THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION IN INDUSTRIAL GROWTH:
A CASE STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND CHARACTER OF
PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION TO BOSTON
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Number 112 A
May 1973

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*Much of the field work for this study was conducted by Clinton Bourdon, and many of the hypotheses developed here were worked out through extensive discussions with him. The study was supported by a grant from The Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. For the specific content of this paper, however, the author bears sole responsibility.
This paper develops a series of hypotheses about the role of migration in developed industrial economies. The hypotheses suggest that a continuous stream of migrants from economically backward areas is critical to the process of economic growth, at least as it has occurred in the Western world, and that the social tensions associated with ethnic and racial minorities which both the United States and Western European nations have been experiencing in recent years are a biproduct of this migratory process and the particular way in which it has been organized in modern times. The hypotheses themselves are derived from a case study of the migration of Puerto Rican workers to Boston, Massachusetts and the findings of that study which suggest the hypotheses are presented here as well.

Both the case study and the broader hypotheses toward which it leads are conceived within the context of the particular view of the nature of the low income labor market known as the "dual labor market theory." That view is summarized in the initial section of the paper. Subsequent sections present successively, the basic findings of the case study, a detailed discussion of the characteristics of the jobs and workers examined in that study, and finally, an examination of the broader implications of the case study and the broader hypotheses which it suggests for the characterization of the migratory process and its role in industrial growth generally and in recent American industrial development particularly.

I. The Dual Labor Market Hypothesis

The dual labor market hypothesis was developed in the middle sixties in reaction to the then prevailing diagnosis of the employment problems of the black ghettos in the central cities.¹ That diagnosis focused upon the high

¹The development is summarized by David Gordon in Theories of Poverty and Unemployment (Lexington, Mass. D.C. Heath & Co., 1972) pp. 43-52
levels of unemployment, and emphasized the "unemployability" of the central city population, which was very frequently traced to the growing technical sophistication of employment opportunities and the lagging educational attainment particularly in the rural areas where much of the central city population was thought to have grown up. A number of facets of the economic life of the ghetto seemed to conflict with this view. Most prominent among these were employer complaints of labor shortage; high turnover rates among ghetto workers; the very prevalent belief that anybody who really wanted to could get a job; and the fact that urban discontent seemed, if anything, to be positively correlated with education and industrial sophistication.

The dual labor market hypothesis attempts to explain these contradictions in terms of a fundamental dichotomy of the labor market into a primary and a secondary sector. Work in ghetto areas appears to form part of a secondary sector whose jobs are distinguished from primary jobs by a series of characteristics: low wages, poor working conditions, instability and insecurity of employment, lack of opportunity for advancement, and a personal (as opposed to institutional) relationship between the supervisor and his subordinate. These characteristics of secondary jobs lead them to reward a group of worker traits essentially similar to those rewarded in illicit activity and by the welfare system and making it relatively easy for workers to move back and forth among these three income distributing systems. The characteristics are, however, basically antagonistic to those of primary jobs. The central problem in ghetto labor markets is then the fact that such secondary jobs exist and that black workers are confined to them and to activities which resemble them and do not have access to the preferred positions in the society which lie in the
primary sector. The high unemployment rates are then viewed not as a problem per se but derivative of the instability of jobs and the high rates of voluntary employer turnover which that instability encourages.

Since it was originally put forward, most of the proponents of this view have gone on to attempt to incorporate it into a broader theory of labor market stratification and economic mobility. These efforts are not of great moment in the current context but two amendments appear of note. The first of these is the identification of the characteristics of the intrageneration mobility as the focus of a theory of labor market stratification and of the lack of opportunities of upward mobility as the basic characteristic distinguishing the secondary and the primary sector. Second, that the labor force in the secondary sector is composed, in addition to disadvantaged workers, of youth and women, and that, for youth at least, the jobs seem particularly adjusted to their needs and are not symptomatic of a more fundamental social pathology as they seem to be for ethnic and racial minorities.

The dual labor market hypothesis is not really a theory. It is rather a descriptive, or typological, view of the labor market. Its importance is that it identifies, as the critical issue in labor market theory the process that distinguishes the jobs in the primary and secondary sectors and leads to the confinement of certain workers in the latter. The specification of such a process would constitute a theory. But, while most of the writing has been concerned with discussing what that process might be; the hypothesis itself need

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not be associated with any single specification. And, indeed, most of those who subscribe to the hypothesis are still engaged in developing a theory which might sustain it. It was as part of that endeavor that the case study of migration reported here was conceived.

The existence of migration—and the role of employers in encouraging it—had been noted in earlier studies connected to the dual labor market hypothesis. This migration was of special interest for several reasons: First, it was one of the factors tending to confirm employer assertions about labor shortage which the conventional wisdom would have attributed to employer prejudice and bigotry. Second, the migrants whom the employers seemed to be seeking were largely unschooled. They thus seemed to contradict the accepted belief that the educational requirements of work were rising, sending the uneducated into the ranks of the unemployable. Third, the migration process appeared to offer an insight into the dynamics of low income labor markets which had to then been viewed largely in static terms.

Puerto Rican migration into Boston was selected as a particularly interesting case because it seemed to have arisen suddenly in the mid-sixties, the population growing from almost nothing in the middle of the decade to constitute by the time the study began in 1971, a significant component of the central city population. The very recent origins of the process appeared to make it possible to identify its root causes and its dynamics in the initial stages.

II. Puerto Rican Migration into Boston

A. Research Procedure

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The research procedure upon which the study is based was as follows: a series of initial interviews was conducted with strategically placed community leaders and professional employees of community based labor market and welfare institutions. Respondents were asked to discuss the nature of the migration process and the employment patterns among the migrant population. They were also asked to identify firms in the area with heavy concentrations of Puerto Rican employment. These firms were then contacted and extensive interviews were conducted with their managerial personnel. In some community projects and at a few work sites, interviews were also conducted with the migrants themselves but no attempt was made to pursue this line of inquiry systematically. Impressions gathered through these various different types of interviews were checked against data drawn from the census and from two special surveys of the Spanish speaking populations in Boston, one of which also included other ethnic groups. The mobility of the Puerto Rican population gives rise to very serious sampling biases in all three of these data sources (including the census) but used in combination and as a check against the interviews, these biases were less serious. The final input into the study was the experience of the investigators in Puerto Rico and with black migrants in Northern central cities and in the rural South. The picture of the migration process which emerges from these materials is as follows:

B. The Origins of the Migration

The study confirmed the initial impression that the migration had developed suddenly in the middle and late sixties. Respondents in the interviews

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all report that this was the case. The census shows a growth of the Spanish speaking population in Boston from less than one thousand in 1959 to over 17,000 in 1969. The other studies suggest that the latter figure may be as high as 40,000.

The migration appears to have been a response to the tight labor markets of the middle sixties. Again, respondents report this to be the case, and the data on the distribution of the population by date of arrival seems to peak in these years. The firms identified as significant employers of Puerto Ricans all had large numbers of relatively unattractive jobs. The exact nature of the jobs is of some interest and we shall return to it below.

By any standards, however, they conformed to the description in the dual labor market hypothesis of secondary work. A number of the employers described their own plants as "sweat shops," and the workers certainly thought of them in this way. In the early sixties, the jobs in these shops appear to have been held by older immigrants and native workers, especially black. In the middle sixties, these workers reportedly became a good deal more difficult to manage. Clashes between employees and supervisors and among the employees themselves became more frequent. Employers also seemed to feel that it became more difficult to recruit and hold native workers (although, significantly, employers ranked recruitment and turnover problems as very secondary to the tractability of workers on the job). Faced with these difficulties, employers turned increasingly to the Puerto Rican labor force. Puerto Ricans may have replaced individuals from a variety of different backgrounds, but employers placed particular emphasis upon the severity of labor problems among black

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5 Gianturco and Aronin, op. cit. p. 8 & 16; Sullivan, op.cit. p. 35.
workers and the single group of workers which were replaced by Puerto Ricans were blacks. One employer reported that his neighbor's (there was a lot of talk about neighbors in the employer interviews) black foreman found it so difficult to manage black workers that he had simply decided one day never to hire another black and since then had been hiring Puerto Ricans instead. This story was consistent with the ethnic and racial composition of all of the shops which we visited.

C. The Recruitment Process

Most of the employers with whom we talked claim to have recruited their own Puerto Rican work force from walk-ins off the street. A few employers reported that faced with a labor shortage (by which they meant a group of walk-in applicants that they did not think they could manage), they had contacted community groups and religious leaders in the Spanish speaking community. Everybody with whom we talked -- employers, community leaders, the migrants -- knew of somebody (but always somebody else) who had actively recruited employees on the Island. Generally, this meant that they had hired a Puerto Rican worker on the mainland and paid his fare to return to his native village and recruit people for the shop. One case of a company who recruited from its branch plant on the Island was reported. Those few community leaders known to have institutional contacts with Puerto Rico reported that they frequently received requests from local employers to recruit labor there.

D. The Characteristics of the Work Force

The Puerto Rican labor force in Boston itself is overwhelmingly rural, recruited from the labor surplus, largely agricultural communities in the hills and along the coast. They are, in other words, peasants and conform in speech and attitude to a recognizable peasant type in Puerto Rican culture, the jibero. There is no indication that these people have lived for any
period of time in one of the major cities of the Island or in some other city in the United States. Most of the workers have very little command of English, many are illiterate, and virtually all poorly educated, even in Spanish. None of these characteristics -- rural background, language, education -- seems to constitute a barrier to employment. Employers were much more concerned about high turnover. A number mentioned a tendency among Puerto Ricans to leave suddenly without notice and reappear weeks or months later expecting the old job. (Although in many cases this is clearly a cultural problem which is derivative of their rural background and persists because of communication difficulties between employer and employee.) Another fairly common story involves the worker who left his job suddenly and sent his brother to take his place. The last characteristic of the Puerto Rican labor force reported by employers was a very high propensity to utilize welfare and unemployment insurance. Statistics on the incidence of welfare dependency among Puerto Ricans tends to confirm it. Surprisingly, the employers whom we interviewed treated this either matter-of-factly or with some sympathy. The extreme resentment against welfare common among comparable managerial personnel in higher wage enterprises was not encountered in this study.

6 Most migrants with whom we talked had considered--at least implicitly--moving to other cities on the East Coast where they had relatives; the reason given for rejecting these alternatives was consistently (so consistently that it became a cliche) a fear that their children would become addicted to drugs.

7 Sullivan, op. cit., p. 6; Gianturco and Aronin, op.cit., p. 32, 34, 36.

8 These employer comments are generally confirmed by the survey data: Sullivan, op.cit., p. 71; Gianturco and Aronin, op.cit., p. 74.

9 One study, for example, reports 49% of the household units receiving welfare payments.
Taken together, the picture which emerges is one in which low wage employers found themselves faced with significant labor shortages. Their response to these shortages was to seek new sources of labor. This was a general pattern, and outside Boston, in the surrounding communities, it took the form of reviving traditional migration streams from French Canada, Portugal, Cape Verde, and to a lesser extent, Greece, Italy and Ireland. In these communities and in Boston as well, it also led to the development of a new stream of migration from Puerto Rico. Conditions in Puerto Rico were ripe to respond to the inducement to migrate but it appears fairly clear that there was a definite impetus provided by active recruiting on the part of employers. Since nobody was willing to admit to recruiting themselves, it is difficult to specify the recruitive pattern. But given the high turnover among Puerto Ricans, one might speculate that active recruiting was the work of large employers and that the smaller employers draw as gate applicants the fall off from a migration stream initiated by their larger neighbors. On the other hand, the recruitment cost is very cheap (round trip fare to Puerto Rico is less than $200.00), and even the smallest employer was probably not above sending one of his workers on a quick trip home to the Island at the peak of the production cycle.

Why Puerto Rico? Perhaps, because it is the last large reserve of surplus labor among American citizens who can travel freely to the Boston area. One can, however, think of close substitutes in the black South, Appalachia, and the Southwest. And a significant part of the story, therefore, appears to be the Puerto Rican agricultural migration stream. Since the Second World War, large numbers of Puerto Rican workers have come annually to work on New England farms under contracts negotiated and policed by the Puerto Rican government. There is now a significant stream of noncontract migrant labor as well. It is probably this agricultural migration that made manufacturing employers aware
that Puerto Rican labor was available for recruitment. It is plausible — although we tried and could find no evidence to the effect — that the first Puerto Rican workers in Boston were recruited from this migration stream of people who had started out as seasonal migrants and decided to remain.\(^{10}\) There seems to have been very little tendency for the agricultural migration — in and of itself — to produce permanent settlements of Puerto Ricans. After thirty years, very small colonies of Puerto Ricans are beginning to appear in rural New England towns whose surrounding farms have been heavy employers of Puerto Ricans. But the sudden growth of the Spanish speaking community in Boston did not appear to be related to this process.

III. Job and Worker Characteristics

In a sense, the analysis of the Puerto Rican migration as we have developed it thus far just begs the question. If the migration was initiated by employers in response to the increasing intractability of the black labor force, one wants to know why the black labor force suddenly became intractible and why the Puerto Ricans found the jobs acceptable. The answer to these questions lies in a closer analysis of the characteristics of the jobs and of the Puerto Rican labor force as employees.

A. The Characteristics of the Jobs

As noted earlier, the jobs held by Puerto Ricans tended to possess the characteristics ascribed to secondary work in the dual labor market hypothesis; low pay, poor working conditions, instability, little chance of advancement, and a personalized (as opposed to institutionalized) relationship between employers and supervisors. As earlier work in low income labor markets had revealed, not all of the jobs possessed all of the characteristics, and the

\(^{10}\) We found one man who had come to Boston in 1948. When asked how many other Puerto Ricans there were in Boston then, he replied 9 and began to name them individually. His own migration had nothing to do with the agricultural migration but was attributable instead to a personal wanderlust.
reason for grouping them together is less that they are all alike in some obvious sense than that workers and employers seem to perceive them as being alike. The diversity in actual characteristics is troubling analytically, and a special effort was made to identify the common feature of the jobs; this appeared to be the opportunity for upward mobility; all of the jobs were essentially dead-end. Not only did they offer little chance of advancement within the enterprise, but they offered little in the way of information, training or institutional connections which would facilitate advancement elsewhere in the labor market. It was this finding, in part, which led to the attempt to redefine the whole problem of labor market stratification in terms of differences in the characteristics of the mobility patterns across sectors.11

The reasons for the limited mobility offered by the Puerto Ricans' jobs was various. Generally, the job structure within the enterprise offered little opportunity for advancement. In manufacturing, this appeared attributable to the technology. Two patterns prevailed. In one, there was an overwhelming preponderance of unskilled jobs with few higher level positions of any kind. A produce packaging firm typified this pattern. The second pattern was an essentially bimodal job structure with numbers of very unskilled jobs on the

11 It is to be emphasized that this characteristic of the job does not convey the flavor of work in the secondary sector as it comes through in site visits and as the comments of workers and employers in interviews suggests that they perceive it. That flavor is much more typified by the line of 15 men, working at a feverish piece-work pace yanking the lasts on which the upper had to be formed out of the finished shoe, a job which we were told native adult workers never take and which nobody stays on more than 3 months. One of the implications of the lack of upward mobility from secondary jobs is that workers hold these jobs in a random sequence moving back and forth from one to the other. Because people move from last-puller jobs into work whose other characteristics are similar although whose working conditions are not nearly as harsh, the jobs seem to be of a piece. And one's impression of the jobs as a group is colored by what seems to be its most dramatic aspect.
one hand, and of fairly skilled jobs on the other, but very few intermediate positions through which one could progress in some kind of learning sequence from one type of job to the other. The unskilled jobs, moreover, were often physically isolated from other jobs in the plant so that they offered little opportunity to learn by osmosis and limited information about what kind of openings in higher level positions might be available. Shoe plants were typical of this second type of job structure. In service industries, particularly hospitals, the lack of upward mobility seemed to be less a feature of the technology than of the institutional barriers created by professionalization.

Aside from the technology, the major factor curtailing mobility, or perhaps more accurately, leading the labor force to perceive the jobs as lacking mobility, was that the industries were declining in the area and offered little prospect for lifetime employment. This was particularly important factor in the shoe industry and was mentioned again and again in interviews. Because so many shoe plants had closed in New England, most of the skilled labor force had been "burnt" more than once. When plants closed now, skilled workers generally preferred to leave shoes even when comparable jobs were available elsewhere. Young workers were discouraged from entering the industry by their parents, by school counselors, and, in fact, by just about anybody from whom they sought advice. Our interviews with managerial officials left little doubt that this was good advice.

A last factor involved in the lack of upward mobility was the seasonal and cyclical sensitivity of the demand for labor. In several plans, these fluctuations were so frequent and so severe that the jobs offered no continuity
of employment in which a series of skills could be accumulated. On the whole, however, this pattern was less pronounced than we had expected. A couple of plants indicated that they had made special efforts to eliminate these fluctuations in employment in the recession of 1970 by increasing reliance upon inventories and by dropping that part of their product line for which demand was most variable. But even if one views job opportunities in these plants as normally much more unstable than at the time of this study, actual instability appears to be considerably less important as a factor than either the probability of plant closings or the structure of technology.

The one other job characteristic which in terms of earlier studies of the dual labor market is of some interest was the number of jobs in manufacturing which were unionized--well over half the sample.\textsuperscript{12} The unionization, it is to be noted, did not seem to have much of an effect upon the job characteristics. What appeared to be involved was that either the plant had a bimodal job structure itself or was part of an industry which had such a structure. The heart of the union organization and the place where it exercised some influence upon job characteristics was the skilled mode. The unskilled jobs were organized as a by-product. Thus, for example, unskilled workers did not have real access to the formal grievance procedure and differences continued to be worked out in a personalized way between foreman and employee. Or, again, there typically was no formal bidding procedure for movement between the unskilled and other jobs although such procedures

\textsuperscript{12}This seems to be confirmed by one of the sample surveys which reports that 43% of the Puerto Rican's were union members. Sullivan, \textit{op. cit.} p.69
did govern movement between jobs above the unskilled level.

It is of some interest in judging the equity of the market structure to note that the unskilled workers in the secondary jobs tended to support the union dues structures and the pension plans although they received little service from the union representatives and their turnover patterns were such that they never drew upon the pension fund. In other words, the unskilled workers subsidized the skilled labor force.

The one place at which union organization may have had some impact upon the market was in wage determination. Several managers mentioned the difficulty of raising wages in the face of a shortage of unskilled workers because of the leverage which this would exert upon the skilled wage. One might argue that this deterred them from reacting to market scarcities through competition and increased reliance upon the recruitment of new immigrant groups. This proposition however is dubious. The labor shortage which employers perceived was one which could be overcome if at all only through a major change in the relative wages of unskilled workers and changes of this magnitude would have driven them out of business.

B. The Characteristics of the Labor Force

The Puerto Rican labor force may be characterized in several different ways: Its most outstanding characteristic, however, appears to be its extreme mobility; its underlying attachment to the Island; and the very temporary nature of its commitment to Boston. Employers, as already noted, in describing the labor force, emphasized the extremely high turnover rates and the tendency of workers to disappear without warning for months at a
time and then return seeking their old job back. Discussions with community leaders and with the migrants themselves suggest that what lies behind these observations is a population that continues in some fundamental sense to be rooted in their place of origin. People do not typically come to Boston seeking to make a permanent life in the city. Rather they come for a relatively short period of time, planning to accumulate money and return to the Island with funds to buy a farm or open a small business. Most are unable to realize this ambition but they nonetheless return to deal with family problems, to visit, and as a temporary respite from income earning activities. They may or may not subsequently return to Boston. Those who ultimately do settle in Boston and bring, or form, a family there, reportedly do so only after several trips back and forth to the Island, and often then only by default, postponing the decision to return rather than making a conscious decision to remain. This pattern of mobility back and forth between Puerto Rico and the main land also shows up in the survey data where it might be expected to be muted by underreporting among the more mobile segment of the population. The pattern is very similar to that observable among blacks in the rural south in the early 1960's, when practically everybody had been north at one time or another and where there was a constant flux of people returning home temporarily and departing again to visit or live with some relative in the North.

This suggests that the conventional view of migration as a one shot move between two points misses the essence of the process. It leaves the

13 The survey date also suggest this. Thus in a sample where one-fourth of the respondents were Cubans with no opportunity to return home, 22% planned to stay six months or less and an additional 35% had no definite plans about length of stay. Gianturco and Aronin op.cit. p. 11
14 Ibid. p. 15 & 16.

Half of the sample (25% of which was Cuban) had returned home at least once since moving to U.S.; 16% returned home three or more times. Mobility in Boston is also high. Over one-half of the sample had lived three or more places in Boston.
impression that what is taking place is the accumulation of a stock of people in Boston and a reduction in the stock of people in Puerto Rico. In fact, the migration process is characterized more accurately as a continual flow of people originating on the Island, passing through Boston and moving back to Puerto Rico. The numbers of Puerto Ricans in Boston, this suggests, may be constant, but the particular people there is not. Out of this flow, of course, there eventually does drop out a group with a more permanent attachment to the city, but at the early stage of the migratory process upon which the study focused, this number is a relative small portion of the labor force. The whole process may be likened to the silting up of a river over time. We will return to this simile below in discussing the implications for the dual labor market. It is especially appropriate for this purpose because it is the flowing character of the migratory process which renders the migrant particularly adapted to the secondary market, and, as an increasing proportion of the migrant community become permanent residents (as the stream silts up, as it were), its usefulness as a source of secondary workers declines.

The underlying attachment of the migrants to Puerto Rico and their Island orientation relates to the second reason why they found the secondary jobs in the Boston labor market acceptable: from the perspective of the Island—particularly the parts of the Island from which the migrants come—this work lies much closer to the top of the job hierarchy. Puerto Rico has undergone extremely rapid development in the last twenty years. The effect of that development has been to shift the economic structure from one
initially dependent upon sugar cane and coffee to one centering in manufacturing and services. The type of manufacturing and services upon which this transition has hinged involves light assembly work, considerable warehousing, garments and shoes work essentially comparable to that offered in Boston, and in some cases exactly the same. The driving force in the growth of the service sector has been tourism so that, again, the types of jobs associated with modern economic development are not unlike the restaurant, hotel, and hospital jobs offered in Boston. Very little of this development, however, has occurred in the regions of the Island from which the migrants come. Employment in these regions continues to be confined to agricultural labor in sugar cane and coffee. The work is associated with an earlier, backward period in Puerto Rican history; it is also, by any objective standard, extremely demanding physically, debilitating and unpleasant. The younger generation has refused to do it. As a result, in the last five years as the older generation has died or retired, these traditional industries have faced such a severe labor shortage that they have been forced to undertake a radical program of mechanization and technological change. The shortages are so severe in fact, that the government has heavily subsidized the agricultural wage rate. But it is the contrast between these traditional jobs and those in the Boston labor markets which seems to make the latter acceptable to the migrants. The continual back flow of migrants to the Island preserves and reinforces that perspective.

The severe labor shortages on the Island in cane and coffee create a paradox in rural Puerto Rico very much like the paradox in the Boston urban ghettos of the mid-sixties of extremely high rates of unemployment (rates in some areas are as high as thirty and fifty per cent: these figures moreover
are consistent with casual observation in the region) and severe labor shortages in certain occupations. The parallel to the Boston labor market is reinforced by the fact that agricultural interests in the coffee regions have been lobbying for the importation of Colombian workers. The shortage in Puerto Rico clearly hinges upon job attitudes rather than the competition of more remunerative opportunities. This is indicated not only by the unemployment rate, but also by the fact that government subsidies had raised the wage rate to a point where, given transport and out of pocket living costs, it is probably comparable to that paid in Boston. The comments of community leaders in Boston tend to confirm that younger workers refuse even the more remunerative agricultural jobs in the States on the grounds that such work is degrading.

There is a story about why the native workers find the jobs in Boston unacceptable which is congruent with this story about why the Puerto Rican workers do not. That story is that the native black workers are the sons and daughters of an earlier generation of black migrants who came out of the black South in the 1940's and 1950's. The picture of the migratory process which emerged from the black communities in the rural South and the Northern ghettos is very similar to that which emerged in the Puerto Rican study; a continual stream of people moving through the Northern cities and back South again from which there falls out a population more or less permanently resident in the North, who raise their children there. For the parents whose perspective is that of the rural South, the secondary jobs are attractive and that accounts for the initial concentration of blacks in these jobs. The children, raised in the North, with a Northern perspective, see these jobs as the bottom of the social hierarchy and find them unacceptable, very much
as the Puerto Rican migrants (and probably the migrant parents of black youths as well) find agricultural work unacceptable. The story about the growing intransigence of the black labor force in the mid-1960's, is then one about a shift in the composition of the black labor force from one dominated by first generation immigrants to one dominated by the second generation.

This story does not explain the apparent suddenness of the shift in worker attitudes. The shift in the composition of the labor force must have occurred gradually, probably in a period beginning in the mid- or late 1950's, whereas the shift in attitudes was by all reports more abrupt. It is possible that the abruptness of the shift is simply a misperception on the part of employers. The shortage of agricultural workers in Puerto Rico was also perceived as occurring abruptly in the mid 1960's but closer examination suggested that it was a much more gradual phenomenon which had gone unnoticed in no small part because policy and ideology were adjusted to a labor surplus in agriculture. But what seems more plausible is that the behavior of the labor force is a function of several variables including not only job attitudes but also economic conditions and opportunities and that the generally depressed economic conditions in the late 1950's and early 1960's masked the change in the composition of the labor force whereas the manifestations of that change in the mid 1960's were heightened by the extremely tight labor markets, the civil rights agitation, and the increased permissiveness of the welfare system.

The preceding discussion has concentrated exclusively upon the black population, although the jobs, both before and after the entrance of Puerto Ricans, were also held by a number of other immigrant groups. This emphasis accords very much with employer comments which suggest that the displacement
was basically one of blacks by Puerto Ricans. The story about other immigrant
groups is nonetheless consistent with the preceding hypothesis: there were no
second generation workers and the immigrant labor force consisted either of
very recent immigrants or much older people from some earlier era of migration.
Why there were no recent black in-migrants is difficult to explain; perhaps
migration from the South has stopped, perhaps employers do not distinguish
between Northern and Southern blacks (pure race prejudice is ruled out by the
presence of Spanish speaking and Haitian blacks).

The major alternatives to an explanation based upon aspirations, and
the one most consistent with the current preoccupations of economic theorists,
is an explanation based upon differences in the information of the various
labor force groups and in their endowments of human capital. Differences in
information was also the hypothesis of the Department of Labor when they
undertook to finance the project of which the case study is a part. It turned
out, however, to be exceedingly difficult to evaluate these alternatives in
the context of the case study. Both were completely out of keeping with the
spirit and the language of the interviews and seemingly foreign to the thinking
of all of the participants in the labor market; employers, workers, community
leaders, and employees in other labor market institutions. If information or
human capital is important, it clearly operates at a level once removed from
the consciousness of the market practitioners. Personally, I find this somewhat
implausible. But plausibility aside, it creates a difficulty in that the study
itself yielded no particular model which could be tested. One is forced to
turn instead to theory. And there turn out to be a surprising number of
alternative theoretical specifications.

The simplest specification -- or rather the one which seems most natural
in the context of the problem -- is that recent migrants are differentiated
from the native population by a series of traits which increase the range of jobs open to them, either because those traits increase their productivity or because they increase the range of valuable job information. In the case of the Puerto Ricans, obvious traits which might work in this way are their agricultural background, their low levels of educational attainment, their language, and their lack of experiences in the Boston labor market. None of these background characteristics seemed to important barriers, however, in the actual performance of work. Employers did not generally mention language deficiencies until asked and discussions of the communication problem suggested that as long as there was someone around who spoke both languages, however imperfectly, it could be overcome. In several shops, there was more than one non-English speaking language group. The low levels of educational attainment among the Puerto Ricans was not generally remarked upon and many employers were unaware of it. While the study focused upon unskilled jobs, where these handicaps could be expected to be least important, many of the shops included a very wide range of job types and barriers to the promotion of Puerto Ricans was also discussed. Here again, employers did not place much weight upon language or educational deficiencies; the major barriers appeared to be the relative paucity of higher level positions, the turnover of the Puerto Rican labor force, and institutional barriers which restricted access to promotion from those parts of the plant where the Puerto Ricans were concentrated. One cannot, of course, extrapolate from these findings about jobs in the plants studies to higher level employment opportunities in general, but they do lead one to be highly skeptical about explaining differences in the attitudes of Puerto Ricans and blacks on the basis of differences in the range of job access for the two groups which derive from their human capital endowments.

Similarly, there was no obvious differential in the amount of job
information available to the different groups of workers. We have already noted the active role of employers in spreading the information which developed this new source of labor in the first place. Comments of each of the different types of respondents suggested the effectiveness of the network of friends and relatives in spreading job information. Employers' comments, particularly, emphasized the speed with which it operated; once you hired one Puerto Rican, you could quickly recruit almost as many additional workers as you wanted. Community leaders evinced no knowledge of a range of jobs from which migrants were excluded because of a lack of information.

There are, of course, a variety of other, more complex models of the way in which human capital and information operate to influence job access which cannot be excluded on this basis. We tried to test the job access hypothesis directly by comparing census data for the black and Spanish speaking populations but these tests proved inconclusive; the data on income and unemployment are very similar, thus seeming to refute an access hypothesis, but differences in the occupational distributions of the two groups were consistent with it. Another piece of information which seems relevant was the fact that the difficulties with the black labor force revealed themselves in their tractability on the job rather than in any shortage of job applicants. In sum, if one cannot exactly confirm the expectations hypothesis which emerges in the interviews, at least it seems not unreasonable to proceed from it.

C. Summary of Case Study

To recapitulate the results of the case study then, the Puerto Rican migration into Boston appears to revolve around a series of secondary jobs at the bottom of the labor market. The jobs are secondary in the sense that they are essentially dead-end; they offer very little opportunity for advancement to positions of higher pay and social status. The jobs are relatively unattractive
in other of their dimensions as well, tending to offer low pay, poor working conditions, and the like. These characteristics were not especially detrimental to the recruitment of Puerto Rican workers. Most Puerto Ricans planned to return quickly to the Island. They therefore viewed their attachment to the Boston labor market as decidedly temporary and were indifferent to the prospects of advancement which a job might or might not offer. Moreover, the pay, working conditions, and status of the jobs, however poor in the context of the Boston job structure, were from the perspective of the Puerto Rican economy, where the migrants had developed their value structure, superior. They were particularly superior to the agricultural employments which dominated the opportunity structure in the regions of the Island from which the migrants came and which were associated in their eyes with backwardness and peasant status. The racial and ethnic groups which preceded the Puerto Ricans in the jobs appear originally to have shared a similar perspective. They came to the city in the 1940's and 1950's from the peasant, agricultural economies of Southern and Eastern Europe and from black rural South. Like the Puerto Ricans, many of these earlier migrants, especially the blacks, expected to, and in fact did, return home. By the 1960's however, a portion of the probably much larger group of migrants had remained in Boston long enough to raise a generation of children there. Those children did not share the labor market perspective of their parents. They saw the jobs in terms of the job structure of the city and in the context of a work life which was going to played out in the Boston labor market. This shift in the attitudes predominating among the labor force must have occurred gradually in the late 1950's and early 1960's as the children of earlier migrants came to working age, but it was masked by the loose labor
market conditions of that period. On the other hand, their expression in the middle sixties was probably exacerbated not only by the tightening of the market, but also by the civil rights movement, the awakening of black consciousness, and by the increasing permissiveness of the public assistance system. It was possibly aided by increases in upward mobility among the second generation as well. In any case, it was the shift in attitudes from one generation to the next that created a shortage of tractable laborers in the secondary labor market and led employers to initiate the Puerto Rican migration into the city. Finally, it may be noted that the position of the jobs in the economic structure precluded reliance upon instruments other than the recruitment of a new migration stream as a means of adjusting to the labor shortage. Many of the industries were already declining in the region and felt that an effort to meet the aspirations of the native labor force by raising wages and improving working conditions would force them out of business. Paradoxically, moreover, many of the jobs in question, while offering very little opportunity for advancement, were nonetheless tied into a fairly rigid, institutionalized wage structure, and wage increases were precluded by the leverage they would have had on other positions in the structure.

IV. The General Implications

The key elements of the preceding story are threefold: a set of dead-end jobs which the native labor force will not accept; a new migrant population with a labor market perspective, molded in an underdeveloped region, in terms of which these jobs are acceptable; and a second generation, from some earlier migrant stream originally recruited to fill the jobs but which has come to adopt the perspective of the natives. The driving force in this process is the second generation. In adopting the attitudes of the native labor force, they reject their parents' jobs. This has a double effect, creating,
on the one hand, a labor shortage which forces employers to induce the new
migration stream and generating, on the other hand, a set of tensions with the
native labor force who monopolize the more favored positions to which the second
generations aspires. Critical to their story is the characterization of the
migrant community as a flow, rather than, as populations are usually conceived,
a stock. The flow-like character is the outgrowth of a labor force with
little permanent attachment to the destination, engaging in continual movement
back and forth between the origin and destination, and when at the destination
always planning to return home shortly. It is the flow-like character which
makes the jobs acceptable: the temporary nature of their stay renders the
labor force indifferent to the lack of security and advancement and the periodic
visits home reinforce the perspective of the home labor market, in which the
jobs have much higher relative status. The flow also makes the size of the
labor force highly responsive to variations in economic conditions. It is
basically the fact that the second generation is a fall-out from this flow,
with a permanent attachment to the destination, that distinguishes it from its
progenitor, making its size unresponsive to economic opportunities and
creating the possibility of tension and conflict between opportunities and
aspirations.

A superficial reading of industrial history suggests that this story
may not be peculiar to the Puerto Rican migration but, rather, a very general
story about economic development. Industrial economies may, in other words,
generally have a tendency to generate a series of unstable, deadend jobs which
the native labor force, except in periods of dire unemployment, will reject,
forcing employers to recruit migrants who have a different perspective on the
labor market in underdeveloped regions, at home or abroad. And these migrants
may in turn systematically spawn a second generation, who reject their parents' jobs, generating conflicts over upward mobility within the developed region
and forcing employers to look increasingly far afield for new migrants to
fill the bottom positions in the economy. There is a corresponding story to be told in the underdeveloped region about that part of the migrant stream which returns to the homeland with an accumulation of capital, skill and aspirations acquired in the developed region. Such a returning population is a key factor engendering economic development in backward regions and spreading industrialization. And as it develops itself, the backward region not only becomes increasingly less useful as a supply of labor, forcing the developed country to move further afield, but eventually must add its own demands for unspoiled labor to that of other industrial nations. This is thus a story about the nature of world wide economic development itself. It is a story that can easily assume dimensions which are truly Marxian in scope; an underdeveloped world whose labor force is critical to the growth of industrial nations; increasing difficulty in recruiting such workers as the world-wide economy develops; a growth process within the developed nations punctuated by a series of clashes between second generation workers and the native workers who monopolize the jobs to which the second generation aspires, which become increasingly severe as the supply of labor to fill the bottom jobs dries up and the society becomes more and more anxious to hold the second generation in them, and finally, a world wide economic collapse when the supply of underdeveloped labor is ultimately exhausted. Whether or not such a Marxist end is


16 For a more orthodox Marxist treatment of this problem, see Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, "Immigrants: West Europe's Industrial 'Reserve Army'", Economist, 1972. This article apparently summarizes the argument of a forthcoming book by the authors entitled, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (Oxford University Press).
inherent in the process itself, of course, depends upon what there is in the economy which generates the secondary jobs and, to the extent such jobs are a necessary feature of the economic structure, whether less explosive substitutes for migrant labor can be found in other groups which inhabit the secondary market such as women and youth.

The basic story, i.e. without the Marxist ending, however, is broadly consistent with the economic history of the United States and of Europe. The chief differences between the two economies is the role played by foreign immigration versus the migration of native workers from the underdeveloped regions within national boundaries. European development depended initially upon internal migration. As a result, the hypothesis would suggest, the distinction between recent migrants and native workers was less obvious and, in particular, the upward mobility of "second" generation workers, easier. As internal sources of labor were exhausted, however, European countries have been forced to rely increasingly on foreign immigrants. This reliance has become painfully obvious in recent years with the massive inflows of Italians, Turks, and Eastern Europeans to Germany and Switzerland, the "colored" migration to England, and the inflow of Spanish, Portuguese and North African workers to France. But the use of foreign labor can be traced much farther back in the century. We have not carefully investigated these migrations, but a few intensive case studies and many journalistic accounts suggest the reasons for the migration, the role which the migrants play in the economy, and the tensions associated with them are essentially similar to those

17 Cf. Kindleberger, op.cit. esp. p. 171-195

18 Kindleberger op.cit. p. 176-177
suggested by the study of the Puerto Rican migration to Boston. 19

In American economic development the European process was reversed. Initial reliance was upon foreign immigrants. 20 It was only later, that American industry turned to the domestic areas of underdevelopment.

This view of the process suggests that the racial tensions experienced in the United States in the 1960's had its roots in the cutting off of foreign immigration in 1923. That cut-off curtailed the traditional sources of new workers for secondary jobs and forced employers to turn from underdeveloped areas abroad to backward regions within their own borders. The full effect of this was delayed by the depression of the 1930's but it resulted in the 1940's and 1950's in large scale black migration to the northern cities. The migrants were recruited for, and largely confined to, secondary jobs but because these jobs were an improvement over the opportunities available in the South and because residence in the North was often viewed as temporary, they were accepted passively. By the late 1950's,

19 Eg. Kayser, op. cit.; also Kindleberger, op.cit.

20 While it seems a little farfetched to equate the role of earlier immigrants with that of the Puerto Ricans and blacks in a hypothesis which depends so heavily upon the flow-like character of the migration process, the data turns out to be surprisingly supportive of this view. Thus, Kuznets and Rubin note that while there was little reverse migration in the first half of the nineteenth century, the nature of the migration process appears to have changed during the second half of the century (a change incidentally which coincides with a number of other changes in the industrial structure impinging upon labor market stratification). Departures as a percentage of arrivals rise rapidly during the period, reaching 50% in the last normal interval (1910-1915). A positive correlation between arrivals and departures, as well as questionnaire evidence (77% of one sample of returnees had been in the U.S. less than five years, 18% more, between five and nine), indicate that the departees are short-term migrants. Simon Kuznets and Ernest Rubin Immigration and the Foreign Born Occasional Paper No. 46 (National Bureau of Economic Research: New York, 1954) Part II esp. p. 26-30 and p. 39.
however, a second generation of black workers who had grown up in the North was entering the labor force. This second generation did not view the job opportunities in the perspective of the South, and given the northern perspective found them unacceptable. The pressure of this second generation for upward mobility combined with the resistance of the groups commanding the jobs which the younger blacks were seeking access, then, is basically responsible for the clashes of the period.

The problem of the blacks is thus seen as essentially a problem of immigrant groups and a re-reading of earlier American history suggests that analogous clashes between natives or earlier ethnic migrants, and the children of more recent immigrants occurred frequently in the later half of the previous century and the early part of this one. What makes the black case different are two factors. First, and probably less important, because the newer migrants were distinguished by race, it was impossible to obscure, let alone moderate their separate identity, and this undoubtedly made the barriers to upward mobility a good deal more rigid. Second, however, the South out of which the migrants came appeared to have found an alternative to migration as a means of manning the jobs in the secondary sector in a racial caste system. The social and legal structure of the society impressed upon Negroes the fact that their role was to man to lower stations in the job structure, however menial and unattractive those stations might be. In terms of social stability, this solution is in many ways more attractive than that of migration because it completely avoids the problem of an intractable second generation threatening the jobs of more established groups. Having closed off foreign immigration, the attractiveness of the solution to Northern employers
was bound to increase as the number of new migrants upon which it could
draw within the national boundaries dried up. Thus, one can argue that
the blacks had to fight especially hard to insure the upward mobility and
resist any attempt to impose in the North the Southern caste solution. Cer-
tainly, the problem was perceived in this light by the Black leadership, if
not by the man in the street. The central issue of the 1960's may then be
interpreted in this light as one of whether the country would resolve the
secondary labor market problem through the racial caste system of the
South or look for an alternative compatible with the libertarian ideology
of the North and of the basic national documents.

I would like to believe that this issue was resolved in favor of
the second alternative. I am fairly confident, in fact, that it was resolved
in this way. My confidence springs not so much from the effectiveness of
policies in actually producing mobility for blacks out of the secondary
sector. The evidence about this is ambiguous. But I do think that the
rhetoric which accompanied these policies combined with the black power
movement, and the change in the black psychology which it produced, has
effectively destroyed the sociological foundations of the caste system which
prevailed in the South so that the problem of the "second generation," if
it remains, cannot be resolved in the Southern way. But if this is true,
then, quite aside from the racial problem, there remains the problem of the
secondary labor market.

There is already considerable pressure to return to foreign immi-
 gration as a means of handling this problem. That pressure is apparent in
the efforts of low wage employers in the communities surrounding Boston to
change the quotas for national immigrant groups. It is also apparent in a substantial legal and quasilegal migration from the Caribbean and South American in Boston and, by all newspaper accounts, on the West coast. The immediate policy problem which this poses is therefore for our immigration laws. But there lurks in the background a problem connected with the upward mobility of the second generation. The ethnic tensions here may well have international repercussions.

In the light of these pressures, the whole problem of the secondary sector and the role of immigration within it will have to be reviewed. Such a review entrains a complex set of issues which cannot be adequately treated within this context. But the present study does suggest several points which, at the risk of prolonging and already overlong paper, seem important to bring out here. This discussion may also serve to highlight some of the theoretical issues implicit in the foregoing story about migration and low income. The points fall under two basic headings: the curtailment of secondary jobs and the organization of the migration stream.

Curtailing Secondary Jobs

One obvious way of dealing with the problems which immigration poses for the economy is to curtail the number of jobs which the immigrants are recruited to fill. The Boston study and the theory which emerges from it suggest a basic difficulty with this policy: it is not clear exactly what role the secondary jobs play in the operation of the economy. The theory of migration which we have been developing hinges upon two distinct--although not necessarily exclusive--postulates about this. The two postulates may be termed--borrowing with some deliberation from the debates about the consumption function--the relative income and the lifetime income postulates respectively.
The dual labor market explanation rests essentially upon a postulate about life-time income. The distinguishing features of the jobs in the two sectors is the security and the chance for advancement, and hence opportunities for increasing income over the incumbants work life, which they offer. Primary jobs offer these things: secondary jobs do not. Migrants find the secondary jobs acceptable because they do not plan to remain at the destination long enough to take advantage of the life-time opportunities or to be handicapped by any paucity thereof. It is, in other words, the time-horizon of the migrants in the labor market of the destination that distinguishes them from the native labor force. This postulate will permitt the elimination of secondary jobs without directly affecting the operation of the rest of the economy.

The relative income hypothesis, by contrast, emphasizes the position of the jobs in a job hierarchy. Workers, it suggests, tend to view the jobs in the economy as arrayed in some kind of rank order. The attractiveness of the job and the incentive to seek it out and hold onto it once found depends upon the jobs relative position. Jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy, because they are at the bottom, offer little incentive to the work force to take them or, when they take them, to perform them well. The difference between migrants and nonmigrants then derives from the differences in the job hierarchies in terms of which they perceive the same jobs. The migrants perceive jobs in terms of the job hierarchy at the point of origin, and that hierarchy overlaps the hierarchy of the destination in such a way that the jobs at the bottom of the latter lie at the top of the former.
As noted earlier, the jobs which Puerto Ricans held in the present study—and more broadly, most jobs generally viewed as secondary—are distinguished from other jobs in the economy by a lack of opportunity for advancement. The relative income hypothesis is thus not logically necessary to explain that migration process. Nonetheless, one cannot dismiss on that account the relative income hypothesis. First, not all the distinctions made by workers are understandable in these terms. Thus, even in the present study, while a life-time income hypothesis may explain why native workers reject the industrial jobs Puerto Ricans are attracted to, the relative income hypothesis is required to explain why the Puerto Ricans who accept the jobs in Boston are rejecting agricultural work on the island (or, for that matter, on the mainland). Outside the confines of the present study, there are also industrial jobs which provoke similar symptoms of labor unrest but do not fit the life-time income hypothesis. The most prominent example here is the automobile assembly line where management—both in the United States and in Western Europe—seems to be experiencing problems with native labor very similar to those encountered in the secondary sector and is responding, at least in Europe, by recruiting foreign workers. These automobile jobs do not, however, fit the description of the secondary sector either in terms of any detailed list of their characteristics or on the basis of the upward mobility they provide.

A second reason why it is difficult to dismiss the relative income hypothesis is that the psychological and learning theories which have been used to explain other phenomenon associated with dual labor market hypothesis are very similar to the theory from which the relative income hypothesis was
first derived to explain the behavior and consumption and savings. Thus, even if it were possible to explain the migratory process without that theory, it does not seem plausible that the labor market structure in which the alternative explanation rests would exist without relative income effects.

A clear implication of the relative income hypothesis is that the migratory labor force at the bottom of the job hierarchy plays a critical role in motivating the native labor force. If migration were halted and the jobs of migrants eliminated, the next jobs in the hierarchy would simply fall to the bottom and experience the kind of difficulties which migrants are recruited to overcome. This may imply that some minimal rate of migration is necessary to the functioning of an industrial economy, whatever the nature of its jobs. (It does not necessarily imply this because there may be substitutes for migrants (such as women, youth, racial castes) who will hold lower level jobs in such a way that they motivate those above them).

If this is indeed the case, and migrants are required to motivate the rest of the labor force, crises at some point in the course of world-wide industrial development is inevitable. But one would want to use a great deal of caution in hastening this crisis by prematurely restricting immigration.

The Boston study suggests a certain amount of caution about a policy of curtailing migration through the elimination of secondary jobs even if one rejects the relative income hypothesis. A number of these jobs, it was noted, are complements to skilled work in the primary sector, and the cost in terms of such work of their elimination might be quite high. Elsewhere, we have
argued that many such jobs are complementary in another sense not directly observable in a study of this kind: they are generated by efforts to stabilize employment opportunities in other parts of the economic system. Of perhaps equal import is a point about the characteristics of the Boston jobs not emphasized earlier. The secondary sector in the Boston area is closely related to the process of job export to underdeveloped countries. In a number of industries—shoes, textiles, garments in particular—employers saw the employment of immigrants as an alternative to movement abroad. It is possible that this is an accident of the peculiar structure of industry in the Boston area. But it is also possible that it is a regular feature of secondary employment and inherent in the dynamics of the process we were observing. Thus, a good part of the fact that the jobs were classed as secondary by the native labor force was due to the fact that much of the industry had already moved abroad, making the prospects of the industry very uncertain. The movement of the industry, moreover, seemed to proceed from very low quality products involving relatively unskilled work to higher quality and high skilled production, eliminating a series of semiskilled jobs which may have once made it possible to advance from the unskilled jobs the Puerto Ricans were holding to the skilled craft jobs at the top of the job hierarchy. Similarly, the fact that this was occurring insured that the job hierarchy in Puerto Rico did in fact overlap with the hierarchy in Boston. One might argue that if the two hierarchies were composed of completely different jobs, or if they were to more nearly coincide, no incentive for migration would have

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exists. In any case, to the extent that job export is central to the process—and even if it is not inherent in the basic process but is in particular cases associated with it—the elimination of secondary jobs may not prove feasible.

Organization of the Migration Stream

If the secondary sector is to be maintained and in-migration remains a major source of labor, then the other range of policies which must be explored are those affecting the organization of the migration stream. There should be forms of organization under which the development of a second generation—and with it, the problems created by their desire for upward mobility—takes place less rapidly. The realization of these alternatives, moreover, should prove more feasible in the future as the migration stream comes to be dominated once again by foreigners, the forms and conditions of whose work is governed by visa, than it has been in the last 30 years when migration has primarily involved American citizens whose freedom of movement is protected by constitutional guarantees.

There are two polar forms of organization, both illustrated by the Puerto Rican migration to New England. One pole is the industrial case where migration is completely free; migrants settle in the local community and can change their jobs and place of residence more or less at will. The other pole is the migration of agricultural workers generally under contract to a specific employer. In this case, the migrants live on the farm in housing provided by the employer and isolated from the local community, and return upon the expiration of the contract directly to the island, without other stopovers on the continent. Between these two polar cases are a variety
of possible intermediate arrangements in which the opportunities for the
migrant to develop other social and economic contacts at the destination are
greater than those of contract agricultural workers but more circumscribed than
in the case of the free industrial migrant. Very few of these "intermediate"
positions are actually realized in the case of the Puerto Rican migration,
but in the European case, where the migrants are foreign nationals, and the
migration is worked out in a series of special arrangements between the
countries of origin and destination, all sorts of variations are found.22
Thus, for example, in Germany, automobile firms control an industrial migration
process very similar to that of the Puerto Rican agricultural migrants in
which workers come under fixed term contracts negotiated by their government
and live in isolated housing supplied by the company. Temporary visas for
foreign workers provided an intermediate case, where the duration of stay is
limited and return migration is forced, but contacts with the local community
during the stay are open.

In general, it appears that the development of a second generation
occurs more rapidly the more open the migration process and the freer the
migrant is to pick his employer, his place of residence and his date of
return. Thus the process is much more rapid in the case of Puerto Rican
industrial migration than in the case of the agricultural migration from
the island. It should be noted, however, that even in the agricultural
case, there has eventually been some fall out of permanent residents. Thus,
after twenty years of migration, there are now scattered throughout rural New
England in virtually every little town, tiny communities of Puerto Ricans,
made up of one time agricultural migrants who decided to stay the winter and
brought their families to join them. These communities have reduced the

22 Kayser, op.cit. pp. 153-210
isolation of the agricultural migrants and the dependence of these migrants upon their employers, and this has reportedly had the effect of lessening the tractability of the agricultural workers. The fact that such a fall-out eventually occurred should not detract from the basic point that the rate of fall-out is clearly a function of the way in which the migration process is organized and that there are forms of organization which retard that process and prolong the period over which a given migrant source will serve its industrial function.

A related point which needs to be made, however, is that the range of feasible forms of organization is probably not independent of the functions which the migrants are drawn to perform. Thus, agriculture, because of its geographic isolation, lends itself to a contained migration process in a way in which industry does not. The agricultural jobs share with many of the industrial and service jobs the characteristic of variability in employment levels, and this is one of the features which makes the jobs unattractive to native workers and makes migrants, who can be shipped home in slack periods, attractive to both the employers and the society at large. But, the variability of agricultural demand is seasonal, and hence, predictable. This facilitates the use of fixed duration contracts with a structured return process. Industrial and service jobs seek migrants as much to bear the uncertainty of demand as its variability. Indeed in a number of employers included in the present study, the actual variability seemed small. Since the housing supplied in the agricultural case involves capital investment and a long time horizon, it too is deterred by uncertainty. For these reasons, the agricultural pattern may not prove attractive even where it is feasible.
Large employers—such as the German automobilie companies—share many of the characteristics of agriculture. Their size enables them to set physical boundaries, even in an urban setting, which are comparable to those inherent in the nature of agriculture. Their size probably also makes demand less uncertain.

None of this is true for the service and small industrial employers in which so much of the demand for Puerto Rican workers is located, and this leads one to be very skeptical about the ability for organizational forms which limit the rate of permanent settlement to serve the economy for which migrants seem presently to be recruited. My own feeling is that considerable research—much of it international in character—will be required to form a judgment about this.

Finally, in discussing the organization of migration, several additional specific points need to be made. First, the rate at which "second generation" develops clearly depends upon whether or not the migrants are permitted to bring their families, and it appears that the fall-out might be completely blocked by limiting migration to men alone. It is to be born in mind, however, that a number of the jobs for which migrants are recruited in the U.S. employ men and women interchangeably and some (domestic servants) are almost exclusively female. To the extent that there are female jobs available, and hence a demand for such labor, as well as men wishing to bring their family, it may be very difficult to prevent the migration from developing.

Second, it may not be so easy to impose a particular organizational form through legal requirements as it appears. The process of migration
which we are describing is one in which there is both a strong employer demand for labor and a strong desire among the migrants for work. As just noted, moreover, a number of the characteristics generating the demand for migrants—the desire of both the employer and the native labor force to escape the incidence of unpredictable fluctuations in the demand for output—are not conducive to forms of organization which are apt to minimize the second generation. Under these circumstances, efforts to impose such an organization are likely to lead to the development of a black market. Such a black market is already present in Boston in the form of a large group of illegal migrants from Latin America living under the umbrella of the Puerto Rican and Cuban populations. Employers report that illegal migrants form a more stable work force, but this very stability may be conducive to the development of a second generation labor force.* This labor force will have the protection of American citizenship and this alone is apt to create a strong contrast between their behavior and that of their parents. Such a second generation will also have much to resent in the treatment of their parents, whose status opens them to exploitation by employers threatening to report them to authorities.

*The process is somewhat complex because, whereas for blacks and Puerto Ricans, the second generation includes children born at the place of origin but raised at the destination, legal barriers probably deter the immigration of children of nonworking age. On the other hand, the barriers place a premium on having children in the States since birth confers American citizenship. The process is still further complicated by the fact that some of these children are sent home immediately after birth retaining citizenship rights which their parents expect them to exercise when they reach working age. This last procedure is producing a population in Latin America of potential citizen immigrants which will immeasurably complicate the legal issues in the future to say nothing to the perception of equity in the immigrant communities of the next generation.
One is thus lead to conclude with considerable scepticism about the ability of the society to avoid the problems of the second generation through the organization of the migrant stream. If, as appears to be the case, the economy cannot either operate without the migrant stream which produces the second generation, then the only alternative for public policy is to focus upon the opening of channels to upward mobility. Such policies were not, however, elucidated by the Puerto Rican case study.