On Death Ground: Why Weak States Resist Great Powers
Explaining Coercion Failure in Asymmetric Interstate Conflict

by

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ABSTRACT

Great Powers often adopt coercive strategies, threatening or using limited force to convince weak states to comply with their demands. While coercive strategies have succeeded in just over half of asymmetric crises since World War I, there remain a number of cases in which weak states have chosen to resist. With their tremendous military advantage, why is it that Great Powers so often fail to coerce weak states? While a high probability of victory in war gives them the leverage to make high level demands of a weak target, concession to such demands can threaten the very survival of the weaker state, its regime, or its regime leadership. Perceiving its survival to be threatened at any level, a target will likely resist, so long as it has the means to do so.

Commitment problems have also been cited as an explanation for why states cannot reach peaceful agreements. Yet Great Powers have, in fact, largely been able to overcome commitment issues in asymmetric conflicts by forming coalitions, by involving third party Great Powers in negotiations, making incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and taking diplomatic measures to reduce the target’s audience costs.

Finally, externalities such as international norms against invading a sovereign state without first seeking resolution through the United Nations have increased the costs to a Great Power for employing a brute force war strategy. In such cases, in fact, a Great Power may first choose a coercive strategy designed to fail in order to obtain justification for its preferred strategy of war.

To reach these conclusions, I introduce a game theoretic model for asymmetric coercion, calculate equilibrium conditions, and formulate hypotheses for coercion failure based on survival and commitment issues. I create a data set of 116 asymmetric cases from 1918 to 2003 and then conduct ordered probit regressions to test predictions of survival and commitment hypotheses. I then conduct extensive qualitative case studies from the recent asymmetric conflicts between the United States and the states of Iraq, Serbia, and Libya.

Thesis Supervisor: Barry Posen
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been engaged militarily against much weaker states in conflicts in Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S., as a Great Power with vastly superior military capability, has invaded and imposed its will in over half of these conflicts. Invasion, however, is a costly and risky venture and in the modern world, the material gains from conquest appear limited. It was in this context that the U.S. opted for limited air strikes in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Although these coercive strategies were to deliver less ambitious objectives, they also cost less in U.S. blood and treasure. Coercion held the promise of foreign policy gains while avoiding the hefty costs of invasion and occupation. And, as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, occupation can prove even more costly than invasion.

Great Powers routinely target weak states by adopting a variety of strategies to achieve their foreign policy objectives, which may range from relatively minor policy changes on the part of the weak state to higher demands for homeland territory or regime change. The United States has been the Great Power most frequently involved in these asymmetric conflicts, being responsible for a third of all crises since the end of World War I and for almost all such lopsided conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In asymmetric crises, Great Powers most often choose a strategy of coercion, threatening or using limited force to convince target states to comply with their demands. For coercion to succeed, however, the target must concede to the demands of the powerful challenger. Though coercive strategies have succeeded in just over half of all asymmetric crises, there still remain a significant number of cases in which weak states have resisted and the
crises have been decided by brute force invasion or ended in a foreign policy failure for the Great Power. With such an enormous advantage in military power, why do Great Powers so often fail to coerce weak states into doing their will?

With its vast military superiority, a Great Power’s probability of victory and its expected outcome from an asymmetric war are great. As a result, a powerful challenger has the coercive leverage to make high level demands of a weak target state. Such demands, however, if conceded, may threaten the survival of the target state. And even if demands do not threaten state survival, the very act of conceding may well threaten the survival of the target regime, as it may be perceived as weak by a domestic opposition group plotting revolt. Concession may also prove to be costly for the target’s leader, weakening his control over the ruling regime and threatening his own survival. As a consequence, when a target state perceives its survival to be threatened at any level, it will likely resist, so long as it has the means to do so.

In asymmetric conflicts, only the Great Power has the military power to threaten the survival of the weak state. As such, it is the Great Power that determines whether to accommodate a weak state over the issue at hand or to escalate the conflict into a crisis. If the powerful challenger chooses the latter, it then has a range of foreign policy options available, from non-military strategies of diplomacy, inducements or sanctions, to military strategies of coercion or brute force. A rational challenger chooses coercion when the expected outcome, i.e. the net of benefits to costs, is greater as compared to other foreign policy options. This is only the case, however, when it assesses the target as likely to concede to its demands. Since a target will not likely concede to its own demise, the objectives that a Great Power can obtain through coercion are lower than
those that it can gain from a brute force strategy. The challenger’s high costs of a brute force war, however, which involve invasion and occupation, are usually greater than the more moderate costs associated with coercion. Therefore, Great Powers often prefer coercive strategies with limited aims and lower costs to the more costly option of brute force war.

When considering the coercive demands it will make of a target, a rational challenger recognizes and refrains from making demands likely to be resisted by the target. When it assesses its demands as too high, the challenger can either lower its aims and/or increase its threats. Alternatively, if the target is still likely to resist and the issue is sufficiently important, the Great Power should adopt a brute force strategy to achieve its objective. Yet, in the real world, Great Powers often do adopt coercive strategies which fail.

Why states fail to resolve their conflicts peacefully, why wars occur, and how wars terminate remain critical questions in international relations. Academic research has focused either on how states, regimes, and individual leaders fail to behave rationally or why states cannot rationally reach agreements either to prevent or to end war. In recent years, commitment problems have increasingly been cited to explain why states cannot reach peaceful agreements. This commitment argument proposes that Great Powers operating in an anarchic international environment cannot make credible promises to abide by the terms of an agreement, even when it is in their \textit{ex ante} interests to do so. Given the great disparity in power in asymmetric conflicts, commitment problems are particularly likely to arise for a Great Power, a conundrum dubbed \textit{Goliath’s curse}.\footnote{Sechser, Todd S. (forthcoming) “Goliath’s Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive Threats” \textit{International Organization}}
Targeted states at the negotiating table understand that once the terms of an agreement have been implemented, incentives may then exist for the Great Power to make additional demands. Expecting that concession to an initial demand will only lead to further demands, the target resists.

Yet in the majority of the asymmetric crises since the end of World War I, weak states have conceded to the coercive demands of Great Powers. Great Powers have, in fact, largely been able to overcome commitment problems through a variety of measures including the formation of coalitions, the inclusion of third party Great Powers in negotiations, the offering of incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and efforts to reduce the audience costs of a target’s leadership for making concessions.

To understand why coercion fails it is essential not only to explain why weak states resist, but also why Great Powers do not always recognize situations in which coercive strategies are likely to fail and why they do not instead adopt alternative foreign policy options such as accommodation or a brute force strategy of war. Misperception, miscalculation, and uncertainty explain why a Great Power may mistakenly or unluckily choose a coercive strategy which subsequently fails. There are other cases, however, in which a Great Power chooses to coerce with the belief that such a strategy will almost certainly fail and is counting on the target’s resistance to provide a justification for war. Externalities stemming from international norms against invading sovereign states without first seeking resolution through the United Nations increase the cost for a Great Power to adopt a brute force strategy without a casus belli. This was the situation in the lead-up to the Gulf War in late 1990 when the Bush administration demanded Iraq abide by the UN Security Council Resolution to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. Saddam
Hussein’s refusal provided justification for the subsequent U.S.-led invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{2} In sum, a Great Power may first adopt a coercive strategy designed to fail in order to decrease the diplomatic and domestic costs for its preferred strategy of a brute force war.

In the next section, I begin to further develop these explanations for coercion failure and in the final section, I outline the chapters which follow.

**ASYMMETRIC COERCION THEORY**

In this section I lay the foundation for a theory of asymmetric coercion by first defining key terms, identifying explanatory variables of demands and threats, and organizing these concepts into a typology of coercion. This provides a method for classifying the universe of coercion cases into a coherent framework for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I also define the dependent variable of *foreign policy outcome* and examine limits on coercive force and alternative foreign policy options: accommodation, inducements, economic sanctions, and brute force military operations. I conclude this chapter by examining explanations for coercion failure and develop criteria for testing two hypotheses for coercion failure.

**TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND A TYPOLOGY OF COERCION**

*Asymmetric Conflict*

This research focuses on interstate conflict, for which the distribution of power between states is such that the powerful can threaten the survival of the weaker, but not

\textsuperscript{2} Sometimes such a strategy does not succeed. In the lead-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. made coercive demands that Iraq abandon its WMD or face regime change. When Saddam chose to abide by the UNSC resolution, this denied George W. Bush justification for war. Bush chose to invade, regardless, and accepted the condemnation of the international community.
vice versa. A powerful state is one capable of a conventional military invasion to occupy a weak state. While asymmetry is primarily determined by relative military power, other factors such as distance, geography, and climatology can affect the ability of the powerful state to project its military might.

By contrast, the weaker state cannot threaten the survival of the powerful state though vital security interests may still be at stake. For example, following September 11th further terrorist attacks has remained a vital security concern for the United States but is still not a survival issue. While another attack would prove painful, even the worst case scenario of a terrorist group detonating a nuclear device in a metropolitan area, even in Washington, D.C., would not result in the demise of the United States.

An additional insight into the dynamics of asymmetric conflict recognizes that, while the powerful state may have the military advantage, the weaker state generally has higher interests at stake which can translate into greater resolve. Resolve is a measure of the willingness of a state to suffer the costs of war.

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4 In this dissertation I do not consider asymmetry caused by nuclear weapons, for two reasons. Though the U.S. and other Great Powers possess the capability to destroy a state through a barrage of nuclear weapons, the nuclear option has been reserved almost exclusively for deterrence and only rarely against weaker states for compellence. Since cases of compellence comprise 90% of asymmetric crises, cases of nuclear compellence in asymmetric crises is rare. One example of nuclear compellence was the Soviet Union’s threatening missile strikes against Israel, as well as France and England, during the Suez crisis in November of 1956. International Crisis Behavior project crisis 152 Suez nationalization, www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb
5 For further discussion on the differences between survival and vital interests see Freeman, Chas W (1997) Arts of Power. Statecraft and Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington 9-14
when its survival is threatened. Thus the powerful state’s military advantage in some cases may be offset by the weaker state’s greater interests at stake which generates greater resolve to resist and to suffer. Asymmetric conflicts are thus not solely concerned with relative differences in state’s military power but also the interests at stake and the costs which states are willing to endure.

**Definition and Typology of Coercion**

In an asymmetric conflict, the powerful state often finds coercion to be an attractive option. Coercion is an instrument of statecraft employed to achieve foreign policy objectives. While prominent theorists vary in their definition of coercion, the definition I adopt as most suitable for this project emphasizes that coercion *threatens force or uses limited force to convince a target to comply with demands.*

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9 Though the target typically has asymmetric interests and greater resolve than the challenger, this is not always the case, particularly when demands do not threaten target survival. For example, in 2003 Iraq was willing to allow UN inspectors back into country to verify that Iraq had abandoned its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Saddam’s resolve to maintain the ambiguity over his defunct WMD program did not outweigh the resolve of the Bush administration to use the issue of Iraqi WMD as its *casus belli* for invading and overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime.
10 I defer until later in this chapter alternative options to coercion, namely accommodation, inducements, sanctions, and brute force military operations.
11 This definition is consistent and integrates prominent theorists’ definitions of coercion. Thomas Schelling defines coercion in terms of a punishment strategy where coercion is “…the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” Schelling, Thomas (1966) *Arms and Influence* Yale University Press, New Haven, 3. Alexander George focuses on the more indirect use of violence in his definition of coercive diplomacy as “…the use of intimidation of one kind or another in order to get others to comply with one’s wishes…The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.” George, Alexander and William Simons (1994) *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* WestView Press, Boulder, 2. Thomas Freedman focuses on the freedom of the target of coercion to make decisions when he defines coercion as “…the potential or actual application of force to influence the action of a voluntary agent.” Freedman, Lawrence (2004) *Deterrence* Malden, MA: Polity Press 27. Robert Pape focuses on the calculations made by the target of coercion in his definition of coercion as “…efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits.” In addition for Pape “…‘coercion’ is the word I use to refer to the same concept as Schelling’s ‘compellence.’” Pape, Robert (1996) *Bombing to Win* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 4. Finally Daniel Byman’s focus is on behavior change by the target in his definition of “coercion as the use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would.” Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman (2002)
consists of an explicit or tacit ultimatum which informs the target what it must accomplish and what violent consequences will ensue should the target’s response not be to the challenger’s satisfaction.

The typology I develop consists of the three primary characteristics of coercion: the nature of the demand, the level of the demand, and the type of threat (Figure 1.1). This typology provides a framework for classifying cases and identifying and coding explanatory variables.

Figure 1.1: Typology of Coercion

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The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 30. My contribution is to point out this change in behavior is linked to the challenger’s demands, similar to what Clausewitz refers to for war, “...to compel our enemy to do our will.” Clausewitz, Carl von (1976) On War edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Book I, Chapter I, 2, 75
Nature of Coercive Demands: Compellence and Deterrence

A coercive strategy consists of both demands and threats. As to demands, they can be either compellent or deterrent in nature. Much has been written on the difference between compellence and deterrence. For this study, the key difference is whether the resulting concessions are observable. With compellence, demands are for the target to make an observable change in its behavior. Compellent demands include actions such as “stop”, “go back”, “give back” or “give up.” Two compellent demands were made in October of 1998 when the United States insisted Serbia reduce its deployed troops to pre-crisis levels and allow international monitors into Kosovo. Both the reduction in troop levels and admittance of monitors were observable Serbian concessions directly linked to U.S. demands.

By contrast, deterrent demands require the target to continue in its current actions. The deterrent demand is simply “don’t”. With nuclear deterrence, for example, the demand is “don’t launch your nuclear weapons.” The causal link between a challenger’s demands and target compliance is obscured, however, by the negative nature of the demands. Deterrent demands thus provide a target’s leader with plausible deniability which lowers both audience and reputation costs. Target leaders can comply with demands while claiming they had never planned to take any aggressive action. Deterrent

12 Schelling, Arms and Influence 69-78 provides the best explanation of the difference between compellence and deterrence and Posen, Barry (1996), “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters” International Security, 21:1. 80 provides an excellent description of why compellent demands are both greater demands and more difficult to communicate than deterrent demands.
13 Audience costs refer to the costs a leader suffers primarily by a domestic audience as a result of making concessions. James Fearon includes an international aspect to audience costs, however the main point of audience costs is that the costs are suffered domestically by the leader. Reputation costs are the expected future costs suffered by the target as a result of revealing its willingness to concede to the demands in the current crises. James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 581.
demands are thus relatively more palatable to the target, allowing it to more easily concede.

Unfortunately, this unobservable quality which makes compliance more likely also makes it more difficult for the challenger (and researchers) to determine whether it was the deterrent strategy which caused the target to comply. Deterrence can be expensive in terms of diplomatic and military commitments, making it essential to know the effectiveness of the strategy in gaining the desired outcome. In sum, while this Janus nature of compliance may make deterrence more effective, it also makes it more difficult to assess.  

The advantage of differentiating compellence and deterrence according to the observable quality of target compliance is that it avoids the problem of assessing compliance in terms of the status quo. Conventionally compellence has been defined as changing the status quo while deterrence maintains the status quo. The problem with this approach is that states often differ in their perception of the status quo and a demand which may be intended by the challenger as deterrent may be perceived by the target as compellent. For example, the United States pursued a policy of containment with Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S. established no-fly zones and deployed forces in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey to deter Iraq from further internal and external aggression. However, from Iraq’s perspective, U.S. demands were compellent, impinging on its sovereignty by demanding its military be removed from designated safe zones in the north and south and allowing UN inspectors access to confirm the dismantlement of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program.

14 I credit Ken Oye with providing me with this insight.
A final challenge in identifying the nature of a coercive demand lies in real world cases where there are elements of both compellence and deterrence. This is particularly true for compellent cases since, along with the explicit demand for the target to make an observable change, there is the accompanying implicit deterrent demand: “and don’t do it again.”

In sum, the combination of challenger and target disagreement over the status quo nature of demands and the fact that real world cases of coercion often contain both compellent and deterrent demands makes it difficult for the researcher to classify cases. However, this obstacle can be partially surmounted by focusing on the nature of the core demands made and assessing whether target concessions to these demands are observable.

**Level of Coercive Demands: Policy Change, Extra-Territory, Homeland, and Regime Change**

A second characteristic of coercive demands deals with the level of demands made. I adopt and modify the Correlates of War (COW) project coding which categorizes the level of demand as policy change, territory, or regime change. I further differentiate territorial demands as either extra-territory or homeland territory, since homeland territory typically holds a higher value for states. Demands for policy change and extraterritorial concessions are generally less costly for a target than higher level concessions of homeland territory or regime change, either of which is more likely to threaten the survival of a state, of its regime or of its leadership.

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16Faten Ghosn and Scott Bennett “Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, 3.10 27 September, 2007” [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/](http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) p.6. COW also codes reparation, which I code as policy change if this includes monetary or capital reparations and territory if territorial reparations.
In addition, in real world cases, it is not unusual for the challenger to make multiple demands. For instance, during the 1990s after the Gulf War, the U.S. made three demands of Iraq. Two demands were for policy change: that Iraq abide by the southern no-fly zone restrictions and the northern safe haven and that Iraq dismantle its WMD program. A third demand for regime change, made law by the U.S. Congress in 1998, declared the removal of Saddam Hussein to be a national security objective.\(^\text{17}\) Though this was the largest demand to be made of Iraq, containment and abandonment of WMD remained the core U.S. foreign policy objectives. In sum, classifying cases based on the level of demands depends on identifying the challenger’s core demands, i.e. those objectives which, once achieved, would result in the end of the crisis.\(^\text{18}\)

**Type of Coercive Threats: Punishment and Denial**

Regardless of the nature or level of demand, in order to be viable a threat must be credible enough to induce the target to comply. Two types of threats provide different coercive mechanisms for changing a target’s behavior: punishment and denial.\(^\text{19}\)

Punishment is “…the threat of damage, or of more damage to come.”\(^\text{20}\) The coercive mechanism is the threat of future punishment which must be sufficiently large and credible to convince the target that it is preferable to concede now rather than to endure further pain. Punishment strategies are aimed at altering the target’s cost benefit assessment. An advantage of employing a punishment strategy is that, when successful, it is less costly for the challenger than alternative strategies of denial or brute force

\(^{18}\) An alternative approach is to code each demand as separate cases. This is the approach taken by Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
\(^{19}\) Snyder, Glenn (1958) Deterrence by Denial and Punishment Center of International Studies Research Monograph No.1: Princeton
\(^{20}\) Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press, Arms and Influence
invasion. In fact, if threats alone are sufficient to induce concessions, the actual costs are quite low. Even when limited strikes are employed in a punishment strategy, the challenger’s costs are usually lower than the costs of invasion. For example, the air-only campaign over Kosovo cost the United States no combat fatalities and only a few aircraft destroyed or damaged.

The challenge for operationalizing a punishment strategy is to identify which key elements of the target to threaten (i.e. the targeting of the target state). I adopt a Clausewitzian framework for the state, disaggregating it into its regime (or government), its military, and its population. 21 A punishment strategy may threaten all three elements, but I will discuss only the regime and population. 22 First, with regard to the regime, a challenger may directly attack either its infrastructure (buildings, facilities, assets) or its leadership. An example of the latter is an air power decapitation strategy aimed directly at regime leadership. 23 As a punishment strategy decapitation succeeds if the expected cost of strikes, i.e. the leader’s death, convinces the regime leadership to make concessions while it is still viable and in power. 24

22 A challenger adopts a punishment strategy when it threatens a target’s military with the intent of increasing the expected costs for resistance. There are two causal mechanisms that can result in target concession. First, the target leadership values its military and, through cost benefit analysis, may decide to make concessions on the issue at stake in order to preserve its military capabilities. The initial air strikes of Operation Allied Force are an example of an unsuccessful punishment strategy aimed at military forces. Planned for three nights of strikes predominantly against Serbian military facilities, these attacks were not sufficient to convince Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to concede Kosovo. A second causal mechanism involves a challenger’s attacks on target military forces aimed at sparking a military uprising to overthrow the regime or to convince the regime to concede in order to preempt a military coup. An example of this can be found in the U.S. defeat of the Iraqi Army in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, which sparked the March uprising. Initiated by defeated Shiite soldiers returning from the battlefield, the uprising very nearly overthrew Saddam Hussein and his Baath party.
23 I have not discovered a case of a successful threatened decapitation strategy. Interestingly in all three conflicts I examine, Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, the U.S. strikes the residences of their leaders.
24 If decapitation succeeds by killing the regime leadership then this is a brute force not a coercive strategy.
Second, a challenger can threaten the population, in which case two causal mechanisms can then convince the regime to concede. Giulio Douhet theorized that air strikes against the population would cause them to rise up and overthrow the regime.\textsuperscript{25} Presumably, a new regime would be more likely to then concede to the challenger’s demands. Alternatively, to prevent such a revolt, the target’s leaders may become convinced that concession is necessary. The motivation of preempting a war weary Serbian population before they voted him from office influenced Slobodan Milosevic in his decision to concede Kosovo in 1999.\textsuperscript{26}

The alternative coercive strategy to punishment is that of denial.\textsuperscript{27} Here the challenger attacks the target’s ability to defend the object at stake. If the challenger can convince the target the situation is so hopeless that it can no longer defend the objective, the target has the incentive to concede rather than incur further losses from continued fighting. While punishment strategies are aimed at what the target values, the objective of denial strategies is to alter the balance of power by attacking a target’s defenses. As such, denial strategies against an enemy’s hardened defenses require a more extensive expenditure of force to convince the target of the futility of resistance. Should the conflict be over an issue which the target highly prizes, a denial strategy can prove nearly as costly as a decisive military victory.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{28} Pape, Robert (1996) \textit{Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War} Ithaca: Cornell University Press 15. Even if a denial strategy includes invasion, it still may prove effective if target concessions avoid the costs of occupation.
\end{flushright}
A critical aspect of an effective coercive threat is that it must be perceived as credible by the target. Both the capability and the will of the challenger play into this perception. Capability refers to the challenger’s military capacity to back up its threats with force and its relative power advantage over the target. Should the target resist, does the challenger have the military power projection capability to punish the target into compliance or to deny it the ability to defend itself?

The other half of the credibility calculation is the willingness of the challenger to incur the costs of carrying out its threats. An example of an incredible threat would be that of a U.S. ground invasion of Kosovo after President Clinton’s public declaration in early 1999 that no such action would be considered. It was clearly a strategic blunder to remove the uncertainty over U.S. intentions. However, even if Clinton had not done so, the higher expected combat losses for invading Kosovo made a denial strategy less credible than the alternative punishment strategy of an air-only campaign.

A final consideration of punishment and denial threats concerns their effectiveness. Robert Pape claims that only denial strategies work for “important” demands of homeland territory or regime change. He claims punishment strategies, short of nuclear weapons, do not generate sufficient levels of pain to effect a change in a target’s decision-making. Undetermined, however, has been the effectiveness of punishment strategies when lower level interests are at stake, such as policy changes over humanitarian rights or extra-territorial concessions. In the case studies for Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, punishment strategies employing primarily airstrikes and/or sanctions

succeeded in obtaining such lower level demands. In the case of Kosovo, a punishment strategy even achieved higher level objectives by targeting the Serbian population and elite, eventually convincing Milosevic to concede what Serbia still considers to be part of its homeland.

**The Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Outcome**

A state engages in coercion to obtain its foreign policy objectives. The degree to which it achieves these objectives determines whether its foreign policy is a success or a failure. The dependent variable of foreign policy outcome compares the challenger’s ex ante objectives with the results from the conflict. A foreign policy outcome is deemed a success if the challenger achieves its core objectives and a failure if it does not. The expectation that a challenger achieve all of its demands, however, is too strict a standard. First, given the uncertainty over interests, capabilities and resolve, a challenger has an incentive to bluff by making greater demands in order to gain a better bargained outcome. Further, a strategic actor realizes that, in the course of negotiations, it will likely need to concede on some points in order to reach an agreement. Such public concessions by the challenger can provide a target’s leader with the means of saving face, thus reducing some of the audience and reputation costs incurred by acceding to the remaining demands. As a result, as with any negotiation, the challenger brings to the bargaining table higher demands than it will likely achieve, some of which it is willing to sacrifice in favor of an agreement.31

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31 Further discussion on the operationalization for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome is deferred to the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3. Two points, however, are worth noting here. First, the dependent variable is not simply a measure of what the challenger obtains. Coding foreign policy outcome in this manner would provide a gross assessment which would not factor in the value the challenger places on the gains it makes, which are determined by its interests, nor would it deduct for the costs of obtaining...
Limitations on Coercive Force and Alternative Foreign Policy Options

Having identified characteristics of the dependent and explanatory variables, the next step is to examine the strategic interaction which translates coercive demands and threats into foreign policy outcomes. Prior to specifying a model of asymmetric coercion, however, two factors require further examination: what are the limits on the use of force for a strategy to still be considered coercive and what alternative foreign policy options are available to the challenger.

Limits on the Use of Force

By definition, coercion entails the *threat of force* and the *limited use of force*. Force is produced by military means and includes a range of violent actions from small arms fire to air strikes. Yet to be determined is the level of force a strategy can employ and still be considered coercive. What counts as “limited” force is a key discriminator between three of the dominant coercion theorists: Alexander George’s *coercive diplomacy*, Thomas Schelling’s *compellence*, and Robert Pape’s *coercion by denial*. In the following analysis, I examine the limits they place on the use of force and then define

them. Achieving a high level outcome, such as a territorial concession or regime change, does not necessarily translate into greater success. If the challenger’s interests are non-vital, then the additional costs of obtaining concessions may make such an outcome less desirable than lower level gains achieved at a lower cost. Coding foreign policy outcome by the degree to which the challenger achieves its *ex ante* core objectives addresses this problem by incorporating the challenger’s valuation of its interests, along with its expected benefits and costs. Second, the dependent variable does not evaluate the efficiency of the challenger’s strategy nor does it compare the effectiveness of coercion to other available foreign policy options. These alternative dependent variables would require analyzing how the challenger executes its strategy as compared to either a hypothesized “flawlessly” executed strategy or an alternative “better” option. See Baldwin, David A. (1999) “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice” *International Security* 24:3 80-107. While there is merit in analyzing the mistakes made in executing a strategy, such counterfactual argumentation is fraught with uncertainty, making objective evaluation difficult for a single case, and impractical for a large number of cases.

my threshold for asymmetric coercion in terms of limited punishment strikes and denial attacks short of invasion or decisive battle (see Table 1.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorist/Work</th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Limits on Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander George</td>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy</td>
<td>- Extremely limited, only threats of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Only exemplary/symbolic military action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Schelling</td>
<td>Compellence</td>
<td>- Limited, punitive strikes to communicate threat of more strikes to come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms and Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Pape</td>
<td>Coercion by Denial</td>
<td>- Restricted, no attacks on civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing to Win</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unlimited attacks on military forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Haun</td>
<td>Asymmetric Coercion</td>
<td>- Limited, punitive strikes to communicate threat of more strikes to come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Limited strikes against military short of ground invasion/decisive battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Threats of ground invasion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Coercion Theorists’ Limits on the Use of Force

The most restrictive form of coercion is Alexander George’s coercive diplomacy which limits military action to “...exemplary or symbolic use.”\(^{33}\) Actions such as increasing alert levels, mobilizing or deploying forces, or military exercises signal the credibility of a challenger’s threat without engaging in violence. The credibility of a threat is “...the perceived likelihood that the threat will be carried out if the conditions that are supposed to trigger it are met. A highly credible threat is one that people believe will be carried out; a threat has little credibility if people believe it is a bluff.”\(^{34}\) The intent of coercive diplomacy is therefore to “…back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to

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persuade him [the target] that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.”

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy to avoid war which succeeds when demands are met and no force is actually employed.

For Thomas Schelling, however, threats alone are often insufficient to coerce. “Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.” Here the purpose for the limited employment of force is to generate an “...expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all.” In *Arms and Influence*, published in 1966, he includes the then ongoing U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam, which had commenced in 1965. At the time of his writing, these attacks were quite restrictive, though clearly beyond that of a symbolic military action. Whereas George favors coercive threats as a substitute for war, Schelling views *compellence* as a limited, punitive war strategy and a substitute for the more violent conventional war fighting strategy of taking objectives by brute force.

The level of violence employed in Schelling’s punishment strategy is limited to only that force necessary to credibly communicate the threat to the target. Excessive force is not only inefficient but counterproductive as it exhausts the challenger’s reserves of latent violence available to produce pain in the future. Therefore, the use of force must be restricted to only that which is necessary to convince the target that it is in its best interest to comply.

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36 Schelling, Thomas (1966) *Arms and Influence* Yale University Press, New Haven, 3
37 Schelling, Thomas (1966) *Arms and Influence* Yale University Press, New Haven, 175
38 The early phase of Operation Rolling Thunder, which Schelling was aware of, attacks were restricted from Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor.
39 Schelling identifies the expected pain from future strikes as the causal mechanism for a target’s concessions. He fails, however, to recognize an alternative causal mechanism: the expected economic costs to the target generated from previous strikes. For example, by June of 1999, NATO air strikes against
For Robert Pape, only denial strategies leveled against a target state’s military capabilities are effective. Punishment strategies targeting the civilian population do not gain “important” territorial concessions. Such actions simply cause unnecessary suffering and divert critical military resources like air power away from the decisive battle. Therefore, military force should be restricted to attacking the target’s defenses only. Compared to the coercive threats of George’s coercive diplomacy or limited strikes of Schelling’s compellence, the wartime application of Pape’s denial strategy is far more costly and, in many cases, requires invasion. And for Pape, the line between a denial strategy and a brute force strategy is ambiguous, as the distinction only becomes evident ex post with coercion succeeding if the target concedes while it still has some means to resist. And the degree of success for the challenger is measured by the difference between the actual costs incurred from the denial strategy and the expected costs of taking objectives by force.

The threshold of violence distinguishing coercion from brute force war in my theory of asymmetric coercion falls between that of Schelling’s compellence and Pape’s denial. Like Schelling, I include as coercive strikes against a target’s population that signal the threat of additional strikes to come. For example, in May of 1999 the U.S. increased the number of air strikes aimed at Serbia’s infrastructure. This threat to Serbia’s economy proved to be a key factor in Milosevic concession of Kosovo. I further include Pape’s denial attacks against a target’s military defenses as coercive measures.

bridges and the electric grid had degraded Serbia’s transportation networks and energy sources and disrupted its economy. Only a concession to U.S. demands would bring about an end to the war which would enable Serbia to rebuild its economic capacity. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was compelled not only out of the fear of the damage from future air strikes, but also to stop the economic losses accruing as a result of the damage from previous air strikes, which could not be repaired while the war continued.

Unlike Pape, however, though denial strategies may well threaten invasion I do not consider an invasion, once commenced, as coercive. Such action significantly increases the expected costs and risks of conflict and is better viewed as a brute force strategy.

Threatening invasion versus an actually invasion is analogous to the distinction George draws between threatening force and actually employing violent force. This logic can be further extended to the nuclear realm. Though nuclear weapons factor into few cases of asymmetric conflict, a similar distinction can be made as to determining whether they are coercive or not. The threat of nuclear attacks aimed at a country's population, countervalue, or its military, counterforce, I consider coercive, whereas an actual nuclear attack would not be as such action significantly increases the expected costs and risks of conflict and is better viewed as a brute force strategy.

Alternative Foreign Policy Options: Accommodation, Inducements, Sanctions, and Brute Force

Up to this point, coercion has been the only foreign policy option considered for the challenger. The decision to adopt a coercive strategy, however, implies that the challenger expects to gain more by that choice than from the other available options. Alternative foreign policy options include non-military strategies of accommodation.

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42 Pape's definition of coercion allows an invasion to be coercive so long as the target conceded while it still had the means to resist.
43 Nuclear weapons are not employed frequently in asymmetric conflicts for three reasons. First, nuclear weapons have only been available since the end of WWII. Second, nuclear weapons are primarily used by Great Powers to deter other Great Powers. By contrast, the threat of a nuclear attack has rarely been used to compel a weak state. An exception is the Soviet Union threatening a nuclear attack against Israel, as well as Great Britain and France, in 1956 to end the war over the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. Third, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation or defense of a Great Power's homeland has decreased the credibility of a Great Power's threat to use nuclear weapons to back up its compellent demands against weak states.
*inducements*, and *economic sanctions* in addition to the military strategy of *brute force*.

Before examining these alternative strategies, I make three observations concerning the challenger’s foreign policy decision. First, as previously noted, there is the difficulty of comparing the strategy adopted from those not chosen. This counterfactual exercise requires calculating the expected costs and benefits for actions not taken. While *ex post* evidence abounds on the excesses and shortfalls of the chosen strategy, no such observations are available for alternative strategies foregone. Also, since conflict outcomes are probabilistic, the fact that a chosen strategy failed (or succeeded) is insufficient proof that the policy choice was the incorrect (or correct) one. As a result, such analysis, laden with uncertainty, proves difficult to support and the plausibility of the results is easily assailed.

Second, strategies may be employed as substitutes or complements. States often approach conflicts with mixed strategies, combining both non-military and military policies. States have long adopted sanctions during war. It is more difficult to evaluate a strategy when its effect is only indirectly reflected in the outcome of a complementary strategy. For instance, the value of an arms embargo may only be fully determined by observing the target’s reduced military effectiveness when directly engaged by the challenger.

Third, foreign policy tools may have both short- and long-term objectives. In the short run, the challenger’s aim is to end the conflict with the best possible outcome, given the foreign policy tools available to it. However, a long-term objective may be to reduce future conflict through *persuasion*, by convincing the target to change its preferences to those amenable to the challenger. While the focus in this research is on the contribution
alternative foreign policies make to the short-term aim of resolving an ongoing conflict, I also recognize the role of foreign policy in removing the sources of long-term conflict.

**Accommodation**

*Accommodation*, or appeasement, is the challenger's option to unilaterally decide not to contest the target over the issue at hand with the expectation that such action will avoid further conflict. 45 "Appeasement is a response to a strategic problem. One state decides to make concessions to another as a way of dealing with the strategic situation confronting it." 46

The conventional criticism of accommodation is that unilateral concessions prove counterproductive, only increasing the adversary's power while eroding the challenger's reputation for resolve. As a result, further conflict is made more, not less, likely. 47 However, in the case of asymmetric conflict, this argument loses some of its force. With Munich, appeasement by Britain and France led to Nazi Germany's absorbing the military capabilities of Czechoslovakia, which had an impact on the balance of power in Europe. By contrast, in asymmetric conflicts accommodation by the Great Power does not alter the already great imbalance of power and since the challenger typically already has less resolve than the target, it is unclear whether accommodation necessarily leads to further conflict.

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More favorable arguments for accommodation point to conditions, under which cooperation and norms of equity may prompt a state to believe its concessions will be reciprocated.\textsuperscript{48} Others point to situations such as periods of power transition, whereby a challenger may have little recourse but to accommodate.\textsuperscript{49} Again, these arguments are not particularly germane to cases of asymmetric conflict, in which power transition is unlikely and the challenger already views the target as an adversary, rendering norms of reciprocity less applicable.

The relatively low number of international crises as compared to the much larger universe of potential crises suggests that accommodation is, in effect, the most common foreign policy choice. Accommodation is the default strategy which a Great Power passively adopts when it chooses to do nothing and thereby avoid a crisis. This appears reasonable, particularly when non-vital interests are at stake and the cost of adopting a non-military or military, coercive or brute force strategy outweighs the expected benefits to the challenger.

Finally, while accommodation is usually considered a substitute for coercion, with the possible exception of unconditional terms of surrender, most negotiated settlements include some element of accommodation. The benefit of accommodation is that this strategy, when successful, avoids the costs of coercion or brute force. Accommodation does have certain drawbacks though, as the challenger foregoes the claims it has to the issue at stake and by doing so may also suffer reputation and audience costs for revealing its weak resolve.

\textsuperscript{49} See Rock, Stephen (2000) Appeasement in International Politics University of Kentucky Press, Treisman, Daniel (2004)“Rational Appeasement” International Organization 58:2 345, and
Inducements

Inducements are side payments meant to convince the target to concede to the issue at stake. In mixed strategies, inducements are the “carrots” of a “stick and carrot” strategy employed to sweeten a deal. The challenger may make concessions in another area or make promises concerning future actions. For example, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States secretly agreed to link the withdrawal of Jupiter Missiles from Turkey with the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. In addition, the United States publicly promised to make no further threats of invasion of Cuba, a policy still in effect. Inducements differ from persuasion in that the target does not change its preferences. Ceteris parabus, if inducements are discontinued, it is likely the target will reverse its behavior. Inducements also have a similar problem to accommodation, in that incentives provided by a challenger may be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Economic Sanctions

States benefit from international trade and finance. An alternative foreign policy tool to military coercion is the threat of the loss of these benefits through economic sanctions. Sanctions can take three different forms all of which threaten a target state’s economy or security: trade, finance, or arms embargos. Trade sanctions restrict the flow of goods and services. The target is punished by the decrease in the availability of goods to purchase and in the demand for its own goods. Such sanctions work best when the target relies heavily on the challenger for trade. The critique against such sanctions is

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that, used alone, they cannot produce significant concessions. Further, the effects of trade sanctions are more often felt by the target population rather than the target regime. Though economic sanctions do not directly use force, they can prove even more deadly particularly to a target state’s weak and poor. In some cases, trade sanctions can actually serve to solidify a regime’s domestic control on power, as was the case with U.S. sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s.

Financial sanctions work like trade sanctions by limiting a target’s sources of financial services. In addition, they can be used to freeze a target’s financial assets held in the challenger state or in other states that cooperate with the challenger. The challenger retains control of those assets, promising to release them once the target agrees to demands. For example, the U.S. froze $8 billion in Iranian assets, which it then leveraged in negotiations to release U.S. hostages in the 1979 Iranian Hostage crisis. A critique against financial sanctions is that, in today’s electronically connected financial world, it is much more difficult to identify and freeze a target’s assets.

Finally, arms embargos are often overlooked as a form of economic sanction. Embargos restricting the flow of weapons, ammunition, parts and supplies decrease the target’s military capabilities and are, therefore, most effective for denial strategies. Used alone, an embargo is not likely to achieve foreign policy objectives, but it can effectively complement a military strategy.

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In sum, economic sanctions are non-violent means for convincing a target to change its behavior. As with any foreign policy option, sanctions have limitations and drawbacks. Still, they are a tool commonly employed by Great Powers, either independently or in conjunction with military force.

**Brute Force Strategy**

A challenger employs a brute force strategy when it seizes an objective by overpowering its adversary, where its military engages the enemy in order to overcome its defenses. For the challenger this traditionally involves the costly and risky war fighting tasks of invasion and occupation. Unlike coercion, with brute force no concessions are required of the target, as it essentially has no choice in the matter. Schelling contrasts brute force and coercive strategies in that military force must be exercised in order for a brute force strategy to succeed, whereas coercion is most successful when force is merely threatened.

While it is easy to distinguish brute force from a punishment strategy, it is less straightforward when compared to a denial strategy. A denial strategy threatens the use of brute force and communicates this threat through the actual use of sufficient force to convince the target that resistance is futile. Denial succeeds when the target concedes, allowing the challenger to avoid the full costs of the brute force strategy.

When bargaining breaks down and neither coercion (by denial or punishment), nor sanctions, nor inducement succeeds in gaining target concession, the only option available to the challenger to achieve its objectives is that of brute force.

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55 Schelling, Thomas (1966) *Arms and Influence* New Haven: Yale University Press
56 Schelling, Thomas (1966) *Arms and Influence* New Haven: Yale University Press
EXPLAINING COERCION FAILURE

As I will demonstrate in Chapter two, a rational challenger only chooses a coercive strategy over other foreign policy options, if it determines the target is likely to concede to its demands. This being the case, what explains cases of coercion in which the target resists and coercion fails? I examine this question in two parts. First, under what conditions is a target likely to resist being coerced? And second, in recognizing such conditions, why would a rational challenger go on to adopt a coercive strategy?

Why a Target Resists

In the real world, coercion does not always succeed, as weak target states do not always concede, even when pitted against Great Powers. In Chapter 3, I present evidence drawn from the interstate crises which took place between 1918 and 2003. Despite its overwhelming military might, the powerful challenger succeeded in convincing the weaker target to concede in only 56% of the cases. What explains this apparent discrepancy between theory and practice? Below I offer five explanations for why a target resists.

I: Misperception and Miscalculation based on Psychological, Cognitive, Group Bias, Non-unitary Actor, and Bounded Rationality Explanations for Target Resistance

An important body of international relations scholarship over the past four decades has examined how humans and groups are limited in their desire or ability to

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57 Rationality here means actors have stable preferences over outcomes and that the challenger and target when given the same information will make identical calculations of probabilities, costs, and benefits. If coercion fails then the challenger suffers the costs of coercion and then must adopt another strategy, which is more costly than having chosen the alternate strategy to begin with.
behave rationally.\textsuperscript{58} Psychological and cognitive biases often lead decision makers to misperceive and miscalculate capability and resolve, demands and threats, probabilities of victory, and the costs of fighting, any or all of which can cause coercion to fail. In addition, rational decision making can be limited, particularly during crises, causing the challenger and target to draw different conclusions from the same information. Finally, organizational and group dynamics further explain why states do not always behave as unitary rational actors.

Such non-rational explanations for why states, regimes, and leaders do not behave rationally provide \textit{ex post} explanations for coercion failure in specific cases. For instance, in 1991 Saddam Hussein, and to a lesser extent the U.S., misperceived the enormous disparity in Iraqi and U.S. military power, which led the Iraqi leader to grossly miscalculate the probable outcome of the Gulf War.

The problem with attempting to systematically assess these non-rational explanations is that such behavior can, in some degree, be found in all conflicts. Unfortunately, these explanations do not provide \textit{ex ante} predictors for which crises are likely to end in coercion success or in failure. Therefore, while I acknowledge that non-rational behavior is common in decision making, I do not develop a theory of asymmetric coercion based upon it, nor do I draw testable hypotheses from it. Instead, in Chapters 4 through 6, I analyze crises for evidence of non-rational behavior and evaluate the degree to which it impacted the outcome. I find that, while non-rational factors are quite useful

for explaining the initiation and the length of a crisis, they are less helpful in explaining crisis termination.

**II: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Uncertainty and Private Information**

Uncertainty and private information concerning the interests, military capabilities and resolve of both the challenger and the target provide a second explanation for why a target may resist. If a challenger and a target are privy to different information, even if both are rational, they may reach differing assessments of the other’s interests, capabilities, and resolve. If these estimates differ to the extent that the challenger’s range of demands it is willing to offer does not overlap with the demands which the target is willing to concede then coercion will fail.

A rational challenger and target should reveal to each other the information they possess so that both actors can make identical assessments and thus avoid a negotiation breakdown. However, there are incentives for the challenger and the target to misrepresent and withhold information and thereby accept the risk of coercion failure in order to increase its expected outcome.\(^{59}\)

It is not difficult to develop a hypothesis for uncertainty as an increase in uncertainty increases the likelihood of coercion failure. However, it proves far more troublesome to test. In actual coercion cases, there is little observable data with which to make comparisons as to the level of information possessed by each actor, particularly as it affects the target’s decision making process. As a result, attempts at evaluating the

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degree of asymmetric information in a crisis tends to devolve into a tautological argument, i.e. asymmetric information is deemed significant because coercion failed.\footnote{I attempted to test this hypothesis on uncertainty in an early draft of the Iraq case study, but eventually abandoned this effort due to a lack of sufficient observable data for all the cases.}

### III: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Issue Indivisibility

*Issue indivisibility* recognizes that there are certain issues over which a target state is unwilling to negotiate, preferring resistance to any peaceful settlement.\footnote{On issue indivisibility see Toft, Monica (2006) “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War” *Security Studies* 15:1, 34-69, Hassner, Ron E. (2003) “To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility” *Security Studies* 12:4, 1-33, Kirshner, Jonathon, (2000) “Rationalist Explanations for War?” *Security Studies* 10:1, 144} James Fearon acknowledges issue indivisibility as a theoretically viable rationalist explanation for bargaining failure, but dismisses it as inconsequential for modern international politics. He argues, though does not provide evidence, that “…issues over which states bargain typically are complex and multidimensional; side-payments or linkages with other issues typically are possible…War-prone international issues may often be *effectively* indivisible, but the cause of this indivisibility lies in domestic political and other mechanisms rather than in the nature of the issues themselves.”\footnote{Fearon, James D. (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War” *International Organization* 49:3, 382 Robert Powell carries this argument further by asserting that, even if an issue is indivisible, this does not explain bargaining failure. “Even if a disputed issue is physically indivisible, one should not think of bargaining indivisibilities as a conceptually distinct solution to the inefficiency puzzle. There are still outcomes (or more accurately mechanisms) that give both states higher expected payoffs than they would obtain by fighting over the issue. The real impediment to agreement is the inability to commit. Powell, Robert (2006) “War as a Commitment Problem” *International Organization* 60:Winter 178} Robert Powell takes it even further to claim that issue indivisibility is, in fact, no more than a commitment problem.\footnote{Powell, Robert (2006) “War as a Commitment Problem” *International Organization* 60:1, 169-203}

Those who argue for issue indivisibility as a rational explanation for war point to specific religious sites or attributes of a particular territory as integral to a nation’s
identify, an issue which cannot be viewed as divisible. But, regardless of whether issue indivisibility is more logically considered a separate explanation for coercion failure or viewed as a commitment problem, the number of crises, in which issue indivisibility is evident, is relatively small. In the case studies I examine, only in the case of Kosovo, the historic birthplace of Serbia, which Slobodan Milosevic proclaimed he would never surrender, does issue of indivisibility appear relevant. And even then Milosevic eventually conceded the territory. As a result, I do not develop or test a hypothesis for issue indivisibility.

IV: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Credible Commitment Problems

A popular rationalist explanation for a target’s resistance arises when a challenger cannot make credible a promise to refrain from making future demands. This is the case when the target believes an agreement will only lead to additional demands from the challenger. In an anarchic world without a hierarchical power to enforce agreements, even if the challenger and the target prefer a negotiated outcome to war, the target knows there is no one to force the challenger to abide by the terms agreed upon. And if the expected outcome of the agreement shifts the balance of power in the challenger’s favor, this only provides an incentive for it to make still further demands. The situation thus creates a commitment problem for the challenger in that it would be better off, ex ante, to accept a negotiated settlement which avoids the costs of war, but it cannot credibly promise not to make future demands ex post.

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For asymmetric conflicts in which the balance of power is already tilted heavily in the challenger favor, a target’s concessions may not cause a noticeable shift in power. They may, however, reduce the challenger’s uncertainty over the level of the target’s resolve. Information revealing a weakly resolved target may have the same affect as a shift in the balance of power, causing the challenger to reassess whether to make additional demands.\textsuperscript{66} The inability of the challenger to rule out further demands increases the target’s reputation costs for making concessions in the crisis at hand. If these reputation costs are sufficiently great, they can preclude a negotiated settlement.

This last insight produces a testable hypothesis for commitment problems. \textit{An increase in a challenger’s commitment problems increases the likelihood of coercion failure.} This is likely to be the case when a challenger has the means to back up additional demands with credible threats. But this, by definition, is always the case in asymmetric conflicts, where Great Powers have the balance of power heavily in their favor. This asymmetry causes weak states to resist Great Powers, a reaction which has been dubbed Goliath’s Curse.\textsuperscript{67}

One shortcoming of a commitment hypothesis based on the logic of Goliath’s curse is that it expects all coercive strategies by Great Powers in asymmetric conflicts to fail. And yet, as I demonstrate in Chapter 3, coercion has been successful in 56\% of asymmetric crises since World War I. The commitment hypothesis, therefore, correctly predicts only 44\% of crises outcomes. A possible remedy is to develop a proxy variable for commitment which provides variation in its prediction of coercion outcomes. Such a

\textsuperscript{67} Sechser, Todd S. (forthcoming) “Goliath’s Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive Threats” \textit{International Organization}
proxy can be developed from an insight provided by Sir Julian Corbett, who observed “that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point.” For asymmetric conflicts, what counts is the military force a Great Power can deploy against the target state. I therefore evaluate the commitment problem in individual cases by assessing whether the deployed military forces of the challenger are sufficient to credibly back up further demands.

V: Rationalist Explanations for Target Resistance: Survival

A final rational explanation for coercion failure is that of target survival. A target state will likely refuse demands which threaten its survival so long as it has the means to resist. In Chapter 2, I will show why it is rational for a target to resist a challenger, even when the probability of victory for the target is quite low, so long as the expected outcome for resisting is greater than that of conceding to its certain demise. This situation is particularly germane to asymmetric conflicts in which the challenger’s high probability of victory makes it more likely to make demands which threaten a target’s survival.

The target survival hypothesis suggests demands which threaten a target’s survival increase the likelihood of target resistance and coercion failure. As with the other explanations for coercion failure, it is difficult to identify testable criteria and avoid tautological argumentation. I will focus on four characteristics of a state’s sovereignty:

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68 The war is limited for the Great Power, though not necessarily for its target. Corbett, Julian (1988), Some Principles of Maritime Strategy United States Naval Institute: Annapolis, Md 58
control over its own government, control of its population, control over its homeland
territory, and the viability of its economy.\textsuperscript{69}

In practice, it is difficult to make a counterfactual assessment as to whether
conceding to a set of demands would, in fact, lead to the demise of a target state. Instead,
I examine whether the challenger’s core demands threaten the target state’s regime,
population, homeland territory, or economy. If concession to demands seriously
threatens any of these four central elements, I assess target survival to be at risk. The
drawback to this approach is that it may misidentify a state’s survival as threatened when,
in fact, it is not. For instance, Serbia considered Kosovo as part of its homeland territory,
yet conceding control over it did not result in Serbia’s death. Despite such potential false
positives, this method of coding survival still proves effective in making predictions of
coercion outcomes.

### Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption for the Target State

In practice, there are relatively few asymmetric crises where state survival is at
risk for a target conceding to coercive demands. More numerous are examples of a
regime or its leadership being threatened internally. While a domestic cause for target
resistance is not strictly a rationalist, unitary actor explanation for coercion failure it does
often occur. And, more importantly, as I will demonstrate in Chapters 4 through 6 it is
impossible to explain the decision making of Iraq, Serbia, or Libya without taking into
account the domestic threats on Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Mu’ammar Al-
Qadhafi, and of their regimes. I therefore relax the unitary actor assumption on the target

\textsuperscript{69} For a useful discussion on state death see Fazal, Tanisha M. (2004) “State Death in the International
System” \textit{International Organization} 58 (Spring) 311-344
state in order to assess the impact of the threat to survival of the target state’s ruling regime and its leader.

**Regime Survival**

A regime’s survival may be threatened domestically in two ways. First, a weak regime may be threatened by civil war, in which opposition groups attempt to overthrow the government. A regime may therefore resist a challenger’s demands since conceding would reveal the regime as weak to domestic opposition groups waiting for an opportunity to seize power. This is the logic of omni-balancing, where the internal structure of weak states is more appropriately described as anarchical rather than hierarchical.70 A rather obvious observation is that a regime’s survival can only be threatened by revolt if a domestic opposition group actually exists. For example, no such organizations were present in Libya to threaten Qadhafi’s regime prior to the rise of radicalized Islamic groups in the mid-1990s.

Second, for a regime whose basis for power is determined by voters, the regime may also be threatened at home by elections. Acknowledging a policy failure can prompt the population to punish the ruling party at the ballot box. This dynamic is the principal-agent problem of audience costs, which I describe in greater detail under regime leadership survival. Though Serbia was not a democracy, Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was elected to power and was therefore vulnerable to being voted out of office, as was demonstrated in its loss of power in the national elections of 2000.

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Regime Leadership Survival

Finally, though the survival of a given regime may well be assured at the domestic level, the survival of its leader may not be. Indeed, in terms of coercion failure, a leader may resist a challenger state’s demands if he expects his position to then be threatened from those within his own regime. This vulnerability to his power is the basis for audience costs. The logic of audience costs is derived from a principal-agent model, where the leader is the agent charged with carrying out the policy preferences for the principals which make up the regime. Principals can either reward or punish the leader by keeping him in or removing him from office. Principals have limited information to judge the leader’s performance and must extract how well the leader adheres to their preferences on the basis of whether his policies succeed or fail. If policies fail, the principals punish the leader by removing him from power. Audience cost is the leader’s expectation as to whether he will be removed from power by the principal for making a concession.

The level of audience costs varies with the number of principals within the regime and how powerful they are, relative to the leader. Democracies are likely to generate high audience costs because of the relative ease of replacing a leader at the polling booth and the greater transparency of democracies, allowing the principals to recognize when a leader’s foreign policy has failed. By contrast, while autocratic states do not have as many principals as democracies, the potentially dire consequences for a dictator who loses power makes his audience costs significant indeed. For authoritarian states, Barbara Geddes has developed a categorization of three types: military regimes, single-

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party regimes, and personalist regimes. Military and single-party regimes typically have more principals involved and are therefore theorized as likely to have higher audience costs than do personalist regimes.

The survival hypothesis therefore predicts coercion likely to fail if either the target state, or regime, or regime leader’s survival is at stake, so long as the target has the means to resist. This last conditional statement of the target’s ability to resist acknowledges that there are cases between Great Powers and weak states in which the weak state does not have the military capacity to put forward any resistance. For example, in 1939 Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania had no means to resist the Soviet Union’s demands for homeland territory and ultimately regime change and so conceded without a fight. Finland, on the other hand, did have the means to resist and did so, even though the Soviet’s limited territorial demands for basing rights were less onerous than those placed on the other three states. Without the ability to mount a resistance, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania preferred instead to concede to the inevitable and thereby avoid the costs of war.

How Target Survival differs from Issue Indivisibility and Commitment Problems

A criticism of the survival explanation for coercion failure is that it can simply be considered a sub-category of issue indivisibility. There is some validity to arguing survival as an indivisible issue, as the premise of the survival hypothesis holds that states

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are not likely to make a concession that threatens their survival.\textsuperscript{74} If a state will not concede part of its survival, then the issue is indivisible. There are, however, two problems with describing survival in issue indivisibility terms. First, indivisibility, by definition, precludes the possibility of any concession being made. I discussed previously, a state’s existence depends on four conditions: control over its population, its homeland territory, and its government, and the ability to maintain a viable economy. Yet any or all of these four issues may, in fact, be conceded to a limited degree and still not result in a state’s demise. For example, Serbia survives today, even after conceding all of Kosovo, a large part of its historic homeland. While survival may be viewed as indivisible in theory, in practice each of the four elements may, in fact, be divisible at the margins.

Second, over the past decade international relations scholars have come to view issue indivisibility as synonymous with specific religious or nationalist territorial issues, the most often cited example being the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{75} Given the way issue indivisibility is now more narrowly characterized, it is inappropriate and confusing to relegate such an important issue as state survival to a subset of issue indivisibility.

A second criticism of the survival explanation asserts that it, at its essence, describes the same causal logic for coercion failure as that used by the commitment problem. Again, there is some validity to this argument. Asymmetric conflicts, by definition, involve a powerful challenger with the capability of threatening the survival of the weak target state. Therefore, a target state may resist a challenger’s demands because

\textsuperscript{74} In an earlier draft of this chapter I included survival as an indivisibility issue.
\textsuperscript{75} Hassner, Ron E. (2003) “To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility” Security Studies 12:4, 1-33
it believes a concession will likely lead to greater demands that will, in turn, threaten its survival. The target resists now because it believes its survival will be threatened in the future.

A weakness of this criticism is its failure to explain why the survival and commitment hypothesis then make disparate predictions of the target's likely decision as to resist or to concede to a demand which does not, in and of itself, threaten target survival. While the commitment hypothesis expects the target to resist, the survival hypothesis predicts the opposite, i.e. the target will likely concede to the original demands since they do not threaten its survival, assuming the challenger has properly matched threats to back up demands. If the survival and commitment hypotheses were based on a similar logic, they would produce the same prediction as to a target's decision making.

A second problem with this criticism is its inability to explain cases in which challengers make high level demands that threaten target survival. The survival hypothesis expects the target to resist as a concession would likely lead to its demise. The logic of the commitment problem, however, breaks down in such a situation, as a target conceding to its own death would not likely be concerned about additional demands when it has no expectation of being around in the future. For such high level demands, the survival and commitment hypotheses again make disparate predictions of the target's response.

The key difference between the survival and commitment hypothesis is that the survival hypothesis incorporates the equilibrium conditions of the asymmetric coercion model I develop in Chapter 2. A rational challenger chooses to restrict its demands, even
when it has additional military force capable of backing up higher demands, when the expected outcome of limited demands and threats exceed that of higher demands backed by greater, and therefore more costly, force. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis does not allow for such an interior solution to the challenger’s optimization problem. It instead assumes that the target will always expect the challenger to increase its outcome by raising its demands.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Why a challenger may choose coercion even when the likelihood of success is low}

The previous section examined rational and non-rational explanations for why a target might resist a challenger’s coercive demand. What has not been addressed is why a rational challenger would choose coercion if it assesses the target as likely to reject its demands. If a target is likely to resist, then the challenger would be better off avoiding the costs of coercion and adopting an alternative strategy. The previous explanations of misperception and miscalculation, and uncertainty and private information apply equally to the challenger as to the target. In addition, there are also two explanations based on low costs for coercion and international norms of coercion which help us to understand why a Great Power might choose a coercive strategy likely to fail.

\textit{Low Costs of Coercion}

A challenger may adopt a coercive strategy even if it is not likely to succeed if the costs of such a strategy are sufficiently low.\textsuperscript{77} This may be the best course of action when the challenger actually prefers a brute force strategy but has not yet deployed sufficient troops to take its objective by force. In such a situation it costs the challenger

\textsuperscript{76} The commitment problem assumes the challenger’s expected outcome to be a monotonously increasing function of demand and threat.

\textsuperscript{77} This assumes there is at least some uncertainty over the likelihood the target will concede.
little to threaten a denial strategy while preparing to invade anyway. Indeed, the very fact
that the challenger is both willing and preparing to invade makes the denial threat all the
more credible. If the target concedes, then the challenger avoids the costs of invasion. If
the target resists, the costs paid by the challenger have still been relatively low.

This occurred in the lead-up to the Gulf War in 1990 when President George Bush
made the decision in October to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops to build up the
U.S.-led coalition force for an invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. adopted a coercive strategy
with the demand that Iraqi unconditionally withdraw its army from Kuwait. Bush did
this even though he still did not think it likely that Saddam Hussein would concede.

**High Costs of Abrogating International Norms**

A Great Power operates within the international system. As such, it is concerned
not only with the outcome of its conflicts with weak targets, but also with how other
states, especially other Great Powers, will likely react to its actions. If a Great Power
challenger threatens the interests of other states not involved in the conflict or violates
international norms of behavior, it can generate negative externalities. For the post
World War I era, international norms require that states work their conflicts through
international institutions. During the interwar period this was done through the League of
Nations and after World War II through the United Nations.

In its conflicts with Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, the U.S. justified its actions, with the
exception of the 1986 El Dorado Canyon airstrikes, through UN Security Council
resolutions. These resolutions were, in effect, coercive demands. There is now an
international norm for a Great Power to make its objectives known and then give the
target an opportunity to concede. It can be costly for a Great Power to ignore this norm. For instance, the U.S. experienced a diplomatic backlash for its unilateral use of force against Libya in 1986.

A Great Power thus has an incentive to avoid the costs of abrogating international norms by working through institutions and adopting coercive strategies, even if such strategies are not likely to succeed or the Great Power does not want them to succeed. President George Bush went to the UN Security Council in November of 1990 to obtain authorization to use all means necessary to remove Iraq from Kuwait. To obtain his casus belli he agreed to a resolution which would have provided Saddam Hussein the opportunity to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. After the costly U.S. preparations for the brute force invasion which President Bush preferred, the idea of an eleventh hour withdrawal, which kept Iraq’s military power in tact, was for Bush the worst case scenario.

In sum, a challenger may choose a coercive strategy that it believes is unlikely to succeed if the costs of such a strategy are low or if the cost of flouting international norms is high.

Organization of Research

The organization for the remainder of this research proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a model for asymmetric coercion. I then generate equilibrium conditions to demonstrate that a powerful challenger only chooses coercion when this strategy has a higher expected outcome than any other available policy option and when the target is willing to concede to demands. According to this finding, coercion should succeed at gaining the challenger’s foreign policy objectives. In the real world, however,
coercion often fails, and in the remainder of Chapter 2, I examine within the framework of the asymmetric coercion model the five rational and non-rational explanations for target resistance which I introduced earlier in this chapter.

In Chapter 3, I examine real world cases of asymmetric conflict. I develop a database of those asymmetric cases since World War I which pitted Great Power challengers against weaker target states. I then produce descriptive statistics to assess the frequency of asymmetric conflicts, how often Great Powers choose coercion over other available policy options, and how often these strategies succeed. I compare the United States against other Great Powers and also provide a comparison across time. I then compare my findings with the results of previous researchers. In the second half of Chapter 3, I operationalize key explanatory and control variables in order to conduct regression analysis which tests the survival and commitment hypotheses.

In Chapters 4 through 6, I investigate three asymmetric conflicts between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, respectively. In Chapter 4, I examine the conflict between the United States and Iraq from August of 1990 to March of 2003. I consider three crises during this period, the first being the crisis following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait leading up to the Gulf War, the second crisis being the Iraqi Republic Guard’s deployment and then redeployment along the Kuwaiti border in October of 1994, and the third crisis being the U.S. demand that Iraq abandon its WMD in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003.

In Chapter 6, I consider three crises between the United States and Libya from 1981 until 2003. The first crisis was triggered by Libya’s support of international terrorism and concluded in a stalemate. The second crisis was over Libya’s involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland in December of 1988 and ended with the extradition of two Libyan suspects to stand trial in the Netherlands in April of 1999. The final crisis followed the September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon and arose from U.S. concern over Libya’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. This crisis concluded in December of 2003 when Libya’s leader, Colonel Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi announced that Libya would abandon its WMD altogether.

Chapter 7 concludes with a summary in which I compile the quantitative and qualitative findings in order to make an overall assessment and make policy recommendations, along with recommendations for further research.
Chapter 2: Theory of Asymmetric Coercion and Explanations for Coercion Failure

Great Powers routinely target weak states by adopting a variety of strategies to achieve their foreign policy objectives, which may range from relatively minor policy changes on the part of the weak state to higher demands for homeland territory or regime change. In asymmetric crises, Great Powers most often choose a strategy of coercion, threatening or using limited force to convince target states to comply with their demands.\(^78\) Coercion is an attractive strategy to the alternative of brute force war as it holds the promise of foreign policy gains while avoiding the high costs of invasion and occupation.

Yet for a coercive strategy to succeed, the targeted state must concede to demands. While the weak state has an incentive to acquiesce in order to avoid punishing sanctions, air strikes or invasion, the issues at stake are usually of a higher value to it than to the Great Power and, therefore, more costly to concede. The demands made, in fact may be so great as to threaten the very survival of the target state. The act of conceding alone can appear weak and prove costly to a target regime under the scrutiny of armed domestic groups plotting revolution. Or the regime’s leader may also be humiliated by making a concession and subsequently removed from power by members of his own party.\(^79\) As a consequence, states, regimes and their leaders deeply resent being coerced and prefer to resist whenever feasible, whether over relatively minor policy changes or much larger demands for territory or regime change.

\(^78\) See Chapter 3
Despite this resistance, the question remains as to why Great Powers, such as the United States, with their tremendous military advantage, routinely fail to coerce weak states into conceding to their demands. A powerful challenger should understand the tension between a target’s fear of overwhelming military might and a target’s desire to resist any coercive demand. Further, if it is a rational actor, a Great Power should only engage in those coercive strategies likely to succeed, making only those threats which it is willing to back up with credible force and issuing only those demands to which the target will likely concede. In so doing, it avoids both policy failure and the high costs of taking objectives by brute force. The record for Great Power outcomes in asymmetric conflicts is mixed. While it has employed coercive strategies in 75% of asymmetric crises since World War I, coercion has succeeded in only 56% of these cases. Why have conflicts with weak states so often concluded with foreign policy failure or invasion?

In the Chapter 1, I presented five explanations for why a target might resist a powerful challenger’s demands. These included non-rational explanations for misperception and miscalculation, along with four rationalist explanations of uncertainty and private information, issue indivisibility, credible commitment problems, and target survival. I also introduced two additional reasons for a rational challenger to issue a coercive demand even though the target is likely to resist: when the costs of coercion are low and when there are external costs for adopting brute force strategies.

In this chapter, I develop a theory for asymmetric coercion in interstate conflict to explain the strategic interaction between a powerful challenger state and its weak

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target state. Specifically, I focus on compellence, a coercive demand for a target to make an observable change in its behavior. With its survival unthreatened, the powerful challenger maintains the latitude to vary both the coercive demands and the threats it issues. The challenger optimizes its outcome by maximizing demands with minimal threats, contingent on the target's willingness to concede. Such a strategy, while achieving more modest objectives than those gained by brute force, does avoid costly invasion and occupation.

I develop this theory of asymmetric coercion in three stages. In the introductory chapter, I laid the foundation by defining key terms, identifying the explanatory variables of compellent demands and threats, and organizing these concepts into a typology of coercion. This provides a method for classifying the universe of coercion cases into a coherent framework for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I also defined the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. I examined limits on the use of force which could be still considered coercive as well as alternative foreign policy options of accommodation, inducement, sanctions, and brute force. Finally, I examined explanations for coercion failure and developed two testable hypotheses based on target survival and the credible commitment problem of the challenger.

In this chapter, I begin by constructing a dynamic model of asymmetric coercion, in which the challenger decides among strategies of accommodation, coercion, and brute force. The model demonstrates that a range of demands exists, in which both the challenger and the target prefer coercion over brute force. The challenger employs costly signaling to communicate the credibility of its threats and to overcome the target's

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81 I omit inducements and sanctions in order to keep focus on the dynamics of coercion.
82 The target always prefers accommodation to either coercion or brute force.
uncertainty over the challenger’s resolve. In its iterative form, the model captures strategic interaction and learning which leads the challenger to manipulate its demands and threats until a settlement is reached.

In the latter half of this chapter, I reconsider the question of why coercion often fails by examining the non-rational and rationalist explanations of coercion failure through the lens of the asymmetric coercion model.

**MODEL OF ASYMMETRIC COERCION**

I now turn to the strategic interaction between challenger and target and develop a dynamic model to explain how an optimizing challenger chooses and modifies its demands and threats in cases of asymmetric coercion. This model incorporates the insight that the challenger in asymmetric conflicts, whose survival is not threatened, has the latitude to vary not only the *demands* that it makes, but also the level of military force it employs to back up the *threats* that it makes. The challenger improves its expected outcome by balancing demands and threats, considering the impact of threat level when choosing demands and vice versa. Previous research in coercion and related sub-fields assumes either the level of demands or threats to be fixed and examines the effect on outcome by varying the remaining variable.

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83 The varying of demands and threats is made between each stage of the iterative model. For a single stage the demands and threats are set with the initial offer.

In addition to providing a game theoretic model for coercion, this model also provides a framework for policy makers and academics to better understand the crucial link between the demands and the threats which are made and the impact their interaction has on crises outcomes. Understanding this connection is critical for strategy development and selection, as well as for employment and evaluation.

Assumptions

Developing any theory in international politics requires simplifying assumptions as to the nature of the international environment and the actors who dwell therein.\(^{85}\) I begin with neorealist assumptions of an anarchic, self-help, international system with states as the primary actors.\(^{86}\) I assume states to be unitary actors, though I later relax this assumption for the target state and examine its regime and leadership.\(^{87}\) This allows me to incorporate domestic power considerations which are particularly relevant in the decision making of weak states.\(^{88}\) I further assume that states (and later regimes) act rationally. Given their constraints, they make decisions they believe will result in “optimal” outcomes.\(^{89}\) Optimal indicates the most desirable or satisfactory outcome, based on the expected costs and benefits of a decision as compared to feasible alternatives.\(^{90}\)

\(^{85}\) Kenneth Waltz (1979) *Theory of International Politics* Boston: Mc\-\-Graw-Hill 7-10


\(^{87}\) I do not relax the unitary actor assumption for the challenger in order to keep the model tractable and parsimonious. The qualitative chapters include cases where this unitary actor assumption breaks down in regards to the United States. For an excellent example see the section in Chapter 5 on U.S. decision making during the Kosovo crisis.


\(^{89}\) In adopting a rational actor framework, I do not suggest that psychological, cognitive, or group/organizational biases are unimportant. I address these factors when analyzing the reasons why states do not act rationally as the cause for coercion failure.

I develop the asymmetric coercion model in four steps. First, I consider strategic interaction in a simple, single stage model, introducing the concepts of reputation costs, probability of coercion success once coercive diplomacy fails, signaling costs, the target’s costs of resistance, the challenger’s costs of carrying out threats, probability of brute force victory and the costs of brute force. Second, I calculate the equilibrium condition, demonstrating that the challenger’s optimal outcome is achieved when demands and threats are limited. Third, I extend the logic to an iterative game, noting that, for cases in which a compellent offer does not succeed in achieving objectives, the challenger can learn and adjust its offer in subsequent stages. Conflict continues until either the challenger accommodates, the target concedes, or the challenger gives up on coercion and achieves its objectives by brute force. Finally, I calculate the coercion range, within which both the challenger and target both prefer the coercive outcome to the brute force outcome.

**The Single Stage Model**

Consider the following conflict between two states.\(^\text{91}\) One state, the challenger, has the military power projection capability to threaten the survival of a weak target state. A dispute arises over an issue, which the target controls. The range of issues could vary from relative minor matters, such as a target’s policy towards an ethnic group within its state, to larger issues, such as the control of territory or the nature of the regime in power. To aid in conceptualization, consider a dispute over territory as depicted in Figure 2.1, where the distance between 0 and 1 represents the territory the target initially controls.

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\(^\text{91}\) See appendix for a formal presentation of the coercion model.
Both states gain by controlling as much of the territory as possible. The challenger has three foreign policy options available to it: accommodation, coercion, or a brute force strategy of invasion (see Figure 2.2).\footnote{In reality, the challenger has the additional option of inducements, economic sanctions or a mixed strategy. For clarity I restrict the options to accommodation, coercion, or brute force.} In the following sections, I explain Figure 2.2, the coercion model in extended form, and examine the outcomes of these three options. I then consider the conditions under which both the challenger and the target prefer concessions to brute force.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Linear Representation of Conflict Issue.}
\end{figure}
**Accommodation and Reputation Costs**

The challenger’s first option is to accommodate the target. If the challenger chooses this, it then receives nothing and the target gains all the benefits from whatever is at issue (territory) with an outcome of \([-r_c,1]\), respectively, where \(r_c\) are the reputation costs incurred by the challenger. The challenger’s lack of resolve over the issue having

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93 The following concepts are developed in greater detail in the remainder of the chapter, but are provided here as reference. Probability of brute force victory is the likelihood that the challenger is able to take the objective at stake by force. The cost of brute force is the expected costs endured by challenger or target in the brute force operation. Challenger reputation costs are the expected costs in future conflicts as a result of choosing accommodation. Target reputation costs are the expected costs in future conflicts for conceding. Signaling costs are the challenger’s costs for providing information to the target over the credibility of its threat. The value of the issue at hand is normalized such that the most that can be demanded is 1 and the least is 0. Demand is the percentage of the issue at stake which the challenger has signaled to the target that if it concedes will end the crisis. Probability of coercion success is the likelihood that the challenger’s coercive strategy will succeed after the target has rejected the offer. The costs of making good on threats is the expected loss to the challenger for following through on its coercive threats. Costs of resisting are the target’s costs for continued resistance to the challenger’s demands. Asterisk on Demand* and Threat* indicate these are optimized such that they provide a maximized outcome for the challenger.
been revealed, the reputation costs are any additional losses now expected as a result of making this information public.\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{Coercion and Signaling Costs}

The challenger's second option is to coerce the target, in which case the challenger extends an offer consisting of a demand and a threat communicated by means of a costly signal.\textsuperscript{95} Signaling costs are those costs a challenger bears for making exemplary or limited uses of force to demonstrate the credibility of its threats. These are sunk costs, since the challenger incurs them regardless of whether the target concedes or not. For exemplary military actions, the operational expenses for deployments/exercises are relatively low. For limited uses of force, signaling costs are much greater. Once the challenger exercises force, there are not only larger operational costs, but also potential combat losses, the inherent risk of conflict escalation, and the potential loss of prestige.

Signals are intentionally costly in order to communicate the challenger's resolve. The challenger has the incentive to bluff by making threats it does not intend to keep in order to gain larger concessions. The target, aware of this incentive, discounts such cheap talk.\textsuperscript{96} Costly signaling overcomes this skepticism by demonstrating to the target

\textsuperscript{94}Morrow, James (1999) "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment and Negotiation" in Strategic Choice and International Relations Princeton 78-114

\textsuperscript{95} Because of its power advantage I assume it is the challenger which initiates the crisis by making a coercive offer. In order to keep the model parsimonious, I do not allow the target to make a counter offer, but instead assume that in subsequent stages the challenger can incorporate information from a target into future offers. An example of this is Libya's counter offer to the U.S. that the trial of the two Libyans suspected of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing be held in the Netherlands instead of the U.S. or Great Britain. The U.S. delayed for 6 years before issuing a second offer for just such a trial in the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{96} Fearon, James D. (1992) "Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises" PH.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 122
the challenger’s willingness to incur costs that a less resolved challenger would not be willing to endure.\textsuperscript{97}

If the challenger wishes to raise the threat level, it must likewise communicate the credibility of this increase by incurring additional costs. Signaling costs increase significantly as the challenger crosses the threshold of violence by moving from exemplary actions to limited strikes. Signaling costs again rise dramatically when moving from limited strikes to major ground operations (see Figure 2.3). While minimal threats may be made credible with relatively inexpensive diplomatic or symbolic military signaling, greater threats may require limited force, a move which entails larger operational costs and an increased risk of further escalation. Signaling costs are greatest for major combat operations, for which the loss of troops is expected to be significant and the power and prestige of the challenger are at stake.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{97} James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution}, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90. Note that if the challenger’s overall costs for military operations decreases, then the level of force required to effectively signal resolve increases. For example, the United States development of modern airpower with precision bombing from medium altitude which limits the threat to U.S. aircrew may actually decrease the effectiveness of signaling since such limited strikes are less costly for the U.S.. I credit Barry Posen for this insight.

\textsuperscript{98} This assumption that the rate of signaling costs increase when crossing the threshold of violence and the threshold of invasion is central to the finding that a challenger optimizes by limiting demands and threats.
Target Concession

Once the challenger issues its compellent offer, the target has two options: to concede or to resist. The target’s outcome for conceding is the expected benefits it retains (1-demands) minus any reputation costs. The target will choose to concede if its expected outcome for conceding is equal to or exceeds that of resisting.

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99 The model does not allow for partial concession by the target. In the real world this clearly happens, for instance following the U.S. El Dorado Canyon airstrikes in April 1986 against Libya, Qadhafi partially met U.S. demands which resulted in a stalemated outcome.

100 Additional costs to the target are the losses incurred from the challenger’s signaling. This is not addressed for two reasons. First for symbolic signals the targets costs are negligible. The second reason is that for signals generated by limited force the costs to the target are incurred prior to the target’s decision making and therefore are not part of the target’s calculations. These additional costs would only matter if the limited use of force destroyed a significant portion of the issue at stake.

101 This research adopts the assumption common amongst bargaining literature that if the outcome for concessions and resistance are equal that the target concedes. Also it is assumed that there is no additional value for the target by resisting and demonstrating to others that it is tough enough to take a beating.
Target Resistance: Probability of Success once Coercive Diplomacy fails and the Costs of Resistance

If the target resists, the outcome of the crisis will be determined by the likelihood the challenger will enact its threats and that these actions will then succeed in inducing the target to cede to demands. This probability of coercion success once coercive diplomacy has failed depends on the level and type of coercive threat employed (denial or punishment).\(^\text{102}\) Ceteris paribus, a denial strategy which threatens to seize an objective with brute force has a greater probability of success than a punitive strike against a recalcitrant target. The likelihood of the challenger achieving its aims when the target resists can be viewed as a lottery, whereby the challenger succeeds with the probability of coercion success \(p_s\) and fails with one minus the probability of coercion success \((1 - p_s)\).

The target’s expected outcome is a function not only of the challenger’s probability of success, but also of the target’s costs of resistance. The costs of resistance are the losses the target endures from the challenger carrying out its threats. For punishment strategies, these losses are the economic, infrastructure, and civilian injuries or deaths from punitive strikes.\(^\text{103}\) For denial strategies, the costs of resisting are combat losses and weakened defenses.

\(^{102}\) Probability of coercion success refers to the probability of the challenger’s success. Probability of success differs from the probability of victory calculation from the bargaining in war literature which is concerned with the outcome of a war. Such calculations produced fixed variables given the assumption both states use all there available military capability and does not consider alternative strategies. For an example see Fearon, James D. (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War” International Organization 49.3, 379-414

\(^{103}\) Punishment could also be military losses which are not employed at defending the issue at stake.
Costs of Carrying out Threats

The challenger's outcome, should the target resist, depends on its probability of coercion success, the value the challenger places on its objectives, signaling costs and the costs of carrying out threats. The costs of carrying out threats are the additional costs the challenger pays if the target resists. These costs differ from signaling costs intended only to communicate the credibility of the threat. For example, the signaling costs of a denial strategy are the operational costs and combat losses the challenger endures in making strikes aimed at convincing the target that its defenses are ineffective and that it cannot defend against a brute force attack, which is forthcoming. By contrast, the costs of carrying out a denial threat are the operational costs and combat losses the challenger incurs when the target resists. If the target never concedes, then the costs of carrying out the denial threat equals the cost of brute force.

Optimizing Coercive Demands and Threats

Now consider the challenger's strategic decision as to the level of demands and threats to include in its coercive offer. The challenger desires the optimal outcome to the conflict. With a coercive strategy, this is reached by achieving the maximum demands at the lowest threat level, contingent on the target conceding. This outcome avoids both the decrease in benefits, should the target resist, and the costs of carrying out threats.¹⁰⁴

The challenger's optimal demand* is therefore the highest demand for which the target is indifferent between conceding and resisting.¹⁰⁵ This equilibrium condition for

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¹⁰⁴ This assumes that the preferred outcome is greater than the reputation costs for accommodation.
¹⁰⁵ Assume that the target accepts the offer if indifferent. Asterisk indicates a demand is optimal for the challenger.
demand* is illustrated in Equation 1, where the target’s outcome for conceding equals that of resisting:

\[
\text{Target outcome for conceding} = \text{Target outcome for resisting} = (1 - \text{demand*}) - (\text{reputation costs}) = 1 - ((\text{probability of coercion success}) \times (\text{demand*})) - (\text{cost of resisting})
\]

\textbf{Eq. 1.}

The left-hand side of Eq. 1 is the target’s outcome for conceding. This is the residual after the challenger receives its concession \((1 - \text{demand*})\) minus the reputation cost the target suffers for conceding. The right-hand side of Eq. 1 is the target’s outcome for resisting. This is what the target expects to retain by resisting, which is the value of the issue (normalized) minus what is demanded, discounted by the probability that coercion will be successful, all reduced by the cost the target expects to incur by resisting.

Note in Eq. 1 that, as demand* increases, the target’s expected outcome for conceding and resisting both decrease, but the outcome for conceding decreases at a faster rate than that for resisting, since the demand* is discounted by probability of coercion success. The challenger therefore obtains its optimal outcome by increasing its demands until the target’s outcome for conceding just equals its outcome for resisting.

Solving for demand* by rearranging Eq. 1 reveals the relationship between optimal demands and the costs of resistance, reputation costs and the probability of coercion success:

\[
\text{demand*} = \frac{\text{cost of resisting} - \text{reputation costs}}{1 - \text{probability of coercion success}}
\]

\textbf{Eq. 2.}
The optimal demand* increases as the target’s costs for resisting increase. This captures the idea that the more costly it is for the target to resist, the greater the demands the challenger can make. Demand* also increases as the challenger’s probability of coercion success rises. This indicates that the higher the likelihood that coercion will be successful, the greater the demands the challenger can make. By contrast, demand* decreases as the target’s reputation costs increase. This indicates that the target is more likely to resist demands if it believes that the expected future costs for making a concession have grown.

**Optimizing a Challenger’s Coercive Threats**

Calculating the optimal demand* is the first half of the challenger’s optimization problem. The demand* must be backed by a threat and signaling the credibility of that threat is costly. A rational challenger prefers to make the lowest threat necessary to achieve the demand*. The challenger’s optimization problem then consists of maximizing demand* at minimum signaling cost. A detailed solution to this problem is provided in Appendix 2.A. The result demonstrates that, given the assumptions regarding the costs of resistance, reputation costs and signaling costs, an interior solution exists, whereby a challenger’s optimal offer limits both the demands and the threats made. The intuition is that while the challenger gains by increasing demands, the signaling costs required for such demands grows exponentially, particularly when signals cross the threshold of violence and the threshold for major ground combat. As the challenger increases demands, it eventually reaches the point at which the marginal benefits from further demands are more than offset by the increased costs of additional signaling.


Iterative Stages: Strategic Interaction, Learning, and Information Updating

The single stage model of asymmetric coercion provides a framework for understanding how a challenger decides among its foreign policy options of accommodation, coercion, and brute force. It provides insight as to how the challenger chooses its optimal demands, threats, and signals when it coerces. In addition, it provides the expected outcomes for the challenger and target, when the target concedes or resists. However, real world cases of coercion often consist of multiple rounds, in which both the challenger and the target learn by receiving updated information on the other’s resolve and capabilities, which, in turn, affect estimates of the probabilities and costs of coercion and brute force. New information may cause the challenger to update its offer by adjusting demands and/or threats. The following example of a challenger employing a denial strategy is useful for illustrating this point.

A challenger initially chooses to coerce if the expected outcome is greater than that of accommodation or brute force. In order to set an initial optimal offer, it evaluates the probability of coercion success, the costs of signaling the credibility of its denial strategy, as well as the target’s reputation costs and costs of resisting. Once the target receives signals, such as air strikes against its army to demonstrate the challenger’s resolve and the vulnerability of the target’s defenses, the challenger expects the target to concede. I later consider explanations for why a target might reject this offer, but for now it is sufficient to note that the challenger learns from a rejected offer that the demands were either too high for the threats, the threats were too low for the demands, or the signals were insufficient to make credible the threats.
When the target rejects the offer, the challenger then must make good on its threat. These actions then succeed in convincing the target to concede the objective with the probability of coercion success ($p_s$). However, if the challenger’s enacted threats fail to convince the target to concede, the challenger updates its beliefs about subsequent probabilities and costs of coercion and brute force. In this second stage, the challenger again has the option of choosing to accommodate, adopt a brute force strategy, or update its coercive strategy by adjusting its demands, threats, and signals. For instance, it might decide to publicly mobilize additional troops or escalate the scale of strikes to signal an increased threat. Upon receiving this new offer, the target likewise updates its information and determines whether to continue resisting or to concede. This process continues, with challenger updating its information and making subsequent offers until the challenger accommodates, the target concedes, or the challenger takes the objective by force. Figure 2.4 illustrates two stages of this iterative strategic interaction:

![Figure 2.4: Iterative Asymmetric Coercion Model: Two Stages](image-url)
A real world example may help clarify this interactive learning. In late January of 1999 at Rambouillet, France the United States introduced demands for Serbia to relinquish control of Kosovo to NATO troops. The U.S. backed these demands with the threat of three days of limited air strikes which commenced in late March. When Serbia still resisted, the U.S. adjusted both its demands and threats. In May, it lowered its demand by allowing the UN Security Council to have authority in Kosovo rather than NATO, by admitting Russian troops along with the NATO troops as peacekeepers, and by removing any reference to a referendum for Kosovo independence. The U.S. also increased its threat by ratcheting up its air campaign with additional aircraft, attacking a broader range of Serbian targets. By early June, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic conceded upon his conclusion that his strategy of resistance was no longer working and that U.S. and NATO resolve was high, as were Serbia’s costs for resisting.¹⁰⁶

**Brute Force, Probability of Brute Force Victory, and Costs of Brute Force**

The third option available to the challenger is to reject both accommodation and coercion and to adopt a brute force strategy to seize the objective by force. The challenger’s expected outcome for such a strategy is dependent on its *probability of brute force victory* and the *costs of brute force* it will endure. The probability of brute force victory (pᵥ) is the likelihood that, if the brute force strategy is employed, the challenger will be able to take its objectives.¹⁰⁷ While the probability of coercive success considers whether the implementation of coercive threats will achieve the challenger’s objectives,

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¹⁰⁶ See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account.
¹⁰⁷ The probability of victory is not always the likelihood the challenger can conquer the target, but rather that the challenger can take the conflict issue by force. For issues such as regime change the probability of victory may entail conquest, while for lesser issues this may not be the case. For instance if the issue in dispute is extra-territorial such as an island, the probability of victory is the likelihood the challenger can seize the island, not that it invade the target state itself.
the probability of brute force victory predicts the likely outcome of the challenger’s brute force strategy. The costs of brute force are the expected costs for taking and holding the objective by force. The target’s brute force outcome therefore depends on the likelihood it can defend the objective \((1 - p_v)\) along with its costs for so doing.

**Challenger’s Foreign Policy Choice: Coercion, Brute Force, or Accommodation**

The challenger’s decision to accommodate, coerce, or use brute force depends on which option provides the greatest expected outcome. In this section, I examine the conditions for which the challenger chooses coercion over brute force or accommodation.

**Challenger’s Comparison of Coercion versus Brute Force**

First consider the challenger’s choice between coercion and a brute force strategy. The challenger selects coercion if the expected outcome exceeds or equals that of brute force. This inequality is denoted as:

\[
\frac{\text{Challenger outcome coercion}}{\text{Demands}^* - \text{signaling costs}} \geq \frac{\text{Challenger outcome of brute force}}{\text{probability of victory} - \text{costs of brute force}}
\]

Eq.3.

Since the challenger sets the optimal demand\(^*\) at the point where the target is just willing to concede, the challenger’s outcome for coercion is the benefits it receives from coercion, which is simply demand\(^*\) minus signaling costs. The challenger chooses coercion so long as this outcome is greater than that of brute force. The brute force outcome is the expected value of the issue which is the value of the issue (normalized to be equal to 1) discounted by the probability that the challenger will take the objective \((p_v)\)
and then reduced by the losses endured by the challenger for implementing its brute force strategy.

Rearranging Equation 3 and solving for the optimal demands* yields the range of demands for which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force:

Demands* ≥ probability of victory - costs of brute force + signaling costs \hspace{1cm} \text{Eq.4.}

In other words, the benefits from coercion must exceed the expected outcome of the brute force strategy plus the signaling costs the challenger incurs.

**Target Preference between Concession and Resistance**

Unlike the challenger, the weak target has no choice between a coercive and a brute force strategy. Instead, the target only has the option of conceding or resisting if the challenger chooses to coerce. As previously discussed, the target prefers conceding to demands* rather than resisting so long as concessions produce a better expected outcome. This is simply Eq. 1 expressed as the following inequality:

\[
\text{Target outcome for conceding} \geq \text{Target outcome for resisting}
\]

\[
(1 - \text{demand}^*) - (\text{reputation costs}) \geq 1 - (\text{probability of coercion success}) \times (\text{demand}^*) - (\text{cost of resisting})
\]

\hspace{1cm} \text{Eq. 5.}

Solving again for optimal demands* yields the demands which the target prefers to concede rather than resist (Equation 2 as an inequality).

\[
\text{demand}^* \leq \frac{\text{cost of resisting} - \text{reputation costs}}{1 - \text{probability of coercion success}}
\]

\hspace{1cm} \text{Eq. 6.}
Combining equations 4 and 6 produces the **coercion range**, i.e. those demands for which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force and the target prefers conceding to resisting.

\[
p_v - \text{cbf}_c + s_c \leq x \leq \frac{e_t - r_t}{(1 - p_s)} \quad \text{Eq. 7.}
\]

The coercion range is depicted visually in Figure 2.5 below for optimal demands* \((x^*)\), probability of brute force victory \((p_v)\), probability of coercion success \((p_s)\), the challenger’s costs of brute force \((\text{cbf}_c)\), the target’s costs of resistance \((e_t)\), challenger signaling costs \((s_c)\), and target reputation costs \((r_t)\). Notice that the upper boundary of the coercion range is the optimal demand*, i.e. the maximum demand for which the target will still concede. And the lower bound of the range is the minimum demand for which the challenger prefers coercion to brute force (see Appendix 2.A for proof). Note that the probability of coercion success is depicted as being less than the probability of victory. Since \(p_s\) is a function of the threat, as the threat level increases, the probability of coercion success converges towards the probability of brute force victory.

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108 The coercion range is closely related to Fearon’s bargaining range derived in Fearon, James (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War” *International Organization* 49:3, 387. However, it differs from Fearon’s model since the challenger does not have the option of making a counter offer. It also incorporates probabilities and costs of coercion as well as brute force, which reduces the coercion success space compared to Fearon’s calculation. See appendix for proof.
Accommodation versus Coercion or Brute Force

The final comparison juxtaposes the choices of coercion and brute force with that of accommodation. The challenger chooses accommodation if the outcome for coercion and for brute force is less than that of accommodation. This occurs when signaling costs, the cost of carrying out threats or the costs of brute force outweigh the expected benefits from target concessions. The objectives gained may have minimal value to the challenger, as with non-vital interests, or weightier objectives may be too costly to achieve. For example, homeland territorial demands gained through invasion and occupation may be so costly as to exceed the expected benefits.
EXPLAINING COERCION FAILURE

In the previous section, I developed a model for asymmetric coercion which derived the optimal demands, threats, and costly signals for a coercive strategy preferred by a challenger over brute force or accommodation. The model also produced the coercion range of demands which the challenger prefers to brute force and to which the target prefers to concede rather than resist. Yet, in real world cases of coercion, targets often do resist and these conflicts result in policy failures for the challenger or brute force campaigns of invasion and occupation. Given the results for the asymmetric coercion model, I review the five explanations introduced in Chapter 1 for why a target may resist a coercive strategy. I also examine two explanations based on low costs of coercion and external costs of brute force strategies for why a challenger might choose a coercive strategy even though it believes coercion is likely to fail.

I: Non-Rationalist Explanations for Coercion Failure

Due to psychological and cognitive biases, decision makers often misperceive and miscalculate capability and resolve, demands and threats, probabilities of victory, and the costs of fighting to the extent that coercion fails. In addition, rational decision making can be limited, particularly during crises, causing the challenger and target to arrive at different conclusions regarding the same information. In such cases a coercion range, in which both the challenger and the target prefer coercion to a brute force strategy, may not

exist. Figure 2.6, below, illustrates this disconnect, whereby the divergent estimates of the challenger and the target cause them to arrive at coercion ranges without overlap. If the maximum demand to which the target will concede \( x_t^* \) is less than the minimum demand which the challenger will accept \( (p_v - c_b f_c + s_c) \), then there are no demands which both target and challenger prefer to resistance and brute force, respectively.\(^{110}\)

![Diagram of coercion ranges](image)

**Figure 2.6: No overlap in coercion range due to differing estimations by challenger and target**

*Rationalist Explanations for Bargaining Failure*

James Fearon begins his seminal article, “Rationalist Explanations for War”, with the observation “…that wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur.”\(^{111}\) Since all states incur costs by fighting and would benefit from agreements which avoided such costs, he argues that war, depicted as a brute force strategy within the asymmetric coercion model, is a failure of states to negotiate a resolution. With brute force other foreign policy options of accommodation or coercion have either not been chosen or, if chosen and implemented, have failed to achieve their objectives. Though insightful, Fearon fails to compare the costs of a brute force strategy to the costs of these alternative strategies.

\(^{110}\) If the target’s estimates are approximately the same as the challenger then the coercion range will be as previously calculated in Figure 5. If the target’s estimates are larger than those of the challenger this actually increases the coercion range.

And, as demonstrated earlier, even when coercion succeeds, the challenger incurs signaling costs and the target incurs reputation costs.

In his article, Fearon focuses solely on the costs of a brute force strategy, what he refers to as the costs of war, while excluding from his discussion the costs incurred by coercion. This error of omission is illuminated in his discussion of the *ex post* inefficiency of war. He argues that a brute force war is always inefficient *ex post*, as both states suffer and would have been better off having achieved a resolution which avoided those costs.\textsuperscript{112}

While technically correct, the term *ex post* inefficiency is misleading, as the following bargaining example demonstrates. Consider a consumer purchasing an automobile. She spends time on-line researching and more time and money traveling to dealerships to test drive various models and negotiate with salesmen until she finds one willing to supply a desirable car at an agreeable price. At the same time, the automobile dealership expends advertising dollars on newspaper and television advertisements to draw in customers. The efforts of the consumer and producer eventually conclude with a deal being struck. However, note that this transaction is inefficient *ex post*. The consumer would have been better off if she had avoided the costs in time and money to locate her new car, and the dealership better off if it had not had to pay for advertising. Like brute force war, the automobile market is *ex post* inefficient.

Yet while Fearon proclaims war as inefficient, economists have not adopted a similar argument to decry the free market.\textsuperscript{113} Why? Because *ex post* inefficiency simply

\textsuperscript{112} Fearon, James (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" *International Organization* 49:3, 383

\textsuperscript{113} Fearon is not alone with this argument see Powell, Robert (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem" *International Organization* 60:Winter 169, Reiter, Dan (2003) "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War"
describes an interaction, whether it be an international negotiation or a free market exchange, which incurs transaction costs. All bargaining entails some transaction costs, even if it is simply the time it takes to reach an agreement. Pareto efficiency is only meaningful ex ante when expected outcomes can be compared, incorporating transaction costs for all available options.

In fact, Fearon makes two implicit assumptions inappropriate for asymmetric conflict: first, as just discussed, that the expected costs for brute force are always greater than the alternatives of coercion or accommodation, and second, that the target state’s survival is not at stake.

Before addressing this second assumption on state survival, I first examine Fearon’s three rationalist explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and incentives to keep information private, issue indivisibility, and commitment problems. I then derive a testable hypothesis for a challenger’s credible commitment problems.

II: Uncertainty and Private Information

Uncertainty and private information concerning the challenger’s and the target’s interests, military capabilities, and resolve provide a second explanation for why a target may resist being coerced. If challenger and target are privy to different information, even if both are rational, they may reach differing assessments of the other’s interests, capabilities, and resolve. If these estimates vary sufficiently, such that the challenger’s range of acceptable demands does not overlap with what the target is willing to concede, then coercion will fail in the same manner as it did with the previous non-rationalist explanation (see Figure 2.6 above). The difference here is that the cause of coercion

failure is uncertainty resulting from private information rather than miscalculation or misperception.

Fearon points out that states could avoid a negotiation breakdown by revealing to each other their private information. There are incentives, however, for the challenger and the target to bluff and misrepresent their intentions and capabilities in order to obtain a greater expected coercive outcome even if this means accepting the risk of war. 114

III: Issue Indivisibility

Issue indivisibility is the idea that there are certain issues over which a target state is unwilling to negotiate, preferring resistance to any peaceful settlement. 115 Those who argue for issue indivisibility as a rational explanation for war have recognized specific religious sites or the attributes of a specific territory as integral to national identity, a matter which cannot be viewed as divisible. 116 Fearon acknowledges issue indivisibility as a theoretically viable rationalist explanation for bargaining failure, but dismisses it as inconsequential for modern international politics. 117

Demonstrating how issue indivisibility leads to coercion failure in the coercion model is a straightforward matter. If the target will make no concessions at all on the

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Robert Powell carries this argument further by asserting that, even if an issue is indivisible, this does not explain bargaining failure. “Even if a disputed issue is physically indivisible, one should not think of bargaining indivisibilities as a conceptually distinct solution to the inefficiency puzzle. There are still outcomes (or more accurately mechanisms) that give both states higher expected payoffs than they would obtain by fighting over the issue. The real impediment to agreement is the inability to commit. Powell, Robert (2006) “War as a Commitment Problem” International Organization 60:Winter 178
issue at stake, then the maximum demand that the target will concede is equal to 0 ($x_{\text{max}} = 0$). Figure 2.7 depicts this case, where the challenger’s expected outcome for a brute force strategy exceeds the maximum demand to which the target will concede ($x_{\text{max}}$).

**Maximum target will concede**

$X_{\text{max}} = 0$

\[0 \rightarrow p_v \rightarrow p_s p_v \rightarrow 1\]

Challenger prefers brute force

if $x < p_v - cbf_c + s_c$

**Coercion fails since**

$x_{\text{max}} < p_v - cbf_c + s_c$

**Figure 2.7: Issue Indivisibility and Coercion Failure**

**IV: Credible Commitment Problems**

A third rationalist explanation for coercion failure applies to cases in which a challenger cannot make credible promises *ex ante* to refrain from making future demands. The target believes concession will likely lead only to additional demands. There are two explanations for how this may occur. First, there may be cases in which a target’s concessions reduce the challenger’s uncertainty over the target’s resolve. This information causes the challenger to reassess the expected outcome of initiating a future crisis with additional demands.\(^{118}\) The inability of the challenger to preclude making

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further demands increases the target’s reputation costs for making concessions. If these costs are sufficiently high, this reduces the demand* and may eliminate the coercion range. This decrease in demand* can be seen below in Equation 2, where an increase in reputation costs decreases demand*:

\[
\downarrow \text{demand}^* = \frac{\text{cost of resisting} - \text{reputation costs}}{1 - \text{probability of coercion success}}
\text{Eq. 2.}
\]

An increase in a target’s reputation costs decreases the level of demands for which it will concede. Figure 2.8 demonstrates how the reduction in demand* shrinks the coercion range.

\[
\downarrow x^* = \frac{(c_t z - \uparrow r_t)/(1 - p_s z)}
\]

**Figure 2.8: Impact on Coercion Range due to Reputation Costs**

The relationship between a challenger’s commitment problem and its impact on the coercion range as shown above in Figure 2.8, generates the first testable hypothesis for coercion failure.
Commitment Hypothesis: An increase in commitment problems increases the likelihood of coercion failure

Commitment problems are more likely to occur when the challenger has the military power available to back up additional demands with credible threats. But this is always the case in asymmetric conflicts, in which Great Powers, by definition, have the balance of power in their favor. The hypothesis of a weak state resisting a Great Power because of this large discrepancy in power has been dubbed Goliath's curse. The sheer magnitude of a Great Power such as the U.S. thus generates a commitment problem that can result in coercion failure.

Unrefined, the commitment hypothesis predicts that all asymmetric conflicts are likely to fail. Yet as I will show in Chapter 3, Great Powers succeed at coercion in 56% of asymmetric cases. Without modification the commitment hypothesis does not provide variation in its prediction of crises outcomes. A possible remedy that I employ is derived from an insight of Sir Julian Corbett, who observed that what matters for Great Powers in limited wars are the forces they are willing and able to deploy and "...bring to bear at the decisive point." For testing the commitment hypothesis, the question is whether the Great Power has sufficient deployed power to credibly back up any further demands. If the answer is yes, then a commitment problem is deemed to exist and the prediction of the hypothesis is that the target will likely resist.

119 Sechser, Todd S. (forthcoming) "Goliath's Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive Threats" International Organization
120 The war is limited for the great power, though not necessarily for its target. Corbett, Julian (1988), Some Principles of Maritime Strategy United States Naval Institute: Annapolis, Md 58
A second explanation for commitment problems is based on a shift in the balance of power, a point I will defer until after I discuss target survival as an explanation for coercion failure in the following section.

**Target Survival as a rationalist explanation for coercion failure**

A final rationalist explanation for coercion failure not considered by Fearon, but which I present, is that of target survival. Targets resist demands when concession risks its own survival. Fearon, in his bargaining model, makes the implicit assumption that the issues over which states negotiate will not threaten the target state’s survival. He claims that war is always inefficient *ex post*, since both states suffer and incur costs and would be better off achieving a resolution which avoided those costs. But this is not always the case, particularly in asymmetric conflicts where the range of demands which a challenger prefers to brute force war may all lead to the demise of the weak target.

To demonstrate this, I return to the linear bargaining model (Figure 2.5) and consider a dispute between a powerful challenger and a weak target over the issue of territory which the target controls. This territory includes the target’s homeland. Now, the target may not require all of its territory in order to survive as a sovereign state, but it does require some territory. It needs a certain amount of land for its population to inhabit and for its economy to remain viable. This being the case, there is a maximum demand ($x_{max}$) for territory which the challenger can make and to which the target could concede and retain just enough land to survive. Figure 2.9 depicts this situation, where no coercion range exists, since the challenger prefers the outcome of a brute force war ($p$,

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122 For example Serbia survived without Kosovo following the Kosovo crisis of 1999. See Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis.
- $c_{bf} + s_c$) to receiving $x_{\text{max}}$, and the target cannot concede more than $x_{\text{max}}$, since this would result in its demise.\textsuperscript{123}

A potential rebuttal to my survival argument was one given by Fearon in his discussion on issue indivisibility. In it, he asserts that "...issues over which states bargain typically are complex and multidimensional; side-payments or linkages with other issues typically are possible."\textsuperscript{124} This argument, however, does not apply to cases in which survival is at stake, as there are not likely to be any side-payments or linkages

\textsuperscript{123} Since the expected outcome for the target conceding to its own death is less than or equal to 0 then the target prefers to resist and face a brute force strategy, even if the probability of victory for the challenger is very high, as long as the expected outcome for brute force is greater than 0.

\textsuperscript{124} Fearon, James D. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War" International Organization 49:3, 382

Robert Powell carries this argument further by asserting that, even if an issue is indivisible, this does not explain bargaining failure. "Even if a disputed issue is physically indivisible, one should not think of bargaining indivisibilities as a conceptually distinct solution to the inefficiency puzzle. There are still outcomes (or more accurately mechanisms) that give both states higher expected payoffs than they would obtain by fighting over the issue. The real impediment to agreement is the inability to commit. Powell, Robert (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem" International Organization 60:Winter 178
which provide a settlement that a target would prefer over its own survival.\textsuperscript{125} Given that survival is a primary motivator for the interaction of states in international politics, this explanation is systemic and not domestic.\textsuperscript{126}

Survival is a rationalist explanation for why a target state resists demands and it provides a second hypothesis for coercion failure.

**Survival Hypothesis:** *Demands which threaten a target’s survival increase the likelihood of coercion failure*

Targets are likely to resist demands which threaten their survival, even when their probability of success for resisting or their probability of victory in a brute force war is low, so long as they have the means to resist.

*What is $x_{\text{max}}$?*

Theoretically, $x_{\text{max}}$ is the maximum demand to which a target could concede on an issue and still survive. But what issues threaten a state’s survival and how much can a state concede on a given issue and still survive?

I identify four issues which affect state survival. First is control over the state’s decision making. Demands threaten survival when they strip the state of its sovereignty over policy. Tanisha Fazel, in her work on state death in the international system, focuses on control over foreign policy as the primary indicator of a state’s death.\textsuperscript{127} Demand for regime change which replaces the state’s policy makers thus threatens a state’s survival.\textsuperscript{128} The second issue is a state’s control over its population. Third is

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{125} Kirshner, Jonathon, (2000) “Rationalist Explanations for War?” *Security Studies* 10:1, 144
\textsuperscript{126} Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics* Boston: McGraw Hill, 92
\textsuperscript{128} Here regime change is the replacement of the entire regime, not simply replacing the leader of a regime with another of its members.
\end{footnotesize}
control over homeland territory. Fourth is a viable economy sustaining the population and from which a state’s regime can procure revenue.

Another characteristic, which is not in and of itself a survival issue, is that of a state’s military. Several countries such as Iceland, Panama, and Liechtenstein do not have their own military forces, relying instead upon other countries for their defense. A coercive demand made against a state’s military may threaten survival but only indirectly, if a concession makes the state’s regime, population, territory, or economy vulnerable to attack. For example, in late February 1991, President George Bush’s ultimatum for the Iraqi Army to withdraw from Kuwait within 48 hours would have required Iraq to abandon a large quantity of its heavy weapons in a hasty retreat in order to meet the deadline. Such a loss threatened Iraqi survival, as concession would have exposed its population, homeland territory, and regime to invasion.

Identifying these four issues critical to state survival is an easier task than determining how much a state can concede on a given issue. How much territory, population, economy, or control over its policies does a state really require to remain sovereign and viable? This is an extremely challenging task for analysis. For example, in 1999 Serbia claimed, and still claims, Kosovo as part of Serbia’s historic homeland. Serbia withstood punishing NATO airstrikes before finally ceding control over it. In the end, while the Serbs considered Kosovo a part of its homeland territory, Serbia still survived as a state following the loss of it. Kosovo had, in fact, been insignificant to Serbia in terms of the size of its territory, its Serbian population, its economy, and its strategic location.
To avoid this difficulty in determining whether a set of demands would actually result in the death of a state, I adopt an approach whereby demands which seriously threaten homeland territory, the population, the regime, or the economy are defacto considered a survival risk. For such cases, the survival hypothesis predicts that the target state will resist if it has the means to do so and that coercion will fail. This method avoids the tautological coding of demands as threatening survival when the target resists. One drawback to this approach, however, is that it can produce false positives, as in the case of Kosovo. Nonetheless, a focus on core demands and their threat to any of these four survival issues provides a useable, albeit imperfect, method for testing the survival hypothesis.

**Relaxing the Unitary Actor Assumption on the Target State**

In addition to state survival, a state’s regime and the leader of that regime are also concerned with their political survival. Though regime and leadership survival is a domestic and not a rationalist, unitary actor explanation for coercion failure, it is a critical determinant of a state’s decision making. Relaxing the unitary actor assumption on the target regime and regime leadership incorporates into the asymmetric coercion model the concepts of omni-balancing and domestic audience costs, which I will discuss next.

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130 I do not relax the unitary actor assumption on the challenger state for three reasons. The first is technical, relaxing both restrictions would prove overly complex for modeling without additional insight gained. The second is that should the challenger’s non-unitary actions lead to coercion failure, then this is captured by the explanation of misperception and miscalculation due to non-unitary behavior. Third, much research has been done on how non-unitary behavior by the U.S. can lead to the U.S. losing asymmetric conflicts. See Mack, Andrew (1975) “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” *World Politics* 27:2, 175-200 and Merom, Gil (2003) *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* Cambridge University Press
Regime Survival

A regime’s survival may be threatened domestically in two ways. First, a regime can be overthrown through revolution and civil war. Domestic opposition groups may rise up in revolt and replace the regime with a government of their own. A target regime may then resist a challenger’s demands out of fear that concession will reveal weakness and prompt armed groups to seize power. This is Steven David’s logic of omni-balancing, where the internal structure of such states is more appropriately viewed as anarchical rather than hierarchical.\(^{131}\) The likelihood that a regime will be overthrown for making a concession I call the expected domestic costs of concession.

In the asymmetric coercion model, the expected domestic costs to the target regime for conceding \((dc_t)\) are in addition to the reputation costs the target state incurs.\(^{132}\) This has the effect of lowering the optimal demand* to which a target will concede, thereby reducing the coercion range (see Figure 2.10). If the decrease in demand* is large enough, the coercion range is eliminated and coercion fails.

\[ x^* = \frac{(c_t z - r_t)}{1 - p_s z} \]

\[ x^* = \frac{(c_t z - r_t - dc_t)}{1 - p_s z} \]

---


\(^{132}\) Reputation costs are expected losses due to the challenger or external third parties making additional demands of the target, but not domestic groups.
**Figure 2.10: Regime’s domestic costs for conceding**

In the case of democratic states, a regime may also be removed from power by elections. A regime resists when it expects to incur audience costs for a concession that can lead to its being voted out of office. I discuss more on domestic audience costs in the next section on regime leadership survival.

**Regime Leadership Survival**

The regime leadership, like the regime, places a priority on its political survival. The leader’s hold on the regime is threatened when the leader concedes and thus reveals a policy failure to members of the regime. Audience costs are defined as the expected costs of conceding. The logic of audience costs is the principal-agent problem which I discussed in detail in Chapter 1.

Domestic audience costs ($ac_t$) are incorporated into the coercion model in the same way as the regime’s domestic costs for conceding, which I presented in the previous section (see Figure 2.11, below). An increase in audience costs reduces the demand* and, if significant, may eliminate the coercion range.

\[
x^* = \frac{(c_t z - r_t - dc_t)/(1 - p_s z)}{p_v - cbf_c + s_c}
\]

\[
x^* = \frac{(c_t z - r_t - dc_t - ac_t)/(1 - p_s z)}{p_v - cbf_c + s_c}
\]
In sum, expanding the analysis on target survival by relaxing the unitary actor assumption to include regime and regime leadership survival introduces the domestic concepts of omni-balancing and audience costs to explain coercion failure. These concepts also help us understand otherwise incomprehensible actions of states. For instance, Saddam Hussein’s orders in 2003 to only defend Baghdad, which left Iraq defenseless against a U.S. invasion, can only begin to make sense by examining the domestic threats to his leadership and regime.

**Revisiting Commitment Problems and Survival Issues**

Having introduced target survival, I now return to consider a second explanation for how commitment problems can lead to coercion failure. There are certain issues a concession by the target may result in a shift in the balance of power. For instance, a concession of territory such as Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, may well leave the target more vulnerable to an attack by the Great Power. A concession of this magnitude would shift the balance of power further increasing the challenger’s probability of victory in a subsequent conflict. Coercion fails if the shift in the probability of victory results in the challenger’s minimum acceptable demand exceeding $x_{\text{max}}$, the maximum the target believes it can concede and still remain viable as a state (see Figure 2.12, below).
Why a Challenger Chooses a Coercive Strategy not likely to Succeed

The previous section examined five explanations for why a target might resist a coercer’s demands. Why then, would a challenger adopt and pay the signaling costs for a coercive strategy that is likely to fail? The non-rational explanation of misperception and miscalculation and the rationalist explanation of uncertainty and private information previously discussed also apply to a challenger’s decision to adopt a coercive strategy that the target, in turn, resists. In these two situations the challenger makes its decision with the belief that the target is likely to concede. There are, in addition, two explanations that address cases in which the challenger rationally adopts a coercive strategy, even though the target is likely to resist: when the costs of adopting a coercive strategy are low and when there are external costs a challenger incurs for adopting a brute force strategy.

Low Costs of Coercion and Uncertainty over Target Resolve

When a crisis arises and a challenger opts for a brute force strategy, there may be a time lag between its decision and its ability to execute its strategy. This lag may be the time needed to deploy sufficient military force. The challenger may elect to adopt a
coercive strategy in the interim until it is ready to invade. Since the challenger is already incurring signaling costs through the deployment, additional diplomatic costs for making its coercive demands known are, in comparison, quite low. Still, making a coercive demand in this case is only rational if there is some uncertainty over the target’s resolve to resist. In Appendix 2.A, I evaluate the conditions under which uncertainty over a target’s resolve prompts a challenger to adopt a coercive strategy unlikely to succeed. The intuition is that it costs the challenger little to make the coercive demands. If it fails, which is likely, the challenger has wasted little as the coercive strategy did not preclude it from continuing its preparations for invasion, but if it succeeds, the challenger gains much by avoiding the high costs of war.

An example of such low costs of coercion is the strategy adopted by the U.S. in 1990 in the lead-up to the Gulf War. The U.S. took six months to build up its troop levels in the Kuwaiti theater of operations in order to expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. In the interim, the U.S. adopted a coercive strategy, first leveraging sanctions and then later the threat of airstrikes and invasion. Adopting a coercive strategy was not costly, as the U.S. was already preparing for a brute force invasion. If Iraq had conceded to all of the United States’ demands, the U.S. would have avoided the costs of the brute force invasion. In the end, it cost the U.S. little to make the demands and may have actually reduced its costs for invasion, as the following explanation on the external costs of brute force strategies will elaborate.

External Costs for a Challenger Adopting a Brute Force Strategy

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133 Saddam attempted to concede to the UN resolutions, but not to U.S. demands that Iraq withdrawal from Kuwait in 48 hours and thus abandon its heavy weapons.
Crises between Great Power challengers and weaker target states do not take place in a vacuum, but within the international system. As such, a rational challenger should factor into its calculations not only the expected costs and benefits of its interaction with the target, but also the affect such actions will have on third parties. If adopting of a brute force strategy threatens the interests of other states, it can generate negative externalities. For example, in the post World War I era, there has developed an international norm that states first attempt to resolve their conflicts through negotiation or to bring their disputes before international institutions, such as the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations, before resorting to violence. States that abrogate this norm by pursuing a brute force strategy without first attempting to negotiate a settlement incur external costs. These costs may range from a general increase in tensions with other states to a much greater risk if a third party is drawn into the conflict. It may therefore be beneficial to a challenger to first engage the United Nations and adopt a coercive strategy, even if the target will likely resist, as this may reduce the external costs of a brute force strategy the challenger plans to undertake, once coercion fails.

An example of a failed attempt to reduce external costs can be found in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. and Great Britain failed in their efforts to obtain a second UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. This was an ill-fated effort to reduce the costs for breaking the international norm against invading a sovereign state.

Interestingly, in these cases, the coercive strategy is a success for the challenger not if the target concedes, but if the external costs for the brute force strategy are reduced. In fact, a target’s concessions may be unwelcomed, as was the case in January 1991,
when the Bush administration’s worst case scenario would have been an eleventh hour concession by Saddam Hussein to UN resolutions on the eve of the Gulf War.¹³⁴

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter began with the observation that, in asymmetric conflicts pitting an immensely powerful United States against much weaker target states, the crises often concluded with brute force wars rather than with concessions which would have avoided the full costs of invasion and occupation. Why didn’t the U.S. and its targets reach a compromise? To answer this question, I developed an asymmetric coercion model which produced the equilibrium conditions, under which a challenger would prefer coercion to brute force or accommodation and a target would prefer concessions to resistance. The model also incorporated the idea that a strategic challenger moderates both the demands and the threats it makes in order to optimize its coercive outcome.

In the second half of this chapter, I returned to consider why a target resists coercion. I reviewed a non-rational explanation for coercion failure due to miscalculation and misperception and James Fearon’s three rationalist explanations of bargaining failure based on uncertainty and private information, issue indivisibility, and credible commitments. I hypothesized that as the challenger’s deployed military forces increase, a condition making the commitment problem more likely, so to increases the chances for coercion failure. Introducing a new rationalist explanation of bargaining failure based on target survival, I hypothesized demands which threaten target survival increase the likelihood of coercion failure. I then relaxed the unitary actor assumption on the weaker state to allow for regime and leadership survival as factors in the target’s decision.

making. Finally, I introduced the low costs of coercion and the external costs of brute force as two rationalist explanations for why a challenger might choose to adopt a coercive strategy even when it knows the target is likely to resist.

In the next chapter, I turn to international asymmetric crises since World War II drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project. I examine how often Great Powers adopt coercive strategies and how often these strategies fail. I compare the outcomes between the United States and other Great Powers and contrast my findings with those of other researchers on coercion and coercive diplomacy. In Chapters 4-6, I then return to the survival and commitment hypotheses I developed in this chapter and test them against the outcomes of crises between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya.
APPENDIX 2.A

ASYMMETRIC COERCION GAME

Consider two states, the challenger (C) and the target (T). An issue with a valuation of 1 is in dispute. The challenger makes demand (x) of the target, where x is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1, (x ∈ [0,1]). When x = 0, the outcome for C and T is [-r_c,1], respectively, where r_c are the reputation costs for C, setting x=0. Both players are risk neutral and the valuation of the demand is \( v_c(x) = x \) for the challenger and \( v_t(x) = 1-x \) for the target.\(^{135}\)

C chooses demand (x) and threat (z). Threat levels range from 0 to \( z_{max} \) (\( z \in [0, z_{max}] \)), where z=0 is no threat and \( z_{max} \) is the maximum credible threat the challenger can make, based on the relative power of the two players and the value of the issue to the challenger. The highest possible value for \( z_{max} \) is 1, where the challenger credibly adopts a brute force strategy to take the issue by force.

The challenger incurs signaling costs \( s(z) \) for making offer \([x,z] \). The signaling cost function increases monotonically, is strictly convex and is a sunk cost, whether the target concedes or resists. The challenger incurs costs to carry out threats \( c_c(z) \) and the target incurs the cost of resisting \( c_t(z) \), should the target reject the offer. If \( z=1 \) then \( c_c(z) = c_{bf_c} \), the challenger’s cost of a brute force strategy, and \( c_t(z) = c_{bf_t} \), the target’s cost of brute force. Assume \( c_c(z) = c_c \times z \), \( c_t(z) = c_t \times z \), where \( c_c \) and \( c_t \) are positive coefficients.\(^{136}\) The target incurs reputation cost \( r_t \) for conceding.

The challenger’s probability of coercion success \( p_s(z) \), which is the likelihood the challenger will gain its objectives when the target resists, is an increasing function of threat. This is the probability that C gains demands even though T resists. Assume \( p_s(z) = p_s \times z \), where \( p_s \in (0,1) \) and for brute force \( z=1 \), \( p_s(1) = p_v \), where \( p_v \) is the challenger’s probability of a brute force victory.\(^{137}\)

The game follows a sequential ultimatum protocol where C moves first, making a take it or leave it offer of demands, threats, and signals \([x,z,s] \). If x=0, z=0, s=0, then C

\(^{135}\) It clearly need not be that both players place the same value on the issue at hand. However making assumptions on risk and valuation of the issue simplify the model without impacting the main outcome.

\(^{136}\) The assumption of linearity does not detract from the overall findings of the model.

\(^{137}\) This assumption is made for making calculations tractable, but it does not detract from the models overall findings.
has adopted a policy of accommodation, and if \( x=1, z=1, s=0 \) then \( C \) has adopted a brute force strategy. If \( C \) chooses a coercive offer \((x \in [0,1], (z \in [0,1]), s > 0)\), then \( T \) moves by either accepting or rejecting the offer. If \( T \) resists then the success or failure of \( C \) is a lottery with \( C \) obtaining its demands with \( p_s(z) \) and failing with \((1 - p_s(z))\). See Figure A2.1 for the game in extended form.

\[
\begin{align*}
[p_v \cdot \text{cbf}_v, & \ 1 - p_v \cdot \text{cbf}_v] \\
\text{Brute Force} & \\
C \quad (x,z,s) & \quad T \quad \text{Resist} \quad \text{Lottery} \quad \text{Extende} \quad \text{Form} \\
\text{Accommodate} & \quad \text{Concede} \\
[-r_c,1] & \quad [x - s(z), 1 - x - r_t]
\end{align*}
\]

Figure A2.1: Coercion Game in extended form

**Optimization of Demands and Threats**

Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 for optimal demand* and the optimization problem for the challenger can be rewritten in notational form in Equations 1A, 2A, and 3A, below.

\[
\begin{align*}
1 - x^* - r_t & = 1 - p_s(x^*) - c_t z & \text{Eq. 1A.} \\
x^* & = (c_t z - r_t)/(1 - p_s(z)) & \text{Eq. 2A.} \\
\max z [(c_t z - r_t)/(1 - p_s(z)) - s(z)] & \text{Eq. 3A.}
\end{align*}
\]

Solving the optimization problem by taking first order conditions for Eq. 3A in terms of \( z \) results in

\[
c_t/(1 - p_s z^*) + p_s(c_t z^* - r_t)/(1 - p_s z^*)^2 - s_c'(z^*) = 0
\]

which simplifies to

\[
(c_t - p_s r_t)/(1 - p_s z^*)^2 - s_c'(z^*) = 0 \quad \text{Eq. 4A.}
\]

Estimating the signaling cost function using a Taylor polynomial results in

---

138 For the lottery the challenger’s outcome = \( p_s(z)[x - s(z) - c_t(z)] + (1 - p_s(z))[0 - s(z) - c_t(z)] = p_s(z) x - s(z) - c_t(z) \). The target’s outcome = \( p_s(z)[1 - x - c_t(z)] + (1 - p_s(z))[1 - c_t(z)] = 1 - p_s(z) x - c_t(z) \).

139 The model does not allow for a partial acceptance of the challenger’s demands. However this situation can be adapted to the model by thinking of the challenger’s demand as the partial demand accepted by the target. This assumes the challenger does not reject the target’s partial concessions.
sc(z) = b_0 z^0 + b_1 z^1 + ... + b_n z^n = \sum_{i=0}^{n} b_i z^i \quad \text{Eq. 5A,}

where b_i is the coefficient for the z^i'th term.

The derivative of the signaling function in terms of z is

\[ s'(z) = b_1 + 2b_2 z + 3b_3 z^2 + ... + nb_n z^{n-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{n} i b_i z^{i-1} \quad \text{Eq. 6A.} \]

Substituting Eq. 6A into Eq. 4A obtains the following:

\[ (c_l - p_s r_l)/(1 - p_s z^*)^2 = \sum_{i=0}^{n} i b_i (z^*)^{i-1} \quad \text{Eq. 7A.} \]

Solving for z* in general terms is not practical, however, for the case where n=2, a solution set does exist. First note that the derivative of the signaling function simplifies to

\[ s'_c(z) = b_1 + 2b_2 z. \]

To keep calculations more manageable assume b_1 = 0. Substituting for s'_c(z) in Eq. 7A produces

\[ (c_l - p_s r_l)/(1 - p_s z^*)^2 = 2b_2 z^* \]
\[ (c_l - p_s r_l)/(2b_2) = z^*(1 - p_s z^*)^2 \]
\[ (c_l - p_s r_l)/(2b_2) = z^*(1 - 2p_s z^* + p_s^2 z^{*2}) \]
\[ z^* - 2p_s z^{*2} + p_s^2 z^{*3} - (c_l - p_s r_l)/(2b_2) = 0 \]
\[ z^{*3} - 2p_s^{-1} z^{*2} + p_s^{-2} z^* - (c_l - p_s r_l)/(2p_s^2 b_2) = 0 \quad \text{Eq. 8A.} \]

This equation can be expressed in general cubic terms as

\[ Az^{*3} + Bz^{*2} + Cz^* + D = 0 \quad \text{Eq. 9A} \]

where A=1, B = -2p_s^{-1}, C = p_s^{-2}, and D = - (c_l - p_s r_l)/(2p_s^2 b_2).

Solutions for z* are derived using Tartaglia’s method of depression of a cubic equation. Table A2.1 provides a summary of the solution set for z*. The table depicts. for varying levels of p_s, the values which produce real values for z* where z* ∈ [0,1]. Note that as p_s increases, the range of values for z* decreases, demonstrating that the greater the probability of success, the lower the threat required for x*.

---

\footnote{\textsuperscript{140}n=2 insures signaling costs increase exponentially. A solution for n=1 is not provided given the assumption of the non-linearity of the signaling function.}
Table A2.1: Solution set for Eq. 9A for real numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p_s$</th>
<th>$D = - (c_1 - r_1)/2p_s^2b_2$</th>
<th>$z^*$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>[-9800.999, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>[-9, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>[-1.1851851851, 0]</td>
<td>[.66666, 0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>[-0.351165829, 0]</td>
<td>[.44444, 0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>[-0.152603505, 0]</td>
<td>[.336, 0]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second Order Conditions Satisfied

To confirm this solution set is a maximum, take the second order conditions in terms of $z$ derived in Eq 8A:

$$3z^*^2 - 4p_s^{-1}z^* + p_s^{-2} < 0$$

$$(3z^* - 1/p_s)(z^* - 1/p_s) < 0.$$ \hspace{1cm} \text{Eq. 10A}

Since $p_s \in (0,1)$ and $z^* \in [0,1]$, then $(z^* - 1/p_s) < 0$. For Eq. 10A to be true requires

$$(3z^* - 1/p_s) > 0$$

$$3z^* > 1/p_s$$

$$z^*p_s > 1/3.$$ 

The result confirms the solution as a maximum for values of $z^*$ and $p_s$ subject to their product being greater than $1/3$.

---

141 To read this chart note that the first column varies the value of the probability of success ($p_s$) which is the only variable which is contained in both $B$ and $C$ from the cubic equation Eq. 9A. Column 2 is the $D$ variable. It represents the range of values for $D$ which produces a solution for $z^*$ which is a real number between 0 and 1 (the allowable range for $z$). The values in column 2 and 3 were calculated using a cubic equation calculator, http://www.1728.com/cubic.htm, and verified with an excel spread sheet.
The impact on optimal demand due to changes in threat, probability of coercion success, target costs for resisting and target reputation costs: Comparative Static Results

From Eq. 2A, comparative static results derived by taking the derivative of x* in terms of z, p, c, and r generate the following:

\[ x^* = \frac{(c_iz - r_t)/(1 - p_z)} \quad \text{Eq. 2A} \]

\[ \frac{\delta x^*}{\delta z} = c_i/(1 - p_z) + p_s(c_iz - r)/(1 - p_z)^2 > 0, \text{ for } c_iz > r_t \]

\[ \frac{\delta x^*}{\delta p_z} = z(c_iz - r)/(1 - p_z)^2 > 0, \text{ for } c_iz > r_t \]

\[ \frac{\delta x^*}{\delta c_i} = z/(1 - p_z) > 0 \]

\[ \frac{\delta x^*}{\delta r_t} = -1/(1 - p_z) < 0. \]

This suggests that an increase in threat or probability of coercion success will increase the optimal demands made, so long as the costs for resistance exceed the target's reputation costs for conceding. It further suggests that a rise in the costs of resistance increases optimal demands and that an increase in reputation costs for conceding decreases optimal demands.

Coercion range where coercion is preferred to brute force by the challenger or resistance by the target

The challenger's valuation of a brute force strategy where \( x = 1, z = 1 \) as depicted in Figure A2.1 is

\[ v_c(1,1) = v_c(\text{victory}) + v_c(\text{defeat}) \]
\[ v_c(1,1) = p_v (1 - cbf_c) + (1 - p_v)(0 - cbf_c) = p_v - p_v cbf_c + p_v cbf_c = cbf_c \]

The challenger chooses coercion over brute force when

\[ v_c(x^*,z^*,s(z^*)) = v_c(1,1) \]
\[ x^* - s(z^*) = p_v - cbf_c \]
\[ x^* = p_v - cbf_c + s(z^*). \]

The target choices are concession or resistance. It chooses concessions when

\[ v_t(\text{concessions}) = v_t(\text{resistance}) \]
\[ v_t(\text{concessions}) = 1 - x^* - r_t \]
\[ v_t(\text{resistance}) = 1 - p_z(x^*) - c_iz \]

substituting

\[ 1 - x^* - r_t \geq 1 - p_z(x^*) - c_iz \]
\[
\text{Eq. 12A.}
\]
\[x^* \leq \frac{(c_t z - r_t)}{(1 - p_z)}.
\]

Note Eq. 12A is simply Eq 2A expressed as an inequality. Combining Eq. 11A and 12A produces the coercion success range where coercion is preferred to brute force for the challenger and where concession is preferred to resistance for the target:
\[
p_v - c w_c + s(z^*) \leq x^* \leq \frac{(c_t z - r_t)}{(1 - p_z)}.
\]
\text{Eq. 13A.}

In linear form, the coercion success range can be expresses as in Figure A2.2.

\[p_v - c b f_c + s_c \leq x^* \leq \frac{(c_t z - r_t)}{(1 - p_z)}
\]

Figure A2.2: Coercion Range

\textbf{Uncertainty over Target Resolve}

The target’s likelihood of being highly resolved and therefore resistant to the challenger’s offer, is \(\tau \in (0,1)\). The asymmetric coercion model can be depicted in extended form in Figure A2.3 below:
Figure A2.3: Asymmetric Coercion Model with Uncertainty over Target Resolve

The challenger’s valuation of its expected outcome for choosing coercion is

\[
v_c (\text{coercion}) = \tau \text{[target resists]} + (1 - \tau)\text{[target concedes]}
\]

and for choosing a brute force strategy

\[
v_c (\text{brute force}) = \text{brute force outcome}.
\]

The challenger prefers coercion to brute force when

\[
\tau \text{[target resists]} + (1 - \tau)\text{[target concedes]} > \text{brute force outcome}
\]

\[
\tau \text{[target resists - target concedes]} > \text{brute force outcome - target concedes}.
\]

Multiplying both sides by (-1) and solving for \(\tau\) produces the following inequality:

\[
\tau < \frac{\text{[target concedes - brute force outcome]} - \text{[target concedes - target resists]}}{\text{[target concedes - target resists]}} \quad \text{Eq. 14A.}
\]

Equation 14A is the ratio of the difference in the challenger’s expectation of coercion success and the expected brute force outcome, over the difference between coercion success and failure.
Substituting into Eq 14A values from Figure A2.3 for the challenger’s three outcomes of target concessions, resistance, and brute force produces the following inequality:

\[ \tau < \frac{x^* - s - p_v + cbf_c}{x^*(1 - p_s) + c_c} \]

Eq. 15A.

Ceteris paribus, an increase in demands \(x^*\), challenger costs of brute force \(cbf_c\), and probability of coercion success \(p_s\) all increase the willingness of the challenger to coerce a more highly resolved target, while an increase in signaling costs \(s\), probability of victory \(p_v\), and costs of carrying out threats \(c_c\) decrease the willingness of the challenger to coerce.
Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis

Why do the coercive strategies of Great Powers against weak states often fail? In the previous chapter, I developed a theory for asymmetric coercion, in which a rational challenger has the choice among strategies of accommodation, coercion, and brute force. I concluded that a challenger estimates the outcomes for the foreign policy options available to it and chooses coercion when it is found to have the highest expected value. For coercive strategies, the optimal expected outcome is obtained by adjusting demands and threats contingent on the target’s willingness to concede. I then examined five explanations for why a target might still resist a challenger’s coercive offer. These included non-rational explanations of misperception and miscalculation as well as rational explanations based on uncertainty, issue indivisibility, commitment problems, and survival. I also examined two rational explanations for why a challenger may choose coercion even if it knows its strategy is likely to fail: 1) when it is a relatively low cost option while preparing for a brute force strategy and/or 2) there are high external costs for adopting a brute force strategy without first attempting coercion.

I turn now to assess the assumption that the coercive strategies of Great Powers often fail by examining real world asymmetric conflicts. In so doing, I address the following questions: How often do asymmetric crises between Great Powers and weak states occur? In such crises, how frequently do Great Powers choose coercion over other available foreign policy options? How often is the Great Power successful at achieving its foreign policy objectives? How often is it successful at coercion? How often do Great Powers first choose coercion only to later adopt brute force strategies? How do the
results for the United States compare to other Great Powers? And are these findings consistent with results from previous related research?

Answers to the above questions will validate the relevance and importance of my research agenda. Asymmetric conflicts are a recurrent phenomenon of the international system. In these lopsided crises, Great Powers usually succeed at achieving their foreign policy objectives and most often adopt coercive strategies to do so. Still, in many cases, weak states do resist and these crises conclude either in a brute force invasion or as a foreign policy failure for the Great Power.

The second objective of this chapter is to test the survival and the commitment hypotheses for the coercion outcomes I developed in the previous chapters. The survival hypothesis predicts a target will resist demands which threaten its survival so long as it has the means to do so. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will fail when a powerful challenger cannot credibly promise not to increase demands in the future, a situation more likely to develop when the challenger has already deployed military forces capable of backing up further demands. I test these hypotheses against asymmetric crises which have arisen since World War I in which Great Powers made compellent demands of weaker states. I find that the survival hypothesis correctly predicted the outcomes for two thirds of the cases, while the commitment hypothesis was correct in less than half the crises.

I will first proceed by developing a data set for all cases of asymmetric interstate crises. I code these cases according to the strategy the Great Power challenger chooses, which allows me to examine the frequency of coercive cases and the nature of the

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142 The ex ante objectives are the optimal demands that the powerful challenger has estimated the weak target state will be just willing to concede.
demands as compellent or deterrent. Second, I discuss my reasons for the coding criteria for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. I also consider two alternative dependent variables of coercion and coercive diplomacy outcome. I then assess the success rates for Great Powers across countries and time and then compare my findings with those from previous related research. Third, I make predictions for the outcomes of all the cases, using the survival and commitment hypotheses. Fourth, I identify and code key explanatory variables from the asymmetric coercion model for the challenger’s strategy, demands, threats, and signals. I also develop variables as proxies for survival and commitment and include control variables which are relevant to conflict outcomes. This allows me to conduct regression analysis and compare the survival and commitment hypotheses while controlling for other factors which impact crises outcomes. I conclude by examining my findings and identifying issues to assess in the qualitative cases in Chapters 4 through 6.

THE DATA SET

My data set is drawn from the asymmetric crises since the end of World War I. I select cases from the crises identified in The International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB). The ICB database contains 455 interstate crises from 1918 to 2006. Since my

---

143 I choose this time period for two reasons. First, the League of Nations was introduced an international institution aimed at resolving state conflict. The League failed to prevent another world war, though, and following WWII the victors founded the United Nations. Both institutions have been involved in a significant number of asymmetric crises, and in many cases have authorized the use of force and sanctions. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. The second reason for beginning with the end of World War I is more practical, based on the availability of data. I identify Great Powers as the major powers identified by the Correlates of War majors2008.1.csv dataset www.correlatesofwar.org. This list includes the USA, Great Britain, France from 1816-1940 and 1945-2008, Germany from 1925-1945 and 1991-2008, Italy from 1860-1943, USSR from 1922-2008, China from 1950-2008, and Japan from 1895-1945 and 1991-2008.

144 I only include cases until 2003 as the more recent asymmetric crises have not yet been resolved. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database is an interactive version of the data and summaries originally
interest is in dyadic cases between a Great Power and a weak state I utilize the research of Kenneth Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis in their Coercive Diplomacy Database, with which they expand the ICB database into 624 dyadic cases. From here, I eliminated crises which are not asymmetric. I identified 116 asymmetric cases, in which Great Powers challenged non-Great Power states (See Appendix 3A). I classified these cases as either coercive or brute force strategies and, where coercive, I code demands as compellent or deterrent (see Table 3.1 and Appendix 3A). The 116 cases average to 1.4 crises per year, which make asymmetric conflict a recurrent phenomenon in international relations.


145 I thank Kenneth Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis for providing me access to their data, including the crisis summaries for each case which proved invaluable.

146 I began with 208 asymmetric cases from the Schultz and Lewis dataset and reduced these further to 109 by reducing a crisis which has multiple dyads into a single dyadic case by examining which of the Great Powers was most involved in the conflict. I also eliminated cases where the Great Power did not challenge the weak state or had no discernable objectives for the crisis. I also include 5 additional cases which I identify in chapters 4-6, for the crises between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs, and Libya.

147 It is important to note that these asymmetric cases are contingent on a crisis occurring. As such, omitted are unobserved cases where a Great Power avoided a crisis when it chose to accommodate a weak state. Conditioning on crises restricts cases to primarily coercion or brute force. There is a single case where a challenger initiated a brute force strategy to then later change the strategy to accommodate the target: the French in Vietnam in 1954. These omissions of cases of accommodation are unfortunate, but unavoidable due to the nature of the dependent variable. Foreign policy outcome measures success or failure based on the challenger’s ex ante objectives given the issue at stake. In cases of accommodation, however, the challenger has an incentive not to reveal compromises it makes in order to avoid reputation or audience costs. As with deterrence, with accommodation it is difficult to ascertain whether the crises was avoided because the challenger accommodated the target, and even if it can be identified it is difficult to determine whether the challenge achieved its core ex ante objectives.
Table 3.1: Frequency of Asymmetric Interstate Conflict (1918-2003)

From Table 3.1, two questions which I asked earlier can now be addressed. First, as to how often Great Powers choose coercion, coercive strategies were chosen twice as frequently as brute force (87 compared to 43). Coercion was chosen 75% of the time but, in 12% of the cases, Great Powers adopt coercion initially only to later switch to brute

\[148\] Since deterrence in asymmetric crises is rare, the following summary is provided. In 1922 the United Kingdom deterred Turkey from invading Thrace after Turkey had defeated Greek forces in Anatolia. In 1927 Japan deployed forces to Manchuria to deter China from threatening Japanese economic interests there. In 1956 the USSR deployed forces to Poland’s border in a failed attempt to deter the Polish Communist party from electing Wladyslaw Gomulka as party leader. In 1961, after Kuwait was granted independence, the United Kingdom deployed forces to Kuwait to deter Iraq from taking military action. In 1964, following the alleged attack on the USS Maddox by North Vietnam, the U.S. conducted military strikes to deter North Vietnam from taking further military action. In 1975, in response to Guatemala deploying forces to the Belize border, the United Kingdom deployed forces to deter an invasion. Again in 1977, following the granting of independence to Belize, the United Kingdom again deployed forces to deter Guatemala from taking military action. In 1983 the U.S. deployed troops to Honduras to deter the Nicaraguans from taking military action. And in 1991 Russia threatened war with Turkey when Turkey threatened to intervene in fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
force strategies. Second, comparing the United States to other Great Powers, the U.S. is the country most frequently involved in asymmetric conflict, responsible for initiating a third of all asymmetric crises.\textsuperscript{149} In addition, the U.S. chooses to coerce more frequently than other Great Powers, 80\% of the time as compared to 72\%, respectively.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 116 & 26 (22\%) & 22 (19\%) & 46 (40\%) & 22 (19\%) \\
\hline
\textbf{Coercion} & 87 (75\%) & 19 (73\%) & 17 (77\%) & 34 (74\%) & 17 (77\%) \\
\textbf{Compellence} & 77 (66\%) & 17 (65\%) & 17 (77\%) & 27 (59\%) & 16 (73\%) \\
\textbf{Deterrence} & 10 (9\%) & 2 (8\%) & 0 & 7 (15\%) & 1 (5\%) \\
\hline
\textbf{Coercion Only} & 73 (63\%) & 14 (54\%) & 14 (64\%) & 32 (70\%) & 13 (59\%) \\
\textbf{Compellence} & 63 (54\%) & 12 (46\%) & 14 (64\%) & 25 (55\%) & 12 (55\%) \\
\textbf{Deterrence} & 10 (9\%) & 2 (8\%) & 0 & 7 (15\%) & 1 (5\%) \\
\hline
\textbf{Coercion Initial/Brute Force Final} & 14 (12\%) & 5 (19\%) & 3 (13\%) & 2 (4\%) & 4 (18\%) \\
\textbf{Compellence} & 14 (12\%) & 5 (19\%) & 3 (13\%) & 2 (4\%) & 4 (18\%) \\
\textbf{Deterrence} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\textbf{Brute Force Only} & 29 (25\%) & 7 (27\%) & 5 (23\%) & 12 (26\%) & 5 (23\%) \\
\textbf{(\% of top row)} & & & & & \\
\hline
\textbf{Brute Force Total} & 43 (37\%) & 12 (46\%) & 8 (36\%) & 14 (30\%) & 9 (41\%) \\
\textbf{(\% of top row)} & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Asymmetric Interstate Conflicts Across Time}
\end{table}

Since the international environment has changed over time, it is also useful to compare the frequency of conflicts in various periods (see Table 3.2, above). I divide the cases into four periods: Interwar (1918-1938), World War II (1939-1945), Cold War

\textsuperscript{149} The U.S. was involved in 41 cases, followed by the USSR/Russia with 23 cases, and Nazi Germany with 13. The ranking changes if viewed according to the number of crises per year. Per year Nazi Germany leads, as all 13 of its asymmetric crises transpired between 1925 and 1945 for an average of \textit{.65} crises/yr. The U.S. is second with \textit{.48} crises/year and the USSR third (1922-1990) at \textit{.33}crises/yr.
(1946-1989), and Post-Cold War (1990-2003). The frequency of coercive strategies is consistent across time, with coercion still the preferred strategy, chosen 73% - 77% of the time.

In sum, across countries and time, asymmetric conflict occurs on a regular basis, with coercion being the strategy most commonly adopted. The United States initiates the greatest number of crises and chooses to coerce more frequently than do other Great Powers. Yet to be addressed, however, is how successful Great Powers are at achieving their foreign policy objectives. In the next section, I develop coding criteria for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome, which allows me to assess how often Great Powers succeed in obtaining their foreign policy aims. I also identify and code alternative dependent variables, that of coercion outcome and coercive diplomacy outcome, which allows for a comparison of my findings with previous research.

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Foreign Policy Outcome**

The dependent variable for this quantitative study is the challenger’s foreign policy outcome, a measure of whether the challenger achieves its core ex ante objectives (see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). Focusing on ex ante core objectives reduces three potential coding problems. First, it reduces the likelihood of miscoding cases in which the challenger has actually gone on to lower its demands significantly once the target resists. Without such a restriction, cases of obvious foreign policy failure would be coded as a success.

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150 The Post-Cold War period ends in 2001. I include the three cases after September 11, 2001 in the Post-Cold War period.
For example, in 1968 North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, an electronics and signals intelligence gathering ship operating off the coast of North Korea.\textsuperscript{151} Initially, the U.S. demanded North Korea return the Pueblo and its crew and formally apologize. After 11 months of negotiations, the U.S. reduced its demands to gain the return of the 83 crewmen only and issued an admission of its own guilt in deploying the Pueblo as a spy ship. This was clearly a failure of U.S. policy, which should not be coded a success on the basis that North Korea eventually conceded to the United States’ drastically reduced demands.\textsuperscript{152}

Second, focusing on core objectives prevents too high a bar being set for measuring success. In negotiations, strategic actors expect to concede on some points in order to reach an agreement. Such public concessions by the challenger provide the target state’s leader the means of saving face, thus reducing some of the audience costs incurred by acceding to the remaining demands. As a result, the challenger brings to the bargaining table higher demands than it knows it will likely achieve, some of which it is prepared to sacrifice in order to reach an agreement. If the coding for the foreign policy outcome were based on all the challenger’s \textit{ex ante} objectives, it would lead to too many outcomes being miscoded as failure.

For example, during the Kosovo crisis in January of 1999, the U.S. demanded Serbia withdraw its troops from Kosovo and allow in NATO peacekeepers. The U.S. later adjusted this demand to also allow in Russian troops under a UN Security Council mandate. This U.S. concession, however, did not change the core demand that Serbia forfeit control over Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{151} North Korea claimed it was operating in its territorial waters while the U.S. maintained it was in international waters.
\textsuperscript{152} I code this a partial failure since North Korea conceded to only one of the U.S. three demands.
Third, this coding criterion is based on objectives determined by the challenger. It is not simply a measurement of what or how much the challenger obtains in the conflict. If it were, it would not factor in the value the challenger places on the issue, which is determined by its interests, nor does it consider the challenger’s costs for obtaining them. If the challenger’s interests are non-vital, the increased costs of obtaining a high-level concession, such as homeland territory, may make such an outcome less desirable than lesser objectives gained at a reduced cost. Coding foreign policy outcome as the degree to which the challenger achieves its ex ante core objectives, however, surmounts this problem, as the challenger determines the level of demands made by first assessing its interests, expected benefits, and expected costs. As a result, success or failure is not measured by the level of objectives obtained, but by the degree to which the objectives identified by the challenger are met.

A weakness of a dyadic (success/failure) coding scheme is that it does not allow for partial outcomes. I therefore expand the coding criteria for the dependent variable by including outcomes of partial success and partial failure.53

Two Additional Dependent Variables: Coercion and Coercive Diplomacy Outcomes

In addition to foreign policy outcome, there are two alternative dependent variables which have been applied in previous research: coercion outcome and coercive

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53 This is the same coding method adopted by Hufbauer, Schott and Eliot for their research on U.S. economic sanctions. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg (2007) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. Such a fine tune adjustment to the dependent variable does not, however, alleviate the problem with certain ambiguous cases which have elements of both success and failure. For example, in the crisis between the United States and Libya in 1986 over demands that Libya stop its support of terrorism the result of the crisis was stalemate. Libya significantly reduced its terrorist activities, but did not stop them altogether which ultimately led to a second crisis with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December of 1988. A partial fix for this problem of coding foreign policy outcome for ambiguous cases is to conduct robustness checks to determine whether reversing the coding for these cases changes the overall results, see Table 10 Robust check II.
diplomacy outcome.\textsuperscript{154} Coercion outcome evaluates whether the foreign policy outcome was a success or failure and whether it was the coercive strategy that was responsible for that outcome. Coercion codes as a failure cases in which a brute force strategy is later adopted, even if the challenger subsequently achieves its foreign policy objectives. Since there are 14 such cases in the Asymmetric Interstate Data set (see Appendix 3.A), the coercion success rate is much lower than that for foreign policy outcome. Coercive diplomacy similarly codes cases as a failure if brute force is later adopted. It also codes 13 cases of coercion success as coercive diplomacy failures, as the challenger employed limited force beyond that of exemplary military action (see Table 3.5).

I adopt the foreign policy outcome as the dependent variable for quantitative analysis over coercion or coercive diplomacy for two reasons. First, my data set includes both cases of coercive and brute force strategies while coercion and coercive diplomacy assume that all cases are coercive. It would be inappropriate, however, to code as a failure those cases in which the challenger never chooses to coerce. Second, as previously mentioned, coercion and coercive diplomacy code as a failure those cases in which the challenger abandons coercion for a brute force strategy. The final strategy chosen by the challenger, however, is an explanatory variable within the asymmetric coercion model. The fact that both coercion and coercive diplomacy code the success or failure of the outcome according to whether a brute force strategy is adopted introduces

endogeneity into regression analysis, as both dependent variables are correlated with final strategy.

In sum, I employ foreign policy outcome as the dependent variable for further quantitative analysis. I also include codings both for coercion and coercive diplomacy in order to compare my findings with those of previous research.

**Foreign Policy Outcomes in Cases of Asymmetric Conflict**

In the previous section I developed coding criteria for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. This enables me to analyze how successful the coercive and brute force strategies have been at achieving the foreign policy objectives of Great Powers. Table 3.3, below, presents the foreign policy success rate for the 116 asymmetric interstate crises I have identified (see Appendix 3.A for a list of cases).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Great Power Foreign Policy Success</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Success</th>
<th>Other (non-U.S.)Great Power Foreign Policy Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success/Total</td>
<td>84/116 (72%)</td>
<td>29/41 (71%)</td>
<td>55/75 (73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Total</td>
<td>63/87 (72%)</td>
<td>23/33 (70%)</td>
<td>40/54 (74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55/77 (71%)</td>
<td>21/30 (70%)</td>
<td>34/47 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/10 (80%)</td>
<td>2/3 (67%)</td>
<td>6/7 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Only</td>
<td>51/73 (70%)</td>
<td>20/28 (71%)</td>
<td>31/45 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43/63 (68%)</td>
<td>18/25 (72%)</td>
<td>25/38 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/10 (80%)</td>
<td>2/3 (67%)</td>
<td>6/7 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Initial/Brute Force Final</td>
<td>12/14 (86%)</td>
<td>3/5 (60%)</td>
<td>9/9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/14 (86%)</td>
<td>3/5 (60%)</td>
<td>9/9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force Only</td>
<td>21/29 (72%)</td>
<td>6/8 (75%)</td>
<td>15/21 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force Total</td>
<td>33/43 (77%)</td>
<td>9/13 (69%)</td>
<td>24/30 (80%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Foreign Policy Success Rates
Three findings are particularly worth noting. First, Great Powers are, more often than not, successful in obtaining their foreign policy objectives against weak states, whether coercive or brute force strategies are adopted. From the second column, second row of Table 3.3, one can see that Great Powers succeed in obtaining their core foreign policy objectives 72% of the time. Second, brute force strategies are only slightly more successful than coercive strategies (77% versus 72%, respectively). Third, the United States’ foreign policy success rate (71% total, 71% coercion only) is not significantly different than that of other (non-U.S.) Great Powers (73% total, 69% coercion only).

It is also informative to review how success rates vary across time (see Table 3.4, below). During the Cold War, the success rate for coercion and brute force is significantly lower than other periods. In only 50% of cases do Great Powers achieve their foreign policy objectives, whether through coercion or brute force. This lower success rate stems primarily from the asymmetric crises involving the Soviet Union or China, which combined for roughly half the total number of cases but with successful outcomes in only 6 of their 22 cases (27%). There are two explanations for these poor results. First, these asymmetric crises occurred in the midst of the Cold War pitting the Soviet Union and/or China against the United States. U.S. intervention or the threat of intervention offset the balance of power enjoyed by the USSR and China against target states. For example the U.S. intervened in the crisis between the USSR and Turkey in

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155 From Table 3.3, second column, last row brute force strategies succeed in 33/43 (77%) of cases while coercion succeeds in 63/87 (72%) of cases (second column third row).
156 From Table 3.3, third column, second row U.S. foreign policy success total 29/41 (72%), U.S. coercion only from third column, fourth row 20/28 (71%), Other Great Power success total from column 4 second row 55/75 (73%), and Other Great power coercion only from column 4 fourth row 31/45 (69%).
157 See Appendix A. The Soviet Union were successful in 1956 vs. Israel over Suez Nationalization-War, 1956 vs. Hungary over the Hungarian Uprising, 1968 vs. Czechoslovakia in the Prague Spring, 1973 vs. Israel in Yom Kippur War, 1979 vs. Afghanistan in the Afghanistan Invasion, and 1980 vs. Poland in Solidarity. By contrast China was unsuccessful in all 6 crises versus Taiwan, India and Vietnam.
1946 over control of the Turkish Straits and again in 1954 and 1958 in the crises between China and Taiwan over the Taiwan Straits.

A second explanation notes that Soviet and Chinese leaders were prone to initiate crises from which they were then willing to back down if the target resisted. Given the autocratic nature of the communist parties in the Soviet Union and China, they may well not have suffered significant audience costs for backing down from crises.¹⁵⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success/Total</td>
<td>84/116 (72%)</td>
<td>25/26 (96%)</td>
<td>19/22 (86%)</td>
<td>23/46 (50%)</td>
<td>17/22 (77%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Only</td>
<td>51/73 (70%)</td>
<td>14/14 (100%)</td>
<td>11/14 (79%)</td>
<td>16/32 (50%)</td>
<td>10/13 (77%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compellence Only</td>
<td>43/63 (68%)</td>
<td>12/12 (100%)</td>
<td>11/14 (79%)</td>
<td>11/25 (44%)</td>
<td>9/12 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>8/10 (80%)</td>
<td>2/2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5/7 (71%)</td>
<td>1/1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Total</td>
<td>63/87 (72%)</td>
<td>19/19 (100%)</td>
<td>14/17 (82%)</td>
<td>17/34 (50%)</td>
<td>13/17 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compellence</td>
<td>55/77 (71%)</td>
<td>17/17 (100%)</td>
<td>14/17 (82%)</td>
<td>12/27 (44%)</td>
<td>12/16 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>8/10 (80%)</td>
<td>2/2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5/7 (71%)</td>
<td>1/1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Initial/Brute Force Final</td>
<td>12/14 (86%)</td>
<td>5/5 (100%)</td>
<td>3/3 (100%)</td>
<td>1/2 (50%)</td>
<td>3/4 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compellence</td>
<td>12/14 (86%)</td>
<td>5/5 (100%)</td>
<td>3/3 (100%)</td>
<td>1/2 (50%)</td>
<td>3/4 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force Only</td>
<td>21/29 (72%)</td>
<td>6/7 (86%)</td>
<td>5/5 (100%)</td>
<td>6/12 (50%)</td>
<td>4/5 (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force Total</td>
<td>33/43 (77%)</td>
<td>11/12 (92%)</td>
<td>8/8 (100%)</td>
<td>7/14 (50%)</td>
<td>7/9 (78%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Foreign Policy Success by Time Periods

In sum, coding by the type of strategy employed, the nature of the coercive demand (compellent or deterrent), and crisis outcome provides important descriptive statistics to assess both the frequency of crises and coercive strategies, as well as the overall success rates for Great Powers in asymmetric conflicts. Asymmetric crises occur often and Great Powers usually succeed at gaining their foreign policy objectives. They

also choose coercion more often than brute force and, in coercive cases, they more often seek compellent rather than deterrent demands. The U.S. is the Great Power most frequently initiating asymmetric conflicts and, with the exception of the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, its success rate does not vary much from that of other Great Powers.

In light of these findings from Tables 3.1-3.4, I take up in the next section the question of how my results compare with those of previous researchers.

**Compellence in Asymmetric Conflict**

In 87 out of the 116 cases in the database, Great Powers choose coercive strategies. Of these, only 10 are cases with deterrent demands. As discussed in Chapter 1, the difficulty with coding deterrent cases lies in determining whether a target’s actions are caused by the challenger’s coercive strategy. To avoid this problem, I exclude deterrent cases and instead focus on the 77 cases in which the Great Power makes compellent demands. Table 3.5, below, lists these cases by year, challenger, target, and crisis name. Success/failure codings are listed for the three dependent variables of foreign policy, coercion, and coercive diplomacy. I also include predictions from the survival and the commitment hypotheses. These project the likely outcomes of the crises according to the level of threat to target survival and the credibility of the Great Power to

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159 Table 3.4, from column 2 row 3, one can see that 77 of the 87 coercion cases are compellence while only 10 are deterrence cases.

not make further demands, based on whether it had deployed military forces capable of backing them up. I examine these predictions in more detail in a later section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CHALLENGER</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>CRISIS NAME</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Coercive Diplomacy</th>
<th>Survival Prediction</th>
<th>Commitment Prediction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Costa Rican Coup</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian War</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Rhenish Rebellions</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Costa Rica/Panama Border</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German Reparations</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austrian Separatists</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ruhr I</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Corfu Incident</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Mosul Land Dispute</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nicaragua Civil War</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Hegemony Over Albania</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chinese Eastern Railway</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Asterick indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the Great Power.

* The survival prediction predicts the likely outcome (success/failure) of the crises based on whether concessions threatened target survival.

* The commitment prediction predicts the likely outcome (success/failure) of the crises according to the credibility of the Great Power commitment not to make further demands, based on whether it had deployed military forces capable of backing up additional demands.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CHALLENGER</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>CRISIS NAME</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Coercive Diplomacy</th>
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<th>Commitment Prediction</th>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Trieste I</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
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</table>

164 Asterisk indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the Great Power.

165 In 1939 the Soviet Union demanded some Finnish islands and an adjustment to its shared border. Survival hypothesis predicts coercion failure as this threatened Finnish homeland territory. The Soviet Union had deployed military forces along the border capable of making additional territorial demands. The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion failure, as the Soviet Union was likely to make additional demands. As a result of the ensuing war, the Soviet Union did end up with more territory than originally demanded.

166 Great Britain demanded Israel withdraw its troops from Egypt. Demands did not threaten Israel survival so survival hypothesis predicts coercion success. Deployed British forces were not capable of backing up further demands of Israel so commitment hypothesis also predicts coercion success.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CHALLENGER</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>CRISIS NAME</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Coercive Diplomacy</th>
<th>Survival Prediction</th>
<th>Commitment Prediction</th>
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<td>Failure</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Bosnian Civil War</td>
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<td>Failure</td>
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<td>Failure</td>
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</table>

167 Asterisk indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the Great Power.

168 See Chapter 5 for full description of Bosnian Civil War.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CHALLENGER</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>CRISIS NAME</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Coercive Diplomacy</th>
<th>Survival Prediction</th>
<th>Commitment Prediction</th>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>UNSCOM II (Desert Fox)</td>
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<td>Success</td>
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<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<td>Success</td>
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</table>

Asterisk indicates that while the overall demands threaten survival, the prediction is still for success since target did not have the military means to resist the Great Power.
Table 3.6, below, presents the success rates for the dependent variables of foreign policy outcome, coercion, and coercive diplomacy for the 77 compellence cases from Table 3.5. From the second column the Great Powers success rate for coercion (56%) is significantly lower than that for foreign policy outcome (71%). This is expected, given that the 12 cases in which the challenger initially chose coercion but later adopted brute force, are all coded as coercion failures. Coercive diplomacy for Great Powers has an even lower success rate (43%), as in 10 cases coded as successful coercion, military force was more than exemplary and crossed the threshold of violence. These cases are all therefore coded as coercive diplomacy failures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Great Powers (77 Cases)</th>
<th>United States (30 Cases)</th>
<th>Other (non U.S.) Great Powers (47 Cases)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Foreign Policy Outcome</td>
<td>55/77 (71%)</td>
<td>20/30 (67%)</td>
<td>35/47 (74%)</td>
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<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercion Outcome</td>
<td>43/77 (56%)</td>
<td>18/30 (60%)</td>
<td>25/47 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy</td>
<td>33/77 (43%)</td>
<td>13/30 (43%)</td>
<td>18/47 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome Success</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Asymmetric Compellence Success Rates

Comparing Findings with Other Research

To assess how reasonable the results in Table 3.6 are, I compare these to the findings of other researchers on coercion, coercive diplomacy, and compellence. A direct comparison is somewhat hampered, however, as researchers have focused on varying

---

170 Foreign policy outcome is coded a success if the Great Power achieved its ex ante core objectives either through coercion or brute force. Coercion outcome is a success if the Great Power achieved its objectives without having to resort to a brute force strategy of engaging in major military operations or invasion. Coercive Diplomacy is a success if coercion succeeded without taking more than exemplary military action.
research questions, which have led to different scope conditions. This, in turn, results in different cases being selected and alternative dependent variables studied. I examine three datasets which are most closely related to cases of asymmetric compellence cases. These include Robert Pape’s work on airpower and coercion, George & Simons and Art & Cronin’s combined research on the United States and coercive diplomacy, and Todd Sechser’s most recent research on compellence (see Table 3.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asymmetric Compellence</th>
<th>Pape Air Power Coercion</th>
<th>George &amp; Simon and Art &amp; Cronin U.S. Coercive Diplomacy</th>
<th>Sechser Compellence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>16/40 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>65/139 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Coercion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Success</td>
<td>43/77 (56%)</td>
<td>9/17 (53%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Coercive</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy Success</td>
<td>31/77 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26/66 (39%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Asymmetric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>13/30 (43%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6/19 (32%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Comparison of Asymmetric Compellence with Previous Research

Robert Pape’s *Bombing to Win* investigates 40 cases of airpower coercion. He codes 16 cases as successful for an overall success rate of 40%. In Pape’s data set 17 of the cases are asymmetric, from which he concludes 9 are successful for a 53%

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asymmetric coercion success rate. This is quite close to the 56% asymmetric success rate I calculate in Table 3.7, though two points need to be clarified. First, Pape codes coercion a success for some cases which involve major combat operations. In his view, coercion is still a success if the target concedes while it still retains the means to resist. I, however, instead code such cases as brute force strategies. Ceteris paribus, this should produce for Pape an overall coercion success rate higher than my own, though a second consideration explains why this is not actually the case. Pape draws all his cases from what he calls “important” conflicts which involve higher level foreign policy demands. As such, these cases may have a lower overall success rate as compared to the cases in my data set which incorporate a wider range of demands, including lower demands for policy change. Even though differences in the coding the dependent variable and in case selection makes a direct comparison imperfect, it is still useful to know that my coercion success rate is very close to Pape’s.

Alexander George and William Simons, in their seminal work on The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, examine 7 U.S. cases of coercive diplomacy. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, have added 15 crises for a total of 22 cases, 7 of which they code as successful for an overall coercive diplomacy

\[172\] 12 of the 17 asymmetric cases are included in my dataset. Not included is Britain in Somaliland in 1920, which I exclude as a non-state target, Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 which I code strictly as brute force, the Korean War in 1950 and 1953 which I combine as a single case, France and Algeria which I exclude as a non-state target, and the USSR in Afghanistan in 1978-88 which I exclude as a non-state target.

\[173\] Pape codes Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939, the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939, and the Korean War all coercion successes, while I code them as brute force strategies. Pape, Robert (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War Ithaca: Cornell University Press 52

success rate of 32%.\textsuperscript{175} Comparing only U.S. crises from my data, I code 13 of 30 cases as coercive diplomacy successes for a success rate of 43%.\textsuperscript{176} Art and Cronin argue, however, that their and George and Simons combined data set is both small and not representative of the universe of coercive diplomacy cases. Since these cases are drawn from the most well known and difficult cases for coercive diplomacy, they argue that their success rate of 32% underestimates coercive diplomacy success.\textsuperscript{177} Given this, my result of 43% is not unexpected.

The final research with which I compare my results is recent work on compellence by Todd Sechser.\textsuperscript{178} He employs the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database, as I do, and identifies 139 compellent cases, of which he codes 65 as successful for an overall coercion success rate of 47%. Sechser's coding of his dependent variable for compellent outcomes most closely fits the coding criteria I employ for coercive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{179} Of these 139 cases, 66 are asymmetric with Great Power challengers, of which Sechser codes 26 as successes for an overall success rate of 39%.\textsuperscript{180} This is close to the 40% success rate I calculated for coercive diplomacy (see Table 3.7).

\textsuperscript{175} Three of these cases, however, are not asymmetric, although this does not change their overall success rate.
\textsuperscript{176} My dataset includes 15 of the 20 asymmetric cases in the combined George & Simon and Art & Cronin dataset. Excluded is the Nicaragua case which I code as deterrent, two Somalia cases which I exclude as the target as non-state actors, and 1991 Safe Haven and 1993 No Fly Zones in Iraq which I code as brute force.
\textsuperscript{180} My dataset of 77 compellent cases and Sechser's 66 asymmetric cases which include only 20 similar cases. This variation in case selection is in large part due to selection criteria as I do no include many of his cases as being either brute force, or deterrent. Also Sechser includes multiple dyads from the same crisis in the database. Of the 20 cases which overlap we agree on the coding of 16 out of 20 outcomes.
Overall, my findings on coercion and coercive diplomacy outcomes are consistent with earlier findings from related coercion research. With this confirmation, I now return to test the survival and commitment hypotheses for coercion outcomes.

**SURVIVAL AND COMMITMENT HYPOTHESES**

One means to examine the *survival* and *commitment* hypotheses is to compare the predictions they make for the outcomes of the 77 compellent cases (Table 3.5). The *survival* hypothesis predicts that the target state will likely resist and coercion will fail when its survival is threatened, so long as it has the means to resist.\(^\text{181}\) The *commitment* hypothesis predicts coercion will fail if the challenger cannot make credible promises, *ex ante*, not to make additional demands. The commitment problem is more likely to arise if the challenger has already deployed military forces which can credibly back up more demands.\(^\text{182}\) In the last two columns of Table 3.5, I list the predictions for these two hypotheses. Table 3.8 provides a synopsis for how often each hypothesis correctly predicts the crises outcomes. Overall, the survival hypothesis (66%) performs much better than the commitment hypothesis (43%).

\(^{181}\) For this assessment only target state survival is evaluated. In the regression analysis I include additional variables for regime and leadership regime survival.

\(^{182}\) Commitment problems are more likely in asymmetric crises since Great Powers have the military capacity to back up threats against weaker states, the situation Todd Sechser dubs “Goliath’s Curse.” Sechser, Todd S. (2007) *Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International Crises* dissertation Stanford University. This insight, however, does not provide *ex ante* predictors of coercion success or failure for specific asymmetric cases. To make testable the credible commitment hypothesis, the remedy I adopt is one suggested by Sir Julian Corbett, who noted “that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point.” Corbett, Julian (1988), *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* United States Naval Institute: Annapolis, Md. It is, therefore, those Great Powers that deploy offensive military forces capable of backing up further demands which are more likely to encounter commitment problems.
Table 3.8: Comparing Predictions of Survival and Commitment Hypotheses in 77 Asymmetric Compellence Cases

Two points need to be addressed. First, the commitment hypothesis only makes predictions for 67 of the 77 compellence cases. Concessions made to demands in 10 of the crises would have led to the target’s demise. For such cases, the logic of commitment problems breaks down. The credibility of a challenger’s promise not to make future demands means nothing to a target that does not expect to be around in the future.

Second, in 9 of the 77 cases the target state does not have the military capability to resist the Great Power. The survival hypothesis predicts coercion success for these cases since even though a target may want to resist, it has no choice since it has no means to do so.\textsuperscript{183}

In sum, though the survival hypothesis better predicts coercion outcomes than does the commitment hypothesis, there are other factors which also affect outcomes. In the next section, I examine explanatory and control variables which, when incorporated into regression analysis, allow an evaluation of the survival and commitment hypotheses while controlling for these factors.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
& Survival Hypothesis & Commitment Hypothesis \\
\hline
Correct Predictions & 51 & 29 \\
\hline
Total Predictions & 77 & 67 \\
\hline
Percentage of Predictions Correct & 66\% & 43\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Comparing Predictions of Survival and Commitment Hypotheses in 77 Asymmetric Compellence Cases}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{183} If these cases were all coded as failures the survival hypothesis predictions would be reduced to 55\% (51/77), which is only slightly better than predictions made by a coin toss, though still better than the commitment hypothesis predictions.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

In this section, I operationalize variables for the asymmetric coercion model developed in Chapter 2. The model includes the challenger’s strategy and if it changes strategies in later stages its final strategy, which I code as compellence, deterrence, brute force, or accommodation (see Appendix 3.A). For coercion cases I introduce core demands, threats, and signals (see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). For the survival and commitment hypotheses discussed in the previous section I develop variables for state survival, regime survival, leader survival, and commitment. Finally, I identify control variables also relevant to conflict outcomes; military power, contiguity, allies, intrawar conflict, sanctions, institutions, polity, superpower involvement, and history. The remainder of this section discusses in detail each of these variables in further detail.

Strategy and Final Strategy Variables

The strategy variable identifies whether accommodation, coercion (compellence or deterrence), or brute force strategies were adopted by the challenger. The final strategy variable identifies the strategy employed by the challenger at the end of the crisis. These two dummy variables have been included since in 14 cases Great Powers began with coercive strategies, only to later change to brute force.

Core Demand Variable

The core demand is the ex ante, objective derived by the challenger which if obtained will likely bring the crisis to a conclusion. I code these as either policy change, extra-territorial concessions, homeland territorial concessions, or regime change.

\[184\] Since the 77 cases of compellence are all cases of coercion, the strategy variable is dropped in the regression analysis.
**Threat Variable**

The *threat* variable indicates whether a challenger adopts a punishment or a denial strategy. A punishment strategy indicates that the threats are aimed at the target’s population or government with the intention of increasing the target’s costs for resisting. A denial strategy attacks the target’s military defenses with the aim of reducing the target’s ability to defend the issue at stake.

**Signal Variable**

Signaling Costs are observable measures the challenger takes and costs it endures in order to communicate the credibility of its threat to the target. I divide signals into three categories according to their employment of exemplary military actions, the limited use of force, and major combat operations.\(^{185}\)

**State Survival Variable**

I code *state survival* as to whether or not a concession by the target would threaten the state’s control of its population, homeland territory, regime or the viability of its economy. I also note whether the target has the military means to resist the challenger.\(^{186}\)

**Regime Survival Variable**

*Regime survival* indicates whether or not domestic opposition groups within a state could threaten revolt and/or overthrow of the regime. The logic of omni-balancing

\(^{185}\) Major combat operations is not a significant variable in any of the regression results and so is excluded from the models

\(^{186}\) This contingent criteria reverses the coding for 9 cases which are identified by astericks in Table 3.
suggests that a regime is less likely to make a humiliating concession which could be interpreted by opposition groups as a sign of weakness.187

**Leader Survival Variable**

I also identify leadership survival as a concern for certain types of regimes in target states. I include three variables adopted from Barbara Geddes’ framework for authoritarian regimes, which I code as military, single party, or personalist regimes.188 These variables are a proxy for the audience costs the leader of a regime expects to pay for conceding and thereby revealing a failed policy. An alternative proxy for audience costs is the $W$ score developed in the *Logic of Political Survival*, where $W$ indicates the size of the winning domestic political coalition necessary for the regime leader to stay in power.189

**Commitment Variable**

The commitment hypothesis predicts the target will resist demands when the challenger cannot credibly commit not to make further demands. The commitment variable indicates whether or not the challenger has sufficient military forces deployed to back up additional demands. I code whether the Great Power deployed military forces capable of making credible threats to back up additional demands.190

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190 I examine each case for evidence the Great Power deployed offensive military forces in excess of what is required to credibly back up the current demands and which could be employed to back up further demands. I do not set coding criteria for the number or type of forces but evaluate each case individually. If additional forces are deployed then I code the commitment variable 1 and otherwise 0. See Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion on why deployed force is selected as a proxy for commitment problems.
Control Variables

Other variables impact challenger and target decision making and are likely to affect crises outcomes (see Appendix 3.B for coding rules). Military power is a measure of the relative military power of the challenger and the target. I calculate this as a ratio by dividing the annual military expenditures for the challenger by the combined military expenditures of the challenger and the target. $^{191}$ Contiguity specifies the challenger and target as sharing borders or separated by sea by only a short distance. $^{192}$ Target Allies are Great Powers actively involved in the crisis on the behalf of the target. Intrawar conflict codes those crises initiated while a war is ongoing. $^{193}$ Sanctions indicate economic sanctions employed by the challenger. $^{194}$ Institutions indicates the active involvement of the League of Nations or United Nations in the conflict. Polity difference measures the difference between the challenger and target along the polity spectrum from fully institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized democracies. $^{195}$ Given the low success rate of the Cold War period two control variable for U.S. and USSR have been included. Finally, history indicates whether the challenger and target have had a previous military dispute and if the challenger was victorious in that dispute. $^{196}$

$^{192}$ Correlates of War Direct Contiguity (v3.1) www.correlatesofwar.org accessed 14 April 2010.
$^{195}$ Polity IV Project Polity IV www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm accessed 14 April 2010
**REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

With dependent, explanatory, and control variables specified, I now conduct statistical regressions to further assess the survival and commitment hypotheses. Table 3.9 summarizes the results for 5 regression models. The most appropriate regression, given the ordinal coding (1-4: failure, partial failure, partial success, success) for the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome, is the ordered probit utilized in Model I. To verify whether the coding criteria for the dependent variable alter the results, I include a probit regression (Model II) with foreign policy outcome coded dichotomously as either success or failure. Model III is another probit regression, but with regime survival, militarist, single party, and personalist variables replaced by the target's W score as an alternative proxy for a target regime and leader's audience costs. Model IV is an ordered probit regression with this W score variable, which also excludes the commitment variable in order to assess target state survival for all 77 compellent cases. Model V is an ordered probit which includes W score and commitment variables but omits variables which were not significant in the other models' regression results.

**MULTICOLLINEARITY**

As multivariate regressions, collinearity is always a concern and I provide a correlation matrix for all the variables, with the exception of the commitment variable, in Appendix 3.C. Commitment is only highly correlated with one variable, the regime demand. As discussed earlier, the commitment hypothesis only makes predictions for 67

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197 The results do not change with ordered logit or logit models.
of the 77 compellence cases. Concessions made to demands in 10 of the crises would have led to the target’s demise. For demands such as regime change, the logic of commitment problems breaks down. The credibility of a challenger’s promise not to make future demands means nothing to a target that does not expect to be around in the future. As a result commitment is perfectly correlated with regime.

Reviewing Appendix 3.C, there is concern over a high degree of collinearity (above .40) for two explanatory variables: homeland demand and personalist regime, Homeland is highly correlated with state survival, exemplary military signal, and limited force signal, while personalist is correlated with contiguity, sanctions, and polity differences. To see if this collinearity impacted the regression results, I ran a series of regressions omitting these variables but did not find that this affected the overall results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I Ordered Probit</th>
<th>Model II Probit</th>
<th>Model III Probit</th>
<th>Model IV Ordered Probit</th>
<th>Model V Ordered Probit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>1.113 (.553)**</td>
<td>1.930 (1.091)*</td>
<td>1.848 (1.035)*</td>
<td>.564 (4.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Survival</td>
<td>-1.321 (.777)*</td>
<td>-2.121 (1.718)*</td>
<td>-2.367 (1.440)*</td>
<td>-1.368 (.700)**</td>
<td>-1.744 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Survival</td>
<td>-.431 (.630)</td>
<td>-.161 (1.134)</td>
<td>-.733 (1.711)</td>
<td>-1.368 (.700)**</td>
<td>-1.744 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarist regime</td>
<td>-.120 (.238)</td>
<td>-.733 (1.711)</td>
<td>-.733 (1.711)</td>
<td>-1.368 (.700)**</td>
<td>-1.744 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>.077 (.593)</td>
<td>-.095 (1.917)</td>
<td>-.733 (1.711)</td>
<td>-1.368 (.700)**</td>
<td>-1.744 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist regime</td>
<td>.384 (.671)</td>
<td>-.768 (1.104)</td>
<td>-.768 (1.104)</td>
<td>-1.368 (.700)**</td>
<td>-1.744 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Strategy</td>
<td>1.004 (.692)</td>
<td>.704 (1.057)</td>
<td>.6548 (1.9961)</td>
<td>.986 (.589)*</td>
<td>1.23 (.534)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraterritorial</td>
<td>-.0373 (.767)</td>
<td>.1714 (1.359)</td>
<td>.4780 (1.230)</td>
<td>.363 (.747)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>.219 (.782)</td>
<td>1.196 (1.773)</td>
<td>.7247 (1.424)</td>
<td>-2.36 (1.718)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>.494 (.488)</td>
<td>.381 (.757)</td>
<td>.5278 (.6793)</td>
<td>.729 (.447)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplary Signal</td>
<td>.809 (.603)</td>
<td>.456 (1.049)</td>
<td>.5837 (1.9609)</td>
<td>.749 (.534)</td>
<td>.882 (.505)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Force Signal</td>
<td>-1.337 (.609)**</td>
<td>-.259 (1.248)**</td>
<td>-1.899 (1.084)*</td>
<td>-.520 (.536)</td>
<td>-.784 (.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power</td>
<td>2.492 (1.994)</td>
<td>-.351 (6.725)</td>
<td>2.711 (5.711)</td>
<td>4.157 (2.013)**</td>
<td>3.245 (1.972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-2.506 (.942)***</td>
<td>-3.087 (1.581)*</td>
<td>-2.665 (1.301)*</td>
<td>-1.903 (.746)**</td>
<td>-1.784 (.692)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Allies</td>
<td>-.453 (.586)</td>
<td>-.250 (8.52)</td>
<td>-.7844 (.7504)</td>
<td>-.704 (4.78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrawar Conflict</td>
<td>1.768 (.778)**</td>
<td>1.671 (1.155)</td>
<td>2.101 (1.243)*</td>
<td>2.1 (.620)***</td>
<td>1.578 (.534)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>-1.544 (.743)**</td>
<td>-.575 (1.245)</td>
<td>-1.878 (1.010)*</td>
<td>-1.267 (.571)**</td>
<td>-1.413 (.565)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>-.7004 (.470)</td>
<td>-.682 (6.80)</td>
<td>-.626 (6.39)</td>
<td>-.627 (.415)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Difference</td>
<td>.0456 (.057)</td>
<td>-.0039 (.1013)</td>
<td>-.009 (.0751)</td>
<td>.005 (.043)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-2.84 (1.394)**</td>
<td>-.154 (2.413)</td>
<td>-.174 (6.81)</td>
<td>-1.919 (.978)**</td>
<td>-1.873 (.804)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>2.058 (.684)***</td>
<td>2.987 (1.49)**</td>
<td>3.086 (1.339)**</td>
<td>1.807 (.539)**</td>
<td>1.704 (.530)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.724 (7.238)</td>
<td>-.409 (5.947)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi squared</td>
<td>54.07***</td>
<td>45.54***</td>
<td>46.82***</td>
<td>62.17***</td>
<td>62.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-52.665</td>
<td>-18.89</td>
<td>-18.25</td>
<td>-55.94</td>
<td>-53.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R square</td>
<td>.3392</td>
<td>.5466</td>
<td>.5619</td>
<td>.3572</td>
<td>.3273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated as * p < .10, ** p < .05, and *** for p < .001.
Results

The most significant finding by far is that the state survival estimator is negative, as expected, while the commitment estimator is positive, which is contrary to the expectations of the commitment hypothesis. Both were significant above the 90% confidence level for all but one of the regression models.\textsuperscript{198}

The survival hypothesis expects that when target survival is threatened, the likelihood of a challenger achieving its foreign policy outcome decreases. This should result in a negative relationship between the state survival variable and the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. This negative relationship is strongly supported by the quantitative evidence.\textsuperscript{199}

The commitment hypothesis expects that when a challenger has deployed sufficient military forces to back up further demands, the likelihood of a target believing promises that the challenger will not make further demands decreases. This should result in a negative correlation between commitment and crisis outcome. The evidence, however, does not support this relationship. It instead strongly supports the opposite, showing that an increase of deployed military force increases the likelihood that a challenger achieves its foreign policy outcome in asymmetric cases of compellence.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{198} Only in the Model III probit regression with 67 observations does state survival fail to reach \( p > .10 \). In this model for state survival \( p > .21 \). In Model V commitment is omitted and in Model VI commitment \( p > .18 \).

\textsuperscript{199} Including final strategy in the regression controls for whether a powerful challenger changes its strategy from coercion to brute force, which occurs in 14 cases (see Appendix 3.A).

\textsuperscript{200} A possible counter argument to the lack of supporting evidence is to claim contiguity not the level of deployed military forces is a better proxy for commitment problem. While contiguity is negative and significant, it, like commitment, performs poorly in prediction coercion outcomes correctly predicting 39/77 (50%) of the 77 compellent outcomes.
While the state survival estimator for the survival hypothesis is both negative and significant, the regime and leadership survival estimators are not consistent. The regime survival estimator has a negative sign, as expected, though not significant for any of the regression models. The regime survival variable measures whether the target state has domestic opposition groups which can threaten the regime in power. There are two possibilities for the inconclusive results. First, the evidence to code the regime survival variable is not consistent across all 77 cases. Domestic opposition groups are not identified in the ICB or the Schultz/Lewis Coercive Diplomacy databases. I code this variable based on the availability of evidence for each case provided, in large part, by the ICB and Schultz/Lewis case summaries. The amount of information on the domestic political situation in the target states varies considerably. I examine in much greater detail several of these crises which are included in the qualitative case studies in Chapters 4-6. Future research involving a more in-depth examination of domestic opposition groups in the other cases would improve confidence for the coding of regime survival.

A second possibility is that, in asymmetric conflicts, a domestic opposition group may well view the crisis itself, a Great Power pitted against the target, as a sign of a weak regime regardless of regime concession or resistance. If this is the case, the existence of domestic opposition groups capable of revolt may not bias the target regime towards resistance. In some cases, this may even provide an incentive for a target regime to concede, such as when Libya's Qadhafi reversed his policy of support for terrorism, once radicalized Muslim militant groups had formed within his country. 201

In addition to the inconclusive findings for regime survival, the three authoritarian regime type variables, militarist, single party, and personalist regimes, used as proxies

201 See the second case in Chapter 6.
for a regime leader’s audience costs, are neither consistent nor significant in any of the models. Research on authoritarian regimes and audience costs shows that the type of authoritarian regime impacts the likelihood a target will make concessions, i.e. the personalist regime leader being the most likely to concede, as he suffers the lowest audience costs. I did not find evidence to support this finding.

An alternative to employing militarist, single party, and personalist regimes variables to code the authoritarian regime type of target states is Bueno de Mesquita’s $W$ score, a variable which codes states from 0 to 1 according to the size of the winning domestic political coalition required by each regime in order to remain in power. The $W$ score is significant but, similar to the commitment variable, the sign of the estimator is positive indicating that, as the size of the winning coalition increases, the likelihood of achieving the foreign policy outcome also increases. Thus neither regime type estimators nor the size of winning coalition produces results which support the logic of the audience cost argument.

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202 I code these as dummy variables with non-authoritarian regime as the basis. A positive estimator indicates that that type of regime has a positive affect on outcome, compared to all other regime types.


204 The $W$ score variable is a rather crude variable coding in .25 increments between 0-1. At the low end of the spectrum states such as 1979 Pakistan and 1998 Afghanistan are coded 0, Saddam’s Iraq and Qadhafi’s Libya are coded .25, Milosevic’s Serbia .75, and democracies such as the US and UK 1.0. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D Morrow (2003) The Logic of Political Survival Cambridge MA: MIT Press

205 $W$ score is significant for both ordered probits Models V and VI and nearly so in the probit regression in Model IV. The $W$ score estimator is at $p>.16$ for Model IV, and it is significant at $p>.05$ for probit regressions with 77 observations (model not included in Table 9). Weeks, Jessica L. (2008) “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve” International Organization 62 (Winter) 35-64

206 The audience cost argument states that as the number of principals capable of punishing leaders decreases, audience costs for the leader also decrease, thus increasing the likelihood the leader will be willing to concede to coercive demands.
There are three possible explanations for these inconsistent or counterintuitive results. First, previous research on regime leader audience costs analyzed cases in which the authoritarian regime was the challenger. In those cases, the focus was on different types of authoritarian regimes and their relative propensity to back down from their initial demands. The logic for audience costs when the authoritarian regime is the target may be different. Since the target state is not the one initiating the crisis in asymmetric conflicts, the leader may not suffer the same level of audience costs as a challenger’s leader.

A second possible cause, one which I find more plausible, is a non-rational explanation based on the type of individuals who become authoritarian leaders. Such leaders often rise to power through violent means via coups or revolution. Saddam Hussein and Mu’ammar Qadhafi, whom I examine in detail in Chapters 4 and 6, both seized power through coups and later became the object of coup attempts themselves. Such leaders are more likely to perceive a persistent threat to their survival, even when they are well in control of both their regime and the country, as was the case with Saddam Hussein. By the late 1990s Saddam had subdued the Shia and Kurds and by all appearances was well in control of his Baath party. Yet his ingrained “paranoia” led him to take additional measures, forming his Fedayeen and constructing an internal security apparatus to deter the formation of opposition within his army and regime. Constantly focused on his survival, a personalist regime leader may misperceive audience costs to be much higher than what they are.

A third argument, related to the second, asserts that personalist regimes often are ruled by a charismatic leader, whose power rests in his followers’ continued belief in his
“supernatural” leadership.\textsuperscript{207} It may be against the nature of such a leader to concede to any demands, even when there are few within the regime capable of punishing him.

A fourth argument focuses on the elite of authoritarian regimes, i.e. those who make up the principal actors capable of punishing the leader and their fear that a concession by their leader will weaken the entire regime’s hold on power.\textsuperscript{208} This fear for regime survival may undermine the logic of audience costs in such cases.

\textit{Selection Effects in Explanatory Variables}

A potentially troublesome finding for the asymmetric coercion model is that the explanatory variables for \textit{core demands}, \textit{threat}, and \textit{signal costs} are not consistent or significant (see Table 3.9). Upon reflection, however, I find three selection effects explain these results. First, with regard to the \textit{core demand}, I expect that, \textit{ceteris parabus}, an increase in demands will decrease the likelihood the challenger will achieve its foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{209} When the high level demand of regime change is made, the target should be particularly resistant. In 9 out of 10 such cases, however, the target actually conceded and in only 1 of those 9 crises did the challenger revert to a brute force strategy.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{208} I credit Barry Posen for this insight.
\textsuperscript{209} The core demand variables are coded as dummy variables with policy change as the basis. As a result policy change is not included as a variable included in the regressions. In addition, the colinearity between commitment and regime change variables requires regime change to be dropped from all but Model V, where commitment was dropped in order to evaluate regime change.
\textsuperscript{210} The 9 successes included 1918 U.S.-Costa Rica, 1926 U.S.-Nicaragua, 1939 Germany-Austria, 1939 Germany-Czechoslovakia, 1939 Italy-Albania, 1944 Germany-Hungary, 1944 USSR-Romania, 1945 USSR-Romania, and 1994 U.S.-Haiti. The one failure was the U.S. unconditional surrender demand of North Korea in the Korean War. The one case of challenger reverting to brute force was the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939.
What explains this unexpected high level of success for Great Powers in coercing weak states into regime change? In 6 of the 10 cases, the target states did not have the military means to resist and were therefore more likely to concede. Great Powers therefore chose to coerce regime change in those cases in which they were confident they would succeed.

If this is true, that target states resist regime change when they have the means to do so and that challenger’s only coerce regime change when they believe the target will concede, then there is likely to be a higher percentage of brute force cases when regime change is the objective. This is, in fact, the case as only 13% of the compellent cases have the core demand of regime change (10 of 77), while this occurs in 33% of brute force cases (14 of 43). An example of this selection effect of choosing brute force over coercion is discussed in Chapter 4. In March of 2003, President George W. Bush chose to conduct a brute force invasion of Iraq. Though Bush made an ultimatum for Saddam to leave Iraq, he at the same time indicated that the U.S. would invade Iraq regardless of Saddam’s decision. The Bush ultimatum was therefore not coercive, as he did not believe Saddam could be compelled to concede power.211

A second selection effect may explain why the threat variable is not found to be significant in the regression models. The threat variable codes punishment or denial as the strategy adopted by the challenger. The threat estimator is positive, indicating denial results in better outcomes than punishment, but it is not a significant finding for the majority of models. This may be explained by the fact that denial strategies, which apply more coercive pressure than punishment strategies, are also more costly to employ and are therefore reserved for conflicts in which high value issues are at stake. These are also

likely to be cases in which it is more difficult for the challenger to obtain its foreign policy objectives.

A final selection effect may explain signaling costs. The exemplary signal variable indicates those signals which employ exemplary military action. This is positive though not significant, which may be explained by the same reasoning just used for why the threat variable is not significant. Exemplary signals are reserved for more difficult cases than those where diplomacy alone can convince the target to concede. In addition, the limited force signal is negative and significant, which is opposite to the expectation for signaling costs, in that, as the challenger increases the costs it is willing to endure, the credibility of its resolve is also increased. The limited force variable also may also be an indication that diplomacy and exemplary signals have already failed. For such cases, the likelihood of success is much lower, even when limited force is employed to signal resolve.

**ROBUSTNESS CHECKS**

In this final analytical section, I examine the quantitative findings and consider the sensitivity of the regression results for alternative codings of the dependent variable and for outlier cases which may skew the results. In Table 3.10, I compare the findings from five robustness checks against the results from the baseline ordered probit regression of Model I.

**Changing the Coding on the Dependent Variable**

Of particular concern is how changing the coding of the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome for individual cases affects the overall findings. In Robust Model
I consider the impact of coding cases as partially successful. I swap the coding for the 10 cases of partial success to that of partial failure.\textsuperscript{212} This recoding does not change the overall results.\textsuperscript{213}

A second robustness check is to recode the dependent variable for cases where other researchers have reached contradictory findings. Todd Sechser codes 4 cases as compellence failures, which I have coded as either success or partial success foreign policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{214} In Robust Model II, I input Secher’s codings for the dependent variable. The result is that while the commitment estimator is no longer significant, it remains positive and the state survival estimator remains negative and significant. Hence, a change in the coding of these controversial cases does not change my overall findings.

**Removing Outliers**

In Robust Models III and IV, I remove potential outlier cases which could skew the results. Nazi Germany was a prolific coercer, as Hitler achieved his foreign policy outcomes in all 7 cases of asymmetric coercion.\textsuperscript{215} In Robust Model III I remove these cases, which does not change the findings, with the exception of the fact that state survival is just below the 90% significance level (p<.12). This slight reduction in

\textsuperscript{212} The result of Robust check I had all partial successes coded as 3 changed to 2. In a robustness check which I do not present in Table 10 I also changed the coding criteria on foreign policy outcome to 1-3 (1 failure, 2 partial failure/success and 3 success). This had no impact on the estimators.

\textsuperscript{213} An alternative robust check of changing success to partial success has a more significant impact on the survival. Changing more than 5% of the success codings to partial success is sufficient to make the state survival variable no longer significant at the p<.10 level.

\textsuperscript{214} There are no controversial cases between my coding and that of George and Simon, Art and Cronin, or Pape. Sechser, however, codes the following cases as failures: 1924 Great Britain vs. Turkey “Mosul”, 1970 U.S. vs. Syria “Black September”, 1990 U.S. vs Iraq “Gulf War”, and 1999 U.S. vs. Serbia “Kosovo.” Under my coding criteria these cases are either success or partial success.

\textsuperscript{215} In only the case of Poland in 1939 was a final strategy of brute force necessary.
significance, however, has as much to do with the decrease in the number of observations in the regression as it does with the exclusion of the Nazi Germany cases.

In Robust Model IV, I exclude all the World War II cases in order to examine whether the nature of global war affects the dynamics of asymmetric conflict. I conclude that it does not. While the state survival variable remains negative, it is no longer significant at the 90% level (p<.14) and the commitment variable remains positive but not significant. This decrease in significance of the survival estimator, however, is primarily due to the decrease in the number of observations, given the large number of explanatory and control variables.\textsuperscript{216}

**Change in Coding Commitment**

A final critique questions the method with which I code the commitment variable and asserts that it was inappropriate for me to exclude the 10 cases for which I did not make predictions using the commitment hypothesis. In Robust Model V, I correct for this omission by coding all 10 of these cases in favor of the commitment variable. Despite this correction, the results still do not change the overall findings, as the commitment variable remains positive.

In sum, my quantitative findings are consistent and robust across a variety of regression models with various combinations of explanatory and control variables, with alternative codings of the dependent variables, with consideration of potential outlier

\textsuperscript{216}Regression results improve by increasing observations and decreasing the number of variables tested. Running the Robust IV regression without the commitment variable, similar to Model IV (Table 9) increases the observations to 60 and slightly improves the survival variable (p<.13). Eliminating the variables which are not significant (see Model V Table 9) results in commitment variable being positive and significant (p<.05) and improves the survival variable (p<.11). Combining Model IV and Model V by removing the commitment variable and other variables which are not significant improves the survival variable substantially (p<.03).
cases, and with corrections for a possible shortcoming in the coding criteria for the commitment variable.
Table 3.10: Robustness Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Robust I</th>
<th>Robust II</th>
<th>Robust III</th>
<th>Robust IV</th>
<th>Robust V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordered Probit</td>
<td>No Partial Success</td>
<td>Sechser Coding</td>
<td>No Germany</td>
<td>No WWII</td>
<td>77 Commit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>1.113 (.553)**</td>
<td>1.098 (.564)**</td>
<td>.809 (.568)</td>
<td>1.020 (.564)*</td>
<td>.299 (.607)</td>
<td>.672 (.484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Survival</td>
<td>-1.321 (.773)*</td>
<td>-1.405 (.811)*</td>
<td>-1.878 (.888)**</td>
<td>-1.226 (.779)</td>
<td>-1.222 (.826)</td>
<td>-1.223 (.750)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Survival</td>
<td>-.431 (.630)</td>
<td>-.4869 (.643)</td>
<td>-.202 (.617)</td>
<td>-.786 (.723)</td>
<td>.0257 (.669)</td>
<td>-.237 (.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarist Regime</td>
<td>-1.210 (1.238)</td>
<td>-1.364 (1.25)</td>
<td>-.114 (.244)</td>
<td>-1.460 (1.254)</td>
<td>-1.409 (1.378)</td>
<td>-1.828 (1.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>.077 (.593)</td>
<td>.1781 (.601)</td>
<td>-1.473 (.567)**</td>
<td>.1672 (.612)</td>
<td>-.442 (.729)</td>
<td>-.577 (.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>.384 (.671)</td>
<td>.6300 (.698)</td>
<td>-.086 (.677)</td>
<td>.413 (.684)</td>
<td>-.485 (.738)</td>
<td>-.036 (.630)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Score</td>
<td>Final Strategy</td>
<td>1.004 (.692)</td>
<td>1.119 (.718)</td>
<td>1.082 (.678)</td>
<td>1.132 (.709)*</td>
<td>1.34 (.739)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraterritorial</td>
<td>-.0373 (.767)</td>
<td>-.1826 (.793)</td>
<td>-.1560 (.830)**</td>
<td>.0447 (.772)</td>
<td>.892 (.930)</td>
<td>.276 (.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>.219 (.782)</td>
<td>.064 (.794)</td>
<td>-.202 (.895)</td>
<td>-.011 (.816)</td>
<td>-.055 (.880)</td>
<td>.370 (.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>.494 (.488)</td>
<td>.5343 (.502)</td>
<td>.676 (.482)</td>
<td>.529 (.497)</td>
<td>.164 (.561)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplary Signal</td>
<td>.809 (.603)</td>
<td>.914 (.612)</td>
<td>.977 (.668)</td>
<td>.772 (.608)</td>
<td>1.42 (.734)**</td>
<td>1.165 (.582)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Force Signal</td>
<td>-1.337 (.609)**</td>
<td>-1.215 (.620)**</td>
<td>-1.40 (.588)**</td>
<td>-1.227 (.612)**</td>
<td>-1.118 (.617)*</td>
<td>-.972 (.542)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power</td>
<td>2.492 (1.994)</td>
<td>2.623 (2.070)</td>
<td>.015 (1.838)</td>
<td>2.00 (2.034)</td>
<td>4.272 (2.14)**</td>
<td>2.213 (1.896)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Allies</td>
<td>-.453 (.586)</td>
<td>-.453 (.593)</td>
<td>.380 (.554)</td>
<td>-.436 (.606)</td>
<td>-.004 (.645)</td>
<td>-.276 (.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrawar Conflict</td>
<td>1.768 (.778)**</td>
<td>1.870 (.802)**</td>
<td>2.503 (.839)**</td>
<td>1.839 (.794)**</td>
<td>1.747 (.895)*</td>
<td>1.865 (.723)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>-1.544 (.743)**</td>
<td>-1.569 (.753)**</td>
<td>-2.322 (.884)**</td>
<td>-1.834 (.820)**</td>
<td>-1.62 (.985)*</td>
<td>-1.784 (.773)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>-.7004 (.470)</td>
<td>-.670 (.476)</td>
<td>-.768 (.487)</td>
<td>-.647 (.471)</td>
<td>-.737 (.54)</td>
<td>-.715 (.433)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Difference</td>
<td>.0456 (.057)</td>
<td>.057 (.057)</td>
<td>-.009 (.058)</td>
<td>.038 (.057)</td>
<td>-.013 (.072)</td>
<td>-.0003 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-2.84 (1.394)**</td>
<td>-3.31 (1.45)**</td>
<td>-1.659 (1.285)</td>
<td>-2.32 (1.418)*</td>
<td>-1.377 (1.75)</td>
<td>-1.393 (1.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>2.058 (.684)**</td>
<td>1.998 (.694)**</td>
<td>.746 (.519)**</td>
<td>2.150 (.704)**</td>
<td>2.977 (.794)**</td>
<td>1.725 (.576)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Chi Squared</td>
<td>54.07***</td>
<td>53.28***</td>
<td>65.05***</td>
<td>51.45***</td>
<td>46.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-.52665</td>
<td>-.40698</td>
<td>-.47860</td>
<td>-.51386</td>
<td>-.4554</td>
<td>-.5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R Square</td>
<td>.3392</td>
<td>.3956</td>
<td>.4046</td>
<td>.3336</td>
<td>.3373</td>
<td>.3487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

The objective in this chapter was two-fold: first, to examine several of the assumptions behind my research question of why Great Powers often fail to coerce weak states and, second, to test the survival and commitment hypotheses. As to this first objective, I questioned how frequently Great Powers are involved in asymmetric conflicts with weak states. How often do Great Powers choose coercive strategies and how often are they successful? How does the United States compare to other Great Powers? Does the frequency and success of asymmetric conflicts vary over time? To answer these questions, I identified cases of asymmetric crises since World War I and discovered that Great Powers achieved their foreign policy objectives in three-quarters of the cases. In addition, Great Powers chose coercive over brute force strategies at the rate of two to one. The United States initiated a third of all the crises and 86% of the crises since the end of the Cold War, which far outnumbered those of any other Great Power. The U.S. was even more likely to choose coercion and its overall success rates were not significantly different than those of other Great Powers.

In order to assess the validity of my findings, I then compared these quantitative results to those from previous research. In order to do this, I first coded for two alternative dependent variables of coercion and coercive diplomacy. I then found that Great Powers were successful at coercion 56% of the time and at coercive diplomacy in 43% of the cases. This compared favorably with the findings from Robert Pape, George & Simon and Art & Cronin, and Todd Sechser.

As to my second objective in this chapter, I tested the survival and commitment hypotheses by making predictions for each hypothesis for the 77 cases of asymmetric
compellence. I found that the survival hypothesis performed better than the commitment hypothesis. Refining this analysis, I operationalized explanatory and control variables in order to assess the two hypotheses while holding constant for other variables that could affect the crises outcomes. Again, I found that state survival was a consistently significant estimator of foreign policy outcome. The commitment variable, however, was directly correlated with foreign policy outcome, opposite of the relationship expected by the commitment hypothesis.

Several other estimators were also not as expected. The proxies for regime and regime leader survival did not perform as well as the state survival estimator. In addition, several of the explanatory variables derived from the asymmetric coercion model also did not perform well. Selection effects explain why Great Powers only choose to coerce for higher level demands when they believe the target will likely concede. As a result, there were few cases of coercion for regime change in which the target resisted. More often, however, the Great Power chose to employ a brute force strategy for regime change, which is consistent with a selection effect explanation and with the predictions of the survival hypothesis. Targets will likely resist when their survival is at risk. Rational challengers expect such resistance and choose brute force over coercion for such cases.

In addition, the threat and limited force signal variables performed contrary to what was expected. This is, in part, explained by the fact that threats of force is expensive for the challenger and therefore reserved for those difficult cases, in which the target is more likely to resist or where previous efforts where diplomacy backed by exemplary military signals have already failed.
In the next three chapters, I further examine the survival and commitment hypotheses in qualitative cases drawn from conflicts between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya. These cases allow for an in depth assessment of the reasons for coercion success or failure. It also allows for more precise testing and a side-by-side assessment of the survival and commitment hypotheses. In addition, U.S.-only cases were intentionally chosen for two reasons. First, the U.S. is the Great Power most often involved in asymmetric conflicts, being responsible for initiating a third of all crises and 18 out of the 21 cases since the end of the Cold War. Second, holding constant for the U.S. as a Great Power reduces concern that cross-national variation in the challenger is responsible for variation in coercion outcomes. Additionally, I include multiple crises for each target state, which allows me to hold constant for both challenger and target and to focus, instead, on causes for the variation of the key explanatory variables.\footnote{The primary disadvantage of selecting only U.S. cases, all but one of which occurred after the Cold War, is that taken alone, it is unclear as to the degree to which these qualitative cases can be generalized for other Great Powers and during other time periods. Fortunately, this problem is mitigated by the quantitative findings from this chapter which includes cases of all the Great Powers since WWI.}
APPENDIX 3.A: 116 CASES OF ASYMMETRIC INTERSTATE CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICB#</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>ICB Name</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Russian Civil War I</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Costa Rican Coup</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian War</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Smyrna</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Cilician War</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Rhenish Rebellions</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Costa Rica/Panama Border</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German Reparations</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austrian Separatists</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Chanak</td>
<td>Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ruhr I</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Corfu Incident</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Mosul Land Dispute</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nicaragua Civil War I</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Hegemony Over Albania</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>Deter</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chinese Eastern Railway</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mukden Incident</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Jehol Campaign</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopian War</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Kaunas Trials</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spanish Civil War I</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Marco Polo Bridge</td>
<td>Brute Force</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Anschluss</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Compel</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia's Annexation</td>
<td>Compel</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Memel</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Invasion of Albania</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Entry Into World War II</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Soviet Occupation of the Baltic</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Soviet Occupation of the Baltic</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Soviet Occupation of the Baltic</td>
<td>Compel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finnish War</td>
<td>Comp/BF</td>
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218 ICB# is the crisis number for the International Crisis Behavior Project. Comp/BF indicates an initial Compellent strategy followed by a Brute Force Strategy. BF/Accomm indicates Brute Force followed by Accommodation.
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Appendix 3.B: Variables

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<td>Foreign Policy Outcome</td>
<td>1 = Failure</td>
<td>Failure: Target resisted challenger's demands</td>
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<td>(1-4)</td>
<td>2 = Partial Failure</td>
<td>Partial Failure: Target conceded, but not to core demands</td>
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<td>3 = Partial Success</td>
<td>Partial Success: Target conceded to a part of core demands</td>
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<td>4 = Success</td>
<td>Success: Target conceded to core demands</td>
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<td>Strategy</td>
<td>0 = Accommodation</td>
<td>Strategy adopted by challenger.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Strategy (0-2)</td>
<td>1 = Coercion</td>
<td>Challenger’s strategy at end of conflict</td>
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<td>2 = Brute Force</td>
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<td>Core Demand Policy</td>
<td>Policy (0/1)</td>
<td>Challenger core demands are for policy change, extraterritorial concessions, homeland territorial concessions, or regime change</td>
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<td>Extra-territory</td>
<td>Extraterritory (0/1)</td>
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<td>Homeland Regime</td>
<td>Homeland (0/1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Regime change (0/1)</td>
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<td>Threat (0-1)</td>
<td>0 = Punishment</td>
<td>Nature of coercive threat as either punishment or denial</td>
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<td>1 = Denial</td>
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<td>Signal</td>
<td>Exemplary EMSig (0/1)</td>
<td>Highest level of signaling</td>
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<td>Limited Force LFSig (0/1)</td>
<td>Sanctions, naval ops, mobilize/deploy</td>
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<td>Major Combat MCSig (0/1)</td>
<td>Limited force/unopposed occupation</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Major combat operations</td>
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<td>State Survival</td>
<td>0 = Does not threaten survival or threatens survival but target state does not have means to resist</td>
<td>Target state control of population, territory, regime or viability of economy threatened by a concession to core demands</td>
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<td>1 = Threatens survival</td>
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<td>Regime Survival</td>
<td>0 = no domestic opposition groups</td>
<td>Indicates whether there are domestic opposition groups in target state that can threaten regime</td>
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<td>1 = domestic opposition</td>
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<td>Leader Survival</td>
<td>Military (0/1)</td>
<td>The type of target regime based on Barbara Geddes’ Authoritarian data set W score from Bueno de Mesquita, The Logic of Political Survival</td>
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<td>Personalist (0/1)</td>
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<td>W score (0-1)</td>
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<td>Commitment219</td>
<td>0 = Challenger has not deployed military forces with offensive capability</td>
<td>Whether challenger has deployed offensive military power reasonably capable of back up additional threats. With such forces deployed commitment hypothesis expects foreign policy outcome likely to fail</td>
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<td>1 = Challenger has deployed military forces with offensive capability</td>
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219 I examine each case for the presence of deployed forces from the crises summaries provided by the International Crisis Behavior database and the Coercive Diplomacy database. I do not set specific coding criteria based on number or type of forces.
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<th>Explanation/SOURCE</th>
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<td>Ratio of military expenditures MilExpA/(MilExpA+MilExpB)</td>
<td>Correlates of War (COW) National Military Capabilities database Military Expenditures</td>
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<td>Contiguity</td>
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<td>Contiguity between states COW Direct Contiguity Database</td>
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<td>0 = None 1 = Support from Major Power</td>
<td>Whether target received support from an ally</td>
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<td>Intrawar Conflict</td>
<td>0 = dispute during period of peace 1 = dispute took place during ongoing war</td>
<td>Whether conflict occur during ongoing war. Coded 0 if conflict responsible for initiation of war</td>
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<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>0 = No sanctions 1 = Sanctions</td>
<td>Whether challenger imposed economic sanctions</td>
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<td>Institutions</td>
<td>0 = No 1 = Yes</td>
<td>League of Nations or United Nations involvement</td>
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<td>(0-20) Absolute difference in polity score between challenger and target</td>
<td>Polity IV project database (-10 to 10) Autocratic to democratic</td>
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<td>Superpower</td>
<td>United States (1/0) Soviet Union (1/0)</td>
<td>Indicates whether a superpower is challenger in conflict</td>
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<td>0 = no previous dispute, draw, or target won previous dispute 1 = challenger won previous dispute</td>
<td>Militarized Interstate Dispute database and International Crisis Behavior database</td>
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### APPENDIX 3.C: Correlation Matrix (N=77)

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<th>Personalist Regime</th>
<th>W Score</th>
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Matrix (continued)
Chapter 4: United States vs. Iraq 1990-2003

In this and the following two chapters I conduct qualitative analysis of asymmetric coercive crises drawn from conflicts between the U.S. and Iraq, the U.S. and Serbia, and the U.S. and Libya. For these cases I identify the source of the crises, issues at stake for both challenger and target, and the demands, threats, signals made and actual outcomes of the conflicts. I also conduct process tracing, examining probable causes for the crises outcomes, and assess alternative explanations.

I then assess how well two hypotheses for coercion failure, survival and commitment predict the coercive outcomes for these conflicts. First, survival predicts that coercion is likely to fail when all possible negotiated agreements acceptable to the challenger result in the target's demise. Target states, regimes, and their leaders resist demands which threaten survival so long as they have the means to resist. Second, the commitment problem predicts that the likelihood of coercion success decreases when a challenger cannot credibly commit to refrain from making further demands. Though both hypotheses correctly predict the outcomes for the majority of these qualitative cases, survival performs better than commitment problem as to not only the number of cases it correctly predicts but also the degree to which the logic of the survival explanation is matched by evidence.

I begin with the conflict between the United States and Iraq from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 to the U.S. invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. This period warrants careful study as it both began and ended with large-scale combat operations. I select three crises from this conflict for analysis: the Gulf War from August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991, the Iraqi deployment of troops to the Kuwaiti
border in October, 1994, and the period leading up to the Iraq War from September 12th, 2002 to March 20th, 2003. The demands involved in these crises are primarily compellent in nature and their explanatory and dependent variables of demands, threats, and outcomes vary considerably.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides context to the initiation of the conflict, including Saddam’s rise to power and the key events which led to the invasion of Kuwait. In the next three sections I examine each crisis in turn, summarizing key actions and decisions and then assessing each hypothesis for coercion failure. In the final section I examine how well the two hypotheses fare and conclude that survival is a better predictor for these three crises than commitment.

SADDAM HUSSEIN’S RISE TO POWER

Modern Iraq dates back to 1932 with the establishment of the Hashemite monarchy, which governed until its ouster by a military coup in 1958. 220 The new Republic of Iraq struggled through internal turmoil and a series of coups. In 1968, the Arab Socialist Baath Party seized power, placing Ahmed Hasan Bakr at its helm as president and Saddam Hussein at his side as deputy and enforcer. 221 Convinced that the greatest threat came from domestic sources, Saddam viciously secured a hold on power by ridding the party of potential rivals and maintained control of the regime by relying on family and Tikrit tribal loyalties. 222 They also purged the military and instituted the

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Republican Guard, an elite corps commissioned to keep the Baath party in power. Iraq nationalized oil production in 1973 and with this revenue Bakr and Hussein were able to solidify their power through an expansion of the government’s bureaucracy and military.

The domestic opposition which remained emanated from the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. Saddam was able to weaken the Kurds through a combination of military action and a 1975 treaty with Iran. By contrast, Shia opposition grew steadily, culminating in widespread demonstrations following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Saddam responded, arresting thousands of demonstrators and executing their leaders. Now firmly in control, Saddam Hussein unseated Ahmed Bakr as president.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ITS AFTERMATH, AND THE KUWAIT INVASION

Tensions soon mounted between Saddam and Iran’s new leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. By 1980 border skirmishes were frequent and in September Iraq launched an offensive into Iran. Its objective was to eliminate Iranian influence and to regain full control of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, Iraq’s primary access to the Persian Gulf, which had been partially conceded to Iran as part of the 1975 treaty. This offense quickly stalled, however, and Iran mounted a counterattack, pushing the Iraqi Army back across

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the border by 1982.228 Once fighting on its home soil, the Iraqi Army regained its footing and the conflict stagnated into a war of attrition until 1987, when the Iranian Army overextended itself in its failed attempt to take Basra. Iraq retook the offensive into Iranian territory and with that Iran finally accepted a UN Security Council ceasefire in 1988.229

The war cost Iraq dearly, as oil production fell precipitously while military costs escalated. In the mid-80s, in order to pay for the war and expand the military Saddam obtained Saudi and Kuwaiti financing and, in a remarkable Cold War achievement, procured equipment from the Soviet Union along with military support and aid from the United States.230

Except for a larger military, Saddam emerged in 1988 with little to show for eight years of fighting. Iraq still did not control the Shatt Al-Arab and, with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at half of its prewar level, its economy had been devastated.231 Whereas the Iraqi government relied upon oil exports for 95% of its revenue in 1980, Iranian attacks had since cut crude production by 60%. Iraq then completed a pipeline to

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Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s and steadily increased oil production until it reached prewar levels by the end of the conflict in 1988. Unfortunately for Iraq, the increase was then more than offset by tumbling world crude prices. By this point, Iraq had not only depleted its $35 billion in reserves, but also incurred over $50 billion in foreign debt, half of which was owed to the Saudis and Kuwaitis. By 1989, oil revenue covered only half of Iraqi’s $23 billion in annual expenditures, of which $5 billion alone went towards debt payments.

To solve these economic problems Saddam turned against Kuwait. He claimed, with some justification, that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate were responsible for depressed oil prices, as they were producing well above their OPEC quotas and he increased diplomatic pressure to curtail their production. Saddam also rationalized that Iraq’s war with Iran was fought for the benefit of all Arab states and, therefore, Saudi and Kuwaiti loans were rightly to be considered as contributions to the effort. Finally, Saddam attempted to obtain access to the Persian Gulf by forcing the settlement of a border dispute with Kuwait. Were Kuwait to cede the Warbah and Bubiyan islands, Iraq would be able to secure the port at Umm Qasr (see Figure 4.1). Kuwait chose to ignore all of these demands and, in late July of 1990, Iraq deployed Republican Guard

armored divisions to the Kuaiti border.\textsuperscript{238} Following a brief meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait on August 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1990.\textsuperscript{239}

![Figure 4.1: Iraqi Access to the Persian Gulf along the Kuaiti Border\textsuperscript{240}](image)

**THE GULF WAR, 2 AUGUST 1990 – 28 FEBRUARY 1991\textsuperscript{241}**

**U.S. INTERESTS IN KUWAIT**

Iraq’s invasion of Kuait triggered a crisis for the United States, which considered three of its interests to be at risk. First, Iraq’s actions destabilized global oil prices which directly impacted the U.S. economy. Saddam now controlled a third of Middle Eastern oil production and approximately 20% of world proven oil reserves.\textsuperscript{242} An already weak U.S. economy suffered increasingly as crude prices doubled in August.

\textsuperscript{238} Ibrahim, Youssef M “OPEC Meets Today: Talks Are Clouded by Iraq’s Threat to Kuait” \textit{New York Times} 25 July 1990
\textsuperscript{241} The International Crisis Behavior Project, “Gulf War, Case 339” http://www.cidem.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 29 January 2009
of 1990. Second, the invasion threatened the ongoing Middle East peace process as Sudan attempted to link the crisis with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Third, the United States was concerned with the overall impact to international stability if Iraq’s aggression were to go unchecked. A failure on the part of the U.S. to respond forcibly could have undermined U.S. resolve and threatened the “new world order” in its very infancy.

I divide this crisis into three stages and provide a synopsis of the key explanatory and dependent variables in Table 4.1. In the first stage, from 2 August to 19 October 1990, the United States adopted a strategy of economic sanctions to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The U.S. also deployed military forces to defend Saudi Arabia and deter Iraq from further aggression.

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<td><strong>Punishment</strong> - Economic Sanctions - Air strikes on Iraqi infrastructure and leadership <strong>Denial</strong> - Air strikes on Iraqi military - preparation for ground invasion</td>
<td><strong>Success</strong> Iraq agrees to withdraw from Kuwait within 21 days</td>
<td><strong>Success</strong> Iraq Forces withdraw from Kuwait following U.S. ground invasion <strong>Partial Success</strong> U.S. coalition ejects Iraqi Army from Kuwait but U.S. unable to close off retreat and Iraqi Army retains half its heavy weapons</td>
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Table 4.1: Coercion Typology of Gulf War, 2 Aug 1990 – 28 Feb 1991

In the second stage, from 20 October 1990 to 15 January 1991, the U.S. continued sanctions but the Bush administration began distancing itself from a coercion strategy, instead deploying ground forces to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and destroy the
armored divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. In the third stage, from 16 January - 28 February 1991 the U.S. conducted a five-week-long air campaign followed by a ground invasion with the objective of liberating Kuwait and severely weakening Iraq’s military power.

THE FIRST STAGE: 2 AUG – 19 OCT 1990, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DETERRENCE

The United States responded to the invasion by quickly pushing through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 which condemned the invasion and made the compellent, extra-territorial demand “…that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.” The U.S. adopted a non-military punishment strategy of economic sanctions. These sanctions against Iraq were further adopted by all UN states according to UNSCR 661, which froze Iraqi financial assets and imposed a trade and arms embargo. The U.S. ruled out a strategy of accommodation with these actions and with these words from President Bush: “…if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.” The United States also issued a deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Saudi Arabia and with the deployment of military forces to Saudi Arabia, signaled that it would back this demand.

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http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement
accessed 26 February 2009

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement
accessed 28 January, 2009

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Bush claimed that U.S. forces would "... not initiate hostilities, but they [would] defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf." 249

At this early stage, the United States had insufficient forces in the region to credibly adopt either a coercive military or a brute force strategy to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Also, the more general concern over stability in the emerging post-Cold War world led the United States to work through the UN Security Council. 250 As a result, even if the U.S. had desired to adopt a brute force strategy, which it initially did not, it did not have the support of the Soviet Union, France and China to garner a resolution authorizing force.

IRAQ'S RESPONSE AND THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Saddam rejected an unconditional withdrawal, and, in reply announced the annexation of Kuwait. On the 12th of August, he further insisted that any settlement of the crisis be linked to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. 251 In order to reduce the number of fronts and free up additional troops to defend Kuwait, Saddam settled the Iran-Iraq stalemate by agreeing to return to the terms of the 1975 treaty.

The impact of the UN trade embargo was immediately felt as imports were cut by 90% and exports by 97%. As a result Iraq began rationing in early September. 252 Iraq indeed seemed the perfect target for sanctions as it imported nearly 70 percent of its food

and U.S. estimates had Iraq at a two- to three-month supply of wheat, rice and corn.\textsuperscript{253} In addition, Iraqi oil was particularly vulnerable to embargo as its crude flowed primarily through pipelines into Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

However, economic distress on the part of the Iraqi population did not translate into sufficient pressure to convince Saddam to withdraw his army from Kuwait. Having ordered chemical weapon attacks on Kurdish villages in the past, Saddam was not moved by civilian suffering and would not change his policies at the first sign of misery. In addition the sanctions had minimal impact on the Iraqi Army. Having already achieved the objective of seizing Kuwait, it was now positioned in a static defense which required minimal logistical support. Therefore, while Saddam acknowledged the plight of the Iraqi people, he remained defiant.\textsuperscript{254}

On the 5\textsuperscript{th} of October, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent envoy Yevgeny Primakov to Baghdad to convey that only a withdrawal would avoid military confrontation.\textsuperscript{255} Saddam confided to Primakov, “…now that I have given up all the results of the eight-year war with Iran and returned everything to prewar conditions, the Iraqi people will not forgive me for unconditional withdrawal of our troops from Kuwait.”\textsuperscript{256} Primakov then traveled to Washington on the 19\textsuperscript{th} of October and presented

a gloomy assessment, casting doubts that sanctions alone would convince Saddam to alter his course.\textsuperscript{257}

**ANALYSIS OF STAGE I: 2 AUGUST – 19 OCTOBER 1990**

The invasion of Kuwait triggered a crisis for the United States. While it had just emerged victorious from the Cold War with an abundance of military power available to compel an Iraqi withdrawal, it would take time and resources to deploy sufficient military force to the region to demonstrate a credible offensive capability. In the interim, the only viable foreign policies were those of accommodation or a non-military coercive strategy of economic sanctions. Accommodation was dismissed as only encouraging further Iraqi aggression and weakening U.S. credibility to deter other states from taking similar actions in the future.

The unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the core demand on which the U.S. refused to compromise, but economic sanctions were not a sufficient threat to compel Iraq. Sanctions, however, were not implemented out of miscalculation on the part of the United States. While the U.S. would have preferred the sanctions to work, it could not rely solely on this non-military solution. Sanctions did, however, punish Iraq and serve as a stop-gap measure while hundreds of thousands of U.S. and coalition forces poured into the Persian Gulf to “defend” Saudi Arabia and U.S. military planners busily planned an offensive campaign. This first stage ended as soon as the U.S. was in a position to elevate the threat and adopt a credible military strategy to force Iraq out of Kuwait.


On 11 October the Pentagon briefed President Bush on an offensive option to invade Kuwait. The military estimated it would require an additional 200,000 U.S. troops beyond the 230,000 U.S. and 200,000 international forces already deploying to the Gulf. A deployment order was required by the end of October to have these additional forces in position by mid-January. This forced a decision point for the United States: either it continued with economic sanctions and maintained defensive-only forces in Saudi Arabia or it could ratchet up an offensive military threat. In late October, President Bush chose the latter. Though this new course contained elements of both punishment and denial strategies, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, declared it a primarily brute force strategy as the force build-up was designed to achieve a decisive military victory.

Bush announced the troop buildup following the November mid-term elections. The doubling of force was intended to signal the credibility of an offensive military threat. However, the strength of U.S. resolve was diluted by an outcry from Congress. Unlike sanctions and the defense of Saudi Arabia, both of which had received broad

259 Two technical concerns made the end of October decision necessary. First the Defense Department had activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to deploy the troops. If the military released control of these aircraft back to the airlines once the deployment of troops was complete at the end of October, it would then be difficult to deploy an additional 200,000 troops later. Second military estimates were that a ground war needed to commence no later than March in order to avoid the searing summer heat of the Kuwait desert. “Table 14: Threater CENTCOM personnel at weekly intervals” Gulf War Airpower Survey, volume V (1993) Government Printing Office: Washington 51, “Table 15: CENTTAF Strike aircraft Strength by Week”, Gordon, Michael (26 October 1990) “Mideast Tensions; U.S. Decides To Add As Many As 100,000 To Its Gulf Forces” New York Times
261 “Mideast Tensions; Excepts From Gulf Testimony” New York Times 4 December 1990
support, many in Congress disagreed with any offensive military option and instead counseled the White House to have more patience to allow sanctions to work.\textsuperscript{263} Polling also indicated that the American public preferred a diplomatic to a military solution.\textsuperscript{264} To counter this dissent, the President met with bipartisan leadership and top Bush administration officials testified on the necessity of military action before congressional committees.\textsuperscript{265}

International support to expel Iraq from Kuwait proved easier to obtain. On 29 November, the Security Counsel passed Resolution 678, setting a deadline of 15 January 1991 for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal and authorizing the coalition to take whatever means necessary to enforce Iraq’s compliance.\textsuperscript{266} President Bush, realizing that further diplomatic effort would be needed to gain congressional support, offered to conduct direct talks with Iraq.\textsuperscript{267} These negotiations only fizzled into a brief, unproductive meeting, however, between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Secretary Baker on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of January.\textsuperscript{268} Though the effort did not produce a peaceful settlement, it did solidify sufficient domestic support for Bush as both the House and the Senate authorized the use of force only three days later.\textsuperscript{269}

\textsuperscript{263} Gordon, Michael R (12 November 1990) “Mideast Tensions; Nunn, Citing ‘Rush’ to War, Assails Decision to Drop Troop Rotation Plan” \textit{New York Times}

\textsuperscript{264} Dowd, Maureen (20 November 1990) “Mideast Tensions; Americans More Wary of Gulf Policy, Poll Finds” \textit{New York Times}


\textsuperscript{269} Clymer, Adam (13 January 1991) “Confrontation in the Gulf; Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf; Margins are 5 votes in Senate, 67 in House” \textit{New York Times}
IRAQ'S RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE

Iraq responded to this new threat in three ways. First, Iraq fortified its defenses in Kuwait and mobilized an additional quarter of a million reserve troops. Second, in an ill-fated attempt to garner international support, Iraq incrementally released hostages in a series of high-profile visits by dignitaries and international celebrities. Third, Saddam attempted to drive a wedge between the coalition’s Arab and Western states by repeatedly calling for a linkage between Kuwait and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This effort gained some footing within the Arab community following the 8 October confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli defense forces at Haram al-Sharif which left 21 Palestinians dead.

A November interview provided useful insight into Saddam’s perception of the crisis. First, he noted that the decision to go to war was not his to make. He understood the asymmetric dynamics of the conflict and realized that it was the powerful U.S. which would make this decision. Iraq’s only choice was to resist or to concede to U.S. demands. Second, Saddam correctly observed that the U.S. had added the objective of weakening Iraq’s military power. Britain’s Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had expressed this intention to Primakov in October. Bush, however, in order to gain and retain domestic and international support, did not make explicit the U.S. desire to destroy

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the Republican Guard, though it was a primary objective of the offensive campaign he had approved.273 Regardless of whether Saddam was completely candid or not, these comments do reveal that he understood the asymmetric nature of the conflict and that, facing the growing offensive capability of the coalition, Iraqi military power was now at stake.

As December wore on, Saddam spoke increasingly pessimistically of the chances for a peaceful settlement, blaming U.S. intransigence, yet vowing that Iraq would never withdraw its troops unconditionally.274 As Iraq prepared for combat, Saddam provided indications of a two-part strategy he had formulated. First, on the 24th of December, Saddam announced that in response to any U.S. strikes, Iraq would target Israel.275 An attack on Israel was intended to elicit an Israeli counterattack which would, in turn, rob the coalition of its Arab support. Second, Saddam predicted that, just as it had lost its resolve in Vietnam, the U.S. would give up fighting once casualties mounted.276 Saddam’s rhetoric grew ever more bellicose as the 15 January deadline approached. He called upon the Arab world for jihad and predicted that Iraq’s high moral character would overcome the U.S. technological advantage.277 For Saddam, the key to success lay not in

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his army’s ability to defeat the U.S. on the battlefield, but in its ability to outlast the U.S. and to inflict more casualties than the U.S. was willing to endure.\textsuperscript{278}

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF STAGE II: 20 OCTOBER 1990 – 15 JANUARY 1991}

The United States’ efforts at coercive diplomacy failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait even after his country had endured 5 months of painful sanctions and now faced a war against a vastly superior coalition force. In the first stage of the crisis, the U.S. had not yet deployed sufficient force to threaten to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. By January of 1991, however, the credibility of an impending attack had risen dramatically. Yet Saddam still resisted. What explains his continual refusal to concede at the risk of not only losing Kuwait, but also much of his military power? And why did the U.S. not compromise to provide Saddam a face-saving opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement?

First, misperception and miscalculation over the balance of power and the willingness of the United States to use force figured heavily into Saddam’s decision to resist. Iraq’s combat experience with Iran, extensive though it was, had not prepared Saddam to face the United States. He, to a greater degree than the U.S., underestimated the vulnerability of his army to modern airpower and ground forces. Saddam also deceived himself by habitually punishing those within his regime who brought him “bad”

\textsuperscript{278} He graphically detailed how U.S. troops would swim in their blood and become food for the desert birds Baghdad Domestic Service (10 January 1991) “Saddam: U.S. To Swim ‘in Blood’ if War Starts” FBIS-NES-91-007
news. As a result, he misperceived how hollow his forces had become and the degree of technological advantage enjoyed by the U.S.. 279

Second, Saddam’s dominant and perpetual concern was his political and personal survival. 280 He had constructed a cult of personality and exhibited the characteristics of Max Weber’s charismatic leader. As such, his power rested in his followers’ continued belief in his “supernatural” leadership. 281 During the Iran-Iraq war Saddam attempted to divert economic hardship away from the Iraqi population by means of foreign loans. The resulting debt was substantial and a driving force behind his decision to invade Kuwait. The subsequent five months of the international trade embargo only exacerbated Iraqi’s dismal economic plight. Unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait would not solve any of these problems and could only further undermine Saddam’s authority. Standing up to the mighty United States, on the other hand, enhanced his standing within Iraq and the Arab world and might present him a political victory, even if it led to military defeat.

A combination of misperception, miscalculation, and political posturing may explain Saddam’s refusal to concede in the face of overwhelming force, but it does not explain the unwillingness of the United States to make compromises of its own. There were three other factors, rather, which contributed to its reluctance to reduce demands to settle the crisis once the U.S. had deployed its forces. First and foremost, a compromise which left the Iraqi military intact would require the long-term deployment of U.S. forces, lest Kuwait and Saudi Arabia be left exposed to future Iraqi aggression. From

both a foreign policy and domestic political perspective this would also be the Bush administration’s nightmare scenario, i.e. to have paid the diplomatic and political costs to obtain both UN and congressional approval for an invasion, to have paid the actual deployment costs of half a million personnel, many of whom had already been in place for six months, only to have Saddam accept the UN demands in the eleventh hour. On the eve of war, the U.S. not only did not want compromise, but was relieved when Saddam proved such a “cooperative” enemy by refusing to concede.

A second reason for not compromising was that of U.S. primacy in the nascent post-Cold War world. Not only had the United States recently emerged as the sole superpower, but it also possessed an abundance of military force in Europe no longer required to deter a crumbling Soviet Union. This was now available to be used in the Persian Gulf. Equally important was the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor any other major state had chosen to balance against the U.S. by aligning with Iraq. As a result, the U.S. enjoyed an asymmetric advantage in power by January, which translated into a high probability of victory in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait at a relatively low cost.

Third, the U.S. perceived any compromise with Iraq as a threat to broader U.S. interests. Compromise could destabilize the post-Cold War world order by reducing U.S. credibility to deter other states from taking similar aggressive actions. Consequently, the U.S. was unwilling to make any concessions which would appear to reward Iraq’s actions. In addition, Saddam’s insistence upon linking any settlement to the broader Middle East peace process only increased the expected costs for the U.S. in procuring an agreement and lessened the likelihood of a diplomatic solution ever convincing Iraq to leave Kuwait.

All told, these three factors created an expected outcome of war which exceeded that of any peaceful settlement to which Saddam might have agreed.

**THE THIRD STAGE: 17 JANUARY – 28 FEBRUARY 1991**

Once coercive diplomacy had failed to convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States commenced air strikes in the early hours of 17 January 1991. The initial focus of the U.S. was on gaining air superiority and directly targeting Saddam and other strategic targets in and near Baghdad. Within three days, however, the majority of strikes shifted toward the Republican Guard and the regular Iraqi units deployed to the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) (see Figure 4.2).

![Figure 4.2: Iraqi Force Deployment in Kuwait](image)

> The map shows the deployment of Iraqi divisions. XX above a rectangle indicates a division. A large X within the rectangle indicates an infantry unit, a racetrack symbol to represent the tread of a tank indicates
By mid-February the air campaign and the impending ground invasion had finally convinced Saddam to concede to the unconditional withdrawal in an effort to preserve his army. In order to avoid a Soviet-brokered peace deal which would leave Iraq with much of its military power in tact, however, the U.S. was no longer interested in this concession alone. Instead it issued an ultimatum which, if accepted, would have forced the Iraqi Army to abandon much of its heavy equipment in Kuwait. Indeed a prime objective of the U.S. military strategy was to weaken Saddam’s power by destroying his Republican Guard. Though the USAF had designed a strategic air campaign to target Saddam and his Baath party in Baghdad, the overwhelming majority of air missions were allocated to fix, attrit, and sever avenues of retreat from the KTO until the U.S. Army’s mighty left hook could engage and annihilate the Republican Guard.284

In this section I examine the events leading to Saddam’s decision to withdraw and I consider punishment and denial as the competing coercive levers which caused this reversal. By comparing the timing and the level of the U.S. military effort, I conclude that the U.S. denied Saddam both the hope that both his strategy would succeed and the means of defending Kuwait. It was fear of the destruction of his army which caused him to accept the Soviet proposal to concede Kuwait in order to save his army. I do not suggest, however, that the U.S. actually adopted a coercive denial strategy. The U.S. was, rather, applying a brute force strategy to eject the Iraqi Army from the KTO and to


destroy the armored divisions of the Republican Guard. The consequence of executing this brute force strategy, however, placed coercive military pressure on Iraq to concede to UN demands, despite the fact that the U.S. no longer intended to accept such concessions.

My purpose here is not to provide a detailed analysis of military operations but to examine how and when the U.S. employed its military power and to compare these actions to those of Iraq.\textsuperscript{285} The war can be divided into six week-long periods, commencing with air strikes on the 17\textsuperscript{th} of January and ending with a unilateral U.S. ceasefire on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of February.

\textbf{WEEK ONE, 17-23 JANUARY: AIR SUPERIORITY AND STRATEGIC ATTACK}

The initial phase of the air campaign prioritized two U.S. military objectives: gaining and maintaining air superiority and attacking Iraqi political/military leadership and command and control.\textsuperscript{286} The U.S. quickly achieved air superiority and by the end of the week, the Iraqi Air Force ceased to offer any resistance.\textsuperscript{287} In addition, air strikes degraded Iraq’s integrated air defense system.\textsuperscript{288} The cost to the coalition for achieving


\textsuperscript{287} During this period the coalition achieved 16 of its 33 fixed wing air-to-air kills and for the remainder of the conflict the majority of Iraqi sorties were one way missions to Iran, where those aircraft lucky enough to avoid coalition fighters remain still. Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A Keaney (1993) “Figure 10: Iraqi Flight Activity versus Coalition Kills” \textit{Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary} Washington: US Government Printing Office 59

\textsuperscript{288} This can be in part measured by the effectiveness of Iraq’s radar guided surface to air missiles (SAMs). Initially radar SAMs had an impact hitting 9 of the 33 aircraft downed or damaged during the first week of the war. By contrast for the remainder of the war only 5 of the 53 aircraft damaged or lost were credited to radar SAMs. This degradation was in part due to the efforts of U.S. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) campaign as many of the Iraqi radar operators refused to guide their missiles, but as important was the adaptation of U.S. tactics along with the shift in operations away from Baghdad’s SAM belt. Cohen, Eliot A and Thomas A Keaney (1993) “Figure 11: Coalition Fixed-Wing Combat Attrition By Cause” \textit{Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary} Washington: US Government Printing Office 61, Cohen, Eliot A and
air superiority was initially significant, with a loss of 17 aircraft in the first three days of
strikes. By mid-week, however, once the U.S. had restricted aircraft operations to
medium altitude and shifted its attacks from Baghdad to the KTO, coalition losses
decreased dramatically, averaging one aircraft loss per day for the remainder of the
war.\textsuperscript{289}

For strategic attacks, the U.S. conducted precision strikes with F-117 stealth
aircraft and conventionally-armed cruise missiles. By the third night of strikes, the U.S.
had already exhausted virtually all Iraqi leadership targets.\textsuperscript{290} Rather than punish Saddam
until he conceded, however, the purpose of this decapitation strategy was to degrade his
ability to command and control the Iraqi military.\textsuperscript{291}

Iraq responded to the strikes in three ways. First, it launched ballistic Scud
missiles at Israel in an attempt to split the coalition by drawing the Israelis into the
conflict.\textsuperscript{292} This provocation placed enormous pressure on Israel’s leadership to respond
in kind and required a good deal of diplomatic effort on the part of the United States to
dissuade Israel from retaliating.\textsuperscript{293} Second, Iraq reacted to strikes on its Air Force by
hiding its aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters and even flying some to Iran. Third, once
the war was under way, Iraq did not bow to the pressure to seek a ceasefire and on 21 January publicly rebuffed such an overture made by the Soviets.294

WEEK TWO, 24-31 JANUARY: THE KTO AND AL KHAFJI

By week two, the focus of the air campaign had shifted to the south, the most important change being the increased emphasis on attacking Iraq’s ground forces. The Iraqi Army deployed to the KTO 42 divisions, 8 of which were elite Republican Guard units. They totaled 336,000 troops, 3,200 tanks and 2,400 artillery pieces.295 In the first week the coalition conducted 938 strikes, primarily with U.S. A-10s, B-52s, F-16s and F-18s. These strikes tripled to 2,798 by week two and attacks on the Republican Guard rose 16-fold from 53 to 805.296

Saddam’s strategy to draw Israel into the conflict and to inflict a large number of U.S. casualties in a bloody ground war was not working. Israel had yet to retaliate to over a dozen Scud launches and the U.S. appeared content with an extended air campaign to severely attrit Iraqi forces prior to any ground operation.297

Saddam was ready for the ground campaign to begin and for U.S. casualty rates to rise. He met with his commanders in Basra on the 27th of January and ordered an Iraqi

294 Baghdad Domestic Service (21 Jan 91) “Gorbachev Letter Proposes Withdrawal from Kuwait” FBIS-NES-91-014 22 Jan 91, Baghdad INA (21 Jan 91) “Text of Saddam’s Reply” FBIS-NES-91-014 22 Jan 91
offensive. Soon thereafter, three Iraqi divisions massed along the Kuwait-Saudi border, sending lead units to cross and occupy the Saudi coastal town of Al Khafji on the evening of 29 January. Saddam considered this invasion of Saudi Arabia a major success. The Iraqi forces, however, held Al Khafji for only a day and a half until Saudi and U.S. Marine ground units dislodged them on the morning of the 31st. The larger story was the inability of the Iraqis to maneuver and maintain the offensive as coalition aircraft mounted nearly 300 sorties against the exposed Iraqi armor as its columns moving to the south. Its columns stalled and the offensive collapsed.

**WEEKS THREE AND FOUR (1 FEB – 14 FEB): KTO AND AL FIRDOS**

In weeks three and four, the coalition continued to prioritize the Iraqi Army. The number of strikes rose to 3,512 in week three and 3,972 in week four. In addition the effectiveness of strikes increased as the coalition made two adjustments to its tactics, relaxing altitude restrictions on strike aircraft such as A-10s to improve their lethality and employing infrared targeting pods and laser-guided bombs against Iraqi tanks.

Though attacks against leadership targets fell sharply following the first three nights of strikes, in week four air planners returned to attack lower priority bunkers in Baghdad not yet targeted. On the 13th of February the coalition hit the Al Firdos

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district bunker in downtown Baghdad. The attack killed several hundred civilians, capturing international attention and forcing the U.S. to cancel strikes on Baghdad for two weeks.

While Iraq stood defiant for the first three weeks, by week four Saddam began to show signs of weakening his position. On the 11th of February Iraq announced its willingness to consider a ceasefire. That same day, the Soviet envoy Primakov arrived in Baghdad to discuss conditions for such a ceasefire. Primakov was initially encouraged as Saddam sent a message to Gorbachev which for the first time dispensed with linking a withdrawal to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His hopes were soon frustrated, however, as Saddam only agreed to send his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to Moscow for further talks. The peace terms Saddam then issued on the 15th of February were more demanding than his 12 August proposal.

The U.S. dismissed Saddam’s proposal but worried that the Soviet efforts might yet succeed in bringing Iraq to agree to withdraw from Kuwait, a development the U.S. would find difficult to refuse.


In week five, coalition air strikes in the KTO reached their apex at over 4,000 sorties flown, accounting for 85% of all missions. In preparation for the ground

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305 Cairo Domestic Service (11 Feb 91) “Soviet Envoy Arrives in Baghdad 11 Feb” FBIS-NES-91-029 12 Feb 91
offensive, strikes were increasingly aimed at Iraq’s front line units. U.S. Central Command Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf set a goal for coalition airpower to attrit 50% of Iraqi armor by the 24th of February, the date set for the invasion.

SOVIET FINAL ATTEMPT AT BROKERING A PEACE AGREEMENT

On 18 February Tariq Aziz arrived in Moscow to speak with President Gorbachev. Gorbachev informed him that the Soviet Union would immediately call for a Security Council session to seek a cease-fire if Iraq declared its readiness to set a timeline for a troop withdrawal. Aziz took this information to Baghdad and returned to Moscow on the 21st prepared to finalize a peace proposal.

By the morning of the 22nd, Gorbachev and Aziz had reached an agreement on a six-point proposal. In it, “...Iraq agree[d] to implement Resolution 660, that is to withdraw all of its troops immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait to the positions they occupied on 1 August 1990.” The timetable would have all Iraqi forces out of Kuwait City within 4 days and out of all of Kuwait within 21 days. However, Aziz also insisted on the following caveat: “...immediately upon completion of troop

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309 Schwarzkopf, Norman and Peter Petre (1992) It Doesn’t Take a Hero New York: Bantam 506
311 Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) Memoirs New York: Doubleday 561. The six points of the peace plan “1. Iraq agrees to carry out Resolution 660 of the United Nations Security Council, that is, to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait to positions they occupied on Aug. 1, 1990. 2. The troop withdrawal will start the day after a cease-fire encompassing all military operations on land, sea and in the air. 3. The troop withdrawal will be completed within 21 days, including a pullout from Kuwait City within the first 4 days. 4. Once the withdrawal has been completed, all UN Security Council resolutions will no longer be valid because the reasons for them will have been removed. 5. All prisoners of war will be freed and repatriated within three days after a cease-fire and the end of military operations. 6. Control and monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops will be carried out by observers or peacekeeping forces as determined by the Security Council”, “War in the Gulf: Moscow’s Statement; Transcript of Comments on Soviet Peace Proposal” New York Times 23 Feb 1991
withdrawal from Kuwait, the reasons for the passage of the other Security Council
resolutions will no longer exist, so said resolutions shall cease to be effective."\textsuperscript{313} The
proposal was transmitted to Baghdad and, in the early hours of 23 February, Saddam
accepted the terms.\textsuperscript{314}

As these events transpired, Gorbachev kept Bush informed of the progress being
made and let him know that the peace proposal was being formalized and sent to
Baghdad.\textsuperscript{315} The Bush administration, however, rejected two conditions of the proposal:
the removal of the 12 UN resolutions and the extended timetable for withdrawal, which
would allow the Iraqi Army to depart from Kuwait with all its heavy weapons which had
survived the airstrikes.\textsuperscript{316} On 22 February, the day before Saddam approved the proposal,
Bush pre-empted the Soviet negotiations by issuing a new ultimatum: a coalition
ceasefire would be contingent on Iraq’s commencement of a withdrawal by noon the next
day, 23 February, to be out of all of Kuwait in 48 hours. In addition, Saddam would have
to make a public statement agreeing to these terms.\textsuperscript{317} This new deadline was intended to
humiliate Saddam and to force the Iraqi Army to abandon a significant portion of its
equipment in Kuwait.

\textsuperscript{313} Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) \textit{Memoirs} New York: Doubleday 562
\textsuperscript{314} Primakov, Yevgeny (2004) \textit{Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium} New Haven: Yale
University Press 70, Gorbachev, Mikhail (1995) \textit{Memoirs} New York: Doubleday 562, Schmemann, Serge
(22 Feb 1991) “War in the Gulf: Diplomacy; Soviets Say Iraq Accepts Kuwait Pullout Linked to Truce and
an End to Sanctions; Bush Rejects Conditions: War is to go on” \textit{New York Times}, “War in the Gulf: Soviet
Statement; Moscow’s Statement on the Iraqis’ Response” \textit{New York Times} 22 Feb 1991
\textsuperscript{315} “War in the Gulf: U.S. Statement; Transcript of White House Statement and News Conference on
\textsuperscript{316} Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998) \textit{A World Transformed} Alfred A. Knopf: New York 474-476,
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THE U.S. GROUND INVASION

In the early hours of 24 February, or G-day, the coalition commenced its ground invasion. U.S. Marines broached the Iraqi forward defenses along the Kuwaiti southeast border and met with little resistance as they raced through a second line of defense by nightfall (see Figure 4.3).\footnote{Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals’ War New York: Little, Brown and Company 355-58} On the morning of the 25\textsuperscript{th} the Iraqis mounted a counterattack but were driven back within hours.\footnote{Associated Press (25 Feb 1991) “War in the Gulf: The Marines; 2 Divisions Said to Near Kuwait City” New York Times, Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (1995) The Generals’ War New York: Little, Brown and Company 369.} By that evening Kuwaiti resistance was reporting the departure of Iraqi troops from Kuwait City and, in the early hours of 26 February, Baghdad Radio announced a general withdrawal of all forces from Kuwait.\footnote{Baghdad Domestic Service (25 Feb 91) “Official Spokesman Says ‘Withdrawal Order’ Given” FBIS-NES-91-038 26 Feb 91, Tyler, Patrick (26 Feb 1991) “War in the Gulf: The Overview; Iraq Orders Troops to leave Kuwait but U.S. Pursues Battlefield Gains” New York Times}

The coalition’s ground plan had been for the Marine advance to be followed by a U.S. Army 7\textsuperscript{th} Corps attack on the Republican Guard’s exposed western flank while the 18\textsuperscript{th} Corps drove deep into Iraq toward Tallil to cut lines of communication with
Baghdad. All of this, however, was contingent on the Iraqi Army standing and fighting. Its retreat instead became a race to see how much of his army Saddam could salvage before escape routes could be sealed off. At 8:00 a.m. on 28 February, the U.S. formally declared a ceasefire and, though the coalition never completed its encirclement, it did destroy or capture 75% of the tanks, 54% of the Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and 89% of the artillery pieces of the Iraqi Army in the KTO.\(^\text{323}\)

![Figure 4.3: Timing of Coalition Ground Invasion, 24 Feb 1991](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/timing_of_attack.jpg)


The reduction of Iraq’s overall military power, though not total, was significant and greatly degraded Iraq’s ability to project power across its borders. Iraq’s army had been reduced from 955,000 to 350,000 troops, from 5,500 to 2,300 tanks, from 159 to 120 armed helicopters, and from 3,000 to 1,000 artillery pieces. In addition, the Republican Guard had contracted by nearly half, from 12 to 7 divisions and the Iraqi Air Force had gone from 689 to 439 combat aircraft.  

IRAQI DIPLOMACY

The rapid succession of events in the ground campaign was accompanied by a flurry of diplomatic activity in an attempt to bring about a ceasefire. After issuing its withdrawal order on the 26th of February, Iraq informed the Soviets, who then, as promised called an emergency UN Security Council meeting to discuss a ceasefire. In response, the U.S. announced its conditions for a ceasefire. They called for Iraq to agree to abide by all 12 of the Security Council Resolutions and for Saddam to publicly renounce the annexation of Kuwait and to accept responsibility for reparations.

The following day, Aziz wrote a letter to the Security Council, in which Iraq agreed to renounce the annexation of Kuwait and to pay war reparations, but only if it were absolved from the remaining resolutions. When the U.S. and Security Council

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rejected the offer, Aziz produced a second letter to relay that Iraq would abide by all resolutions.\textsuperscript{328}

All of these efforts, however, were quickly overcome by events. The Bush administration believed, incorrectly, that an Iraqi retreat had been cut off by U.S. forces. Prompted further by the negative press generated from images of the carnage along the "highway of death" leading from Kuwait City to Basra, the U.S. moved unilaterally to declare a ceasefire on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of February. General Schwarzkopf and Iraqi military leaders then met on 3 March 1991 to finalize the peace agreement and brought the war to an end.\textsuperscript{329}

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF STAGE III: 17 JANUARY – 28 FEBRUARY 1991}

It was a combination of factors which finally convinced Saddam to soften his position. A month of intense air strikes left the Iraqi Army demoralized and ineffective, the Iraqi offensive at Al Khafji failed to draw the coalition into an early ground campaign, and Scud attacks on Israel failed to split the coalition. Finally realizing the United States’ high probability of victory and low costs in terms of casualties, Saddam was pressed to concede to its core demand: the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

An alternative interpretation of events maintains Saddam was never coerced into withdrawing forces prior to the ground invasion. This argument is made on the basis of four claims: there is no evidence that Saddam would have abided by the terms of the Soviet six-point peace plan to which he agreed on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of February; even in the Soviet

\textsuperscript{328} "War in the Gulf: Diplomacy; Texts of Iraqi Letters" \textit{New York Times} 28 February 1991

peace plan Saddam never agreed to an unconditional withdrawal; Saddam rejected the United States’ 48-hour ultimatum to withdraw; and finally, the United States had long abandoned a coercive strategy, did not desire Iraqi concession to the UN resolution for unconditional withdrawal, and took measures to frustrate the Soviet efforts.

To address this argument I address each claim in turn. First, as to whether Saddam would have abided by the Soviet peace plan to begin withdrawing his forces within 24 hours of a ceasefire, to be out of Kuwait City in 4 days and out of Kuwait in 21 days the only evidence we have is Saddam’s word. It would have benefited him little, however, to later renege on his promise and would have proven politically costly. At the most, Iraq could have gained a day or two of relief from air strikes during the ceasefire before the U.S. recommenced strikes. The cost for such a temporary ceasefire would have been the further alienation of the Soviet Union, the lone major power and only permanent member of the Security Council somewhat sympathetic to Iraq’s plight.

Second is the claim that Iraq never agreed to an unconditional withdrawal as evidenced by a clause in the Soviet plan, insisted on by Tariq Aziz which stipulated that, upon the Iraqi troop withdrawal, the remaining UN resolutions would no longer be in effect. This, the U.S. insisted, was clearly Iraq imposing conditions, a move which Bush firmly rejected.

While it is true that Aziz did attach these conditions for a voluntary Iraqi withdrawal, the core U.S. demand that Iraq remove all its forces from Kuwait was conceded. Further, any suspension of the UN resolutions would take place only following the withdrawal. And finally, Aziz’s conditions did not address any of the issues which Iraq had used to justify the invasion in the first place: Kuwaiti
unwillingness to forgive Iraq's war debts, Kuwaiti unwillingness to concede to Iraq the Warbah and Bubiyan islands to secure the port at Umm Qasr, and Kuwaiti oil production over OPEC quotas. In fact, the conditions announced by Saddam on 12 August 1990 were even more extensive than these, but the Soviet peace proposal made no reference to any of these issues nor did it link a withdrawal to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I therefore conclude that though Iraq did not concede unconditionally to a withdrawal, the Soviet peace plan was a concession to the core U.S. demand of the withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Third, as to Saddam's dismissing the U.S. ultimatum, it was clear at the time to both Saddam and the U.S. that the 48-hour timeline was more than the extra-territorial demand to vacate Kuwait, but was in effect a demand that the Iraqi Army withdraw from Kuwait in defeat, in a hasty retreat which would force it to abandon a large portion of its heavy weaponry.

The final point claims that Saddam was not coerced because the United States had abandoned its coercive strategy at the commencement of hostilities and no longer desired that Saddam agree to the UN resolutions. This was the position the United States held on the eve of war in mid-January and clearly in late February the U.S. accelerated its ground invasion in part to avoid any agreement taking place. Still, from the Iraqi perspective it was impossible to differentiate a coercive denial strategy from a brute force strategy ex ante and the increase in U.S. demands did not preclude Iraq from conceding to the original UN resolution. While the U.S. could not prevent Saddam from agreeing to the Soviet peace plan, it was, in turn, not prevented from refusing to accept the plan and adding the demand that the Iraqi Army vacate Kuwait in 48 hours.
The weakening of Iraq’s military power became an objective as soon as the United States was in a position to pursue it. Once President Bush approved military plans and ordered the deployment of forces in October 1990, his administration’s efforts were aimed at securing international and domestic support for a military offensive. By mid-January, having undertaken the arduous and costly task of deploying over four hundred thousand troops and having expended an enormous amount of diplomatic and political capital to obtain the UN resolution and the congressional vote, the U.S. had no interest in any compromise which left Iraq’s military intact.

The U.S. position hardened further as the air campaign progressed. Aircraft losses remained low and the Iraqi Army proved quite vulnerable to airpower. By the 24th of February the United States’ expected outcome for the ground invasion exceeded that of the Soviet peace proposal. It would almost certainly liberate Kuwait and severely weaken Saddam’s military power.

In sum, the United States achieved the majority of its foreign policy objectives in the Gulf War. The core demand was for the removal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. In addition, Iraqi military power was significantly degraded, rendering Iraq less threatening to the region. However, the destruction of the Iraqi Army, in particular the Republican Guard, was not fully realized. This left Saddam with a sufficient number of loyal forces to remain in power and they proved instrumental in subduing a significant uprising by the Shia in the south and in pursuing the Kurds in the north.
ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME

In this section I assess the predictions from two hypotheses for coercion failure, survival and commitment, presented in Table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War Aug 90-Feb 91</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Iraqi Army from Kuwait</td>
<td>Predicts Success</td>
<td>Predicts Failure</td>
<td>Coercion Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait not required for Iraqi state survival and Saddam can withdraw and claim victory for standing up to U.S.</td>
<td>Deployed forces and demonstrated U.S. military power and resolve makes credible military threat if U.S. makes further demands (which it does)</td>
<td>Saddam agrees to Soviet proposal to withdraw Iraqi Army from Kuwait in 21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army abandon heavy weapons in a 48-hour withdraw from Kuwait</td>
<td>Predicts Failure</td>
<td>Humiliating withdrawal if Iraqi Army forced into a hasty retreat. Sign of Saddam’s weakness which threatens his regime</td>
<td>Predicts Failure</td>
<td>Coercion Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployed forces and demonstrated U.S. power and resolve makes credible military threat if U.S. makes further demands for Iraqi homeland territory or regime change</td>
<td>Saddam refuses to accept U.S. 48 hour ultimatum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Predictions of Coercion Outcome

TESTING HYPOTHESIS ON SURVIVAL

The survival hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when a powerful challenger’s demand directly threatens the survival of a weaker target, an issue which the target is not likely to peacefully cede while it maintains the means to resist. This hypothesis suggests that, for rational actors, if a challenger makes an optimal demand and signals a credible threat then the target will likely acquiesce so long as concessions do not threaten the survival of the target. I will test the survival hypothesis at three levels: the
state, the regime, and the regime leader. If demands threaten neither state, nor regime, nor leader survival then the hypothesis predicts coercion will likely be successful. If, however, concessions will likely result in either target state death or the removal of the regime or regime’s leader from power, then the target will resist so long as it has the means to do so. In this Gulf War case this requires making predictions for the two compellent demands: the Soviet withdrawal proposal and the Bush 48-hour withdrawal ultimatum. The survival hypothesis performs well, correctly predicting Saddam Hussein would accede to the Soviets’ proposed withdrawal from Kuwait. It also predicts that Saddam could not accept the humiliation of conceding to Bush’s ultimatum, to appear weak not only to the U.S. but, more importantly, to domestic opposition groups.

The Impact to Iraq of the Soviet’s Proposed Withdrawal

The extra-territorial demand for Iraq’s Army to withdraw from Kuwait did not threaten Iraqi state survival. The demand was neither for Iraq to relinquish control of its homeland territory nor to cede control of its population. A concession would, however, adversely affect Iraq’s economic fortunes though not to the point of risking state death.

Iraq’s economic woes had been the primary motivation for the August 1990 invasion. The Iran-Iraq war had reduced Iraq’s oil production and raised its debt. By the end of the war, though Iraq had been able to return its output to prewar levels, the low price of global crude prevented Iraq from generating sufficient revenue to service its war debt and sustain government spending while preserving an acceptable standard of living for the Iraqi population.

While a demand which threatens state survival is also assumed to threaten the regime, the reverse is not necessarily true, though I do regard a compellent demand for regime change as threatening the survival of both the state and the regime. Death of the regime entails removing it from power over the state, not necessarily the actual death of the regime’s leader.
The crisis was thus brought on by this fiscal shortfall which, if left unchecked, would have held long-term implications for Iraq’s economic and military strength. But this did not mean that Iraq’s survival was at risk. Indeed, while the Iran-Iraq war had seriously drained the resources of both states, the regional balance of power had actually tilted in Iraq’s favor. Though the war exhausted Iran’s military strength, Iraq emerged as the most powerful state in the Gulf. And while the decision to invade Kuwait actually worsened Iraq’s economic situation at the introduction of the trade embargo, the sanctions did not lead to the collapse of Iraq’s economy or weaken Saddam’s grasp on power. In fact, sanctions had the perverse effect of actually increasing the population’s dependence on the government after it implemented a rationing system.

Conceding to a withdrawal from Kuwait would have benefited Iraq economically once the sanctions were lifted. Such a decision, however, would have also forfeited the economic potential of the Kuwaiti oil fields and of a secure access to the Gulf, leaving Iraq dependent on the good will of its not-so-friendly neighbors in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran for its oil to reach the world market. Essentially, Iraq would have given up all the objectives for which it had invaded with little to show for it. In the end, though a withdrawal clearly would have been a major concession, it would not have led to Iraq’s demise.

*Impact of the Soviet proposed withdrawal to Saddam Hussein and his regime*

Prior to the commencement of the war on 17 January 1991, a withdrawal of Iraq’s mighty army from Kuwait without so much as a fight would have been humiliating both to Saddam and to his regime. While Saddam had a firm control of his Baath party and
the military, he feared the domestic repercussions of such a move, particularly from Shiite and Kurdish groups, and confided as much to Primakov in October. This fear, coupled with Saddam’s misperception and miscalculation of the probability of victory and the costs of resisting, explain why coercive diplomacy failed in the second stage of the crisis leading up to the 15 January deadline. After five weeks of air strikes, however, Saddam’s calculus had evolved. Now during the third stage, on the eve of the coalition ground invasion, he understood that further resistance would not likely result in Iraq keeping Kuwait and also risked the loss of his army. Yet concession no longer entailed the same level of humiliation as before, as Saddam could now claim that Iraq had defiantly and valiantly withstood America’s airpower. He could withdraw and declare a victory of sorts, having stood up to the might of the West, much as Nasser had done following the Suez crisis.

In sum, since neither Iraq, nor Saddam, nor his regime’s survival was threatened by the Soviet proposal, the survival hypothesis correctly predicts that Saddam would concede to demands to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Impact of Bush’s 48-hour Withdrawal on Iraqi Survival

While the Soviets’ proposed withdrawal did not threaten Iraq’s survival Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum was a different matter altogether. The nationalization of oil production and investment in industrialization and manufacturing in the 1970s had, at least by regional standards, created a strong economy for Iraq. During the 1980s Iraq sacrificed investment in its economy to create a garrison state with a million man army drawn from a population of only 20 million. Iraq’s power now firmly resided in its
military might, specifically its army, which was now threatened with the loss of its heavy weaponry.

Iraq’s military forces were vital to Iraq’s national security, given the regional threat from Iran, along with the global threat now posed by the U.S. coalition. To assess these threats, I evaluate how much military power Iraq stood to lose if it had conceded to Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum as compared to resisting, and whether those expected losses would likely have risked Iraq’s survival. The following analysis provides insight through a counterfactual exercise to estimate the quantity of tanks, APCs, and artillery the Iraqi army would likely have abandoned in a hasty retreat from Kuwait. This estimate is then compared to the actual weapons remaining in Iraqi hands after the war.

On 24 February, after weeks of airstrikes and on the eve of the ground campaign, Iraq had approximately 2,087 tanks, 2,151 APCs and 1,322 artillery pieces operational in the KTO (see Table 4.3). By 1 March the totals had been slashed to 842 tanks, 1,412 APCs, and 279 artillery pieces still in Iraqi control. Iraq deployed 43 divisions to the Kuwaiti theater of operations, just over half of which (23 divisions) were inside Kuwait, while the remainder (including the Republican Guard divisions) were deployed just inside the border of Iraq (see Figure 4.2).

In a worse case scenario for Iraq conceding to the 48-hour ultimatum, assume the Iraqi Army would abandon all of its weapons in Kuwait, which equates to roughly half the equipment within the entire KTO on 24 February, i.e. approximately 1,040 tanks,

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1,075 APCs, and 660 artillery pieces. Assuming the Iraqi Army had been able to get out of Kuwait with even half of its equipment, this would have left Iraq with 1,570 tanks, 1,610 APCs, and 1,000 artillery pieces. Combining these two estimates (third row of Table 4.3) provides an estimated range for the number of weapons the Iraqi Army would likely to have retained under the Bush ultimatum. Comparing this to the actual weapons remaining in Iraqi control after the war (comparing Row 3 and Row 4 in Table 4.3), Iraq would have recovered more military equipment by conceding to the Bush ultimatum. Iraq clearly would have recovered more tanks and artillery pieces and the number of APCs actually recovered falls within the estimated range of APCs recovered by conceding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Tanks (remaining)</th>
<th>APCs (remaining)</th>
<th>Artillery (remaining)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan 1991</td>
<td>KTO</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>2,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Feb 1991</td>
<td>KTO</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>1,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Kuwait</td>
<td>1,040 – 1,570</td>
<td>1,075 – 1,610</td>
<td>660-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(if 100% - 50% abandoned)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1991</td>
<td>In Iraqi Control</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Iraqi Army heavy equipment estimates in Kuwaiti Theater of Operations

332 This is a conservative estimate since the hardest hit units were those within Kuwait, particularly those units along the eastern Saudi border, and the most heavily armored divisions were those of the Republican Guard which took the lightest damage from U.S. air strikes.
333 The estimate of 1,000 artillery pieces is high since the vast majority of these were towed. It is no surprise that the actual number of Iraqi artillery pieces which survived the war was so low given the Iraqi hasty retreat.
334 The high number of Iraq’s APCs, relative to tanks and artillery, which actually made it out of Kuwait during the war makes sense given the APCs greater mobility and the number of troops each vehicle could carry. Even had Saddam conceded to Bush, the number of APCs which would have gotten out of Kuwait would have been at least as many as those that actually got out while under fire.
335 The 16 January and 1 March numbers were produced through imagery assessment. The 24 February numbers for battle damage assessment were estimated by USCENTCOM. Various battle damage assessments of the damage inflicted by airpower prior to the ground invasion range from 20 to 48%. Using the more conservative 20% estimate increases the number of weapons Iraq could recover, but does not affect the outcome of this analysis. Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999) Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction Westport, CT: Praeger 68
Given this assessment, I conclude that Iraq would have retained more of its military capability had it chosen to concede to the Bush 48-hour ultimatum. This does not suggest that this was the type of assessment which Saddam should have been able to make while under fire. Rather, this is simply a comparison of the likely results of concession versus what actually transpired on the ground.

The second question of whether the expected military losses would likely have threatened Iraq’s survival requires additional analysis. In August 1990 the Iraqi Army totaled roughly a million men, 5,500 tanks, 6,000 APCs, and 3,000 artillery pieces. By the time the Iraqi Army regrouped at the end of the Gulf War it was roughly one third its former size in terms of both personnel and equipment (see Table 4.4 below). If Saddam had conceded to the ultimatum and recovered 100% of the weapons remaining in Kuwait, the Iraqi Army would have retained an additional 100,000 men under arms, just under half the size of its former army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>APCs</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 - Prior to Iraqi Invasion</td>
<td>955,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(53 divisions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Feb 1991 – Prior to U.S. Invasion</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 – After Gulf War</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28 divisions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Saddam Conceded and 100% of weapons recovered from Kuwait</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37 divisions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Iraqi Army Before and After Gulf War

The 100,000 additional troops were estimated by assessing the additional equipment which likely would have been retained by conceding to the 48-hour ultimatum with the 100% estimate of Table 3 row 3 and then extrapolating the number of additional divisions this equipment would arm.
By the end of the Gulf War, Iraq's army had shrunk to a third its former size. Had Saddam conceded to Bush's ultimatum and avoided the ground war, Iraq might have retained up to half its forces. But the relevant question is whether either a third or a half of its army was sufficient for Iraq to defend itself against either Iran or the U.S.. Table 4.5, below, compares the size of the Iraqi and Iranian Armies in 1980, prior to the force build-up of the Iran-Iraq war, with their size after the Gulf War in 1991. The Iraqi Army maintained a numerical advantage over Iran throughout this entire period and it is reasonable to assume, based on these force ratios, that the Iraqi Army possessed sufficient military force to defend itself against an Iranian invasion after the Gulf War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iraqi Army Troops</th>
<th>Iraqi Army Tanks</th>
<th>Iranian Army Troops</th>
<th>Iranian Army Tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>955,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Comparison Iranian and Iraqi Army 1980-1991

Turning to the United States, at the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. had in theater over 500,000 ground troops, 2000 modern battle tanks, and 900 strike aircraft, not counting other coalition forces. The U.S. had thus both a numeric and qualitative advantage over the Iraqi Army giving it the capacity to invade Iraq, even if Saddam conceded to Bush's ultimatum. Note that this assessment evaluates the capability, not the will, of the U.S. to overthrow the Iraqi government in March of 1991. Since the U.S. threatened Iraq's state survival should Saddam acquiesce to the 48-hour ultimatum, the

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survival hypothesis predicts Saddam would resist this demand. This even though the probability of the Iraqi Army stopping the U.S. ground invasion on 24 February 1991 was small.

**Impact to Saddam and his regime for conceding to Bush’s Ultimatum**

In the previous section I concluded that Iraq was likely to resist Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum since a concession would have left the Iraqi state vulnerable to invasion. I now evaluate how such a concession would have impacted Saddam and his regime. According to the logic of target survival, a threat to the state likewise threatens both its leader and his regime. But it is also worthwhile to examine the domestic impact of such a concession on both the leader and regime. First, as to Saddam’s survival as leader of his regime, the question is whether a humiliating concession to Bush’s ultimatum would have generated sufficient audience costs from within the Baath party and Iraqi Republican Guard to cause Saddam to be removed by members of his own regime. Audience cost is the result of a principal-agent problem, whereby those within the regime evaluate the performance of the leader for evidence of success or failure of his policies and punish the leader for failure by removing him from power. Given Saddam’s personalist regime and the ironfisted control he had over the government, military, and the Baath party, this is not likely. Personalist regimes such as Saddam’s are less likely to generate large audience costs since there are few principals within the regime with the means to punish the leader.342 In this case, concession to the U.S. would not likely have generated sufficient audience costs to threaten his survival.

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The second level of domestic assessment is whether the survival of Saddam’s regime was at risk from domestic opposition groups. The logic of omni-balancing suggests that concessions by Saddam could reveal him to be weak and opposition groups could use this information to assess the regime’s vulnerability and attempt a revolt.\(^{343}\) The Shiite and Kurdish opposition groups of March 1991 had both the ability to observe whether or not Saddam ordered a hasty retreat and the power to threaten his regime. The severity of this threat is evidenced in the uprisings which followed the Gulf War and very nearly toppled the regime.

Though a concession likely did not pose a threat to Saddam from those within his regime, the Bush ultimatum would render the state more vulnerable to foreign invasion and a direct threat from domestic opposition groups to the survival of Saddam’s regime. Since the survival hypothesis requires that only the state’s, or the regime’s, or the leader’s survival be threatened this hypothesis correctly predicts coercion failure.

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS ON CREDIBLE COMMITMENT**

The commitment problem places the blame on coercion failure to be the challenger’s inability to credibly commit *ex ante* to make no further demands on the target once it concedes. Potential settlements which either increase the challenger’s power or harm the reputation of the target by exposing its weak resolve introduce an incentive for the challenger to make still further demands. This is particularly problematic in an anarchical system where there is no one to enforce the promises a challenger makes. The unenforceability of international agreements precludes some which, *ex ante*, are in the interests of both the challenger and the target.

For a given crisis two conditions must be met before a credible commitment problem is deemed to exist. First, the challenger must have sufficient military force deployed to the area in order to back up demands beyond those already made. The lack of force mitigates the commitment problem since a rational challenger will not make additional demands if it does not have the force available to make good its threats. Second, the challenger must be able to make additional demands in the future. If the original demand threatens the survival of the target, such as one for regime change or unconditional surrender, then the logic of the credible commitment argument no longer holds. A target cannot fear future demands if it believes it has no future. In such a scenario target resistance is driven by survival rather than a commitment problem.

**Soviet Proposal**

In the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was considering the Soviet proposal for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S.-led coalition had a sufficient military advantage not only to dislodge the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but also to threaten the entire Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). The credible commitment hypothesis therefore expects that Saddam would reject the Soviet proposal, since he would believe a concession to be followed by additional U.S. demands. But Saddam, in fact, agreed to the Soviet proposal. What is most interesting here is that the logic of the commitment problem, that the challenger would escalate demands once the target conceded, proved true for this case. When informed that Saddam would accept the Soviet plan President Bush then increased demands to a 48-hour withdrawal which would have forced the Iraqi Army to abandon much of its heavy weaponry in Kuwait. In sum,
the U.S. not only had the deployed forces to back up additional demands, but then they in
fact did make more demands once Saddam conceded.

**Bush’s 48-hour Ultimatum**

Examining further whether a credible commitment problem then existed with the
Bush 48-hour ultimatum, one must ask if there were additional demands the U.S. could
have made of Iraq given the forces available to the U.S. at the time. The answer is yes.
Had Saddam conceded to Bush’s ultimatum, the Iraqi Army would have ended up in a
better position than the one in which it found itself at the end of the ground invasion, but
not by much (see previous section). On 28 February, when the U.S. declared a unilateral
ceasefire the Iraqi Army was in disarray and in no position to defend Iraq. The U.S.
therefore had the military capability to take and hold Iraqi territory, even to threaten
Baghdad, as no significant Iraqi forces stood between the capitol and the U.S. Army’s 7th
Corps and 18th Airborne units. Given the military advantage the U.S. had gained by 28
February, the commitment hypothesis would logically expect that the U.S. would make
still further demands of Iraq, such as territorial concessions of its oil fields in southern
Iraq or for regime change. The U.S., however, made no further demands and instead
instituted a unilateral ceasefire. In this second case, the credible commitment hypothesis
correctly predicts Saddam would not concede to the 48-hour ultimatum.

In sum, the credible commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicted that Saddam
would resist the Soviet proposal, and when he conceded the U.S. did in fact make
additional demands with its 48-hour ultimatum. The commitment hypothesis then
correctly predicted Saddam would not concede to the 48-hour ultimatum. But then on 28
February, when the Iraqi Army was defeated the U.S. did not increase its demands as expected by the commitment hypothesis. What explains these apparent discrepancies? If Saddam was concerned with the U.S. ratcheting up demands, neither he nor any Iraqi spokesmen ever publicly voiced the commitment argument as a reason for Iraqi intransigence. If the credibility of the U.S. to commit was at issue, it would have been in Iraq’s interest to make this concern public, as this might have garnered assurances from the U.S., such as those given by the U.S. not to invade Cuba following the Cuban missile crisis. And finally why didn’t the U.S. go on to make additional demands of Iraq once it had defeated the Iraqi Army?

Avoiding Commitment Problems: Bush Administration Tying its Hands

The Bush administration largely avoided credible commitment problems by effectively tying its hands by four measures which made it more difficult and costly for the U.S. to adopt military objectives beyond that of attacking the Iraqi Army in the KTO. First, the U.S. engaged the United Nations from the outset of the crisis. The U.S. succeeded in passing key resolutions through the Security Council for the limited demand of Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. These resolutions also blessed the U.S.-led coalition military actions to force Iraq out of Kuwait. The United States in effect made a public promise through the UN which, if subsequently reneged, would have had diplomatic costs to the U.S. and been detrimental to Bush’s plans for a New World Order. Second, the coalition, which included forces from Syria, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, had a dampening affect on any additional ambitions the U.S. might have had with regards to Iraq. Theses regional Muslim states were willing to join the U.S. and fight to eject
Iraqi troops from Kuwait and even to weaken the Iraqi Army so that Saddam could not threaten his neighbors again. They would not, however, be party to an invasion of Iraq, an action which would likely have split the coalition.

Third, the Soviet Union played a role in limiting U.S. designs. While a weakened Gorbachev could not convince Bush to accept the Soviet proposal for an Iraqi withdrawal, the Soviet Union still remained a major global and nuclear super power. The U.S. had vital security interests in the continued peaceful decline of the Soviet Union, one of which was that of securing the Soviets’ vast nuclear arsenal. Such interests would likely have suffered at a U.S invasion of Iraq and the subsequent strain on U.S. – Soviet relations.

Finally, the Bush administration was constrained domestically by the congressional joint resolution of 12 January which “...authorize[d] the President to use the U.S. armed forces against Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Resolution 678.” Reflecting the mood of the American people, Congress was split in its support of military action and as a result the resolution passed by the slimmest margin since the War of 1812.

For the Gulf War the survival hypothesis performs better at predicting the actual outcome of the crisis than does the credible commitment hypothesis. Saddam conceded when his survival was not threatened but balked at humiliating concessions which would threaten Iraq and his regime from domestic opposition groups. By contrast the Bush

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administration avoided credible commitment problems through its ties to the UN, its military coalition, its interests in further cooperation with the Soviet Union, and domestic U.S. constraints.
IRAQI TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO KUWAITI BORDER, 6 OCTOBER 1994 – 17 OCTOBER 1994

In this section I consider a second crisis between the United States and Iraq in October of 1994. The confrontation took place during the interwar period of 1991 to 2003, in which the United States maintained economic sanctions to compel Saddam to abide by UN resolutions following the Gulf War. The most notable of these resolutions demanded that Iraq abandon its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and allow international monitoring to ensure that it did not recommence production. Numerous crises arose during this period as Iraq attempted to free itself from sanctions and from the watchful eyes of UN inspectors. By the fall of 1994, Saddam was frustrated that these efforts had failed to have the sanctions lifted and decided to mobilize his Republican Guard to again threaten Kuwait.

On the 6th of October U.S. intelligence sources discovered armored elements of two Republican Guard divisions massing near the Kuwaiti border much as the Iraqi Army had done just prior to the August, 1990 invasion. This time the United States responded much more quickly and forcefully. It immediately repositioned forces in the region and signaled its resolve by announcing the deployment of thousands of troops and hundreds of additional war planes. Adopting a coercive strategy, the U.S. issued the deterrent, extra-territorial demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait and, within days, added the compellent policy demand that the Republican Guard units redeploy to their permanent posts north of the southern no-fly zone (see Table 4.6 for typology of coercive demands, threats, and outcomes). It further backed these demands with the punishment threat of air

346 The International Crisis Behavior Project, “Gulf War, Case 412” http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 5 March 2009
strikes and cruise missile attacks on Baghdad. Iraq blinked first and, on the 10th of October, announced the repositioning of its troops with the claim that they had only been conducting exercises. By the 17th of October, eleven days later, U.S. intelligence confirmed the units had returned north of the no-fly zone, where they remained until 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of Demands</th>
<th>Nature of Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy - Withdrawal of deployed Republican Guard Units from Kuwaiti Border back to garrison</td>
<td>Compellent - Withdraw Republican Guard Units to garrison</td>
<td></td>
<td>Success - Republican Guard redeployed to garrison</td>
<td>Success - Republican Guard redeployed to garrison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Coercion Typology of Iraqi Troop Deployment to Kuwaiti Border, 6 Oct – 17 Oct 1994

This crisis has been largely ignored by coercion scholars, in part because it was overshadowed by the concurrent, highly publicized asymmetric crisis between the United States and Haiti. Yet the Iraqi troop deployment is a useful test of asymmetric coercion for three reasons. First, coercion succeeded quickly and armed conflict was avoided. In the study of armed conflict, this is a case of war that did not take place, of the dog that did not bark. Second, the United States’ compellent demand was for a relatively modest policy change for Iraq to restrict the positioning of troops within its own borders. This
demand was not inconsequential, however, as it forced Saddam Hussein to cede at least partial sovereignty over southern Iraq. In this case, an airpower punishment strategy succeeded in compelling policy change. This tests the claim of airpower theorist Robert Pape that “…coercion by punishment rarely works. When coercion does work, it is by denial.” 347 Finally, this crisis provides another test for the survival and credible commitment hypotheses. In this particular case, both explanations correctly predict coercion success.

The following section is divided into three parts. First, I provide context for the crisis, reviewing the significant and relevant events following the Gulf War and leading up to October of 1994. Second, I summarize the key actions and the timing of decisions from 6 October to 17 October and assess alternative explanations for Iraq’s actions. Third, I assess how well the predictions for the two hypotheses for coercion failure fare when compared to the actual outcome of the crisis.

**POST GULF WAR IRAQ, 1991-1994**

At the conclusion of the Gulf War the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 to continue sanctions against Iraq until it agreed to acknowledge the Kuwaiti border demarcated by the UN Secretary General. It was also to abandon its WMD program, cooperate with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors, agree to honor its prewar debt obligations, and pay war reparations to Kuwait. 348 Saddam, however, was preoccupied with the domestic unrest sparked by his defeat and sent surviving units of the Republican Guard to suppress Shiite

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and Kurdish uprisings. To constrain Saddam’s ability to use force against these groups, the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone and a northern safe area. While the U.S. restricted Iraqi troops in the north, no such restrictions were placed on troop deployments in the south.

In January of 1993 Iraq began to test the determination of the United States in enforcing these restrictions and weapons inspections. Iraqi aircraft repeatedly violated the no-fly zone and Iraqi officials impeded the work of inspectors. To induce cooperation President Bush, in his final days in office, ordered air strikes on Iraqi air defenses in the north and south and cruise missile strikes on the Zaafaraniya nuclear facility.\(^{349}\) This did not, however, deter Iraq’s efforts at undermining the U.S. and, in April, Iraqi intelligence made an assassination attempt on the former U.S. president during his visit to Kuwait. This prompted a June 1993 retaliatory cruise missile strike on Iraq’s intelligence headquarters by the new Clinton administration.

**UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN IRAQ**

Following the Gulf War, Iraq continued to threaten the Persian Gulf and with it the vital economic and security interests the U.S. had in maintaining unrestricted access to the region.\(^{350}\) The U.S. economy was dependent on foreign oil and, although the U.S. received little of its oil supplies from the Gulf by the mid-90’s, any interruption in the flow of oil from the region would have an immediate impact on the global price of crude and, in turn, on the U.S. economy as a whole.

\(^{349}\) Gordon, Michael R. (19 January, 1993) "Raid on Iraq; U.S. Leads Further Attacks on Iraqi Antiaircraft Sites; Admits its Missile hit Hotel; Raids in 2 Regions" *New York Times*

The U.S. therefore adopted a strategy of containment of Iraq. It continued to maintain a military presence in the region, primarily through the forward presence of air and sea power, but also with a small number of ground troops and pre-positioned equipment meant to reduce the deployment time for follow-on forces, if needed. Economic sanctions were also kept in place in an effort to compel Iraq to abide by existing UN resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, as well as to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military forces.

**IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS – REPUBLICAN GUARD DEPLOYMENT**

Years of sanctions eventually placed such a burden on the Iraqi people that even a tyrant like Saddam could no longer ignore them. Inflation spiraled out of control, leaving most Iraqis unable to afford food and dependent on meager government rations. As a result, in November of 1993 Iraq changed its policies and began to cooperate with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors in the hope that this would convince the Security Council to lift sanctions. By the summer of 1994, UNSCOM had made significant progress, destroying all known chemical and nuclear weapons and production equipment and installing video surveillance equipment at key production facilities.

The Security Council reviewed the sanctions bi-monthly and, in September, Saddam was counting on a positive recommendation from UNSCOM to help lift the sanctions. By this point, Iraq had exhausted its foreign currency reserves for purchasing

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foodstuffs and begun to halve rations to well below subsistence levels. The UNSCOM chief recommended more time, however, to ensure further Iraqi compliance and to make certain the new monitoring equipment was functioning properly.

Convinced that the Security Council would not lift sanctions as long as he remained in power, regardless of the level of cooperation, Saddam again reversed course. First, Iraqi officials issued threats to deny inspectors further access unless sanctions were immediately lifted. Second, Iraq mobilized 14,000 troops in armored elements of two of its Republican Guard divisions and began deploying them near the Kuwaiti border. This brought force levels in southern Iraq up to 64,000 troops. These events coincided with an address made by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, to the UN General Assembly on the 6th of October. He concluded his remarks by stating that “Iraq [had] the right to demand with all possible strength, a change of this unjust and illegitimate situation as soon as possible and to demand complete clarity in the UN position on its [Iraq’s] just demand.”

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UNITED STATES' QUICK RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Intelligence sources discovered the movement of the Republican Guard units, prompting an immediate U.S. response. On the 7th of October, a Navy carrier group was dispatched from the Adriatic to the Red Sea, which included two destroyers carrying cruise missiles. Also, 2,000 Marines conducting exercises nearby in the United Arab Emirate boarded the USS Tripoli, which then repositioned off the Kuwaiti coast (see Table 4.7 for the chronology of crisis).359 These forces joined the coalition's 77 combat aircraft and 18,000 Kuwaiti troops already in place.360

On 8 October, the Pentagon took the unusual step of announcing deployment orders by disclosing the repositioning of its forces, the airlift of 4,000 soldiers to joint, pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait, and the deployment of ships from Diego Garcia bearing equipment for another 15,000 troops.361 The Pentagon further announced that it had placed on alert USAF air combat wings in the U.S. and Europe, along with the Army's 24th mechanized division at Ft. Stewart, Georgia.

Concurrent with its deployment announcement, the Pentagon also issued a deterrent demand that "...Iraq respect the territorial integrity of Kuwait." Though the military spokesmen denied that the forces currently in the region were sufficient to repel an invasion, they emphasized that they were capable of punishing Iraq with hundreds of

359 Gordon, Michael E. (9 October 1994) "Threat to Kuwait; Iraq Moves Its Troops Toward the Brink Again; Clinton Responds Quickly" New York Times
cruise missiles and air strikes capable of reaching downtown Baghdad. Later that day, President Clinton reiterated the U.S.’s position by warning Saddam that “...it would be a grave error for Iraq to repeat the mistakes of the past or to misjudge either American will or American power.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action/Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>- Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz addresses the UN General Assembly and demands lifting of sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- U.S. intelligence observes two Republican Guard armor divisions begin to deploy towards Kuwait Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>- U.S. deploys USS George Washington Carrier Group from Adriatic to Red Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>- Pentagon announces deployment of Carrier Group, 2,000 Marines, 4,000 soldiers and Pre-Positioned Equipment Ships from Diego Garcia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pentagon warns of capability of forces to conduct punishment strikes on downtown Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October</td>
<td>- Iraq announces troop withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- President Clinton announces deployment of 36,000 troops and 350 combat aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 October</td>
<td>- U.S. intelligence observes commencement of Iraqi troop withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October</td>
<td>- U.S. acknowledges Iraqi troop movement but continues deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October</td>
<td>- Several Republican Guard units delay south of 32d Parallel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Russia announces commencement of negotiations with Iraq to recognize Kuwaiti border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 October</td>
<td>- U.S. submits Resolution 949 to Security Council demanding Iraq continue pulling back its forces to home bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>- UN Security Council adopts Resolution 949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>- Iraq accepts Resolution 949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October</td>
<td>- U.S. intelligence determines remaining Republican Guard units moving north</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Chronology of Iraqi Troop Movement to Kuwait Border

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IRAQ BACKS DOWN

It did not take long for Iraq to respond to the initial deployment of U.S. forces. After consultation and urging by Russia, Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Said Sahhaf announced on 10 October that Iraq would remove the forward Republican Guard units from the border. He claimed their deployment had merely been part of scheduled military exercises, though there was some evidence the Iraqis had also been establishing logistics sites, just as they had in late July 1990. That evening, President Clinton stated that there was not yet evidence of a withdrawal and that the United States policy would “... not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or intimidate the United Nations as it ensure[d] that Iraq [would] never again possess... weapons of mass destruction.” With that, he announced the additional deployment of 350 aircraft and 36,000 troops.

On the 11th of October, forward Iraqi units began pulling back from the border and, on the 12th, Iraq announced that most of its troops had been withdrawn. Uncertain as to whether the Iraqi troops were indeed returning to their garrisons, the U.S. indicated that it would continue with troop deployments and keep 155,000 on alert.

On 13 October, U.S. intelligence noted 2 brigades from one Republican Guard division stopping near the town of Nasiriya, south of the no-fly line at the 32nd parallel. It

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also observed Iraqi forces just north of Basra at Qalat Salih delaying their retreat. 368 On the 14th, the U.S. submitted Resolution 949 to the Security Council, which was then adopted on the following day. It demanded “…that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions.” It further demanded Iraq not threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq, that it not redeploy units to the south, and that it cooperate fully with UNSCOM. 369 On the 16th of October, Iraq accepted the Security Council resolution and, by the 17th, the crisis came to an end with U.S. reports of Iraqi troops again on the move north. 370

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY AND RECOGNITION OF KUWAITI BORDER

Just as the old Soviet Union had played an active diplomatic role during the Gulf War, so too did the new Russian Federation involve itself in this crisis. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in the midst of an economic crisis of its own. It therefore had an interest in lifting sanctions in hopes of collecting the $7 billion it was owed and gaining lucrative contracts promised it by Iraq. 371 When the troop withdrawal was announced on the 10th of October, Iraq confirmed the decision had been made in consultation with Russia. 372 Three days later, the Russian foreign minister,

370 Greenhouse, Steven (17 October 1994) “U.S. Says Iraq Appears to Resume Pullback from Kuwait Border” New York Times
Andrey Kozyrev, met with Saddam and issued a joint statement:

Russia has called for adopting decisive steps to prevent the escalation of the situation and to return the situation to the course of political and diplomatic efforts. These efforts will eventually lead to achieving solid security and stability in the region, to the cancellation of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and to setting up good neighborly relations between Iraq and Kuwait.\textsuperscript{373}

The meeting also produced a proposal that Iraq acknowledge the Kuwaiti border, in response to which the UN would lift sanctions. Kozyrev conveyed this proposal first to the Kuwaiti government and then traveled to New York to present it to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{374}

President Clinton, however, was irritated by Kozyrev’s efforts which did not address the central issue of Iraqi forces still being in the position to threaten Kuwait in the future. Before Kozyrev could address the UN, the U.S. pushed through a vote on Security Council Resolution 949 demanding that Iraq complete its troop withdrawal.\textsuperscript{375}

The Russians’ diplomacy proved only partially successful. On the 10\textsuperscript{th} of November, Saddam Hussein did indeed formally recognize “...the sovereignty of the State of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence.”\textsuperscript{376} Russian efforts to have the Security Council subsequently lift sanctions, however, proved fruitless.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF IRAQI TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO KUWAITI BORDER}

The identification of lead elements of Republican Guard armored units deploying near the Kuwaiti border on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of October sparked a crisis for the United States. Just

\textsuperscript{376} Crossette, Barbara (11 November 1994) “Iraqis to Accept Kuwait’s Borders” \textit{New York Times}
as in August of 1990, the U.S. did not have a sufficient military presence in the region to initially adopt either a brute force defensive strategy or a credible deterrent denial strategy. The U.S. again ruled out accommodation and, since economic sanctions were already in place, its only feasible option was a punishment strategy. The Gulf War taught policy makers that general deterrence did not always work with Saddam. To prevent a similar miscalculation of its resolve and intentions, the United States quickly extended a strong, immediate deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait. It signaled the credibility of its punishment threat when the Pentagon gave notice that its combat aircraft and cruise missiles for the carrier group were within range of Baghdad.\(^{377}\)

Though the explicit demand made by the Pentagon on the 8\(^{th}\) of October for Iraq not to invade Kuwait was deterrent, there was also an implicit compellent element that the Republican Guard units also withdraw from the border. This was clearly understood by Iraq as evidenced by its announcement on the 10\(^{th}\) that it would be repositioning those forces. President Clinton then reiterated this demand in his address that evening to encourage compliance.

The U.S. could initially threaten a punishment strategy of limited air and cruise missile strikes on Baghdad but until additional attack aircraft were deployed, it could not credibly threaten a denial strategy of directly attacking these heavy elements of the Republican Guard.\(^{378}\) Iraq conceded to a withdrawal prior to the announcement of an additional 350 aircraft and 36,000 troops to be deployed to the region (only 30,000


\(^{377}\) Clinton, William (8 October 1994) “Remarks on Iraq” American Presidency Project

\(^{378}\) The tactical aircraft already in place were there to enforce the no fly zone. They did not have anti-armor capability. The U.S. follow on forces included A-10s which did have anti-armor weapons. Herr, Eric W (1996) Operation Vigilant Warrior: Conventional Deterrence Theory, Doctrine, and Practice Masters Thesis, Montgomery, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies
actually deployed). This increased capability could defend against another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and it could eventually destroy the forward deployed Republican Guard units. These forces were not, however, sufficient to credibly threaten a U.S. invasion of southern Iraq.

The U.S. succeeded in its punishment strategy to compel Iraq to a policy change of returning the Republican Guard troops north of the southern no-fly zone (32nd parallel). While this was a relatively modest change to Iraqi policy, it still had a negative impact on Iraq’s sovereignty in the southern region, albeit in a more limited way than the northern safe area constrained Saddam’s freedom of action against the Kurds in the north.

**CRITIQUE OF THE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL**

A critique of this analysis points out that, given the small number of troops deployed Saddam never intended to invade Kuwait. The redeployment of those troops, therefore, should not be viewed as a concession resulting from the airpower punishment strategy adopted by the United States.

Indeed, I concur that Iraq did not deploy enough troops to invade Kuwait. The most these forces could have hoped to accomplish was a cross-border incursion similar to Al Khafi during the Gulf War. I also agree that Saddam likely had no intention of actually crossing into Kuwait. He instead had deployed his ground forces as part of a signal to coincide with Aziz’s speech at the UN. Still, the concessions Iraq eventually made, though modest in comparison to territorial concessions or regime change, were nevertheless real. Not only did the Republican Guard units withdraw, but Saddam also chose to abide by the U.S. demands not to deploy additional troops to southern Iraq again. Also as a result of this crisis Saddam agreed to recognize Kuwait.
In sum, this crisis was a clear defeat for Saddam. In the face of the U.S. compellent demand that Iraq redeploy its forces and not deploy them again, Iraq forfeited partial sovereignty over southern Iraq. Saddam made this concession while the U.S. had only a credible threat to punish Baghdad with air strikes and cruise missiles and prior to the U.S. deployment of additional attack aircraft and ground troops to threaten his Republican Guard armored units.

**ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME**

In this section I assess the predictions from the two hypotheses for coercion failure against the actual coercion outcome for the Iraqi Troop Deployment crisis of October 1994 (see Table 4.8 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demand</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Troop Movement to Border Oct 94</td>
<td>Iraqi Republican Guard troops withdraw from border and return to garrison north of 32\textsuperscript{nd} parallel</td>
<td>Predicts Coercion Success</td>
<td>Predicts Coercion Success</td>
<td>Coercion Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq withdraws its troops from the Kuwaiti border and returns them to garrison

| Predicts Coercion Success | U.S. can threaten only limited air and cruise missile strikes. U.S. deployed military capability not credible for either direct attack on Republican Guard or invasion of southern Iraq. |

Table 4.8: Predictions of Coercion Outcome

\[379\] Saddam had already lost sovereignty in the airspace overhead southern Iraq with the U.S. establishment of the southern no fly zone.
TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis for target survival predicts that compellence is likely to fail if the challenger’s demand directly threatens the survival of either the state, or the regime, or the regime’s leader, so long as the target has the means to resist. If, however, the demands threaten none of these three, the hypothesis predicts coercion likely to succeed. In this crisis there is a single compellent demand, that Iraq redeploy its Republican Guard units away from the Kuwaiti border and back to garrison north of the 32nd parallel. The survival hypothesis correctly predicts that coercion will succeed as this concession threatens the survival of neither Iraq, nor Saddam Hussein, nor his regime.

Impact on Iraqi State Survival

The U.S. demand to withdraw the two Republican Guard divisions did not threaten Iraq’s survival. The units were not deployed to defend southern Iraq from attack, but rather to threaten Kuwait. The Iraqi Army still maintained 50,000 troops south of the 32nd parallel. Further, neither Iran nor the U.S. had forces deployed that could threaten an invasion of Iraq, even with the additional 36,000 troops the U.S. intended to deploy.

This crisis was triggered by the dire state of Iraq’s economy as a result of economic sanctions and by Saddam’s reaction to the realization that sanctions would remain in place so long as he remained in power. Conceding to redeploy Republican Guard troops did not further exacerbate Iraq’s economic straits. It was, in fact an initial step, along with Iraqi recognition of Kuwait and Saddam’s later acceptance of the “Oil-for-Food” program which eventually stabilized Iraq’s weakened economy.
Though conceding did not threaten Iraq's survival and aided in eventually stabilizing its economy, it did impinge on Iraqi sovereignty as to where it could deploy its forces within its own borders. As such, it was an unwelcome concession which limited the government's control of its territory and population in southern Iraq.

**Impact of Redeployment on Saddam and his Regime**

Since the U.S. demand for the redeployment of troops did not threaten the survival of the Iraqi state, the next step is to determine whether the demand threatened that of either Saddam or his regime.

The United States' initial reaction on the 8th of October was to publicly announce the deterrent demand that Iraq not invade Kuwait. But delaying the compellent demand to redeploy those troops back to garrison effectively lowered the audience costs suffered by Saddam. This delay afforded Iraq the opportunity to then announce the redeployment of those troops on the 10th of October, deny any intention of invading Kuwait, and characterize the troop movements as part of a preplanned exercise. The U.S. did not make explicit its compellent demand until the 14th of October when it appeared the Iraqi troops were delaying their redeployment. There is no evidence that the sequence of public statements between the Pentagon and the White House was intentionally coordinated to provide an opportunity for Saddam to save face. Regardless, the delay had that affect.

Even if one believes that the sequencing of U.S. actions and statements had no impact on the level of humiliation Saddam suffered by making a concession, his audience costs were not likely to be large as he continued to maintain an iron fist control over his regime. He relied on familial and tribal ties and placed only those loyal to him into key
positions of the government, the Republican Guard, and the Baath party. This effectively prevented and co-opted potential opposition from within his regime. Therefore any audience costs Saddam might have suffered would not likely have resulted in his removal from power by those within his regime.

With regards to domestic threats from outside Saddam’s regime, these had already been effectively dealt with in the recent past. Although the Iraqi government had barely survived the insurrection of March 1991, the regime had ruthlessly attacked the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north. These groups were weakened to the extent that they no longer posed the same level of threat they had directly following the Gulf War.

In sum, the demand to redeploy the Republican Guard divisions to garrison north of the 32nd parallel did not threaten the survival of the Iraqi state, Saddam, or his regime. The survival hypothesis correctly predicts that Iraq would likely concede and that coercion would succeed.

TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS

The commitment hypothesis expects coercion to fail if a powerful challenger cannot credibly commit *ex ante* to not make further demands should the target concede. For the October 1994 crisis, the commitment problem hypothesis correctly predicts coercion success since the U.S. did not have sufficient military force deployed to credibly back up additional demands the U.S. might have made.

In theater, the U.S. had only a few thousand ground troops with deployment orders for an additional 36,000 (of these 30,000 eventually deployed). These forces were insufficient to mount an offensive into southern Iraq where permanently stationed troops numbered 50,000. The only offensive option available to the U.S. was that of limited air
and cruise missile strikes. As a result, the U.S. was not in a position to make credible threats to make additional demands of Iraq, such as demands for homeland territorial or regime change. The credible commitment hypothesis therefore predicts Iraq would concede. Even though this prediction proved correct, as in the Gulf War, commitment issues were never publicly brought up by Iraq and did not appear to factor significantly into Saddam’s decision making.
In this section I examine the crisis which led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. The September 11th, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fundamentally altered the United States’ perception of the threat from terrorists and the weapons of mass destruction they could employ. Though the task of identifying international terrorist networks was complicated, the targeting of those states which supported terrorist organizations proved less so and the U.S. quickly responded to 9/11 by attacking both Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Before the Afghanistan War had concluded, however, President Bush was already contemplating his next move. Adopting a preventive war strategy, the U.S. would no longer wait to be attacked, going instead on the offensive, targeting not only terrorists and the states that actively supported them, but also those “rogue” states most likely to provide them with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. At the top of this list was Iraq.

While the U.S. had been able to contain Iraq’s conventional military since the 1991 Gulf War, it had not been able to verify the extent of Iraq’s WMD programs. Convinced that such weapons would remain a threat as long as Saddam Hussein was in power, President George W. Bush employed coercive diplomacy in September of 2002, renewing the *compellent* demand that Iraq disarm. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441 in November, demanding that Iraq declare the extent of its WMD programs and cooperate fully with UN inspectors. Should Iraq not comply, the U.S. threatened to remove Saddam from power (see Table 4.9 for typology of coercive

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380 The International Crisis Behavior Project, “Iraq Regime Change, Case 440”
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer accessed 27 March 2009
demands, threats, and outcomes). Its coercive threat was intended to be one of denial with a rapid troop buildup to be followed by an invasion. Saddam, however, did not believe the U.S. had the resolve to push all the way to Baghdad, expecting instead that the U.S. would again rely on airpower as it had done in Afghanistan in 2001. Preparing therefore for air strikes only, Saddam dispersed his military forces and did not take the steps necessary to defend against a U.S. invasion. Worried also about a domestic or military uprising, which had occurred following Desert Storm in 1991, Saddam attempted to insulate himself by placing his most loyal troops nearest him in a concentric circle defense of Baghdad. Saddam prioritized the placement of troops according to loyalty rather than on operational considerations for how best to defend the country against an American invasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat</th>
<th>Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep 02 - 20 Mar 03</td>
<td>Policy Iraq declare all WMD programs and cooperate fully with UN inspectors</td>
<td>Denial - Air Strikes against Iraqi Army - Ground Invasion</td>
<td>Success Iraq declared WMD programs and cooperated with UN inspectors</td>
<td>Success Bush Administration used Iraqi WMD as justification for invasion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9: Coercion Typology of Lead-up to Iraq War, 12 September 2002 – 20 Mar 2003

By 2002, a combination of economic sanctions, UN inspections and U.S. air strikes employed throughout the 1990s had, in fact, already led Iraq to dismantle its WMD programs. This information had been kept secret, however, not only from the
international community but even from Saddam’s own military in an effort to deter domestic and regional threats. Therefore, his concession to U.S. demands in the fall of 2002 was but a policy change to publicly acknowledge that Iraq no longer possessed WMD. Unfortunately for Saddam, he now found himself in the untenable position of having to prove a negative. A dozen years of deceiving and harassing UN inspectors had left both the UN and U.S. ill-disposed to lending credence to any statement coming out of Iraq. Even actions to remove all remaining traces of chemical or biological agents at known WMD sites were taken by the U.S. as evidence of Iraqi subterfuge. Iraq did indeed comply with the UNSCR 1441 demands per a declaration in December 2002 that its WMD programs no longer existed and by cooperating with UN inspectors.

The issue of Iraqi WMD was, in fact, used as a pretense for removing Saddam from power, a strategy neoconservatives now within the Bush administration had been pushing since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{381} An invasion of Iraq was even suggested by Paul Wolfowitz as an initial response to the 11 September 2001 attacks despite the lack of evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{382} It was this underlying objective of removing Saddam from power which was primarily responsible for the Bush administration judging Iraq to be in material breach of the UN resolution, even though Iraq was now clearly cooperating with inspectors. Thwarted by France and Russia in its attempts to garner international support for an invasion through a second Security Council resolution, the U.S. finally abandoned its façade of diplomatic negotiations and commenced an invasion.


\textsuperscript{382} Woodward, Bob (2002) \textit{Bush at War} Simon and Schuster: New York 60
on 20 March 2003. By early April Saddam’s regime had been toppled and on May 1st, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. In the end, no WMD were ever discovered.

The Iraq War itself is not a case of coercion as the Bush administration never expected Saddam Hussein to concede to regime change. George W. Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq was not accompanied by either a promise that he and his family would be safe or that Saddam leaving the country would prevent the U.S. invasion. The ultimatum therefore should not be considered coercive. Instead the U.S. adopted a brute force strategy in order to eject Saddam from power.

Still, the lead-up to the Iraq War, with President Bush’s decision to go to the United Nations and make Iraqi WMD justification for an invasion provides an intriguing case for analyzing asymmetric coercion. Even though the U.S. did not intend to accept Iraqi concessions, Saddam Hussein was still successfully coerced into revealing that Iraq no longer possessed any WMD, thereby losing whatever prestige and deterrent value he believed he had previously enjoyed through a policy of ambiguity.

The case of the lead-up to the Iraq War is an interesting case of asymmetric coercion for five reasons. First, coercive diplomacy succeeded in achieving Iraqi policy change. Granted, this was not a major policy concession as Saddam was not being asked to abandon WMD, but rather to reveal that Iraqi WMD programs no longer existed. Still this deception had value to Saddam for he guarded this fact even allowing Iraq to endure a decade of costly sanctions levied in large part over the issue of WMD. It was therefore a painful concession for Saddam to make. Second, it is another case in which the U.S.

was unwilling to take "yes" for an answer, just as Saddam's acceptance of the Soviet proposal for withdrawal from Kuwait in February 1991 was rejected by the elder Bush.

Third, the U.S. calculated that Saddam could not be coerced into regime change. President Bush therefore did not even make a compellent demand for regime change, opting instead for brute force invasion. This self-selection of the U.S. in not choosing a coercive strategy it believed would fail illustrates the limits of coercion as an effective foreign policy tool for such high-level demands as regime change.

Fourth, the extended length of the conflict between the United States and Iraq which began in August of 1990, demonstrates that, over time, a challenger may come to view the existence of the leader and/or regime as the problem, rather than the foreign policies of the state. By the mid-90s neoconservatives who would later come into positions of power within the Bush administration were convinced that only regime change could curtail the seemingly endless series of crises arising between the two states. Yet it was unlikely that any coercive strategy could force Saddam Hussein from power, an objective that only a brute force strategy was likely to achieve.

Finally, this crisis provides another test for the survival and commitment hypotheses of coercion outcomes. As abandoning WMD did not threaten either Iraq, Saddam, or his regime's survival the survival hypothesis correctly predicts Saddam would likely concede to the U.S. demands. The deployment of over 700 tactical aircraft and over a 100,000 U.S. troops during the winter of 2002-2003 increased the credibility of an invasion. It was now Saddam's resistance, not concessions, which would threaten Iraqi survival. By contrast, the commitment hypothesis initially predicts coercion success in the fall of 2002, until the U.S. deploys sufficient military force to credibility threaten
an attack. At this point the commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts Iraq likely to reverse its decision and stop cooperating with UN inspectors. The commitment argument suggests that further Iraqi cooperation would only lead to additional demands by the United States. In fact the U.S. did increase its demand, although no longer coercive, for Iraqi regime change. Still, Iraq cooperated fully with the UN, hoping French and Russian efforts in the Security Council would succeed in preventing the U.S. attack.

The following section is divided into three parts. First, I provide context for the crisis, briefly reviewing the relevant events from October 1994 until September 11th, 2001. Second, I examine the key actions and the timing of decisions during the crisis, from President Bush’s United Nations address on 12 September 2002 until the U.S. invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. I analyze the decisions made by the U.S. and Iraq, as well as address alternative interpretations of the crisis. Third, I assess how well the predictions of the two hypotheses for coercion failure fare as compared to the actual outcome of the crisis.

**UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ: 1994-2002**

Following the Gulf War the U.S. strategy for containing Iraq took a three-pronged approach: continuing economic sanctions, deploying United Nations inspectors to verify Iraq’s abandonment of its WMD program, and restricting Iraqi military operations in the north and the south. By the mid-90s all three of these efforts were beginning to unravel. The impact of sanctions was significantly reduced once Saddam agreed to the UN’s Oil-for-Food program. Iraq was soon exporting billions of dollars worth of oil each year and Saddam controlled to a large extent which countries received the lucrative contracts to
December of 1998 proved a turning point for U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq, as the decision to withdraw UN inspectors in preparation for the four days of coalition air strikes, named Operation Desert Fox, subsequently left Iraq’s WMD programs unmonitored for over four years. In addition, Iraq grew increasingly defiant in the northern and southern no-

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fly zones, engaging the coalition aircraft entering its air space.\textsuperscript{386} Convinced Saddam would never fulfill the obligations of the UN resolutions to which he had agreed in 1991, the Republican-led Congress passed the \textit{Iraq Liberation Act} in 1998, making Iraqi regime change a U.S. mandate.\textsuperscript{387} Though now its official policy, the U.S. did not adjust its containment and punishment strategy to eject Saddam from power until the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 elevated the threat of Iraqi WMD falling into the hands of international terrorists. Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. again turned to Iraq, this time with a renewed resolve to bring about regime change and, in so doing, remove any threat from Iraqi WMD.

\textbf{UNITED STATES’ INCREASED INTERESTS IN WMD FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11\textsuperscript{TH}, 2001}

The September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks demonstrated Al Qaeda’s capacity to hit targets within the United States and raised the concern over WMD falling into the hands of international terrorist groups. The Bush administration quickly added Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, just after Afghanistan on its short list of state sponsors of terrorism. Though there were no credible evidence linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, President Bush justified this action by pointing to the potential threat of WMD being procured from Iraq and used in a

\textsuperscript{386} For an overview of military operations during this period see Michael Knight’s (2005) \textit{Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military} Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 150-250

\textit{UNITED STATES’ COMPELLENT DEMANDS AND THREATS: 12 SEPTEMBER - 8 NOVEMBER 2002}

President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address put Iraq on notice, labeling it a rogue state along with Iran and North Korea in an “…axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” Bush would no longer accommodate these states, allowing them to continue to stockpile weapons which could then be misappropriated by those intent on harming the United States. He noted that, “by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose[d] a grave and growing danger…[and]…could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.”\footnote{Bush, George W. (29 January 2002) “Bush State of the Union the United Address” http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/ accessed 1 April 2009} In his 1 June 2002 address at West Point he further articulated his preventive war strategy, assuring his audience that “…the war on terror [would] not be won on the defensive…” and that the U.S. would have to “…take the battle to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge[d].”\footnote{Bush, George W. (1 June 2002) “President Bush Delivers Remarks at West Point” http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0206/01/se.01.html accessed 1 April 2009}
Though both Iran and North Korea had active WMD programs at the time, President Bush chose to target Iraq alone and, on 12 September 2002, he announced his preemptive strategy when speaking before the United Nations General Assembly:

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction...[and] end support of terrorism.  

He went on to underscore:

The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met or action will be unavoidable and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Just as in the lead-up to the Gulf War, in order to shore up domestic and international support the President sought authorization for the use of force from both the United States Congress and the UN Security Council. Unlike his father, however, President George W. Bush found it more convenient to first secure approval from Congress, where both the House and Senate voted by a large bipartisan margin to authorize the use of military force (See Table 4.10 for chronology of crisis).

By contrast, garnering a Security Council resolution proved more challenging, as both France and Russia would not condone military action against Iraq. After weeks of diplomatic maneuvering, Secretary of State Colin Powell was finally able to push through UNSCR 1441 on 8 November 2002 by a vote of 15-0. The resolution held Iraq in “material breach” of previous resolutions and afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply.

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392 While there was some evidence of Iraqi WMD, there was no evidence of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection
by disclosing its WMD programs and allow enhanced inspections. It also warned of serious consequences for non-compliance. To obtain the resolution, Powell was forced to concede to weaker terms, whereby Iraq would be considered in material breach of UNSCR 1441 only if found to be both falsifying its weapons declarations and (rather than or, which the U.S. preferred) not cooperating fully with UN inspectors. Iraq was to provide unrestricted access for inspectors and declare all aspects of its WMD programs within 30 days.

**IRAQ'S RESPONSE**

Since President Bush had labeled it a founding member of the axis of evil in January 2002, Iraq had been in discussions with the UN Secretary General over the potential return of UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and IAEA inspectors. Though Iraq had consistently refuted U.S. accusations concerning its WMD, the gravity of President Bush’s 12 September 2002 United Nations address was not lost on the Iraqis. Within days, Saddam agreed to the return of inspectors “... to remove any doubts that Iraq still possesse[d] weapons of mass destruction.” Though Iraq denied having WMD and adamantly opposed UN resolution 1441, once it had passed, Iraq reluctantly agreed to abide by it, allowing UN inspectors

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into the country and providing a 12,000-page WMD declaration to the UN on 7 December 2002.\textsuperscript{399}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>11 September 2001</td>
<td>World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks</td>
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<td>November 2001</td>
<td>U.S. defeats Taliban in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Late November 2001</td>
<td>Bush orders Rumsfeld to begin military planning for Iraq</td>
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<td>28 January 2002</td>
<td>“Axis of Evil” State of the Union Address</td>
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<td>1 June 2002</td>
<td>Bush Preventive War Strategy speech at West Point Graduation</td>
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<td>12 September 2002</td>
<td>Bush UN General Assembly speech demanding Iraq declare WMD and admit UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors</td>
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<td>October 2002</td>
<td>Congress authorizes use of force in Iraq</td>
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<td>8 November 2002</td>
<td>UN Resolution 1441: 30 days for Iraq to declare WMD and cooperate with inspectors</td>
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<td>7 December 2002</td>
<td>Iraq submits 12,000 page declaration</td>
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<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Iraq increases cooperation with UN inspectors</td>
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<td>19 December 2002</td>
<td>U.S. declares Iraq in Material Breech of UNSCR 1441</td>
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<td>December 2002</td>
<td>U.S. announces large deployment of troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 February 2003</td>
<td>Secretary Powell provides “proof” of Iraq WMD at UN Security Council</td>
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| March 2003             | - France successfully leads campaign within Security Council to defeat resolution with a 17 March deadline for Iraq to disarm  
                         | - Iraq continues cooperation with inspectors, destroys missiles, prepares for defense of Baghdad |
| 17 March 2003          | Bush withdraws second resolution before vote and issues 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam and sons to leave Iraq |
| 20 March 2003          | U.S. invades Iraq                                                                  |
| 9 April 2003           | Saddam regime toppled                                                              |
| 1 May 2003             | Bush declares end to major military operations                                     |

\textbf{Table 4.10: Chronology of Lead-up to Iraq War}

Much of Iraq’s WMD capabilities had eroded during the 1990’s through a combination of sanctions, previous periods of cooperation with UN weapons inspections, and the Desert Fox air strikes. Saddam either could not or chose not to reconstitute the

\textsuperscript{399} Baghdad Babil (14 November 2002) Editorial by Abd-al-Razzaq al-Dulaymi reacting to Iraq’s decision to comply with UN Resolution 1441 FBIS-NES-2002-1114
WMD programs.\textsuperscript{400} Instead, he adopted a deterrent strategy of ambiguity over the status of Iraqi WMD.\textsuperscript{401} The impetus behind this strategy could in part be traced to the destruction of much of Iraq’s conventional military power during the Gulf War. Its current undertrained and underequipped 350,000 soldiers were a mere shadow of the million men it had fielded in the Gulf War, though the Iraq Army was still larger than that of Iran and outnumbered the U.S. forces deployed in the region.\textsuperscript{402}

With Iraq now anticipating the return of UN inspectors, Saddam ordered all WMD sites to be scrubbed for any remaining documents or traces of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{403} Ironically, it would be the actions of the Iraqi military in sanitizing these locations which Secretary of State Colin Powell would later offer as “proof” of Iraqi deception.

\textbf{UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY}

Though the U.S. had gone to the Security Council to demand Iraq abandon its WMD program, this did not mean that the Bush administration intended to accept a concession by Saddam. President Bush quickly began making the case against the credibility of any claims or actions by Saddam: “He deceives. He delays. He denies.

\textsuperscript{402} International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001-2002) \textit{The Military Balance} London: Brassey’s
\textsuperscript{403} Woods, Kevin, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey (2006) \textit{Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership} Naval Institute Press: Annapolis 93
And the United States and, I'm convinced, the world community, aren't going to fall for that kind of rhetoric by him again."\(^404\)

In response to Iraq's WMD declaration in December, the U.S. quickly countered that the report had significant omissions and contained little substantive information on Iraq's program since the departure of UN inspectors in 1998.\(^405\) UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix and IAEA chairman Mohamed ElBaradei provided a similar assessment in their report to the Security Council on 19 December 2002. While they did indicate that Iraq was cooperating in the process by allowing inspections, they felt more cooperation was required in terms of "...uncovering of evidence to exonerate themselves that they [were] clean from weapons of mass destruction."\(^406\) Secretary of State Colin Powell subsequently declared Iraq in material breach of Resolution 1441, citing not only the large omissions and gaps in the report, but also the disturbing, though as it turned out truthful claim that "...the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all."\(^407\)

On 27 January 2003 Hans Blix provided his 60-day assessment of UN inspections, indicating that little had changed since December, i.e. Iraq was cooperating with the inspection process, but was still not revealing its WMD.\(^408\) The following


\(^{405}\) Sanger, Davie E and Julia Preston (13 December 2002) "Threats and Responses: Report by Iraq; Iraq Arms Report has Big Omissions, U.S. Officials Say" New York Times,


\(^{407}\) Powell, Colin L. (20 December 2002) "Threats and Responses; in Powell’s Words: ‘We Are Disappointed, but We Are Not Deceived’ by Iraq” New York Times

evening President Bush asserted the United States’ position in his second State of the Union Address:

The United States will ask the UN Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about...Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups. We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him. 409

On the 5th of February, Secretary Powell presented additional evidence from U.S. intelligence sources on Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorist organizations. 410 The following day, President Bush ordered 15,000 more troops to join the 100,000 American personnel already in place in the Persian Gulf. 411

Powell’s presentation was not sufficient, however, to change the position of France and Russia, who along with Germany, issued a joint statement on the 10th of February:

Russia, Germany and France favour the continuation of the inspections and a substantial reinforcement of their human and technical capacities through all possible means and in liaison with the inspectors, in the framework of the UN resolution 1441.

There is still an alternative to war. The use of force can only be considered as a last resort. Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully. 412

Though the U.S. was predisposed to going forward with military action on the basis of UNSCR 1441, without further authorization from the Security Council, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who faced a vote of no confidence in Parliament, desired a second resolution to quell domestic concerns over the legality of an invasion. Not wishing for the U.S. to go it entirely alone and as a personal favor to Blair, Bush pressed forward for the second resolution. Standing firm, France in particular actively campaigned against the U.S. and British proposal.

On 6 March President Bush, doubting France would veto, announced that the U.S., Britain, and Spain would jointly submit a resolution to the Security Council, “…stating that Iraq ha[d] failed to meet the requirements of Resolution 1441.” Britain introduced the draft resolution the very next day, setting a 17 March deadline for Iraq to disarm.

The U.S. and Britain failed to garner the requisite votes to pass the resolution, however, and France, Russia, and China stated their intentions to veto, if necessary. On 16 March, Prime Minister Blair, President Bush, and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar met briefly in the Azores, issuing the following joint statement: “If Saddam refuses even now to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the serious consequences foreseen in UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions.” The next morning, the U.S. withdrew the draft resolution from consideration and that very evening, President Bush addressed the nation and delivered an ultimatum: “…Saddam Hussein

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and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military
conflict commenced at a time of our choosing."  

**IRAQI COOPERATION WITH UN AND STRATEGY OF DENYING U.S. CASUS BELLUM**

By the time Saddam agreed to allow UN inspectors back into country, Iraq had
long since destroyed all of its WMD and the Republican Guard had removed any
remaining traces of their existence. Saddam’s new strategy was to now fully cooperate
with inspectors in order to remove justification for a U.S. invasion. This new strategy
was initially difficult for Saddam to employ as a dozen years of deceiving UN inspectors
had inculcated within the Iraqi government a culture of obfuscation. Following Hans
Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei’s initial reports of anecdotal examples of non-cooperation,
however, Saddam redressed this problem by making it clear to subordinates under the
threat of severe punishment that Iraq would fully cooperate with inspectors. A second
problem Saddam could never overcome, however, was the thoroughness of Iraq’s
cleanup, which left him no proof that the tons of VX nerve agents and Anthrax
un accounted for, were not hidden away as the U.S. claimed.

Still Iraq cooperated with inspectors by providing them heretofore unprecedented
access to the Iraq military and Saddam’s presidential palaces. Iraq even destroyed the 76

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418 Iraqi Survey Group (October 2004) *Final Report*
accessed 2 April 2009
Cooperate with Inspectors” *New York Times*
Al Samud II medium-range missiles it had only recently produced when the U.S. argued the missile’s operational range breached existing UN resolutions.420

By the spring of 2003 Saddam was convinced that the U.S. would invade. Still, Iraq continued to cooperate with inspectors to provide additional support for France, Germany and Russia in the hopes that their opposition could halt the U.S..421 In addition, Saddam became increasingly defiant, rebuffing any suggestion that he go into exile, and firmly rejecting Bush’s ultimatum on the eve of war.422

**UNITED STATES’ MILITARY PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT**

Planning by the Bush administration for a military operation against Iraq began in the midst of the Afghanistan War. On the 21st of November 2001 President Bush informed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that he wanted to “…know what the options [were].”423 The existing contingency Operation Plan 1003-98 was similar to planning for the Gulf War in that it included a six-month buildup of 400,000 troops prior to invasion.424 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, however, pushed for a lighter and quicker response. By February 2002, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, General Tommy Franks had taken lessons from Afghanistan and pared down the forces required to commence the attack to 160,000. Deployments would then continue until a

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total of 250,000 troops could be available for occupation at the end of combat operations.\textsuperscript{425}

Saddam and the world were well aware of the U.S. military plans as senior defense officials leaked the war plan just days after the Security Council’s vote on UNSCR 1441. In late November, General Franks submitted a request for deployment orders, the number of initial forces for which had now been further ratcheted down to 128,000 to be in the region by mid-February 2003. A total of 200,000 were to be in place by the commencement of ground operations (G-day).\textsuperscript{426} By 20 March the U.S. had 115,000 American ground troops in place alongside another 26,000 British soldiers and marines.\textsuperscript{427} Coalition forces in the entire region totaled 250,000, including 735 fixed-wing combat aircraft.\textsuperscript{428}

Unlike the Gulf War, for which a lengthy air campaign preceded ground operations, the U.S. planned a near simultaneous attack dubbed “Shock and Awe”. The ground invasion was to be a two-pronged push to Baghdad with the Marines approaching from east of the Euphrates and the Army maneuvering from the west. The plan for a northern attack was abandoned in March when the Turkish parliament voted to deny the U.S. permission to deploy its 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division from Turkish territory.\textsuperscript{429} Punishment air strikes against leadership targets and the Republican Guard had not been planned in advance of the ground invasion. Denial air strikes, however, had begun as early as July

\textsuperscript{427} Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003) \textit{The Iraq War} Praeger: Westport, CT 36-37
\textsuperscript{428} Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003) \textit{The Iraq War} Praeger: Westport, CT 24
\textsuperscript{429} Filkins, Dexter (2 March 2003) “Threats and Responses: Ankara ; Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops” \textit{New York Times}
2002 as the U.S. degraded Iraq’s air defenses and command and control network in the southern no-fly zone in preparation for air support for the ground invasion.\textsuperscript{430}  

President Bush ordered the first attacks to commence in the early hours of 20 March, just hours after the deadline had expired.\textsuperscript{431}  

Initial air and missile strikes on Baghdad failed to topple Saddam’s regime. By 9 April, however, U.S. ground troops had entered central Baghdad.\textsuperscript{432}  

On 1 May 2003, aboard the \textit{USS Abraham Lincoln}, President Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq.\textsuperscript{433}

\textbf{IRAQ’S MILITARY PREPARATIONS}

On the eve of war Iraq had an estimated 389,000 active duty personnel, of which 350,000 were Iraqi Army, a force with an inventory of 2,600 tanks and 2,400 artillery pieces.\textsuperscript{434}  

A subset of the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard, was comprised of 70,000 personnel divided into three elite groups: the Special Guard in Baghdad provided for Saddam’s own personal protection, while the Northern, or 1\textsuperscript{st} Corps, further defended Baghdad and Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit from the Kurds and from Turkey and Iran. The Southern, or 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps, employed its armored divisions to suppress the Shias and to defend against an Iranian or U.S. attack.\textsuperscript{435}  

Saddam could also count on the Saddam Fedayeen, an organization founded in 1995 to gain additional domestic control. Some 40,000 strong, though not professional soldiers, these men were loyal to Saddam and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{430} Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor (2006) \textit{Cobra II} Pantheon: New York 69
\item \textsuperscript{431} Bush, George W. (19 March 2003) “President Bush Addresses the Nation” \url{http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html} accessed 1 April 2009
\item \textsuperscript{432} “Timeline: Iraq” \textit{BBC} \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/737483.stm} accessed 5 April 2009
\item \textsuperscript{433} Bush, George W. (1 May 2003) “Bush makes historic speech aboard warship” \textit{CNN} \url{http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/} accessed 5 April 2009
\item \textsuperscript{434} Franks, Tommy and Malcolm McConnell (2004) \textit{American Soldier} HarperCollins: New York 348
\item \textsuperscript{435} Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003) \textit{The Iraq War} Praeger: Westport, CT 40,46
\end{itemize}
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tasked with keeping Iraqi towns under Baath party control. 436 The Fedayeen had training in small arms and were capable of conducting irregular warfare, as the U.S. would later discover. They reported outside of the army command structure directly to Saddam’s sons. 437

In preparation for the U.S. attack, the Republican Guard withdrew towards Baghdad. Rather than have them prepare entrenched defensive positions, however, Saddam dispersed them for the extended U.S. air campaign he felt was sure to come, as the one he had witnessed in Afghanistan. He did not anticipate a U.S. ground invasion all the way to Baghdad and did not take certain defensive measures expected by U.S. military experts, such as flooding the Euphrates, setting oil fields on fire, or defending key strategic points along the road to Baghdad. Ignoring all military advice, Saddam instead deployed the army in a series of concentric circles around Baghdad, with his most loyal forces in the innermost rings. 438

ANALYSIS OF LEAD-UP TO IRAQ WAR

The September 11th, 2001 attacks fundamentally altered the U.S. perception of the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction. No longer would the U.S. accommodate states that threatened to supply terrorists with these weapons. President Bush initiated a crisis for Iraq in his 12 September 2002 address at the United Nations when he made the compellent demand that Iraq abandon its WMD. He backed up this demand with the threat of removing Saddam from power if he failed to disarm. The U.S. signaled the

credibility of its threat politically with the quick and bipartisan authorization from Congress to use force, diplomatically with the passing of UNSCR 1441 which entailed “serious consequences” for Iraqi noncompliance, and militarily with a public release of its plans for a rapid buildup of ground forces.

Though the U.S. threatened a ground invasion, Saddam did not find such a denial strategy credible. He was convinced, rather, that the U.S. would rely extensively on airpower and he dispersed his government and military to defend themselves against air strikes. His conclusions were founded in part on the propensity of the U.S. to employ airpower over ground forces.

Saddam miscalculated by not anticipating a U.S. invasion of Baghdad. He instead dispersed and hid his forces in anticipation of airstrikes. He also prepared against domestic threats to his personal survival and that of his regime and designed the defense of Baghdad with this in mind. He had witnessed the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan to the ragtag Northern Alliance Army supported by U.S. airpower. He had also experienced the near toppling of his regime by Shia and Kurdish opposition in the March uprisings of 1991. From this point of view, Saddam’s decisions not to take such defensive measures as flooding the Euphrates, setting fire to oil fields or reinforcing key strategic positions to the south make more sense. Why endure these costs or expend his army defending positions which U.S. ground forces would never threaten? From Saddam’s perspective it was preferable to instead employ all his forces to insulate his regime. He could then ride out U.S. airstrikes, as he had done for Desert Fox, while defending against any domestic opposition.
Saddam also mistakenly hoped that Bush would order an attack only if the U.S. received a clear mandate from the Security Council as it had for the Gulf War. Saddam realized that conceding to UNSCR 1441 was a necessary step in attempting to forestall a U.S. attack. His strategy of removing all traces of WMD and cooperating with inspectors was an effort to eliminate any justification the U.S. might have for military action and to bolster French and Russian efforts to prevent Security Council authorization. Unfortunately, the Bush administration was unwilling to accept that, after twelve years of defiance, Saddam would finally relent and could now be trusted to abide by UN resolutions. President Bush was convinced Iraq had WMD and there was nothing Saddam could do to satisfy him. The U.S. interpretation of the resolution intentionally placed Saddam in a “Catch-22”: if he continued to deny Iraq had any WMD, the U.S. would label him a liar and, if he produced WMD, the U.S. would call him a cheat. Either way, the U.S. would have its justification for an attack.

Vice President Dick Cheney elaborated on this skepticism regarding WMD inspections in a 27 August 2002 speech. In his view, Iraqi cooperation with UN inspectors provided no assurances of Iraqi compliance. “On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box.

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439 Evidence of the United States belief that Iraq had WMD is its secret prewar planning, which assumed both that Iraq had WMD and that removal of WMD was one of the two primarily objectives of a ground campaign. In addition the U.S. military planning included preparing troops for combat in a contaminated war zone. Franks, Tommy and Malcolm McConnell (2004) American Soldier HarperCollins: New York 350, 371

440 White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer reiterated this position in a 2 December 2002 Press conference “If Saddam Hussein indicates that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is violating United Nations resolutions, then we will know that Saddam Hussein again deceived the world. If he says he doesn’t have any, then I think that we will find out whether or not Saddam Hussein is saying something that we believe will be verifiably false.” CNN http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/02/se.03.html accessed 6 April 2009
Meanwhile, he would continue to plot.” 441 Saddam’s decision to destroy all evidence of WMD would later make it impossible for Iraq to account for the whereabouts of known WMD stockpiles. As a result, Iraqi officials were unable to dispute U.S. claims that these supplies were in fact hidden. 442

When Secretary Powell declared Iraq in material breach of UNSCR 1441, the U.S. abandoned its pretense of a coercive strategy, favoring instead a brute force strategy to depose Saddam. 443 The U.S. did not adopt a coercive strategy for regime change as President Bush did not believe Saddam would ever voluntarily abdicate power. 444 In fact, it was the threat of forcing regime change which the U.S. had levied against its demand for Iraq to disarm. This confirms that the U.S. did not consider regime change to be within the range of possible coercive outcomes, but an objective that could only be achieved through force.

**ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

In this section, I assess two alternative interpretations of events: that Iraq was not coerced into abandoning WMD, and that Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum amounted to a coercive demand for regime change which failed.

The first argument claims that, although he had allowed his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs to decay, Saddam had the intention of reconstituting these weapons programs once sanctions were removed. This is the finding of the Iraqi

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442 There is evidence the U.S. truly believed WMD programs did exist. The U.S. not only made this its *casus belli* for war, but actually put together the Iraqi Survey Team before the invasion to document this evidence.


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Survey Group (ISG), sent in by the Bush administration to discover hidden stockpiles and to assess the extent of Iraq’s WMD programs. \(^{445}\) Though ISG found no physical evidence, after interviews with Saddam and his surviving deputies, it surmised that Saddam continued to value WMD and that he believed they had helped win the Iran-Iraq war, had deterred a U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991, and that ambiguity over WMD had deterred the Israelis and Iranians in the 1990s. ISG concluded that Saddam had retained the scientists to reconstitute his WMD programs in the event economic sanctions were lifted.

The argument for Saddam’s plans to reconstitute his WMD, however, is not backed by the facts. The only evidence presented by the ISG for Iraq’s intention to reconstitute was the retention of the Iraqi scientists and technicians who had constructed and operated the WMD facilities. But what was Saddam supposed to have done with these highly educated Iraqi citizens? Short of exile or execution, neither of which had been previously demanded by the U.S. or UN, there was little Saddam could have done to disavow himself of their expertise. In sum, there is no evidence Saddam ever intended to reconstitute Iraqi WMD. Instead, all of his actions after September 11\(^{th}\), 2001 indicate he was ridding Iraq of all traces of WMD.

Even if the ISG findings were accepted, however, they do not refute the argument that U.S. compellent demands caused Iraq to change its behavior in 2002. In fact, Iraq began allowing UN inspectors back into country after an absence of 4 years and cooperated more fully with inspections than it had ever done in the past. Saddam further

made a policy change by abandoning his strategy of ambiguity over the existence of Iraqi WMD. Iraq took additional conciliatory actions by destroying all of its new Al Samud II medium-range ballistic missiles. U.S. coercive diplomacy therefore succeeded in obtaining the core demands of UNSCR 1441, even though the U.S. would accept neither Saddam’s concessions nor the evidence that Iraq no longer possessed WMD.

A final argument has been made that President Bush did in fact make the compellent demand for Iraqi regime change, for which coercion failed.\(^{446}\) His ultimatum was for Saddam and his sons to depart Iraq within 48-hours or face a U.S. invasion. Only after this deadline had expired and Saddam had summarily rejected this demand did the war commence.

There are two reasons, however, to reject the assertion that Bush’s ultimatum was, in fact, a coercive demand. First, the U.S. was unwilling to negotiate with Iraq and, unlike in 1991 when the Soviet Union played a critical role in convincing Saddam to concede to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, there was no such intermediary in 2003. Saddam had, in fact, alienated Russia in December of 2002 by canceling a major oil contract with the country to punish it for voting in favor of UNSCR 1441.\(^{447}\) Second, the Bush administration did not intend to nor believed the ultimatum would coerce Saddam out of power. In fact, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice favored an alternative draft of Bush’s ultimatum speech in which the pending military action was to be simply announced.\(^{448}\) It did not make sense to her to declare an ultimatum if the U.S. intended to invade Iraq regardless of Saddam’s response. Prior to the end of the 48-hour deadline,


in fact, the White House went on to make public its intention to enter Iraq even if Saddam did abdicate power and accept exile. Finally, while Bush officials hinted that the U.S. might accept an offer of exile for Saddam, President Bush would make no guarantees for the safety of Saddam or his family should they follow through with the offer.

In sum, the Iraq War was not a case of coercion and the Bush ultimatum, which was in effect, an unconditional demand for Iraqi surrender, should not be considered a case of coercion failure. Rather, it should be seen as a successful case of a brute force strategy of invasion followed by an extremely long and costly occupation.

**ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME**

In this final section, I assess predictions of the two hypotheses for coercion failure presented below in Table 4.11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demand</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead-up to Iraq War</td>
<td>Iraq declare WMD programs and fully cooperate with UN inspectors</td>
<td>Predicts Success</td>
<td>Predicts initial Success then Failure</td>
<td>Coercion Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep 02 – 20 Mar 03</td>
<td></td>
<td>WMD not required for Iraqi, Saddam or his regime survival</td>
<td>U.S. military presence initially limited until December when U.S. in position to make credible threat of attack</td>
<td>Iraq reveals all evidence that it no longer has WMD and cooperates with inspectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.11: Predictions of Coercion Outcome

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TESTING SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS

The survival hypothesis predicts coercion is likely to succeed when concessions do not threaten the target state, regime, or regime leader’s survival, so long as the target has the means to resist. And in the lead-up to the Iraqi War the U.S. demand, which effectively called for Saddam Hussein to abandon his policy of ambiguity over the existence WMD, threatened the survival of neither Iraq, nor the Baath party, nor Saddam. I do not suggest, however, that Saddam was not concerned over the safety of all three. In fact, he continually adopted measures to decrease the likelihood of invasion, revolt, and coup. His WMD policy was an effort to deter Iran, the founding of the Fedayeen and reorganization of homeland defense by region was to prevent revolution, and his elaborate internal security network was to protect against coups. Still, the Iraqi Army was strong enough to stand up against Iran and Saddam’s internal security measures protected him and his regime from internal threats. Therefore conceding to no longer having WMD did not risk the survival of Iraq, Saddam, or his regime and the survival hypothesis therefore correctly predicts coercion would likely succeed.

Impact on Iraq State Survival

The most credible regional threat to the Iraqi state was that posed by Iran.451 However, although Iran now had an airpower advantage as a result of the Gulf War, Iraq’s Army of 350,000 troops and 2,300 tanks was still larger than Iran’s 305,000 troops and 700 tanks. And, as evidenced twice in the Iran-Iraq war, an Iranian invasion would

likely bog down in the southern region of Al-Basrah and thereby not threaten Iraq at large.

Since Iraq had previously employed chemical weapons against Iran, the threat of Iraqi WMD likely had an impact on Iranian calculations for future military action against Iraq. Still given the relative weakness of Iranian forces, the Iraqi Army was well equipped to defend itself against any attempt by Iran to invade and overthrow Saddam.

The other external threat to Iraqi survival was that posed by the United States. Saddam’s ambiguity over WMD, however, would not likely have deterred U.S. military action. Indeed the weapons had not deterred the U.S. in 1991 when Iraq actually possessed them. Further, since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Iraqi WMD served more as a catalyst than a deterrent as it now provided the Bush administration the excuse they were looking for to invade.

In sum, Saddam’s policy of ambiguity over WMD likely had some deterrent value against a limited Iranian attack, but it was not required for Iraqi state survival, and after 9/11, presented the Bush administration with a casus belli.

Impact on Saddam’s Regime for Conceding

Besides its impact on Iran, ambiguity over WMD also had a potential deterrent effect on domestic opposition groups such as the Shia and the Kurds. Conceding would not only remove the threat of WMD to these groups, but also would provide a signal that Saddam’s regime was weak. Saddam, however, had suppressed domestic opposition following the March uprising after the Gulf War, and in the ensuing years had taken measures to prevent another revolt.
In 1995, Saddam founded the Fedayeen, his loyal paramilitary organization, which gave local Baath parties additional force to keep towns and villages in line.\textsuperscript{452} In the wake of the Desert Fox airstrikes of 1998, Saddam also split the administration of Iraq into four regions, delegating control of the military forces in each district to a trusted Baath politician.\textsuperscript{453} Though this would later hinder the Iraqi military from defending against the U.S. invasion, Saddam ordered this reorganization to retain better domestic control over Iraq and to prevent the rise of rivals from within the army.

In sum, conceding ambiguity over WMD did reveal a weakness in Saddam’s regime which consequently would have made it more vulnerable to revolution, if strong domestic opposition groups had existed. His founding of the Fedayeen along with the administrative reorganization of homeland defense, however, had prevented the formation of armed dissident groups. In addition, had Saddam continued to resist the UN resolutions, he would have increased the likelihood of a U.S. attack, which he, in turn, feared could have triggered an uprising.

**Impact on Saddam for Conceding**

As the leader of an authoritarian personalist regime, Saddam should not have expected the same level of audience costs for making concessions as faced by either democratic leaders or leaders of military or single party regimes.\textsuperscript{454} Saddam had in recent years expended enormous resources on an elaborate internal security network to

monitor not only the Iraqi population, but also watch those within his own military and security apparatus. To further protect against a military coup, he forbade his army, save the loyal Special Guard, from entering Baghdad. Saddam had, in fact, once again successfully insulated himself from the threat of coup to the extent that concession to U.S. demands did not threaten Saddam’s ouster from within.

In sum, Saddam conceding to U.S. demands and removing the ambiguity over Iraqi WMD did not threaten Iraqi, Saddam, or his regime’s survival. While such a concession did remove whatever deterrent value WMD had against an Iranian attack, it decreased, though obviously did not eliminate, the likelihood of a U.S. invasion. The concession also revealed the Baath regime as weak, but Saddam had effectively taken measures to reduce the risk of revolt by forming his Fedayeen and by reorganizing homeland defense. Finally, Saddam’s personal survival was ensured by his placing a premium on loyalty within his regime and employing an elaborate internal security network to deter coups. Since survival was not at stake, the survival hypothesis therefore correctly predicts Saddam would concede to U.S. demands and coercion would succeed.

**TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS**

The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion as likely to fail when a powerful challenger cannot credibly commit *ex ante* to make no further demands once the target concedes. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, the commitment problem was minimal, as the

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U.S. had insufficient military force in the region to make credible threats of invasion. The commitment hypothesis therefore initially correctly predicts Saddam’s concessions in the fall of 2002. The situation changed, however, in early 2003 with the U.S. deployment of more troops and tactical aircraft in preparation for a brute force invasion. This force buildup tipped the regional balance of power further in the United State’s favor. This increased the ability for the U.S. to back up increased demands with credible force. Still, Saddam continued to cooperate with UN inspectors even as the U.S. prepared for invasion and as the U.S. maneuvered diplomatically, though unsuccessfully, for a second UN resolution authorizing force. The commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts Saddam would discontinue cooperation and coercion would fail as the likelihood that the U.S. could demand regime change increased.

*Explaining Iraq’s continued Cooperation with the United Nations*

What explains Saddam’s continued cooperation with UN inspectors as the U.S. prepared for invading? By early 2003 it was apparent that the U.S. had deployed sufficient military capability to attack. Not yet evident was the United States’ will to invade Iraq without a Security Council resolution authorizing it to do so. Saddam hoped that Iraqi cooperation would be sufficient to negate the Bush administration’s argument for war. Even in February, when the U.S. was pressing hard in the Security Council for a resolution to authorize force, Iraq’s best option was to continue to cooperate with inspectors in hopes that the French and the Russians would prevent authorization and that the U.S. would not attack without such justification.

France and Russia no longer felt obliged to rubber stamp U.S.-sponsored resolutions as they had in 1990 in the lead-up to the Gulf War and in 1994 in response to
the Iraqi troop movement to the Kuwaiti border. The diplomatic battle within the Security Council over economic sanctions on Iraq in the late 1990s had driven a wedge between them and the U.S., as France and Russia stood to reap the largest economic rewards from the lifting of sanctions. As long as U.S. demands were vetted through the Security Council and Iraq conceded to those demands, Saddam could correctly calculate that French and Russian diplomacy would prevent the U.S. from garnering a resolution to authorize force.

Saddam’s mistake was not in its continued cooperation, but in underestimating U.S. intentions for a full-fledge ground invasion to Baghdad to depose him from power, even without a UN resolution.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I assessed interstate asymmetric conflict between the United States and Iraq from the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until the 20 March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. I analyzed three crises from this conflict: the Gulf War from 2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991, the Iraqi troop movement to the Kuwaiti border in October of 1994, and the lead-up to the Iraq War from 12 September 2002 to 20 March 2003. In these crises, the U.S. made four compellent demands, for three of which coercion succeeded in gaining Iraqi concessions (see Table 4.12). I assessed the survival and commitment explanations for coercion failure and conclude that the survival hypothesis is a better predictor for the coercive outcomes of the three crises.

The hypothesis on survival correctly predicted all four coercive outcomes. Saddam conceded to U.S. demands as long as the Iraqi state, Saddam’s regime, and his leadership survival were not at stake. The single case of coercion failure involved
President Bush’s ultimatum in 1991 that the Iraq Army retreat from Kuwait within 48 hours, a concession which would have cost the Iraqi Army a great number of heavy weapons and been a humiliation for Saddam so damaging as to threaten his regime’s domestic control of Iraq. In fact, the subsequent March uprising illustrates just how precarious Saddam’s control of Iraq was at the end of the Gulf War, regardless of his decision to concede or fight. In addition, the issue of target survival explains why in 2003, rather than adopting a coercive strategy, the U.S. chose a brute force invasion to achieve Iraqi regime change. This demonstrates the limits of coercive strategies for higher order demands such as homeland territory or regime change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compelling Demand</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Iraqi Army from Kuwait</td>
<td>Predicts Success</td>
<td>Kuwait not required for Iraqi state survival and Saddam can withdraw and claim victory for standing up to U.S.</td>
<td>Coercion Success Saddam agrees to Soviet proposal to withdraw Iraqi Army from Kuwait in 21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 90-Feb 91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Predicts Failure Deployed forces and demonstrated U.S. military power and resolve makes credible military threat if U.S. makes further demands (which it does)</td>
<td>Coercion Failure Saddam refuses to accept U.S. 48 hour ultimatum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Troop Movement to Border Oct 94</td>
<td>Iraqi Army abandon heavy weapons in a 48-hour withdrawal from Kuwait</td>
<td>Predicts Failure</td>
<td>Humiliating withdrawal if Iraqi Army forced into a hasty retreat. Sign of Saddam’s weakness which threatens his regime</td>
<td>Coercion Success Iraq withdraws its troops from the Kuwaiti border and returns them to garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Predicts Coercion Success Deployment of troops to south not required for Iraqi security. Saddam not humiliated as Iraq given opportunity to announce redeployment prior to any U.S. ultimatum</td>
<td>Coercion Failure Saddam reveals all evidence that it no longer has WMD and cooperates with inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Predicts Coercion Success U.S. can threaten only limited air and cruise missile strikes. U.S. deployed military capability not credible for either direct attack on Republican Guard or invasion of southern Iraq</td>
<td>Coercion Success Saddam agrees to Soviet proposal to withdraw Iraqi Army from Kuwait in 21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Table 4.12: Predictions of Coercion Outcomes
The commitment hypothesis correctly predicted just two of the four coercion outcomes. Yet notably, for all three crises there was little evidence that a U.S. commitment problem had a significant impact on Saddam’s decision making. This is a particularly troubling finding for the commitment argument as there is an incentive for a target to communicate its commitment concerns in order to gain additional assurances from the challenger that it will not make further demands.

Finally, I will take this opportunity to make four comments before turning to the next case of U.S. foreign policy with Serbia in Bosnia and Kosovo. First, the typology for coercion I employed assisted in the coding of each case in terms of the nature (compellent or deterrent) and level (policy, extra-territory, homeland, or regime change) of demands and type (punishment or denial) of threats. Identifying the core ex ante demands also provided a means for coding U.S. coercion and foreign policy outcomes. This method enabled me to identify the key dependent and independent variables in each case and provided a means of cross-case comparison. The asymmetric coercion model was also a useful framework for examining the strategic interaction which transpired between the U.S. and Iraq. This included examining the range of strategic options available to the U.S. as the challenger, from accommodation, to sanctions, to coercion, to brute force invasion. It was a systematic means of evaluating Iraq’s decision to resist or concede as a function of the demands and threats issued by the United States.

Still, as a parsimonious rational model, the asymmetric coercion model has limits. Notably, it does not incorporate psychological biases, misperceptions, or miscalculations, which are particularly relevant to the decision-making of Saddam Hussein and of George W. Bush. Nor does a two-actor model adequately explain the role of third parties, such
as that of the Soviet Union during the Gulf War or of post-Soviet Russia in 1994 during the Kuwaiti border crisis. Finally, the unitary actor assumption omits important domestic considerations for both the U.S. and Iraq. I have attempted to overcome this shortcoming, at least in part, through a combination of process tracing and analysis aimed at assessing causality in each case. I also considered the actions of third parties and relaxed the unitary actor assumption in testing the survival and commitment hypotheses for coercion outcomes.

Second, successful coercion does not necessarily avoid war. Coercion in the air campaign of the 1991 Gulf War employed limited force, but was still extremely violent and risked blood and treasure on both sides. In addition, both in 1991 and in 2003, Iraq was coerced successfully, but the U.S. refused to accept its concessions. For the Gulf War the high military, political, and diplomatic costs to the elder Bush’s administration to deploy offensive forces to the region led to a fear on its part that Saddam would escape with his military intact by agreeing to the initial demand of unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; for all its efforts, Saddam could simply invade again once U.S. forces departed from theater. This, factored in with the success of the coalition air campaign in increasing the probability of a brute force victory, led the U.S. to increase its demands in late February. To satisfy U.S. officials Iraq would now have to abandon its heavy weapons in a humiliating hasty retreat from Kuwait, a demand to which Saddam could not concede. Again in 2003 the U.S. refused to accept that Iraq was willing to abide by UN resolutions to abandon its WMD. Again refusing to take “yes” for an answer, the Bush administration used the pretense of Iraqi WMD as justification for its brute force strategy.
Third, the October 1994 deployment of Republican Guard forces to the Kuwaiti border is a case in which a punishment strategy of threatening conventional air and cruise missile strikes successfully coerced Saddam into making a policy change. This concession restricted Iraq's sovereignty over the number of troops it could deploy within its own territory south of the 32nd parallel. The aftermath of this crisis also highlights how the punishment from economic sanctions eventually led Saddam to recognize Kuwait in the hopes of getting the sanctions lifted. Granted, these were relatively minor concessions compared to territory or regime change, but the costs to the U.S. of the threat of limited air strikes and of economic sanctions were likewise minimal compared to the later costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

This case of the success of a punishment strategy runs counter to Robert Pape's assertion that only coercion by denial works. Pape's research, however, is limited to only those "important" airpower cases involving territorial demands. This was indeed the case in the Gulf War crisis, where a denial strategy did cause Saddam to concede Kuwait. The 1994 case demonstrates, however, that when demands are low, punishment strategies can, in fact, achieve more limited U.S. objectives.

Finally, as this case illustrates, there are limits to the effectiveness of coercion. Coercion is less likely to achieve high level demands which threaten target survival. For such objectives, a challenger may instead choose a brute force strategy, as was the case with Iraqi regime change in 2003.

In Chapter 4, I conducted qualitative analysis of three asymmetric crises drawn from the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and found that the survival hypothesis was a better predictor of coercive outcomes than the commitment hypothesis. In this chapter, I continue this analysis, looking to a conflict between the U.S. and Serbia within the same time period. It is a conflict that warrants careful study, as the Clinton Administration chose on two occasions to go to war over non-vital U.S. security interests. Reluctant to expose its troops to the risks of ground combat, the U.S. conducted air-only operations. I focus analysis on two crises during this period: the Bosnian Civil War from the spring of 1992 until its conclusion with the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, and ethnic violence between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo which escalated in the summer of 1998 until the ceasefire of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes against Serbia on 9 June 1999.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides context to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and to the political and ethnic divisions which led to the Bosnian Civil War. I summarize key events, actions, decisions, and final outcomes and conclude with an assessment of the two hypotheses for coercion failure. In the second section, I repeat this process for Kosovo. In the final section I conclude by examining how well the survival and commitment hypotheses fare.
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

The origins of modern Yugoslavia can be traced back to the end of World War I with the founding of the *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*, renamed the *Kingdom of Yugoslavia* in 1929. In World War II, the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia until partisans liberated the country in 1945 and elected Marshal Tito as president. Three decades later, in 1974, in response to increasing ethnic violence, Tito amended the constitution to create two autonomous regions within Serbia: the primarily ethnic-Albanian Kosovo and multi-ethnic Vojvodina (see Map 5.1). Tito died in 1980 without having established a successor, an omission which led to tensions throughout the 1980s. Slovenians and Croats demanded a reduction in the influence of the federal government while the Serbs sought greater control over Yugoslavia. Additionally, Kosovo demanded that its status be elevated to that of a Republic.456

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By the time of Tito's death, Slobodan Milosevic was a well entrenched and rising member of the Serbian Communist party. Born to Montenegrin parents, Milosevic grew up in the Serbian town of Pozarevac, where in high school he joined the Communist party.

457 Central Intelligence Agency (1993) "Former Yugoslavia (Political)" map no. 728410 (R00472) 4-93 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/former_yugoslavia.jpg accessed 1 June 2009
and met his future wife, Mirjana Markovic, who also became his closest political
confidante.\footnote{Sell, Louis (2002) \textit{Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia} Durham NC Duke University Press 16} Whereas Markovic was a communist ideologue, Milosevic’s membership in the party was primarily a means of career advancement. With his graduation from law school in 1964 he garnered the favor of an ambitious Serbian politician, Ivan Stambolic. Over the next two decades, Milosevic rose on Stambolic’s coattails through a series of increasingly influential economic and governmental postings. These culminated in Stambolic’s ascension to the Serbian Presidency in 1986, at which point Milosevic assumed Stambolic’s former position as Serbian communist party chief.\footnote{LeBor, Adam (2004) \textit{Milosevic A Biography} New Haven CT: Yale University Press 71}

Their political partnership began to unravel shortly thereafter, however, in September of 1986 when a Belgrade newspaper leaked sections of a pro-Serbian nationalist memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of the Sciences and Arts. While Stambolic publicly condemned the memorandum, Milosevic remained ambiguous over the question of Serbian nationalism.\footnote{Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) \textit{Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic} Boulder, CO: Westview 59} Ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo later mounted in April of 1987 and Milosevic appeared before a crowd of 15,000 denouncing the Kosovar Albanian demand for independence, “Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo.”\footnote{Reuters (26 April 1987) “Protest Staged by Serbs in an Albanian Region” \textit{New York Times}} Milosevic returned to Belgrade a national hero and, within five months, leveraged his populist support to drive Stambolic from power.\footnote{Stambolic did not officially resign until December 1987} Milosevic then moved to consolidate his powerbase in Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. In October of 1988 he replaced the leaders of Vojvodina with men loyal to
him and, in March of 1989, he forced Kosovo to accept a new constitution which significantly decreased its autonomy.\textsuperscript{463}

By the time Milosevic finally assumed the presidency of Serbia in May of 1989, he was in a position to control Yugoslavia through an alliance with Montenegro and his support from Vojvodina and Kosovo. Consequently, the relationship between Slovenia and Serbia grew increasingly tenuous and in September of 1989, the Slovenian Parliament declared itself a sovereign state.\textsuperscript{464} In December, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo formed the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) with Ibrahim Rugova as their leader and adopted a strategy of passive resistance in their quest for independence.\textsuperscript{465}

\textit{Milosevic's Consolidation of Power}

Milosevic rode a wave of Serbian nationalism into the presidency. Once in office, however, he faced the dilemma of how to consolidate his powerbase from the support he had drawn from disparate factions of the Serbian populace. Old guard communists wished to maintain the communist party, non-communist nationalists wanted an end to the communist system, and reformers sought economic reform.\textsuperscript{466}

In the fall of 1989, communism collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, taking the League of Communists in Yugoslavia down with it, an institution that was formally dissolved in late January of 1990.\textsuperscript{467} Milosevic responded to these events in two ways. First, he crafted a new Serbian constitution that was overwhelmingly approved in a

\textsuperscript{464} Even with this declaration it would be nearly two years before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation} New York: Penguin 77
\textsuperscript{465} Doder, Dusko and Louise Branson (1999) \textit{Milosevic Portrait of a Tyrant} New York: Free Press 61
\textsuperscript{467} Simons, Marlise (23 Jan 1990) "Upheaval in the East: Yugoslavia; Yugoslav Communists Vote To End Party’s Monopoly" \textit{New York Times}
national referendum in June of 1990. This gave the office of the presidency broad powers, uncontestable by either parliament or constitutional courts.\textsuperscript{468} Second, Milosevic dismantled the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) in July 1990, repackaging it as the new Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The SPS inherited all the SKS assets and much of its membership, making it the most powerful party in Serbia.\textsuperscript{469} Three contending, albeit far less popular, political parties also formed during this period: the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), founded by nationalists, Vuk Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) formed by Seselj after he split away from the SPO, and, finally, the Democratic Party headed by Belgrade intellectuals.\textsuperscript{470}

\textit{Slovenia Secession and Croatia’s Civil War}

On 23 December 1990, a Slovenian referendum for independence passed by an overwhelmingly margin. The Serbian-dominated federal government in Belgrade responded to the mounting threat of a Slovenian succession by taking control of the Yugoslav People’s Army (\textit{Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija}, JNA). The Slovenian government, however, resisted and seized control of the heavy military equipment in Slovenia.

The following March, Milosevic met secretly with Croatian President Franco Tudjman at Tito’s favorite hunting villa in Karadjordjevo, in northwest Serbia.

\textsuperscript{468} Hayden, Robert M (1992) “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics” \textit{Slavic Review} 51:4 (Winter) 660
According to Tudjman, he and Milosevic agreed to the demarcation of borders between Croatia and Serbia and to the partitioning of Bosnia.\(^{471}\)

On June 25\(^{th}\), 1991 the republics of Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence in response to rising nationalism, to dismal economic conditions in Yugoslavia, and to the growing assertiveness of Milosevic.\(^{472}\) Slovenia’s secession was relatively bloodless, following only ten days of fighting against an inept, Serbian-dominated JNA.\(^{473}\)

Croatia was much less fortunate. The Karadjordjevo talks did not prevent violence from escalating between Croatian forces and the JNA, which fought alongside ethnic Serbs from the eastern Croatian regions of Krajina and Slavonia. The UN Security Council responded to the violence by adopting an arms embargo for all of Yugoslavia, a measure which would later hamper overt efforts by the U.S. to arm the Bosnian Muslims.\(^{474}\) Though the Serbs made early gains in Croatia, by autumn large-scale desertions had weakened the JNA offensive. In November, both the Serbs and the Croats agreed to a UN-brokered truce and the deployment of nearly fifteen thousand United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers.\(^{475}\) While the ceasefire provided a much needed respite for Croatia to reorganize and rearm, it locked in territorial gains for the Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia. It also freed the Serbian-controlled JNA, now


\(^{473}\) Fewer than 70 were killed in the fighting, over half of which were JNA.


\(^{475}\) Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation New York: Penguin 177
renamed the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ), to join Serbs in neighboring Bosnia in preparation for civil war.476

**Ethnic Political Division in Bosnia**

While Croatia’s war was fought between the Croats and Serbs, in Bosnia three ethnic factions vied for power. Parliamentary elections in November of 1990 had split Bosnia along clear ethnic lines. Muslims constituted 44% of the population and were represented by the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) led by its founder and later Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic. At 31%, Serbs were the next largest ethnic group, electing Serb nationalist Radovan Karadzic as the head of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS). The SDS was the most powerful party within Bosnia and enjoyed the support of both Serbia and the JNA. Its headquarters was established at Pale, a town just east of Sarajevo. Croats made up only 17% of the Bosnian population and were represented by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ). Though the Bosnian Croats suffered under weak leadership, they did receive political and military support from Croatia and its president, Franco Tudjman.477

After Slovenia and Croatia’s secession, a tear had appeared in the political fabric of Bosnia. Muslims and Croats favored independence over membership in a Serbian-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Bosnian Serbs, however, preferred Bosnia remain a republic within the FRY and refused to be a minority ethnic group in an

independent Bosnia. On 15 October 1991 the Bosnian parliament, minus its Serbian contingent, voted for sovereignty but refrained from declaring independence. In response, the Serbs declared their own Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, later renamed the Republika Srpska and on 9 January 1992, they declared their independence from Bosnia. Fearing civil war, the European Community (EC) initiated negotiations with the three Bosnian factions. The talks, however, were overcome by events as Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted for independence in a 1 March 1992 referendum boycotted by the Serbs. From there, violence quickly thereafter spiraled into full-scale civil war.

**BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR 1992 – 1995**

The dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War triggered violence rarely witnessed in Europe since World War II. Particularly brutal, the three-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to simply as Bosnia) left tens of thousands dead, displaced two million more, and introduced the term *ethnic cleansing* to the humanitarian intervention lexicon. Throughout the conflict, the objectives of the international community were to ensure the survival of the Bosnian state and to put a stop to the killing. This was achieved only through a U.S. strategy that combined economic

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478 Binder, David (16 October 1991) “Serbia and Croatia Agree to Another Cease-Fire; 4th Independence Move” *New York Times*
480 The Croat’s were divided over the issue of Bosnian independence. Zagreb’s eventual support for the referendum was more out of a desire to wrest control of Bosnia from Belgrade as a potential stepping stone toward the incorporation of Bosnia rather than a desire for Bosnian independence. Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup (1999) *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* New York: M.E. Sharpe 106-7
sanctions, military force, the de facto partitioning of Bosnia, and the long-term commitment of U.S. ground troops.

By any measure, Bosnia is a complex and difficult case of asymmetric coercion. The conflict included numerous actors from the Yugoslav republics and their ethnic-based political parties, all seeking independence. It also involved intervention from international institutions and the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Within Bosnia, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats struggled for territory and sovereignty while the bordering states of Croatia and Serbia intervened both politically and militarily. International institutions stepped in early on in the conflict. The European Community and the United Nations formed the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in an ill-fated attempt to bring about a peace agreement. As the conflict wore on, NATO became involved, conducting limited air operations to deter the Bosnian Serbs. When ICFY efforts failed, the United States and Russia joined Great Britain, Germany, and France to form the Contact Group and began placing greater diplomatic and military pressure on the warring parties. Ultimately, the United States brought about a permanent settlement through a coercive strategy of sanctions, air strikes, and rearming and supporting the Croat-Muslim offensive.

Though these efforts eventually achieved the United States' core ex ante objective of maintaining a Bosnian state and ending the violence, Bosnia is hardly a shining success story for U.S. foreign policy. It took three violent years of civil war to bring the actors to the table and, in order to reach a settlement, the Clinton administration had to concede to the partitioning of Bosnia and allow the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to keep territory secured through ethnic cleansing. The U.S. was also complicit in
circumventing a UN Security Council arms embargo in its own efforts to arm the Bosnian Muslims. By the conclusion of the war, the United States had placed its reputation and prestige, along with that of NATO, at risk over its non-vital interests in ending the Bosnian Civil War. The U.S. then continued to pay for its “success” by deploying peacekeeping troops to the region for nearly a decade.

I divide the Bosnian Civil War into three coercive stages and provide a synopsis of the key explanatory and dependent variables in Table 5.1. In the first stage, from April 1992 to February 1994, the United States supported the EC-UN peace effort. This diplomatic initiative implemented economic sanctions and an arms embargo, and deployed thousands of peacekeepers to the region, but did not directly threaten military force. In the second stage, from February 1994 to April 1995, the United States took over negotiations by forming the Contact Group. During this period the U.S. brokered a Muslim-Croat peace agreement, resulting in the Bosnian Federation. The military balance of power in the region shifted in favor of the Croats and the Bosnian Federation with the support of the U.S. for their military build up which accompanied the limited NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The period then culminated in a temporary four-month ceasefire over the winter and spring of 1995.

In the third and final stage, May - November 1995, violence again erupted as Croatian forces assumed the offensive against the Serbs, gaining momentum in Croatia and then joining with Muslim Federation forces in Bosnia throughout the summer of 1995. Alongside this offensive, the United States adopted a sticks-and-carrots strategy, threatening air strikes while offering a peace deal which would partition Bosnia by recognizing the Republika Srpska and lift UN sanctions on Serbia. A ceasefire was

\footnote{The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993.}
eventually declared in mid-October and a political settlement reached at the Dayton Peace Accords in November of 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive Stage I</td>
<td>SERBIA <em>Policy Change</em> - Pressure Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan</td>
<td>Punishment - Economic Sanctions</td>
<td>SERBIA <em>Partial Failure</em> accepts Vance-Owen but continues support of Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>Failure Civil War continues and Serbs control 70% of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1992 – February 1994</td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS <em>Homeland</em> <em>Regime change</em> - Accept Vance-Owen resulting in break up of Bosnian Serb government &amp; non-contiguous territorial concessions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive Stage II</td>
<td>SERBIA <em>Policy Change</em> - Pressure Bosnian Serbs to accept Contact Group proposal</td>
<td>Punishment - Economic Sanctions - Limited NATO air strikes</td>
<td>SERBIA <em>Partial Success</em> accepts Contact Group Proposal but continues to provide military support</td>
<td>Failure Though Civil War abates with temporary ceasefire, negotiations for permanent ceasefire fail and Serbs continue to control 70% of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1994 – April 1995</td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS <em>Homeland</em> - Accept Contact Group proposal resulting in territorial concessions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercive Stage III</td>
<td>SERBIA <em>Policy Change</em> - Pressure Bosnian Serbs to accept Contact Group Proposal</td>
<td>Punishment - Economic Sanctions <em>Denial</em> - Air strikes on Bosnian Serb Command and Control and weapon storage areas - Croat-Muslim ground campaign</td>
<td>Success Milosevic wrests Dayton Accords end Civil War in Bosnia</td>
<td>Success Dayton Accords end Civil War in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1995 – Nov 1995</td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS <em>Policy Change</em> - Accept Contact Group Proposal resulting in territorial concessions</td>
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Table 5.1: Coercion Typology of Bosnian Civil War, Feb 1992 – Nov 1995
In April of 1992, the civil war within Bosnia expanded into a regional conflict as both Croatia and Serbia moved forces into Bosnia. Following the Serb shelling of Sarajevo, the U.S. and EC formally recognized Bosnia’s independence in an ill-fated attempt to constrain the fighting.\(^{483}\) However, the late May arrival of General Ratko Mladic, appointed by Milosevic as commander of the newly-formed Bosnian Serb Army, only marked an escalation in the violence. The shelling of Sarajevo intensified and, in response, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which by then included Serbia and Montenegro and the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo.\(^{484}\) The sanctions did little to stop the fighting and the superior-armed Serbs soon gained 70% of Bosnian territory through a campaign of ethnic cleansing, i.e. purging eastern and northern Bosnia of most Muslims and Croats.\(^{485}\) This, in turn, generated a crisis for Europe as over two million refugees, roughly half the Bosnian population, either fled the country or were internally displaced.\(^{486}\)

Under pressure to take action to alleviate the situation, the United Nations deployed 1,700 UNPROFOR troops over the course of the summer and, in the fall,

The Croats were the most amenable to the Vance-Owen plan as their territorial ambitions were largely met in the placement of all three provinces along the Croatian

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border. By contrast, the Bosnian (Muslim) government had serious issues, both with the proposed constitution and with the division of territory. President Izetbegovic, however, hoped for a military intervention by the U.S. with the new Clinton Administration. Albeit reluctantly, he did agree to Vance-Owen in order to garner international support. He also rightly calculated the Serbs would never agree to such a plan. 491

The plan, in fact, produced a split between Serbs in Belgrade and Pale. Milosevic was increasingly concerned over the deteriorating health of Serbia’s economy and the negative impact of the UN-imposed sanctions. He prioritized Serbia’s economy over the interests of Serbian nationalists, who supported the Bosnian Serbs. This move was condemned by Serb nationalists, leading to the dissolution of the political alliance between Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). In subsequent elections, Milosevic’s Socialist Party was, however, able to form a more moderate government without the SRS. 492

Still Milosevic was reluctant to press Karadzic for an agreement until territorial gains in eastern Bosnia were resolved. 493 Not until April of 1993, when the Security Council voted to implement tougher sanctions against the FRY, did Milosevic finally begin to urge the Bosnian Serbs to sign. 494 Vance-Owen, however, called for the Serbs to

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relinquish territory they had just gained in the previous year’s fighting and the provinces designated for the Serbs were intentionally drawn non-contiguous to deny the viability of an independent Bosnian Serb state (Map 5.2). Believing that the provisions of Vance-Owen threatened the very survival of their newly-formed republic, Bosnian Serbs ignored Milosevic’s demands and overwhelmingly rejected the plan in a mid-May referendum.495

In addition to territorial issues, the plan also called for the Serbs to hand over their heavy weapons to their adversaries. Equally important, the plan was not backed by a threat credible enough to compel them to comply. The Croats and Muslims were too weak and were at the time fighting each other over the remaining 30% of Bosnia. No major power was willing to commit to employ its military in order to implement the plan. And Bosnian Serbs could afford to resist Milosevic as he was not yet in a position to leverage effective political and economic pressure against them.496 It would not be until the tides of war had turned in the summer of 1995 and the Bosnian Serbs were on the defensive that Milosevic could finally exert power over them.

United States Interests in Bosnia

Though the United States desired a peaceful political transition in the former Yugoslavia, it viewed the situation as a primarily European issue without vital U.S. security interests at stake. As such, the U.S. supported the EC’s diplomatic efforts but, even as the humanitarian crisis unfolded over the summer of 1992, it was unwilling to

commit military aid in the absence of a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{497} The Bush administration maintained this policy even as presidential candidate Bill Clinton called for the U.S. to consider military force and a lifting of the arms embargo to help stop the ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{498} In the fall of 1992 and throughout 1993, however, as thousands of European troops deployed to Bosnia as peacekeepers, U.S. security interests were now indirectly connected through the military commitments of its NATO allies.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF COERCIVE STAGE I: APRIL 1992 – FEBRUARY 1994}

The large out-flow of Bosnian refugees triggered a crisis for the United States. Without vital interests at stake, the U.S. readily deferred to the Europeans to broker a peace agreement to stop the fighting. The Vance-Owen plan, however, proved to be flawed as it mismatched the demands and threats it made of the Bosnian Serbs. It called for large homeland territorial concessions and regime change. A forfeiture of 30\% of Bosnian Serb-held territory would leave them with only scattered, non-contiguous provinces. They were also expected to surrender their arms and accept a Bosnian constitution which would end the newly-formed Bosnian Serb Republic. To back up these demands Vance-Owen threatened and implemented economic sanctions but made no significant threat of military force. The international troops deployed to Bosnia were not well-armed and operated under a UN peacekeeping mandate. More importantly, the balance of power in Bosnia lay in favor of the Serbs as they gained and held ground while the Croats and the Muslims expended their efforts fighting each other. In sum, coercive diplomacy failed because the significant demands for territorial concessions and

\textsuperscript{498} Ifill, Gwen (10 August 1992) “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Clinton Takes Aggressive Stances On Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict” \textit{New York Times}
the demise of the independent Bosnian Serb government were not backed by a sufficiently large threat (see Table 5.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 92 – Feb 94</td>
<td>SERBIA Policy Change - Pressure Bosnian Serbs to accept Vance-Owen</td>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>SERBIA Partial Failure accepts Vance-Owen but continues support of Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>Failure Civil War continues and Serbs control. 70% of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS Homeland Regime change - Accept Vance-Owen resulting in break up of Bosnian Serb government &amp; non-contiguous territorial concessions</td>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS Failure Refuses to accept Vance-Owen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Typology of Coercive Stage I, April 1992 – February 1994

While economic sanctions may have been insufficient to convince the Bosnian Serbs, they did motivate Milosevic. Bosnia was not part of Milosevic’s vision for a Greater Serbia. Rather than a demand for homeland territory or regime change, the Vance-Owen plan was merely a policy change for Serbia to stop its support of the Bosnian Serbs and to pressure them to concede. The Serbian economy, on the other hand, as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ongoing war, was now suffering from hyperinflation and a 50% loss of GDP, leaving it particularly vulnerable to UN sanctions. While Milosevic initially supported the Bosnian Serbs in its early victories, by April 1993 he viewed them as a major impediment to the removal of sanctions and the
stabilization of the Serbian economy. Milosevic's powerbase lay in his popularity and the support of the political elite in government and business. Both groups were threatened by the severe economic conditions.

By 1993, Milosevic was no longer politically aligned with the more radical Serbian nationalists in the SPO and SRS, who were now operating as opposition parties. Though he had initially supported the Bosnian Serbs, as the civil war continued and economic conditions worsened, he slowly shifted his policies against them. Despite the unlikelihood that the Bosnian Serbs would concede to demands to disband their newly-formed independent government and concede territory while they were winning, Milosevic began, at least publicly, to pressure them to accept Vance-Owen.499

In Athens, on 2 May 1993, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic caved into international pressure and signed on to the Vance-Owen peace agreement, though final approval rested with the Bosnian Serb National Assembly. Two weeks later, General Mladic appeared before the Assembly, offering up an impassioned speech against Vance-Owen and prompting the Assembly to reject the plan in the end.500 It would take additional time for the situation in Bosnia to shift to the point where Milosevic could leverage his political and media machine to exert sufficient influence over the Bosnian Serbs to change their minds.


By September of 1993 the Vance-Owen plan was dead. The ICFY changed tactics in the subsequent Owen-Stoltenberg and European Action plans and attempted to induce the Bosnian Serbs by redrawing the maps and conceding to the de facto

500 Binder, David (4 September 1994) “Pariah as Patriot; Ratko Mladic” New York Times Magazine
partitioning of Bosnia. Like Vance-Owen, however, these efforts demanded the more powerful Serbs relinquish territory without a credible threat compelling them to do so.

The dynamics of the conflict changed on 6 February 1994, when a single mortar round landed in Sarajevo’s Markala marketplace killing sixty-eight civilians. The attack and subsequent media coverage led to two changes in U.S. foreign policy. First, the U.S. was now willing to threaten NATO air strikes should the Serbs not cease the shelling and remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. The U.S. also demonstrated a willingness to enforce the UN’s previously mandated no-fly ban. Second, the U.S. commenced negotiations to end the fighting between the Croats and Muslims, first reaching a cease-fire on February 22nd and then forming the Bosnian Federation at the end of March 1994. This proved a major diplomatic achievement which would eventually shift the balance of power in the Federation’s favor as Croats and Muslims rearmed and refocused their attention against the Serbs.

In late March and April of 1994, Serbs attacked the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Gorazde, one of six designated safe areas. In an effort to deter further attack, the UN

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502 Cohen, Roger (7 Feb 1994) “TERROR IN SARAJEVO; NATO to hold Emergency Talks on Sarajevo Attack” New York Times. It is disputed who fired the artillery round.
503 North Atlantic Council (9 Feb 1994) “DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL” Press Release (94)15 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-015.htm accessed 4 June 2009. Though the ultimatum was also addressed to Muslim forces, it was clearly aimed at the Serbs which had the preponderance of heavy weapons around Sarajevo.
504 To prove the point the U.S. downed four Serb fighters. Gordon, Michael R. (1 Mar 1994) “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; NATO CRAFT DOWN 4 SERB WARPLANES ATTACKING BOSNIA” New York Times
505 Schmidt, William E. (24 Feb 1994) “Croats and Muslims Reach Truce To End the Other Bosnia Conflict” New York Times
approved three limited NATO air strikes. The Serbs retaliated by shelling the town, downing a NATO fighter, and taking 120 UN personnel hostage.

The Gorazde crisis brought an end to ICFY efforts and, on 24 April 1994, the ICFY was replaced as lead international negotiators by the newly-formed Contact Group, led by the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia, joined with representatives from France, Germany and Great Britain. The Contact Group differed from previous efforts, in that negotiations were bilateral in nature, the U.S. now charged with bringing the Croats and Muslims to the table, while Russia was responsible for the Serbs. The Contact Group announced its peace plan in mid-May, proposing a federated Bosnia, partitioning it with 51% of the territory going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs.

The United States advocated a “lift and strike” strategy, threatening to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian (Muslim) Army and strike the Bosnian Serb Army with NATO air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the terms of the Contact Group plan. The U.S. also wished to increase economic sanctions on Serbia to further motivate Milosevic to pressure Pale. The Russians, on their part, approved of the partitioning plan.

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506 UNSCR 824 (1993) on 6 May 1993 declared Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica as safe areas.
but resisted the other measures. In the end, the Contact Group plan, like previous efforts, lacked sufficient coercive leverage.\textsuperscript{510}

Predictably, the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the Contact Group plan in July of 1994.\textsuperscript{511} Though Bosnian (Muslim) and Croatian forces were beginning to take the initiative, they had yet to make serious gains against the more powerful Serbs, who still held 70\% of Bosnia and had little reason to give up nearly one third of the territory they held. Even under pressure from their allies, Russia and Serbia, they continued to resist. On 4 August 1994, after the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the Contact Group’s proposal for a third time, Milosevic implemented economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{512}

Unable to form an appropriate response in the face of the obstinate Bosnian Serbs, the Contact Group did little. The U.S. considered unilaterally lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Federation Army, but faced the opposition of Great Britain and France, who feared such action would increase the risk to their peace-keeping forces. The Clinton administration instead adopted an opaque policy. While the U.S. did not openly arm the Croats or Muslims, the U.S. provided training and encouraged clandestine arms shipments from Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{513}

The air power portion of the U.S. strategy did not materialize until November of 1994. During the previous summer, the Bosnian army had advanced into northwest Bosnia, forcing Serbs out of the UN-designated safe area of Bihac. The Serbs mounted a counter attack which included air strikes and, by mid-November, was in position to overrun the town. In response, the UN Security Council authorized NATO air strikes against the Serb surface-to-air missile sites and the Serb airbase at Udbina in neighboring Krajina. The results of the strikes were dismal. The Serbs retaliated by detaining over two hundred UN personnel near Sarajevo. Fearing the Serbs would keep their personnel hostage, NATO backed down.

The Serbs, however, continued to detain and harass UN troops and, by December of 1994, France, the largest contributor of UN peacekeepers, called for NATO to begin planning for a UNPROFOR withdrawal. This led to the NATO Council endorsement of OPLAN 40-104. This plan called for the deployment of up to 20,000 U.S. ground troops to assist in a withdrawal from Bosnia if such action became necessary. President Clinton promised to send these troops to the region, should such action become necessary. At the same time, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, under increasing pressure to seek a peace agreement, initiated a ceasefire proposal through former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Karadzic agreed to reopen the Sarajevo airport, to allow the movement of humanitarian aid and to stop the harassment of UN personnel in return for a

514 Gordon, Michael (18 November 1994) “U.S. Proposes Exclusion Zone in Bosnia Town” New York Times
four-month ceasefire and the recommencement of serious negotiations.\textsuperscript{519} Though it largely held until May 1995, this Serbian-initiated ceasefire did not produce a permanent peace, providing rather an opportunity for the Croatian and Bosnian Federation Armies to prepare for a summer offensive.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF COERCIVE STAGE II: FEBRUARY 1994 – APRIL 1995}

Once again images of humanitarian suffering caused by the shelling of Sarajevo and the attack on Gorazde sparked a change in the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy. The U.S. took over international negotiations by forming the Contact Group at the end of April, 1994 and proposed a partitioned, federated Bosnia with 51\% of the territory going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49\% to the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{520} Unlike Vance-Owen, this new proposal significantly reduced the level of demands by allowing the Bosnian Serbs to keep their government, their heavy weapons and allowing them to form independent diplomatic relations with Serbia.

This proposal, like the Vance-Owen plan before it, had no mechanism to make credible threats to back up its demands. The “lift and strike” strategy advocated by the U.S. was vetoed by Europe, who feared for their troops in Bosnia vulnerable to Serb retaliation following NATO air strikes. While the Contact Group did reduce its demands from those of the Vance-Owen plan, it still was unable to sufficiently increase the threat level.


\textsuperscript{520} Greenhouse, Steven (15 May 1994) “Peace Outline Has Its Flaws, Bosnians Say” \textit{New York Times}
Milosevic continued to publicly pressure Karadzic and Mladic, even going so far as to order the blockade of roads, to cut economic ties, and to freeze the pay of Bosnian Serb military officers.\textsuperscript{521} These actions had a decided effect on both men. In July of 1994, Mladic traveled to Belgrade in an effort to make amends with Milosevic. Karadzic initiated contact with Jimmy Carter, a move which resulted in a ceasefire over the winter of 1994-95.\textsuperscript{522}

The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, failed to fully appreciate what effect a withdrawal of Serbian support would have on the balance of power in the region, particularly for the Serbs in Croatia. The fate of Krajina and Slavonia, however, had long been decided by Milosevic and Tudjman back at Karadjordjevo in March of 1991.\textsuperscript{523} The Krajina Serbs, who relied on Serbia's backing to deter Croatian forces, were in no position to defend against a Croat offensive. The Bosnian Serbs had not considered nor prepared for the collapse of Krajina, which had created a second front, now threatening western Bosnia. So long as they misperceived that the balance of power in Bosnia remained in their favor, the Bosnian Serbs had insufficient incentive to concede to a 51/49 partition while they held 70\% of the territory (see Table 5.3).

Though U.S. efforts at coercion failed, at this juncture, the seeds for ultimate success were sown with the formation of the Croat-Muslim Bosnian Federation. This alliance would eventually change the balance of military power on the ground in Bosnia, proving a viable threat to Bosnian Serbs and finally bringing both Karadzic and Mladic under Milosevic's control.

\textsuperscript{521} Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in Banja Luka.


\textsuperscript{523} Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation} New York: Penguin 131
The second critical event of 1994 was the NATO Council’s endorsement of OPLAN 40-104. This commitment of up to 20,000 U.S. ground forces elevated U.S. interests to include its prestige and sincerity of its commitments to NATO. NATO’s credibility would have been seriously undermined had the UN called for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, only to have President Clinton refuse to deploy U.S. troops.\footnote{Holbrooke, Richard (1998) \textit{To End A War} New York: Modern 65-67.}

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<tr>
<td>Feb94 – Apr 95</td>
<td>SERBIA Policy Change - Pressure Bosnian Serbs to accept Contact Group Proposal</td>
<td>Punishment - Economic Sanctions</td>
<td>SERBIA Partial Success</td>
<td>Failure - Though Civil War abates with temporary ceasefire, negotiations for permanent ceasefire fail and Serbs continue to control 70% of Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOSNIAN SERBS Homeland (No longer Regime Change) - Accept Contact Group Proposal resulting in territorial concessions</td>
<td>- Limited NATO Air Strikes</td>
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<td>BOSNIAN SERBS Failure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Refuses Contact Group Proposal</td>
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Table 5.3: Typology of Coercive Stage II, Feb 1994 – April 1995

**COERCIVE STAGE III: MAY – NOVEMBER 1995: END OF CEASEFIRE TO DAYTON ACCORDS**

On the 1\textsuperscript{st} of May, 1995, after three years of relative calm, war returned to Croatia with the expiration of the four-month Bosnian ceasefire. The Croatian Army pushed into western Slavonia, meeting light resistance, and within a week, had retaken the region,
though Serbs still controlled eastern Slavonia and Krajina (see Map 5.1). The strong showing by the Croatian Army was attributable to two factors. First, the Croatian Army proved a much better fighting force over what it had been in 1991. The U.S. had supported Croatia’s military buildup by encouraging arms embargo violations and by retired senior U.S. officers advising the Croatian Army. Second, and more important, Milosevic had withdrawn Serbian military support from the Krajina Serbs.

The ceasefire likewise collapsed within Bosnia as fighting broke out around several cities, including Sarajevo. Following several weeks of hard fighting, UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum on 25 May 1995, calling for both the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian (Muslim) Armies to refrain from employing their heavy weapons near Sarajevo or face NATO air strikes. When the Serbs refused to comply, NATO struck an ammunition depot near Pale. This elicited a now predictable response from the Bosnian Serbs, who shelled five of the six safe areas and seized 400 UN personnel, this time displaying them handcuffed as human shields in front of potential NATO targets. By the 10th of June, the Bosnian Serbs had clearly won the standoff. To secure the release of

the remaining hostages, the UN announced it would “return to the status quo” and “abide strictly by peacekeeping principles until further notice.”

In June 1995, France and Britain began sending mixed signals as to their resolve over Bosnia. While French and British diplomats publicly questioned how long they would continue to support UNPROFOR, their militaries deployed heavily-armed units to the region as a new rapid-response force. It was unclear how this additional ground power would be used, however, whether it was to provide additional military might to back up UN ultimatums or to facilitate a withdrawal. At the same time, bilateral talks between the United States and Serbia were scuttled over the hostage crisis and a disagreement over terms for suspending the UN sanctions. Milosevic, bolstered by the recent Bosnian Serb victory, demanded the sanctions be permanently lifted and balked at the U.S. insistence that the Security Council retain the right to reimpose them.

In July 1995, in response to raids by Muslim forces staging out of the UN safe area of Srebrenica, General Mladic ordered the shelling of the city. With the UN unwilling to authorize NATO airstrikes, the lightly-armed and outnumbered UNPROFOR troops could do no more than withdraw as the Bosnian Serb forces overran the city and conducted the mass killing of over seven thousand Muslim men. This gruesome

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530 Cohen, Roger (11 June 1995) “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE UN MANDATE; Peacekeeping vs. an Intractable War” New York Times
532 Milosevic demanded that the UN General Secretary make the determination as to whether Serbia was in compliance. Kinzer, Stephen (8 June 1995) “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN BOSNIA; U.S.-Serb Talks Suspended” New York Times
attack, along with the fall of Zepa two weeks later, shocked the U.S. and Western Europe into action.

President Clinton acknowledged to his national security team that the current U.S. foreign policy was untenable and that the situation in Bosnia was making the U.S. look weak and “...doing enormous damage to the United States’...standing in the world.”

This newfound resolve was, in part, due to his belated recognition that, regardless of the outcome in Bosnia, he had already committed 20,000 ground troops to deploy to the region, whether to enforce a peace agreement or to assist in a potentially violent UNPROFOR withdrawal. Clinton therefore pressed for the peace agreement as he could ill afford to deploy U.S. troops to enforce a failed foreign policy in the midst of his 1996 reelection bid.

A 21 July 1995 conference hastily convened in London and attended by NATO leaders, a Russian representative, and the UN General Secretary’s envoy, produced two fundamental changes to NATO policy. First, a line was drawn in the sand declaring that an attack on Gorazde, the last UN safe area in eastern Bosnia, would “...be met by

substantial and decisive air power.” This protection was later expanded to include the other remaining safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla. Second, NATO airstrikes had been hampered by a “dual key” approval process, which required authorization by UN military officials and NATO civilian officials. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali now agreed to delegate UN strike authority out of civilian hands and into those of the overall military commander for UNPROFOR, French Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier. This significantly streamlined the NATO-UN air strike approval process.

The Clinton administration then announced a new “End Game” strategy in early August 1995. The plan called for a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reinvigorate the Contact Group’s proposal, this time adding the threat of a large-scale air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs if they rejected the plan. Unlike a similar U.S. proposal in 1993, the Europeans now agreed to the expanded role of NATO air power over the tepid objections raised by Russia.

This stiffening of U.S. resolve was accompanied by a shift in the balance of military power within the Balkans in favor of Croatia, the Muslim-Croat Bosnian

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538 Whitney, Craig (2 August 1995) “ALLIES EXTENDING SHIELD TO PROTECT ALL BOSNIA HAVENS” New York Times
540 The U.S. plan was a seven point initiative calling for 1) a comprehensive peace settlement 2) three-way recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 3) lifting of economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 4) Peaceful return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia 5) cease-fire and end of all offensive operations 6) Reaffirmation of Contact Group plan for 51/49 split of territory to Bosnian Federation (Muslim and Croats) and Bosnian Serbs respectively 7) Comprehensive economic program for regional reconstruction, Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modern 74
541 It also included the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation if they also refused the plan Woodward, Bob (1996) The Choice New York: Simon & Schuster 268-9
Federation, and NATO, all aligned against the Serbs. On 4 August 1995, the Croatian Army commenced a new offensive, “ethnically cleansing” over 200,000 Serbs from Krajina. This left eastern Slavonia the sole Croatian territory still under Serbian control. The stunned Bosnian Serbs witnessed not only the collapse of Krajina, which opened a new front to their west, but also saw the influx of thousands of Serb refugees. As with western Slavonia, Milosevic withheld military support and instead blamed Krajina Serb leadership for failing to reach a settlement with Croatia’s President Tudjman. The Croat offensive had a rippling effect in northwest Bosnia, relaxing the Serb stranglehold on the Bihac pocket and allowing Bosnian-Muslim units to break out of the city. Meanwhile in central Bosnia, both Croatian and Muslim Federation troops began attacking Serb positions.

As the tides of war quickly turned against the Bosnian Serbs, their leadership began to show signs of strain and their solidarity publicly unraveled. President Karadzic blamed the recent losses in western Bosnia on General Mladic and he moved to relieve Mladic of command of the army. Having originally been appointed to his position by Milosevic, however, Mladic now traveled to Belgrade to confer with him. In the end, he refused to step down and declared Karadzic’s order illegal. Backed by the entire Bosnian

Serb General Officer Corps, Mladic won the day and forced Karadzic to reverse his decision.\textsuperscript{547}

The United States' newly appointed chief negotiator in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, sought to bypass both Bosnian Serb leaders altogether. He met with Milosevic in Belgrade on 17 August 1995 and announced that the U.S. would no longer negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs, dealing instead with Milosevic alone.\textsuperscript{548} Two Serbian artillery shells killed thirty-seven in another attack on Sarajevo's Markala marketplace on 28 August, providing the pretext the U.S. had been waiting for to commence preplanned NATO air strikes.\textsuperscript{549} Karadzic and Mladic were still stunned over the collapse of Krajina and, with air strikes imminent, they were particularly vulnerable. Summoning the bickering pair to Belgrade on 30 August, Milosevic finally wrested from them the authority to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs by threatening to cut them off completely from any aid.\textsuperscript{550} With morale low and losing territory in the west, they were now desperately in need of Serbian support and were no longer in a position to refuse Milosevic.


\textsuperscript{548} Holbrooke, Richard (1998) \textit{To End A War} New York: Modern 4


\textsuperscript{550} Chollet, Derek (2005) \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords} New York: Palgrave 63, MacMillan Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation} New York: Penguin 365
Operation Deliberate Force, 30 August - 14 September 1995

Following the 28 August 1995 shelling of the Markala marketplace, the U.S. immediately called for the UN to approve and for NATO to implement a large-scale air operation. Following a one-day delay to secure the withdrawal of the remaining UNPROFOR troops from Gorazde, Operation Deliberate Force commenced on the 30th of August. Over the next two days, NATO launched 372 strike sorties against the Bosnian Serb Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), artillery positions, ammunition depots, and command and control centers located near Sarajevo and Pale in southeast Bosnia (see Table 5.4 for daily strike summaries). In addition, the UN’s Rapid Reaction Force fired over 1,000 artillery rounds against Bosnian Serb positions near Sarajevo and in western Bosnia.

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551 Cohen, Robert (29 August 1995) “Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs” New York Times. The NATO air campaign which has become known as Deliberate Force actually consisted of three parts, DEADEYE targeted the Bosnian Serbs Integrated Air Defenses (IADS), Vulcan was a military target set specific to protecting the enclaves of Sarajevo and Gorazde, and DELIBERATE FORCE was a broader target set consisting of option one (fielded forces) and option two (command and control, munitions depots, and IADS munitions sites, and radar and SAM sites) targets. Option three targets which included Serb troop concentrations and civilian infrastructure were never approved to strike. The operational objective was to “…adversely alter the BSA’s [Bosnian Serb Army] advantage in conducting successful military operations against the BiH [Bosnian (Muslim) Army]” with the aim of compelling the Serbs to “…sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN mandates, and negotiate.” Sargent, Richard (2000) “Chapter 10: Deliberate Force Targeting” Owen, Robert ed. DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 285, Dittmer, David and Stephen Dawkins (1998) Deliberate Force: NATO’S First Extended Air Operation Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 10-11. AF South Fact Sheets (16 Dec 2002) Operation Deliberate Force www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm accessed 22 June 2010


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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Weather</th>
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**Table 5.4: Deliberate Force Strike Rates and Battle Damage Assessment**


555 Approved target consisted of 56 targets with 338 Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI). A DMPI is the exact location on a target identified for a weapon to strike. For example a munitions storage area may be a target, while each weapons storage bunker may be a DMPI.

556 Sorties indicate combat aircraft that penetrated into Bosnia. These include strike aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense aircraft, and Combat Air Patrols, but not command and control aircraft, Combat Search and Rescue or air refueling assets. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is NATO's assessment of DMPI's effectively serviced. Attacks were primarily against fixed targets such as air defense sites and command and control, ammo and depot facilities, and bridges and lines of communication. Relatively few attacks were against fielded forces. BDA assessment in some cases were delayed several days due to inclement weather impairing reconnaissance. Sargent, Richard (2000) "Chapter 12: Deliberate Force Operations: Deliberate Force"
At the onset of air strikes Lieutenant General Janvier dispatched messages to General Mladic on 30 August with three conditions for halting the bombing: cease threatening attacks on the four safe areas, withdraw all heavy weapons from Sarajevo, and cease hostilities throughout Bosnia. On 31 August, Janvier requested a 24-hour bombing pause from NATO in order to meet with Mladic, but then rejected Mladic’s conditional acceptance. Mladic demanded a guarantee that the Bosnian (Muslim) Army would not take over the territory vacated by a Serb withdrawal. The bombing pause was further extended until the 5th of September when confusion arose over who had the authority to speak for the Serbs. Milosevic, who had yet to fully exert control over the Bosnian Serbs, made an attempt to accept the UN terms by contacting the Secretary General’s senior civilian envoy, Yasushi Akashi, while Karadzic sent a conciliatory message through Jimmy Carter.

Regardless of diplomatic efforts made, by 5 September there was no evidence on the ground that Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were being removed from Sarajevo. NATO air strikes recommenced, this time accompanied by a revised ultimatum for the Bosnian Serbs to cease their attacks on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, to immediately withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo.

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Combat Air Assessments” Owen, Robert ed. DELIBERATE FORCE: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press 337, 338, 344
and to allow the free movement of UN and non-government organization personnel in
and out of Sarajevo.

In addition to military activity, U.S. diplomacy was also beginning to make
inroads. In Geneva on 8 September Croatian, Bosnian, and Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) foreign ministers agreed to basic principles for a
Bosnian settlement, which recognized the international borders of Bosnia and formed two
political entities within Bosnia: the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and the Serbian
Republica Srpska with territory divided 51% to 49%, respectively. 561

On 9 September, the Croatian and Bosnian Federation Armies launched a
coordinated ground offensive into western Bosnia. 562 The same day, General Mladic
informed Janvier that the Bosnian Serb Army was now ready to meet the UN ultimatum.
The two met, along with Milosevic, in Belgrade the following day. 563 Meanwhile,
NATO expanded its air operations into western Bosnia supporting the Croat-Muslim
ground offensive which was gaining momentum and threatening Banja Luka, the largest
Serbian city in western Bosnia. 564

On 13 September Holbrooke met with Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic in
Belgrade, where the Serbs agreed to the basic principles signed in Geneva the previous

561 9 September 1995 “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Details of Accord: Division Within Unity” New
York Times
562 Cohen, Roger (16 September 1995) “CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE CROATS; Croatia
Expands Its Power in Bosnia” New York Times
Washington: Center for Naval Analyses 37
564 These strikes included the use of 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Murray, Trevor (11 September 1995)
“CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE FIGHTING; Bosnian Serb Civilians Flee Joint Muslim-Croat
Attack” New York Times

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week. In addition, Mladic agreed to end the siege on Sarajevo and to remove all heavy weapons upon receiving assurances that Russian UNPROFOR troops would occupy the positions the Serbs were to vacate. In return, NATO suspended air strikes the very next day, on 14 September, initially for 72 hours and then permanently, once the Bosnian Serbs were deemed in compliance.

**Permanent Ceasefire**

Although NATO suspended air strikes, the Croat-Muslim ground offensive continued, forcing the Serbs to concede large portions of western Bosnia. Holbrooke, who preferred to enter formal peace negotiations with the ground reality closely matching the Contact Group’s 51/49 partitioning, encouraged Croatia’s President Tudjman to continue seizing territory, but cautioned against taking Banja Luka. By 19 September, the offensive had begun to lose steam and Croat forces approaching Banja Luka from the south were hampered by Bosnian Serb forces in the easily defendable mountainous terrain while Croat forces from the north took significant losses as they attempted to cross into Bosnia over the Una river at Dubica.

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By October the Croat-Muslim offensive had stalled and the Bosnian Serbs were showing signs of mounting a counteroffensive.\textsuperscript{571} On 5 October, with the Federation and Bosnian Serbs each controlling roughly half of Bosnia, Holbrooke finally secured a ceasefire agreement between Croatia’s President Tudjman, Bosnia’s President Izetbegovic and Serbia’s President Milosevic. President Clinton announced the ceasefire would officially commence on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of October, with peace talks taking place later in the United States.\textsuperscript{572}

**Dayton Accords\textsuperscript{573}**

Negotiations began on 1 November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio and concluded three weeks later. The Dayton Accords were then formally signed in Paris on 15 December.\textsuperscript{574} As with the October ceasefire agreement, the talks were held primarily with Croatia’s Tudjman, Bosnia’s Izetbegovic and Serbia’s Milosevic. Neither Karadzic nor Mladic, now internationally indicted war criminals, were present.

An early agreement between Milosevic and Tudjman resolved the remaining issue of the Croatian war, i.e. the return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia. Milosevic agreed to

\textsuperscript{571} Hedges, Chris (4 October 1995) “Negotiator Says Cease-Fire in Bosnia Is Unlikely Soon” *New York Times*


turn over the region, and in return, Tudjman supported the Bosnian peace process. The more difficult and time-consuming aspect of the talks lay in defining the inter-entity border to separate the Federation from the Republika Srpska (see Map 5.3).

MAP 5.3: Dayton Agreement Inter-entity Boundary Line

To gain an agreement Milosevic conceded on two key territorial issues: first he agreed to give up Serb-held sections of Sarajevo and territory in eastern Bosnia in order to provide the Federation with a secure access route to Gorazde. Second, he agreed to

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delay for a year a decision over the Brcko corridor and to ultimately submit the issue to international arbitration.\textsuperscript{577} In return, the Republika Srpska retained 49\% of Bosnian territory and received recognition as a separate political entity within Bosnia with the right to directly interact with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The Bosnian Serbs retained their military, though their heavy weapons were assigned to UN-monitored cantonment areas. As promised, Milosevic delivered the cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs when he traveled to Bosnia the following week and secured the signatures of both Karadzic and Mladic.\textsuperscript{578} For his efforts, he finally succeeded in having UN sanctions against the FRY lifted.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF COERCIVE STAGE III: WHY KARADZIC AND MLADIC CONCEDED NEGOTIATING POWER TO MILOSEVIC}

After three years of bloody civil war in Bosnia, the United States finally succeeded in coercing the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a permanent peace agreement (see Table 5.5 for coercion typology). A critical juncture in the process took place in Belgrade on 30 August 1995 when Karadzic and Mladic ceded negotiating power to Milosevic.\textsuperscript{579} Two related factors explain their reversal, the build up of Croat and Muslim military forces which combined with Milosevic’s withdrawal of Serbian military support shifted the balance of power in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{577} At issue was control of the Brcko corridor, the narrow neck connecting the eastern and western sections of the Republika Srpska. Brcko was largely populated by Muslims prior to the war, but by wars end had only Serbs. Also at issue was the width of the corridor. Holbrooke, Richard (1998) \textit{To End A War} New York: Modern 308. In March 1999 a final ruling on Brcko established the district would be jointly run by the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska. (9 March 1999) “Bosnian Serbs Moderate Confrontation” \textit{New York Times}

\textsuperscript{578} Holbrooke, Richard (1998) \textit{To End A War} New York: Modern 310

\textsuperscript{579} Milosevic included the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriach Pavle at his Belgrade meeting with Karadzic, Mladic, and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Coercion Outcome</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
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<td><em>Punishment</em>&lt;br&gt;- Economic Sanctions&lt;br&gt;<em>Denial</em>&lt;br&gt;- Air strikes on Bosnian Serb Command and Control and weapon storage areas&lt;br&gt;- Croat-Muslim ground campaign</td>
<td><em>Success</em>&lt;br&gt;Milosevic wrests power to negotiate for Bosnian Serbs and agrees to 51/49 split of Bosnia at Dayton</td>
<td><em>Success</em>&lt;br&gt;Dayton Accords end Civil War in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>BOSNIAN SERBS</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Policy</strong>&lt;br&gt;(No Longer Regime change or Homeland Territory)&lt;br&gt;- Accept Contact Group Proposal resulting in territorial concessions</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>BOSNIAN SERBS</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Success</em>&lt;br&gt;Karadzic and Mladic concede negotiating power to Milosevic</td>
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**Table 5.5: Typology of Coercive Stage III, May 1995 – Nov 1995**

The balance of military power between the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation began to shift with the collapse of Krajina, which left the Bosnian Serbs’ western flank exposed to the Croat-Muslim offensive. General Mladic, however, was prevented from reinforcing Banja Luka, as his heavy weapons were dedicated to the siege of Sarajevo. He feared Muslim troops would occupy the positions vacated by a withdrawal from Sarajevo and NATO air power threatened the transport of the weapons.580

Though the Bosnian Serbs’ situation in the west was serious, it was not yet dire. Mladic was unwilling to concede to NATO’s demands to remove his weapons from Sarajevo until he received assurances that Russian peacekeeping troops would replace his

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580 Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in Banja Luka.
forces. Such a deployment would prevent the Muslim forces in Sarajevo from further territorial gains and provide a buffer between the Bosnian Serb and Federation forces in central Bosnia. This was the same tactic employed by the Serbs in Croatia in 1991, when UNPROFOR troops deployed to eastern Croatia, thus freeing the Serbs to reinforce Bosnia.  

To secure the deployment of Russian troops Mladic was willing to endure 12 days of NATO air strikes in the interim. Under this umbrella of air power, however, the Croat-Muslim offensive gained momentum, leaving Mladic little option but to accede to NATO’s demands, though not before he received the assurances for the Russian peacekeepers.

The second factor in Karadzic and Mladic’s concession of negotiating power was Milosevic’s threat to pull the plug on all Serbian support. Serbia had already secured its border with Bosnia and reduced the flow of goods. More importantly, the fighting during the summer of 1995 had nearly exhausted the Bosnian Serb Army, leaving them dependent on Serbia to continue their military operations. In sum, Karadzic and Mladic had finally concluded that they were losing and needed Milosevic’s support to avoid a defeat that could threaten the very survival of the Republika Srpska.

**ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION FAILURE**

In this section I assess the predictions for the two hypotheses for coercion failure, that of target survival and challenger commitment problems. The Bosnian crisis was initiated when the United States adopted its core objectives of maintaining a single

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Bosnian state and procuring a permanent ceasefire. This case differs from that of Iraq or Libya in that the U.S. targeted two countries, Serbia and the Republica Srpska. The U.S. employed sanctions on Serbia to convince Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to pressure Bosnian Serb President Karadzic and General Mladic first to concede to a ceasefire and then to the Contact Group’s peace proposal. The U.S. also employed military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, through NATO airstrikes and through its support of the Croat and Muslim ground offensive. In the following analysis, I evaluate Serbia and the Republica Srpska as separate target states and test the two hypotheses against each case in turn.

**TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS**

In the asymmetric coercion model the powerful challenger optimizes its outcome by matching demands and threats such that the target is just willing to concede. The expectation of the *survival* hypothesis is that coercion will succeed so long as the target’s state, regime, and regime leadership’s survival is not threatened by acquiescing to a challenger’s demands as long as the target has the means to resist. For the case of Bosnia, the *survival* hypothesis correctly predicts U.S. coercion success for both Serbia and the Republica Srpska.

**IMPACT ON SERBIA, MILOSEVIC, AND HIS REGIME’S SURVIVAL FOR CONCEDING**

*Impact on Serbia for Conceding*

Conceding to a ceasefire and signing the Dayton Peace Accords did not threaten the survival of Serbia. Bosnia had never been part of Serbia and had maintained an autonomous status as a republic for over a century prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
in 1991. The Contact Group’s proposal therefore did not infringe on Serbia’s control of its territory or its population. In addition, an agreement which removed the draconian UN sanctions stood to improve Serbia’s economic plight and, indeed, proved the key motivating factor behind Milosevic’s support of the Dayton Accords.

**Impact on Milosevic’s Regime for Conceding**

Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) controlled the Serbian government and, within Serbia, there were no armed opposition groups capable of violently overthrowing the regime. In November of 1990 Milosevic sealed an alliance between the SPS and the Yugoslavian Army (JNA). This successful subjugation of the military to civilian control not only reduced the chances of a military coup, but also by its mere presence deterred the formation of armed opposition groups that could threaten revolt. As a result, Milosevic’s government was not threatened by civil war.

The SPS was vulnerable, however, at the ballot box. Since Milosevic’s rise to power, the SPS had won elections easily. But a year after Dayton, in the November 1996 national election, its margin of victory was significantly narrowed. This required the SPS to share power by expanding its governing coalition. Still, it is not likely that the decrease in the SPS vote share was a direct result of Milosevic signing the Dayton Peace Accord, but of a general displeasure on the part of the Serbian population with Milosevic’s leadership and, in particular, with his mishandling of the economy. Conceding to U.S. demands actually assisted Milosevic and his SPS by bringing the costly Bosnian Civil War to a close and by lifting the debilitating UN sanctions.

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In sum, Milosevic’s regime was not threatened by conceding to U.S. demands as there were no domestic opposition groups capable of threatening revolution and concessions which put an end to the war and sanctions may have improved SPS election prospects. Indeed, resistance would only have led to still greater dissatisfaction with the regime.

**Impact on Milosevic’s Leadership for Conceding**

As the leader of a single party regime, Milosevic was more likely than Saddam Hussein, a leader of a personalist regime, to suffer audience costs for making concessions. Milosevic, however, undertook two actions to undercut the backlash generated by his pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace agreement. First, in February of 1994 Milosevic began employing his propaganda machine to place the blame for Serbia’s growing economic crisis on the unwillingness of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group’s peace plan. Second, he changed his policy incrementally, first by implementing weak economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs, then enforcing those sanctions more strictly and, finally, threatening to withdraw all Serbian military support for their war effort. This placement of blame for policy failure on the Bosnian Serbs and the incremental implementation of this policy reversal succeeded at least partially in deflecting audience costs away from Milosevic.

**IMPACT OF CONCESSION ON REPUBLICA SRPSKA, KARADZIC AND MLADIC, AND THEIR REGIME’S SURVIVAL**

**Impact on Republica Srpska for Conceding**

By the October 1995 ceasefire, conceding to the Contact Group plan no longer threatened state survival for the Bosnian Serbs. By contrast, the earlier Vance-Owen,
Owen-Stoltenberg, and European Action plans had all threatened to take away territory and the Bosnian Serb government’s control over its population. The Vance-Owen plan was particularly onerous as it, in effect, demanded regime change by not even recognizing the Bosnian Serb government. It also reduced the overall size of Serb-held territory, broke it up into provinces which were non-contiguous, and disarmed the Bosnian Serb Army. The subsequent Owen-Stoltenberg and European Action plans were less threatening for the Republica Srpska. Yet while these proposals did allow for the de facto partitioning of Bosnia, they still required major territorial concessions.

When introduced in May of 1994, the Contact Group’s proposed 51/49 territorial split, likewise, required the Bosnian Serbs to concede land which they had fought for and held for three years. By the fall of 1995, however, the situation on the ground had changed and the Croat and Muslim offensive had reduced Bosnian Serb-held territory to roughly half of Bosnia, now reflective of the plan’s partitioning. In sum, conceding to the Contact Group’s plan for a 51/49 territorial split did not threaten the survival of the Republica Srpska as this peace agreement provided international recognition of the republic, allowed the Bosnian Serb Army to maintain its heavy weapons at cantonment sites, and enabled special economic and diplomatic ties established with Serbia.

**Impact on Bosnian Serb Regime for Conceding**

While the Contact Group plan did not externally threaten regime survival, one must consider whether there were armed domestic opposition groups within the Republica Srpska capable of overthrowing President Radovan Karadzic and his Serbian

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584 There were however three controversial territorial swaps where Milosevic’s conceding parts of Sarajevo, the Gorazde corridor, and deferred talks on the Brcko corridor issue in exchange for worthless land in western Bosnia.
Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS). This logic of omni-balancing applies to regimes threatened by opposition groups from within the country but outside of the regime. Such groups look for signs of weakness in a regime as a trigger for revolt. In this case, while the Bosnian Serb government was threatened on many sides, by NATO, the Bosnian Federation, Serbia and, at times, by internal dissension, there is no evidence that it was threatened by revolt from an armed domestic opposition group.

**Impact of Concession on Bosnian Serb Leadership**

The final analysis on survival assesses whether President Karadzic would suffer significant audience costs for conceding to a permanent ceasefire and peace agreement. By the fall of 1994, Karadzic was beginning to feel pressure to bring the war to an end. Turning to a third party, Karadzic solicited Jimmy Carter to negotiate a four-month ceasefire in an effort to buy time. Unfortunately for the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic was unable to garner a permanent peace agreement which would allow the Republica Srpska to retain the territory they held. The ceasefire, instead, proved more beneficial for Croatian and Muslim forces, granting the two armies time to make preparations for a summer offensive.

Indeed, the Croatian offensive against Krajina in July of 1995 along with the withdrawal of Milosevic’s support led to the collapse of the Serbs in Croatia, creating a rippling effect across northwest Bosnia. In central Bosnia, both Croatian and Muslim Federation troops also began attacks on Serb positions. Karadzic blamed the losses on

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Mladic and unsuccessfully attempted to take control of the Bosnian Serb Army.\textsuperscript{586} Further advances of Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces in August then forced both leaders to cede their negotiating power over to Milosevic at the patriarch’s meeting in Belgrade on 30 August.\textsuperscript{587} The encroaching enemy forces, impending NATO airstrikes, and Milosevic’s threat to withdraw all Serbian military support had all worked together to place the very survival of the Republica Srpska on the line.\textsuperscript{588}

Concession at this point no longer generated as high an audience cost as before, when the Bosnian Serbs had had the military advantage. Even so, Karadzic attempted to deflect audience costs by first blaming Mladic in early August for the military defeats in western Bosnia and then blaming Milosevic for withholding Serbian support.

A counterargument asserts that Karadzic’s survival was indeed at stake for conceding and points to July of 1995 when Karadzic and Mladic were both indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Karadzic subsequently lost the presidency in 1996 and eventually went into hiding where he remained until his arrest in 2008. Still, even though the indictment eventually led to Karadzic’s arrest, its impact on Karadzic in August of 1995 does not appear to have affected his decision making. As long as Republica Srpska remained a state and Karadzic in power the indictment had little impact, particularly since the ICTY had no authority to make arrests. Since conceding to the Contact Group’s proposal ensured the recognition of the Bosnian Serb state and left Karadzic in control it is not likely he considered the indictment a risk to his survival.

\textsuperscript{586} Perlez, Jane (6 August 1995) “Bosnian Serb Leader Demotes Commander” New York Times
\textsuperscript{587} The patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church was also in attendance at the meeting along with the President of Montenegro.
\textsuperscript{588} Milosevic’s threat to withdrawal Serbian support for Bosnia was made more credible by his actions in Krajina.
In conclusion, the survival of the Republica Srpska, Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb government was not at risk by conceding to a permanent ceasefire and peace agreement. The reverse was actually the case, as the survival of the Republica Srpska would have been seriously threatened had they not conceded. The survival hypothesis therefore correctly predicts coercion success for the U.S. core demands.

LIMITS OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS

The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. A commitment problem is more likely to arise when the challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back up additional demands. In late August and September of 1995, a combination of the Croat-Muslim ground forces and NATO airstrikes now threatened the Bosnian Serbs. These deployed forces were also available to back higher demands, such as for additional territorial concessions in western Bosnia.

With the collapse of Krajina, the Bosnian Serb western flank was exposed and the city of Banja Luka lay vulnerable to the Croat western offensive. It was, in part, this dire situation which prompted Mladic to concede to a withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo in early September.\(^{589}\)

The commitment hypothesis therefore incorrectly predicted coercion would fail as the hypothesis expected the Bosnian Serbs to view a concession as only leading to further territorial demands.

Serbia, by contrast, was never threatened, either by NATO airstrikes or by a ground invasion. Serbia had a modern integrated air defense system (IADS) and its army

\(^{589}\) Interview with author of former Republica Srpska General Manojla Milovanovic on 12 May 2010 in Banja Luka.
could easily defend against Croat and Muslim forces. The real threat to Serbia had always come from sanctions. Yet the sanctions in place were already severe and had been in effect for three years. In effect, there was little room for the U.S. to increase sanctions further in order to back additional demands. As a result, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicts Milosevic’s willingness to concede to U.S. demands.

Avoiding Commitment Problems

How then did the U.S. overcome its commitment problems with the Bosnian Serbs? Four factors influenced the Bosnian Serb calculation that the U.S. would make no further demands. First, the U.S. intentionally included Russia in the Contact Group and charged it with bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table. The Bosnian Serbs placed more trust in the Russians, as witnessed by Mladic’s refusal to remove his heavy weapons from Sarajevo until assured that it would be Russian troops that occupied their vacated positions.

Participation by Russia also increased the diplomatic costs for the U.S., had it decided to renege on the agreement. The U.S. would have suffered strained relations with Russia, particularly now that Russia had placed its reputation on the line.

Second, Milosevic’s involvement helped reduce commitment concerns for the Bosnian Serbs. While he held negotiating power for the republic, it was contingent on his holding fast to the 51/49 split of Bosnian territory. At Dayton, Milosevic made it clear that he could not take the agreement back to the Bosnian Serbs with less. This point was non-negotiable and resulted in last-minute trades of worthless mountainous terrain in western Bosnia, dubbed “the egg” by U.S. negotiators because of its shape, in exchange
for broadening the Gorazde corridor in the east (see Map 5.3).\textsuperscript{590} While Milosevic made concessions with regard to Sarajevo and the Goradze corridor and deferred the Brcko corridor to international arbitration, he came away with the promised 49% of Bosnian land.

Third, NATO suspended air strikes, once Mladic agreed to remove the heavy weapons from Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{591} So long as the Bosnian Serb Army fulfilled the terms of the ceasefire, it would be diplomatically difficult for the U.S. to recommence the strikes. This loss of air support weakened the Croat-Muslim offensive, thereby limiting the availability of military force to back up additional demands the U.S. might have contemplated.

Finally, the commitment hypothesis presumes that a target reveals itself to be weakly resolved when it makes a concession. A target state may, however, be able to mitigate this appearance of weakness by first enduring some punishment before conceding. Having withstood 12 days of air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs indeed looked tougher and more resolved than they would have, had they had conceded prior to any NATO airstrikes.

\textsuperscript{590} Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End A War New York: Modern 299
WAR IN KOSOVO JUNE 1998 – JUNE 1999

Though the Dayton Accord brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic refused to include in the negotiations the issue of the political instability and ethnic unrest in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Kosovo is a small, diamond-shaped valley, approximately 80 miles north to south and east to west, wedged between southern Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia (see Maps 5.3 and 5.4). In 1998 Kosovo had a population of 2 million, 90% of which were ethnic Albanians and the remainder predominantly ethnic Serbs.592

Map 5.3 of Kosovo593

592 Online NewsHour (1 October 1998) “Terror in Kosovo” A News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript
The lesson Albanian Kosovars learned from Bosnia was that only violence could prompt an international response to assist in their struggle for independence from Serbia. Following Dayton, a small group of militants known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to grow, both in membership and in popular support. By the summer of 1998, fighting between the KLA and the Serbian military and police had spread.

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throughout the region, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their homes.

The lesson the Clinton Administration took away from Bosnia was not to sit back and wait for a Balkan crisis to solve itself. The United States quickly engaged diplomatically in an attempt to curtail the violence. A peace agreement brokered in October 1998 between U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and now Federal Republic of Yugoslavian (Serbia and Montenegro) President Slobodan Milosevic called for a reduction in Serbian forces in Kosovo and the introduction of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors.

The United States and the Serbs had, however, excluded the KLA from the peace talks and the KLA unraveled this flawed agreement over the winter. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration was diverted internationally by Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign in Iraq in December, and domestically by the Lewinsky affair. Attention was drawn back to Kosovo in January 1999, however, when the chief OSCE monitor accused the Serbs of a massacre in the Kosovar Albanian village of Račak. In response, the United States hardened its policy and, at talks in Rambouillet, France in February, it demanded the Serbs remove the majority of its forces from Kosovo, allow in NATO troops as peacekeepers and, in three years’ time, hold an international conference over the future of Kosovo.595

In late March, at Milosevic’s rejection and the Kosovar Albanians’ albeit delayed acceptance of these demands, NATO commenced an air campaign, Operation Allied Force (OAF), aimed at changing Milosevic’s position. The Serbs responded to the initial

air strikes with a large-scale counter-insurgency operation which would eventually evict close to a million Kosovar Albanians from their homes.\textsuperscript{596} Only after 78 days of NATO bombing, heavy diplomatic pressure from Russia, and a growing unpopularity of the war among the Serbian population and elite did Milosevic finally concede to demands negotiated between the U.S. and Russia.\textsuperscript{597} Watered down from Rambouillet, these demands designated Russian and NATO troops as peacekeepers and placed them under the auspices of the UN Security Council. It further removed any reference to a future international conference on the status of Kosovo, leaving the fate of the province ambiguous.

Kosovo is an intriguing case for the study of asymmetric coercion. Where coercive diplomacy failed, military coercion through air power succeeded in convincing Serbia to concede a portion of their historic homeland. The level of success of U.S. foreign policy in Kosovo, however, is contestable. The United States failed in its initial deterrent objective of preventing widespread ethnic violence in Kosovo and the coercive air campaign, initially designed for only 3 nights, lasted 78 days. Some analysts have deemed the conflict a U.S. foreign policy failure or, at best, a hollow victory.\textsuperscript{598} Still, the United States clearly gained a territorial concession from Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians did return to take control of Kosovo at war’s end.\textsuperscript{599} As with Bosnia, however, the United States placed its reputation and prestige, as well as its security interests in

\textsuperscript{596} Many of the Kosovars remained within Kosovo so were not technically refugees but instead internally displaced persons (IDPs).

\textsuperscript{597} The G8 included U.S., Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy.

\textsuperscript{598} Sechler, Todd S. (2007) Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International Crises dissertation Stanford University, 118

\textsuperscript{599} It should also be noted that upon the Kosovars return most of the over 100,000 Serbs living in Kosovo were ethnically cleansed.
NATO, at risk over non-vital interests and continues to the pay for its “success” with the long-term commitment of peacekeeping troops.

I divide the Kosovo War into three coercive stages and provide a synopsis of the key explanatory and dependent variables in Table 5.6. In the first stage, from May 1998 to January 1999, the United States demands Serbia to change its policy in Kosovo and obtains an agreement from Milosevic in October. The omission of the KLA from the talks, however, left them free to occupy the territory vacated by the Serbian Army. When Serbia realized their withdrawal was handing control of Kosovo over to the KLA the agreement unraveled as the Serb forces quickly reversed course and violence returned to Kosovo.

The second stage, from mid-January to late April 1999 commenced with the Clinton Administration’s policy change following the Račak massacre. The U.S. now ratcheted up its demands for Milosevic to remove all Serbian forces from Kosovo and deploy NATO troops in their stead. Such a costly demand, absent a commensurate escalation in threat, was the primary reason coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet. This, in turn, led to the NATO air strikes of late March and April while the Serbs systematically ejected roughly a million Kosovar Albanians from their homes.

The third coercive stage commenced with NATO’s 50th Anniversary Washington Summit in late April, from which NATO leaders emerged unified in their resolve to succeed in Kosovo. Russia also agreed to do its part to pressure Milosevic into a peace agreement. Militarily, NATO stepped up attacks on Serbia’s fielded forces and expanded the targeting of Serbia’s leadership and infrastructure. Meanwhile, Russia and the United

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States negotiated a mutually acceptable peace proposal, which Russia delivered and Milosevic accepted in early June.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1998 – January 1999</td>
<td><em>Homeland Territory</em> - Serbia reduce military presence, allow in monitors, negotiate with Kosovar Albanians</td>
<td><em>Punishment</em> - Threat of air strikes</td>
<td><em>Partial Success</em> - Kosovar Albanians returned to their homes by winter - Serbian forces initially withdraw, but then return - Violence returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1999 – April 1999</td>
<td><em>Homeland Territory</em> - Serbia remove forces - allow in NATO peacekeeping troops - decide future of Kosovo within 3 years</td>
<td><em>Punishment</em> - NATO air strikes</td>
<td><em>Failure</em> - Serbian forces remained in Kosovo - Hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999 – June 1999</td>
<td><em>Homeland Territory</em> - Serbia remove forces - allow in UN peacekeeping troops - Kosovo future left ambiguous</td>
<td><em>Punishment</em> - Economic Sanctions - Escalating NATO air strikes</td>
<td><em>Success</em> - Serbian forces leave Kosovo - Kosovar Albanians return - NATO and Russian peacekeeping troops deploy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6: Coercion Typology of the Kosovo War, May 1998 – June 1999

The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section covers the post-Dayton Accord period and Milosevic’s machinations to remain in power, as well as the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The second through fourth sections cover the three coercive stages just described (see Table 5.6). In section five, I test the
two hypotheses for coercion failure: *survival* and *commitment* and, in the final section, draw conclusions from both the Bosnia and Kosovo cases.

**POST-DAYTON SERBIA – MILOSEVIC’S HOLD ON POWER, RISE OF KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY AND VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO**

Milosevic emerged from Dayton with two significant gains: the lifting of UN economic sanctions against Serbia and an international reputation as a peacemaker. Back home, however, years of bloodshed over Croatia and Bosnia and economic decline had taken a toll on his popularity and, after the November 1996 elections, his power had been substantially weakened. Prior to the election, his political coalition had consisted of his Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and his wife Mirjana Markovic’s smaller Yugoslavia Left (JUL) party. In order to retain a majority of seats in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, in 1996, he was forced to include in his government the former opposition party, the liberal New Democracy (ND). Even so, the remaining opposition, loosely banded under the Together (Zajedno) coalition, a group which had in the past been unable to pose a credible challenge, had now gained ground in local elections and taken control of Belgrade and several other municipalities. A stunned Milosevic attempted to falsify the election results but finally relented in the face of large-scale public protest.

Milosevic remained in power but, over time, felt increasing pressure from nationalists. In 1998 he moved to co-opt them by bringing into his coalition two of their

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600 The UN and EU sanctions were known as the inner wall. The U.S. maintained bilateral sanctions known as the outer wall.

leading voices: Vuk Draskovic, founder of the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), and Vojislav Seselj, founder of the extremist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). 602

**Rise of Kosovo Liberation Army and mounting violence in Kosovo**

Though Dayton ended the Bosnian Civil War, the peace conference had avoided discussing the ethnic tensions which had long plagued Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians, led by Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK), had for many years opposed Serbia through a strategy of peaceful resistance. Bosnia had proven, however, that only violence could goad the international community into action. Following Dayton, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA also known as the UCK, Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves), a small guerilla movement formed in the early 1990s, began to gain support, particularly outside of the capital of Pristina. 603 In late 1996, the military potential for the KLA was also greatly enhanced by a bonanza of small arms made available by the collapse of the government in Albania. Cheap weapons flowed from Albanian armories into the eager hands of KLA fighters. 604

By early 1998, a better armed KLA emerged from the shadows, waging attacks on Serbian civilians, police and Kosovar Albanians cooperating with the Serbs. 605 Serbian police responded with a series of heavy-handed raids on the homes of KLA leaders, including the highly-publicized 5 March attack on the Jashari clan in Prekaz twenty miles

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603 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova. Rexhep was among 20 founding members of KLA. He was the first KLA member along with two others to come forward publicly on 28 November 1997. He served as the operations officer (G-3) at KLA headquarters in 1998 and as Inspector General for the KLA during combat operations during the NATO air campaign. Cohen, Lenard J. (2001) *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* Boulder, CO: Westview 234
west of Pristina, which according to conflicting reports, left 40 to 60 dead, among them women and children.\footnote{This retaliatory operation was in response to a 28 February 1998 gunfight which left 4 Serbian police dead. Abrahams, Fred and Elizabeth Anderson (1998) \textit{Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo} Human Rights Watch: New York 28}

Following the attack the size of the KLA expanded rapidly. From an organization of approximately 200, with an informal horizontal organization, the KLA’s membership rose to approximately 1,000 in the course of two weeks. The KLA also reorganized, adopting a more conventional military structure, forming a Headquarters and establishment of 7 zone commanders responsible for the brigades and operations assigned to them.\footnote{Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.} Most of the new volunteers had neither weapons, nor training and recruits traveled to Albania for weapons and received a minimum of training. In addition to recruits, funds from the Kosovar diaspora began to flow quickly into the region with close to $200,000 raised by the KLA in just days following the Prekaz attack.\footnote{Nebi Qena (17 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosovo. He is a Kosovar Albanian and Associated Press reporter who covered the Kosovo campaign in Pristina until 3 April 1999 when he and his family were forced to leave the city. He continued reporting from Macedonia until the end of the war in June 1999.}

\section*{Coercive Stage I: United States Involvement in Kosovo, May 1998 – January 1999}

Following the attack on the Jashari clan, the United States attempted to stop the violence through diplomatic channels. In March, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, blaming Milosevic for the surge in violence, urged the Contact Group to impose
sanctions. The U.S. then dispatched Richard Holbrooke in May to deliver a stern warning to Milosevic to end the fighting in Kosovo.

Neither the threat of sanctions nor diplomacy, however, had much impact on the ground, as the fighting continued throughout the summer between the Serbs and the KLA. In late May, the Serbs launched an offensive to regain the nearly 40% of Kosovo then under KLA control. In the process, they drove tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their villages. By early June NATO was considering military options while, on the diplomatic front, the U.S. worked through the Contact Group to demand a ceasefire, a Serbian troop withdrawal, and a Kosovar Albanian guarantee to abandon the use of terrorism. By late June, the Serbian offensive had stalled and the KLA began to step up attacks. Defeats in mid-July, however, forced the KLA back into hiding and a return to guerilla tactics. The Serbs then countered with a second, broader offensive which again displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians.

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609 The Contact Group consisted of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.


The minor sanctions included a halt to supplying equipment for internal repression or terrorism, deny visas to those responsible in Kosovo, and stop financing of export credits and money for privatization of state-owned companies. Erlanger, Steven (10 March 1998) “Sanctions on Yugoslavia” New York Times


614 Desertions within the KLA were particularly high during this period as many of the March recruits were either killed or returned to protect their families. Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.

The Holbrooke Agreement, October 1998

In September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and American President Bill Clinton reacted to the humanitarian crisis with a joint statement calling for an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo and the commencement of negotiations. By the end of the month, the UN Security Council had incorporated these demands into a resolution condemning the violence in Kosovo but stopped short of authorizing the use of force by NATO.616 Russia, however, soon made it clear to the U.S. that, while Russia would veto another resolution to authorize force, it would not interfere if NATO were to elect to conduct air strikes without a UN mandate.617 Confident that air strikes would not widen the conflict, NATO approved Operation Allied Force (OAF), a limited, phased air operation against Serbian military assets and command and control facilities. With the now credible threat of NATO air strikes in hand, Richard Holbrooke returned to Belgrade and brokered a deal with Milosevic on 12 October 1998. Milosevic agreed to reduce Serbian military and police presence in Kosovo to pre-conflict levels, to allow up to 2,000 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors to enter Kosovo, and to begin serious negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians.

Short-Lived Peace, Winter 1998

Holbrooke’s diplomatic victory in October was short-lived, however, as a fatal flaw in the agreement soon surfaced. The KLA had been omitted from the negotiations and, as Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, the KLA reemerged from the shadows to

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occupy the checkpoints and villages they had previously held in May.\(^{618}\) The militants’ actions prompted the Serbs to reverse course and redeploy their forces.

In December and January, violence returned to Kosovo in a series of tit-for-tat reprisal attacks between the KLA and Serbs. On 14 January 1999, in response to a KLA attack which left three policemen dead, Serb forces entered the village of Račak, killing forty-five men. William Walker, chief of the OSCE monitors, arrived the next day and placed responsibility for the killings on the Serbs.\(^{619}\)

**ANALYSIS OF STAGE I, MAY 1998 – JANUARY 1999**

The killing of Kosovar Albanian women and children of the Jashari clan in western Kosovo on 5 March of 1998 triggered a crisis for the United States. The Clinton administration’s experience in Bosnia told them that ethnic violence in the Balkans could easily spiral out of control and only tough, decisive U.S. diplomacy could stop it. In addition such key administration officials as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and envoy Richard Holbrooke mistakenly deemed Milosevic a bully who would only back down when threatened by military power. The U.S. therefore rejected a strategy of accommodation and instead adopted a coercive strategy threatening limited air strikes.

The U.S. demanded a reduction in Serbian troops to pre-summer 1998 levels, the deployment of OSCE monitors, and the commencement of negotiations between the

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\(^{618}\) Holbrooke did attempt to contact the KLA in a visit to Kosovo in May 1998. The KLA leadership, however, would not meet with him. General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview. Agim Ceku is former Kosove Prime Minister and chief of the KLA. He was a career officer in the JNA until deserting to fight for the Croatia in 1991 through 1998. In 1998 he retired from the Croatian Army and joined the KLA where he was named their chief. He served as Prime Minister of Kosovo from 10 March 2006 to 9 January 2008. Smith, Jeffrey (18 November 1998) “Turnaround in Kosovo: Rebels Bounce Back As NATO Threats Drive Army Out” *Washington Post* and Judah, Tim (2000) *Kosovo: War and Revenge* Yale University Press: New Haven CT 189

Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. The credible threat of NATO air strikes in October proved sufficient to convince Milosevic to initially concede to these demands and enter into an agreement with the United States.

The U.S. Relationship with the LDK and the KLA

The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) was an established political party with an organized shadow government, founded in 1989 by the intelligentsia in Pristina and led by Ibrahim Rugova, a poet, professor, and pacifist. The U.S. had no difficulty engaging diplomatically with the LDK in May of 1998 when Rugova met with Richard Holbrooke and agreed to talks in Belgrade. For his cooperation, Rugova was rewarded with a trip to the White House on 29 May. In contrast, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had only recently formed as a secretive insurgent group and its founders were young men lacking in political experience, drawn primarily from the rural villages of western and southeastern Kosovo. For his part, Rugova refused to acknowledge the KLA. By the summer, however, the KLA’s numbers had swelled to over 1,000 and


\[www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part1/ch1.htm accessed 24 June 2010\]


\[Judah, Tim (2000) *Kosovo: War and Revenge* Yale: New Haven CT 154\]

\[Rugova, Ibrahim (29 May 1998) “Dr. Ibrahim Rugova Kosovo Albanian Leader makes remarks outside White House after meeting with President Clinton” Washington Transcript Service\]

\[Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova. Rexhep was among 20 founding members of KLA. He was the first KLA member along with two others to come forward publicly on 28 November 1997. He served as the operations officer (G-3) at KLA headquarters in 1998 and as Inspector General for the KLA during combat operations during the NATO air campaign. Judah, Tim (2000) *Kosovo: War and Revenge* Yale: New Haven CT 66-7\]
they could no longer be ignored. Holbrooke made at least one attempt to contact KLA leadership during a visit to Kosovo in early summer, but was rebuffed. 624

By late July, however, the Serbian offensive had driven the KLA underground. High desertion rates had reduced their numbers to well under 300, rendering them seemingly inconsequential on the political front. 625 Holbrooke, therefore, entered the October talks with Serbia and the LDK, having made no contact with the KLA. This structural error of precluding a key actor from negotiations led directly to the agreement’s collapse. Despite its exclusion from the talks, the KLA benefited the most from the negotiated Serbian withdrawal, seizing the opportunity to reorganize, train, and rearm, and quickly reemerged from the shadows. 626 This, in turn, prompted Serbia to reverse its policy and redeploy its forces.

Milosevic learned from this experience that U.S. demands without the compliance of the KLA were tantamount to a territorial demand for Kosovo, an issue he refused to concede, even in the face of air strikes. Furthermore, late December’s Operation Desert Fox in Iraq demonstrated to Milosevic that Saddam Hussein’s regime could survive the same limited U.S. air strikes Serbia now faced. In sum, coercive diplomacy failed at this stage, as the diminished expected costs to Serbia from limited air strikes was insufficient to outweigh the losses from the de facto homeland territorial demands for Kosovo.

624 In an interview with the author, General Lieutenant Agim Ceku, the commanding officer of the KLA, claimed that the KLA made a mistake by not meeting with Holbrooke in the summer of 1998. Rexhep Selimi, a founding member of the KLA, agreed with Ceku, but pointed out that in the summer of 1998, while the KLA had reorganized militarily, it did not have a political wing capable of engaging the U.S. diplomatically. General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview. Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.

625 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.

626 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
The October agreement, proved only partially successful. It allowed Kosovar Albanian refugees to return to their homes over the winter. It was not, however, a sustainable solution to quell the violence in Kosovo. This first stage ended with the massacre at Račak, signaling to the Clinton administration that its foreign policy in Kosovo was no longer tenable.

Coercive Stage II: A Change in U.S. policy over Kosovo, January to late April 1999

Escalating violence in Kosovo and the international attention created by Walker’s condemnation of the Serbs led to a change in White House policy. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright now convinced National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to support a more aggressive position. On 19 January, the National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC) agreed to an ultimatum for the removal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the insertion of NATO troops as peacekeepers. Still, Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton stood fast in refusing to consider U.S. ground troops for combat operations.

At Rambouillet, France in February, a final attempt at coercive diplomacy by the U.S. produced the “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo.” This called for an aggressive timetable for the withdrawal of all Serbian forces (except for border guards), the deployment of a NATO implementation force, the establishment of an miracle.”

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627 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
629 www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/partI/ch1.htm accessed 24 June 2010
631 Alternatively it could be argued that Rambouillet was not an attempt to coerce Serbia at all, but rather to coerce the Kosovar Albanians to sign on to the agreement in order to provide justification for NATO bombing. Either way U.S. coercive diplomacy against Serbia had failed or had already failed.
of a democratic Kosovo government, and an international meeting to be held in three years’ time for a final settlement.\textsuperscript{632}

**Why Milosevic did not concede to the Rambouillet Agreement**

Unlike negotiations the previous fall, Milosevic was no longer interested in conceding to U.S. demands. Four changes help explain this reticence. First, the Serbian population was clearly against the Rambouillet concessions. In a nationwide referendum in April 1998 and in opinion polling conducted during Rambouillet negotiations in February and March of 1999 the Serbian population overwhelmingly opposed foreign intervention in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{633} Second, Milosevic’s political coalition had moved to the right with the inclusion of the Serbian Radical Party and the purge of moderates further removed those from his government and military who might argue for compromise.\textsuperscript{634} Third, in December 1998, Milosevic witnessed Saddam Hussein’s regime survive four days of bombardment and Serbian defense specialists visited Baghdad to glean lessons on how to withstand U.S. air strikes.\textsuperscript{635} Finally, the demands made by the U.S. at Rambouillet were significantly greater than what Milosevic thought he was agreeing to back in October. Milosevic had miscalculated Holbrooke’s demands as merely requiring a Serbian policy change in how it dealt with Kosovo. Only with the Serbian troop

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{632}Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 10 Dec 2006 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html The agreement also included in Appendix B section 8 the following clause: “NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.”
\item \textsuperscript{635} Diamond, John (30 March 1999) “Yugoslavia, Iraq Talked Air Defense Strategy,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*
\end{itemize}
withdrawal did it become clear that the KLA was still viable. Rambouillet, on the other hand, was demanding historic homeland territorial concessions, seeking to replace Serbian forces with NATO troops and setting a timeline for international talks which would doubtlessly lead to an independent Kosovo. Equally important, while the demands had escalated to homeland territory, the threat of limited air strikes had remained unchanged.

Interestingly, not only did Serbia refuse to sign the Rambouillet agreement but so, too, did the KLA-led Kosovar Albanian delegation. They sought a referendum for Kosovo independence, a measure opposed by both the Serbs and the Russians. Instead of a referendum, the U.S. inserted an amendment, designating in “three years after the entry into force of the Agreement, an international meeting [would] be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo.” Even then, KLA representatives would not sign on without first returning to Kosovo to explain the agreement to its commanders. Once satisfied that the KLA leadership concurred, the delegates returned and signed the Agreement on 18 March 1999. With signatures in hand, Holbrooke returned to Belgrade, where he met for the last time with an intransigent Milosevic. On 24 March 1999, NATO commenced Operation Allied Force (OAF).

United States Interests, Political and Military Objectives in Kosovo

The United States had only non-vital security interests at stake at the commencement of the OAF air strikes, i.e. the prevention of a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Kosovo similar to that of the Bosnian Civil War. President Clinton made clear

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636 U.S. State Department Rambouillet Agreement Chapter 8 Article 1. 3.  
www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html accessed 24 June 2010  
637 Rexhep Selimi (18 May 2010) Interview in Pristina, Kosova.
the limitations of U.S. interests when, on the eve of OAF, he announced that he did not intend to use U.S. troops to fight a ground war. 638

**Operation Allied Force: The 3-Day Air Campaign**

The initial phase of OAF took aim at fifty NATO-approved targets: integrated air defense sites (IADS), command and control facilities, airfields, military and police barracks, electric power facilities near Pristina, and two “dual-use” weapons factories. 639 Given the combat aircraft and cruise missiles available to NATO, this target set required only three nights of air operations. 640

**United States and NATO air assets**

NATO commenced operations with 214 deployed combat aircraft, roughly half of which were U.S. strike aircraft. 641 In addition the U.S. employed conventional cruise missiles launched from B-52s, USN surface ships, and USN and British HMS submarines. 642 Though other NATO countries also provided a large number of aircraft, the highest priority targets were assigned to the modern U.S. strikers and strike packages were led by U.S. mission commanders.

640 Not simply the weather but also the level of moon illumination is important for night operations
641 U.S. aircraft included USAF A-10s, B-1s, B-2s, B-52s, F-16s, F-15Es, and USN F-14Bs and F/A-18s
Serbian Air Defenses

The Serbian air defenses were professionally trained with a robust IADS (Integrated Air Defense System) armed with forty-four SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 radar-guided SAMs (surface-to-air missile systems), over a hundred vehicle-mounted SA-9 and SA-13 infrared-guided SAMs, nearly two thousand AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) pieces, and thousands of infrared-guided MANPADS (man portable air defense systems). Serbian Air Force fighter interceptors included 16 modern MiG-29 Fulcrums and 88 older MiG-21 Fishbeds.

NATO aircraft neutralized these defenses by jamming and attacking Serbian radars, flying at medium altitude well above MANPADs and AAA effective ranges, and by employing Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) to protect strike packages from Serbian fighters. This suppression was largely effective as NATO lost only two aircraft to enemy ground fire, a U.S. F-117 and F-16, of which both pilots were rescued.

Phase One of OAF: 24 – 27 March 1999

The first phase of OAF focused on suppressing Serbia's air defenses and targeting Serbian military facilities. On the first night, fifty-five cruise missiles were launched.

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643 Lambeth, Benjamin (2001) NATO's Air War for Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA 17
645 Neutralizing defenses did come at a cost. NATO could conduct fewer strikes if strike packages required both CAP and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) on station. More importantly medium altitude operations greatly affected the number of strikes due to weather. Not until May was the weather good enough in the Balkans to conduct medium altitude operations on a consistent basis.
646 I segment the Kosovo conflict into three coercive stages (prior to Račak, Rambouillet to Washington Summit, and Washinton Summit to Milosevic conceding). This should not be confused with OAF’s three phases of targeting where NATO identified its targets as phase I, II, and III (Phase I: IADS, military barracks, Kosovo electrical grid and two military factories, Phase II: Serbian Fielded Forces in Kosovo, Phase III: Broader leadership and civilian targets in Serbia).
against the IADS, airfields and Kosovo’s electrical power plant in Pristina. In addition, NATO conducted 120 air strikes targeting radar and SAM sites, military airfields, command and control nodes, military barracks and munitions storage areas. NATO fighters also downed three Serbian Mig-29s (Table 5.7 provides a summary for the first four nights). While NATO flew even more strike missions the second night, poor weather on night three extended the Phase I strikes into a fourth night.

These four nights of air strikes on the Serbian military did not convince Milosevic to change his mind nor did they deter Serbian forces from commencing large-scale operations against the Kosovar Albanians.

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647 The targeting of Pristina’s electrical power was to degrade the Serbian IADS by forcing them to resort to backup power sources.
648 Lambeth, Benjamin (2001) NATO’s Air War for Kosovo RAND: Santa Monica, CA 22
649 The last night of phase I strikes was punctuated by the Serbs downing an F-117 stealth fighter, the first time this aircraft had been lost in combat. This was followed by a dramatic 7-hour combat search and rescue mission which plucked the downed pilot from the suburbs of Belgrade. Haun, Phil (2003) “The First Night CSAR” in Haave, Christopher and Phil Haun eds A-10s over Kosovo Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press 214
Day Strike Wx Number of Number of Target
Date Missions Weapons targets Description
expended (DMPIs)

1 175 Clear 190 (170) 180 IADS, Airfields, Electrical
24 Mar grid, barracks, munitions

2 300 Clear 110 (100) 80 Airfields, military HQs, barracks and
25 Mar

3 280 Partly Cloudy 50(40) 40 Attacks in Belgrade and Kosovo
26 Mar

4 250 Partly Cloudy 40(40) 40 Attacks in Belgrade
27 Mar

Table 5.7: Strike Summaries for first phase of OAF

Serbian Response: Rock Concerts and Ethnic Cleansing

Serbia responded to NATO air strikes in two ways. First, the air strikes
galvanized the population to “rally round the flag” in support of Milosevic. Political
protestors found they could not voice dissent against Milosevic while their nation was
under attack. At night in Belgrade and other cities, as air raid sirens blared, thousands
of Serbs defiantly congregated in the streets and on bridges. On the 28th of March, a

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650 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one
unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)
651 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is
the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.
Allied Force: Initial Report United States Air Forces in Europe Studies and Analysis Directorate:
Power Journal 38 (Autumn) 16 - 17
654 “Kosovo Update” (9 April 1999) New York Times
rock concert commemorated the ten-year anniversary of the constitutional changes which had stripped Kosovo of its autonomy. Many of the bands which played and the Serbian students who now protested NATO were the same ones who had earlier protested Milosevic’s falsification of the 1996 election results.655

Second, within Kosovo, Serbian ground forces now launched attacks against the KLA by targeting the Kosovar Albanian population.656 Within days, tens of thousands poured across the border, into refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro. After the initial phase of NATO bombings, the numbers of refugees swelled to hundreds of thousands as the Serbs moved to empty Pristina and other large towns throughout Kosovo.657 By mid-April, Serbian forces were again fully in control of Kosovo while the KLA fled along with the refugees.

Phase Two of OAF, 28 March – 24 April 1999

The U.S. responded to this large-scale humanitarian crisis by expanding its target list to include Phase II targets, the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo. These air strikes, however, were ineffective due to limited U.S. contingency planning for such operations, restrictions in the rules of engagement, the lack of NATO ground troops to facilitate strikes, poor weather, and the tactical adaptation of Serb troops.658 After a month of

656 Smith, Jeffrey and William Drozdiak (11 April 1999) “Serbs’ Offensive Was Meticulously Planned” Washington Post
658 NATO air planners had done little to prepare for striking fielded forces in terms of intelligence or developing command and control for combat operations. The lack of friendly ground forces precluded
bombing, the U.S. had neither stopped the violence nor seriously weakened the military capability of the Serbs in Kosovo (see Table 5.8 for weekly summary of air operations).\(^{659}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Avg Strike Missions/day</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Average Weapons expended (precision)(^{660})</th>
<th>Average Number of targets (DMPIs) attacked(^{661})</th>
<th>Significant Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar – 3 Apr</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>Cloudy</td>
<td>105 (21)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>NATO expands target set, first attacks in downtown Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – 10 Apr</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>Cloudy</td>
<td>199 (90)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>NATO begins targeting Serbian fielded forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–17 Apr</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>214(94)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>U.S. collateral damage attack on train and refugee column(^{662})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–24 Apr</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>171(83)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Milosevic private residence targeted: NATO Summit held in Washington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.8: Phase II, OAF Air Operations Summary; 28 Mar–24 Apr 1999\(^{663}\)**

employing close air support procedures where ground forces are responsible for targeting the enemy. The rules of engagement allowed only attacks on Serbian military equipment and Serb forces quickly switched to driving civilian vehicles. The weather for most of April was cloudy to partly cloudy precluding sustained mid-altitude operations. For a tactical overview of the challenges of attacking fielded forces see Haave, Christopher and Phil Haun eds (2003) *A-10s over Kosovo* Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press.\(^{659}\)


First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)\(^{660}\)

Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.\(^{661}\)

During the second phase the most significant collateral damage incident was the 14 April daylight attack by U.S. F-16’s on a Kosovar refugee column which killed 73 Kosovar. Arkin, William (2001) "Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History,’” Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, ed. *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* New York: Columbia University Press 16


\(^{660}\) First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)

\(^{661}\) Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.

\(^{662}\) During the second phase the most significant collateral damage incident was the 14 April daylight attack by U.S. F-16’s on a Kosovar refugee column which killed 73 Kosovar. Arkin, William (2001) "Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History,’” Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, ed. *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* New York: Columbia University Press 16

In addition to targeting Serb fielded forces, on 3 April NATO conducted a small number of strikes on leadership targets in Serbia (referred to as Phase IIA targets by NATO spokesmen). Two security headquarters housed in office buildings were struck in downtown Belgrade, followed over the next two weeks by strikes on police and military headquarter buildings, telephone exchanges, TV and radio stations and towers, and dual-use factories and oil refineries. NATO also struck transportation and other infrastructure targets. By the 21st of April, the last bridge over the Danube had been dropped and Belgrade’s main water supply was destroyed. NATO also began targeting Milosevic and his political supporters directly by bombing the office building housing the headquarters of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and his wife Mirjana Markovic’s Yugoslavia Left (JUL) party. The master bedroom of Milosevic’s official residence was struck the very next day.

Even with these attacks directed at Milosevic personally and the increasing number of successful strikes on Serbian fielded forces, it was clear by late April that these air strikes were not having the desired effect of convincing Milosevic to acquiesce.

**ANALYSIS OF STAGE II; FEBRUARY 1999 – 24 APRIL 1999**

The Rambouillet Accord articulated what Milosevic had already realized: the United States was demanding the territorial concession of Kosovo. Yet Milosevic had already signaled that he would not give up Kosovo when he redeployed Serbian forces in

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666 Graham, Bradley (23 April 1999) “Missiles Hit State TV, Residence of Milosevic” Washington Post

667 The inclusion by the U.S. of the Rambouillet amendment for an international meeting in three years time indicates that by March 18, 1999 the U.S. clearly understood that it was demanding a territorial concession of Serbia
November in response to the KLA retaking territory. For the United States to gain such territorial concessions through coercive means would require a significant increase in the level of force used in order to increase Milosevic’s expected costs of resistance. Instead, the Clinton administration maintained its previous threat of limited air strikes. Three factors explain the inability/unwillingness of the U.S. to make threats commensurate with demands.

First, U.S. security interests were non-vital. The Clinton administration was primarily concerned with preventing another humanitarian crisis similar to that of Bosnia. This effectively capped the level of force the U.S. was willing to threaten and Secretary of Defense Cohen and General Shelton adamantly opposed the deployment of ground troops for any role other than peacekeeping. President Clinton likewise had little appetite for a ground war in Kosovo and publicly ruled out such an option. This was a strategic mistake, as it reduced the ambiguity over whether the U.S. might invade. Absent this tipping of the hand, however, Milosevic still had reason to be confident, given the transparency of NATO’s operational planning, that a ground invasion of Kosovo was unlikely.

Second, a rift within Clinton’s NSC Principals Committee between the State and Defense departments resulted in the U.S. using separate criteria for evaluating the level of demands it would make and the threat of force it would use to back up those demands. The Račak massacre proved a turning point for Clinton’s foreign policy in Kosovo. Secretary of State Albright pinpointed Milosevic as the problem and argued for getting all Serb police and military out, NATO troops in, and a return to Kosovo autonomy.668

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668 Albright titled the chapter in her memoirs concerning Kosovo as “Milosevic is the Problem” Albright, Madeleine (2003) Madam Secretary New York: Miramax Books
Her viewpoint, however, had previously been checked by Cohen and Shelton, who argued against threatening force over non-vital interests. After Račak, however, Cohen and Shelton were effectively silenced as National Security Advisor Sandy Berger swung his support to Albright. Even so, Cohen and Shelton held firm on no ground troops. In sum, Clinton agreed to a foreign policy strategy which now fundamentally mismatched demands and threats. Why is it he agreed to such a flawed plan?

A primary reason for Clinton’s miscalculated foreign policy was a misperception of Milosevic’s willingness to resist. Clinton, Albright, and Holbrooke had all faced Milosevic before in Bosnia and again in October 1998 when he backed down once the U.S. threatened force. They had come to believe that the threat of air power, or at most three days of limited strikes, would convince him yet again. They failed, however, to properly consider Milosevic’s interests in Kosovo. Kosovo was not Bosnia. Kosovo was the historic birthplace of Serbia, the retention of which had served as the platform for Milosevic’s ascension to power. Furthermore, the territorial demands now being made by the U.S. were far greater than the policy changes to which Milosevic had mistakenly believed he was agreeing in October. Finally, two additional events had taken place since October: Milosevic’s political coalition had moved further to the right with the purging of moderates and Desert Fox had demonstrated that the costs of limited air strikes were bearable.

U.S. efforts at coercive diplomacy failed with the commencement of Operation Allied Force as the threat of force was then replaced by actual strikes. While limited air strikes did not change Milosevic’s calculus, it did trigger an escalation in Serbian military operations which generated hundreds of thousands of refugees, fundamentally altering
the dynamics of the conflict. It proved to be a tactical success but a strategic blunder. Rather than enduring only a limited number of days of attacks, as Saddam Hussein had in Desert Fox, Milosevic now confronted unrelenting NATO air strikes. Over time, however, as air power failed to compel Milosevic to accept the terms of Rambouillet, the reputation of NATO itself was coming under attack.

By the time of the NATO Summit in Washington, U.S. interests had expanded beyond humanitarian concerns to include security interests in a viable NATO and the prestige of the U.S. and of Clinton’s presidency. As this second coercive stage came to an end the U.S. found itself frustrated with its inability to increase the level of its threat to Serbia, though this was about to change.

**Coercive Stage III and OAF Phase III; 24 April – 9 June: Washington Summit to Peace Agreement**

The air campaign, originally planned for 3 days but extended well into April, slowly expanded to include attacks on Serbian fielded forces and a limited number of strikes on Serbian leadership and infrastructure. On 24 April, however, as European leaders met in Washington to celebrate NATO’s 50-year anniversary, two critical events transpired. First, Boris Yeltsin phoned Bill Clinton and offered to pressure Milosevic into a peace agreement. The U.S. agreed to meet with Yeltsin’s new personal envoy to the Balkans, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, to negotiate a mutually acceptable proposal for Chernomyrdin to present to Milosevic. Second, the Clinton administration and NATO leaders arrived at the consensus that the reputation and credibility of NATO was now at

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669 “Kosovo Update” (31 March 1999 and 19 April 1999) *New York Times*
670 “Kosovo Update” (26 April 1999) *New York Times*

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The European Union and United States imposed additional sanctions on Serbia (and Montenegro), including a ban on oil sales, a prohibition of travel, and the freezing of financial accounts.\footnote{Drozdiak, William (26 October 1999) “Milosevic Foes Urge U.S. to End Sanctions; Measures Said to Help Yugoslav President” \textit{Washington Post}} Serbia, however, was in part able to circumvent the most draconian measure, the oil ban, by means of Ukraine shipments along the Danube.\footnote{Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) \textit{Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets} dissertation New York: Columbia University 530}

On the military front, additional U.S. combat aircraft requested in mid-April began to arrive on the scene. The number of combat sorties available increased just as NATO leaders approved Phase III civilian and leadership targets (see Table 5.8).\footnote{The number of combat aircraft increased from 300 to over 800. Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) \textit{Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets} dissertation New York: Columbia University 512 and “Kosovo Update” (11 April 1999 and 4 May 1999) \textit{New York Times}}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day/Date</th>
<th>Avg Strike Missions/day</th>
<th>Wx</th>
<th>Average Weapons expended (precision)</th>
<th>Average Targets (DMPIs) attacked</th>
<th>Significant Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Apr - 1 May</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>320 (149)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>NATO and EU impose oil embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May - 8 May</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>449 (70)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Chinese Embassy bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May - 15 May</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>817(126)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 22 May</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>Partly Cloudy</td>
<td>354(90)</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Russian envoy presents demands to Milosevic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 - 29 May</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>PptyCldy - Clear</td>
<td>707(210)</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>Milosevic indicted war criminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May - 5 Jun</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>533(171)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Milosevic concedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 9 Jun</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>349(86)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Peace agreement reached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.9, Phase III: Operation Allied Force Airstrike Summary**

As the intensity of air strikes escalated so, too, did the likelihood of mishaps. There soon followed two incidents which diluted NATO’s efforts. First, on 5 May a U.S. Army Apache attack helicopter crashed, killing two soldiers. This was the second such incident for the U.S. Army’s Task Force Hawk during mission rehearsals in the high mountains along the Kosovo-Albanian border. The Apache deployment turned into a public debacle as the Pentagon intervened, blocking Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) U.S. General Wesley Clark’s bid to employ Task Force Hawk in combat.

Second, and more importantly, on 8 May a B-2 bomber unintentionally struck the

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676 First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)

677 Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.

678 Task Force Hawk consisting of some 5,000 U.S. soldiers deployed from Germany to Tirana Albania including a squadron of Apache attack helicopters and a Battalion of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). Gordon, John IV, Bruce Nardulli and Walter Perry (Autumn/Winter 2001-2) “The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk” Joint Forces Quarterly 52-57

679 “Kosovo Update” (6 and 16 May 1999) New York Times
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese personnel. This resulted in the suspension of attacks around Belgrade for three days and sidetracked U.S. - Russian negotiations for nearly two weeks. 680

Despite the diplomatic fallout over the Chinese Embassy bombing, NATO was still able to increase its operations tempo as additional aircraft arrived and the weather improved. In May, NATO nearly doubled the targets attacked, tripled the weapons expended, and increased by half again the number of missions flown (see Table 5.10 for summary of air strikes). 681

680 Following the embassy bombing attacks on Serbian leadership targets practically ceased, the exception being the 25 and 26 May bombings of the Dobanovci Presidential villa command and control bunker. However, attacks on Serbian infrastructure continued with multiple strikes on petroleum facilities, electrical power stations, bridges, railways, dual use factories and TV and radio stations. NATO HQ (8 May – 3 June 1999) Operational updates www.nato.int/Kosovo/all-frce.htm accessed 5 October 1999 “Kosovo Update” (9 and 12 May 1999) New York Times

681 These numbers can be somewhat misleading as the number of weapons employed was increased by both bombers and fighters employing greater number of unguided bombs in strikes in Kosovo. Likewise the increase in the number of strikes against fielded forces increased the targets attacked. Alongside the escalation of NATO air strikes in late May, the KLA had regrouped in Albania and within Kosovo and now launched a ground offensive near Mt. Pasterik along the western Kosovo border. Though the KLA advance was quickly halted by Serb forces just within the border, it did flush the Serbs out into the open, exposing them to NATO attacks General Lieutenant Agim Ceku (17 May 2010) Interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Phase</th>
<th>Avg Strike Missions/day (% change)</th>
<th>Average Weapons expended/day</th>
<th>Average Precision Weapons expended/day</th>
<th>Average Number of Targets (DMPIs) attacked/day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I 23 – 27 March</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II 28 Mar – 24 April</td>
<td>383(+53%)</td>
<td>173(+76%)</td>
<td>72(-22%)</td>
<td>79(-7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III 25 Apr – 9 June</td>
<td>568(+48%)</td>
<td>519(+300%)</td>
<td>132(+183%)</td>
<td>151(+191%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: Comparison of Air Strikes by Phase

Impact of War on Serbian Population

While previous air strikes against bridges, railways and communication sites had inconvenienced the Serbian population, attacks on Serbia’s electric grid posed a more serious threat. By mid-May, Serbia had up to 85% of electrical power interrupted, which in addition to the direct impact this had on daily life, also had a ripple effect of causing major disruptions in water supplies to cities throughout the country.\(^{684}\)

Serbs were also beginning to feel increased economic pressure as their already weakened economy stagnated and unemployment began to rise. Indeed, the primary motivator for Milosevic to end Bosnia’s civil war in 1995 had been the lifting of UN economic sanctions. Even more crippling to Serbia’s economy in the early 1990s,

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\(^{682}\) First number is total munitions, in parenthesis are number of precision weapons. More than one unguided bomb is usually dropped in a single attack on a DMPI. Numbers are approximate (+/- 20)

\(^{683}\) Each of the fifty approved targets could have multiple desired mean points of impact (DMPI). DMPI is the precise coordinates on a target designated for weapons impact.

however, was the forfeiture of trade from the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia following Yugoslavia’s breakup. Yugoslavia had arguably been in a better position to transition to a market-based economy than most of the European communist countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the combination of political disintegration and corruption prevented an efficient shift to the private sector and, as a result, Serbia’s economy languished throughout the 1990s. In 1999, the air strikes on factories and transportation networks and the disruption of the power supply combined with the economic sanctions on oil production and the freezing of financial assets to produce a 30% drop in Serbia’s economic output. Serbia reported that the bombing of factories alone had put more than half a million workers out of jobs and a total of two million were out of work by June.

Two months of war and the inconveniences of power outages, lack of water, and shortages of imported goods began to take their toll on a weary Serbian population. Their exuberance for war at this point had clearly waned. The daily rock concerts sponsored by Mirjana Markovic’s JUL party eventually petered out as the tens of thousands who first demonstrated dwindled down to a few hundred. In the south, women began protesting to the Serbian Army against having their husbands and sons serve in Kosovo and, once their men were granted leave, they protested their return to duty. Though there was

Gall, Carlotta (25 May 1999) “Crisis in the Balkans: Serbia;
growing displeasure with the war, the Serb population for the most part blamed the U.S. and not Milosevic for their predicament. Indeed, there were no large demonstrations against him as there had been following the 1996 elections.

**Serbian Domestic Political Discontent**

The first visible signs of domestic political opposition came in late April from Deputy Prime Minister Yuk Draskovic, the leader of the nationalist SPO party who had joined Milosevic’s coalition the previous year. Draskovic publicly accused Milosevic and Markovic of using the war for political gain and called for a negotiated settlement with NATO. His comments only succeeded in getting himself removed from office in late April.689 By mid-May, however, other Serbian officials were publicly advocating an end to the war. In fact, the idea of allowing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo as peacekeepers was being openly debated within Milosevic’s regime.690 By the end of May, small and sporadic anti-Milosevic protests had sprung up in some of the more severely bombed cities and several opposition party leaders had begun to now openly criticize Milosevic.691

**Russian and U.S. Diplomacy**

In mid-April Boris Yeltsin, dissatisfied with Russia’s foreign policy efforts to bring about an end to Kosovo, fired his Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primokov, and selected

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689 Erlanger, Steven (29 April 1999) “Milosevic Abruptly Fires A High-Profile Maverick” *New York Times*
690 Block, Robert (14 May 1999) “Serb Official Urges Deal on Kosovo Peace Force –Close Milosevic Associate Backs UN Contingent; U.S. Troops a Possibility” *Wall Street Journal*
691 Erlanger, Steven (21 May 1999) “Yugoslav Politicians Carefully Maneuver for Day Milosevic is Gone” *New York Times*
Viktor S. Chernomyrdin as his personal envoy to the Balkans. Following Yeltsin and Clinton’s phone call during the Washington Summit, Chernomyrdin traveled to Washington on 4 May to deliver a letter from Yeltsin. In it, Yeltsin proposed a ceasefire and requested a UN envoy be named to assist in Russian diplomatic efforts. These efforts led to a joint endorsement of a seven-point peace plan released at a G8 Foreign Minister meeting on 6 May. The plan modified the Rambouillet Accords to allow the UN Security Council to determine the make-up of peacekeepers and to affirm “…the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity…” for Serbia. Diplomatic efforts stalled for nearly two weeks in the wake of the Chinese embassy bombing but by the 20th of May, Chernomyrdin was in Belgrade presenting the G8 proposal to Milosevic. The key sticking point was whether any Serbian troops would remain in Kosovo and the composition of foreign peacekeeping troops. On 3 June Milosevic agreed to a modified G8 proposal that substituted UN for NATO peacekeepers, thus placing the future of Kosovo in the hands of the Security Council. Military negotiations for implementing the peace agreement took place along the Kosovo-Macedonian border from the 5th to the 9th of June. Shortly thereafter, NATO halted its bombing while Serbian forces withdrew. A UN Security Council Resolution passed on 10 June acknowledged an end to

692 “Kosovo Update” (15 April 1999) New York Times

347
the fighting and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. Russian and 
NATO ground forces then crossed the border into Kosovo on the 12th of June.

Analysis of Coercion Outcome: Why Milosevic gave up when he did

What caused Milosevic to finally accept the G8 peace proposal after over two 
months of NATO bombing is a critical question for coercion and has been the subject of 
intense academic debate. Four factors explain this decision: first, Milosevic’s strategy 
was no longer working; second, he was losing the support of the population and political 
elite for the war; third, he faced a credible, imminent threat of even more costly strikes to 
Serbia’s infrastructure, and fourth, the G8 proposal provided him a face-saving means to 
make concessions.

Milosevic’s Failing Strategy

The first contributor to Milosevic’s concession was the mounting evidence that 
his strategy was no longer working. His strategy can be usefully disaggregated into two 
military and two political components. The first military objective was to rid Kosovo of 
the KLA and thus present a fait accompli to the U.S. demand that Serbia curtail its

aggression in Kosovo. In the days leading up to OAF, Serbia deployed additional troops and equipment to carry out a counterinsurgency mission. Protected by cloud cover from NATO airstrikes, Serbian forces pressed forward to evict the Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo and, in so doing, remove the source of KLA support. From a tactical perspective these operations were highly effective. The KLA departed Kosovo along with all the other refugees and, even when the KLA was able to reorganize and attempt an offensive in late May, their forces were weak and easily repulsed. From a strategic standpoint, however, it was a major blunder and a critical mistake for Milosevic. He may well have expected the flow of refugees into neighboring countries to provide him bargaining power to leverage against NATO for a better deal in exchange for allowing the refugees to return home. The CNN images of thousands of suffering Kosovar Albanian refugees, however, lent credence to U.S. claims that Serbia, and not the KLA, was at fault in Kosovo and reinforced the justification for continuing and escalating NATO air strikes.

The second military component to Serbia’s strategy was to inflict significant combat losses on NATO aircraft and aircrew, making it either too costly for NATO to continue air operations or, at a minimum, creating tension among NATO countries that might cause a fissure in the alliance. The Serbian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) engaged NATO aircraft from the opening strikes until the final days of OAF, but were largely neutralized by a combination of medium-altitude operations and the embedding of combat air patrols (CAPs) and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) assets in strike

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702 The author flew missions in support of the KLA offensive and therefore witnessed the inability of the KLA to penetrate much more than a few miles past the Albanian-Kosovo border.

packages. Serbia succeeded in downing only two aircraft both U.S., the first being a not-so-"stealthy" F-117 and the other an F-16. Even so, the U.S. was able to recover both pilots and Serbia was never able to generate losses significant or consistent enough to cause NATO to question the risk level of its air campaign.704

Along with its efforts to attrit NATO’s forces, Serbia also employed a political strategy of attempting to fracture the alliance by exploiting any collateral damage and civilian deaths caused by the bombings. The U.S. was fully aware of the negative effect errant bombs would have on NATO’s fragile consensus to employ force. Collateral damage estimates and risk calculations were therefore incorporated not only into the selection of targets but also into the timing of attacks. The two factories selected for the initial Phase I strikes were both inactive, significantly reducing the risk of civilian casualties.

The first major collateral damage incident took place on 13 April when an F-15E struck and then re-attacked a bridge as a train was crossing it, killing 10 passengers.705 This event was trumped the next day, however, by F-16s misidentifying tractors in a column of Kosovar Albanian refugees as military vehicles. The ensuing attack killed 74.706 While these back-to-back blunders placed NATO on the defensive diplomatically,

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704 Unable to destroy the aircraft it initially engaged and threatened by NATO SEAD aircraft, Serbian SAM operators chose to live to fight another day by limiting their radar emissions making it difficult for NATO to target their radars. While this greatly reduced the tactical effectiveness for Serbian radar-guided SAMs it did force NATO initially to reduce the number of strike missions it could fly as the number of SEAD aircraft available to support strike packages was limited. The greatest shortage initially was in the availability of EA-6B jammers. The USAF had not replaced the EF-111 when it eliminated the jammer from its inventory following Desert Storm and instead relied on the U.S. Navy and Marines. Though the aircraft could be flown multiple times each day, given the length of missions, the aircrew could only fly once a day which proved to be a limiting factor until additional squadrons and aircrews arrived.

705 Myers, Steven Lee (13 April 1999) “NATO Commander Says Train Was Hit Not Once, but Twice” New York Times

the refugee attack eventually proved counterproductive to the Serbian media campaign. The Serbs seized the initiative, bussing international journalists to the scene to document the grisly event. In route, however, the reporters observed the torched homes and vacated villages, the handiwork of Serb forces. They then interviewed survivors, who provided first-hand accounts, not only of the aerial bombing, but also of Serb troops and police forcing them from their homes at gunpoint. After some initial faulty reports, NATO admitted responsibility for the refugee attack and tightened its rules of engagement to prevent a reoccurrence. In the end, the overriding message was that, while NATO’s attack on the Kosovar Albanians was an accident, the Serbian attacks clearly were not.

No further major collateral damage incident transpired until NATO began escalating its attacks following the Washington Summit. The bombing of the Chinese embassy on 8 May was not the most deadly, but it was by far the most politically harmful collateral damage event of the war. Not only did it sidetrack U.S.-Russian negotiations but it also seriously threatened U.S.-Chinese relations. Nonetheless, this and subsequent collateral damage events signaled NATO’s newfound resolve to see the war through despite the additional risk. In sum, Serbia was never able to fracture the NATO alliance over the issue of collateral damage. Any window of opportunity Serbia may have had in the early stages of the war was more than offset by images of Kosovar Albanians driven from their homes.

The second political component to the Serbian strategy lay in Russian intervention. At the commencement of OAF this appeared promising, as the Kremlin

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707 Erlanger, Steven (16 April 1999) “Blackened Bodies and a Half-Eaten Meal” New York Times
708 Clinton was eventually able to mend relations with the Chinese government somewhat with an apology
709 An excellent example is NATO bombs hitting so close as to shatter windows of the Swiss and Swedish Ambassadors’ residences “Kosovo Update” (21 May 1999) New York Times
decried Western aggression while angry mobs demonstrated outside the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Prime Minister Primakov, when notified of the NATO airstrikes while aboard his Washington-bound jet, dramatically ordered the plane to turn around over the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{710} Though angered by NATO’s actions, Yeltsin was dependent on economic assistance from the U.S. and, therefore, could not afford to be drawn into the conflict militarily. Yeltsin quickly dispatched Primakov to Belgrade with orders to bring an end to the conflict. Despite Primakov’s efforts, Milosevic refused to negotiate unless NATO first ceased its bombing, a precondition the U.S. would not consider.\textsuperscript{711}

Two weeks into the war Yeltsin, who was facing fierce domestic opposition and possible impeachment hearings in the Duma, was clearly frustrated over the hostilities and the inability of Primakov to bring Milosevic to the table.\textsuperscript{712} On 14 April, the Kremlin announced that Primakov was being replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin as Yeltsin’s personal envoy. This marked a policy change for Russia. Yeltsin now pushed for a ceasefire on terms much closer to those preferred by the U.S. rather than Serbia. Evidenced by Yeltsin’s phone call to Clinton on 24 April and by Chernomyrdin’s negotiations with Strobe Talbott through the end of May, this new policy removed the final underpinning to Serbia’s war strategy. Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade on 3 June to deliver the G8 proposal to a dejected Milosevic, who reluctantly acceded.

In sum, by June 3\textsuperscript{rd} it was clear to Milosevic that his strategy of resisting NATO was not working. He had not been able to stop the bombings by fracturing the NATO


\textsuperscript{711} Bohlen, Celestine (29 March 1999) “Yeltsin Sends His Premier to Urge Serbs to Negotiate” \textit{New York Times}

\textsuperscript{712} Bohlen, Celestine (10 April 1999) “‘Don’t Push Us,’ Yeltsin Warns West on Balkans” \textit{New York Times}
alliance. Attempts at downing a large number of aircraft had failed, as had his touting of civilian casualties caused by collateral damage. Serbia’s military operation had succeeded in evicting the majority of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, but this had not gained for Milosevic any additional bargaining power, but instead neutralized any international sympathy Serbia may have garnered as the victim of NATO’s military action. Finally, Yeltsin’s decision to work with the U.S. for a joint peace proposal dashed Milosevic’s last hope of Russian intervention.

**Loss of Serbian Support for the War**

The failure of Milosevic’s strategy is a necessary, though not sufficient explanation for why he chose to concede to the G8 proposal when he did. A second reason was waning support for the war among the Serbian population and the political elite. Indeed, general popularity and the backing of the old communist establishment had been key to Milosevic’s rise to power. While Milosevic was deft at legal and political maneuvering and electoral fraud to remain in power, there were clearly limits to how much he could manipulate Serbia’s electoral system. This was witnessed in the 1996 election when, only after months of widespread protest, he finally relented and accepted the election results. Serbia was clearly not a democracy, yet the vote of the Serbian population still mattered. As Milosevic’s popularity decreased throughout the 1990s so, too, did his freedom of action. To remain in power, he was forced to bring in and accommodate additional political actors in his coalition.

The Serbian population’s eagerness to resist NATO, demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands who protested in late March, had by May been replaced by a war weariness. The rock concerts, once cheering on Milosevic, now devolved into a small,
but growing number of protests against the war, as widespread power and water outages, rising prices, and unemployment had sapped their support. A final piece of *ex post* evidence of their sentiments was the general sense of relief and the lack of protests which greeted Belgrade’s announcement of a peace agreement.

The political elite had initially either supported the war or at least felt constrained against speaking openly against the war or Milosevic. By mid-May, however, opposition leaders, as well as those within Milosevic’s own party, felt emboldened to publicly call for concessions to stop the bombing. In sum, the popular and political defiance of NATO had shifted to the point of accepting an agreement which would stop the war, even if this meant U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.

**Expectation of Further Damage to Serbian Infrastructure**

A third explanation for Milosevic’s decision on 3 June was his resigned sense that further delay would only lead to further damage to Serbia’s infrastructure and economy. The ever improving weather for bombing, increased number of combat aircraft, and the shift to striking targets throughout Serbia caused the expected cost for rebuilding, already estimated in the billions, to climb even higher.\(^{713}\) Despite the previous attacks on bridges, factories, oil facilities and the power grid, NATO had still demonstrated a good deal of restraint, given the plethora of infrastructure and economic targets which Serbia could not defend. Economically, Serbia still stood to lose a great deal should Milosevic

\(^{713}\) NATO directly targeted factories owned by Milosevic’s wealthy political supporters, even calling and faxing before hand so that factory owners were aware of NATO’s intentions, however there is no direct evidence that these crony attacks were primarily responsible for Milosevic’s concessions. For arguments for Crony attack see Hosmer, Stephen (2001) "Chapter 6: Damage to ‘Dual-Use’ Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure" in *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* Monterey CA: RAND and Douglas, Frank Scott (2006) *Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets* dissertation New York: Columbia University
refuse the G8 proposal. And though the Serbian people had suffered economically through most of Milosevic’s tenure in office, this did not make him immune to their plight. Indeed, during the Bosnian Civil War he had held the lifting of economic sanctions as his highest political objective.

A Face-saving Concession

A final reason for Milosevic’s willingness to concede to the G8 proposal in June was its inclusion of face-saving measures absent from the Rambouillet demands. This allowed Milosevic to make the claim to the Serbian people that he had not surrendered Kosovo to the U.S.. The deployment of both NATO and Russian peacekeeping troops under the auspices of the United Nations was a key U.S. compromise. This provided Russia influence both on the Security Council and on the ground over Serbia’s interests in Kosovo. Further, the G8 proposal removed all reference to a future referendum on the question of Kosovo independence. These two measures provided the cornerstone to Milosevic’s address to the Serbian people on 10 June after the peace agreement had been finalized.714

Alternative Explanation: Threat of Ground Invasion

Rather than the fear of further punishing air attacks on Serbia, an alternative explanation for Milosevic’s decision to concede to the G8 proposal lay in the mounting threat of a NATO ground invasion. Having already begun the deployment of troops to

714 Milosevic, Slobodan (10 June 1999) “Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s Address to the Nation” Washington Post
Albania and Macedonia, NATO was now in position to make a decision on a ground invasion.\textsuperscript{715}

Clearly the potential for a NATO ground invasion had increased following the Washington Summit. Tony Blair pressured the White House to consider the issue and, on 19 May, Clinton relented by announcing that he would not rule out a ground option, though he did add that the alliance “…ought to stay with the strategy that we have and work it through to the end.”\textsuperscript{716} Two days later, the Clinton administration called for NATO to deploy 50,000 troops along the border. Though the purpose given by the White House for the deployment was preparation for a peacekeeping mission, the timing of the move added weight to the likelihood of invasion.\textsuperscript{717} On 2 June, one day before Milosevic conceded, Clinton met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the first discussion of a ground invasion. In order to have the requisite 150,000 troops in place by mid-August and avoid a winter ground war, a decision to invade needed to be made by mid-June.\textsuperscript{718}

The shortcoming of this argument is that the key actions which would make the threat of a ground war credible had not yet been carried out. Even though Prime Minister Blair lobbied hard for it, President Clinton was still deliberating and a reluctant U.S. Congress had not approved the large-scale deployment of ground troops necessary for a ground war. The forces that were in place were not sufficient to mount any offensive

\textsuperscript{715} Pape, Robert (2004) “The True Worth of Air Power” Foreign Affairs 83:2. Pape critiques the argument that a punishment strategy caused Milosevic to concede because NATO had stopped strategic attacks following the Chinese embassy bombing. Though Pape is correct that attacks on Serbian leadership were stopped, however attacks on Serbian infrastructure and dual-use factories continued.

\textsuperscript{716} Seelye, Katharine (19 May 1999) “Clinton Keeps Option For Ground Troops” New York Times

\textsuperscript{717} Perlez, Jane (21 May 1999) “Clinton is Pushing for 50,000 Troops at Kosovo Border” New York Times

action and it would take well over two months to remedy this shortcoming.\textsuperscript{719} The Mt. Pastrik operation by the KLA at the end of May failed miserably.\textsuperscript{720} The Serbian military remained well entrenched in the mountainsides and forests overlooking the major arteries into western and southern Kosovo and the expected casualties to U.S. ground troops, even with NATO’s air supremacy, were significant. Overall, the threat of a ground invasion does not explain Milosevic’s willingness to accept the G8 proposal on 3 June. The imminent threat of additional economic losses from further air strikes better explains the timing of his actions than the threat of invasion.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION FAILURE}

In this section I test the two hypotheses for coercion failure, i.e. that of target \textit{survival} and challenger \textit{commitment} problems (see Table 5.11). Kosovo is an interesting case in that neither the U.S. nor Serbia initially recognized the core demand as one of homeland territory. This realization dawned on Milosevic after he had agreed to reduce troop levels in October of 1998, only to reverse this policy as the KLA began occupying the posts vacated by Serbian troops. It was not until Račak in mid-January 1999 that the U.S. began to make public what was already being asked of the Serbs: that they relinquish control of Kosovo.

It would not be until June of 1999, however, that the U.S. could escalate military force to the point that Milosevic was finally willing to concede. Even then, he insisted

\textsuperscript{719} The U.S. had approximately 5,000 troops associated with Task Force Hawk in Albania and NATO’s Task Force Sabre (formerly known as Task Force Able Sentry) in the FYROM (Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia) had approximately 620 soldiers along the border of Macedonia and Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{720} General Wesley Clark has alternatively argued that the KLA operations may well have convinced Milosevic of a ground invasion. Priest, Dana (19 September 1999) “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War” \textit{Washington Post}
that the U.S. include in the agreement Russian peacekeepers and remove all reference to a future referendum, in order to lower his audience costs.

Interestingly, the *survival* hypothesis incorrectly expects this coercive strategy likely to fail since demands threatened Serbian control of its homeland territory and the audience costs for making a concession also threatened Milosevic and his regime. While coercive diplomacy failed at Rambouillet, the U.S. eventually succeeded in increasing its threat of force to the point of convincing Milosevic to concede. By contrast, the *commitment* hypothesis correctly predicts Milosevic would eventually concede since the U.S. air power-only strategy could not credibly back up further demands for additional territory or for regime change. This is the single case out of the ten compellent demands considered in the case studies presented in chapters 4-6 on Iraq, Serbia, and Libya for which the *commitment* hypothesis correctly predicts the outcome while the *survival* hypothesis does not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th><em>Survival</em> Hypothesis</th>
<th><em>Commitment</em> Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1998 - June 1999</td>
<td>Homeland Territory</td>
<td>Predicts Failure - Serbian state threatened by homeland territory - Milosevic's political survival dependent on keeping Kosovo</td>
<td>Predicts Success - U.S. air power insufficient to credibly back up additional demands</td>
<td>Success - Milosevic agrees to withdraw Serbian troops for NATO peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11: Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure
TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS

The survival hypothesis expects coercion to fail when the state, the regime, and the regime leadership’s survival is threatened by a concession, so long as the target has the means to resist. The survival hypothesis presumes that when survival is not at stake that the challenger and target act rationally. According to the asymmetric coercion model, this entails the powerful challenger maximizing its outcome by matching demands and threats such that the target is just willing to concede. For the case of Kosovo, however, the survival hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion failure since Serbian homeland territory, Milosevic, and his regime were all at risk.

IMPACT ON SERBIA, MILOSEVIC, AND HIS REGIME’S SURVIVAL FOR CONCEDING

Impact on Serbia for Conceding

Agreeing to the G8 peace plan required Serbia to cede control of its homeland territory. Unlike Bosnia, which had always been a separate republic, Kosovo was an historic part of Serbia and even considered to be its birthplace. The loss of control over homeland territory, control over population, control over government, and economic viability are the four issues I assess to determine if a concession threatens state survival. While the threat to territory was significant, those of population control and economic viability were much less so. Acquiescing meant the loss of control over 200,000 Serbs living in Kosovo. In addition, relinquishing control of Kosovo did not seriously threaten the Serbian economy as Kosovo was a poor region without major resources or industry and with an economy based on subsistence agriculture. On the contrary, conceding
Kosovo to the U.S. would likely have improved the Serbian economy by putting an end to NATO airstrikes and UN sanctions, thus allowing Serbs to go back to work.

**Impact on Milosevic and his Regime for Conceding**

Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) controlled the Serbian government and there were no domestic opposition groups within Serbia with the capacity to violently overthrow the regime. In November of 1990, Milosevic sealed an alliance between the SPS and the Yugoslavian Army (JNA). This successfully subjugated the military to civilian control, thus lowering the chances not only of a military coup but also of the formation of armed opposition groups that could revolt. As a result, Milosevic’s government was never threatened by civil war.

SPS’s power was more susceptible, however, at the ballot box. Following Milosevic’s rise to power, the SPS had won elections by comfortable margins. But a year after Dayton, in the November 1996 national elections, its margin of victory was significantly reduced. And, as the popular demonstrations following the elections made clear, Milosevic and his SPS could no longer simply dismiss unfavorable election returns. Though the SPS still controlled parliament, they were forced to share power by expanding their governing coalition. After seven years of Milosevic rule, the Serbian population had begun to express a general displeasure over the dissolution of Yugoslavia and his mishandling of their now dysfunctional economy. By 1999 Milosevic and his SPS were vulnerable to the point that a concession over Kosovo, with or without a fight,

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could produce sufficient audience costs to remove them from power in the next election. And this, in fact, is what happened in 2000.\footnote{Following the War over Kosovo Milosevic did not appear to perceive the Serbian population’s displeasure with him and the SPS. He was responsible for calling early elections in 2000 and surprised by the results. Thompson, Mark R. and Philipp Kuntz (2004) “Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October” Journal of Democracy 15:4 (October) 159-172}

In sum, though Milosevic and his regime were not worried about a revolt, their hold on power was threatened by a negative outcome in future elections.

**Why Milosevic conceded**

The survival hypothesis predicts that Serbia, Milosevic and his SPS party would not likely concede control of Kosovo as this threatened their survival. Yet Milosevic did just that. In a previous section I discussed why Milosevic conceded when he did. Here, I further measure his decision against the prediction of the survival hypothesis and discuss four factors which help explain it. First, though Serbians considered Kosovo part of their homeland, they had lived without controlling it from 1974 to 1989. And, given its marginal economic output, its small land mass, the insignificance geopolitically, and the tiny fraction of the Serbian population residing there, Serbia could, in fact, survive without it. Though its people were willing to fight for it, the loss of Kosovo did not spell the end of the state of Serbia.

Second, as previously discussed Milosevic’s strategy had failed by late May of 1999 and further resistance would only have led to more punishment for the Serbian population. It was clear that Serbia could not inflict sufficient costs, either militarily or diplomatically, to deter U.S. military efforts.

Third, Milosevic, the United States, and Russia undertook three steps to reduce the audience costs to Milosevic for conceding to demands. Initially, Milosevic resisted
signing the Rambouillet Accords even though this brought on NATO air strikes. This created a “rally around the flag” effect of support by the Serbian population. Milosevic only conceded after two months of NATO bombing and then only when the Serbians’ enthusiasm for war had waned. Under the strain of NATO airstrikes, few Serbians could blame Milosevic for making concessions, as evidenced by their general sense of relief and the lack of large anti-Milosevic protests following his announcement. Second, the U.S. conceded to including Russian troops alongside NATO peacekeepers. This allowed Milosevic to announce that he had not surrendered Kosovo to NATO but had, rather, handed over guardianship to UN peacekeepers which included Serbia’s ally. Finally, the U.S. removed all reference to a future referendum for Kosovo’s independence, enabling Milosevic to argue that his concession would not necessarily lead to an independent Kosovo. Two months of resistance combined with the U.S. conceding to Russian troops and no referendum to provide a platform, albeit shaky, for Milosevic to make an argument to the Serbs that enduring 78 days of air strikes had been justified and that he had not, in fact, surrendered Kosovo.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, while concession to demands in June may not have threatened Serbia’s and Milosevic’s survival, further resistance would have. Milosevic stood up to the U.S. for as long as he could, but when faced with the catastrophic economic consequences of the escalating NATO air campaign, he relented. This crisis proves to be a critical case for explaining the limitations of the survival hypothesis. Of all the crises studied in Chapters 4 – 6, it is the only one in which the survival hypothesis produces a false positive, predicting failure when the actual outcome was success. In spite of this, the case turns out to be the exception which proves the rule.
Not only does it demonstrate that states and their leaders resist when their survival is threatened, but they will likewise concede when further resistance is likely to prove fatal.

**TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS**

The *commitment* hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail if the United States cannot credibly commit *ex ante* to make no further demands of Serbia. A commitment problem is more likely when there is deployed military force capable of backing up additional demands. In June of 1999, however, the U.S. had not yet deployed sufficient ground forces to credibly threaten an invasion of Kosovo, let alone Serbia. President Clinton had not yet made a decision on whether to deploy more U.S. troops and, even if he had, it would have taken until August at the earliest before such forces could have been in a position to threaten an invasion of Kosovo. And finally, because NATO had reluctantly agreed to go to war over Kosovo, the chances that the U.S. could have convinced the 18 other NATO countries to further increase demands were remote. The U.S. was therefore in no position to militarily back up demands for further Serbian territory or for regime change. As a result, the *commitment* hypothesis correctly predicts that coercion would succeed, that Milosevic would not believe his concession would only lead to further demands.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I have examined two important cases of coercion where the U.S. adopted strategies which employed air power and sanctions but intentionally did not risk ground forces, as vital U.S. security interests were not at stake. The Bosnian Civil War and Kosovo are both crises for which the U.S. eventually succeeded in achieving its core
demands, but not before coercive diplomacy had failed and the U.S. had placed its reputation and prestige on the line. Some critics, therefore, do not consider Bosnia and Kosovo foreign policy successes, pointing out the lengthy duration of the conflicts, the level of military effort expended by the U.S. for such meager returns, and the bloodshed and economic losses endured by Bosnians, Serbians, and Kosovar Albanians. Despite these critiques, however, coercive U.S. strategies did succeed in ending the Bosnian Civil War while maintaining Bosnia as a state, and in wresting Kosovo from Serbian control.

For these two cases, I tested two hypotheses for coercion failure: target survival and challenger commitment problems (see Table 5.12 below). The survival hypothesis correctly predicted the concession by Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs to end the Bosnian Civil War. In Kosovo, however, where the demand for homeland territory was expected to create significant audience costs for Milosevic and his regime, the survival hypothesis incorrectly predicted coercion failure. Milosevic, rather, conceded because further resistance in the face of unlimited NATO air strikes threatened the economic viability of Serbia and, by extension, his grasp on power.

By contrast, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Serbia’s concessions in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It did not, however, foresee the Bosnian Serb’s dependence on Milosevic and therefore did not predict a concession when the U.S. could well have made additional territorial demands backed by credible threats from Croat-Muslim forces and NATO air power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compelling Demands</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Civil War April 1992 – Nov 1995</td>
<td>- Maintain single Bosnian State - Ceasefire and peace agreement</td>
<td>SERBIA Predicts Success - Serbian state not threatened as Bosnia not part of Greater Serbia - JNA loyal to Milosevic regime - Milosevic's political survival dependent more on stabilizing Serbian economy than on future of Bosnia</td>
<td>SERBIA Predicts Success - Sanctions against Serbia already at maximum and neither NATO air power nor Croat – Muslim ground forces sufficient to back up additional demands of Serbia</td>
<td>SERBIA Coercion Success - Milosevic agrees to pressure Bosnian Serbs and places sanctions on them in August 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo June 1998 – June 1999</td>
<td>Homeland Territory</td>
<td>Predicts Failure - Serbian state threatened by loss of homeland territory - Milosevic's political survival dependent on keeping Kosovo</td>
<td>Predicts Success - U.S. air power insufficient to credibly back up additional demands</td>
<td>Success - Milosevic agrees to withdraw Serbian troops for NATO peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.12: Predictions of Coercion Outcomes
Chapter 6: United States vs. Libya 1981-2003

In Chapters 4 and 5, I conducted qualitative analysis for cases of asymmetric coercion drawn from the conflicts between the United States and Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and between the U.S. and Serbia from 1992 to 1999. In this chapter I conclude with the case of U.S. foreign policy in regard to Libya from 1981 to 2003. This particular conflict was chosen for two reasons. First, it is a case where economic sanctions replaced military force as the United States’ primary coercive lever. The U.S. air strikes of the 1980s gave way to UN sanctions in the 1990s and the threat of military force was reintroduced only indirectly following September 11th, 2001. This heavy reliance on sanctions provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the asymmetric coercion model for cases where coercive threats are non-military in nature. Thus far, the asymmetric coercion model developed in Chapter 3 has only been evaluated in cases where coercion entailed *threatening force or the limited use of force to induce a target to comply with demands*. The Libyan case is an intentional expansion of the scope conditions for the asymmetric coercion model in an initial effort at generalizing the model for sanctions.

Second, this conflict differs from the other two in that, over time, the U.S. abandoned its foreign policy objective of removing Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi from power. With both Iraq and Serbia, as conflict extended over years, the United States came to view their leaders, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, as the source of the problem. As a result, the U.S. eventually adopted regime change as a formal policy objective for both countries. The Libyan case is intriguing, however, in that while the U.S. escalated its demands of Iraq and Serbia in the late 90s, it simultaneously abandoned regime change as a policy objective for Libya, this even though the conflict had been
ongoing for a decade longer. And, while Hussein and Milosevic were both eventually
driven from power as a direct or indirect result of U.S. actions, Qadhafi not only remains
the leader of Libya, but U.S. diplomatic relations with the country has been restored. The
Libyan conflict, unlike either Iraq or Serbia, therefore provides a case for evaluating the
asymmetric coercion model where U.S. objectives decrease over time.

I separate the conflict between the United States and Libya into three crises. The
first commenced with President Reagan assuming office in 1981 and his administration’s
adoption of a more aggressive, adversarial policy towards Libya. A series of U.S.-
initiated naval exercises, intended to challenge Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra,
produced a series of military confrontations which only flamed tensions between the two
countries. Libya’s involvement in terrorist attacks, its overt support of terrorist
organizations, and Qadhafi’s anti-western rhetoric led the White House to adopt two
foreign policy objectives. The first was a coercive demand for Libya to change its policy
of supporting international terrorism and the second was a non-coercive, brute force
objective of Libyan regime change. (see Table 6.1 below for coercion typology of
demands, threats and outcomes).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Stop terrorist activities</td>
<td>- unilateral sanctions</td>
<td>- Libya reduced, but did not stop, terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Stop support of terrorist groups</td>
<td>- airstrikes</td>
<td>- Libya stopped overt support of terrorist groups, but continued covert support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brute Force Objective Regime Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing December 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brute Force Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Extradite two Libyan suspects for trial</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td>No regime change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1991 – April 1999</td>
<td>- Cooperate with investigations</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Libya hands over two suspects for trial in Netherlands and cooperates with investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acknowledge Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Libya does not acknowledge responsibility or pay compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pay Compensation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001 – Dec 2003</td>
<td>Policy Change</td>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandon support of terrorism</td>
<td>- U.S. unilateral sanctions</td>
<td>- Libya abandoned support of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandon WMD</td>
<td>- Implicit threat of airstrikes</td>
<td>- Libya abandoned WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acknowledge responsibility for Pan Am Flight 103</td>
<td>Denial</td>
<td>- Libya acknowledged responsibility for Pan Am bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bombing</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Libya paid $2.7 billion in compensation to victims’ families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pay compensation to victims’ families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To back up the compellent demand that Libya stop supporting terrorism, the U.S. employed a punishment strategy of sanctions by suspending diplomatic relations and
imposing a unilateral economic boycott. These actions were undermined, however, by Reagan’s inability to garner international support for sanctions. In 1985, a sharp spike in the number of terrorist attacks killing Americans reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy to now include the threat of military force. When Libya was implicated in the April 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque, the U.S. retaliated with a joint Air Force and Navy airstrike codenamed *El Dorado Canyon*. Jets struck multiple targets including Qadhafi’s residential compound. The U.S. only partially achieved its aim of stopping Libya’s support of terrorism as Qadhafi’s rhetoric subsided along with the number of terrorist attacks with Libyan ties until the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December, 1988. The U.S. failed, however, in its attempts to produce regime change as Qadhafi survived several coup attempts in the months following *El Dorado Canyon*.

A second crisis between the U.S. and Libya commenced with allegations linking Libyan Arab Airline employees to the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. In 1991, the U.S. and Britain demanded that Libya extradite the two officials implicated in the bombing, disclose all evidence, take responsibility for their actions, and pay compensation to the victims’ families. Notably, the Bush administration refrained from pursuing Libyan regime change. Although they refused American and British demands, Libyan officials did recommend the case be tried by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, in the Netherlands. The U.S., not believing Libya to be sincere in its offer rejected it out of hand.723 Unlike President Reagan, Bush and then Clinton did not threaten military force to back demands, relying instead on sanctions. In 1992, the UN Security Council

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approved multilateral sanctions to complement the unilateral sanctions the U.S. had already had in place for more than a decade. The UN sanctions intentionally omitted Libyan oil exports, however, and therefore did not have the same draconian impact as the sanctions concurrently being imposed on Iraq and Serbia. They did, however, prevent Libya from obtaining the requisite equipment and supplies to increase oil production and, accompanied by the depressed global oil prices of the decade to follow, slowly eroded Libya’s petroleum-based economy.

In 1997, Britain’s new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, found himself under pressure from the families of Lockerbie victims to accept Libya’s recommendation for a third country trial and in an effort to settle the case, convinced President Clinton to reverse U.S. policy. This eventually led to the extradition of the two Libyan suspects to stand trial in the Netherlands. In return for the extradition, the U.S. agreed to the suspension, though not the permanent removal, of UN sanctions. This particular crisis concluded as a partial success for the U.S. as Libya did concede to its core demand of extradition. Qadhafi, however, would not agree to the additional demands of taking responsibility for the bombing and paying compensation.

Following the conclusion of this second crisis, the Clinton administration continued secret negotiations with Libya over four issues: the two remaining demands concerning Pan Am Flight 103 and demands for Libya to renounce terrorism and end its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. In return, the U.S. would end sanctions and normalize relations. Talks stalled, however, over the United States’ desire to resolve the demands sequentially, beginning with Pan Am Flight 103. Qadhafi remained reluctant to make any such concessions until a final verdict in the trial had been rendered.
In addition, Libyan officials would not consider conducting bilateral negotiations over WMD, stating their preference, rather, for a multilateral forum.

The Clinton administration eventually suspended the secret talks in 2000, fearing a leak would disrupt the upcoming presidential elections. In January 2001, a verdict in the Lockerbie trial was finally reached convicting one of the two suspects. The new George W. Bush administration, however, chose not to reinitiate talks until prompted by the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The September 11th attacks changed the dynamics of the international security environment and ushered in a third crisis between the U.S. and Libya. The U.S. maintained its previous demands of Libya and, importantly, President Bush chose not to include Libya in his “Axis of Evil” or to reintroduce Libyan regime change as an objective as he had with Iraq. While Qadhafi publicly condemned Al Qaeda’s actions, the tripartite talks, which included Britain, recommenced but made little progress. In September 2002, the U.S. and Britain again offered that, in exchange for Libya acceding to its demands all sanctions would be permanently lifted and diplomatic relations with the U.S. restored. Along with the inducement of normalized relations, the credible threat of military force had risen with the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and preparations for the invasion of Iraq. These actions demonstrated both the capability and the willingness of the Bush administration to use force to remove regimes. In March of 2003, just days before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi finally conceded to talks over Libyan WMD. In August, Libya acknowledged responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to payment of $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims’ families. The U.S. then publicly agreed to the permanent lifting of UN sanctions.
Then in October 2003, U.S. and British intelligence identified and intercepted a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuges bound for Libya. Caught red-handed with irrefutable evidence of an active nuclear program, Qadhafi moved in December to concede to demands to end his WMD programs while the offer of normalizing relations was still on the table. This final crisis was a successful case not only of coercion, but also of coercive diplomacy, as the U.S. achieved all of its objectives without resorting to even a limited use of force.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section provides context by reviewing the rise of Libya as a state and of Qadhafi as its dictator. It also examines how the conflict between Libya and the U.S. originated with Libya’s involvement in international terrorism. I then summarize the key events, actions, decisions, and outcome for the first crisis from 1981 until 1988. In the next section, I repeat this process for the second crisis which commenced with the implication of Libya in the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and ended with Libya extraditing the two suspects for trial in the Netherlands. The third section considers the U.S. demands to bring a final resolution to Pan Am Flight 103 and to address Libya’s terrorism and WMD policies. This third crisis commenced on September 11th, 2001 and ended with Qadhafi abandoning Libya’s WMD programs on 19 December 2003. In the final section, I test the predictions from the two hypotheses for coercion failure against the actual outcomes in these three crises.

A word of caution is warranted before proceeding further. Unlike the Iraq and Serbia cases for which, as a result of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic’s removal from power, there has emerged a variety of sources on their perceptions and motivations, Qadhafi continues to rule Libya. Scant information is available about his beliefs or his
intentions during these crises. My analysis therefore proceeds on my interpretation of how Qadhafi would likely have perceived the facts presented to him. I base this on his reactions to certain events and on previous research as to what motivates such charismatic leaders of personalist regimes.

THE HISTORY OF LIBYA AND RISE OF QADHAFI

Modern Libya consists of the three historic tribal provinces in the Sahara Desert: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (see Map 6.1). These regions form a landmass roughly the size of Alaska. In 1951 Libya had a population of under a million with the majority settled along the winding Mediterranean coastline. Italy wrested control of the region from the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and following World War II, the colony fell under the jurisdiction of the British and the French. With the encouragement of the United Nations, Libya was granted its independence in 1951 with the establishment of the monarchy of King Idris al-Sanusi. At the time, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world.

Given their ethnic heterogeneity, along with their harsh treatment under fascist Italian rule, the tribes were reluctant to form a strong central government. Instead they formed a loosely federated system with each province (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) each preserving a great deal of political and economic autonomy.

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King Idris chose his advisors and filled key governmental positions on the basis of tribal and family loyalty.\textsuperscript{726} Incompetent and corrupt, his ministries and administrative offices funneled what meager revenues it garnered from British and U.S. contracts to the king and his cronies.\textsuperscript{727}


\textsuperscript{727} Federal revenues were quite significant, given Libyan's minuscule agricultural based economy, accounting for 35 percent of Libya’s GNP in 1960. Luciani, Giacomo (1987) “Allocation versus Production States: A Theoretical Framework” Beblawi, hazem and Giacomo Luciani ed \textit{The Rentier State} New York: Croom Helm
Ethnic Groups

![Ethnic Groups Map](image)

**Map 6.1: Libya**

*U.S. Interests in Libya*

During the Cold War, U.S. strategic interests in Libya were minimal, but did include basing rights at Wheelus Air Base outside Tripoli to train NATO aircrew and, if

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necessary, forward deploy Strategic Air Command bombers. Still these security matters were relatively minor compared to the significant economic interests generated by the discovery of large deposits of high quality sweet crude oil under the Sahara in 1959 and the rapid expansion of Libyan oil production which followed.\textsuperscript{729}

**The Impact of Oil on Libya: 1960 – 1969**

The discovery of oil beneath the desert sands produced an economic bonanza for Libya but it also placed a strain on its weak federal government. In 1963 King Idris strengthened his powers through constitutional changes aimed at solving property rights over oil fields which straddled various provinces and at constructing a national oil pipeline. Beyond this, however, his government remained patronage based, though the distribution of wealth was now on a much larger scale. Libya had risen rapidly to become the world’s fourth largest oil producer, its population had doubled to just over two million, and its annual per capita income had soared from $60 in 1960 to now over $2,000 in 1969.\textsuperscript{730}

**1969 Military Coup of the Revolutionary Command Council and Rise of Colonel Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi**

Though King Idris had spent nearly two decades on the throne, in 1969 his regime remained fragile. He had been unable to monopolize the use of force within Libya and therefore lacked a key Weberian element of sovereignty which ultimately led to his undoing. Libya had two separate armies. Those most loyal to the king were in the police, local militias, and the well-armed and British-trained Cyrenaican Defense Force


(CDF), which provided for the king’s personal security. These forces totaled 14,000 and their personnel were recruited from tribes most loyal to Idris. The other armed force was the Royal Libyan Army (RLA) which numbered 6,500. The RLA had been formed by the British during WWII and its soldiers were recruited predominantly from Libya’s lower middleclass. These soldiers had few personal or tribal ties to the monarch. The primary function of the RLA was the employment of Libya’s lower classes, not the defense of Libya. With King Idris’s newfound oil wealth, he supplied his CDF with modern weapons and procured expensive Western air defense systems and jet fighters. Fearing a heavily-armed RLA, however, he refused their requests for modern weapons.

King Idris’ concerns proved justified. On 1 September 1969, twelve junior officers, the self-proclaimed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), staged a bloodless coup. The Royal Libyan Army quickly rallied behind the RCC and, within a matter of days Libya was under their control. King Idris, who was out of the country seeking medical attention, drew little support from an apathetic Libyan population. The RCC actions were largely ignored by the people and the coup was tacitly condoned by the CDF, who chose to remain in their barracks rather than fight. On the international front, the U.S. moved quickly to recognize the new regime and the British followed suit, once King Idris had accepted exile in Egypt.

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Mu’ammar Al’Qadhafi soon emerged as the RCC’s leader. The charismatic twenty-seven-year-old army captain assumed the rank of colonel when the RCC named him their chairman and the commander-in-chief of the Libyan Armed Forces.\(^{735}\)

Qadhafi was born in 1942 into a Bedouin tribe near the town of Surt on the Gulf of Sidra, midway between Libya’s largest cities of Tripoli and Benghazi (see Map 6.2). Tribal affiliation barred Qadhafi from attending university and, as with many of his fellow RLA officers, a military career was the only option available for social mobility.\(^{736}\) Emulating Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Qadhafi joined a small revolutionary group as an army cadet. This clandestine group, modeled after Nasser’s “Free Officers Movement” with its Pan Arab goals, formed the core of the RCC.\(^{737}\) Only after the coup, however, did Qadhafi emerge as the RCC’s leader, though he would not exert power independent of the cabal until 1975, following a failed coup attempt by two of its members.\(^{738}\)

Qadhafi’s aspirations were not limited to ruling Libya but extended to a desire for prestige and respect from the Arab world at large. After the death of Nasser in 1970, Qadhafi proclaimed himself successor to Pan Arabism.\(^{739}\) This, in part, motivated Qadhafi to adopt his anti-Western and anti-Israeli policies to support international terrorist groups and seek nuclear weapons.\(^{740}\)

\(^{740}\) Libya's nuclear ambitions are covered in more detail later in this chapter.
Map 6.2: Libya\textsuperscript{741}

Libya under the RCC and Qadhafi: 1969-1975

The RCC initially focused on incorporating the CDF into its ranks in order to gain the monopoly on violence which had eluded King Idris and led to his downfall. The

RCC also ordered the removal of all foreign troops from Libyan soil and both Britain and the U.S. complied, evacuating their forces in 1970.742 This policy, however, forfeited Libya its two major weapons suppliers. To fill this void, Libya entered into a long-term arms deal with the Soviet Union.743

In 1971 Qadhafi also commenced domestic reforms aimed at restructuring Libyan politics. He dismantled the government’s tribal system and attempted to create a single political party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Qadhafi soon grew disillusioned, however, by the inability of the ASU either to mobilize the population or to replace the existing bureaucracy. Consequently, he initiated his “Popular Revolution” in 1973.744 By 1975, Qadhafi had published the Green Book, which provided his blueprint for a socialist Libya. He called for the destruction of the existing system of government, to be replaced by Local Basic People’s Conferences and Worker People’s Committees, which directly elected representatives to a national General People’s Conference.745 While the Popular Revolution succeeded in destroying what remained of Libya’s political structure, Qadhafi failed to replace it with functioning institutions. The new ministries were even more inefficient than those before, having overlapping jurisdictions and redundant functions, and being administered by uneducated and undertrained, incompetent bureaucrats.746

744 Tanner, Henry (19 April 1973) “Libyan Chief Pessimistic on Arab Cause” New York Times
In addition to political change, Qadhafi also envisioned dramatic economic and socialist reform.\textsuperscript{747} His most successful move came in 1973 when he nationalized foreign oil companies, which had been predominantly British and American.\textsuperscript{748} This, combined with the spike in global crude oil prices and Libya’s increased oil production, generated an enormous revenue stream which Qadhafi at least partially diverted to such domestic issues as health care, education, housing, agricultural and industrial reforms, and an increase in the minimum wage. While Qadhafi made funding available to these projects, Libya unfortunately lacked the functioning governmental institutions to efficiently implement most of them. With Libya’s growing reserves, Qadhafi also spent liberally on modernizing Libya’s military, on instituting a nuclear program, and on aid to foreign insurgents and terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{749}

By the end of 1974, the issue of how to deal with this enormous inflow of oil revenues generated an ideological split within the RCC over the broader question of the role of government and private property. In 1975, a drop in global crude prices and the resulting dip in revenues exacerbated differences within the RCC. Several members objected to Qadhafi’s continued liberal spending.\textsuperscript{750} Two RCC members responsible for the ministries of planning and finance, orchestrated an unsuccessful coup in August of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Qaddafi, M. Al (2005) \textit{The Green Book} Ithaca: Ithaca Press 33}
\footnote{Vandewalle, Dirk (1998) \textit{Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building} Ithaca: Cornell University Press 66}
\end{footnotes}
Qadhafi used the event to consolidate his power base, gutting the RCC of its decision-making authority and reducing its membership to himself and four loyal members. He was now in a position to more fully implement his revolutionary reforms by dismantling what remained of Libya’s legal and political institutions.

Over the next five years, Qadhafi carried out the *Green Book* reforms. The People’s Committees spread rapidly throughout Libya while the economy was progressively nationalized. Still, the People’s Committees’ purview was restricted as Qadhafi continued to control the keys to his regime’s survival: the police, the army, and the oil.

**Qadhafi’s Confrontation with the West**

Along with his own revolution, Qadhafi also encouraged foreign groups in their revolutionary pursuits. His government became directly involved with the planning and participation in various foreign insurgencies and terrorist activities. By the end of the 1970s, however, these interventionist policies had alienated not only his North African neighbors but also the majority of Arab states in the Middle East. In addition, Qadhafi’s foreign policy was perceived by the United States as increasingly hostile to U.S. interests. Tensions escalated as the U.S. accused Qadhafi of supporting several international terrorist organizations, attempting to annex Chad, intervening in sub-Saharan Africa, attempting to obstruct the Middle East peace process, and attempting to

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develop a nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{754} In 1978, following Qadhafi’s denunciation of the Camp David Accords, a frustrated Carter administration placed Libya on its list of state sponsors of terrorism, imposed an arms embargo and, in February 1980, closed the U.S. embassy in Tripoli.\textsuperscript{755}


In January 1981, President Ronald Reagan entered the White House promising to restore America’s military power and prestige.\textsuperscript{756} Libya provided low-hanging fruit for a more confrontational U.S. foreign policy as Qadhafi was outspoken in his support of international terrorist groups, Libya had also recently invaded Chad and was actively developing nuclear and chemical weapons programs.\textsuperscript{757} Reagan demanded Libya change its policies though, privately, the White House did not believe such changes were likely. The administration’s approach combined overt and covert military and intelligence operations with diplomatic and economic sanctions in an attempt to coerce, contain, and weaken Qadhafi’s regime.\textsuperscript{758}

Militarily, President Reagan provoked a crisis by approving U.S. Naval exercises off the coast of Libya, exercises previously disapproved by President Carter. These were designed to elicit a response from Qadhafi by challenging Libya’s territorial claims to the


\textsuperscript{756} The Sandinista government in Nicaragua was also targeted by the new Reagan Administration.


\textsuperscript{758} Davis, Brian (1990) *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya* New York: Praeger 39
Gulf of Sidra. A military confrontation ensued on 19 August 1981 when two Libyan Su-22 attack jets fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. F-14s operating south of the 32° 30' north latitude, Qadhafi's self-proclaimed ‘line of death.’ Both Libyan fighters were subsequently shot down by the F-14s.

A month later, the Reagan administration leaked to the press that it had intelligence on Qadhafi threatening to assassinate Reagan in retaliation for the Gulf of Sidra incident. The U.S. recalled all American citizens from Libya in December of 1981 and placed a unilateral boycott on Libyan oil. While the administration attempted to elicit international support for sanctions against Libya, the unwillingness of the White House to release any evidence of the alleged assassination attempt undermined these efforts. As a result, when Reagan announced additional sanctions against Libya in February and March of 1982, even the United States’ staunchest allies refused to go along with U.S. policy.

A History of United States Sanctions of Libya

Since 1972, the United States had employed a series of unilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions against Libya which had reduced formal diplomatic ties and restricted trade to nominal levels (see Table 6.2 below for history of sanctions). While Libyan oil accounted for $7.8 billion, or roughly 10% of U.S. crude imports, and American exports were at $462 million per annum in 1980, President Reagan’s sanctions

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762 Gwertzman, Bernard (26 Feb 1982) “U.S. Decision to Embargo Libyan Oil is Reported; Embargo Decision Reported” *New York Times*
forced U.S. imports to drop to only $9 million and exports to less than $200 million by 1985.\textsuperscript{763}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Diplomatic or Economic Sanction to Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>U.S. Ambassador leaves Tripoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>U.S. prohibits sale of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>U.S. Arms Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>U.S. removes remaining diplomats and expels six Libyan diplomats from its Washington Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May, 1981</td>
<td>U.S. closes Libyan Washington Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May, 1981</td>
<td>U.S. warns citizens travel to Libya is hazardous and urges U.S. oil companies to begin orderly withdrawal from Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1981</td>
<td>U.S. orders all U.S. citizens from Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1982</td>
<td>U.S. bans all imports of Libyan oil U.S. controls U.S. exports to Libya except food and medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January 1986</td>
<td>U.S. banned remaining trade with Libya (except import of news material and export of humanitarian supplies), banned loans to Libyan govt, froze all Libyan assets, and banned travel between U.S. and Libya (except journalistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 1986</td>
<td>European Community reduces number of Libyans in official capacities (embassy, press agencies, airlines) and makes it more difficult to obtain non-diplomatic visas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Diplomatic and Economic Sanctions of Libya, 1972-1986\textsuperscript{764}

Increase in Libyan Terrorist Activities: 1983 - 1985

Despite U.S. efforts to coerce, contain, and weaken Libya through limited military action and sanctions, Qadhafi continued to antagonize the Reagan administration. In April of 1983, U.S. intelligence uncovered a shipment of Libyan weapons bound for the communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua and in May of 1983, Libyan troops once...

\textsuperscript{763} Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 28-29

\textsuperscript{764} Niblock, Tim (2001) "Pariah States" & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 27-32
again invaded Chad.\textsuperscript{765} The bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon on 23 October 1983, though not directly linked to Qadhafi, produced a major shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Libya.\textsuperscript{766} The Marines were withdrawn and in April of 1984, Reagan announced National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, establishing a more aggressive response to terrorist groups and their state sponsors.\textsuperscript{767}

Reagan’s new foreign policy received an unexpected boost two weeks later when Britain severed diplomatic ties with Libya following the killing of a female police officer in front of the Libyan embassy in London.\textsuperscript{768} Yet it would not be until the end of 1985 that Reagan obtained sufficient evidence to take direct military action against Libya. That year witnessed a series of hijackings and high profile killings linked to terrorist organizations with Libyan ties, including Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Tripoli-based Abu Nidal organization. In the span of seven months, these groups carried out three airliner hijackings, one of which resulted in the murder of a U.S. Navy sailor; the seizure of the cruise ship \textit{Achille Lauro} and execution of 69-year-old wheelchair-bound American, Leon Klinghofer; and the simultaneous attacks on the Rome and Vienna airport two days after Christmas which killed a total of twenty, including an eleven-year-old American girl.\textsuperscript{769}

\textsuperscript{765} Libyan forces had intervened in Chad’s civil war on three previous instances in 1978, 1979, and 1980-1.
\textsuperscript{769} Nordheimer, Jon (18 April 1984) “Gunman in London in Libyan Embassy Fires Into Crowd: A Police Officer is Killed” \textit{New York Times}
On 7 January 1986 President Reagan announced “irrefutable evidence of
[Qadhafi’s] role in these attacks,” banned all trade with Libya, and ordered any remaining
U.S. nationals out of Libya.\textsuperscript{770} In addition, Reagan ordered a second carrier group to the
Mediterranean to conduct operations in the Gulf of Sidra.\textsuperscript{771} From January through
March, these two naval groups conducted monthly “Freedom of Navigation” exercises.
On the 24\textsuperscript{th} of March, Libya fired SA-5, long-range, radar-guided, surface-to-air missiles
at U.S. Navy aircraft as they crossed over the “line of death.” In response, and in
accordance with the White House’s more aggressive rules of engagement, the U.S. Navy
not only destroyed the missile site, but also sank two Libyan patrol boats which were
approaching the fleet and severely damaged a third.\textsuperscript{772}

Unlike the Gulf of Sidra incident in 1981, this time Qadhafi retaliated. On the 5\textsuperscript{th}
of April, 1986 an explosion rocked a Berlin discotheque, killing two, including a U.S.
soldier. Most damning for the Libyans were encrypted messages between Libya’s
embassy in East Berlin and Tripoli prior to and following the bombing. Intercepted and
deciphered by both the U.S. and British intelligence the messages implicated Qadhafi
with direct knowledge of the attack before it occurred.\textsuperscript{773} Finally, armed with this
“smoking gun,” Reagan ordered air strikes on Libya.

\textsuperscript{770} Reagan did not freeze Libyan financial assets and allowed humanitarian trade. Reagan, Ronald (7
accessed 1 Dec 09

Against Libyan Support of International Terrorism” \url{www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2712a.gif} accessed 1
Dec 2009

\textsuperscript{772} Weinraub, Bernard (25 March 1986) “In Disputed Area: Libya Says It Downed 3 Jets, but Washington
Reports No Losses” \textit{New York Times}

El Dorado Canyon: 15 April 1986

In the early hours of 15 April 1986, U.S. Air Force F-111s conducted night strikes on three targets in Tripoli while U.S. Navy A-6Es simultaneously attacked two targets in Benghazi. The United States codenamed this joint operation *El Dorado Canyon*.

The targeting process for the air strikes had commenced six months prior as intelligence and operational planners formulated military options to respond to the increase in terrorist activities linked to Libya. Following the Berlin discotheque bombing, the White House approved five targets. These were selected based on three criteria: proportionality and attacking targets with direct links to Libyan terrorist activities, limited collateral damage potential, and minimum risk to U.S. aircrew.

Despite collateral damage issues, two of the targets selected were in urban areas: the Bad Al-Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli and the Benghazi Military Barracks. Bad Al-Aziziyah was by far the most lucrative target as the compound served as headquarters for Libyan terrorist operations. It also contained Qadhafi’s residence along with his personal security detachment. The Benghazi barracks served as an alternative command center and provided visiting quarters for representatives of various international terrorist groups. A third target, the Murat Sidi Bilal Training Camp, specialized in training naval commandos for terrorist attacks against naval vessels. While it fit nicely into the targeting criteria, what made it most attractive was its location outside of Tripoli, which reduced the potential for collateral damage, and along the coast, which reduced the threat to U.S. jets from Libyan surface-to-air weapons. In addition, two airfields were targeted. One in Tripoli was home to Libya’s transport aircraft. These had been used to support operations in Chad, as well as to deliver weapons to support terrorist activities abroad.
The other airfield, near Benghazi, was the base for Libya's MiG 23 Flogger interceptors. Though the airfield was not directly connected to terrorist activities, they were targeted to prevent Libyan fighters from threatening the U.S. strike packages.774

The three Tripoli targets were allocated to the USAF 48th Fighter Wing located at RAF Lakenheath, England. The wing operated the high-tech, supersonic, terrain-following F-111Fs equipped with the (then) advanced PAVE TACK infra-red targeting system capable of delivering multiple 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs from low altitude. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher approved the launch of the strike package from English soil once she had been briefed on its targets. Neither France nor Spain approved the U.S. request to transit their airspace, forcing the F-111s to fly a much longer, circuitous routing to Libya via the Straits of Gibraltar.775

The results of the attacks were billed by the White House as a success although, tactically, the battle damage assessment of the F-111 strikes was far from stellar. Of the eighteen F-111s, one aircraft was shot down and its aircrew lost, and five aircraft aborted due to either equipment failure or aircrew navigational error. This left only twelve aircraft to deliver their bomb loads.776 The F-111 attacks which employed freefall

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775 The impact of increasing the enroute mission length from 4 to six and a half hours by diverting around France and Spain was twofold. First the increase in flight time increased the likelihood that the F-111s offensive and defensive systems would become inoperable. The 1960s and 70s electronic equipment was susceptible to overheating and the longer the mission the more likely these systems would go offline. Indeed two of the 18 F-111s failed their systems checks just prior to entering Libya. Stanik, Joseph T. (2003) El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press 183. Though it cannot be confirmed that the increase in flight time was responsible, it was likely a contributing factor. Second the 6 ½ hours enroute was at night in formation on a tanker. This demanding flying increased aircrew fatigue, which contributed to the poor aircrew performance in misidentifying targets and improperly employing weapons.
776 One aircraft mismanaged its refueling drop off point and missed its target window. Two other aircraft failed their systems check. One aircraft was hit by Libyan surface-to-air fire and the aircrew drowned after ejecting over the Mediterranean. Two aircraft had systems malfunctions on their bomb runs and one aircrew aborted when unable to identify the assigned radar offset point. For a discussion on the tactical
munitions on the Tripoli airfield went relatively well, destroying two and damaging three of Libya’s nine transport planes. However, of the precision attacks on the two remaining targets only one third of the bombs hit their mark. The fewest hits came from the attacks made on Qadhafi’s headquarters. Only three of the nine designated jets actually employed their weapons and of these three, only two acquired their targets. Although bombs fell inside the compound, none were direct hits against the buildings they were assigned. Damage to Qadhafi’s residence, however, was visible and significant. Qadhafi reported serious injuries to two of his six sons and the death of a one-and-a-half-year old adopted daughter. One aircrew misidentified its target offset point and released bombs onto a nearby neighborhood, killing seventeen Libyan civilians and damaging the French embassy.

The U.S. Navy fared better with their twin strikes at Benghazi, with 11 out of their 14 strike aircraft reaching their designated targets. The airfield was surprised as it still had its lights on which made it relatively easy for the six A-6Es to identify and destroy six Libyan aircraft on the ramp, including two MiG 23s on ground alert.

Simultaneously, five A-6Es pounded the Benghazi Military Barracks each releasing a

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777 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (17 April 1986) “Al Qadhdhafi Appears on TV” Daily Report FBIS-SOV-86-074


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stick of sixteen 500-pound bombs. Unfortunately, two bombs missed wide of the barracks, damaging houses in an adjacent neighborhood and killing five civilians.  

**Libyan Response to El Dorado Canyon**

Libya responded to El Dorado Canyon in three ways. First, officials called for immediate reprisal attacks against America and Britain. Within 24 hours of the air raids, Libya launched two SS-1 Scud B surface-to-surface missiles. These missiles splashed two miles offshore of a U.S. Coast Guard aid-to-navigation station in the middle of the Mediterranean on the small Italian island of Lampedusa, two hundred miles north of Tripoli.

Second, for nearly a month, there was a spike in retaliatory terrorist attacks. Separate shootings of U.S. State Department personnel left two wounded in the Sudan and Yemen. In Beirut, one American and three British citizens were kidnapped and executed. In addition, two bomb plots were foiled in London and another two in Turkey.

Third, although there was an initial flurry of activity in the immediate aftermath of El Dorado Canyon, over time the number of Libyan-supported terrorist attacks

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782 Miller, Judith (April 16 1986) “Italian Island, a Libyan Target, Escapes Unscathed” *New York Times*


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significantly decreased from nineteen in 1986, to seven in 1987, to only five in 1988.\textsuperscript{784} This decrease is attributable to three factors. First, the El Dorado Canyon strikes had a direct impact on Qadhafi, who was visibly shaken by the bombing. He withdrew from Tripoli to his desert residence, where he was better insulated from potential U.S. air strikes or coup attempts. Following the strikes, Qadhafi also proved far less adversarial, publicly toning down his rhetoric regarding the U.S. and terrorism. Second, Libya's policy shifted away from direct involvement in the planning and executing of terrorist attacks and more towards the indirect support of terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{785} Finally, in the wake of the Berlin discotheque bombing, with evidence that Libya was directly responsible for terrorist activities in Western Europe, European states now began to enforce measures to reduce Libya's capability to conduct terrorist attacks by limiting the number of Libyan embassy personnel authorized to be in country and restricting student visas.\textsuperscript{786}

**U.S. Actions After El Dorado Canyon**

U.S. foreign policy, at least in the short run, convinced Libya to reduce its direct involvement in terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{787} Less successful were U.S. efforts at affecting Libyan regime change, despite reports of infighting within the Libyan military and several coup attempts prior to and in the immediate aftermath of El Dorado Canyon.\textsuperscript{788}


\textsuperscript{787} Jentleson, Bruce W (1991) "The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More than Remaking Governments," *Political Science Quarterly* 106:1 (Spring) 64

\textsuperscript{788} Foreign Broadcast Information Service (16 April 1986) "Fighting Reported in Tripoli Between Factions" *Daily Report* FBIS-MEA-86-073
Though hopeful Qadhafi’s regime would fall, by August of 1986 the U.S. realized this was unlikely. The CIA had supported anti-Qadhafi dissident groups for over a year but these proved weak and disorganized, and subsequent coup attempts were thwarted by Qadhafi’s personal security force.\textsuperscript{789} In mid-August, President Reagan approved a series of deception and disinformation operations aimed at encouraging further Libyan domestic opposition.\textsuperscript{790} The Administration discontinued its involvement in October, however, when \textit{The Washington Post} made these covert operations public.\textsuperscript{791} This revelation, combined with the easing of Qadhafi’s rhetoric, the decrease in direct Libyan involvement in terrorist attacks, and the distractions of the Iran-Contra affair to Reagan’s national security team brought this crisis to an only partially resolved stalemate.

\textbf{ANALYSIS OF CRISIS I: 1981 – 1988}

Though tensions between the United States and Libya had begun to rise in the waning years of the Carter administration, it was President Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy against Libya in 1981 which initiated this crisis. The U.S. adopted two policy objectives with regard to Libya. First was the demand for Libya to stop its terrorist attacks and to discontinue supporting terrorist organizations. The U.S. employed a punishment strategy to back up these demands with sanctions and limited air strikes intended to increase the cost to Qadhafi for continuing his policies. U.S.-only sanctions proved ineffective, however, as Reagan was unable to garner international support for a multilateral approach.

A second objective, rather than a coercive demand, was the brute force removal of Qadhafi from power. Though the White House did not publicly declare this aim, El Dorado Canyon’s direct targeting of Qadhafi’s compound and subsequent U.S. covert operations in Libya were designed to weakened Qadhafi’s regime and encourage internal opposition.

Though the U.S. employed force on several occasions in the early 1980s in a tit-for-tat response to Libyan actions, it was not until the El Dorado Canyon airstrikes that the U.S. succeeded in convincing Qadhafi to at least partially change his policies. After an initial flurry of retaliatory attacks in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes, the number of terrorist events linked to Libya fell noticeably over the course of the next three years. Libya also dropped its open assistance for international terrorist organizations though, according to the U.S. State Department, it continued to provide a limited amount of money, arms and training to up to 30 such groups. These included radical pro-Palestinian organizations, as well as other national movements such as the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). In addition, European states reduced the number of Libyan officials and students allowed into Western Europe, which further limited the ability of Libya to conduct attacks. In light of Qadhafi’s half-hearted change in Libya’s terrorism policy, the absence of public concessions, and the eventual return of Libyan attacks with the Pan Am bombing in December of 1988, I code this coercive outcome as a partial failure (see Table 6.3).

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In regard to its objective of regime change, the U.S. failed in its efforts either to kill Qadhafi or to foment a coup to remove him from power. The White House claimed the airstrike on the Bad Al-Aziziya Barracks was not an assassination attempt but an attack on Libya’s terrorist operations headquarters. This explanation is undermined, however, by the fact the U.S. knew the compound contained Qadhafi’s personal residence. In addition, the U.S. assigned a large proportion of F-111s, nine of 18, to attack the compound. Whether this can be characterized as an assassination attempt or not, the attack failed to decapitate Qadhafi’s regime.

U.S. covert actions also failed either to weaken Qadhafi or to stiffen dissident resolve enough to remove him from power. Though there were several coup attempts and serious infighting within the Libyan military, these efforts proved ultimately unsuccessful.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| January 1981 – 1988 | Core Demand Policy Change  
- Stop terrorist activities  
- Stop support of terrorist groups  

Brute Force Objective  
Regime Change  

Punishment  
- unilateral sanctions  
- airstrikes  

Partial Failure of Coercion  
- Libya reduced, but did not stop, terrorist attacks  
- Libya stopped overt support of terrorist groups, but continued covert support  
- Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing  
December 1988  

Brute Force Failure  
No regime change

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This crisis eventually devolved into a stalemate. While Qadhafi did not concede to U.S. demands, he did reduce the number of terrorist attacks and shifted to covert support of terrorist groups, albeit in an effort to avoid any more "smoking guns." In addition, the Reagan administration's bungling the management of covert operations and the distractions of the Iran-Contra affair weakened the White House's resolve to further press its demands on Libya. The net effect was U.S. unilateral sanctions that were far too weak to credibly back up U.S. demands.

**ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION OUTCOME**

In this section, I assess the predictions from the *survival* and *commitment* hypotheses for coercion (see Table 6.4). For this case the United States made the compellent demand for Libya to change its foreign policy of terrorism and the support of terrorist groups. The actual coercion outcome was a partial failure. Libya reduced the number of attacks it conducted and shifted from overt to covert support of terrorist groups but Libyan terrorist activities continued, as witnessed in the December, 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. This is an interesting case for testing the two explanations for coercion outcomes in that the *survival* and *commitment* hypotheses make divergent predictions, both of which at least partially fail to accurately forecast the actual coercion outcome.
Table 6.4: Predictions of Coercion Outcome

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS ON SURVIVAL**

The *survival* hypothesis expects coercion to fail when a challenger’s demand threatens the survival of a target that has the means to resist. As in previous cases, I test the survival hypothesis at three levels: the state, the regime, and the regime leadership. If demands do not threaten any of these three, then the survival hypothesis predicts the target to concede. Here, the survival hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion success as a Qadhafi concession was not likely to threaten the Libyan state, his regime, or his leadership position. In point of fact, Qadhafi’s grasp on power was fragile. He was threatened by coups from within his government and military and by the further risk of U.S. airstrikes targeting him directly.

**Impact of Concession on the Libyan State**

The U.S. demand for Libya to change its policy of terrorism and the support of terrorist organizations did not threaten Libyan state survival. Compliance with this demand would have abrogated Libyan control of neither its population nor its territory.
Further, a concession would not have been costly. On the contrary, it could have had a long term positive impact on Libya’s oil dependent economy in the event of a repeal of U.S. sanctions.

A concession would also likely have improved Libya’s external security situation. Its greatest threat came from the United States and Israel. Considering U.S. military actions were a reaction to Qadhafi’s terrorist policies, his repudiation of them would likely have reduced the probability of future U.S. attacks. Israel also had the capacity to conduct limited airstrikes against Libya as it had demonstrated against Iraq in its 1981 strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor. A change in policy which eliminated Libyan support for the anti-Israeli organizations of Hezbollah, the PLO, and Abu Nidal would have decreased the likelihood of a strike by easing tensions between the two countries.

In sum, the survival of the Libyan state would not have been threatened by conceding its terrorist policies, rather such acquiescence would likely have decreased the risk of attack by both the U.S. and Israel.

**Impact of Concession on Qadhafi’s Regime**

As with Libyan state survival, a concession by Qadhafi was not likely to place his regime at risk from domestic opposition groups. While a public concession would have revealed Qadhafi’s regime as weak, there were no organized groups within Libya in a position to revolt against the government. It would be over a decade before radicalized Islamic militants formed and gained sufficient strength to threaten the Qadhafi regime. Also, as discussed in the previous section, a Qadhafi concession would actually have reduced the likelihood of a U.S. or Israeli attacks against his regime.
Impact of Concessions to Qadhafi's Leadership

In addition to analyzing state and regime survival, a final assessment is necessary as to whether concession would have risked Qadhafi’s leadership position within his regime. Though Qadhafi held no public office, he ruled Libya as dictator of a personalist regime. Compared to military or single-party authoritarian regimes, or to democratic states, leaders of personalist regimes are expected to suffer lower audience costs for making concessions. This audience cost argument is derived from a principal-agent model, whereby the leader is the agent charged with carrying out the policy preferences of the principals making up the regime. The principals can either reward or punish the leader by keeping him in or removing him from office. The problem is that the principals have limited information to judge the leader’s performance and must extract how well the leader adheres to their preferences on the basis of whether his policies succeed or fail. If policies fail, the principals then punish the leader by removing him from power. Audience cost is the leader’s expectation as to whether principals will remove him from power for making a policy concession. For a personalist regime, however, there are few principals likely to have the power to overthrow the leader.

According to this reasoning Qadhafi as head of his personalist regime, should not have been overly concerned with the risk of a coup at his making a concession to the United States. Resistance, however, did place his personal safety and that of his family at risk, particularly if Libya continued to kill Americans. President Reagan had already demonstrated a willingness to directly target Qadhafi himself, irrespective of U.S.

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executive policy forbidding political assassination. If given further evidence of Libyan terrorist actions Reagan would likely have ordered more strikes against him. The expectation of low audience costs for conceding, combined with the risk of further U.S. strikes for resisting, provided incentive for Qadhafi to acquiesce.

On a related point, a catalyst of this conflict was the anti-Western stance Qadhafi adopted in order to increase his prestige within the Arab world. A confrontation with the U.S. elevated his standing among Arab leaders. While he may have had little need for concern about domestic audience costs, he did have to consider how a concession would damage his reputation abroad.

In sum, the survival hypothesis predicts that for this crisis, concessions to U.S. demands did not place Libya, Qadhafi, or his regime at risk. Libya, in fact, stood to gain economic benefits at the lifting of U.S. sanctions. In addition, there were no domestic opposition groups capable of threatening Qadhafi’s regime and, as leader of a personalist regime, the audience costs for conceding were likely to be low. Finally, while acquiescing stood to damage Qadhafi’s reputation in the Middle East, it would likely have reduced the threat posed to Libya by the U.S. and Israel.

Though the survival hypothesis predicts coercion would succeed, the actual outcome was a partial failure. What explains Qadhafi’s unwillingness to publicly concede to U.S. demands and his determination to maintain a terrorist network that would later go on to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in December of 1988?

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A Weak Qadhafi and Reagan's Weakening Resolve

The explanation for the partial failure of U.S. coercive demands is linked to two factors: the weakness of Qadhafi’s leadership and the weakening resolve of Reagan to make further threats of military force. First, Qadhafi’s hold on power proved more fragile than that expected for a ruler of a personalist regime. Following El Dorado Canyon, Qadhafi was visibly shaken and retreated from Tripoli to his desert residence. While this action made further U.S. airstrikes more difficult, it also enhanced Qadhafi’s personal security from coups. Discontent among sections of the Libyan Army and several serious coup attempts in the days just prior to and after El Dorado Canyon threatened Qadhafi’s regime leadership. Given his tenuous position, the additional humiliation of conceding to U.S. demands would have generated audience costs and thus provided an incentive for Qadhafi to resist. Instead, Qadhafi chose the mixed response of only reducing the number of terrorist attacks which could be traced back to Libya, thereby removing the casus bellum for further U.S. attacks. He accomplished this without publicly conceding, sparing himself the domestic audience costs for revealing a failed policy.

Second, President Reagan contributed to the partial failure of his coercive strategy by making U.S. military action contingent on “smoking gun” evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorist attacks. This decision is understandable in light of the international blowback for taking military action without hard evidence. The cost of this policy, however, was a reduction in the credibility of U.S. threats so long as Libya was not overtly conducting terrorist operations. The subsequent exposure of U.S. covert
operations in Libya, along with the fallout over the Iran-Contra affair, further reduced the Reagan administration’s latitude in threatening force.

In sum, Qadhafi was initially much more vulnerable to the threat of a coup than that expected of a leader of a personalist regime. While he successfully avoided audience costs by increasing his personal security and by not publicly conceding to the U.S., he still reduced the level of Libyan terrorist operations to forestall further U.S. attacks. In addition, U.S. threats of force were undermined by the unwillingness of the Reagan administration to undertake further strikes without the hard evidence to quell international and domestic opposition. It was the combination of these two factors which produced a stalemate and the partial failure of U.S. foreign policy which sowed the seeds for future conflict.

**TESTING COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS**

The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger (U.S.) cannot credibly commit *ex ante* to make no further demands once the target (Libya) concedes. This commitment problem is also more likely to arise when the challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back up additional demands. In this crisis, the commitment problem for the U.S. appeared significant as it maintained naval air power in the Mediterranean. Though this force was not enough to credibly back up demands for territory or regime change, it likely would have been enough to back up demands for additional Libyan policy changes. Policy disputes included Libya’s claims over the Gulf of Sidra, its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, its anti-Israeli stance, and its intervention in Chad. The U.S. maintained a military presence in the region with two carrier battle groups assigned to the U.S. Navy 6th fleet, which could be used to
enforce sanctions, to contest Libya’s claims to the Gulf of Sidra, and to conduct airstrikes against Libyan WMD facilities. The credible commitment hypothesis therefore predicts that coercion would likely fail as Qadhafi would expect his cooperation only to lead to more U.S. demands rather than to an end to the crisis.

While the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Qadhafi would not publicly concede, it did not anticipate the reduction in the level of Libya’s terrorist operations. Yet this decrease in activity was readily observed by the U.S. and signaled a weakening resolve by Libya. This information introduced an incentive for the U.S. to make still further demands, though it was, in fact, never acted upon.

In sum, the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted Qadhafi’s public resistance to U.S. demands. It did not, however, predict that Libya would reduce its level of terrorist attacks and furthermore would incorrectly expect the U.S. to increase its demands once a reduction in attacks was observed. What explains this partial divergence in the commitment hypothesis expectations and the actual coercive outcome?

**Explaining why Libya reduced its terrorist activities and why the U.S. did not increase its demands**

Why did Qadhafi reveal himself as weak to the U.S. by reducing the level of Libyan terrorist activities? As I previously argued in testing the survival hypothesis, Qadhafi’s personal survival and that of his family was at risk of further U.S. airstrikes if terrorist operations were linked directly back to Libya. Along with this threat the El Dorado Canyon raid had encouraged several coup attempts and created dissent within the Libyan Army. Qadhafi likely wanted to avoid a recurrence of such unrest.
A closely related argument asserts that Qadhafi also learned from the El Dorado Canyon raid that the U.S. would not hesitate to use force if Libya were caught red-handed in direct involvement in terrorist attacks. This would explain why Qadhafi shifted from overt to more covert support of terrorism. It also explains his willingness to reveal himself publicly as weakly resolved, as he expected the U.S. to make no further attacks, so long as Libya gave them no cause to do so.

An alternative explanation is that the decrease in Libyan attacks was a result of the restrictions placed on student visas and personnel in Libya’s Western European embassies. These actions did decrease Libya’s intelligence capacity in Europe and may have reduced its ability to conduct operations such as it had in the Berlin discotheque bombing. It did not, however, restrict Libyan operations outside of Europe, nor did it prevent terrorist attacks such as that on Pan Am Flight 103, the bomb for which was placed in checked luggage originating in Malta. This argument also does not explain Qadhafi’s shift from overt to covert support of foreign terrorist groups.

A second question is why the U.S. did not increase its demands when it observed that Qadhafi had, in fact, modified his terrorist policies. The U.S. simply was not willing to back up additional demands with the threat of force. As previously argued, U.S. reluctance to conduct airstrikes without hard evidence, the leak of its covert operations in Libya, and fallout over the Iran-Contra affair restrained the Reagan Administration from exploiting the situation.
By the end of Reagan’s second term in office, relations between the U.S. and Libya had stalemated. The election of George Bush in November 1988 was welcomed by Qadhafi, who expressed his desire for a positive change in the relations with the United States.796 Hopes of a rapprochement evaporated, however, along with two hundred and seventy lives in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December 1988.

Accusations tying Libya to the bombing surfaced in the ensuing investigation. By October 1990, the detonator for the Pan Am Flight 103 bomb was determined to be the same design as that employed in the later bombing of French Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 over Niger on 19 September 1989. Both devices were traced to a shipment of twenty detonators purchased from Syria by Libyan intelligence. In addition, fragments of clothing in which the Pan Am bomb had been wrapped were traced to a shop in Malta. The shopkeeper identified two men as having purchased the clothing, Lamen Fhimah, station chief for Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta, and Abdel Basset, the chief of Libyan Arab Airline security. Investigators could not, however, establish a chain of responsibility for the bombing within the Libyan government and, unlike the Berlin discotheque, were never able to show that Qadhafi had prior knowledge of or had approved the attack.797

Upon completion of a lengthy investigation, the United States and Great Britain issued indictments on 14 November 1991 against the two Libyans accusing them of

placing the bomb in a suitcase aboard Malta flight KM18 bound for Frankfurt, where the luggage was then transferred to Pan Am Flight 103 bound for New York via London. 798


On 27 November 1991, the United States and Britain released a joint declaration demanding Libya:

-- surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials;
-- disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other material evidence, including all the remaining timers;
-- pay appropriate compensation 799

Qadhafi refused, declaring there was no evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing and that he would not hand over the two suspects to stand trial in the U.S. or in Britain. 800 Libya’s foreign minister instead suggested an international trial in a statement he issued denying “…any Libyan connection with the aforementioned incident or any knowledge of it by the Libyan authorities…” and calling “…on the United States and Britain to apply the logic of law, wisdom, and reason by resorting to neutral international investigation committees or to the International Court of Justice.” 801 The U.S. quickly rejected the offer as a disingenuous stalling tactic. 802

800 New York Times (29 Nov 1991) “Qaddafi Scoffs at Demands for Bombing Suspects”
801 Tripoli JANA (Jamahaniyyah News Agency) (15 November 1991) “People’s Bureau Denies Lockerbie Involvement” Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports FBIS-NES-91-221
Libya went on to characterize the U.S. and British demands as political rather than judicial since they required Libya to agree to compensation prior to a verdict and without any evidence of Libyan state involvement.\textsuperscript{803} On 18 January 1992 Libyan officials informed the UN Security Council that it was invoking Article 14 of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and that Libya would be conducting its own judicial proceedings in lieu of extradition.\textsuperscript{804}

Libya's response satisfied neither the U.S. nor Britain and three days later, aided by the support of France, they succeeded in pushing Resolution 731 through the UN Security Council. This measure denounced the Libyan government for not effectively cooperating with establishing those responsible for Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA flight 772. It also urged the Libyan government to provide a full and effective response to contribute to the elimination of international terrorism.\textsuperscript{805}

In response, Qadhafi met with United Nations Secretary General Envoy Vasily Safronchuk on 26 January 1992. Following the meeting Safronchuk announced that Libya had agreed to cooperate with the UN, but that it had already begun its own legal proceedings and would not extradite the two suspects. On 11 February the Libyan representative to the UN informed the Secretary General that Libya would accede to French demands regarding UTA Flight 722 and allow a French judge to travel to Tripoli.

\textsuperscript{803} Niblock, Tim (2001) “Pariah States” & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 37
to investigate the case. It would not, however, concede to U.S. and British demands for extradition which Qadhafi claimed infringed on Libyan sovereignty. In later talks with the UN Envoy, Qadhafi cited a lack of trust as the primary reason for not allowing a trial to take place on either U.S. or British soil.

Despite Qadhafi’s efforts to avoid sanctions, the Security Council passed Resolution 748 on 31 March 1992, which forbade the takeoff and landing of aircraft in Libya, prohibited the supply of aircraft maintenance services and parts, prohibited the sale or transfer of arms and military equipment as well as military technical advice or training, and reduced the number of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions. Importantly, however, the sanctions did not forbid the sale of Libyan oil, as Italy, Spain and Germany were dependent on a continual flow of Libyan crude. On 11 November 1993, with no change in Qadhafi’s position, the Security Council went on to pass Resolution 883, which froze Libyan foreign financial assets, though not the funds from oil sales, and banned the export of selected parts and equipment to supply Libya’s oil production infrastructure.

**Impact of Sanctions on Libya**

The Libyan economy, almost entirely dependent on its oil exports, had stagnated in the late 1980s as the global price of crude fell precipitously. Oil prices would remain

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809 Niblock, Tim (2001) “Pariah States” & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 41

depressed at between $16 and $24 a barrel (2000 dollars) from 1986 until 2003, while Libya’s oil production remained relatively fixed at 1.4 to 1.5 million barrels per day from 1991 to 2003, even after OPEC raised Libya’s quota.\textsuperscript{811} As a result, Libya’s per capita GDP slowly eroded from $11,200 in 1991 to $9,200 in 2002 (see Chart 6.1 below).

![Chart 6.1: Comparison of Libyan Oil Production to GDP/capita 1991 - 2003\textsuperscript{812}](image)

The major economic impact of sanctions fell on Libya’s ability to import goods, a strain which placed inflationary pressure on Libya’s markets.\textsuperscript{813} In the long run, the sanctions made it difficult for its oil industry to procure equipment and spare parts to maintain its infrastructure and impossible to increase production. This inability to increase its oil exports to offset low oil prices made Libya’s economy even more susceptible to price fluctuations in the global market. The depressed price of global


crude then delivered a harsh blow to Libya’s GDP. Even so, Libya was fortunate relative to Iraq since the sanctions against it did not boycott oil exports altogether, thus sparing Libya the economic meltdown suffered by Iraq.

An indirect impact of the sanctions was the threat posed to Qadhafi’s regime by the rise of radicalized Islamist groups within Libya. Unemployment hovering at 20%, double digit inflation, and a youth bulge with 70% of the population under the age of 20 contributed to a growing disillusionment amongst Libyans over Qadhafi’s regime. This, in turn, sparked Libya’s youth to join the militant opposition groups spreading throughout Arab states. The groups which formed within Libya included the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Liberation Party, National Salvation Front, Islamic Martyrdom Movement, Libyan Islamic Group, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Force (with ties to Al-Qaeda).

In June 1995, violence erupted in the form of attacks on government security forces in Benghazi and the central region of Libya. In August, an assassination attempt on Qadhafi failed, though sporadic violence continued to be reported and eventually led to another attempt made on him in 1996 near his home town of Sirte. In 1998, Qadhafi finally responded to the insurgency, sending a thousand troops into Benghazi. These forces ultimately succeeded in crushing the uprising. The serious threat to his regime from these radicalized groups appear to have had a sobering affect on Qadhafi who reversed his previous policy of supporting terrorism and now called for action against

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international terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda. Despite his shifting position with regard to terrorism, however, he did not change his position on extraditing the two Pan Am Flight 103 suspects to either the United States or Great Britain.

United States’ Reaction to Qadhafi’s Intransigence

By the fall of 1995, economic sanctions had proven decisive in convincing Serbia’s President Slobodan Milosevic to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into signing the Dayton Peace Accords. By then it was equally apparent that the weaker sanctions imposed on Libya would not have the same effect on Qadhafi. On 20 December 1995, the U.S. Senate passed the “Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act of 1995” with a last-minute amendment added to extend the provisions of the bill to Libya. This bill imposed sanctions on foreign companies which invested more than $40 million per annum in Libya’s petroleum industries.\(^{818}\) This angered the European Union since the sanctions were aimed primarily at their corporations. Though the E.U. promised reprisals and the Clinton administration initially did not support it, once the bill also passed the House of Representatives, President Clinton signed it into law on 5 August, 1996.\(^{819}\)

Another relevant piece of U.S. legislation was the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.” This law modified federal statutes, allowing the relatives of the 105 U.S. victims of Pan Am Flight 103 to bring a $4 billion civil suit against the Libyan government.\(^{820}\)


Libya’s Diplomatic Success 1997-1998

Though the UN resolution had not broken Libya’s economy, nearly five years of economic and diplomatic sanctions had weakened Libya and isolated it from the world community. The tides, however, were finally beginning to turn in Qadhafi’s favor in 1997 and 1998, when Libya achieved a series of diplomatic successes. In August 1997, Qadhafi traveled to Niger and met with the presidents of Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, who then issued a joint statement announcing closer economic cooperation among their countries and calling on the UN to evaluate the impact of its sanctions on Libya.821 Qadhafi made further progress on 21 September 1997 when the Arab League passed a resolution allowing both diplomatic and humanitarian flights to and from Libya and releasing Libyan funds being held in Arab banks.822 One of the most significant diplomatic gains for Qadhafi came on 27 February 1998 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against the U.S. and Britain and declared that it alone had jurisdiction to decide whether Libya must surrender the two accused.823

Two factors account for Qadhafi’s diplomatic successes. First, by the late 1990s Qadhafi had reversed his aggressive foreign policy, no longer intervening in neighboring countries and withdrawing his support for international terrorist groups. Libya was now less of a threat to African and the Middle Eastern countries. Second, there was an international reaction to the imposition of sanctions following UN reports of a steep rise

in Iraq’s infant mortality rates and a subsequent gaffe by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, who when questioned about the high death figures responded that “...the price is worth it.” As a result, many countries were now less willing to support the sanctions against Libya.

**United States’ and Britain’s Changing Position**

Nearly seven years after rejecting Libya’s proposal for a trial by the International Court of Justice, both the United States and Britain reversed their position and on 24 August 1998, issued a joint letter to the UN Security Council with an initiative to try the two Libyan suspects in the Netherlands. Upon Libya’s delivery of the two accused men, the UN sanctions would be suspended, though not permanently lifted.

Four reasons explain this reversal in policy. First, it was clear to both the U.S. and Britain that the sanctions would not convince Qadhafi to extradite the Libyan suspects to either country. In addition, U.S. efforts to strengthen the sanctions on Libyan oil exports had failed and future attempts were not likely to succeed. Second, current sanctions on Libya were unraveling as a result of the international backlash against Iraqi sanctions, with African and Arab countries openly defying the existing Security Council resolutions. Third, the Labour Party now held the majority party in Parliament with Tony Blair as their new Prime Minister. Unlike John Major, Blair had not been personally involved with Lockerbie and proved more willing to consider a compromise. Finally, the

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British families of the victims, some of whom had met personally with Qadhafi, supported the third-country legal framework. In the summer of 1998 they placed domestic political pressure on Prime Minister Blair, who, in turn, convinced President Clinton to support a trial in the Netherlands. 826

**Conclusion of Crisis**

Though all parties were now in agreement with a trial in the Netherlands, there was no formal diplomatic ties between Libya and the U.S. or Britain to commence negotiations. After mediation by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and South African President Nelson Mandela, however, Qadhafi finally handed the two suspects over to The Hague on 5 April 1999. 827 As promised, UN sanctions were then suspended, though they would not be formally lifted until August of 2003. The U.S. continued to maintain its unilateral sanctions until Libya agreed to take responsibility and pay compensation for the bombing and also added demands that Libya renounce its support of international terrorism and abandon its WMD programs. 828


The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the subsequent implication of Libyan Arab Airline officials in the bombing initiated a second crisis between the United States...
and Libya. The United States demanded that Libya extradite the two suspects to stand trial, to cooperate fully with the investigation, to acknowledge responsibility for the involvement of its officials in the bombing, and to pay compensation to the victims’ families. Unlike the first crisis of the 1980s, however, regime change was no longer a U.S. objective.

This omission makes this an important case of asymmetric coercion. With Iraq and Serbia the United States increased its aims over time to include regime change as an objective for both countries. The U.S. came to view both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic as the source of conflict in each case, respectively. In order to back up the demands for regime change the U.S. ratcheted up its threats of military force. With the Libyan case the U.S. instead chose to reduce its objectives and exclude regime change. The U.S. further curtailed its demand for extradition to either the United States or Britain when it accepted Libya’s compromise offer of a third country trial in the Netherlands. This decrease in demands was particularly instrumental in the partial success of coercion, as the credibility of the U.S. in threatening force had evaporated since the Reagan years.

This crisis also differs in that it is not a case of military coercion at all since the U.S. did not threaten military force. In lieu of the threat of force, the U.S. instead employed a two-tiered punishment strategy of unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Long-term sanctions limited Libyan oil production, which combined with depressed global crude prices to stagnate its economy. The removal of these sanctions then allowed Libya to import U.S. and Western European crude oil technologies to increase its exports, a measure which proved a key motivating factor for Qadhafi’s concessions.
In April of 1999, Libya conceded to the U.S. demand for extradition of the two Libyan suspects to stand trial for the Pan Am Flight 103. Qadhafi did not, however, concede to the entirety of this demand as he refused to extradite them to the U.S. or Britain. Libya went on to cooperate with the investigation but would not take responsibility for the bombing or to pay compensation prior to a final verdict. I therefore code this case as a partial success (see Table 6.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nov 1991 – April 1999 | Policy Change  
- Extradite two Libyan suspects for trial  
- Cooperate with investigations  
- Acknowledge responsibility  
- Pay compensation  | Punishment  
- U.S. unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions  
- United Nations. diplomatic and economic sanctions, though not on Libyan oil exports  | Core Demand  
Partial Success  
- Libya hands over two suspects for trial in Netherlands and cooperates with investigation  
- Libya does not acknowledge responsibility or pay compensation |

Table 6.5: Typology of Sanctions: U.S. versus Libya, 1991 – 1999

Analysis of Explanations for Coercion Outcome

Here I assess predictions from the survival and commitment hypotheses (see Table 6.6). In this case, the United States demanded Libya extradite two Libyan officials, cooperate with the investigation, acknowledge responsibility, and pay compensation to the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103. Both hypotheses predict a successful outcome, as there were neither target survival issues nor challenger commitment problems likely to cause coercion failure. Libya did eventually cooperate and surrender
the two suspects to stand trial but only in a country of its own choosing rather than in the U.S. or Britain. As I will show, the outcome proved to be only partially successful as Qadhafi would not concede to taking responsibility for the bombing or paying compensation. Sanctions alone were not sufficient to convince Qadhafi to concede to all demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Foreign Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1991 – April 1999</td>
<td>Policy Change</td>
<td>Predicts Success</td>
<td>Predicts Success</td>
<td>Core Demand Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Extradite two Libyan suspects for trial</td>
<td>- Conceding did not threaten Libyan state, regime, or Qadhafi’s leadership</td>
<td>- U.S. could not increase sanctions</td>
<td>- Libya hands over two suspects for trial in Netherlands and cooperates with investigation - Libya does not acknowledge responsibility or pay compensation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS OF SURVIVAL**

The survival hypothesis expects coercion to fail when the state, the regime, and the regime leadership’s survival is threatened by a concession, so long as the target has the means to resist. Here the survival hypothesis predicts coercion success.

**Impact on the Libyan State**

Compliance with the U.S. demands to extradite, cooperate, acknowledge responsibility, and compensate for the bombing did not threaten Libya’s state survival.
Concessions would have no impact on Libya’s control of its territory or its population. Economically, concession would benefit Libya by avoiding UN sanctions.

Still, Qadhafi rightly viewed these demands as an infringement upon Libyan sovereignty and, throughout the crisis, he refused extradition of Libyan citizens to the countries of their accusers. He did not, however, reject the notion of extradition altogether and in response to the U.S. and British joint declaration in November of 1991, Libyan officials set their conditions for a third-country trial.

In sum, though Libya’s sovereignty was infringed by the U.S. demands, the survival of the state was not at risk and, if Qadhafi had initially agreed to them, he would have likely avoided UN sanctions.

**Impact on Qadhafi’s Regime**

A concession by Qadhafi would not have placed his regime at risk from domestic opposition groups. While a public concession would have revealed Qadhafi’s regime as weak, there were still no militant organizations within Libya poised to revolt against his government. This had changed by 1995, however, as a weakened Libyan economy generated a large number of unemployed and discontented youth susceptible to radicalization. The window of opportunity for rebellion was short-lived, however, and in 1998 loyal troops crushed the opposition and removed the threat to Qadhafi’s regime.

**Impact of Concessions to Qadhafi’s Leadership**

Along with state and regime survival, an assessment is also required as to whether concessions would have risked Qadhafi’s leadership of his regime. As ruler of a personalist regime Qadhafi should have been less likely to incur significant audience

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829 The impact was only on 2 of Libya’s 4.4 million citizens.
costs for conceding policy failure. However, as demonstrated in the previous case, Qadhafi had proven vulnerable to coup attempts arising from internal machinations. Aside from the fact that he continued to rule, there is scant evidence to determine the degree to which Qadhafi controlled his regime. I therefore do not assume audience costs were insignificant in this case.

Interestingly, Qadhafi took measures which avoided audience costs in two ways. First was the manner in which Libya rejected the U.S. and British demands. While Qadhafi publicly rejected the joint proposal in November 1991, Libya's foreign minister set conditions for extradition to a third country for trial. Qadhafi had not rejected the U.S. demand of extradition, only where the trial would take place. By stipulating these conditions from the outset of the crisis, it would be the U.S. and not Libya that would later be seen as making concessions, despite the fact that the U.S. still gained a core objective. Qadhafi also avoided audience costs by rejecting the demands for the acknowledgement of responsibility for the Pan Am bombing and payment of compensation.

A second way Qadhafi offset audience costs was by deferment of the extradition until a time when his power and prestige were ascending. Qadhafi agreed to demands in 1999, once the militarized Islamic opposition had been crushed and his regime was again firmly in control of the country. His recent diplomatic victories in Africa and the Middle East had also bolstered his stature, making it easier for him to absorb criticism from within the regime for allowing the two officials to be extradited.

In conclusion, neither the survival of the Libyan state nor that of Qadhafi's regime was at stake by conceding to demands. There is insufficient ex ante evidence, however,
to conclude whether or not Qadhafi’s survival was threatened. Ex post evidence from his refusal to extradite the two suspects to the U.S. or Britain, to acknowledge responsibility for the bombing, or to pay compensation indicate that the punishment from sanctions was likely too low and/or the audience costs of making such concessions was likely too high. As a result, the survival hypothesis proved only partially correct in predicting coercion success.

**TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS**

The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. This commitment problem is more likely to occur when the challenger has sufficient military force deployed to back up additional demands. For this crisis, however, the U.S. had abandoned the threat of military force and instead adopted a strategy of sanctions. Adapting this hypothesis to sanctions, a commitment problem is more likely to arise when the challenger has the credible threat of additional sanctions to back up further demands.

In this case, however, the U.S. could no longer threaten to increase sanctions. This was, at least in part, due to the international sentiment against sanctions in reaction to UN reports of the high infant mortality rates in Iraq. In fact, the sanctions the U.S. and Britain had been able to pass through the Security Council in 1992 had been weakened by the actions of neighboring African countries and the Arab League in 1997. The U.S. had already garnered the maximum unilateral sanctions it could levy with little chance of placing additional economic or diplomatic pressure against Libya. As a result,

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the U.S. did not have a credible threat to back up the additional demands it was considering, confronting the lingering issues of Libya’s terrorist policies and its WMD programs.

Unlike the survival hypothesis, for which I posited an *ex post* explanation for the partial success of coercion based on Qadhafi’s avoidance of audience costs, I can offer no similar *ex post* explanation per the commitment hypothesis for why sanctions did not convince Qadhafi to concede to all demands.

**LIBYA AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS FROM 1999 TO 2001**

The second crisis between the U.S. and Libya abated with the extradition of the two suspects of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. For its part, Britain reinstated diplomatic ties with Libya in July of 1999, but the U.S. would not consider such a move or lift its unilateral sanctions until additional concerns were addressed.831 In regard to Pan Am Flight 103, Qadhafi had yet to accept responsibility for the bombing or to pay compensation. In addition, there was the lingering issue of Libya’s foreign policy on terrorism. Finally, the U.S. raised concerns over Libya’s WMD as evidence began to surface during the 1990s that Libya had reenergized its nuclear program.832

Though diplomatically Libya had shed much of its pariah status to the rest of the world, this did not translate into a significant increase in the level of trade or growth in Libya’s still stagnant economy. In the face of low global oil prices economic recovery was dependent on a boost in oil production, an option limited by Libya’s undercapitalized

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oil industry which had fallen into neglect under years of sanctions. Its oil production and transportation network had originally been constructed by American companies in the 1960s and 70s. An increase in the flow of crude now required the injection of U.S. equipment and technology. Though Qadhafi had succeeded in having UN sanctions suspended, the resolution had not been rescinded. This, along with unilateral U.S. sanctions, had to be lifted before Libya could hope to lure still leery western investors. With this objective in mind, Libya commenced negotiations with the U.S. in May of 1999.

The U.S. agreed to the talks with Libya contingent on their remaining secret.\textsuperscript{833}

In a November 30, 1999 speech by former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Ronald Neumann, articulated U.S. foreign policy towards Libya. Prior to the removal of unilateral sanctions the Clinton administration expected a final settlement of the Pan Am bombing, that Qadhafi take steps to publicly disavow himself of terrorism, and that Libya cease the pursuit of WMD and missile programs. Importantly, Neumann maintained that Libyan regime change was not a U.S. objective.\textsuperscript{834} While the private talks made some progress, the Clinton administration suspended them in early 2000 over concerns that knowledge of the talks would be leaked and disrupt the upcoming presidential election.\textsuperscript{835}

\textsuperscript{833} St John, Ronald Bruce (2004) “‘Libya Is Not Iraq’: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy” The Middle East Journal 58:3 399
\textsuperscript{834} Neumann, Ronald E. (2000) “Libya” A U.S. Policy Perspective” Middle East Policy 7:2 (February) 143-145
History and Motivations for Libya’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program

Libya’s quest for WMD commenced with Qadhafi’s rise to power in 1969 and his efforts to obtain them continued for over three decades. Here I detail the varying degrees of progress Libya achieved in attaining nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. I also examine the two reasons Qadhafi desired to obtain these non-conventional weapons: security and prestige.

1970s: Qadhafi’s Nuclear Ambitions

From the outset, Qadhafi placed high priority on obtaining nuclear weapons. Given the great wealth generated from the influx of oil revenues in the 1970s, Libya’s initial efforts were directed at purchasing weapons from nuclear states and thereby circumvent the arduous process of developing an indigenous nuclear program.836 Libya first approached China in 1969 and, in the late 1970s made overtures to the Soviet Union, France, and India.837 In 1973, when early efforts had failed to procure weapons, Qadhafi instituted Libya’s Nuclear Energy Commission with the mandate of developing the scientific and technical capacity for a domestic nuclear program.838 Libya took a large step forward in 1975 with the purchase of a nuclear research reactor from the Soviet Union, which went on to achieve operational status in 1981.839

836 For details on Libya’s nuclear weapons programs see the excellent work by Wyn Bowen (2006) “Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink” Adelphi Papers 46:380
An initial motivator for Libya to acquire nuclear status was Qadhafi's desire to gain prestige and respect within the Arab world. After the death of Egyptian President Nasser in 1970, Qadhafi proclaimed himself successor to Pan Arabism, much to the dismay and derision of leaders of other Arab states. Libya's nuclear weapons program and large-scale procurement of modern conventional weapons, including Soviet tanks, jets, and air defenses was, in part, an effort by Qadhafi to bolster his credibility within the Middle East and in Northern Africa.

A second motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons lay in Libya's growing security concerns over Israeli conventional air power and nuclear weapons capabilities. Relations with Israel deteriorated rapidly following the 1969 coup in Libya and remained strained throughout the 1970s.


In the 1980s, Libya's nuclear program stagnated in the face of growing international concern over Qadhafi's nuclear intentions. By the mid-80s, the Soviets were no longer willing to offer scientific and technical training or equipment and parts. Other countries were likewise discouraged in providing Libya support. In addition, in the decade following the formation of its Nuclear Energy Commission, Libya had been

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841 Evidence of this strained relations include the Israeli shoot down of an Libyan airliner in February 1973, the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, anti-Israeli rhetoric by Qadhafi, threats on Libya by right wing Israeli politicians, and Qadhafi's condemnation of the Camp David Peace Accords. Abadi, Jacob (2000) "Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya's Policy Toward Israel" The Journal of Conflict Studies 20:1 (Fall) www.lib.unb.ca/Tests/JCS/Fall00/Abadi.htm accessed 4 Feb 2010
unable to form a cadre of scientists and other skilled technicians to develop an indigenous program. This left Libya highly dependent on foreign expertise.842

With the arrival of the Reagan Administration, the strained relations between Libya and the U.S. only worsened. Qadhafi began to view nuclear weapons as a potential deterrent to U.S. aggression. In a televised speech Qadhafi pointed to the 1986 El Dorado Canyon air strikes in lament: “[i]f we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we would have hit it at the same moment.”843

In contrast to a stagnant nuclear program, Libya's chemical weapons program advanced rapidly during the 1980s in large part with the technical support of West German companies, as well as other European, Asian and American firms. Libya constructed three chemical factories in this period, with the best known being its Rabta facility, 75 miles south of Tripoli.844 This plant produced blister and nerve agents, some of which were employed against Chad troops in 1987.845

Unlike its active chemical weapons program, however, Libya disavowed biological weapons and signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1982. Although accusations surfaced in the 1990s that Libya had attempted to acquire biological weapons, no evidence was ever uncovered that such a program existed.846

846 Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2009) “Libya Profile” Biological Overview” NTI Country Profiles www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Biological/index.html accessed 5 Feb 2010
1990s: Libya’s Reinvigorated Nuclear Program, Concealment and Deception of Chemical Facilities, and Allegations of Biological Weapons

In the late 1990s, Libya’s dormant nuclear program was reinvigorated with the influx of weapon designs and centrifuge equipment, courtesy of the A.Q. Khan network.\(^ {847} \) Libya spent as much as half a billion dollars over six years to acquire the technical knowledge and equipment to design and build a nuclear device.\(^ {848} \) But despite this direct injection of technology, a combination of poor management and a lack of domestic scientific and technical expertise caused Libya to fail at maturing the key capabilities of uranium enrichment and weapons design and at developing the long-range missiles needed to deliver such weapons.\(^ {849} \)

El Dorado Canyon demonstrated to Qadhafi that the U.S. had the capability to also strike his WMD facilities, much as the Israeli airstrike had destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Libya then moved to construct its next two chemical facilities underground in hardened tunnels.\(^ {850} \) In 1990 the Libyans even set fire to tires set on top of the exposed Rabta plant in an effort to deceive U.S. intelligence into assessing the plant as non-operational.\(^ {851} \) In addition, unlike signing on to the BTWC, Libya refused to join the Chemical Weapons Convention which took effect in 1997.\(^ {852} \)


\(^{850}\) Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2009) “Libya Profile” Chemical Overview” *NTI Country Profiles* [www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Chemical/index.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Chemical/index.html) accessed 5 Feb 2010


Even the fact that Libya had signed the BTWC did not assuage U.S. concern. In the mid 1990s the Clinton Administration alleged that Libya had made efforts to acquire biological weapons technology, though it conceded that Libya’s scientific and technological constraints hindered any further development of a biological weapons program or weapons delivery system.853


In January 2001 President George W. Bush entered the White House. When briefed on the status of the suspended secret talks with Libya, the surprised Bush officials were reluctant to reinitiate the talks. They feared the political fallout should it become known that the U.S. was negotiating to reestablish diplomatic ties with Libya prior to a final settlement on the Pan Am bombing.854 As a result, the new administration passed on the opportunity afforded by the 31 January conviction of one of the two Libyan officials and acquittal of other, which removed a major obstacle to Qadhafi’s cooperation.

The September 11th, 2001 attacks escalated U.S. security concerns towards not only international terrorism but also Weapons of Mass Destruction, both of which combined to produce a third crisis for the U.S. and Libya. This fundamental alteration of the international security environment was not lost on Qadhafi who immediately undertook efforts at rapprochement with the United States. Qadhafi’s position towards terrorism had shifted markedly in the late 1990s apparently as a result of his experience with radicalized Islamic groups, some of which had been supported by Al Qaeda. Libyan

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interests with regard to terrorism were more closely aligned to that of the U.S. even before the September attacks. This change in the international security environment taken with Qadhafi’s own animosity towards radical Islamic groups may explain why Libya was one of the first and most vocal of Arab states to condemn Al Qaeda and offer intelligence to assist the United States.855

In October 2001, the U.S. recommenced talks with Libya, though the Bush administration’s attention was clearly more focused on Afghanistan at the time.856 In May of 2002, Libya offered to pay $2.7 billion to the families of Lockerbie victim’s with a partial payment to be made after the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, another payment contingent on the suspension of unilateral U.S. sanctions, and a final payment once the U.S. State Department removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.857 The U.S. rejected this offer, however, as it did not address Qadhafi’s responsibility for the bombing or Libya’s WMD programs.

In September of 2002, President Bush spoke before the United Nations General Assembly and demanded that Iraq abandon its WMD or face regime change. British Prime Minister Tony Blair took the opportunity to approach Qadhafi with an offer that would normalize relations between the U.S. and Libya, if Libya would end its WMD programs.858 By this time Libya had reversed its policies such that the support of terrorism was no longer an issue. For six months, Libya remained silent and did not

858 This letter was sent after Blair met with Bush at Camp David in September. Fidler, Stephen, Mark Huband and Roula Khalaf (27 January 2004) “Return to the fold: how Gadaffi was persuaded to give up his nuclear goals” Financial Times
respond to Blair’s offer until mid-March 2003 on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Libya then contacted Britain agreeing to abandon its WMD in exchange for the removal of sanctions and the reestablishment of diplomatic and economic ties with the United States.\textsuperscript{859}

Tripartite negotiations between the United States, Britain, and Libya recommenced in the spring of 2003 with the objective of reaching a final resolution on Pan Am Flight 103 and WMD.\textsuperscript{860} In August, Libya delivered a letter to the UN Security Council agreeing to take responsibility for the Pan Am bombing and to pay compensation.\textsuperscript{861} In return, the U.S. announced it would not oppose ending UN sanctions on Libya and, on 12 September, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1506, permanently lifting the 1992 sanctions.\textsuperscript{862} Still, the U.S. kept unilateral sanctions in place until a final resolution was reached over Libya’s WMD.

In October 2003, British and U.S. intelligence sources identified, tracked, and intercepted an A.Q. Khan shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuges aboard a ship bound from the UAE to Libya. This action accelerated the trilateral negotiations, ending with Libya providing U.S. and British intelligence access to Libyan chemical and nuclear sites. In mid-December 2003, Libya offered to renounce its WMD programs and on the

\textsuperscript{859} Bowen, Wyn Q (2006) “Libya & Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink” \textit{Adelphi Papers} 46:380, 62
\textsuperscript{860} After Qadhafi’s vocal opposition to Al Qaeda and Libyan intelligence support to the U.S. the issue of Qadhafi’s policy of supporting terrorism was no longer an issue. Also Britain persuaded the White House to exclude neoconservatives from the Pentagon and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton from the negotiations. Hirsch, Michael (2 May 2005) “Bolton’s British Problem” \textit{Newsweek} 145:18 30

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19\textsuperscript{th}, Qadhafi made his decision public.\textsuperscript{863} The crisis concluded in the ensuing days when Libya, as Qadhafi promised, opened its chemical and nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors. By June 2004, the U.S. had resumed diplomatic relations with Libya.

\textit{Analysis of Coercion: September 2001 – December 2003}

The reluctance of the Bush administration to continue negotiations with Libya was replaced by an urgency in the aftermath of the September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 attacks which initiated a third crisis between the U.S. and Libya. The four compellent demands were unchanged from those articulated by the Clinton Administration in 1999: to acknowledge responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the families of the victims, to publicly renounce its support of terrorism, and to abandon its WMD programs. It was the latter two which comprised the core U.S. demands and were, the catalyst for the crisis.

While the demand remained unchanged, the U.S. threat behind these demands had increased substantially. Sanctions had actually decreased with the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 and only U.S. unilateral sanctions remained in place. The real increase was in the credibility of U.S. military action. Though the U.S. did not directly threaten Libya with air strikes or invasion, the battles waged in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 demonstrated a credible threat of U.S. military force should Libya not end its support of terrorism and abandon its WMD.

Qadhafi’s concessions came in three stages. First, in the immediate aftermath of the September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001 attacks, Qadhafi publicly condemned Al Qaeda and provided

intelligence to the United States. Such cooperation, which Libya had demonstrated even before September of 2001, continued until, by the fall of 2002, it was apparent to the U.S. and the world that Qadhafi no longer supported international terrorism. In fact, his regime had been actively fighting radicalized Islamic groups within Libya since the late 1990s. In August 2003 the two demands remaining from the Pan Am bombing were finally resolved; the Libyan government issued a statement taking responsibility and paid the $2.7 billion settlement to the families involved.

On the heels of the interception of the A.Q. Khan shipment of centrifuges in October of 2003, Qadhafi was brought to meet the final concession in December of 2003. He agreed to abandon WMD in exchange for the lifting of unilateral U.S. sanctions and the normalization of relations. I therefore code this case as successful in obtaining all four compellent demands (see Table 6.7 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Compellent Demands</th>
<th>Type of Threat (Denial or Punishment)</th>
<th>United States Foreign Policy and Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001 - Dec 2003</td>
<td>Core Demands Policy Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandon support of terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandon WMD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acknowledge responsibility for Pan Am Flight 103 bombing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pay compensation to victims’ families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- U.S. unilateral sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Implicit threat of airstrike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Implicit threat of airstrikes and invasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Success</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandoned support of terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abandoned WMD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acknowledged responsibility for Pan Am bombing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Paid $2.7 billion in compensation to victims’ families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternative Explanations for why Libya gave up WMD

Libya's abandonment of WMD has rightly been viewed as a successful case of coercive diplomacy, particularly over the issue of nuclear roll-back. What remains contentious is why Qadhafi chose to abandon his long-standing nuclear ambitions. Four general arguments have emerged as to what caused him to concede when he did. The first was articulated by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney in their bid for re-election in 2004. They both reaffirmed the value of their preventive war doctrine by crediting the 2003 invasion of Iraqi for Qadhafi's concessions. A second argument contends that the diplomatic channels forged by the Clinton administration during the late 1990s in its negotiations over the extradition of the two Libyan suspects set the stage for Qadhafi to concede WMD. A third argument focuses instead on the change in Libyan interests, which were spurred on by sanctions and translated into a desire by Qadhafi to shed Libya's pariah status and normalize relations with the U.S. A final argument, which I support, acknowledges that the threat of U.S. military force, diplomatic efforts, and sanctions all played a role in Qadhafi's decision, but no single factor was sufficient to coerce him into abandoning his nuclear program. These three factors plus the key decisions not to seek regime change and to conduct negotiations in a manner as to allow


Qadhafi to save face and avoid domestic audience costs led to Libyan concessions to all demands.\textsuperscript{867}

**Argument I: Bush’s Aggressive Foreign Policy**

The argument that Bush’s aggressive policies following the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks caused Qadhafi to concede his WMD rests heavily on the timing of key Libyan decisions. Immediately following 9/11, talks between the U.S. and Libya recommenced after a hiatus of a year and a half. Libya, however, was unwilling to link the issue of WMD with a final settlement of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and talks stalled until mid-March 2003, as the U.S. was making its final preparations for an invasion of Iraq. This timing suggests Qadhafi may have agreed to return to the negotiation table out of fear that a similar fate would befall Libya.\textsuperscript{868} In addition, Qadhafi’s 19 December 2003 announcement to abandon WMD came just four days after the U.S. military had captured Saddam Hussein.

Qadhafi’s decision in mid-March 2003 to enter trilateral negotiations over WMD coincided with the U.S. demonstrating its military capabilities. The U.S. had recently toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for supporting Al Qaeda and had just deployed over a hundred thousand troops to the Middle East in preparation for removing Saddam Hussein from power for Iraq’s alleged possession of WMD.\textsuperscript{869} Bush’s actions against Iraq had been preapproved by the U.S. Congress. In addition, French and Russian diplomatic efforts in the UN Security Council had failed to derail the planned U.S.


\textsuperscript{868} In a September 2003 interview Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi said Qadhafi told him in a phone conversation that “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.” Hume, Brit (26 December 2003) “Muammar Qaddafi: ‘I Saw Iraq and I Was Afraid’” *Fox News* www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,106721,00.html accessed 10 Feb 2010

\textsuperscript{869} See Chapter 4 for further discussion on Bush administration motivations for Iraq invasion.
invasion. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that U.S. military and diplomatic actions in regard to Iraq were a motivating factor for Qadhafi to finally agree to negotiate with the U.S. and Britain over WMD.

However, it is also important to understand the terms for these new negotiations. Six months prior, Britain had extended an offer to Qadhafi from the U.S. to normalize relations in exchange for Libya ending its WMD program. This offer by Prime Minister Blair was made after consultations with President Bush at Camp David and coordinated to be delivered in conjunction with Bush’s September 12th, 2002 speech at the UN demanding Iraq abandon its WMD. Accepting the British offer could have solved two of Qadhafi’s problems. First, the lifting of economic sanctions and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. was expected to improve Libya’s economy and had been a foreign policy objective of Qadhafi’s for over a decade. Second, the abandonment of WMD would remove a casus belli for U.S. military action against Libya. Accepting this offer would effectively improve both Libya’s security and economic outlook.

The second point made by Vice President Cheney, i.e. that Qadhafi’s decision to abandon WMD was the result of the capture of Saddam Hussein, is unlikely. Serious negotiations between the Libya and the U.S. over WMD followed Libya’s August 2003 letter to the UN Security Council, in which Libya accepted responsibility and agreed to pay compensation for the Pan Am bombing. The September 2003 permanent lifting of UN sanctions brought the Pan Am affair to a close and presented an opportunity for a resolution on Libya’s WMD. The October interception of an A.Q. Khan shipment bound for Tripoli provided concrete proof of an active Libyan nuclear program and concluding negotiations quickly progressed from there. By mid-December 2003, prior to Saddam’s
capture, Libya had already agreed to abandon its WMD in exchange for normalized U.S. relations, though the public announcement by Qadhafi did not take place until the 19th of December. There is no evidence that the capture of Saddam Hussein played a role in Qadhafi’s decision.

In sum, prior to March 2003 Qadhafi had been unwilling to conduct negotiations over WMD. The U.S. invasion of Iraq motivated Libya to abandon this position and agree to the next round of negotiations, which led to a final resolution of the Pan Am bombing. This settlement removed the final barrier to negotiations over WMD and the interception of the centrifuges provided an incentive for Qadhafi to accept what now appeared to be an attractive deal while it was still on the table. Qadhafi would trade a three-decades-old nuclear program that had yet to make any real progress in developing weapons, a non-existent biological weapons program, and a chemical weapons program in exchange for normalized U.S. relations and the prospect of recapitalizing Libya’s oil industry.

By contrast, those who discount the role of Bush’s preemptive doctrine argue that Qadhafi was willing to concede his WMD programs prior to 2003, but that it was U.S. policies which delayed an earlier settlement. Next, I present two separate arguments based on this premise.

**Argument II: U.S. and British Diplomacy**

A second argument is that the diplomatic channels and trust forged during secret negotiations in the late 1990s provided an earlier opportunity to resolve issues between the U.S. and Libya. Qadhafi indicated a willingness to concede his WMD programs as
early as 1999 but the U.S. delayed in settling.\textsuperscript{870} The primary evidence for this is the willingness of Libya to extradite its two officials to the Netherlands in April of 1999 before entering secret negotiations with Britain and the U.S. in May. According to Martin Indyk, who served as a senior director on Clinton’s National Security Council and participated in the secret talks, Libya was willing to discuss any issue with the U.S.. It was the Clinton administration that set the agenda to first settle the Pan Am affair before broaching the broader issue of Libyan support of terrorism and its WMD. According to Indyk, this process was derailed by the Bush administration’s refusal to reconvene talks.\textsuperscript{871}

Still, while Qadhafi was clearly eager to have the remaining sanctions removed, he had not indicated a willingness to concede to all U.S. demands. Qadhafi was unwilling to consider paying any compensation until after a verdict in the Lockerbie trial had been rendered. Also, Libya refused to negotiate directly with the U.S. over WMD, offering instead to participate in a multilateral forum. In May of 2002, Libya finally offered to pay compensation in exchange for lifting sanctions and removing Libya from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. The offer, however, did not include an acknowledgment of Libyan responsibility and made no mention of WMD. Furthermore, Libya never indicated a willingness to directly negotiate with the U.S. over WMD until mid-March of 2003.

Though Libya was willing to continue negotiations after 1999, it was the Clinton administration which further slowed the process. The U.S. established a sequential strategy which then delayed talks. For the extradition of the two Libyan suspects, the

\textsuperscript{870} Indyk, Martin (9 March 2004) “The Iraq War did not force Gadaffi’s hand” \textit{Financial Times}  
\textsuperscript{871} Indyk, Martin (9 March 2004) “The Iraq War did not force Gadaffi’s hand” \textit{Financial Times}
U.S. agreed to the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999. The U.S. then planned to allow the permanent lifting of UN sanctions in exchange for a final resolution on the Pan Am bombing. Only once the Pan Am case was already settled would the U.S. lift its sanctions and normalize its relations in exchange for Libya abandoning WMD and support of terrorism. It was also the Clinton administration that suspended the talks in 2000 during the presidential election. By contrast, the Bush administration delayed reinitiation of talks with Libya by only nine months from the time of taking office until just after the September 11th attacks. Then negotiations floundered as Libya remained reluctant to take responsibility for the Pan Am bombing or to negotiate over WMD.

In sum, the diplomatic progress in the late 1990s clearly established negotiating channels and a certain level of trust between the U.S. and Libya to continue talks. However, Qadhafi was unwilling to concede to three U.S. demands, i.e. acknowledging responsibility paying compensation for the Pan Am bombing and abandoning Libya’s WMD programs, until the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The diplomatic channels forged through British efforts therefore proved necessary, but not sufficient for Qadhafi to concede to the U.S. core demand of abandoning WMD.

**Argument III: A Change in Libyan Interests**

A third argument points to a much earlier change in Qadhafi’s confrontational foreign policy towards the West which followed President Reagan’s departure from office in 1988. Qadhafi desired rapprochement with the United States but the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland proved a major stumbling block to this
effort. In addition, the impact of sanctions on Libya’s stagnating economy during the 1990s and the rise of radicalized Islamic terrorist groups further convinced Qadhafi that it was in his own interest to resolve conflict with the U.S..

A shortcoming of the view that Qadhafi had changed his anti-western stance by the late 1980s is that it ignores the fact that the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in December of 1988 and UTA Flight 772 bombing in September of 1989 were a product of Libya’s terrorism policies. It was not until after being confronted with evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombings that Qadhafi began to take steps to reverse these policies. It was, rather, the rise of radicalized Islamic groups which threatened Qadhafi and likely contributed most to his reversal of Libyan terrorist policies.

A second weakness in this line of reasoning is that, although Qadhafi may have desired rapprochement, he was unwilling to meet demands to extradite the two suspects to the U.S. or Britain. It would be the U.S. and Britain who eventually made concessions for a third-country trial at the insistence of Libya. If rapprochement had been truly that important to Qadhafi, he could have acted to reverse his decision and meet the U.S. and British joint demands at any point in the seven years since their introduction in 1991.

A final critique questions why, if Qadhafi’s interests in WMD had changed, Libya went on to secretly procure upwards of a half a billion dollars worth of nuclear technology from the A.Q Khan network after 1997. One speculation is that Qadhafi continued with his nuclear program to provide a bargaining chip for future

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This seems unlikely. To be used as a bargaining leverage would require Libya to eventually make known its nuclear acquisitions, something Libya never made an effort to do. More puzzling is the fact that Libya continued to make purchases from the A.Q. Khan network even after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Qadhafi would likely have realized the discovery of such transactions would, if anything, reduce Libya’s bargaining leverage rather than enhance it. Indeed, that is precisely what happened upon its discovery in October of 2003.

In sum, sanctions and the rise of radical Islamic groups placed significant pressure on Qadhafi to change his position with regard to terrorism, but not to the extent that he would agree to the extradition of the two Lockerbie suspects on U.S. terms. In addition, though Qadhafi may have eventually doubted the deterrent value of WMD in a post-911 world, such doubts were not sufficient for him to unilaterally abandon his programs or even to halt the procurement of additional nuclear technology from the A.Q. Khan network when the opportunity presented itself.

Argument IV: A combination of threat of force, diplomacy, sanctions and limited demands

A final argument, which I make, concludes that the three previous arguments provided necessary, but insufficient reasons for a final agreement being reached in December of 2003. By the end of the 1990s, sanctions and the rise of militant Islamic groups within Libya had apparently persuaded Qadhafi to abandon his support of terrorism. This had not, however, been sufficient to cause Qadhafi to concede to

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extradite the two Pan Am suspects to either the U.S. or Britain. When the U.S. agreed to a trial in the Netherlands, this did produce further negotiations with Libya. But it, in turn, did not convince Qadhafi to acknowledge responsibility for Lockerbie or to negotiate over WMD. Finally, the U.S. invasion of Iraq likely motivated Qadhafi to agree to negotiations over both issues. But it was the intercept of uranium enrichment centrifuges bound for Libya in October 2003 which provided “smoking gun” evidence, which the U.S. could well have used to make unconditional demands of Libya to abandon WMD. This appears to have convinced Qadhafi to quickly take the deal on the table in exchange for normalized relations before the U.S. changed its position.

A point not discussed in the three previous arguments is the importance of the U.S. decision not to make regime change an objective for Libya as it had with Iraq. This decision was critical to a successful coercion outcome. The willingness of President Bush to agree to Blair’s request to cut the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, out of negotiations relieved the pressure from neoconservatives within the administration to increase the level of demands on Libya. The willingness of all parties to coordinate and abide by the timing and wording of public announcements concerning Libyan concessions further provided Qadhafi a means to save face and thereby reduce audience costs.

ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS FOR COERCION FAILURE

In this final section I again assess the predictions from the survival and commitment hypotheses (see Table 6.8). The crisis between the United States and Libya following the September 11th Al Qaeda attacks generated two core compellent demands:

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that Libya stop all support of international terrorist organizations and abandon all WMD programs. The survival hypothesis correctly predicts that coercion would succeed, as neither Libya’s, nor Qadhafi’s, nor his regime’s survival was threatened by this concession. The commitment hypothesis incorrectly predicts coercion failure as the U.S. had more than sufficient combined military force in the Mediterranean and Middle East to credibly back up additional demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Core Compelling Demands</th>
<th>Survival Hypothesis</th>
<th>Commitment Hypothesis</th>
<th>Actual Coercion Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001 - Dec 2003</td>
<td>Core Demands Policy Change  - Abandon terrorism - Abandon WMD</td>
<td>Predicts Success - Conceding did not threaten Libyan state, regime, or Qadhafi’s leadership</td>
<td>Predicts Failure - U.S. military with sufficient force to back up additional demands</td>
<td>Core Demand Success - Libya abandoned support of terrorism - Libya abandoned WMD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: Predictions of Coercion Outcome

TESTING THE SURVIVAL HYPOTHESIS

The expectation of the target survival hypothesis is that coercion will likely succeed as long as the state, the regime, and the regime leadership’s survival is not threatened by acquiescing to a challenger’s demands. For this case, the survival hypothesis correctly predicts coercion success.

Impact on the Libyan State

Complying with the demands to abandon its support of terrorism and WMD programs did not threaten Libyan survival. Such concessions would clearly have no
impact on Libya’s control of its population. Abandoning terrorist and WMD policies did
infringe upon Libyan sovereignty but, in and of itself, change to these policies did not
risk survival of the state, as I discuss below. Finally, agreeing to these demands would
lead to a normalization of relations with the U.S., an outcome which would improve both
Libya’s security and economic outlook.

The question remains as to what impact stopping its support of terrorism and
abandoning its WMD programs would have on Libya’s security. As I previously
discussed at length in the first Libyan crisis, abandoning support for terrorist groups did
not threaten Libya’s survival and, in fact, now added the benefit of reducing the potential
threat of a U.S. attack à la Afghanistan. With regard to nuclear weapons, Qadhafi had
originally desired a nuclear program for the prestige and security. Libya would gain in
prestige as the only Arab country with the same nuclear capabilities as Israel. Qadhafi
also presumed that nuclear weapons would provide a deterrent to U.S. strikes, such as El
Dorado Canyon. This calculus reversed itself abruptly, however, on 11 September 2001.
Rather than dissuading, Libya’s nuclear program now encouraged U.S. aggression as had
Saddam’s alleged WMD program. Likewise, chemical weapons had little, if any
deterrent value against a U.S. military prepared to fight in a chemical environment, as

In sum, while abandoning its policies on terrorism and WMD impinged on
Libya’s sovereignty, it was not likely to threaten the survival of the state and reduced the
threat of a U.S. attack and brightened Libya’s economic outlook.
Impact on Qadhafi’s Regime

In 2001, at the commencement of this crisis, Qadhafi’s regime was not threatened by domestic opposition groups as it had been in the mid-1990s. While conceding to U.S. demands would reveal the regime as weak, there was no militarized opposition to revolt against Qadhafi’s government. On the contrary, conceding to U.S. demands decreased the likelihood that the U.S. would make regime change an objective as it had with Iraq.

Impact on Qadhafi’s Leadership

The final assessment questions whether Qadhafi would suffer significant audience costs for conceding. As leader of a personalist regime Qadhafi was less likely to be punished by principals from within his regime replacing him for policy failure. In this case, it is unlikely Qadhafi was overly concerned for his leadership survival for three reasons. First, Qadhafi’s hold on power had improved since the 1990s. Though there is not much evidence as to the degree of control he maintained, he was still in power and there were no longer reports of coup attempts made from within the government or military.

Second, Qadhafi had already abandoned his support of terrorist groups. The militant Islamic organizations which threatened his regime in the late 1990s had already turned him against international terrorist groups. Meeting the U.S. demand to abandon support of terrorism was merely a matter of Qadhafi publicly acknowledging the change in policy his regime had already adopted. This was not an acknowledgement of policy failure and, as such, did not likely generate audience costs in areas he cared about.
Third, Libya's WMD programs had decreased in importance for the regime. For three decades, Libya had been unsuccessful in its efforts to produce nuclear weapons. Even the recent injections of nuclear enrichment and weapons technology from the A.Q. Khan network had not translated into an improvement in the scientific and technical expertise required for Libya to develop a viable nuclear program.

In addition, the high cost of WMD had been a source of tension within the regime since the mid-70s. Since 1990, with the exception of acquisitions from A.Q. Khan, Libyan efforts at improving its nuclear capabilities had failed. Given the high costs and minimum progress, it is likely that there remained within the regime those who viewed WMD as an economic albatross to Libya's weak economy.

The combination of Qadhafi being more in control of his regime, Libya already having abandoned its support of terrorism, and the failure and high costs of WMD programs reduced the audience costs Qadhafi was likely to suffer.

In conclusion, the survival of neither the Libyan state, nor Qadhafi nor his regime was likely to be at risk by Libya abandoning its support of terrorism and its WMD programs. The survival hypothesis therefore correctly predicts coercion success for these core demands.

TESTING THE COMMITMENT HYPOTHESIS

The commitment hypothesis predicts coercion will likely fail when the challenger cannot credibly commit ex ante to make no further demands. The commitment problem is thus likely to be more pronounced when the challenger has military forces deployed to back up additional demands. In this case the U.S. had adequate forces in the Middle East
and Mediterranean to have employed them against Libya. In addition, the impending invasion of Iraq demonstrated the willingness of the U.S. to make demands for regime change even after Saddam had conceded that Iraq no longer had any WMD. According to the commitment hypothesis, the credibility of both U.S. military capability and the resolve to use them would lead Libya to expect the U.S. to make additional demands, as it had with Iraq, and this would cause coercion to fail.

By 20 March, 2003 the U.S. had deployed 115,000 American ground troops in Kuwait. There were also 20,000 soldiers from the U.S. 4th Infantry Division that had prepared for a northern invasion, until the Turkish Parliament disapproved their plans. Their equipment was afloat in the Mediterranean along with the two carrier battle groups of the 6th Fleet. I am not suggesting the U.S. actually had plans to employ these or others of its forces against Libya, but wish to demonstrate that the U.S. forces in the Mediterranean alone had a substantial number of troops, ships, and aircraft that were not tied down in Iraq and available to the U.S. to credibly threaten Libya.

In addition, the Bush administration was in the process of demonstrating how a powerful challenger would, in fact, increase its demands even if the weak target has already conceded, just as the commitment problem logic expects. With Iraq, President Bush’s stated demand in September of 2002 was for Iraq to verifiably abandon its WMD. When, however, Iraq did indeed cooperate, the Bush administration refused to accept Saddam’s concession and instead upped the U.S. objective to that of regime change.

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Avoiding Commitment Problems

Given the fact that the U.S. had the deployed military capability to make additional demands and had already demonstrated its willingness to do so in Iraq, how did the U.S. avoid credible commitment problems with Libya? Three reasons help explain this. First, the U.S. publicly acknowledged that Libyan regime change was not a policy objective. In the 1990s, while Iraqi regime change had become a U.S. policy objective, the Clinton administration made it clear that this was not the case for Libya. Further, President Bush intentionally excluded Libya from the “axis of evil.” This was done in large part because of previous negotiations over the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and out of deference to Great Britain.

Second, the order in which the U.S. sequenced the negotiations built trust between Libya and the U.S.. In August 2003, Libya agreed to settle the Pan Am bombing issue by acknowledging responsibility and paying compensation. In return, the U.S. and Britain allowed the permanent lifting of the suspended UN sanctions, as promised. This established a pattern of trust which led Qadhafi to agree to abandon WMD in December of 2003 and the U.S. to normalize relations fully by June of 2004.

Third, the credibility of the threat of U.S. military action against Libya eroded as the Iraqi insurgency mounted. By December of 2003, the average number of daily attacks against coalition forces had risen nearly ten-fold since Bush’s May declaration of the end of major combat operations.877 As the U.S. military was becoming increasingly enmeshed in its counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, it appeared less and less likely that

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it would be able to open up a third front in Libya, thus decreasing the likelihood of a commitment problem.

In conclusion, the *survival* hypothesis correctly predicted a successful outcome of this crisis. Concessions were not likely to threaten the Libyan state, Qadhafi or his regime. On the contrary, resistance would have significantly increased the risk to the Libyan state and Qadhafi’s regime from an attack the U.S. could now credibly threaten.

By contrast, the *commitment* hypothesis incorrectly predicted coercion failure for this crisis. The U.S. had deployed in the Mediterranean a significant military force. In addition, the Bush administration had demonstrated its resolve to use force in Afghanistan and Iraq. It had also shown a willingness, as in the case of Iraq, to continue to increase the demands it made of its targets regardless of whether they conceded or not. Still Qadhafi conceded. This was, in part, due to experience with previous administrations, who had disavowed Libyan regime change as a U.S. foreign policy objective and alleviated Qadhafi’s concern that the U.S. would make further demands. So, too, did President Bush’s exclusion of Libya from the “axis of evil” and in the sequential pattern in which Libya would concede to a demand and the U.S. would follow with a concession of its own, until all demands had been met.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I assessed interstate asymmetric conflict between the United States and Libya from President Ronald Reagan entering the White House in January of 1981 to Colonel Mu’ammar Al’Qadhafi agreeing to abandon Libya’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction in December of 2003. I analyzed three crises from this conflict: the crisis over Libyan terrorism from 1981 to 1988, the U.S. demand for a trial of two Libyan officials for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the crisis over Libya’s terrorist policies and WMD programs following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. In these three crises, the U.S. made compellent demands for which coercion partially failed in the first case, partially succeeded in the second, and fully succeeded in the third case (see Table 6.9, below). As in the previous two chapters I then assessed the survival and commitment hypotheses for coercion success or failure and conclude that the survival hypothesis is a more accurate predictor for the coercive outcomes of these three crises.

The survival hypothesis predicted coercion success for all three crises, which proved correct for one of the cases and partially correct for a second. Overall, Qadhafi proved willing to concede to U.S. demands as long as the Libyan state, his regime, and his survival were not at stake. The single case where Qadhafi did not concede to U.S. demands followed the El Dorado Canyon airstrikes when he reduced, but did not abandon, terrorist attacks and stopped overt support while still providing covert assistance to terrorist groups.
### Table 6.9: Explanations Predictions of Coercion Success/Failure

<table>
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<td>Jan 1981 - 1988</td>
<td><strong>Policy Change</strong> - Stop terrorist activities - Stop support of terrorist groups</td>
<td>Predicts Success - Conceding did not threaten Libyan state, regime, or Qadhafi’s leadership</td>
<td>Predicts Failure - U.S. deployed military force sufficient to credibly back up additional demands for Libyan policy change</td>
<td><strong>Partial Failure of Coercion</strong> - Libya reduced, but did not stop, terrorist attacks - Libya stopped overt support of terrorist groups, but continued covert support - Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing December 1988</td>
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<td>Nov 1991 – April 1999</td>
<td><strong>Policy Change</strong> - Extradite two Libyan suspects for trial - Cooperate with investigations - Acknowledge Responsibility - Pay Compensation</td>
<td>Predicts Success - Conceding did not threaten Libyan state, regime, or Qadhafi’s leadership</td>
<td>Predicts Success - U.S. could not increase sanctions</td>
<td><strong>Partial Success</strong> - Libya hands over two suspects for trial in Netherlands and cooperates with investigation - Libya does not Acknowledge Responsibility or Pay Compensation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 2001 - Dec 2003</td>
<td><strong>Core Demands Policy Change</strong> - Abandon terrorism - Abandon WMD</td>
<td>Predicts Success - Conceding did not threaten Libyan state, regime, or Qadhafi’s leadership</td>
<td>Predicts Failure - U.S. military with sufficient force to back up additional U.S. demands</td>
<td><strong>Success</strong> - Libya abandoned support of terrorism - Libya abandoned WMD</td>
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</table>

As it turned out, Qadhafi’s grasp on power was relatively weak in 1986, exposing him to several serious coup attempts in the wake of the U.S. airstrikes. He thus proved more susceptible to domestic audience costs than expected as the leader of an authoritarian, personalist regime. Qadhafi, however, limited audience costs by refusing to concede to U.S. demands. He likewise ameliorated the threat of further U.S. airstrikes
by reducing Libyan terrorist attacks and thus eliminating the *casus belli*. Qadhafi's strategy worked, as the credibility of U.S. military threats was reduced by the Reagan administration's unwillingness to take further action without "smoking gun" proof of Libyan involvement.

The *commitment* hypothesis partially predicted the outcome of the first and second crises, but incorrectly predicted the third. In the first crisis, though Qadhafi did not concede to U.S. demands following El Dorado Canyon, he did reduce the number of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks. This revealed him as weakly resolved which, according to the commitment hypothesis, would likely have led to further U.S. demands, which never actually materialized.

In the second crisis concerning the extradition of the two Libyan officials, the U.S. did not have the ability to back up additional demands with the credible threat of increasing sanctions. Further, the U.S. overcame potential commitment issues by involving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and South African President Nelson Mandela in the final talks. This success was only partial, though, as Qadhafi never agreed to a trial in the U.S. or Britain, and did not acknowledge responsibility or pay compensation for the bombing until August of 2003.

In the third crisis, the U.S. had sufficient military forces in the Mediterranean to increase its demands of Libya, from abandoning WMD to regime change. This, in fact, was what the Bush administration was in the process of doing at that time in Iraq. Of the three cases, this is the one most likely to fail. Yet not only did Qadhafi concede to U.S. demands, but President Bush also did not then raise demands. Commitment issues were overcome by U.S. restraint from threatening regime change, the sequential and
incremental way in which each demand was resolved, and the diminished military threat to Libya resulting from the entanglement of the U.S. military with the Iraqi insurgency.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

I began this research project with the observation that Great Powers frequently target weak states and often adopt coercive strategies in the asymmetric crises that follow. Though outmatched militarily, weak states frequently resist, leaving the powerful challenger to either accept the situation as a foreign policy failure or choose a costly brute force strategy, which often leads to invasion and occupation. My purpose has been to explain this recurrence of weak target states resisting the coercive demands of powerful challengers.

In Chapter 2, I developed a framework to explain this puzzle. First, I created a game theoretic model of asymmetric coercion to deduce circumstances, whereby a powerful challenger would choose coercion over other available foreign policy options. I then calculated equilibrium conditions to illustrate under what situations a challenger optimizes its expected outcome in limiting both the demands and the threats that it makes on targets. To maximize this outcome, I concluded that a rational challenger only chooses coercion when the target is likely to concede. Second, I employed the asymmetric coercion model to evaluate the existing non-rational and rationalist explanations for why coercive bargaining fails. I then introduced a new rationalist explanation for target resistance in the face of threats to its survival. From two of these explanations, I derived testable hypotheses for coercion failure, one based on target survival and the other on challenger’s commitment problems. I concluded Chapter 2 with an introduction of two explanations for why a powerful challenger might rationally choose coercion even though it believes the target is likely to resist, during a lengthy

\[878 \text{ The equilibrium condition had the challenger maximizing demands and minimizing threats such that the target was indifferent between conceding or resisting.}\]
military buildup prior to an invasion, during which the costs of coercion are low, and cases in which there are high external costs for a challenger to adopt a brute force strategy without first attempting coercion.

In Chapter 3, I examined the empirical evidence of asymmetric conflicts. This quantitative analysis served two purposes. First, I generated descriptive statistics to assess the relevance of this project for real world cases of asymmetric coercion. To do so, I developed a dataset containing 116 asymmetric cases having arisen since the end of World War I. I then coded each according to the strategy the Great Power adopted and the degree to which it achieved its foreign policy objectives. I then compared my findings with those of other researchers on coercion.

Second, I utilized the survival and commitment hypotheses to make predictions as to whether coercion would likely succeed or fail for cases of coercion with compellent demands and compared these predictions to the actual outcomes of the cases. To control for other factors that might have affected these outcomes, I further operationalized explanatory and control variables and then ran a series of ordered probit regressions. Overall, I found that the quantitative evidence supported the survival hypothesis but not the commitment hypothesis.

To evaluate how well the asymmetric coercion model captures the dynamics of coercion in real world conflicts and to conduct in-depth testing of the survival and commitment hypotheses on individual cases, I carried out a series of qualitative studies. Chapters 4 through 6 address cases involving the extended conflicts between the United States and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya, respectively. I draw four broad based findings from these cases. First, they validate the overall utility of the asymmetric coercion model as a
framework for evaluating the decision making of both powerful challengers and weak
targets in asymmetric conflicts. Second, consistent with my quantitative findings, these
cases support the survival hypothesis that targets are likely to resist making concessions
which place their survival at risk. Further, states, regimes and their leaders are also likely
to concede when further resistance threatens their survival. Third, there is scant evidence
that commitment problems are a significant obstacle to Great Powers seeking to coerce
weak states. Again and again the United States avoided potential commitment issues
through the formation of coalitions, the engagement of international organizations such as
the United Nations, the involvement of other Great Powers, such as the USSR/Russia in
the Iraqi and the Serbian crises or Great Britain in two of the Libyan crises, or by
implementing incremental tit-for-tat concessions in order to build trust and reduce the
audience costs of the target leader. Fourth, some crises which may be coded as coercion
failures are in fact foreign policy successes. In these cases coercive strategies were never
meant to succeed, but merely to provide justification for brute force war. This was
clearly the case with the lead-up to the Gulf War in 1991 and to the invasion of Iraq in
2003.  

For the remainder of this chapter, I summarize these findings in four sections.
First, I reexamine and draw insights from the quantitative and qualitative studies.
Second, I reevaluate these findings against the competing hypotheses of survival and
commitment. Third, I identify limitations to the formal modeling, quantitative methods,
and qualitative methods I employed in this study and provide recommendations for future

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879 In the case of Kosovo, Rambouillet can also be considered a case in which the U.S. wanted coercive
diplomacy to fail in order to provide justification for the NATO air campaign.
research. Finally, I address important foreign policy implications on the basis of my findings.

**EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FINDINGS**

**Summary of Quantitative Findings**

In Chapter 3, I identified 116 cases of asymmetric crises between Great Powers and weak states from 1918 to 2003. Of the Great Powers, the United States was by far the most frequent initiator of these lopsided crises, responsible for a third of cases overall and 86% of cases since the end of the Cold War. Great Powers usually achieved their foreign policy objectives, succeeding in 72% of the cases. During the Cold War, however, Great Powers achieved their foreign policy outcomes in only 50% of the cases, a success rate much lower than for other periods.

Great Powers chose coercion much more frequently than brute force, with the U.S. being the country most likely to coerce, in 80% of its cases, as compared to other Great Powers at 72%. In these coercion cases, Great Powers were also seven times more likely to make compellent demands rather than deterrent demands.

To increase confidence in these findings, I compared my results with previous research. This required coding coercion cases for two additional dependent variables: coercion and coercive diplomacy outcomes. For the 77 compellent cases, coercion succeeded 56% of the time, while coercive diplomacy, with only the threat of force employed, succeeded in 43% of the cases. Both results compared reasonably with previous findings.
Finally, I tested the survival and commitment hypotheses and their predictions as to the likely outcome for each case of compellence. The survival hypothesis accurately predicted 66% of the crises outcomes, while the commitment hypothesis correctly predicted 43%. To ensure other factors were not the cause, I controlled for other variables likely to affect crises outcomes. I operationalized key explanatory and control variables and then ran a series of ordered probit regressions. My findings supported the survival hypothesis, as the state survival estimator was consistently significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable of foreign policy outcome. As the survival hypothesis predicted, an increase in the threat to target survival decreased the likelihood of coercion success.

By contrast, the estimator for commitment was positively correlated with foreign policy outcome, which ran counter to the expectations of the commitment hypothesis. In the abstract, commitment problems are present in all asymmetric conflicts. With the large imbalance of power tilted in its favor, a Great Power has the military capacity to credibly back up any further demands. Uncorrected, a commitment hypothesis based on the overall balance of power is deterministic, as it predicts coercion as likely to fail for all asymmetric conflicts. Yet in Chapter 3, I found that coercion failed in only 44% of asymmetric crises. In an attempt to provide a better proxy for commitment problems, I introduced the idea first proposed by Julian Corbett, that the deployed military power of a Great Power is a better measure of the capability and will of a Great Power to employ force. Unfortunately, this alternative proxy for commitment ultimately fared no better, correctly predicting only 43% of the actual outcomes.
A limitation of this, as with all statistical analysis, is the fact that quantitative studies cannot directly evaluate the causes of crises outcomes, i.e. whether the target based its decision on concerns for its survival, on the challenger’s commitment problems, or on some other factor. To address this methodological shortcoming, I turned to qualitative methods and conducted in-depth case studies.

**Summary of Qualitative Findings**

In Chapters 4 through 6, I examined crises for which the United States issued a total of 10 compellent demands. These cases were all drawn from the extended conflicts between the U.S. and Iraq, Serbia, and Libya. I chose these cases based on the variation in crises outcomes, in the level of demands made by the U.S., and in the amount of military force threatened or employed. Below, I briefly highlight the insights each case brings to the study of asymmetric coercion.

**United States vs. Iraq: The Gulf War, August 1990 – February 1991**

The Gulf War is an excellent case for assessing three attributes of asymmetric coercion. First, the case tests the upper limits of compellent demands a Great Power can successfully pursue through coercion. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, the U.S. initially adopted a punishment strategy of sanctions. When this had little effect, the U.S. shifted its policy towards a brute force strategy. President Bush made the decision in October to forcibly remove the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and to

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880 U.S. only cases were purposely chosen in order to hold constant for the powerful challenger. Also I included multiple cases for each target state which allowed cross-case comparisons where both challenger and target are held constant. Finally, the time period for the crises, with the exception of the first Libyan case, were all following the Cold War. Holding constant for the Great Power and time period makes it problematic to generalize the qualitative findings, but it has the advantage that I examine the causes and outcomes of cases with less concern that it is a change in either the powerful challenger or the international environment which is responsible for variation in the outcomes. Since the quantitative analysis includes all the Great Powers this mitigates the problem of generalizing from only U.S. cases.
destroy the armored divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. By the time the U.S.-led coalition commenced airstrikes on 17 January 1991, coercive diplomacy had failed to convince Saddam to concede to the demands set out by numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for an unconditional withdrawal. This failure was due, in part, to uncertainty over the likely outcome of the impending war, along with miscalculation by Saddam Hussein over the true balance of military power. It was also the result of the audience costs Saddam anticipated suffering, had he ordered a humiliating retreat of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait without a fight. Coercive diplomacy also failed as, once U.S. forces had fully deployed by January of 1991, President Bush was no longer to be satisfied with an Iraqi withdrawal. At this juncture, he was determined to prevent a reoccurrence of Iraqi aggression by destroying the Republican Guard.

Saddam’s position softened, however, after five weeks of air strikes. The “stinging ice of reality” convinced Saddam by the eve of the ground invasion to agree to the Soviet Union-brokered peace proposal, which called for an orderly withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Coercive airpower and the credible threat of an impending ground invasion succeeded in gaining extra-territorial concessions from Iraq.

Preempting Saddam’s concession, President Bush announced a 48-hour ultimatum for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. An effort to meet this new deadline would have forced a hasty retreat, forcing the Iraqi Army to abandon a large portion of its heavy weapons, along with their dug-in defensive fighting positions, rendering Iraq’s already weakened army even less capable of defending itself and the Iraqi homeland. Though Saddam could be coerced into giving up Kuwait, he was

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unwilling to concede an army which was the only obstacle standing between U.S. forces and Baghdad.

Second, the Gulf War is a good case to demonstrate why a Great Power may choose coercion even when it believes such a strategy is not likely to work. In October of 1990, doubts over its ability to coerce Saddam Hussein led the Bush administration to plan for a brute force invasion of Kuwait. Prior to combat operations, however, Bush still felt obliged by international norms to justify the use of force by first seeking approval from the UN Security Council. The resulting *casus belli* required the U.S. abide by the coercive strategy dictated by the 29 November 1990 UNSC resolution. The resolution contained the compellent demand for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, along with the denial threat that, should Iraq refuse, then the U.S.-led coalition was authorized to take measures necessary to enforce compliance. The diplomatic and domestic political costs for abrogating international norms were sufficient to prompt President Bush to accept this strategy, despite the fact that coercive diplomacy was not likely to succeed. Further, once the U.S. had deployed its forces to the region, President Bush no longer even wanted coercive diplomacy to work, as this would leave hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces in the Middle East for an undetermined period of time and sacrifice his objective of destroying the Iraqi Republican Guard.

In addition to the need to obtain a *casus belli*, once President Bush decided upon a brute force strategy in October, a good deal of time was required to deploy the additional men and equipment needed to simultaneously invade Kuwait and attack the Republican

Guard in southern Iraq. Since the U.S. was already paying the costs to deploy these troops, it could afford, in the interim, to adopt the coercive denial strategy mandated by the UNSC resolution.\textsuperscript{883}

Third, the Gulf War provides a strong test for the commitment hypothesis, which it fails.\textsuperscript{884} Of all the cases, the Gulf War presents the most likely conditions for a credible commitment problem to cause target resistance. The U.S. had more than sufficient military force deployed to the region to further threaten an invasion of Iraq, had Saddam Hussein conceded to a hasty withdrawal from Kuwait. At the time, Saddam was well aware of the U.S. capability to threaten the Iraqi homeland and his regime, and he would later claim victory on the basis that the U.S. had not deposed him.\textsuperscript{885} It is also a strong test in that, once Saddam conceded to the Soviet proposal, Bush indeed did go on to increase demands on Iraq, just as the logic of commitment problems dictates. Yet, despite these optimal conditions for a credible commitment problem, Saddam attempted to concede.

Two related factors help explain why commitment problems did not play a prominent role in Saddam’s decision to accept the Soviet proposal on the eve of the ground invasion. First, the involvement of the Soviet Union in negotiations lessened Saddam’s concern that the U.S. would make future demands of Iraq. The reputation of

\textsuperscript{883} The denial strategy required little in the way of additional direct costs since the Bush administration had already determined to deploy forces for a brute force invasion. There were, however, two potential costs for adopting this strategy. First the U.S. forfeited opportunities for a surprise attack as a deadline was set in the UNSC resolution. The U.S. somewhat overcame this constraint by keeping secret the start of the ground invasion. The second potential cost, previously discussed, was that Saddam might concede to the coercive demands that would require President Bush to either accept the concession and thus forfeit the opportunity to destroy the Republican Guard, or attack anyway and incur the costs from disapproving international and domestic audiences.


Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were on the line in negotiating a peace deal. The U.S. would likely have suffered significant diplomatic costs resulting in the form of a deterioration in its relationship with the Soviet Union had Bush first agreed to accept the Soviet proposal then reneged once the Iraqi Army had withdrawn from Kuwait. The U.S. had vital national security interests at stake with the Soviet Union and wished to maintain a cooperative relationship over specific issues, such as securing the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal, along with the more general concern of continuing the peaceful transition out of the Cold War. Second, the U.S. had intentionally formed a coalition which included Arab states. This coalition would likely have been fractured had the U.S. agreed to the Soviet proposal and then abrogated that agreement by later threatening to invade Iraq. This combination of Soviet involvement in negotiations and Arab participation in the U.S.-led coalition ameliorated the commitment concerns Saddam may have had about agreeing to a peace proposal.

**United States vs. Iraq: The Kuwaiti Border, October 1994**

Unlike the Gulf War, the deployment of two armored Iraqi Republican Guard units to the Kuwaiti border resulted in only a minor crisis for the U.S. It is a useful case for this research, however, for it provides three insights into the use of asymmetric coercion when relatively low-level demands for policy change are at stake.

First, Iraq’s deployment of forces to the Kuwaiti border in October of 1994 was in response to the dire economic conditions in Iraq, a direct result of the UN sanctions in place since 1990. The extension of sanctions by the Security Council and the exhaustion of Iraqi foreign currency reserves used to purchase foodstuffs generated a crisis for Iraq. The first insight is that a target’s options may not be limited to only conceding or
resisting a challenger’s demands. Leading up to this case, Iraq had been cooperating with UN inspectors, but when Iraq’s actions did not result in a recommendation to lift sanctions, Iraq then chose a military response which sparked a new crisis for the U.S..

Second, this is a case in which coercive diplomacy succeeded quickly. Only the minor policy change of redeploying its Republican Guard units back to garrison was demanded of Iraq, backed by only the punishing threat of U.S. airstrikes on Baghdad. This case demonstrates punishment strategies can succeed in gaining modest objectives.

Third, this is an example of a powerful challenger taking measures to lower the target’s audience costs for conceding. The Clinton administration delayed a public announcement of its demand for Iraq to redeploy its forces. This provided the Iraqi government a window of opportunity to claim that the deployment had been a mere exercise rather than a failed attempt to again invade Kuwait. This gave Saddam Hussein plausible denial that, rather than having been coerced to withdraw from the border, he was simply following through with his original intention to redeploy the troops. Regardless of the validity of this claim, had the U.S. preempted Iraq with an ultimatum, Saddam’s audience costs would likely have risen considerably. In this case, the timing of the U.S. signals had an impact on Iraq’s decision making. Whether this was the intention of the Clinton administration or not, the delay minimized the humiliation Saddam suffered for redeploying his troops, which made such a concession more likely.

**United States vs. Iraq: Lead-up to the Invasion of Iraq, September 2002 – March 2003**

The crisis leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides yet two more insights into asymmetric conflict. First, just as his father had prior to the Gulf War, President George W. Bush felt obliged to go to the United Nations to obtain a *casus belli* before
invading Iraq. Unlike the Gulf War, however, this time Saddam Hussein cooperated with the UN, allowing in weapons inspectors and thereby depriving the younger Bush of the UNSC resolution he sought to authorize the use of force against Iraq. This unintended coercive diplomacy success increased subsequent U.S. diplomatic costs for the war. The fact that the U.S. went on to invade regardless demonstrates the limits to which international norms can constrain a determined Great Power. Ultimately, in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power, George W. Bush was willing to pay the international and domestic political costs of invading a sovereign state without the blessing of the United Nations.

Second, this crisis is an example of selection effects in action. The U.S. intentionally did not adopt a coercive strategy demanding Iraqi regime change, as Bush calculated that he could not coerce Saddam Hussein into relinquishing power. This provides evidence to support the selection effects argument made in Chapter 3. One reason there are so few observed cases of Great Powers failing to coerce weak states into regime change is that a powerful challenger anticipates failure and instead either accommodates or chooses brute force.


The Bosnian Civil War is the most complex crisis analyzed, as it involved two target states: Serbia and the Republica Srpska. Two insights are worth noting in this case. First, this crisis demonstrates the limits to the credibility of the threat of force when a Great Power’s vital interests are not at stake. The U.S. was not willing to risk

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886 When Great Powers do demand regime change it is either because the weak state does not have the means to resist or because the Great Power is obliged by international norms to provide the weak state an opportunity to concede even though it is not likely to do so.
deploying ground troops for combat operations, a refusal which restricted the coercive leverage the U.S. could muster. Not until Croat and Muslim ground forces, supported by NATO airpower, threatened to overrun western Bosnia did President Karadzic and General Mladic concede negotiating power to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Second, this is a case for which sanctions succeeded in changing target behavior, convincing Milosevic to withdraw Serbia’s support for the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic calculated that the negative impact of Serbia’s decimated economy outweighed the benefits he garnered from supporting the Bosnian Serbs. Here sanctions were effective in changing Serbia’s policy toward Bosnia, a critical factor in bringing the Bosnian Civil War to an end.

United States vs. Serbia: Kosovo, 1998 – 1999

The Kosovo crisis provides four additional insights for asymmetric coercion. First, it is the sole case for which the survival hypothesis produced a false positive, predicting failure when the actual outcome was a success. The criteria I developed for state survival evaluates whether a target’s government, homeland territory, population, or the viability of its economy is at risk. Since Serbia considers Kosovo as part of its homeland, the expectation was for it to resist U.S. demands. Serbia withstood 78 days and nights of NATO bombing, yet Slobodan Milosevic eventually conceded Kosovo, even though Serbia still retained military forces capable of further resistance. Though Milosevic was unwilling to give up Kosovo without a fight, once his strategy to fragment the NATO alliance failed, he was no longer willing to endure the costs of continued resistance. Over a decade later, it is evident that, with its tiny Serbian population, limited
economy and material resources, and its inconsequential geostrategic position, Kosovo was not critical to the survival of the Serbian state.

Second, this crisis demonstrates that, in certain cases, punishment strategies can succeed in obtaining higher level objectives. The U.S. airpower-only strategy, once air strikes were escalated from limited military targets to broader civilian targets, eventually convinced Milosevic to concede a portion of Serbia’s historic homeland. \(^{887}\)

Third, Kosovo is a case in which the United States did not behave as a unitary actor. Coercive diplomacy failed and the conflict escalated to violence, in large part because the Clinton administration did not coordinate its demands and threats. Following the Račak massacre in mid-January of 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright convinced the administration to codify its demands for Serb forces to withdraw, along with a thinly veiled promise of a referendum for Kosovo independence, at Rambouillet and, once the Kosovar Albanians finally signed on, to set a deadline for Serbia to either concede or face airstrikes. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton stood fast in refusing to consider the use of ground troops over non-vital U.S. security interests. Coercive diplomacy failed when, in late March of 1999 NATO commenced airstrikes, which continued for two and a half months longer than the three days for which they were originally intended. The threat from limited NATO airstrikes was not commensurate with demands for Serbian

\(^{887}\) Even though ultimately successful, I do not suggest Kosovo be adopted as a template for future coercive strategies. The Clinton administration either intentionally or inadvertently made high level demands of Serbia without the initial credible threat of force to back up those demands. After a month of ineffective air strikes and after hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians had been forced from their homes and only after the credibility of the NATO alliance was at stake along with the reputation of the Clinton administration did the resolve of NATO and the U.S. finally stiffen to the point of making its threats of force credible to Milosevic.
homeland territory until the Washington summit in late April, when NATO’s newfound resolve led to an escalation in the severity of airstrikes against Serbia.

Finally, Kosovo demonstrates that, at times, a leader may prefer to resist a Great Power and absorb some punishment in order to establish a reputation for being tough and to deflect domestic audience costs. Milosevic demonstrated his resolve by standing up to the U.S. and NATO for 78 days. In so doing, he could then turn to the Serbian people and argue that he had done all he could to retain Kosovo and that further resistance would be futile and only cause further suffering.\footnote{I credit Barry Posen with this insight.}

\textit{United States vs. Libya: Terrorism, 1981 – 1988}

The crisis between the U.S. and Libya in the 1980s provides two insights into asymmetric conflict. First, this is a case for which the U.S. combined both coercive and brute force strategies. The Reagan Administration made coercive demands of Libya to reverse its terrorism policies. The U.S. also bombed Qadhafi’s compound and conducted covert operations in an anemic effort to topple his regime. Just as with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the fact that the U.S. chose not to attempt to coerce regime change in Libya supports the asymmetric coercion model’s finding that a powerful challenger does not choose coercion when a target state is likely to resist.

Second, this case demonstrates the limits to coercion when a Great Power places constraints on the level of force it is willing to employ. Given the domestic and international pressure on President Reagan to abstain from using force, he only authorized strikes in retaliation for Libyan attacks against the U.S. Navy and in response to terrorist attacks when there was undisputable, “smoking gun” evidence of Libyan
involvement. Following El Dorado Canyon, Qadhafi undercut the United States’ justification for further military action by reducing Libya’s direct involvement in terrorist attacks, by shifting to covert support of terrorist groups, and by suppressing anti-western rhetoric. As a result, the crisis stalemated and, while terrorist attacks by Libya decreased over the next two years, the raid proved a short-term solution to a long-term problem, as evidenced by the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December of 1988.

*United States vs. Libya: Pan Am Flight 103, 1991 – 1999*

The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 created a second crisis for the U.S. and Libya which lasted for nearly a decade and generated three insights into asymmetric conflict. First, this is the only case which did not involve some threat of military force. Instead, the U.S. used only sanctions in a punishment strategy aimed at convincing Qadhafi to extradite the two Libyan officials suspected of the bombing. This case therefore provides an opportunity to expand the asymmetric coercion model to include sanctions. Economic sanctions eventually did influence Qadhafi in his decision to extradite, a demand he conceded as part of his broader objective of normalizing relations with the U.S. and Western Europe.

Second, while sanctions produced a positive externality for the U.S., they also had the potential to be very negative. Sanctions, coupled with depressed global crude prices, stagnated Libya’s oil dependent economy. This dismal economic environment proved conducive to the recruitment of Libya’s disillusioned and unemployed youth into the radicalizing Islamic militant groups that sprang up across Libya. In one respect, this benefited the U.S., as the threat these groups posed to his regime caused Qadhafi to reverse his pro-terrorist policies. Had the militants succeeded in overthrowing Qadhafi,
however, they could have presented a greater threat to U.S. security interests. The U.S. would have belatedly achieved Reagan’s objective for Libyan regime change only to now find itself dealing with a country ruled by a radicalized Islamic regime with Al-Qaeda ties.

Third, a key step in resolving this crisis was the 1998 Clinton administration renouncement of Libyan regime change as a U.S. foreign policy objective. For nearly two decades, Qadhafi had refused to make any concessions to the United States, a stance which changed after the lifting of the threat of regime change. Subsequent Libyan concessions support the survival hypothesis, in that once survival was no longer at stake, the U.S. was able to convince Qadhafi to make policy changes, even when demands were backed by sanctions alone.


The final crisis over Libya’s Weapons of Mass Destruction is useful for examining two final aspects of coercion. First, the credibility of any threat of force which the U.S. could leverage against Libya was enhanced by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Following September 11th, 2001 Qadhafi cooperated with U.S. intelligence against Al Qaeda. He also agreed to negotiations to settle Pan Am Flight 103. It was not until March of 2003, however, that Qadhafi finally agreed to negotiate over his WMD. U.S. military action in Iraq demonstrated to Qadhafi that WMD programs or even maintaining ambiguity over the existence of such programs did not increase Libya’s security. On the contrary, not only did WMD fail to deter, but they also provided the U.S. with a casus belli and increased the likelihood of U.S. military action.
Second, the U.S. overcame a potential commitment problem caused by a lack of trust between the two countries. The building of trust was accomplished through a series of orchestrated diplomatic actions. Libya agreed to first announce the final settlement of Pan Am Flight 103, in return for which the U.S. publicly supported the permanent lifting of UN sanctions. The byproduct of both parties fulfilling their promises over this relatively minor issue not only increased the credibility of both states, but also instilled a belief that further negotiations could be mutually beneficial. This set conditions for bringing this two-decade conflict to a conclusion, as seen when Libya agreed to abandon its WMD in exchange for a normalization of relations with the United States.

**THE SURVIVAL AND COMMITMENT HYPOTHESES**

In Chapter 3, I tested the survival and commitment hypotheses by making predictions with each as to the likely outcomes for cases of asymmetric coercion. The survival hypothesis predicted that coercion failure was likely when concession threatened the target state, its regime, or its regime leader. The commitment hypothesis, by contrast, predicted coercion failure as likely when the Great Power had deployed sufficient military forces to back up further demands.

In the qualitative cases of Chapters 4 through 6, I continued with a more thorough evaluation of the survival and commitment hypotheses. The compellent demands, hypotheses predictions, and coercion outcomes for the ten cases I examined are presented in Table 7.1, below.\(^{889}\) I also provide explanations for the actual cause of the coercion outcome. Overall, these qualitative results corroborate the quantitative finding that the

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\(^{889}\) For these qualitative cases the outcome considered is whether coercion succeeded, which is slightly different than the dependent variable for the quantitative cases of foreign policy outcome. See chapter 3 for a detailed explanation.
survival hypothesis is a better predictor of coercion outcomes. The survival hypothesis predicted correctly in 80% of the cases (8 of the 10), compared to 60% (6 of the 10) for the commitment hypothesis. In the text following Table 7.1 I examine each case where the survival or commitment hypothesis made the incorrect prediction.

Note that the proxy for commitment problems based on a Great Power’s deployed military forces fares much better than the alternative of a more abstract interpretation of the commitment problem based on the overall balance of power. In this latter case the commitment hypothesis always predicts coercion failure in asymmetric crises and therefore is correct in only 20% of the cases (2 out of 10). Since the hypotheses only predict binary outcomes of either of success or failure, I count as correct predictions of success when the outcome is partial success or failure when the outcome is partial failure.
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Table 7.1: Summary of Predictions and Outcomes for Qualitative Case Studies

To better understand the limitations of the survival and commitment hypotheses, I now consider why the hypotheses made incorrect predictions. I begin with the two

$^{891}$ Initially, from September to December 2002, commitment hypothesis predicts coercion success as U.S. had limited forces to back up threat of invasion of Iraq. Later, by late February 2003, U.S. had increased deployed forces to Persian Gulf in preparation for invasion. Commitment hypothesis predicts coercion failure at this point as U.S. had sufficient force to credibly back up additional demands of Iraq, yet Saddam continued to cooperate with UN.
inaccurate predictions by the survival hypothesis. First, in the Kosovo case, the survival hypothesis predicted failure when the actual outcome was a coercion success. Serbia’s survival proved not to be threatened by concession of Kosovo. As discussed in Chapter 1, a limitation of the survival hypothesis is that it predicts coercion failure for demands for population, homeland territory, regime change, or major economic concessions. In the case of Kosovo, however, territorial demands did not, in fact, threaten Serbia’s survival, an inaccurate assessment which produced a false positive for the survival hypothesis.

Second, in the crisis over Libya’s terrorism policies of the 1980s, the survival hypothesis correctly assessed that U.S. demands did not threaten Libya’s survival, but its prediction of a successful outcome proved wrong. Coercion partially failed, not because demands threatened survival, but because the Reagan administration was unable to maintain a credible threat of force to back up its demands and the crisis ended in a stalemate. In this case, coercion failed because the U.S. mismatched its demands and threats. The survival hypothesis, however, assumes that challengers and targets behave rationally, that a challenger will correctly match its demands and threats, and that the target will likely concede, so long as these demands do not threaten survival.

Turning now to examine the commitment hypothesis, it predicted the wrong outcome in four of the ten cases. In addition, in all four cases, the commitment hypothesis predicted failure where the actual outcome was either a coercion success or partial success. First, during the Gulf War Saddam Hussein attempted to concede to the Soviet peace proposal in an effort to forestall the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Kuwait. As discussed earlier, the involvement of the Soviet’s in the peace process along with the
inclusion of Arab states in the U.S.-led coalition reduced potential commitment problems for the United States. Second, in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam conceded to the Security Council’s resolution over Iraqi WMD in another ill-fated attempt to prevent a war with the United States. Saddam recognized that George W. Bush’s real strategy was that of brute force, and that the younger Bush’s desire was for Saddam to reject the UN resolution to provide Bush a *casus belli* for the planned invasion. Saddam was therefore not concerned about commitment issues as he realized Bush’s real aim was regime change. Third, during the Bosnian Civil War, the Bosnian Serbs eventually conceded negotiating power to Slobodan Milosevic. The inclusion of the Russians in the Contact Group and Milosevic in the negotiation process lessened the Bosnian Serbs concerns that the U.S. would make further demands. And fourth, Qadhafi agreed to abandon his WMD programs only after the U.S. had fulfilled its promise to allow the lifting of UN sanctions after Libya agreed to a settlement with the families of the victims of PAN AM Flight 103. This incremental fulfillment of promises by both the U.S. and Libya over the relatively minor issue of the PAN AM bombing developed trust and provided a diplomatic template for further negotiations over Libya’s WMD. In sum the failed predictions of the commitment hypothesis demonstrate that a Great Power can ameliorate the weak states concerns over the credibility of its commitments by forming coalitions, involving third party states, and by the building of trust through incremental concessions. The cases of U.S. and Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003 also highlight that the credibility of a Great Power’s commitment is not the primary concern for a weak state when the Great Power’s true strategy is that of a brute force war.
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

For this research project, I utilized a multi-method approach, employing formal modeling for theory and hypothesis development, along with quantitative and qualitative analysis to test hypotheses. In this section, I address the limitations for each of these methods.

Limitations and Recommendations for Formal Modeling

Developing a model for asymmetric coercion required making assumptions as to the rational behavior of actors in the international system. In order to include the domestic factors which impact the decision making of leaders and regimes, however, I relaxed the unitary actor assumption for weak target states. The introduction of audience costs incorporated these domestic political concerns, considerations which may alter a target’s decision as to whether it will make concessions. Audience cost similarly affects a powerful challenger. While it is the Great Power in asymmetric coercion that determines whether a conflict will escalate to a crisis, it is the target’s decision to concede or resist which determines the crisis outcome. Since the dependent variable for this study is foreign policy outcome, I deemed the non-unitary behavior of the target as more pertinent to the crisis outcome. Therefore, to keep the focus on the target’s decision making and to keep the model both parsimonious and tractable, I did not relax the unitary-assumption for the challenger. 892

892 Non-unitary action by the challenger may lead to a mismatch of demands and threats which may cause coercive diplomacy to fail and lengthen the duration of a crisis. However, due to the iterative stages of the asymmetric coercion model the challenger has the opportunity to learn from these failures and adjust its demands and threats in its subsequent offers.
A second limitation of the asymmetric coercion model is that it excludes inducements and sanctions as available foreign policy options. Inducements, however, are frequently used alongside coercion as part of a mixed “carrot and stick” strategy. Sanctions, likewise, are commonly employed as either a complement to or substitute for coercion, as was the case in all the crises examined in Chapters 4-6. While the model could be expanded to include sanctions as another foreign policy option, the introduction of mixed strategies would greatly complicate the model.

A recommendation for future research is to adapt the asymmetric coercion model to the study of sanctions. This seems promising, as sanctions work by increasing the costs of resistance in order to convince a target to concede to demands, which is a causal mechanism very similar as that of coercive punishment strategies. A word of caution is warranted, however, since the equilibrium conditions derived from the asymmetric coercion model are based on the balance of military power, expressed as the probability of victory in war. Sanctions, on the other hand, are sometimes employed in cases, such as against an ally, in which it makes little sense to discuss the possibility of war. Here, the asymmetric coercion model may be inappropriate, as neither brute force nor coercive strategies are available as foreign policy options.

**Limitations and Recommendations for Quantitative Methods**

The quantitative research in Chapter 3 was based on cases originating from the International Crisis Behavior data set. Three issues limit confidence in regression results; two concerns have to do with known selection effects determining the size and
distribution of cases, and a third concern stems from problems which remain over
operationalizing variables for regime and leadership survival.

The first selection effect is the omission of cases of accommodation. The 116
cases in the asymmetric dataset do not include cases in which Great Powers chose to
accommodate the target. Accommodation, along with coercion and brute force, are the
three strategy choices available to the powerful challenger in the asymmetric coercion
model. The cases in the data set, however, are conflicts that have already escalated to
the point of crisis after a Great Power has chosen a coercive or brute force strategy over
accommodation. Omitting accommodation cases reduces the size of the data set and
introduces a potential selection bias as the powerful challenger chose not to escalate those
conflicts in which it did not expect the outcome of a coercive or brute force strategy to
outweigh the costs of accommodation. Unfortunately, a truncation of the database is
unavoidable, given the nature of the dependent variable, which measures the success or
failure of foreign policy outcomes. Even if these cases could be identified and the
problems associated with the dependent variable resolved, there is little data available to
code explanatory variables for the potential crises which never actually occurred. An
alternative approach, to include time series data on all the potential asymmetric conflict
dyads, could well capture these omitted accommodation cases, but would do little to
solve their inherent coding problems.

A second selection effect also not incorporated into the regression analysis stems
from cases in which the challenger moves directly to a brute force strategy because the
target is not likely to concede to coercive demands. Such cases are not coded as failure
since the challenger anticipated coercion failure and therefore never adopted a coercive
strategy in the first place. Evidence of this selection effect at work is most pronounced in the cases of regime change. Demands for regime change are found in 10 of the 77 cases of compellence but, of these 10 cases, coercion succeeds in 9, creating a far higher success rate than the overall coercion success rate of 56%. A critical piece of data which explains this result is the fact that, in 6 of the 9 successful cases, the target state did not have the means to resist the demands of the Great Power. This supports the theoretical finding of the asymmetric coercion model that an optimizing challenger only chooses coercive strategies likely to succeed. The limitation of the regression analysis, however, is that it has not been corrected for this selection effect. As a result, the demand estimator from the ordered probit regressions does not reflect the significant role demands play in determining foreign policy outcomes.

A third limitation of this quantitative analysis is that I was unable to operationalize suitable variables for commitment, target regime, or leadership survival. The commitment proxy which measured the Great Power’s force deployment performed poorly. For regime survival, there was little data on domestic opposition groups for many of the 77 cases. For regime leader survival, my attempts failed at employing either regime type or size of winning coalition (W score) as acceptable proxy variables for a target leader’s audience costs.

Future quantitative international relations research could benefit from an effort to generate a variable which codes for domestic opposition groups. Such data could prove useful for a variety of research projects which seek to incorporate this domestic competition. In addition, future research on audience costs should not be limited to examining the challenger’s audience costs for backing down from its demands. The
scope of this research, rather, should be expanded to include the audience costs for a target in making concessions.

**Limitations of and Recommendations for Qualitative Methods**

Finally, a limitation of this qualitative research is the number and type of cases I have examined. The cases in Chapters 4 through 6 cases were drawn primarily from the Post-Cold War period and, in all of them, the U.S. was the powerful challenger. The advantage of this approach is that it holds constant both the challenger and the time period. The disadvantage is that there are no qualitative cases for other time periods or involving other Great Powers. While this is mitigated by the inclusion of such cases in the quantitative analysis, an expansion of the qualitative cases would increase confidence in how broadly these research findings can be generalized. It could also provide insights into the question of why coercion succeeded so rarely during the Cold War. A final advantage of additional qualitative research is that it would likely unearth fresh cases currently omitted from the ICB database.\(^{893}\)

**FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

In this final section, I address foreign policy implications of this research for asymmetric coercion. By far the most important application identifies the limits to which a Great Power's foreign policy objectives can be achieved through coercion. A primary finding affirms that coercive strategies are likely to fail, as a target will not make concessions which threaten its survival, so long as it has the means to resist. In their

\(^{893}\) The qualitative cases in this research project identified 5 additional cases not captured in the ICB database.
decision calculus, a Great Power’s policy makers should carefully weigh how their demands will be perceived by the target. Not only should they consider whether their demands threaten the survival of the target state, but also whether the act of conceding alone might generate audience costs for the target which threaten the power of its regime or its leader. As a result, policy makers need to carefully consider how the timing and content of signals impact a target’s audience costs.

At the lower range of foreign policy objectives, coercion may also fail or only partially succeed when a Great Power does not have vital security interests at stake. As demonstrated in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the ability of the U.S. to credibly threaten military force can be significantly degraded, at least in the initial stages of a conflict, by its unwillingness to risk its troops over non-vital interests. A danger in escalating a conflict into crisis over limited objectives is that, once an ultimatum has been issued the prestige of a Great Power lies in the balance. While the original issue may have been minor, a Great Power is likely to view its reputation as vital. This can then precipitate a vast expenditure of its blood and treasure to avoid losing the conflict, even if the costs far outweigh the benefits of such a hollow victory.

A second implication of this research is that Great Powers can take steps to ameliorate commitment problems. Trust will always be an issue in an anarchic international environment, particularly for weak states who fear Great Powers. Fortunately, Great Powers can take measures throughout a conflict to lessen a weak state’s concern that concession to today’s demands will only lead to further demands tomorrow. The formation of broad international coalitions, such as the U.S.-led coalition

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during the Gulf War, as well as the involvement of ally or non-ally Great Powers, such as the USSR/Russia with Iraq and Serbia and Britain with Libya, increases the costs a powerful challenger suffers for abrogating an agreement. The implementation of incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and taking measures to reduce the audience costs born by the weak state’s leadership for conceding are further measures a Great Power can employ if it wants to overcome commitment issues.

Third, statesmen and policy analysts should be alert as to a Great Power’s true intentions when it issues coercive demands. Overreaching demands may merely be an attempt to mask preparations for a brute force war, as was the case of the elder Bush administration in the Gulf War, or it may be an effort to create a casus belli as with the claim of Iraqi WMD by the younger Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In cases such as these, coercion failure may well be the desired outcome in an effort to avoid the costs of abrogating international norms against the invasion of sovereign states.
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