ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND EXPRESSIONS OF NATIONALISM:
A Quantitative Analysis of the Present-day Chinese Identity

by

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in any medium now known or hereafter created.

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ABSTRACT

Economic globalization and growing interdependence have greatly facilitated the flows of trade, investment, and ideas among formerly hostile countries. However, political antagonism driven by nationalistic sentiments continues to break out in countries with increased inflows of foreign investments, such as China. The media identifies that a majority of participants in China's recent anti-foreign antagonism are urban young Chinese and nicknames them China's "angry youths". This thesis focuses on the micro-foundations underlying expressions of nationalism in the forms of economic protectionism and xenophobic political hostility, and musters both public and original survey data to examine the dynamic effects of interpersonal contact and patriotic predisposition as explanations for individual attitudes on international policy issues.

The empirical analyses of three main hypotheses suggest that the Chinese generation of "angry youth" is not as radical as the media has portrayed. Yet, their significantly higher levels of comfort with western values and rules of the game in the era of globalization do not necessarily mean that they are any more eager to embrace the global and transnational socioeconomic and sociopolitical identities than their seniors. This thesis finds that China's integration into the global economy over the past three decades has not yet promoted more popular cosmopolitan identities and perspectives among the general public as various theoretical accounts project, even among citizens who have high levels of exposure to foreign business and economic influence. The persistence of nationalistic worldviews and identities among the Chinese public has serious implications for foreign businesses and governments that wish to proactively engage a rising China in international and regional affairs.

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Introduction

Economic globalization and growing interdependence have greatly facilitated the flows of trade, investment, and ideas among formerly hostile countries. However, political antagonism driven by nationalistic sentiments continues to break out in countries with high levels of foreign investments from their supposed "foes". China has been a top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and business activities of multinational corporations (MNC) since the 1990s. Yet, over the past few years, the media covered numerous incidences of anti-foreign boycotts, protests, and demonstrations in several major Chinese cities. Incidences of similar protests had been initiated by young Chinese studying or working overseas as well.[1]

These mass hostilities are typically triggered by symbolic foreign policy disputes, such as a foreign prime minister's visits to a controversial shrine or crass comments made by a foreign television anchorman. The media notes that many participants in these anti-foreign actions are urban young Chinese and nicknames them China's "angry youths".[2] Since these 20- and 30-somethings grew up in the era of China's reform and integration into the global economy, after China normalized relations with the world's major powers, questions arise regarding the effect of foreign economic and ideational exposure on reducing citizen hostile perceptions, both in the Chinese context and more broadly.

Distinct from existing literature that studies economic interdependence and international conflict from the aggregate national or systemic perspectives, this thesis focuses on the

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[1] See "Thousands in Beijing Protest Japan," Associated Press, April 9, 2005, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P1-107233328.html; "Chinese victims protest outside Japan's embassy," *Reuters*, June 1, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/photo/2007-06/01/content_884706.htm; "Thousands Protest CNN Commentator's Remarks," *CBS*, April 19, 2008, http://cbs2.com/local/CNN.Jack.Cafferty.2.703948.html; "Beijing calls to end 'radical' anti-France protest," Associated Press, April 22, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24259535/.

[2] China's "angry youth" (*fenqing*) has drawn increasing attention recently as policy analysts became interested in this unique but understudied generation and their expression of critical and often anti-foreign political views. For example, the Brookings Institution hosted an event titled "Understanding China's 'Angry Youth': What Does the Future Hold?" on April 29, 2009 to explore some of their hyper-nationalistic and anti-American attitudes.

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underlying micro-foundations of political antagonism, expressed in the forms of 1) economic

nationalism and 2) xenophobic political hostility. Since national economic and political cultures

exist as symbolic systems (Helleiner & Pickel 2005), this thesis presumes that individuals'

identification with specific nationalistic symbols when they analyze foreign relations is

positively correlated with their expression of anti-foreign attitudes. Further, individuals who

hold strong emotional attachments to nationalistic symbols typically perceive themselves

primarily as *citizens of a particular country*. Extant scholarship posits that the increasingly open

economic borders and growing ease of contact in the era of globalization enabled groups of

individuals to develop multiple socioeconomic and sociopolitical roles, and these roles in turn

challenge the symbolic cohesion of established national communities. (Cohen 2001) However,

globalization also means that individuals can now freely utilize the distinct psychological capital

associated with each role toward various ends, and consequently, the long-standing symbols of

nationalism continue to assist individuals, especially those with limited political information, in

processing complex international policy issues.

  With regards to political antagonism, the well-known Allport-Pettigrew contact

hypothesis regards intergroup contact as a form of social-psychological intervention to reduce

hostility. (Hewstone & Cairns 2001) Under favorable conditions, interaction helps moderate

negative perceptions among members of different cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. In the era

of globalization, workplace contact involving foreign business partners, interlocutors, and expat

co-workers meet most of the prescribed ideal conditions, as workplace colleagues a) share

cooperative professional goals; b) interact daily on a non-superficial basis; and c) their

interaction is supported by workplace authority and professional institutions. It is thus

reasonable to expect that compared to arm's-length trade between nations, daily interaction with

foreigners at work should have strong impact on Chinese employees' perception of the FDI

home countries and the people. Given the traditional Chinese culture of networking, significant

numbers of the MNC offices in China have in fact explicitly established Social Events

Committees to help local and international employees socialize and mingle outside their regular

work settings. These workplace arrangements can be expected to exert positive influence over

employee perception over time.

This thesis examines whether sustained professional contact with foreign counterparts has

effectively reduced anti-foreign hostile perceptions or promoted more sophisticated identities and

conciliatory attitudes among a significant segment of China's "angry youth" population, the

young urban professionals.[3] The **dependent variable** is whether or not an individual regards her

national citizenship identity as her principal sociopolitical role. To distinguish this symbolic

national dimension of an individual's identity, this thesis contrasts the national identity with an

individual's identification with i) her private self; ii) her professional workplace; and iii) the

integrated "global village"—a transnational dimension. This thesis designs an original survey

study to account for the variation in self-identification among young professionals working in

major Chinese cities. Another related question this thesis wishes to address is the validity of the

"angry youth" designation. To do this, this paper also performs statistical analysis of public

survey data of the general Chinese population, made available through the World Values Survey

(WVS), to see if individuals belonging to the "angry youth" segment indeed view themselves

differently, i.e. more nationalistic, than the more senior generations.

The **independent variables** in this study include 1) the degree of an individual's

exposure to foreign contact in society and at the workplace, which varies with their locations of

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[3] The full spectrum of China's "angry youth" population also includes college and graduate students, as well as unemployed urban youth of age.

residence, social economic status (SES), the nature of employer, content of work assignment, and so forth; and 2) the stickiness of patriotic predispositions that an individual first acquires as a result of adolescence socialization and subsequently reinforced by ongoing elite cues. The patriotic disposition varies primarily between different age cohorts who have experienced different stages of China's growth and development—namely before and after China's reform and opening—but is more homogenous among the "angry youth" population as a result of compulsory patriotic education programs at school.[4] This paper argues that the key images that adolescence patriotic socialization instills and present-day elites reactivate both relate to the same specific schematic symbols in the nation's experience. The paper employs the survey and statistical methods to empirically test the relative strengths of foreign contact vis-à-vis patriotic schematic predispositions in shaping individuals' identification and policy attitudes.

In the following sections, this thesis first elaborates the puzzle of continued political antagonism observed among former "foes" in the era of economic interdependence and globalization. It then reviews the utility of contact as a form of intervention to reduce intergroup hostility, and discusses the schematic predispositions that allow individuals to form nationalistic perceptions and utilize symbolic short cuts. Next, the paper analyzes both the nationwide World Values Survey on China (2007) and original survey data (2010) on China's foreign relations with the United States and Japan over the past decade to illustrate the linkages between foreign exposure, self-reported identity, and symbolic policy attitudes. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of possible future directions of this project and the utility of a formal model.

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[4] Since this paper is more interested in the socio-political sphere of influence, the independent variable examined here does not account for variation in levels of individual socialization through family influence.

Economic Globalization and Expressions of Nationalism: The Puzzle

Literature touting the positive influence of commerce on world peace dates as far back as Montesquieu. (Hirschman 1977) Today, international commerce comprises not only trade flows, but also the broader impacts of worldwide MNC production activities. Theories of realistic conflict posit that while competition causes intergroup hostility, interdependence potentially abates conflicts through promoting communication between actors and creating the demands for cooperation. (Mansfield & Pollins 2003; Doyle 1997; Stein 1993) The international political economy literature argues that growing global production and economic cooperation have made available large amounts of FDI worldwide and produced positive effects on security relations among great powers. (Brooks 2005) Further, since FDI has generally facilitated growth and development through creating job opportunities and raising the standards of living for ordinary employees, most developing country governments share an interest in avoiding the interruption of FDI inflows associated with the onset of domestic or international turmoil.

In the nationalism literature, Gellner (2006) puts forth the notion that nationalism, as the idea of industrialization, is the agent of social change. In his view, the industrial productive system brings about homogenization through the creation and dissemination of a high culture, and is simultaneously and deliberately pursued by nationalists. To extend this line of argument, nationalism may also have a "standardizing" effect on culture in order to induce the benefits of modern industrialization, i.e. globalization, in all parts of the world. For example, in an analysis of the historical experiences of rapid industrialization in several East Asian economies, Woo-Cumings (2005) argues that nationalism acted as the central "binding agent" in mobilizing the domestic population behind rapid economic growth and state-led development strategies amid an uncertain international security environment. Helleiner & Pickel (2005) further stresses the role

of ideas and find that globalization reinforces rather than weakens the link between national

identity and economic progresses. They argue that the enduring and sometimes heightened

economic significance of national identities and nationalism in the age of globalization is not just

a "protectionist" ideology, but is also associated with popular support for economic liberalization

and globalization. They quote economist Harry Johnson's definition of economic nationalism as

economic programs that seek to "extend the property owned by nationals so as to gratify the taste

for nationalism" and produces "psychic income in the form of nationalistic satisfaction." The

"psychic income" Johnson refers to closely align with the "psychological capital" mentioned

earlier in this paper, which individuals adopt with the activation of different socioeconomic and

sociopolitical identities to serve a wide array of practical purposes.

Meanwhile, sociologists Goldthorpe et al (1969) also look at the political implications of

the *embourgeoisement* of the workers in the modern age. They cite previous literature that

predicts that the workers' newly gained affluence and social status would lead to their

widespread acceptance of bourgeois political values, a convergence of income and living

standards, and basically flatten many intergroup differences. Unfortunately, Goldthorpe et al's

empirical findings from manual wage workers' interaction with their middle-class peers at the

time do not support these predictions. Along similar logic, Steinfeld (2010) postulates that

economic globalization and the spread of global capitalism produced more capitalistic identities

worldwide as the public became more accepting of foreign (essentially western) rules and

regulations. Steinfeld defines globalization as organized worldwide production chains and

argues that any major participant in this system must accommodate to the direction and control

from the product conceptualizers, branders, and marketers, which are often MNCs. He argues

that participation in the global economy and global production evokes compliance to foreign

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rules of the game, and in this sense, China has practically "outsourced" the making of domestic institutions to foreign companies and rule-making authorities over the decades. As a consequence, the Chinese public accepted the foreign-made rules, played by them, and effected changes in their belief and value systems.

In fact, today's upwardly mobile young Chinese urban professionals, who grew up during the reform era, after China normalized diplomatic relations with most of the world's great powers, not only share many similar group characteristics with the stereotypical middle-class white-collar workers in Goldthorpe et al's England, they are also viewed as more receptive of the "homogenization" effect that the bourgeois values and rules of the game that China's integration into the global economy entails. These young people have been exposed to international economic and ideational influences since their formative years. They consume news in foreign languages and intelligently analyze the rhetoric used by foreign governments and their own. Many of these young, cosmopolitan professionals working in China's urban centers hold white-collar jobs. A significant portion of them is employed by MNC headquarters of different nationalities and is often required to interact with their foreign counterparts on a regular basis. When it comes to interpreting international affairs, one might expect young urban Chinese to demonstrate more sophisticated and cosmopolitan viewpoints, and likewise, refrain from radically nationalistic attitudes or behavior.

The above theoretical predictions render it particularly puzzling why some among the young Chinese urban professionals would at times exhibit varying degrees of anti-foreign attitudes. The public opinion literature helps shed some light on this puzzle through suggesting that the general public often tends to either have no strong opinion or use cues such as citizenship identity when they process policy. (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992) The majority of the

general public without substantial exposure to international contact would likely be mobilized by nationalistic cues and hence identifies with symbolic foreign policy issues rather than for example, trade disputes, which could potentially have more substantive impact on the "imagined community" to which they belong. (Anderson 1983) Likewise, people who are more informed about international affairs through sustained positive foreign exposure may identify with more substantive issues, given their different experience in and attachment to the global economy.

Additionally, it is important to note that the contact hypothesis actually highlighted the different natures of foreign exposure. While positive foreign exposure induces cooperative outcomes, too much negative foreign exposure may actually evoke confrontational or reactive results. According to Gellner, nationalist antagonism can be viewed as a form of rebellion in a transitional society, as it allows the underprivileged public to legitimize their frustration. Zheng (1999) contends that Chinese nationalism is a response to the myriad of problems of declining state power, as well as actual and perceived threats that China faced both domestically and internationally. Given that decentralization in China took place alongside the process of modernization, and later globalization, the elite as well as the mass public reacted to western pressure and perceived "antagonism" with an awakening of national solidarity. Zheng makes a distinction between the official discourse of nationalism, namely, patriotism, and popular nationalism. He argues that although both forms aim at building a strong and wealthy China, patriotism requires all residents to identify with the existing state, i.e. see themselves primarily as a citizen of the Chinese state.

Scholarly discussion of the effects of FDI on the vitality, energy, perception, and motivations of the individual contributors to the global economy and to China's successes is scarce compared to the national- or systemic-level analyses. Scheve & Slaughter (2004)

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famously argue that MNC workers tend to feel less secure about their jobs. As countries around the world compete for FDI inflows, existing jobs at MNCs might easily be lost to overseas laborers as a result of changes in international prices of labor, political risk, or episodes of mass hostility. Consequently, employees at MNCs or in the export sector more generally may have greater incentives to support productive foreign relations between their native countries and the FDI source countries, or may feel more strongly about policy issues pertaining to trade and capital flows than their counterparts working in domestically-oriented companies, given their prevalent job security concerns.

With regard to working life specifically, workers' rights in the era of economic globalization have inspired a series of recent research. Scholars have conducted both large-N analyses and qualitative case studies of the effects of FDI and the activities of MNCs on collective labor rights in developing countries. (Mosley & Uno 2007; Mosley 2008) FDI is generally viewed as a vehicle to not only create wealth and employment in the recipient country, but also bring in cutting-edge technologies and management skills to enhance the recipient's competitiveness. However, a distinction must be made about the different types of FDI and their effects on labor. The majority of existing literature looks at efficiency-seeking MNCs and labor-intensive production such as footwear and apparel, and concludes that their activities tend to lead to a "race to the bottom" in economic and social policies in China and other developing nations. Efficiency-seeking MNCs typically engage in low-technology, labor-intensive manufacturing. Since their overall production costs are due largely to wages instead of capital equipments, efficiency-seeking MNCs have strong incentives to reduce labor demands for wages through restricting collective labor rights. (Cohen 2007) To make matters worse, developing country governments sometimes neglect to provide or enforce collective labor rights as an attempt to

attract increased inflows of FDI or ensure job creation. As a result, export processing zones (EPZs) specializing in low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing are often associated with restricted collective labor rights and negative worker perception of their foreign employers.

In contrast, market-seeking MNCs are motivated primarily by access to specific national consumer markets. Scholars posit that in capital-intensive or technology-intensive industries such as automobile and electronics, wages comprise a relatively small portion of firms' overall production costs. Further, since market-seeking MNCs produce high-tech, skill-intensive commodities, it is often more important for them to attract and retain skilled and semi-skilled labor. (Hall & Soskice 2001; Mosley 2008) The original survey conducted in 2010 in China for this thesis limits its geographical scope to urban centers such as Beijing and Shanghai precisely to control for the types of MNC activity. Most efficiency-seeking MNCs concentrate their low-skill, labor-intensive production in the various EPZs in China's populous coastal provinces such as Shandong, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. Meanwhile, a large number of market-seeking MNCs base their sales operations and R&D centers in metropolises like Beijing or Shanghai. Market-seeking FDI is typically considered more beneficial to host countries than other forms of foreign investment. Therefore, young urban professional Chinese working and living in these metropolises would be more likely to accept foreign rules of the game as practically prescribed by their institutions of employment, and should also have an easier time embracing the more cosmopolitan views and values that emerge during their interaction with foreign peers.

Schematic Heuristics and the Nature of Contact

To conceptualize individual identity, this thesis adopts four relevant dimensions: *private*, *professional*, *national*, and *transnational*. These dimensions denote individual identification with distinct socioeconomic and sociopolitical groups. Hewstone & Cairns (2001) posit that group identity is demarcated by the social categories within which individuals interact. The authors believe that positive and cooperative contact could reduce intergroup hostility through changing the structure of antagonistic categorization. In light of their argument, workers who make frequent foreign encounters at the workplace may derive a great sense of self-esteem from their professional career and thus perceive their most prominent social identity to be a professional of their occupation. Others who eagerly embrace the transnational economic opportunities brought about by globalization may see themselves more as members of the global community, rather than citizens of their specific nation state. Individuals with such re-categorized social identities may hold less strong attachment to patriotic symbols.

This thesis also examines two other forms of the expression of nationalism. The first is economic nationalism, as expressed in public support for protectionist, anti-immigrant policy. While globalists tout open national borders and the free flows of goods, capital, and people, economic nationalists defend the strict limits on immigration and in certain cases even advocate tighter control of the movements of people under the pretext of terrorism and other national security concerns. The second expression of nationalism is found in xenophobic boycotts of foreign products. Boycott is an extreme and unwise case of using the "psychic income" to generate nationalistic satisfaction, at the expense of material well-being of the general populace. Although these two variables differ from individual identification, this paper regards the causal

mechanisms leading to such nationalistic expressions to be the same, and for the purpose of parsimony, only discusses the case of identity activation in this section.

Contrary to conventional assumptions about individual rationality, extant scholarship presents disconfirming evidence regarding the power of self-interested motivations in politics. A body of literature posits that symbolic political attitudes such as ideology, party identification, and racial prejudice, rather than interest in individual material well-being, more accurately predict public support for national policy. (Sears et al 1980; Lau & Heldman 2009) Rankin (2001) extends this argument to the international realm and shows that citizens rely on accessible political symbols, particularly their national identity, to process limited political information and form opinion on trade debates. Others echo that political attitudes and behavior are more effectively understood in terms of group identification than individual self-interest. (Conover 1984; Kinder 1998; McCauley 2001) These authors posit that citizens understand and react to politics based on their emotional attachment to different groups and their symbols.

A crucial element of national identity in the literature is patriotism, referring to an individual's emotional attachment to a specific country and the national symbols. (Sidanius 1997) This paper argues that the patriotic dimension of individual identity is an instillation of the individual's patriotic education both at school and through the official media at large, consisting of various schematic heuristics used by the state authority in her native country in the official interpretations of international relations. In cognitive psychology, a schema is a pre-established script for humans to comprehend the meaning of discrete events in life. Through comparing current events with previously established mental images, schema helps human make sense of the world and gives meaning to our expression and action. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980)

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If the dominant dimension of individual identity is the "socialized" patriotism, then an individual is more likely to rely on *schematic cues* of nationalism to assess foreign policy first and foremost as a citizen of her native country. Although a temporal distinction should be made between individual's initial exposure to these schemas through adolescence socialization and later exposure through ongoing elite cues, this paper argues that in the case of China, both processes activate the same schematic images of China's victimization experience in the past centuries. Therefore, both sets of cues rely on the same mental schema and affective attachments. The "epistemic community" that Hall (1993) imagines to exist among the elites, intellectuals, and policy makers in the Chinese scenario had been permeated with official rhetoric of patriotism since the founding of the People's Republic, and especially in the early years of China's reform. *Patriotic heuristics* thus constitute an adequate predictor of individual attitudes on international politics.

Two commonly cited patriotic schemas in China's foreign relations pertain to the country's unresolved historical disputes with Japan resulting from World War II and China's postwar struggles with U.S. hegemonism in order to ensure legitimacy of the mainland communist government. Two mechanisms of intergroup conflict discussed by Forbes (1997) are especially relevant here. In the Sino-Japanese case, much of the individual perception of bilateral relations is developed through generations of patriotic education and retelling of the stories about Japanese aggression. As a result, individual-based contact is often insufficient for people to forgive or forget past atrocities, since they are deeply imprinted in the nation's collective memory. Forbes's first mechanism—prejudice resulting from threat perception—provides insights here. This mechanism points to the necessity for "justified denigration" of the foreign country, which is perceived to threaten the home country's national interests and thus

motivate its citizens to coalesce around national dignity. Justified denigration is particularly

salient if the conflict dyad were the "victim" and "perpetrator" of past atrocities. McCauley

(2001) posits that the expression of moral indignation at prior intergroup injustice lends

cohesiveness to individual conceptualization of present day international politics. Such

indignation underlies the interpretative schema shared by many of China's "angry youth" in their

"justified" hostility toward Japan, as the modern Chinese identity is largely characterized by a

strong sense of "victimhood" arising from the country's turbulent interactions with western

imperialism in past centuries. (Gries 2004; Suzuki 2007) Consequently, Chinese youth, even

those with high levels of foreign exposure, may take greater pride in being a part of modern

China's reform and growth successes than from their professional fulfillment building on their

respective careers at MNCs.

In the Sino-American case, individual perception of bilateral relations has always

revolved around defending the legitimacy of the mainland Chinese government. Consequently,

questions like mainland-Taiwan relations and the governance of Tibet figure particularly salient.

Forbes's second mechanism stresses the importance of relative status in situations of contact,

namely, equality. Indications of inequality between groups in contact will likely trigger

comparison, competition, as well as emotional difficulties. Even though China has ascended to

be among the U.S.'s top trade partners in the 1990s, huge asymmetries still exist between the two

countries in terms of their comprehensive national capabilities and international influence. The

U.S.'s postwar sanctions on China played an important part in perpetuating the "in-group" vis-à-

vis "out-group" dyad; and China's reform accomplishments since the 1990s revived a sense of

nationalism and enhanced the country's desire for retribution. Such "retribution" schema and

aspirations prevail till this day. Consequently, young Chinese working at MNCs may be more

sensitive to the asymmetric influence that China and the U.S. exert in international affairs, and may have incentives to anchor their professional grievances involving foreign interlocutors or expat colleagues in the broader context of Sino-American or Sino-Japanese conflicts. They may also project their professional frustration onto China's constrained political influence incommensurate with its rising economic status on the international arena. Consequently, Chinese youth, even those with high levels of foreign exposure, may remain particularly conscious of and emotionally attached to symbolic policy issues.

On the other hand, if the non-national or non-patriotic dimensions dominate an individual's identity when she engages in international affairs, then she is more likely to view foreign policy issues from a private, personal standpoint. Individual-based contact strengthens the non-patriotic dimensions of an individual's identity, since personal contact allows people the most direct, firsthand experience with their counterparts from other ethnic groups, countries, or cultures. Interpersonal contact in this case not only reduces prejudice, but also provides the individual additional political information with which she could better process international events. As such, positive *interpersonal foreign exposure* weakens the boundary of the traditional antagonistic groups and their emotional attachment under favorable conditions, or may not have much effect at all when those conditions are absent in society or at the workplace.

The main variation in an individual's patriotic predisposition roughly corresponds with age division, as a result of state intervention and socialization. In particular, during the first few years of China's reform, the central government maintained somewhat skeptical attitudes toward foreign economic and ideational exposure, and high levels of contact were not ardently encouraged. Therefore, the cohort born before the 1970s, who spent their adolescence or early adulthood during the early years of reform, would have internalized the skepticism of the central

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authority as part of their understanding of international relations. In contrast, the Chinese government began passionately welcoming foreign capital and promoting international engagement in the 1990s. Consequently, the cohort born in the 1970s and 1980s should be less hostile toward transnational economic and ideational influences. The effect of family influence also varies to some extent between these two groups, as the parents of the pre-1970s cohort likely were born before the founding of the PRC and have accumulated personal memories about World War II and the Chinese Civil War. Given the absence or presence of favorable conditions for foreign contact, an individual either continues to rely on schematic heuristics or reigns in her feelings of nationalism and refuses to respond in a patriotic manner to international policy issues.

Measurement of the relative stickiness of patriotic predisposition is a challenge this paper faced in order to operationalize the default identity variable. As part of the solution, this paper uses "workplace discussion" in the original survey as an instrument in the empirical analysis. In general, people tend to discuss political issues that are most salient to them. (Baldassarri & Bearman 2007) This empirical regularity combined with the persuasive argument theory that the following paragraphs will discuss would predict that individuals with strong patriotic dispositions would likely discuss symbolic policy issues quite often and reinforce their schematic attachment to these issues after discussion, whereas individuals with weak patriotic attachments would discuss symbolic foreign policy issues less and increasingly view these issues as irrelevant for the stable developments of a country's foreign relations. The frequency of workplace discussion interacted with the level of foreign exposure constitutes a variable that approximates the relative strength of patriotic schematic disposition vis-à-vis the effect of foreign contact.

Table 1. Causal Mechanisms of Role Activation

	Positive Foreign Exposure (Frequent, sustained, equal, cooperative/supervisory, etc.)	**Negative** Foreign Exposure (Infrequent, random, unequal, competing for employment opportunities, etc.)
Default **Patriotic** Predisposition	Recategorization → Non-National Identity	Reinforce/No Effect → National Citizen Identity
Default **Non-Patriotic** Predisposition	More Political Information → Non-National Identity	Polarization → National Citizen Identity

Table 1 outlines four major causal pathways contributing to the different outcomes of

individual self identification. The two simplest cases are when patriotic predisposition

dominates an individual's default identity and when her exposure to foreign economic and

ideational influences is infrequent, unequal, or otherwise negative; and when the non-patriotic

dimension dominates an individual's identity and her foreign exposure consists of highly positive

elements. In the first case, negative foreign exposure either does not change individuals' self

perception or work to *reinforce* her preconceived biases regarding the target country and its

people. Negative exposure in this case makes the individual increasingly aware of her national

identity and more willing to stand behind the symbols of the state.

In the second case, positive foreign exposure provides the already conciliatory or

cosmopolitan individual with more available *political information* to process the policy programs,

as well as firm support for her non-nationalist assessment of the situation. The individual thus

gains confidence from such sustained and cooperative interaction to maintain her position,

without feeling any need to rely on the short cuts of national symbols or sentiments of solidarity.

The other two cases are somewhat more complex. In the case when patriotic

predisposition dominates an individual's identity and when the level of foreign exposure is

sustained, frequent, and equal, over the long run, these individuals may also gain more political

information and experience a process of *role recategorization*, and begin to identify more closely

with her non-national, more cosmopolitan identities. However, the role recategorization

mechanism requires far greater degrees of positive exposure than is the case with non-patriotic-

dominant individuals to effect any change in role identification, and the levels often require

conscious endeavors to achieve.

In the last case when the non-patriotic dimension dominates and when the individual

experiences negative foreign exposure, we will likely witness a surprising shift in attitude, where

the individual turns to nationalistic cues and actually seeks confirmation and justification of

previously latent patriotic sentiments as a result of the *polarization* mechanism. Attitude

polarization refers to the effect that when people with strongly opposing views interpret new

information in a biased way, their views tend to become even more extreme and few would stay

neutral or hold moderate opinions. (Kuhn & Lao 1996) The effect of information exchange

figures largely in this process, as the literature observes that people tend to advocate positions

that are much more extreme than their original opinions after polarized group discussion.

Existing literature supports two primary explanations for the polarization effect: 1) social

comparison and 2) the persuasive argument theory (PAT). (Isenberg 1986) The social

comparison mechanism is commonly cited in the identity politics literature to explain individual

motivation to enhance self-perception and esteem. Persuasive argument, meanwhile, is more

relevant for the conditional foreign exposure variable, as it predicts variation in individual

attitude post-group discussion. Specifically, PAT posits that an individual first weighs the pro

and con arguments presented in group discussions, and then applies the strongest arguments that

confirm her existing beliefs to justify her subsequent expression and action. As a mechanism for

polarization, exchange of opinions increases the overall stock of confirming evidence in favor of

the group view. Further, Hastie & Park (2005) argues that even if people have sought and interpreted new evidence in an unbiased manner, they may still remember and recall it selectively to reinforce their existing beliefs. As such, discussion of international affairs will likely trigger individuals' search for confirmation of their latent patriotic attitudes and consequently strengthen their previously flimsy attachment to schematic symbols and identification with the nation state in order to "win" the debates or convince their interlocutors.

Figure 1. The Patriotism-O-Meter in a Given Population

Patriotism-O-Meter

The causal mechanisms in Table 1 can be understood more intuitively through the graphs in Figure 1. This paper nicknames the function of changes in a given population's most marked expression of nationalism in specific policy scenarios the "Patriotism-O-Meter". The y-axis records the scale of nationalistic expression, with 1 representing complete identification with and

extreme attitudes or behavior of nationalism, and -1 denoting thorough embrace of global,

professional, or other non-national roles, as well as conciliatory policy attitudes and behavior.

The x-axis documents the length of foreign exposure, which can be measured in months or years,

depending on the specific situations of encounter. The overarching logic here is that compared

to constrained time periods, individuals are more likely to make sustained positive foreign

contact and experience shifts in their personal identification and attitudes in the long term. Over

the long run, individuals' expression of nationalism is likely to converge to a more moderate

level regardless of their respective default patriotic predisposition, as denoted by the dotted line

for x values greater than 20 on the right-hand side of the graph.[5]

The four mechanisms discussed in Table 1 find their most vocal expressions embodied by

the peaks and nadirs in Figure 1. The solid line illustrating the time period less than 10

represents nationalist expressions that are positively correlated with the default levels of patriotic

predisposition of the subpopulation, namely, the two simplest cases in Table 1. For individuals

starting out with non-patriotic default identities, they usually quickly gather additional political

information through personal foreign contact in the short run. This information in turn provides

them with more confidence to analyze international affairs through non-national lens, and these

individuals quickly reach the -1 point on the y-axis without feeling any necessity to utilize the

elements of nationalism to assist their interpretations. Meanwhile, individuals who start out with

stronger patriotic predisposition are not likely to specifically look for positive factors in their

foreign encounter in the short term. Instead, they are more apt at identifying the negative

elements either in their personal experiences or in international affairs. In this scenario,

international disputes could easily mobilize this segment of the population to become vocal and

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[5] At this stage, Figure 1 remains a very crude model. The discussion here is for illustration purposes only. Further
research is required in order to turn the function into a formal model, with explicitly calculated peaks, nadirs, and
central tendency.

reach the point of 1 on the y-axis, as they tend to feel a strong need to rely on national symbols to defend their positions and preconceived notions.

However, over time, the dashed line documents an inconsistency or negative correlation between nationalist expressions and the default levels of patriotic predisposition among the populace. The non-patriotic-dominant individuals may encounter highly negative incidences in their foreign interaction when the length of exposure exceeds 10. Consequently, they activate the polarization mechanism and start to rely on the nationalistic "psychological capital" in order to accomplish their goals of either winning foreign policy debates or persuading their foreign interlocutors to concede in negotiations. Finally, over long periods of sustained foreign exposure greater than 15 or so, even the patriotic-dominant individuals would gain enough positive experiences and gradually realize the process of role recategorization or new role creation to acquire much less radical policy attitudes.

The following three hypotheses on the expression of nationalism follow from the discussion thus far:

H1: Individuals with more abundant opportunities for positive foreign exposure (especially at the workplace) are less likely than those without equal exposure to identify themselves primarily as a Citizen of China.

H1a: Individuals in the "angry youth" cohort who have high levels of foreign exposure at the workplace are less likely than their peers without equal exposure to feel strongly about symbolic policy issues or identify with the national citizen role.

H1 explores the effect of group re-categorization and role creation as a result of contact. If re-categorization worked, then individuals with higher social economic status (SES) or those working at MNCs who make frequent foreign encounters will more likely identify themselves as

a professional of their occupation or as a world citizen rather than a national citizen. McAdam et al (2001) proposes the dichotomy of the "embedded" vis-à-vis the "detached" social identities. They argue that embedded identities guide a wider range of everyday social contacts, whereas detached identities touch on only a confined range of social relations. If these new social identities generated by individual employment status were an effective form of intervention, then it should allow individuals to "detach" from the powerful nationalistic sentiments and overcome the use of schematic cues. To test H1, the analysis of the WVS data in the next section provides the general tendency among the Chinese public, whereas the analysis of the original survey will focus more on the workplace effects and testing H1a.

H2: Individuals with more abundant opportunities for positive foreign exposure are less likely than those without equal exposure to perceive foreign workers as threats to employment opportunities and less supportive of protectionist government policies.

In order to test H2, this paper analyzes the WVS data and examines public opinion toward immigrant policy in China. As discussed in the previous sections, competition between the locals and foreigners for employment opportunities and fears of unemployment affect the condition of interaction. People with less than ideal foreign exposure may be more conscious of the negative implications associated with this situation and thus more eager to show their support for economic nationalism. At the same time, the polarization mechanism may also have an effect here, as expressed through preservation of self-interest. Since professionals working on knowledge-intensive tasks face just as much, if not more, competition from foreigners than their peers working on mostly manual tasks, urban employees may also exhibit various degrees of protectionism when their job security is on the line.

H3: Individuals with more abundant opportunities for positive foreign exposure are less likely than those without equal exposure to participate in or consider potential participation in boycott activities.

To test H3, this paper will examine the self-reported participation in boycott activities in the WVS dataset. Boycott is another case where the polarization mechanism may be present. Individuals with sustained positive foreign exposure may wish to make a statement through their participation in boycotts if the specific disputes activated the latent patriotic schemas they are most closely attached to. The boycott activities of interest to this study are typically xenophobic in nature and serve as signals of collective antagonism on the part of the general public. Ideally, the dataset should document individual participation in specific anti-foreign boycotts involving particular countries or particular policy issues. However, the data available through the WVS surveys are no precise measures of these specific boycotts. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that since the survey was conducted in 2007, major incidences of boycotts in the previous years widely covered by both domestic and international media revolved around disputes in U.S.-China and China-Japan relations, such as the series of well-known anti-Japan protests in 2005 following the Japanese government's approval of revisionist history textbooks and accompanying Japan's subsequent bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, or the somewhat regular demonstrations against the U.S.'s sales of arms to Taiwan. Regarding the nature and meaning of these boycotts, although the employers might not all be aware of their employee's actual participation in boycott activities, the newsworthy incidences of boycott in China typically require some forms of visible social cost. Take for example the anti-Japan boycotts, participants not only needed to spend the time joining in the marches and demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy and consulates, they also had to pledge to the

boycott of Japanese products, ranging from food, cosmetics, to automobiles. Notwithstanding the generalized terms of the WVS survey questions on boycotts, an examination of the respondents' recorded behavior could still help illustrate whether or not the factors discussed in this thesis have influenced their decisions.

Research Design and Methods

This thesis has offered a theoretical account of individual perceptions and expressions of nationalism thus far. In this section, the paper supplies empirical examples from both a nationwide values survey and an original survey on U.S.-China and China-Japan relations to determine the validity of these theories, mechanisms, and hypotheses. Although no hot war took place after China normalized relations with Japan and the U.S. in the 1970s, bilateral relations have been far from peaceful in spite of sustained economic and social contacts. Contemporary scholarship on Chinese foreign relations often frames China-Japan and U.S.-China hostilities in terms of competition for power or regional leadership. Most of the recent incidences of anti-foreign protests, boycotts, and demonstrations mentioned in the introduction section took place during or after serious disruptions of U.S.-China and China-Japan relations. The fact that a majority of the participants in these protests and boycotts were young urban Chinese also begs this question: is the "angry youth" generation really more nationalistic than other segments of the Chinese population? This paper analyzes both public and original survey data to explore the effects of foreign exposure and patriotic predisposition on young Chinese's self identification and political attitudes, particularly regarding symbolic policy issues.

2007 World Values Survey

As a first step, this thesis analyzes cross-sectional data obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS) on China conducted in 2007 to establish the macro context as well as general trends. The WVS full-probability nationwide survey contains about 2,000 valid samples covering respondents residing in all seven officially divided geo-political regions across China, as shown in Figure 2. 24 of the 32 Chinese provinces are represented in the data, including: three municipalities/provinces in the North; two provinces in the Northeast; seven municipalities/provinces in the Eastern coastal region; three provinces in the Central region; three provinces in the South; three municipalities/provinces in the inland Southwest; and three provinces in the less developed Northwest. The inland samples align closely with the targets of China's official Western Development Program, including all provinces in the Southwestern and Northwestern regions, plus Guangxi.

Figure 2. Geopolitical Stratification of Respondents in WVS

The WVS sampling report notes that such regionally based stratification method ensures that the allocation of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) is balanced across Chinese provinces with different levels of economic development. In other words, the stratification characteristic of the survey design accounts for the variation between the developed coastal provinces and the less developed inland region. The report also states that the number of PSUs within each strata is proportional to the population size of that region. Further, the WVS dataset encompasses fairly even samples across different age cohorts, as shown in Figure 3. This paper groups all respondents into three distinct age cohorts, namely, pre-1945, pre-1970, and post-1970; and the relevant demarcating events include the founding of the People's Republic as well as the onset of China's opening and reforms.

Figure 3. Age Distribution of Respondents in WVS

Table 2. Summary Statistics of World Values Survey – China (2007)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
World Citizen	1454	2.96	0.58	1	4
Chinese Citizen	1764	3.39	0.56	1	4
Asian Citizen	1469	2.94	0.63	1	4
Anti Immigrant Policy	1419	2.18	0.84	1	4
Boycott Will	1958	0.46	0.50	0	1
Boycott Action	1975	0.04	0.18	0	1
SES	1822	2.34	0.89	1	5
Contact Potential thru Work	1825	1.94	1.31	1	5
Trust Other Nationality	1204	2.16	0.97	1	5
(Exposure Avg.: above 3 vars	1999	2.05	0.78	1	5)
Reject Foreign Neighbors	1969	0.20	0.40	0	1
Protectionist Tendency	1429	0.76	0.42	0	1
Trust Govt	1885	3.32	0.64	1	4
China Pride	1970	2.94	0.77	1	4
(Patriotic Avg.: above 2 vars	2002	3.11	0.57	1	4)
Gender	2015	0.54	0.50	0	1
Age	2015	44.76	13.32	18	70
Education	2004	2.20	1.55	0	6
Income	1599	3.96	1.87	1	10

Table 2 presents the summary statistics of all the dependent variables and covariates of interest to this study. A close examination of the correlation matrix of all variables does not imply any serious problem with multicollinearity. With regard to specific variables and the measures, the main dependent variables of this thesis include the following:

World Citizen: measured by question V210 "I see myself as a world citizen" in WVS, and the answers range from 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 4 "Strongly Agree".

Chinese Citizen: measured by questionV212 "I see myself as a citizen of China," with the same answer coding. Table 2 indicates that an overwhelming majority of the respondents (3.39 out of 4.0) identifies on average with this citizen role. Figure 4 below compares the density plots of the global vis-à-vis the national identifications, and shows that significantly more respondents "strongly agree" to the national identification and reject the global identification.

**Figure 4. Density Plot of National and Global Identifications in WVS**

National and Global Identifications

Figure 5 below partly addresses the question of the validity of the "angry youth" designation. The density plots clearly shows that the cohort born between 1945 and 1969, whose pre-adulthood socialization took place in the early days of the founding of the PRC, are more attached to the national identity and strongly view themselves as citizens of China. However, the "angry youth" cohort born in the 1970s and 1980s do not deviate significantly from their elders—only a small portion of this cohort rejects the national identity more so than the other generations. These preliminary analyses of the empirical data imply that the "angry youths" may just be as nationalistic as any average Chinese citizen.

Figure 5. Identification with National Role by Age Cohort in WVS

Identification with Chinese Citizen Role by Age Cohort

| | 1970-89 cohort | — — — — 1945-69 cohort |
| — - — - — pre-1944 cohort | | |

Asian Citizen: measured by question V213E "I see myself as a citizen of Asia," and again

with the same answer coding as the preceding identity variables. The WVS China survey in fact

included a question V2141 "Firstly, I see myself as a citizen of," which ranks the respondents'

identification and is thus a more relevant and precise measure for the purpose of this paper.

Unfortunately, the results of V2141 were not made available in the published dataset.

Nonetheless, the survey code book records that 243 (12.2 percent) of all respondents selected

"World Citizen" as their first identity, while 681 (34.2 percent) chose "Chinese Citizen," and

only 11 (0.6 percent) chose "Asian Citizen." These results correspond roughly with the separate

measures of the variables for identification, except for the case of "Asian Citizen," which

received a significantly higher level of identification (2.94 out of 4.0) on average when posed as

a question on its own.

Boycott Will: measured by question V97 "Political action: joining in boycotts." This

question makes a distinction between actual participation/willingness to participate and the

unwillingness to ever participate in boycott activities. Therefore, this paper recoded it as a binary variable, with 0 representing unwillingness to ever join in boycotts, and 1 otherwise.

Boycott Action: measured by question V101 "Political action recently done: joining in boycotts." This question documents the respondents' actual participation in boycotts in the past five years, and is thus a binary variable, where 1 indicates the affirmative, and 0 otherwise. It is noteworthy that although close to half of all respondents expressed willingness to participate in boycott activities (0.46 in Table 2), in reality, the mean of those who have actually committed to action is drastically reduced to 0.04.

Anti Immigrant Policy: measured by question V124 "What the government should do about people coming from other countries for work." The answers are coded as 1 "Let anyone come," 2 "As long as jobs are available," 3 "Strict limits," and 4 "Prohibit people from coming." The order of the answers suggests increasing protectionist tendencies and increasing antagonism toward immigrant workers.

Meanwhile, the main explanatory variables and controls include the following:
(1) Variables pertaining to individuals' exposure to globalization.

SES: measured by question V252 "Self-reported social class," and the answers are coded as 1 "Lower class," 2 "Working class," 3 "Lower middle class," 4 "Upper middle class," and 5 "Upper class." The order of the answers suggests increasing opportunities for global exposure, as the assumption here is that people with better Social Economic Status (SES) in China tend to live in metropolitan cities, have more abundant opportunities as well as greater necessity than their less well-off inland counterparts to interact with foreign nationals and businesses.

Contact Potential through Work: measured by question V242 "Respondent's profession/job." The answers in the original dataset are listed as categorical, and this paper

recoded the values to represent increasing likelihood of foreign exposure through the respondent's industry and occupation. In the recoded outcome, 1 indicates the lowest likelihood of spontaneous personal contact with foreign individuals and businesses through one's occupation, and the groups in this category include "members of the armed forces" and "agricultural workers"; 2 represents "owners of farms" and "unskilled manual workers"; 3 represents "semi-skilled" and "skilled manual workers"; 4 includes "foremen and supervisors," "non-manual office workers," "supervisory non-manual office workers," and "professional workers"; and finally, 5 represents "employers/managers" of establishments of all sizes, who possess the highest likelihood of making sustained foreign encounters in their professional capacity. The assumption here is that non-agricultural and skilled workers in China are more likely to engage in trade and export industries through work, and consequently have more opportunities to interact with foreign interlocutors, business partners, or clients.

Trust Other Nationality: measured by question V130 "If one trusts people of another nationality." The assumption underlying this variable is that individuals with sustained positive foreign exposure tend to be more informed about and accepting of other nationals. Similarly, people with inadequate or negative foreign exposure tend to reinforce their biases and skepticism of other groups or countries, and hence obtain little confidence in their peoples. The original answers range from 1 "Do not trust at all" to 4 "Trust completely," and the original mean score is 1.79, with a standard deviation of about 0.7. Given the much smaller size of the valid sample containing this variable (almost two-fifths of the entire sample miss values on this question), this paper recoded the answers to be of the same 1-5 scale as the preceding two variables which also measure foreign exposure, in order to obtain an average to correct for the missing data problem. Table 2 shows that the recoded level of trust on average is 2.16, implying that many China

people hold reservations about foreigners. The newly generated variable in Table 2 which contains the mean value of variables SES, Contact Potential, and Trust is labeled "Exposure Average," with a mean score of 2.05, as well as a much enlarged sample size of 1999.

Reject Foreign Neighbors: measured by question V37 "Would not like to have immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors." The answers are coded as binary, with 1 suggesting positive rejection, and 0 acceptance or indifference. Similar to the preceding variable, the assumption here is that individuals with sustained positive foreign exposure tend to be more informed about and accepting of other nationals, and would not be opposed to including foreign nationals in their immediate area of residence. More specifically, while 19-22 percent among the upper, upper middle, and lower middle classes would not like to have foreign workers or immigrants as neighbors, the percentage rose to 24-27 percent among the working and lower classes. Further, the correlation coefficient between trust of other nationalities and rejection of foreign neighbors is -0.15, suggesting that people do not automatically accept foreigners as neighbors simply because they trust foreigners more than their peers.

(2) Variables measuring individuals' patriotic predisposition.

Protectionist Tendency: measured by question V45 "When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Chinese people over immigrants." The answers are coded as binary, with 1 indicating agreement to the statement, and 0 rejection or indifference. This variable is viewed as a proxy of the respondents' default level of economic nationalism. Table 2 denotes the prevalence (0.76) of such sentiment of economic nationalism. Surprisingly, only 27 percent of the lower class and 45 percent of the working class agree that when jobs are scarce, nationals should be prioritized, while an overwhelming 56-58 percent among the three upper classes demonstrates such protectionist perspectives. These percentages seem counterintuitive on the

surface when compared side by side with the results of the Reject Foreign Neighbor variable. They suggest that when job security becomes a salient concern, individuals with higher SES are equally likely, if not more so, to express economically nationalist attitudes.

Trust Govt: measured by question V138 "Level of confidence in the government." The answers range from 1 "None at all" to 4 "A great deal," suggesting increasing levels of affinity for the ruling regime. Table 2 denotes fairly high levels of confidence (3.32 out of 4.0) in the Chinese government among the respondents on average.

China Pride: measured by question V209 "How proud one is to be Chinese." The answers range from 1 "Not at all proud" to 4 "Very proud," indicating increasing sentiment of default levels of nationalism. This variable is different from the dependent variable "Chinese Citizen" identification, which measures the individuals' identification with the state. The China Pride variable accounts more for the variation in emotional and psychological attachments to the ethnic symbols of being Chinese. Table 2 shows that such affective attachment is somewhat strong (2.94 out of 4.0) among the average respondents, but is not as strong as the identification with the national citizen role (3.39 out of 4.0). Similarly, a new variable labeled Patriotic Average in Table 2 is generated to represent the mean value of variables Trust in Government and China Pride, with a new mean score of 3.11, and an enlarged sample size of 2002.

(3) The controlled variables include mostly demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Gender: measured by question V235, where 0 represents male, and 1 female.

Age: measured by question V237 as a continuous variable.

Education: measured by question V238. In the regression models, this paper chose the country-specific coding of levels of education, ranging from 0 "never attended school" to 6 "master degree and above".

Income: measured by question V253 "Scale of incomes." The answers range from 1 "Lower step" to 10 "Tenth step." It is worth pointing out that the correlation coefficient between SES and income is 0.5, indicating that when people self-report their social economic class, they do not base it just on income alone. Table 2 indicates that the majority of the respondents belong to the lower income steps (3.96 out of 10), which also closely match the reality on the ground.

Post-1970 Age Cohort Dummy: the age dummy separates out the generation born after 1970, namely, the "angry youth" cohort, which constitutes the focus of this thesis.

Weighting: the WVS data are weighted by variable s018, the "equilibrated weight." This weight incorporates national weights to correct for demographic differences as well as household weights, and also weights all countries surveyed equally (N=1000).

The Model

This thesis estimates an additive model to account for the expressions of nationalism. The following specification sums up the predicted linear relationship between the dependent variable and the main covariates relating to individual attributes and foreign exposure,

$$\text{Nationalistic\_Expression}_i = f \{ \text{Foreign\_Exposure}_i, \text{Patriotic\_Predisposition}_i,$$
$$\text{Demographic\_Attributes}_i \}$$
$$= X_i \beta + Z_i \alpha + \mu_i \tag{I}$$

where *i* denotes any given respondent in the WVS dataset, X is a vector of the regressors, and Z represents a vector of the controls. Tables 3 through 5 present the preliminary results of 13 ordinary least squares (OLS) research models performed with the WVS dataset. All model specifications include the same controls. The tables below show that after controlling for

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individual-level demographic attributes, some of the main explanatory variables of interest

indeed obtained statistical significance.

Table 3. OLS Models and Results of WVS: *H1 Role Identification*[6]

VARIABLES	(1) Chinese Citizen	(2) Chinese Citizen	(3) Chinese Citizen	(4) World Citizen	(5) Asian Citizen
Foreign Exposure Avg.	0.0497**	0.0290		0.0199	0.123***
	(0.0221)	(0.0250)		(0.0836)	(0.0268)
SES			-0.0563**	0.0277	
			(0.0278)	(0.0420)	
Contact Potential thru Work			0.0228	-0.0201	
			(0.0179)	(0.0374)	
Trust Other Nationality			0.0678**		
			(0.0308)		
Reject Foreign Neighbors		0.0565	0.130***	-0.125**	
		(0.0420)	(0.0492)	(0.0583)	
Patriotic Predisposition Avg.	0.247***	0.244***			0.193***
	(0.0252)	(0.0287)			(0.0353)
Protectionist Tendency		0.160***	0.155***	-0.0953*	
		(0.0443)	(0.0541)	(0.0488)	
Trust Govt			0.201***	-0.0275	
			(0.0330)	(0.0353)	
China Pride			0.0900***	0.114***	
			(0.0273)	(0.0301)	
Post-1970		0.0839	0.0232	-0.0359	-0.0510
		(0.0533)	(0.0660)	(0.0650)	(0.0566)
Obs	1,466	1,087	632	807	1,241
R-squared	0.074	0.090	0.130	0.042	0.058

Standard errors in (); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 presents the tests of H1, namely, the effects of foreign exposure and patriotic

predisposition on individuals' identification with the national and the more global roles. The

first three models examine the factors influencing an individual's self-perception as a citizen of

China. All three models indicate that the variables pertaining to patriotic predisposition are

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[6] Ordered logit and ordered probit analyses were also conducted given the binary and ordinal categorical dependent variables. Since the logit/probit results are similar to those of OLS, only the OLS models are reported hereafter.

positively correlated with this national identity. Among other things, trust in the Chinese

government has a particularly salient effect on individual perception. At the same time, the

effects of the variables measuring foreign exposure are much less certain. These results imply

that patriotic predisposition seems to override other attitudinal characteristics in determining

individuals' identification with the national role. Moreover, the age cohort dummy does not

seem to have significant effects across all models, indicating that the post-1970 "angry youth"

cohort is not any more or less nationalistic than the other groups.

Meanwhile, model (4) does lend some support to the theoretical predictions on the effects

of foreign exposure and sticky patriotism when it comes to embracing the more global dimension

of individuals' socioeconomic and sociopolitical identity. Model (4) shows that respondents

who are not accepting of foreign neighbors are usually less likely to identify themselves as

World Citizens. Same goes for respondents who have demonstrated a marked protectionist

tendency in their views toward job priority. It is interesting to note that China Pride seems to

have a much more perceptible effect on individuals' identification with the global role than with

the national role. One possible explanation may be that as opposed to an indicator of reactionary

patriotism, the China Pride variable in this case implies that along with China's rise, the Chinese

people have gained more confidence about their country's rightful place in the world, and have

consequently, developed a new schematic image of their country as a "responsible stakeholder"

in international and regional affairs meriting more aggressive foreign policies.[7]

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[7] The role of a "responsible stakeholder" was coined in 2005 by then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech during his visit to China.

Table 4. OLS Models and Results of WVS: *H2 Anti-Immigrant Policy*

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Foreign Exposure Avg.	-0.0511	-0.0608	-0.238**	
	(0.0369)	(0.0401)	(0.117)	
SES			0.00819	-0.0817*
			(0.0607)	(0.0455)
Contact Potential thru Work			0.134***	0.0234
			(0.0517)	(0.0285)
Trust Other Nationality				-0.193***
				(0.0510)
Reject Foreign Neighbors		0.188**	0.137*	0.188*
		(0.0767)	(0.0800)	(0.0978)
Patriotic Predisposition Avg.	-0.0117	-0.0168		
	(0.0445)	(0.0515)		
Protectionist Tendency		0.162**	0.163**	0.0817
		(0.0650)	(0.0697)	(0.0873)
Trust Govt			-0.000180	-0.0263
			(0.0468)	(0.0574)
China Pride			0.0272	0.0396
			(0.0408)	(0.0482)
Age	0.00375*	0.00622*	0.00624*	0.00156
	(0.00193)	(0.00343)	(0.00366)	(0.00460)
Post-1970		0.0473	0.0727	-0.0501
		(0.0857)	(0.0910)	(0.112)
Obs	1,201	921	796	556
R-squared	0.024	0.041	0.049	0.072

Standard errors in (); *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4 presents the tests of H2 about individuals' support for economic nationalism, and more specifically, anti-immigrant policies. Models (7) through (9) show that increasing levels of foreign exposure are generally negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes. Models (7) and (8) also denote a positive relationship between protectionist predisposition and anti-immigrant views. While the age cohort dummy again seems to have no significant effect on economic nationalism, one of the controls, age, turns out to make statistically significant differences across models. The results imply that although the "angry youth" cohort is not less

protectionist than their seniors, the respondents do generally display slightly more pronounced

anti-immigrant attitudes as their ages go up.

Table 5. OLS Models and Results of WVS: *H3 Boycotts*

VARIABLES	(10) Boycott Will	(11) Boycott Will	(12) Boycott Action	(13) Boycott Action
Foreign Exposure Avg.	0.0447*	0.107	0.00127	-0.0341
	(0.0233)	(0.0688)	(0.00737)	(0.0295)
SES		-0.0211		0.0209
		(0.0348)		(0.0133)
Contact Potential thru Work		-0.0184		0.0124
		(0.0307)		(0.0137)
Reject Foreign Neighbors	-0.157***	-0.148***		0.000108
	(0.0357)	(0.0387)		(0.0127)
Patriotic Predisposition Avg.	0.0208		-0.00432	
	(0.0264)		(0.00892)	
Protectionist Tendency	0.0176	0.00430		-0.00366
	(0.0353)	(0.0383)		(0.0137)
Trust Govt		-0.0301		0.00927
		(0.0265)		(0.00869)
China Pride		0.0362*		8.20e-05
		(0.0215)		(0.00744)
Edu	0.0355***	0.0169	0.0184***	0.0159***
	(0.0116)	(0.0133)	(0.00380)	(0.00450)
Income	0.0195**	0.0175*	0.00655**	0.00346
	(0.00881)	(0.0105)	(0.00323)	(0.00390)
Post-1970	-0.00410	-0.0267		0.00609
	(0.0493)	(0.0527)		(0.0183)
Obs	1,125	964	1,554	968
R-squared	0.063	0.058	0.035	0.029

Standard errors in (); *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 5 lays out the tests of H3 about individuals' participation in boycott activities.

While models (10) and (11) explore the respondents' consideration of participation, models (12)

and (13) examine their actual self-reported behavior. The results show a curious relationship

between the respondents' acceptance of foreign neighbors and their willingness to boycott. This

relationship may be due largely to the reinforcement effect or the lack of any effect, since

individuals un-accepting of foreign nationals presumably are already averse to the application of foreign products or association with foreign symbols. As a result, they may not feel the need to engage in any particular boycott activities when crises arise. At the same time, two of the controlled variables, namely education and income, appear to be the decisive factors accounting for boycott behavior. These results may reflect the visible costs incurred by boycotts, since individuals must have the capacity to plan and organize (primarily through extensive and efficient social networks), as well as the ability to afford potential opportunity costs (i.e. to participate in boycotts instead of engage in more productive activities). The fact that many recent incidences of boycotts in China were organized through cell phone networks and Internet forums and joined mainly by young urban professionals does comport with these findings.

Design-Related Problems

The WVS dataset, while benefiting from the nationwide full-probability sampling, is not free from flaws for the purpose of this study. For instance, omitted variable bias is present in the current survey sample. The most crucial omitted variables include those that directly and explicitly measure individuals' levels of foreign exposure, particularly through their employment. Therefore, the original survey was conducted precisely to focus more on the degrees of foreign interaction at the workplace in major Chinese cities.

Missing data constitutes another major obstacle to the statistical analysis. Some of the covariates included in the current model, such as Trust Foreign National, miss as much as two-fifths of all valid samples. This problem can be largely due to the complication of the "I don't know" answer option. Take for example the variable Trust Foreign National, which misses the most data, an examination of the raw data shows that 800 respondents (40.2 percent of the total

sample) missing values on this question chose "I don't know" as their answers. Further cross tabulation with Contact Potential through Work indicates that among these 800 respondents, 465 are either "agricultural workers" or "members of the armed forces", who have the lowest likelihood of making spontaneous foreign contact on a daily basis. As a result of the absence or inadequacy of foreign exposure, these individuals, as well as their peers engaged in professions with slightly higher likelihoods of foreign encounters, may feel reluctant or uncomfortable to give a definitive assessment of their trust of foreigners when they took the survey and consequently opted for the "don't know".

Another complication many researchers of political economy and nationalism face is the problem of endogeneity. Admittedly, individuals' feelings of patriotism can be reinforced by their identification with the state and its economic advances. This thesis strives to identify a sufficient number of independent variables to address this problem, without having to resort to a more sophisticated set of structural equations at this stage.

Finally, as is common with all survey research, several key variables in this study are subjective measures self-reported by the respondents, and are thus susceptible to the influences of survey wording, the condition and timing of the interview, and so forth. Also, since the WVS study was not explicitly designed to measure expressions of nationalism, the order of some of questions and variables as presented on the survey questionnaire could have primed the respondent to be either more or less patriotic than she usually is. As such, one could reasonably expect measurement errors associated with this publicly available dataset.

2010 Original Survey

The preceding analysis of the WVS data sheds light on the macro picture of identification among the general public in China. In order to address some of the design-related problems, this project conducted an anonymous pilot survey in March 2010 over the Internet among young Chinese professionals working in 19 industries in three major urban Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, and Haikou.[8] The pilot study endeavored to randomize and diversify the sample pool, yet the returned responses still display various biases. The final dataset contains only 145 valid responses from interested participants, a return rate of about 30 percent. Figure 6 shows that the industry of banking/finance is significantly overrepresented. This overrepresentation is partly because many skilled urban professionals choose to have a career in finance, and partly a result of the social desirability bias—some professionals working in the internal finance department of corporations might misreport themselves as working in the financial services industry.

Figure 6. Distribution of Respondents across Industry in Original Survey

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
[8] Please refer to Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the original survey sampling methods and limitations.

As for the demographic controls, although the original survey data is not as close a representation of the reality in China as the WVS sample, Table 6 displays fairly satisfactory distribution among the respondents. The data confirms that almost all of the respondents are under the age of 40 at the time of the survey, meaning that they belong to the post-1970 age cohort. Specifically, about 80 percent of the respondents were born after the year 1980, and 20 percent born in the 1970s or earlier.[9] In addition, 95 percent of the young urban professionals reported competency in the English language, while 12 percent speak Japanese. The data also comports with the researcher's assumption that the surveyed professionals have all received some tertiary education and are able to perform cognitive- and knowledge-intensive tasks at work. It is worth pointing out that patriotic predisposition is assumed to be constant in this section's analysis of the original survey since the respondents belong to the same "angry youth" generation, who share similar experience of patriotic education during their school years.

Table 6. Distribution of Demographic Characteristics in Original Survey

Gender			Male		Female
			48%		52%
Age	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	Above 41
	17%	63%	14%	5%	1%
Education	Secondary School	High School	Some College	University/ College	Graduate Degree
	0	0	5%	59%	36%
Monthly Income		< RMB2000	RMB2000-5000	RMB5001-8000	> RMB8001
		1%	27%	29%	43%

As discussed previously, the added value of the original survey lies in its more precise breakdown of the degrees of foreign exposure at the workplace. In regard to employment-related measures, the pilot study surveyed workers at both domestic and foreign firms in order to mitigate the problem of selection effects. In the current dataset, 55 percent of all respondents

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[9] The overrepresentation of the 1980s cohort in the dataset is another bias of the "snowball sampling" method.

work at domestic Chinese institutions, 11 percent work in joint ventures, and 34 percent work in

wholly foreign owned firms. Among the 46 percent of respondents whose companies are funded

wholly or partially by FDI, 38 percent of their employers receive investment capital from the U.S.

and 22 percent from Japan. Regarding job status, 36 percent of all respondents supervise other

employees at work.[10] In addition to differentiating the nature of employers, the original survey

measures the degree of foreign exposure at the workplace with questions 28, 29, 30, and 36.

(Appendix 2) Table 7 describes the disparity in the frequency and duration of foreign contact.

Table 7. Levels of Foreign Exposure at the Workplace in Original Survey

Interaction with foreigners		Everyday	Often	Sometimes	Occasionally	Never
		24%	16%	19%	32%	9%
Discussion of IR events		Everyday	Often	Sometimes	Occasionally	Never
		4%	12%	37%	42%	4%
Foreign work content				Yes		No
				50%		50%
Business travel abroad	> 2 times/yr	1-2 times /yr	Once every 1-2 yrs.	Once every 2-3 yrs.	Once > every 3 yrs.	N/A
	6%	8%	6%	4%	9%	66%

To remedy the omission of the ranked identification variables from the WVS survey, the

original survey made sure to measure individual ranking of her most prominent identity with

questions 26 and 27. (Appendix 2) Question 26 states: "I see myself firstly as" and asks the

respondent to choose from 1) an autonomous individual; 2) a professional of my occupation; 3) a

citizen of China; and 4) a world citizen. Question 27 asks about the respondent's second most

salient social identity and offers the same set of choices.

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[10] Although this survey accounted for the types of employer, which by default determines the levels of foreign interaction at the workplace, a potential selection problem remains with the operating procedure of work assignment. Specifically, an individual with low levels of anti-foreign attitudes may be more likely than her peers to get noticed by her supervisor and consequently receive more foreign-related job assignments. An improved version of this survey in the next stage of this project should fix this problem.

Individual attachment to symbolic policy issues is measured, employing a 5-point Likert scale, by questions 5-11 in the context of U.S.-China relations and by questions 12-18 for China-Japan relations.[11] (Appendix 2) These questions typically ask whether or not a respondent views a given foreign policy controversy as impeding the stable developments of bilateral relations. As previously discussed, individuals with greater affective attachments to certain policy issues usually perceive these issues to be more important than others on the national policy agenda. The foreign policy issues included in the original survey consist of both substantive, material disputes, and non-substantive, symbolic problems. For example, question 5 asks to what extent the respondent agrees with the statement "China-U.S. trade imbalance constitutes an impediment" and question 18 poses "Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine constitutes an impediment".[12] The analysis considers an individual to be emotionally attached if she "agrees" or "strongly agrees" with the statement in question.

Results and Discussion

Despite numerous imperfections of the original survey design and data collection, the current dataset demonstrates several interesting patterns of individual attitudes. Table 8 provides a summary of the respondents' identification of the salience of specific foreign policy issues in the context of U.S.-China and China-Japan bilateral relations. It is worth noting that three symbolic foreign policy issues, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Japanese government's

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[11] The 5-point Likert question is a common survey method used in existing literature to measure public opinion on policy issues.

[12] A note on question wording: one potential problem is that whether "does constitute" is different from "should constitute" in revealing individual attachment to the given issue. The differences seem more pronounced in the English language. However, the word "constitute" in the Chinese language encompasses both the *de facto* and the *de jure* dimensions of its meaning. Since the survey was conducted in Chinese, this study assumes a high correlation between individual *perception* and *assessment* of the issue salience. Another problem with question wording is how sufficiently it distinguishes to what extent it is an individual's *independent* judgment and to what extent it is an individual's reaction to *peer* judgment. An improved version of this survey in the next stage should fix this problem by specifically asking how important a given issue is to the individual personally.

approval of revisionist history textbooks, and the Japanese prime minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine stand out as the most salient disputes (in bold), as they all received mean scores of "agree". The U.S. president's meetings with the Dalai Lama and the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea follow closely behind. Meanwhile, issues like the U.S.'s War on Terror and China's trade imbalance with Japan received mean scores that correspond more closely with "disagree," and most of the other issues tended to cluster toward the center.

Table 8. Summary Statistics of Issue Identification in Original Survey

Issue	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min (Strongly Disagree)	Max (Strongly Agree)
Impediment to China-U.S. relations					
Trade imbalance	142	3.42	1.11	1	5
U.S.-Japan alliance	142	3.44	1.09	1	5
War on Terror	138	2.90	1.08	1	5
Taiwan arms sales	144	**4.16**	1.05	1	5
NATO bombing	143	3.25	1.15	1	5
EP3 collision	142	3.08	1.08	1	5
Dalai meetings	143	**3.97**	1.14	1	5
Impediment to China-Japan relations					
Trade imbalance	144	2.95	1.09	1	5
U.S.-Japan alliance	142	3.36	1.07	1	5
Article 9	141	3.47	1.03	1	5
UNSC bid	143	3.29	1.09	1	5
East China Sea	143	**3.97**	0.90	1	5
History textbook	144	**4.13**	1.01	1	5
Yasukuni visits	144	**4.01**	1.00	1	5

The principal-component factor analysis with promax (oblique) rotation confirms that the five highlighted foreign policy issues in Table 8 activate the same patriotic schematic symbols when individuals process bilateral relations.[13] Overall, the factor analysis outlines four

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[13] Oblique rotation assumes some degrees of correlation among factors. Since it is empirically difficult to untangle the various dimensions of nationalistic sentiments, promax rotation is applied here instead of varimax rotation, which produces orthogonal factors.

significant dimensions that explain 68 percent of the variance of all underlying symbolism.

(Table 9) This thesis defines the first factor as the schematic dimension of nationalism, which

triggers individual identification with patriotic symbols derived from historical legacy such as

Japanese imperialism during WWII and U.S. hegemonism in the postwar years. The second

factor is a sovereign dimension of nationalism, which concerns the more substantive aspect of

the functions of nation states such as security alliances, warfare, and international aspiration.

The third factor is a territorial dimension, which is particularly salient in international

confrontations that involve direct military attack. The last factor is the economic dimension,

which pertains mostly to trade disputes in the globalization era.

Table 9. Factor Analysis of Underlying Symbols in Original Survey

Issue	Schematic	Sovereign	Territorial	Economic
Taiwan arms sales	0.553			
Dalai meetings	0.672			
East China Sea	0.845			
History textbook	0.912			
Yasukuni visits	0.874			
U.S.-Japan alliance (US context)		0.836		
U.S. War on Terror		0.498		
U.S.-Japan alliance (Japan context)		0.902		
Article 9		0.427		
UNSC bid		0.493		
NATO bombing			0.911	
EP3 collision			0.908	
Trade imbalance with U.S.				0.844
Trade imbalance with Japan				0.775
Eigenvalue	5.14	1.72	1.41	1.21
Variance Explained = 68%	37%	12%	10%	9%

In order to test H1, namely, individuals with high degrees of foreign exposure at the

workplace are less likely to identify primarily as a citizen of China, this thesis looks at the

relationship between respondents' self-reported "first identity" and the frequency and duration of their workplace contact. It should be noted that in the dataset, 44 percent of all respondents chose "a citizen of China" as their first identity, and 32 percent chose "a citizen of China" as their second identity. Thus, overall, about three quarters of the sample population to varying degrees identified with their nationalist identity. In terms of the impact of workplace contact on such identification, Table 10 presents the findings on the interaction effects between the types of employer and the frequency and duration of contact.

Table 10a indicates that 42 percent of respondents who work at domestic Chinese institutions and have only occasional contact with their foreign counterparts identify themselves as primarily a citizen of China, whereas 16 percent of their counterparts identified with the newly created "professional" and "supranational" dimensions of their social identities. In contrast, 45 percent of individuals who work at wholly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, who also have significantly more frequent interaction with foreigners at work, chose national citizenship as their primary identity, but only 4 percent of their counterparts identified with the newly created categories. Although the confidence intervals associated with the outputs here and in almost all of the following tables imply that the cross-group differences are not strictly significant given the small sample size, the results in Table 10a still go against potential selection effects, as they suggest that frequent foreign contact and increased political information are not powerful enough motivators for employees to embrace the more professional or transnational roles. It may often be the case that frequent interaction under unequal conditions works in the opposite direction to make the employees especially conscious of their national differences with their foreign interlocutors and expat colleagues. As such, a polarization effect has likely taken place and encouraged individual identification with the citizenship identity.

Table 10a. Type of Employer Interacted with Frequency of Contact

	Domestic * Low	Domestic * High	Foreign * Low	Foreign * High
"Citizen of China" as answer to Q26	28	4	8	21
	42%	40%	47%	**45%**
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[30.5, 54]	[15.6, 70.6]	[31.1, 59.1]	[35.2, 51.7]
"Professional" or "World Citizen" as answer to Q26	11	0	0	2
	16%	0%	0%	4%
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[6, 22.3]			[1, 15.7]
Total Respondents	67	10	17	47

Table 10b shows that the duration of sustained contact (measured by question 32), as opposed to simple frequency, may have a more significant impact on citizenship identification. The results show that more than half of the respondents who have worked at domestic Chinese institutions for over three years identified themselves as primarily a citizen of China, 17 percent higher than their less experienced co-workers. The interaction effect is less pronounced among employees working at foreign funded firms (including both JVs and wholly foreign), although those who have been with their current employers for three years or longer also tended to identify slightly more with their citizenship identity. The raw data suggests that a majority of the respondents working in domestic Chinese institutions seldom interact with foreigners. It can thus be argued that extended absence or "minimal" exposure to foreign contact underscores the nationalist dimension of individual identity. In the mean time, the polarization effect also seems present, as respondents working at foreign firms for over three years are 48 percent more likely to favor their national identity over their professional or transnational identities.

Table 10b. Type of Employer Interacted with Duration of Employment

	Domestic * <3 yrs.	Domestic * > 3 yrs.	Foreign * < 3 yrs.	Foreign * > 3 yrs.
"Citizen of China" as answer to Q26	18	14	17	12
	35%	**52%**	45%	**48%**
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[23.4, 49.4]	[33.4, 69.8]	[29.8, 60.7]	[28.2, 65.2]
"Professional" or "World Citizen" as answer to Q26	9	3	2	0
	18%	11%	5%	0%
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[5.3, 24]	[1.8, 25.6]	[1.3, 19]	
Total Respondents	51	27	38	26

In order to further probe the respondents' expressions of nationalism, this paper turns to the salience of symbolic policy issues and examines two issues that received the highest mean scores in the dataset: a) the U.S.'s arms sales to Taiwan (mean of 4.16, question 8); and b) Japan's revisionist history textbooks (mean of 4.13, question 17). Specifically, this thesis looks to variation in terms of the stickiness of patriotic predisposition and its impact on individual attachment to schematic symbols. As elaborated in the theory section, this paper uses "discussion of international events at the workplace," measured by question 29, as an instrument to approximate the stickiness of schema or issue salience, as people usually talk more about the issues they consider significant. If an individual does not consider U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or Japan's revisionist textbooks important impediments to China's relations with the two countries, then she is unlikely to spend large amounts of time discussing these subjects with her workplace colleagues. In addition, "foreign media consumption," measured by question 38, is used in this section as a complementary instrument to measure individual patriotic predisposition. If early socialization and patriotic education strongly impressed an individual's understanding of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese conflicts, then she is more likely to seek news in domestic media that typically confirms her current beliefs when international crises break out. If the patriotic

dimension dominates her identity, then she also has little incentive to create a cognitive

dissonance for herself by reading about diametrically opposing narratives in foreign media

coverage of the same disputes.

Table 11a shows that foreign media consumption is fairly evenly distributed among

employees working at different types of companies, as well as between the two major age

cohorts represented in the dataset. It is reasonable to expect that individuals with high levels of

foreign exposure during adolescence (primarily through learning foreign languages) and at the

workplace will be both interested in and capable of seeking news coverage in foreign media

sources when international crises occur. Different interpretations of the same events in domestic

and foreign media will also likely reduce an individual's affective attachment to some of the

long-standing, patriotic symbols that she used to rely on as heuristics to process international

affairs. Moreover, an individual's decision to seek foreign interpretation of the same crises also

reflects her internal struggle against ongoing elite cues that activate the patriotic schemas. As

such, this thesis uses foreign media consumption with fair confidence to represent the strengths

of patriotic predisposition.

Table 11a. Foreign Media Consumption as an Instrument

	Domestic	JV	Foreign	1970s Cohort	1980s Cohort
Foreign media consumption (newspaper, television, or Internet)	44%	50%	53%	45%	48%

Table 11b reports the findings on the interaction effects between the frequency of foreign

interaction and the frequency of international affairs discussion at the workplace. The results

show that regardless of the frequency of discussion, majority of the respondents with low levels

of foreign interaction (answering "occasionally" or "sometimes") at the workplace highly

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regarded the arms sales to Taiwan as impediment to U.S.-China relations. This is confirming

evidence that the lack of foreign exposure allows individuals to continue relying on schematic

heuristics to process international relations. Meanwhile, regardless of the level of contact, most

individuals who discuss international affairs frequently or often at the workplace consider

Japan's revisionist textbooks impede Sino-Japanese relations. This is likely confirmation that

individuals often discuss the most salient policy issues, and such discussion in turn motivates

people to look for pro arguments and reinforces individual identification with symbolic issues.

Table 11b. Frequency of Contact Interacted with Frequency of Event Discussion

	Low Contact * Low Disc.	Low Contact * High Disc.	High Contact * Low Disc.	High Contact * High Disc.
Strongly Agree to Taiwan Question	39	6	18	5
	53%	**67%**	40%	38%
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[41.3, 63.9]	[33, 89.1]	[27.4, 56]	[16.8, 66]
Strongly Agree to Textbook Question	32	7	16	7
	43%	**78%**	36%	**54%**
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[31.9, 54.2]	[41.6, 94.5]	[23.5, 51.6]	[27.9, 77.9]
Total Respondents	74	9	44	13

Table 11c records findings on the interaction effects between the nature of media

consumption and the frequency of international affairs discussion at the workplace. The table

finds that regardless of the national origin of media sources, an overwhelming majority of

respondents who discuss international affairs frequently or often at the workplace strongly

consider that Japan's revisionist textbooks impede Sino-Japanese relations. At the same time,

respondents on the opposite ends, namely, those who primarily read news in the domestic media

and seldom discuss international events at work and those who both seek foreign news coverage

and discuss international events often with colleagues, similarly identified the Taiwan arms sales

issue an impediment to U.S.-China relations. The results suggest that higher degrees of foreign

exposure and increasing stock of political information do not effectively reduce individual

attachment to patriotic symbols when they assess international relations. The exchange of

perspectives and debates with foreign interlocutors may actually render an individual more

susceptible to the polarization effects and hence express more extreme than usual political views

in order to have her perspectives prevail.

Table 11c. Media Consumption Interacted with Frequency of Event Discussion

	Domestic * Low Disc.	Domestic * High Disc.	Foreign * Low Disc.	Foreign * High Disc.
Strongly Agree to Taiwan Question	33	4	23	8
	52%	44%	43%	**57%**
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[39.3, 63.6]	[17.5, 75.2]	[30.1, 56.2]	[31.4, 79.6]
Strongly Agree to Textbook Question	29	5	18	10
	45%	**56%**	33%	**71%**
95% Conf. Interval of Percentage	[33.5, 57.7]	[24.8, 82.6]	[21.6, 46.3]	[43.6, 89]
Total Respondents	64	9	54	14

In conclusion, the empirical analyses in this section provide somewhat disconfirming

evidence on the hypothesized positive effects of foreign exposure on 1) reducing national citizen

identification and 2) reducing affective attachment to schematic symbols. In reality, individuals

with more substantial foreign exposure at the workplace may not necessarily have weaker

attachments to their national identities or the socialized schema. Such inconsistency implies that

more comprehensive and in-depth scholarly work needs to be done to empirically determine the

effectiveness of intergroup contact as a form of intervention to reduce hostile perceptions and

nationalistic attachments in the era of economic globalization.

Conclusion

This thesis contributes to the existing scholarship on economic interdependence and international conflict through examining on the micro-foundations of expressions of nationalism, namely, economic protectionism and xenophobic political hostility. The paper musters both public and original survey data to explore the dynamic effects of interpersonal contact and patriotic predispositions as explanations for individual attitudes on international policy issues. Specifically, this thesis proposes a causal model that illustrates the linkages between an individual's foreign economic and ideational exposure, the most prominent dimension of her identity, and her perception of symbolic foreign policy crises.

More broadly, this thesis is interested in how the opinions and behaviors of China's "angry youth"—a unique but understudied generation—may impact China's political future and foreign relations. Since this population grew up in the era of China's reform and integration into the global economy, this paper seeks to provide preliminary explanations of how foreign economic and ideational exposure affected the political attitudes of a significant segment of the "angry youth" population: young urban professionals. The empirical analyses suggest that the "angry youth" generation is not as radical as the media has portrayed. However, their significantly higher levels of comfort with western values and rules of the game in the era of globalization do not necessarily mean that they are any more eager to embrace the global and transnational socioeconomic and sociopolitical identities than their seniors.

The thesis tests three main hypotheses that predict the variation of individual expressions of nationalism. The first hypothesis looks at individual identification and the effects of group re-categorization/role creation as a result of intergroup contact. The second hypothesis focuses on economic nationalism and compares the relative strengths of socialized patriotic schema vis-à-

vis individual-based foreign contact. The third hypothesis turns to political behavior and public expressions of antagonism through examining boycott activities. This paper then presents empirical research models and statistical analyses of both the nationwide World Values Survey and the original survey of young urban Chinese professionals to demonstrate the effects of foreign exposure and other employment-related attributes on individual identification as well as perception of specific issues in U.S.-China and China-Japan relations.

The analyses of the two sets of data reveal that the relative strength of contact is often weakened in the face of nationalistic predispositions that individuals acquired through adolescence socialization and subsequently reinforced by the political elites. The results also indicate that the polarization mechanism discussed in Table 1 and Figure 1 is likely to operate with the strongest force for young urban Chinese. As a next step of this project, supplementary focus group interviews should be conducted in order to determine how the specific causal mechanisms illustrated in Figure 1 function in each stage. These interviews particularly should aim to isolate the factors of workplace grievances and inequality, and how they interact with levels of contact to negatively affect intergroup perceptions. Also as a next step, a formal model should be developed to more accurately describe the function presented in Figure 1 and calculate the precise values of its peaks and nadirs.

China's integration into the global economy over the past three decades has not yet promoted more popular cosmopolitan sociopolitical identities among the general public, even among citizens who experience high levels of exposure to foreign business and economic influence, who also have higher social economic status as a result of the regional benefits from the country's economic globalization. The persistence of nationalistic worldviews (i.e. support for anti-immigrant policies) and identities (i.e. self identification primarily as a Citizen of China)

among the general public has serious implications such as economic protectionism and anti-foreign hostilities for foreign businesses and governments that wish to proactively engage a rising China in international and regional affairs.

The empirical findings of this thesis suggest that in order to augment the positive effects of intergroup contact and foreign exposure, interested governments and parties should continue promoting further global as well as regional economic integration to reduce sentiments of economic nationalism as well as xenophobic misunderstanding. In terms of specific policy steps, concerned governments should maintain, and whenever possible, extend bilateral or multilateral trade talks and Free Trade Agreements; develop more in-depth cross-border cultural and educational exchange programs to help people coming from different national backgrounds better understand each other at non-superficial levels; and sustain ideational campaigns to win the hearts and minds in formerly antagonistic societies. As for firms and businesses, since motivated employees are the most productive employees, corporate human resources departments, particularly those as JVs and MNCs, should develop more customized employee training and rotation programs with the foreign JV partners or MNC headquarters to help equip the staff with more sophisticated understandings of the corporate culture as well as the history and culture of the FDI source countries.

Appendix 1. Original Survey Sampling Methods and Limitations

Given the time and financial constraints of this study, the original survey employed the "snowball sampling" method to distribute the surveys by mobilizing about 40 points of contact in my personal professional and social networks, and by asking them each to distribute the survey to 10-15 skilled professionals working in different industries in their extended networks. These initial contacts included my high school, college, and graduate school classmates; past professional colleagues; and personal friends. About half of them work and reside in Beijing, 10 percent work in Haikou, and the rest work in Shanghai. Taking into account that my contacts might recruit survey takers primarily from their immediate workplace, I tried to encompass as diverse a set of industries as possible in selecting these initial points of contact. As a result, my initial contacts represented 13 of the industries in the final distribution: accounting, airline, advertising, automotive, consulting, finance, education, engineering, government, health services, IT, media, and telecomm.

Since this is a preliminary attempt at collecting original data for a potentially larger project, the overall survey design, measurements of outcome variables and conditioning variables, and the "snowball sampling" methods all require further refinement in future stages of the study. For example, the pilot survey did not include questions about the respondents' geographic locations because clustering the answers by city/province will not do much to fix the biases in this non-nationwide sampling. I also intended to focus on metropolitan centers where most MNC activities are primarily market-seeking (as opposed to efficiency-seeking) for the purpose of this study. Future stages of the project should administer a nationwide full-probability survey or devise a "respondent-driven sampling" model to mathematically weigh the sample points and correct for non-random selection. Future survey should also explore the possibility of collaborating with professional polling agencies (e.g. those working with the WVS) to take advantage of all available resources and expertise.

Appendix 2. Original Survey Code Book

To what extent do you agree with the statements in questions 1-4?
1.   Stable China-United States relationship is important for the success of China's reform and development.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

2.   Stable China-Japan relationship is important for the success of China's reform and development.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

3.   I approve of the Chinese government's overall stance in dealing with the U.S.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

4.   I approve of the Chinese government's overall stance in dealing with Japan.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

For stable developments of China-U.S. relations, to what extent do you agree with the statements in 5-11?
5.   China-U.S. trade imbalance constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

6.   The U.S.-Japan alliance constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

7.   The U.S. Global War on Terror constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

8.   U.S.'s arms sales to Taiwan constitute an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

9.   The 2001 EP-3 plane collision constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

10.   The 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

11.   U.S. president's meetings with the Dalai Lama constitute an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

For stable developments of China-Japan relations, to what extent do you agree with the statements in 12-18?
12.   China-Japan trade imbalance constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

13.   The U.S.-Japan alliance constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

14.   Japan's revision of Article 9 of the Constitution (under which Japan renounces war as a sovereign right and bans settlement
        of international disputes through the use of force) constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

15.   Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

16.   Disputes between China and Japan about the rights to explore oil and gas fields in the East China Sea constitute an
        impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

17.   Japanese government's approval of revisionist history textbooks constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

18.   Japanese Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine constitutes an impediment.
        1. Strongly Disagree   2. Disagree   3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree   4. Agree   5. Strongly Agree

19.   I would like to learn more about the American history, society, and culture through (check all that apply)
        a. Official Programs   0. No   1. Yes   b. Grassroots Programs   0. No   1. Yes
        c. Personal Contacts   0. No   1. Yes   d. I would not like to learn more   0. No   1. Yes

20.   I would like to learn more about the Japanese history, society, and culture through (check all that apply)
            a. Official Programs   0. No   1. Yes   b. Grassroots Programs   0. No   1. Yes
            c. Personal Contacts   0. No   1. Yes   d. I would not like to learn more   0. No   1. Yes

Some background information about you:

21.   My gender   0. Male   1. Female

22.   My age   1. 21-25   2. 26-30   3. 31-35   4. 36-40   5. above 41

23.   My education
            1. Secondary School   2. High School   3. Some College   4. University/College   5. Graduate Degree

24.   My monthly income is
            1. Less than RMB2000   2. RMB2000-5000   3. RMB5001-8000   4. RMB8001 or more

25.   I speak (check all that apply)
            a. English   0. No   1. Yes   b. Japanese   0. No   1. Yes   c. Other   # of languages

26.   I see myself firstly as   1. An autonomous individual   2. A professional of my occupation   3. A citizen of China
            4. A world citizen   0. Undecided

27.   I see myself secondly as   1. An autonomous individual   2. A professional of my occupation   3. A citizen of China
            4. A world citizen   0. Undecided

28.   I ____ interact with people of other nationalities at the workplace.
            4. Everyday   3. Often   2. Sometimes   1. Occasionally   0. Never

29.   I ____ discuss current events of international affairs at the workplace with colleagues
            4. Everyday   3. Often   2. Sometimes   1. Occasionally   0. Never

30.   The content of my work involves dealing with foreign countries.   1. Yes   0. No

31.   I supervise other employees at work.   1. Yes   0. No

32.   I have been employed at my current workplace for
            1. Less than a year   2. 1-2 years   3. 2-3 years   4. 3-5 years   5. 5-10 years   6. 10 years or more

33.   The employer I work for is a   1. Chinese company   2. Joint venture   3. Foreign-owned company

34.   If answer to question 33 is "joint venture" or "foreign-owned company," then the foreign capital comes from
            1. U.S.   2. Japan   3. Other

35.   The industry I work in is   1. Accounting/Auditing   2. Airline/Aviation   3. Advertising/Marketing
            4. Manufacturing   5. Automotive   6. Banking/Finance   7. Consulting   8. Education/Training   9. Engineering
            10. Export/Import   11. Government   12. Hospital/Health Services   13. Food & Restaurant Services   14. IT
            15. Judiciary/Legal   16. Media/Publishing   17. Real Estate   18. Telecomm   19. Transportation

36.   I travel abroad for work   1. Once every 3 years or more   2. Once every 2-3 years   3. Once every 1-2 years
            4. 1-2 times a year   5. More than 2 times a year   0. Not Applicable

37.   I have resided abroad continuously for 6 months or more.   1. Yes   0. No

38.   I usually get news from (check all that apply)
            a. Chinese newspapers   0. No 1. Yes   b. Foreign language newspapers   0. No 1. Yes
            c. Chinese television   0. No 1. Yes   d. Foreign language television   0. No 1. Yes
            e. Chinese news websites 0. No 1. Yes   f. Foreign language news websites 0. No 1. Yes
            g. I do not read any news 0. No 1. Yes

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