor and common man. That the Emperor was designated as Son of Heaven provided the religious connection and therefore a foundation for traditional political attitudes of awe and fear in pre-modern China.

On the other hand, religion negated the fear and avoidance the common man associated with politics. The divine mission of changing the social order to create T'ai p'ing superseded traditional political predispositions and beliefs. One might posit that those rebellions in traditional China which came closest to success, thus qualifying as true revolutionary attempts, had their basis in religious foundations fostered by secret society doctrine or other religious groups teachings. In any event, we can state that religion, at the very least, provided the emotional fervor necessary to initiate a break with the socialized norm of political behavior and attitudes in traditional China.

There seems to have been a shift in the relationship between religion and politics with the onset of serious Western impact in China around the mid-eighteenth century. As European missionaries and merchants descended on China and caused external pressures (both the First and Second Opium Wars), China was concurrently being internally rocked by unrest and dissension
which culminated in the T'ai p'ing rebellion (1852 - 1864).

When the alien Manchurians conquered China in the 1600's and established the Ch'ing dynasty, the religious legitimization of the Mandate began to weaken. The Chinese resented the Manchu rule and potential rebels received continuous signals from Heaven to defy the Mandate. The Ch'ing rapidly became corrupt, and were weakened by the numerous rebellions and internal unrest. Although their actual authority and control was questionable, they maintained a semblance of control, not through their divine link with Heaven, but through the malevolent support rendered them by England and France. At the same time that these European powers were humiliating Manchu officials with forced opium trade, gunboats, unequal treaties, etc., they provided the Ch'ing with the military support to defeat the rebels. In fact, had it not been for British intervention, the T'ai p'ing rebellion may have succeeded in revolutionizing the Chinese social order.

Dynastic Chinese history had seen the same or, at the very least, similar rebellious upheavals at the end and subsequent beginning of each dynastic cycle. Yet, with the Manchus it was different. Not only did the Ch'ing dynasty lose the Mandate of Heaven on October 10, 1911--the very concept of the Mandate came into question. The result was a period, beginning with the Republican era (1911) and up to the dawn of the communist takeover, when no basis for political legitimacy or correctness existed. China reluctantly existed throughout her
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semi-colonization being, what third world development specialists
term, "anti-Western Western" and looked to Europe and the
United States for social and political structure, as well as
standards for political legitimacy and correctness.

The Chinese experimented with a Republic, a national demo-
cracy, even a monarchy; but each of these superimposed political
cultures failed. Their bases for legitimacy did not seem compat-
ible with China's religio-political history, China's present
realities, or China's socio-political needs. Yet, with the
wounds of humiliation, by the West, attributable to traditional
social and political orders--including the Mandate of Heaven--
China could not look back. The burden of the challenge was to
find, at least functionally, a basis for legitimacy and
correctness which utilized concepts of the past political
history; and which would therefore be compatible with Chinese
political culture on the one hand, without stressing obvious
similarities with a political past that had been deemed obso-
lete and discarded. Maoism as it evolved up to and surrounding
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, functioned as a
religious belief system legitimizing the authority of and
establishing a standard of correctness for the political system
much the same way as the Mandate of Heaven had functioned in
China's political tradition. Functioning as a religious belief
system, Maoism, in some ways, seemed to also be an attempt to
blend China's politico-religious traditions (centering around
Confucianism individualism and Taoist communalism) into one
belief system. This attempt was directly aimed at eliminating the idealization/practice paradox of Confucianism and Taoism discussed earlier. The paradox though grounded in religious beliefs and practices seemed to also influence social interactions and political participation. By the 1960's this paradox had taken the form of "red" versus "expert." The Maoists determined that to be "red" (Maoist) ideally would make one automatically expert. Mao's antagonists had just as seriously decided that to be "expert" ideally allowed one the opportunity to practice being "red." To finally resolve this paradox would clarify what constituted correct political attitudes and behavior, and as a result operationalize correct political learning. This was the function of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution. We will explore this function of Maoism in Chapters further on in this study.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1 The author identifies secret societies as socio-political in nature in that, in many cases, they were established to challenge the political authority of the emperor, or the corrupt bureaucrats who were supposedly "hoodwinking" the good but weak emperor. (I am grateful to T. Huey for this last point.)

2 We do not wish to infer intention here by our use of the term "attempt." As we mentioned earlier, from our research perspective outside of the People's Republic of China, we are not in the position to ascertain intention on the part of the political leadership with regard to policy directives or political socialization strategies.

3 In this and the next section we intend to provide a brief overview of the major characteristics and influences of China's political and religious traditions. We present such overviews with the recognition that each section in itself could and perhaps has been presented as major studies elsewhere. We present these overviews to illustrate the context out of which contemporary Maoism evolved, particularly in light of the foundations of China's political culture.

4 These are scarcely recounted epics describing a period of sages and an early Hsia dynasty, referred to as the neolithic period, occurring before the advent of the Shang dynasty. However, little archeological documentation exists to substantiate their actual existence and it is difficult to determine what is actual history and what is mythology prior to the Shang dynasty.

5 We do not refer here to the theory of dynastic cycle, but rather to identify that hereditary monarchy occurred within each period's dynastic reign and not inter-dynastically.

6 During the Shang and Chou periods, the political leader was referred to as "Wang" translated as King. It was not until the state of Ch'in that the term emperor was used to designate the ruler. The Ch'in Shih Wang-ti became the "first emperor" at the beginning of the Ch'in dynasty.

7 The author would refer the reader to the following sources for further detail: Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1964; John F. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions, University of
Although Confucius lived during Chou times (551-479 B.C.), his teachings were not influential. Even during the short Ch'in dynasty Confucian scholars did not conform with the strong legalist tendencies of the later Ch'in rulers and were persecuted. It was not until the Han Dynasty was firmly entrenched in power that Confucianism was recognized as an official socio-political philosophy governing socio-political actions.

The reader is not to assume altruism here. Confucius' rules for correct behavior identified four traditional classes of which governmental officials and scholars were the highest. The rules dictated that the superior class must show love for and responsibility to their inferiors in much the same way a father takes paternal interest in his children.


These five virtues were subsumed under the heading of Teh (德) translated as virtue or good qualities.


Ibid., pp. 247-248.
Indian Buddhism taught that man had to be able to control himself and his drives, to be able to give up wealth, power and pleasure in order to find peace.

As Chinese Buddhism flourished religiously, economic and political power became a coveted fringe benefit for pious Chinese Buddhist monks. According to Buddhist doctrine pious works such as gifts to monks and to Buddhist monasteries and activities could contribute to successful rebirth for one's self or one's recently deceased family member.


The author is grateful to Talbot Huey for sharing his concept of "top down"/"botton-up" analytical perspective.


Reference to a Taoist example of the Natural is illustrated with a concept of the rock and the water. Although the rock stands strong in the middle of the river, it does not interfere with the flow of the current. On the other hand, the water maintains its natural flow around the rock without struggling to remove the rock from its path.


C. K. Yang, ibid., p. 177.


Shryock, op. cit., Chapt. IV, pp. 49-53.

Dynastic histories and more recent historical analysis indicate that nomadic tribes occupying territories surrounding the Chinese state were continually staging aggressive assaults to acquire more territory and, at the same time, political authority. The successful attackers claimed dynastic rule; e.g., the Wei dynasty 386-543, and the Liao dynasty 937-1125. The unsuccessful assailants were regarded as barbarians and were
usually sinicized after their defeat.


36 It should be mentioned here that secret societies could, and often did, degenerate to gangsterism or to the role of henchmen for local political authorities and warlords.

37 The term t'ai-p'ing tao originated with the Yellow Turbans in 1841 and refers to a system of social justice envisioned by Taoist believers as their utopia. In their ideal society, there would be no extremes of rich and poor and equality and justice for all individuals within the society would be the governing principle. This concept or its derivative served as the basis for many rebellions and peasant uprisings throughout Chinese history. A noted example is the T'ai p'ing rebellion of 1813. One might even identify tenets of T'ai-p'ing tao in the Socialist Revolution undertaken by contemporary Chinese Communists from 1949 to the present.


39 The Way of Five Bushels of Rice sect also independently rose in rebellion in Szechuan about the same time as the Yellow Turbans, thus causing the Later Han administration to concentrate the major portion of its resources to quelling rebellions in two separate areas.


45 Oftentimes, rebellions were successful because the rebel forces were more highly disciplined and organized than the corrupt, unorganized government forces. This was particularly
the case in secret society inspired rebellions in traditional China.


48. The term family refers to both the immediate family grouping of parents and siblings and the extended family of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The traditional Chinese family unit was organized on patriarchal lines, where the bride assumed her husband's family as her own. For further details on the family structure in traditional society, the author would refer the reader to: O. Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New York, 1968; C. K. Yang, Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village, the M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.

49. We expand the definition of the term political here to include concepts of power. Thus when we refer to politics and political norms in traditional China, we speak of power relationships (who has power over whom) from both the societal and governmental points of view.


52. Hsiao Ching, op. cit., p. 483.


54. Ibid., p. 357.

55. The reader should note here that the traditional Chinese understanding of the terms father and son. Marcel Garnet, Civilization Chinese, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1930 provides insight. He notes the classificatory nature of the traditional Chinese family and with regard to father and son positions writes: "The father is not distinguished from the paternal uncles. The word is even used for a circle which includes far more than the father's brothers (grandfathers, great-grandfather, etc.) the sons are confounded with the indistinct mass of nephews. All
cousins, no matter how distinct, are treated as brothers." p. 155.


59 Ibid., p. 13.


62 Chiang, op. cit., p. 27.


66 Although China experienced contact with Western culture and society with visits from Marco Polo and the like, the interaction seemingly did not result in a superimposition of Western culture on Chinese culture. In fact, on the contrary, Chinese culture soon impacted and influenced Western European culture with the return of Asian travellers. We do not see a "serious" impact of Western culture until the eighteenth century with the advent of treaty ports, missionaries and European "international" communities on Shanghai and Canton.

67 This term has been coined to refer to an attitude within the Third World to become western to acquire the economic and technological capability associated with the West, while at the same time rejecting certain ideologies, attitudes or principles associated with Western thinking and culture.
CHAPTER III

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM: ORIGINS

"... every society will have a religion—even if it is called anti-religion."

In the previous chapter we have taken note of the complexity of traditional religious beliefs in the Chinese context. Among a melange of religious beliefs (ancestor worship, animism, ying/yang principles, Buddhism, etc.) we have identified two levels of religious belief and practice—the official religious function of Confucianism with its social ethics and orientation to life and societal ordering and popular Taoism with its mysticism. Our task in this chapter and the next is to illustrate how Maoism is a continuation (with modifications) of China's religious traditions.

However, before doing so we must address two critical philosophical questions: a) what is a religion? and b) can what is viewed as a political belief system from one perspective be regarded as a religious belief system from another? The first question explores the differences and similarities between Western and Chinese understanding of the functional use of religion. Having addressed these two philosophical questions, we will discuss the origins of the Maoist religious belief system, pointing out Confucian and Taoist influences where appropriate.
Identifying a Religious Belief System

There are three principal methods of describing and identifying any phenomenon—examination of the content, the structure, or the function of the phenomenon. Content refers to the substance or meaning of an entity. An examination of content entails describing the essence of the unit under investigation. Structure, on the other hand, is concerned with the interrelationship of the parts of a whole. An examination of a phenomenon's structure can result in the identification of that phenomenon based upon its systemic pattern within another unit. Finally, an entity can be identified by its function—that is, by its operational role within a broader unit. In the case of the first method of identification, content, the description of the entity and, therefore, our understanding of it can be taken to be fairly absolute.

Once the essence of a matter has been identified, it is unlikely that its basic meaning will change. In contrast, both the structure and function of an entity are bound to the context in which they appear. In other words, the identification or description of the unit is very much dependent upon the broader perspective in which it is located. Such that, if the broader unit changes or is modified, the systemic pattern and operational role of the entity can change in such a way that its identity also changes. Further, in the case of function, since the operational role of the entity is by far
the most dynamic of the three descriptive methods, identification of the unit, though most easily observable, must always be regarded as relative to the broader unit. The purpose of this brief discussion is to clarify our intent and approach in identifying a religious belief system.

As mentioned in our introduction, the term "religion" and the nature of its inherent meaning have perplexed both experts in the field and mankind in general. The only seemingly accepted "known" of religion is that it refers to or represents an "unknown," whether from an eschatological viewpoint or a divine suprahuman viewpoint. In order to cope with these religious unknowns, mankind has established various belief systems which make the unknown comprehensible and, therefore, manageable in a tangible sense. Emile Durkheim has gone so far as to define religion as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, unifying into a single moral community all those who adhere to those beliefs and practices." 3

This definition still does not assist us greatly in differentiating between religious and nonreligious belief systems. Therefore, we have established three criteria which will facilitate our differentiation. We identify religious belief systems as those systems which 1) address the ultimate and eschatological questions of life and death, or the meaning of life and death; 2) establish values, morals, or orientations to life, which assist the individual in coping with personal tragedies or uncomfortable experiences of life; and 3) generate what can be identified as religious experiences. 4 Although
our criteria add structure and focus to our discussion of religious belief systems, we realize that they do not constitute a definition of religion nor do they encompass our full understanding of the nature of religion. We will attempt to present such a definition and an explanation of our understanding below.

As we have discussed in Chapter I and point out again here, we do not limit our use or understanding of the term "religious" to the divine, in a rigorously theistic sense. We maintain that religiousness can depend upon the individual's perception of what is ultimate, as well as upon the observer's analysis of what the individual or society views as ultimate. William James, the noted expert on religious phenomena, was perhaps the first in his field to adhere to this broad notion of religion. He defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men . . . so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." More recently, Paul Tillich has asserted that ". . . everything which is a matter of unconditional concern is made into a god." Of particular interest to us here is his observation:

If the nation is someone's ultimate concern, the name of the nation becomes a sacred name and the nation receives divine qualities which far surpass the reality of being and functioning of the nation. The nation then stands for and symbolizes the true ultimate.

Thus, according to Tillich, the content of a religious system can vary as greatly as the society's notions of the ultimate.
As each of the definitions cited above indicate, one cannot attempt to define or discuss religion without mention of certain key terms—divine, sacred, supernatural, superhuman, ultimate, etc. But one must ask, if religion is defined by the divine and sacred, without being circular in argument, what does it mean to be divine and sacred and so on. Most religions in content associate the divine and sacred with a god or gods or some form of superhuman being. To be divine, according to man's perceptions and interpretations, is to be all powerful, to have control over nature and man, and to hold the answers to the meaning of life and death, whether the context be a heaven or utopia. Yet this notion of religion as divine and sacred, etc., is only one aspect of the nature of religion. The second, and equally important aspect of the nature of religion is man's response and relationship to his notions of religion. From this perspective we understand religion in terms such as numinous, cosmic, mystical and transcendental, spiritual or having to do with a soul, and mythical. Religious man learns of the divine mythically; is tied to the divine by a spirit or soul; communicates with the sacred through mystical, transcendental or cosmic connectors; and is numinous in the presence of the divine. Taken as a whole then, our definition and understanding of religion emerges from the point of man's perceptions of and response to the divine and sacred, or, as Tillich asserts, to the ultimate.
These perceptions of religion are basic, the divergence or differences in religious content are bound and determined by the cultural and traditional contexts upon which the various interpretive religious contents are based. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we define religion as: Man's perception of the divine and sacred or ultimate and his numinous, mystical or transcendental response to these perceptions. This definition does not attempt to address the existential question of the existence of the divine (as in God) but only defines religion within the limitations or parameters of man's perceptions. In other words, some choose to perceive the sacred as a superhuman being, some choose to perceive the sacred as the state, and some choose not to perceive notions of the sacred. However, there is a question as to the existence of this latter group, both in our mind, and in the minds of such scholars in the field of religion as Eliade Mircea and Yinger. 8

Our next question then is how do this definition and understanding of religion fit into the traditional (and eventually contemporary) Chinese perception and interpretation of religion? To answer this question, we must again focus on the two levels of religious tradition in China. Confucian doctrine had little to say of the supernatural (much like formal Maoism as we shall later see) yet it established the political leader (emperor) as the godlike figure (Son of Heaven) on the basis of his divine connections with the sacred entity of Heaven. In other words, Confucianism officially
established man's perceptions of divinity, sacredness, and religion. On the other hand, Taoism, at the popular level, was preoccupied with the supernatural, but the preoccupation focused on man's response to the supernatural, his mystical, spiritual relationship to Heaven.

One identifiable difference between our understanding of religion and the Chinese traditional cultural interpretations is that while Confucianism established orientations to life through rules rigidly ordaining a social order, there was no evidence of an attempt to establish meaning of life. The official Confucian godhead was not concerned with establishing an ontological meaning of life and death. However, Taoist responses to the sacred at the popular level did include an interpretation of the meaning of life and death. From this historical perspective the Taoist influences on popular Maoism with its emphasis on the purpose of life, and ontological issues of mortality are clear.

In summary, although the two levels of traditional Chinese religion (official Confucian and popular Taoist) do not directly correspond to our dual understanding of religion (perception and response), the similarities between the two contexts of understanding indicate our definition and understanding of religion are applicable to the Chinese context.

Our second theoretical question dealt with the validity of viewing a political ideology as a chameleon which might also be recognizable as a religious belief system depending on context and perspective, and, we will add, function. Ideology
has been defined as a quasi- or pseudo-religion. Yet, such a definition fails to explain or illustrate how ideology can be perceived as a political belief system from one perspective and a religious belief system from another.

Although ideology can be broadly structurally defined as the collective thoughts and attitudes of a specific historico-social group, it has been connotatively defined (in content) synonymously with Marxism. In this latter instance the historico-social group is determined according to class and the collective thoughts concern themselves with the human condition of the oppressed and its causes. In neither of these instances do we find the faintest hint of the divine or transcendental. However, if we consider ideology functionally as does Karl Mannheim, we are led to the possibilities of a religious conceptualization of the term. Mannheim observes that the opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas, which constitute the content of ideology, are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one(s) who express them. And further he states that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influences his opinions, perceptions, and interpretations. In other words, man's ideologies are a product of his perceptions and in turn his ideologies determine his perceptions. Or, at an even more ontological level, what is important in a definition of ideology is not the doctrine of what is espoused but the socio-historical environment and man's
response to it intellectually in his system of thoughts.

Functionally, then, ideology can be regarded as a mirror which reflects man's perceptions of his "life-situation." This definition somewhat corresponds to our definition of religion which we might also functionally regard as a mirror which reflects man's perceptions. But in the case of a religious belief system the perceptions are intended to conceptualize the supernatural and sacred and the response to these perceptions are emotional before they are intellectual.

Thus, we differentiate between the two solely on the basis of man's perceptions and his response to his perceptions; therefore, from the researcher's perspective we do so on the basis of the observable manifestations of these perceptions and responses. If man perceives or is observed to perceive his "life-situation" as synonymous with his perceptions of the sacred, there is an apparent overlap between ideology and religion. Eliade Mircea has observed such a dichotomy in traditional societies. Pre-modern man perceived his secular world as sacred (created by supernatural or divine beings). Thus, Mircea concluded, one could not take, for example, an observation of a ritual of initiation in a traditional environment at its secular face value. Rather, one had to interpretively observe, as did Mircea, that the ritual of initiation is a functional reflection of traditional man's continual attempts to make his religious, sacred past his "life-situation" present.
From one perspective the initiation ritual is observed as secular, from another perspective it becomes an observable manifestation of the sacred. Mircea goes on to assert that modern man's perceptions of the sacredness of his life-situation are deceiving in that he attempts to deny his sacred past and assert his secular present. Thus, the observer cannot assuredly take his observations of secular man's perceptions at face value. Modern man can assert secularness but manifest sacredness. Returning to our study of Maoism, in the manner we observe Maoism from one perspective as a political ideology and from another perspective as a religious belief system. Further, we note both the secular assertions of Maoist/Marxist praxis and the sacred manifestations, at a functional level, of a Maoist religious belief system.

Having addressed the theoretical question of differentiating between an ideology and a religious belief system, we must now turn our attention to a more specific theoretical focus, the methodological approach to an identification of a religious belief system. Specifically, we have chosen to focus upon how a religious belief system functions in the political socialization process, above and beyond the function that political ideology serves in the process. We need not precede such a discussion by establishing that religion does indeed have a role in the socialization process, since this task has been performed by noted experts in the fields of sociology and political science. Rather, our first task is
to discuss how to identify a religious belief system by examining its role in the political socialization process.

It is important that we mention here again our recognition of the dynamics of function. That is to say, we recognize what we functionally identify as a religious belief system at one point in time can functionally be identified as something else (1) as the needs or context of the broader system change or (2) if it is observed at a different point in time. As an example of the former case, Figure 1 on the following page contrasts contextual differences in the hierarchial relationship of environmental factors which weigh heavily upon the course chosen to attain politically correct behavior—and therefore upon the selection of the functional mechanism to transform environmental factors into a framework suitable to generate politically correct ideas. "Political Socialization Process I" is socialization in Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution. Here tradition and traditional values and relationships prescribe the nature of the belief system. "Political Socialization Process II" can be likened to any dictatorial regime where a combination of pure ideological and raw coercive approaches force correct ideas. The same environmental factors exist in both cases, but the nature of the functioning mechanism generating correct political ideas differs because of the differing relative importance or emphasis assigned to each factor.

In order to understand the concept of a functional
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS I

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<tr>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
<th>Transforming Force</th>
<th>Socialized Behavior</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Need for mobilizer, integrator, legitimizer</td>
<td>Hierarchial order of Environmental Factors imply religious belief system exists</td>
<td>Politically correct ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strong religious/political tradition</td>
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<td>3. Interjection of new symbols</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Eradication of competing political dogmas, symbols, institutions</td>
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POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
<th>Transforming Force</th>
<th>Socialized Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Eradication of competing political dogmas, symbols, institutions</td>
<td>Hierarchial order of Environmental Factors imply non-religious (ideological) belief system exists</td>
<td>Politically correct ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interjection of new symbols</td>
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<td>4. Need for mobilizer, integrator, legitimizer</td>
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FIGURE I
IDENTIFYING BELIEF SYSTEMS
Maoist religious belief system within the context of an ideologically atheistic political system, it is important to stratify contemporary Chinese society into three categories or groups of its population. The first and, in terms of numbers, the most significant group is the masses of Chinese people themselves. We refer here to the workers, urban and rural, who, although participants in the socio-political system, do not significantly contribute to policy or ideological directives. Members of this group can include both party (CCP) and nonparty members. The next category consists of artists, political officials, bureaucrats, and the like responsible for interpreting and transmitting policy and ideological directives based on their knowledge and understanding of social history and political culture. Again this group can include both party and nonparty members. The third and final group, which is by far the smallest of the three, is composed of the policy-makers and direct influencers of the policy-makers. We refer here to those select individuals who assume primary responsibility for establishing policy and ideological directives.

With this stratification of the society's population, we can approach an understanding of the functioning of the political system by examining the way the system functions for each of these population categories. One method which allows us to ascertain the functional relationships between these three groups is the notion of input-output (see Figure 2).
familiar to political theorists concerned with structural communication with a political system. Within the contemporary Chinese context, however, the communication process functions somewhat differently. What we see instead of the theorized flow is an incomplete cycle of inputs and outputs, where policy and ideological directives are not necessarily initiated as a result of demands or responses emanating from the social-political masses (Figure 3).

When we attempt to identify a functional Maoist, religious belief system—referring now back to our discussion of the context of a function in identifying that function—we must be aware of both when and how a Maoist religious belief system functioned within the socio-political structure of contemporary China. We must also be aware of the popular affection for Mao that existed in China during this period, Maoist ideology was being interpreted, and therefore, received by the masses as a religious belief system (see Figure 4 on the following page).

On the basis of this notion of communications—occurring as they are described in Figure 4—as well as by our observation of the relationship of religion and politics in traditional China, it is conceivable that we might observe the co-existence of a Maoist religious belief system functioning in the political socialization process of China in the 1960's, with
Figure 2
MODEL OF A SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM

Figure 3
SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM (CONTEMPORARY CHINA)
Figure 4
SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM (CONTEMPORARY MAOIST CHINA)
anti-religious policy directives being issued by the CCP leadership under the auspices of Mao. In other words, our functional view of a Maoist religious belief system must at one point focus on the numinous response of the population to its perceptions of divinity. This dichotomy in contemporary Maoism can be further explained as a continuation of the historical dichotomy in that, traditionally, every Chinese, whether official elite or popular peasant, must be recognized as both Confucian and Taoist in religious disposition. The existence of a functional Maoist religious belief system is made even more likely when we examine the experiences and activities identified with Mao himself. Beginning with the Long March (1934), the cult of Mao grew steadily, and, not coincidentally, reached its height during this period of the Cultural Revolution. Let us now examine this portion of the structure which became the Maoist religious belief system.

Origins of the Maoist Religious Belief System

The foundation to the Maoist religious belief system we observe in the 1960's had its origins long before the 1949 communist takeover. The first instance when we can observe Mao being associated with those criteria for a religious belief system established earlier in this chapter (i.e., ultimacy, orientations to life, and religious experiences) is during the period of the Long March Chang Chen), October
1934 through October 1935. The Long March has been regarded, by Chinese and non-Chinese alike, as an epic unequalled in history. In fact, the Chinese, particularly under the auspices of a cult of Mao established during the Cultural Revolution, seem to have made the Long March into a "semi-religious" experience, glorifying the leadership of Mao and suggesting through personal testimony of Long March participants and media editorials that the March constituted a near, if not actual miracle. In a book, written by Chen Chang-feng, Mao's personal bodyguard throughout the Long March, we find evidence of the Chinese attempts to elevate the Long March to religious dimensions. Chen, in one passage, recalls the march over Mount Linpan, which occurred just as he was recovering from an attack of malaria.

The program began with the history of the origin and nature of the family from cave men to capitalism and went on to discuss the role of women under capitalism. Mao spoke the first rule of the Red Army with regard to women. . . . 'The Red Army soldier does not rape women. . . . Rape is a counter-revolutionary activity.'

Chen recalls:

As we neared the top, I couldn't go another step. My head swam, my body seemed to float and I suddenly collapsed in a heap.
I was vaguely aware of two large hands helping me to my feet, and I heard Chairman Mao's kindly voice say, 'Get the medical orderly to give him some medicine in a hurry. His Malaria has come back.' My heart sank. 'It's not malaria, Chairman,' I cried. 'It's just that I have no strength. I'm afraid I'll never get to northern Shensi.'
'You will definitely. Don't worry,' the Chairman said encouragingly. 'There's nothing frightening about
difficulties. The only thing to worry about is being afraid of them. They're pretty frightening if you are. But they're not the least bit if you don't let them scare you.' The Chairman's words gave me confidence.

'Are you cold?', the Chairman asked.

'Chilled to the bone.'

'Here, put this coat on and drink some more hot water.'

All he had on underneath was a grey cotton army uniform. What's more, he had worked until very late the night before and had marched for hours today in the rain.

I pushed it back. 'I don't need it. I can march.' I refused to put it on, and struggled to walk. I took one step and collapsed in a faint. When I opened my eyes again, I was wearing the Chairman's coat. The Chairman stood in the rain the autumn wind ruffling his thin grey army tunic.

Warmth flooded through me. My strength seemed to return. I rose to my feet and stared at the Chairman. My throat was constricted. We camped in the village at the foot of the mountain that night. I lay on my bed, thinking of all that had happened that day. 'If it weren't for the Chairman's care and encouragement, I probably would have died on Mount Liupan today,' I said to myself. I thought and thought, and tears filled my eyes. 'I'll never forget what the Chairman said,' I vowed. 'No matter where or when, I'll remember always.'

What we observe at the end of Chen's narrative is a numinous emotional response to a deified figure. It is the apparent level of emotional response to Mao that indicates his transcendence from just a concerned or benevolent political leader to a deified figure in the eyes of Chen. Chen's intense commitment (vowing always to remember the words of Chairman Mao) goes beyond mere political commitment in this author's opinion.

The statistics of the Long March are indeed overwhelming:
- Out of a total of 368 days en route, 235 were day marches, and 18 night marches.

- Of the 100 days of halts, 56 were spent in northwestern Szechuan, leaving only 44 days of rest over a distance of about 5,000 straight miles. This averages out to about 1 stop for every 114 miles of marching.

- The mean daily march covered 24 miles.

- The Red Army crossed 18 mountain ranges (5 of which were snow-capped); crossed 24 rivers; passed through 12 different provinces; occupied 62 cities; defeated 10 different provincial warlord armies (in addition to the main Government forces under Chiang); and crossed 6 aboriginal districts (many of which contained tribes hostile to the han).

However, our task here is not to argue whether the Long March was or was not an outstanding event in world history. Compared to the feats of Hannibal and his army or the Roman army under Caesar, the heroism or achievements of Mao's Long March appear only relative in the light of history. Yet, the Chinese have elevated what was in effect a military retreat to a religious crusade to rid China of the evil forces of the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang nationals.

Throughout the Long March, Mao conducted a daily study session called "The March and Study Program." For these sessions, he prepared an elementary course in Marxism to instruct new peasant recruits who joined the March along the way. We could argue here that Marxism was presented in the Study Programs as an ultimate Utopia by a godlike figure, thus raising the atheistic content of Marxism to a religious dimension. However, such an argument would involve an extensive discussion of the ontological qualities of atheism and of the
content and nature of Marxist thinking well beyond the scope of this study. What is important to note of the Marxist orientation of the March and Study Program during the Long March is that it provides a foundation for a functional use of Maoist/Marxism 30 years later during the cultural revolution. We maintain that any belief system, even an atheistic belief system, can be utilized functionally as a religious belief system in a society, regardless of content.

Mao, himself, summed up the significance of the Long March as follows:

Speaking of the Long March, one may ask, 'What is its significance?' We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto. . . . It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is a army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kaishek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, and obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future.21

We find the next stage in the foundations of a Maoist religious belief system observable during the Yenan period, 1937-1947. Mao regarded Yenan as China in microcosm while he was there.22 Yenan was the training ground for the future leaders and the laboratory of experimentation for the ideals of the new Maoist social and spiritual order.

At the communist base in Yenan, Mao further developed
the tenets of a belief system. Mark Selden describes the theme of the period as the Yenan way:

... the Yenan way represents a distinctive approach to economic development, social transformation, and people's war. Its characteristic features included a heavy reliance on the creativity of the Chinese people particularly the peasantry and a faith in the ultimate triumph of man over nature, poverty, and exploitation. ... Underlying this approach was a conception of human nature which held that men, all men, could transcend the limitations of class, experience, and ideology to act creatively in building a new China.23

This approach described above had been implemented to such a degree that by 1939, Snow observed after a visit in the Yenan area:

The Yenan government had built up an intelligent and prosperous community life. Free compulsory primary education was introduced, and middle schools, technical schools and colleges, including a College for Women, were established. ... There was a public health service and several hospitals. There were many industrial co-operatives and also some state-owned industries, but private trade also flourished. Peasants in this 'Shen-Kan'Ning' region opened up over 600,000 acres of new land and with government help tens of thousands of refugees from occupied China were settled here. Opium was extirpated. In the areas I saw prostitution and child slavery were effectively prohibited, and there were no beggars. The idle were put to work.24

While at the Yenan base, Mao drafted three articles most important in the recognition and understanding of a Maoist religious belief system. The first, "In Memory of Norman Bethune," written in December, 1939, paid tribute to a Canadian doctor who travelled to China, eventually settling in Yenan, to assist the communist forces in their struggles against both the Japanese and Kuomintang (KMT) forces. Dr. Bethune's martyrdom highlighted the Maoist concept of selflessness:
Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his boundless sense of responsibility in his work and his boundless warm heartedness towards all comrades and the people. . . . We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit every one can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.\textsuperscript{25}

This notion of absolute selflessness is no less apparent in Christianity.

In September, 1944, Mao authored "Serve the People," an article outlining the ultimate dedication of Chang Szu-teh, an Eighth Route army member, to the people—to the point of his death. The article not only reinforces the notion of selflessness identified earlier, it also represents Mao's attempts to conceptualize and evangelize eschatological notions of the ultimate.

All must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient Chinese writer Szu Ma Chien said, 'though death befalls all men alike, it may be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather.' To die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather. Comrade Chang Szu-teh died for the people, and his death is indeed weightier than Mount Tai.\textsuperscript{26}

Again, we may note the similarities in Christianity—the notion that the death of a Christian martyr has, throughout western religious history, been perceived to be more meaningful than that of ordinary men.

The last article, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," was written in July, 1945. In this article Mao presents the aims of the CCP:
We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory. We should fire the whole people with the conviction that China belongs . . . to the Chinese people.27

We find further on in the article, as he relates the Chinese fable of the Foolish Old Man, the notion of sacrifice to the point of death, and purposeful death condoned by God, is apparent:

The Foolish Old Man replied, 'When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons, and grandsons, as so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower'. . . Having refuted the Wise Old Man's wrong view, he went on digging everyday, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs. . . . We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart.28

With regard to the significance of Yenan in the foundations of a Maoist religious belief system, one author observed:

Chairman Mao observed that the key to survival, as well as victory, lay in such spiritual qualities as indomitable human will, personal dedication, self-sacrifice, and austerity.29

Although not directly related to our present discussion, it is important to note here that the Yenan period also is very significant because it was then that the Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art were held. It will be useful now to step aside from our path and point out a specific direction of these talks which will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI. The Yenan Forum talks laid the foundations for
what would become one of the principal mechanisms for political socialization during the Cultural Revolution and after. During the Yenan Forum, Mao presented a raison d'être for literature and the arts that went well beyond the groundwork of the May Fourth movement. All art was to be for the people, by the people and representative of the people's lives. This latter point served as a basis for Mao's conclusions about human nature:

Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course there is. But there is only human nature in the concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In a class society there is only human nature that bears the stamp of a class. Human nature that transcends classes does not exist. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat and of the mass of the people. While the landlord and bourgeoise classes uphold the human nature of their own classes as if . . . it were the only kind of human nature . . . what they call human nature is in substance nothing but bourgeois individualism, and consequently in their eyes proletarian human nature is contrary to their human nature. This is 'the theory of human nature' advocated by some people in Yenan as the so-called basis of their theory of art and literature. It is utterly mistaken.

Mao sought to correct this theory of human nature and thus the theory of art and literaturer with what he referred to as "revolutionary realism" and "revolutionary romanticism." Combined, they equal revolutionary truth—that is, "life as reflected in works of literature and art transcended to a higher plane, more intense, more concentrated, more typical, nearer the ideal, and therefore more universal than actual everyday life."

First appearing during this Yenan period, the Yang-ko or local folk songs and dances were the precursors of the
modern revolutionary operas of the sixties. The Yang-ko evidently became the mechanisms for experimental interpretations of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism for the peasant audiences. Of the significance of these songs and dances, Edgar Snow writes, "From 1942, the symbol of popular culture in the border region (of Yenan) became the Yang-ko . . . which were redesigned and combined with dramatic programs to propose social evils and to propagate the virtues of the new society." The later revisions of Traditional Peking Operas, which resulted in the model revolutionary operas staged during the 1960's were perhaps based on these experimentations of the Yenan period. With that point we can conclude our brief diversion and return to the original notions of the Maoist religious belief system presented in this chapter.

What is of particular importance when reviewing the period of the Long March and Yenan and its impact on the origins of the Maoist religious belief system is the martial or military context of the period. Throughout this period Mao was continually involved in planning military strategems and mobilizing the Chinese masses in military tactics against the Kuomintang and the Japanese. One must then ask: What impact on Maoism as a religion did its military origins have on its content and functional character? The immediate response to this question is that it had significant impact. At the level of functional character military needs, and more specifically, the strategic need for extensive popular participation in the
rural areas, demanded that Mao integrate the various pluralisms (both religious and non-religious) of China's rural masses into a cohesive, effective, military force against his domestic and national political enemies. Implicit in this function is the notion of bureaucratic hierarchy. We find such organizational structures both in a military and a religious context. Bureaucratic hierarchy identifies the leadership from the mass even in the case where the two groups must function cooperatively as a whole. Thus integration occurs around an established focal point with clear authority patterns.

Whether one chooses the Crusades or the T'ai-ping rebellion, as examples, the effectiveness of religion as a societal integrator, which establishes a bureaucratic hierarchy, is apparent. Functionally, religion also contributes significantly to delineating clearly the virtuous self from the evil foe and provides an intense emotional commitment (perhaps it could be argued an intensity beyond that initiated by nationalism or political ideology) based on sacred righteousness, to achieve victory. Again historical examples, both Western and Chinese, demonstrate the effectiveness of religion in this instance. That the Maoist religious belief system originated in a military context meant that functionally, and most critically, its role was to integrate, mobilize and incite, rather than to integrate and pacify the Chinese masses.

At the level of content, we can also see significant influence of the military aspect on the Maoist religious belief
system. In many cases, the discipline requirements between religious belief and practice and military involvement are similar. Consider the slogans: "soldiers of Christ," "Onward Christian soldiers, march to victory" and the like. Most critical to the discipline training in both religious belief and military participation is a commitment to unqualified self-sacrifice to the point of death. Every soldier is disciplined to give up his life unflinchingly in combat to contribute to defeat the foe. Similarly, training in most religious belief systems dictates an individual commitment to suffering and death to contribute to the defeat of the evil forces. To combine these discipline training orientations is to create a self-perceived invincible military force, which believes that death does not constitute an end for the believer but contributes to the eventual demise of the unsacred enemy: thus the transition from hero to martyr. Because of the military weak position of Mao and his forces during the twelve-year period of the Long March and Yenan, the notion of self-sacrifice and martyrdom was vital to any hopes for success. In the major portion of Mao's writings and teachings during this period self-sacrifice and martyrdom are emphasized. In 1957, Mao wrote:

We the Chinese nation have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood . . .

and in 1944:

This army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on.36
and, again in 1944, Mao wrote:

Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence. But we have the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart, and when we die for the people, it is a worthy death.37

What we see emerging during the period of the Long March and Yenan are a series of themes which characterize the Maoist religious belief system and seem to have their basis in the military context of the period. The first and perhaps most significant theme is one of suffering, self-sacrifice and martyrdom discussed above. A second theme, also discussed above and closely related to the first, is a sense of the virtuous invincibility of self based on sacred righteousness and the evil, destructable foe. Chinese accounts of the super human feats of the Mao-led army during the Long March illustrate this theme.38 The third theme we find arising from the warfare content is one of comradeship, brotherly love and cooperation, coupled with a structured organized hierarchy. With reference to the need for comradeship and brotherly love, Mao wrote:

We hail from all corners of the country and have joined together for a common revolutionary objective. . . . Our cadres must show concern for every soldier, and all people in the revolutionary ranks must care for each other, must love and help each other.39

The fourth and final religious theme encompasses the elements of the orientations to life criteria discussed earlier in this chapter. The arduous military struggle for the Mao-led communist forces took its toll on the standard of living and basic lifestyle in communist (Soviet) areas. All resources had to be channeled to the war effort—a war effort
whose end was not in sight. Individual perseverance and frugality were critical for survival of Mao's forces as a group. In addition, to instill a sacred commitment to the ultimacy of a Marxist Communist society, Mao's followers had to exemplify correct communist behavior and its rewards in the same way that a Christian exemplifies correct Christian living to instill a sacred commitment to the ultimate rewards of Heaven. Thus in the origins of the Maoist religious belief system we see a thematic emphasis on a commitment to a severe, puritanical life-style which included virtues of frugality, perseverance, diligence, humility and a ministerial vocation to spread the "word" of Mao, through exemplary living. We see evidences of this theme throughout Mao's writing of the period:

We must be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people heart and soul.\(^{40}\)

If you become conceited, if you are not modest and cease to exert yourselves, and if you do not respect others . . . then you will cease to be heroes and models.\(^{41}\)

It is not hard for one to do a bit of good. What is hard is to do good all one's life and never do anything bad, to act consistently in the interests of the broad masses . . . and to engage in arduous struggle for decades on end. That is the hardest thing of all.\(^{42}\)

The origins of the Maoist religious belief system with this military content had developed by the mid-1940's so that we can construct rules for being a "good"communist which are not too far removed from any rules for being a "good Christian":

\[\]
Ten Rules for Being a Good Communist

1. A communist... should be staunch and active, looking upon the interests of revolution as his very life and subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution; always and everywhere he should adhere to principle and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions... he should be... more concerned about others than about himself.

2. A communist must be ready at all times to stand up for the truth.

3. A communist must be ready at all times to correct their mistakes.

4. Selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight... are most contemptible... (a communist) should have selflessness, working with all one's energy (and) whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work.

5. A communist should be the most far-sighted, the most self-sacrificing, the most resolute and the least prejudicial in sizing up situations.

6. A communist should set an example in study.

7. The exemplary vanguard role of the communist is of vital importance.... A communist... should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work and fostering internal unity and solidarity.

8. A communist must never be opinionated or domineering, thinking that he is good in everything while others are good in nothing; he must never... brag and boast and lord it over others.

9. A communist must listen attentively to the views of people outside the party and let them have their say. If what they say is right, we ought to welcome it, and we should learn from their strong points; if it is wrong, we should let them finish what they are saying and then patiently explain things to them.

10. As for people who are politically backward, a communist should not slight or despise them, but should befriend them, unite with them, convince them and encourage them to go forward.
The above ten points seem to represent an ascetic, almost puritanical way of life expected of everyone calling himself a communist in the 1940's. In 1941, Mao addressed an assembly of representatives from the Shensi-Kausu-Ningsia Border Region (Yenan) saying:

We communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people, take root and blossom among them.44

In the New Testament we read of the parable of the seed sower recounted by Jesus to a gathering of people, and note the parallel between a good communist and the Word of God:

A sower went out to sow his seed and, as he sowed, some fell along the road . . . other seed fell on the bedrock . . . (some) seed fell among the thorns . . . (and still) other seed fell on the good soil and grew up and yielded a hundredfold . . . the seed is the Word of God . . . the seed in the good soil (represents) those who listen to the word and retain it in a good and well-disposed heart and steadily bear fruit.45

During the twelve year period of the Long March and Yenan, we also see the beginnings of the coalescence of the historically conflicting strains of Confucianism and the more popular traditional religions, such as Taoism, in these initial stages of the Maoist religious belief system. That is to say, we can observe the merger of the notions of individual "goodness" as the basis for "societal goodness," respect for societal rules and laws of propriety (li), social conformity, and model emulation which are prevalent in Confucianism, with concepts of self-sacrifice, willpower, and brotherhood allegiance (loyalty) which are found in
traditional popular religion strains (particularly those associated with religion-based secret societies), in the Maoist doctrines formulated between 1934 and 1946. We will develop this observation further in the chapter which follows.

Between 1947 and 1965, just prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mao experienced a "seesaw" political career, while attempting to stabilize the Community Party, and subsequently a new People's Republic. During the early 1950's, emphasis was placed upon economic stabilization and social reform. A new marriage law was promulgated which equalized the relationship between men and women and land reform laws were adopted and implemented. Communism and cooperation were introduced throughout China. Maoist ideology vis-a-vis the Party was rectified through a number of purges and campaigns. However, in 1956, Maoism, as a socio-political ideology, came under sharp criticism from literary circles as a response to Mao's solicitation to "let a hundred flowers bloom." The party bureaucracy also chose this time to suggest its disenchantment with the thoughts of Mao by neglecting to include any references to them in a Party statute drafted during that year. Mao shifted his emphasis to discourses on contradictions among the people in which he moralized about the continual conflict between good and bad that results in contradictions, all necessary for the continuity of life. In January, 1958, Mao resigned at Chairman of the People's Republic, thereby relinquishing his position of national political leader, or "Son of Heaven."
The Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, proved itself to be a failure in both theory and practice by 1960. Mao had envisioned a total nation self-sacrificing and arduously working with only frugality as a reward, to catapult China to economic and technological superiority. Such virtues had been successfully fostered during the Long March and at Yenan. Yet, now the nation was not so inspired. From the early 1960's on, Mao's emphasis shifted to exposing and denouncing "revisionism"—reverting to the old ways, re-establishing old loyalties. At the Tenth Plenum, held in September, 1962, Mao urged attacks on revisionism on all fronts and a resumption of a class struggle, under the auspices of the Socialist Education Movement. 46

Although China began a rapid economic stabilization period from 1962 on, the groundwork for a Maoist belief system which would lead China to a new social order and an ethereal "Great Harmony," that had been previously established, now seemed in jeopardy. The events, beginning in November, 1965, would initiate a process of reversal.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III


2 We define belief as faith or trust that an event, phenomenon, etc., about which there is no accepted knowledge is a fact, a reality, or is true.


4 We rely here on Joachim Wach's definition of a religious experience as any experience which 1) is a response to what is considered ultimate, 2) is a total response of the total being, 3) is the most intense experience of which an individual is capable, and 4) involves a commitment which impels the individual to act. Types of Religious Experiences: Christian and Non-Christian, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 33-34.

5 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).


7 Ibid., p. 44.


11 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 56.


14. This notion of stratification is presented here solely as an analytical tool and should not be taken as an empirical description of contemporary Chinese society. Further, we do not intend any inferences to the notion of class in either the Marxist or Maoist sense.


16. It is well beyond the scope of this study to include in our discussion here an historical recounting of the events of the Long March. For such detail we refer the reader to: Frederic Tuten, The Adventures of Mao on the Long March, Citadel Press, N.Y., 1971; Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Grove Press, Inc., N.Y. 1938, pp. 198-218.

17. For an example of such an account see Chen Chang-feng, On the Long March with Chairman Mao, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1972.

18. References to religious experiences on the Long March: Chen Chang-feng, On the Long March with Chairman Mao, pp. 84-87.

19. Ibid., p. 216.

20. Taken from a recount of an interview with Mao conducted by Frederic Tuten, op. cit., p. 116.

21. Taken from Mao Tse-tung, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism."

22. Reference to Stanley Karnow's Washington Post article (see p. 12).


30 During the May Fourth Movement, which took shape in May, 1919 as a response to the Allied decision at the Paris Peace Conference to turn over the former German holdings in Shantung Province to Japan, a new vogue of literature emerged in China, inspired by John Dewey and a Chinese introspective look at its tradition. Hu Shih, a student of Dewey's led the literary revolt. Student unions published a variety of new journals such as Young China and the construction in which the literary questioning of China's past and an outcry of nationalist sentiments were translated into utilitarian and utopian idealism.


32 Lois Snow, China on Stage, Vintage Books, New York, 1972, defines revolutionary romanticism as a modification of realism and an idealized or symbolized heightening of reality, p. 28.

33 Mao, op. cit., p. 19.

34 Edgar Snow, op. cit., p. 268.


37 From Mao Tse-tung, "Serve the People," September 8, 1944, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume III.

38 One such account, "An Account of the Long March," referenced in Snow, Red Star Over China, was written by the First Army Corp and published in Yumang Pao in 1936.


41 From "We Must Learn to Do Economic Work," January 10, 1945, Selected Works, Volume III, p. 239.


46 The Socialist Education movement sought to raise the level of socialist consciousness of both the masses of Chinese people and the Party bureaucracy. It reintroduced concepts of mass participation and cooperation based upon the thought of Mao.
CHAPTER IV

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM: STRUCTURE

...considered in its essence and its principles, communism as it exists, ... is a complete system of doctrine and life which claims to reveal to man the meaning of his existence, to answer all the fundamental questions which are set by life, and which manifests an unequalled power of totalitarian inclusiveness. It is a religion, and one of the most imperious quality: certain that it is called to replace all other religions; a religion of atheism, for which dialectic materialism supplies the dogma, and of which communism as a rule of life is the social and ethical expression.¹

Jacques Maritan

In our identification of the structure of a Maoist religious belief system, we are initially concerned with the framework of interrelationships of the parts or elements of the whole. However, from a functional viewpoint, it is important to first establish the context within which the function occurs. We will therefore begin our discussion here with a brief review of the political environment of China during the first stages of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1965-1968).

The four years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were a period of exaggerations in China, politically, culturally and socially. These exaggerations brought certain essential features of Maoism into focus. What had in the past been implicit in the thoughts and teachings of Mao became
explicit. Yet, however helpful these exaggerations of the period are in focusing our observations and study of Maoism, we do not see the Cultural Revolution as a "pure" ideo-religious experience. Rather, the Cultural Revolution had a fundamental political-power-aggression-conflict dimension totally "secular" in context. However, it is exactly this "secular" political power struggle dimension that is important to review because it in some very basic ways colored and shaped the manner in which Maoism functioned as a religious belief system. In the previous chapter we saw how the Chinese interpretations of the Long March as an extraordinary event contributed a semi-military, warrior element to Maoism in its functioning as a religious belief system. Here, we wish to ascertain that the "secular" political power struggle dimension of the Cultural Revolution introduced a sense of intense, uninhibited "struggle" between "good" and "bad," between the "two lines" of contention. The ideological struggles between "Red" and "expert" escalated or, were escalated by youthful Red Guard and their supporters into intense, exaggerated emotional battles between the "good" Maoists and the "evil" Liu Shao Chi'ists. In addition, this period of the Cultural Revolution is important in that we find (we argue not so coincidentally) an emergence of a cult of Personality surrounding Mao which suggests divine qualities to Mao outside of the realm of political leader, and, consequently, provides foundation for Maoism to function as
a religious belief system during the period. As we shall see in the development of this chapter the Cultural Revolution during which both the "secular" power struggle and the cult of Mao with its suggested religiousness emerged introduced certain themes which shaped the Maoist religious belief system and its function in the political socialization process of the period.

After our review of certain key events of the Cultural Revolution, we will proceed with a detailed identification of the structure of the Maoist religious belief system during this period. Finally, we will conclude this chapter with a preliminary analysis of the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.

Events of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1965-1969

The history and events of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution have been reviewed by many writers. However, for the purposes of our study here we will only briefly refresh the reader's memories of the main events of the Cultural Revolution and illustrate, where appropriate, the influence or impact of the context of the Cultural Revolution period on the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system.

The extraordinary events of the Cultural Revolution were coupled with amazing emotional outbursts from the population, particularly the middle school through college aged youth.
Idealism and "revolutionary romanticism"^3 prevailed. The rampaging purges by the Red Guard, the frenzied worship of Mao, the proselytizing attempts of pro-Maoists all contributed to heightening emotionalism during the period. It is this "exaggerated" emotionalism that has facilitated our identification of the functional characteristics of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution. We will expand this discussion further on in this chapter.

Although it has been established^4 that the organizational beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution occurred at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1962 under the guises of the Socialist Education Movement, the immediate cause of the Cultural Revolution is attributed to an article published in the Shanghai Wenhui pao on November 10, 1965 entitled, "On the New Historical Play Hai Jui Dismissed from Office." The article was authored by Yao Wen-yuan, a Shanghai party member, perhaps with the help of Mao's fourth wife Chiang Ching. During a working conference of the Central Committee held in late September, Mao had called for a criticism of the play Hai Jui Dismissed from Office, written by the vice-Mayor of Peking, Wu Han. This action indicated that the play represented an attack on Mao's dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai from his post as defense minister in 1959. P'eng Chen, the Mayor and Party Secretary of Peking, led the Peking Party Committee in refusing to launch a counterattack. As a result of the events surrounding Yao's article, the stage was set and the lines of conflict established for the
ensuing battle between Mao and P'eng. It is important to note here that the conflict surrounding the Hai Jui play was an esoteric struggle between the ideologues, pro-Maoists, or as we observe the "theologians" and the materialists, anti-Mao pragmatists. Ostensibly the arguments appeared to engulf the "correct" interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, at a more fundamental level, the conflict surrounded the dogmatic validity of Maoism and its subsequent functional implementation within the socio-political environment of the People's Republic. The next two significant events at this stage of the Cultural Revolution further delineated these fundamental antagonisms.

On May 10, 1966, Yao published another article, this time attacking Teng T'o, Peking Vice-Party Secretary and suggesting a conspiracy between Wu Han, Ten T'o, P'eng Chen, and others to undermine the revolutionary directives of Mao by refusing to attack Wu Han's play. On May 16th, the Central Committee, under the direction of Mao, issued a circular to all Party organizations (even at the local, rural level) criticizing P'eng Chen for his failure to maintain control over his subordinates (Wu Han) and emphatically reiterating the need for revolution:

The whole Party must follow Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions, hold high the great banner of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called 'academic authorities' who oppose the Party and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of . . . journalism, literature and
art and publishing, and seize the leadership in these cultural spheres. To achieve this, it is necessary at the same time to criticise and repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the Government, the army and all spheres of culture... Above all, we must not entrust these people with the work of leading the Cultural Revolution. (P'eng Chen headed a group of five responsible for the Cultural Revolution.) In fact many of them have done and are still doing such work and this is extremely dangerous.5

A week later, at Peking University, Nieh Yuan-tze, a philosophy student, and six of her classmates posted a Big Character Poster (Da zi Bao) attacking university officials who had refused to allow debate either on the campus or in classes, on the Wu Han play.

By 'guiding' the masses not to hold big meetings, not to put up big character posters, and by creating all kinds of Taboos, aren't you suppressing the masses revolution, not allowing them to make revolution and opposing their revolution? We will never permit you to do this!6

Nieh's attack took the struggle beyond the realm of political power conflicts to a tension between students and faculty and administration over correct versus corrupt leadership. Although the conflict in this academic context was just as "secular" as the political power struggle at the top, the nature of the conflict introduced the notion of evil, corrupt leadership at the popular (though still elite) level. This spirit, as we shall see, sparked the religiously, revolutionary zeal of the Red Guard to exorcise China of the evil anti-Maoists.

Lu P'ing, the president of Peking University, Secretary of the Party Committee on campus and principal antagonist
named in the big character poster, organized a large number of students to accuse Nieh and her comrades of being renegades and counter-revolutionaries who had openly attacked the CCP on campus. The accusers were in turn ostracized and verbally attacked by students and faculty. Nieh's poster had been published in the People's Daily and broadcast on Peking Radio by June 2. On June 4th, an editorial in the People's Daily announced that classes had been suspended at Peking University and that Lu P'ing had been removed from his position as Party Committee Secretary to be replaced by a work team directed by two party members from North China, to reorganize the Peking Party Committee.

On the campus, students were forced to stay in their rooms and study Liu Shao-chi's How to be a Good Communist. All student demonstrations or rallying were forbidden and the university was closed to all outsiders. This situation continued until the end of July, when student groups at Peking University, and middle schools and factories all over China, began to organize themselves into Red Guard units (Hong Wei Bing), identifiable by red bands worn around their upper arm. These Red Guard youth assumed the responsibility of studying and espousing the thoughts of Mao and furthering the cause of the Cultural Revolution by any means necessary. Local Red Guard units carried out investigations into the ideological inclinations and activities of their teachers and local government officials—party and non-party alike.
Collier, a first hand observer of much of the Cultural Revolution, concluded that "an important aspect of all this activity was the erosion of the concept of the all-powerfulness and sanctity of authority, so deeply established in Chinese history." He goes on to observe that, "the slogan of the day was 'It is justified to rebel!' which was closely related to the slogan 'Serve the People!' and to the notion of "being modest, dedicated to the common good and living a simple life of hard struggle."\(^9\)

Mao convened the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP on July 23rd, during which he presented a directive (later known as the Sixteen Points) which outlines the direction the Cultural Revolution was to take:

> At present our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those people in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of a socialist system.\(^10\)

On August 18th, a million Red Guard youth gathered in Tien An-men Square to proclaim Mao as their leader and demonstrate support for the Sixteen Point directive of the Central Committee. Mao, in turn, dramatically displayed his support for the Red Guard by donning a red armband inscribed "Hong Wei Bing." Throughout 1966, the Red Guards swept over China spreading Mao's Cultural Revolution, chiefly in the cities
and by "dragging out" conservative (anti-Mao) Party officials. The rampaging youth shook China with their Purification Campaigns designed to rid China of the evil demonic anti-Mao forces. The campaigns surfaced under the guises of such slogans as "sweep out the monsters and ghosts" (a very ethereal concept for a society supposedly so bound by materialist Marxism); "Destroy the four olds" (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits); and "great exchanges of revolutionary experiences." The impact of the Red Guards was such that by January, 1967 Mao was forced to call on the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.), headed by Lin Piao, to maintain order. The P.L.A. was instructed to avoid physical repression at all times and channel the energies of the youthful Red Guard into study sessions on the thoughts of Mao and the significance of revolution in contemporary China, but this proved an impossible task for many months in many locations. 11

The Wuhan Incident in July, 1967 climaxed the events of the Cultural Revolution, and placed the contending forces on the brink of civil war. The episode began when unrest broke between youth and steel-workers pro-Mao and party officials in the Wuhan steel mills. The former group organized themselves into two organizations called "the three steels" and the "400,000 strong" and ideologically attacked the party leaders at the mills. Ch'en Tsai-tao, the commander of Hunan province military district, organized a rightist group, calling themselves 'The Million Heroes', and they, together with
the local garrison, Independent Division-8201, physically suppressed the pro-Mao group.

The Central Cultural Revolution Committee sent two of their public security ministers, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li, to Hupei to investigate the causes of the incident and quiet the disturbances. The two ministers examined the details and determined that Ch'en had erred in deploying local militia to violently suppress the student/worker group. Ch'en had the two committeemen arrested for being suspected of espionage and detained incommunicado. When news of the arrest reached Peking, Chou En-Lai was instructed to fly to Hupei to secure the release of Hsieh and Wang. However, as his plane approached the landing field in Hupei, Chou noted that the airfield was surrounded by troops of "Million Heroes" and local militia armed with tanks and automatic weapons. Chou ordered that his plane be rerouted. He gathered troops, including a naval unit dispatched up the Yangtze and parachute troops airlifted to Haukow, Wuchang, and Hanyang, and marched by land towards Hupei.

Ch'en, realizing the odds were not in his favor, released Hsieh and Wang and surrendered himself to Chou before any serious fighting broke out. Ch'en was immediately escorted to Peking for re-education. It is fairly probable that, if fighting had erupted in Hupei, escalation would have been inevitable and the Cultural Revolution would have abruptly become a violent civil war, fought primarily by China's youth. The Wuhan Incident added a significant eschatological
dimension to the ensuing Maoist religious belief system. What was critical was not just the imminent threat of escalation to a civil war, but that the civil war would be within and between the Communist forces. Such a violent internal eruption would have been unthinkable in Marxist and Maoist thinking. The threat of such a cataclysm introduced an apocalyptic element to the Maoist religious belief system. There was an urgency that Maoist inspired virtue prevail to prevent an immense "blow up" the aftermath of which would be unfathomable.

In late Fall of 1967, Mao began to seriously question his activities and 'ideological purity' of his Red Guard, so much so that one morning at three o'clock, he summoned five Red Guard representatives to his residence and reprimanded them for disunity in their actions and "failure to measure up to his 'revolutionary standards.'"12 "You have let me down," he reportedly criticized, "And, what is more, you have disappointed the workers, peasants and soldiers of China."13 Mao's reversal of his previous uncompromising support of the Red Guards was directly related to the seemingly uncontrollable and, most important violent frenzy of Red Guard activities throughout China. His proselytizing disciples had taken China to the verge of anarchy in one short year, precipitated by the attack on the corrupt Party leadership. From Mao's perspective, revolution would eventually bring about his ideal utopia anarchy would not. His only option was to disclaim the young demon-purgers as demons in their own right. Mao issued a directive
authorizing the Army to suppress Red Guard 'Rebels' (physically if necessary) and survey and control the hanging of posters and Red Guard publications. In addition, Red Guard youth were dispatched to the countryside "to learn from the peasants." Their lessons were to consist of hard work, frugality, simplicity of life and all the virtues derived from an arduous life style. By December an estimated 3,190,000 students and youth had been sent to the countryside for re-education. The fighting and ideological clashes between pro- and anti-Mao groups lulled during the winter of 1967 and early spring of the following year. However, by summer, 1968, fighting and violent ideological clashes between rampaging Red Guard units and workers, local officials and peasants had again escalated in some areas. One report of unrest in Canton reads:

The chaos in the city was reported to have been caused mainly by 3,000 Red Guards who under pretext of hunting "counter-revolutionaries" were terrorizing the inhabitants, and by 10,000 youth who had swarmed into the city after being sent to work on farms and supported themselves by robbery. Clashes between northern and southern Red Guard organizations and between Red Guards and workers--particularly the railway and transport workers--added to the confusion. About 100 people were reported to have been killed and 1000 injured in fighting between Red Guards and railwaymen on July 26.

During August, 1968, "Mao-Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Teams," consisting of PLA members, workers and peasants were set up and immediately sent into the universities and middle schools to curb ultra-leftism among students and faculty. Throughout China, all attempts were being made, per Mao's
orders, to reverse Mao's revolutionary struggle that had been carried on by the Red Guard.

By October, 1968, the Red Guards had been broken up or, at the very least, were being controlled and delimited by the intervening P.L.A. Revolutionary Committees were established in all provinces and the Revolutionary Committees were established in all provinces and the Cultural Revolution seemed to be at an end. These committees (triple alliances) were made up by selected representatives from the Revolutionary Rebels (reeducated Red Guards), Revolutionary cadres (former Party members who had been purged, "remoulded" and, as a result espoused their devotion of Mao), and P.L.A. (People's Liberation Army) representatives. Their purpose was to bring together the contending forces (Party, students and army) and thus create an organization equilibrium that would continue the cultural revolution at the local level but in a totally controlled and non-violent format.

The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese National Communist Party was convened in Peking on April 1, 1969 to formally announce the conclusion of the "successful" Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. A new Constitution of the CCP, adopted by the Ninth Congres contained a statement which justified the Cultural revolution and re-established the priorities for post-1969 China: "It is essential to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity
of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness."17

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been called everything from a power struggle to a civil war. However, what is most impressive to us is the overt attempt to deify Mao Tse-tung during the four year struggle, in a personality cult and, more particularly, the emergence of a Maoist functionary as a religious belief system serving as a basis for the political socialization process during this period. We are concerned here with how the "secular" transcends to or can influence the "sacred." We have described the Cultural Revolution as a political-power-aggressor struggle. Yet the dynamics of this struggle observably influenced the structural-functional characteristics of the Maoist religious belief system. It reinforced the themes of self-sacrifice, martyrdom and personal virtue originated during the period of the Long March and Yenan and, particularly under the auspices of the cult of Mao, introduced new (additional) thematic religious variations to the Maoist religious belief system. We will examine these Cultural Revolution generated thematic variations more closely as we turn our attention here to the structure of the Maoist Religious belief system as it developed during the years 1965-1969.

The Structure of the Maoist Religious Belief System

In our review of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution we identify six themes which were most important in
shaping Maoism as a functioning religious belief system. These are: 1) "Miracles" attributed to Mao during the period. These "miracles" range from Mao's 9 (nine) mile swim of the Yangtze River at age 72 to "secondary healings" such as that of the removal of the "45 Kg. tumor" recounted in Chinese media sources during the period; 2) faith in the power of Mao's thoughts and their ability to give supreme strength to the believer and to reverse natural or man-made calamities; 3) the need to preach (as disciples) Mao's thoughts; and 4) to bring about confession and conversion of non-believers; 5) the necessity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom as a demonstration of belief in Mao's thoughts; and 6) the infallibility of Mao's thoughts and the belief that nothing is impossible. These themes come out of a "secular" context of Mao's interpretations of Marxist revolutionary struggle. Yet, their nature, particularly their functional nature, is, in most cases, "spiritual" or beyond the realm of human capability.

We will look more closely at each of these themes, as well as examining how these themes (and those identified in the previous chapter) fit into the broader functional structure of the Maoist religious belief system. This latter discussion will focus on our three analytical criteria for identifying religious belief systems functionally (eschatology, orientations to life, and religious experiences). However, as we indicated in the previous section, the themes
emanating from the period of the Cultural Revolution are most observable under the auspices of the cult of personality surrounding Mao. We will briefly turn our attention here to an examination of the cult of Mao and its influence or contributions to the "deification" of Mao and consequently the functionally religious character of the Maoist belief system.

The Personality Cult of Mao Tse-tung:

Milton Yinger defines a cult as "the purely personal, non-institutionalized religious experience of a group of people tied together only by common religious emotions and needs." This definition provides a fairly accurate description of the cult of personality of Mao Tse-tung which reached its height during the period of the cultural revolution. We cannot and do not claim that "religious emotions and needs" were the only thread that bound the Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution. Nationalism, cultural traditions, societal norms, and political events (all admittedly secular) functioned similarly during the period. However, what is important here is the cult and its functional significance for an understanding of the socio-political environment of the Cultural Revolution.

Although only vague remnants of the cult remain in post-Mao China today, there is no doubt that it did exist. Mao, himself, in an interview with Edgar Snow, acknowledged
the existence of a cult glorifying his person. Mao is quoted as speculating that "Probably Mr. Khrushchev fell because he had no cult of personality at all." Whether Mao was intimating that Khruschev failed to elicit a "religiously" emotional commitment from his Soviet population or not is not pertinent to our discussion, although such a speculation is plausible and interesting from the analytical level of Chinese perception of the Soviet Union. What is clear and germane to our discussion is the fact that Mao both recognized the existence of a cult of personality surrounding his person and its critical significance in maintaining political efficacy and legitimacy.

The ground was seemingly set for a cult idealizing Mao in the early 1960's, before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution with such publications as Lei Feng's Diary (1963) in which we read:

November 8, 1960
This is a day I shall never forget, the day on which I gloriously joined the great Chinese Communist Party, the fulfillment of my loftiest ideal.
My excited heart could not calm down for a single moment. . . . Our wise Chairman Mao! Only when we have you can we have a new life. When I struggled for my life in the abyss of fire, I hoped for enlightenment. It was you who saved me, who gave me what I eat and what I wear, who sent me to school, who trained me to be worthy of the red emblem. . . .

However, the sentiments expressed in this passage were not shared by Mao's followers, particularly the youth, until 1966, when an official cult of Mao was recognized by those both inside and outside China.
What is important about the cult of Mao during this period is its impact on the masses of Chinese people, during a period of tumult and chaos. The cult seemed to mobilize the masses to accomplish amazing feats in the name of Mao. In addition, as Yinger's definition suggests, it unified Mao's followers in attitude and in spirit. Lucian Pye observes: "On the surface the cult of Mao's personality seemed to be all-pervasive. Everywhere he was being extolled, and the power of his thoughts was associated with all manner of achievements, from the raising of better watermelons to the winning of table tennis matches."\(^{23}\) Another author described the cult of Mao thusly: "to read him (Mao's thoughts) brought illumination, to see him was a joy, to speak to him transfigured one: love for Chairman Mao was deeper than love for one's father and mother...\(^{24}\)

In July, 1966, Mao, whether knowingly or unknowingly significantly contributed to the glorification of his name and allusions to his superhuman powers with a spectacular nine mile swim across the Yangtze River. At 72 years of age, such a feat for a non-professional, non-active swimmer would certainly imply superhuman powers for many traditional animistic and mysticial Chinese population. The swim received extensive press and television coverage, as did the 5,000 Red Guard youth who accompanied Mao to the shores of the Yangtze cheering him on with banners proclaiming him "the only Sun in Our Hearts." Mao, having fallen from the
public eye, while in "retreat" in Wuhan, returned to Peking triumphantly after his swim to lead his forces in the Cultural Revolution. Passages from another diary published in Peking Review in 1968 demonstrate the evolution of the cult two years after the Yangtze swim:

Always think of Chairman Mao, obey him under all circumstances, closely follow him at all times and do everything for his sake. Great as are the heavens and earth, what we owe to Chairman Mao is greater. Dear as are father and mother, Chairman Mao is dearer. Without Chairman Mao I wouldn't be alive today. Without Chairman Mao, there would be no emancipation for all the working people.

It is interesting to note here two separate instances where respect and love for Mao, as a supreme being, was to supersede respect and love for one's parents. This dogma is not alien to that found in Taoist influenced secret societies where brotherhood within the society was to supersede family ties. The sequel to this dogma is also found in most Western Christian religions where one is admonished to respect one's parents but to love God and place this loyalty above all.

At the height of the cult, the religious superhumanness of Mao was further affirmed when thousands of high school and college Red Guard broke into the Roman Catholic Church building in Peking and tore the crucifix from the altar, replacing it with a plaster bust of Mao. From one perspective, this act could be seen as a "secular" iconoclastic (anti-religious) attack on Catholicism by these Red Guard Youth. However, from our perspective, we observe this to be 1) an indication of the intensity of emotion (perception) of
the cult of Mao and 2) an outward display (response) of 
an attempt to "deify"--replace a symbol of one god with a 
symbol of another. From this perspective, the impact as well 
as religious symbolism of the cult of Mao on these youth is 
clear.

The little red book, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-
tung*, also contributed greatly to the cult of Mao during the 
Cultural Revolution years. It was reported that in an 
eleven month period from January to November, 1968, seven 
hundred forty million volumes of the little red book were 
printed and distributed in the Chinese population. The 
book was presented as, and was perceived to contain, the 
ultimate truths and the keys for life. All Chinese were 
expected to read selections daily from the book. In addi-
tion, it was to be referred to and, Mao's instructions fol-
lowed in time of need:

> We must study Chairman Mao's words every day. If 
we miss one day problems will pile up. Let two days 
pass, and we start slipping backwards. Three days 
make it impossible for life. 28

The little red book containing Mao's thoughts seems to 
have been perceived and used as a spiritual and technical 
reference source in all manner of life's problems from 
surgical removal of a tumor to numbing one's senses to the 
continual irritation of inhaling "cow-dung." Further, it 
became the symbolic representation of Mao's spiritual 
infallibility which nurtured the following conviction: 
"... My aim in life is to apply Mao Tse-tung's thought,
and in death, too, I will die for Mao Tse-tung's thought..."30

In its simplest structural form a religious system should, at the very least, consist of, a doctrine or set of principles which address eschatological matters and provide orientations to life, have a following or group of believers who place their faith in the truth and legitimacy of the doctrine, and commit themselves to the ultimacy of the belief system. That is to say, without believers there can be no belief system, or, as observed by Carl Gustav Jung, religiousness is a "peculiar attitude of the human mind."31 We might expand on Jung's observation by saying that the peculiar attitude takes man beyond the realm of himself and yet, in some way, attempts to define and conceptualize humanity. During the period of the Cultural Revolution in China there is an observable religious belief system emerging and cult of believers surrounding the person of Mao, as indicated above.

Although we have focused much of our attention on the structural elements of a Maoist religious belief system, we feel it useful here to momentarily examine the content of the Maoist Religious belief system, particularly vis-a-vis an expanded discussion of the themes we have identified above within the framework of the Maoist religious belief system and, secondarily the identification criteria introduced in our initial focus on the term religious.
The Content of the Maoist Religious Belief System During the Cultural Revolution

As we have indicated at various points previously, the thematic content of the Maoist religious belief system was influenced or determined by the contexts of the evolution of Maoist Chinese communism from at least the period of the Long March to the events leading to and during the Cultural Revolution. A review of these themes will provide a basis for increased understanding of the nature and function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.

Taking into consideration the overlap found in the thematic variations introduced above, we have arrived at a final count of five thematic categories found in the Maoist religious belief system, which incorporate all the themes mentioned in this and the previous chapter. We will briefly explore each of these categories below.

Theme One: Miracles

We use the term miracles here to mean superhuman acts or events which go beyond the realm of current scientific knowledge and logic and which can be performed only by divine figures or under the auspices of a divinity.

Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese media was inundated with personal accounts of people who had experienced or observed "miracles" attributable to Mao or, more frequently his thoughts or images. These media
accounts furthered the cult of Mao significantly. As an example of the genre of these personal accounts we refer to a New China News Agency (NCNA) report, published in 1969, in which we read where a worker in a farm tools plant suffered an injury which severed his right arm near the shoulder. The amputated section of right arm was additionally severed in two sections only held together by fragments of skin. The worker was rushed to the hospital where surgeons were "determined to rejoin his severed arm and restore its functions by relying on invincible Mao Tse-tung thought." In the media account of the surgery, the first operation joining the upper arm section to the shoulder proceeded well. However, the forearm sections presented a problem. The sections had remained in an "unreviewed" state for eight hours, two hours longer than Chinese medical sources indicated as critical for successful reviving and rejoining of severed limbs. The surgery team proceeded reportedly asserting that "men armed with Mao Tse-tung thought can work miracles." The worker's arm was successfully restored such that five months later, after therapy again directed by Mao Tse-tung thoughts, he wrote with his restored arm "Chairman Mao has given me a second right hand."

It is apparent that by media accounts such as the one cited above, Mao Tse-tung and his thoughts were elevated to a position above the realm of man. The references to the "miracle" of the surgery, explicitly by the surgery team and
implicitly by the worker, indicates perceptions of Mao as a suprahuman, divine being.

**Theme Two: Faith (in the Power and Infallibility of Mao Tse-tung Thought)**

In the author's opinion, faith is a complex, multi-dimensional concept. Its definition—an unquestioning belief in the existence of and power of the "unknown," the "sacred" or the "suprahuman"—is founded in religious thinking. Yet, one cannot simply offer such a description without including a focus on the function of faith as an interpretative connector between the believer and the believed. By interpretive connector we mean a link which is predetermined, and therefore biased by man's perceptions of the unknown, sacred or divine and through which all of man's information and feeling about the divine are passed. Within this function is implied a loyalty and trust granted uncompromisingly once belief has been established. There is also an observable feeling of invincibility generated by the believer's faith in the power of the unknown, divine force.

Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution we observe a faith in the power and infallibility of Mao Tse-tung thought which is unquestioning and uncompromising. We also observe in the "believers" a feeling of invincibility when armed with Mao Tse-tung thought. Again, we find instances of this theme throughout the official media releases during the period. For example, a 1966 NCNA article which attributes the invincibility
of the Chinese table tennis team to an application of Mao Tse-tung thought to their match competitions. And throughout 1969 reports flourished citing how faith in Mao Tse-tung thoughts brought bumper crops, conquered cancer, protected capsized fishermen from a raging storm and so on. In all instances, victories or successes are attributed to the power of Mao Tse-tung thought. One is reminded of the popularized Taoist belief in magic found in traditional China. The next three thematic categories establish who the Maoist believers are and how they live their lives in accordance with the Maoist religious belief system.

**Theme Three: The Virtuous Life of a Maoist**

As we have seen previously, the true Maoist was expected to lead an exemplary life which would serve as a model for "would be" Maoists. Again we find a continuity from traditional China where the Confucian ethic demanded that one live one's life as a model for others to emulate. The specific thematic virtues (most of which were founded in the military context of the origins of the Maoist religious belief system as we introduced in the previous chapter) are 1) frugality; 2) perseverance; 3) diligence; 4) humility; 5) brotherly (class) love; 6) ministerial vocation; and 7) selflessness. Also included in the Maoist virtuous life style were the themes of self-criticism and confession and, most important of all, the themes, self-sacrifice and martyrdom. These latter themes
will be addressed further on as separate thematic categories.

On the surface, these virtues do not appear to be "religious" as such. However, that same could be said of the virtues typifying good Christian living. The similarities between the two virtuous life styles (Maoist and Christian) should be apparent to the reader. What in fact makes each of these virtuous life styles religious rather than ethical social codes, is that in each case the virtuous life style is expected to somehow link the believer to his perception of the "unknown" or "sacred." In the Christian context, a virtuous life style emulates Christ's life and allows the Christian to identify with the Christ/God figure. This life style is rewarded by the believer joining God in heaven after death. In the Maoist context, a virtuous life links one with the thoughts of Mao (which as we have previously established were perceived as "suprahuman" with powers outside the realm of man's capabilities) and identifies one as a follower of Mao. Further, the Maoist virtuous life style made on a contributor to the eventual "ultimacy" of Mao's Great Harmony, a state which, though admittedly secular, envisions a heaven-like equilibrium and tranquility on earth. What we are saying then is that the sub-themes within the virtuous life style of the Maoist religious belief system are religious in that there is a perceived link with the "sacred" Maoist thoughts, and as we can see below, with Mao himself. We cite as an example of the themes within this category an account published
in NCNA of a committee member who, after one late evening meeting, was offered a ride to his home so that he could rest for the following day's manual labor he would perform. Refusing the ride, he said, "Chairman Mao wore straw sandals when he led the people of the Chingkang Mountains in crossing mountains and rivers (the Long March) to make revolution. Following Chairman Mao, we should travel on foot to break a path and create a Red new world." In this passage we find the virtues of frugality, diligence and humility and indications that there is a perceived link with the mental image of Chairman Mao on the Long March.

We have seen earlier in this chapter how the Red Guard youths during the Cultural Revolution, perceiving themselves as Mao's disciples, scoured China preaching the thoughts of Mao. This theme of ministerial vocation had its roots in Yenan and flowered during the period of the Cultural Revolution. In addition to the activities of the Red Guard, all true Maoists were expected to "preach" the teachings and thoughts of Mao at every opportunity. Again in the media we see where nine year olders were sent into the fields to recite Mao's thoughts to the farm laborers. In addition we hear stories of "story tellers" who create revolutionary stories based on their "ardent love for Chairman Mao, (and) Mao Tse-tung thought and travel throughout China proselytizing Maoism. One such preacher/storyteller reported that he had
"told revolutionary stories on some 820 occasions within a few months to a total of more than 180,000 people." One can ask how does "storytelling" enter the realm of the religious and sacred. In the case of the "storytellers" during the Cultural Revolution, the source for the stories was Mao Tse-tung thought which, as we have established at various points now throughout this chapter, as a direct result of the cult of Mao, was perceived as suprahuman, invincible, miraculous and therefore, we maintain, "sacred" or "religious." Therefore the "storytellers" though "secular" performed the religious function of a preacher. Our next thematic category explores some of what the "storyteller/preacher" and the Red Guard "disciples" preached in their "missionary"activities during the Cultural Revolution.

**Theme Four: Confession and Conversion**

The themes of confession and conversion were perhaps the most pronounced of all the themes emerging from the period of the Cultural Revolution. The term confession, where applied to a religious context, can be defined as either a profession of faith or an admission of guilt, sin, or wrongdoing. During the Cultural Revolution, self-criticism functioned synonomously primarily with the latter understanding of confession, although, in some cases, the self-criticism included or was followed by a profession of faith in the thoughts of Mao. Most illustrative of the nature and function of self-
criticism as a confession of wrongdoing was an article published in Peking Review in 1968 at the height of the Cultural Revolution. We read of a young woman who describes self-criticism sessions conducted by her family and the impact of these sessions on the individual. She first confesses her wrongdoing (being inconsiderable and selfish in not participating in household chores to help her mother-in-law):

Mother, I really have been doing too little housework. I knew you were annoyed, but I thought . . . I've been working in the daytime and going to meetings or doing propaganda work at night. I get all tired out, but when I come back I have to face your unhappy looks. Sometimes, I thought: We might as well call it quits. . . . Of course, this way of thinking was wrong. Chairman Mao teaches us . . . "UTTER DEVOTION TO OTHERS WITHOUT ANY THOUGHTS OF SELF." But I didn't do that . . . I thought of myself before thinking of others. 41

The article continues with similar self-criticisms by other family members. The article then concludes with the young woman's assessment of the experience of a self-criticism session:

This is an instance of how my family regularly airs thoughts of self-interest and fights against them. Sometimes such revelations and criticisms make one blush with shame. I think this is what is called touching one's soul. 42

Initially, this account of a self-criticism session does not remind one of a religious confession. However, when the young woman admits that this wrongdoing is contrary to the teachings of Mao and then likens the session to "touching one's soul" the session leaves the realm of the secular and must be regarded as an experience of "religious" confession.
The theme of conversion can be treated similarly. The "re-education" of purged anti-Maoists can easily be likened to the "religious" conversion to a faithful believer. Although, the concept of "re-education" as it was applied during the Cultural Revolution might be regarded as a type of "brainwashing" in the sense that the person being "re-educated" had to relinquish old loyalty-trust patterns that were seen as traditional or bourgeois, the re-educated person had to espouse Maoism with the total commitment of any religious convert.

Theme Five: Suffering, Self-Sacrifice and Martyrdom

This final thematic category was perhaps the most critical underlying current of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution. As we introduced in the previous chapter, the military context of the Long March and Yenan necessitated a commitment to suffering, self-sacrifice and martyrdom by Mao's followers in order to move toward military victory over the KMT and the Japanese forces. When the Maoist religious belief system emerged during the Cultural Revolution these themes were not only still evident but seemed to rest at the core of Maoist thought. Mao continually stressed the importance of continuous struggle and revolutionary change in the progression toward the true Maoist state. The primary functional role of the Maoist religious belief system was to facilitate and instill this commitment to struggle at the popular level. To be a good Maoist was to suffer. To be a
good Maoist was to self-sacrifice. To be a good Maoist was to die for Maoism and the people. Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese media was inundated with accounts of martyred heroes who willingly laid down their lives—not necessarily in the grandeur of battle but on a commune while trying to save three of twenty-nine sheep buried in a cave by torrential rain or in floodwaters from the Shuang River while trying to save state materials. We read of four such martyrs:

... Four of our comrades-in-arms gloriously gave their lives in the struggle against the almost non-stop series of rock-falls. In the blood-stained pocket of hero Lin Kuo-lu, inside a copy of Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung was a piece of paper—inserted as a bookmark—before the chapter "Dare to Struggle and Dare to Win." ... written on the paper were the words: "THE SACRIFICE OF THE FEW IS THE COST OF HAPPINESS FOR THE MANY." These moving words voiced the common feeling deep in the hearts of all the martyrs who were determined to live and die for the people.

Articles such as the one cited above indicate the significance and emphasis placed on martyrdom. However, most significant is the inference of the inspirational influence of the thoughts of Mao on the martyr. There are no explicit references to the religious or sacred in this martyr's account yet the innuendo is there. One is reminded of the Christian martyr clutching the Bible as he unflinchingly meets his death. Clearly this view is from a Western perspective. But, from the Chinese perspective if one recalls the "spiritual," "superhuman," "mystical" quality given Mao's thoughts, particularly during
the Cultural Revolution the notion of "religiosity" is there. All of the themes discussed above constitute the content of the Maoist religious belief system. As can be seen some themes are more "religious" in nature than others which are perhaps at some level more philosophical or secular. However, brought together in a doctrine of thoughts which are perceived to have powers beyond man's capabilities (e.g., in defying medical laws, etc.) these themes seem to constitute a system of religious beliefs. This "religiosity" of the Maoist belief system will become even more apparent as we further examine the belief system in terms of our functional criteria introduced earlier.

Functional Criteria and the Maoist Religious Belief System

We have identified thematic categories and specific themes which we see as prevalent in the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution. Now we must briefly examine how these themes fit our functional criteria for identifying a religious belief system. In content there is a "religiousness" to them. But we are more concerned here with the extent to which they function "as a religion" societally.

Criterion One: Eschatological Questions

Eschatology has been defined as the "views which men (hold) regarding the future, including such matters as the state of the individual after life (or the meaning of death), . . .
the end of the world; and the new heaven and new earth which are expected to follow." The Maoist religious belief system places much emphasis on these ultimate, eschatological questions. With regard to the future, Maoism prophesies a future of "incomparable brightness and splendor"—a "supreme ideal" in this word, a "heavenlike" socialist state where "the Great Harmony" prevails. We read in the little red book:

The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this is an objective law independent of man's will.

That the eventual ultimacy of the socialist state is "independent of man's will" places it above the realm of man with inferences to objective laws (of nature) which are controlled both in traditional Chinese religious thinking (Taoism) and some Western religious thinking by a suprahuman (Heaven) power. Socialism, with its egalitarianism, classless, unbiased brotherly love, etc., is a new Heaven of sorts, though on earth. It is a secular concept which has religious overtones.

Functionally, it facilitates political learning of political participation in national development, to infer that the entire nation can be transformed into a Heaven on earth. It instills a "religious" response on the part of the population to achieve that ultimacy—a commitment to the death. The theme of suffering, self-sacrifice and martyrdom is important here. To achieve the ultimacy of the socialist state suffering and martyrdom is needed and expected. As we mentioned earlier, Mao foresaw the need for continual
revolutionary struggle in order to achieve socialism. Revolutionary struggle means suffering, self-sacrifice and death. Through the thoughts of Mao, particularly two of the three "constantly read articles" (Serve the People and Comrade Bethuen . . .)⁵⁰, the theme that would engender a "religious" response to suffering and death were instilled in the population through their daily reading of the little red book. One could say that at some level, the purpose of the Cultural Revolution (apart from the "secular" power struggles) was to instill a religious commitment in the population to suffering and martyrdom for the sake of Mao's visions of socialism.

Criterion Two: Morals, Values, Orientations to Life

In our use of the terms morals, values and orientations to life, it is important to restate that we recognize a distinction between the philosophical and religious connotations of these terms, particularly, vis-a-vis the concept of a belief system. From both a philosophical and religious viewpoint, morals, values, and orientations to life refer to a set of principles or ethics explaining or addressing the meaning of life in relation to its environment. However, the religious usage differs from its philosophical usage in that religion delimits the connotation to only those morals, values, and orientations to life which are perceived by the individual to prepare him for ultimacy--whether or not his notions of ultimacy incorporate a belief in life after death. In other words, one might conclude that a philosophical query of morals
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asks the question: What is the meaning of good? or Why are some men good and some men bad?; whereas a religious inquiry of morals, on the other hand, would determine that good is anything that brings one closer to one's sacred ultimate (Heaven, socialism, etc.), and that good men are those who seek or strive for the (culturally or societally) accepted ultimate and bad men intentionally do not. The Maoist religious belief system clearly had religious connotations to morals, values, and orientations to life, as we will establish below.

The Maoist religious belief system a priori establishes good/bad on the basis of class. Theoretically, the working class--peasants and workers--automatically accept the socially established ultimate notion of a new socialist state and are striving for or, at the very least, have the untapped potential to strive for it, and are therefore good. In Maoist terminology this notion of good is communicated as social morality. But according to our differentiation between "philosophical" morals and "religious" morals, because good eventually leads to the ultimacy of socialism (almost as a reward), it is "religious."

On the other hand, the class "enemies," the petty-bourgeois, landlord, revisionist, class, do not accept the ultimacy of a socialist state, do not strive for it, and are therefore bad. It should be noted that the class "enemies" during the period of the cultural revolution were not, for the most part, considered incorrigible and could
therefore be converted (another non-secular purpose of the Cultural Revolution!). The morals, values, and orientations to life contained in the Maoist religious belief system were to be applied only within the class group of "believers."

Within this class group, the true Maoist was to exemplify the themes in thematic Category Three: self-denial and selflessness--concern for others rather than self, at all times; love and self-sacrifice (as has been previously mentioned, to the point of death) for one's class brother; modesty and humility--unpretentiousness about one's accomplishments or abilities; frugality--voluntary thrift and prudence in one's lifestyle; hard work and diligence--willingly pushing oneself to one's limit and beyond to accomplish a task for the benefit of the class; and finally, the notion of exemplary life--that is, if everyone lives according to the orientations to live established by the Maoist Religious belief system, the society will be good. We see examples of or references to these situations to life throughout the communication media of the Cultural Revolution period, and most particularly in the little red book. From reports of a radio broadcast in 1969 we read:

... On 17 May 1968 Comrade Hsieh Chen-hsin, aware of the dangers of an electric shock, saved the life of commune member Li Chi-min by absorbing the shock himself. Sacrificing himself, he rescued his class brother and also saved other poor and lower-middle peasants from death. He fulfilled his iron-clad oath always to be loyal to Chairman Mao and to fear no difficulties or sacrifices in making revolution.52

... After being assigned the task of treating (the patient blinded by cataracts), Chen Chi-chin searched
through data on acupuncture but could find no example of a cataract being removed. Spurred on by the desire to rid his class brother of his anguish, he was determined to blaze a trail. . . . Standing in front of a mirror, he experimented on his own eyes. He inserted the needle between a depth of five fen, the limit set by books on acupuncture.

As he was doing this, he felt that he might go blind. But this teaching of Chairman Mao's instantly came to mind: "Countless revolutionary martyrs have laid down their lives in the interests of the people, and our hearts are filled with pain as we, the living, think of them--can there be any personal interest, then, that we would not sacrifice. . . ."

He thought of Doctor Bethune, a foreigner who gave his life for the liberation of the Chinese people. Why, he asked himself, could he not sacrifice one of his eyes for a class brother? He made up his mind that even if it cost him his own sight he would restore the patient's eyesight.53

From Quotations, we read:

We should be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese People heart and soul. . . .54

The principle of diligence and frugality should be observed in everything. . . . We must not take a short view and indulge in wastefulness and extravagance.55

These orientations to life found in the Maoist Religious Belief System of the mid-1960's bear close resemblance to orientations to life found in many Christian religious belief systems. For example, the notions of brotherly love and self-sacrifice found in Roman Catholic and Protestant teachings; and the notions of frugality espoused by Quaker sects. We do not draw attention to these similarities here to infer any content comparisons between Maoism and western Christian religions. Rather, we intend only to further illustrate the "religiousness" of the Maoist belief system in understandable terms. What is
even more interesting to note is that the Maoist religious belief system seems to be a continuation and a symbiotic union of the vying religious traditions of China's past, examined in Chapter Two. We will address this notion in detail further on in this chapter.

Criterion Three Religious Experiences

Our final criterion for identifying a religious belief system had to do with the generation of what could be recognized as religious experiences. We identify this to be the most problematic of our criteria in that experience is a personal phenomenon that is not easily observable or reliably interpreted. An individual's experiences are his own emotional or non-emotional encounters, encompassing all ranges of intangible feelings, with the state of living or with sheer existence itself. An individual's religious experiences, as James and Wach56 also conclude, are totally emotional, intangible and not easily identifiable without direct query of the individual. As we are not in the position to interview a statistically significant sampling of the Chinese population about the Cultural Revolution to ascertain the extent or nature of religious experience, our discussion here, although based on written and broadcast accounts of personal experience during this period should be regarded as interpretive and speculative. Nonetheless, we do not feel such interpretations decrease the validity of our criteria or undermine the thrust of our argument, vis-a-vis the Maoist religious belief system, as we
can clearly make a quantitative as well as a qualitative state-
ment about the nature of events which had the flavor of relig-
ious experience.

As delineated in our distinction between the notions of
philosophical versus religious with respect to orientations to
life, when we refer to the concept "religious" relative to a
Maoist religious belief system, we refer to a belief that
ideas, actions, values, etc. are related to the ultimate--
that which is beyond man's point of comprehension or control.
In like fashion, in our inquiry into the nature of a religious
experience, our interpretation of the term "religious" will
remain the same. In addition to the notion of a religious ex-
perience as a total emotional response within the framework
of an institutionalized religion, a religious experience can
also be any total emotional encounter--with the state of
living--in which the individual is concerned, in some way,
with the ultimate. This concern can be recognized by expres-
sions of intense feeling associated with either an encounter
with or a reflection about the Ultimate. In the height of
the cult of Mao during the period of the Cultural Revolution,
we find numerous expressions of what can be identified as
religious experiences associated with encounters with the
person of Mao, his thoughts, or his picture.

In a Peking Review article published in 1967 we read:

. . . Mai Hsien-teh was unconscious or semi-conscious
for quite a long time after being admitted to hospital.
. . . The nurse tested his reactions by showing him a
pictorial magazine. As she turned over the pages she noticed his lips quivering. His eyes were concentrated on a picture of Chairman Mao. With great effort he managed to raise his left hand, which had remained useless since his admission to hospital, and with trembling fingers he touched the picture. . . .

He suddenly exclaimed "Chairman Mao!" It was the first time since he had been in the hospital that he had spoken so clearly.

The image of the great Chairman Mao and his brilliant thought roused Mai Hsien-teh from his stupor. He became fully conscious and was able to think clearly. 57

We will not attempt to ascertain whether the above account constituted a miracle cure or a faith healing either of which fall well within the range of a religious experience. What is important is the experiential response to the image of Mao—that seeing Mao's picture brought about a revival where medicine inferredly could not.

In yet another article published in 1969 we read:

... When he looked up at Chairman Mao's portrait on the wall, he called to mind Chairman Mao's teachings ... and became even more determined. Though he had never heard of such a disease, he recalled his experience during paralysis and inserted a needle into Chang Li-chung's right leg three times. Immediately, the patient could move his leg. ... Chen inserted the needle three times into Chang's left leg. He then told the patient: "Old Chang! Try to stand up and take a few steps." With the help of two others supporting him on each side, Chang Li-chung stood up and took two steps forward. Grasping young Chen's hands and with tears rolling down his cheeks, the veteran miner looked up at Chairman Mao's portrait and shouted over and over: 'Long live Chairman Mao!'. . . .58

And finally, as recounted in a Peking Radio Broadcast:

... Mai A-chi led the whole family to stand before the portrait of Chairman Mao and made the following solemn vow: "There are a thousand and one requirements, but the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung thought is the primary requirement; there may be a thousand and one changes, but the Red hearts devoted to Chairman Mao will never change. . . .59
Tillich tells us that religious experience motivates a will to believe. In the case of Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution, we find Tillich's conclusions especially applicable. Religious experiences initiated by encounters with Mao, his image or thoughts reinforced the symbolism of the Maoist religious belief system and served to maintain intense emotional fervor throughout the Cultural Revolution—an element Hoffer asserts is critical in a successful revolution. We will discuss this thought further in Part II of this work. We will now first turn our attention to a discussion of the place of the Maoist religious belief system within the broader historical structure of Chinese political culture. We will then conclude this chapter with an initial look at the structural functional role of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.

The Continuity of Chinese Political Culture in the Maoist Religious Belief System

In the previous section, we discussed the thematic content of the Maoist religious belief system based on our identification criteria. In addition to the themes cited above we find in the Maoist religious belief system a basic belief that the individual, though intrinsically good, always has the potential for evil (bourgeois and revisionism), but that continual "re-education"/conversion and a rigorously modeled society
with set behavior patterns can assume that the individual stays on the "correct path" to socialism, even given the pitfalls of life. The underlying assumption of the Maoist religious belief system is that the actions, thoughts of individuals, and interactions among individuals in the society make the society. Operationally this assumption means that in order to change the society one must change the individuals in the society. Again we begin to understand the rationale for a turbulent Cultural Revolution designed to struggle, criticize and transform from a Maoist perspective. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, models, both symbolic and real, of the ideal Maoist individual were presented to the population for emulation. Slogans such as "Learn from the P.L.A.," and the care given to create heroes such as those found in the model revolutionary operas, confirm this observation. Yet, contrary to official Maoist claims for a new China, with cultural, social, and political innovations manifest by these above-cited elements, Maoism during the Cultural Revolution, in addition to its evolution of Marxist-Leninist ideology, also appears to be an amalgamation of traditional politico-religious belief systems which had previously contended with each other for influence throughout China's history.

As was discussed in Chapter Two, although one can identify a number of religious and mystical influences in traditional China, there seems to have been a polarization of religious belief systems into two conflicting, yet complementary groups.
On the one hand we have Confucianism--the official belief system--with its system of social ordering of thought and behavior, emulation of models, belief in an intrinsic potential for "good" (i.e., proper living) in the individual--and therefore societally--and its legitimization of political authority through association with an ultimate, superhuman notion of Heaven.

On the other hand, we have the popular mutations of Taoism, as manifest in many religious-based secret societies, with its codes of brotherly love, self-sacrifice to the point of death, diligence and commitment in cause, and, most importantly, its notions of creating a new society after destruction of the decadent old. In both the official and popular religious belief system we find at the basis, the notion of a Harmony--harmony between man and nature and equilibrious harmony in people's interactions with each other. Yet, as concluded earlier, the two religious influences conflicted most in their socio-political notions of the hierarchical ordering of society, while paradoxically complementing each other in their concepts of interpersonal relationships--that is to say, the merging of the Confucian element of respect for authority and the Taoist element of brotherly love regardless of boundary of efficacy.

Within the Maoist religious belief system, as indicated in the previous discussion, the elements of the two contending religious orientations are clearly obvious. Further, Maoism seems to have blended the principal socio-religious components of each belief system such that the historical tensions would not
be manifest in uncontrolled dogmatic clashes between opposing traditional religious groups, each vying for societal supremacy and influence for their religio-political convictions. Without struggling on the tenuous ground of establishing intention or non-intention on the part of Mao or official Maoist policy, it is nonetheless clear that Mao recognized how deeply imbued the Chinese cultural tradition (including reliances on and predispositions to religious custom) was in the Chinese populations—even given the attempts of the May Fourth Movement and contemporary pre- and post-49' communist ideology to sever the cultural limbs with the past. In "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Mao observes:

> It will take a fairly long period of time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. The reason is that the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come from the old society will remain in our country for a long time to come, and so will their class ideology.62

One might therefore assume that during the cultural revolution Maoism selectively combined the useful elements of the traditional contending religious belief systems (omitting the uncontrollable elements of mysticism, sorcery, and the like) thus becoming the official and only religious belief system exercising influence in the political system. What we would have then is not a break with or departure from the traditional Chinese political culture, with its symbiotic relationship between religion and politics, brought about by a cultural revolution; but rather a continuation of the political culture
where the Maoist religious belief system legitimized and nurtured political authority of the pro-Maoist faction during the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution.

One could ask at this point why it is so important to have Maoism functioning as a religious system during the Cultural Revolution rather than functioning solely as a political ideology or nationalist movement, as it functioned during previous struggles. The answer to this query is twofold. The first part is found in the significance Mao placed on the cult of personality when he attributed Khrushchev's fall to the absence of such a cult. Earlier in this chapter we identified the functional association of the cult of Mao with the Maoist religious belief system. The cult was also critical, functionally, to the Maoist religious belief system, and consequently to the maintenance of power and legitimacy of the pro-Maoist faction throughout the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution. It created and projected a superhuman and "spiritual" aura around the person and thoughts of Mao, such that popular encounter with him, his image, or his policies always occurred emotionally, rather than with a combination of emotion and intellect prevalent in modern requirements for political participation. With the fervor and total emotional commitment to a Maoist religious belief system enhanced by the cult of Mao, response to Mao's political directives was not threatened by a rational analysis of facts which might have steered public opinion against Mao and for Liu Shao-chi, or toward pragmatism and "bourgeois
revisionism." This may explain why so much emphasis and attention from the pro-Maoist forces was directed toward the universities and the educational system in general—the modern training ground for rational analysis of facts.

The second part of the answer relates to the chaos and confusion associated with distinguishing the "good guys" from the "bad guys" throughout most of the Cultural Revolution period. As Hinton and others have aptly observed in analyses of the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Mao forces became as "left" and "red" as the pro-Maoist forces in order to purposefully confuse the issues and the "ideological" camps. Fraudulent Red Guard units were set up by the anti-Maoist forces all over China. Their espousal of Maoist Cultural Revolution rhetoric was so convincing, it became increasingly difficult, as the Cultural Revolution progressed, to distinguish the pro-Maoist camp from the anti-Maoist camp—the revolutionaries from the counter-revolutionaries. As Hinton observed:

From the names adopted by various (Red Guard) units, it was impossible to tell which were rebels and which were loyalists (pro-Lin). The General Headquarters of Red Guard from Shanghai Schools and Colleges early pre-empted the field in that city. It supported the status quo. . . . Nationwide organizations with such titles as Red Guard Army, International Red Guards, International Revolutionary Rebel Army, and the May 16th Brigade turned out to be conservative while the Peking Red Guard's Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters, the Red Rebel Regiment of the Harlein Military Engineering Institute, and the ChingKang Mountain Corps of Tsinghua University were radical units which established nationwide liaison centers.64

At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the "good guys" had to be identified by level of commitment, both emotional and
physical. True Maoist had to exude a "Daniel-in-the-lions-den" demeanor in all their actions. The youth were continually called upon, in implicit and explicit Maoist doctrine, to "fight for the faith" and to fight to purge the wrong-doers, the reactionary class enemies—the heretics—and deliver China on the righteous road to Maoist socialism. (One might speculate that the P.L.A. was held back in the initial stages of the cultural revolution so that the Red Guard youth could carry the fight.)

In the little red book, we read: "Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall." And further on we find the admonition:

A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.

With their instructions from the little red book, the compilation of Maoist dogma, the Red Guard youth were inspired to violently uphold the thoughts of Mao to the point of martyrdom. We are reminded here of the religious convictions of the Crusaders and other groups throughout history whose battlecry was legitimized and nurtured by religious dogma.

As a result of observations of the unconfined violent activities and encounters of the Red Guard during the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution, one might safely speculate that the P.L.A. was purposefully held back from physically suppressing the actions of the rampaging youth, so that the
true Maoist Red Guards could demonstrate the extent of their belief in Maoism. However, without making further attempts to substantiate this speculation, it is clear that the Maoist religious belief system facilitated the political socialization process amid the major sociopolitical upheaval of the Cultural Revolution period. We will establish this more fully in the final chapter of this section and throughout Part II of this work.
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES


3 We refer here to the "revolutionary romanticism" defined in Lois Snow, China on Stage, op. cit., p. 36. However, we expand the term beyond her literary usage to include an emotional reaction to the events of the Cultural Revolution on the part of the youth.

4 This point is astutely observed by L. Pye in China: An Introduction, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1972, p. 299.


6 Ibid., p. 82.

7 William Hinton observes that Mao's supporters refer to this period (totalling 50 days) as the "Fifty Days of White Terror."


Prior to August, 1968, whenever Mao had requested (ordered) the P.L.A.'s intervention in Red Guard activities, it was always emphasized that violence or physical suppression be avoided at all costs. The P.L.A. units were to talk to violent, rampaging Red Guards and attempt to educate them about the correct ideological tactics to use against bourgeois and counter-revolutionary elements. This directive for physical suppression represented a major shift in Mao's support of the Red Guard.

*Tai, op. cit.*, p. 59.


By the term "secondary healing" we mean those healings performed by a faithful believer(s) or disciple(s) but attributed to the "spiritual" power of a divine force. For example, those "secondary healings," or "miracles" performed by the disciples of Jesus Christ yet attributed to Jesus' power as recounted throughout the New Testament.

*Yinger, op. cit.*, p. 52.

Most immediate examples surround the posthumous homage paid to Mao, and not coincidently Chou En Lai, before him.


*Excerpt from Lei Teng's Diary (1963).*
23 Pye, op. cit., p. 303.


27 Free China Weekly, February 2, 1969, p. 3.


30 New China News Agency (NCNA), December 6, 1967.


32 New China News Agency (NCNA), November 4, 1969.

33 Ibid.

34 NCNA, August 26, 1966.


36 NCNA, September 14, 1969.

37 NCNA, August 13, 1969.

38 NCNA, June 11, 1969.


41 Peking Review, Number 40, October 4, 1968.

42 Ibid.

43 Peking Radio broadcast, June 28, 1968, op. cit., Urban, p. 84.

45 Peking Review, Number 49, December 1, 1967.


49 Quotations, p. 24.


51 During the Cultural Revolution, most students and all youth categorically were aligned with the working class and, as Mao's initial support of youth Red Guard activities indicated, are also considered good. However, towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, as has been previously discussed, Mao's view of the Red Guard youth movement changed—eventually returning to its selective classism.

52 Urban, op. cit., p. 94.

53 Ibid., p. 96.

54 Quotations, p. 170.

55 Ibid., p. 187.

56 Reference to William James and Wach.


61 We distinguish here between the ubiquitous rebellions and uprisings throughout China's history usually unprevented by official intervention and the officially "controlled" clashes between opposing groups during the Cultural Revolution.

63 We refer here to the pre-'49 civil war periods when the CCP and Chinese communism under the on-again-off-again leadership of Mao strived to establish a communist ideology unique to the Chinese experience and a nationalist surge against Japanese and Western aggression.

64 Hinton, op. cit., pp. 59-60.


66 From "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," March, 1927, Selected Works, Volume 1, p. 28; in Quotations, pp. 11-12.
CHAPTER V

THE FUNCTION OF THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM IN THE
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

... ruling classes do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it, but try to find a
moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the
logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and
beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted. (So
if a society is deeply imbued with the Christian spirit,
the political class will be governed by the will of the
sovereign, who, in turn, will reign because he is God's
anointed ... the Chinese mandarins ruled the state
because they were supposed to be interpreters of the
will of the Son of Heaven, who had received from heaven
the mandate to govern paternally, and in accordance with
the rules of the Confucian ethic, the people of the
hundred families ... 1

In the previous chapters, we have given considerable
attention to identifying and establishing Maoism as a religious
belief system. In this and the remaining chapters, we will focus
on the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the poli-
tical socialization process during the cultural revolution.
In this chapter specifically we wish to accomplish two things.
First, we will discuss the general relationship between the
Maoist religious belief system and political socialization
within the context of functionalist theory. And second, we
will show how various aspects of political socialization were
reinforced and conditioned in particular by the functioning of
the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution.

We have indicated previously that upheaval and chaos created by the Cultural Revolution made acute the need for an efficient and effective political socialization process. From 1965 through 1969, the Chinese population was continually agitated by class struggle, political purges, and internal political ideological struggles as to whether politics or pragmatism should take command. One can attribute the turbulence either to a power struggle within the CCP between Mao and Lin Shao-chi, or to an official attempt to politicize the post-1949 generation of youth to the urgency and continual need for revolutionary class and ideological struggle! In either case, the fact of the matter remains that the Chinese masses were required to totally participate in a political system where factionalism had produced confusing and conflicting interpretations of the correct political attitudes and behavior to be displayed. Whatever the origin and purpose of the Cultural Revolution, success or victory would depend on how well the Chinese masses were politically socialized to hold the correct attitudes and beliefs and how well the standard of correctness was communicated to the population. The Maoists claimed victory at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. From our observations and research, their determining weapon had been a Maoist religious belief system.

A Functional Analysis of the Maoist Religious Belief System

The political system has two very critical objectives to accomplish in order to increase its chance of successful political
socialization. First it must generate a standard for correctness upon which the learning process can be based. And, second, it must have a motivating external stimulus which the individual cannot help but regard as critical to his ego comfort and maintenance. A religious belief system can function to satisfy these two objectives. Specifically, the Maoist religious belief system functioned thusly in the political socialization process throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. We will examine this functional relationship and the political socialization process vis-a-vis political learning in contemporary China in the paragraphs which follow.

Earlier we identified functional analysis as our method of inquiry regarding the relationship of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process. We presented an analytic framework developed by Carl Hempel which modeled the system under study according to the functional inter-relationships of the components of the system. The inherent inferences of Hempel's analytic model are that the proper functioning (accomplishment of role) of a structural component or institution will result in the maintenance of the system. And, further, that a functional analysis is only valid when a direct cause and effect functional relationship can be identified. For example, he illustrates a valid functional statement as follows: "the heartbeat has the effect of circulating the blood, and this ensures the satisfaction of certain conditions (supply of nutrition and removal of wastes) which are necessary for the proper
working of the organism." In this illustration the heartbeat satisfies a "functional requirement" or need which ensures the maintenance of the organism. Inferentially, then, if the heartbeat did not (1) occur or (2) did not circulate the blood, the organism would cease to exist. In the pure sciences, it is perhaps useful and constructive to restrict a functional model to a rigorous cause and effect framework. However, in the social sciences, where behavioral patterns are not predictably consistent or restricted by constant stimuli which always produce the same behavioral response, to say that a functional relationship does not exist because the system does not "work properly" or maintain itself as a direct result of the functioning of one extrapolated component is to deprive the analyst of an analytical tool which could, when applied, contribute significantly to a structural-functional understanding of systemic operations.

From a political science perspective, a functional analysis provides a systematic and rigorous analytical framework either for determining what causes a certain political situation to occur or for establishing the specific role of a given factor in the results of a political event or occurrence. In other words, whether the political system under study "works properly" or not, there are still observable structural functions which can be identified which will contribute to an understanding of how and why the political system works, or does not work. Within the context of this study, we utilize Hempel's model to provide an analytical framework. However, we do not wish to imply that because we can identify a functional relationship between a
Maoist religious belief system and the political socialization process of China, that the Chinese political system necessarily worked properly during the Cultural Revolution. We can illustrate, though, that the Maoist religious belief system did perform a specific function in the political learning process of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution. By incorporating our proposition in the Hempel analytic paradigm introduced in Chapter One, we have:

(1) Political socialization functions adequately during the Cultural Revolution in China only if a standard for correctness upon which political learning (with sanctions, role-models and symbols) exists;

(2) A religious belief system is one item in a class of empirically sufficient conditions for such a standard to exist;

(3) If political socialization functioned adequately during the Cultural Revolution, then a Maoist religious belief system (among other items in the class of necessary conditions) can be observed to be present in the political learning process of political socialization.

Our only inference here is that the political socialization is self-regulating, that is, able to produce the necessary conditions for its continued adequate operation, when political learning occurs. The term adequate does not connote any qualitative assessment of the effectiveness or operational efficiency of the political socialization process, or for that matter of the political system which is conducting the political socialization. More specifically, by concluding that political socialization functioned adequately during the Cultural Revolution in China, we are not intended to imply that the Chinese population
was in fact politically socialized (i.e., had learned) to hold the correct political attitudes and behaviors conceived by the Maoist doctrine. We are only saying that we observe a process of political socialization and, within that process, we observe the Maoist religious belief system operating as one of several possible functional prerequisites (conditions necessary for a unit to come into being) for political learning in political socialization. We are examining a function within a function. That is to say, we are identifying how the Maoist religious belief system functions in the political learning process—function one—thereby contributing to the functioning of political socialization during the cultural revolution—function two. (See Figure 5). The Hempel model is only an analytical tool providing the parameters and systematic rigor for our examination of political learning during the Cultural Revolution. Though it aids in presenting the ideas we wish to express, it does not define or prescribe our conclusions about the Maoist religious belief system.

In applying a functional analysis to a socio-political system or process, it is usually useful to determine whether the function under study is manifest by its operation (that is, intended and recognized) or whether it is latent (that is, unintended or unrecognized, albeit its observable existence). Within the context of this study, this determination can only be reduced to a speculation. As we stated in Chapter I, we do not intend to suggest that Mao or the political leaders during the Cultural Revolution intentionally established Maoism as a religious belief
System: Maoist Religious Belief System
Setting: Maoist China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Prerequisite: The addressing of ultimate eschatological questions of life and death; a set of values, morals, or orientations to life; religious experiences.
Function: To generate a standard for correct political attitudes and behavior in the political learning process.

System: Political Socialization
Setting: Maoist China during the Great Cultural Revolution.
Prerequisite: A standard for correct political attitudes and behavior in the political learning process.
Function: To perpetuate political correctness in the populus

FIGURE 5
THE FUNCTIONAL INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION VIA THE POLITICAL LEARNING PROCESS
However, it is clear that Maoism was intended, at some official level, to facilitate the political learning process in political socialization. The official attempts by Lin Piao to nurture the cult of personality with the publication of The Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung ("little red book") substantiates this observation. So that, at this secondary level, (see Figure 5), we can suggest that the function of political learning in the political socialization process is manifest. With regard to the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political learning process of political socialization, we are also inclined to recognize this function as manifest. Yet, even at the suggestive level, this observation is difficult to substantiate. Nonetheless we feel this observation is plausible and as such deserves further attention here.

Although we cannot substantiate any official intentions to establish a Maoist religious belief system, we observe, as we indicated previously, in the Maoist religious belief system an attempt to integrate the traditional religious belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism into one functionally efficient belief system. As an examination of the content of the Maoist religious belief system suggested in the previous chapter, Maoist doctrine as it can be observed during the Cultural Revolution seemed to be an attempt to officially merge the self-discipline and self-exemplary tendencies of Confucianism with the other directed community self-sacrifice and brotherhood tendencies of Taoism. The true Maoist is required to hold himself as an
example for others to emulate; he is to be totally self-disciplined and proper in all manner of political (and social) thought and behavior. Concurrently he is required to demonstrate total self-sacrifice for the common goal and unbounded class (brotherly) love. As was discussed in Chapter II, these two traditional religious belief systems existed simultaneously but not necessarily symbiotically within the belief structures of Confucian Mandarin and Taoist peasant alike. In the former instance, the Confucian Mandarin strove for the contentment of Taoism. The Taoist influenced peasant, on the other hand, was required to incorporate Confucian virtues in his total lifestyle, paying particular attention to the rules for interpersonal behavior.

Whether or not we can determine the intentions of Mao in establishing a Maoist religious belief system or in specifying the function that the Maoist religious belief system would serve in the political learning process, we can show that the Maoist religious belief system which we observe operating during the Cultural Revolution incorporated Confucian and Taoist morals and virtues. Further we can show that Mao recognized the need to politically socialize the post '49 generation of youth who were not internally motivated to strive for Maoist Communism. Lucian Pye has observed of Mao's commitment to this end: "Until the Chinese Communist system is substantially institutionalized, people will not be automatically inspired by what is taking place, and special effort to indoctrinate each generation in the revolutionary ethic will continue to be needed." Whatever the
official intention, we do observe a Maoist religious belief system functioning as a standard for correctness upon which sanctions, role-models, and symbols--initiators and reinforcements for the political learning process--are based. Let us now present a general view of the political socialization process relative to our analytical framework.

The Role of Political Learning in the Political Socialization Process During the Cultural Revolution

Both political scientists and sociologists alike have ventured to define political socialization. Selectively reviewing these definitions, we find:

the process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the on-going system.\(^5\)

the process through which an individual acquires his own view of the political world... the way in which one generation passes on political standards and beliefs to the succeeding generations.\(^6\)

the process by which individuals acquire the knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to participate as more or less effective members of the society.\(^7\)

From these definitions, we find a consistent understanding of the political socialization process as a learning process whereby the individual acquires the skills and attitudes which allow him to behave within the norm of the political culture. Within the process the distinction has been made between direct and indirect political socialization.\(^8\) The former is a learning situation where the content of what is transmitted is specifically political, thereby producing a political attitude. The latter
differentiation refers to the internalization of values which are not necessarily related to politics but which can subsequently influence the acquisition of analogous values which are political. Whether direct or indirect, the primary purpose of political socialization is to promote legitimization of political power.

Structurally the political socialization process can be broken down into four major components: (1) the learning process—how learning takes place and the principles of the process; (2) the teaching process—who teaches (agents) or communicates (institutions) what is to be learned and how to communicate it; (3) the lesson—what is taught, that is the nature of the political culture which is being transmitted; and (4) the impact or value of the process—the resulting political behavior and attitudes of the population.

Until recently, political scientists have been more concerned with the last three components leaving the study of how learning takes place in the political socialization process to the social-psychologists. However, many political scientists now recognize that no analysis of the political socialization process can be considered complete without understanding how political learning occurs. Though not exclusively, it is this aspect of the political socialization process that we emphasize here. Our primary intent is to selectively illustrate how the Chinese population learned correct political attitudes and behaviors during the Cultural Revolution and to describe the role the Maoist religious belief system played in this process.
Learning theorists define learning as the "establishment of a connection or association between a stimulus and a response where, prior to learning, no such association existed." They indicate that learning must be preceded by motivation whether internally (personal stimulation to learn to acquire or maintain comfort of ego relative to one's environment) or externally (coercion or external pressure which presuades or focus the individual to learn in order to acquire or maintain ego comfort relative to this environment). Learning theory further stipulates that learning can occur with stimulus-response or through identification and imitation; and that learning is a cumulative process, whereby stimulus response associations are usually transferred from one situation to another, finally being internalized by the individual to become his frame of reference from which attitudes are formed.

Within a political science framework, Richard Merleman, integrating learning theory with the theory of cognitive dissonance, has categorized this learning process into a six stage sequence where: (1) un-conditioned reinforcement is provided by the political regime through means of a stimulus which results in a positive gain for the population with their compliance; (2) the political regime then associates itself with the unconditioned stimulus which evoke positive behavior patterns within the population, thus resulting in classical conditioning; (3) the political regime, its association with unconditioned stimuli firmly imbedeed in the minds of the population, reduces its use
of the positive material gain associated with the unconditioned stimulus resulting in intermittent reinforcement; (4) the political regime then presents another stimulus (the demand for a new behavior sequence) to the population assuring that a compliant response to the new stimulus will produce the institutional processes symbolizing the unconditioned reinforcement, thus creating a secondary reinforcement to the initial stimulus; (5) the population now receiving only the symbols of the material gains of compliance (to maintain cognitive equilibrium and rationalize responses to contradictory stimuli) automatically reduces the cognitive dissonance between gaining primarily symbolic rewards (with infrequent material gain) on the one hand, and having to learn new behavior sequences on the other; the population then converts this positive affect toward government in general into a grant of legitimacy for the political regime; and finally (6) the political regime having been granted its legitimacy by the population begins to signify governmental processes which provide secondary reinforcement by an elaboration of a series of condensed symbols which stand for these purposes. (See Figure 6.) The decisiveness of an effective use of symbols and symbolism is nowhere else more apparent than from the above cited paradigm.

Merleman's model also provides us with another key factor in the understanding of the political socialization process—the notion of legitimacy. From a learning theory perspective, the purpose of political socialization is two-fold. On the
Political Regime | Population Masses
---|---
(1) Unconditioned stimulus to population | Positive population gains with compliance
(2) Political regime associates itself with unconditioned stimulus | Positive behavior patterns evoked
(3) Reduction in material gains to population | Positive behavior pattern firmly imbedded in population
(4) Political regime demands a new behavior sequence to symbolize the initial unconditioned reinforcement | Cognitive dissonance generated between gaining primarily symbolic rewards and learning new behavior pattern
(5) Political regime continues secondary reinforcement | Population reduces cognitive dissonance through compliance
(6) Political regime generates condensed symbols providing secondary reinforcement of government processes | Population grants political regime legitimacy with each compliance to new secondary reinforcement

**FIGURE 6**

**MERLEMAN'S MODEL OF THE POLITICAL LEARNING PROCESS**
one hand the political socialization process, as we have previously indicated, should convey to the population the norms for correct political attitudes and behavior based on the political culture. However, on the other hand, the political socialization process should also result in the legitimacy of the authority and power of the political systems. In other words, if the pupil learns well and therefore carries with him the skills and disposition to achieve socially, then there is a strong tendency for the pupil to regard the teacher and the teaching methods as legitimate. Legitimacy provides a quality of "oughtness" to the learning process no matter what the methods of the process. And, as Merleman suggests, legitimacy can be manipulated by the political system, by control of the learning process, particularly at the initial stages of stimulus-response. We will be identifying evidence to further this suggestion throughout the remainder of this work.

We have devised our own sequentially staged paradigm of political learning. Our model differs from or perhaps expands Merleman's, in that we recognize the learning process in political socialization to be cyclical (once initiated) and, therefore, self-perpetuating, as well as self-reinforcing. The cyclical nature of the process does not necessarily result in a stagnation or eventual inhibition of the learning process. Rather it is delineated solely by the cumulative boundaries of the political culture. Our four staged model for political learning proceeds thusly:
Stage One: External Motivation

The members of the population receive external stimulation from the political system, or agents of the political system, which motivates them to learn about and acquire skills to participate in the political system so that they may acquire or maintain ego comfort relative to the political environment. The stimulation most apt to promote ego comfort for child or adult (or immigrating alien) alike is identity—a sense of belonging to the greater whole. The agents of the political system (family, school, peer group) indicate that, to gain identity and maintain it, the individual must participate in the political system. For example, a child, although automatically an American citizen if born in this country, is externally motivated to learn how to participate in the political system in order to maintain the system, thereby maintaining his or her 'Americanness.'

During the Cultural Revolution in China political socialization, though aimed at the entire population, was primarily directed at the post-'49 generation of youth. This latter group was to be taught what it meant to be a Maoist revolutionary, why it was politically socially and morally crucial to be "red" first and "expert" second. Concurrently, this generation of youth were to learn "correct" political attitudes and behavior. The external stimulation this generation received
was the message and initiative to engage in "continuous revolution." To do so was to be identified as a Maoist and to be recognized as a contributor to the Maoist interpretation of ultimate Marxist-Leninist communism. This identity stimulus even transcended the realm of party membership. In fact, throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution, the "true-Maoists" youth were directed on a seek-out-and-destroy mission to rid the Party of anti-Maoist, revisionist, bourgeois. The group of true Maoists--the Red Guard--was placed above the highest political (secular) power group.

One has to assume that identification as a true Maoist Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution was coveted, particularly among the youth. Membership in this group gave one (at least temporarily) a chance to supersede authority.\(^\text{11}\) (Maoism functioned as a mandate.) Whether one chooses to regard this mandate as emanating from Heaven or from Mao, the notion of divine mission to expunge corruption in authority is observably present. From this perspective, Maoism can be regarded as functioning much the same way as Taoism functioned in its "sacred" legitimization of dissent. In contemporary--Cultural Revolution--China this mandate was a stimulus from the Maoist faction of the political system to learn "correct" Maoism at both attitudinal and participatory levels so as to "save"/maintain the Chinese political system, and thereby "save"/maintain one's (Maoist-defined) Chineseness.
Stage Two: Stimulus Response Controlled Learning

During this stage, the political system and its agents in the political socialization process control the learning of individuals by monitoring and channeling the stimulus-response activities of the individual into correct political attitudes and behavior. The political system exercises its control through two types of stimulus-response reinforcements—sanctions and role models.

Type One: Sanctions. The individual receives the external stimulation. Then the political system or its agents monitor and dictate the responses with sanctions which reward a correct response and punish an incorrect response. The type and degree of sanctions used depends very much upon the ideological type, stage of development, and perhaps sovereign security of the political system. For example, in a democratic, developed political system, where territorial boundaries and an independent national identity are firmly established, citizens may be stimulated to participate in an electoral process by voting. If the individual responds correctly and votes, his identity with the political system is affirmed or reaffirmed; and he is told he has the added benefit of placing someone in political office who shares his views and will look out for his wellbeing. If, on the other hand, the individual responds incorrectly and does not vote, his identity with the political system may be weakened by statements such as "non-voters cause the system to fail." This would mean a potential loss of the source of his
identity; and he may suffer the consequences of having someone in a political office who is not attentive to his wellbeing. In a developing country where national sovereignty has not been firmly established, and the population is subject to identity crises between socio-political traditions and modernity, the sanctions employed by the struggling political system, particularly by those which discourage incorrect responses, may be more severe. Utilizing the same example from above, the voter in the developing country may receive similar reward sanctions as the voter in the developed country. But the non-voter in the developing country risks social and political ostracization, loss of all other social and political material benefits, and perhaps even death by his negative response.

Within the specific context of our study, the sanctions determining stimulus-response learning during the Cultural Revolution were clearly delineated. To exhibit "correct" Maoist attitudes and behavior was to maintain identity and therefore ego comfort and, at a more militarily based level, to be the "attacker" rather than the "attacked." On the other hand, to exhibit "incorrect" anti-Maoist attitudes and behavior was to be ostracized, "purged" and subjected to "re-education" which also meant a loss of social and political material benefits. All of the above negative sanctions were, from the Chinese perspective, external indications of a "loss-of-face" which traditionally was the worst fate one could suffer.

The problem, during the Cultural Revolution, was not
one of delineating sanctions. Rather, it was establishing "correctness." As we observed earlier, the basis of conflict during the Cultural Revolution, at one level, centered around which political strategem (for development), attitudes and behavior were to be considered "correct." Lin Shao-chi and his supporters claimed to represent political correctness just as Mao and his supporters did. Presumably, the solution for the pro-Maoists was to elevate Maoist political strategy beyond the realm of secular politics to the transcendental. To be politically correct, from the Maoist perspective, was to have a "soul." The sanctions then corresponded to this transcendental status for correctness. For the Red Guard and other Maoist supporters, political correctness was synonymous with, among other things, declaring faith that the power of Mao's thoughts could overcome natural calamity, human weaknesses, political enemies and the like. To share and live this belief was to be accepted into the "fold"--to identify as a Red Guard, a Maoist. To deny this faith was to be denied identity and to risk partaking in the ultimate Maoist state of "Great Harmony."

Type Two: Role Models. Various role-models representing correct political behavior and attitudes are selected by the political system to reinforce proper political stimulus-response learning patterns. Individuals learn correct political behavior and attitudes by initiating the thoughts and actions of the role-models, in their responses to stimulation from the political
system. Various studies\textsuperscript{13} examining political socialization have concluded, for example, that attitudes toward voting and voting behavior are learned from role-models in the family or peer group. Role models, though usually positive and identified as heroes by the political system, can also be representative of the results of incorrect response to the political system. Publicized political traitors exemplify this latter category of role-model and have been used as negative reinforcements for correct political behavior throughout history.

Role-models were critical in the political learning process during the Cultural Revolution. The Maoists took great care in establishing heroes who demonstrated political correctness. We shall see evidence of this case in our discussion of the significance of certain main characters in the model revolutionary operas in the chapters which follow.

Stage Three: Automatic Learning/Symbolism

At this stage of the political learning process the individual begins to automatically transfer previously controlled, stimulus-response associations from one situation to another. This process has also been referred to as generalization and discrimination in sociological theory. Up until now, the individual whether child or adult, has been motivated by the political system to learn about politics, and how to participate in politics, in order to gain or further a sense of identity. The individual then began to learn, through control of his
stimulus-response pattern either with sanctions or through imitation of role-models, the advantages of positive response and disadvantages of negative response to stimuli from the political system. The resultant effect is the establishment and reinforcement of correct political attitudes and behavior. Now the individual is able to understand and relate to abstract conceptualizations (symbols) of correct political thinking and behavior generated by the political system, and automatically reacts to the symbols with the "correct" response. From this point on, political learning need be only peripherally controlled by the political system through the use of symbols.

We could argue that automatic learning was achieved, particularly with the generation of Red Guards, in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution. The events however of the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution indicate that if achieved the automatic learning was confused and perhaps temporary.

Initially, in June, 1966 when Mao indicated his approval of Red Guard attitudes and behavior by donning their symbol—a red arm band—it appeared that Mao had given free rein to Red Guard activities with peripheral control\(^{14}\) by the Maoist faction in the political system. One might argue that Mao's demonstration of support of the Red Guard was intentionally premature—providing a trust they could live up to. It is just as likely that Mao was pleased with the level of "learned" political correctness evidenced by Red Guard activities in
the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and, as a consequence, gave them his support.

However, as we have also seen in the previous chapter, Mao's support was short-lived. By late 1967-early 1968 the activities of the Red Guard youth indicated a problem with how they interpreted the symbols generated by Mao and his supporters. They had difficulty discriminating between correct and incorrect, Maoist and anti-Maoist. To compensate they became, what might be called 'Fundamentalist' Maoists. They interpreted Maoism to its extreme and violently purged anyone who demonstrated (or who they perceived to have demonstrated) behavior or attitudes below this extreme standard. It was clear by Mao's denunciations of the Red Guard in 1968 that even Mao himself did not intend or desire that Maoism be so violently crusaded in China.

The uncontrollable violence and Fundamentalism of the Red Guard can be explained. Without denying an alternative explanation that perhaps the Red Guard youth suffered from adolescent (delinquent) frustrations, we prefer the explanation that Maoism in its functioning as a religious belief system instilled in the youth an irrationalism associated with the transcendental sacred. Driven by the intense emotions imparted by their belief in the righteousness of Maoism, they acted outside of secular law. All religions at their Fundamental levels place "sacred" law above "secular" law and the Maoist religious belief system was no exception. Mao fostered this by his initial call to the Red Guard youth to "cleanse" the CCP (the epitome of
secular law) of its corrupt bourgeois thinking.

In this mode of response, the Red Guard seemed to equate secular (CCP) law with anti-Maoism. In this confusion they sought to destroy even some of Mao's supporters who espoused CCP propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. Political learning for the Red Guard youth in China did not progress beyond this stage of automatic learning. Rather than exercise only peripheral control the pro-Maoist faction of the political system reverted to full control and supervision of Red Guard activities.

Stage Four: Internalized Motivation

During this stage of political learning, the individual internalizes the political concept and values, as well as their appropriate symbols associated with correct political attitudes and behavior, such that correct response to the political systems stimuli is almost instinctive. Correct political thinking and behavior becomes synonymous with ego comfort relative to the individual's socio-political environment. Motivation to continue political learning (and participation) becomes internally, rather than externally generated by the political system. The individual now qualifies as an agent for political socialization in the political system.

As we indicated above political learning, particularly among the Red Guard youth during the cultural revolution did
not reach this stage of our model. We will discuss why this happened in the conclusion of this work.

We might illustrate our model of political learning as described by Figure 7. It should be noted that throughout the learning stages of the political socialization process, the political system strives to maximize the effect of its stimuli on the political thinking and behavior of the population, while minimizing direct material costs (material reward sanctions of increased benefits). Consequently the use of symbols and symbolism is important. The sooner correct positive compliance with the symbols of governmental stimuli occur, the sooner the political system can decrease the cost of trading material benefits (social welfare, increased standard of living, etc.) for increased political and socio-political participation.
Figure 7

STIMULUS-RESPONSE MODEL OF THE LEARNING PROCESS IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
Figure 8 illustrates our assessment of political learning during the Cultural Revolution. In this instance the political learning becomes locked between stages two and three. (We must remember, however, that according to Mao and his supporters the Cultural Revolution was declared a success even given the problems of the Red Guard.) Nonetheless, symbolism was still considered critical to the developments of the Cultural Revolution and to political socialization during the period. We will examine the symbols and the use of symbolism in the chapters which follow.

At the societal level, we can identify a fifth stage in our model of the learning process of political socialization which we call generational acculturation. As individuals, who have reached stage four, begin to externally motivate other individuals and transfer their intuitive notions of correct political attitudes and behavior to them, a pattern or manner of political thinking begins to be established without the society or subsets of the society. As this pattern is transferred generationally, political acculturation occurs. In Chapter I, we indicated that we viewed political culture as cumulative. We meant by that observation that political culture continues to incorporate present patterns of political thinking into the sum of historical political thinking patterns, generated as a result of the politically related experiences of the society. Within the context of our political learning model, the cumulative process of political generational acculturation is more apparent.
STIMULUS-RESPONSE MODEL OF THE LEARNING PROCESS IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Individually, members of the society are motivated, first externally then internally to respond according to the needs and inclinations of the political system. Societally, the aggregate of individual internal motivations toward complying with the stimuli of the political system (based upon each person's perception of his place within the political system) produce a society-bound pattern of political thinking which is generally transferred. Thus, as one generation complies with correct political thinking and behavior, the political system, with a generation of socializing agents, can increase its political demands for compliance placed upon the next generation without the additional cost of increasing the material and emotional (identity) costs associated with the initial stimulus to the learning process. In addition, as the needs or larger environment of the political system change, causing a change in the initial stimuli generated by the political system, the societal pattern of political thinking and behavior gradually changes to maintain compliance (and individual ego comfort) and broadens the dimensions of the political culture. Thus incorporating this fifth stage of political learning, generational acculturation, into our model we have the resultant diagram in Figure 9.

In this model of generational political socialization and acculturation, the political system has two options. It can either: (1) introduce symbols of response compliance at an earlier stage in the political learning process, thus decreasing its political socialization costs further; or, if its broader
Figure 9

GENERATIONAL ACCULTURATION OF POLITICAL LEARNING
environment changes creating new needs (war, revolution, dramatic increase in national production of resources), the political system can (2) maintain its individual stimulus-response political learning generationally, while increasing initial stimulus demands without incurring tremendous increase in political socialization costs. The assumption here is that, as each generation is socialized to hold correct political attitudes and to comply to government demands with correct political behavior, the correct responses act as building blocks as they are transferred to the succeeding generation.

For example in Figure 10 generation one is motivated to learn that voting is expected by the political system as a correct political behavior and learns to vote to maintain ego comfort. Generation one then transfers the knowledge of voting as correct political behavior to generation two. Generation two then begins the political learning process with the assumption that voting is correct political behavior. In the external motivation stage the political system can then demand of this new generation that citizens, who participate in the political system by voting, are concerned enough about the well-being of the system (i.e., ego comfort through the maintenance or the identity source) to participate in a military draft. Although this stimuli-demand is potentially a much more costly form of correct political behavior to the individual who complies than voting, the political system does not necessarily have to intensify positive or negative sanctions, or to generate new
Figure 10

GENERATIONAL ACCULTURATION OF POLITICAL LEARNING--A VOTING EXAMPLE
symbols to reinforce correct learning. Using the cultural propensity to vote as a basis for symbols reinforcing military draft should be enough. By the third generation, the assumption is that, if you vote, you will also fight for your country; and the previous generation of role models who voted and fought for the country should be enough to perpetuate voting and military service in the political culture.

Although outside the scope of the use and applicability of this model in this study, it should be noted that our model for political learning can incorporate negative, as well as positive political attitudes and behaviors into the political culture. Political apathy can become a part of the political culture in the same way as a propensity toward voting, when, during stage one, the individual does not associate ego comfort with identity within the political system or with any other external motivation generated by the political system to stimulate correct political learning. In other words, external motivation depends upon the success that the external party has in interpreting critical factors for ego maintenance to the individual in such a way that the individual is impelled to learn in order to attain or retain these factors. If the individual does not recognize the externally generated motivating stimuli as necessary for ego comfort and maintenance, the learning process in general, and political learning in particular, will not begin.

One can ask the question at this point if political learning during the Cultural Revolution did not progress beyond
stage three of our model for a significant portion of China's population. Can we observe a generational acculturation of correct political attitude and behavior as a result of the function of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution. This query is at the core of this study and will be answered in some detail in our conclusions. Let it suffice here for us to assert that generational acculturation did occur as a result of the function of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution, but it was acculturation perhaps not foreseen or intended by Mao and his supporters, as we shall see later.

The last topic we wish to address before presenting our data taken from the texts of the model revolutionary operas is the character of the political learning process utilized during the Cultural Revolution. More specifically we are interested in introducing the theatre as a primary tool in the learning process and in the adequate functioning of the political socialization process during this period of chaos.

Political Learning During the Cultural Revolution

We have indicated, at various points throughout this work, that in order for political learning to occur a standard for correctness upon which the learning process can be based must exist. There must be some measure against which correct and incorrect political attitudes and behaviors can be distinguished. With an operational standard for correctness functioning sanctions,
role-models and symbols can be utilized by the political system as motivations and reinforcements for the political learning process. The Maoist religious belief system functioned as such a standard during the Cultural Revolution.

Throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution the chaos in the political leadership at the party level made it difficult to determine who was considered to have the correct political attitudes. As examples, we observe the ideological heresies of Lin Shao-chi, Vice-Chairman of the Party; P'eng Chen, First Party secretary and Mayor of Peking; his vice-mayor, Wu Han, who authored Hai Jui Dismissed from Office; and Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary General of the CCP (who recently reappeared in top party leadership in 1973). However, their supporters in school and government who managed to avoid Red Guard purges continued to launch counter-attacks attempting to sway public opinion away from the Maoist camp. Because of the disruptions in universities and middle schools (which caused many to close their doors until well after the official end of the Cultural Revolution) and the social disruptions which resulted in the breakup or separation of family units, the role of socializing agents was primarily assumed by pro-Maoist government leaders. The vehicle that was used to externally motivate political learning throughout the population was the theatre, particularly the traditional Peking Opera. Long before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, even before Yenan, Mao had utilized the theatre to promote correct political thinking in the Chinese population. Edgar Snow reported in the 1930's that whenever the Red Army
marched into a new area they would immediately set up a stage and
enact a play or opera depicting the ideological thinking of Mao.
Snow writes:

there was no more powerful weapon of propaganda in the
communist movement than the Reds' dramatic troupes'
and none were more subtly manipulated. A flow of almost
daily programs, 'Luring newspapers' used military,
political, economic and social problems as dramatic
material in a humorous, understandable way for the
skeptical peasantry. . . Where the Red occupied new
areas, it was the Red theatre that calmed the fears
of the people, gave them rudimentary ideas of the Red
Program, and dispersed great quantities of revolutionary
thoughts to win the people's confidence . . .17
Mao and his revolutionary forces employed this avenue of politi-
cal communication with the population because it had been proven
successful throughout China's history. In traditional China
dramas depicting political events or intrigues were being per-
formed to peasant audiences.

During the Cultural Revolution, the Maoist forces exercised
complete control over the theatre. Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's fourth
wife and a former actress, was a member of the National Cultural
Revolution Revolutionary Group (Wen-ge) and was given sole
responsibility for supervising the rewriting and staging of
Peking Revolutionary operas. The resulting model revolutionary
operas, which were the only dramatic works staged in China
throughout the Cultural Revolution, served as the primary vehicles
for political learning. Referring to our model of political
learning earlier in this chapter (Figures 9 and 10) the model
revolutionary operas became the channels for the external
motivation, controlled learning and automatic learning stages in
the socialization process. And the actors or characters in the operas became the primary political socialization agents, replacing or superseding the influence of teachers, parents and peer group. Great care was obviously taken to revise the opera scripts so that they incorporated the virtues and morals of Maoism (which we have identified as a Maoist religious belief system) and so that they presented the sanctions, role models and symbols necessary to motivate and reinforce political learning. They presented the Maoist religious belief system as the standard upon which correct political attitudes and behaviors could be distinguished and learned.

Within the texts of these staged microcosms of Maoist Chinese society, we can observe the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system in the political learning process. The remaining chapters will present these observations. The discussions will incorporate the Hempelian analytical model to structure our observations. To accomplish this, we will demonstrate how the Maoist religious belief system functions as a standard for correctness in the sanctions, role models, and symbols which motivate and reinforce political learning, thereby causing political learning to exist and political socialization to function adequately.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER V


2 By "totally participate" we refer to the calls for total individual commitment to the CCP and the People's Republic communicated officially and unofficially by the media, education and social systems.


7 Brim, Handbook of Socialization Theory.

8 This distinction is made by Kenneth Prewitt "Political Socialization and Political Education in the New Nations" in Sigel, Learning About Politics.


11 The relationship of the individual to authority is important in the Chinese context, particularly given the Confucian influences which we review in Chapter Two. As we have also seen L. Pye, R. Solomon, and others have emphasized the importance of authority in the contemporary Chinese political culture. In the Chinese context authority was rigid and some might argue inhibitory. Authority was not questioned. The May Fourth Movements in the early 1900's is the first instance in contemporary China where we see youth not only questioning authority but attempting to break down traditional rigid, Confucian based authority patterns.
The Cultural Revolution is the second instance where youth assumed this task. In both instances the attack was on traditional authority. In the context of the Cultural Revolution the attack took its form under the slogan "Destroying the four olds" (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits). At the crux of these "four olds" was Confucian authority.

12 We refer here to the quote by Mao that "not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul . . . " From "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People . . ." cited previously.


14 Red Guard activities were monitored but were not, at this time, restricted. There were instances where restriction and P.L.A. intervention were necessary but this was not the general policy of the time.

15 By Fundamentalist we mean here a basic interpretation and reliance on the Thoughts of Mao similar in their intensity to Protestant Fundamentalists in this country who are rigid in their interpretations and reliance on the Bible for directing their personal lives.

16 During the period of the Cultural Revolution China's youth under the age of 25 made up over half the population.

17 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China.
PART TWO

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM
AS A STANDARD FOR CORRECTNESS
CHAPTER VI

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AS A STANDARD FOR CORRECTNESS: SANCTIONS AND ROLE MODELS

Throughout the preceding chapters, we have attempted to identify and discuss the origins and structural components of a Maoist religious belief system. In addition, we have presented our model for political learning within the political socialization process emphasizing the function that a religious belief system can serve in the learning process. Within the framework of this latter discussion, we identified three functional requisites for the political socialization process—sanctions; role-models; and symbols. Through the use of the model Revolutionary Peking Operas cited in our introduction, our purpose in this and the remaining chapters is to illustrate how the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a standard for correctness in the political learning process of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution, by serving as a basis for sanctions, role-models and symbols. We will accomplish this task by surveying the texts of the Peking Operas to identify instances where sanctions, role-models, and symbols occur and can be attributed to components of the Maoist religious belief system. In addition, we will be highlighting passages in the texts where Maoism...
seemingly attempts\textsuperscript{1} to incorporate some components of the traditionally contrasting religious belief systems—Confucianism and Taoism—into one functional religious belief system. As we mentioned in our introduction, in our approach to our data source, we have made every attempt to let our conclusions flow from the texts, rather than utilizing the texts to substantiate previously drawn conclusions.

We will begin this, and the following chapter, with a brief discussion of the specific role of our three functional requisites in the political learning process of political socialization. We will then proceed directly with our examination of the specific texts, interjecting any discussions of the background of the individual Peking Opera, characters, or period of the background setting of the opera where we deem necessary.

Sanctions and Role-Models as Requisites for Political Learning

When we examine the political socialization process, we are concerned with how the individual learns or is conditioned to respond with attitudes and behaviors consistent with the norms of the political culture and considered correct by the political systems. Critical to an understanding of the political socialization process is an examination of how the political system conveys to the population what is politically correct as well as what is politically incorrect. As we indicated in our political learning model in the previous
chapter (Figure 7 of Chapter V), we view sanctions and role-models as two factors which convey the standard for correctness in the initial stages of the political learning process. Each (i.e., sanctions and role-models) can be utilized as reinforcements of the learning process, either individually or in concert. We will discuss them briefly before turning to the "model" texts to cite examples of their occurrence and function.

We define a sanction as any stimulus which either rewards or punishes an individual (or group) for a previous behavior or response, thereby establishing the boundaries for attitudinal and behavioral learning within a social environment. Sanctions can be presented to the individual in the form of material gain or loss (i.e., increased money or decreased food supply) or in the form of non-material gain or loss (i.e., reinforced identity with the social environment or acceptance by it; or, conversely, rejection by the social environment). However, no matter what its form, the primary function of a sanction is to establish the boundaries for learning.

Within the political environment, the function of a sanction remains the same. However, not only is the form either material or non-material, the sanction can be directly political (i.e., political security or lack of political representation) or it can be non-political (i.e., increased standard of living). In either case, the sanction as a stimulus can produce correct or compliant political attitudes and behavior in an individual
or in the society as a whole.

In the learning process of political socialization, roles and, most particularly, role models serve a critical function in establishing the boundaries of behavior in much the same way as do sanctions. Roles specify and determine the pattern of behaviors by which the individual interacts with his environment. Whether individual-to-individual, individual-to-group, individual-to-social system, or group-to-group roles establish the position of the individual's ego (identity) relative to his environment. Roles are usually learned by observation of persons or groups who have been established or are perceived as role-models within the individual's frame of reference. Identification with a role-model both establishes the individual's position in society and establishes the modes of thinking and behavior for the individual, based on the cultural and social norms of the society. Thus, the role-model can be recognized as the tangible personification of the standard for correctness. As such, role-models function as agents in the socialization process in that they initiate and facilitate the external motivation which gives the individual the incentive to learn (see Figure 7 of Chapter V). Within the social sciences, parents, teachers, peer groups, and authority figures have all been cast as role-models or agents of the socialization process. It is important to note that, for the most part, persons who are in the position to exercise power over the individual (whether child or adult) are recognized as role-models.
This observation is important in that the role model is perceived to have influence and efficacy in establishing the individual's position in society, thereby significantly contributing to the individual's ego comfort. With this magnitude of potential influence on the individual, it is important that the role model represent the correct pattern of interaction and behavior for the individual. Unfortunately sociological and psychological studies have indicated that the role-models can be the subjects or motivators of negative learning as well as positive learning. For example, the child can learn social prejudice and discrimination by observing the parent interact with persons the parent perceives to be at a lower level on the social stratum. In addition, unlike sanctions which always imply controlled learning, the learning which occurs as a result of identification or imitation of role-models can be uncontrolled and involuntary. Expanding our previous example, the parent in the position or function of role-model need not deliberately espouse lessons on social prejudice and discrimination in order for the child to learn social prejudice and discrimination as a pattern of behavior. The child merely imitates attitudes and behaviors observed in his parent, presuming that they are correct. In this case, the parent may be completely unaware that he has functioned as a role-model in the learning process of socialization.

As we found in our discussion of sanctions, the function of role models does not change significantly in our more specific
context of political socialization. Within the political environment, the role-model usually personifies the standard for correctness within specific boundaries. In addition, the role-model establishes the individual's position in and his interaction with his political environment. However, given the inherent influence of the role-model on political learning, from a system maintenance point of view, it is important that the political system exercise control over what correct political learning will be. The political system cannot afford to have role-models which initiate or motivate negative political learning, either intentionally or unintentionally. For example, the sociological role-model of the father can result in the son learning political apathy rather than political participation, as a result of observing his father's political attitudes and behaviors. To assure correct political learning then, the political system--unable to completely control parents, teachers, peer groups, and personal authority figures, as role models and agents of political socialization--can identify and establish their own role-models as agents. In the case of Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution (and traditionally), as evidenced in the "model" revolutionary works of the periods, heroes have been utilized in this position.

With regard to our approach in this chapter, we have chosen to discuss sanctions and role-models together for two reasons. First, according to our model for political learning presented in the previous chapter, both sanctions and role-models
occur in the initial stages of political learning, and function similarly in the political socialization process. Second, and equally important, sanctions and role-models can be utilized simultaneously by the political system in the controlled learning stage of political socialization and can reinforce each other as functional requisites of the political learning process.

That is to say, sanctions, particularly non-material sanctions, can be presented to the population via the role-models or established political heroes, as the population observes how the role-models are treated and revered by the political system. The population can therefore aspire to achieve the same deference and distinction as accorded the hero role-model for his political attitudes and behavior. Sanctions and role-models also combine in what socialization theorists, notably Robert Merton,² call anticipatory socialization—that is, the individual begins to take on the attitudes and behaviors of a particular role with the anticipation that he will one day occupy that role. In this instance, the role-model is observed and initiated voluntarily by the individual; and compliant or "correct" attitudes and behavior are sanctioned by the individual's positive identification with that projected role; whereas non-compliance results in non-identification.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a standard for determining which political values and norms were correct and which were incorrect. The sanctions generated by
the Maoist religious belief system were clear and easily
distinguishable. If the individual held the correct political
attitudes and behavior—self-sacrifice, class love, frugality,
diligence and hard work, etc. (see Themes Category Three in
Chapter IV) all for the achievement of a Maoist communist
state—then he was rewarded by being recognized or sharing in
the identity of Mao's "masses". In addition, the compliant,
"correct" Maoist individual shared the short-term gratification
of being included in the social welfare programs provided by
the political system; i.e., employment, child care, secondary
education, and the like. The negative sanctions were equally
effective and distinguishable. If the individual demonstrated
incorrect political attitudes or behavior, he was either ostra-
cized and rejected by his immediate socio-political reference
group (family, commune, factory, school, etc.); or, at the
harshest degree, he was purged and removed from his socio-
political reference group (a loss of identity and resultantly
ego comfort) and taken away for "reeducation".

Not just during the Cultural Revolution but traditionally,
the Chinese have placed great importance on "saving face" and
group identity. So much so that, as Solomon and Hiniker have
separately observed, the Chinese individual will, more
often than not, "feign" compliance with the perceived authority
or socio-cultural norm; rather than run the risk of losing face
within the social reference group, or being ostracized or
rejected by the group with which he is identified. Both
sanctions and role-models were important in the determination of the norm and identity with which the individual would choose and identify. The individual in traditional China learned from sanctions, administered by the political system, which attitudes and behaviors complied with the prevailing socio-political, Confucian belief system and cultural norm and which did not. Role-models, often heroes, were used to reinforce or supplement this learning process. In Confucian China, in particular, it was well established and understood that the political leader was to act as the role model for the son; the husband, the role model for the wife; and so on. The more powerful or accepted: the role-model in perceived status, the more it was assured that compliance (again, whether feigned or real) would be forthcoming from the individual.

During the Cultural Revolution, although this tendency probably was often manifest, the general confusion coupled with the propaganda strategies utilized by both sides (i.e., the pro-Maoist, pure ideological "reds" versus the pro-Liu pragmatist "experts") would have made it difficult for the average individual to determine which side merited compliance, again, whether true or feigned. The rampaging Red Guard youths who scoured the country attempting to physically and verbally proselytize their interpretations of Maoism added significantly to the confusion. We can only surmise that it was for this reason that so much emphasis was placed on drama
(the traditional communication link between the political system and the population), and, specifically, on who controlled drama. Whoever controlled the manner of communication could control what was communicated--what sanctions existed and what role-models were correct figures to emulate. In this light it is understandable that the Cultural Revolution should be sparked by a controversy over the contents of a play.

The pro-Maoist faction, under the direction of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, took control of the theatre early in the Cultural Revolution. Chiang Ching reviewed all of the Peking Operas being performed in Peking, Shantung (her native province) and Shanghai (the center for leftist Mao support). In 1963, Mao, based on Chiang's findings, sharply criticized the Department of Cultural Affairs, calling it a "department of emperors and generals, useless scholars and sickly maidens." At this point, Chiang assumed sole responsibility for reviewing all theatrical and dramatic works for their ideological content (a responsibility formerly resting with the Department of Cultural Affairs) and making revisions where necessary. The first dramatic work to engage Chiang's scrutiny was the Shanghai Opera Sparks in Reed Marshes which depicted guerilla activities during the war of resistance against Japan. The opera was revised by the Opera Troupe of Peking under the close supervision of Chiang and was eventually staged at the First Festival of Peking Operas on Contemporary Themes held
in Peking in Summer, 1964. Mao, who was present at the performance, was so pleased with the results of the content revisions that he renamed the opera Shachiapang. In a speech presented at the Festival Chiang described the methods that had been utilized to revise the opera:

First the leadership set the theme. Then the playwrights went three times to acquire actual life experience. . . . When the script was written, many leading members of the Kwang Chow military command took part in discussions of it, and after it had been rehearsed, opinions were widely canvassed and revisions made. In this way, by constantly asking for opinions and making revisions, they succeeded in turning out in a fairly short time, a good topical play reflecting a real-life struggle.7

The symbolic importance of portraying real-life struggle on stage and the emphasis this criteria received should be noted here and will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter. Their success with Shachiapang led the Opera troupe, again with the close scrutiny of Chiang Ching, to revise the script of the Shanghai opera The Red Lantern and adapt it as a Peking Opera during the 1964 Festival.

By August, 1966, during the height of the Cultural Revolution turbulence, all stage productions and performances of traditional Peking and Shanghai operas had been halted, except for seven productions we have previously identified as the "Model Revolutionary Works."8 These works, four of which we examine here (Shachiapang, Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, On the Docks, and The Red Lantern) dominated the stage throughout the Cultural Revolution and served as the communication
channel for the Maoist forces in disseminating the correct attitudes and behaviors by presenting sanctions and role-models (based on the Maoist religious belief system, which, as we illustrated earlier are (necessary) functional requisites in the political learning process of political socialization). Through "revolutionary realism" combined with "revolutionary romanticism" on stage, the Maoist faction attempted to politically socialize the Chinese masses into Maoist Communist men, women, and children who would deny themselves, their individual needs and desires for the good of Maoism and the presumed eventuality of a Chinese Communist state guided by the CCP. In order to promote this voluntary self-denial, it was necessary to motivate the individual to learn to transfer his identity frame of reference from himself to a politically defined class group, recognized by the Maoists as "the masses of Chinese people." Eric Hoffer, uncognizant of the Chinese context during the Cultural Revolution, wrote of mass movements in 1951: ". . . to ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of his individual identity and distinctness."9 "The most drastic way to achieve this end," Hoffer continues, "is by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collective body."10 As we shall see later in this chapter, the ultimate self-denial that was expected of "a member of the Chinese masses was self-sacrifice, if necessary, to the point of death. Theatrical drama, as Hoffer points out, is critical
in provoking this, otherwise avoided tendency in individuals:

Dying and killing seem easy when they are part of a . . . dramatic performance. . . there is a need for some kind of make-believe in order to face death unflinchingly. To our real, naked selves there is not a thing on earth or in heaven worth dying for. It is only when we see ourselves as actors in a staged (and therefore unreal) performance that death loses its frightfulness and finality and becomes an act of make-believe and a theatrical gesture.\textsuperscript{11}

As we shall see, the "model revolutionary operas" attempt to carry the audiences into a "realistic" world of "make-believe". Such a world, Hoffer\textsuperscript{12} maintains, is the most necessary and most enduring factor in igniting and controlling a mass movement. He has further observed that "when faith and the power to persuade or coerce are gone, make-believe lingers on."\textsuperscript{13} The operas combine those seemingly contradictory elements of realism and make-believe in their time setting and characterizations. Although the content of each of the model operas is supposed to present the real life struggles of the masses, the time frame of three of the four is set well previous to the 1960's and the period of the Cultural Revolution. Both Shachiapang and The Red Lantern take place during the war of resistance against Japan in the mid-to-late 1930's. Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy highlights P.L.A. activity against warlords and bandits in Northeast China in 1946, just prior to the civil war between the Communists and the Kuomingtang. On the Docks, is the only "model" revolutionary opera with a time setting in the 1960's. Yet, even in this instance, the
audience is led into a world of make-believe, as they ponder the struggles of their international "class brothers" in Africa. Consequently, both adult and youth audiences had to leave their time frame of reference to identify with the lives and characters in the plays. For the adults in the audience, the journey was into their memories of times past. For the youth, not coincidently, the main targets of the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution, the journey went beyond any experiential cognitive reference points. The youth in the audience had to search in their imaginations for what "it must have been like" and couple this image with what was being presented to them. For both adults and youth, once the journey into memory or imagination began, the individual entered into a realm of "make-believe" while viewing the theatrical production. This journey was facilitated on stage by the play-acting feats of the role-model heroes and symbolic uses of color and imagery (as we shall later see). According to Chairman Mao, this unnatural combination of "revolutionary realism" with "revolutionary romanticism" led to "revolutionary truth." The sanctions and role-models presented through the medium of the model revolutionary operas were to be regarded and accepted by the audience as real, tangible evidences of the truth and validity of the Maoist religious belief system. The use of symbols and symbolism, as we shall see later, was to reinforce and eventually cause internalization of this political learning process.
Before we begin our discussion of the examples of sanctions and role models found in the model revolutionary operas we will present a synopsis of each opera to provide background and context for the reader.

Synopses of Model Revolutionary Operas

Shachiapang:

Shachiapang is a ten scene opera set in Changshu County of Kiangsu Province during the War of Resistance (1934). The plot concerns the cooperation of Communist and peasant revolutionary forces and their successful efforts to prevent Japanese and Kuomintang forces from taking over the town of Shachiapang.

The major characters can be divided in two opposing groups. The protagonists are Kuo Chien-Kuang, political instructor of the New Fourth Army; Sister Ah-Ching, underground worker of the CCP, who owns and runs the local tea house as a cover; Cheng Chien-ming, secretary of the Changshu County Committee of the CCP; Aunt Sha, peasant activist; and her son, Sha Szu-lung, a member of the Shiachiapang peasant militia; and Ah-fu, another revolutionary peasant. The chief antagonists are Hu Chuan-Kuei, the commander of the KMT "Loyal and Just National Salvation Army" and his chief of staff Tiao Teh-yi; and Kuroda, the colonel of the invading Japanese army.

In scenes one and two, a group of eighteen wounded New Fourth Army soldiers arrive in Shachiapang, assisted through Japanese lines by Sister Ah-Ching. Once in town, Aunt Sha and other villagers take care of the wounded soldiers.
Some two weeks later, Sister Ah-ching learns of a Japanese "mopping up" campaign that is headed toward Shachiapang and relays to Kuo instructions from the County Committee of the CCP to hide his wounded men in the marshes surrounding the town until the Japanese leave. The wounded troops are evacuated from the village with boats and provisions provided by the villagers. The Japanese "mopping up" campaign reaches Shachiapang just as the evacuation is complete. Their commander, Kuroda, angered that his "mopping-up" has not uncovered the New Fourth Army wounded, sends orders to the KMT "Loyal and Just National Salvation Army" to continue the search for the wounded communist forces.

Scene three outlines the collaborative meetings between the Japanese Imperial Army and the KMT "Loyal and Just National Salvation Army". Hú, the commander of the KMT "puppet forces," and Tiao, his chief of staff, agree to seek out and destroy the New Fourth army forces, including the known wounded soldiers.

The KMT forces arrive in Shachiapang in scene four as the town recovers from the raid by the Japanese Army. Sister Ah-Ching wisely halts the attempt to bring the New Fourth Army wounded back from the marshes, but worries about their low provisions. Realizing that the KMT forces are acting as puppets for the Japanese, she decides to first find out as much as she can about the size and strategies of the KMT and Japanese forces. Earlier in the war of resistance Sister Ah-ching had saved Hu's life by hiding him, ironically enough,
in the tea house cellar, from the Japanese Imperial forces who sought to destroy his nationalist forces. He arrived still expressing his gratitude to Sister Ah-ching, unaware that she was an underground worker for his internal enemy, the CCP. Tiao, though, was doubtful of her loyalty to the KMT, and inferentially accused her of hiding the wounded New Fourth Army soldiers just as she had hidden Hu. An enraged Sister Ah-ching demands that they immediately search her teahouse. Tiao's accusation had been just an attempt to expose his suspicions about Sister Ah-ching to Hu.

In a survey of the area, Tiao determines that the wounded soldiers are hiding in the marshes. He plots to trick the communist soldiers by sending the villagers out in fishing boats (with his men camouflaged in the boats) to give the appearance that the KMT troops have left and life is back to normal. This, he concluded, would draw the wounded men out. Sister Ah-ching, strategizing that the wounded men would not be fooled and would maintain their cover if they heard gunfire, throws a brick covered with a straw hat into the lake to draw the KMT troops' fire. Realizing that his plan would not work after the gun shot warnings, Tiao威胁s to starve the wounded troops out of the marshes in a waiting tactic.

Scene five finds the wounded soldiers almost out of food and medicine and drenched by a rainstorm. However the eighteen men now know that they can "hold out till victory" through thunder, starvation and death, armed with Chairman Mao's
thoughts. Kuo sends two scouts in disguise to row to the town and get supplies from supportive villagers.

As scene six opens, Sister Ah-ching attempts to send two villagers to the marshes with food and medicine under cover of night. The villagers are discovered by the KMT guard and narrowly escape capture by swimming back to shore. Sister Ah-ching devises another plan.

This time Aunt Sha's son will appear to be seriously ill and they will go to Hu and request a boat to take the boy to a doctor for treatment. Just as the plan is in action, CCP commander, Cheng, arrives in town disguised as a doctor. In treating the "ill" boy he learns of the situation. Cheng whispers to Sister Ah-ching that the main communist forces will be arriving soon to wipe out the KMT forces and that the wounded troops should be removed from the marshes to the Stone village nearby.

As the KMT forces leave to prepare for Commander Hu's marriage (to the Japanese interpreter's daughter!) Aunt Sha's son volunteers to swim under a boat (so that it will appear to be empty and drifting in the wind) and deliver the new instructions to the wounded soldiers. Although Tiao notices the boat and realizes its meaning, his men are not in time to stop the evacuation of the wounded troops.

Scene seven opens with Tiao and Hu ordering torture for Shachiapang villagers in order to find out who the undercover communists are and who helped the wounded New Fourth Army men
escape. Some villagers are executed shouting as they fall, "Long live Chairman Mao and the CCP." Tiao orders that Aunt Sha be brought in for questioning and again voices his suspicions about Sister Ah-ching to Hu. Although Hu has already invited her to assist him in his wedding plans, he agrees reluctantly to set a trap for Sister Ah-ching.

Sister Ah-ching arrives at Hu's headquarters hoping to get information to pass to the approaching communist forces to complete their strategies. She is cautious but seemingly unaware that she is walking into a trap set by Tiao. The three (Hu, Tiao and Sister Ah-ching) are chatting casually about Hu's wedding arrangements when Aunt Sha is dragged in.

Aunt Sha seeing Sister Ah-ching there realizes that she is being used as bait to trap Sister Ah-ching and determines to protect Sister Ah-ching even if it costs her her life. When questioned Aunt Sha denounces the enemy KMT puppet forces. Hu orders her taken away to be shot, but Tiao signals to the guards not to follow through with the order. Sister Ah-ching unaware of his signal suggests that Hu not shoot her and save her for a "bigger catch." "Surely the New Fourth Army men will come to rescue her." Her scheme works. Hu decides not to have Aunt Sha shot. More importantly, Tiao seems more trustful of Sister Ah-ching's loyalty and asks that she escort Aunt Sha home and keep an eye on her. Aunt Sha is brought in again and the two women leave.

Tiao sends some of his men to follow them as a last check...
on Sister Ah-ching. If they whisper while walking it will mean they are in collusion and his initial suspicions of Sister Ah-ching would have been correct. The guard returns excitedly reporting that the two women are fighting. The two women have again outwitted Hu and Tiao. Hu orders Aunt Sha jailed as Sister Ah-ching later recounts how the old woman attacked her calling her a "Traitor". Tiao is finally convinced that Sister Ah-ching is loyal to the KMT.

Scenes eight through ten highlight the surprise attack launched by the New Fourth Army (as Hu's wedding celebration is in progress) and the final victory and the liberation of Shachiapang by the New Fourth Army. In the final scene Sister Ah-ching faces the captured Hu, and accuses him of being a Japanese imperialist traitor, and declares herself openly a member of the CCP.

**Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy:**

Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy is set in the Peony River Area of Northeast China in the Winter of 1946. The ten scene opera depicts the cooperation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and local villagers to destroy a bandit brigade of KMT forces holed up in a stronghold on Tiger Mountain. There are three categories of characters--PLA soldiers, local peasants in the village surrounding Tiger Mountain who have suffered the bandit raids, and the KMT bandit troops. Yang Tzu-jung is the chief character in the first category and stands out as the principal hero of the opera. Hunter Chang,
his daughter Chang Pao and Li Yung-chi, a peasant railway worker are key peasant characters. The principal bandit characters are Vulture, bandit Chieftain of Tiger Mountain and leader of the KMT's "Fifth Peace Preservation Brigade of the Eastern Hulunkiang Region" (hereafter referred to as the KMT Brigade); Luan P'eng, bandit Chieftain of Breast Mountain and Horse Cudgel Hsu, liaison adjunct for rival bandit.

The opera opens with the PLA in a "continuous march" in pursuit of Vulture through the snowy mountains in the Northeast. Yang, who had been sent out as a scout, returns to inform the Chief of Staff that with the help of a mute boy (who he and the other scout rescued from a ravine) and his father, they trailed Vulture to Black Dragon Valley. Vulture and his bandits having pillaged this valley were now holding back to their Tiger Mountain base in Chiapi Valley. The PLA soldiers prepare themselves to march on, determined to have the cold snow and fatigue to "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty. . . ."

Scene two briefly depicts Vulture's pillage of Chiapi Valley. Vulture and his bandit chief of staff discuss the whereabouts of Luan Ping, who has absconded with Horse Cudgel Hsu's contact maps for the entire area. With this map they can control the area. While Vulture and his chief confer, his bandits burn and kill in the village. Li Yung-chi's infant son is snatched from Li's wife's arms by a bandit and thrown over the cliff. Li lunges to attack the bandit, but is shot in the left arm. As he lies on the ground, Vulture enters and aims
his gun to finish Li off but Li's wife flings herself to cover him and is killed by Vulture's bullet. Li is taken prisoner as he vows to avenge these deaths with Vulture's blood.

In scene three Yang seeks out the Hunter Chang and his "mute" son whom he rescued earlier to ask their assistance in locating Vulture's mountain hideout and the various approaches and defenses. Chang is reluctant to trust Yang, but the child (a girl) remembers his kindness and blurts out their story of tragedy at the hands of Vulture and his bandits.

When Vulture first attacked their village, he killed the young girl's grandmother and captured her mother and father. An uncle took care of her. Shortly after his capture, Hunter Chang escaped and came to get his daughter. His wife who could not escape threw herself over a mountain cliff rather than be victim to Vulture alone. Chang had dressed his little daughter as a boy and she acted as a mute to maintain her disguise. This way she would be protected from capture and mistreatment. Yang is moved by the story and vows to destroy Vulture and avenge these wrongdoings. Hunter Chang tells Yang of a dangerous trail down the back of Tiger Mountain that is unguarded and describes the bandit stronghold defenses. He also tells Yang of a bandit visitor (Howling Wolf) and a woman who sought rest in their cabin and of a contact map they had. Yang realizes this map is important and after leaving his ration of food for Hunter Chang and his daughter sets out with his men to find Howling Wolf.

By scene four Yang finds and kills Howling Wolf. Along
with the contacts maps Yang seizes a letter from Vulture to Howling Wolf requesting his attendance at a Hundred Chickens Feast to celebrate Vulture's birthday. Yang volunteers to disguise himself as a bandit and infiltrate the bandit den in Tiger Mountain. From within, he can familiarize himself with the layout of the stronghold and lead the attack. The Chief of Staff agrees to let Yang carry out the manoeuver. It is determined that he will take the contacts maps to Vulture as evidence of his new loyalty to Vulture.

Scenes five and six recount Yang's infiltration into Vulture's bandit den. On the way up the mountain he encounters bandit sentries. As they question Yang, a tiger approaches. The two bandits cower in fear. Yang shoots the tiger through the head. In his initial meeting with Vulture, he successfully utilizes all the bandit jargon and (using information provided by his captured bandits) answers all Vulture's questions concerning fellow bandits and their strongholds. In the end, Yang produces the contacts map Vulture so coveted. Vulture is convinced and Yang, as Vulture's newly appointed bandit chieftain, sets out to "case" the Tiger Mountain stronghold.

In scene seven we find the PLA Chief of Staff and Li Yung-chi attempting ways to arouse the peasants in the villages surrounding Tiger Mountain to join the PLA in an attack on the bandits den. When the peasants realize the benevolence and sincerity of the PLA they willingly volunteer. Yang manages to leak out information to the Chief of Staff about the strategic
defenses and tunnels in the stronghold, and in scene nine the PLA and the villages prepare for the attack. Pao pleads to be included in the attack so that she can personally avenge her family's past tragedies and is brought along as a medical assistant.

In the final scene the Tiger Mountain Stronghold is successfully attacked during the Hundred Chickens Feast. The drunken bandits have been taken off guard and are unprepared to defend the stronghold. During the attack Yang triumphantly confronts Vulture as a member of the PLA. As the curtain closes Pao attempts to stab Vulture to death but is restrained by the PLA medical orderly.

On the Docks:

On the Docks is set in contemporary post '49 China. It is a seven scene opera that depicts the application of international brotherhood (defined and interpreted by Mao Tse-tung thought) on dockwork. The list of major characters includes: Fang Hsi-chen Secretary of the CCP branch of the dockers' brigade; Kao Chih-yang, team leader of the dockers brigade and Chao Chen-shan Chief of the Dockers' Brigade, both branch committee members of the CCP; Ma Hung-liang, a retired dockworker; Han Hsiao-chiang, a young dockworker who is a middle character (torn between the virtues of Maoism and selfishness); and Chien Shan-wei, the only central antagonist character.

Scene one opens with a depiction of a dock on the Huangpu River in Shanghai in the Summer of 1963. The dockers
under the supervision of Kao are loading eight thousand sacks of rice seed for export to Africa which is due to be shipped in two days. There are also two thousand sacks of export wheat also eventually to be shipped to Africa stored on the docks. Chien, arrives on the scene with a rush assignment to load a shipment of fiberglass onto a Scandinavian ship.

As Chien and Kao (joined by Chao) discuss which shipment takes priority, Party Secretary Fang arrives from a district Party committee meeting as Chien leaves. New orders have been issued which mean that the shipment of rice seed must be advanced one day to avoid an approaching typhoon. All outgoing ships must haul anchor early the following morning. These new orders mean that in a period of less than twenty-four hours, eight thousand sacks of rice must be loaded on the Africa-bound ship, two thousand sacks of wheat must be moved into the warehouse so that they will not be destroyed by the impending rain; and a shipment of sacks of fiberglass must be loaded on the Scandinavian ship. There must be no damage or mixup of any sack.

The dockers are determined to accomplish this seemingly impossible task led by Mao Tse-tung's thought: "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty. . . ." Office workers have volunteered to assist. They will use the machinery to load the rice seed and the dockers' youth brigade will load the wheat on their shoulders.

In scenes two and three wheat from a spilled sack is discovered by Kao on the dock area and in the spilled wheat
some fragments of fiberglass. An investigation is called to
discover who spilled the wheat and how spilled fiberglass
got into the area where the wheat was being moved. What Kao,
Fang and the other dockers do not know is that a young dock
worker, Han has spilled the sack while discussing his disappoint-
ment with dock work with Chien. Chien, (who had some fiberglass
fragments that he had swept up from the other loading areas
in a dustpan) offered to cover for Han and swept up the spilled
wheat. He swept the wheat into the dustpan with the fiber-
glass and (intentionally)dumped both into the wheat sack while
Han was not looking. He maliciously suggested that Han take
another sack to the wheat storage area while he minded the torn
sack. The sack Han unknowingly took was rice seed. Chien
advised Han to forget the spilled sack, not mention the occur-
rence to anyone and to go to a movie when his eight hour shift was over.

Later, during the investigation, Han is questioned and denies
knowledge of the incident. When he is asked to stay on duty
until the spilled sack is found, he retorts that he is free
to go when his eight hours are up and rushes off angrily.
Fang and Kao are upset at his attitudes and behavior but determ-
ines that the first priority is to find the spilled sack to
avoid an international bad reputation for China. (All export
must be perfect in accordance with Mao's teachings.)

The investigation and search continue through scenes four
and five. Fang has communicated the incident to the district
Party committee and they have concluded that "an acute and
complex class struggle" is the source of the trouble. The Committee had also determined that the wheat must be shipped in the morning to avoid the typhoon. Fang, Chao, and Kao confer and determine that Chien may be the culprit. But they cannot determine the level or extent of his involvement. The challenge for Fang and the dockers has intensified. They must count the number of wheat sacks to make sure all are accounted for; load the wheat sacks from the warehouse, back to the dock and complete the loading of the eight thousand sacks of rice seed. They must find the spilled sack of wheat; and finally uncover the class struggle which is determined to be the cause of the trouble. They must accomplish all this is about twelve hours.

Ma, the retired docker, who had just come to visit, decides to help in the search and the loading. A youth dock worker is sent to bring Han back to the docks. Han reappears on the docks just as Chien is plotting to find the rice seed sack in the wheat storage area so that it will not be found by Fang and the dockers. Chien reprimands Han for his return and attempts to frighten Han by recounting the discovery of fiberglass fragment in the spilled wheat. Han is surprised about the fiberglass, and out of fear, takes Chien's advice to flee the docks.

As they talk, Fang and Ma appear. When Fang and Ma question Han again he insists on a transfer to another dock. When Fang refuses, Han tears up his dock identification card
and defiantly declares he "quits" the dock. Fang and Ma are shocked and try to talk sense into the youth. As Ma takes Han off, Fang turns to question Chien. Chien stumbles under the examination and Fang's suspicions are reinforced. She orders a docker to watch his movements.

In the meantime, the dockers have not found the spilled wheat sack in the warehouse. They determine it was never taken to the warehouse. Two dockers step up and recount that they reloaded a sack which had apparently fallen from a cart of rice seed which was to be loaded. Fang rushes to the loading platform to check the sacks. They are filled with rice seed. She determines that a switch has been (intentionally) made and that the spilled sack of wheat is on the lighter transport boat bound for loading on the foreign freighter for Africa. Kao volunteers to brave the storm and take a launch out on the lake to stop the transport and retrieve the spilled sack of wheat from the rice seed shipment, declaring that "even if the sky starts falling," they will prop it up. Fang adds "we will not disappoint Chairman Mao!"

In scene six, Ma and Fang talk to Han. When Han finally realizes his wrongdoings and that he has been maliciously "used" by Chien he confesses the spilled sack of wheat. He asks that his request for transfer be nullified and vows uncompromising belief and adherence to Chairman Mao's Thoughts.

In the final seventh scene, Kao returns with the spilled
sack of wheat having conquered the storm in his little boat; and Chien is captured by Chao as he tries to escape taking with him "a letter of recommendation from his American boss, an offer of contract from his Japanese boss, and an appointment document issued by the Kuomingtang." All of the sacks were loaded on schedule, the freighters set sail to their respective destinations and the dockers stand on the docks with Fang, Kao, Chao, Ma and Han as a red sun slowly rises in the early morning.

The Red Lantern:

In eleven scenes, this opera depicts the story of a revolutionary family and the struggles they encounter attempting to aid the communist guerrillas on Cypress Mountain who are fighting the Japanese. The setting is in Northern China during the war of resistance. The major characters are the Li family (father Li Yu-ho, a railway worker; his daughter Tieh-Mei and his mother Granny Li); their neighbors who assist them in their struggles, Hui-Lien and her mother-in-law Aunt Tien; Hatayama, Chief of the Japanese Gendarmerie; and Wang Lien-chu an underground communist who turns traitor under the torture of the Japanese.

In the first two scenes the Li family receives a secret code from a liaison man and accepts the task of delivering it to the communist guerrilla base on Cypress Mountain. Wang has witnessed Li's initial contact with the communist liaison man at the railway station and, when he cannot escape the Japanese patrol, shoots himself in the arms to give the appearance that the
liaison man shot him. Meanwhile when the liaison man and Li arrive at Li's house, Li tests the liaison man's identity with a red lantern as Granny and Tieh-Mei look on from the background. The liaison man gives the correct pass words, passes the test, and delivers the code to Li. Li is to deliver the code to the local Knife-Grinder (also an underground Communist) the following day.

In scene three when Li attempts to rendezvous with the Knife-Grinder at the gruel stall the Japanese gendarme approach. To protect the secret code, Li covers the slip of paper in his lunch box with a serving of gruel while the Knife-Grinder overturns his cart to divert the enemy's attention. The transfer of the secret code is aborted.

In scene four Wang, who has been brought in for questioning and tortured by the Japanese Chief, Hatoyama, confesses his alliances with the Communist Party and identifies Li as the accomplice who met the Communist liaison man with the secret code. As a result, Li is arrested for questioning in scene five. However, before Li had returned home and was arrested Hatoyama had sent a bogus liaison man to the Li house in an attempt to trick Li's mother and daughter into turning over the secret code. Tieh-Mei answers the door and is fooled by the man's disguise and use of secret pass words she has heard earlier. She goes to pick up the red lantern as a final test but is stopped by Granny, who picks up a kerosene lamp instead. The bogus liaison man does not recognize this final test and is thrown out of the house by Tieh-Mei who is angered that she was so easily fooled.
After Li's arrest, realizing the entire family is in danger, Granny tells Tieh-Mei the real story of her family so that she may understand the seriousness of the revolutionary struggles and carry on if anything happens to Granny and Li. Tieh-Mei learns that her real parents and Granny's husband (also a railway worker) had been murdered during a demonstration of workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway seventeen years ago. A young comrade (Chang Yu-ho, now Li Yu-ho) of Teih-Mei's real father rescued Chen's one year old daughter and took her to Granny to be raised as her own grandchild. Chang also took on Granny Li's surname and was recognized as her son and Tieh-Mei's father. Hearing this story of her past, Tieh-Mei understands the struggle and is determined to carry it on to avenge her family tragedies.

In scene six Li is questioned and tortured by Hatoyama. Wang is brought in to destroy Li's cool composure. Li denounces Wang as a traitor but does not divulge the whereabouts of the secret code.

In scene seven, the Knife-Grinder attempts to make contact with Granny to get the secret code. However, when he approaches the house and sees that the red paper butterfly (a signal to the underground communist forces) is not in the window he leaves. (Granny has taken the butterfly down to avoid further suspicion from the Japanese). Granny sends Tieh-Mei out through a loose stone in an inner bedroom which leads to the neighbor Hui-lieu's house, to find the Knife-Grinder. However, while Tieh-Mei is out, two Japanese spies come to
the house to question Granny. When they notice Tieh-Mieh's absence they ask her whereabouts. Granny says she is ill in the next room. They push Granny aside and lift the door curtain. A voice cries out, "Granny, who's there?" Convinced that it is Tieh-Mei the spies leave. Hui-lieu comes out of the room and tells Granny she came into the room when she heard Granny being questioned. As they talk, Tieh-Mei returns through the hole in the wall and recounts her unsuccessful attempts to find the Knife-Grinder. Hui-lieu returns to her house just as the Japanese gendarmie come to gather Granny and Tieh-Mei for questioning. They do not divulge the whereabouts of the code to Hatoyama.

In scene eight Li, Granny and Tieh-Mei are briefly reunited. Hatoyama gives them one last chance to turn over the secret code, then orders them executed. The three stand firm. Three gendarmes raise their guns, but only two shoot, leaving Tieh-Mei standing. Hatoyama demands she hand over the code. She glares at him. He releases her, hoping that she will lead him to the secret code.

In scene nine, Tieh-Mei returns home angered and vowing to be a revolutionary, avenge her grandmother's and father's martyrdom and deliver the secret code to the communist guerrilla base in Cypress Mountain. Her neighbors, Aunt Tien and Hui-Chien come to comfort her. Realizing that spies wait outside the door to trail her every move, Hui-lien changes clothes with Tieh-Mei (Tieh-Mei is reluctant as she does not want to
get them in trouble) and goes out the door quickly, followed by the gendarmes. Tieh-Mei slips through the hole in the wall and leaves Aunt Tien's house as Hui-lieu with the secret code and a red lantern in a basket on her arm.

In scene ten she finds the Knife-Grinder (remembering the Red Lantern test) and tells him of the Tien help. The Knife Grinder orders some guerrillas to go help the Tiens move to a safe place and to escort Tieh-Mei to the mountain base while he and another group of guerrillas go to fight an approaching group of Japanese gendarmes. In the final scene, Tieh-Mei, escorted by the Knife-Grinder, hands the secret code over to the guerrilla leader and holds the Red Lantern high.

Sanctions and Role-Models in the Model Revolutionary Operas

In each of the texts of the four "model" revolutionary operas we examined, we found sanctions being utilized as either initiators or reinforcers for the political learning process. The sanctions or rewards, given to the characters in the operas as they exhibited positive and correct political attitudes or behaviors, were usually extra food or clothing representing material gain or identity and acceptance by class, party, or politically correct (communist) groups. In Shachiapang, Aunt Sha, an elderly peasant woman takes care of the wounded New Fourth Army soldiers by unselfishly tending their wounds, washing their clothes, cooking for them, and most importantly, holding the correct political attitudes toward the CCP:

The Communist Party is like the bright sun/ . . . Without the Party my whole family would have died long ago.14
In return for her unselfish display of brotherly (class) love and of correct political attitudes Aunt Sha is given (rewarded with) extra food: "Go and hide Aunt Sha's grain in the jar buried behind her house." A similar sequence is presented in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, when old hunter Chang and his daughter are given food by the two P.L.A. officers in return for help in tracking down the bandits.

Negative sanctions (punishments) are equally important in establishing the correct political attitudes and behavior for the political learning process. As we have mentioned earlier, in the Chinese frame of reference, the most dramatic and effective punishment any individual could receive is to "lose face" or suffer public disgrace for a thought or action. According to his Confucian tradition, the average Chinese individual would do anything, including compromise himself to avoid losing face in his family, peer group, or, while interacting with a perceived authority figure. One can only assume, as the political system did during the Cultural Revolution, that vestiges of this Confucian past still influenced the thinking and dispositions of contemporary Chinese.

In all of the model revolutionary operas, we find the villain or negative role-models suffering the disgrace of loss of face. However, in On the Docks and The Red Lantern, the negative sanction functioning in the political learning process is most striking. In both of these model Revolutionary
Peking operas, we find loss of face being used as a negative sanction to highlight incorrect political thinking or behavior. As we shall see, the loss of face occurs when the individual is displaying attitudes or behaviors unbecoming a true Maoist. That is, they have committed the ultimate "sin" of selfishness, class betrayal, or disloyalty to the Maoist Communist cause. Each of these transgressions against the Maoist religious belief system was tantamount to politico-religious heresy.

In *On the Docks* both negative characters Chien Shou-wei, the archvillain, and Han Hsiao-chiang, the young dockworker cajoled by Chien, suffer loss of face. The character, Chien, having been caught by the Party Secretary in his wrongdoings projects confusion, embarrassment and nervousness (all external signs of loss of face) to the audience as the dialogue continues:

Fang: . . . I know you pay great attention to changes in weather. You've been doing this for a dozen years, haven't you?

Chien (noticing the insinuation behind her words, tries to cover up for himself): It's all for the good of the work. I contact the weather station every day.

Fang: Oh? . . . then you knew about the coming of the typhoon?

Chien (in confusion): Uh . . . no . . . no . . . I slip up sometimes. For instance today (embarrassed) I forgot to contact the weather station.

Fang: . . . So that is why you left two thousand sack of export wheat out in the open, eh? So that is why you changed the loading plan and wanted us to load the Scandinavian ship and leave the seed rice behind, eh? If we had done as you wished, then once the typhoon
started the foreign freighter wouldn't be able to set sail and the seed rice would miss the sowing season (for Africa). What a serious consequence that would bring.

Chein (flabbergasted and sweating profusely): that . . .
Fang: You've had a busy day. Go home now and rest.
Chien: (unwittingly): No . . . no . . . I must find Han!
Fang: So?
Chien (frightened by his own slip): No . . . no . . . I mean I must go back to the dispatcher's office! (turns to go . . .)
Fang: Chien Shou-wei, the dispatcher's office is over there!
Chien: . . . (slips out of the warehouse in utter confusion). 18

Further on in the opera Han, realizing he has been fooled by Chien, and, as a result, has caused near calamity by his incorrect political thinking and behavior (demeaning his class of dockworkers, selfishly asking for a transfer to become a sailor, and not owning up to his mistake of dropping the sack of wheat), declares (with remorse): I've been a fool."19 And at another point he sings with (shame and remorse in his heart):

I've been infected by bourgeois ideas,
How wrong of me to look down on dockers' work.
I should not have let down my elder's hopes,
Nor lightly believed that black-hearted Wolf (Chein).
Now I've brought trouble to us all,
I can hardly be forgiven, hardly be forgiven! . . .
Mixed feelings of remorse and shame
Bring tears to my eyes . . .20

In this passage, in addition to seeing an example of theme four—confession and conversion (see chapter IV) as illustrative of the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system, we also see vestiges of the Confucian ideal of filial piety--"not
letting down one's elders"--a virtue which had to be incorporated into a Maoist religious belief system. It was to function in the political socialization of the younger generation who had not experienced pre-1949 China, but who were being called on, nonetheless, to carry on the revolution; and to also indicate the suffering of their parents and all the generations of Chinese people before them. One can only imagine the impact of these negative sanctions on an audience having to return to the real world of the Cultural Revolution, where, at any time, a person could be singled out and criticized (or worse yet purged) for thoughts or actions considered politically incorrect or unbecoming of a "true Maoist." The use of role-models in the model revolutionary operas was probably equally effective in the political learning of the audience and deserves close attention here.

In general, role-models are particularly important factors in the political learning process in that they personify, in tangible terms, correct or incorrect political attitudes and behavior. As we mentioned previously, role-models simplify learning through identification and imitation. The individual learns correct political attitudes and behaviors by imitating the attitudes and behaviors of the role-model. Equally significant, the individual learns to avoid incorrect political attitudes and behavior by observing and identifying with the fate of the negative role-model as a result of his wrong doings. We have also noted that the role-model most accessible to the
political system is the hero (or the villain). From the official attention given to scrutinizing all aspects of the political and individual psychological personalities of the main characters (role-model/heroes) in the model revolutionary operas, it is clear that the pro-Maoist forces, under the guidance of Chiang Ching considered the functions of the role model/hero and role-model/villain crucial to the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution. Lois Snow has observed of the function of the hero in contemporary China: "Heroes in socialist China have little in common with capitalist-grown varieties. Model revolutionaries are people revered by the masses for having led—and most often lost—lives dedicated to service beyond the call of socialist duty, and who are meant to be emulated in daily life. They are not apart from ordinary citizens." 21 We observe further evidence of the significance of the hero in the model revolutionary operas in an article written by the "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" group of the Peking Opera troupe of Shanghai describing the "remoulding" of the hero Yang:

In the text it is explained that the original script (until changed in 1963) 'blatantly clamoured for prominence' to give Yang Tzu-jung 'dare-devilry and dashing roughness', that is 'bandit-like airs'. It called upon the hero 'to hum obscene ditties on his way up the mountain to the bandits' stronghold.' We criticized and repudiated this erroneous trend and made great efforts to achieve a typical portrayal of Yang as a hero in the image of the proletariat. The original script did not make the least mention of Yang's contact with the masses, to say nothing of describing the flesh-and-blood relationship and the Class feelings between him and the working people.
We cut out the two scenes about superstition and murder which were specially written to play up the negative roles (of the villains). These were replaced by a new scene, 'Asking about Bitterness', purposely designed to demonstrate the fish-and-water relationship between our army and the people and the flesh-and-blood relationship between the working people and Yang Tzu-jung who relies on the masses and conducts propaganda among them.

Thus the two essential sides to his character—class love and class hatred—are clearly defined. Without this, it would be impossible to detect the class traits in the hero's inner world and Yang would remain a reckless adventurer divorced from the masses . . . . Without accentuating Yang's political consciousness due to his being armed with Mao Tse-tung Thought, the audience would not know what ideological force propels him to go deep into the enemy's stronghold, and would not even feel worried about him or even doubt if he could succeed in his mission.22

The character of the hero Yang presents a role-model of a dashing—minus the roughness—courageous P.L.A. officer who personifies the Maoist virtues of self-sacrifice, class-love, and determination base (seen in theme three, chapter IV). In the revised script of the model opera, the new Yang's virtues are reviewed by the Chief of Staff while consideration is given to the choice of who will infiltrate the bandit's den:

Yang has all the qualifications to shoulder this load
Born of a hired-hand peasant family,
From childhood he struggled on the brink of death;
Burning with hatred, he found his salvation
In the Communist Party and took the revolutionary road
He joined the army, vowing to uproot exploitation
If I send him on this dangerous mission alone,
I'm sure, with his heart red as fire,
A will strong as steel,
He'll surely overcome Vulture.23

In both Shachiapang and The Red Lantern, the main heroes are more realistic than Yang and, yet must still romanticize the virtues of Maoism in political struggles. In every way, they conform to the functional requirements for all dramatic
heroes who "must now radiate revolutionary optimism and faith in Mao's concepts of communism." As role-models, they appear more human. Their lives, although set during the struggle against Japanese aggression in the 1930's, could be identified with by both young and old alike in contemporary China. Self-sacrifice to the point of death, such as that experienced by Li Yu-ho in *The Red Lantern*, was a continual commitment expected of every true Maoist, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. In *Shachiapang*, Kuo Chien-kuang mounts to the task of maintaining morale and the fighting spirit in his wounded soldiers and outwitting the enemy--tasks again not uncommonly expected of Maoist participants in the Cultural Revolution. Despite his realistic, non-dashing nature, Kuo has all the characteristics of a hero role-model:

A soldier born of the people . . . loyal to Chairman Mao, devoted to his people and motherland, and full of wisdom, courage and resourcefulness, he is the responsible, dedicated leader, a fierce fighter when he meets the enemy, an affectionate, pleasant young man when he relaxes and jokes with Aunt Sha. That he has reached the height of political maturity is stressed constantly.

Throughout all four model revolutionary operas, we find heroic characters. In our examination of the opera scripts, we have identified four types of hero characterizations. These are peasant hero, worker hero, army hero, and party hero. Each character type seems to represent a necessary socio-political element within the Maoist defined and accepted class referred to, in Mao's writings and speeches, as "the people." Within the context of political socialization during the Cultural
Revolution, each hero character type seems to represent some socio-political role to which individual within the Maoist Communist system should aspire, in order to comply with the stimuli generated by a political system influenced by Maoism. The peasant and worker roles are presented as the backbone of the revolution—indeed the society. The ideal peasant or worker, once imbued with Maoist Communist doctrine, is to epitomize the Maoist virtues of self-sacrifice, frugality, exemplary life style, class (brotherly) love, humility, and diligence. Their primary political function is to assist the Army and Party (proletariat) in whatever they design to be the correct road to "ultimate" Maoist socialism. We glimpse the significance of this association and function in On the Docks as Kao Chih-yang defiantly sings in response to the query, Can dockers really run the docks?

A tossed stone raises a thousand ripples,
My heart is turbulent as the Huangpu.
I am reminded of the past...
Before liberation battleships and freighters
Flying the stars and stripes, sailed haughtily,
Bringing weary dock workers only
Tears of blood and aching wounds.
Then the cannon of the P.L.A.
Dispersed the clouds that hid the sun,
And a powerful hand grasped the revolutionary seal
The Party calling on the dockers to rely on their own efforts
Show their strength, do a good job,
And win glory for our land.26

Characterizations of peasant or worker heroes are throughout the model opera. The character of Aunt Sha in Shachiapang displaying the virtuous attributes of Theme V (suffering, self-sacrifice, martyrdom. See chapter IV) pledges self-sacrifice
at the hands of the enemy in order to protect the Party under-
cover Agent Sister Ah-ching:

Even if they break my bones, I won't care! Shoulders back, I face the foe--
What's Sister Ah-ching doing here?
It's most likely the enemy's putting her to test.
I must protect her and face everything myself!27

Or, the dock workers in On the Docks who work three shifts
straight with no rest in order to find a missing sack of spilled
wheat that may have been mixed with spilled fiberglass fragments.
Or, finally, the peasant neighbors of the Li's who help the
young girl Tieh-Mei escape the Japanese gendarmerie and deliver
a secret code to communist guerrillas in the hills without care
for their own safety.

The Army heroes share much of the characteristics of the
peasant and worker hero types. However, in the texts of the
operas, emphasis is placed upon courage against impossible odds
(with Maoism as the primary source for the courage), as well
as class consciousness and class love. In a discussion above
concerning the importance of heroes in the model revolutionary
operas, we described the two outstanding army heroes, Kuo
Chien-kuang and Yang Tzu-jung, the dashing P.L.A. platoon
leader who bravely goes into the bandits den, disguised as a
bandit and singlehandedly outwits the enemy, bringing about
their defeat at the hands of the P.L.A. Yet, there are lesser
army heroes, whose significance as role models in the political
learning process cannot be understated. For example, the P.L.A.
Chief of Staff in Taking Tiger Mountain who, although an unnamed
character in the opera sings a very important proclamation for Maoism, ultimacy, and political correctness based on Maoism:

We're worker and peasant soldiers, come To destroy the reactionaries and change the world... With the Party and Chairman Mao leading the way, A red star on our army caps... Where the red flag goes dark clouds disperse... The People's Army shares the people's hardships.

And, the wounded, young New Fourth Army soldier, Wang, in Shachiapang, who makes light of his serious wounds and refuses to take medicine to heal his wounds because medicine is scarce and should be kept "for more serious cases" (which the textual and dramatic inferences suggest and, we must assume the audience realizes, should include Wang).

The Party heroes are by far the most dramatic and outstanding in the model operas. As role-models, they seem to personify the epitome of the Maoist religious belief system actualized within a political environment. In addition to exemplifying the Maoist virtues found in the other three hero types, Party heroes are also characterized as cool-headed and witty with the enemy and patient with others who aspire to be true Maoist, but seemingly falter along the way. This hero type seems to exemplify all of the themes (excluding Theme Four, Confession and Conversion) subsumed in the Maoist religious belief system (see chapter IV). They perform the miracles, they display the uncompromising faith in the power of Mao Tse-tung thought, they lead flawless virtuous lives, and express the commitment to suffer, self-sacrifice and die for Maoism.

In all scenes where the Party hero appears, the
character takes center stage. In times of crisis, all character heroes and role-models look to the Party hero for solutions, strength, etc. The Party hero seems to represent the "anticipatory" role of the proletariat—the political role to which most Red Guard youth during the Cultural Revolution aspired. In Shachiapang, Sister Ah-ching personifies class love as she "helps the old" and "guides the young" peasants of the village and boldly enters the "tiger's den" (Kuomintang/Japanese local headquarters run by the puppet army villains) not knowing that a trap may await her. The characters, Fang Hai-chen and Kao Chih-yang, in On the Docks, share the bill as Party heroes. Kao risks death to take a small boat out in a raging typhoon to catch a freighter set sail for Africa with one sack of spilled wheat in a shipment of rice seed. (It should be noted that the wheat was eventually being shipped to Africa as well.) Fang, on the other hand, delivers the soliloquy which highlights the importance of hero role models:

A gale of revolution is sweeping the world,
The hearts of awakened people are closely linked.
Mao Tse-tung Thought is conveyed
On the wings of east wind . . .
Steel-strong heroes tempered in a blaze . . .
Bravely they advance,
Displaying a militant internationalism.
Heroes by the thousands we have without end;
From them we must learn
To dedicate ourselves to the world revolution,
To be a never-rusting cog
In the great revolutionary machine. 31

And, finally, in The Red Lantern, we find the Party hero Li Yu-ho, who like Sister Ah-ching, boldly enters the enemy's trap and willingly undergoes torture and finally submits to death,
rather than divulge information:

Brought up by the Party to be a man of steel,
I fight the foe and never give ground.
I'm not afraid
To have every bone in my body broken,
I'm not afraid
To be locked up until I wear through the floor of my cell . . .
However hard the road of revolution,
We must press on in the steps of the glorious dead. 32

We have mentioned earlier the expectations of self-sacrifice to the death in the Maoist religious belief system (see Theme Five, chapter IV). Although each character hero type in the texts at some point avows his/her willingness to die, only two main heroes actually face martyrdom33 and only in one model revolutionary opera--The Red Lantern. Both peasant hero types, Granny Li, and Party hero type, Li Yu-ho, face death unflinchingly shouting "Long Live Chairman Mao!"34 We find it interesting to note that of all the hero types we have identified, the peasant and Party hero types are used to characterize the drama and glory of a martyr's death. One is reminded here of an analogous situation in early Christianity where within a classification schema of Christian-disciple-saint, it was the Christians and the saints upon whom the plight of martyrdom most often fell. We do not intend to infer here that the workers and army were not expected to voluntarily give up their lives should the occasion arise in revolutionary China. Rather we wish to emphasize the importance Mao placed on the peasants and Party in achieving his "ultimacy"--the Great Harmony of Maoist Communism.

Although we have given much attention to the hero as a
role model in the model revolutionary operas, we cannot neglect the minor role-models who promote correct political learning through their characterizations. We refer here specifically to the youth role-model and, surprisingly enough, the negative role-model or villain.

As we have mentioned earlier, much emphasis was seemingly placed on politically socializing the youth of China during the Cultural Revolution. Consequently it was particularly important in their political learning process to have youth role-models in the model revolutionary operas with whom China's youth could identify and emulate. Each model opera has a youth role model. However, the two most striking, and perhaps most representative of China's youth during the Cultural Revolution are Tieh-Mei, Li's daughter in The Red Lantern and Han Hsiao-chiang, the young dock worker in On the Docks. Tieh-Mei is immediately introduced to the audience as a "poor man's child." We are told that because of her class birth right she is a "good girl" and "competent in all she does." With regard to the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political learning process, the lesson is simple. Correct class identification and class consciousness equals "goodness". We see here a basic tenet of the Maoist religious belief system--the inherent "goodness" of the masses, the peasant and working lower class. Yet, amidst all the goodness of Tieh-Mei, we are struck by her naivete. She displays an innocent nonchalance about the struggles of revolution and the nature of the seriousness of the plight of her nation. As her
father and granny prepare to receive an undercover communist Liaison Man, Tieh-Mei asks innocently: "How is it I have so many uncles, granny?" When granny attempts to close the subject of the "uncles," Tieh-Mei responds in true childish cockishness, "Even if you won't tell me, granny, I know." She then goes on to assert her knowledge and understanding, such as it is:

I've more uncles than I can count;  
They only come when there's important business.  
Though we call them relatives, we never met before,  
Yet they are closer to us than our own relatives.  
Both dad and you call them our own folk;  
I can guess part of the reason why;  
They're all like my dad,  
Men with red, loyal hearts.

The level of her political knowledge and understanding is clear. She has an intuitive inclination (presumably as a result of her class and upbringing) yet does not fully comprehend the magnitude of the situation. It is as though she has observed well, yet has not had the training and insight to put it all together. Later we learn that this lacking is due to the fact that granny has "protected" her from the past:

For seventeen storm-tossed years I've kept quiet,  
Several times I wanted to speak,  
But I was afraid you were too young for the truth.

However, this protection from the past almost proves very costly as Tieh-Mei mistakenly comes close to destroying the family's cover as underground agents when she is fooled by the Bogus Liaison Man sent by the enemy to get the secret code. It is interesting to note here that both youth role models we
examine (Han in *On the Docks* as we shall see) blunder and make mistakes during their political learning process. Further, it is their contrition in conjunction with the embarrassment they suffer with "loss of face" for their misdeeds, which motivates them to begin learning the correct political attitudes and behavior.

Throughout the remainder of the opera, we watch Tieh-Mei blossom from a naive, protected child into a young revolutionary anxious to carry the revolutionary "Red Lantern" and knowledgeable of all the struggle and self-sacrifice that task entails. After having heard the truth of her background and the fate of her true parents, she proclaims:

Now I know I was raised in wind and rain . . .
Now with high aims I see my way clear.
Successors must carry forward the cause of our martyrs.
Here I raise the red lantern, let its light shine . . .
My father (adopted father Li) is as steadfast as the pine,
A communist who fears nothing under the sun.
Following in your footsteps I shall never waiver. . .
Generation after generation we shall fight on.\(^\text{40}\)

And, at home after having witnessed the execution of her father, Li, and Granny, we see correct political learning having taken root in young Tieh-Mei:

Granny, dad, I know what you died for.
I shall carry on the task you left
Unfinished and be the successor to the red lantern . . .
I'm prepared: arrest me, release me,
Use your whips and lash, your locks and chains.
Break my bones, you will never get the code . . .
This is Tieh-Mei's answer.\(^\text{41}\)

Tieh-Mei sneaks from under the watchful eye of the Japanese gendarmie (with the aid and self-sacrifice of her "class" neighbors), and succeeds in delivering the secret code to the
communist guerrilla forces in the mountains. One can only imagine the dramatic and emotional impact of this young role-model on Chinese youth in the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.

Han Hsiao-chiang, in _On the Docks_, is a youth role-model much closer to the real life experiences and attitudes of China's youth in the 1960's and, perhaps as a result, is much more complex and sophisticated than the character of Tieh-Mei. Han is a youthful dock worker assigned to the Huangpu River platform docks in Shanghai. He represents yet another dimension of China's contemporary youth in that he is restless and impatient, committed to the revolution, but only at an intellectual, esoteric level. He is unhappy with the meniality of dock work and feels his education should warrant him a more "important" position in the struggle. This feeling of educational elitism was apparent among China's youth during the 1960's and perhaps partially accounted for the intensity of the Cultural Revolution in schools and colleges throughout China, and for the eventual "shutdown" of higher education in China during (and after) the Cultural Revolution.

Another characteristic of role-model Han, critical to the political learning of contemporary Chinese youth, was his inability to determine right from wrong, Maoism from revisionism. His malleability at the hands of archvillain Chien results in his loss of face and responsibility for near political metamorphosis. Early in the opera, Han shuns overtime work to "find
the spilled sack" (which he spilled) in order to go to a movie about sailors and revitalize his dream of sailing the high seas to bring about Communist internationalism. In a confrontation with his team leader, Kao, he declares: "When my eight hours are up, I'm free." When he is reprimanded by Kao and reminded of his class origin, he returns: "What? Me, the son of a docker, a boy who grew up under the red flag--are you insinuating that I don't talk like a member of the working class? Are you claiming I talk like a capitalist?" In a period when, according to Mao and his supporters, youth could do no wrong and were the stalwarts on the road to Maoist communism, a youthful character in a model revolutionary opera uttering such heresies is surprising but not unexplainable. It seems that Mao walked a tightrope with regard to his support of the youth and Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution. On the one hand, China's youth were regarded as protected, unaccustomed to struggle, somewhat selfish, and certainly unprepared for the ardor of revolution. Yet, on the other hand, the burden of the revolution would be on their shoulders. They would have to be all the things they were not. There are two basic learning principles that can accomplish this end. First, to (dramatically) point out the student's shortcomings with the hope that the shock will result in an intensive effort to "catch up to" the expected norm. Or, second, to describe or perceive the student as you would have him be rather than as he presently is, with the hope that the student will put forth an intensive effort to match his projected image. It seems both principles
were being employed to politically "educate" youth during the Cultural Revolution. The role-model of Han presents the former principle; while Mao's reliance on the Red Guard as the preachers of Maoism, revolution, and Communist ideals seems to fulfill the latter principle. In this light, it seems important, then, to present the role-model Han somewhat negatively in an effort to reinforce political learning much the same way negative sanctions or punishments function in the process.

We see evidences of Han's continued brashness and defiance throughout most of the script. Afraid (as we have seen) that he will be caught and accused of political sabotage because of the spilled sack (a fear conjured by Chien to further his influence and manipulation of Han), Han approaches Party Secretary Fang to ask that his request for transfer (an unthinkable request of a true unselfish Maoist) from the docks be approved. He is confronted by Ma, a retired yet proud Maoist dock worker, who admonishes: "I saw through you as soon as I came to the dock, there's something wrong with the way you think." As we have seen in our synopsis, to confirm this suspicion, Han declares he will "quit" when he learns his transfer has not been approved. Yet, Fang apparently sees through Han's political incorrectness (in true Party hero form) as she observes:

Han's attitude is very strange.
Han--
Perhaps someone has cast you adrift alone in a boat,
You may drown in the murky waters.
An evil wind has shipped up the waves,
I must set out in the storm;
I'll haul your silly boat back to port,
Setting our course by the revolutionary markers.
Such a wind analogy might provoke any young impulsive Red Guard youth to think twice before choosing sides.

Fang declares her intentions to "reeducate" Han, but it is Ma, the old retired dock worker, who begins the process. In an effort to convince Han of the significance of his role in Mao's revolution, he recounts for Han the history of suffering, the reason for the death of Han's father, and the significance of dockers in Mao's China:

Now in our new society,
Thanks to the Party and Chairman Mao,
We dockers have risen, we are now
Proud masters of our country, care for
And insured against illness and death . . .
How can you casually toss away
Have you forgotten the roots
From which you've sprung?46

Yet, Han can only respond:

It's hard to let twelve years of learning go to naught,
Making a living with a carrying pole is no good,
Whatever you say.47

It is only when Fang divulges the negative thinking and wrong-doings of Chien to Han that he begins to feel remorse for his part in the accident of spilled wheat and begins to understand what his role should be in the revolution. Again, as in the case of Tieh-Mei, it is loss of face and embarrassment which provokes the motivation to learn political ideas and behaviors based on Maoism. Han declares:

I've been a fool . . .
Mixed feelings of shame and remorse
Bring tears to my eyes.
From now on I must be firm,
Sharp in vision and really determined.
Head high, I'll brave wind and rain
Battling on the docks, going through trials
To become tempered steel.48

The lesson here provided by the role-model character Han
is much more complex and perhaps more at the roots of the under-
lying impetus for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
In the character of Han, we observe the convergences of the
conflicts deep seated in China's past and present. From the
past, we see the conflict between the traditional religious
belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism--the pull between
self and community, the controversy over the "spiritual" impor-
tance of education. In China's present, this traditional con-
flict was being restructured and exacerbated by the pull
between "red" versus "expert"--ideologue versus pragmatist.
And every Chinese individual, particularly the youth who were
to inherit the New China were caught up in the web of conflict,
not knowing which way to turn. During the Cultural Revolution,
as we indicated earlier, the Maoist religious belief system
seemingly attempted to merge the traditional religious belief
systems of Confucianism and Taoism into one religious belief
system incorporating elements from each. Thus the true Maoist
was to be preoccupied with the discipline of self, yet self-
sacrificing for the community of class brothers; educated and
capable enough to carry the country to Maoist communism, yet
spiritual enough to recognize the ultimacy of Mao's communism.
Recent experience and observation of popular and official (anti-
Maoist) trends, however, seemed to indicate that self and
community, education and spirituality, and red and expert could
not coexist within the individual without self, educational elitism, and expertism taking precedence. Han most clearly epitomizes this fault. The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to politically resocialize China's population so that selflessness, spirituality, and redness would, not eradicate, but supersede self, education, and expertise, in influencing individual political attitudes and behavior. In order for this restructuring of tendencies to occur, a complete shift in the pendulum was required. The Maoist religious belief system was to function in this capacity through the vehicle of the model revolutionary operas. The population had to be all self-sacrificing, spiritual and red; and the Maoist religious belief system provided the emotional commitment and standard upon which this shift could be based. Han, reeducated in his thinking and disgraced by his display of selfishness and educational elitism, symbolizes such a shift as he vows: "I definitely will listen to the teachings of Chairman Mao, remould my thinking and be a revolutionary all my life." 49

As a result of the characterizations of the role-model Han and all the other role-models and sanctions carefully presented in the model revolutionary operas, the audiences should have begun to identify with and appreciate what was expected of them as true Maoists with correct political attitudes and behaviors. Yet, as we indicated in our learning model in the previous chapter, sanctions and role-models are initial functional requisites in the political learning process and symbolism (or in Merleman's terminology, a condensation of symbols)
are necessary to solidify the learning process in political socialization. We find symbols of the Maoist religious belief system as correctness in political attitudes and behavior throughout the model revolutionary operas and will present and discuss them extensively in the next chapter of this work.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

1 We do not intend to imply here any intention on the part of Mao or the Chinese political leadership to purposely propagate Confucianism, Taoism, or Maoism as a religious belief system. We mean here that we observe elements of Confucianism and Taoism simultaneously operating in what we identify as a Maoist religious belief system.


3 Even though most secondary schools, colleges and universities were eventually closed down as a result of disturbances during the cultural revolution, the policy of free primary education for Chinese children remained intact. In fact, during the Cultural Revolution it was decided that only the children of poor peasants, workers and party members (Mao's "chosen" class) deserved the right to attend school, particularly at the higher levels. While the children of families recognized as upper class, bourgeois or as political enemies were to be denied entrance or access to secondary or higher education because they did not have the "consciousness" to learn "correctly" and apply their acquired knowledge for the good of the Chinese people and the Maoist state.


5 Chiang Ching's attempts or desires to control the theatre in China may have begun in 1950 when she was a member of The Film Enterprise Guiding Committee which functioned under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and had censorship capacity. Serving on the Committee as "Madame Mao", Chiang Ching criticized a movie entitled "Inside Story of the Ching Court" claiming it was reactionary. Her interest in reforming theatre and drama continued. In 1964, Chiang spoke at the East China Drama Festival held in Shanghai calling for the creation of a new revolutionary theatre and, particularly, reform of Peking Opera. With this background, it should be clear why Chiang Ching was a natural choice to assume primary responsibility for creation, critique and reform of Peking Revolutionary Operas during the Cultural Revolution.


9 Ibid., p. 60.

10 Ibid., p. 64.

11 Ibid., p. 65.

12 Ibid., p. 68.

13 Ibid., p. 68.

14 Shachiapang, p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 5.

16 We posit this assumption based on the official statements emanating from the People's Republic that the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to rid the society of vestiges of the past—petty bourgeois, traditional thinking. For details see Peking Review, 1966, 1967.

17 Our attention is particularly drawn to the directors' cues provided in the parentheses indicating how the actor should portray the character.

18 On the Docks, p. 28.

19 Ibid., p. 38.

20 Ibid., p. 39.

21 Lois Snow, op. cit., p. 34.

22 Chinese Literature, Number 1, Peking, 1970, p. 15.

23 Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, p. 17.


25 Lois Snow, op. cit., p. 120.

26 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

27 Shachiapang, p. 41.
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, p. 35.

The Party hero type is not found in the model opera Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. Although we are struck by this omission as something that might warrant further research and analysis, such an undertaking goes beyond the scope of this present study. Thus we will not take the time here to explore or present probable reasons for this omission.

We refer here to the function of anticipatory roles in political socialization where the individual takes on the observed attitudes and behavior of a role to which one aspires. For example, individuals wanting to be doctors or lawyers assuming the observed characteristics of these professions long before the function in the role. For further explanations or detail we would refer the reader to: Sociology, Broom and Selznick, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1955.

On the Docks, p. 38.
The Red Lantern, p. 35.

We find secondary characters in Shachiapang (village peasants Wang Fū-ken and Peasant Liu) who suffer a martyr's death before a firing squad, Wang, for his refusal to divulge the names of communist Party members in the village and Liu because his son is in the New Fourth Army. However, although their martyrdom makes them heroes of a sort, they are not major character heroes and, are therefore not included here.

Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 40.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 24.
46 Ibid., p. 33.
47 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
48 Ibid., pp. 36 and 38.
CHAPTER VII

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AS A STANDARD FOR CORRECTNESS: SYMBOLS

One cannot begin to emphasize the importance of symbols and symbolism in the political learning process. Previously, we briefly mentioned the function of symbols in the learning process, particularly with regard to their role as reinforcers of political learning. In this chapter, we will focus our attention on the importance and specific functions of symbols and symbolism within the context of the Cultural Revolution in China. Our discussion begins by presenting our definition and understanding of the terms "symbol" and "symbolism." We will then present our analysis of the use and function of symbols and symbolism in the model revolutionary operas as they relate to the Maoist religious belief system and political learning during the Cultural Revolution. We accomplish this analysis by reviewing the use of symbols and symbolism in the model operas within the framework of the religious themes and criteria presented in Chapter Four, which assisted us in identifying the functionally religious elements of Maoism.

Symbols can be defined as tangible or cognitive representations of reality, past or present, and of abstract concepts upon which reality can be based. Or, more simply, we can view
symbols as expressions of a reality beyond symbols. Symbols are most often objects, but they can also be presented as a system of representations of an abstract concept. In the latter instance, the symbol is very much bound to a context or set of connotative norms present within the society. For example, in the United States, as well as most other western nations, democracy symbolizes freedom, while communism symbolizes a lack of freedom. However, within the context of a Communist Marxist political system, say perhaps The People's Republic of China or an Eastern European country, democracy symbolizes capitalism (a lack of freedom based on class) while socialism symbolizes freedom. In both cases, the symbolism is based on either an historical understanding or societal connotation of the abstract concept. Along this regard, Edwyn Bevan has identified two types of symbols. Symbols of the first type are "visible objects or sounds which stand for something of which we already have direct knowledge." According to Bevan, the purpose of this type of symbol is (1) to remind us of the object or concept being symbolized; or (2) to tell us something about the action or meaning of the object or concept at a particular moment; or finally (3) to prompt us to act in a certain way at a particular moment, regarding the nature of the object or concept, based on an awareness or understanding the symbol gives us.

The second type of symbols provide information about the objects or concepts they symbolize. Specifically, regarding the
nature of the object or concept, they convey to those who see or hear the symbols knowledge they do not have or perhaps even would not have, were it not for their cognitive awareness of the symbol. In the case of the first type of symbols, the symbol need not resemble the object or concept being symbolized. However, with the second type of symbol, where new information about the object or concept is provided by the symbol, the symbol must resemble the object or concept. In the political learning process (as well as learning in general), the second type of symbol often precedes the first.

For example, we first learn that the dove, a non-aggressive, docile bird of the pigeon family is the symbol for peace. In this learning instance, the peace-like characteristics of the dove closely resemble the concept of peace which is being symbolized. However, once this symbolic association has been made, it is then possible to expand the symbol of the dove to a more esoteric level. For example, we can begin to symbolize a politician's predisposition toward war or peace by use of the symbol dove. During the 1960's, United States Senator George McGovern was symbolized as a dove due in large part to his attitudes and disposition toward the Vietnam War. In this instance, the symbol of the dove tells us something about the object (i.e., the Senator) without any direct resemblance of that object. One would not necessarily find any meaningful resemblance between the man and the bird without prior knowledge of the symbolic meaning of a dove. We see here a
restatement of Merleman's discussion of the condensation of symbols stage of cognitive learning where the first type of symbols (non-resemblance to symbolized object) represent secondary reinforcement of political learning once legitimacy has been granted the political system.

Whether we define symbols as concrete objects (e.g., a bird) or intangible objects (e.g., a national ideology), what we are in fact attempting to study is an abstraction, an image or expression of an idea or object which may or may not bear resemblance to the idea or object being symbolized. The question becomes, how does one study and comprehend an abstraction? More importantly, how does one study how men or their societies use these abstractions which they have constructed from their social, cultural and religious histories or perceptions.

We know that "men use symbols to 'condition' or 'motivate' themselves and others." We further know that when symbols are used by men to "motivate themselves, the symbols function as "triggers to release forces whose power is derived from non-symbolic sources in nature, the body, or socio-political laws. . . ." That is to say, symbols can motivate men to acquire or express a particular behavior or attitude by initiating interpretations which are bound in the tangible reality of the individual or group. These interpretations derive their power to influence or persuade in that they have been previously established and accepted within the context of the society's reality.
With this knowledge then it seems most appropriate to study how men use symbols by observing the actual symbols used and the societal contexts in which symbols are used to motivate other men. In this regard Hadley Cantril in his study of the Psychology of Social Movements provides insight to this observation of the function and impact of symbols when he notes:

Symbols, such as flags, insignia, or caricatures of the enemy, are . . . short cuts crowded with meaning. People seem to get worked up into a higher emotional pitch when they are reacting to symbols than to general programs or ideologies.6

However, in our understanding of the function of symbols in the political learning process, before the individual can associate a flag symbolically to the nation, he must first learn symbolically what that nation stands for ideologically or what it means in terms of its conceptual identity.

In other words, the individual must first understand symbolically that America stands for freedom and democracy ideologically. This symbolic knowledge can be provided through historical context or through visual symbolic representations, such as the fifer and drummer picture of the revolutionary war which remind us of the fight for freedom and democracy. Once this level of symbolic association has been reached, the individual can then learn to associate the symbol of the flag with his nation and eventually with the concepts of freedom and democracy. When the individual then sees the symbol of the flag, he understands that even though a flag does not resemble a nation, freedom, or democracy, in concrete, tangible
terms, the flag symbolizes freedom and democracy for him.

What we find here, and in the above discussion of symbols, is a two-level, hierarchy of the cumulative functioning of symbols and symbolism in the political learning process. At the first level, the individual learns to relate to an object or concept only through symbols which resemble the object or concept, the symbolic association can be culture bound. There must also be, however, an obvious or explicit link between the symbol and the object or concept. At the second level, the individual learns to respond to symbolic representations of objects or concepts, where the symbol, not necessarily resembling the object or concept it symbolizes, may build on or expand from the individual's previous (level one) understanding of the symbol. We might represent the two-level function of symbols in the political learning process as shown in Figure 11.

We have alluded to the importance of symbols in the political learning process. When the individual is motivated to conform to certain attitudes and behaviors consistent with socio-political cultures and norms. We must also emphasize the importance of symbolic representations in a religious belief system, which can be observed to be functioning in the political belief socialization process. That is to say, a symbol associated with the religious belief system can also function as a type one or type two political symbol which generates or initiates political learning. Gerhardt Lenski's study of the role of the Catholic Church in the political socialization of
### Stages in Political Learning

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<td>Individual learning</td>
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**FIGURE 11**

**THE TWO LEVELLED FUNCTION OF SYMBOLS AND SYMBOLISM IN POLITICAL LEARNING**
children in Detroit provides an excellent example of this dual, religio-political function of symbols. Lenski found that the Catholic Church first isolated the children from elements in the dominant culture which might interfere with or contradict its symbolic religious doctrine. Once so isolated, the children were then taught to organize their lives around a particular set of sacred symbols associated with the Catholic religious belief system. Once this first level of symbolism (type two-resemblance) had been achieved, the children's political predispositions (association of political symbols) was dictated by the relationship of the religious symbol. Thus, according to Lenski's findings, a Catholic Democrat in Detroit would probably vote against a politician running on a Democratic platform who was suspected of communist inclinations, because in the Catholic Church Communism symbolizes atheism or at least non-belief in an Ultimate Being.

Within the context of a religious belief system, symbols perform the critical function of providing concreteness to the abstract. Religion by its very nature is beyond man's comprehension. Man neither knows or understands what the Ultimate is, or, for that matter, why an Ultimate need exist. He only believes that something called the Ultimate may exist and therefore may have influence or control over his life. This faith in an unknown is initiated and reinforced through the symbolic representation of that unknown. In some religions, the Ultimate Being, God, is symbolized as all powerful and knowing. Usually this symbol is presented as a larger than life face of a father-like figure (the power and wisdom of the authority
figure) projected in the sky. Yet, in other religions, the Ultimate is symbolized by nature. Tillich describes the symbolic characteristics of these religions: ". . . nowhere (else) is nature worshipped as such. Nature provides the symbols, but what they signify is not nature." Nature as the Ultimate Being (or as we shall see, the Communist state as the Ultimate) provides the symbolic, tangible reality upon which faith and commitment to the unknown can be based.

Traditionally, China has not been unlike other nations in its use of symbols and symbolism in the political learning process. The title of Son of Heaven given to the political leader, functioned as a type one symbol representing his association of the political system with the ultimate. The symbol of Heaven, as representative of ultimate power, was first established within the many religious belief systems in China's tradition, including the religious belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism upon which we have focused throughout this study. However, this symbolic claim to divine or ultimate right to political power made by the traditional Chinese emperors can also be found in societies from Ancient Egypt to the British Empire. As we have just discussed, what distinguishes these symbolic claims one from the other is solely the cultural context, particular to each society, upon which level one (concrete object) symbols can be based and learned. It is the cultural context which gives the level one symbols their power to influence and persuade the population.
In contemporary China, particularly since the May Fourth Movement of 1919, symbols and symbolism (both level one and level two) have been generated and communicated esoterically through drama and literature. Much of the symbolism, particularly in drama, has been and is still being based on the traditional rigid structure and format of Classical Peking Opera and on China's historical context. Because classical Peking Opera established basic, level one symbolic associations (as we shall see below), it was relatively easy to generate second level symbols which reinforced the learning of correct political attitudes and behavior, based on the tenets of the Maoist religious belief system. In fact, the culmination of second level symbols in contemporary China occurred during the Cultural Revolution through the medium of the model revolutionary operas, which, as already mentioned, had their roots in classical Peking Opera.

The Use of Symbols and Symbolism in Classical Peking Opera

Classical Peking Opera as we know it had its origins during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). Capital operas (Ching hsi'), as classical Peking opera was first called, represented an amalgamation of various provincial styles of song and dance that had developed in China since at least as far back as the T'ang dynasty (618-906 A.D.). Throughout its development classical Peking Opera has been replete with symbols and symbolism. The actor in classical Peking opera studied six to ten years before appearing on stage. His education consisted of arduous training
in symbolically representing traditional Chinese characterizations, moods, and emotions, action, events, and the like.

On the stark, paucily propped stage of classical Peking opera, the actor had the sole responsibility of carrying the audience through the adventures and plots of the dramas with only his ability to symbolically convey action, reactions, attitudes, and experiences through his dance movements, stage entrances and exits, costumes, and song. The level of symbolism used spanned basic mime movements to subtle intonations and variations in acrobatic movement. There were four major classifications of stage character: shen, male lead character; tan, female lead character; ching, painted face character, usually denoting a warrior or god; and ch'ou, the clown character. Each character had its particular symbolic meaning, costume, make-up, body movements and song type.

As a result of this rigid and specified symbolism, the audience could understand the nature of the plot including the intricacies of interpersonal interaction among the characters, without any prior knowledge of the drama or its plot. In fact, it has been observed that the plot was of little importance to the audience. Rather the audience was critically concerned with the actor's technical ability in portraying the symbolic meaning of his role. This intricacy of symbols and symbolism, as presented in classical Peking opera, is alien to the western theatregoer, and may be overlooked by the researcher or analyst.
using Chinese theatre or drama to gain understanding or insight into the dynamics of Chinese society and politics (traditional or modern). We deem it important here to briefly typify the extent of intricacy of symbolism in the classical Chinese theatre by discussing the symbolic role of sleeve movements (hsiu). Although the discussion, in its detail, will be peripheral to our analysis of the functions of symbols in traditional Chinese drama, it will assist the reader in appreciating the importance of intricacy of symbols in the communication of plot, content and emotional expression to the audience.

A Brief Review of the Symbolism of Sleeve Movements in Traditional Peking Opera

Sleeve movements were critical in the symbolic representation of emotion in classical Peking Opera. These movements were performed by the actors and actresses using long cuffs of white silk (water sleeves, shui hsiu), which were attached to the appropriate character costume of the actor and could range anywhere from one and a half to two and a half feet long. Each of the one hundred and seven movements of these water sleeves performed by the actors had a specific term and a specific symbolic meaning. There was no allowance for variations in these movements. We cite six such movements as examples: in the 'shuang tou hsin' sleeve movement, used only by the tan character, the actor raises both arms, with palms inward and sweeps his sleeves downwards from the chest to the knees and then with a turn of
the wrist flings the water sleeves back, a little to the right. This sleeve movement is used to symbolize worry or anxiety.
In the "T'ou hsün sleeve movement, only performed by the Ch'ing character, the actor flings both water sleeves out either to the right or left. If to the left, the head looks right and vice versa. This movement symbolizes making a decision or anger.
An actor symbolizes his helplessness or inability to solve a problem by holding his arms slightly bent and allowing the water sleeves to drop out of the folded position in a movement called "Chih hsün."

To symbolize sorrow or grief, the actors employs the "Shuang fan hsün" sleeve movement in which both hands are raised above the shoulders (a space of two inches only separating the hands as they perform the movement while the arms are bent) and the wrists moved in a circular movement which flings the sleeves upward to hang down the back. In conjunction with this movement, the foot is stamped twice on the floor. (Where just the right sleeve is used and the foot is stamped only once, the movement symbolizes sorrow at being left behind or parting from a husband or lover.) With the "Che hsün" sleeve movement, the actor symbolizes embarrassment by holding the right hand against the chest in an upward direction, while the left arm is bent with the water sleeve held before the face to conceal it. The actor's head must be turned away looking downwards towards the right. And, as a final example of the intricacy and symbolic subtlety of sleeve movements, we have the "Shuang Yang hsün" movement which symbolizes happiness or excitement.
where the actor raises both hands with palms down to chest height then turns his hands quickly flicking the water sleeves outward.

From this brief encounter with the art and symbolism of water sleeve movements in classical Chinese operas (along with the knowledge that similar intricacies existed in like detail for movements of the head, foot, hand, eye, and of acrobatics), one can begin to grasp the level of symbolic association that has become the cultural norm for Chinese theatre goers. Through classical Chinese theatre the audience was taught to perceive reality through symbols and symbolism. Abstract concepts, objects, and real life issues and problems were presented and understood symbolically. One could perhaps speculate that this cultural history of symbolic learning and association has placed the majority of China's theatre going population, which probably approaches seventy-five to eighty percent of the entire adult population in Contemporary China, at our second level of learning (non-resemblance of symbols to object or concept).

In any event, we can assume that the contemporary Chinese audiences viewing the model Revolutionary Peking Operas during the socio-political chaos and confusion of the Cultural Revolution, had a theatrical history of associating with and understanding reality, societal problems, and life's experiences through symbols and symbolism, which would facilitate their grasp of the esoteric symbolism utilized to convey correct political attitudes and behavior, based on the Maoist religious belief system in the model operas.
The Use of Symbols and Symbolism in the Model Revolutionary Operas

The model revolutionary operas which dominated the stage during the Cultural Revolution did not contain all of the symbols and symbolic gestures and movements found in the classical Chinese theatre. The costumes, scenery and props are much more explicit representations of reality, and, as a consequence do not warrant extensive symbolism. We do find, however, an integration of the same use of the classical symbolisms of make-believe (e.g., the modern day villain has a greyish-green face much the same as his theatrical predecessors), acrobatic technique, and the use of colors. (For example, red was used in classical Chinese theatre to symbolize strength and honesty; and in the model revolutionary operas, red carries over the same symbolic meaning although the context and usage is appropriate for the next context.) Yet, what is interesting is the genre of symbols and symbolism employed in the model revolutionary operas of the 1960's.

Throughout all four model operas, we find symbols and symbolism which represents Maoism as a religious belief system and as a learning tool through which the correct political attitudes and behavior expected of the viewing population are transmitted. We will review the major symbols and uses of symbolism as we have observed them. Throughout this discussion, we will also emphasize a secondary function of the symbol in political socialization—that of the role symbols play in providing a "definite objective toward which action can be directed."
The symbol, as we illustrated in our learning model, no matter what its type or level, has a primary function to facilitate the association and understanding of the intangible or abstract in relation to objective reality. The symbol is perceived to represent, and then eventually to be reality. From a political learning perspective, if the society can be taught to perceive the same associational relationships between symbol and reality, then to manipulate the symbol is to manipulate reality and control the society's understanding of its position and relationship to reality.

In the case of China during the Cultural Revolution, control of symbols and reality was critical to the maintenance of power, and more importantly to the maintenance of legitimacy. The Maoist religious belief system, as it was presented in the model revolutionary operas (as well as in news media and other means of political communication), provided the symbolic basis on which correctness vis-a-vis the individual's relationship to a political reality could be based and controlled. We will illustrate this, and our other assertions regarding the functional interrelationship of symbols, the Maoist religious system, and political learning below.

**The Model Revolutionary Operas as Thematic Symbolism**

Each of the four model revolutionary Peking operas is of itself a symbolic representative contemporary Chinese political reality, particularly the reality of the Cultural Revolution. It is probably safe to assume that this symbolic nature of the
operas was intentional given the great care and official\textsuperscript{16} attention concerning their many structural and content (i.e., script) revisions. \textit{Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy} and \textit{Shachiapang} provide the symbolic conceptualization of right versus might. Their thematic contents symbolically emphasized the power of correct political attitudes and beliefs (based on the Maoist religious belief system) over the brute force of the enemy--the anti-Maoist with incorrect political attitudes and beliefs. In \textit{Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy} the main character Yang, a true Maoist communist, boldly and single-handedly infiltrates the bandits' den, armed only with virtue and righteousness of the Maoist religious belief system:

\begin{verbatim}
A Communist always heeds the Party's call,  
He takes the heaviest burden on himself;  
I'm set on smashing the chains of a thousand years 
To open a freshet of endless happiness for the people.

Well I know that there's danger ahead,  
But I'm all the more set on driving forward;  
No matter how thickly troubled clouds may gather, 
Revolutionary wisdom is bound to win.

Like the Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains, 
I shall break through every obstacle; 
The flames that blaze in my red heart 
Shall forget a sharp blade to kill the foe.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{verbatim}

The symbolism found particularly in the last paragraph provides an excellent example of second level symbolism based on the Maoist religious belief system and the representation of political correctness. The symbol of the Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountain is well associated with the Maoist religious belief system's themes which include the virtues of diligence (theme three) and faith (theme two) as discussed in Chapter IV.
Upon this second level symbol is based the symbolic representation of the strength of a red (symbol of strength and honesty) heart against the real, and potentially fatal weapons of the enemy. Here, returning briefly to western religious symbolism, one might be reminded of the symbolism of the Christians facing the brute, savage forces of the lions in the Roman amphitheatre, with only their faith as their shield. Through this use of symbolism conveyed by the character Yang, the Chinese audience learns the invincibility of correct political attitudes and behavior based on Maoism. During the confusion and panic caused by the power struggle within the Cultural Revolution, no better lesson could be symbolically conveyed to the millions of Chinese who were to follow the brave role-model Yang into the enemy's den.

Sister Ah-ching, in the model opera Shachiapang displays equal symbolic heroism as she, armed with righteousness of Maoism, double-deals with the enemy to protect the wounded New Fourth Army soldiers, and inferentially the entire village. Although secondary characters (fellow villagers) participate in the undermining of the enemy, it is made symbolically clear that it is Sister Ah-ching with her understanding and practice of Maoist virtue and principles, who singlehandedly sabotages the enemy right under their noses:

The New Fourth Army is marching back east to smash the "mopping-up" (of the Kuomintang) The sun will soon shine over Shachiapang. . .
On instructions we've reconnoitred All enemy positions except this headquarters
Now I have a chance to enter the tiger's den
To see what's going on here . . .

Here again the symbolism of right versus might, spiritual righteousness (based on Maoism) versus brute force, is reinforced.

Thematically, the other two model revolutionary operas being examined here have different symbolic emphasis vis-a-vis the Maoist religious belief system, although their function in the political learning process does not differ. The revolutionary opera, *On the Docks*, presents a symbolic theme critical to the Maoist religious belief system, particularly with respect to its attempted integration of the Confucian and Taoist religious systems. The spiritual, moral, and political struggle between community and self, is portrayed within the broader Maoist political context of class consciousness. Their critical portrayal is focused around the seemingly secondary "middle character"²⁰ Han Hsiao-chiang. Young Han, in many ways, typifies the traditional tug between the Confucian virtue of exemplifying self and the Taoist virtue of loyalty and self-sacrifice for community interests which Maoism, particularly during the period of the Cultural Revolution, sought to combine in a functional religio-political belief system. It was important in promoting total political and social participation in contemporary China to stress the cultural tendency of exemplary personal behavior and self-actualization founded in Confucianism and, yet, to simultaneously stress the cultural predisposition toward community, family, and brotherhood at the core of Taoist doctrine.
To combine these contradictory traits without having one, particularly self, supersede the other was indeed a formidable task for a functional religious belief system within the context of traditional Chinese influences. In On the Docks, the Maoist religious belief system symbolically successfully rises to the formidable task of the "confession and conversion" of young Han (cited earlier). However, whether this symbolic success represents reality or is but a manipulation of reality for political socialization purposes remains a question we will address in the final concluding chapter of this work.

As was mentioned above, the character Han provides us with an interesting look into the conflict between self and community within the symbolism of contemporary Chinese drama. Han is committed to the community of revolutionary class brothers, both international and domestic. His internal conflict and confusion stems from his misguided illusions as to how he should serve the community—what his role should be. He is convinced, especially through the misguidance of the archvillain Chien, that one's contribution is meaningless unless it is dashing and exemplary (perhaps like that of Yang Tzu-jung in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy). His faulty interpretation of Maoism was expression of the self for the betterment of the community (a notion well founded in Confucianism). Toward the end of the opera, it is revealed that Han's lack of enthusiasm and commitment is attributable to his feeling that docker's work does not count at the present stage of socialist
construction. His "dream" (symbolic reinforcement) is to be a sailor, a role he mistakenly perceives as being more significant and critical for bringing about Maoist "international" socialism. We are here reminded of Freud's analysis of the symbolism of dreams and their meaning and function in the actual life experience of the dreamer. Although, in a wakeful state, Han fantasizes about his interpretations of the actuality of a sailor's life. He "displaces" his reality of being a dock-worker with a fantasy that is more significant--his illusionary life as a sailor. Caught up in the interpretive symbolism of his "dream", he righteously rejects the carrying pole which symbolizes menial and insignificant dock work in his eyes. He declares:

If I'd been born twenty years earlier I too would have used that pole on the foremen and the American gangsters. But now we're in the middle of socialist construction. I want to make an even bigger contribution... I want to be a seaman and deliver our goods personally to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America in support of their struggle. That is really great internationalism.

His dilemma is critical to the Maoist religious belief system and to the political socialization process, if it is to result in political participation. And, his character symbolizes the struggle, the traditional tug-of-war between elements embodied within the Maoist religious belief system.

The theme of the model revolutionary opera *The Red Lantern* has the most direct symbolic reference to the Maoist religious
belief system. The red lantern used by the Li family to test the identity of CCP underground members symbolizes the function of the Maoist religious belief system in testing the dedication of the Maoist to the causes of revolution and, ultimately, communism. It also symbolically functions as a critical element in the growth of Li's young daughter, Tieh-Mei, from a protected, innocent, young girl to a Maoist revolutionary. After being told the significance of the red lantern by her adopted grandmother, Li:

For many years this lantern has lighted the way for us poor people, and us workers. Your grandfather used to carry this lantern, and now your dad carries it. . . . We can't do without it at crucial moments. Remember, this red lantern is our family treasure. 23

Tieh-mei understands the symbolic relationship between the red lantern and the revolutionary struggle for Maoist communism, including what her role should be in the struggle:

Granny has told me the story of the red lantern, The words are few, but the meaning is deep. Why are my father and uncle not afraid of danger? Because they want to save China, Save the poor, defeat the Japanese invaders. I realize I should act as they do, And be a person like them. I am seventeen, no longer a child, I should share my father's worries. If he's carrying a thousand pound load, I should carry eight hundred. 24

For the youth participants in the Cultural Revolution, this symbolic representation of the Maoist religious belief system as the salvation for China and the poor, and as the weapon which provides invincibility against danger, must have been a critical lesson in their political learning, reinforced
by their youthful identification with the character Tieh-mei. To further this symbolism of the red lantern representing the function of the Maoist religious belief system and the expected role of individual service to Maoism, this is the only model opera where principle characters actually die a martyr's death (all major characters in the other three model revolutionary operas profess their commitment to sacrifice their lives for the ultimacy of Maoist communism, but are not called upon in the plot to fulfill their vows).

In addition to the symbols and symbolism of the major themes of the model revolutionary operas under consideration, each has a wealth of symbols and symbolism in their respective texts which contribute to the political learning process by symbolically presenting correct political attitudes or behaviors of characters based on the Maoist religious belief system. We will focus our discussion on secondary, yet critical uses of symbols and symbolism below.

The Function of Symbols in the Model Revolutionary Opera's Religious Themes

During the Cultural Revolution correct political attitudes and behaviors consisted of acceptance and adherence to the Maoist religious belief system. As was discussed in Chapter IV of this work, the principle themes of the Maoist religious belief system (directly related to how Maoism influenced individual behavior and attitudes) included the virtues of
faith in the power of Mao Tse-tung thought, class (brotherly) love, diligence, humility, and a belief in the ultimacy of Maoist communism as a solution to China's socio-political needs. To conform to these principles meant total unselfish commitment in political participation. This manner and degree of compliance was recognized officially (in the pro-Maoist camp) as political correctness. To reject any one or all of these principles was officially regarded as bourgeois revisionism, rightism, or in other words politically incorrect behavior.

In China during the Cultural Revolution, the symbolic representation of the distinction between political correctness and incorrectness was no less blatant than the symbolism of the white hat of the good guys and the black hat of the bad guys prevalent in the Western adventure tales of the United States. In the case of China, the symbolic distinction was between "red" versus "expert." To be "red" was to believe and participate in Maoism—to place ideology and doctrine before specialization and pragmatism; to be recognized as a Maoist, a "good guy." On the other hand, to be "expert" was to believe and participate in modernization with little if any consideration for ideology or doctrine—to be pragmatic before ideological; to be recognized as a supporter of bourgeois revisionism, a Liu Shao-chist, a "bad guy". To be placed in this latter category was to be subject to the repudiation and purge by the Red Guards and other groups of Maoist supporters.

The primary, dual purpose of the Cultural Revolution,
however, was not only to purge anti-Maoists, it was also to pro-
mote political socialization, particularly among the youth--
to promote learning through experience, revolution through parti-
cipation in political struggle. The model revolutionary operas
were probably critical in their capacity to allow the audiences
to experience vicariously the experiences and political struggles
of the stage characters through symbols and symbolism. One
such example of this use of symbolism is found in The Red
Lantern where the Maoist hero Li engages in a pre-torture dia-
logue with the Japanese archvillain Hatoyama which is full of
religious and political symbolism:

Li (sounding the enemy out coolly): I am a poor worker
and like to be straightforward. Anything you have
in mind, just speak out.
Hatoyama: Quite frank! Come on, old friend, drink up.

Li: It's very kind of you, Mr. Hatoyama. Sorry, I don't
drink. (Pushes the cup away, takes out his pipe and
lights it.)

Hatoyama: You don't drink? There's an old Chinese saying,
"Life is but a dream." It passes in a flash. There-
fore, as is well said, "Enjoy wine and song while we
can, for tomorrow we die."

Li (blowing out his match contemptuously): Yes, listening
to songs and drinking the best wine is the life of an
immortal. I hope you always lead such a life and I wish
you "long life," Mr. Hatoyama. (Throws away the
match sarcastically.)

Hatoyama: Hah . . . (Forcing a smile.) Old friend, I am
a believer in Buddhism. A Buddhist sutra tells us,
"The bitter sea has not bounds, repent and the shore
is at hand."

Li (counter-attacking): I don't believe in Buddhism. But
I've heard the saying "The law is strong, but the out-
laws are ten times stronger."*

Hatoyama: Well said, my friend. But this is only one
kind of creed. As a matter of fact, the highest human
creed can be condensed into two words.

Li: Two words?

Hatoyama: Right.

Li: What are they?

Hatoyama: "For myself."

Li: For yourself, eh?

Hatoyama: No, every man for himself.

Li: (pretending not to understand): "Every man for himself"?

Hatoyama: Right. Old friend, you know the saying, "Heaven destroys those who don't look out for themselves"?

Li: Oh, Heaven destroys those who don't look out for themselves?

Hatoyama: That's the secret for doing everything.

Li: So there's such a thing as a secret for success in life?

Hatoyama: There's a secret for doing everything.

Li: Mr. Hatoyama, for me your secret is like trying to blow up a fire through a rolling-pin. It just doesn't work.

(Hatoyama is taken aback.)

(*Here "law" means the reactionary ruling class while "outlaws" means the revolutionary spirit of rebellion of the proletariat and revolutionary people in their struggle against the reactionaries. In striking back against Hatoyama, Li Yu-ho uses this saying to imply that the Japanese bandits may ride roughshod for a time, but it is the revolutionary people who are really strong. The Japanese bandits are doomed. The Chinese people are sure to win.)

This passage is replete with esoteric symbolic references to elements of the Maoist religious belief system and its political function. The audience has already been made aware of the fact that the character Li is a true Maoist exemplifying correct political attitudes and behavior earlier in the opera.
In this instance, Li "leads on" Hatoyama to divulge his heretical belief in Tradition (i.e., the old Chinese saying quoted, the reference to Buddhism, and the Confucian element of self) to the audience. As Li in his "goodness" is obviously the opposite of Hatoyama in his "badness", the audience is led symbolically to understand that Li's convictions and beliefs are also the opposite of Hatoyama. This use of symbolism is further reinforced later in Li's encounter with Hatoyama when the latter declares that his job is to issue passes to Hell. Li's response is symbolically representative of the role every Maoist communist should serve against the "devil": "You know very well what my job is." Li returns, "I'm the one who will demolish your Hell." The symbolism is strong and the message is clear. With particular regard to the religious overtones of the symbolism, one is reminded of the role of Christ and his Christian followers to fight to devil, and thus in a manner of speaking to demolish Hell.26

Specifically, from our examination of the model operas, we find illustrative examples of various symbolic representations of the major themes we have identified in the Maoist Religious belief system. We will cite certain of these examples below:

**Symbolic Representation of Theme Two -- Faith in the Power of Mao Tse-tung Thought:**

In our discussions of faith as a religious theme found in Maoism in Chapter IV we defined faith as an expression of belief
in the actuality or existence of an object, being or event where this belief is not founded in knowledge (either experiential or acquired). Symbols of faith can be presented as expressions of belief or as declarations of the individual's willingness to commit himself to a thought, action or deed based on a presumed belief. Simply, faith is an expression or declaration of individual perception. Religion, as we have defined it, consists of man's perceptions of the unknown—interpreted differently within various cultural contexts. In religious terms then, faith is man's declaration of commitment to his perceptions of the unknown.

We have already illustrated certain perceptions during the Cultural Revolution which recognized Mao and his thoughts as divine, sacred or, at the very least, transcendental to man's reality and capabilities. In this regard we would identify the cult of Mao (which, at the very least nurtured these perceptions of Mao) as a level one function of symbolism promoting the lesson of the absoluteness of the legitimacy and authority of Maoism. The cult of Mao fostered a faith in the sacred power of Mao Tse-tung Thought. We cite from the model operas two examples of the symbolic expression of this faith. In Shachiapang as Sister Ah-ching attempts to mentally construct a rescue plan to move eighteen wounded soldiers from under the scrutinizing nose of the enemy, she symbolically expresses her faith that the power of Mao Tse-tung Thought will guarantee her success as strains of "the East is Red" seem to ring in her ears:
Chairman Mao/  
With your teachings . . . 
I can certainly meet this test and beat the enemy. 27

Her faith is not explicitly expressed to the audience by direct declarations of her faith. It is presented in symbolic abstraction. Without her stating explicitly she has faith in Mao's teachings, her faith is symbolically implicit in her statement about them.

We find another symbolic expression of faith in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. When Yang, as he attempts to slip out information to the communist forces from his undercover position within enemy lines, declares:

I must never forget to be bold yet cautious,  
And succeed through courage and wits.  
The Party's every word is victory's guarantee,  
Mao Tse-tung Thought shines forever.28

We see here the character Yang's declaration of commitment to his perception of the power of Mao Tse-tung Thought. It is eternal. And, within any social or cultural context what is eternal is powerful and, we might add, symbolically expressive of the sacred or divine.

Symbolic Representation of Theme Three -- Virtuous Lifestyle:

We have established previously, to be virtuous was to be frugal, diligent, expressive of brotherly (class) love, and so on. All of the positive role model characters in the model revolutionary operas serve as symbols of this theme. As we have seen, great care was given to develop positive role models within the operas; each was exemplary of these Maoist virtues.
We have highlighted some of these examples in the previous Chapter and will do so further on in this chapter in our discussion of the function of symbols in identifying the criteria which help us recognize Maoism functionally as a religious belief system.

However, what we will emphasize here is that care has been given to making sure that all lesser characters (unnamed village peasants, dockworkers, and New Fourth Army and P.L.A. soldiers) also symbolize Maoist virtue. Even at the most unassuming levels, these characters exude Maoist virtue in their day to day lives. At various points in the operas, the main hero refers to these nameless role models as heroes to symbolize their adherence to and the collective display of Maoist virtue.

We will present examples of the symbolic expressions of Themes Four (Confession and Conversion) and Five (Suffering, Self-Sacrifice and Martyrdom) in the section below. We defer this discussion thusly, because we feel the symbolic expressions are more illustratively presented within the framework of our analytical criteria for identifying religious belief systems.

The Function of Symbols in Identifying Maoism as a Religious Belief System: Criteria

We can begin immediately to cite examples of expressions of symbols and symbolism which further highlight the application of our analytical criteria (i.e., (1) Ultimacy; (2)
Orientations to Life; and (3) Religious Experience) on our study of the function of Maoism in political socialization.

Criteria One—Ultimacy:

Symbolic references to a Maoist notion of ultimacy for the Chinese state are found throughout the model revolutionary operas. Most striking are those found in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, where the hero Yang declares:

Destroy Vulture, and win liberation for the people, 
Rise as masters and greet the sun in these deep Mountains 
Follow the savior the Communist Party, 
And bring the land a new life, 
Like our old home in Shantung, 29
Good days will be here forever.

And in The Red Lantern we find Li symbolically alluding to the ultimacy of the New China and the meaning of his struggle relative to this ultimacy as he awaits the martyr's death:

... The red flag of revolution is raised on high, 
The flames of resistance spread far and wide ... 
Once the storm is past flowers will bloom, 
New China will shine like the morning sun, 
Red flags will fly all over the country 
This thought heightens my confidence 
And my resolve is strengthened. ... 30

And finally in On the Docks in the final scene the dock workers with party hero Fang: sing as the red sun rises slowly in the background:

We dockers follow our Communist Party, ... 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought in our minds, 
We march on towards communism. 31

We shall change the old world thoroughly.

Holding the red flag high, we charge!

In each of these instances the reference to the sun symbolizes Mao. This level two symbol is based on a first level
symbolism found in the revolutionary song "The East is Red" where Mao is directly referred to as the morning sun rising in the east. It is this sun, returning to the above quotes, that will symbolically bring forth the ultimacy of the "new life" and the "new China." The symbolism of the red sun and the "new China" are significantly expressive of the sacred. We do not view this symbolic reference to the ultimacy of a "new China" as secular or materialistic in a Marxist sense. The imagery transcends the secular. The symbols express contemporary Chinese perceptions (in this case Mao's interpretive perceptions) of a sacred ultimate that provides meaning for the present. Hugh Duncan, in his study of the role of symbols in societal communication furthers this point:

> All goals, ends, purposes, heavens, hells, any ideal future whose immanence invests action to such a degree that what is happening now can only be understood by what will happen then, offer peculiar temptations to mystifications. Christian eschatology, Marxist classless heavens, and Wagnerian erotic immolations are but a few of these imagineries, yet powerful, futures. . . . Once the promise (of these futures) is symbolized, and these symbols become sacred, they are no longer subject to critical discussion.32

Duncan sees symbols of ideal or ultimate futures as powerful in their influence on man's attitudes and behavior in his present life experience. This relationship, as we have stated earlier, between the present reality and the hypothetical, unknown future, serves as a basis for man's perception of that ultimate future as sacred, no matter what the context.

Further use of symbolism establishes belief in this ultimacy as correct political thinking. It is the heroes (the
dockers are also class heroes in their own right) in each case who declare their belief in this ultimacy of a new Maoist China. Their role as heroes symbolizes their correctness and the correctness of their political thinking. Thus the audience can learn from this use of symbols that belief in and contribution toward this Maoist ultimacy is politically correct. Again, referring to the period of the Cultural Revolution, which was intended to set China ideologically straight on the road to the Maoist ultimacy, this lesson had to be perceived by pro-Maoists as critical.

Criteria Two--Orientations to Life

With regard to the symbolic references to the Maoist religious doctrine establishing orientations to life, we find illustrative examples in the model operas. As we indicated in Chapter IV, six specific orientations to life found in Themes Three and Five could be identified in the Maoist religious belief system. They were 1) selflessness and love for class brothers; 2) self-sacrifice--commitment to the point of death; 3) modesty and humility; 4) frugality; 5) diligence and hard work beyond one's capacity, and 6) exemplary life style or setting the example of good Maoist communist behavior for others to emulate. Rather than citing examples of symbols for each of these Maoist virtues in all four model revolutionary operas, we will highlight examples of symbolism for those themes and virtues particularly critical if political learning is to promote political
participation (that is, selflessness, self-sacrifice, and diligence and exemplary life). We will proceed by selecting one example from one opera: then the second example from another opera; and so on.33

As has been previously discussed, the Maoist religious virtue of selflessness refers to one's disregard of self and identity with community and with one's class (brotherly) love. One illustrative example of a symbolic representation of selflessness is found in Scene Ten of The Red Lantern where, as we cited in the synopsis, Aunt Tien, cognizant of the danger in which she places herself and her daughter-in-law, persuades Tieh-mei to change jackets with Hui-lien, so that Tieh-mei can slip away through the Tien house, and avoid being followed by Hatoyama's spies as she sets out to deliver the secret code (red lantern in hand) to the communist guerrilla base in the mountains. As Tieh-mei objects to this assistance from Aunt Tien stating "I mustn't get you into trouble,"34 Aunt Tien replies:

My Child!
None but the poor help the poor,
We are two bitter gourds on the same vine;
We must save you from the tiger's jaws, . . . .

We are both working-class families . . .
No matter how risky it is, I must see
You safely away.35

Aunt Tien's words symbolize the selflessness expected of all Maoists. She symbolically relinquishes her identity, and that of her daughter-in-law, to identity with her poor working class of brothers. Her compliant behavior with this Maoist virtue is
politically correct, and represents a symbolic lesson in the political learning process of Chinese audiences during the Cultural Revolution.

A symbolic reference to self-sacrifice is found in the model opera Shachiapang. Our attention is drawn again to a secondary character, Wang Fu-ken, a peasant villager, who symbolizes self-sacrifice to the point of death after his refusal to divulge the names of communist underground agents in the village to the commander and chief-of-staff of the "puppet" Kuomintang army. As he staunchly faces his martyr's death before the firing squad he shouts "Long live the Chinese Communist Party," "Long live Chairman Mao." The political lesson in this symbolic illustration of self-sacrifice is clear. Politically correct behavior equals self-sacrifice for Mao and Maoist Communism. The impact of this lesson during the Cultural Revolution when China's vast population was in the throes of a power struggle which in the end would legitimize the political authority of either Mao or Liu can be assumed to be significant.

In On the Docks we find an example of symbolism used to denote diligence, and commitment beyond one's capacity. As team leader of the dock workers, Kuo prepares to go out in a small boat into a raging storm to stop a freighter, he declares confidently:

... Though the thunder crashes in a deluge of rain, Though the tide rises high in the deep of night, Though the waves are wild and the current swift, I shall brave them all and set out in pursuit. Neither mountains of knives nor seas of flames Can stop a Communist from doing his duty.
Kuo is challenged, beyond human capacity, yet true Maoist communist that he is, he goes out on his "suicide" mission. By this act, he averts the political sabotage attempts of the arch-villain Chien. One cannot help but observe that the raging storm is symbolic of the Cultural Revolution and that Chien, who feels technology should replace dockers to improve production, symbolically represents the major culprit of the Cultural Revolution Liu Shao-Chi. Whatever, the inference, it is clear that the audience is presented a lesson through which it can be learned that political behavior based on the Maoist religious virtue of diligence is not only correct, but also results in success against any odds.

Finally, we turn our attention to the symbolic representation of exemplary life. This Maoist religious virtue is important for two reasons. First, as we previously discussed, the example of correct political thinking and behavior provided by a role model can be the most tangible and identifiable lesson in the political learning process. And second, with regard to the attempts of the Maoist religious belief system to integrate those elements of the traditional religious belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism necessary for socialist construction, the Maoist religious virtue of exemplary life style seemingly attempts to take the Confucian virtue of exemplary role social behavior and merge it with the Taoist virtue of service to community discarding the individualism of Confucianism and the anarchic fanaticism of Taoism. It is interesting to note
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that the symbol we found to represent exemplary life refers to a traditional Chinese proverb—the one regarded by many, including the author, as one critical basis for Maoism. The proverb we refer to here, is the Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountain and its symbolic utilization is found in the model revolutionary opera Taking Tiger Mountain By Strategy. The symbolism surrounds the hero character Yang as he prepares to enter the bandit's den on Tiger Mountain. As he gathers the courage and "revolutionary wisdom" to proceed in his task, he gains insight through his symbolic emulation of the exemplary life of The Foolish Old Man:

Like the Foolish Old Man who removed the mountains,
I shall break through every obstacle!
The flames that blaze in my red heart
Shall forge a sharp blade to kill the foe.38

Here again the lesson for the audience is clear. Yang owes his exemplary life of correct political attitudes and behavior to his symbolic emulation of the exemplary life of the Foolish Old Man. So too, individuals in the audience can achieve exemplary life by emulating the exemplary life of Yang.

Each of these above cited examples of the use of symbolism to present Maoist religious virtues or themes are significant. They are meant to illustrate the functions of the Maoist religious belief system in the political learning process during the cultural revolution. We cannot conclude this discussion of symbols and symbolism however without giving attention to the element of religious experience in the Maoist religious
belief system, its symbolic representations in our data, and its role in political learning.

Criteria Three--Religious Experience:

In our discussion in Chapter IV, we indicated some of the problems we recognized in identifying religious experience. Most outstanding is the problem of recognizing religious experience without having the opportunity to confirm whether the experience being observed has all the emotion and sense of ultimacy (Wach's criteria for religious experiences) in order to qualify as a religious experience. Our utilization of the model revolutionary operas as our data source further confounds this problem. Not only can we not establish through interview or survey actual accounts of religious experience, we also face the difficulty of having to infer symbolic representations of religious experience of an opera character. While we hesitate to make this latter inference, we do feel that many of the thematic experiences of opera characters (based on director's cues supplied in the texts) are intended to symbolize religious experience. For example, the faith in the Maoist religious belief system, expressed by the heroes and other characters in the operas, symbolize religious experience, viewing as Tillich does that faith is a type of religious experience. Martyrdom is another type of religious experience symbolically presented in the model operas. That the characters who sacrifice their lives for Maoism are referred to in the scripts as martyrs
rather than simply as heroes seems to substantiate this obser-
vation. There is, however, one instance where we feel this
inference is comfortably supported. Although we highlight this
singular instance of symbolic reference to religious experience,
it is a strong and definite example, and can be regarded as
representative of the less definable yet existent examples of
symbolic religious experiences implicit in the model revolution-
ary operas.

Of all the religious experiences, perhaps the most easily
identified and observed is conversion. The state of conversion
presupposes total emotional commitment to the new belief system
including a belief in the doctrine and concept of the Ultimacy
of the new belief system. Therefore, to identify conversion to
a religious belief system is to identify a religious experience.
Windermiller, in his study of the similarities of religious con-
version and brainwashing, has provided us with nine criteria
for identifying conversion. He concludes that religious con-
versions are occurrences that: 1) are crisis experiences and
problem-solving processes which maintain ego identity and ego
comfort; 2) involve a total emotional upheaval which results
in a changed life style and manner of thinking for the individual;
3) occur most often as a result of group pressures to confess
wrongdoings; 4) occur most easily in highly structured organi-
izations; 5) introduce new vocabularies, values, and beliefs;
6) often occur as a result of exhaustion, surrender and sug-
gestion; 7) are directly preceded by self-criticism, doubt,
fear and guilt; 8) bring about a feeling of cleanliness, lightness, euphoria, relief, gratitude, enlightenment, dedication, and zeal in the individual; and finally 9) occur as a result of one psychic system within the individual is being suppressed while another replaces it in the individual's consciousness.

We observe a conversion of this type, symbolic of Theme Four, to the Maoist religious belief system in the sixth scene of *On the Docks*, where the young dockworker Han realizes his past transgressions and accepts, or is converted, to the doctrine of Maoism. As an expression of his conversion, he declares his total commitment to Maoism and the Maoist notion of Ultimacy:

Thanks to the help of the Party,  
I've come to see the light.  
Mixed feelings of remorse and shame  
Bring tears to my eyes.  
From now on, I must be firm,  
Sharp in vision and really determined.  
Head high, I'll brave wind and rain.  
... going through trials  
To become tempered steel ...  
I definitely will listen to the  
Teaching of Chairman Mao, removed  
My thinking and be a revolutionary  
All my life.

From the acting cues provided in parentheses in the script we see that the actor who portrays Han must sing the above with full displays of emotion. This latter factor confirms our conclusion that religious experience based on the Maoist religious belief system is being symbolically transferred to the audience.

Religious experience is important, whether personally experienced or vicariously experienced through symbolism, in
the political learning process of political socialization. Group religious experience (such as that of the audience in viewing the conversion of Han in *On the Docks*) can "motivate the will to believe" and can "bind the group together." As political socialization seeks to bring about voluntary compliance and participation in the political norm, a society bonded together by means of religious experience certainly facilitates this process.

Looking more specifically at the context of China during the Cultural Revolution, we can observe an intentional attempt to generate religious experiences within the population based on the Maoist religious belief system. Paralleling events in other arenas (i.e., the frenzied, and perhaps even ecstatic, response of the Red Guard to the teachings of Mao and their supposed mission to "preach" Maoism all across China; as well as the expounding of "miracles" attributed to faith in Mao presented via official, pro-Maoist controlled media items) suggest that the model revolutionary operas were also intended to initiate symbolic religious experiences for their viewing audiences. These symbolized religious experiences would in turn motivate the audience to either learn more about the Maoist religious belief system, thus initiating the political learning process; or they would reinforce belief in Maoism thus reinforcing the learning of correct political attitudes and behavior.

Tillich has observed that "Man's ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because (symbolism) alone is able
to express the ultimate." He further states that it is as a result of acceptance of symbols that express our ultimate concern that faith in the ultimate occurs. From a political perspective, Merleman has concluded that symbols represent a symbolic expression of tangible rewards accepted by the population in return for compliant response to stimuli generated from the political system. Included in his conclusion is the observation that, as the population achieves a stage of cognitive dissonance where compliant behavior is given to the political system for mere symbols of material gain, legitimacy (or faith in the "oughtness" of political authority) is granted the political system by the population.

The function of the symbol in each case is quite similar. So much so that, in a context where the functional interrelationship of religion and politics are an entrenched element in the political culture, it is quite possible, and perhaps most effective to use one set of symbols which both represent the ultimate and, at the same time, reinforce political learning. The symbols and symbolism presented in the model revolutionary operas served such a dual function as a result of their foundation in the Maoist religious belief system. The critical symbols in the dual functions are those which represent the concept of ultimacy found in the Maoist religious belief system.

We find examples of such symbols in each of the four model revolutionary operas under consideration here, particularly in their respective final scenes. In each opera, the symbol of
ultimacy used for the finale is the color red. As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, in traditional Chinese Peking Opera, the color red symbolized honesty and truth. This symbolic reference is carried forward to the modern revolutionary operas, but is also expanded to fit the new religio-political context of the Cultural Revolution. In the model revolutionary operas, the color red does not just symbolize honesty and truth, it seems also to symbolize the Ultimate Truth of the Maoist religious belief system. Set within the context of the struggle between "red" versus "expert" which predominated the ideological conflicts of the Cultural Revolution, this observation about the new symbolic significance of the color red seems valid.

In the final scene of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, the P.L.A. Chief of Staff and the hero, Yang Tzu-jung claim victory against the bandit Vulture and his Tiger Mountain "Fifth Peace Preservation Brigade of the Eastern Heilungkiang Region", against a backdrop of a huge red flag which predominates the stage of actors. In Shachiapang, the audience is instructed that, as a result of the wipe out of the New Fourth Army's victory over the Japanese/KMT supporters, the "people of Shachiapang, under the leadership of Chairman Mao . . . are rid of the Japanese and puppet troops and once more see the light of day." As the final curtain falls, the bright red rays of the sun predominate the scene as well as the red flags of the New Fourth Army. We find the red sun with its bright rays predominating the final scene of On the Docks as well. As the scene ends, the audience sees the Dockers
waving red flags singing "Holding the red flag high, we charge!" The red sun of dawn slowly rises in the background and "illuminates both banks of the Huangpu River." The final scene of The Red Lantern is perhaps the most striking use of this symbolism for ultimacy of the four operas. It contains no dialogue. The scene opens with red flags fluttering against the sky. Young Tieh-mei enters with the Knife-Grinder. They are followed on stage by all the communist guerrillas. Then the audience views the following: "Solemnly, Tieh-mei hands the code to the guerrilla leader. Brandishing their rifles and swords, all rejoice in their victory. Tieh-mei holds aloft the red lantern while crimson light radiates."

In each of these four finales, the audience is left with clear symbolic analogies of the religious and political meaning of Maoist ultimacy. To be "red" is to be Maoist; to believe in Mao's ability to lead China to Communist ultimacy; to follow Mao's teachings; to dedicate oneself totally to socialist construction which means uncompromising political participation; to give one's life, if necessary, for Mao and Maoism. To be "red" is spiritually correct and politically correct. And, during the Cultural Revolution, when it was more critical than ever (for the Maoist camp) that China's population choose to be "red", the model revolutionary operas as we have seen were vital political learning tools in that they provided the sanctions, role-models, and symbols which established political correctness based on the Maoist religious belief system.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII


3 We refer the reader to our discussion of Richard Merleman's cognitive political learning theory in Chapter V of this work.

4 Duncan, op. cit., p. xxii.

5 Ibid.


7 Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor. (Cited previously)


9 The cultural Revolution itself, as we have seen, was sparked by a misused dramatic political symbol. Mao felt that the Wu Han play, "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" was a symbolic attack on his dismissal of Peng Teh huai from office a few years earlier.


11 Ibid., pp. 96-107.

12 The longer this cuffed extension of sleeve, the more accomplished the actor in his ability to manipulate the sleeves to convey symbolically meaning and objects.


14 Most sleeve movements began with the water sleeve folded double over the costume sleeve to give the appearance of a large cuff.

15 Cantil, op. cit., p. 68.
We refer here to the position Chiang Ching assumed as critical reviewer for all revolutionary operas. It is clear that Chiang Ching saw this position as important to the outcome of the Cultural Revolution. One can only assume that Mao supported Chiang both in her functioning within this position, as well as in her decisions and policies implemented while in this position. On the basis of the above, we must assume that the scrutiny and attention given to the revisions and productions of the model revolutionary operas was both intentional and officially sanctioned.


Although, as we indicated earlier, we share William Hinton's conclusion that the Cultural Revolution was primarily an ideological struggle of red versus expert. We feel this struggle manifest itself as a political power struggle over which side the "red" Maoist or the "expert" anti-Maoist (Liu Shao Chi supporter) would control the political machine and therefore the population.

Shachiapang, p. 40.

Middle characters are between good and bad. They may demonstrate incorrect political behavior, however, it is made clear that they are corrigeable with re-education into the teaching and thoughts of Mao.

Sigmund Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams, observes that the function of symbols in dreams can be analyzed in terms of "condensation" and "displacement". In the former category we merge our fantasies and illusions with the concepts of reality we hold in our waking hours. In the second instance, we displace whichever of the two cognitions (concepts or reality or fantasies) we consider insignificant with what we deem most significant. Thus the dreamer can attempt to actualize the fantasies of his dreams if he considers them more significant than the reality of his life experiences.

On the Docks, p. 34.
Ibid., p. 24.
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30 The Red Lantern, op. cit., p. 34.


32 Duncan, op. cit., p. 318.

33 We have chosen this particular presentation format here to facilitate presentation style and to decrease the monotony of reading example after example to illustrate a point.

34 The Red Lantern, op. cit., p. 40.


36 Shachiapang, p. 39.


42 See Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 7-8.


44 Tillich, op. cit., p. 41.


47 Ibid., p. 553.

48 See Scene Ten photo display in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy.

49 Shachiapang, p. 51.

50 On the Docks, p. 41.
51 Ibid., p. 41.
52 The Red Lantern, p. 44.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

THE MAOIST RELIGIOUS BELIEF SYSTEM AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

So long as we confuse all authority with supernatural authority, reason in society cannot exist.
Hugh Daniel Duncan*

Throughout the preceding chapters, we have discussed two major thesis arguments: first, that we could observe Maoism functioning as a religious belief system during the period of the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1969); and, secondly, that we can further observe the Maoist religious belief system functioning as a standard for correctness in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.

Our data for these arguments, the model revolutionary operas, have provided us with a novel point of view of the social-political thinking of the Maoist camp during the Cultural Revolution. More specific to our needs, the model operas have provided us with insights and an empirical base from which we could view the process of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution (giving particular attention to political learning and the functional role of Maoism in that process). It is upon these insights and observations drawn from the data contained

*Communication and Social Order, p. xxiii.
in the four model opera scripts that our conclusions are based. Before we discuss our conclusion, however, we feel it important here to reiterate the intentions of this study.

As we stated in our introduction, this study is meant to be primarily descriptive and secondarily explanatory. Our intent was simply to observe and describe the process of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution using four model revolutionary operas as our telescope. Then, on the basis of our observations, we were to present in our concluding statement, an assessment of the impact of the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system on the effectiveness of the political socialization process in China. This assessment would suggest explanations for the outcome of the Cultural Revolution relative to our focus on the religious dimensions of Maoism.

For obvious reasons, we chose not to look at the intentions of the political system with regard to political socialization or at the impact of the socialization techniques used on the population. We realize that our telescopic view is not actual contact with the people and events observed and, therefore, does not provide a firm basis for any grandiose generalizations. However, our method of research and data source does support our ability to accurately and validly describe the function of a process and to present suggestions or pose critical questions on the basis of this description. This is our task in this final chapter. We will first summarize our
description of the function of Maoism operating as a religious belief system in the political learning phase of the political socialization process, based on our conclusions drawn from the script content of the model revolutionary operas. Our final task will be to discuss the significance of our description of the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process, relative to the cumulative evolution of China's political culture.

At the conclusion of a study such as ours, one very interesting questions one should ask is: Why it is so important to have had Maoism function as a religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution, in addition to its function as a political ideology or as a popular movement led by a charismatic political figure? One answer to this query is found in the nature of China's political culture. As we have indicated, politics and religion have had a functional interrelationship since the Ch'in dynasty when political authority was first legitimized by establishing a divine association between Heaven and the political leader (so called the Son of Heaven to accentuate this association). Religion, as we have seen, has traditionally been very critical to political legitimacy and, one might argue, to political socialization—where political learning amounted to compliant response to the stimuli from the emperor because of his association with Heaven. What we have attempted to illustrate here is that this traditional functional relationship between religion and politics has been carried over to contemporary
China, where we observe Maoism functioning as a religious belief system to legitimize political authority. The personality cult of Mao and the superhuman power attributed to his thoughts serve as observable illustrations of this function.

A second response to our question is also found in China's past--specifically, in China's religious traditions. Confucianism, the official religious belief system, was the primary contributor to the establishment of the traditional functional interrelationship between religion and politics. The Taoist religious belief system, as we have seen, justified popular rebellion against any political authority which, by its corruptness or injustice to the people, demonstrated its "loss" of the Mandate of Heaven. Thus in China's past we find one religious belief system legitimizing political authority and another religious belief system legitimizing popular dissent against political authority. The Maoist religious belief system seemingly attempted to merge the conflicting functions of these belief systems. On the one hand, Maoism was to be regarded as the official religious belief system of the Cultural Revolution period which legitimized the authority of Mao. Yet, it was simultaneously to be regarded as the popular religious belief system which legitimized criticism of the CCP and the authority of anti-Mao, pragmatic political officials, such as Liu by the Chinese masses.

Elements of the Maoist religious belief system which were functional requisites for the political learning process during the Cultural Revolution also serve to illustrate the Confucian
and Taoist influences in contemporary Maoism. The Maoist communist individual was to be exemplary of self (i.e., truly Confucian) in providing a model of correct behavior, yet selfless (i.e., truly Taoist) in his sacrifice and dedication to the larger community. Above all, the individual was to exhibit total discipline in lifestyle, a virtue shared by Confucianism and Taoism. As we have seen from the character Han in the model revolutionary opera, *On the Docks*, this was a difficult tightrope to walk for the average, non-hero-type Chinese individual and particularly for the youth of the Cultural Revolution period.

Although one might take the meaning of a cultural revolution literally—that is, an abrupt change or upheaval of China's socio-political culture—the functioning of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution seemed to be a restatement of the Confucian-Taoist influenced political culture rather than an upheaval of that culture. We make this assertion even in the light of the slogan which propelled the Red Guard in their activities—"Destroy the Four Olds" (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits). There is an answer to this seeming contradiction between policy and practice observable in Mao's directives during the Cultural Revolution. It is as follows: If we view the Cultural Revolution from a secular perspective as a power struggle, where Mao Tse-tung was the attacked and Liu Shao-chi and his supporters the aggressors, one might view Mao in the position of a political
leader struggling to reestablish the legitimacy of his authority. In this position, Mao vascillated between which strategy would most effectively defend his position. This position of having one's authority challenged was not, as we have seen, alien to China's political traditions. Although the Red Guard were instructed to "Destroy the Four Olds," Mao was in the position of not discounting anything that might defend his position. In our observations of the function of the Maoist religious belief system during the Cultural Revolution, we see Maoism transcending the realm of secular political authority to establish an authority which would be perceived by the population as superhuman, and in a manner of speaking, sacred. Concurrently, Maoism served as an impetus to attack the secular authority of the CCP declaring the majority of Party officials as corrupt and misguided.

From whatever perspective one chooses, Maoism was functioning simultaneously as both Confucian and Taoist. Strategically, given China's tradition of political culture, this dual defense was perhaps the most effective means for Mao to reestablish legitimacy and power during the Cultural Revolution. His political person was elevated to a position where it could be perceived to transcend the human realm as was the person of the Confucian emperor. His thoughts (doctrine), which were also elevated to a level where they were perceived as superhuman, and therefore sacred, instigated an attack on secular authority with its corrupt pragmatism much the same way that Taoism
attacked the secular authority of the political system. Hence, from this perspective of viewing the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle, we would suggest that the function of Maoism as a religious belief system (which merged the traditional religious belief systems of Confucianism and Taoism) significantly contributed to Mao's successful emergence as legitimate political authority at the end of the Cultural Revolution.

As we have stressed at various points in this study, we cannot substantiate any theses of intention, on the part of either faction (Maoist or non-Maoist) in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution, with regard to the establishment of Maoism as a religious belief system or to its function in the political socialization process. However, it is clear that surrounding the cult of Mao, which crescendoed to its peak during the Cultural Revolution, one can observe elements of Maoism which seemingly attempt to integrate elements of Confucianism and Taoism into one religious belief system. Maoism both legitimized Mao's political authority and justified the rebellion led by his Red Guard youth against the Liu Shao-chi faction and its ideologically corrupt heresies against Maoism. These functional elements of the cult of Mao are seen in the continual call for popular revolutionary struggle in the name of Mao (or the Party) and in the continual legitimization of Maoist communism throughout the model revolutionary operas.

Looking more specifically at these elements of the Maoist religious belief system and their specific function in political
learning during the Cultural Revolution, we see clear evidences in the model operas that the Maoist religious belief system established what constituted political correctness during that four year period. One had to believe in the ultimacy of Maoist communism for China, where the Great Harmony would prevail. The role-model heroes in the model operas introduced and reinforced this lesson for every audience. One had to adhere to Maoist religious orientations to life (selflessness, self-sacrifice, exemplary life style, etc.) which, if followed, would bring China one step closer to Maoist ultimacy. Each positive role-model in the model operas (particularly the heroes) personified correct political behavior based on these Maoist orientations to life. And finally, one had to experience Maoism religiously which motivated conversion, belief, and adherence to the Maoist religious belief system through "remoulding" or through self-sacrifice and martyrdom.

The sanctions based on the Maoist religious belief system were equally clear with regard to political correctness and incorrectness. To comply with Maoist political stimuli through correct political attitudes and behavior meant progress toward Maoist ultimacy, manifest initially by increased, tangible material gain (for example, more food) or increased symbolic ego comfort (increased identity within the Maoist "chosen" class of working or poor peasant). To reject or deny Maoist political stimuli meant expulsion from Mao's select class and loss of identity which meant ego discomfort; embarrassment which was loss of face; or purge. In the model
revolutionary opera, the Maoist's always received the positive sanction rewards, while the enemies of Maoism always suffered the punishment of loss of identity, embarrassment, or purge. (It is interesting to note that no villains were killed in the end. Obviously, death was an escape and too easy a punishment for their gross wrongdoings.)

We can sum up the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political learning process during the cultural revolution by returning briefly to our learning model presented in Chapter V. The youth of China (aged 15-25 approximately) can be inserted in our model as generation two.* In figure 12, we see the Maoist faction of the political system introducing the stimuli of participation in the Cultural Revolution as correct political behavior. Based on the Maoist religious belief system, the model revolutionary operas presented the sanctions, role-models, and symbols which were to accompany this stimulus and eventually lead to the automatic learning with total symbolism (stage three).

However, stage three automatic learning was never reached. Instead, the Maoist political system re-introduced controlled learning under the auspices of the revolutionary committees in addition to the controlled learning of the

*In this case, generation one is the pre-1949 (adults age 40 and above) segment of the population who were socialized to accept the political legitimacy of Mao as a result of the "success" of the long March and the eventual victory of the CCP, the material gain (land reform, increased standard of living for peasants, etc.) received just prior to and after the communist victory and the ego comfort associated with improved status of the peasant class.
Stimulus participation in Cultural Revolution as correct political behavior

Stage One
External Motivation

Sanctions, role models, and symbols presented in model Revolutionary Operas

Triple alliance/Revolutionary Committees

Stage Two
Controlled Learning

Stage Three
Automatic Learning

Symbolism of Cult of Mao and Mao Tse-tung Thought

Figure 12
Stimulus Response Model of the Learning Process in Political Socialization During the Cultural Revolution--Generation Two: Red Guard Youth
model revolutionary opera and the media, yet we suggest that the Cultural Revolution was not successful in promoting viable political learning which would advance political socialization by "ideologically remoulding" the population. The thousands of Red Guard youth, who were the principal target of the political socialization process, had to in the end be restricted and surveilled. They had not learned correctly what political "correctness" was. The reason for this lack of success in the political socialization process can, we suggest, be attributed to the function of Maoism as a religious belief system as we described it above. Maoism, in its attempts to merge Confucian and Taoist religious principles, further confused the already confused youth. China's youth, as well as the majority of the adult population, were caught up in a power struggle, where during most of the conflict, it was difficult to distinguish sides. This created the problem of perception. Who was Maoist and who was not? This distinction was critical because the Maoists were to be exalted for their "religious" virtue while the non-Maoists were purged for their secular, pragmatic corruption. For most of the rampaging Red Guard Units this distinction was not and could not be made. So they attempted to purge almost everyone. One must ask: What has the function of the Maoist religious belief system to do with this confusion in the political learning process?

When Maoism seemingly merged both Confucianist and Taoist religious principles to gain victory in the power struggle, became both the official religious belief system
system which legitimized its political authority and the popular religious belief system which challenged that same political authority. The Red Guard youth worshipped the figure and thoughts of Mao Tse-tung yet were unknowingly out to destroy the very foundation of his political authority--the CCP. When Mao himself recognized that his power base was being destroyed by the Red Guard rather than reinforced, he revoked his support and attempted to render them impotent with the PLA and later through the triple alliance of the Revolutionary Committees.

As we have seen throughout this study, political socialization occurred during the Cultural Revolution and the Maoist religious belief system functioned as a standard for establishing and measuring correct political attitudes and behavior. But the Red Guard youth did not learn what they were supposed to learn, primarily, we would argue, because the stimuli generated by the Maoist faction of the political system were confusing and contradictory.

It has only been 11 years into the political socialization process of generation two which began in 1966. Based on our model we might venture to suggest that the recent occurrences in China (both surrounding the death of Chou En-lai, the anti-Confucius and anti-Lin Piao campaigns, and more recently the mass demonstrations staged to support the purge of the "gang of four") are but a continuation of the political socialization process begun in 1966, where the present political system is
still attempting to pass generation two through stage three (automatic learning--stimulus with symbols) to stage four (internal motivation--symbol, no stimulus) of our generational acculturation model. However, the mass demonstrations in support of Chou En-lai, which were evidently not expected or controlled by the political system coupled with the observations of recent visitors returning from the People's Republic of China,* that there is a seeming shift toward elitism and pragmatism in what would be generation two of our model (the 25-35 year old "former" Red Guard youth) indicates that political socialization of this generation in Maoist political correctness (which condemned elitism and pragmatism and demanded communal selflessness and "sacred" ideological righteousness) has still not been achieved.

The success of the political socialization process begun in 1966 can only be evaluated for its success or impact with an analysis of the baseline for stage one in the political learning process for generation three. From our model, we might speculate that if the current political learning of generation two, based on the Maoist religious belief system (after Mao), continues through stage four--where the automatic response to political stimuli of the revolutionary struggle would be total participation in the revolutionary struggle as a true Maoist--generation three would begin its political learning process at a base-line where acceptance of the

*We refer here to comments and observations made by Lucian Pye and Roy Hofeinz on their recent (1977) visits to the People's Republic of China at a meeting of Chino Scholars in November, 1977.
political legitimacy of Maoism (carry over from the base-line of generation two) and automatic, voluntary participation in a Maoist-defined type of revolutionary struggle would be modus operandi assumptions.

Based on our current observations of generation two, this scenario becomes unlikely. Rather, what we see is a situation where the political system under Hua Kuo-fang (without Mao and his superhuman aura) is attempting to create a new standard for political correctness for the adults of generation two and the youth of generation three. This standard for political correctness is much more grounded in pragmatism. It is secular, rather than religiously based. In many ways, it is apparently anti-Maoist. This divergence from Maoist political correctness has been accomplished symbolically through the campaign against the "gang of four." Mao's political, social, and "ideological" mistakes have been separated from his figure (image) and attributed to the "gang of four" or their influence over him through his wife Chiang-Ching. Mao remains a sacred demi-god in the memories of the population while his policies as well as much of his thoughts, which during the Cultural Revolution were believed to have miraculous powers, are being abandoned by the present leadership.

To sum up our functional analysis of the Maoist religious belief system and its role in the political socialization process in China during the Cultural Revolution process in China, we must return to Hempel's analytical statement introduced in Chapter I. Fitting our findings into the Hempel
During the Cultural Revolution in China, political socialization functioned adequately in the setting of Chinese political culture with its historical functional relationship between religion and politics;

(b) Political socialization functioned adequately within the setting of China's political culture because a standard of correctness existed (was satisfied);

(c)' The Maoist religious belief system was one factor in a class (of I) of empirically sufficient conditions for a standard of correctness within the context of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution;

(d) We can observe through the model revolutionary operas the Maoist religious belief system as being present in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution.

In other words, the political socialization process in China during the Cultural Revolution could not have functioned (irrespective of how it functioned or the nature of its results) without a standard of correctness. We maintain this, in part because of China's political culture, particularly the Confucian influences, in which the political authority established the standard for correct political behavior by his actions, and, in part, because one cannot learn to comply with a norm without a standard on which to measure that norm. The Maoist religious belief system, which we know did functionally exist, based on the content of the model revolutionary operas, is one factor of many which could have functioned as a basis for a standard of correctness in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution. (For a further discussion of this statement and others in the Hempel schema see
the Appendix.) What is important here, is our conclusion on the basis of this functional analysis, that to observe Maoism functioning as a religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution is to observe a continuity in the political culture Mao sought to abruptly change.

Although the Tenth Plenum in 1969 announced the victorious end of the Cultural Revolution in favor of the Maoists, one strong and vital element of the political culture remained intact, the functional interrelationship between religion and politics. Further, the Maoist religious belief system, by its amalgamation of Confucian and Taoist elements, particularly in its religious orientations to life, seems to have rekindled the cultural influences of the two traditional religious belief systems, rather than destroying them. Perhaps this suggestion may present one explanation for the necessity and intensity of the anti-Confucian campaign during the 1970's.

The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was a political success of sorts for the pro-Maoist faction of the political system because Mao emerged the victor in the power struggle and managed to maintain that legitimized power base until his death. However, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was an unsuccessful attempt to politically socialize the youthful generation of potential Maoist revolutionaries. The Maoist religious belief system, as it functioned during the cultural revolution, was responsible for both the success and the
failure of the Cultural Revolution. Above all, we view the function of the Maoist religious belief system in the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution as an experiment in "ideological remoulding" which seemingly built on rather than destroyed the religio-political traditions of Cina's political culture. One major point it has clearly established is that the dominant Confucian and Taoist influences in the political culture could not be merged and at the same time, have political socialization succeed.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The author was born in Boston, Massachusetts on December 23, 1977.

She entered the Boston University College of Liberal Arts in September, 1966 and was graduated in June, 1970 with an A.B. in Government and a minor concentration in philosophy. During her undergraduate academic career she attended a Summer Language Institute in 1969 at Middlebury College in Vermont and received a certificate of course completion in Intensive Elementary Mandarin Chinese. During the Summer of 1970 the author served as a delegate for the United States at the World Youth Assembly held at the United Nations, New York. She had major responsibility for drafting delegation policy statements and presenting these statements at Assembly sessions.

In September 1970 the author enrolled in the doctoral program in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where she continued work for the degree of doctor of philosophy until December, 1977. During this period she resumed her language training at Harvard University (in 1970) and in Taipei, Taiwan (in the summer of 1971). In Taipei, she conducted preliminary research in Taipei, Taiwan in Summer, 1971. From 1973 to 1975 she took time from her academic pursuits to work as a staff analyst and later as director of technical marketing for a private consulting company in Cambridge, Mass.

The author currently holds the position of political scientist-in-residence Instructor in the department of African-American Studies, College of Liberal Arts at Northeastern University. She has held this position since September, 1975.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM* AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The brief discussion which follows addresses our rationale for using this formal analytical framework in our study and our assessment of what we feel its contribution has been. Our study posits two primarily conceptual theses—first that Maoism can be viewed functionally as a religious belief system and secondly that Maoism functioning as a religious belief system has an integral role in the adequate (but not necessarily intended) functioning of the political socialization process in China. This analytical framework of structural functionalism allows us to discuss in an easily separable way, the functioning of Maoism in China and then about the functioning of the Chinese political socialization process. Without our analytical framework, it would not be a difficult task to confuse the interrelated ideas of each of these themes beyond recognition.

The most significant contribution our analytical framework makes is that it fixates the interrelationships of the political socialization process which would otherwise be convoluted by the dynamics of the process. Without this categorization of variables, we would not have been able to propose and support our generational acculturation model of political socialization—a model we claim can be used as a guide to predictive statements about China.

Since structural-functionalism usually only classifies variables and defines relationships, some theoreticians have been led to criticize functional analysis. One of these major criticisms of functionalism is its tendency to produce a more retrospective analysis rather than an analysis which produces generalizable theories upon which prediction can be based. That is, after functional analysis has been used to categorize the variables and define the relationships of a system, the results of the analysis can fall short of having predictive import. In the single circumstance, however, where the functional analysis can be construed as implicitly invoking an "hypothesis of self-regulation," it does become possible to use the analysis for explanatory and predictive purposes. As we will discuss here, our study of the political socialization process lends itself to such an analysis.

The discussion in the body of our study presents the basic elements of a structural-functional requisite analysis, first of Maoism and then of political socialization. We first
identify in Chapter II the historical setting of our analyses (i.e., pre-Maoist China with its traditional relationship between politics and religion). In Chapter III we begin a structural-functional prerequisite analysis of Maoism by discussing the contemporary setting of pre-'49 China as influenced by Mao. As we examine the origins of Maoism, we place into perspective the regard held for and the position given to the Long March and Yenan by the Chinese. Continuing the analysis into Chapter IV, we define the functional prerequisites of a religious belief system as being: (1) the addressing of ultimate eschatological questions; (2) the presentation of morals, values, or orientations to life; and (3) the generation of what can be identified as religious experiences. As we discuss the structure of Maoism we address each of these requirements and establish that Maoism can indeed be viewed as functioning as a religious belief system.

In similar fashion we begin our analysis of the function of the Maoist religious belief system in political socialization. We recall the unit's setting (i.e., Maoist China with its historical traditional relationship between politics and religion as discussed in Chapter III) as characterized by the specific internal and external conditions during a selected time period (i.e., the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as outlined in Chapter IV). We then discuss the functional requisite of the system under observation—a standard for political correctness—in Chapter V.
As first proposed in our introduction, we present in Chapter V via the formal logic of the Hempel model that Maoism did function as a standard for correctness in the political socialization process in China. The modification of premise (c) to premise (c') through the insertion of the Class of I, as discussed in our introductory chapter, is the appropriate form of our analysis, as this identifies the basis for satisfying our functional prerequisite as a class of traits rather than as a single trait. As suggested by the Hempel model, we will discuss here briefly the other members of our class of I: political ideology, the Chinese political culture, and the Chinese historical experience. Each of these are traits equivalent to the Maoist religious belief system in their ability to provide a basis for political socialization.

We can see from our discussion in Chapter III and IV of the origins and structure of the Maoist religious belief system that the momentum of China's historical experience and political culture is captured in the functioning of Maoism. That is to say, there are elements of political precedents, modes of legitimization, and timeworn religious and cultural traditions, which could be a basis for the establishment and communication of a correct standard for political attitudes in historical experience and political culture. Those elements when embodied in the Maoist religious belief system or when identified in the above are the same or are strikingly similar. This fact is not surprising when we observe the amount of cultural, religious,
and historical continuity preserved or built upon by Maoism.

As for political ideology, its position as a basis for correct political ideas is unquestioned. As for its equivalence to the functions of the Maoist religious belief system, many of the same parallels cited above do apply. We know that the nature of political ideology is intimately related to the basic operations of the political system. From a socio-political communications point of view of the political system, China as we discussed in Chapter III is different from some standard models. Instead of a chain of communication from policy-makers to the socio-political bureaucracy to the socio-political masses back to the policy-makers, we have in contemporary (as well as in traditional) China feedback communication between the policy-makers and the bureaucracy and between the bureaucracy and the populus (see Figure 4). Though the means of communication between the policy-makers and the bureaucracy may have been closer to classically-based political ideological methods, the communication between the bureaucracy and populus surely was not. As we pointed out, ideological interpretations of correct political behavior and its response from the populus were transmitted through the elements of the Maoist religious belief system.

A much more intuitive and therefore more speculative approach to the discussion of whether the standard for politically correct ideas was based upon the Maoist religious belief system or upon pure political ideology is to examine the hierarchical
relationship of environmental factors affecting which course of the two might have been taken. Again from Chapter III, Figure 1 contrasts the same list of environmental factors which are arranged differently only with respect to their hierarchial order. Our speculation is that Political Socialization Process I applies to China during the Cultural Revolution. This is based upon both (a) the internal requirements and conditions affecting political socialization during this period before an observable course had been chosen and (b) our ranking of the environmental factors deemed most important during the Cultural Revolution. This ranking was compiled by observing the areas in which most energies were applied and upon which most reliance was placed to legitimize current or future activities.

The important conclusion to reach here is that, notwithstanding which element is most prominent at any one time, we have identified all major bases for the functional prerequisite of political socialization during the Cultural Revolution. It is not strict formalism which has driven the above discussion of Hempel's Class of I. In the context of our study, it cannot and should not be argued that only a religious belief system could have been a standard for political socialization in contemporary China. Though we do feel that the Maoist religious belief system was of primary importance, it becomes necessary to explore other possible standards for correctness so as to place into context the standard we have chosen to examine extensively.
The examination of our second thesis—that Maoism does indeed function as a religious belief system—is made possible through this formal, elemental presentation of a structural-functional requisite analysis. Our analytical framework provides a neatly separable backdrop of definitions and concepts for Chapter V. In Chapters VI and VII, we move to an empirical level to further our analysis of the functioning of Maoism by separately examining the sanctions reinforced by Maoism from the symbols it defines.

As we introduced earlier in our discussion here one of the most significant contributions of our use of this formal structural functional framework is that it made possible our presentation of the generational acculturation model. Because we identified political socialization as having an hypothesis of self-regulation, we are able to justify our building of this explanatory model. It is upon this underlying theme of self-regulation in Chapter V that our analysis shifts from one of how Maoism as a religious belief system came into being to one of what is the basis for the continued, adequate functioning of the political socialization process in China, during this period of the Cultural Revolution. Let us now explain this idea of self-regulation before continuing the discussion of the model we formalized in Chapter V.

We mean by a hypothesis of self-regulation that one can empirically observe the following characteristics in an adequately functioning system: that the system within definable
limits exhibits traits which act to compensate for events or influences in its environment which adversely affect its operation, purpose or existence. If the system were not able to develop these traits which help satisfy the system's functional requisites, its continued, adequate functioning would be in jeopardy. For example, if a hostile change in a hydra's environment caused it to be split into pieces, each of the separate pieces would attempt to regenerate into a completely whole hydra. Though it was not discussed in detail in Chapter V, it is the author's speculation that functioning political socialization processes are self-regulating systems. That is to say, that if there were internal or external environmental changes threatening the functional requisites of say the political socialization process in China, that the system would develop traits which would act to compensate for unsatisfied functional requisites--hypothetically if a certain type of political behavior represented an unauthorized redefinition of the standards for political correctness, a new play for example could be written in which this new and threatening behavior would be strongly deplored or reprimanded. As we discussed in Chapter V, it is the learning process in political socialization which is cyclical (once initiated) and, therefore, self-perpetuating, as well as self-reinforcing.

With an associated hypothesis of self-regulation, the results of a functional analysis can have predictive importance. In a formal sense, the syllogism used in Chapter I containing
the Class of I generalization is allowed to have a conditional conclusion by combining (a) with (d'), resulting in the following model:

(b) System s functions adequately in a setting of kind c only if condition n is satisfied;

(c') I is a class of empirically sufficient conditions for n in the context determined by s and c; and I is not empty;

(d'') If s functions adequately in a setting of kind c at time t, then some one of the items in class I is present in s at t.

Hence if political socialization functioned adequately in Maoist China during the Cultural Revolution, then the influences of at least one of the Maoist religious belief system, political ideology, the Chinese political culture, or the Chinese historical experience provided the basis for the functional requisite, a standard for political correct behavior. To evaluate this conclusion at a different time period say after the Cultural Revolution or today, we must return to the generational acculturation model proposed in our study.

Our model of generational acculturation describes from a system dynamics point of view why the Maoist religious belief system functions whenever the political socialization process functions adequately. Because the Maoist religious belief system was intimately tied to the political learning process in China, its place in political socialization was assured. We were able to show in Chapter V that the basic modes of political legitimacy and authority used by Maoism were part of a historical continuum and not a new occurrence unique to Maoism
or the Cultural Revolution. Our model is in the mold of Richard Merleman's conceptualization of the political learning process. When we take this type of systemic view of the political learning process and add to it both the dynamic inter-relation of historical momentum and cultural continuity and the self-regulating character of functioning learning processes, our conceptualization of generational acculturation is the result. Figures 7 and 9 taken from Chapter V capsize our model. With it we can make speculations as we do in our concluding chapter, as to the nature of the adequate functioning of political socialization at a different time period (e.g., to explain the period immediately after the Cultural Revolution or to predict the occurrences of tomorrow).

One can see the relevance and benefit of utilizing a behaviorist theoretical foundation, such as those of Hempel and Merleman, to describe the role of religion (with regard to its affect and transcendental qualities) in the political learning aspect of the political socialization process during the Cultural Revolution in China. As we mentioned particularly in our discussion of Hempel's analytical framework, we did not allow this foundation to influence our conclusion about the role of the Maoist religious belief system in political socialization in China. Nor, for that matter, did we draw any insightful interpretations of the insignificance of the religiousity of Maoism during the Cultural Revolution solely or even principally on the basis of this foundation. We
utilize it only inasmuch as it facilitates the presentation of what might otherwise be regarded as a study of religion and its intangible, "unknown" qualities (particularly in the Chinese context) and religion's functional impact on political socialization during a period of chaos and disorder, the Cultural Revolution. In other words, the Hempel foundation and our own model which was presented briefly above provided us with a structured framework and logical basis within which we could begin to look at and analyze an unstructured and chaotic period of China's history.