Planning Tremé: The Community Development Field in a Post-Katrina World

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ABSTRACT

A Network of community development (CD) organizations in New Orleans and nationwide collectively framed Hurricane Katrina in 2005 as the result of willful government failure to protect an original American city and its most vulnerable residents. They saw their efforts to equitably redevelop the city as seeding a renewed social movement for economic and racial justice that would result in the self-determination of local low-income communities of color. This interpretation built on their shared activist histories, especially the movement origins of the CD field that championed the self-determination of low-income urban African-American and Latino neighborhoods.

Yet, chronic tension within CD between the field’s enduring movement aims and its institutionalized practices emphasizing housing production seriously constrained the Network’s efforts. By late 2006, Network organizations had split apart over the future of New Orleans public housing. This dissertation is an in-depth case study of the first 15 months after Katrina that uses participant-observation to explore this tension and its implications for the movement possibilities of the CD field. I argue that there are three mechanisms of institutionalization that stratify the field and constrain its movement aims: a) the marketization of community development, b) the reformation of poverty, and c) the radicalization of community organizing repertoires.

In New Orleans, these three mechanisms combined with intense civil society conflict, the roll-out of neoliberal deconcentration policy, a weak local political economy, and competing cultural repertoires within the Network to undermine collective action. Institutionalized race and class inequalities were reproduced within the Network and urban space. When the federal government proposed to demolish 70% of the city’s public housing, one Network cohort agreed to redevelop the Lafitte projects while another filed a resident class action lawsuit against the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Lafitte redevelopment cohort came to control a substantial portion of land in Tremé/Lafitte and the resident participation process in redevelopment. Resident participation was a narrowly construed process of site planning, especially compared to principles of resident participation enshrined in neighborhood recovery planning serving mostly middle-class New Orleanians.

This unanticipated Network polarization proved instructive. Economic human rights and equitable development activism has grown out of the Network and the Gulf Coast. This suggests
possibilities for movement renewal in the institutionalized community development field, particularly by re-appropriating the mechanisms of marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing. Community development’s incorporation into the neoliberal political economy has opened up spaces for political resistance by practitioners working within the system. A new discourse of economic human rights points to a reorientation of the field around low-income residents’ right to the city. Finally, community organizing can be reintegrated into CD, beginning with internal organizing processes as a means to develop a new theory of power to transcend historical institutional distrust within the sector.

Thesis Supervisor: J. Phillip Thompson
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Acknowledgments

This dissertation is dedicated to the residents and activists of New Orleans and beyond who rose to meet the challenges unleashed by Hurricane Katrina, and have since been tirelessly championing an equitable and just life for all current and former residents of this irrepressible city.

I am writing these acknowledgements on August 29, 2010, the five year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, as New Orleanians and residents of SE Louisiana and the Gulf Coast celebrate their recovery, honor the memories of lost lives, homes and ways of life, and simultaneously deal with new challenges brought about by the Deepwater Horizon/BP Gulf oil spill. This unique region of the country deserves our support, investment and respect long after today’s tributes and reflections draw to a close.

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I am indebted to my committee, Chair J. Phillip Thompson and members Diane E. Davis and JoAnn Carmin, for their keen input and support not only on this thesis, but in their encouragement and feedback over the last five years of my involvement with Hurricane Katrina recovery. I am particularly grateful to Phil for opening up tremendous work and scholarship opportunities for me in the Gulf Coast. Our time together working in the region with community development practitioners and scholars was instructive and invaluable. Professor Michèle Lamont of the Department of Sociology at Harvard, former Visiting Professor Gus Newport in the Department of Urban Studies & Planning (DUSP) at MIT, Professor Larry Vale at DUSP, and Professor Renia Ehrenfeucht at the University of New Orleans were also tremendously helpful in making sense of my fieldwork and research agenda.

To protect anonymity, I cannot thank particular Katrina colleagues by name. But I would like to express my thanks to the individuals representing the range of community development, labor, social justice and advocacy organizations I had the privilege of working with and learning from over the past five years. From direct action pro-public housing activists to executives at national unions and community development intermediaries, Katrina responders made room for me at their tables and in their demonstrations (be they programmatic or protest). I would like to thank the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Oxfam America, and especially The Mertz Gilmore Foundation, the Leonard & Louise Riggio Foundation/Project Home Again and the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation for underwriting my applied work in the region through 2010. The Social Science Research Council and the Hal Horowitz Fund at MIT supported my research in its later stages.

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I could not have considered a PhD nor seen this through to completion without the unconditional love of my parents, Sue and Steve and Jack and Julianne. Their bemused pride in my pursuit of a PhD, with its significant financial opportunity costs, has been a foundation for me in this endeavor. The chance to return home to Massachusetts to attend MIT also gave me the pleasure of living close to my extended family again, and helped me renew some wonderful relationships, especially with my aunts and cousins who shared with me their own insights on public housing while I was consumed with the fate of New Orleans’s projects. Finally, I cannot imagine navigating this experience without my husband, Steve Moga, by my side. He is easily the best discovery I made at MIT. I don’t recommend to any household trying to write two dissertations at once, but I do hope those who are dealing with such trials have the solid love and warmth of a partner like I have with Steve. He helped me clarify ideas, make sense of what I was seeing, fed me well, and generally made my life happier and more fulfilling. I look forward to our future explorations as we move on from MIT.
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Chapter 1: Hurricane Katrina and the Community Development Field

Introduction

In spring 2006, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 50 workers rights’ activists gathered in a ballroom in Houma, Louisiana for a day long strategy session on protecting Latino workers in the clean-up after Katrina and incorporating disenfranchised African-American workers into the recovery and reconstruction job market. Throughout the day, selected speakers addressed the group to motivate and challenge them to develop collaborative responses to the exploitation and dislocation of brown and black workers across the disaster-stricken Gulf Coast states of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. In the post-lunch lull, an executive from one of the largest syndicators of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits in the United States took the podium. This organizational leader proceeded to rally the crowd around confronting the “shameful” inequalities wrought by “global capitalism,” the “common enemy” facing the congregated activists and the marginalized workers and low-income residents they represented. This speaker pledged resources and support for a new, inter-generational organizing movement led by emerging young “leadership” mentored by “veteran” organizers. This new generation of leaders would bring a global “human rights” understanding to this work, and this particular executive encouraged other national organizations to “open [their] minds” to support and embrace this organizing activism emerging out of the post-Katrina Gulf Coast.

It was a provocative and inspiring appeal, in part because of its intriguing source. All over the Gulf Coast after Katrina, the leadership of well-resourced, well established national organizations like community development intermediaries, labor unions, liberal philanthropies, and policy advocacy organizations were putting down roots, opening up shop, and pledging substantial organizational resources to the renewal of the “next Civil Rights Movement” in New
Orleans and the Gulf. Motivated to respond to the unprecedented physical and social disaster of Katrina, national organizational representatives who came to New Orleans found initial solidarity with local grassroots organizers, non-profit community development entities, social service providers, and social movement organizations in their framing of the storm as willful federal failure to protect an original American city and its low-income, communities of color from the storm’s violence. National and local responders were mutually incensed by the widespread displacement of so many of the city’s poor African-American residents, and the likely lack of government leadership to bring these residents home, considering the Bush Administration’s emphasis on a private-sector driven recovery strategy that implied displaced renters and the urban poor would be left without the resources to return and participate in the recovery of the city. Of these national and local responders, the majority had come to their current positions in community development, labor, policy advocacy, and legal work via personal histories of social movement activism. For them, the recovery of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina would be nothing short of reigniting a social movement to overcome the institutionalized racial and economic inequality that had led to such rupturing of low-income, African-American New Orleanians’ lives and the physical devastation of their neighborhoods. They were collectively determined to step in and fill a government void of repatriating and incorporating the displaced urban poor into the city’s recovery, and to demand an equitable and even leadership role for low-income communities of color in charting the future of New Orleans. Their interpretation of and response to Katrina harkened back to their shared past activism in the early days of the community development movement in the 1960s and 1970s, which fought for the self-determination of low-income African-American and Latino urban communities via their
economic and political empowerment, following the waning of the Civil Rights Movement and the wave of urban riots that swept the nation in the late 1960s.

Despite their heroic efforts and fiery rhetoric, this ensemble of organizations faced tremendous obstacles in renewing this professed movement activism in the first year after the storm. As a participant-observer in the coordinated disaster response activities of these national and local organizations, it struck me that the powerful institutional position of national entities was a strong constraint on their espoused desires to organize the “diaspora” of displaced low-income New Orleanians and on their ability to form equitable partnerships with smaller, local community-based groups who hoped to lead on any shared recovery activities. Furthermore, it seemed that local, community-based groups in New Orleans, used to an historical legacy of local government corruption, institutional racism and a chronic lack of resources, were mired in a deep distrust of policymakers and outside “experts” that helped developed and implement urban policy such as the national community development intermediaries, their liberal philanthropic funding partners, and big labor allies arriving in the city. Notably, the pronounced racial politics of New Orleans, in which white, Creole and black residents had been historically locked in combative struggle for control of the city, only exacerbated these structural differences between national and local organizations and their ability to come together in common cause to rebuild New Orleans.

As a community development scholar and practitioner, I saw come to life in New Orleans the chronic tensions in the community development sector between the field’s enduring movement aims of low-income community self-determination and what has evolved over 40 years into a standard set of institutionalized practices emphasizing affordable housing production and organizational development. In my work in New Orleans, Boston, and elsewhere in the U.S.,
community development practitioners continue to refer to their occupational work as part of a
“movement” even as the activities they are describing involve determining appropriate financing
strategies to build apartment complexes for the urban poor, or program development to improve
community development corporations’ service delivery. This tension was in stark relief in post-
Katrina New Orleans: how would it be possible for a network of national and local organizations
interested in seeding the “next Civil Rights Movement” to do so when national entities were
prioritizing establishing local organizational capacity to manage Community Development Block
Grant funds and local community groups were prioritizing organizing black and working poor
New Orleanians to demand oversight of government decision-making bodies? While these latter
entities envisioned a confrontational political organizing model to take control of the recovery
process on behalf of urban poor black communities, their national counterparts were
emphasizing stepping in as a “quasi-government” to lead on low-income neighborhood
redevelopment, especially rebuilding thousands of severely damaged affordable housing units.
Despite their shared framing of the causes and consequences of Hurricane Katrina, these
organizations would face substantial difficulty in overcoming what is an unresolved and
institutionalized tension within the community development field: what Stoecker (1997) calls the
“capital-community contradiction,” that is, the conflict between its contemporary professional
practices emphasizing housing production and its social movement origins promoting political
organizing for community self-determination.

Research Question and Hypothesis

This dissertation is situated in the schism within community development scholarship
concerning the potential and limits to community development practice, between political
economy critiques articulating the complicity of community development in advancing
neoliberalism (e.g., Newman and Lake 2006) and liberal democratic theories promoting community development as a successful means of asset building in low-income communities (e.g., Ferguson and Dickens 1999, Walker 2002). Both of these literatures, as I will show in detail subsequently, are incomplete assessments of community development practice and its promises and pitfalls. I build off of and expand these two strands of research to tell a more complete story of the tension between the community development sector’s movement aims and its institutionalized practices. I begin by asking: How has the institutionalization of the field constrained its enduring movement aim of low-income community self-determination? The evolution of the field from an urban social movement to an occupational sector today is well-established; how this progression has limited the field’s transformative potential is not well understood, and demands deeper exploration. I argue that three key “mechanisms” (Elster 2007, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) of institutionalization are behind the stratification of the community development field and act as constraints on its original movement aims. These mechanisms are a) the “marketization” (Salamon 1993) of community development, b) the reformation of poverty (e.g., O’Connor 2001), and the c) “radicalization” (Ferree 2010) of community organizing “repertoires” (Swidler 1986).

Through a case study of the contentious recovery politics of post-Katrina New Orleans that takes participant-observation as its primary research technique (Burawoy 1998), I will show that the community development (CD) field’s early “movement entrepreneurs” (Zald and McCarthy 1990) who now comprise the leadership of the field tried valiantly in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to deliver on the social movement frame that persists in CD practice, but were ultimately unable to achieve this goal due to the three inter-dependent, neoliberal mechanisms introduced above. Taken together, in New Orleans these mechanisms of the marketization of CD, the
reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing led to the reproduction of power inequalities within the CD field, in which insider strategies emphasizing liberal, market-driven physical development led by national elites were privileged at the expense of locally-led, collective-identity-based political organizing strategies. This led to the dissolution of a what I call a post-Katrina CD Network comprised of national and community-based organizations initially mobilized by what social movement scholars might describe as a shared injustice frame (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001) of government failure and displaced, low-income, African-American New Orleanians’ right to return to the city. Specifically, this process of institutionalization has constrained movement aims by creating organizational capacity gaps between CD actors, silencing the poor, narrowing the concept of participation in CD, and reproducing institutional inequalities of race and class in relational networks and in urban space.

As it turned 40 in 2007 in the aftermath of Katrina, the CD field seemed to lack any promise as a counter-institutional force to neoliberalism, hurting for progressive alternatives to neoliberalism’s rising racial and economic inequality. If this line of analysis is correct, this suggests the need for renewed avenues to social movement activism for interested activists, practitioners and scholars in the community development field, possibly by working within the neoliberal political economy, by developing new movement frames, and by interrogating the inequalities within the CD field that restrict its movement potential.

**Understanding the Community Development Field**

The community development (CD) field was originally conceived as a “movement” for the self-determination of urban poor Black and Puerto Rican communities that grew mainly out of the social justice activism of the 1960s and 1970s. Self-determination, defined here as political empowerment and economic autonomy, was the means to transform “ghetto” circumstances and

As a relatively young field that celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2007, the field’s early movement entrepreneurs have grown into its national leaders at organizations such as NeighborWorks America and Enterprise Community Partners, for example, and their personal-professional movement histories in the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power activism, immigrants’ rights activism, and labor organizing continue to guide their work today. At the same time, this network of leaders and the organizations they now head have been at the forefront of the institutionalization of the field, that is, the formalization and professionalization of CD organizations and practices, especially tax-credit led affordable housing production that has rationalized the field nationwide and triggered its profound growth since the early 1980s (see Stoutland 1999). These movement entrepreneurs turned CD executives symbolically represent a profound and enduring tension in the field – the persistence of a social movement frame around low-income community self-determination within a narrowly conceived, institutionalized practice of affordable housing production in urban poor neighborhoods (O’Connor 1999, Dreier 1999).

Community development (CD) scholarship is organized loosely around two competing themes concerning the potential and limits of CD practice. Political economy critiques of community development (CD) argue that the field is incapable of fulfilling its core goal of low-income community self-determination because economic power is concentrated outside of low-
income communities of color, held by affluent white interests (see Reed 1987, 2001, among others). A related critique is that CD was never meant to fulfill such powerful aims, but rather was seeded by the state and philanthropy as a reformist measure to head off revolutionary demands for community self-determination (O’Connor 2001), turning anti-colonial movement activism into a form of “corrective capitalism” (O’Connor 1999: 81). More recent political economy critiques bring these two arguments together by positing that CD practice and leadership is complicit in the “roll-out” (Bondi and Laurie 2005, Peck & Tickell 2002) of a global, neoliberal political economy (Cummings 2001, Jessop 2002, Newman and Ashton 2004, Newman and Lake 2006, Thibault 2007). The hallmarks of neoliberalism are state retrenchment, devolution, and privatization of formerly public goods and services, with an accompanying growth in a “shadow state” of private sector providers – especially non-profit entities – delivering social welfare programs, such as the provision of affordable housing, healthcare, and job training and employment programs (Bondi and Laurie 2005, Lake & Newman 2002, Mitchell 2001, Wolch 1990; see also Bockmeyer 2003, Smith 2008). Devolution and privatization in the era of globalization have encouraged the growth of the “entrepreneurial state” (Harvey 1989), in which localities compete with one another for capital investments in a global “political economy of place,” with top-down urban development playing a critical role in this race (Fraser et al. 2003, Fraser & Lepofsky 2004). Community development, conceptualized narrowly here in terms of this municipal entrepreneurialism, is the connection of private capital with low-income urban neighborhoods (Liou and Stroh 1998, Walker 2002), namely through affordable housing production and other improvements to the socio-spatial environment, delivered mainly by non-profit agencies who contract with the state and are also funded by private philanthropy to deliver place-based goods and services to the poor. This emphasis on housing production and physical
development has come at the expense of the field’s political organizing roots and its emphases on building political power among the urban poor (Cummings 2002, DeFillipis 2001, Ferman 1996, Newman and Lake 2006, Traynor 1992, Weir 1999), and has also steered non-profit community-based organizations away from their former stewardship of civil society and the fulfillment of democratic and participatory principles of human development (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004).

As such, these non-profit actors and organizations fulfill roll-out neoliberalism, by serving as the conduits of state retrenchment and privatization. Yet, this transformation is discursively characterized as more efficient and democratic (Bondi and Laurie 2005, Rankin 2001) by putting program delivery in the hands of community-based organizations that understand and reflect local contexts, an interpretation supported and reiterated by these CD entities and their constituents as they benefit from increased resources, political power, and authority to carry out their work in and on behalf of low-income communities (Bondi and Laurie 2005, Mitchell 2001) – and witness concrete physical improvements in low-income communities from their efforts.

Alternatively, a second strand of research in the field also heralds the field’s success at channeling private capital into poor communities, but does so by framing it as fulfilling the movement ethos of the field by means of asset-building (Ferguson & Dickens 1999) and community revitalization (Galster et al. 2005). The marketization (Salamon 1993) of the field brought transformative market logics of efficiency and competition to the sector, in this case around the design and implementation of affordable housing production financed by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Early CD intermediaries launched by national foundations and Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s to rationalize and develop the field (Newman and Lake 2006) were instrumental in designing and winning passage of the LIHTC in the mid-1980s,
a victory in the midst of an overall federal shift in tax policy, devolution and privatization of low-income housing provision (Liou and Stroh 1998). The LIHTC has been enormously successful in the last 25 years, producing more than 2M housing units (Roberts 2008-9), outpacing the total number of public housing units, housing vouchers available, and housing produced by other major government sources such as HOME funds. Similar to other major federal housing and urban policies that have sought to bring private capital to low-income communities, such as the federal HOPE VI program to transform public housing, the LIHTC is credited with “sustaining” CDCs (Dreier 1999, O’Regan & Quigley 2000) and delivering billions in private investment to urban poor neighborhoods previously written off as unable to attract private investment (see Cummings 2002 and Fraser et al. 2003 on low-income communities as underserved investment markets).

Intermediaries are credited as the most important trigger for success in the growth and professionalization of the CD field (Stoutland 1999, Walker 1993), responsible for increasing the housing development and organizational capacity of the CD sector. They are typically heralded as introducing a robust “support system” in the field (Keyes et al. 1996, Walker 2002, Walker et al. 2002) that enables “comprehensive” community revitalization strategies to flourish (Frisch & Servon 2006, Walker 2002) and fosters successful CD “partnerships” and “alliances” dedicated to housing production and neighborhood revitalization (Nye and Glickman 2000). Furthermore, by training countless CDCs nationwide to undertake tax-credit development projects, intermediaries and the LIHTC financing these deals are viewed as the foundation for local CD organizations’ success in increasing property values in low-income communities, the preferred measure of evaluating community revitalization (Galster et al. 2005, Smith 2003, Walker 2010). Though CD scholarship acknowledges the tensions between development and organizing,
housing production and political empowerment that persists in the field, many scholars argue that 
this market-driven, professionalized, organizational production capacity symbolizes a CD 
“movement” dedicated to building quality housing for low-income communities (Goetz 1993, 

Thus the marketization and professionalization of CD is seen as sustaining the CD movement, albeit with the movement goals made slightly more vague over time – with 
“economic vitality” (Ferguson & Dickens 1999), resident participation and community control 
remaining at the movement’s core. The movement’s primary strategy, however, has evolved 
away from political organizing towards building safe, secure, physical housing through which residents can receive social services, gather in residential associations, and take advantage of the social capital (Saegert et al. 2001) and human development aspects of secure housing tenure living alongside desirable neighbors. Arguably, in this view, affordable housing is the first step to fulfilling liberal democratic principles for poor communities. Housing production is also far more measurable via metrics like units produced, families housed, and services delivered than the CD movement’s early practices of community organizing and political action. Thus, the marketization of the field was deemed innovative (Carr 1999), politically and economically promising (Goetz 1993), and accountable to funders and residents alike. As development-driven outcomes were framed as liberal successes, especially in the face of a broader societal shift to the political right, funding and organizational support for previous collective-identity based political organizing strategies dropped off (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999, Dreier 1999, Rubin 1995), and over the decades political organizing was detrimentally recast as comparatively radical (Ferree 2010) and distinct from the primary housing development function of the field (Stoecker 1997).
Both analytical assessments of CD as complicit in neoliberal urban restructuring and as fulfilling liberal democratic principles are accurate and incomplete. Political economy critiques overemphasize structural constraints and abstract genuine political conflicts--between the state and civil society, between poor communities and political and economic elites--to the point that human agency is stripped from these struggles and unequal outcomes such as gentrification and displacement seem structurally inevitable--with no possible alternatives (Larner & Craig 2005; Peck & Tickell 2002, Peck & Tickell 2007, and Smith 2005 all point to Margaret Thatcher’s declaration that “there is no alternative” as a mobilizing frame of neoliberalism). Community development literature heralding the successful transformation of low-income communities from “neighborhoods of poverty” to “neighborhood of choice” (Brookings 2005: 2) downplay both the structural political economic forces constraining the empowerment of low-income communities (DeFillipis 2001) and the unequal, policy-driven outcomes of displacement and gentrification that low-income neighborhoods experience. Moreover, the literature suffers from a narrow range of analytical cases, with global cities such as New York and London repeatedly assessed in neoliberal research (see Brenner and Theodore 2002 for examples) and New York, Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis and other US cities with strong CD sectors studied in the development and planning literature (Frisch & Servon 2006, Stoutland 1999; see, for example, Keyes et al. 1996, Yin 1998, Goetz 1993, Johnson 2004).

**Post-Katrina New Orleans**

National and local community development practitioners responded to the unprecedented physical and social devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans (Please see Map 1 in the Appendix for a map of neighborhoods and planning districts in New Orleans). Nelson, Ehrenfeucht and Laska (2007) summarize the major points of Katrina’s impact: 80% of the city
was flooded, with water lingering for up to six weeks in places, and reaching heights of 10 to 15 feet in some neighborhoods. Almost 80,000 homes in New Orleans were “severely damaged or destroyed” (24); 77% of the Parish population experienced flooding. Yet communities that were disproportionately damaged by the storm were home to higher numbers of the poor and African-Americans (Logan 2006). Approximately 300,000 people were displaced; as many as 2,000 people may have died due to the storm, though official estimates are lower (Hirsch 2009). Hurricane Katrina, the most expensive disaster in our nation’s history, struck far beyond New Orleans, laying waste to Gulf Coast communities from Texas to Florida, with many neighborhoods in Mississippi, Alabama and Southeast Louisiana also effectively razed by the combined water and wind impacts of the hurricane.

Yet the devastation to New Orleans, a historically and culturally distinct city in the US and the largest in Katrina’s immediate impact zone, dominated the nation’s attention, and came to symbolize fundamental development questions about where to build, for whom, and by whom. With the federal government largely condemned for its inept preparation for and response to the storm (Graham 2005, Graham 2009) and the televised impacts of so many carless, mostly poor and black (and often elderly or disabled) New Orleanians abandoned to die in the city’s belated mandatory evacuation – trapped on roofs or warehoused in the damaged and overcrowded Superdome – individual, charitable Americans were sufficiently outraged or shaken to donate more resources than following any other national crisis (Frank 2005), and non-profits and philanthropies nationwide moved quickly to join in what has become a concerted if uneven national effort to rebuild an original American city.

When Katrina struck, Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and the White House. Under Bush, Katrina recovery was irrevocably shaped by ideological, controversial federal
redevelopment decisions – to demolish 4,500 units of public housing and replace them with 1,600 units of mixed-income households, to try and suspend federal fair labor laws for rebuilding, to give a disproportionate amount of CDBG funds to Mississippi compared to state-by-state damage estimates, to rely heavily on tax credits and FEMA trailers to replace damaged affordable housing, and to avoid temporarily expanding social welfare programs (e.g., vouchers, Medicaid) to stabilize the lives of the displaced – as well as the State of Louisiana’s decision to spend the majority of CDBG rebuilding funds on making homeowners whole, and the delays and errors involved in launching that enormous subsidy program.

The federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina permanently displaced the majority of the city’s poorest – public housing residents and low-income black renters who required assistance to return to their homes and hometown, a feat described across the elite political spectrum, from Republican leaders to liberal anti-poverty advocates, as a blessing for the city (Hirsch 2009, Powell 2007, Briggs et al. 2005, Reed & Steinberg 2006). Although everyone from grassroots activists to officials from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) came to embrace the rhetoric of the “right of return” for displaced New Orleanians after the flood (Luft 2009), weak local and strong ideological federal government leadership led to a largely free market and private-sector driven recovery of the city, more or less assuring that this right of return has not been fulfilled, except for the luckiest and pluckiest few.

The post-Katrina population of New Orleans five years out from the storm is significantly different from its pre-storm population. Numerous studies have documented that if racial and ethnic communities were disadvantaged prior to a disaster, the extreme event only hastened their decline (Fothergill, Maestas, and Darlington 1999; Fothergill and Peek 2004). Katrina’s overall reshaping of the city’s population reinforces this trend. New Orleans has been losing population
since 1960; of the 50 largest cities in the U.S., it was one of only eight that lost population between 1990 and 2005 (pre-Katrina estimate). It also topped lists in terms of poverty: the seventh highest rate (23.2%) among U.S. counties in 2004, the second highest concentrated poverty1 (38%) among the 50 largest cities in 2005 (Berube and Katz 2005, Brookings 2005) (Please see Map 2 in the Appendix for neighborhood poverty rates in New Orleans from the 2000 census.). Furthermore, poverty was highly racially stratified in New Orleans; in 2005, almost one in three black families lived in poverty, compared to fewer than 5% of white families (Brookings 2005). By 2009, the city’s population had rebounded to 78% of its pre-storm levels (354,850), indicating a plateau in growth from 2008 (336,644).2 The city is wealthier and whiter now, due mainly to the growth in homeownership, lack of affordable places to live for those at the lower end of the economic spectrum, and enduring displacement from the storm. Table 1 shows select demographic changes from 2004 to 20083:

Table 1.

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<td>with fewer Renters,</td>
<td>Whites: 28%</td>
<td>Whites: 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more secure Homeowners,</td>
<td>Blacks: 68%</td>
<td>Blacks: 61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And fewer families in the</td>
<td>Homeowners: 47%</td>
<td>Homeowners: 53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>city.</td>
<td>No mortgage: 37%</td>
<td>No mortgage: 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Households: 57%</td>
<td>Family HH: 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single-person HH: 36%</td>
<td>Single-person HH: 41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The city remains majority African-American, if slightly less so, and the city now has a white majority on the City Council and a white Mayor for the first time in two and three decades, respectively. This racial change of the guard is significant, though there remains a strong black middle-class leadership structure within the city.

1 Concentrated poverty is the proportion of poor residents living in neighborhoods where the poverty rate is at least 40%.
Disasters, including manmade ones such as Katrina, often exacerbate social inequalities (Pelling 2001). Post-Katrina New Orleans is no exception, and its most visible redevelopment projects are the demolished "Big Four" public housing projects, per order of HUD, where New Urbanist mixed-income properties are rising up on enormous parcels of land, celebrated in developer's marketing materials and by many in the city – but not all – as demonstrative, desirable signs of the city's rebirth (see Images 1 and 2).

*Image 1: St. Bernard Projects, July 8, 2006*  
*Image 2: Columbia Parc (formerly St. Bernard), April 17, 2010*

(Photos by author)

These four former public housing sites, situated in historic neighborhoods and central planning districts within the city, have become centerpieces of targeted zones of revitalization plans for the city, non-profits and philanthropy. Yet, leading up to their demolition, they were prominent sites of contention for community development practitioners and social justice activists, including within the Network featured here, as organizations split apart over whether demolition and redevelopment was a pathway to bringing residents home or an indication of their permanent displacement.

**The Case: The Post-Katrina Recovery Network**

This dissertation focuses on the first 15 months after Hurricane Katrina, the period from September 2005 – December 2006, when a national organizational network of community
development advocates began strategizing a response to the flood. Network members represented CD, labor, academic, social movement, and philanthropic organizations located in New Orleans and Baton Rouge and in high capacity CD cities nationwide, all working in CD practice in one form or another. A network formed from members reaching out to one another after the flood to strategize around how to allocate organizational resources for a collective, sustained response to the storm’s aftermath. Network members knew one another from shared social movement histories as well as existing organizational relationships, including subsidiary relationships between New Orleans-based entities and their national headquarters, or due to voluntary or consulting relationships between local and national and national and national organizations.

Local and national organizations focused on Katrina’s twin challenges of residential displacement and severe housing and neighborhood damage. Their bi-directional and overlapping lines of communication and collaboration illustrate what I define as a community development “network” committed to a just, equitable and progressive response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Networks are social structures that “constrain social behavior and social change” (Wellman 1983:157). Rivera et al. (2010: 92) define a social network as existing “wherever distinct social actors (also called nodes) are connected by more or less persistent ties (or relationships). Both actors and ties can be represented by a variety of different constructs” including “interorganizational ties,” and “actors can simultaneously be connected by several different relations.”

This Network is built from the personal and professional relationships between executives and grassroots leaders who have come to head national community development organizations, labor unions, local community coalitions, philanthropy, or hold faculty positions in academia.
(See Ferguson and Stoutland 1999 for analysis of the “community development system”). The majority of these organizational representatives were the decision-makers behind involving their agencies in post-Katrina New Orleans (cf. Diani 2003). Their relationships became resource channels (Diani 2003) to support post-Katrina recovery, and their inter-organizational ties and inter-personal relationships led to collective action (Klandersmans and Oegema 1987).

As the months unfolded, this network grew to just over 60 practitioners, activists, consultants and philanthropists representing 28 different organizations, including MIT, focusing on New Orleans’ recovery, specifically the redevelopment of low-income, African-American neighborhoods and the repatriation of displaced low-income, African-American New Orleanians. Organizations ranged from grassroots, informal (i.e., no 501c3 status) emergency action organizations to large religious, academic, labor, philanthropic and CD organizations. Key organizational characteristics of the 28 organizations include:

**Headquarters:** Organizations were almost evenly split between the New Orleans region and the Northeast. 15 were based in or around New Orleans. Two were from the Bay Area in California, and the remaining 11 were headquartered along the Boston-Washington corridor.

**Net worth:** Non-local organizations were on average larger than local entities, including pre-Katrina. Using net assets as an approximation of organizational resources, the average asset base in 2006 for a New Orleans organization was $27M (median is $6.9M), compared with $1.36B for the NE organizations (due in part to the enormous endowments of two national foundations; the median was $37M). (The range across the entire 28 organizations is from a negative net worth of $2M to over $11B in assets.)

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family services, public health, public safety, etc.), the unions in this study have come to New Orleans specifically to participate in community redevelopment projects as a means for job creation and eventual union recruitment.
Type: Philanthropy, organizing and development organizations dominated the Network. There were six foundations, six social movement organizations (SMOs), and five community development organizations – including two intermediaries. There were four relief organizations, three legislative advocacy organizations, two unions, and two universities.

This case of this CD Network in post-Katrina New Orleans offers a rare window into the foundational relationships within the CD system (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999), that is, the personal and organizational channels within the field that direct resources to and effect socio-spatial change in low-income communities. Network participants initially intended to build a renewed movement for racial and economic justice in the Gulf Coast through which the goal of community self-determination for the poor and displaced would finally be realized. Yet, in what I describe as the contentious recovery politics of New Orleans, the institutionalized CD field conflicted with clear community demands for comprehensive, resident-driven, government intervention and change, leading to the Network’s splintering into two loosely polarized camps favoring development versus organizing responses as the solution to their shared mobilization frame. A significant source of conflict was the future of the Lafitte public housing development in Tremé, one of the Big Four projects slated for demolition. Large, politically powerful CD intermediaries and relief organizations chose to partner with the federal government over the redevelopment of one of the sites, attempting to step in as a “quasi-government” that could rectify the housing shortage and resident displacement, whereas other network members chose to sue, protest and organize against the government’s plans for redevelopment, also viewing their strategy as one of resident repatriation and alleviating the housing shortage. Within a year of the storm, existing power inequalities within the CD field had been reproduced in New Orleans. Yet, learnings from this failure at goal attainment and the reproduction of inequality structures in
the city also led in the years to come to renewed movement possibilities in the Gulf Coast and the CD field.

Of particular interest to CD scholars and practitioners are the extreme circumstances of post-Katrina New Orleans that rekindled the movement desires and rhetoric of well-established CD leaders who had begun as activists in urban poor communities and become leading professionals in the field. At the same time, the case of post-Katrina New Orleans led Network members to marshal their professional and expert resources to the best of their abilities, and put in stark relief important fissures in the field concerning the efficacy of development practice. This case thus offers an historical view of the evolution of the CD field as personified through the actions and choices of a Network of activists and practitioners operating in post-Katrina New Orleans. Much has been written on planning, development and movement outcomes in the Gulf Coast since Hurricane Katrina (Green, Bates, and Smith 2007; Luft 2008; Luft 2009; Nelson et al. 2007; Reardon et al. 2009; Rubin 2009; Thompson 2009; Wagner, Frisch & Fields 2008). This case brings together post-Katrina disaster research and community development scholarship via an in-depth and up close examination of key actors and relationships in the CD system at the particular historical moment preceding the field’s 40th anniversary and following one of the worst disasters in US history.

A Shared Injustice Frame

Although the analytical concept of an organizational network is central here, also important to the case is the shared vision of the network that their commitment to post-Katrina New Orleans embodied the seeding of a renewed social movement for community self-determination in the Gulf Coast. The idea of a mobilizing “collective action frame” (Benford and Snow 2000) is essential to understanding the particular coalescence of this Network around post-Katrina New
Orleans. A collective action frame is a “schemata” (Goffman 1974, quoted in Benford and Snow 2000: 614) that is actively produced by actors to “render events...meaningful and thereby...organize experience and guide action” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). The additional purpose behind a collective action frame, beyond meaning construction, is to mobilize “potential adherents and constituents”; collective action frames “inspire and legitimate activities” of movement activists or movement organizations (Benford and Snow 2000: 614) – or, in this particular case, of the organizations within the CD network here.

The Network operated from a shared “injustice frame” (Goodwin et al. 2001) that assigned blame for Katrina’s devastation to the federal government, and less so, local government. Actors shared an energizing moral outrage over the federal government’s willful neglect of New Orleans and its most vulnerable residents, leading up to and following the storm, and grounded in historical legacies of institutional racism and anti-urban bias. Incorporated into this frame were the rights of displaced residents to return to the city and participate in the recovery. This collective action frame would serve to organize and guide the Network’s strategic responses to Hurricane Katrina.

The Extended Case Method

I use the extended case method (ECM) here. The ECM is a reflexive, “politically-engaged”, theory-driven mode of ethnography utilizing participant-observation to analyze how macro-forces shape social situations in order to “reconstruct” existing theories, i.e., shed new light on or fill gaps in existing theories (Burawoy 1998, Burawoy et al. 1991, Tavory and Timmermans 2009, Eliasoph and Lichterman 1999, Small 2009). Because of this goal of reconstruction, anomalous cases or discrepancies between theoretical frames and empirical findings are especially important to the researcher (Burawoy 1998, Gamson 1991, Small 2009).
ECM is rooted in reflexive science, which emphasizes “intersubjective…dialogue” between the researcher and her study site and population (Burawoy 1998: 14). ECM embeds the researcher’s objectivity in the theoretical framing of the case, i.e., the emphasis is not on uncovering a “truth” via the research but in advancing theory (Burawoy 1998). From this casing, via participant-observation ECM allows the researcher to extend a) to the structural (e.g., macro social forces) from the inter-subjective processes of an ethnographic case, and b) from a case to broader theory to offer hypotheses or generalizations about society. An important contribution of ECM is its ability to trace social processes over time, that is, its ability to follow unfolding events over time and to discover their linkages (Mitchell 1983, Small 2009).

Defining and selecting a case using the ECM approach derives from studying social situations that appear to defy or challenge existing theories (Tavory and Timmermans 2009). I came to post-Katrina New Orleans as a participant-observer in a community development network through two inter-related theoretical entry points, outlined previously, that through political economy or liberal democratic lenses analyze the limits to and opportunities of community development (e.g., Ferguson and Dickens 1999, Goetz 1993, Newman and Ashton 2004, Newman and Lake 2006, O’Connor 1999, O’Connor 2001, Stoecker 1997, Tabb 1971, Walker 2002).

The anomalies of the case compared to traditional community development conflict settings were a) the post-disaster setting and corresponding scope of the damage, including displacement, suggesting that market-driven, place-based CD interventions in the built environment may not be sufficient or appropriate given the need to organize the diaspora for resident participation, b) the disproportionate power of the federal government after Katrina compared to traditional theories of liberal CD that posit that local governments and urban regimes are key in the public-private
cooperation that drives CD policy and practice, c) the notably distinct racial politics, history and culture of New Orleans that served to expose in full force the cultural schisms in the field, and d) the relatively low organizational and production capacity of the CD field in New Orleans (Lowe 2006), compared to most CD case studies.

One particular value of ECM in this research project is its emphasis on participant-observation as the technique through which the researcher connects local processes to external, macro forces. Through participant-observation in this CD network, I got to know network actors by working closely with them, to come to know them as multi-dimensional agents dealing with structural constraints and inter-subjective conflicts in their Katrina responses. ECM enables the researcher to pursue multiple situations, sources of knowledge and local meanings via participant-observation (Burawoy 1998, Eliasoph and Lichterman 1999). In New Orleans, I worked with foundations, CDCs, labor unions, community development intermediaries, legislative advocacy organizations, direct action Marxist groups, social movement organizations and other academics, including from other universities. I came to intimately follow and seek to understand the various social processes unfolding over time and space – from New Orleans to Washington, D.C. and back – threading through Boston, San Francisco, New York, Mississippi and Alabama. I worked with actors schooled in the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, in organized labor, and in more recent immigrants’ rights and workers’ rights movements. I spent time volunteering with protest-oriented activists fighting to re-open public housing at the same time that I was meeting with national 501c3s concerning their site redevelopment plans. Through participation-observation, I was able to engage deeply with participants across the Network, and to observe unfolding social processes grounded in specific theoretical frameworks concerning the limits to and potential of community development. In particular, through this ECM approach,
which entails close observation and personal interaction with key actors, I came to see the limits of the rigid categorizing of political economy analyses of community development as a conduit for neoliberal privatization in post-Katrina New Orleans, as well as to understand how the institutionalized practice of CD, sometimes behind the back of key actors, limited the movement aims of the Network after the flood, and more generally in the field today.

ECM has as its core principles: intervention, process, structuration (Giddens 1984) and reconstruction (Burawoy 1998); it confronts the corresponding power dynamics of domination, silencing, objectification, normalization in research settings by pursuing inter-subjective dialogue between researcher and setting, as well as dialogues between the social processes witnessed in the case and the macro social forces shaping those processes, and between the case and theory. This requires the researcher to be aware of the potential biases her own social position and ideological commitments may have on the observation and analysis of the subject. I show sources of such potential biases in Table 2 below, which details the dialectical relationships between ECM principles and the power dynamics of the research setting in this case.
### Table 2. Power Effects of ECM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four principles of ECM</th>
<th>Power effects</th>
<th>My post-Katrina case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>My intervention came almost immediately after the flood, in response to requests for post-storm assistance from racial and social justice activists in NO made to their colleagues, two African-American professors at DUSP. The threat of domination existed due to my situated social position as a white woman from an elite Northern university with access to national resources and decision-makers and safe, secure places to live and work in New Orleans and elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong> (“aggregation of situational knowledge into social process”) (Burawoy 1998: 15)</td>
<td>Silencing</td>
<td>Because of my personal and professional exposure to a range of CD practitioners, advocates and activists in this network, I was able to pursue multiple situations, sources of knowledge and local meaning of Katrina and her aftermath via participant-observation and make sense of those as a broader social process of mobilization and resistance to federal ideological hegemony and potential permanent displacement of the low-income poor. I risked the potential for silencing particular voices and knowledge of post-Katrina recovery given my structural position and cultural schisms within the Network that constrained to whom I had access and how I made sense of the various situations, meanings and knowledge produced in this case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structuration</strong></td>
<td>Objectification</td>
<td>The Network’s response to Katrina shaped and was shaped by the neoliberal federal political context, a regime-less local political economy, etc. in terms of what strategic responses seemed viable and how those responses shaped future state, civil society and network actions. The challenge here is not to reify CD actions and case outcomes such that broader neoliberal forces, for example, are treated as inevitable, universal truths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>The anomalies outlined above suggest the gaps or limits to existing class conflict theories of urban development and theories of community development movement potential and the possibilities for restructuring those theories. Yet, “fashioning” the case to fit the theory and vice versa to generalize about society risks normalization, or establishing categories of action and society, and “sites” and subject groups for investigation and prescription that erase the critical factors of context and dialogue – e.g., in this case, neoliberal community development practice, or the existence of an urban underclass (Wilson 1987).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My fieldnotes include data collected from September 2005 – December 2006 as part of a larger participant-observation role that ran through 2009. My fieldnotes are meeting notes, emails, journal and blog entries, supplemented by primary and secondary documents (e.g., organizational materials and newspaper articles, respectively) collected in private strategic planning meetings with different network members as well as in public recovery meetings (e.g., neighborhood planning meetings, etc.). My data collection is colored by my own perceptions of
what is important to note, what information is legible in formally structured engagements such as the private meetings in which I participated, my own situated social position (Young 2002; e.g., my outsider, Northern, MIT-affiliated status, my class background, etc.); yet, there is much to be gained from my up-close, thick description and sustained access across a range of CD practitioners and advocates and post-disaster micro-settings.

I use organizational names because recovery responses are publicly known. However, I change all identifying characteristics of individual representatives in order to protect anonymity.

**Structure of the dissertation**

This dissertation will show how the three mechanisms of institutionalization – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – constrained the movement aims of the CD Network in post-Katrina New Orleans. In the next chapter, I introduce the three mechanisms of institutionalization. I also lay out the mobilizing context of the “crisis” that Hurricane Katrina produced. In chapter 3, I begin with a presentation of four key environmental challenges, or triggering conditions (Elster 2007, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) circumscribing the Network’s efforts in interaction with the field-level mechanisms of marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing. These four environmental challenges are a) a fractured civil society, b) an ideological, federal state, c) a weak local political economy, and d) competing cultures within the Network. I then expand on the Network’s framing of Katrina, and describe the CD network’s response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans over the 15 month period.

In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I situate the field-level mechanisms within this challenging operating environment to analyze their outcomes on the Network. Three key outcomes are discussed here: In chapter 4, I examine the embodiment of institutionalized inequalities of race and class in the
Network (relationally) and in New Orleans (spatially). In chapter 5, I analyze the competing strategic responses within the Network to HUD’s public housing demolition plans. In chapter 6, I explore the cursory levels of resident participation in the redevelopment of Tremé/Lafitte serving low-income, black public housing tenants and their neighbors compared to post-Katrina neighborhood planning processes that served mostly white, middle-class residents. In each chapter, I demonstrate how the three mechanisms of institutionalization – marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing – led to these outcomes through their structuring of the CD field and CD practice. Finally, in chapter 7, I reflect on the implications for community development and planning practice and scholarship based on this network’s failure to realize its movement aims in New Orleans. Critically, this failure ultimately led to several strands of political activism emerging out of the post-Katrina Gulf Coast, which suggest lessons for reconstructing neoliberal theories and renewing the movement possibilities of community development.
Chapter 2: Mechanisms of Institutionalization and the Crisis of Katrina

This chapter and the next lay out the mechanisms of institutionalization and the broader operating context constraining the Network’s movement aims in post-Katrina New Orleans. This chapter introduces the process of institutionalization in the CD field over the past three decades. It then analyses three causal mechanisms (Elster 2007, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) related to the institutionalization process that have been instrumental in shaping the contours of the field today. These mechanisms are the marketization of CD, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing. The last section of this chapter discusses the role of crisis in destabilizing institutionalized fields and addresses the specific illegitimacy crisis of the state that brought this network together despite inter-organizational differences.

I will begin chapter 3 by illustrating how these mechanisms in this “crisis” context merged with four environmental challenges, or triggering conditions (Elster 2007), in post-Katrina New Orleans. These conditions – civil society distrust and conflict, ideological federal policy, a weak local political economy, and competing cultures within the Network – are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, which offers an in-depth narrative of the Network’s experience in the city, grounded in their shared framing of their work as a renewed social movement. Subsequent chapters dig more deeply into how these mechanisms constrained the field’s movement aims on the ground in New Orleans.

The Institutionalization of the CD Field

Institutionalization is “the spread of rule-like behavioral models” brought about by the diffusion and standardization of shared schema, backed by implicit incentives to encourage their adoption (Wejnert 2002: 303). Via institutionalization, an “organized pattern of action” becomes embedded “in formal structures,” and behaviors, actions, and practices become routinized over
time (Zucker 1987). Institutionalization may derive from rationalization associated with state
growth; certain practices and forms become normalized and legitimated, and organizations learn
to conform for survival (Zucker 1987, Wejnert 2002). Although institutionalization can be
difficult to operationalize, suggested indicators include the passage of laws and regulations
governing action and behaviors, the presence of professionalism, associated discourse or jargon,
“certainty of judgment”, evolving justifications for action, patterns of “maintenance,” “resistance
to change,” replication, and legitimating authority (Zucker 1987: 448). Critically, meaning also
is embedded in institutions (Lamont and Small 2008). That is, the meanings we assign to issues
of poverty, inequality, and place, for instance, also are institutionalized in our policies,
organizational practices, and the rules and norms that govern fields. These institutionalized
meanings need not reflect the values of particular individuals within an organizational field –
what management theorists describe as the degree of person-organization fit (Valentine, Godkin
and Lucero 2002), but institutional contexts may restrict their practical opportunities for action.

Processes of institutionalization are closely associated with social movement growth and
1978). In the U.S. since the 1960s the number of advocacy organizations in politics has
exploded (Jenkins and Edwards 2004) due to a number of factors, including philanthropic
support, “conflicts over regulation and deregulation,” “ideological polarization,” and “the
institutionalization of the movements of the 1960s and 1970s” (Jenkins and Edwards 2004: 486;
see also Jenkins and Halcli 1999, Knoke 1986, Minkoff 1995, 1997). Scholars argue that since
the 1970s, the trend for social movements in the US has been towards professionalization
(McCarthy and Zald 1973, Minkoff 1995, 1997), which may subvert fulfillment of their original
movement goals as they move away from protest and confrontation and towards organizational maintenance and institutional strategies (Piven and Cloward 1978, Jenkins and Edwards 2004). Although institutionalization suggests to some scholars an end point of social movement activity, or at least of a social movement organization, others view, as I do here, that institutionalization signifies an evolution point in a social movement process rather than its conclusion (see Olzak 1989 for a brief review of this debate). For instance, Tilly (1978) characterizes movement organization participants as “members” and “challengers” in his polity model of collective action, depending on whether they are inside (i.e., institutionalized) or outside the polity.

Newman and Lake (2006) and Ferguson and Stoutland (1999) provide important histories of the institutionalization of the community development field. The community development field began as a social movement in the late 1960s for the self-determination of low-income Black and Latino urban communities. Its early emphasis was on community organizing and empowerment, a struggle centered on building political power and a proud cultural, collective identity for marginalized urban communities. National and local funders supported this activism toward human and social development efforts. Yet, as the political climate shifted rightward in the 1970s and into the early 80s, funders began to pull out of this sector, citing lack of measurable outcomes and responding to the increasingly conservative environment for urban and low-income development under former Presidents Nixon and Reagan.

With the lack of production outcomes in the community development movement in the early years and federal retrenchment from cities and low-income communities, initial supporters of the CD sector did not expect it to last. Surprisingly, as the Reagan Administration substantially shifted responsibility for low-income housing to the private market, most notably by creating the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit in 1986, the community development sector, despite its nascent
productive capacity, began to grow – in large part with the assistance of national housing intermediaries created by national philanthropy to “rationalize” the sector and minimize risk for investors (Newman and Lake 2006). What followed into the end of the decade was the growth, professionalization, bureaucratization and de-politicization of the sector away from its confrontational, social justice, empowerment and collective identity roots to a formalized practice of finance, land use planning, real estate development, and housing management to spur development in blighted, disinvested, low-income neighborhoods. Broadly within the sector, community organizing has been disconnected from its confrontational, political roots and incorporated into loosely defined capacity building initiatives (Fraser et al. 2003; see also Chaskin 2001). These are narrowly construed efforts typically launched by extra-local public-private collaboratives to generate resident-input and initiative for community improvement that is kept separate from larger urban development processes and decisions made about the neighborhoods in which residents live.

Today, the community development sector sits within the larger Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector, a significantly structurally disadvantaged non-profit component (due to its community size, social justice missions, and place-based mandates) of the enormous, for-profit, private real estate and banking industry. The field is charged with the enormous task of developing affordable housing in low-income communities beset by urban processes of gentrification or chronic disinvestment. Bank legislation and profits continue to substantially fund the sector, alongside government funds, developer fees, and philanthropic contributions for programs and services. The commitments of local and national philanthropy, the private sector and the national intermediaries make or break community development in cities across the U.S.

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5 The entire sector is in crisis given the economic collapse of the last two years.
This contemporary emphasis on finance and development was on display in Network members’ strategies after Hurricane Katrina. For example, when the national CD intermediary Enterprise Community Partners entered New Orleans, it wholesale created a new non-profit affordable housing developer, Providence Community Housing, in partnership with Catholic Charities, which operated the largest private provider of affordable housing in Louisiana, rather than build out the city’s modest community development sector (see Lowe 2006 on New Orleans’ CD capacity), which appeared to be an outsized task given the urgency to channel federal Community Development Block Grant dollars to the city for housing and neighborhood redevelopment. This decision ultimately reinforced pre-storm inequalities, by enlarging one of the biggest, most well-resourced non-profit service providers in the region. But it was a rational decision by Enterprise from their position as a national intermediary whose mission was to minimize investor risk and leave capacity behind in the city, a decision shaped by post-disaster conditions of urgency and pragmatic choices about how to work with the Bush Administration.

Although the process of institutionalization of the CD field is well established in the literature, the ways it has constrained the enduring movement aims of the field have not been well explicated. I see three mechanisms (Elster 2007, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) of institutionalization that significantly constrain the movement goals of the CD field. These are a) the “marketization” (Salamon 1993) of community development, b) the reformation of poverty (e.g., O’Connor 2001), and the “radicalization” (Ferree 2010) of community organizing “repertoires” (Swidler 1986).

First, as described in chapter one, the marketization process in CD was viewed as an innovative means for giving low-income communities access to traditional liberal democratic sources of political power – control of private property, associational forms of community
participation, and representation by politically powerful liberal elites including non-profit developers, philanthropy, and unions. This is the perspective that dominates mainstream CD literature and practice. Second, the federal government’s holistic, community-based commitment to poverty eradication enshrined in Great Society programs gave way to an ideological reformation of social policy in which poverty was reconceived as a problem of individualized, deviant, pathological behaviors brought about by New Deal/Johnson era poverty policy, thereby justifying the role back of many of these social programs. This reformation has been used since the 1980s as cause for greatly expanding the underwriting power of liberal philanthropy, frontline presence of non-profit social service providers, and professionalization of anti-poverty work, leading to the prevalence in the CD sector of a reformist, caregiving ethos of ministering to the deviant poor, now training them in self-sufficient behaviors for integration into mainstream society (O’Connor 2001, Dreier 1997). Lastly, marketization reinforced by the reformation of poverty led to the radicalization of community organizing repertoires, i.e., a reframing of confrontation protest and organizing strategies as politically radical, or as operating on the margins of mainstream community development practice (cf. Ferree 2010). This has led to deep cultural and political schisms within the field between those embracing mainstream, liberal physical development strategies versus radical collective-identity based organizing strategies.

The “crisis” of Katrina shined a light on the role of these mechanisms in constraining the CD field’s movement aims. Before expanding on this crisis context, these three mechanisms are explained in detail below.

**Mechanism #1: Marketization of Community Development**

Salamon’s (1993) concept of the “marketization” of the social welfare “sector” reflects the infusion of market logic of competition and efficiency, the market-driven practices of fee-for-
service and tailoring services to clients who can pay, and the competitiveness between non-
profits and for-profit organizations for “market share”. Following on the heels of Reagan’s
“privatization revolution,” marketization is another way of understanding the professionalization
and rationalization of the community development sector in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to
the potential benefits of a professionalized sector embracing market principles and practices that
leads to better fundraising, housing development, budgeting, and service delivery skills,
marketization includes the substantial drawbacks of curbing non-profits’ commitment to
constituency empowerment or serving the poorest and most vulnerable, and their general
stewardship of civil society that centers democratic participation, the development of social
capital (e.g., trust and affective networks), and fairness and justice as core principles for human
development (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). A trend of marketization reconfigures stakeholder
relationships for non-profits, prioritizing donors, investors or service delivery partners, rather
than residents and the communities CD organizations are in particular charged with representing.
As the sector professionalized and centered housing production in the last two decades of the 20th
century, it shifted away from community organizing and political advocacy in low-income urban
communities that might threaten relationships with the donors and investors funding housing
production (Newman and Lake 2006, Domhoff 2009). Part of this shift has been to subordinate
resident and “local” participation and self-direction to the input and decisions of professionalized
staff and a supra-local network of consultants, policymakers, funders and technical assistance
providers that determine the best practices and major development priorities of municipalities
and communities in today’s global political economy of place (Fraser et al. 2003, Fraser and

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6 In CD, this includes the “hardest-to-house” and/or “extremely low incomes” populations, i.e., the disabled,
substance abusers, parents with substantial difficulty meeting work requirements, etc. and those with incomes below
30% the area median, respectively.
Lepofsky 2004, Domhoff 2009; see also Stoecker 1997). For example, due to the relatively nascent housing production and overall professional capacity of the CD sector in New Orleans (Lowe 2006) further challenged by the scope of Katrina’s destruction, national network members focused on housing production and sectoral capacity-building exercised outsized power to shape the built environment of the post-Katrina city.

Reagan substantially slashed government budgets for low-income housing as part of a broader ideological shift of privatization and devolution – emphasizing charity, voluntarism, and market efficiency – that relegated low-income housing and community development the responsibility of the private sector. Around this same period, the Ford Foundation, Congress and other corporate and philanthropic donors institutionalized a previously modest effort in the CD sector to develop financial intermediaries that would provide funds and technical assistance and training to build the capacity of the CD field to develop new, affordable uses of land and housing (Liou and Stroh 1998). Intermediaries are modeled on private-sector financial firms (e.g., commercial banks) that match lenders with borrowers for investment purposes (Liou and Stroh 1998). Because the CD field has the social mission of providing housing and services for low-income communities, the intermediaries in this sector are governed by a “social enterprise” ethos of making affordable capital and technical skills accessible for low-income community-based development organizations (i.e., CBDOs – this includes CDCs) to deliver housing units and social services to their target communities. As such, CD intermediaries (CDIs) have been dually characterized as “bankers” and “philanthropists” (Liou and Stroh 1998).

Ford, Congress and other donors launched three national intermediaries between 1979 and 1982 that have revolutionized the field and practice of CD. Indeed, their creation, growth and success in professionalizing and rationalizing the sector for financial investment and housing
production has been described as “the single most important story of the nonprofit development sector in the 1980s. Arguably, without this source of support for grassroots development activity, state and local governments would have displayed far less responsiveness to nonprofit developer needs over the decade” (Liou and Stroh 1998: 582). One of the CDIs’ first demonstrative efforts was successful, intensive lobbying for the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) in the mid-1980s as part of reform following the Savings and Loan scandal.

The LIHTC is the major source of affordable rental housing production in the nation today (Roberts 2008/2009). It has led to the creation of more than 2M affordable units, outpacing the number of public housing units (~1M), Housing Choice Vouchers (formerly Section 8) (~1M) and units built with HUD HOME funds (450,000 since 1990), another multi-billion dollar source of rental housing production for states, municipalities and CBDOs. Assembling affordable housing and tax credit deals is extremely complicated, time-consuming and expensive – tax credit applications in post-Katrina Louisiana were estimated to cost $30,000 to prepare (Maggi 2006). Two of the three CDIs launched 30 years ago have become the primary syndicators of tax credits today. Tax credit syndication is the bread and butter behind their capacity-building efforts in hundreds of communities nationwide (Liou and Stroh 1998), as well as behind the environmental conditions they helped create for the proliferation of thousands of CDCs nationwide by the end of the 20th century. Sponsored research by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and Enterprise, two of the largest non-profit intermediaries in the US, shows that “supporting the construction and preservation of affordable housing-particularly housing financed by the federal Low-income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program-has a broad, positive effect in low-income communities that generates a significant return on investment” including
“family financial stability,” “increased local purchasing power,” and “higher property values” (Walker 2010).

There are several important drawbacks to the dominance of LIHTC projects in affordable rental housing production. First, they serve higher income households compared to public housing or vouchers, both of whom reach households with extremely low incomes (up to 30% of area median income). LIHTC deals target households up to 50-60% of AMI – i.e., very low income households; the cost of housing production tends to keep affordability around that threshold versus reaching even poorer households. Some research suggests that non-profit developed projects cost more than those built by for-profit firms, perhaps because non-profits are more likely to offer social services with their housing developments (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999). LIHTC projects also tend to “concentrate” income groups together in order to maximize the subsidy in the deals, and the housing tends to be built in already poor or moderate-income communities, rather than relocating needed affordable housing to wealthier or more suburban communities (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999). These concentration tendencies defy the deconcentration policy aims of the dominant “dispersal consensus” (Imbroscio 2008), undermining the otherwise vaunted status of tax credit financing for affordable housing.

More importantly, the value of tax credits is tied to the market. When the market collapses, as we experienced with the credit/mortgage/financial crisis (i.e., Great Recession) of the last two years, so does the value of the tax credits. Rather than allowing the CD sector, as part of the social welfare system in the US, to run counter-cyclical to the market – ramping up affordable housing access in times of economic hardship, the ability to produce much needed shelter falls apart along with the economy.
Lastly, the FIRE sector comprises 90% of LIHTC investors (Roberts 2008/2009). Along with Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements and Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) legislation, the LIHTC acts as a key institutional constraint or incentive (depending on one’s view) situating the CD field in the FIRE industry. Financial firms, banks, insurance companies, and government-sponsored corporations like Fannie Mae are the major investors – and by extension, with the assistance of the CDIs, the major producers – of affordable housing in the U.S. The prominence and monetary size of the LIHTC – not to mention CRA legislation and CDFI funds (for affordable lending in low-income communities) – has serious implications for where affordable rental housing production is situated in the larger federal policy arena as well. LIHTC, CRA and CDFI are all housed in the Department of the Treasury. Scholarship and practice situates affordable housing and community development as the purview of the Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD), in part because of public housing, fair housing law, community development block grants, and the general mission and aim of HUD. In actuality, CD practice and policy should be captured as a subsidiary aim of the US Treasury, whose mission, “duties and functions” include to

Maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities...enable economic growth and stability at home and abroad, strengthen national security by combating threats and protecting the integrity of the financial system...The Department of the Treasury’s mission highlights its role as...an influential participant in the global economy...the executive agency responsible for promoting economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the United States.  

In contrast, HUD’s mission is

HUD’s mission is to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality affordable homes for all. HUD is working to strengthen the housing market to bolster the economy and protect consumers; meet the need for quality affordable rental homes: utilize housing as a platform for improving quality of life; build inclusive and sustainable communities free from discrimination; and transform the way HUD does business.  

7 http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/  
8 http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/about/mission
So the mission of social inclusion and community sustainability based on stable affordable housing is practically divorced from the production of the bulk of that affordable housing in the U.S., which is actually part of fulfilling a mission of economic growth and financial stability in a competitive global context. Taken this way, critics of neoliberalism are absolutely correct in characterizing housing as a commodity produced for profit and growth ends within a global economy (Marcuse 1989, Marcuse and Keating 2006, Pow 2009, Wu 2005). As such, the production of affordable housing requires a set of rational, efficient, low-risk, high-return, scalable mechanisms that constrains customization for local context. CDIs that syndicate tax credits thus drive the “mass customization” (Gilmore and Pine 1997, Pine and Davis 1999) of affordable rental housing nationwide, as different design features and tenant mixes prove profitable, replicable, and scalable. This is why it is often so easy to recognize HOPE VI or other affordable housing redevelopments by their homogeneous New Urbanist design features. It is not just a design principle of walkability and community that drives this replication, but the cost effectiveness of reproducing it on a large scale nationwide by a small community of non-profit and for-profit developers that have figured out how to efficiently package tax credit deals, assemble multiple sources of financing, and deliver a number of affordable units for a set of low-income tenants using a limited number of design principles, with some modest tweaking to reflect local conditions. Affordable rental housing production in the U.S. since the 1980s has become professionalized, standardized, and institutionalized within the FIRE sector and capital markets, led by a benevolent oligarchy of CDIs as tax credit syndicators and capacity builders of the field and of low-income communities.

*CD as urban entrepreneurialism*
Community development, as part of both the FIRE industry and a key tool in urban governance, is beset at multiple scales by a market logic that impedes both these arenas. Cities, for the last four decades have grown increasingly caught up in what Fraser et al. (2003) describe as a “global political economy of place” (see also Logan and Molotch 1987), forced through a trend of neoliberal globalization to become more entrepreneurial (Harvey 1989) and to compete for capital investment. Coming out of the urban riots of the late 1960s and 1970s, the fiscal crises that followed, a rightward shift in politics, society and governance that triumphantly holds that poverty won the war on poverty, market liberalization and regulatory rollbacks that made capital increasingly flexible and consolidated among a global few, and little capacity to raise their own revenues, cities have come to over-rely on large scale development projects to attract corporate capital or an upper income tax base. Public housing has been systematically demolished around the U.S., tax credits finance the majority of affordable housing developed today, stadiums and entertainment districts and university expansions have been encouraged to attract the middle-class back to the city, and corporations receive enormous subsidies to keep or site their headquarters and facilities in local economies. Labor and environmental regulations, incentives for private housing developers, and social safety net policies have been modified to facilitate market-driven, private-sector growth and control over cities.

The market logic of competition, privatization and ownership has pervaded community development since the early 1980s, when philanthropy began to pull out of funding the CD movement’s organizing roots and Reagan substantially removed the government from the business of low-income community support. Yet, this market logic unfolds on multiple scales in low-income communities and in community development, and thus attracts a diverse,
complicated network of actors that often clash with one another over how to respond to the chronic challenges present in low-income communities (LICs).

The Housing Acts of 1934 and 1937 made improving living conditions for low-income Americans a federal mandate. These acts were victories for philanthropic housing reformers and have always been compromised in their aim by the federal government’s willingness to acquiesce to private market, i.e., real estate, resistance to publicly supported housing. Indeed, the alleged failure of public housing – its “concentration” of poverty and its racial segregation – helped fuel the further surrender of housing and community development to the market. Today, at the neighborhood scale, LICs have been defined as “markets” requiring private investment for revitalization, a frame that has attracted diverse interest groups such as “proponents of black nationalism, neoliberal economics, and postmodern micropolitics” (Cummings 2002: 399). At the city-wide scale, LICs – especially those proximate to downtown development zones, are seen as drags on a municipality’s attractiveness to private capital, and thus need to be revitalized to come in line with the city’s overall marketing, development and investment strategy to help it compete in the global political economy of place (Fraser et al. 2003). At a regional or national level, LICs are sites to be contained as the responsibility of cities, evidenced, for example, by suburban resistance to regional governance strategies or at the national level by the rise of suburban power in Congress in the 1980s (Wolman and Marckini 1998).

CD Intermediaries as Urban Restructurers

Community development corporations originally were founded to build civic, political and productive capacity in these communities, to enable residents both to advocate for their own rights and to build viable economic and housing models in their neighborhoods. As government funding declined and philanthropic support moved away from CD’s organizing roots and
towards enhancing housing production as part of the rightward shift of privatization and
devolution, the core principles of racial and economic justice in the CD movement were – if not
exactly abandoned – reinterpreted. CD came to be about “making capitalism work in poor
communities” (Liou and Stroh 1998: 575), about the productive capacity to “mobilize, allocate
and regulate the use of land and capital” (Walker 2002: 2). Housing production became the
primary objective of the sector. As CD intermediaries matured and institutionalized complex
and expensive tax credit development as the primary means for affordable rental housing
production, mega developers like James Rouse, the founder of Enterprise Community Partners,
became “spokespersons” for the sector (Liou and Stroh 1998: 576). The requirements of
specialized financial and technical skill to succeed in CD has privileged those with the access to
and ability to work with capital markets, and further de-emphasized the role of resident input and
empowerment in the focus on developing scalable, replicable affordable housing models in urban
poor communities nationwide. In an era of continually shrinking resources, stagnating social
mobility, and rising socio-economic inequality, a supra-local tax credit development regime has
arguably come to govern the CD field, complete with a lopsided, institutionalized dependence on
capital markets and Wall Street investors for housing funds.

This marketization and repositioning of the field brings with it different ideologies and
values to the practice – a preference for quantifiable, measurable outcomes, an emphasis on
material asset accumulation, etc. The level of physical development – i.e., units produced – is the
number one measure of success, followed by related market-based performance metrics –
efficient uses of funds, increases in local property values, and a rise in individual “self-
sufficiency,” measured as a decreased use of government subsidies or receipt of higher wages.
Political organizing, with its evolving agenda, time-consuming process, and qualitative
outcomes, is discouraged. Political advocacy is directed by staff and closely resembles lobbying and an extension of machine politics in cities with higher capacity CD regimes (Koschinsky and Swanstrom 2001, Marwell 2004, 2007). The practice of community development, more broadly, is rarely an act or symbol of resistance or societal critique.

The takeaway from the post-Katrina case of Enterprise and the Catholic Church subsidiary Providence Community Housing relatively easily gaining control of the low-income neighborhood Tremé/Lafitte and doing so as an act of moral political resistance against an illegitimate state (Jones and Ward 2002) is how it reveals CD intermediaries as urban restructurers in the large neoliberal urban project. The “realities of housing economics” (Dreier 1997: 241) are such that it is not possible to provide affordable housing for the poor, especially the extremely low-income, without permanent subsidy. LIHTC projects do not serve extremely low-income households, and must be affordable for 30 years. As the government has moved out of low-income housing provision and the LIHTC has taken over, the poorest in the nation are increasingly underserved in the affordable housing market. As developers and policymakers have focused on making mixed-income projects palatable to potential market rate tenants and to broader society in our uncritical zeal for poverty “deconcentration,” low-income residents are ever more sidelined, including through toothless planning exercises. Fraser and Kick (2007: 2357) find that for mixed-income housing to work, goal alignment between investors, the state, and nonprofits matters, whereas goal alignment with residents is irrelevant. Residents are “relatively underserved...while other stakeholders realize a variety of benefits.”

Although CD intermediaries have used their substantial power to win some important benefits for the CD field and to build 2M units of housing in the last 30 years, they have not reallocated that power to advocate for greater government responsibility for housing the poor –
indeed, they are structurally disinclined towards such activism. Their existence and success also obscures the reality that there is virtually no substitute for government subsidy for housing the poorest among us. Furthermore, their membership in the “dispersal consensus” (Imbroscio 2008) has aided the federal government’s aggressive efforts to privatize public housing in the US, by intermediaries’ ability and willingness and pride in redeveloping inarguably aged, underfunded, and physically declining public housing projects around the nation. As part of this wholesale privatization process, whether benevolently or otherwise, CD intermediaries are key restructurers of the urban environment, central to the process of removing public access to land and housing from poor communities of color and regulating their continued presence in new privatized spaces. They are complicit in the same “legislative and regulatory changes that implicitly seem to require [public housing authorities] to choose solvency over helping only the neediest” (Quercia and Galster 1997: 566). In designing innovative new financing mechanisms for the production of affordable rental housing, intermediaries are part of the entrepreneurial regime that now governs and shapes cities (cf. Harvey 1989). What is particularly alarming for local activists is intermediaries’ national scale and their lack of rootedness to any particular locality. In this sense, they have the power to shape local places according to universal, replicable, anodyne norms that they helped design and disseminate. That they do so much of this work motivated by a moral, normative commitment to alleviating poverty and mainstreaming the poor obscures their direct role in the privatization and restructuring or urban space and the further marginalization of the poor in the process. In New Orleans, for example, despite the best of intentions of Lafitte’s non-profit developers, the residents of Tremé/Lafitte are no closer to coming home today than the former residents of the St. Bernard development, now Columbia Parc, which has seen deeply subsidized units reduced by 85% (Reckdahl 12/10/08).
Mechanism #2: Poverty Reform

I use the term “reform” as the basis for describing the changes to poverty policy and conceptualizations of poverty over the last three decades. These changes have been variously described as the moralization of poverty (Lipman 2009), the privatization of poverty (Pruijt 2003, Binder 2007), the feminization of poverty (see (Bianchi 1999 for a review), welfarization (Wacquant 2010), and other ways of expressing the shifting contours of who is poor and how we respond to poverty in the U.S. The “reformation of poverty” captures the nation’s wholesale departure from the Great Society social welfare agenda of the 1960s (Wilson and Aponte 1985, O’Connor 2001) that took shape especially during the Reagan Administration. We reframed poverty from a social justice issue impacting geographic and demographic communities necessitating government intervention in human, neighborhood and economic development to one of individual behavior – especially of dependency – mediated only by an acceptance of personal responsibility and market-driven initiatives to encourage work and self-sufficiency. In recasting poverty as a problem of dependency, conservative scholars (e.g., Murray 1984), politicians, and policymakers attributed this change to expansive liberal government programs such as War on Poverty initiatives and New Deal-era Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to justify their roll-back and elimination. There was significant racialization and feminization of this poverty debate as well, as conservative rhetoric, backed up by improvements in liberal poverty researchers’ data collection that gave us a more accurate picture of who was poor in the U.S., twisted this data to suggest that fraud was rampant on the welfare rolls increasingly populated by African-American single mothers with children. These women, represented in the poverty literature as statistics in out-of-wedlock and teen pregnancy rates (Wilson’s thesis on the urban underclass is arguably the most cited example of this framing
(1987)), along with the lazy, jobless, criminal men that lived with them in isolated urban ghettos, were the “undeserving” poor, requiring work mandates, welfare time limits or prison sentences (for the men) in order to learn employable behaviors and to enter mainstream economic society (O’Connor 2001, Hays 2003). The nation’s growing obsession with welfare cheats, the pathologies of the ghetto underclass, government dependency, and the undeserving poor culminated in welfare reform in 1996 under President Clinton, in which cash assistance to mothers with dependent children was time-limited and attached to stringent work requirements (For a full accounting of changes to poverty policy and attitudes throughout the 20th century, see O’Connor 2001). Similar work requirements have been underway in subsidized housing, in addition to a range of other tightened eligibility rules to restrict who has access to an ever declining stock of affordable housing in the U.S.

While there has been some expansion of government programs under the most recent Administrations, notably the increased availability – and use – of food stamps, the dramatic retrenchment of the federal government from anti-poverty programs has been a defining feature of the last thirty years. This shift has been the source of and companion to the marketization described earlier, as part of the federal government’s chipping away at the social safety net has been its exodus from sheltering the poor. Indeed, the CD sector has inherited a significant responsibility to house the poor, including those turned out into the private market as public housing is demolished and rebuilt as privately managed mixed-income developments. Its competing logic alongside market-driven housing production is one of philanthropic responsibility for the poor, whether it is through caregiving, political advocacy, or social enterprise development (Dreier 1997). Alongside the private sector non-profit and for-profit developers that have stepped up to provide housing for the poor is an array of social service
providers to minister to the poor (Salamon 1993). In addition, the growth of private philanthropy supporting these advocacy organizations has been substantial and significant (O’Connor 2001, Jenkins and Halcli 1999). Taken together, the ascension of philanthropy, non-profit developers, and non-profit social service providers to deliver the bulk of programs and services for the poor in an era of neoliberal privatization emphasizing individual enterprise and economic self-sufficiency has led to the resurgence of a caregiving ethos for the deviant poor, to rehabilitate them for mainstream society.

Dreier (1997) summarizes the three reform motivations driving philanthropy’s continued presence in affordable housing activism and practice in the US: caregiving/charity, social enterprise, and advocacy and organizing. O’Connor (2001) provides an excellent history of anti-poverty activism and practice through the 20th century that demonstrates how cultural (behavioral) interpretations of the poor were routinely privileged over structural critiques of capitalist inequality. Predominately white, middle-class liberal poverty researchers and reformers – including housing reformers that fought for improved living conditions and built settlement houses in urban poor communities (Dreier 1997, Von Hoffman 2005, 2009) – consistently “othered” the urban ethnic and racial poor as morally and behaviorally deficient, requiring uplift, role modeling, and other therapeutic interventions, even if accompanied by material improvements such as better housing and job opportunities. In the latter 20th century, this therapeutic, culturalist response to poverty was reinforced by a rightward shift in the political climate and the privatization and marketization of social welfare practice described above. Today, CD reflects this uneasy collusion between total market control of the sector and the enduring presence of a moralizing of poverty and the poor (Lipman 2009, Katz 1995) that justifies on-going intervention on their behalf – in their “real” interests (Imbroscio 2008) via
carefully controlled empowerment and participation strategies stressing local community improvement (Fraser et al. 2003) and private-property based resident associations. Often disguised as political advocacy by the broader poverty industry (O’Connor 2001), the charitable or caregiving ethos pervades contemporary anti-poverty action, including within the CD sector. This caregiving ethos is about providing therapy, counseling, social services, case management and “uplift” to low-income residents and communities that require behavioral change to step away from pathological lifestyles and associations and to enter mainstream society. This moralizing stance by well-intended middle-class reformers who continue to dominate the sector today obscures or exacerbates the rather rapacious market logic that also infuses the sector, since the poor are recast as victims requiring aid and care. That their lives are particularly vulnerable to the negative externalities of the market is either missed in practitioners’ emphasis on social work and stabilization, or this work is especially discomfiting considering the disproportionate toll labor and housing markets and racial and social inequalities have on low-income urban communities of color in the US.

CD organizations playing a caregiving “provider” role in low-income communities, which risks disempowering the poor by setting them up as passive recipients of external largesse or top-down project management (Toomey 2009), is reflected in the partnership between Enterprise and Catholic Charities in post-Katrina New Orleans to take control of neighborhood land on behalf of local residents and Catholic Charities’ poor clients requiring emergency services and social assistance in the aftermath of the hurricane. Enterprise described its partnership with the church as the latter imparting their “blessing” on the former (personal communication, 2/20/06a) as well as the church and its subsidiaries being one of the few well-equipped non-profits in the city that could develop the capacity for large, multi-unit or multi-site development. As the struggle
unfolded between public housing redevelopers and activists in New Orleans following HUD’s demolition plans, the head of Catholic Charities said he was “scared to death that this thing will end up in the courts for years while the residents are placed on hold” and asked that everyone "please pray for a spirit of humility and collaboration." (Filosa 2007b) His organization committed several million dollars for social services and counseling to “guide” families through the dislocation and eventual repatriation home (Filosa 2007b), and in Congressional testimony he reminded listeners of the need for a “focus on the SUFFERING VICTIMS of Katrina, who we have been called to serve, then GOD, who LOVES these families infinitely more than we do, will BLESS our efforts together… for the GOOD and BRAVE people of Louisiana.”

Enterprise’s mission, included in outreach letters to displaced tenants, specified the goal of helping low-income residents move out of poverty and into the “mainstream” of society.

**Mechanism #3: Radicalization of Community Organizing**

Ferree (2010) introduces the concept of the “discursive opportunity structure” to demonstrate how resonant versus radical frames are “institutionally anchored” to existing power structures within society. Resonant frames, defined here as “mutually affirming” with this institutional structure, are typically advanced by mainstream participants in a social movement, those with institutional access whose goals are culturally in line with general values, norms and beliefs in wider society. Yet, achieving resonance is not necessarily the default strategy of movement participants; indeed, many activists will adhere to more radical frames and ideas as a deliberate means to challenge hegemonic power structures. Radicalism here is “mutually contradictory” with this institutional structure; radical frames push for more transformative social change over the longer term.
Resonance and radicalism are dialectical and contentious: “The use of nonresonant frames is by definition radical,” Ferree writes (2010: 347; see also Steinberg 1999). The advancement of resonant ideas necessarily marginalizes more radical alternatives, as well as, by association, their proponents and constituents. Choosing resonant frames also delimits the ability to see social problems from a different angle. Examining this dialectical relationship within social movements or in social fields – who chooses and employs resonant frames versus radical ones – reveals the institutionalized power structures within those arenas, as well as the hegemonic ideas, practices, ways of doing and modes of meaning-making. In effect, understanding resonant versus radical aspects of a given social field sheds light on its political dynamics; resonant frames, for example, reinforce existing power structures and mainstream political views. Radical frames challenge them.

I take Ferree’s concept of radicalization and extend it to what Swidler (1986) defines as cultural repertoires or tool-kits (see also Steinberg 1999 for a similar extension). Tool-kits are “symbolic” forms of “meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life” that people use “to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986: 273). People draw on these repertoires to order their behavior and define solutions to life’s challenges and opportunities; that is, they develop “strategies of action” or “persistent ways or ordering action through time.” Tool-kits are grounded in ideologies, “socially embedded and complex systems of values, norms and beliefs, usually with historical roots in ongoing power struggles” (Ferree 2010: 348).

Community organizing is an ideologically rooted individual and collective tool-kit for disadvantaged groups, including geographic or demographic communities, which emphasizes individual and collective empowerment through relationship and organization building aimed
towards social change. It frequently uses confrontation and protest as a means of contesting institutionalized power rooted in capitalist inequalities. It begins at a local or small scale in the aims of building a larger social movement for change (Stoecker 1997, 2001).

The CD movement originally took community organizing as its central repertoire as a means to challenge a racist capitalist political economy. As the community development movement institutionalized, market-based, physical development schemes – especially affordable housing production – became dominant. CD has been narrowly recast over the decades as the business of affordable housing production for low-income communities. More expansive definitions include more general attempts at asset-building (Dickens and Ferguson 1999), but reviews of the field reveal that scholarship tends to define and evaluate CD practice on the basis of the performance of organizations devoted to affordable housing production (e.g., CDCs; see Frisch and Servon 2006). As affordable housing production has become the main practice within the field, accompanying processes of marketization and the reformation of poverty had led to a deeper transformation of the field, such that concepts of economic mainstreaming of poor communities and economic self-sufficiency for poor residents have become the resonant frames in the field. That is, CD is about connecting low-income communities to the nation’s economic mainstream (Stoecker 1997, Liou and Stroh 1998, Cummings 2002, Fraser et al. 2003), rather than about achieving community self-determination through political empowerment and economic autonomy, pursued via community organizing. Community organizing as the once dominant practice of the CD movement has become radicalized in this transition to market-driven development practices and frames and associated liberal, democratic ideologies. The political ideologies – anti-colonialism, for example, or Black Power – behind community organizing have also been radicalized, in effect, being relegated to the margins of mainstream (white) political
thought. Even less specific political economic perspectives on power and the need for confrontational community organizing as a way of restructuring society have been marginalized in the institutionalization of the CD field. As Stoecker (1997), Fraser et al. (2003) and others point out, community organizing is still embraced in CD, but only in newly defined, less radically political terms such as community-building or organizing practices that take building consensus as their operative goal.

As the community development movement institutionalized, it became the purview of skilled professionals charged with housing production and neighborhood improvement strategies – including economic, workforce and physical development programs and services. Although an organizing spirit may persist in places, nonetheless staff and boards are overwhelmingly professional and middle-class, and organizing tends to focus on quality of life concerns or life skills development (e.g., shared park use for ethnic groups, combating bedbugs, community gardening basics). A general civic capacity is developed, but organizing is rarely channeled towards structural inequalities in cities or in housing or labor markets. Community organizing towards structural change or reducing market inequalities is undertaken typically by independent formal and informal organizations such as ACORN or Industrial Areas Foundation. Professional social movement organizations like these have become developers in some instances.

The sidelining of community organizing in favor of physical development and housing production in the field (Newman and Lake 2006) undermined local groups in New Orleans operating according to a community organizing logic and reinforced the “taken-for-granted” authority (Suchman 1995, Zucker 1987) of national CD professionals to drive the city’s recovery. Community organizing has been sharply curtailed as a legitimate practice within the sector, as it defies the rationalization of the practice and its emphasis on quantifiable outcomes.
CO challenges what White (1999: 325) describes as the depoliticized shift from development, poverty and “the representation of the poor” as a “contested terrain” to a “techno-bureaucratic project.” Yet the role of confrontation and protest is seen not only as having limited efficacy (Piven and Cloward 1978), but as anathema to a middle-class culture of technocratic knowledge and professionalism that favors expertise, objectivity and “gentile” negotiation as the preferred modes of practices (Rein 1969, O’Connor 2001). Thompson (1998) and Imbroscio (2008) characterize liberal policymakers as privileging allegedly objective “interests” (and intuiting them on behalf of the poor) over emotional ties such as trust and affection that bind collective identity groups together in communities and in the face of a hostile, unequal world (see also Regis 1991). These affective ties are essential to community organizing. Yet, the “rationalization” of CD has radicalized its organizing, movement and particularistic roots, retaining trust and reciprocity as de-politicized social capital (DeFilippis 2001, Saegert et al. 2001), and emphasizing finance, deal-making and housing production. Emotions are left behind with the grassroots – community associations and families – as one travels the professional distance away from residents.

**The Crisis of Hurricane Katrina**

The process of institutionalization of the CD movement has made the analytical concept of “field” a useful application to describe the bounded, collective practices, worldviews and actors that comprise CD today. In this dissertation I use the word “sector” interchangeably with the term “field.” The concept of a field defines the socially constructed space in which actors’ strategic efforts to create and establish control over social order unfolds and is institutionalized over time (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Fligstein and McAdam 1995, Fligstein 1997, Swartz 1997). The state plays a central role in guiding this action and shaping the contours of the field;
this includes a lack of state leadership, such as in New Orleans, leading certain organizations to step up to fill that void. Organizations will have differences in their distances to the state (Davis 1999) that result in certain organizations being more institutionally aligned, cooperative or accessible relationships to the state than others, or institutionally more powerful to challenge the state more than others.

In this era of devolution and retrenchment, services previously provided by the government have been shifted to the private sector (Brenner and Theodore 2002, Newman and Lake 2006, Smith 2008), including non-profits that now provide services and programs in the areas of housing, economic and workforce development, education and social services, and others (Marwell 2004, 2007, Smith 2008). Federal funding is allocated towards a particular policy area and goal, and then disbursed to national, state and local non-profits to carry out the work to realize those policy goals – organizations that often work closely with governments to develop these policy priorities. This well-functioning policy/program network (Smith 2008) reflects a strong, stable institutional capacity in a given field that reproduces itself over time.

An institutional infrastructure develops over time from reliable infusions of public money, allowing organizations and agencies to set workable annual budgets, hire staff, engage in strategic planning, and carry out their operations with a reasonable degree of financial support and stability. Public dollars invite private dollars – including philanthropic funds (see Lowe 2006 for the importance of community foundations here), encouraging further growth of the field to contribute towards commonly realized aims. In the community development sector, non-profit financial intermediaries (CDFIs) play a particularly important role coordinating multiple funding streams and local development activity with government policy goals and public-private objectives (Smith 2008, Newman and Lake 2006, Ferguson and Stoutland 1999).
For instance, in Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the Mayor more or less control what affordable housing gets built, where, and by whom. Local CDCs are defined as “partners” of the Mayor and through the Massachusetts Association of CDCs lobby state and local governments on policy issues and funding needs and enjoy strong relationships with their state and local representatives. The local office of the national intermediary LISC in Massachusetts and Boston receives large amounts of federal dollars, as do quasi-public state agencies like Mass Housing Partnership, and local CDCs receive LISC and MHP funds, training and directives on how to carry out the federal and local policy agenda. I highlight the Boston experience because many of the national community development professionals in the Network built their careers in Boston, so their past experience in this regimented, high capacity CD field in a machine politics city shaped their response and understandings of post-Katrina New Orleans.

Fields prove remarkably stable over time, but are subject to instability due to changing socio-political or economic conditions and the shifts in funding priorities that accompany these evolving structural conditions⁹. These periods of crisis or instability can bring about changes in the field, but the landscape is structured such that those with power have a structural advantage. As their challengers struggle to survive, those with power will struggle to hold on to their position and authority within the field. In unsettled times, repertoires and practices are called into question, and new modes of action may be ushered in. Ideologies play a particularly important role in ordering action (Swidler 1986, Fligstein 1997, Fligstein and McAdam 1995). The ingredients of discursive debate, collective action and organizational strategies are all amplified in unsettled periods, when “new constituencies prove difficult to satisfy through established

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⁹ For example, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, the collapse of the housing market makes developing affordable housing extremely expensive and leaves fewer dollars on the table for it, thus forcing out the organizations who cannot manage it skillfully, bringing about contraction in the industry via the closure of some organizations and consolidation among those that can survive.
practices” or “when larger social institutions are either poorly articulated with one another or undergoing historic transitions” (Suchman 1995: 585). Thompson (2005) describes unstable, critical periods like this as moments of “moral passage” for individuals and groups, where basic moral commitments are either redefined or reinforced.

Hurricane Katrina was a “crisis” for the state, civil society, and the CD field, triggering competing responses by national and local network members to illegitimate state action (Jones and Ward 2002). This state “crisis” is especially important, considering the role of the state as a target for social movements and as a shaper of a field. Neoliberal urban theorists Jones and Ward (2002) build on Habermasian theories of legitimation crises of the state, tied to the undermining of the “rationality” of the state derived from system-wide breakdowns, where social problems (crises) “cannot be resolved within the range of possibilities that is circumscribed by the original principles within society” (Habermas 1976: 7, quoted p. 478). In the weak political economy of New Orleans, and with all levels of government and civil society confronted with unprecedented displacement, the laissez-faire tradition of local governance and neoliberal privatization strategies initially appeared as completely inappropriate responses to a disaster of such magnitude. Indeed, standing in Jackson Square in mid-September, President Bush spoke plainly about the scope of the disaster, the legacy of institutional neglect and racism that led to it, and the intention of the government to allocate unprecedented resources to the region’s recovery (Lieberman 2006). Yet, in actuality, the state pushed ahead with its privatization plans for recovery, handing out no-bid contracts for cleanup, demolishing 4,500 units of subsidized housing in the midst of a critical housing shortage, refusing to expand the service provision of HUD and the Department of Health and Human Services to meet the needs of the displaced, and using tax credits as the primary vehicle for reconstruction, setting up the private sector to lead on
recovery and reconstruction. Based on this pattern of exclusionary, unequal, harmful decision making, the state was widely dismissed as an ineffective and illegitimate leader of the recovery – citizens and civil society would have to take matters in to their own hands.

Jones and Ward describe this as the state following a “logic of crisis displacement” (Habermas 1976), in which it transforms an “economic” crisis – in this case, the inability of the government at any level to absorb the socioeconomic destruction of Katrina due to decades of privatization, devolution, and in New Orleans specifically, economic decline (i.e., a prolonged bust) – into a political crisis, in which it introduces “new forms of representation [to] support the ideological and material effects of state intervention” (Jones and Ward 2002: 479). The state, in an attempt to restore its legitimacy, to appear neutral in the face of competing interests, engages in a “selective ‘sorting process’…to incorporate certain interest groups (and exclude others from) the state apparatus and policymaking process to protect accumulation and ensure (relatively) crisis-free stabilization” (Jones and Ward 2002: 479, Offe 1984: 51). For the state in post-Katrina New Orleans, engaging the assistance of the national and local non-profit sector enabled them to reposition their Katrina response as one driven by “the people,” by civil society, and reflecting an enduring commitment to poverty alleviation and individual “self-sufficiency” via demolition of “squalid and dangerous” public housing into “renewed, reconnected and revitalized” mixed-income communities, the dominant anti-poverty paradigm of the last two decades (The Washington Post 2007). The state has thus refashioned itself as democratic, committed to equality and opportunity, and as bringing New Orleans into the modern era, away from decades of past policy failure leading to concentrated poverty and blocked opportunity, while at the same time embracing the widely diffused ideology of market superiority and the practice of government standing aside to let the private sector do a better job. Katrina and mixed-income
redevelopment becomes a cover for a “shock doctrine” of rapid privatization (Klein 2007),
pursued via “exceptional” policies (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez 2002) rammed
through in moments of crisis, as is the case in New Orleans, where HUD – not the local housing
authority, which is in receivership – decided to demolish four projects with virtually no citizen or
local input of any kind, citing disproven storm damage as the reason.

This Network aimed to curtail the damage done by neoliberal, right-wing policies (Peck
2006, Dreier 2006b) that threatened permanent displacement and the undesirable, unrecognizable
transformation of New Orleans from a culturally unique and appealing and affordable place to
live for low-income communities of color. The network also realized the substantial
shortcomings of New Orleans – its low-wage economy, its high rates of poverty, its legacies of
government corruption and citizen distrust. The Network espoused a shared critique that the
government had significantly failed New Orleans and its poorest, most vulnerable residents. This
allegation was accompanied by a collective ideological critique of the global political economy –
of the “apartheid economy” of the South, of the “militarization,” privatization and “ethnic
cleansing” of New Orleans by a neoliberal government, and of the legacy of inequality and
“poverty” from “global capitalism.” The initial, fiery, righteous rhetoric and the problem
definition and proposed solutions by these community activists and practitioners was as bold as
Katrina’s damage was deep – communities independently rebuilding levees while chairing
government allocation and oversight committees, a philanthropist rebuilding an entire city block
as an inspiration to other philanthropists, labor unions and community developers stepping in as
a “quasi-government,” all gearing up for battle at the site of the “next Civil Rights Movement.”

Yet, although the Network developed this shared injustice frame, how they acted on that
depended on their organizational position and accompanying repertoires and resources in the
institutionalized CD field – nationally and at the local scale. Institutional logics such as “participation,” “capacity building,” and “local control” varied across the Network, as did jargon, practices, symbols (Swidler 1986) and “artifacts” (Schein 1988) associated with CD or community organizing. The distance between national and local groups was an amalgam of traditional organizational differences such as access to resources and political power, but also cultural differences, especially between community development and community organizing “repertoires” (Swidler 1986). New Orleans lacked a strong community development sector, and its civic capacity was driven by a community organizing ethos, albeit a relatively fragmented one. In contrast, market-driven community development logic drove national responders’ actions in New Orleans. The highly technocratic and professionalized response of national community development representatives compared to the racialized and politically confrontational representatives of local community organizing would substantially impede cooperation. Thus, network members articulated competing symbolic responses to this crisis – CD professionals’ proposals of land acquisition and physical reconstruction of entire neighborhoods (akin to former Recovery Czar Ed Blakely’s oft-quoted “cranes in the sky” (Krupa and Donze 2007, Roberts 2009) as evidence of New Orleans’ renaissance) versus community organizers’ solidarity marches, coalition-building retreats, lawsuits, tent cities, and the door-to-door gutting of homes (a “tenants helping tenants, neighbors helping neighbors”\textsuperscript{10} recovery strategy).

**Conclusion**

The history of New Orleans is partially one of exceptional poverty, population decline, economic malaise, political corruption, institutional inequality, and fractious racial politics. Political organizing efforts tied to this history are thus undermined. Katrina’s absolute devastation of the

\textsuperscript{10} NOHEAT Survivors Village materials
status quo and the typical post-disaster rhetoric of urban restoration, rebirth and renewal necessitated external assistance and communication and collaboration across tired racial and neighborhood boundaries. This “new normal” undermined the “old” way of speaking for the poor via conflict and confrontation, which was challenged by well-resourced, institutionally powerful outsiders who took up the call for assistance, endowed with the professional authority and vast resources to rebuild a sturdier, healthier city. Yet the legacy of government corruption, and institutional harm wrought by ill-conceived, racist or classist policies and projects and the corresponding deep distrust of governments and “experts” did not allow national CD professionals to enter the city without experiencing strong challenges to their dominant CD repertoire.
Chapter 3: Planning Tremé

Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the field-level mechanisms related to the process of institutionalization that constrained the Network’s movement goals in post-Katrina New Orleans. These mechanisms, the marketization of community development, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing, intersected with four key environmental challenges in the post-flood city. These challenges are a) civil society distrust and conflict, b) ideological federal policy, c) a weak local political economy, and d) competing cultures within the Network. Figure 1 illustrates this complex and difficult operating context.

Figure 1.

Mobilizing Context:
The Crisis of Hurricane Katrina

Field-Level Mechanisms
(Process of Institutionalization)

- CD Marketization
- Poverty Reform
- CO Radicalization

Environmental Challenges:

- Civil Society Conflict, Distrust
- Deconcentration/MIH Policy
- Weak Local Regime, Capacity
- Competing Cultures

Break down:

- Inequalities reproduced in network and urban space
- Competing responses to HUD
- Differential resident participation in development v. planning
This chapter describes these four environmental challenges. I precede this with a brief reintroduction of the CD Network under study here, situated within a deeper presentation of its shared injustice frame (Goodwin et al. 2001, Gamson 1992) and how this collective diagnosis of the crisis of Hurricane Katrina and its causes mobilized the Network to take action together. I then describe the Network’s collaboration around a model for organizing, planning and development in Tremé, leading up to the breakdown in the Network’s movement aims by the first anniversary of the storm predicated on the federal government’s plans to demolish and redevelop four public housing projects as mixed-income development properties. I then return to the four environmental challenges impeding the Network’s collective action. In the next three chapters that follow this one, I analyze in depth how the three mechanisms of institutionalization stratifying the CD field rendered the Network unable to fulfill its movement aims in this complex and challenging post-disaster environment.

A Shared Injustice Frame: the “next Civil Rights Movement”

Early on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm in Plaquemines Parish, LA, SE of New Orleans, and later in the day near the LA/MS border (Knapp et al. 2005). The storm’s damage to New Orleans came not from a direct hit from the hurricane, but from the collapse of the city’s levee system in three places, allowing water from the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain to overtake and flood the city. As the flood waters slowly rose and 80% of the city was left under water for weeks, “100,000 New Orleans, predominantly black and poor, [were] stranded in the city for days amidst horrifying and militaristic conditions. They [were] eventually evacuated to cities nationwide and housed over time in hotels and in parks of FEMA trailers” (Graham 2009). Despite being well-informed of this worst case scenario of a rare hurricane event such as Katrina impacting New Orleans (Keifer
and Montjoy 2006), local, state and federal governments were completely unprepared for the nightmare that unfolded from the breached levees and the reality of the poorest and most vulnerable struggling to survive in the rising flood waters. Carless, getting by on the dredges of public assistance with the hurricane striking at the end of the month, disabled, elderly, or parenting small children, the New Orleanians left behind had for a variety of interrelated reasons been unable to heed Mayor Nagin’s voluntary evacuation leading up to the hurricane. Now, with the television media out in full force in the chaotic, swamped city, they were shown variously perched on roof tops, waiting for volunteer rescue boats, or wading through chest deep waters with their belongings in trash bags on their heads, all hoping to reach the city’s Superdome, the shelter of last resort, in order to be evacuated from the city.

Because the Army Corps of Engineers bore responsibility for maintaining the now crumbling levees, because disaster response falls under federal jurisdiction, and because the federal government had been modeling for years a very similar scenario to what came to transpire, the majority of New Orleanians and many citizens, pundits and politicians nationwide blamed the federal government for the impact and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Thomas 2005, TIME Poll Results 2005, Hsu 2006, Davis 2006, Walsh 2008). The federal government’s failure to react and send assistance to the city for days as the flood waters rose came under particular fire, and the local government response at the municipal and state level, while also sharply criticized, was nested within the federal government’s overarching responsibility to mitigate the impact and aftermath of the disaster. Because the levee breaches directly caused the scope of the damage to New Orleans, critics of the government response had no problem framing the storm as an unnatural, *manmade*, disaster. Added to the scale of Katrina’s physical destruction was the unequal impacts suffered by the city’s poor – predominantly African-American, predominantly
renters – due to the city’s disproportionate poverty, racial inequality, and urban decline. These pre-storm conditions, created by generations of policy decisions leading to intense socio-spatial racial and economic segregation; the evisceration of a strong, unionized local port economy replaced by a low-wage, tourism-dependent economy; and contentious racial and cultural politics between the city’s neighborhoods and tri-partite ethno-racial populations (Hirsch and Logsdon 1992, Hirsch 2009, Hirsch and Levert 2009), between the city and its suburbs, and between the city and the state, reinforced the city’s socio-spatial isolation as a predominantly poor, predominantly black, predominantly Democratic city in the U.S. Deep South. These legacies of institutional inequality (Frymer et al. 2006) stratifying and encumbering the city meant that Hurricane Katrina not only wreaked physical and social havoc on the Crescent City, it also rendered local government effectively helpless on charting the city’s recovery, as it was financially bankrupt and forced to lay off thousands of staff in the months after the storm. The city’s population shrank to about one-third of its pre-storm population after Katrina struck, leaving a smaller, whiter, more affluent subpopulation behind to determine the course of the city’s recovery.

When Katrina struck, the GOP controlled the White House and both houses of Congress. President Bush “[was] severely criticized at home and abroad for an abysmal response to the storm; the issue of race and accusations of racism manifested as indifference [accompanied] many critiques” (Graham 2009; see, for example, Sullivan 2005, VandeHei and Weisman 2005, Polman 2005, Kurtz 2005, Alter 2005). Bush responded to such criticisms by making a speech acknowledging the legacy of racism and inequality that left New Orleans so vulnerable to Katrina (Lieberman 2006), but his recovery policy reflected his Administration’s agenda of further government privatization and rollback of social services. The federal government handed
out no-bid contracts for cleanup, refused to expand federal service provision to meet the needs of the displaced, and used tax credits as the primary vehicle for reconstruction. Accompanying the tax breaks was a call for the “participation of...private relief organizations such as Habitat for Humanity to help build houses with the prospective homeowners providing their own ‘sweat equity’ in the construction effort” (Richmond Times, 2005); “the private sector is critical in the rebuilding effort,” President Bush declared (Walsh, 2005). There was little alternative at the local level; the City of New Orleans had lain off 3,000 workers, was effectively bankrupt, and was practically “disintegrating” after Katrina (Sterngold 2005).

Activating the Network

This pre- and post-storm political context mobilized the Network to take action. A cohort of faculty and students from MIT’s Department of Urban Studies & Planning was an organizational member of the Network.\(^{11}\) MIT, like many of its university peers (e.g., Birch 2009, Reardon et al. 2009, Wagner et al. 2008), was motivated to respond to the exceptional social and physical disaster of Hurricane Katrina. With the coincident timing of the fall semester beginning shortly after the storm struck land on August 29, 2005, and most of the City of New Orleans still under water as students arrived on Registration Day in early September, students and faculty began convening in the first few weeks of classes to discuss a departmental response, and to share ideas and emotions about the unprecedented but widely televised horror unfolding in the Gulf Coast.

Our MIT team had received requests for assistance from a grassroots organizing group in New Orleans, Community Labor United, to help the organization respond to the widespread displacement of its members and the shocking scope of the physical damage to housing in the city, by providing both technical and strategic assistance around building a political response to

\(^{11}\) When I refer to MIT in this dissertation, I am referring specifically to this group of MIT faculty and students associated with the Network.
what was quickly being framed as a manmade disaster resulting from government failure and neglect (Graham 2005, Thomas 2005, TIME Poll Results 2005). In addition, the faculty heading our team had pre-existing, long-standing working relationships with a range of national non-profit community development, labor and policy organizations, with whom we were now discussing a coordinated response to Hurricane Katrina. Many of these national entities had subsidiary 501c3s in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast that they were trying to assist financially and operationally. Several of these organizations also had been contacted by New Orleans groups or the LA government to provide recovery technical assistance.

I have defined these coordinated organizational relationships as a community development network (see Rivera et al. 2010 and Wellman 1983 for network definitions) that, motivated by a collective desire to reignite their movement activism of the past, developed what I describe as a shared injustice frame, following in the tradition of social movement scholars and their work on framing (Benford and Snow 2000, Goodwin et al. 2001). As described in chapter 1, network members knew one another from shared movement histories as well as existing organizational relationships. Initial network formation is depicted in Figure 2.12

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12 This figure represents the Network as bounded by the work undertaken in this case. Many of these organizations pursued working relationships with other entities as well, for example, ACORN’s partnership with Cornell and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on a recovery plan for the Lower Ninth Ward. I mention all organizations by name because their recovery responses are widely known. I protect individual anonymity by not using names or other descriptive information when providing quotes, etc.
The Network grew to about 28 organizations, ranging from informal grassroots groups to national, well-resourced organizations, with about half hailing from the New Orleans region, and the majority of the others from the Northeast. There were six foundations, six social movement organizations (SMOs), and five community development organizations – including two intermediaries. There were four relief organizations, three legislative advocacy organizations, two unions, and two universities. A full list of organizations is included in the Appendix (Table 1). Additional descriptive information can be found on pages 23-24 of this document.

What appeared to be a demonstrative move by the federal government towards urban privatization and permanent displacement of the urban poor from New Orleans led to the development of the Network’s shared injustice frame (Goodwin et al. 2001, Gamson 1992) of...
Hurricane Katrina’s cause and consequences – willful, federal government indifference to and neglect of a unique American city and its most vulnerable residents, the majority of them black and poor, leading to their possible permanent displacement and exclusion from recovery processes was the source of moral outrage for network members. This extended towards a shared diagnosis that the “right of return” of the displaced should be the “fundamental” (PHRF statements and petitions, September 2005) objective of their response. The injustice of the potential violation of the rights of New Orleans residents to not participate in the recovery and reconstruction of the city, and of their risk of permanent displacement from their homes and kin networks, given their random, forced dispersal around the US, fueled the motivating outrage of network actors. Indeed, the “right of return of displaced New Orleanians was a claim used by a broad range of recovery actors… it became ‘the motto of the reconstruction movement, used widely within and beyond movement circles’ (Luft, 2009, p. 516)” (Graham 2010). It would even be incorporated by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development in their post-Katrina redevelopment plans.

For the Network, a shared injustice frame reflected a belief that their collective response was nothing short of a social movement. One executive from a national CD intermediary saw New Orleans as the site of “the next Civil Rights movement” (personal communication, 2/20/06a). A consultant retained by an international relief organization to advise on funding grassroots recovery and organizing viewed Katrina as “an opportunity to organize a strong movement in the South” (personal communication, 10/25/05). A local, direct action radical left activist in New Orleans saw reconstruction as only occurring equitably through a “real, popular, pro-working class, anti-racist… movement developing our own plans, making demands and struggling to implement them” (personal communication, 11/6/05). A local grassroots coalition saw
“movement mobilization nationwide” backing union-community partnerships envisioning “what kind of society we want” as a key ingredient in an equitable recovery response (PHRF meeting documents, 9/29/05, PHRF document, 10/10/05). These individuals – men and women, Asian-American, African-American and white, based in New Orleans and nationwide – articulated the collective movement spirit that infused the Network’s efforts. Many scholars and activists called for a renewed social movement in the aftermath of Katrina (Dawson 2006, Dreier 2006, Giroux 2006, Luft 2009, Muhammad 2005, Sanyika 2009); this CD network believed they could heed this call.

To be clear, this was a movement against an ideological federal state and amorphous elite capitalist interests, more generally. The Bush Administration’s recovery agenda emphasized private sector recovery, interpreted by many on the left as a furtherance of the Administration’s “crony capitalism” (Dreier 2006b) and zeal for neoliberal privatization. Local black, grassroots activists believed union-community mobilization was essential to thwarting “business interests and the right-wing [plans] to rebuild New Orleans and the Gulf Coast area [as] a theme park for the wealthy, where anti-union corporations of the world can rake in profits without the constraint of union wages, environmental and health and safety standards, benefits of any kind, and the voice and participation of the vast majority of its former residents…” (PHRF document, 10/10/05)

A local white, Marxist activist framed the Urban Land Institute, a “501(c) (3) nonprofit research and education organization” focused on land use and real estate development issues13, as a “pro-profit think-tank for the real estate industry [that used] the veneer of ‘expertise’ to cover up the capitalist interests they are serving” (personal communication, 11/6/05) – in this case, Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission charged with redeveloping a recovery plan for the city. A member of the Commission, Joseph Canizaro was a major

13 http://www.uli.org/LearnAboutULI.aspx
developer in the city and a Bush friend and major donor (Baum 2006) and described by a local, African-American CD leader as “the most dangerous person in the city” (personal communication, 11/3/05). Canizaro had previously brought the strongly contested HOPE VI redevelopment of the former St. Thomas projects to the city that led to the removal of about 80% of the former tenants from the site. In an early internal planning memo circulated by MIT to SEIU, NeighborWorks America, PolicyLink, and Community Labor United, the Network was proposed as a force that “could competitively bid on rebuilding contracts” on behalf of disadvantaged communities of color, challenging the “Halliburton’s [sic] and Dow’s that ran the show in the old Gulf Coast” and in the process “bring powerful political pressure” to bear on the GOP-controlled Congress (personal communication, 11/14/05). Within the Network, strategies for countering and reversing the plans of the Bush Administration and the private real estate and capitalist interests we feared were hungrily circling the city, included: a) national non-profit CD intermediaries and labor unions acting as a “quasi-government” to rebuild low-income communities, b) poor and working class black New Orleanians “overseeing all aspects of recovery and reconstruction” by sitting on and leading government decision-making bodies (PHRF Statement, September 15, 2005), and c) demands for the federal government to immediately put back into service public housing projects and public hospitals in the city and to provide high-wage, public sector jobs for New Orleanians to rebuild their city and homes.

Enthusiasm and resources for collaboration accompanied this shared injustice frame. Local and national network members expressed a real willingness to collaborate around the injustice of Hurricane Katrina. Local and grassroots entities recognized the value of intra-community collaboration and external partners and support. Both of these inclusive stances came with some wariness, considering the city’s historic legacy of institutional racism and violence carried out in
part by well-meaning “experts” and the fractious racial, organizational and neighborhood politics that divided potential allies in the stratified and poor city. As survivors of the storm, many network members overseeing small organizations formerly dependent on one to five staff members and a bevy of members and volunteers were now dealing with their own personal challenges on top of damaged offices, displaced staff, absent constituencies and members, and eviscerated budgets and programs. When four MIT students, including myself, went to New Orleans for a month to map the community organizing landscape for one of the Gulf Coast Funders for Equity, we reported that despite these capacity constraints, small community based organizing groups exhibited an “incredible energy [and] a strong commitment to social justice for New Orleanians across the racial and economic spectrum,” and shared “common recovery concerns…[operating] in distinctive and potentially complementary fashions, addressing a multitude of community redevelopment issues.” (Graham, Bavishi, & Wilch 2006)

Now they sought technical and legal assistance and safe social and physical space to continue to build emerging, post-storm coalitions as they coped with the flood’s aftermath. This newfound spirit of cooperation and collaboration, articulated repeatedly in meetings with representatives of local, grassroots organizing groups, crossed race, class, neighborhood and municipal boundaries, extending to include national organizations.

Given the shortage of manpower among these groups – including an absent constituency – and despite the traditional suspicion of outsiders, there is recognition within this community of the need for additional support and input from committed activists external to New Orleans. Although this is a politically delicate issue…this will go a long way towards building a base for effective political mobilization around development.” (Graham et al. 2006)

A key focus for local organizers within the Network was to understand how to make the best use of national allies, without subordinating local leadership. One black-led activist organization was “inundated with emails and calls from across the country by folks who have skills and want to help” (personal communication September 16, 2005) and strategized ways to put these
national “support” networks to use, building “trust” between local and national allies and establishing the “legitimacy” of all involved (meeting notes, 9/30/05; personal communication, 9/16/05).

In turn, well-resourced national outsiders such as CD intermediaries allocated or raised millions of dollars for organizational stabilization and capacity-building of local community development organizations across the Gulf Coast. Enterprise Community Partners volunteered to provide technical assistance and advisory services to the State of Louisiana, after witnessing the number of displaced residents pouring into Texas cities in the organization’s southwest region. It also assisted the City of New Orleans with designing redevelopment policies for blighted properties, and formed a partnership with the Archdiocese of Greater New Orleans / Catholic Charities to launch a city-wide non-profit housing developer to address the rental housing crisis. The AFL-CIO, to much fanfare, and after months of planning, made a $1B rebuilding commitment to New Orleans, seeking to replicate a highly successful workforce development and housing construction program it had implemented in New York after 9/11. Like its national counterparts, including PolicyLink and NeighborWorks America, Enterprise and the AFL-CIO made long-term financial and organizational commitments to the region, pledging to leave behind local housing and community development capacity and a stronger workforce in the metro area in the years to come.

Similarly, liberal and progressive foundations made multi-million dollar, multi-year commitments to the region. Some came together and created the Gulf Coast Funders for Equity, a collection of “grantmakers supportive of promoting a bottom-up approach to equitable

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development in the Gulf". 15 Beyond the high profile contributions such as The Rockefeller Foundation’s $3.5M for a neighborhood planning process in New Orleans (Schwartz 2006), or Brad Pitt’s commitment to building housing in the Lower 9th Ward, countless smaller, private philanthropies gave tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars to grassroots organizations like the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund & Oversight Committee (funded by The Vanguard Foundation) and New Orleans Housing Emergency Action Team (funded by the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee). Indeed, one representative of a progressive foundation in the Network told the MIT consulting team she hired that she was under “pressure” to spend money in the city (personal communication, 1/6/06).

Lastly, numerous national universities made multi-year commitments to New Orleans. Many entered into community planning and development partnerships with local community-based organizations as part of a post-Katrina HUD grant issued in the fall of 2005 or allocated university funds to planning partnerships (e.g., Reardon et al. 2009, Rubin 2009, Thompson 2009). Tulane University’s School of Architecture launched CITYBuild in 2006 as a host and coordinating hub for external universities working in the city.16 The CITYBuild Consortium included more than 30 national and international schools of architecture, design, and planning, including MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning. Though MIT did not receive a HUD grant, our presence in the city was fairly typical as we worked in parallel and occasionally with other universities dedicated to community-driven, equitable and sustainable redevelopment. Across intermediaries, universities, foundations, and the rest, virtually every national organization in the Network had professional staff living permanently in the region, and executive staff traveling to the region regularly. The moral outrage and activist energy of these

15 http://gulfcoastfunders.org/about.html
16 http://www.tulanecitycenter.org/programs/citybuild-consortium
national executives in the first year after Katrina was well matched by their moral, financial, and organizational commitments to New Orleans. Many organizations in the Network hoped that they would bring to local recovery partnerships "political power, visibility and credibility" (personal communication, September 2005) or "prestige" in additional to technical assistance and expertise and, from universities, "energetic" student labor (Reardon et al. 2009: 396).

Well-resourced national organizations were given relatively free reign by local government to come into New Orleans and set up shop. The story of New Orleans recovery cannot be told without acknowledging the endless, demonstrative contributions of thousands of volunteers (Powell 2007). For example, progressive white evangelical preacher Jim Wallis described New Orleans as "converting ground" for a generation of "new abolitionists" committed to eradicating global poverty, which they believe is the "new slavery" (Graham 2008). Powell (2007) describes the volunteer hours logged by the city’s renascent convention business. Because the local government and citizen population was so decimated in the first few years after the storm, and because the federal government offered tax credits and little else to jump start the reconstruction and redevelopment process, network non-profits swarmed into the city with little help but little resistance from local governments, save the enormous headaches of working with a semi-functioning municipal bureaucracy. Although this power imbalance would prove debilitating to the Network, the ability of national network members to arrive in the city, meet up with one another and with local organizations, and collectively survey the region’s possibilities for an equitable and just recovery with seemingly little state interference suggested a promising start to fulfilling the Network’s movement aims.

Planning Tremé
Within the Network, displacement was framed as the foundational problem plaguing post-Katrina New Orleans; the reality that thousands of evacuated residents’ homes were likely uninhabitable compounded this crisis. Thus, the scope of housing destruction was also a formidable, urgent problem, but nested within the reality of the lack of places for people to return to from Baton Rouge, Houston, Atlanta and nationwide. Without homes to come back to, the displaced risked permanent dislocation from the city, never mind the ability to participate in recovery planning and development processes. Furthermore, without their voice, the city’s recovery process would be dominated by elites – government and business representatives, and the affluent, predominantly white residents whose houses were comparatively unscathed or who possessed the resources to rebuild. By January 2006, census estimates put the population in the city at 158,353, of which only 22% were African-American, down from just over 454,863 and a ratio of 67% in July 2005, respectively.\footnote{http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108567.html}

The Network embrace a broadly defined, multi-faceted goal: to empower the voice of low-income, African-American New Orleanians, who were most likely to be displaced and left out of post-disaster recovery processes, and to rebuild their home communities in a more equitable, more inclusive, more participatory way. They envisioned sustainable citizen political and economic empowerment, by enabling residents to participate in recovery planning processes as well as in the physical rebuilding process through job training and placement. Citizen empowerment would necessarily follow from carefully designed planning and rebuilding processes that provided good jobs, high wages, and citizen decision-making and control over their communities’ recovery.

Although the Network’s proposed strategies would necessarily evolve over the course of the year, there were three fundamental components that members embraced: a) a coalition-based
approach to recovery, b) physical redevelopment, and c) some form of local participation, whether through community organizing, political campaigns and advocacy, or participatory planning. MIT planners suggested a holistic community development model that emphasized “community-led planning, design and development” (personal communication, 9/14/05), using investments generated from community-based, cooperative physical development projects to fund community organizing. These revenues from cooperative ownership combined with the political empowerment built through organizing would lead to the CD movement’s aim of community self-determination and was the solution to building power and rebuilding neighborhoods in post-Katrina New Orleans. Yet, the diversity of interpretations of what local participation would look like proved highly problematic; the importance of redevelopment – whether to build a strategy around it or to pursue a political organizing strategy that would lead to desired development – was also subject to debate. The desire for a local-national coalition was universal; yet, unsurprisingly, questions of leadership undermined this consensus. Table 1 captures the core concepts and key network partners of our efforts over time:
Table 1. Core Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Core Strategies</th>
<th>Core Network Partners</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept 05: Immediate</td>
<td>- Coalition-led “community-led planning, design and development” model that uses CD investments to fund community organizing and reconstruction; - Position coalition as “major actor in the rebuilding process”, representing communities of color in redevelopment contract bids, for example</td>
<td>National: SEIU, NeighborWorks America, PolicyLink, The Advancement Project Local: People’s Hurricane Relief Fund &amp; Oversight Committee (PHRF)</td>
<td>Unable to raise funds for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftermath</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept/Oct 05:</td>
<td>Three-pronged strategy of: - Organizing the New Orleans diaspora - Neighborhood physical redevelopment - Policy development and political advocacy</td>
<td>National: NeighborWorks America, Private philanthropist, PolicyLink Local: PHRF</td>
<td>Unable to raise funds for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 05: Grassroots</td>
<td>Grassroots-led coalition with national support to pursue four issue areas: - Diaspora organizing - Legal assistance and advocacy - Housing - Jobs</td>
<td>Local: PHRF, NO affiliates of Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), Pacific Institute of Community Organizing/LA Interfaith Organizing (PICO-LIFT) National: SEIU, NeighborWorks, The Advancement Project, Oxfam America, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee</td>
<td>Seed funding for community organizing from GC Funders for Equity member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter 05:</td>
<td>Grassroots organizing coalition with national support to develop a “common agenda” for political advocacy and to work together on redevelopment on a “demonstration block”</td>
<td>National: Gulf Coast Funders for Equity Local: NO community organizing groups</td>
<td>Became independently funded project of a GC Funders for Equity member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006:</td>
<td>- Comprehensive, neighborhood-based participatory planning, organizing and redevelopment initiative; - Participatory political advocacy through real estate redevelopment of low-income neighborhood</td>
<td>National: NeighborWorks, private philanthropist Local: Neighborhood Housing Services of New Orleans, Ujamaa CDC</td>
<td>Private philanthropist chose to redirect funding to more storm damaged, higher homeownership neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entering Tremé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring/Summer 2006:</td>
<td>Participatory community organizing and planning linked to redevelopment of blighted and adjudicated properties in Tremé/Lafitte, possibly incl. public housing</td>
<td>National: AFL-CIO, Enterprise Community Partners, Tulane University Local: Catholic Charities/Providence Community Housing, Ujamaa CDC</td>
<td>Unable to raise funds for planning and organizing; Enterprise &amp; Providence negotiated independent agreement with HUD to redevelop Lafitte public housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Tremé/Lafitte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the fall, in part due to the early philanthropic support of a private donor focused on housing redevelopment, MIT, NeighborWorks America, SEIU, Community Labor United – now
the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund & Oversight Committee (PHRF), The Advancement Project, and PolicyLink strategized around how to transform the recovery process via three primary tactics: organizing the diaspora, physical development, and policy advocacy. These organizations envisioned exerting political power to become a “major actor” in rebuilding on behalf of low-income communities of color. The Network grew to incorporate additional grassroots and social movement organizations from the Gulf Coast and organizational members of Gulf Coast Funders for Equity to pursue our goal of building a coalition around diaspora organizing, legal assistance, and housing and jobs development in New Orleans. In January 2006, several organizations in the Network supported a team of students from MIT on the ground to try to move this coalition forward, by convening, surveying and connecting local community organizing groups around a “common agenda” for political advocacy (Graham et al. 2006) that progressive funders could underwrite. Network members debated whether they could find a “demonstration block” to test organizing-driven physical redevelopment and meet workforce development objectives (personal communication, 11/11/05).

The planning field has a long history of valuing local participation and leadership, arguing it brings legitimacy and authenticity and is an important source of knowledge, especially concerning local context. After disasters, local civil society expertise and organizations can provide resident services and entrée into communities for outsiders, especially when local governments are ill-equipped to take on this role, due to post-disaster damage (Reardon et al. 2009). Rubin (2009:401) argues that local partnership and knowledge was particularly important for outsiders in post-Katrina New Orleans, considering the city’s “unique character and [that] intractable issues of race and class seemed to call for deep knowledge of local people, organizations, and practices.” Figuring out who to work with as outsiders was a particular
challenge for many national organizations (Thompson 2009, Rubin 2009), even when local organizations initiated contact with external entities.

A major rationale for building a coalition among network members was to overcome the fractious ethno-racial, class and neighborhood politics among local community-based groups in an effort to project one loud, demonstrative and powerful voice speaking for the displaced poor (Thompson 2009). Given organizations self-professed desire to work together—many for the first time, an early priority in the Network was convening community organizing and social movement organizations (SMOs) to determine their members’ shared issues, political agendas, and recovery goals. Many of these SMOs found themselves in an unfamiliar but necessary spokesperson or representative role on behalf of their members, given the scope of displacement and urgency of recovery (Axel-Lute 2006). They articulated that they were amenable to inter-organizational conversations about how to pursue a common political agenda.

SEIU, the MIT-based group, The Advancement Project, progressive funders, and local SMOs convened to figure out how to seed such a grassroots coalition shortly before Thanksgiving. By the 2005 winter holidays, progressive funders had agreed to support the aforementioned community organizing mapping project undertaken by MIT students. This project revealed that the initial grassroots and social movement organizations in the Network were much less amenable to working together than they had suggested, citing organizing structures that did not facilitate collaboration, for example. In terms of the overall network’s three-pronged effort of building a political coalition to pursue physical redevelopment oriented around some form of local participation or leadership, the main trajectory that the Network intentionally or unintentionally followed was to segregate organizing from development from planning. MIT
continued to try to keep these three inter-related community-based processes together as a network member.

In December 2005, the Urban Land Institute, on behalf of Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission, a racially diverse group but populated mainly by business elites, released its draft city recovery plan, in which the City was advised to allow certain, low-lying, severely damaged neighborhoods to return to wetlands (ULI 2005). In January 2006, when the Commission issued its final recommendations, one suggested that neighborhoods be given several months to prove their “viability” to justify restoration of services, redevelopment prioritization, and government recovery funds (Baum 2006, Powell 2007, Nelson et al. 2007). The outcry – especially from predominantly African-American and lower- and moderate-income neighborhoods was vociferous and immediate (Powell 2007, Nelson et al. 2007, Reardon et al. 2009). As Nagin abandoned the plan, neighborhoods nonetheless were mobilized to welcome or hire planners and architects to help them develop neighborhood recovery plans. The BNOB report and citizen activism also led to two more formal neighborhood planning processes, funded by the City Council and philanthropy (see Nelson et al. 2007 for an excellent analysis of the myriad planning processes in post-Katrina New Orleans).

What this meant for the Network was that neighborhood planning was a process that unfolded relatively independently from the Network’s strategic discussions, and that its commitment to planning as an integral element of any emerging participatory development coalition model was unintentionally undermined by the existence of autonomous planning processes unfolding all around the city. While it is beneficial that neighborhoods ranging from white and affluent Lakeview to the low-income, African-American Lower Ninth Ward had access to planners and planning processes, it was ultimately a blow for the Network’s coalition
efforts as originally envisioned. Fundraising for an independent planning process proved very
difficult. The point here is not that the Network desired to re-invent the wheel or duplicate
processes in the beleaguered city and in residents’ exhausted lives. The larger point was that this
pointed to a problematic divorce between participatory planning, community organizing, and
neighborhood redevelopment unfolding within the Network and within the city, more broadly.

Organizing and development also became increasingly distanced within the Network as its
cooplition building efforts continued, due to funder and investor priorities. Progressive funders
concentrated their efforts on building the capacity of community organizing groups, SEIU
pursued workforce development efforts, NeighborWorks America moved slowly and deliberately
towards a program of community building training, and our private philanthropist interested in
housing development proved resistant to our proposed model of comprehensive community-led
planning, organizing and development. The original network nucleus in which
SEIU, MIT, local
SMOS and others were emphasizing diaspora organizing began to dissolve. In turn, the AFL-
CIO and Enterprise Community Partners stepped to the fore of the Network’s efforts. As
mentioned, both of these national, well-endowed, relatively politically powerful organizations
desired to make a long-term and deep commitment to New Orleans. They envisioned leaving
behind new organizational and housing production capacity, new affordable housing, and a
stronger, more empowered workforce and neighborhoods. The AFL-CIO in particular viewed
MIT students’ efforts to map the community organizing landscape for progressive funders as
particularly beneficial to incorporating community-based organizations into their billion dollar
workforce, commercial and residential development initiative. Enterprise would go on with
Catholic Charities to launch Providence Community Housing, a city-wide non-profit housing
developer. Over a series of meetings unfolding in the spring of 2006, the Network developed a
cohesive vision for a coalition-led neighborhood redevelopment process that utilized resident organizing, community planning and the acquisition of blighted and adjudicated properties – and possibly public housing – to launch and guide the reconstruction of Tremé, a low-income, moderately damaged, historically significant Creole neighborhood proximate to the French Quarter on the higher grounds of New Orleans.

**MIT’s Intermediary Role**

MIT played an awkwardly defined local-national intermediary role within the Network, trying to bridge the distance between the AFL-CIO and many of the community organizing groups and handful of CDCs we had come to know through students’ work with progressive funders, other network allies, and the private philanthropist in the Network in post-Katrina New Orleans. We were charged with identifying local, community-based partners for these national operators and facilitating these national-local relationships (meeting notes, 2/15/06). We were the “voice” of community organizing, planning, and local incorporation in these meetings. Yet, in reality, we had very few local ties to the region. The progressive funder-sponsored community organizing project was operating on an independent, parallel track, and in our neighborhood-based planning and redevelopment proposals we consistently identified large national and local organizations as our core partners, for example, NeighborWorks and Tulane, entities lacking strong community-based ties. Community representation always came in the abstract form of “neighborhood residents” (New Orleans Homecoming Project, Draft Statement of Intention and Process, 1/17/06; Proposal, 6/8/06).

**Choosing Tremé**

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18 By the summer of 2006, MIT had seeded a process of building strong local ties in the Tremé neighborhood of New Orleans, engaging with a well-regarded neighborhood community activist and former Civil Rights leader, and putting several students to work full-time in the community to build out these relationships with residents and community organizations. Yet, we were unable to raise funding to support this work for the long term.
Fueling the Network’s efforts was an abstract fear of rampant speculation, “land grabs,” and “backroom deals” to buy up property in New Orleans that would lead to gentrification and permanent displacement. The entire “footprint” of New Orleans seemed up for grabs, including because landlords might abandon their properties, consistent with a “history in New Orleans of people walking away from real estate,” explained one African-American community activist and lawyer during a visit from one of the unions (personal communication, 2/20/06b). Organizers, in his view, had a responsibility to orient themselves and others to “get beyond that every group wants to claim” the city and to focus on developing New Orleans “the way it could look,” because people did not want to come home to what it looked like “now” (personal communication, 2/20/06b).

This fear of a land grab arose in part from the financial and leadership bankruptcy of the city to guide redevelopment, a recovery strategy of “rebuild at your own risk” to which the “private sector redevelopment will be welcomed” (Graham 2006a). New Orleans was undergoing a “...Land grab right now... Low-income, marginalized, dispersed populations need organized, active, persistent representation so they don’t get left out of this...those of us who can accumulate large parcels of land in certain neighborhoods, for large-scale redevelopment efforts, need to incorporate community organizing into planning and redevelopment to drive reconstruction...” (Graham 2006b; emphases original)

In essence the Network responded to fears of speculation in New Orleans with a land grab. In June 2006, led by the AFL-CIO and the newly formed Providence Community Housing, MIT, Tulane, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Enterprise Community Partners, and two local CDCs proposed to redevelop 196 blighted and adjudicated properties in Tremé/Lafitte that the city had put up for grabs, following legislation Enterprise helped author.

Moderately damaged and geographically central low-income African American neighborhoods, including Tremé and Central City (see Maps 1 and 2 in the Appendix), seemed particularly at risk for speculation and gentrification. Their proximity to downtown, moderate
hurricane damage, and position on the higher ground of the city also made them desirable sites for resident-led, equitable development strategies. This is why the Network focused on Tremé as the site for a “demonstration” or “model” initiative, following the recommendation of a local CDC leader during our first site visit to the city in November 2005. From New Orleans, an MIT colleague wrote:

Tremé has access to a large number of services, abuts the French Quarter, and is facing severe pressure for gentrification. It is bisected by a freeway entrance that separates what is now called Back of Town from the section currently known as Tremé though both are historically part of the area. The back of town area had a great deal of potential for targeted redevelopment. Really nice architecture, significant flood damage, strong historical presence (birthplace of jazz), etc. This is an area that could be well served as a model and will be almost immediately reknit into the city’s fabric. If we can figure out how to do something there, it could then be transferred to some of the other neighborhoods that are not as well connected, like the lower 9th...All in all, from a real estate perspective, the Central City and the Tremé make a great deal of sense as focused areas for redevelopment. (personal communication, November 3, 2005)

Given this specter of viability that would come to settle over the city’s neighborhoods, Tremé seemed like a workable site for an “equitable framework” for development, considering it would probably “get rebuilt anyway” (personal communication, 11/3/05). Tremé was “the community to organize,” explained one national CD leader, as the “easiest quick win” and as a priority neighborhood in the BNOB/ULI plan at that point (personal communication, 2/20/06 and 3/7/06).

Yet, this was not a purely utilitarian calculation. Tremé is one of the most historic black neighborhoods in the United States, home to the first free people of color in the U.S. Congo Square, an historic gathering place and site of celebration for free people of color, is located there. It is home to the largest black Catholic congregation in the United States and is the historic heart of the Creole community in New Orleans. It was also cut in half by highway construction (I-10) in the era of Urban Renewal, losing its vibrant black business corridor and suffering from economic and urban decline in the decades that followed. Given its historic significance, relative
damage and geographic location, the opportunity to redevelop Tremé in partnership with local residents seemed highly symbolic and important as the recovery process unfolded.

*Drawing on Past Models*

In coming together to build a coalition around participatory redevelopment, national organizations drew on a variety of community-based models from their activist and professional pasts. As mentioned, the AFL-CIO drew on its success in Lower Manhattan after September 11, and SEIU and its community partners recognized the values of “door to door union organizing” (personal communication, 2/20/06b). But more personal histories came to the fore in national executives’ plans for New Orleans. Most prominent were the experience of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, in Boston’s Roxbury neighborhood, and an immigrant rights organizing and development non-profit in New York City.

One of the union leaders in the Network had been a senior official in Boston city government, responsible for planning and development in the city. Under this official’s leadership, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), “a nonprofit community-based planning and organizing entity rooted in the Roxbury/North Dorchester neighborhoods of Boston,” was granted eminent domain over blighted and vacant land in its community.19 As a result, DSNI is nationally known within the community development and organizing fields for, through “a series of policy firsts,” becoming “the first community nonprofit organization in the country to be awarded eminent domain powers over vacant land,” which it then converted to community land trusts (Newport 2005: 12) DSNI appears in the scholarly literature on community planning, organizing, development and control as a national model for other disenfranchised, low-income communities (Imbroscio 2004, Medoff and Sklar 1994, Stoecker 2001, Fraser and Kick 2005, Ferguson and Stoutland 1999). In his own oft-told narrative about

19 http://dsni.org/history.shtml
his role in this unlikely victory for DSNI, this senior labor official describes his motivation as his own family’s displacement from Boston public housing under eminent domain law. He described assisting DSNI exercise eminent domain to take control of its own community as a personal and professional highlight. Now in New Orleans, he envisioned his organization with similar power to build materially fruitful partnerships with community-based organizations to give them control of neighborhood land and development.

Similarly, an executive from one of the community development intermediaries operating in New Orleans drew on her past experience as an immigrant organizer in New York City. In her volunteer-turned-professional experience at the dawn of the Reagan Administration, she saw how much power poor immigrant communities gained when they created their own organizations and acquired their own property. She went on to an extraordinary career in affordable housing production and community development finance, and envisioned for New Orleans a similar economic and political power that she experienced and help create in New York. To her, the model was clear, based on the CDC she helped launch decades ago: begin with rental housing, develop the financing capability, pursue homeownership, organize the community, and provide social services to build power through community autonomy and self-sufficiency.

DSNI was legendary in New Orleans far beyond our network; the former Executive Director was now a consultant to New Orleans organizations and a newly created state foundation, the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, which was interested in funding community organizing and organizational capacity-building. Many local organizations hoped to replicate DSNI’s model as they sought to build power and organizational capacity in the aftermath of Katrina. But important to this network’s narrative and outcomes is the lack of prominence of community organizing in these personal histories. From this labor ally’s perspective, state law was skillfully
exploited on behalf of low-income communities. From this intermediary ally, the power of community organizing was dwarfed by the power of community development and property ownership. This latter ally believed that in New Orleans there was “no time to organize” (personal communication, 3/7/06), and that the unifying message of our collective action was “no net loss of affordable housing” (personal communication, 2/20/06a). As these organizations gained power within our network, their view – that affordable housing production was the fulfillment strategy of the “right to return,” and that organizational capacity-building was about improving local non-profits’ real estate development, property management, planning and board development skills (personal communication, 2/20/06a) – came to dominate the Network.

As such, the local organizations who now took prominence in the Network in spring 2006 were Tulane and Catholic Charities, both large, politically powerful institutions in the city who could provide technical assistance and access property. Smaller, carefully considered grassroots partners such as PHRF and local CDCs largely disappeared from strategic planning efforts or were effectively silenced as larger national and local entities created a coalition model leading with development and incorporating planning and organizing.

After kicking off the summer with a heady announcement by the AFL-CIO of their $1B commitment to New Orleans, the Network’s plans for a redevelopment process grounding resident organizing and planning hit a major stumbling block. On the same day as the AFL’s announcement, HUD publicly disclosed for the first time its plans for public housing in New Orleans – the demolition and redevelopment of four developments as smaller, mixed-income communities. Approximately 4,500 units in the “Big Four,” as the projects would come to be known, would be reduced to 1,600. If developers followed the one third/one third/one third model of market rate/moderate income/low income units that HUD preferred, then the number of
units affordable to former public housing tenants would be about 500. Within two weeks displaced tenants filed a class action against HUD citing the violation of international human rights law and fair housing laws and their right to return home and participate in any redevelopment decisions concerning the projects.

Less than two months later, MIT learned that Enterprise Community Partners and Providence Community Housing (Catholic Charities) had been selected to redevelop the Lafitte development in Tremé, one of the Big Four public housing developments in the city. The Network’s vision for a new model of planning and organizing supported by physical development was crushed: the AFL-CIO had been deliberately sidelined by HUD (personal communication, July 2010), and Enterprise and Providence were to work with Urban Design Associates on a traditional site planning approach, per HUD. Enterprise and Providence, despite HUD’s wishes, committed to one-for-one replacement that would ensure one physical public housing built for each one that was demolished. Enterprise and Providence asked MIT to submit a proposal for a workforce and economic development component.

The Network was eviscerated over this turn of events leading up to the one year anniversary of the storm. Advancement Project lawyers were representing displaced public housing tenants in a class action lawsuit against HUD; Enterprise and Providence were redeveloping Lafitte as a mixed-income community. MIT and the AFL had no formal role, though MIT’s name was willingly linked to the project at a time when we still envisioned a more transformative role for planning and organizing, ultimately leading to moderate but well-traveled criticism against us. The Network’s nucleus collapsed, as did any shared sense of possibility for collective action or movement renewal in the face of such a hostile, aggressive state. The fate of the Network turned out to be bound up in the fate of the city’s public housing. Yet, the challenges to the Network
and its desired movement activism leading up to this fallout were numerous. The remaining section in this chapter details four environmental challenges to the Network’s collective efforts and shared vision.

**Four Environmental Challenges to Collaboration**

**Civil Society Distrust and Political Conflict**

A fundamental challenge for the Network to achieve its broader movement aims was the depth of civil society distrust and political conflict in New Orleans:

The “breakdowns [behind Katrina] were structural, technological, and individual; which is to say, there were (above all) political...A long history of division, factionalism, and unrestrained parochialism left New Orleans and Louisiana without the unity, social concern, or collective ability to meet the challenges put forth by the monster storm. And if one overlay that fractious political map of the city and the state with a cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic template, the fault lines stood out in bold relief.” (Hirsch 2009: 5-6)

New Orleans community groups struggled to overcome histories of racial, cultural and neighborhood-based conflicts with one another in competition for scarce resources. They struggled to work in good faith with outsiders. They were particularly suspicious of institutional power (e.g., Khan 2007). The institutionalized poverty and inequality rendered in New Orleans over hundreds of years – from slavery, from Jim Crow, from public housing and urban renewal and HOPE VI, from patterns of development that shunted African-Americans disproportionately to low-lying, vulnerable neighborhoods, from prior government malfeasance against African-Americans in the face of floods (see Barry 1998) – all of this led to a deeply ingrained, widely held suspicion in New Orleans of government, “experts,” and their resources. Both the City of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana had long been riddled with government corruption, adding to the degree of distrust. As Lowe (2006:73) writes of community development corporations, civil society organizations had to flourish “in spite of the political situation” in New Orleans.
Furthermore, the city’s tri-partite racial ordering intensified racial politics in the city, and layered onto the competition for scarce resources in the impoverished city a highly contentious politics of legitimacy among community groups and across neighborhood boundaries. In poor, black communities that had rich histories of self-help and mutual aid societies – the city’s Social Aid and Pleasure Clubs (see Regis 1999, 2001) – kin and friendship networks mapped tightly onto neighborhoods borders, often down to the block level, across generations of family and history and culture. Sean Reilly of Governor Blanco’s LA Recovery Authority lamented about New Orleans, “When you say ‘neighborhood,’ it becomes politically and racially charged” (Baum 2006). As one young black man from New Orleans told us, in warning us against bringing the deconcentration paradigm to New Orleans:

“...it goes without saying that you will live forever, in the neighborhood you grew up in and your parents grew up in. 7th ward for life. There is no consideration of leaving the neighborhood to live in another part of town. That in itself is traumatic when it does happen as we recently saw when uptown residents of the ST. Thomas were forced out and put into the downtown 7th ward [in the St. Bernard development, due to HOPE VI redevelopment of St. Thomas]. Violence escalated, as the communal identities clashed, and people never really integrated into the downtown community...so the mixed income idea is awash if people can’t return to their communal space.” (personal communication, 9/15/05)

Hirsch (2007: 754) describes just a handful of the “ethnocultural divisions” in New Orleans – “color, class, language, religion and geography.” The MIT student team discovered in working with community organizing groups,

…as organizations struggle to discern, represent and serve the needs of their constituents, the legitimacy of these CBOs and their organizers becomes contested. Discourses of race, class, gender, age and localism very much shape who can or will work together. In a community organizing landscape characterized by diversity (where at least half of the organizers we met are women, half are not of African American ancestry, and far more than half were not born and raised in New Orleans), and as part of the highly race and class based narrative of the storm and its aftermath, the hierarchy of legitimacy arising from identity markers functions as a major challenge to collaboration. The risk remains that organizations will be unable to build the solidarity needed to pursue a long term planning-agenda because of their failure to negotiate these challenges of capacity and culture. (Bavishi et al. 2006)
Identity markers, government distrust, and post-disaster insider-outsider politics congealed in the post-flood city to create a highly complex, highly treacherous operating environment for network members. Table 2 captures these overlapping and interconnected cultural divisions that threatened civil society cooperation and the Network’s movement goals after Hurricane Katrina, reflected in the rhetoric of local community-based groups. Speakers include select local African-American and white radical grassroots activists, highlighted because they represent the fractious racial politics and strong institutional distrust that permeated the local working environment.

### Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks from local African-American and white residents, grassroots activists, and organizational leaders</th>
<th>Race (Grassroots v. elites)</th>
<th>Class (Local v. national; Local v. local)</th>
<th>Post-disaster (Insider v. outsider)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“relief...money will...go to...well established white organizations...our communities...will remain institutionally impoverished...”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federal government bears criminal responsibility for Katrina’s “racist” impacts tantamount to “ethnic cleansing”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Only the desires of the working class and poor citizens of the affected regions have legitimacy”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“…in the rush to get in the game, it will come down to business as usual…”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The poor have been abandoned by “liberals and the left”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside “progressives” are like Bush trying to “install [a] puppet front” in Afghanistan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRF is “a little bitty thing” that is “now semi-defunct,” without “the base...or the history” in New Orleans; “of course” they do not represent “something real”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Community Partners and Habitat for Humanity are “everywhere now as if they could really do something in New Orleans. This is a President Bush prop-up.”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“There will be a battle for the future of the city and people will not be able to be ignored or merely representing from afar.”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the leaders of this country have just tried to murder 100,000 poor black folk”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“…the labor movement is full of white liberals, so what else can you expect?”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ACORN’s doing everything...to build their organization’s strength...through preying upon survivors while PHRF is doing everything in their power to collaborate and build a broad-based movement”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“various interest [sic] are positioning themselves to secure their interest through the policy process without public deliberation...irrespective of the human interest and demands”</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously mentioned, a major difficulty in navigating this political environment from afar was assessing who a legitimate and productive community partner might be, even when local organizations solicited outside assistance directly (e.g., Reardon et al. 2009, Thompson 2009). One outcome of this institutionally rooted, pervasive grassroots discourse was outsiders’ efforts to find “neutral” or well-respected entities and individuals to anchor projects. For instance, two member organizations of the Gulf Coast Funders for Equity chose to pay their local consultants through NeighborWorks America’s local affiliate, viewing them as a neutral and safe fiduciary agent for donor funds. When the MIT student team prepared to go to New Orleans for

...
the community mapping project, SEIU set us up with a local community organizer as our liaison, describing her as someone who “In terms of politics down there [seems] to be accepted by everybody” (personal communication, December 2005). We were also encouraged to get in touch with Gus Newport, a well-known, highly respected black leader and former Mayor of Berkeley, CA who was also viewed as a neutral interpreter and go-between of the intense, complex cultural, organizational and racial politics in the city.

*HUD and Mixed-Income Housing Policy*

In New Orleans, because of the trauma and injustice associated with the St. Thomas HOPE VI redevelopment in particular, the “traditional urban planning idea” of income mixing and poverty deconcentration was viewed with outright hostility by many local activists. This dominant federal policy, one local ally explained, disrespected “The cultural identity of [New Orleanians] as attached to neighborhoods and land base” (personal communication, 9/15/06). He had a right to fear the encroachment of deconcentration policy in the city. As he was likely hitting send on his email, a “scholar’s petition” co-authored by MIT Professor Xavier Briggs and Harvard Sociology Professor William Julius Wilson was published on the Urban Sociology section of the American Sociological Association. The petition, “Moving to Opportunity in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina” (Briggs et al. 2005), was signed by 200 “nonpartisan” social scientists “with expertise in economic opportunity, housing markets, community development, and the well-being of children and families of all backgrounds.” It called for taking advantage of Hurricane Katrina to give displaced families the opportunity to move to better neighborhoods – less poor, “more resource-rich” communities – by providing them with the policy tools (housing vouchers, social services, counseling) that would “motivate” them to make this move. It claimed not to want to “depopulate the city or its historically black communities” but condemned the
“ghetto poverty” of pre-Katrina New Orleans and framed the flood as an “extraordinary opportunity to rebuild lives”, even those recovering “outside the region.” Housing redevelopment, in this petition, becomes an “opportunity generator in the best possible locations” (versus merely building “shelter” as the comparative option). These “moves to opportunity” – including, presumably, those that resettle the poor outside of the city – were “one part of rebuilding a stronger New Orleans.” They implored the government, private sector and non-profit and community-based organizations to “seize” this opportunity on a transformative “scale”, using their “expertise” and “growing body of scientific research” as justification.

Since the fall HUD’s actions and inactions around public housing and bringing displaced residents home had been watched carefully and with growing anger by local and national network members. HUD’s decision to board up all the projects in December 2005 was described by one local CDC leader as “criminal” and “effectively preventing any public housing resident from returning to NOLA.” She added that she hoped “there is a group of lawyers who are taking this issue on” (personal communication, 12/7/05). Advancement Project and local civil rights attorneys were indeed in the process of filing a lawsuit on this state-sponsored displacement. Resistance to the arrival of mixed-income redevelopment in post-Katrina New Orleans also extended up to the formal BNOB subcommittee focused on housing redevelopment. When a fellow MIT student attended a meeting in early November, he remarked, “there was an interesting discussion that centered on people being pissed off by the notion that mixed-income neighborhoods were intended to replace poor neighborhoods, and that poor people were not going to get the same proportion of units in the rebuilt New Orleans as they had pre-Katrina” (personal communication, 11/4/05).
In June 2006, HUD officially announced its plan to demolish the “Big Four” public housing projects and replace them with mixed-income properties, in the process substantially reducing the number of deeply affordable units (See Graham 2010 for a detailed account). The planned demolition of the Big Four and their replacement with mixed-income communities triggered substantial conflict between network members on different sides of the “deconcentration” debate, and also substantially narrowed the range of strategic options for national and local groups, as they shifted into reaction mode against the state. One on “side,” national and local legal advocates filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of displaced residents, citing international human rights treaties and U.S. fair housing law as grounds for residents’ right to return to their homes and the right to participate in recovery efforts. One the other “side,” key organizations in the Network negotiated to redevelop one of the sites, promising “no net loss of affordable housing” (personal communication, February 20, 2006) despite HUD’s opposition to this plan.

Importantly, this network ally viewed this as a “deal with the devil” (private communication, n.d.) and the most pragmatic way to ensure that the most residents did have the right to return in the foreseeable future, in part by making an irreducible commitment to one-for-one unit replacement and resident participation, despite HUD’s resistance to these parameters. To these national developers skilled in mixed-income redevelopment, affordable housing production, and community development finance, the right of return was “empty rhetoric” without available physical units, and affordable housing would be the pragmatic, just and ultimately empowering means for fulfilling this right. In fact, as network meetings around the redevelopment of Tremé/Lafitte progressed in the months leading up to HUD’s June announcement, members framed the redevelopment of public assets such as public housing as the physical and symbolic “backbone” of any initiative (Principles and Propositions, 5/2/06) that would also include “a
community organizing and planning process…that…in conjunction with neighborhood redevelopment, leads to community ownership. The development of [adjudicated properties and public housing] will be an initial catalyst for long-term neighborhood transformation” (Proposal, 6/8/06).

Months later, direct action activists characterized the planned demolition and redevelopment of Lafitte as a “gentrification project” that justified the “expensive degrees of MIT students” (personal communications, 8/28/06). MIT was called upon to “denounce the push to dismantle and privatize public services” in New Orleans “in order to make the Right of Return a reality” (personal communication, 10/6/06). As recently as 2009, an Advancement Project attorney singled out the non-profit developers responsible for this mixed-income initiative on a well-known anti-poverty blog, questioning their anti-poverty and community development commitments (Sinha 2009). Overall, these oppositional responses to HUD and federal deconcentration/MIH policy – legal action and protest versus a developer agreement – ravaged already tentative attempts to build a broader community recovery coalition of national and local community organizers and developers to rebuild the city.

A weak local political economy

Hirsch and Levert (2009: 209) write, “…the city’s politics (“ineffectual, corrupt, racially polarized”), without a strong economy to pull the city back from the brink, in the face of such enormous reconstruction challenges was a “cement life jacket” (see also Powell 2007). This cement life jacket weighted down an already floundering city government, one, as mentioned, left bankrupt and with a fraction of its former personnel to navigate the enormous physical and social devastation in the city. There was no “command and control structure in the city as a whole,” rendering it “a truly chaotic situation” six weeks out from the flood. The city lacked
allies at the state level given “a long history of anti-New Orleans sentiment” in Baton Rouge (personal communication, 10/14/05). “The mayor, governor, and federal officials are all at odds. According to [Democratic Senator Mary] Landrieu, the Bush Administration is walking away from early financial commitments” (personal communication, 10/14/05). Both the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana lacked the historical and institutional roots of collaboration and cooperation – including with the federal government – that was necessary to confront the storm’s disastrous impacts, also evidenced in their failure to prepare for and mitigate Hurricane Katrina’s destruction (Kiefer and Montjoy 2006). Because of this troubled past, Nagin prioritized his relationship with the White House in deciding how to proceed in post-hurricane recovery (Baum 2006). The lack of government efficacy, citizen distrust, and external control of the city from Baton Rouge and Washington, D.C. also meant that New Orleanians earned a reputation for fatalism; “problems are to be endured, not solved” (Mitchell 2007: 794). Baum (2006) describes the first year after Katrina as a “lost year,” as residents and the city government waited around for the promised federal assistance and commitment that never arrived.

National network members often had the ear of local government, but the city’s lack of resources and complicated politics made public-private partnerships extraordinarily difficult. The city also lacked the stewardship, especially in Mayor Nagin, a former business executive revealed to be in well over his head after Katrina, to coordinate or lead the private sector’s response. Powerful national organizations like Enterprise Community Partners and PolicyLink stepped in to assist the city and the state with developing recovery legislation; foundations underwrote the city’s Office of Recovery Management created more than a year after the storm. In this environment, small, community-based entities felt marginalized and excluded from the recovery politics unfolding around them. Many of them had “lost public funding” that put
serious constraints on their operational capacity; many of them were concerned about protecting voting rights of the displaced as municipal elections scheduled for the spring of 2006 loomed. They worried about the future of the city’s schools in the face of a state takeover and a turn to charter schools. They watched as hundreds of unionized teachers were fired, and disaster responders rented up properties on dry ground while local organizations’ staff and member bases remained displaced due to housing damage and rapidly rising rents. In Nagin’s attempt to direct the city’s recovery process, his creation of an exclusive, elite-dominated advisory process – done to fulfill promptly the White House’s directive for a recovery plan necessary for federal funding (Baum 2006) – virtually assured that their controversial recommendations would be met with fierce, local resistance, especially from African-American communities who saw the Commission’s recommendations as another government attempt to exile them from the city (Powell 2007; Nelson et al. 2007). Nagin, in response to the public uproar, retreated and allowed residents to rebuild where they wanted if they could in “Darwinist” fashion (Powell 2007), with city services to follow as needed and as available.

Grassroots network members were ill-equipped to fill this government void, and to meet the expectations of national network members who envisioned equitable, proactive local-national partnerships. “Day-to-day survival” was the order of the day for many local organizations, which proved overwhelming emotionally and logistically for local leaders, impeding their ability to “think about longer term strategic recovery goals” (Graham et al. 2006). Displacement was an added burden, as it eviscerated their manpower in the form of members and staff, and establishing communication with displaced residents was inordinately difficult. In the first year after the storm, very few organizations – locally and nationally – had any useful information on the displaced – who they were, where they were. It seemed that only FEMA had that
information, and the agency was not disclosing it. Tracking down displaced residents and maintaining reliable communication in their unsettled lives was an enormous task that seriously impeded the Network’s goal of organizing in the diaspora. In addition, reallocating recovery funds to offices and efforts in host cities – Houston, Baton Rouge, Atlanta, for example – was a difficult choice to make given how desperately recovery resources were needed in the Crescent City. Sociologist Kathleen Tierney has characterized “typical postdisaster recovery” (Graham 2007: 307) as a “systematically managed recovery process” concurrent with “money flying in every direction.” (Tierney, personal communication, March 2005, quoted in Graham 2007: 307).

In post-Katrina New Orleans, it seemed there was little that was systematic about the recovery process, spare the federal government’s intent to hand it over entirely to the private sector. National network members entered this chaotic environment with the best of intentions and powerful political access, but facing substantial infrastructural hurdles. For local, grassroots organizations, it was as if their local government had finally abandoned them completely.

*Competing Cultures within the Network*

The last major challenge is rooted in these substantial social structural hurdles. Network actors drew on competing cultural ingredients to make sense of Hurricane Katrina and to orient their proposed solutions and strategies. Despite a shared injustice frame and a widespread perspective that viewed their post-Katrina efforts as the foundations of a movement, network actors’ prognostic frames (Benford and Snow 2000) and their “tool-kits” (Swidler 1986) suggested divergent worldviews and led to the breakdown of the Network’s aims.

New Orleans politics broadly is steeped in black political thought; Black Liberation theories (see Luft 2009 for Black Liberation roots behind post-Katrina rights-based movement activism), Black Nationalism and anti-racist perspectives pervade many of the organizing frameworks
local, grassroots activists applied to the post-Katrina environment. For many outsiders, including myself, these traditions of African-American thought were not easily recognized, understood or acknowledged – there is no shortage of analysis that the politics of New Orleans are racially charged and divisive. But few of these analyses situate the fraught racial politics to community worldviews embracing black self-determination, self-help, political autonomy, and resistance in the face of white oppression (for exceptions and examples, see Luft 2009, Muhammad 2005, Regis 1991, Regis 2001). The strident, often harsh political rhetoric sampled in Table 2 above is more easily understood within the context of historical legacies of violent institutionalized inequality and the race- and class-based analytical perspectives that develop in response to this history.

In contrast, national actors appeared to embrace more mainstream, liberal democratic worldviews – embracing affordable housing as a means to moving the poor into the “mainstream” (Providence-Enterprise outreach letter, 9/15/06), for instance, arguing that “there was no time to organize” to build power, and pursuing insider, political negotiation with the state instead. Yet, the worldviews of these more powerful network actors were actually relatively radical as well, and certainly in contrast to their insider strategies. One CD intermediary leader rallied workers’ rights conference members against the perils of “global capitalism.” One labor leader assailed the “apartheid economy” that had left New Orleans so poor and unequal. An MIT colleague framed our work on behalf of a private philanthropist as it being “about picking a fight” – civil society taking on the illegitimate state (Jones and Ward 2002; personal communication, October 2005). These exhortations suggested a dominant class analysis relative to a racial lens, but nonetheless they were grounded in the conviction of state-civil society conflict that created persistent, economic and racial inequality in society. It was this shared
radicalism that suggested network members would be able to build a movement together in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

Yet their respective prognostic frames and strategic tool-kits arising from their different “situated social positions” (Young 2002) collided. For instance, the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and many other grassroots organizations believed that international human rights treaties and UN intervention were the necessary corrective to government’s willful “ethnic cleansing” (Luft 2009). The only legitimate way to rebuild New Orleans was to have working-class and poor black New Orleanians sit on and oversee government decision-making bodies, with binding power over such commissions or agencies. In effect, the “world community,” international treaties, and “the people” would come together as a global force to compel the federal government to live up to its social contract with the most vulnerable people and places in society. This perspective, which pointed towards political organizing and direct action protest as the “tools” to realize this outcome, extended to national network actors who acted as legal advocates on behalf of the displaced poor.

In contrast, many national network actors believed that they had to step in as a “quasi-government” to take over for failed federal action. Though this should be understood as a rallying cry against an ideological activist state, in practice it is not dissimilar from operating as a “shadow state” (Lake and Newman 2002) on behalf of neoliberal governments as part of privatization and devolution trends. This prognostic frame pointed to important “tools” such as developing a “delivery mechanism” for CDBG funds in the city (personal communication, 2/20/06a); it took “no net loss of affordable housing” as its movement mantra (personal communication, 2/20/06a). Its strategic repertoire centered housing production, community development finance, insider access, and political bargaining skills as essential to catalyzing
social change in New Orleans. It was about being able to make use of the policymaking process, as one local activist suggested powerful outsider elites would do to take control of New Orleans, compared to the radical left activists in New Orleans who, as local activist described, only knew how to protest such a strategy, not exploit it for themselves (personal communication, 12/27/05).

Conclusion

The Network failed to achieve its shared movement vision in large part because the “tempered radicalism” (Meyerson and Scully 1995) of the national and local elites within the Network clashed with the unorganized grassroots radicalism of New Orleans. It is also clear that the unequal political and financial power of the different network members contributed to the contentious politics of post-Katrina New Orleans, and that their different structural positions in the political economic system led them to make very different choices as recovery processes unfolded and the Bush Administration made urban privatization its recovery plan. These environmental challenges – a fractured civil society, a weak local political economy, a strong ideological federal state, and divergent cultural frames and repertoires – combined with field-level mechanisms of institutionalization to reproduce in New Orleans the inequalities and tensions in the CD field. These mechanisms are the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing. In the following three chapters, I analyze how these mechanisms led to the fracturing of the Network over this 15 month period within this complex and challenging operating environment, preventing their realization of a renewed movement in post-Katrina New Orleans.

Coda
HUD/HANO hosted a single public input meeting on the proposed demolition, a raucous and emotional affair in a packed school auditorium (for a first-hand recount, see Graham 2006f). The Advancement Project’s lawsuit delayed the demolition of Lafitte and the other Big Four projects – St. Bernard, CJ Peete, and BW Cooper – well into 2007. Related lawsuits and political organizing continue today, especially in the Right to the City Alliance^{20} and Zero Eviction Campaign^{21} linking public housing residents from New Orleans with urban poor communities of color around the U.S. and abroad. The U.N. has visited New Orleans three times in a series of ongoing investigations concerning the human rights of the city’s poor, African-American, and public housing residents.

In November 2006, the Democrats regained control of Congress, and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) introduced a House bill mandating affordable housing replacement in the Gulf Coast, including one-for-one replacement of any demolished public housing units in New Orleans, and the bill easily passed, including with the full support of the LA delegation. This set off intense legislative advocacy among a network of Gulf Coast organizations to have a companion Senate bill passed, but ultimately Senators Shelby (R-AL) and Vitter (R-LA) blocked the bill from ever getting out of committee. The New Orleans City Council, with a white majority for the first time in two decades after Creole New Orleanian Oliver Thomas went to prison and Jackie Clarkson was elected in his place, approved demolition of the projects in December 2007, while police and protesters clashed outside. (For a full accounting of this legislative period and its challenges, (see Graham 2010.))

Today, CJ Peete and St. Bernard, now Harmony Oaks and Columbia Parc, respectively, are mixed-income communities under development, while the Lafitte site, the only one with

^{20} http://www.righttothecity.org/
^{21} http://www.habitants.org/zero_evictions_campaign
developer commitment to one-for-one replacement, stands empty after the bottom fell out of the
tax credit market and Enterprise and Providence adjust their sources of funding. Providence has
publicly documented its planning process on its website, and is a founding member of the
NEWCITY Neighborhood Partnership in the Treme/Lafitte and Tulane/Gravier neighborhoods,
an umbrella organization of 55 “neighborhood partners and affiliates” working in and overseeing
neighborhoods allocated “$3B of community, economic and housing development.” (Please see
the Appendix for a NEWCITY map (Map 3) and list of partners (Table 2).) MIT is one of these
55 organizations, although we have no formal role. Providence, Enterprise and NeighborWorks
America, are Steering Committee members of NEWCITY. Many of the individuals and
organizations from the Network are still actively involved in New Orleans recovery, more
broadly.

PHRF was reorganized in May 2006, with the original leadership pushed out over questions
regarding their management of funds and the coalition, including allegations of serious gender
inequity within the group. They went on to found the People’s Organizing Committee.

The city today has about 100,000 fewer people (~350,000) than prior to the storm. Though its
citywide poverty rate has stubbornly held at about one in four residents, the city is whiter, and
wealthier, with its population more concentrated on higher ground. The majority of
neighborhoods in the city have passed 50% of their pre-storm populations, with the exception of
eight, five of which are former projects and their surrounding neighborhoods (including two of
the Big Four redevelopments). Driving around the city in spring 2010, the redevelopment
happening on three of the four Big Four sites felt like the most concentrated redevelopment

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anywhere in the city, and is being framed as a catalyst for corresponding commercial, residential, and corridor development by groups like the LA Disaster Recovery Foundation, Seedco, Living Cities, and other investors, boosters, and funders.
Chapter 4: 
Overcoming “Challenges of Capacity and Culture”\textsuperscript{23} in the Regime-less City

Chapters 2 and 3 laid out the mechanisms of institutionalization and the environmental challenges the Network faced in trying to realize its movement aims in post-Katrina New Orleans. This chapter and the next two analyze three key outcomes brought about by the three field-level mechanisms of institutionalization in community development – the marketization of CD, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing. These mechanisms interacted with the four environmental challenges on the ground to produce the complex operating context that constrained the Network’s movement aims. This chapter addresses the first outcome (see Figure 1, p. 65), the relational and spatial reproduction of institutionalized race and class inequalities, i.e., in the Network and in urban space due to the organizational and cultural capacity gaps between network members in the institutionalized community development field. It closes with an analysis of the city’s lack of a governing regime that could have operated as an intermediary and steward for network members, especially between outsider organizations and local groups.

National Community Development comes to New Orleans

As described in chapter 1, network organizations headquartered outside New Orleans\textsuperscript{24} had greater net worth than local organizations, on average. Table 1 exhibits the percentage of local organizations at certain asset intervals\textsuperscript{25}:

\textsuperscript{23} Bavishi et al. 2006

\textsuperscript{24} For the purposes of discussion, I include the LA Disaster Recovery Foundation, headquartered in Baton Rouge, and the local IAF affiliate, headquartered in Jefferson Parish, a suburb of New Orleans, with New Orleans-based organizations. Of the 15 organizations in Louisiana, these are the only two not within the city limits.

\textsuperscript{25} With the following exceptions, 2006 net assets are used for all organizations, taken from Guidestar. For MIT and Tulane, their 2006 endowments are used. ACORN’s 2006 annual budget is used. The AFL-CIO’s and our private philanthropist’s commitments to New Orleans are used. Of the six organizations that I could not find any financial information, four of the six were grassroots organizations in New Orleans. One was a university-based legal aid
Table 1. Net Assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Organizations (28)</th>
<th>HQ in Greater New Orleans (15)</th>
<th>HQ in Greater New Orleans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assets &gt; $1B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Assets &gt; $100M</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets &gt; $1M</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets &gt; $100,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers are used for descriptive purposes only; net assets did not translate into specific financial commitments to New Orleans recovery. Rather, the relative size of an organization’s worth correlated loosely with national prestige, status, and access to local residents and communities. That is, on average, the smaller an organization’s financial footprint, the more likely they were to work directly with residents or communities. The bigger the organization, the more likely they were to support smaller entities doing this “frontline” work.

Ferguson and Stoutland (1999) describe the different goals, functions and capabilities of community development entities as organized within a system operating on four levels, ordered by their direct connection to residents. Level 0 is grassroots, informal organizations operating on the ground with direct resident participation (e.g., tenants associations, neighborhood watch groups). Level 1 is “frontline” organizations that provide programs and services to residents with some paid staff (e.g., CDCs, local church parishes, local TANF offices). Level 2 organizations are local policymakers, TA providers and funders – the “authorizing and support environment” for Level 1 entities. Lastly, level 3 organizations are the “state, regional and national counterpart to level 2” that supports Levels 1 and 2. The Network was comprised mainly of Level 0, 1 and 3 organizations.

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clinic. The sixth was Providence Community Housing, the joint venture of Catholic Charities ($29M in 2006 net assets) and Enterprise Community Partners ($158M in 2006 net assets).
The distinction here between CD system levels is an organization’s interaction with residents. There is a feedback loop between the practices, customs and rhetoric developed in working directly with residents and the organization’s strategic repertoire (Swidler 1986). For “frontline” CDC staff, for instance, a commitment to improving the lives of low-income residents (cf. Rubin 1993) translates into the direct services of providing an affordable place to live, assisting them with job searches or with financial literacy education, helping them save for education or a home, or developing their capabilities to interact with local government leaders. These efforts are accomplished by a high level of interaction with low-income tenants – many who are disabled, non-English speakers, elderly, not highly educated, recovering, or facing a myriad of additional challenges that circumscribe their daily lives – such as classes held at night outside of normal working hours, community festivals, meetings in housing complex basements, long phone conversations, and the occasional trip to local government or donors’ offices. In contrast, the Level 2 or Level 3 entities that drive development decision-making about low-income communities to improve living conditions or to bring them in line with citywide place-making strategies, rarely interact with low-income residents. Indeed, frontline organizations serve as a buffer between these organizations and the residents they purport to serve or need to sign off on the overall development plans for the area (cf. Fraser at al. 2003). Level 2 or 3 executives may attend the occasional community festival, or in a district-organized local government, hear from some constituents with some regularity, but generally speaking, their interactions are with one another, and the conversations are about housing units, land use, desired tenants (commercial and residential), and financing.

Community development intermediaries (CDIs) are Level 3 organizations. Through the marketization of community development three national intermediaries rationalized the field and
grew into political and financial powerhouses in the process. The necessary skills and resources for the field’s market-based goal of the efficient and scalable production of low-income housing was consolidated within CDIs, who in turn provide support to thousands of small to mid-sized CDC partners around the nation to build affordable housing in low-income communities. CDIs are also behind large-scale redevelopment projects, such as the transformation of public housing projects into mixed-income developments, and especially behind a substantial percentage of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit-financed housing, again typically in partnership with smaller, neighborhood-based CDCs. These intermediaries, unlike their place-based, local counterparts, are not tied to any particular geographic community, but work nationwide delivering best practices in financing, management and operations. These powerhouse intermediaries are the CD organizations that arrived in New Orleans after Katrina pledging capacity-building, funding, training, and long-term assistance to local, community-based organizations and policymakers.

The national Level 3 outsider organizations such as the intermediaries and unions who arrived in New Orleans were focused on acquiring land on which to redevelop housing and neighborhoods – it was an effort oriented around physical planning and redevelopment of the built environment from which resident organizing and capacity building would result in the form of community associations, tenant associations or community-based organizations providing social services. Yet, they had such ambitious efforts, the AFL’s $1B commitment and Enterprise’s pledge to redevelop 1,500 units of housing in Tremé, for example, requiring complex public-private financing, that the existing local community development sector was an insufficient local partner to undertake these initiatives.

The goal of capacity building is a traditional one in community development, and one national responders, including in the Network, were keen to pursue in post-Katrina New Orleans.
Chaskin (2001) defines capacity as a relational, multi-dimensional concept, in which the skills, (access to) resources, shared values and networks of individuals and organizations within and beyond a bounded community are essential to the community’s ability to collectively identify and solve problems. This human and organizational capacity is marshaled and deployed through an “infrastructure of instrumental relations” (298). Social capital - the trust and access to resources produced via relational networks - is also an essential ingredient.

Local community-based organizations (CBOs), formal and informal, shared a similar but differently expressed objective. They sought material and political support from national funders and worked to build inter-organizational and cross-neighborhood communication and collaboration. Yet their rhetoric was rarely the community development language of “building capacity.” Beyond the actual capacity gap between local and national entities, this rhetorical difference also reflects an equally important cultural chasm: different ways of making sense of their strengths and weaknesses in the aftermath of Katrina.

When outsider organizations arrived in New Orleans, they cast around for local community partners to assist in developing and implementing redevelopment plans. An expectation was communicated – sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit – that New Orleans would have local capacity that could be harnessed, even with some external development and support. Yet the capacity gap between New Orleans – its civic capacity, organizational capacity, and governance capacity – and the outside organizations that arrived to assist in the aftermath of the disaster cannot be overstated, especially when compared to the high capacity urban environments such as Boston and New York in which many of these national leaders had come of age.

*The community development sector in New Orleans*
In New Orleans, there was an emerging housing and community development field prior to Katrina. Lowe (2006) recounts the seeding of the CD sector in New Orleans in the 1990s. As recently as the early 1990s, the field had been relatively nonexistent in New Orleans, a city with the highest vacancy rate of any major US city at that time, with almost one in five houses empty in the decade prior to the storm. Mayor Marc Morial made housing and community development a priority of his Administration in 1994, and The Greater New Orleans Foundation (GNOF; Level 2) moved to develop the sector in the Parish. (LISC also launched a demonstration project there during that period for similar purposes.) Non-profit capacity building was a key focus for local and national foundations during the 1990s, with GNOF, the United Way (Level 2), the Institute for Mental Hygiene, the Baton Rouge Area Foundation (Level 2), the Council for a Better Louisiana, the Community Foundation of Shreveport-Bossier (Level 2), the Annie E. Casey Foundation and Ford Foundation (both Level 3s) working together and independently to launch local intermediaries to build non-profit capacity in the state. GNOF seeded All Congregations Together and IAF/The Jeremiah Group (both Level 1s) to increase community organizing capacity in Greater New Orleans (a 10-parish region under GNOF’s auspices), it also helped launch the Center for Nonprofit Resources, the New Orleans Jobs Initiative, the Crescent City Peace Alliance, and the New Orleans Neighborhood Development Collaborative (NONDC), a local community development intermediary, during the same period.

By 2000 New Orleans had 28 CDCs (Level Is); the “typical” CDC had up to 2 full-time staff members and relied heavily on volunteer support. Most had just begun “to broaden its scope beyond non-housing activity, possibly completing its first housing project or managing fewer than three units at once” (Lowe 2006: 69). GNOF’s efforts channeled $6M for “core operating support” to nine CDCs through NONDC, with a Board of representatives from LISC, GNOF, the
city, local funders, the private sector and the CDCs to oversee the development of the sector. The nine CDCs supported here developed over 600 units of housing by the end of the decade, with more than half of that in one large multifamily project in New Orleans East.

Because of local government’s legacy of corruption, mismanagement, and citizen distrust, CDCs believed that volunteer participation was essential in establishing their trust and credibility in communities, especially through resident representation on CDC boards. Relying heavily on volunteers slowed down the growth and learning of CDCs, which they saw as a positive, by juxtaposing it to local government’s tendency to act rashly and poorly, often in partnership with the private sector, without “public accountability, contribution or consent” (Lowe 2006: 70). Napoleonic law in Louisiana also significantly slowed down development, rendering property acquisition an extremely complex and time-consuming process. But CDCs existed in part to counter the lack of government leadership and capacity to develop communities. “Community development must thrive in spite of the political situation” in New Orleans, Lowe writes (2006: 73).

In response to the newness of the sector, government distrust, and the “long-existing racial divide” between neighborhoods in New Orleans, GNOF’s work with CDCs emphasized community building, capacity building, and organizational development, rather than housing production. Community and resident empowerment was an “implicit goal” to heal racial divides that reached back through generations of local families (Lowe 2006). GNOF, in return, enjoyed “high levels of trust for its leadership,” for believing in “neighborhood resident involvement and process ownership to be a necessary ingredient for effective community development” in the city. “…the primary success of GNOF in community development through NONDC, may have been keeping all the players at the decision-making table” (Lowe 2006: 81).
Katrina displacement eviscerated the volunteer and community control bases of the community development sector. The community development sector also had not grown much in production capacity by the time of Katrina; the largest CDC in the city produced 13 units of housing in 2005 (personal communication, 3/10/06). Another CDC, based in Tremé, had an annual budget of about $300,000 prior to the storm, which almost doubled in 2006 due to post-storm contributions. When community development intermediaries and unions arrived in the city, they found a sector completely unmatched to take up their ambitions. For example, when one intermediary arrived in the city to market its highly structured community building programs, it discovered a sector so devastated that local groups viewed these training opportunities as far less valuable to their recovery than obtaining dry, safe places to meet and new office equipment. Many of these organizations had never even heard of this national organization, one of the largest intermediaries in the country. They proved impatient to know what this agency planned to do in the region and how it might help them. They also pointedly asked for – and received that afternoon – new printers to help them go about their recovery work (meeting notes, 6/10/06).

Since the flood, this field has continued to grow and take shape, in large part due to the contributions of outside organizations like PolicyLink, Enterprise Community Partners, LISC, and NeighborWorks America, new regional organizations like The Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, the Louisiana Housing Alliance, and local organizations like the Greater New Orleans Foundation, who have continued to develop the institutional and organizational capacity of the local government and non-profits statewide to develop affordable housing and legislate for affordable housing policy. Today, there is “$3B of community, economic, and housing development” activity in the Tremé/Lafitte and Tulane/Gravier communities alone (NEWCITY
Neighborhood Partnership flyer, n.d.). But this sectoral development has come at some cost. The inequalities that plagued community development nationwide – a divorce between community development and community organizing, top-down control, bureaucratization, limited local efficacy, and several large players thriving among many smaller, marginal groups – has been replicated in New Orleans.

**Mechanisms of Institutionalization and CD Capacity Gaps in New Orleans**

First, the organizational capacity gap between Level 3 outsiders and lever 1 local CDCs in New Orleans is primarily due to the impact of marketization on the field, which led to the aforementioned explosive growth and success of CDIs that in turn provide support to local CDCs around the country. Part of marketization is the ability of the non-profit sector to compete with for-profit entities, and for the non-profit sector to embrace market principles of efficiency and competition. Cities with well-developed non-profit sectors were more likely to see such transformations take shape, as organizations kept up with the evolution of non-profit service delivery and operations and had the relative adaptive skills to pursue new sources of funding and learn new modes of operating. High-capacity cities or those home to or proximate to the headquarters of CDIs, their investors, and other Level 3 organizations key to structuring the CD field will likely see their non-profit sector benefit from the skills and resources deployed by this leadership organizations (this is akin to the direct relationship of relative power of organizations based on their geographic distance to the state as argued by Davis (1999)). New Orleans is not one of these places, being geographically and socially isolated in the comparatively underdeveloped US South – in terms of community development capacity – and lacking a strong governing regime to attract outside resources and investments in the city.
As the Network took action in New Orleans, foundations peeled off to focus on funding organizing and developers prioritized building housing. These groups worked on separate but parallel tracks, each viewing the other tool-kit – community development versus community organizing – as separate and distinct from their priority. Organizing would focus on connecting with diaspora residents and linking into city planning processes. Development would focus on tax credit projects and rebuilding the former neighborhoods of the displaced. Early on both camps within the Network aimed to incorporate development and organizing together, but institutionalized repertoires, funding sources, and worldviews proved too difficult to transcend. This is reflective of the radicalization of community organizing within the CD field, and the subsequent divorce of organizing and development as strategic repertoires in the sector.

The endowment of a new city-wide non-profit developer, Providence Community Housing, to redevelop Tremé/Lafitte in partnership with Enterprise was particularly problematic for equitably building local organizational capacity across the CD sector. This arguably was a necessary and perhaps the only solution in order to rapidly develop local capacity to handle Community Development Block Grant funds, the cornerstone of federal disaster redevelopment funds for affordable housing and neighborhood rebuilding – and a crucial ingredient to physical rebuilding that stands in sharp contrast to the printers specified by the aforementioned local, grassroots groups. Yet, it also served to expand the already demonstrable power of Catholic Charities in New Orleans, especially over impoverished New Orleanians who depended on the organization for social and emergency services, and in comparison to local CDCs and other pro-poor organizations such as community organizing groups who were trying to incorporate the voices of displaced New Orleans residents into the recovery process. The caregiving ethos of Catholic Charities that is central to contemporary US poverty politics due to the reformation of
poverty dominated here, as did the strengthening of white leadership over this Creole community via the appointment of the Providence to steer redevelopment.

Lastly, All Congregations Together, the local PICO-LIFT affiliate, has played a central role in organizing Lafitte public housing residents and their Tremé neighbors around neighborhood reconstruction. Rather than community organizing focused on political empowerment by means of challenging existing power structures, sketched out, for example, by a long-time black community activist in Tremé, a more conservative model of leading with site development and incorporating community building around site planning and site-based supportive services prevailed here. This outcome stands in stark contrast to the more radical, confrontational, collective identity-based community organizing spirit that flourished in New Orleans pre-Katrina and pervaded the recovery process after the flood. It is also reflective of the watered down version of community organizing that has been retained post-split (between development and organizing) as a resonant model within community development practice today, which Stoecker (1997) typifies as focused more on consensus building or as building social capital (see also Fraser et al. 2003, DeFilippis 2001).

**Community Organizing in New Orleans**

Bavishi and Wilch (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) detail the community organizing sector in New Orleans based on six months of bridging work for national funders interested in supporting the field. What is critical for this analysis is two aspects: the African-American movement roots in New Orleans community organizing practice, and the normative presence of community organizing in the city – that is, it was the primary non-profit, grassroots capacity in the city (compared to the community development sector or the community health sector, for example) – evidenced, for example, by GNOF’s recognition of community organizing groups like ACORN,
IAF, and others as the only eligible citywide entities for representation on the governing board of the privately funded, newly launched United New Orleans Plan (UNOP) planning process (personal communication 6/26/10).

The roots of contemporary community organizing in New Orleans pre- and post-Katrina grew out of working-class black activism in the city, with African-American movement frames at its heart. In her documentation of the growth of a human rights framework among social justice activists in post-Katrina New Orleans, Luft (2009) details two foundations for the “right of return” in New Orleans, summarized in Graham (2010): “One is linked to international human rights treaties that lay out the basic human right to housing, including specifically for Internally Displaced Peoples. The other basis for the right of return was the Black Liberation Movement, in which many older, black men now leading grassroots coalitions of poor and working-class black New Orleanians, had activist roots.” Black Power also seeded post-Katrina organizing; for instance, Malik Rahim, a former Black Panther in New Orleans became a leader of Common Ground Relief, an “anarchist” group responding to Katrina, idolized and supported by “white political radicals” and college students from all over the U.S. (Mizell-Nelson 2008). Black Liberation, Black Power and African-American social activism, with its tenets of self-determination, community control and cultural pride, more broadly, infused the community organizing sector in New Orleans (see Luft 2009, Germany 2007, Mizell-Nelson 2008, Regis 1999 and 2001). The rhetoric and principles of PHRF are just one example of these diffuse ideologies and collective identities grounding the field (see also Luft 2009).

Race is a “marker of class and status” in the U.S. (Gans 2005: 18); New Orleans is no exception, though its racial ordering is more complicated than most US cities. Spain (1977) describes New Orleans as the most “un-American American city”; its tourism and hospitality
industry has long “othered” the city’s unique Afro-American and French fusion roots, marketing it as a short, “swinging” getaway from normal life (Woodside et al. 1989) where workers, couples, singles and men can take advantage of its loose mores, laidback atmosphere, and pioneering adult entertainment industry (Mizell-Nelson 2008). Part of this “othering” has been to commoditize its unique culture born of its invisible working-class black population, especially its music (e.g., jazz, blues), festivals and street life. Mizell-Nelson describes New Orleans as “one of the nation’s most working class cities” (2008:241); Regis details lovingly working-class black community traditions of jazz funerals and second lines as embodying “black subjectivities” and representing the “respectability of blackness…[the] key values of…respect, fiscal power, order, solidarity, peace, community uplift, and beauty” (Regis 2001: 755). The city’s 50+ indigenous black benevolent associations – its Social Aid and Pleasure Clubs – host these funerals and second lines – the latter “anniversary parades that run practically every Sunday from August until April – through their “back of town” neighborhoods (Tremé, Central City). The routes chosen, stops along the way, and songs and music played all contribute to a mapping of the community – including its history – and a “musical appropriation of space” (757). Working-class black street life celebrations, rooted in indigenous community institutions, reflect anti-racist resistance to the violence and risk for black Americans living in a racially stratified society (Regis 2001).

Within these communities and across the city’s 73 officially recognized neighborhoods, and almost 200 unofficial ones, families and inter-generational kin networks were deeply rooted at the neighborhood and even block level. Though this suggests high degrees of a sense of community and commitment to a place, both important ingredients in Chaskin’s (2001) model of community capacity, they also suggest a lack of instrumental weak ties (Granovetter 1973) and
the limited utility of kin and sub-neighborhood level social networks, especially within communities that lacked political power or access to material resources, like deeply poor, African-American communities in New Orleans. Although social aid and pleasure clubs provided modest material and substantial affective benefits for these communities, their existence points to the reality that these neighborhoods lacked access to a sufficient state-sponsored social safety net or viable employment or economic opportunities.

The acts of resistance and community control Regis describes within these tightly-knit neighborhoods are part of a long history of Afro-American activism and collective action by people of color in the Parish – a city with a storied history of struggle that includes once strong waterfront unions, Creole activism for integration and inequality that resulted in Plessy v. Ferguson, instilling Jim Crow as the law of the land, and a city that incorporated refugees from St. Domingue (Haiti) following the slave revolution that established the first free society by people of color in the Western Hemisphere. In sum, black-led and black-focused organizing and political development has been central to the development and identity of New Orleans.

Germany (2007) describes the growth of contemporary black political leadership deriving from a unique partnership coming together to spend $100M in War on Poverty funds in the city in less than a decade, when Black activist groups like COUP (Community Organization for Urban Politics) in the Seventh Ward and SOUL (Southern Organization for Unified Leadership) in the Ninth Ward came together with white liberal elites to develop programs like Head Start and food stamps to drive federal funds into low-income, increasingly racially segregated (Spain 1970, Mahoney 1990) neighborhoods. Though this period of interracial collective action ended in violence, including between the Black Panthers headquartered in the Desire projects and the
police, it provided an opening for Mayor Moon Landrieu to integrate City Hall and for a new
generation of educated black leadership to enter politics.

Nonetheless, Germany also demonstrates that the city has long been stymied by a “warring,
unproductive” politics embodied in “racialized political blocs” and

“in the all-or-nothing approach to cultural and political battles...Baton Rouge versus New
Orleans; Carnival elites versus city politicos; city council versus the mayor; black versus white
city council representatives; housing development versus housing development; ward versus
ward” (Germany 2007, reviewed in Mizell-Nelson 2008: 236).

Organizing in Post-Katrina New Orleans

This factionalized, racialized politics endured and was instructive, alluring and repellent in
post-Katrina New Orleans. It was on vigorous display in a publicized battle between ACORN
and PHRF, in PHRF’s assertions that it was the only legitimate coalition representative of
working-class and poor blacks in the city, the strident language of the government’s “ethnic
cleansing” spoken by local radical organizers, and the pronounced resistance of social movement
organizations to work together in the city after the storm, choosing to continue to organize their
membership bases separately. New Orleans politics is cynical (Germany 2007); confrontational;
indigenous; grassroots; and rooted in racial, social and economic justice movements in the US.
It is split along racial, class, and neighborhood boundaries as an outsized working-class
community fights for meager resources in a poor city with a long dysfunctional political system
and an economy squandered by complacency, intransigence, exploitation, and substantial lack of
private investment (Germany 2007 and Souther 2006, reviewed in Mizell-Nelson 2008) in an
“underdemocratized” state (Frymer et al. 2006: 44). Mizell-Nelson (2008) describes how the
Young Urban Professionals (YURPs), new, mostly white arrivals to post-Katrina New Orleans,
chose to form their own organization rather than partner with the existing, mostly black Young
Leadership Conference as more evidence of how these factional politics seeped into outsiders’ consciousness and approach and were reproduced in the post-Katrina city.

When Katrina struck, community organizers who had managed to return to the city responded the way they knew how, with political analysis, demands for community control and leadership in recovery decision-making and resource allocation rooted in collective identity claims, castigation of government failure and low levels of expectation for government response. What they struggled with were two post-flood tensions – first, they battled a desire to work together in new and unprecedented ways across cultural and geographic borders with lingering suspicion and distrust of one another and of outsiders to the region. Second, they battled the realization that they were exhausted and outmatched by the trauma and destruction wrought by Katrina with the conviction that their organizing-centric, participation-driven, local control approach was nonetheless the right(eous) one requiring external support. There was certainly realization that CBOs might benefit from training and resources, but there was never a question that their logic of organizing and local leadership – despite the obvious challenges to organizing across a diaspora and the scope of the physical destruction wrought by Katrina – might need restructuring or at least co-authority with national organizations trained in disaster response, housing development, policymaking, or other necessary post-storm functions.

What is interesting about New Orleans concerning the relative centrality and power of community development practice versus community organizing is the role reversal of the two repertoires. That is, community development was a newly emerging sector, largely bypassed by the field’s institutionalization of the last thirty years. In contrast in New Orleans, a place scholars and locals argue is rooted in the past (Mitchell 2007; personal communication June 2006), confrontational community organizing and a tradition of protest and institutional distrust
endured. The field’s market principles of efficient, measurable, and scalable production of affordable housing were slow to gain traction in the city’s CD sector, given a lack of local housing and organizational models reflecting this trend, plus difficult property acquisition laws, unique local architecture, and deep suspicion of the government and the private sector (Lowe 2006). When CDIs and other outside organizations steeped in institutional practices and norms within the CD field arrived in New Orleans after Katrina, they discovered an environment in which radical, confrontational community organizing was central to civil society, reinforced by strong institutional distrust of the government and private sector collaboration. Yet, external Network members did discover a strong and contrary tradition of caregiving of the poor due to the size and power of the Catholic Church in the region.

**Symbolic Class and Race Conflict**

The first part of this chapter indicates that the institutionalization of CD has geographic implications for CD practice. That is, New Orleans, with its geographic isolation and weak political economy was effectively passed over by leading CD organizations as the field institutionalized. This meant that the mechanism of marketization had not yet restructured the emerging CD sector in the city prior to Katrina. It also meant that a charitable tradition of caregiving (O’Connor 2001, Dreier 1997) that has returned to anti-poverty policy nationwide persisted in the Crescent City, as did radical, confrontational community organizing models. In the Network, mostly Northern, well-resourced CD and philanthropic organizations responded to Katrina’s impacts on an impoverished Southern city. Field-level institutional inequalities became embodied relationally and spatially in the Network’s response to Katrina.

Pre-existing inequalities in the CD system (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999, Frisch and Servon 2006) were key drivers of power differentials between national and local Katrina responders.
Most of the national organizations in the Network entered New Orleans by invitation or out of necessity to assist their subsidiary entities. Exceptions included Enterprise Community Partners, who volunteered their services to the state and city, and the AFL-CIO, who saw an opportunity to rebuild the city and try to unionize workers in the process. These federated or subsidiary relationships were a critical factor in shaping post-Katrina access to power and strategic responses. They constrained access to the state for local groups by acting as gatekeepers or spokespersons for CBOs. When philanthropy wanted to hear from local community organizations, they sent a cadre of MIT graduate students to listen, for example. There were layers of organizational networks and structures blocking local community organizers’ access to government decision-makers in Washington DC. Davis (1999) characterizes this power as national organizations’ relative proximity to the state compared to CBOs. Organizational capacity gaps reflected more than just differences in resources. The strategic repertoires were quite different, with local, grassroots groups disproportionately favoring “particularist” black-and working-class centered confrontational political organizing and national organizations tending towards “universalist”, market-driven, expert-led physical development (see Thompson 1998 and Fraser and Lepofsky 2004 on particularism and universalism).

Yet, despite this strategic conflict, one of the more disorienting aspects in the levying of claims like “ethnic cleansing” against national responders is that in post-Katrina New Orleans, the leadership of local and national organizations was fairly ethno-racially diverse and relatively homogeneous in class status (in terms of educational backgrounds and employment status). This is in contrast to how scholarship rightfully attributes so much of community redevelopment conflict to class, ethnic-racial and cultural differences between “experts” and residents (e.g., Reed and Steinberg 2006, O’Connor 2001, Young 2006, Young 2007). This Network was
dominated by educated professionals and activists of all racial and ethnic backgrounds, though white and black members comprised the majority. Geographic differences and positions within the CD system were the main sources of power differentials, with Northern-based leaders and organizations privileged and regional tensions between Northern responders and Southern “victims” infusing the struggles between development and organizing approaches.

Yet, class-based and racial conflict fractured this Network as much as liberal development versus radical organizing action did. In part due to their different strategic repertoires, Northern professional elites in the Network represented a “new class” of elites (Fischer 1991, 1996), the “technocracy” elite (Fischer 1990) empowered to lead the recovery due to their privileged position as national – i.e., universal (Fraser and Lepofsky 2004) – experts who could bring best practices in redevelopment and capacity-building to bear on the city. They possessed the class-based cultural, economic and social capital (Bourdieu 1986) that came with their elite political position that provided disproportionate access to the state and increased their chances to receive redevelopment funds. They had relevant professional histories and portfolios of work to justify redevelopment activities in New Orleans now; they had offices in or near DC (cf. Davis 1999), PDAs, travel funds, and past experience on Capitol Hill to facilitate on-going communication with the state after Katrina; they had access to formal meeting space in New Orleans and DC, expense accounts for dinners and hotel rooms, and appropriate business attire for meetings with other executive level decision makers. They spoke the national “jargon” (personal communication, June 10, 2006) of the deconcentration policy “discourse coalition” (Fischer 1996, Hajer 1996). They exchanged these capitals for the gain of acquiring substantial government approval and funds for large-scale redevelopment in Tremé/Lafitte. The economic,

26“I also bought a Treo 650, and can now join the bureaucratic and progressive masses (World Bank, SEIU, etc.) who all own this phone” (Graham 2006a).
social and cultural resources accompanying their elite class status and social position reflected their “social relation of power” to HUD, to the City of New Orleans, to the LRA, to one another (Bourdieu 1989: 375, quoted in Swartz 1996: 73). They reproduced their power by partnering with well-resourced, politically powerful, white-led organizations in New Orleans, or by maintaining a donor-grantee relationship with smaller, grassroots, often black-led organizations, with these relationships mediated by professional or outsider consultants.

In contrast, community organizing groups did not possess the economic, cultural or social capital to gain the attention of the state. In contrast to the varied capitals of national CD entities, local community organizers had destroyed offices and rumpled clothes; little time or money to travel, fill out grant forms, or host out-of-town organizations in the face of gutting homes or offices, tracking down staff, and taking care of kin; no places to meet other than coffee shops or borrowed office space; no spare office in DC; tense relationships with local government; no prior development capacity to take on the scope of reconstruction now demanded by Katrina; and did not speak the jargon of CD.

As the months passed and the Network moved rapidly to mediate or contest the federal government’s privatization plan, New Orleans’s CBOs came to symbolize the social isolation and immobility consistently ascribed to an African-American urban “underclass” (Wilson 1987, Young 2006) that the City of New Orleans came to embody in the eyes of outsiders, including national responders. That is, institutionalized ideologies about status and moral worth of different social groups (Thompson 1998, Steensland 2006) – of the poor, African-Americans, women, for instance – were written onto New Orleans as a place – as a declining, low-income, black city – and community organizers trying to assert a strategy of collective identity-based political
organizing steeped in the city's history and culture were discounted in their efforts by this spatialized discrimination.

Despite the injustice frame described earlier, outsiders to New Orleans – responders in the Network, the public, the media – partially blamed New Orleans and its residents for its misfortune after the storm. The city's “urban decadence could ultimately be drowned in its own vulnerabilities,” social theorist David Goldberg writes (2006: 89). Typical tropes of cultural pathologies assigned to low-income urban African-Americans – of irresponsibility, disorderliness, and fatalism (Lipman 1998, Young 2006, 2007; Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987, Thompson 1998, Goldberg 2006) – were laid down on New Orleans and New Orleanians, given its illustration in the media by the poorest and most vulnerable black bodies stranded in the city. The city’s storied French, Catholic, working-class and black history of celebration, faith, a reverence for strong ties and a history of protest politics rooted in black political movements and black political critique (Hirsch and Logsdon 1992, Regis 1991, Thompson 1998) combined with its economic malaise, white population decline, lack of a strong government regime, government corruption, high crime and blight fashioned the city as a place and as a people as isolated, desperate, lacking capacity and power, and in need of outside intervention, “therapy” (see Imboscio 2008), and saving (Luft 2008, Toomey 2009). New Orleans for better and worse has been characterized as an “un-American” city (Spain 1979), and its culture, history and misfortune set it up as anathema to white, Protestant, “American” ethics of hard work, individualism, efficiency and rationality (e.g., bureaucracy) (Weber 2003 [1958]) mirrored in US
citizens’ high geographic mobility, privileging of the nuclear family, weak ties (Granovetter 1973, McPherson et al. 2006), and architectural and design homogeneity.\footnote{One need watch several hours of HGTV to understand the capitalist forces driving homogeneity in neighborhood and housing design, as sellers are discouraged from putting personal touches on their homes as that will alienate the average buyer and thus drive down sale prices.}

The discordance I mentioned earlier results from this symbolic racial and class conflict embodied in an ethno-racially diverse but predominately middle-class national and local Network responding to a discriminated collective identity mapped onto urban space and infusing post-flood urban restructuring conflicts. In New Orleans recovery politics, there was an implicit association in discursive debates that ‘national’ = ‘white’ = ‘outsider’ and ‘local’ = ‘black’ = ‘insider,’ despite the multiracial cast of characters advocating for physical development or political organizing – Asian-Americans, whites and African-Americans lined up on both sides of the aisle. Yet, national responders together came to represent an outside, non-local, white, affluent Northern “place” exercising power and authority over a demeaned local, Southern, black, and poor city struggling to direct its own recovery. In this political context, actual race and economic status of the particular Network member mattered far less than their structural (e.g., occupational) and ideological position in post-Katrina recovery politics: were they a member of the white, liberal “technocracy” (Fischer 1990) exercising laissez-faire racism (Bobo 2006) or “racial conservation” (Goldberg 2006) via neoliberal privatization and exclusion, or were they a member of the poor, black “underclass” requiring containment and social control and emphasizing political resistance (Young 2006, Lipman 2009, Goldberg 2006)?

Passionate Politics & Strategic Repertoires\footnote{See Passionate Politics by Goodwin et al. (2001) for a discussion of bringing the study of emotions back into social movements.}

From their shared injustice frame (Goodwin et al. 2001), Network members also collectively expressed moral outrage. They let loose a great deal of bombastic or impassioned language
reflecting plans for New Orleans reconstruction – that their work would link together multiple movements on the ground, that the city was the site of the “next Civil Rights movement,” that the government was responsible for “ethnic cleansing” and communities would demonstrate their resilience against this forced displacement by rebuilding a levee on their own, that this was fundamentally a problem of “global capitalism,” or of an “apartheid economy”, and nothing short of sustained collective action was going to reverse this tide.

Yet, national CD groups saw the possibilities for influence and change through an “elite” approach of persuasion, education, and technocratic knowledge. They thus rarely expressed such verbose language in mixed-company, that is, outside of private meetings or in personal conversations. In contrast, community organizers saw influence and change deriving from public pressure on elites and confronting the power dynamics within recovery politics, including by personalizing conflicts (Rein 1969, Piven and Cloward 1965). As such, community organizing (CO) groups developed movement materials and planned marches and demonstrations that captured their emotional perspectives, and spoke in similarly clear terms in emails and meetings. National CD groups were engaging in “emotion management” (Hochschild 1979), suppressing their emotions outside of bounded, safe, or personal contexts, a strategy that reflected the technocratic, bureaucratic nature of their work (Weber 1946, 1981; Martin et al. 1998). This “emotional labor” (Hochschild 1983, Martin et al. 1998) of angry tirades and moral outrage worked within their personal-professional networks, but not when dealing with their primary stakeholder, the state, to gain control of property in Tremé and surrounding communities. In this arena, emotions were to be suppressed, with affective displays limited to professional demonstrations of competency, expert knowledge, and efficacy.
The “display rules” (Matsumoto 1990) of appropriate emotional expressiveness differed between mostly national, CD-focused entities and mostly local, CO-centered groups. Because national organizations held greater power in the post-Katrina landscape in terms of political access and financial resources, they also had the power to set the tone for national-local interactions concerning the future of New Orleans’ low-income neighborhoods. This does not mean that New Orleans-based community organizers did not continue to channel their anger and frustration verbally and nonverbally in meetings; what it means is that national CD entities came to view this as an illegitimate means of expression and action. The emotion and passion evidenced by Katrina survivors and local organizations was deemed an inappropriate way of engaging, stymieing opportunities for strategic planning and coalition-building, for communicating to national groups their resources needs, advocacy agendas, and political goals. What national groups desired was an instrumental, rational display of a strategic plan and resource mobilization strategy that reflected community organizers’ plans to rebuild low-income communities (e.g., Graham et al. 2006). What local groups wanted to do was vent, be heard, be respected, and be provided with safe, dry, functioning spaces where they could carry out this relationship building and strategizing via community building and political organizing.

As community organizers heatedly aired their grievances in meetings with national groups, the latter responded in the short-term and retreated in the longer term. They delivered on the simple requests, such as printers, but could not or would not provide more sustained support by building political coalitions with these local entities, who seemed angry, traumatized, disorganized, and confrontational. A diffuse air of frustration crept in among national responders that the differences in capacity and culture were too much to overcome, in part by community organizers’ defiant emotional politics, considered illegitimate when viewed from a “universal,”
liberal, “expert” development repertoire (Fraser and Lepofsky 2004) that viewed the government rather than residents and communities as the primary stakeholder and audience.

Most of the national actors in the Network came out of past movements – in immigrants’ rights, in labor organizing, in Civil Rights and Black Power. Many evoked political economy critiques of the crisis in the Gulf wrought by the manmade disaster of Katrina, and saw themselves bringing their skills and power to bear on righting decades of government neglect and institutional racism. But their positions of power in the CD system imbued with decades of their own lessons in the practices of community organizing and development and the realities of the political and policy climate (O’Connor 2001, Koschinsky 1998, Koschinsky and Swanstrom 2001, Graham 2007a) after Katrina (total GOP control, strict partisanship and polarization) left them willing to negotiate officially color-blind (Lieberman 2006), neoliberal social policies of privatization via demolition and mixed-income redevelopment, rather than embrace mass political organizing as the primary response to Katrina (see recommendations from Bobo 2006, Dawson 2006). What’s more, when they arrived in New Orleans, they too often succumbed to internalized institutional ideologies that grant moral worth and status on certain groups (men, whites, Northerners, professionals) versus others (non-whites, Southerners, the poor, the grassroots). Despite thinking a shared injustice frame could build the necessary coalitions to launch “the next Civil Rights Movement,” ideological, institutional and structural challenges between liberal and radical national and local developers and organizers rooted in field-level inequalities in power, access and status fractured the Network, condemning in the process New Orleans as a place and New Orleanians as a people unable to save themselves and requiring rescue, help and liberation from national organizations (e.g., Toomey 2009).

Marketization, Radicalization & Institutional Distrust
Marketization and the radicalization of community organizing are at the heart of this conflict and the reproduction of institutionalized inequalities of race and class within the Network and urban space. As described in this chapter, marketization has led to significant organizational capacity gaps within the national CD field, reflected in the underdevelopment of the sector in New Orleans compared to other high capacity cities that enjoy closer working relationships with CDIs and other Level 3 organizations in the CD system. Next, New Orleans has retained a radical community organizing repertoire that has been largely marginalized in the field nationwide.

Marketization signifies a willingness of the private non-profit sector to carry out service provision previously the responsibility of the public sector; neoliberal critics describe this as the rise of a “shadow state” carrying out the privatization regime of a neoliberal government. Radical, system-challenging community organizing frameworks in New Orleans directly challenge this “shadow state,” which they see as embodied in marketized CD organizations within the Network who have come to the post-Katrina city to develop the capacity of the sector and rebuild the city. The stated movement aims of the Network are undermined by the respective impacts of marketization and community organizing’s radicalization as they pit Network members against one another in terms of choices of strategic repertoires (development versus organizing) that overshadow members’ shared injustice frame. In effect, the institutional distrust espoused in radical critiques of government, professionals and experts by local community organizers implicates liberal, development-oriented Network members as complicit in the city’s post-disaster privatization. Given the geographic implications of the field’s institutionalization, this results in a perception community organizing groups in the Network of a powerful, white,
elite Northern Network of non-profit development and philanthropic organizations arriving in New Orleans to privatize the city on behalf of the neoliberal, federal state.

**The need for a strong urban regime**

In Ferguson and Stoutland’s CD system model, Level 2 organizations are local policymakers, TA providers and funders – the “authorizing and support environment” for Level 1 entities. This level serves a bridging function between frontline organizations and national entities that support the overall community development system. Level 2 organizations act as an intermediary between community-based organizations and national CD actors, providing funding, guidance, and a favorable local regulatory environment for CBOs and a point of entry, stewardship and local legitimacy for outsider organizations.

As described in Chapter 3, the financial and operational capacity of the city government was so devastated after Hurricane Katrina that Nagin’s Administration did little more than lay out a welcome mat for the private sector to come in and rebuild New Orleans. Furthermore, Nagin’s previous corporate relationships and his emphasis on winning over the Bush Administration meant that the Mayor was pre-disposed to well-connected, elite management of the recovery process. Lastly, the city and state’s mutual legacy of corruption and racially charged politics further undermined the authority and leadership of the City government in Katrina’s aftermath.

Burns and Thomas (2006) characterize New Orleans as a regime-less city. Four key characteristics typify urban regimes: a shared agenda, a governing coalition, resources, and “a scheme of cooperation” (Burns and Thomas 2006: 518; Stone 2005). An agenda reflects a mutual understanding of the city’s problems and the needed solutions; coalition-based cooperation underwritten by the necessary resources is dependent on “stable and long-lasting relationships” between public and private sector partners, typically local government leaders and
the business community (Burns and Thomas 2006). In cities that lack urban regimes, governance is characterized by temporary, unstable, issue-based coalitions that come together to solve and garner resources towards specific policy issues. “Lack of capacity of the perceived inability to move on many fronts in governance is an inevitable result of the nonregime’s impermanent issue networks” (Burns and Thomas 2006: 519). This perception of weak capacity or incompetence can also become self-fulfilling.

Burns and Thomas, after analyzing how lack of a governing regime in New Orleans impeded the city’s response to the disaster, end on a hopeful but wary note that the recovery process will bring about a regime in the city, based on the creation of the state’s Louisiana Recovery Authority, the city’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission, and the City Council’s Advisory Committee on Hurricane Recovery reflecting public-private relationships committed to steering the region’s recovery. Yet, as the authors feared, this multiplicity of governing committees and the tenuous political relationships within them, proved debilitating to the establishment of an urban regime after Hurricane Katrina. Indeed, this lack of a strong regime impeded the Network’s effectiveness and its realization of its movement aims.

With housing policy devolved to states and municipalities in the US, and the strong ideological preference in US housing policy for market-based solutions and private sector implementation, the need for cross-sectoral cooperation between the public and private sectors on local housing and community development policy is essential (Koschinsky and Swanstrom 2001). Koschinsky and Swanstrom suggest thinking of local housing and community development domains as sub-regimes of urban regimes, similarly requiring a shared agenda, a governing coalition, resources and a willingness and ability to cooperate to provide affordable housing and revitalize low-income communities. What is relevant to this case is the irreducible
need for networks of cooperation and communication between local government and non-profit community development organizations, and the reality that such a coalition will operate within a broader urban regime. Koschinsky and Swanstrom argue that the neoliberal federal policy context

[biases] local housing subregimes to facilitate housing nonprofit involvement in contracting coalitions with public and private agents [and] narrower technical questions rather than broader political and policy questions...[and has created] a community development system that is stronger on integration and cooperation between the government and the nonprofit, and between forprofit agencies and nonprofits, than on the integration and cooperation among nonprofits and between nonprofits and residents...housing nonprofits need to overcome this fragmentation by engaging in coalition building at the local and state level (2001: 117-118).

Such cooperation and coalition-building in post-Katrina New Orleans was substantially impeded not only by the weakness of the existing community development sector, but also by the lack of a governing regime in New Orleans. The city’s lack of a regime is due to a) the absence of a strong private sector (Burns and Thomas 2006, Mizell-Nelson 2008), b) divisive racial politics in the city and state, and c) a legacy of citizen distrust of government. The latter two issues are discussed below.

The New Orleans non-regime

The breakdowns [behind Katrina] were structural, technological, and individual; which is to say, there were (above all) political...A long history of division, factionalism, and unrestrained parochialism left New Orleans and Louisiana without the unity, social concern, or collective ability to meet the challenges put forth by the monster storm. And if one overlay that fractious political map of the city and the state with a cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic template, the fault lines stood out in bold relief. (Hirsch 2009: 5-6)

A spirit of cooperation and a sustainable governing coalition were particularly difficult to establish in New Orleans, given the city’s fractious racial and class politics. Hirsch and Logsdon (1992) provide a detailed account of the unique ethno-racial origins of the New Orleans region
that led to the city’s three-tiered racial structure. Creole, originally a term for persons of Louisiana origins, today represents mainly New Orleanians of the city’s mixed-race origins. Racial boundaries overlap with New Orleans’s political, economic and neighborhood (i.e., socio-spatial) spheres; the intersection of these symbolic and social boundaries is the site of on-going struggle for the distribution of political and material resources (see Lamont and Molnár 2002 on social and symbolic boundaries). The city’s tripartite racial system today co-exists in tension with the traditional “American” black-white dichotomy; “the intense color consciousness of the latter system and the flouting of racial conventions of the former [has] guaranteed conflict” (Hirsch 2007: 754). Creoles historically resisted this black-white ordering; their politics challenging the American color line were once rather “radical” but seemed to disappear in the years since Dutch Morial was elected the first non-white Mayor of New Orleans (Hirsch 2009), a position Creoles held until 2010. By the time Nagin came to office, he did so on an “assimilationist...brand of mayoral politics” that appeased white elites (Hirsch 2007). In his re-election campaign in 2006, he faced a racially polarized electorate over the possibility that whites could retake the Mayor’s office for the first time since 1978.

Hirsch and Levert (2009) document the deep distrust of local government historically justified in post-Katrina New Orleans that choked the recovery process. This distrust was rooted in a history of levee bombing, urban renewal that split Tremé in two with highway I-10, substantial displacement from HOPE VI, and our nation’s more generalized often violent regulation of African-American mobility. More broadly, “the utter lack of trust, and the inability to deal in good faith across racial lines, would short-circuit those attempts at reconstruction that

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29 One Drop, Bliss Broyard’s 2007 biography of her Creole father who as an adult passed as white in Connecticut is also highly illustrative of the cultural history and politics of New Orleans and Creole identity.

30 For instance, conspiracies that flowed after the flood that the levees in the Lower 9th Ward had been deliberately bombed by the government were based on an actual, similar incident in the 1927 Mississippi Flood (see Barry 1998).
challenged racial verities” (Hirsch and Levert 2009). Long-standing lack of faith in government and expectation of government corruption and ineffectiveness in Louisiana rendered “it...exceedingly difficult to provide it with the requisite resources, trust and authority (legitimacy) to move quickly on behalf of Katrina’s victims.” (Hirsch 2009a:6) The state and region lacked the historical and institutional roots of collaboration and cooperation that was necessary to confront the storm’s disastrous impacts. The lack of government efficacy and citizen distrust also meant that New Orleanians earned a reputation for fatalism, “problems are to be endured, not solved” (Mitchell 2007: 794). Indeed, even a City Councilwoman meeting with our private philanthropist pooh-poohed his offer of $20M for the city to rebuild housing, informing us that New Orleans had survived for 300 years already and would continue to do so, with or without our assistance. A major challenge for residents, organizers, and outsiders trying to build effective change coalitions was shifting these old mindsets (Hirsch and Levert 2009; personal communication, June 10, 2006).

There was no clear agenda guiding the city’s recovery. Racial allegations, fears, and conflicts governed the city’s number one challenge: “who would repopulate the city, and how would that be done?” (Hirsch and Levert 2009: 212). Housing, planning and land use decisions were a primary area of conflict, especially concerning the rights of the displaced poor to return, and the locations to which they would return. 31 Given the mandatory evacuation that eventually followed the flood, and the lack of policies and procedures developed by the government at every level to bring people home, the future of the poor was left to the politically powerful – residents, national non-profits, business leaders, and others working with or influencing political

31 New Orleans’ residential settlement patterns were traditionally mixed racially and by class, with slaves and non-white or immigrant domestics living in the neighborhoods behind their white employers. As such, the construction of segregated public housing in the 1930s and 1940s was one of the first and most demonstrative contemporary acts of “legally enforced residential segregation” (Fussell 2007).
leaders. In post-Katrina New Orleans, local Network members perceived that there was a “social judgment that [city elites] just don’t want concentrations of poor people anymore…”, that the local “elite” believed that the city was “way over their fair share” of poor residents. As a result, government/elite post-Katrina redevelopment plans reflected “social engineering thinking going on” “about whether poor, black people…have the right to come back.” This hostile racial and class context is why the battle of the future of public housing in New Orleans was so outsized and symbolic, despite the fact that demolition had been proceeding around the US with limited opposition for almost fifteen years at that point. “The battles over housing, development, and access to aid and the land were viewed, by both blacks and whites, as a power struggle of signal importance” (Hirsch and Levert 2009: 212).

Residents proved skeptical, resistant and hostile to government- and expert-led recovery plans from BNOB forward (Nelson et al. 2007). The city’s failure to stand up to NIMBYism in citing trailers compounded African-American New Orleanians’ suspicion that recovery strategies were aimed at displacing them permanently from the city. UNOP planners’ scientific and technical rhetoric of risk was interpreted as a cover for these strategies. A lack of adequate information on recovery progress and basic information about city operations worsened residents’ fear, hostility and distrust (Nelson et al. 2007); it was not clear who was making decisions about housing, neighborhoods, roads, schools, traffic patterns, trash pickup, and other recovery issues, and who would be impacted by decisions eventually made.

**Constraints on the Network**

Distrust and a ‘dominant, reflexive fear and hostility” also extended to private developers, disaster responders, and national outsider philanthropic organizations (Hirsch and Levert 2009: 211), seen as exploiters or “disaster capitalists” (Klein 2007). The lack of government leadership
in New Orleans substantially exacerbated conflict among local and national non-profits and grassroots groups within the Network. Distrust of experts and outsiders is nothing new in community development or community organizing (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999, Kotval 2005, Campbell 2005), but the legacy and scope of resident distrust varies across time and place, and experts can find themselves, even after years of work, in hostile environments for which they were completely unprepared (e.g., Kotval 2005). Experts are seen as the designers and executioners of governments’ unequal, unfair, greedy, and harmful policies. The imprimatur of credibility that comes from “expert” input to what seem like incredible, unjust actions only hastens citizen hostility toward non-government consultants, technicians, experts, and professionals.

The aforementioned race and class tensions embodied in the Network complicated these conflicts. The “group of local brown organizers who have all found each other” (personal communication, 6/10/06) in the storm’s aftermath also found their city and region crawling with disaster responders, most from the Northeast or from large, high-capacity West Coast cities. As organizers identified their key post-storm challenges as ones of making connections (between each other as well as their organizations and the displaced) and building collaboration in the midst of a chaotic, exhausting, traumatic environment in which they worked desperately to restore some sense of normalcy, they also came face to face with large, outsider organizations that should “move out of the way” and let them get to work.

This was a formidable struggle in the face of absent government leadership, as the Network moved in to fill this void, self-identifying as entities large enough to noticeably, if incompletely, fill this leadership gap. And though they placed some funding with community-based organizations, over and over small CBOs criticized the disappointment they perceived from
national non-profits over local groups’ weak capacity; the tendency for national actors to support already well-resourced, high profile organizations in the region; outsider entities’ failure to listen to local organizations’ actual needs and goals; and the sense that national non-profits took and took from local groups (by demanding meetings and endless disaster tours, for instance) while giving little in return (personal communication, June 2006). During a meeting hosted by a large, national community development intermediary, one local organizer said that she and her allies were routinely “pimped and prostituted” by outsiders. In this meeting, local organizers generally concurred that their groups and communities were excluded from the development process, that rapid planning and recovery timelines were deliberate tools of disenfranchisement, and that even non-profit “jargon” was an obstacle to effective communication and collaboration. Local groups recognized government failure pre- and post-Katrina and were not enthusiastic to depend on the government, or even demand its leadership in the aftermath. Indeed, processes like Nagin’s top-down, business-led planning effort served only to atomize planning and recovery efforts at the neighborhood level. Yet, without strong, progressive government leadership, the Network had no lead to follow, and national non-profits struggled to listen to the grassroots, but they “ultimately did not trust the messaging” they heard, and seemed to choose to ignore it, according to one local activist (personal communication, June 26, 2006). A more charitable and complementary interpretation is that the capacity gap between local grassroots groups and national non-profits was just too big. National organizations were trying to create local entities that could disperse hundreds of millions in CDBG funds, for example; local organizations feeling like they were not being heard were often asking for printers.

Unfortunately, this capacity gap or failure of outsiders to listen across the cultural distance was interpreted by local groups as “disrespect,” and they struggled to claim some power over the
recovery process and to find a way to insert themselves into “the political structure” they felt outside of. Their activism centered on amplifying their voices and the voice of the diaspora, yet they struggled to cohere across organizational, neighborhood and racial divisions, to embrace a newfound spirit of community and combat a troubled history of infighting, racism, classism, hostility and disempowerment. 32

Network rhetoric derided a land grab by outside speculators, espousing a deep distrust for such unnamed infiltrators. Yet, large national Network members fit that description to local community organizers steeped in a history of government and expert distrust. National Network actors’ alternative formulation, that they were filling in for a criminally absent government, was lost on community organizers – and possibly would have been dismissed as an explanation anyway – by the lack of strong communication networks across the different scales these groups represented – these Level 3 organizations trying to communicate to Level 1 and 0 groups, without the bridging and leadership assistance of a local steward in the regimeless city.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how mechanisms of institutionalization – specifically, the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – structured organizational and cultural capacity gaps within the Network, leading to the reproduction of institutionalized inequalities in urban space and within the Network in post-Katrina New Orleans. I introduced urban regime theory to suggest how local government can act as a steward and intermediary across the distances within the CD system, thereby possibly minimizing the degree of conflict that surfaced in the aftermath of the disaster.

32 An intriguing outgrowth of this attempt at unity was the widespread popularity of the physical “center” concept that promulgated after the storm – whether it was community centers, non-profit incubators, training centers, etc. Many community activists and local non-profit staff were already meeting routinely in coffee shops to get back to work as well as trying to plan for their neighborhoods’ “viability” – from this they came to embrace and pursue establishing a physical center in their neighborhoods (personal communication, February 13, 2006).
and constrained the Network’s movement aims. But this emphasis on a regime assumes that a pre-Katrina governing regime would have set the terms of local engagement for the Network, especially for its national members. Local community groups might counter this stipulation with evidence that even a regime-less local government has long been hostile or at least apathetic to the plight of the poor and black in New Orleans. What regime theory does suggest is that had New Orleans had a governing regime prior to Katrina, outside organizations would not have enjoyed such outsized power in the devastated city. Though local government and corporations might still have suffered substantial physical damage, pre-Katrina co-operative relationships, resources and a governing agenda, especially to steer the course of recovery, could still have been put into service after the storm, and might have minimized the impact of the hurricane given the resilience implied in a strong governing regime.

Governing regimes do not necessarily generate more equitable development outcomes in cities; indeed, they are often pro-growth and oriented towards serving a city’s business sector. Perhaps if New Orleans had a governing regime the institutionalization of community development would have come to pass in years past, as the city poured resources into affordable housing production. A governing regime might have welcomed well-resource community development organizations to the city to guide neighborhood redevelopment. My argument is that a regime would nonetheless have mediated and ameliorated the conflict between Network members, by bridging the organizational and cultural gaps created by mechanisms of institutionalization. Both marketization and poverty reform are reflective of privatization trends. A local governing regime, even if supportive of marketization and poverty reformation, would have symbolized an established, authoritative public leader to set the course of the city’s recovery, thereby suggesting that the Network’s redevelopment plans were coming together as
part of a local public vision for the city’s recovery. The radicalization of community organizing suggests marginalization of local voices given their willingness to challenge the system. The presence of a governing regime could have provided a concrete target for resistance for local groups, especially compared to a distant, impervious, federal state, perhaps redirecting some of their ire away from Network outsiders and possibly acting as a communication channel to the federal government. A local governing regime might also have been a stronger counter to the federal state, or, more cynically, provided a smoother path for the rollout of federal privatization plans.

Fundamentally, in an era of neoliberal devolution, local governments act as counter or enabling forces of neoliberalism, and step in to provide leadership and resources as the federal government retreats. Chapter 5 shows how the Network came apart over its competing responses to federal public housing demolition plans. The City Council rubber stamped this agenda two years later. Regime theory suggests that the presence of a governing regime in post-Katrina New Orleans could have played a significant role in channeling and structuring the contentious politics that unfolded in the aftermath of the flood, including those that plagued the CD Network undermined by institutional inequalities.
Chapter 5: Liberal Intervention as Neoliberal Restructuring?
Demolishing Lafitte in Post-Katrina New Orleans

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the second outcome of this post-Katrina case of the CD Network’s activism in post-Katrina New Orleans: the Network’s dissolution over the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) plans to demolish four public housing projects in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. I examine the competing ideologies and policy standpoints that led to Network members’ opposing decisions to fight (i.e., sue) or accept (i.e., act as a developer) HUD’s decision in this case-within-a-case over the future of public housing in New Orleans. Essential to understanding the Network’s breakdown here is that both “sides” operated from their shared injustice frame of government failure and realizing the rights of the displaced. Each camp believed that they were doing right by displaced residents by fulfilling their right to come home through employing their different skills and expertise.

For Advancement Project attorneys and public housing activists, legal strategies rooted in theories of empowerment lawyering (Quigley 1994-1995) and a rights-based framework (Right to the City Alliance 2010), accompanied by protest and political organizing, were viewed as the best means to re-open the projects and bring people back to their original homes, giving residents a chance at recapturing some degree of normalcy as New Orleanians with private means had the chance to do. Legal and protest strategies prioritized resident voice and political organizing as the strongest weapons against the neoliberal state, and used the courts, the streets and independent media to air this voice and put a stop to this proposed policy intervention.

For Enterprise Community Partners and Catholic Charities/Providence Community Housing, rebuilding Lafitte with a unit-for-unit replacement policy meant that residents would see their
right of return actually fulfilled as housing became available again. In their view, refusing to work with HUD only meant that a less equitably minded private sector developer would come in with no commitment to replace the 896 units in the development, thereby guaranteeing that displaced residents from Tremé would remain permanently exiled. These developers had deep experience building affordable, multi-family developments and providing social services to low-income tenants. Their response indicated that they determined to utilize these skills to head off a likely and far less equitable outcome in the post-Katrina rapid privatization scheme of the Bush Administration. It was a liberal intervention into a neoliberal policy intervention. “No net loss of affordable housing” at least in Tremé/Lafitte would be fulfilled.

Yet, despite the shared frame and the mutual response within the Network to do right by displaced residents, these oppositional responses proved devastating for the Network’s collective movement aim. Divergent perspectives on and strategic reactions to liberal deconcentration policy are central here.33 The battle over New Orleans public housing that fractured the Network reveal sharply polarized interpretations of the deconcentration thesis and its demolition and redevelopment solution, with liberal anti-poverty and CD practitioners castigated as neoliberal aggressors by their more radical allies on the left. With the Network already undermined by organizational capacity gaps and cultural cleavages, this final strategic divorce put an end to their collective action.

This chapter will demonstrate how the three mechanisms of institutionalization at the heart of this Network’s conflict – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – structured the fall out over HUD’s demolition plans. First, the marketization of community development ushered in market logics to

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33 Deconcentration policy includes the demolition of public housing and their replacement with mixed-income communities, as well as individual mobility programs that seek to move low-income residents to less poor communities. Only demolition and mixed-income redevelopment solutions are discussed here.
the CD field that brought with them an emphasis on a different set of skills, stakeholders, leaders and metrics in community development – namely community development finance skills, investors and donors as key stakeholders, CD intermediaries as leaders, and quantifiable outcomes such as units produced. In post-Katrina New Orleans, this meant that a national community development intermediary with the requisite real estate finance skills, tax credit development knowledge, and pre-existing relationships with HUD – the key stakeholder in the battle over public housing – was able to negotiate this structural advantage to take control of the Lafitte projects from the threat of a less equity-oriented developer.

The reformation of poverty signifies a dominant culture of reform and caregiving in anti-poverty policy and programs today, including in affordable housing and community development activity. Practitioners aim to mainstream the poor into middle-class society and the capitalist economy through rehabilitation and behavioral change, especially relying on transplanting the middle-class to poor communities and utilizing social service providers to address the needs of the urban poor. The powerful partnership between Enterprise and Catholic Charities reflects the dominance of this caregiving ethos. Catholic Church affiliates were the largest non-profit provider of affordable housing and social services in the state and region, respectively; the faith-based tenets of the Bush Administration and the power of the private sector in marketization and poverty reform enabled Enterprise and Catholic Charities to gain control of Tremé/Lafitte from HUD.

The radicalization of community organizing is the marginalization of confrontational, protest politics as a means to build power within community development practice. As market-based and caregiving strategies became the resonant ways of organizing the field, community organizing’s emphasis on building relationships and institutions to build power in low-income communities
was radicalized. Community organizing was the primary strategic repertoire in New Orleans, and was launched as a challenge to HUD’s demolition plans. Yet, compared to the negotiating approach by Enterprise and Catholic Charities with HUD, a community organizing response appeared comparatively radical, unproductive and even detrimental to residents’ interests given the problem of resident displacement. Community organizers’ reframing of their former Network allies as neoliberal oppressors complicit in federal urban privatization schemes further undermined their comparative position in national media and public portrayals of their activism (e.g., *The Washington Post* 2007).

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I explain why public housing proved to be such a contentious issue in post-Katrina New Orleans, considering the urban ubiquity of deconcentration and mixed-income redevelopment in the nation since the early 1990s. I then present the debate on deconcentration policy. The following sections then lay out the tax credit development process and mixed-income arguments in post-Katrina New Orleans, and HUD’s specific plans for the “Big Four” public housing projects. I then examine the Network’s competing responses and the internal fracturing of its movement aims that resulted in the dissolution of the Network. After a discussion of the role of displacement as a confounding variable in this conflict, I conclude with an analysis of how mechanisms of institutionalization – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – structured the Network’s dissolution over HUD’s demolition plans.

**Why a struggle over public housing?**

Just over 1M units of public housing nationwide is home to 2.03M people (Right to the City Alliance 2010). Though representing only a tiny fraction of US residents, public housing households are some of the poorest and most vulnerable in the nation, with the elderly, disabled,
children, single mothers and black and Latina communities overrepresented.\textsuperscript{34} Public housing has a reputation as one of the predominant public symbols of the federal government's failure to address the persistent problem of urban poverty in the United States. The "public" in public housing engenders on-going societal discussion, condemnation and defense of society's and our government's obligation towards the poor (Vale 2000, Venkatesh 2000). Although urban high rise public housing comprises only 30\% of the total stock (Schwartz 2006), it is the most visibly recognizable and conjured in the public mind when debating the (de)merits of public housing. Because public housing has become a shelter of last resort for the most vulnerable poor in the U.S. – and large urban projects are predominately non-white – economic and ethno-racial inequities are concretized in public housing. Activists mobilized around preserving public housing argue that it is a "barometer" for society's commitment to safe and affordable housing for everyone, and an indispensable safety net tool for the poor, as one of the few housing policy arenas still relatively insulated from the vagaries of the market (Right to the City Alliance 2010).

In New Orleans, HUD had housed about 5,100 families in public housing prior to Katrina (Filosa 1/19/06).\textsuperscript{35} These displaced tenants, along with other renters, were significantly underrepresented in the city's and state's recovery plans despite disproportionate damage to the city's non-public housing rental housing stock (Clark and Rose 2007) and the reality that pre-Katrina, 57\% of residents were renters. The state devoted the vast majority of its CDBG redevelopment funds - $10.4B – to making homeowners whole to rebuild their properties, allocating only about $1B to rental properties – especially $852M to small rental property

\textsuperscript{34} Among the national public housing population are heavy concentrations of elderly (31\% of residents), disabled households (32\%) and children (41\%). The average income for a public housing household is $11,295. One average, this represents 23.8\% of median area incomes. 49\% of non-elderly, non-disabled households get their primary income from wages. All data are from the HUD Resident Characteristics Report as of April 2006, except for the information on median area income and wages, which are from an extract of HUD's Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS) from 2001.

\textsuperscript{35} In total, HUD housed about 14,000 families prior to Katrina, with 5,100 in public housing and 9,000 using vouchers, a population of 49,000 people that was more than 10\% of the city's population (Filosa 2006a).
owners, reflecting the relative lack of large, multifamily properties in the city. An additional $1.7B in Low-Income Housing Tax Credits was set aside for large, mixed-income developments (Public meeting, July 11, 2006). As such, the Network was particularly focused on the future of affordable and subsidized housing and “low-income community viability” more broadly (Graham 2010). The Network was “especially concerned over the return of public housing tenants, given tenants’ dependence on HUD to repair and re-open their units and the Housing Authority of New Orleans’s (HANO) history of mismanagement, neglect, gentrification and displacement in New Orleans” (Graham 2010). Given the comparative lack of rights and voice for the poorest, displaced New Orleanians and the relative lack of storm damage to the brick projects compared to the private rental housing market, the struggle over public housing grew into an outsized, symbolic battleground over the rights of the poor in the “new” New Orleans – their rights to the city, to housing, to participation in the recovery process, and to their bodily and community autonomy.


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36 New Orleans had never responded well to large, multi-unit properties. Powell (2007) wrote, “the smart money [bet] that most of the [LIHTC] credits will go unused. Escalating insurance and construction costs [were] rendering the deals unworkable.” Indeed, only three to four years later, the bottom fell out on those credits given the US housing market collapse and global economic recession.

37 Activists working with displaced public housing residents post-Katrina estimate that “half of the working poor, elderly and disabled who lived in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina have not returned. Because of critical shortages in low-cost housing, few now expect tens of thousands of poor and working people to ever be able to return home” (Evans 2008).
The struggle over public housing in New Orleans has become linked up in the years following Katrina with national and international movements for the right to cities as diverse, accessible, integrated, public spaces and affordable, safe, vibrant places for all strata of society.

Public housing is architecturally and culturally significant in New Orleans (Ouroussoff 2007). Given the city’s historic architecture, disproportionate poverty and inequality, and intense resident and economic segregation, public housing projects were highly visible and symbolic tight-knit physical and social communities within a city organized entirely around dense, close kin and neighborhood networks. The physical structures took on outsized meaning in the recovery process and in HUD’s demolition plans, imbued by the people and networks that lived in them over generations. Kingsley (2007) writes, “Buildings and their neighborhoods were the settings where New Orleanians defined their identity, developed their customs and rituals, and understood their sense of place. After Katrina disrupted those histories and memories, people looked to their buildings and neighborhoods even more desperately.” (2007: 719) This is what I witnessed at a planning meeting in Tremé, where people spoke about the Lafitte buildings as if the structures themselves were their neighbors.

Yet, former public housing residents in New Orleans epitomized the undesirable residents elites wanted to see permanently cast out of the “new” New Orleans that would rise from Katrina’s waste. As Baton Rouge area GOP Congressman Richard Baker exulted to the New Orleans Times-Picayune, “We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans…We couldn’t do it, but God did” (Hirsch and Levert 2009: 212). Indeed,

“One of Nagin’s closest advisers and richest contributors, James Reiss, said as much in an unguarded comment to the Wall Street Journal a few weeks following Katrina: ‘Those who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a completely different way: demographically, geographically and politically…I'm not just speaking for myself here. The way we've been living is not going to happen again or we're out.’” (Powell 2007)
With the help of policymakers and the private sector Katrina removed a significant portion of the city’s undesirable, seemingly intractable, pre-storm features utilized mainly by the working and very poor – its failing public school system, its hulking public hospital, and its public housing projects. Suspicions that the government and power elite were making a concerted effort to permanently expel poor and working-class blacks from the city was rooted in history, specifically the much maligned and violent history of the HOPE VI redevelopment of St. Thomas in the Garden District. “Using federal HOPE VI funds and private money, the St. Thomas project [had] been redeveloped as River Garden, a physically attractive New Urbanist, mixed-income neighborhood in which, controversially, fewer than one in five former PH households [were able] to return” (Nossiter 2006, Graham 2009). At the same planning meeting I just cited, a local African-American, elderly resident and public housing activist accused the planners of leading a process that would end up “just like St. Thomas”, where “those people are totally gone.” An African-American resident explained to me that St. Thomas:

“...was a very historic neighborhood and one of the hearts of the Black Indian and Second Line Traditions. It was a very traumatic experience when it was torn down and the people forced out. The area was also the site of many community protest [sic] for rights, against the police and the city government. When they moved people into the St. Bernard housing project, it started a wave of violence in that neighborhood, because the St. Thomas was an uptown project now being placed in the St. Bernard, a downtown project also part of the 7th ward which doesn’t mix with the St. Thomas or the 10th ward in which it was located.” (personal communication, November 7, 2005)

Critically, the community development sector was implicated in the St. Thomas redevelopment; a local CDC leader explained that a powerful private sector developer in the city, Joe Canizaro “owned all the land around the St. Thomas Housing project (large Hope VI) and he started a CDC that could bring all the important community interests to the table. He used this convening as a vehicle to buy off important community figures. Then he pushed through the
development and dropped funding from the non-profit” (personal communication, 11/3/05). The Network sought to navigate this historical and post-flood setting as it tried to prepare for HUD’s redevelopment plans for the city’s public housing.

The Deconcentration Debate

Public housing demolition to make way for mixed-income communities is rooted in the deconcentration thesis, which stipulates that the physical and social isolation of urban poor communities, usually communities of color, limits their exposure to the economic opportunities, role models, and values present in middle-class communities (Greenbaum et al. 2008). Socio-spatial isolation also leads to behaviors and a “culture of poverty” that is aberrant from mainstream society, demonstrated in the high rates of crime, disorder, violence, drug use, and unemployment in these neighborhoods (Crump 2002, Goetz 2003). Isolated low-income communities are socially disorganized and suffer from a lack of fungible social capital (Briggs 1998).

One proposed solution to this socio-spatial isolation is to deconcentrate the poor, to move them household by household to more affluent neighborhoods where they can benefit from the opportunities, role models, and mainstream social norms present. The other deconcentration alternative is to bring middle-class residents to dwell in poor communities, by converting aged, “severely distressed” public housing stock as part of a substantial financial investment in these neighborhoods. Bringing middle-class residents back to central city communities will result in increased political and financial power, role models and opportunities for these formerly poor neighborhoods. Demolishing public housing and rebuilding expensive new properties to attract market rate tenants is essential to converting these communities from “isolated cauldrons of
dysfunction and pathology” (The Washington Post 2007) to prosperous, healthy, diverse neighborhoods where low-income residents can thrive, so the argument goes (e.g., Berrey 2005).

The federal HOPE VI program that demolished public housing and built mixed-income properties in their place was the dominant deconcentration strategy through the 2000s. Supported by deep federal subsidies, affordable housing providers in partnership with housing authorities, private developers, and community-based organizations, demolished about 100,000 units of “severely distressed” public housing and replaced them with about 60,000 new units at a range of rental prices. This overall reduction in units is part of a nationwide affordable housing crisis in the last two decades, as 1.2M units of affordable housing have disappeared even as demand has risen sharply (The Macarthur Foundation, n.d.).

HOPE VI was based on promising results from the Gatreaux housing mobility program, despite the latter’s small scale findings (Popkin et al. 2009). It was a remarkable vehicle for financing resource-poor communities; estimates indicate that $5B in seed money over the decade leveraged an additional $11.4B in investments as it demolished 100,000 units of severely distressed public housing nationwide. Yet many former neighborhoods shifted merely from high poverty status to a more typical low-income profile (Zielenbach 2003). 17 years into HOPE VI, after multiple follow up studies, success is heavily qualified, and largely dependent on what is being measured. Perhaps most troubling is that 60 to 70% of tenants never return to former sites, and a portion of residents disappear from housing authorities’ rolls entirely (Popkin et al. 2009). HOPE VI has also spurred an unfortunate following by municipalities around the country, who are pursuing public housing demolition with minimal consideration for the services and counseling encouraged in the HOPE VI model.
Mixed-income proponents see it as a strategy for combating poverty and/or a strategy of urban development (Joseph et al. 2007). Critics tend to dispute the first rationale in favor of the second, describing it as a land grab and gentrification tool. Mixed-income housing operates according to four theoretical justifications, akin to the deconcentration thesis: a) poor people will benefit from access to middle-class social networks, b) the middle-class will provide needed social control over a deviant, disorganized community, c) middle-class residents will positively influence the behavior of the poor, and d) middle-class residents bring needed economic and political power to a neighborhood. Joseph et al. review the literature on mixed-income housing and find equivocal results and weak data behind the mainstream enthusiasm for mixed-income housing. They conclude:

…the most compelling propositions are those that do not rely on social interaction across income levels to promote a higher quality of life for residents of mixed-income developments…the least compelling proposition at this time is that through direct interaction, higher-income residents will promote behavioral change among adult lower income residents…the propositions concerning social control and political economy hold more promise at this time based on available empirical evidence, though again, how these dynamics may play out differentially for lower versus higher-income residents needs to be explored. (2007: 395-396)

and

…there is a compelling rationale for mixed-income development that has nothing to do with lifting families out of poverty and is simply based on enabling the private development of valuable inner city real estate. Assuming for the moment that there are a significant number of mixed-income developers for whom poverty alleviation is a goal, more clarity is needed about which pathways of change those developers and their partners intend to promote…given the multiplicity of partners involved in any single, mixed-income development effort—private and nonprofit developers, public agencies, social service providers, community partners, lenders—there are likely to be a multiplicity of expectations, in some cases contradictory. (2007: 397)

This “multiplicity of expectations” bears out. Anti-poverty and affordable housing advocates are deeply divided on the demolition and mixed-income redevelopment of public housing projects, given its negatives of high rates of displacement of former public housing residents (Popkin et al. 2009), contribution to the overall reduction of affordable housing units, and positives of the physical improvement in the housing stock in low-income communities, and
potential as an economic development trigger in urban poor communities. Policies of mixed-income development and poverty de-concentration are technically race-neutral yet have explicit implications for poor urban communities of color (Joseph et al. 2007, Pattillo 2007). Practitioners vary in their willingness and ability to speak frankly about the racialized impacts of these policies. This “color-blind” rhetoric versus racialized reality of contemporary U.S. housing policy thus opens up space for major disagreement among practitioners engaged in strategic planning and policy advocacy for the displaced poor (cf. Pattillo 2007).

*The neoliberal critique*

In post-Katrina New Orleans, the debate over HUD’s plans to demolish public housing reflected an intra-conflict between liberals and radicals over whether deconcentration is a liberal democratic strategy to incorporate the poor into the market and mainstream economic opportunity, or a neoliberal strategy of urban “privatization” and gentrification at the expense of the poor. Since HOPE VI and poverty deconcentration became the nation’s affordable housing policy *de rigueur*, there has been a sustained critique that deconcentration and dispersal is part of a larger neoliberal project to privatize cities and make them the exclusive provenance of the affluent (Hackworth 2007, Bennett, Smith & Wright 2006, Reed and Steinberg 2006, Right to the City Alliance 2010, Lipman 2009). Critics cast mixed-income policy as part of a neoliberal agenda that since the 1970s has privileged deregulation, privatization and globalization of the economy at the expense of the poor via market-driven policies and a weakened state and social safety net (Jessop 2002, Peck and Tickell 2002). Deconcentration, demolition and mixing-incomes have long been questioned as legitimate strategies (Suchman 1995) for neighborhood revitalization, poverty alleviation, and low-income community empowerment.
A trend in urban scholarship and mobilization against deconcentration policy embraces an economic human rights framework. Human rights activism as a mode of resistance has grown alongside neoliberalism since the Nixon Era (Chase-Dunn 1999; Cmiel 1999). In the U.S., 20th century human rights activism shares an important political lineage with the Civil Rights Movement, as the NAACP led African-American claims for human rights recognition in the years following World War II (Anderson 2003). Claims such as the “right to housing” and the “right to return” to New Orleans seek to upend hegemonic notions of “the natural” order of private housing markets or disasters (Stone 1988, Graham 2005) and link to Black Liberation movements of the past (Luft 2009).

For domestic economic human rights activists, trapping people in persistent urban poverty is a form of oppression, resulting from neoliberal policies such as the deregulation and demolition of subsidized housing (e.g., Right to the City Alliance 2010). Their collective action seeks to upend and transform anti-poor and anti-urban ideologies, including the culture of poverty thesis at the heart of deconcentration policy (Right to the City Alliance 2010), and popular stereotypes of public housing as socially disorganized, pathological centers of crime, blight, and poverty, and of the poor as helpless, un-deserving, responsible for their own despair, and in need of “reform” and protection from themselves and their peers. In New Orleans, the socio-spatial isolation and exclusion of very poor, black residents (Brookings 2005) from mainstream economic and political participation fostered a range of claims of the “right to return,” the right to housing and even the “right to the city” on behalf of displaced public housing residents. Yet, anti-demolition advocates faced steep opposition, as the national media, liberal scholars, and national and

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38 In the academy, Bratt et al. (2006) recently called for a new social agenda in the U.S., centered on the “Right to Housing,” based on past federal commitments as well as the economic human rights enshrined in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

**Tax-Credit Redevelopment and Mixed-Income Debates in Post-Katrina New Orleans**

Overnight, New Orleans was transformed from a weak to strong housing market (cf. Bratt 2009) after Hurricane Katrina. The centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s Gulf Coast recovery strategy was the creation of a Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zone, modeled on Empowerment Zone legislation from the 1990s (Richmond Times, 2005). GO Zone legislation provided $8B in tax breaks to stimulate business investment or expansion and affordable housing redevelopment in the devastated area, which included 31 parishes in Louisiana, reaching as far north as Baton Rouge, despite its modest hurricane damage. The legislation took three months to pass, as Republican leaders demanded recovery spending be accompanied by cuts elsewhere. The expectation, as described earlier in this dissertation, was that the private sector would prove “critical in the rebuilding effort” (Walsh 2005).

The passage of GO Zone legislation included $3.5B for rental rehabilitation in Louisiana, including for the 67,700 units damaged in New Orleans. Of that $1.7B was in special low-income housing tax credits, to be competitively disbursed annually from 2006 through 2008, with a two year deadline for housing to be built (Gyan 2006). After an initial round in 2006 went to parishes outside New Orleans with relatively minimal storm damage but shovel-ready projects and Katrina-enlarged populations, in some cases, more than half of the tax credits in subsequent rounds were allocated to Orleans Parish, acknowledging its disproportionate damage.

In 2006, the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency awarded just over $65M in GO Zone low-income tax credits, more than eight times the amount it was used to awarding prior to Katrina.
From the start, as the flood waters receded and federal legislation was under development, the future of public housing in New Orleans was up for debate. Prior to the storm, HUD/HANO had been in the process of demolishing and redeveloping five of the city’s ten developments, to the tune of $700M and in the spirit of “deconcentration” and the promise of “mixed-income communities” (Filosa 2006c). The St. Thomas redevelopment into River Garden, the “flagship” (Filosa and Russell 2005) of this transformation, was hotly contested as a success, considering less than 20% of former tenants had returned to the new development. Tax credits submitted for the first round in 2006 included 12 applications for HANO sites (Eggler 2006).

With the future of public housing unknown and tax credits as the driving force behind affordable housing reconstruction, the tax credit development cottage industry – “developers, nonprofits, lawyers and financiers” (Mowbray 2007) – took control of rental housing recovery in the city and Greater New Orleans region. They moved forward on redevelopment projects largely independent from the myriad planning processes happening in the city; “the city has not found a way to connect developers with neighborhood planning,” said a local lawyer and member of Nagin’s BNOB Commission (Roberts 2006), which disadvantaged the Parish in terms of application competitiveness compared to other parishes that could demonstrate their housing redevelopment projects fit with broader redevelopment plans. Public debate unfolded around plans for tax credits and affordable housing redevelopment concerning appropriate types of projects, specifically pursuing “mixed-income” models – as the Louisiana Recovery Authority wanted, which would require a blending of low-income tax credits and CDBG funds to make them feasible – versus all affordable projects, which investors wanted to see, built on the assumption that “the higher rents in the market rate units will [not] materialize” in mixed-income designs (Moran 2008). Mixed-income projects were seen as particularly high risk in the post-
Katrina market that was already riddled with redevelopment obstacles, including the exorbitant increases in insurance and construction costs rendering tax credit deals potentially unworkable, as well as investor wariness about “doing business in a heavily damaged region” (Moran 2008). Though policymakers and state officials defended the mixed-income design as “sound”, they acknowledged that in times of “crisis” such as that facing the region (especially when the national credit crisis hit) it was much less viable. Nonetheless, a local non-profit watchdog derided the city, region and state for tax credit allocation decisions that were an exercise in anti-poverty “futility” by re-concentrating the poor in the city rather than trying to develop mixed-income solutions, albeit in the face of “many political, legal and practical impediments” (Eggler 2007). Such “impediments” included local discriminatory legislation in the surrounding parishes (Alberts 2007) that blocked multifamily developments and tried to enforce different rental restrictions in order to keep working class and poor New Orleanians of color from resettling in their communities. Indeed, the business of the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center grew so much in the years after the storm that its Executive Director built a name for himself and ultimately ran for Mayor in the 2010 election.

**Demolishing the “Big Four”**

Despite policy advocates’ pleas for deconcentration, of the 72 tax credit projects approved in the Greater New Orleans region two years after the storm, only 18 were mixed-income in their plans to incorporate market-rate housing (Eggler 2007). Yet on the sites of now “barbed-wire and chain link” enclosed public housing projects after Katrina, after months of doing nothing (Filosa 2006b) and leaving residents in limbo on vouchers in New Orleans, Texas and elsewhere, HUD proposed to radically transform these developments into “de-densified” (Filosa and Russell 2005) mixed-income communities using the standard model of about one-third public housing
units, one-third tax-credit (affordable to 50-60% AMI households) and one-third market rate. The specified “Big Four” projects, as they came to be known, comprised 4,500 units, an estimated 70% of all the public housing stock in the city (Browne and Sinha 2008, Right to the City Alliance 2010). Replacement mixed-income developments would offer fewer than 2,000 units, of which only about one-third would be deeply subsidized at public housing rates. HUD proposed this demolition plan despite the market realities of the difficulty in financing mixed-income projects in the post-Katrina Gulf Coast, and in the face of the shocking scarcity of affordable housing for all but the most affluent (including those who had arrived in the city as disaster responders).

As reflected in Section 8 voucher increases, local rents had risen anywhere from one-third to double (Filosa 2006c). In addition to the 14,000 families housed by HUD/HANO around the city pre-Katrina, the agencies also had a combined waitlist of over 17,000 families in New Orleans (Filosa 2006a). Yet it had been slowly and systematically demolishing and reducing the city’s public housing prior to the storm, and accelerated these plans in its aftermath. HUD/HANO estimated that about 60% of displaced tenants, or more than 8,000 households, planned to return to the city post-Katrina (Filosa 2006a). Of its 5,100 pre-storm public housing families, about 80% were given vouchers after the flood, despite the sheer shortage of housing in the local rental market (Filosa 2006e). Rather than remediating and reopening indisputably needed housing, HUD/HANO spent $3M on developing demolition and redevelopment plans (Filosa 2006e). HUD/HANO acknowledged it would be years before residents could return to their rebuilt homes.

Residents and their advocates – dismissed as gadflies (Filosa 2006d) and “rabble-rousers” (Filosa 2007b) – took this to mean residents’ permanent displacement. This conviction was
historically and contextually rooted. The Housing Authority of New Orleans had been in federal receivership since 2002 due to chronic mismanagement and corruption, leaving the federal government in explicit charge of public and subsidized housing in the city after Katrina.

HUD/HANO’s history of redevelopment was one where projects were never “rebuilt on time, or as promised” (Reckdahl 12/3/08). In the post-Katrina political context, mayoral candidates still tossed around phrases like “welfare queens” (Filosa 2006b) and the media described the projects as willingly isolated\(^\text{39}\) “breeding grounds” for crime, disorder, dysfunction, and pathology (Filosa 2006b; Filosa 2006c). Liberal anti-poverty scholars and the national media were advocating for deconcentration strategies (Briggs et al. 2005, Briggs and Turner 2005, The New York Times 2005, The Washington Post 2007), and residents were characterized by these respected scholars as “among the most violent underclasses in the country” living in one of the most “seriously challenging big cities” in the US (Filosa 2006b). With the exception of City Council President Oliver Thomas, who claimed the city didn’t want any more “soap opera watchers” (Nossiter 2006), the city’s politicians were “noticeably silent” on the deconcentration issue (Nossiter 2006) as the DC policy network set (Domhoff 2009, personal communication September 2005, Imbrie 2008, Reed and Steinberg 2006, Filosa 2006e) pushed for the “generic mixed-income suburban community [they] so favored” (Ouroussoff 2007).

HUD’s decision epitomized the Network’s view of an ideological federal state bent on urban privatization in the aftermath of the flood. The “Big Four” projects were Lafitte, C.J. Peete, B.W. Cooper, and St. Bernard. C.J. Peete was located on relatively high and dry ground in Planning District 2 (Central City/Garden District); the other three were located in Planning District 4, (Mid-City). Planning District 2 includes portions of the “Sliver by the River” – the

\(^{39}\) Gwen Filosa (2006b), the New Orleans Times-Picayune staff writer who covered the public housing conflict after Katrina, described the Big Four as “Isolated and steeped in abject poverty, the complexes were insular neighborhoods where strangers were not welcome.”
neighborhoods situated on natural high ground that were relatively unharmed in Katrina’s flood waters and have seen their populations expand to more than 100% of pre-Katrina numbers. Both these districts were adjacent to the French Quarter and Central Business District (i.e., downtown) and have been the subject of significant redevelopment disputes.

The visibly sturdy brick projects, according to expert investigation (by MIT architecture professor John Fernandez) had suffered little storm damage from Katrina and could serve as much needed housing for displaced low-income residents in the face of widespread damage to private market and scattered site subsidized rental housing stock – residents who were needed to fill low-wage jobs within the struggling hospitality and tourism economy in the year following the flood. The actions and rhetoric of HUD from shortly after the storm to leading up to this announcement, in contrast, belied this enormous residential and economic need in the city. Then “HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson controversially (but accurately) [proclaimed] that New Orleans [would] be smaller and whiter for the foreseeable future” (DeBose 2005, Graham 2009).

By December, the department had boarded up and begun to fence off the projects around the city. After demolition was announced, HUD/HANO held a single public meeting soliciting resident input on the plans. “Protests [delayed] the meeting; comments [reflected] PH residents’ bewilderment and anger over their loss of rights to their homes and to participate in redevelopment” (Graham 2006f). HANO authorities would later admit to not actively keeping track of displaced tenants in the years after Katrina (Right to the City Alliance 2010).

**Liberal Intervention as Neoliberal Restructuring: A Radical Critique**

As embraced as the “right to return” was – even HUD enshrined it in its demolition plans (Luft 2009, Graham 2009, Graham 2010), it was in reality tied to whether or not individuals and communities had the resources to reclaim their homes and neighborhoods. Powell (2007) writes,
“…entire neighborhoods are struggling to prove their right to exist by showing they can rebuild.” Flood damage followed the city’s pattern of development – from the natural high grounds in the city outward to lower lying areas, leaving those communities on the higher ridges relatively unscathed, and those below sea level under upwards of 10 feet of water in places. Recovery planning, especially in the first six to eight months after the storm, emphasized rebuilding these relatively unharmed communities first, because services were more easily restored, populations could return relatively easily, poorer elevated communities needed protection from gentrification, and because it also gave returnees safer places to live in the interim of a phased reconstruction.\textsuperscript{40} The Network saw recovery and neighborhood reclamation of high ground poor communities like Tremé as a potential model and demonstration for how \textit{equitable} redevelopment could then happen across the city. For the Network, trying to rebuild Tremé, a historic, low-income black community on higher ground near the center of the city, was an attempt to blend equity and practicality – to prioritize the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable but also to rebuild in a community that would never face dreaded questions of its future “viability,” as many other neighborhoods like Broadmoor and the Lower 9\textsuperscript{th} Ward did.

Within the Network, organizations knew early on that HUD had some plan in the works for public housing, but the details were never clear. Since the fall, Advancement Project and local civil rights attorneys had been hearing from and organizing displaced public housing residents who were trying to get home to New Orleans and to their former units where their belongings remained. These residents complained of being unable to get straight answers from HUD, and were also trying to manage the disaster assistance process, holding on to their disaster vouchers in their host cities and keeping in touch with HANO/HUD. National community development

\textsuperscript{40} Planners split along whether to rebuild the outer lying areas at all, with the philosophy for some in Mayor Nagin’s appointed Bring New Orleans Back Commission being to rebuild “the high ground first – damaged areas maybe” (Kates et al. 2006: 14656)
members in the Network had received some indication from HUD that there would be some rehabilitation or modest redevelopment to public housing sites in the city, including Lafitte in Tremé, and that private sector partners for planning, redevelopment and organizing would be needed and welcome. But in the post-disaster climate of a reticent, impassive, ideological federal state, asymmetries of information and innuendo and confusion, most Network members were trying to devise recovery strategies based on little or unconfirmed information. Direct action public housing activists felt comfortable in January 2006 that public housing was safe. National unions interested in physical redevelopment in New Orleans thought by early spring 2006 that HUD might undertake phased rehab of the projects, which Network members could contract to do, attaching a broader planning, organizing and neighborhood rebuilding process to the redevelopment. As summer arrived in New Orleans, development-oriented Network members came to view the rehabilitation of public assets – including public housing – as the backbone of any comprehensive neighborhood development, planning and organizing initiative. But such wide scale demolition and shrinkage of the public housing stock via mixed-income redevelopment was never discussed explicitly within the Network.

The backbone of the Network was its shared injustice frame of government failure and neglect and the right of displaced, low-income New Orleanians to return home and participate in the recovery process. Despite this shared mobilizing frame, the Network by the time of HUD’s announcement was struggling to transcend the organizational capacity gaps and cultural cleavages detailed in chapter 4. A bifurcation between a liberal, expert development repertoire and radical, grassroots organizing repertoire was increasingly apparent. This bifurcation transcended New Orleans and reflects the impact of marketization and the radicalization of community organizing in the CD field. Funding streams and intra-network alliances were
moving towards traditional camps supporting one or the other strategy, rather than pursuing a
new model of resident-led organizing, planning and development. HUD’s aggressive maneuver
to demolish public housing proved to be the bright line dividing Network members, as some
coalesced around the lawsuit and an accompanying protest strategy, and others came together in
an agreement with HUD to redevelop the Lafitte projects in Tremé.

In response to state action, two conflicting strategies within the Network came into play in
New Orleans – a radical left politics steeped in collective identity-based political organizing and
contentious and participatory politics versus a liberal left, technocratic, representative politics
steeped in expert knowledge and technocratic skill (Fischer 1996, Fischer 1991, O’Connor 2001,
Thompson 1998). These competing approaches mapped loosely onto local and national scales
within the response Network, reflecting the relative power of the national, liberal response (see
Fraser and Lepofsky 2004). The “liberal” coalition (represented in particular by Enterprise, the
AFL-CIO, Catholic Charities, and Providence Community Housing) emphasizing professional,
expert knowledge in community development finance (especially the technical skill to develop
large-scale, multi-family housing) wrought by the marketization of the field prevailed in gaining
control of large pieces of land, including one of the projects, in Tremé to redevelop on behalf of
HUD and displaced residents. The “radical” coalition (especially represented by The
Advancement Project, Loyola Law Clinic, People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and the New Orleans
Emergency Housing Action Team), emphasizing protest politics and community organizing
steeped in collective identity claims of poor and working-class blacks, pursued litigation against
HUD and took to protesting redevelopment plans and demolition and were marginalized within
the Network due to their radicalized organizing strategies. They lost their legal battle but have
continued to pursue resident-driven litigation against HUD on other grounds.
The liberal wing’s agreement to redevelop one of the projects with one-for-one deeply subsidized unit replacement, resident engagement and wraparound supportive services was both politically expedient in view of almost 10 months of resident displacement and proposed in defiance of the state, who wished to see the number of public housing units reduced and had no real mandate for resident participation or social services. The developer’s agreement was an attempt to remove the power from an anti-poor, hostile state uninterested in fulfilling the right of the poor to return to the city, and to situate it instead with community development and pro-poor non-profit advocates who had a real ability to bring residents home. It also reflected the resonance (Ferree 2010) and dominance of mixed-income housing policy as the anti-poverty, urban revitalization strategy in the U.S. That is, whether or not this solution was politically welcome in post-Katrina New Orleans – or by its urban poor communities, more specifically – it was nonetheless a welcome approach in the broader landscape of U.S. urban policy. Indeed, it was vigorously advocated by the liberal policy elite in the aftermath of Katrina (Briggs et al. 2005), a group Imboscio (2008) refers to as “the dispersal consensus” given their value-laden zeal for deconcentration as an anti-poverty, urban redevelopment strategy.

In contrast, national and local civil rights attorneys filed a lawsuit against HUD with 18 public housing residents representing thousands more who were displaced, alleging violation of domestic fair housing laws and international human rights law. Protests accompanied the lawsuit, with activists marching in front of Nagin’s and City Council members’ homes, establishing a tent city, re-occupying the projects, disrupting public meetings, inviting arrest, and promising to permanently disrupt the city. Legal advocates wrote editorials criticizing HUD’s decision in national and local media. A rhetorical war raged, with residents and their allies compared their
legacy of injustice of “lost...lives” and surviving slavery⁴¹ versus HUD and policymakers’ clueless emphasis on “bricks and mortar” masking a despicable goal of “ethnic cleansing.” (Gyan 2006, Nossiter 2006, Filosa 2007a, Alberts 2007) In turn, HUD/HANO, policymakers, and politicians disparaged tenants as “soap opera watchers” (Nossiter 2006) and criminals blocking what promised to be a “glorious” (Reckdahl 2008) “renaissance” (Filosa 2006c) and “tremendous economic boost” (Filosa 2007c) for the city, one that renewed a pre-Katrina “momentum” of revitalization and deconcentration (Filosa 2006b).

Due to marketization CD non-profits have become increasingly responsible for financing and developing affordable housing, including public housing projects that were once the exclusive domain of the state. Not only is affordable housing – the lifeblood of community development – explicitly dependent on the financial market for its existence, but the entire sector has become organized around community development finance practice, given the complexity of realizing affordable housing deals that traditionally need multiple sources of financing, have difficulty accessing conventional sources of funding, and require a range of subsidies to keep units affordable over the long-term. Community development intermediaries such as LISC and Enterprise have revolutionized the field by bridging capital markets with community developers by assisting them in accessing these tax credits and packaging complex housing deals.

Liberal CD advocates have adapted to this market logic within the field out of necessity and satisfaction. Developing affordable housing for millions of low-income families has helped them realize liberal values of private property ownership and representation through private property rights, which can translate into tangible power for low-income communities when they gain access to and control over their land or homes. This was a powerful professional lesson for two

⁴¹ Keith Craft, a Lower 9th Ward resident who became ill after living in a formaldehyde-ridden trailer provided by FEMA remarked that he and his family would prevail, because "...we come from strong people. We endured the ship ride from Africa to here. We can endure this." Alberts, 8/28/07.
of the Network’s drivers of the liberal agenda in post-Katrina New Orleans, as they had been instrumental in CD efforts in Boston and New York in their careers to give community-based racial/ethnic groups control over their housing and land as a proven means to build political power. Liberal elites in post-Katrina New Orleans also saw large-scale redevelopment as a means to increase capacity in New Orleans, a classic community development goal. This included the a) technical expertise of community development finance and deal-making (Fainstein 1991) to redevelop large plots of land expected to be available following gutting, foreclosures, buyouts, and responding to blight, damage and vacancies; b) the development of a construction workforce offering long-term career paths for the historically under- and unemployed; and c) the civic capacity resulting from resident engagement in planning and development, acquired finance and deal-making skills by CBOs, and an employed, healthy workforce that would invest in the city as homeowners, parents, and consumers.

The liberal approach emphasizing expertise and skill kept these organizations at the table politically in dealing with the state. Yet their strategy was easily construed by its radical peers as embracing the “neoliberal” paradigm of racist and classist state-led privatization, deregulation and devolution unleashed on New Orleans after Katrina. These large, well-resourced national and local agencies embody the uneasy ideological juncture that community development practice straddles today. Liberal and neoliberal logics both infuse CD work, with liberalism’s commitment to individualism (in the mode of developing “personal responsibility” and “self-sufficiency (Schram 1993)), universalism (e.g., race-neutral policies and policies that aspire to a white, middle-class, i.e., “universal” norm), and the representative value of “objective” and “neutral” experts to manage and evaluate particularistic group claims (e.g., urban communities of color) jockeying for position alongside neoliberal perversions of liberalism’s private-public
distinction that has removed the state as a “guarantor” of housing of last resort for the poor and replaced it with a “facilitation” role (Goldberg 2006) of market-driven, commoditized housing production and distribution.

Thus, despite concurring that state action after Katrina was illegitimate in its harm and hostility towards the city’s poor communities of color, the liberal sub-coalition in the post-Katrina Network used its expertise, political power, and resources to push for land acquisition in Tremé/Lafitte on behalf of low-income, displaced residents based on political expediency and experience and its belief that it was the most successful means to reversing displacement and building local power. They were emboldened by the way the mechanisms of marketization and poverty reform had structured the institutionalized CD field. In doing so, they appeared to their radical Network counterparts to endorse aggressive privatization and marketization of the public sector in New Orleans. They were labeled as neoliberals by their radical peers and condemned for contributing to the “ethnic cleansing” agenda of the state by assisting with mixed-income housing redevelopment.

Figure 1 illustrates the path from the potential of a community recovery coalition to the conflict between radical and liberal Katrina responders, and its characterization by the former as a neoliberal struggle for the future of the city.
Ultimately, the strategies of action for community developers aligned with the state – i.e., HUD – and the institutional, neoliberal logics of the sector being introduced in New Orleans at an alarming rate after the storm. National community developers spoke the language of deconcentration and communities of choice, they knew how to build and finance mixed-income housing, they had the political power, resources and access to negotiate directly with HUD or with the city – to influence government policy, to varying degrees. New Orleans’ community organizers, in contrast, had political resistance as their primary tool, but no alternative solution to what the government was proposing in terms of privatization and near-permanent displacement. “Revolutionary lawyering” (Quigley 2006) and social movement organizations like the ACORN, IAF, and PICO-LIFT with the capacity to organize their displaced members were organizers’ main resources; they also strove to overcome pre-storm divisions and increase the power of “voice” they proffered as their strongest weapon, the most authentic claim to power over the recovery process, in their view, and one that virtually everyone in development, planning and governance has come to embrace, even if only in rhetoric, and not in practice. But community
organizers were not only materially outmatched by the storm and by their national “allies” after Katrina, they were also reminiscent of now radical forms of community organizing – steeped in collective identity and culture and protest action against the government demanding a redistribution of power. That national CD entities and labor unions could step in with their resonant tools and rhetoric served to only further marginalize community organizers in the recovery spectrum (cf. Ferree 2010), juxtaposing them as angry, hostile, distrusting, and lacking capacity to chart the recovery of the city.

**Displacement as a Confounding Variable in New Orleans**

The role of displacement is intriguing in evaluating these divergent political strategies between legal advocates who saw their lawsuit as part of a larger political organizing and empowerment effort (Quigley 1994-1995, Right to the City Alliance 2010) and developers who saw themselves as those likely to actually bring residents back to New Orleans. Typically, displacement is triggered by demolition and mixed-income redevelopment, with an estimated one-third of pre-demolition tenants returning to rebuilt developments nationwide (Popkin et al. 2009). Displacement is characterized in neoliberal critiques and in anti-deconcentration scholarship as a primary outcome of neoliberal marketization, privatization, deregulation, and devolution strategies, typically as a result of gentrification due to low-income residents being priced out of rebuilt neighborhoods (Lipman 2009, Swyngedouw et al. 2002, Newman and Ashton 2004, Slater 2006, Imbroscio 2004; see also Reed and Steinberg 2006). As a result, the threat of displacement of low-income urban residents has triggered demonstrative political resistance in communities around the U.S. (Lipman 2009, Feldman and Stall 2004). Displacement is characterized as destroying “the roots” of communities – their social networks, their shared histories and struggles, and the overall social fabric that holds them together in the
face of entrenched economic and racial discrimination and oppression (Fullilove 2005, Lipman 2009). Deconcentration, demolition and displacement disproportionately affects poor communities of color and thus evokes a legitimate racial critique of discrimination, control and containment of black and brown bodies (e.g., Lipman 2009) and of ignoring historical legacies of policy violence and oppression against these communities (e.g. Thompson 1998, Reed and Steinberg 2006).

Yet in this case, liberal CD Network members believed that mixed-income redevelopment was the “antidote” to displacement (Joseph 2006). From their joint newsletter mailed to former Tremé/Lafitte tenants in 2006, Enterprise and Providence explained their decision to redevelop the site as one following HUD’s demolition announcement, “to ensure that the residents of Lafitte, and the communities of Tremé and Tulane/Gravier, have a voice in the rebuilding of their neighborhoods.” They continued

Both Providence and Enterprise believe that rebuilding homes can help strengthen whole neighborhoods. Having learned of HANO’s decision to demolish Lafitte, Providence/Enterprise talked to HANO about having a nonprofit organization take a lead role in redeveloping the housing to ensure that the site and the overall program would provide housing for low-income families. HANO agreed and, as a result, this Home Building Plan includes one-for-one replacement of existing public housing units in the area.

When HANO announced their decision to demolish Lafitte, the Providence/Enterprise team had a choice — either spend time fighting the decision (which in our experience could significantly delay opportunities for residents to come home), or accept the decision and focus on the rebuilding of Lafitte. We decided it was more important to take the next step and start rebuilding the community for the residents. (Homebuilding Plan for Tremé/Lafitte & Tulane/Gravier, 2006)

Due to displacement preceding the deconcentration debate in post-Katrina New Orleans, there was an absence of actual resident voices in the struggle. Even legal advocates representing displaced public housing residents had circumscribed access to them due to funding constraints and difficulties in tracking down former tenants. There were some public housing residents back in the city, and they have been a sustained presence in organizing and protest efforts against the
demolition of the Big Four. But their voices have gained in strength and prominence as the years have passed since Katrina struck in 2005. In the first year following the storm, the few and far between available opinions of former tenants and community residents – also representing a range of projects, not specifically the one national Network allies agreed to redevelop – were effectively ignored or drowned out in the conversations between national and local organizations strategizing around how to gain power in post-Katrina recovery.

In community development practice, organizations external to neighborhoods or municipalities brought in to lead community development efforts will always find a local partner to legitimate and help carry out their work. In post-Katrina New Orleans, resident displacement changed this equation. Normally, the “community” is the most important audience, certainly rhetorically, and practically in the sense that development outcomes are measured primarily at the community level – e.g., the number of housing units produced, the number of jobs created, the number of residents participating in planning exercises, the number of associations created – and secondarily at the organizational level – e.g., did the CBO make efficient use of funds, what was the development cost per unit, did the organization raise additional sources of capital, etc. With so many low-income residents displaced – for example, the proposed recipients of redevelopment strategies in Tremé whose voices in normal circumstances were essential to legitimate plans – organizations were left to establish by proxy their legitimacy to represent these residents, and did so mainly by trying to align themselves with local organizations serving the poor – including charitable organizations, as our national outsiders did, or by claiming to speak for the “diaspora”, as local CBOs did. This reduced accountability across the Network towards low-income displaced residents as a stakeholder group in their recovery efforts, and added to the already outsized importance of the state as the primary stakeholder towards whom Network
organizations were targeting their strategies (Fraser and Kick 2007; see Brinkerhoff 2005 on stakeholders and legitimacy in development). This increased the relative power of the liberal wing of the Network skilled in negotiating and working with the state, and further undermined radical Network members who were relying on the power of resident “voice” and organizing to halt the federal demolition and privatization of New Orleans public housing.

**How Mechanisms of Institutionalization Structured this Conflict**

The three mechanisms of institutionalization at the heart of this Network’s conflict – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – structured the fall out over HUD’s demolition plans in the following way. First, in the CD sector that institutionalized around affordable housing production, the mechanism of marketization led to the infusion of market logics in the sector that encouraged an emphasis on a different set of skills, stakeholders, leaders and metrics in community development. Through marketization community development and affordable housing production came to value and prioritize real estate finance acumen, donors and investors – including the state, national community development intermediaries skilled at packaging complex housing deals, and quantifiable outcomes such as housing units produced. To achieve efficiency and competitively succeed in the increasingly privatized sector, CD organizations developed their finance and management skills to win housing contracts away from private sector developers and turned to financial and philanthropic support as federal funds disappeared. To make the financing work for affordable housing, CD turned to large-scale mixed income projects that subsidized affordable units with market rate housing and developed a tax credit market to entice private sector capital to underinvested poor communities. As a result, community development is a subsector of the finance and real estate industry and a key
contributor to the development of mixed-income housing properties nationwide, including through the demolition of underfunded and aging public housing projects.

Because of marketization of community development, in post-Katrina New Orleans, a national community development intermediary entered the city possessing the requisite real estate finance skills, tax credit development knowledge, pre-existing relationships with HUD – the key stakeholder in the battle over public housing, the sectoral authority to negotiate directly with HUD, and the ability to speak in a familiar language of units produced as a metric for measuring New Orleans recovery. Because of this field-level positioning of Enterprise Community Partners as a skilled, market-oriented leader in affordable housing production and community development, the intermediary used this position to its advantage to take control of the Lafitte projects from the threat of a less equity-oriented developer. Network members who rejected the dominant market orientation of the institutionalized CD field were nonetheless structurally and culturally undermined from launching any serious challenge to Enterprise’s position and decision.

The reformation of poverty reflects the relative dominance of a culture of reform and caregiving in anti-poverty policy and programs today. This spirit of anti-poverty reform and caregiving extends to affordable housing and community development activity. Guided by this reformist, caregiving ethos in tandem with the marketization of community development, anti-poverty funders, advocates and practitioners work to mainstream the poor into middle-class society and the capitalist economy through rehabilitation and behavior modification. This is achieved by mixing the poor with the middle-class who can model mainstream values and behaviors by acting as role models. This is also achieved by elevating the role of social service providers to meet the therapeutic needs of the urban poor. With the decline of public funding for
community development and anti-poverty efforts, non-profit housers, and social service providers and their philanthropic donors have taken on an outsized role in sheltering and ministering to the poor. As caregivers, they are empowered in the CD field to speak for and act on behalf of the poor, who are recast of victims of poverty and in need of uplift and mainstream integration. This mechanism of institutionalization structured the partnership between Enterprise and Catholic Charities as a powerful duo to redevelop Tremé/Lafitte. A subsidiary of Catholic Charities was already the largest non-profit provider of affordable housing in Louisiana, and Catholic Charities was the largest social service provider in the heavily Catholic Greater New Orleans region, and had been growing exponentially after Katrina due to the desperate need for emergency services and humanitarian relief. The expansion of faith-based development and social services was a key tenet of the Bush Administration’s privatization goals far beyond Hurricane Katrina. Private sector power inherent in marketization and poverty reform privileged Enterprise and Catholic Charities to step in and win control of Tremé/Lafitte from HUD.

The mechanism of the radicalization of community organizing is a dialectical one from the marketization of the field and the reformation of poverty. As finance and charity came to dominate the CD field its original orientation of resident-led political empowerment via confrontation community organization was undermined and eventually marginalized. As market-based logics and strategies became the resonant ways of understanding and organizing the work of the field, community organizing became a radical approach to seeking community change, with its non-quantifiable emphasis on long-term structural change through building relationships and institutions within poor communities to launch a sustained political challenge against institutionalized power. Prioritizing resident voice and authority was undermined as a strategy for community improvement in comparison to building housing and connecting poor
neighborhoods to the market. Entities and individuals who continued to emphasize community organizing as a means to protest structural inequalities and advocate for change were defunded and sidelined within the field.

Community organizing was the dominant strategic repertoire in New Orleans civil society, and the competing repertoire within the Network as a response to ideological federal state action after Katrina. Yet, because of the resonance of market-driven strategies and the power of market-oriented and reformist organizations like Enterprise and Catholic Charities to negotiate with HUD, in contrast community organizers within the Network emphasizing protest and resistance were seen as comparatively radical and not offering productive solutions to the problem of resident displacement. Furthermore, their ideological roots of community organizing – black political thought and international human rights treaties – were interpreted as radical, outside mainstream thought, and thus dismissed by HUD, local politicians, and the media as rabble-rousers and not representing the “real” interests of displaced New Orleanians, especially as they reframed their former Network allies as neoliberal oppressors and complicit in federal urban privatization schemes.

Protest and lawsuit leaders were castigated in the national media for blocking residents’ right of return (The Washington Post 2007). The radicalization of community organizing within the CD field meant that counterproposals to the redevelopment of Lafitte that emphasized reopening generally reviled public housing and leading with resident voice were structurally and culturally undermined compared to the position and authority of national community development intermediaries and local social service providers who are framed as knowing what is best for the urban poor and best equipped to deliver services, programs and housing to the urban poor – especially in the form of new housing to bring displaced New Orleanians home.
Coda

Litigation, nine months of legislative efforts in the House and Senate, and widespread political advocacy to prevent demolition failed. With the New Orleans City Council’s approval, demolition began in December 2007. Attorneys have continued to pursue resident-driven litigation against HUD on other grounds. (For a full accounting of the legislative activism that unfolded in 2007, see Graham 2010.)

GO Zone tax credits have been extended twice by the Bush and Obama Administrations and are now set to expire in 2012, more than seven years (rather than the initial three Bush intended) after Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Syndicators have had to find new communities of investors in response to the credit crisis (Mowbray 2008), and for a period following demolition of the Big Four public housing projects, it looked as if the 1,904 units replacing the approximately 4,500 that were bulldozed would never materialize, unless HUD and the developers could fill the $50M gap in the $636M redevelopment plan after the tax credits lost about 15% of their value during the Great Recession (Reckdahl 2008).

Attorneys who worked with displaced public housing residents in the years following HUD’s announcement estimate that only about one-third have returned to New Orleans (with less than 10% estimated back in other projects), and that the remainder are lost somewhere, living with loved ones or in trailers, perhaps in Houston or Baton Rouge or dispersed around the Gulf Coast. The developers of Columbia Parc, formerly St. Bernard, kept the waiting list open for the first phase of redevelopment for less than four weeks (Right to the City Alliance 2010). Today, Columbia Parc and Harmony Oaks, formerly CJ Peete, are rising rapidly in the city while the former site of Lafitte, the only development with the one-for-one unit replacement commitment,
sits empty, waiting for financing in the aftermath of Katrina and the fallout of the housing and credit markets.
Chapter 6: Resident Participation in Planning and Development: The UNOP Planning Process & the Tremé/Lafitte Homebuilding Plan

The previous chapter discussed the confounding role of displacement in the conflict within the Network over HUD’s public housing demolition and mixed-income redevelopment plans. Due to massive residential displacement, Network members’ desire to elevate resident voice and leadership as a strategic tool against the state proved extremely difficult. This chapter dives deeper into the way the CD field has moved from its original movement aim of community self-determination to a narrow interpretation and incorporation of resident participation in development and planning programs. Enterprise Community Partners and Providence Community Housing gaining control of Tremé/Lafitte as the non-profit developers on the project came to pass in parallel to the rollout of multiple neighborhood planning processes in post-Katrina New Orleans. These separate but parallel development and planning processes differently incorporated resident participation, as well as served different populations in the devastated city, namely former public housing residents in Tremé/Lafitte and mostly middle-class residents returned to the city in the neighborhood planning processes. The different interpretation and incorporation of resident participation in these respective processes reveals institutionalized class and race inequalities within the CD field concerning the right of residents to take control of urban planning and development processes shaping their communities. This inequality results from the institutionalization of the field and the way that mechanisms of marketization, poverty reform and the radicalization of community organizing have undermined the voice and autonomy of neighborhood residents. This chapter will show how the mechanisms of institutionalization – the marketization of CD, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – led to this third outcome, the narrow conceptualization of resident participation in community development. I will do this by comparing resident
participation in Tremé/Lafitte site development and the Unified New Orleans Plan neighborhood planning process in the city.

Within the Network, the willingness of its liberal wing to pursue mixed-income redevelopment as a repatriation and empowerment strategy reflects the changes to the CD field since its institutionalization. One result of the field’s transformation is the reconfiguring of the role of resident voice and autonomy into an emphasis on “participation” today. The intra-left conflict between organizers and developers in post-Katrina New Orleans was fundamentally about the right of residents, of “the local,” to chart the future of the city. While one side – the developers expert at packaging tax credit deals – saw only urgency and “no time to organize” in the face of state machinations, tax credit applications, and tax credit expiration dates, the other side saw the scope of Katrina’s socioeconomic and physical damage as the moment in which resident organizing and demands should take center stage. Though they were similarly reactive and motivated by a sense of post-disaster urgency, the Network’s community organizers and legal activists saw the primary task of disaster responders in the months and first year after the storm as one of organizing residents in the diaspora. Rapid remediation and reopening of available housing stock – e.g., mildly damaged public housing developments – could provide some places to live for the displaced while they were organized and engaged in grassroots or official planning exercises.

CD organizations in the Network focused on acquiring land in Tremé saw local participation and engagement as something that could occur later, following closed door land acquisition negotiations; in contrast, Network organizers had little in the way of proposals for physical redevelopment. Their expectation and resolute demand that the government should be funding and leading a massive reconstruction flew in the face of the reality of tax breaks and
independent, non-profit efforts at gutting homes and rebuilding housing stock as the solution the federal government put forth within three weeks of the flood. This practical and ideological chasm between the two “sides” in the Network reflects the institutional structure of the field today that privileges development expertise, specifically the finance and asset management skills necessary to build and manage affordable housing brought about by the marketization of community development. Those without these skills or those who refuse to privilege them over resident organizing and self-determination are sidelined, allowed to keep their soapbox and free to pursue litigation and political advocacy, but without the support of the mainstream, development wing of the sector who act as legislative gatekeepers, write affordable housing legislation, enjoy direct access to policymakers, and have access to major sources of investor and donor funds for affordable housing production and low-income community capacity building.

**The Tremé/Lafitte Home Building Plan**

Enterprise was able to volunteer its services to the state and city governments, help them write their affordable housing legislation (meeting notes; Maggi and Filosa 2006) – including for mixed-income property design and housing disposition, and step in and minimize the potential damage of HUD/HANO’s plans for redevelopments of Lafitte. Enterprise not only had the power to influence directly every level of government, it also partnered directly with the Archdiocese of New Orleans and one of the largest social service providers in the region – also the largest private provider of affordable housing in the city – to rebuild affordable housing in Tremé. This partnership allowed it to more or less choose where to put its “stake in the ground” – i.e., to select Tremé as its organizational battleground for the future of the city and its residents. In effect, one of the largest syndicators of LIHTC in the US, funded by the FIRE industry, credited with revolutionizing the field of CD in only two decades, voluntarily entered Louisiana and New
Orleans and with the “blessing” of church and state, claimed a neighborhood, properties and the futures of local residents as its own to develop benevolently and justly in the face of an illegitimate state. Enterprise was the only developer to promise one-for-one replacement and thus, is the last developer to break ground on reconstruction given the prohibitive costs of realizing this equity aim.

To kick off the planning process following their acquisition of Lafitte, Providence and Enterprise published and mailed a newsletter to displaced residents announcing the redevelopment of Tremé/Lafitte and Tulane/Gravier in September 2006, what they called their “Home Building Plan” for the neighborhoods “to help bring people back.” The goal of the Plan was predetermined as building “at least 1500 units of housing” in the neighborhoods, and was described as the result of HUD/HANO’s decision to demolish Lafitte. As described in the last chapter, Enterprise and Providence explained that they had no role in this decision to demolish and were working now “to ensure that the residents of Lafitte, and the communities of Tremé and Tulane/Gravier, have a voice in the rebuilding of their neighborhoods.”

The bulk of the newsletter outlined how resident participation worked in the Home Building Plan process. Resident “input and advice” was “critical” in deciding “about the number and location of the housing units” in a series of two workshops and two walk-in sessions scheduled over four days in about three weeks’ time from the date of the newsletter in order to meet the tax credit application deadline critical to rebuilding Lafitte. This participatory process focused on fulfilling Enterprise and Providence’s “commitment to the residents…to aggressively work to identify and build as many units of housing as possible”, which would be coordinated with “other planning efforts” in the neighborhood and city responsible for developing “a broader community vision” for the neighborhood emphasizing workforce development and social
services, community sustainability and design, retail and recreational amenities, and “educational options.” These “other planning efforts” are detailed in the next section.

Providence and Enterprise, with community organizing, legal and health assistance partners, and property managers hosted resident meetings monthly since the beginning of 2008, and frequently in 2006 and 2007, as demolition and redevelopment plans progressed. Meetings focused on case management services, site design, resident screening processes, and especially keeping track of housing subsidies as residents waited for their units to be rebuilt.

**Recovery Politics: Three Planning Processes**

“For three centuries, New Orleans has had the recurrent opportunities found in other disasters to rebuild the familiar in safer, better, and more equitable ways. It essentially rebuilt the familiar, expanded between disasters, and provided marginal increases in safety but laid the groundwork for the next catastrophic failure with major burdens falling on the poor.” (Kates et al. 2006: 14656).

Nelson et al. (2007) detail four of the five planning processes that occurred in New Orleans in the first two years after the storm. They describe two common tensions across the processes: the tension between: a) urgency and deliberation and b) resident versus professional input.

Today, the city has one master plan that has incorporated a range of goals and plans from these different processes; its former Office of Recovery Management designed a recovery strategy based on the diverse input that resulted.

In order to compare the role of participation in the Tremé/Lafitte redevelopment process to the neighborhood planning processes in the city, I recap here key points from three of these processes – the Mayor’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission’s (BNOB) planning effort, the City Council’s NO Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (NONRP), and the Rockefeller Philanthropy-funded Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP). Because the UNOP process ran
concurrently with site planning in Tremé/Lafitte, I pay particular attention to it. Table 1 illustrates the principles, priorities and strategies guiding these processes.

Table 1. Three Planning Processes in Post-Katrina New Orleans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Bring New Orleans Back Commission</th>
<th>NO Neighborhood Rebuilding Plan</th>
<th>Unified New Orleans Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor Ray Nagin</td>
<td>Mayor Ray Nagin</td>
<td>NO City Council</td>
<td>The Rockefeller Foundation, GNOF, &amp; other private donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>16 representatives from business sector, 1 community activist; 8 white, 1 Latino, 1 African-American</td>
<td>NO City Council; lead planning firms Lambert Advisory (based in Miami) and SHEDO, Legal Aid in NOLA</td>
<td>GNOF’s Community Support Fund &amp; Community Support Organization (CSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Area</td>
<td>Citywide</td>
<td>49 neighborhoods that flooded</td>
<td>Two scales: 13 planning districts and city-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeframe (See Exhibit 1, Nelson et al. 2007: 28)</td>
<td>Sept 05 – Jan 06</td>
<td>Dec 05 – Oct 06</td>
<td>Jun 06 – Jan 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planners</td>
<td>Urban Land Institute; Wallace, Roberts &amp; Todd</td>
<td>Firms nationwide were subcontracted</td>
<td>Private firms sourced nationwide and selected by neighborhood groups from each district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy of Action</td>
<td>Top-down, public, professional planning process; no participation</td>
<td>“Community development and organizing framework” emphasizing “resident-generated priorities” (Nelson et al. 2007: 26)</td>
<td>Participatory planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Emphases</td>
<td>Design and land use to minimize risk, incl. shrinking the city’s footprint and restoring natural environment</td>
<td>Neighborhood needs; entire city to be rebuilt</td>
<td>District-level: Design and land use building on previous processes and public UNOP meetings City-wide: Regulations and policies for safe redevelopment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nagin, in an effort to expedite the city’s recovery, convened a business-friendly, non-participatory process led by the BNOB Commission almost immediately after Katrina, which then proceeded to announce in January 2006 – when only the most affluent or hardiest were back in the city – preliminary recommendations generated by the Urban Land Institute, a Northeast think tank. Recommendations emphasized shrinking the city’s footprint to minimize risk, converting some particularly flood prone neighborhoods into parks, putting a moratorium of
building permit issuance and giving residents four months to prove their neighborhood’s “viability.”\textsuperscript{42}

Citizen uproar was immediate and racially cast, mirroring patterns of development and destruction that left mostly African-Americans in the most flood prone areas, most likely to still be displaced at the time of the recommendations, and least likely to trust their government to respond to their needs and priorities in recovery. Nagin, instead of harnessing the outrage for discussion or productive participation to finish out the existing process, instead just backed off and allowed residents to rebuild where they wanted if they could in “Darwinist” fashion (Powell 2007), with city services to follow as needed and as available.

The BNOB plan led to pronounced neighborhood activism as residents’ took up the dormant but lingering challenge to prove their viability. The City Council also attempted to incorporate residents into recovery planning. Their NO Neighborhoods Redevelopment Plan (known locally as the Lambert plan) unfolded via more than 100 public and individual meetings across the 49 neighborhoods that had at least two feet of flooding. Key recommendations included a) a program in which neighbors had the first right of purchase to buy the lots beside them and b) the reallocation of future profits from the Road Home program (through which the state could acquire homes residents did not plan to rebuild) to redevelop lower-income, disinvested communities (Nelson et al. 2007 detail the full range of recommendations).

Though this plan came from the City Council in an effort to “represent their constituents, many of whom wanted their pre-Hurricane Katrina neighborhoods rebuilt and protected” (Nelson

\textsuperscript{42} The recommendations were accompanied in the local newspaper by a map using green dots to highlight neighborhoods that should be considered for conversion to parkland (Nelson et al. 2007, Powell 2007). A desirable population size was forecast as 250,000 (Kates et al. 2006). The “exclusionist” sentiment guiding the mostly elite populated commission – from the business and real estate and economic development communities, and large, private institutions (e.g., universities) – was that a desirable rebuilt city would inevitably be wealthier and whiter (Powell 2007).
et al. 2007:31), it also engendered local conflict, mainly by tapping into existing racial and geographic boundary issues in the fractured parish. At a planning meeting I attended in Tremé, described in the previous chapter, planners were criticized for not recognizing intra-neighborhood boundaries, for instance, between African-Americans and Creoles who lived on one side of the highway splitting Tremé in two, i.e., St. Augustine parish members, versus those who lived on the other side of the highway, in St. Peter Claver’s area. Or the African-Americans and Creoles who lived in Tremé, and the whites who lived at its border along Esplanade Ridge. One black woman in the audience suggested separate planning processes for the Tremé residents (black) versus the Esplanade Ridge residents (white). Others suggested that they were just hearing of the meeting for the first time, that the August deadline planners were referencing revealed a “technique of waiting until the last minute to ram [the plan] down people’s throats.” The planners pushed back on the allegations of exclusion, stating this was not their “fault,” that they had been in the city working “for months.” Some in the audience were mollified, explaining that their suspicions derived from a “history” of “trauma,” of “what's been rammed down [their] throats in the past...we’re so used to being suspicious of the way politics are done in this city.”

At this point in the summer and residents’ lives, the Unified New Orleans Plan planning process was unfolding. Residents pushed back when they learned of it, claiming it was redundant and too much in their already overstretched, exhausted lives. Residents felt like they were caught between a rock and a hard place: if they did not participate, would their neighborhood be at risk of coming under someone else’s control? If they did participate, would it be another futile process exercise? Residents were ready for action and implementation. The UNOP process would operate on two levels, with plans developed for its 13 districts and one overarching city-
wide plan created. This third planning process was justified as necessary in order to receive Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) recovery funds from the Louisiana Recovery Authority, which would only recognize one city-wide plan. The City Council plan, though expansive, had included only flooded neighborhoods. Also “the progress that neighborhoods have made in their planning and recovery is not uniform across New Orleans, and that’s a major problem”, said Steve Bingler of Concordia, a local planning firm that was acting as a “project manager” for the UNOP process, as reported by one local activist (personal communication, June 24, 2006). The idea was that UNOP would be comprehensive across the city, resident-driven and complementary to previous processes, by building on this previous work. (Nelson et al. 2007) The overlap between NONRP and UNOP processes also called into question the legitimacy of the former effort.

The UNOP process would be funded entirely with philanthropic and private support, especially from The Rockefeller Foundation ($3.5M), the Greater New Orleans Foundation (GNOF) ($1M) and the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund ($1M). Though residents chose to participate in the UNOP process, there was backlash from its inception. The process was advertised nationwide prior to being announced locally, triggering allegations of a lack of transparency and residents’ disenfranchisement. UNOP would be overseen by a new board out of GNOF, the NO Community Support Foundation, which would appoint members to a newly formed Community Support Organization to govern the planning process. The CSO membership would come from the mayor’s office, the city council, the City Planning Commission (one each), city-wide non-profits (two), and five selected nominees from the city’s neighborhood groups. Non-profits that qualified as city-wide had to be in operation prior to Katrina and not be single-
issue based. Unexpected participants at what should have been a routine Saturday morning GNOF board meeting protested these qualifying criteria. Local civil rights attorney Bill Quigley asserted in a widely distributed email that GNOF seemed to be listening to a single community activist, a white man who had in February 2006 launched Neighborhoods Planning Network (NPN) (personal communication, June 24, 2006). Two public meetings outlining UNOP kicked off the UNOP process in July 2006. At one meeting, an elderly black woman wanted to know “who makes the judgment about who's a legitimate group and who isn't?” There would be no diaspora representation on the CSO, in the belief that residents needed to be present in the city to participate in the planning process.

Despite residents' fear that “planners and architects know stuff that me and my mom and them don’t know...so we don’t know what we don’t know until we know”, those living in the city and participating in these planning processes got together and selected planning firms after a public expo where they could meet with each firm and review their work. Planning meetings began in October. Residents were expected to grapple with the question of a “smaller footprint” for the city versus an “absolutely irreducible commitment to the right of return.” This concern and the overall process was framed by the CSO and the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) as one of “individual responsibility,” of “the sum of individual economic decisions,” as “values” driven but also “market driven.” While residents asked for flexibility in redefining neighborhoods and neighborhood boundaries in the process, the LRA also cautioned that not all neighborhoods may come back, nor may they look the same if they did – and residents may not

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43 Interestingly, of the six groups considered eligible for the CSO in June 2006, four of them were community organizing groups (ACORN, All Congregations Together, IAF/The Jeremiah Group, and Total Community Action); the other two were a local community development intermediary (NONDC) and a good government/advocacy group (Committee for a Better New Orleans – described by a prominent legal activist as “Joe Canizaros [sic] group” - personal communication, June 24, 2006). (Ultimately, the CSO was comprised of five residents representing the five city council districts, plus the representatives from the Mayor's office, the Council, the CPC, and GNOF. (Nelson et al. 2007))
want them to. The LRA representative said New Orleans had fallen behind the rest of the state in its planning process; the CSO framed it as residents' chance to participate and to be active, that this was their “first form of empowerment [to] show up...planning.” The CSO also cajoled residents, that national groups had “never seen anywhere else in the world such an engaged and participatory process” and that this would be how “New Orleans puts itself on the map.”

The final citywide plan was a “5- to 10-year blueprint for recovery that identified 95 capital and infrastructure projects” for a total cost of $14B to rebuild a “safer, stronger and smarter city.” The plan was consciously vague and lacking government mandates in order to avoid public outcry and to respect both “individual property rights” and the lingering fear that mandates and other regulatory mechanisms amounted to “ethnic cleansing” (Nance 2007, quoted in Nelson et al. 2007: 33). Many residents continued to believe that the UNOP plan “[circumvented] the democratically elected city council but also [represented] White, elite interests and would shift resources from flooded to unflooded areas” (Nelson et al. 2007: 33). The plan was formally approved in May 2007.

The UNOP neighborhood planning process coincided with the Tremé/Lafitte Home Building Plan. The October Home Building Plan workshops were counted as part of the UNOP planning process, and are the only time in the list of 53 community meetings (representing 26 neighborhood organizations) in the UNOP process in Planning District 4 that Lafitte residents are referenced, other than two other meetings described as Lafitte/Providence meetings in early September. In the September meetings, the residents are listed first; in the October meetings, Providence is.

**Participation in Planning versus Development**
Resident participation in the Tremé/Lafitte Home Building Plan represents an extremely circumscribed vision and implementation of resident participation and empowerment. It also reflects how development is effectively divorced from planning processes that aim to create a consensus-based, publicly developed, shared vision for a place (McCann 2001). Despite how much urban planning has become a tool to advance a pro-growth, economic development agenda in cities (Fainstein 1991), how much it has shifted to a practice of secrecy and deal-making (McCann 2001, Fainstein 1991), i.e., how much it has come to resemble development practice, urban planning’s original commitment to protecting and advancing “the public interest” (Walker 2002, Fainstein 1991, Peterson 2009) continues to qualitatively distinguish it from the housing and community development field. Housing has been defined as social planning, community development as the “control of [negative market] externalities” (Klosterman 1985). But ultimately, the anti-poverty roots and market capture of CD significantly distinguishes it from urban planning.

The anti-poverty aspect of housing and community development, the reality that the urban poor are predominantly non-white, and the African-American movement roots of the community development field render the sector one focused on “particularistic” concerns (Thompson 1998), a sharp contrast to the universalism implied in a commitment to fulfilling the “public interest.” The CD field has shifted from one of an empowerment movement promoting the political power and autonomy of urban poor communities to one of professionalized, market-based practice charged with figuring out where to house the poor and how to make their communities more mainstream, more economically competitive, more appealing to outside capital (e.g., investors, homeowners, affluent renters, businesses). In other words, the focus is on how to get those willingly isolated public housing residents to let outsiders in, so that external groups can take
control of their desirable communities or remake their communities into something desirable that reflects visions designed beyond their borders or behind closed doors (Fraser et al. 2003, McCann 2001). CD remains in principle committed to empowerment and inclusion, but its target “market” also remains an ethno-racialized, “othered” poor; its short-lived commitment to empowerment via political development and autonomy has shifted back to one of mainstreaming and uplift, now measured in market-based material terms such as increased property values, rising income levels, and number of housing units produced, and carried out by those with the financial skills – and their social service partners – to get the work done.

That local housing and community development and neighborhood planning continue to operate on independent, occasionally overlapping tracks is evident in New Orleans and in urban scholarship. In CD processes, planning is limited to a narrowly construed, narrowly executed process that follows privately generated development decisions to generate bounded resident input about site and unit design, or on services or programs geared towards social capital generation, improved quality of life, and perhaps modest material improvements. Figure 1 illustrates the development process:

**FIGURE 1.**

![Diagram](image)

In contrast, planning – across rational, communicative, and other models – follows following process outlined in Figure 2, even when it is triggered to meet development desires specified by the state or urban regime:

**FIGURE 2.**

![Diagram](image)
Figures 3 and 4 replicate these different processes as they unfolded in New Orleans:

**FIGURE 3.**

Deconcentration: Demolish & Rebuild
The Big 4 projects as Mixed-income properties

Financing: Funds allocated And developers Selected to get the Deal done

Site Planning: Design charrettes for site and units

Groundbreaking, Construction, Re-occupancy

**FIGURE 4.**

Rebuild a safer, Healthier city

BNOB, Lambert, UNOP

Footprint will be smaller; 17 priority zones; Neighborhood goals specified

Master Plan Used for financing And development commitments

Development Follows Master Plan

Note that the overlap between site planning in the development process in Figure 3 ("Site Planning"), step number three following the closed door decisions on demolition and financing, unfolds as the second step in the planning process model in Figure 4 ("BNOB, Lambert, UNOP"), before any theoretical development or financing commitments have been made in Planning District 4. After the BNOB backlash, subsequent planning processes in New Orleans were much more explicitly focused on resident participation. In fact, resident anger and resistance was channeled into the planning process. This suggests that the contentious politics of planning are limited to steps one and two in Figures 2 and 4 above. Once residents have had their say, implementation can follow concerning planning and development goals. Of course, as McCann (2001) and others show, some of these goals may not be deemed legitimate and resistance may be persist, depending on how participation was structured and who controlled the planning processes. This is certainly a classic concern in planning theory. Yet, the proposition stands that the contentious politics of planning are typically or desirably limited to the early stages of a larger process of urban restructuring that the figures above illustrate. Planning exists
in part to mute resistance and repurpose it towards desirable ends; the political work here is in framing collective action as realizing the “common good” or “public interest” (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004).

In contrast, in the theoretical and actual development process outlined above contestation is triggered by the secrecy surrounding initial development goals; contentious politics build as goals are announced and may continue throughout and perhaps long after the process. The power dynamic becomes much more black and white, to “fight” or “accept” the development plans, as the Providence materials put it. Because changes to the built environment are involved, the struggle becomes to defeat the development plans before those changes are instituted and the associated risks follow – e.g., displacement, gentrification, new industrial uses, more traffic, new undesirable neighbors, etc. The development process is already in motion as those who resist it are moving to action. The growth machine, or urban regime, or state, has a head start. Planning in this line-up may serve a co-opting purpose for stakeholders directly affected by the development goals, but it is not a means to change those goals, as it theoretically is in the planning process.

This post-Katrina case may be an exceptional one, and not easily generalizable to other development and planning conflicts. Redeveloping public housing does not have a simple analog in other residential development examples; other public facilities – e.g., schools, hospitals, prisons – may be congruous, but impact people’s lives differently, considering public housing is emotionally laden as people’s homes and communities. Alternatively, New Orleans was somewhat atypical in its repeated planning processes in trying legitimately to reach an acceptable participation threshold for residents. Despite the repeated challenges to inclusiveness and accountability to post-Katrina planning in the city, it is arguably somewhat of an ideal to pursue
such comprehensive neighborhood-based planning to develop a citywide Master plan and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance that would actually be adopted by local government.

Yet even these two post-Katrina cases – public housing redevelopment and neighborhood planning – accentuate the different power and protest dynamics in development versus planning, and do so in part because of the distinct differences between the populations served by them in the city. Public housing serves those living in the nation’s shelter of last resort; they are disproportionately women and children of color, the disabled and elderly. These are marginalized, exceptionally vulnerable households that we treat effectively as wards of the state, as an institutionalized population, practically, with little attendant rights – a circumscribed citizenship, if you will. For this population, the landscape on which the choice to fight or accept development is made is extremely imbalanced. Will they challenge the state’s agenda, and with what resources? How do they demonstrate their rights to their homes, to chart their own futures, to “the city” when living in deeply subsidized government property and facing a hostile society that considers them pathologically different and in need of stringent social control? As the New Orleans case so painfully demonstrates, in such contexts, the state – abetted by its planning/policy networks (Domhoff 2009, Smith 2008), i.e., by the dispersal consensus (Imbroscio 2008) – is empowered to decide behind closed doors the future of these sites, their surrounding neighborhoods, and of the residents in these communities. Less egregious examples are widespread in the CD literature (e.g., Fraser et al. 2003). Residents and their allies can either go along, and accept planning as their concession prize, or resist the development agenda and organize to stop it.

In contrast, the planning processes in New Orleans disproportionately served the white middle-class (Warner 2006) – at a minimum, those with enough material and psycho-social
resources to return to the city within six to 12 months after the disaster and participate in the recovery process. Research shows that whites returned much more quickly to the city, in part because they were more likely to live in lesser damaged or undamaged neighborhoods compared to black residents (Fussell, Sastry and VanLandingham 2009). For these residents, the Mayor’s planning process became the site of resistance for proposed development goals, which were promptly derailed by citizen protest. Not only is the fight or accept opportunity much more fluid – more of an approve or deny model, resistance is incorporated into the process, rather than forcing it to occur outside the circumscribed bounds of legitimate participation and input. That this is the option for the whiter, more affluent residents of New Orleans compared to the option presented to displaced public housing residents – who were not given a specific voice in the neighborhood planning process (meeting notes, July 2006) – is indicative of another difference in development versus planning politics – the very different populations the processes are likely to target/incorporate. This difference in residential ethno-racial and class composition and corresponding status and power acts as a feedback and reinforcement mechanism in planning versus development politics (e.g., Soss and Mettler 2004). That is, it reinforces who has the right to expect to participate in neighborhood planning and/or development processes, which option will be presented to them, and what choices they have in shaping the built environment that surrounds them. The middle-class expects to participate in planning and development decision-making based on a history of being included in such processes, and this history is shaped by their class and status based expectations of inclusion. In contrast, urban poor communities of color have historically learned that development politics typically exclude and harm them, and such processes are thus designed to end-run around or co-opt these residents in anticipation of their frequently enacted resistance.
The Role of Mechanisms of Institutionalization in Shaping Resident Participation

This chapter has analyzed the differences in degrees of resident participation in the Tremé/Lafitte redevelopment and the Unified New Orleans Plan process that took place in summer/fall 2006. The mechanisms of institutionalization at the center of this dissertation – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – have influenced these differential participatory processes, especially in their relationship to mixed-income housing policy. The marketization of community development is particularly important here, as it represents a key distinction in community development from urban planning, which retains an ideal of fulfilling the public interest (Friedmann 1973, Klosterman 1980, Innes 1996, Jacobs and Paulsen 2009, Peterson 2009) that acts as a counter influence to the field’s shift towards a market-oriented, deal-making ethos (Fainstein 1991).

Resident participation in federal HOPE VI policy that was substantially weakened in legislation passed in 1998, and enhanced the already wide latitude local public housing authorities had in incorporating resident input and leadership in their demolition and redevelopment plans (Keating 2000). As the Bush Administration increasingly slashed HOPE VI funding, public housing demolition continued nonetheless in cities around the U.S. When HUD announced its plans for the demolition of the Big Four, it mandated site planning with resident input for the projects. A broader scope of neighborhood planning was optional, and practically discouraged in the Tremé/Lafitte redevelopment given the associated tax credit application deadlines necessary to raise financing for the project. Site planning entailed narrow resident input on building and unit design and layout to guide the specific siting of the housing, and later, discussions concerning eligibility criteria for future tenants. Tremé/Lafitte residents in this
circumstance provided consultation (Arnstein 1969) to Enterprise, Providence and the community organizers and health providers coordinating the tenant and neighborhood meetings.

Marketization is the backbone of this narrowly circumscribed level of resident participation in the following ways. First, because of the power inequalities it has produced in the community development field, resident or local knowledge is devalued in comparison with expert knowledge of CD professionals who possess the technocratic and financial skills needed to build multifamily mixed-income housing properties. Second, the emphasis on competition and efficiency necessitates that the developers for Lafitte submit concise, workable plans that meet universal tax-credit financing criteria. Seasoned developers already understand what is required for a successful application package and by necessity must tailor resident input to reflect desired application ingredients. Third, the developers’ primary stakeholder in Tremé/Lafitte redevelopment is HUD and the corporate investors to whom they will seek to sell tax credits. Therefore, winning the redevelopment contract from HUD and the qualifying tax credits to sell to developers is the primary concern of developers. Resident participation is secondary and narrowly designed so as to enable these other stakeholder relationships to proceed as smoothly as possible. If developers desire more expansive resident planning processes, they will have to allocate their own funding or find other sources of funding.

The historical context of the field’s institutionalization is also important here, especially how mechanisms of marketization and the radicalization of community organizing unfolded historically. Citizen participation has long been mandated in federal urban policy initiatives, but ever since it “backfired” in Johnson’s Model Cities program, it has been consistently weakened or aggressively curtailed. The “adversary model” of citizen participation in Model Cities (Mogulof 1969, Warren 1969) that empowered black community organizing to define urban
problems and proposed “comprehensive” interventions led to local government backlash against
the federal government for trying to build power directly in urban black neighborhoods and
bypassing local authorities directly. This degree of citizen engagement was also in conflict with
professional expertise models within urban planning, development and policy (Burke 1968),
which were purported to serve the “public interest” (Lee 1970) more effectively than the
“particularistic” (Thompson 1998) concerns and solutions likely conceived of by urban poor
communities of color. As the community development institutionalized and adopted market-
driven practices of housing production prioritizing real estate finance, investor stakeholders and
quantitative metrics, these earlier norms of citizen participation and community organizing were
detrimentally radicalized within the field. In federal housing and urban policy going forward, a
corollary mandate to securing public-private financing and mixing incomes was to manage
resident participation in such a way that it did not jeopardize the private capital and middle-class
constituents necessary to make projects such as HOPE VI a success.

The reformation of poverty played a direct role in the Tremé/Lafitte context in that the
leadership of Catholic Charities over the redevelopment of the site meant that its social service
and caregiving model infused the resident participation process. Arnstein (1969) provocatively
describes a therapeutic model of citizen participation as the lowest rung of the participation
“ladder,” in which participation is a means of curing minority and poor participants of their
“pathologies.” Site planning in Tremé/Lafitte included the assistance of public health
professionals and wraparound social services to assist residents with housing transitions, job
searches, and other adjustments were provided as part of the redevelopment process.

Resident participation processes in urban planning is not immune to similar criticisms,
especially when it is focused on urban poor communities or communities of color. Planning has
always been a means of protecting and serving elite interests and propertied interests (Jacobs and Paulsen 2009). Yet, at the heart of planning is a struggle over the profession’s commitment to the public interest, and the role of the planner in realizing its fulfillment. Challenges to the existence of a shared public interest in the face of persistent racial and economic segregation and inequality in society have translated into appeals for advocacy planning or communicative planning strategies for poor and non-white communities as a means of ensuring their voice in and benefit from urban planning (Davidoff 1969, Healey 2003, Forester 1989). Yet, in New Orleans, because of this racial and economic inequality that led to a disproportionate number of poor and African-American New Orleanians displaced from the city for far longer than more affluent and/or white residents, the neighborhood planning process hewed more closely to the ideal of planners facilitating citizen engagement towards realizing the public interest in the form of a comprehensive city plan to guide New Orleans recovery. That is, the disparate racial and economic participation in the UNOP process compared to the Tremé/Lafitte Homebuilding Plan revealed the relative promise and limits of resident participation in planning and development.

As community development has moved away from its original aim of community self-determination as a precursor to social and economic integration and towards a narrowly conceived goal of mainstreaming poor communities into the American capitalist economy, it has in the process demonstratively constrained resident participation processes in order to minimize dissent and ensure the smooth functioning of market-driven production and development processes.

Mier (1994), Hartman (1994) and Brownhill and Thomas (2001) are just a few scholars who have pointed out the shortcomings of urban planning and policy in dealing with race, poverty and segregation. Mier argues that on the left and the right is preference for a two-tiered system of
planning and development, one for the segregated and “quarantined” urban underclass that focuses on dealing with their communities from within and one process of urban development and planning for the rest of us. Public housing projects in New Orleans were highly segregated communities within a city organized around some 200 informal neighborhoods. HUD’s unique control over them, their planned redevelopment as tax credit projects, and the widespread displacement of former tenants led to residents’ exclusion from city planning processes in favor of separate planning processes carried out on site only tangentially connected to the UNOP process. The mechanisms of marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing further ensured that the resident participation process with the Tremé/Lafitte redevelopment would be carefully defined and narrowly executed so as not to disrupt the process of securing and retaining financing for the site.

Conclusion

Too often neoliberal critiques of urban restructuring paint the struggles for “the right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996, 2003) as one between good and evil, between just and unjust forces of faceless state actors and growth “machines” (Logan and Molotch 1987) on one side and amorphous communities of color on the other. Yet, low-income community-based organizations that both work with residents and struggle to produce affordable housing in these neighborhoods do not fit easily into this dichotomy. They may be participants in the neoliberal privatization agenda, but they are also a source of civic and political empowerment for low-income urban residents. Furthermore, they are driven by mutually reinforcing and contradictory moralistic anti-poverty (Dreier 1997) and radical self-help ideologies that endure despite how far the field has shifted from its social movement roots. The CD field is historically split by the “capital-
community” dichotomy (Stoecker 1997) that renders it trying to empower poor residents and neighborhoods by incorporating them into an unequal, oppressive capitalist marketplace.

In post-Katrina New Orleans, Network members shared an injustice frame that did not change, despite their different responses to HUD’s demolition plans. Organizations continued to be mobilized by the conviction that the federal government had failed an original American city and its most vulnerable residents, and that these residents had the right to return to the city and to participate equitably in the recovery process. Yet the Network ended up reproducing the institutionalized inequalities within the CD field – differences in structural positions, political power and resources, and competing strategic repertoires – in New Orleans. Three decades of marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing in the sector meant that liberal, expert, national development advocates and their local counterparts in social service and poor relief were structurally and culturally privileged to gain control of Tremé/Lafitte on behalf of residents in the face of a hostile, ideological state. National organizations rhetoric of participation was much more inclusive than their actual practice. In the subsequent site planning process in Tremé/Lafitte the concept and scope of resident participation was highly circumscribed as this non-profit development team adhered to a traditional site planning and development process that HUD recognized as the norm of CD practice. Both Network advocates committed to resident leadership through community organizing and displaced residents themselves were sidelined and relatively silenced in this outcome. This stands in sharp contrast to the relative power and depth of resident participation, though still contested, enjoyed by middle-class New Orleanians back home in the post-storm city. As this chapter demonstrates, this difference in resident participation and authority in post-Katrina New

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Orleans planning and development is reflective of institutionalized inequalities of race and class shaping resident roles in the urban planning and development field more broadly.
Chapter 7: The Community Development Movement in a Post-Katrina World

Introduction

This dissertation argues that the institutionalization of the community development field has constrained the realization of its original movement aims, but how so has been poorly understood. Early movement entrepreneurs who went on to professionalize the field, especially around affordable housing production beginning in the 1980s, are still guided by their former movement histories, but as CD executives today they exemplify the field’s enduring tension between its institutionalized practices and larger movement goals. In particular, the neoliberal mechanisms of the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing in the field act as significant constraints of the fulfillment of low-income community self-determination that was the original objective of the community development movement.

I use a case study of the activism of a community development Network in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to demonstrate how these mechanisms of institutionalization restrict CD movement aims. This Network came together motivated by a shared injustice frame (Goodwin et al. 2001) of government failure and neglect and the right to return of displaced poor, African-American New Orleanians. They pledged to fulfill this right of return through an innovative, comprehensive community development, planning and organizing model in the flooded city. Yet, over the course of the 15 months following the storm that struck on August 29, 2005, the Network failed to realize this shared objective. In New Orleans, these three mechanisms of institutionalization – the marketization of CD, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – combined with post-disaster environmental challenges of intense civil society conflict and distrust, the roll-out of neoliberal deconcentration policy in New
Orleans, a weak local political economy, and competing cultural repertoires within the Network. These mechanisms interacted with these environmental challenges to seriously undermine the Network’s collective action.

Insurmountable divisions surfaced within the Network, brought about by pre-existing institutionalized field-level inequalities from marketization, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community organizing. In post-Katrina New Orleans, large, well-resourced, high capacity national and local organizations pursuing a traditional, market-based housing production model with limited resident participation and grassroots and small national Network organizations emphasizing political organizing and protest rooted in collective identity claims could not overcome organizational capacity gaps and competing strategic repertoires to realize their shared movement aims. The marginalization of community organizing within CD practice, especially confrontational models encouraging political change and community empowerment, served to isolate community organizers in the Network, as well as to undermine local organizations and the City of New Orleans itself, as both these organizations and local civil society more broadly was governed by a confrontational, racial, protest politics, especially compared to the national, marketized practice that guides the CD field today. A charitable ethos of caregiving and the prioritization of investors and donors as key stakeholders associated with the liberal philanthropic and marketized housing production approach substantially narrowed the possibility for resident control in determining the future of their damaged communities.

Three specific outcomes came to pass in post-Katrina New Orleans, as a result. First, institutionalized race and class inequalities became embodied within the Network and urban space. Next, when the ideological, activist, neoliberal federal state against which this Network originally came together proposed to demolish structurally sound and relatively undamaged
public housing representing 70% of the city’s public housing stock, this Network came apart as a cohort of national and local non-profits agreed to redevelop one of the projects, Lafitte, with an equitable unit-for-unit replacement and another Network cohort filed a resident class action lawsuit against the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. Lastly, as part of this fallout over HUD’s actions, Catholic Church affiliate organizations supported by a national community development intermediary came to control the redevelopment of a substantial portion of land in Tremé/Lafitte as well as the resident participation process in redevelopment, and resident participation was a narrowly construed, relatively un-empowering process of community building compared to principles of resident participation enshrined in neighborhood planning in the post-disaster city.

Yet, this unanticipated polarization and failure in 2006 has proven instructive for organizations within the Network in the five years since Hurricane Katrina struck, a period of time that has seen the fortieth anniversary of the community development movement, a deep national recession brought about by the collapse of the housing market, income inequality unsurpassed since the 1920s, and an African-American Democratic President elected to turn the country around after eight years of budget decimating wars, aggressive privatization schemes, across the board relaxation of federal regulations, and tax cuts for the wealthy. Emerging from the wreckage of the first year after Katrina are three interrelated tracks of political activism: a) a coordinated legislative advocacy effort, b) grassroots campaigns for economic human rights, and c) a national coalition devoted to equitable and democratic green urban development.

This robust and growing political activism coming out of the post-Katrina Gulf Coast points to the possibilities for movement renewal in the institutionalized community development field. Three lessons suggest how we can turn to our collective advantage the mechanisms of
marketization of the field, poverty reform, and the radicalization of community development. First, through these mechanisms of institutionalization, community development’s incorporation into the neoliberal political economy has opened up spaces for political resistance by professionals and activists working within the system. Second, a new discourse of economic human rights points to a reorientation of the field around low-income residents’ right to the city and their communities’ existence as integral to the health of the city, rather than as a problem to be ministered. Finally, community organizing can be reintegrated into the field by beginning with internal organizing processes as a means to develop a new theory of power to transcend historical institutional distrust within the field. I expand on each of these lessons below within the context of post-Katrina political activism and then link them back to the enduring but evolving transformative promise of community development.

**Three Strains of Political Activism after Katrina**

*Legislative Campaign for Affordable Housing & Equitable Development*

The lawsuit against HUD froze any demolition plans for 14 months, through December 2007. In November 2006, the Democrats regained control of Congress, opening up a more favorable political climate for post-Katrina recovery. In March 2007, the House passed H.R. 1227, legislation enshrining the right of return of displaced residents and mandating the redevelopment of affordable housing in the Gulf Coast, including a phased, equitable redevelopment of New Orleans public housing pending resident agreement and input. This more cautious and resident-driven approach to the re-opening of public housing applied retroactively to existing development contracts. National and local organizations focused on Katrina recovery worked with Representatives Maxine Waters in California and Barney Frank in Massachusetts to develop and pass the bill, which enjoyed bipartisan support from the Louisiana House delegation.
H.R. 1227 spurred intense political mobilization in New Orleans, the Gulf Coast, and in the national Networks of allies and disaster responders engaged in post-Katrina recovery. Local and national non-profit anti-poverty, housing and community development advocacy organizations came together in a focused campaign to win passage of a similar bill in the Senate. Organizations including Amnesty International USA, Oxfam America, PolicyLink, the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation (LDRF), the 21st Century Foundation, the National Low-Income Housing Coalition, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Agency, and local community-based organizations in New Orleans, SE Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi were just a handful of the more than 100 organization nationwide supporting the Senate bill, S. 1668. The LDRF, Amnesty, and Oxfam all funded different aspects of a coordinated campaign coming out of the Gulf Coast in support of displaced residents’ right of return and their right to participate in the recovery and the redevelopment of affordable housing to house repatriated residents. Public housing residents protesting the planned demolition of public housing were now funded by groups like Amnesty and Oxfam to come to Washington D.C. to testify on behalf of this bill, occasionally providing testimony alongside non-profit developers like Enterprise and Providence who supported a bill mandating phased redevelopment and one-for-one replacement for all public housing units in the city – the “no net loss of affordable housing” prognosis these developers favored. Through 2007, the advocacy campaign gained strength and local organizations materially supported by their national allies developed new political skills and expressed delight at their incorporation into the federal political process.

Alabama and Louisiana Republican Senators Richard Shelby and David Vitter blocked the Senate bill from ever making it out of committee (see Graham 2010 for a detailed account), and in December 2007, as protesters and police clashed outside, the New Orleans City Council
approved the demolition of the Big Four. The lawsuit had been lost recently. The subsequent months were ones of painful rumination and loss for local and national affordable housing advocates. Yet their advocacy efforts, now strategically targeted towards a policy platform of equitable development across the Gulf Coast, continued to grow in strength and prominence. The primary advocacy vehicle was the LDRF-sponsored Equity & Inclusion Campaign, which brought together “grasstips” organizations from AL, MS and LA to develop and pursue this equitable development platform at the local and federal levels. Campaign participants met with elected officials at both Presidential conventions in August 2008, repeatedly met with Congressional delegations traveling to the Gulf Coast, and have had multiple meetings with President Obama’s HUD Secretary Shawn Donovan. Oxfam, and the National Low-Income Housing Coalition through its weekly Katrina Housing Group strategy and coordination meetings, also played important sponsoring roles in building the political skills and incorporation of these local organizations used to political disenfranchisement from their left-liberal, grasstips position in the U.S. Deep South.

Grassroots economic human rights campaigns

Human rights activism in the U.S. South gained ground in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina due to the massive displacement – especially of poor people of color – wrought by federal action and inaction, displacement unseen in the U.S. since the Dust Bowl (Powell 2007). In the wake of the flood, local and national organizations like New Orleans-based Advocates for Environmental Human Rights (AEHR), the Southern Regional Office of Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), the National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (NESRI), the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and its spin-off the People’s Organizing Committee, NOHEAT, and the Atlanta-based US Human Rights Network all began organizing residents and training local organizations in human rights.
rights frameworks, especially their rights based on the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. NESRI worked particularly closely with public housing residents, organizing a trip abroad for them to meet with and strategize with survivors of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia. As HUD announced its plans for demolition, local public housing resident and activist Sam Jackson launched May Day New Orleans, a grassroots, resident-driven resistance movement against forced evictions, demolitions and displacement of poor people of color from New Orleans. May Day, supported by national entities like NESRI and AIUSA, has linked up with international economic human rights campaigns fighting for the right to housing in the US and worldwide. NESRI, May Day, AIUSA, USHRN and AEHR have been instrumental in bringing U.N. officials to the Gulf Coast repeatedly to investigate human rights violations against African-Americans and the poor in the post-Katrina Gulf Coast. Foundations such as the Mertz Gilmore Foundation have been instrumental in funding this work.

Concurrently and in solidarity with these efforts has been the launch of the Right to the City Alliance in January 2007, with grassroots groups in New Orleans joining up with similar organizations from cities around the U.S. including Miami, Los Angeles, Atlanta, New York and elsewhere to launch a new “urban justice” movement to resist neoliberalism and fight for the disenfranchised’s right to the city. One of its main goals is “supporting community reclamation in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.” One of its more recent movement resources is its new publication, *We Call These Projects Home*, arguing for a human right to housing, specifically the preservation and expansion of public housing, using a mixed-methods approach and centering the voices of public housing residents in its scholarly analysis. The Advancement Project, the

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44 http://www.idpguidingprinciples.org/
45 http://www.righttothecity.org/what-we-do.html
lead national attorneys on the public housing class action lawsuit against HUD after Katrina, is
an allied member of the Alliance.

_The Emerald Cities Coalition_

Emerald Cities is a national coalition of community development intermediaries, labor
unions, academia, environmental justice organizations, community action agencies, social justice
advocacy organizations and social investment entities responding to climate change by pursuing the equitable greening of U.S. cities. The three goals of Emerald Cities are to a) reduce the carbon footprint in U.S. cities through integrated green retrofits targeting buildings and neighborhoods in low-income urban areas, b) build a 21st century green workforce providing good jobs, high wages, and long-term careers, especially for low-income residents and men and women of color, and c) increase democratic engagement in poor communities and urban communities of color through community organizing, labor-community partnerships and resident-driven political advocacy for policy change to encourage an equitable and green urban transformation. Emerald Cities is comprised of many of the national Network members who played a key role in the Network’s response to Hurricane Katrina, including SEIU, the AFL-CIO, Enterprise Community Partners, MIT, NeighborWorks America, and PolicyLink. The Coalition offers technical assistance in policy advocacy, labor-community organizing and program design; job training and access; private capital; and information to interested cities and local coalitions. The Coalition has been working closely with the Obama Administration since his election to win favorable legislation and regulation to support their roll out and base building in cities around the United States.

In some respects, these complementary but independent collective action strands reflect the institutional / extra-institutional dichotomy of political activism in the U.S. That is, efforts like
the Equity & Inclusion Campaign and Emerald Cities work strategically within institutionalized channels, working within the political process, seeking policy change via negotiation and consultation with national and local governments and systems change via a program of professional technical assistance and public-private resources to build local civic capacity.

Grassroots urban justice and economic human rights movements, in contrast, are pressing on the political system from the outside, building alliances among urban poor communities of color worldwide to advance an alternative democratic vision for society based on international human rights frameworks and social justice principles. The vision and principles of the Alliance, for example, refute neoliberal deconcentration strategies that organizations like Enterprise or the National Low-Income Housing Coalition have in the past endorsed, embraced or accepted as part of their efforts to provide quality housing for low-income neighborhoods. A structural difference between the Alliance and Emerald Cities is the former's creation by grassroots community organizations and the latter's launch by a coalition of national, professional institutions. The Equity & Inclusion Campaign and some of the human rights activism described above have been seeded by national organizations but have evolved into independent, locally-led efforts.

Yet, at the same time, a guiding principle linking this diverse activism is a commitment to building equity for low-income communities, especially urban poor communities of color. (The Equity & Inclusion campaign has more urban-rural diversity, including rural white Cajun communities in SE Louisiana.) All three strands of collective action identified seek to influence the political economy in the U.S. to empower low-income communities with material resources and political engagement and to lead to a more equitable policy environment that more fairly redistributes economic opportunity and access to housing, healthcare, education and work. All of this mobilization is borne directly out of the political setbacks in the first year of Hurricane
Katrina: Bush’s embarrassing, harmful and ideological oversight of Gulf Coast recovery particularly evoked in HUD’s demolition plans led to both a change in leadership at the federal level and favorable housing legislation passed in 2007, spurring organized political advocacy in the Gulf Coast that has since involved into an independent political campaign for equitable redevelopment of the region. Massive displacement wrought by Hurricane Katrina and threatened further by HUD’s decision to demolish the projects energized pre-Katrina human rights activism in the South and nationwide, leading to specific movements targeting the economic human rights of Gulf Coast public housing residents and linking this collective action to national and transnational social movements. The “deal with the devil” federal political climate of negotiating with HUD and the weak local urban political economy that national organizations faced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina guides their current efforts to transform federal policy and support local urban climate change activism in a coordinated, proactive, strategic fashion.

This on-going political activism reveals three important analytical entry points in understanding the enduring movement potential of the institutionalized community development field and how mechanisms of institutionalization can be reoriented to our advantage. First, community development as a mode of neoliberal urban restructuring opens up spaces for political resistance from within, by community development professionals and activists by virtue of their direct engagement with neoliberal policy. Second, an explicit rhetoric of economic human rights growing in urban social movements points to a broader renewal of the community development sector’s commitment to low-income residents’ right to the city (LeFebvre 1996) and the recognition of these communities positive contribution to the overall health of the city rather than a strain on society to be ameliorated. Third, the CD field can explore a new theory of
power by organizing internally in order to overcome historic institutional distrust that fractures
the field. After introducing these lessons by examining the subsequent political activism that has
emerged from the post-Katrina Gulf Coast and the Network’s setbacks, more specifically, I
conclude with how these lessons map onto the institutionalized CD field today and their potential
for renewing the field’s movement spirit.

**Lesson #1: Reconstructing Neoliberal Critiques**

Often, critiques of development in the neoliberal era end with pessimistic conclusions of the
inexorability of neoliberalism’s continued evisceration of low-income communities, its
appropriation of formerly public spaces, and its savaging of the social safety net (e.g., Kothari
2005). Yet a range of national and international scholars are increasingly demonstrating the
limits to neoliberalism’s growth, and highlighting growing spaces of resistance against its
hegemony (see especially collections by Laurie and Bondi 2005, and Leitner et al. 2007). Of
particular value is the concept of professionals “working the spaces of neoliberalism,” presented
in the essays organized by Laurie and Bondi, which seek to highlight the “tensions and
connections between activism and processes of professionalization in relation to neoliberalism”
(Bondi and Laurie 2005: 1).

This argument states that the mechanisms of marketization, privatization, and devolution
have created a population of public and private sector professionals that carry out neoliberal
public policy aims such as delivering social services, housing programs, and a range of other
formerly public efforts. Critically, these professionals have been drawn up and out of grassroots
groups, community-based organizations or social justice activism and now straddle a strategic
middle ground between the government, private sector and community. They are in effect
“strategic brokers” (Larner and Craig 2005) sprinkled within government, the private sector and
civil society responsible for the institutionalization and execution of the neoliberal agenda, especially at state and local levels. Because of their grassroots or movement backgrounds, and their often newfound power as they are legitimized by and legitimate the neoliberal political economic system, such professionals possess twin sources of knowledge and authority: historical-cultural knowledge of social change and social inequality at the local scale as well as the technocratic and professional knowledge of how to tackle problems of inequality, poverty, social exclusion or economic decline.

Larner and Craig (2005) show how in New Zealand, neoliberal processes of privatization, competitive contracting, and marketization led to a new generation of trained professionals that grew out of local community activism to carry out new public policy initiatives in these communities. Yet, they also show that these same brokers, after legitimating neoliberalism’s expansion, also recognized its inherent contradictions and shortcomings as those responsible for its execution. For example, the competitive contracting led to their professionalization and the development of their community organizations, but it also redoubled their faith in their previously collaborative working relationships and spurred their sustained advocacy for a more collaborative, partnership based model that has since become widely adopted and “normative” in New Zealand governance and public policy.

Laurie and Bondi argue that “the activists discussed in this collection are well aware of [the dilemmas of neoliberalism] and resist representations of their actions and their selves as if they are merely naïve victims of neoliberalism and/or ingénues in their political encounters” (2005: 6-7). Instead, these professionals in social service and community development arenas, for example, are using their privileged insider positions to contest neoliberalism, to transform it at “its core” (2005: 6).
This is a useful analytical lens for understanding the actions of national organizations within the Network post-Katrina, especially in their Emerald Cities (ECC) initiative. The ECC Mission Statement questions the utility and validity of “existing market-driven models of green retrofits” as socio-economically and racially inequitable, not to mention sub par in terms of quality and sustainability. Equally compelling is the leadership within ECC of the historically white and racially exclusionary Building Trades unions to institutionalize a training and apprenticeship program that disproportionately reaches racial minorities to bring them into the unions. Similarly, the unions are proactively pursuing labor-community organizing models when historically labor and communities have been at odds over the narrow, exclusionary “shop floor” focus of union organizing that failed to reach and often alienated low-income people of color underrepresented in these specific workplace strategies. The community development intermediaries, unions, and social advocacy organizations involved in ECC are trying to transform racially and economically exclusionary, market-driven workforce and urban development models, without renouncing their insider-oriented political strategy of legislative advocacy, technical assistance and coalition-building. The current, incredible energy of environmental justice and climate change activism and their intersection within urban poor communities of color has empowered these institutionally powerful organizations to pursue and build out what could be simple, narrowly tailored green building retrofits into a democratic movement for racial and economic justice oriented around workforce and community development.

The Advancement Project, a leading Network member on the “radical” community organizing and protest “side” of the post-Katrina CD Network, has developed a similarly pointed critique and specific space of resistance against neoliberalism in their expanded analysis and

46 http://www.emeraldcities.org/?q=about
defense of public housing in the United States. Never a conventional legal aid organization, but rather an “innovative civil rights law, policy, and communications ‘action tank’” focused on racial equity. The Advancement Project, through its litigation strategies in the Gulf Coast against forced evictions, foreclosures and eventually the demolition of public housing, has with its community-based partners embraced a rights-based theory of the value and need for public housing in the United States. They have come to view the IM units of public housing in the U.S. as key spatial and cultural zones of contention against neoliberalism and for pro-poor, racial justice movement building. In the process, they have sharpened their understanding of and resistance to neoliberalism, especially its processes of privatization and deregulation and the deconcentration policies that flow from it (e.g., Right to the City Alliance 2010).

Lastly, the Equity & Inclusion Campaign has sought to transcend cities’ competition within the global political economy of place (Logan and Molotch 1987, Fraser et al. 2003). Campaign participants have deliberately resisted the inter-state and inter-regional competition for federal recovery resources that its respective local governments have pursued since Katrina, electing instead to advocate for equitable recovery of the Gulf Coast as a unified coalition representing communities from Mobile, AL to Gulfport, MS to Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. These community-based organizations and their national and regional donors (e.g., the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation) have pursued this model in spite of resource competitions between their elected representatives and in the face of federal legislation that tries to pit communities against one another in allocation of resources. The Campaign slowly and carefully developed this coalition strategy in light of intense, inter-state and inter-community resource competition inherent in the political economy of disaster assistance on sharp display in the first two years after Katrina.

47 http://www.advancementproject.org/
All of these examples highlight how a range of local and national, grassroots and professional organizations developed specific understandings of and strategies of resistance to neoliberalism by their direct engagement with neoliberal public policy. Enterprise agreed to redevelop public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans and went on to a leadership role in ECC contesting market-driven urban development. Organizational members of the Equity & Inclusion Campaign spent two years working in relative isolation to rebuild their own communities and regions within a traditional disaster allocation framework before realizing their collective power. The Advancement Project expanded its pre-storm vision of a racially equitable society to develop a specific critique of and response to neoliberalism’s impact on urban poor residential communities through its engagement in the public housing struggle in post-Katrina New Orleans.

The takeaway for CD scholars and professionals is to recognize this effort at resistance and change that bubbles up from practitioners’ engagement with neoliberalism. Rather than foresee an inevitable co-optation model, we should instead look at these interactions within the neoliberal political economy as opening up potential spaces of resistance. Of particular interest are change strategies that emerge from within “the polity” (Tilly 1978), particularly via the insider strategies of the Equity & Inclusion Campaign and Emerald Cities. That is, these two strands of political activism continue to operate within the institutional political process as a means of seeking change. These are concrete examples of how U.S. community development professionals are seeking to transform the neoliberal political economy by working within it. It is easy for scholars working outside these applied settings or even for activists in these settings to assign ulterior motives to or a false consciousness to CD practitioners and advocates seen as neoliberal urban restructurers. We would be better served by connecting explorations of
individual and organizational agency to analyses of broader structural contexts in order to explain their discrete roles and possibilities for resistance in a neoliberal political economy.

Lesson #2: Reclaiming the Right to the City

The demonstrative displacement of poor African-Americans from New Orleans wrought by Hurricane Katrina and perpetuated by post-Katrina federal policies was arguably a wakeup call for liberal CD practitioners and scholars. Powell (2007) described post-Katrina New Orleans as a “democratic moment that is still unfolding.” HUD’s callous and deliberate post-Katrina perversion of mixed-income housing policy that liberal CD advocates had long championed under the HOPE VI program of the 1990s split apart the Network and renewed multiple strands of movement activism in the years following the historic flood. Though only the Right to the City Alliance explicitly embraces Lefebvre’s theory (1996) and the philosophy that the poor and marginalized have an equal right to the city as their affluent counterparts, all the aforementioned mobilization of this post-Katrina “democratic moment” reflect a commitment to empowering poor communities of color in their neighborhoods in the cities where they live.

This stands in stark contrast from the culture of poverty and political economy perspectives behind neoliberal deconcentration and mixed-income strategies, which blamed concentrations of poor households for subsequent patterns of crime, deviance and blight and proposed to bring in the financially and politically powerful middle-class, often white but also black (see Pattillo 2007), as a means of resurrecting these pathologized and isolated neighborhoods. Only by transplanting the affluent to abandoned central cities would the requisite financial, political and organizational resources for economy prosperity follow. Deconcentration and mixed-income strategies fit with a larger political embrace of metropolitanization (e.g., Dreier, Mollenkopf, and
Swanstrom 2001; O'Connor 2001) that sought to undo urban-suburban segregation by bringing the middle-class back downtown and dispersing the urban poor to the suburbs.

HOPE VI, despite its best intentions, ultimately displaced between 60-70% of the original public housing tenants (Popkin et al. 2009). The Bush Administration substantially slashed funding for the program while cities continued to demolish public housing as an economic development strategy devoid of any corresponding equity, redistribution, or anti-poverty agenda. By the time Katrina hit, demolition strategies looked a lot like the HOPE VI St. Thomas redevelopment in New Orleans, where 80% of original tenants were displaced and a Wal-Mart replaced the accompanying independent business commercial development strategy in order to make the financing on the project work. When Enterprise and Providence agreed to redevelop Lafitte, they committed to one-for-one unit replacement against HUD’s wishes, and were required to follow a narrowly tailored site development strategy rather than develop a broader community organizing and planning component as the Network had intended. Despite their best intentions to thwart a far less equitable outcome in Tremé/Lafitte, they were nonetheless reviled by their former Network allies who saw their actions as complicit in a larger process of neoliberal urban restructuring (e.g., Sinha 2009).

Meanwhile, community organizers in post-Katrina New Orleans had no alternative development vision for physically devastated neighborhoods unfit to house displaced residents. Their focus was and continues to be bringing residents back to New Orleans by any means necessary. From this their broader activism has evolved into an effort to stop patterns of displacement of the urban poor in the first place, and to improve the conditions of their lives such that post-Katrina-like outcomes will not be replicated. Similarly, the Equity & Inclusion Campaign has sought to build the strength of local community institutions – both its leaders and
its organizations – such that they possess the political power to determine the fate of their neighborhoods.

The Emerald Cities coalition also appears to have learned from the shocking displacement and aggressive privatization policies that followed Katrina. The three ECC principles – green, democratic, equitable – reveal a commitment to physical development in neighborhoods that does not require the replacement of its current residents with a more desirable stratum, and a corresponding human development investment via political organizing. It also seeks to strengthen the overall policy climate so that equitable development principles are enshrined in practice, and urban poor communities of color are actually prioritized in green urban retrofits. This prioritization is not simply because poor communities should receive redistributive investment from a moral or normative perspective, but because green upgrades in their communities are beneficial for cities and society, more broadly. In this framing, urban poor communities are potential assets for entire cities and regions, not due to their reclamation by the well-off, but because investing in them for the sake of the people who live there improves the overall environment and economy.

Berrey (2005) shows how in one racially diverse but gentrifying neighborhood in Chicago, the concept of diversity was variously booster rhetoric to attract whites to the city, a way for progressive white activists to critique structural inequality, and a means to obscure the discourse used by low-income black residents who spoke of racial discrimination and their rights as tenants. A discourse of rights is growing in urban scholarship (Bratt et al. 2006; see also Somers and Roberts 2008 on the need for a “new sociology of rights”) and practice (Right to the City Alliance 2010, Graham 2009). In an earlier paper I argued that the contentious politics of post-Katrina New Orleans, especially concerning the future of public housing, revealed that spatially-
organized class inequality in the lives of the marginalized urban poor brought about by neoliberal urban restructuring oriented them towards transnational, pro-poor activism (Graham 2007a). My argument was that social polarization and racial and economic exclusion in cities (Sassen 2001, Robinson and Harris 2000) led the U.S. urban poor to conclude they had more in common with the global poor than they did with the vague, middle-class voting bloc at home. I stipulated that advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; see also Kay 2005; Appadurai 2001; Wekerle 2004) bridging New Orleans, Caracas and Nairobi (site of the 2007 World Social Forum) at that time constituted a network of pro-poor activists in a “global grid of cities” pursuing a “politics of contestation embedded in specific places” (Sassen 1999: 191, 193) but trans-local in its execution.

Transnational and national activism emerging out of New Orleans such as the Right to the City Alliance and May Day NOLA is grounded in a discourse of rights. Regional and national political coalitions like Emerald Cities and the Equity & Inclusion Campaign have not embraced this rights framework explicitly, but nonetheless have re-centered the voices of and power of communities of color in their political agendas. In effect, they aim to reclaim the power of these urban poor places, to recapture the “productive force” of urban space (Brenner 2000) for and with the people who live in these neighborhoods. Space remains “an object of political struggle” (Fox Gotham 2003) in urban restructuring, but the movements rising out of Katrina begin with the principle that urban poor communities have the right to their homes, an expectation of equity in living in those places, and can provide benefits to the larger region on their own terms.

Lesson #3: Overcoming Institutional Distrust and Building Power

Civil society distrust and conflict was arguably an equal or bigger obstacle than the neoliberal for the Network in realizing their movement aims in post-Katrina New Orleans. New
Orleans-based scholars Hirsch (2009) and Nelson et al. (2007) document the enormous difficulty in recovery planning and reconstruction due to historical legacies of governmental distrust and racial, class and neighborhood conflict in New Orleans. This intense distrust extended to outsiders, experts, and other well-resourced disaster responders seeking to participate in recovery. Even as local groups verbalized a desire to work with and be supported by outside organizations, they struggled to conceptualize how such a partnership might work, being used to a history of policy violence, intense competition for resources, and government corruption that continually undermined and destabilized New Orleans’ low-income black neighborhoods. One Creole activist clearly articulated the pointed distinction and apparent contradiction between institutional support and local legitimacy in a Shelterforce article celebrating indigenous activism in the region:

"Community groups that start from the dirt they stand on and are neither tied to funders nor to institutions are the majority of organizations on the ground prompting real levels of solution building through civic engagement."—Colette Pichon-Battle, Moving Forward Gulf Coast, Slidell, La., and Center for Social Inclusion local partner (Khan 2007)

The first 15 months after Hurricane Katrina proved too brief a period to develop processes of building trust between Network members, especially national and local organizations and/or organizations prioritizing development versus those prioritizing organizing. In the years that followed, the Equity & Inclusion Campaign, with development support from the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation and Oxfam America, prioritized building relationships of trust and partnership among organizations across a tri-state region. The Campaign did this by repeatedly bringing groups together and supporting them financially to develop a common agenda for redevelopment. The fact that these organizations shared the experience of Katrina’s havoc and were working towards a concrete outcome of developing a policy platform created some necessary parameters and gave the groups a helpful focus around which relationships could
grow. The Campaign was incubated for two years until member groups elected their own Board and hired a new Director; financial support was extended for a period of time after independence in order to give the Campaign time to develop alternative sources of support. This process took over two years.

Durable inter-racial political or trans-local coalitions like this are not impossible, but they require time, reliable financial support, safe space and strategic coordination. Overcoming prior histories of racial or class conflict is essential, and typically requires setting aside time for what can prove to be painful, emotional work. Thompson (2005) argues that this “deep democracy” work begins within communities, as they explore and grapple with their internal inequalities and oppression. Guinier and Torres (2002) advance a theory of relational power, or a “power-with” model of building and sharing power within groups who view power as a mode of resistance to oppression rather than as a power exercised over others to gain a particular desired outcome. Like Thompson, the authors’ vision of shared collective power involves setting aside spaces for internal struggle and “experimentation.” In both models of developing democratic principles and processes within and between racial groups, time, reflection, critique, and analysis are essential to building trust and subsequent power to resist domination.

The problem of a lack of trust between communities and professionals in community development is well-established (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999). The institutionalization of the field has led to disproportionate power concentrated at the top of the CD system, as well as the uneven development of CD leadership, with whites overrepresented (e.g., Shaw and Spence 2004) in a sector that predominantly serves and is rooted in low-income communities of color. These field-level power disparities in CD leadership and authority were transported to New Orleans with the activation of the Network. Furthermore, the majority of organizational members
operated from a traditional “power-over” framework (Guinier and Torres 2002), engaging in contests to wrestle control of the Network’s actions or failing to engage with other Network members because they were not valued as equal partners – whether consciously or otherwise. This conflict over control and authority was exacerbated by resident displacement, as there was little actual “voice” to ally with or to endorse particular Network organizations. The resource differentials between grassroots groups and most of the national responders was also debilitating, as community-based organizations wanted financial support but the freedom to freely experiment with philanthropic dollars and external donors expected relatively clear plans for uses of funds.

The sense of urgency that disasters evoke further undermined the required work needed for the Network to build the requisite trust to underwrite their movement aims. As national organizations moved rapidly to counteract federal government machinations or to fill the void left by an incapacitated local government, and local groups moved to stake their claim to survivor populations and damaged neighborhoods, few organizations believed there was time to move slowly and carefully and build relationships based on shared understanding and necessary critiques and acknowledgement of institutionalized inequalities within the Network. With good intentions and moral outrage, organizations moved rapidly to stake their claim in the contentious recovery politics of post-Katrina New Orleans in order to shore up money, land, and support for displaced residents. The motivating principle here was to gain power over the recovery process on behalf of displaced residents, and to take that power away from an ideological, neoliberal state, as if power is zero-sum.

Rethinking power as shared, generative (Guinier and Torres 2002), and exponential is unfamiliar and disarming, perhaps especially for disadvantaged groups used to being exploited by well-intended (white) liberals who may be necessary for effective political alliances. For
whites or other privileged groups (e.g., professionals), willingness to examine their own privilege and to hear difficult critiques and to share decision-making, authority, and to learn and recognize alternative ways of doing will be difficult and not necessarily welcome. Guinier and Torres (2002) recommend centering the experiences of racially marginalized groups as indicative of social processes and structures that put all of society at risk. The disproportionate suffering of low-income, African-Americans and the media characterization of New Orleans as a “Third World” city undermined the possibilities for outsiders’ identification with and empathy (versus sympathy) for survivors and exacerbated racially polarized understandings of the disaster (Dawson 2006). Displacement further distanced low-income New Orleanians from responders acting on their behalf. In the years since and in non-disaster community settings, racial, occupational and geographic insider-outsider dichotomies still exist, but organizations and leaders typically have more time, resources, and agency to approach coalition-building differently. Inherent in this opportunity is the need to explore the institutionalized inequalities in the marketized, caregiving, housing development-centered CD field, as well as the “situated social positions” of field actors (Young 2002). Katrina exposed the fractures in the field and the missing basic building block of trust in collective action.

**From CD Institutionalization to Renewed Movement Possibilities**

Dreier (1999) posits that the community development field needs to be joined to a larger political movement for social justice. The community development sector is undergoing a generational shift as its original movement entrepreneurs age out. This new generation is less attached to and has been less influenced by the movements of the 1960s and 1970s than their elders, and, as described by Highlander Center youth activists (personal communication, June 2008), are grappling with new ways of understanding urban inequality and the potential for inter-
racial organizing and movement building. International boundaries are ever more porous today, and the field’s earlier internationalist spirit – in the form of pan-Africanism – is echoed in the increasing ethno-racial diversity of US cities (e.g., Shamsuddin 2007) and of social justice activism in the U.S. today. New urban social movements revolve around environmental justice and economic human rights, and a new generation of professional leadership is being cultivated in the Hurricane Katrina recovery process. Yet, the CD field has become deeply embedded in neoliberal processes of urban restructuring even as it has reiterated its moral commitment to low-income urban communities, and as public funds have dried up, financial and philanthropic sector dollars have played an increasingly important role in financing affordable housing production. Community organizing has been radicalized within the field, and often operates on separate but parallel tracks from community development practice, or has been retooled towards consensus building or developing social capital.

Yet, the mechanisms of institutionalization examined in this dissertation – the marketization of community development, the reformation of poverty, and the radicalization of community organizing – have opened up new spaces of resistance and empowerment for CD practice. This suggests a new movement potential for community development, linked closely to urban social movements and making equitable use of the professionals, activists, and competing repertoires that characterize the field.

Community development’s engagement with the neoliberal political economy has strategically situated professionals and activists within the system to push for social change, to attempt to transform neoliberalism at “its core.” This might include taking the financial and negotiating skills developed in the sector and devising innovative new financing streams and legislation to fund deep green retrofits in urban poor communities. It might resemble legal
activists skilled in defending the use value (Logan and Molotch 1987) of housing developing a
theory of economic human rights and building a social movement dedicated to the preservation
and government expansion of public housing. It could mean local community leaders tiring of
endlessly competing for resources in a global political economy of place competition and
building a coordinated campaign to advocate for regional equitable development. It might look
like unions responding to their on-going decline by extending their organizing and development
resources into communities where they can seed community empowerment and build their
membership. All of these possibilities suggest new or renewed sources of funds coming into
low-income urban communities, thereby diluting the relative dominance of the philanthropic
sector and loosening the reliance on social services to ameliorate poverty in the absence of
productive development and organizing activity. They also suggest increased political power to
push back on external interests aiming to incorporate low-income neighborhoods into larger
urban restructuring initiatives (e.g., Fraser et al. 2003).

The growing discourse of rights should be encouraged in housing and community
development as a means of shifting neoliberal ideologies. Rights-based frameworks are familiar
to liberal individualists but economic human rights require positive government intervention
(Somers and Roberts 2008) and thus demand a renewed level of state responsibility for solving
social inequality. Rights-based frameworks also transcend global boundaries and are linked to
transnational social activism connecting cities and the urban poor worldwide. It is a shared
mobilizing framework that reframes housing as a commodity and healthcare as a privilege as
rights, thereby suggesting a basic fiduciary responsibility on the part of the state to fulfill them.
Opinion research demonstrates U.S. public support for human rights (The Opportunity Agenda
2007; Graham 2009), though economic human rights frameworks are still relatively unfamiliar.
Scholarly exploration and advancement of the possibilities of rights-based discourse and how it might re-energize community development could do much to advance it. This ideational shift will not be easy, but the energy and activism is there, even when not made explicit. The broader agenda should be to continue community development’s shift back to valuing low-income communities of color as intrinsically vital to cities and regions, rather than as problematic or unsupportable places requiring amelioration or the infusion of middle-class residents. Reflected in this transition is a renewed commitment to the rights of low-income urban residents to the city, and to the equitable development of their own neighborhoods within a broader vibrant region.

Lastly, little of this will be possible without a deep internal accounting and transformation of the CD field. Too many organizations and leaders have been worn down by the last thirty years of neoliberal expansion, stuck in their narrow technocratic capacities or unable to build relationships with individuals and groups that are racially, occupationally or culturally different. White and/or middle-class leadership in the field would do well to collectively revisit their original motivations for pursuing such complex and difficult but potentially rewarding work, and more resources should be allocated towards the processes of deep democracy and small group democratic experimentation that Thompson (2005) and Guinier and Torres (2002) describe. Furthermore, time, space and resources should be set aside for questioning and developing theories and structures of power within the field, e.g., how capture by the financial sector, liberal philanthropic prominence, overrepresentation by whites in positions of leadership, and narrow conceptions of participation all limit the social change possibilities of a movement once committed to community self-determination. The premise of self-determination should also be interrogated. Is community self-determination what we know the CD field to be about today?
The original synthesis included the recognition that a thriving local community led to broader social and economic integration (Tabb 1970). This may need revisiting for new generations of CD leadership trained to think about metropolitanism, regionalism, income mixing, and global integration. Internal democratic deliberation within the field could again make the case for a conception of shared power reflected in strong local urban communities that are politically and economically connected with their surrounding region. We should also explore how an economic human rights framework might alter this original movement goal.

The specific case of Hurricane Katrina and the community development Network’s difficulty renewing their movement goals in New Orleans suggests a reconstruction of neoliberal theories to understand the development of spaces of resistance within the neoliberal political economy by those operating within it. It also fills a gap in the community development literature where theories of power are underdeveloped, and aims to extend community development scholarship’s focus on institutional inequalities of race and class to an internal focus on how these inequalities shape and constrain the field. Lastly, it suggests that periods of crisis such as that first “lost” year after Hurricane Katrina do not generate the best environmental conditions for movement activism (similarly, see Birkland 1998 on disasters’ shortcomings as policy focusing events).

What we can learn from this case is what disasters reveal about society’s shortcomings, including the limitations of the CD field to challenge the state, to bridge the development-organizing dichotomy, or to truly support resident empowerment. Fortunately, these lessons appear to have been internalized, and the “democratic moment” after Katrina is indeed still ongoing. As CD evolves, it should connect with urban social movements emphasizing environmental and economic justice and rights, recommit to a more equitable policy environment, and embrace its leadership change as an avenue to rethink how power is structured.
in the field. As it enters its fifth decade in our highly unequal post-Katrina world, the community development movement’s potential remains strong.
Afterword

Reflections on the Extended Case Method and Participant Observation

The extended case method (ECM) is an ethnographic, politically engaged, reflexive model of research driven by theory, using participant-observation as its primary technique (Burawoy 1998). Its value is in extending theories, that is, bringing to light new insights or filling gaps in existing theories. Anomalous cases are particularly valuable. Researchers are encouraged to study social situations that challenge existing theory (Tavory and Timmermans 2009).

Motivated by the outrageous, infuriating displays of personal suffering in the days following the city’s flooding due to the hurricane breaching the municipal levee system, as well as my past professional experience as a recovery program practitioner in post-9/11 Lower Manhattan, I decided to get involved in a planning effort led by Professor Phil Thompson, one of a range of MIT initiatives to come together in response to Hurricane Katrina. I was one of multiple students who would come to work with Professor Thompson in New Orleans and the Network examined here. But I also entered New Orleans through two theoretical entry points laid out in chapter 1, political economic and liberal democratic theories that assess the limits to and opportunities of community development. In 2005, I was more familiar with the dominant theoretical lens in community development, that of mainstream liberal perspectives that celebrate the advancement of the field due to the rationalizing role of community development intermediaries (Walker 1993, Liou and Stroh 1998), the value of tax-credit development in improving low-income communities, and the asset building role of community development (Ferguson and Dickens 1999). I was also becoming aware of political critiques that analyzed the structural deficiencies of community development in realizing its movement aims (Stoecker 1997, O’Connor 1999, Newman and Lake 2006) and even in meeting minimal housing production standards. I went to
New Orleans understanding the political economy critiques but steeped in liberal practice from my past role as a community development practitioner.

By using the theory-driven extended case method, I was surprised by the organized and pronounced resistance to the interrelated entry of a national community development intermediary (as well as other well-resourced, liberal, outsider Network members) into the devastated city and the plans for demolition and redevelopment of the city’s public housing. CD intermediaries are celebrated in urban scholarship as “the single most important story” in the professionalization of the CD sector (Walker 1993: 370). They are rightfully credited with bringing important and valuable housing production capacity to the CDC field. They are less frequently critiqued as crowding out “…smaller organizations, those with more radical agendas, and those representing more marginalized constituencies” in order to minimize investor risk in the CD field (Newman and Lake 2006: 56). Similarly, HOPE VI, the signature mixed-income redevelopment strategy as part of de-concentration policy was championed in scholarship and practice as “a bold effort…to improve the life chances of [public housing] families…in becoming self-sufficient and improving their economic circumstances (Popkin et al. 2004)” (Popkin et al. 2009: 478). By the time Katrina hit, the HOPE VI literature was equivocal on the positive outcomes of demolition and redevelopment of public housing (Popkin et al. 2004, Bennett et al. 2006). But the dominant argument in practice and scholarship persisted that deconcentration policy and community development practice emphasizing housing production improved low-income communities and the lives of low-income residents.

To my surprise, I discovered via participant observation in post-Katrina New Orleans strong local and national resistance to marketized and philanthropic community development practices and to deconcentration policy, especially the demolition of structurally sound public housing.
This came from volunteering with direct action activists dedicated to the preservation and reopening of public housing, as well as from watching the Network divide into opposing camps between those who planned to sue the federal government to stop demolition and those who planned to negotiate control of one of the projects to try to bring equitable redevelopment to Tremé/Lafitte. I learned of this resistance to this pragmatic, physical development-oriented latter solution as a member of the Network. But I also experienced a corresponding cognitive dissonance to the redevelopment plans given the Network’s unifying rhetoric concerning the failure of the federal government to do right by New Orleans and New Orleanians.

Furthermore, my cognitive dissonance also came from hearing the espoused movement building aims of the Network, especially concerning the organizing of the diaspora, evoked in a setting of closed door meetings between professional organizations. When we would travel as a group to survey the Lafitte public housing development in Tremé as we wondered and strategized about HUD’s plans to reopen the site, I felt like a “speculator” at the same time as I believed in the organizing and empowerment message at the heart of the Network’s redevelopment efforts.

Indeed, I came to develop strong personal concerns about network members’ willingness to redevelop Lafitte, based on my own work volunteering with direct action public housing activists. One of these activists after she learned of MIT’s association with Enterprise and Providence from several press reports on MIT’s website (Brown 2006, MIT News 2006) publicly chastised me and MIT over an activist listserv. Several months later she published a scathing critique of MIT on Indymedia (Cook 2006) in response to an interview with MIT systems professor Yossi Sheffi – no relation to DUSP – in which Sheffi lambasted New Orleans as a “basket case” (Shorow 2006). Her Indymedia article made the media rounds within the academic
urban planning field. Experiential discoveries like this are especially valuable in participant-
observation grounded in theory as undertaken in the extended case method. My own inter-
subjective analyses as the researcher embedded in the Network proved essential to extending 
community development theories based on this anomalous case.

By using ECM and participant observation, I came to see the limits and opportunities of 
community development practice and activism, especially by witnessing and experiencing the 
cultural and strategic schisms within the field over the value of leading with physical 
development versus prioritizing political organizing. As a white, Northeast based woman 
researcher and consultant from an elite university, I also experienced directly the race and class 
conflicts embodied in community development practice, including within the Network, and how 
these inequalities can be reproduced through practice and in urban space. In New Orleans 
specifically, where my fellow MIT student colleagues were comparing the aftermath to 
conditions rivaling a foreign country (Bavishi et al. 2006), I was not alone in feeling like an ex-
pat in a foreign country (Graham 2006c, Graham 2006d, Graham 2006e), not merely because of 
the disorienting racial politics and chaotic recovery politics of the struggling city, but because as 
ex-pats comes a degree of freedom to roam, explore and negotiate one’s way in society that is 
intrinsically tied to power inequalities based on race, class, and geographic differences.

Through this I realized the absence of frank analysis of the role of race, class and similar 
cultural factors in community development scholarship, even when it is critiquing schisms such 
as the development-organizing dichotomy (e.g., Stoecker 1997) or the tensions between locals 
and outsiders (e.g., Fraser et al. 2003). I also came to discover the over simplification in 
neoliberal critiques between urban restructurers and grassroots resisters. The individual 
organizational representatives I worked with in the Network, particularly those national leaders
advocating for leading with physical development, those most likely to embrace marketized practices, evoked complex analyses of the problems and solutions in post-Katrina New Orleans, ranging from an “apartheid economy” and “global capitalism” but requiring top-down, large-scale development intervention in order to stave off further dislocation and disenfranchisement of urban poor New Orleanians and to build the “organizational capacity” of the local CD sector.

Being a participant-observer on the ground revealed the mismatch between professionalized practices and movement rhetoric and pointed to the multi-dimensional character and coexisting tensions of community development practice often lost in legitimate critiques of its role in urban restructuring. Even as community development practice has become complicit in neoliberalism, it has offered new opportunities for urban social movement activism. In the period following that first year after Hurricane Katrina, this activism has grown substantially.
Appendix

Map 1: Planning Districts, New Orleans.

Tremé/Lafitte, Tulane/Gravier, and Central City highlighted in red circle.

Tremé/Lafitte and Tulane/Gravier highlighted in black circle.

Data sources: Poverty rates (Census 2000), water & parish boundaries (Census Tiger files), neighborhood boundaries (adapted from City Planning Commission of New Orleans)

Note on poverty: People living below twice the poverty threshold includes all individuals whose family has income that is lower than twice the poverty threshold for that size family. Because poverty thresholds are generally considered to be flawed and have not been appropriately adjusted since they were created in 1964, twice the poverty threshold is commonly used as a rough proxy for a living wage.

Note on percentage groups: Groupings of percents were selected using the "natural-breaks" method. This statistical method minimizes the within-grouping variation and maximizes the between-grouping variation using an iterative series of calculations.

Note on HANO developments: This poverty data is from 2000 and does not reflect changes in Housing Authority of New Orleans housing developments.

Note on population density: Because parts of New Orleans East are sparsely populated and have larger block groups, percentages may be misleading as they represent only a small number of people.
Table 1: Organizations in the CD Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org#</th>
<th>Organization in 2005-6</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>2006 Net Assets (unless otherwise noted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ACORN</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Advancement Project</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 4,230,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>$1,000,000,000 (NO Commitment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Project Home Again</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$ 20,000,000 (NO Commitment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/6</td>
<td>Community Housing</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 29,998,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Common Ground</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 259,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Enterprise Community Partners (ECP)</td>
<td>Columbia, MD</td>
<td>$ 158,833,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Ford Foundation</td>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>$ 11,883,270,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Greater New Orleans Foundation</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 133,287,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>$ 19,685,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Loyola Law Clinic</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Cambridge, MA</td>
<td>$ 8,368,066,000 (Endowment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Neighborhood Housing Services of New Orleans</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 6,970,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NeighborWorks America</td>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>$ 11,041,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>New Orleans Housing Emergency</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>New Orleans Network</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Oxfam America</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>$ 81,077,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Formerly Community Labor United</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PICO-LIFT</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>PolicyLink</td>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>$ 4,138,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$3,076,074,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Service Employees International Union</td>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>$ 54,605,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The Jeremiah Group / Industrial Areas Foundation</td>
<td>Jefferson Parish, LA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Tulane School of Architecture / Tulane City Center</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ 807,000,000 (Endowment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ujamaa CDC</td>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>$ (400,215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC)</td>
<td>Cambridge, MA</td>
<td>$ 18,238,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Vanguard Public Foundation</td>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>$ (2,222,116)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 3: NEWCITY Neighborhood Partnership, Tremé/Lafitte and Tulane/Gravier (Post-Katrina).

Table 2: NEWCITY Neighborhood Partners and Affiliates
* Indicates Steering Committee Member

AFL – CIO
American Red Cross
Ascension Health
Bank of America
Basin Street Station
Broad Community Connections*
Carver Theater
Catholic Charities
Christopher Holmes
Daughters of Charity
Dooky Chase
Downtown Development Group
Enterprise Community Partners*
Fannie Mae*
Finance Authority of New Orleans
Freddie Mac
Friends of Lafitte Corridor*
Greater New Orleans Foundation
Greater Tremé Consortium*
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO)
J.P. Morgan Chase*
Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation*
Louisiana Housing and Finance Authority
Louisiana Institute of Film Technology
Louisiana Public Health Institute
Louisiana Recovery Authority
Louisiana State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Neighborhood Housing Services of America CDFI NeighborWorks*
New Orleans Area Habitat for Humanity
New Orleans Police and Justice Foundation*
New Orleans Redevelopment Authority*
NewCorp Inc.
Office of Recovery and Development Admin*
Order of Malta
Orleans Parish School Board
Phoenix of New Orleans*
Pico Louisiana
Providence Community Housing*
Puentes CDC/The Hispanic Apostolate
Qatar Tremé – Covenant House
Rebuilding Together
Recovery School District
Salvation Army
St. Joseph – Tulane/Canal NDC*
St. Peter Claver/Ujamaa CDC
The KIPP New Orleans Schools*
Total Community Action/Headstart
Tulane University
University of New Orleans
University of Pennsylvania
Urban League of Greater New Orleans*
Veterans’ Affairs
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