PLOTTING TRANSFORMATIONS:  
THE ILLEGAL LAND SUBDIVISION PROCESS IN DELHI, INDIA 

by 

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degrees in 

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ABSTRACT

This thesis questions conventional understandings of illegal land subdivisions as a housing option for the poor. Illegal land subdivisions, called unauthorized colonies in Delhi, are settlements that either contravene legal standards and zoning laws or lack planning permission. The study of a recent illegal subdivision in Delhi, India showed three new developments in the process of formation of illegal subdivisions established in the post 1977 period: 1) the decreased risk of eviction by public authorities, 2) the increased risk of fraudulent dealing and land grabbing and, 3) the formalization of contracts between colonizers and landowners.

First, the risk of eviction has decreased due to a policy of regularization. Regularization policies, scholars argue, will lead to an improvement of standards in expectation of eventual regularization. However, due to the resultant increase in the price of land, colonizers are decreasing plot sizes and tightening layouts. Additionally, plotholders plan the physical consolidation of plots in expectation of eventual regularization. Some plotholders have traded the secure tenure of sites and services for larger plots in illegal subdivisions, a move which is supported by the income-earning opportunities created by the heterogeneity of income groups living in illegal subdivisions.

Second, there is an increased risk of fraudulent dealing and land grabbing because of the rising land prices, unclear titles to land and the illegality of transactions. The colonizer’s need to develop a good reputation, leads to territorial organization and the prevalence of a system of commissions. This system has allowed some plotholders to get reductions in the price of their plots by becoming brokers for the colonizer. To prevent land grabbing, speculators are renting plots to poor families for little or no rent. It is often argued that investment in housing follows regularization. The high risk of losing possession however, has resulted in the need for high upfront investment in spite of insecure tenure.

Third, the contracts between farmers and colonizers have become more rigid. In order to profit the colonizer now has an increased stake in development of the settlement to raise land values. He is also playing a more political role in the settlement. Some have argued that illegal subdivisions offer the poor credit through the option of installment payments for the land. The effect of formalization of contracts on the plotholders has been the discontinuation of the system of installments leading to reduced access to land for the poor.

These changed conditions have led to unauthorized colonies catering to higher income groups than before, and bring into question some of the conventional wisdoms about how illegal land subdivisions help meet housing needs of the poor.

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My parents and my brother Amit, for their love and encouragement...
PREFACE

The resident

Manjari shouts across to me in her high pitched voice. "Why have you come to study how the poor live? Don't tell me you don't know how we manage with our meager resources"¹ She is sitting on the steps of her one room house combing her daughter's hair. She and her husband have invested all their savings and borrowed money to buy the plot, 25 square meters of land without water, electricity or sewage.

The colonizer

Shyam Lal sits surrounded by his men in his garden, holding court. In between discussing the affairs of the community, he answers my questions in a composed voice. "Illegal colonies are built with tan man and dhan. Tan (bodies) of the poor, man (minds) of the politicians and dhan (money) of the financiers."² He implies that the process is synergetic, to the benefit of all involved. It is the natural order of things.

The public authorities

A statement on the governments position regarding unauthorized colonies bears the stamp of anonymous authors. "The Government are taking, within the limits of the law, suitable action against the unscrupulous colonizers, it has, however, been noticed that the purchasers of land accept such terms and conditions from colonizers which render Government action difficult".³ As in all government documents, the language is bureaucratic and impersonal making it difficult to pin responsibility for the situation on any one person.

I was curious to find out how these different perspectives interact to shape the process of illegal subdivision of land in Delhi. I soon discovered that people's perceptions of the subdivision process have changed, in turn transforming the process itself. In this thesis I therefore decided to focus on the causes of the transformations and their impacts on the access to land for the urban poor.

This thesis, like all forms of representation, emphasizes some aspects and dampens others. I was looking for answers to a set of questions generated by my prior

¹ Manjari, resident, Sant Nagar, Delhi. Interview Dec, 1990.


experience and the literature. While doing the fieldwork many different streams of evidence, partial explanations became stronger and joined to form a river, which became the central argument. In the process, some interesting streams led to other rivers and were left out, other important ones arrived from places I was not exploring. As the argument made in the thesis is presented "river first," and is a particular perspective from which I observed the plain, I would like to present my point of view at the beginning.

In starting my thesis research I was motivated by the following question: What role did I have as an architect and planner in the field of low income housing? My architectural education in India had mostly prepared me to design elaborate buildings, while the real demand for low income housing was being met by the people themselves. Illegal land subdivisions, squatter settlements and resettlement colonies were housing a majority of the population. To understand my own role in the process, I wanted to be able to fill the gaps and contradictions in what I had read through an exploration of how the process worked on the ground.

The "ground" for me, became the busy settlement of Sant Nagar, a peripheral settlement in the north of Delhi, where the ground (literally) was being subdivided into plots, giving me the opportunity to observe the process of formation of "unauthorized colonies" (illegal subdivisions in Delhi). The land occupied by the colony was originally the agricultural land of two villages; Burari and Jharoda. With the freeze on land transfers in Delhi in 1957, land for housing became in high demand, and colonizers bought agricultural land illegally at low prices and sold it to the urban population making high profits, after subdividing it. In the early days of formation Sant Nagar had been dominated by speculative plot-buyers. In 1983, the government legalized Block A of the colony as a rural settlement area, an action which led to a spurt of additional subdividing on the outskirts, as well as an increase in the overall resident population. The settlement now consists of two halves, a legal part Block A, and an illegal part Block B and C. The colony is becoming rapidly populated and has two main resident associations. I was able to interview some of the various actors who were a part of the creation of this settlement.

I had gone into the case study settlement fully expecting the colonizers to be exploitative and profiteering, and the residents to be exploited by the system and the colonizers, and I began my interviews with such a prejudice in mind. In reality as the interviews proceeded, all the actors seemed to be acting in their own interests, and
sometimes even with social benefits occurring as a result of personal motivations. Often actions inspired by personal, profiteering goals, had social goals met along the way. A colonizer built a school and a clubhouse in his illegal subdivision to gain support and raise land values of his property. Dealers paid commissions to residents who brought customers, which enabled the poor to use their time and social contacts for getting reductions in the price of their own plots. Speculative buyers of land, constructed minimal shelter and rented it out at low or no rent to the poor without taking key money to ensure future possession of land. With there being benefits to so many, was the process of illegal subdivision to be understood as a mutually beneficial process for all the actors involved? This question remains behind the arguments made in the thesis.

I also began research sympathizing with the community efforts to improve the organization of the settlement. However, I found that the resident associations were largely comprised of the better off residents of the colony. And these "socially conscious" people were really interested in mobilizing the people to get the colonies regularized and infrastructure installed in order to make the settlement a higher status neighborhood. As one association's president said to me, "it is only when the proper facilities arrive that this settlement will get dominated by people of higher class. The poor will then have to move out further into the periphery." The community was not only divided along class lines but also fragmented through local political struggles for power. For example, within the same neighborhood, besides the main resident association, there were also smaller resident associations which had the same mandate as the larger one and each claimed to be the real representative of the people. These examples question the notion of a singular community existing in the settlement that mobilizes against the state to demand for various services.

The fieldwork also led me to question the notion of a monolithic state from which the community of urban poor is demanding basic services. Often, I found the officials of the public authorities sympathetic to the cause of the urban poor. The dual roles of many people as residents as well as belonging to state agencies, creates channels of informal linkages. These linkages open up opportunities to work within cracks in the system which help the underprivileged gain access to resources. Such working from within the system also prevents direct confrontation with the state which characterizes

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4 This situation was in part created by the public authorities, as they would deal with colonies only through resident associations and not through individuals.
the movements of the urban poor in squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions in Latin America. These informal linkages between different interest groups, also underscore the fact that the formal and informal sector are highly interconnected, and that national circumstances have simultaneous effects on the illegal land subdivision process at the local level. For example, the recent political upheavals in the past year have slowed the market demand for illegal land because it is not clear which informal linkages will be sustained and useful in the near future. This uncertainty has made speculators as well as residents wary of investing in illegal land subdivisions. Thus, in the thesis I have emphasized the multiplicity of roles played by people, and the informal linkages between different interest groups.

While doing field research I was moved by the generosity of the residents of Sant Nagar with their time, resources and information. I was unwilling to structure my interviews just to get answers to the questions I had; I tried listen to whatever they wanted to talk about. I would like my thesis to reflect the concerns of the residents, along with my own academic understanding of the issues. In the thesis, therefore, I present evidence of the changing perceptions of the people in the land subdivision process and their implications for access to land for the urban poor.
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PLOTTING TRANSFORMATIONS

INTRODUCTION

When I first became interested in illegal land markets in developing countries, I was struck by the fact that people's perceptions regarding the law played such an important part in determining their actions in illegal subdivisions. With the evolution of the laws governing illegal subdivisions, the process of subdividing land would also have evolved. What kinds of changes have these been, and how have they influenced the access to land? The thesis I present shows that such changes have occurred which might require us to change our perceptions of the process of illegal subdivision.

In this thesis, therefore, my main contention is that the illegal subdivision process has changed and evolved over the past two decades. This evolution has been influenced by the changed perceptions of the people directly involved in the process of subdivision. While access to land for the poorer income groups has been reduced, some positive results have also occurred. These changes require us to rethink our understandings of illegal subdivisions and our beliefs about the appropriate role of the state.

The first part of the introduction will describe the findings briefly, with reference to conventional literature. In the second part I will discuss the importance of the conceptualization of the state in explaining its attitudes towards illegal subdivisions. In the third part I will emphasize the linkages between national and local housing policies and events, and the emergence of illegal subdivisions in Delhi. In the fourth part I will present a brief description of the methodology and the case study. Lastly, I will provide a brief description of the structure of the thesis.
I. CURRENT DEBATES ABOUT ILLEGAL SUBDIVISIONS

The recent focus on the success of the market is in contrast to the earlier focus on approaches of direct state intervention in the field of housing. State projects in the form of sites and services and upgrading have been criticized for being a drop in the bucket, for not being able to reach the intended target groups and for being adopted largely due to international donor pressure by governments and therefore not really replicable (Nientied and Linden 1985).

The spotlight has been on one such market mechanism: illegal commercial land subdivision. In its simplest form, a developer buys vacant agricultural land at the urban fringe, subdivides it and sells it in the form of smaller plots. These plots are sold at low prices and have minimal or no infrastructure. The reasons for their illegality vary: the illegal sale of notified land, the development of land not residentially zoned, non-conformity with the prevailing standards of subdivision or other infringements of the law regarding land transactions.

Some research done on illegal settlements has viewed the process as successfully meeting the demands of lower-income groups\(^1\). The arguments often advanced for the support of illegal subdivisions are:

a. Lower costs: Plots in illegal land subdivisions are said to be cheaper than legal plots due to their lower standards of infrastructure and insecure tenure (Baross 1990). The risk of eviction by public authorities is seen as the main cause of insecure tenure. In addition, bypassing the legal system lowers the administrative costs of the developer as well as saves time, leading to quicker operations.

b. Greater choice: Illegal subdivisions offer choices in terms of plot sizes, level of infrastructure and tenure.

\(^1\) Some authors also relate the prevalence of illegal subdivisions to the operation of the housing market as a whole. For example, in the case of Bogota, Gilbert and Ward (1985) argue that strong enforcement against squatting and the existence of a well developed rental market push the poor into renting, or buying land in illegal subdivisions. In Turkey, Payne (1978) found that people bought plots in illegal subdivisions despite the low levels of infrastructure as the developer promised to provide them. Having invested their money they were forced to accept existing conditions.
c. Flexibility in construction: The lot holders can phase the consolidation of the plots in keeping with the budget priorities of the household at different times.

d. Credit: It has been found that developers often extend credit to the buyers in the form of accepting payment in installments, and sometimes even offer loans for construction of their house (Payne 1978). In the absence of access to formal credit markets, this is viewed as a positive aspect.

e. Ability to sell plots easily: The lack of a stable income in the poorer population sometimes leads to sudden shifts in the housing priorities of the poor. The perceived ease of turnover in plots makes illegal subdivisions attractive. Moreover, the lack of laws allows a densification of the plot akin to traditional neighborhoods.

f. Locational advantages: Another reason sometimes advanced is that due to their prevalence throughout the city, illegal subdivisions offer the choice of location.

On a more general level, scholars also argue that insecure tenure in illegal subdivisions leads to the articulation of demands by the poorer sections in society (de Soto 1989). Another positive aspect of illegal settlements could be income earning opportunities created by the minimal services, for example the provision of water or electricity for a price.

II. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

I was surprised to find that, while the earlier process of formation of the illegal subdivisions in Delhi supported the literature, settlements formed after 1977 show different patterns and processes of formation. Therefore, I have divided the processes into two phases, pre-1977 and post-1977, caused by the major changes in government policy. The state of Emergency in 1976-1977 and the authoritarian role played by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) during that period resulted in the demolition of large numbers of illegal settlements. The Junta government that came to power in the general elections of 1977, to soothe the tense situation, formulated a policy for the regularization of unauthorized colonies. Under this policy most settlements were eligible to be regularized. The experience of demolition during the emergency, and the large scale regularization program afterwards, along with the incessant spiralling of land
prices, have been influential in creating the differences between earlier and later colonies.

Three circumstances have changed, which form the basis of the chapters. First, the risk of eviction by public authorities has fallen. Second, the risk of losing possession by land grabbing and fraudulent dealing has increased. Third, increased formalization of the contracts between the landowners and developers have resulted in the developers playing a new role in settlement consolidation. These changes have had impacts at two levels, the settlement and the plotholder. For the settlement as a whole, the nature of the market, the organization of residents and the role of the colonizer, have been affected. For the individual plotholder, there are implications for access to land and housing consolidation.

First, at the settlement level, overall plot sizes have decreased in response to higher land prices. Moreover, the market has become organized around the basis of reputation and a pyramidal system of commissions. The colonizer plays an increased role in the consolidation and growth of the settlement, to the extent that in a part of the case study, one colonizer formed the settlement association.

Second, for the individual buyer, buying a plot involves greater expenses than before. Additionally, the availability of credit through the colonizer has ceased. As a result, the overall plot buyers are of a higher income level than before. However, some rental housing has been added by speculators to avoid losing possession of their land. Also, heterogeneity of income groups living in unauthorized colonies does create income earning opportunities for the poorer residents. Some residents from sites and services projects have moved into the case study settlement to improve their economic situation. These findings contradict some of the literature discussed earlier on the virtues of illegal land subdivisions.

III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The increasing numbers of people served by this mode of land supply in many parts of the world has been in part caused by the trend of governments towards the incorporation of illegal land subdivisions into the legal framework through regularization (Payne 1989). What are possible explanations for the tendency towards the regularization
of illegal subdivisions? The political usefulness of illegal settlements have often been cited as a cause of the tolerance of illegality (Mukherjee 1988; Mitra 1987). Gilbert (1990:25), provides six possible reasons for the tolerance of illegal settlements. First, the patron client relationships that develop are politically expedient. Second, illegality helps ration limited services to the upper income groups. Third, it provides possibilities of politically motivated, selective discriminatory action. Fourth, it gives public authorities flexibility in acquiring land for public projects. Fifth, it is advantageous to some interest groups like the landowners. Sixth, it reduces the price of urban development.

While, in this thesis, I do not attempt to elaborate on the concepts of the state, it is important to the discussion to briefly describe how the state’s actions towards improving conditions of the urban settlements have been viewed by different scholars. The concept of the liberal state understands the state as an entity which acts in the best interests of the poor. The concept of the instrumental state views the state as an instrument of elite interest groups. The concept of the structuralist state views the state as dominated by the interests of the elite but sometimes acting against these interests in order to retain the power structure and avoid social upheaval (Gilbert and Ward 1985, Collier 1976). While the concept of the structuralist state explains gaps in the theories of the liberal and instrumental state, it does not explain the conditions under which the state can pursue the goal of poverty alleviation.

Some scholars have also questioned the underlying concept of the monolithic state.

The public sector is not homogeneous; there is no one single strategy throughout the public sector.... what is more there is seldom any coordination between the strategies of the central and local bodies regarding urban land and housing development (Durand-Lasserve 1987:325).

This questioning emphasizes the contradictory actions of the different agencies within the state and the differences in central and local bodies without giving adequate explanations as to why these contradicting strategies occur. Explaining this problem Peattie (1979: 1021) states:

There is not a single government interest and thus no clear-cut unambiguous government policy. Rather, there are diverse and conflicting interests and shifting alliances between them.
Thus the pluralistic nature of the state would allow the residents of illegal settlements to use the state to gain leverage within the system. Some researchers explain the varying, sometimes contradictory actions towards illegal settlements as a part of "carrot" and "stick" tactics by politicians who offer services and regularization in exchange for votes. They simultaneously provide services incrementally to some settlements and selectively demolish other settlements to retain their control over the voters.

I will argue for an additional factor which could in India, explain the increasing regularization phenomenon - the permeation of the state by the residents of unauthorized colonies. 2 Illegality in Delhi has reached such large proportions (an estimated 1.2 million of the Delhi’s population of 5.7 million resided in illegal subdivisions in 1981) that many of the residents of illegal settlements are either a part of the state or are linked closely to it. The DDA alone has an estimated 60,000 employees (Mukherjee 1988). The personal connections between the residents and parts of the local state (politicians as well as administrators) as a result of the dual role played by some residents result in a sympathetic perspective of the problem of illegal subdivisions in Delhi.

Assuming then, that under certain conditions the state has some autonomy in improving the conditions of the poor, what is the position that the state should adopt towards illegal subdivisions? In the literature two basic views predominate (Varley 1989). First, opinion is divided between regularization and legalization. Regularization implies that the state recognizes the existence of illegal subdivisions and accepts responsibility to provide basic services in the settlements. Legalization means that the state recognizes that this existence of illegal subdivisions has a legal basis and will provide plot-holders with a secure title (Gilbert, 1990:29). Legalization obviously implies

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2 The permeation of the state is a term increasingly used by researchers to depict a situation where some people from the illegal subdivision, work for the state. Here, I use it to mean both, some people working in the public authorities for however un-technical a position, and the informal linkages between people in illegal subdivisions and the public authorities, which give the residents advance access to information.

3 The estimate presented here is from the DDA Report on Policies and Regularization of Unauthorized Colonies. Estimations of the population in unauthorized colonies more recently ranges from a low figure of 25% of the population (Bijlani 1988, to a high figure of 40% (Mukherjee 1988). Mitra (1990) also indicates that unauthorized colonies have remained a significant contributor to the housing stock since 1981. In the absence of accurate recent data regarding population in unauthorized colonies, I have not estimated a figure.
the benefits of regularization. Proponents on the right argue for regularization on the grounds that it will increase investment in housing (Blaesser 1981, Vernez 1973), and increase the availability of services, reduce cost and increase private sector construction (Linn 1983). De Soto (1989) argues for legalization as the granting of titles will enable the plot-holders to use the title as collateral for loans to build houses or start small scale enterprises.

Second, some authors argue that state action has not only failed to ameliorate problems but has often compounded them (Angel 1983). One could argue from this position that the best action that could be taken is to leave illegal subdivisions alone. Analysts on the left have criticized regularization, legalization and self help practices as a way for governments to avoid direct responsibility for the provision of housing. In the face of limited financial and managerial resources it has been easier for governments to make changes in the laws, which do not burden the state. They see regularization policies as alienating the poorest through increasing land prices and gentrification. On a structural level, partial regularization policies are seen as safety valves for diffusing larger social tension (Gilbert and Ward 1985).

The evidence presented in this thesis questions the assumptions of both the points of view presented above. On the one hand regularization breeds conditions of illegality and poor standards that it is trying to prevent. Moreover, evidence shows that some of the hopes of the availability of credit through installments etc. are simply no longer true. On the other hand, those who already possess plots benefit from increased land values that accompany regularization. In the end, the process of illegal subdivision is not completely equitable or efficient, but it seems to function well in meeting the housing needs of a large segment of the urban population.

IV. THE CASE STUDY: SANT NAGAR, DELHI

A. The Context of Delhi

In Delhi, the phenomenon of illegal subdivisions, called unauthorized colonies, has grown considerably over the past thirty years. The emergence and growth of unauthorized colonies in Delhi is linked to evolution of housing policies and the larger
Plan of Shahjahanabad (old Delhi), laid on a plan of New Delhi at approximately the same scale.

Fig. 1.1 Comparison of space standards between imperial New Delhi and Shahjahanabad.
national context. As others have done elaborate studies of the evolution of unauthorized colonies as a part of housing sub-markets (Mitra 1976, Bharathi 1986, Mukherjee 1988), I will briefly touch upon these here. Of importance here will be how various national events and influences have a bearing on the phenomenon of unauthorized colonies.

India's development after independence has been largely influenced by imported models. The continued use of instruments, procedures and institutions created by the British have been the basis of land development practices. The instrument to have the most influence on the development of Delhi has been the use of the "master plan" which, along with the concept of the socialization of land, has been instrumental in perpetuating the dual land market.

At the time of independence, there were two forms of land and housing ownership. The state owned and rigidly controlled the land and housing in colonial New Delhi. In the old city of Shahjahanabad and its extensions, land was privately owned and was commercialized. The contrasts between the two were great in terms of density, quality of housing and levels of control over usage. Low income households depended either on inner city rentals or subsidized government tenements which were available in limited quantities.

After independence, the government had to respond to the increased population in Delhi caused by two main factors. First, the influx of refugees from Pakistan was an immediate problem. The newly formed ministry of Rehabilitation built subsidized tenements in twenty locations, 4 to 6 kilometers away from the city center to accommodate about 65,000 of the 125,000 refugees. The second major source of population growth was the urban migration caused by Delhi's predominance as the center of government and increasing industrial and trade center. To accommodate its employees, the government built 21,000 dwellings of which eighty seven percent accommodated lower income groups (Mitra 1990). Despite these large scale efforts, the government was unable to house all its employees through its own efforts.

Meanwhile, the private sector was also active. Some private companies were catering to higher income levels. They built colonies on farmland after getting their plans approved by the Delhi Improvement Trust, which was the first body in charge of development in Delhi created by the British. The government had also encouraged the formation of cooperative housing societies which were given land on lease at low rates.
Fig. 1.2 Comparison between master plan and reality, Delhi, 1981.
The plot sizes in these earlier legal colonies was about 960 square meters. To fulfill the unsatisfied demand for low income housing, some colonizers began subdividing land without legal permission. However, some families could not afford even the low rates in these subdivisions and they began squatting on vacant public land.

By the mid 1950's, the government realized that there was no piecemeal solution to the urban growth crisis. In an effort to control and guide the development of Delhi, in 1957, it initiated the Master Plan for Delhi. One of the main features of the master-plan was the policy of the large scale acquisition of land. The stated goals of the policy were:

- to achieve the optimal social use of land
- to insure the availability of land in adequate quantities at the right times and for reasonable prices to both the public authorities and individuals.
- to prevent the concentration of land ownership in few private hands and safeguard the interests of the poor and underprivileged.
- to control land values and to eliminate speculative profits (Govt. of India 1958).

There were three main results of this policy. First, it froze all land with no possibility of development till the DDA developed the land. Second, it curbed the operations of the private housing companies at the height of their activities, while providing no alternative channel for private initiative in the housing process. Third, it perpetuated a dualistic land market by excluding already developed areas from its purview. As a result the price of vacant land within the developed areas rose dramatically. All together had the effect of causing the emergence and growth of unauthorized colonies.

Besides these the government also acted through two policies which had indirect effects on the land and housing markets. Starting in 1958 it planned to replace the squatter housing within the city by resettling the population in sites and services projects, in Delhi called resettlement colonies. From 1963 it also proposed the regularization of unauthorized colonies, thus implicitly accepting the process of their formation. For its own part, the DDA had been unable to produce much housing, and what it had produced was not targeted towards the lower income population. Between 1961 and 1971, only 22 percent of the plots went to low income families and between 1971 and 1981 the figure rose to only 42 percent (Misra 1986). We can thus see how a combination of DDA's direct and indirect actions in the land market, caused a growth in the number of unauthorized colonies.
Fig. 1.3 Growth of unauthorised colonies in Delhi, 1942 - 1980.
On the political level, the twenty month Internal Emergency period from 1975 to 1977, changed the complacent conditions under which illegal housing had mushroomed. The government suspended public liberties including the freedom of the press and normal judicial procedures. The DDA, under the pretext of restoring "order" to the city undertook a series of demolitions of unauthorized colonies and squatter settlements and resettled the residents in resettlement camps at the periphery. All the political networks that the residents of illegal settlements had built up to prevent legal action against their settlements were useless under the emergency. The politicians no longer needed legitimacy through the support of the people since they had openly taken an authoritarian stand.

With the Junta Party winning elections after the emergency, (and the later return of the Congress party to power in 1980), the situation returned to normal. In 1977, the Junta government formed a policy for the large scale regularization of unauthorized colonies. Since then, the growth of unauthorized colonies has increased while the formation of new squatter settlements has declined. There has been a growth of resident associations which are registered under the "Registration of Societies Act". These associations are formed in the early stages of the settlement development, often by the colonizer as will be described later in the thesis.

Meanwhile, the DDA's efforts in the direct production of either land or housing have been limited to a few prestigious schemes. In 1980, the DDA initiated Rohini, a large scale housing project in the north western periphery to accommodate 850,000 people on 1000 hectares of land. More recently, it proposed the prestigious scheme of Papan Kalan in the south western periphery. However, these schemes have been overpriced, under-serviced and located at great distances from the city.

Most recently, the influx of refugees from the turmoil in Punjab and Kashmir to the city have increased the population of the city. The refugees have been able to salvage some of their assets from their homes and have found a good investment as well as opportunity to build a house in unauthorized colonies. Simultaneously, the recent political upheavals in 1990, have caused a slowness in the illegal subdivision process. In 1989, the National Front (a coalition of various political parties led by the Junta Party) headed by V.P. Singh came into power, followed by an internal crisis, which resulted in Chandrashekhar becoming the prime-minister backed by the Congress party. In early
Fig. 1.4 Location of Sant Nagar, Delhi.
1991, this precarious arrangement collapsed. The next general elections are scheduled to be held in May 1991. Thus, within a period of two years, India saw three governments. These uncertain political conditions have resulted in slowness of the land market in two ways. First, the recent uncertainty of the political situation, as well as the effects of the international economic recession on the local economy, has made speculators wary of risky investments. Second, the political connections cultivated by the colonizers are in a state of flux, as it is uncertain who will be in power. As a result, buyers are unsure which colonies are safe investments. Meanwhile, in spite of the uncertainty of future conditions, unauthorized colonies continue to provide housing for a majority of Delhi’s urban population. At an estimate between 25 and 45 percent of Delhi’s population lives in unauthorized colonies in 1990.

It is evident from this rather brief historical account that the processes of growth and development of unauthorized colonies are closely linked to the political and economic conditions at a national level.

B. The Case Study and Methodology

The primary empirical evidence for this study consists of fieldwork conducted over a six week period during Dec 1990 and Jan 1991. The fieldwork comprised of a case study of a newly formed illegal settlement - the unauthorized colony of Sant Nagar. While the validity of generalizing from a single case is questionable, this research is a preliminary exploration of the issues. Undoubtedly, the applicability of the argument to other settlements or contexts will need to be tested through additional empirical research. However, as far as possible, the findings were discussed with other researchers as well as corroborated through limited interviews with city officials and residents of other settlements.

The settlement of Sant Nagar was initially selected for a case study largely due to some existing contacts. As the research progressed however, some interesting characteristics became evident:

- most of the existing research on unauthorized colonies in Delhi has tended to focus on colonies which are by now regularized (Khurana 1966, Mitra 1976). The initial process of formation described in these earlier case studies is different I found, from the process of formation of the more recent colonies.
a. Approaching Sant Nagar. Note the walled off agricultural fields and a temple in the distance signifying the formation of a new colony.

b. General density of built area. Note the many vacant plots.

c. The bus-stop at Sant Nagar.

d. The police check post on the main road.

Fig. 1.5 Views of the approach to Sant Nagar, Delhi.
earlier research has also tended to focus on colonies which emerged largely on notified land zoned for urban uses. Thus the colonies, when regularized, were regularized as part of the urban area. Block A of Sant Nagar was initially regularized as a part of the rural area. The process of regularizing such a colony posed interesting advantages and disadvantages as perceived by the residents.

- the colony (both the legal and the illegal part) is in the early process of settlement formation and consolidation. It is moving slowly from a colony dominated by speculative buyers to a more residential commercial one. This gave me an opportunity to study the process unfolding.

The research was conducted mostly through unstructured interviews with residents (25), the initial colonizer of Block B and C, property dealers (4), material supplier and contractor (2), president of resident association in Block A and Block B and C, head of a chit fund (1) and plot holders who were not residents (4). The interviews were not based on statistically significant methods, but were largely directed by the availability of the residents in various parts of the settlement. However, the emphasis was not to obtain quantitative information but more to understand the processes and perceptions involved. Much of the information, especially regarding prices and incomes, could not be verified. Due to this limitation, I will not use the data quantitatively. Additionally, some officials from the DDA and the MCD, some researchers and people (developers and residents) from other settlements were interviewed to understand to what extent the case was generalizable. A newspaper clippings search was also carried out for the years 1987 to 1989 for which clippings arranged by subject were found.

C. Sant Nagar

The case study settlement Sant Nagar is located in North Delhi near the urban periphery. The land occupied by the colony was originally the agricultural land of two villages; Burari and Jharoda. It falls in the East Delhi parliamentary constituency and in the rural municipal zone of Najafgarh. The area covered by the original colony consisted of 8.1 hectares of fertile agricultural land which was prone to annual flooding. In the master-plan it was shown as rural green area.

As is the case with most unauthorized colonies, the rapid growth of Sant Nagar in the past decade is largely due to its location. It is located beyond the outer ring road
Fig. 1.6  Layout plan of Sant Nagar showing Blocks A, B and C.
in the rural zone of the union territory. The nearest large legal settlement of the city is Kingsway Camp, which was one of the various refugee colonies set up after independence to house the refugee population. It is also near the old Autumn lines, a slum area which was cleared by the MCD in 1977. The Delhi University, and the Police Lines (training grounds and facilities) are near Kingsway Camp. Many government offices and educational institutes are located in the urban area nearby.

V. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

There were three main changes which are linked to their impacts at the settlement and the plotholder level. Accordingly the thesis is divided into three main chapters and a conclusion. In each chapter, I discuss one main change in the process of subdivision, identify its possible causes, and relate its impacts on the settlement and the individual residents. As most findings are inter-linked to the three main changes, there may by some repetition in the chapters. In addition, the three changes are summarized in the introduction. The conclusions summarize the settlement and resident level implications in a thematic way. The case study has not been presented in all together in one chapter, but is drawn upon when specific issues are discussed.

The first chapter traces the evolution of DDA’s regularization and demolition policies as being the main causes of the decreased risk of eviction. In this chapter, I also make some conjectures on why the policies have evolved towards increasing regularization. In the impacts on the settlement level I will argue that the policy of regularization contrary to expectations has led to decreased standards of road widths, community facilities and plot sizes. At the plotholder level, while the income groups who can afford a plot are higher, the access to land provides income earning opportunities due to the variety of income groups present. The high expectation of eventual regularization has led to these expectations being physically expressed in the consolidation of the plot.

4 The terms settlement level and resident level are used to indicate both, the physical and the social aspects of the settlement throughout. Thus, the plotholder level would be a plot as well as the household as a social unit. I also use the term plotholder to mean the owners of the plots whereas resident would be used specifically for residents of the settlement, owners as well as renters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGES</th>
<th>IMPACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing risk of eviction</td>
<td>Political vote catching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal linkages between residents and public authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing risk of fraud and land grab</td>
<td>Increasing land prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterproductive state interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing formalization of contracts</td>
<td>Farmers learn of prices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second chapter shows how the risk of losing possession due to fraudulent dealing and land grabbing has increased. High land prices, the unclear titles in land and the increased territorial organization of the colonizers have caused this trend. At the settlement level, the importance of trust and reputation has led to the territorial organization of the colonizers and a system of plot sales through a pyramidal commission structure. The option of location in a particular settlement is seen to be governed by choice as well as constraint. At the plotholder level, the plotholders have to make a high upfront investment in order to ensure possession when they decide to occupy the plot. Speculators are also renting out minimal rooms in order to retain possession of their plot.

The third chapter traces the formalization of contracts between the landowners and farmers. The causes of this formalization are the "urbanization" process of the farmers and the increasing number of farmers turning into colonizers. At the settlement level, the colonizer is increasing his role in the settlement consolidation due to personal motives of increasing land values and gaining political power. At the level of the plotholder, the colonizer can no longer offer credit on installments, a fact which also contributes to the higher income groups present in the settlement.

The conclusions are presented at the end in a thematic way as a recasting of the chapter conclusions. Critical to improving economic conditions through access to land in illegal subdivisions, is a first step into the system. The concern here is for those households who could earlier gain access to illegal land subdivisions but now cannot. In other words how are those who have no access to the system coping? As credit seems to be a critical part of the access to land, increasing the supply of land through state measures and increasing the availability of credit seem to be two options. Finally some issues of research interest to me are presented. The first, is the role of resident associations as mediating institutions between the authorities and the residents, and the interactions between resident associations. The second is the workings of the informal chit funds (called "committees") and their role in providing credit for housing consolidation and informal production and commercial activities. The third is the role of illegal subdivisions in being centers of production activities.

The matrix represents the structure of the chapters.
Chapter 2

THE DECLINING RISK OF EVICTION BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

Why is the perceived risk of eviction by public authorities in unauthorized colonies so low these days? Almost all the people I interviewed did not believe that the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) would demolish their houses. And yet, the DDA has, in the recent past, carried out demolitions throughout the city. Even in Sant Nagar the demolition squad has appeared twice, albeit without demolishing any houses. Simultaneously, the DDA has also regularized many colonies. This pattern of regularization and acceptance of illegal subdivisions is occurring almost universally in cities of the third world (Payne 1989). So how are the conflicting actions of demolition and regularization to be understood? Conventional wisdom has indicated that illegal settlements attract low-income groups due to the insecurity of tenure and hence low prices associated with them. Does the increasing trend towards regularization mean that higher income groups are now settling in illegal subdivisions? If this is true, what implications has the increasing security of tenure had on the plotholders and on the settlement?

In this chapter I explore these questions by tracing the evolution of DDA policies towards unauthorized colonies and by analyzing the effects of these policies on Sant Nagar. There are two main sections to this chapter. In the first section, I trace the evolution of DDA policies of regularization and demolition, and analyze the effects of these on the perceptions of the plotholders. In the second section, at the level of the settlement, I present evidence which contradicts the conventional argument that a
Fig. 2.1 Layout patterns of pre-1977 and post-1977 colonies
regularization policy will encourage colonizers to improve layout standards in anticipation of regularization, and argue that in fact economic considerations dominate. At the level of the plot holders, I support the argument made by others that illegal subdivisions provide combinations of price, security of tenure, plot size and social structures that are preferred over state projects such as sites and services. Thus, although increasing land prices have excluded the poorest from gaining access to land in unauthorized colonies, the colonies provide opportunities for economic mobility to people who benefit in many different ways.

I. CHANGES: EVOLUTION OF DDA’S POLICIES

The evolution of DDA’s policies towards illegal subdivisions in Delhi has followed the third-world trend (Payne 1989). City policies have moved from focussing on eviction and relocation, to the acceptance of unauthorized colonies and their improvement through regularization. In this section, I will trace the DDA’s evolving attitude towards unauthorized colonies, from hostility to acceptance. Exemplifying an attitude of hostility is a statement by the metropolitan councillor in the early 1960’s:

At the very outset, I would like to make it clear that the Government are very keen to rid this ancient and glorious City of Delhi of the menace of unauthorized and generally ugly-planned construction. I have no doubt that every right thinking citizen would like the Government to curb illegal activities with a firm hand, ensure planned development of Delhi, and make it a beautiful and worthy capital of a great nation.

While this attitude is held by some professionals even today, practical considerations have demanded solutions of acceptance and the DDA has moved towards the increasing regularization of colonies.  

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1 Project Report on Policies and Regularization of Unauthorized Colonies. City Planning Wing Delhi Development Authority, 1984. Supporting this viewpoint, while portraying a more sympathetic attitude towards the people, the DDA, in a press statement (1961) argued:

If such colonies are left to themselves, the risk is that slum conditions will develop rapidly, which will obviously be undesirable from the point of view of the inhabitants of those colonies as well as those in the neighboring areas.
### Characteristics of Structures in 471 Unauthorized Colonies,
Delhi, India - 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>54,973</td>
<td>39.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Permanent</td>
<td>39,529</td>
<td>28.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>24,432</td>
<td>17.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to Plinth Level</td>
<td>5,708</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake</td>
<td>5,813</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant Plots</td>
<td>7,545</td>
<td>5.47</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DDA (1984)

### Land Use Pattern in 471 Unauthorized Colonies
Delhi, India - 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
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<td>83.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resid.+ Commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indust.+ Commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>101.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DDA (1984)
A. Regularization Policies

Over the years the DDA has formulated a variety of policies, from the first decision to regularize unauthorized colonies, to the recent policy under which unauthorized colonies can seek regularization provided they fulfil certain conditions. As early as 1963, strong political lobbying in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Indian Parliament led to the regularization of 110 colonies that had existed before the date of notification of land,\(^2\) conditional upon the conformity to Municipal Corporation of Delhi's (MCD) regularization plans and the payment of development charges by the plot holders. Regularization meant freehold tenure and the provision of infrastructure, making the colonies attractive to higher-income groups. Demand for land was high due to the shortage of legal land in Delhi, and prices in these colonies rose. Between 1957 and 1967, Delhi land prices rose ten to twenty times, equalling prices of legal freehold land in middle-class localities (Mitra 1990). Many low income families cashed in on the increase in land prices and sold all or a part of their land. The increase in land prices also fuelled the further growth of illegal colonies.

In the decade of 1967-1977 a series of regularization policies lowered standards and postponed cutoff dates for the consideration of the regularization of settlements, thus giving impetus to the further mushrooming of unauthorized colonies. In April of 1966, the Municipal Corporation relaxed the prevailing standards for roads and community facilities. It also decided to consider for regularization colonies already existing by September 1962 that did not violate the zoning in the masterplan. In March 1969, DDA and MCD decided to consider for regularization 101 colonies that had appeared between 1963 and 1967. Moreover, even colonies on land acquired by the DDA would be regularized after payment of money for the land and penalties for non-conforming uses, and setting aside land for community facilities. Under this decision 68 colonies were regularized, raising the number of unauthorized regularized colonies to 174. Between 1967 and 1974, 260 new colonies appeared, and by 1975 a survey by the DDA noted a total of 471 colonies. During the Emergency imposed in 1976, the DDA played an

\(^2\) "Notification is the first step in acquiring land by expropriation (eminent domain). In the 1960's the DDA had, under the large scale acquisition scheme, "notified" most land on the urban periphery for acquisition to form a land bank."
Development of housing options in Delhi

Source: Mitra (1990)

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### DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN UNAUTHORIZED COLONIES: DELHI URBAN AREA, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>URBAN POP. (Thousands)</th>
<th>POPULATION IN UNAUTHORIZED COLONIES (Thousands)</th>
<th>As % of URBAN POP. in zone</th>
<th>As % of TOTAL POP. in colonies</th>
<th>NO. OF UNAUTH. COLONIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2359</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN UNAUTHORIZED COLONIES: DELHI URBAN AREA, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>URBAN POP. (Thousands)</th>
<th>POPULATION IN UNAUTHORIZED COLONIES (Thousands)</th>
<th>As % of URBAN POP. in zone</th>
<th>As % of TOTAL POP. in colonies</th>
<th>NO. OF UNAUTH. COLONIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3647</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: B. Chatterji Mitra, The Evolution of SCRS in Delhi; from Census 1971; DDA Record

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Fig. 2.3 Spatial growth of housing options -- unauthorised colonies.
authoritarian role and demolished many squatter settlements and some of the 612 unauthorized colonies.

In 1977, the Congress Party fell from power in the general elections after the Emergency and the Junta Party came to power. Under the auspices of this new regime, the DDA formulated a broad policy for the regularization of colonies existing before June 1977. This policy meant that all 612 colonies could be regularized. However, despite the inability of the administration to collect penalties, premiums and betterment charges, the collection of these charges still formed a part of the policy and many colonies were therefore not regularized. In 1983, there were 734 unauthorized colonies that could be regularized under the regularization policy. The population in these colonies in 1984 was in official figures about 2,200,000 out of 6.2 million in Delhi. In 1988 they occupied 45 square kilometers of the 450 square kilometers of urban land of Delhi.

1. Explanations for the Pattern of Policies

The stated objectives of improving the standards in existing colonies and curbing the growth of new colonies have not been met. The growth of colonies has spiralled from 110 colonies containing approximately 9 percent of the population to 734 colonies containing approximately 37 percent of the population of metropolitan Delhi. Moreover, not all the colonies regularized to date have been provided with infrastructure. What explains this trend of increasing regularization even though it has not been able to curb the further growth of unauthorized colonies?

It is interesting to compare the efforts of DDA in Delhi to Bogota, Colombia, in curbing the growth of unauthorized colonies where some success has been achieved in curbing the growth of "pirata" settlements (illegal subdivisions). Faced with a similar problem of increasing illegal subdivisions, the public authorities have actually managed to reduce the growth of illegal colonies (Hamer 1985, Gilbert and Ward 1985). The critical features of the policy are: improvement of services in authorized colonies, lowering of accepted standards, alternative avenues for private sector participation through the lowered norms, and the strict enforcement of the law against subsequent offenders. Strict enforcement of the law and alternatives for legal profitable subdividing ensure that political pressure is not built up to reduce enforcement and discourage the private developer from breaking the law. It seems that such an approach would come
Demolition ban a poll-eve bananza

NOTHING could be more disconcerting for Delhi's planned and orderly development than the Lt-Governor's new directive to the local bodies banning demolition of unauthorised inhabited buildings. As per the new guidelines, the Municipal Corporation and the Delhi Development Authority have been asked to check fresh encroachments on land owned by Government, MCD and the DDA. The new order, however, does not say anything about private or agricultural land. 

Mushroom growth of jhuggi jhappi clusters, unchecked development of unauthorised colonies and large scale illegal construction in the commercial complexes in consonance with the local civic bodies have already ruined the urban planning concept.

Despite scores of surveys and expert studies, the local administration has been grappling with the ever increasing problem of approved and unapproved residential complexes which have become near slums because of lack of basic civic services and unplanned development. The unchecked migration of lakhs of people into the Capital from different parts of the country and total failure of the NCR plans have added to the urban chaos facing nearly eight million people.

The Lt-Governor in the note issued on Aug. 4, 1987, is taking some policy decisions regarding unauthorised colonies and those areas which are inhabited etc., I do not want any demolitions to take place of the inhabited buildings which are inhabited. This must be strictly enforced.

"Our main attention should be to see that no fresh encroachments take place on Government, jhuggi jhappi lands and no fresh unauthorised colonies are developed. These should be stopped at the initial stage itself.

City planners have already started questioning the desirability of the new directive banning the demolition of unauthorised inhabited buildings. The directive is, however, totally silent in regard to the already encroached land owned by the Corporation, the Government or the DDA or illegal constructions thereon.

A close look at Mr Bhandari's new order clearly makes out that the Union Territory's administration has asked the local bodies not to initiate any action against unauthorised people who have already encroached upon public land. It amounts to a total surrender by the administration in its battle against illegal activity. The Government has legalised what is in the eyes of law is totally illegal.

The order prevents the local civic bodies from taking any action against those who have carried out unauthorised construction before Aug. 6. The timing of the order indicates it could be a bonanza to land grabbers or those carrying out unauthorised construction in different parts of the Capital in the election year and possibly, the ruling Congress-I wanting to annoy or offend theirvoters.

The Lieutenant Governor's new directive to the local bodies is a total surrender in regard to the already encroached land owned by the Government or the local civic bodies. A survey undertaken for shifting the Jhuggi Jhappi dwellers identified 652 clusters in various parts of the city. The said there was a plan to allocate each jhuggi dweller a 26 sq. mt plot for rehabilitation. It was stated at the Press conference that the survey which had covered 112 jhuggi jhappi clusters of 652 revealed that there were 21.2 lakh jhuggi jhappi dwellers in nearly 15 lakh people.

Mr Bhandari, who completed one year as Lt-Governor on the 4th of August at the Press conference, expressed the administration's inability to check the menace of urban spread into the urban limit of the Union Territory. According to official sources, not one Jhuggi Jhappi dweller was allotted a plot in the first Master Plan. The administration had not been able to evict and clear out police to regularise the encroachment of jhuggi jhappi and even unapproved colonies. The rapidly growing number of residential colonies is generally considered a basic cause of the increasing environmental degradation and illegal activity in the Capital as a result of the increasing number of illegal settlements.

The Lt-Governor would do well to reconsider his directive purely on the basis of objective evaluation of the situation and not because of political considerations. Unless a new directive is immediately drawn the apprehensions expressed by the city planners and experts are bound to come true in the Capital and may end up as a worse situation in the country.

Take it from me

By A. R. Wig

Fig. 2.4 Hindustan Times (New Delhi). September 10, 1987.
close to the stated goal of curbing growth of illegal subdivisions. In Delhi, however, the conditional regularization was not supported by strict enforcement or opportunities for alternative private sector involvement. Whether this is a result of political motivations or poor policy making is not clear.

It is clear however that the existing pattern of policy making has not occurred in a political or social vacuum. Just as the illegal city would not exist if it did not benefit the elite, (Gilbert and Ward 1985), regularization policies would not exist if they were not beneficial to some interest groups. As others have dealt extensively on the importance of the nature of the state in its capacity to accomplish redistributive reform (Ward 1985, Collier 1976), I will make briefly some remarks.

Earlier, I discussed how some authors interpret housing policies as a part of political strategies to hold power. By using a "carrot" and "stick" approach, politicians have used the poor for their vote catching (Mukherjee 1987). I also discussed how the state might support unauthorized colonies because many of the residents of unauthorized colonies have some connections with the bureaucracy. The officials in the bureaucracy, due to informal connections with the residents, often project views sympathetic towards the problems of people buying land in unauthorized colonies. In an informal conversation a DDA official remarked:

Professionals always complain about political interference in planning projects. Actually, the politicians are more practical and understand reality better. They find solutions to problems caused by our unrealistic planning

Policies are thus an outcome of interactions between the bureaucracy and the politicians, both of which are linked to the residents of unauthorized colonies in different ways. Explaining this tension between the politicians and the bureaucracy, Gilbert (1990:26) states:

The balance of power between the politicians and the technocrats determines the tidemark (of legality and illegality). That balance is strongly influenced by the sophistication of economic and societal organization.

3 Privately the officials understood that rigid implementation of the law would further aggravate the housing crisis. Other authors have commented on this position. In Bogota, Ward notes:

As Paredes and Martinez (1977) put it, they (governments) have the power to stop the pirate urbanization process completely, but if this were done, it would create more problems than it solved.
Processes at work:

a. Expansion into more area.

b. Subdivision of plots.

c. Filling up of vacant plots.

Fig. 2.5 Densification of unauthorised colonies.
Thus selective approaches towards regularization (political tide) are tempered by a simultaneous lowering of standards (technocratic tide). The presidents of the resident associations echoed this point: their strategies for obtaining services and including their colony for regularization alternated between working within the system by using their "approaches" (connections) to the bureaucracy, and using their political strength and affiliations to politicians to demonstrate and make demands from the state.

1. Perceptions Caused by Regularization Policies

While the previous discussion attempts an explanation of why the policies of the DDA evolved as they did, the following discussion will focus on how these actions were perceived by the residents of the subdivision. I will describe two features of the policies as causes of the increased perception of tenure, and then I will address the question of the desirability of regularization under conditions of high tenure security.

The DDA’s policy of regularization, I would argue, has worked against its own stated objectives of restricting further growth of unauthorized colonies. On the one hand, it has adopted a policy of regularizing colonies that meet DDA’s conditions provided the colony was in existence before a certain date, and on the other hand it wants to curb the further growth of illegal colonies after the chosen date by selective demolition and by withholding services and legal status. The written policy for regularizing unauthorized construction provided it meets DDA’s conditions means that the residents know that the colony can be considered for regularization on explicit criteria. This impression has reduced the perceived risk of eviction. Moreover, the chosen cutoff date for consideration of regularization has been shifted many times in the past due to political pressure based on so called "humanitarian grounds." It is obvious that the people would perceive these dates as flexible under political pressure and, since tenure is dependent upon lack of enforcement, as long as the settlement has strong political connections, it would be safe.

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4 The public authorities are well aware of this. The DDA Report on Unauthorized Colonies 1984, states:

.....after consultation with the Lt. Governor, it was decided that the date for regularization of residential structures will be extended to 30.6.77.....Fixation of 30.6.77 as the date of regularization of residential structures seems to be related to the election to the Delhi Metropolitan Council in June, 1977.(p 108)
Move to regularise unauthorised colonies

MCD ill-equipped to provide amenities

The move to regularise an estimated 500 unauthorised colonies on the eve of the general elections has alarmed the MCD which has yet to provide amenities in colonies approved in 1980.

Several hundred crore rupees would be needed to develop the colonies and the MCD does not know where the money is coming from. It has already incurred a Rs 53 crore loan in developing some of the existing regularised colonies and has no idea how it will be repaid.

Officials and councillors described the move as a hurriedly announced "election package" for the Capital and particularly for East Delhi where the move as a hurriedly announced no idea how existing regularised coronies and has

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DESU

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Patriot (New Delhi). October 24,

Express News Service

NEW DELHI. Oct 19

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The DDA has moreover, occasionally warned the public through advertisements against investing in illegal colonies:

All those who may enter into such illegal transactions will do so at their own risk and cost and shall also invite legal action for civil/criminal offenses.\(^5\)

No action, however, has been taken against offenders, thus strengthening the perceptions of secure tenure.

It might be argued that with the perceived increased security of tenure of illegal settlements, the residents may not want their settlement to be regularized, a situation that was observed in squatter settlements in Bhopal (Mitra 1988) and in Jordan.\(^6\) If services have been provided through some private means, then regularization will mean the following of bylaws and the payment of taxes. This condition is especially true in cases like that of Sant Nagar Block A where its rural legal status ensures water and electricity.

The demand for regularization would theoretically vary depending upon the permanency of stay, priorities and income of the residents. Although most residents would want most to obtain services, the poorer population who want most to improve their plots would prefer to avoid additional expenses until they improve their economic position. Second, the colonies regularized so far have not yet been provided with services due to the limitation of funds. Of the 543 colonies regularized to date, only 135 have been provided with sewage and only 22 with roads. Thus, while regularization offers a promise of provision of services for the payment of taxes, these services are often slow in arriving, making illegal options attractive.

In reality, however, the residents of both parts of Sant Nagar do want their colony to be regularized. While Block A has been given water and electricity it does not yet have the proper roads and three-phase power essential to beginning any industry or small scale power-based production.\(^7\) In addition, the existence of the unauthorized portion creates problems for the authorized portion, an issue which will be discussed

\(^5\) Times of India July 31, 1989

\(^6\) Omar Rezaz, talk at MIT, April, 1991.

\(^7\) Solomon Benjamin, "Jobs, Land and Urban Development: The Economic Success of Small Manufacturers in East Delhi, India" 1990
Why Demolitions So Curel?

By Bharat Dogra

In numerous unauthorised colonies, including hut colonies (slum settlements) at Delhi and of other Indian cities, people from weaker sections live in constant threat of eviction and demolition.

To take the example of Sangam Vihar, an unauthorised colony on Mehrauli-Bahadurabad Band, it has experienced a series of demolitions during the last decade or so of its existence. According to a report prepared on this colony by the People’s Union for Democratic Rights the first demolition here took place in 1983. The second demolition occurred in February 1985 when 100 to 150 houses were demolished and some 20 persons were arrested. In June the same year there was another attempt at demolition, about 500 persons were detained while 20 were jailed. Many were injured in the police action. On March 28, 1987 about 50 unoccupied houses were demolished in this colony. On April 100 to 150 houses were totally demolished. On April 5, in another demolition effort, the police badly beat up the local residents. At least 30 people were seriously injured. 32 people were implicated in cases and jailed. On June 20, 1987, a large number of houses in the L Block of the colony were demolished.

This is a single colony in the course of just five years, houses which provided or would have provided shelter to the area of people have been culled, any hundreds of once happy families have suffered and have been temporarily deprived of their bread winners as a result of the hundreds of persons who have been illegally arrested and implicated in legal cases, which linger on for a long time, causing a drain on the meagre resources of these families from economically weaker sections. In addition we should keep in mind the enormous uncertainty and despondency experienced by thousands of people right through this period and continuing till today, as the danger of demolition sounds has always dogged this colony.

Despite all this, according to a recent estimate, this colony houses about one lakh people. The distances and the anonymity are very much the same for the people from weaker sections continue to flock to such unauthorised colonies because they have nowhere else to go. The prices and rents of houses are simply too high for them in the legal parts of the city. Why don't the authorities recognise this reality and instead of inflicting such measure of distress on people, take realistic steps to meet the housing needs of weaker sections at prices they can afford.

This is an article on demolitions in unauthorised colonies in Delhi. In many cases the need for demolitions arises only because corruption ridden officials allow ignorant people to buy land and construct houses at unauthorised places, or at places which have already acquired by DDA. While explaining this, the article also pleads for a humanistic approach once a demolition operation has become unavoidable in the eyes of the government.

For the authorities it is easier to justify demolitions on land on which unauthorised constructions have come up on the pretext that this land has already been acquired by DDA (Delhi Development Authority). For this bargaining and related schemes, the requirement would be that one can freeze DDA as it goes ahead with its allotted task of tackling the encroachment on the land of which it is supposed to hold is blocked by unauthorised structures. However, a counter-question that has to be asked here is—why in that case unauthorised constructions were not ignored at an early stage, and why weren't the poor and weak human beings not disturbed from ruthless property agents and not informed about the likely loss of their scarce savings in this land?

Why is it that these unauthorised constructions were ignored at an early date, and why weren't the ignorant people living here forewarned from ruthless property agents not informed about the likely loss of their scarce savings in this land? Why were the property agents who sold and re-sold this land not arrested?

As the people who live in these colonies are being misled and are unaware of the fact that the local police will not be able to save this land, the local police will lose 10 per sq yard, DDA will lose 15 per sq yard and the property dealers will get 25 per sq yard, the original cost of a plot, 20 per sq yard while the rest of the money goes to property dealers and their helpers. Following past experience when a large number of houses have been constructed, then demolition squads will turn up to finish the task in a few days. The savings and labours of several years of the people living here are wiped out.

Demolitions can be stopped, or at least reduced to a large extent, but not if the corrupt system outlined above continues in full swing unhindered. Can we or at least plead for a more humanitarian approach when some suits or constructions held illegal in the eyes of the authorities have to be removed by them. In July this year, when about 400 huts were demolished in Delhi, India, Delhi was in the middle of heavy rain and a monster cyclone in Karachi unhindered. Was it or would it have been so in India?

A series of questions that can be asked are—why it is easier for a property dealer who has purchased land from illegitimate parties and/or incurred debts, who have to face the demolition squads; or has saved some part of the money invested in the vertical expansion of houses and buildings-go down in rubbles below them.

The Forum Gazette (New Delhi)
further later. The residents of Block B clearly want regularization in order to obtain at least minimal basic services of water, electricity, roads and sewage, for which they have to fight for even after regularization. Finally, although regularization and the provision of services means the payment of betterment charges, the authorities have up till now been unable to collect these.

B. Demolition Policies

The use of demolition by the DDA is the conflicting flip side to the policy of regularization.\(^8\) There have been ad hoc demolitions prior to 1977, the largest number occurring between 1972 and 1974 which the DDA described as "social drives" (DDA report). In 1977, with the imposition of a state of emergency by Mrs. Gandhi, the bureaucracy was temporarily freed from its prior political constraints. Spurred by her son Sanjay's drive for a "clean city," many unauthorized colonies and squatter settlements were demolished.\(^9\) I will describe three different kinds of demolition threats.

Within the general context of regularization and acceptance of illegal subdivisions what factors explain when demolitions do occur? Gilbert (1990) argues that the existence of illegality permits selective demolition according to political considerations. Demolition is also the reaction of authorities faced with an alarming spread of illegal settlements; they demolish to discourage further spread of illegality. The excesses would normally be dealt with first on an irregular ad hoc basis, though later they might threaten all new settlements.

1. Vulnerability to Demolition

A settlement is particularly vulnerable to demolitions if:

1) it is located on land targeted for prestigious projects by the public authorities,

\(^8\) Demolitions have occurred during two intensive periods. In the early seventies "to curb the menace of unauthorized construction particularly those which were put up on the lands required for the execution of important public projects a social drive was launched and a large number of unauthorized constructions were demolished". The second wave occurred during the emergency 1976-77 many demolitions were carried out in order to "clean up" the city (DDA report 1985). However, I did not have access to detailed records on demolitions.

\(^9\) After the return to normalcy, the residents of illegal subdivisions evolved new ways of dealing with their situation, having learnt from their experience. The rapid growth of resident associations in these colonies is one evidence of the changed circumstances (Mukherjee 1988)
Demolition without any notice

By Raveen Thukral

Syed Ahmed, a 45-year-old man, stands in front of the broken bricks which were once his house and wonders whether the authorities would return to him what he has lost. His house was one of the many in Shiv Park area, Kakni village, West Delhi, which were demolished by the DDA and MCD on 12 September.

Describing the demolition operation which lasted for two days, Syed Ahmed said, they came on bulldozers and foot along with hundreds of policemen and crushed whatever came in their way. No notice or documents were shown and all attempts by the residents to stop the authorities resulted in lathi blows from the policemen and the CRPF jawans.

Syed Ahmed, who came to Delhi from Kashmir 30 years ago, has been staying at Shiv Park since 1983 and is one of the happy citizens who voted the Congress to power in 1984. He had paid two instalments for the television he had recently bought and even that was crushed by the bulldozer which moved down his home.

Interestingly Syed Ahmed who possesses a ration card has not been paying electricity and water bills regularly. He even paid the house rent after a notice was served to him by the MCD. Similar is the case of Achhey Miya who has been staying in the area for the past 10 years and has a ration card (No. 107561) issued to him in 1981.

Over 400 houses were razed to ground in the area by the authorities on the two fateful days and each victim has his own tale of woe to tell.

According to the residents of Shov Park the main occupation of the people in the area has been tailoring and embroidery. Most of the people, with the help of their families, took orders from garment manufacturers in Uttam Nagar area and completed them at home. As a result of the demolition they were not only left homeless but also deprived of their livelihood.

Demolishing for its 'dirty ways' Tara Chand, another resident, recalled the day when the Congress representative of the area came begging for votes and promised the residents to provide all facilities. With their belongings on the roads and shelters, the residents of Shiv Park left with no alternative but to get back.

The fear that their labour and money would once again be wasted kept the hands of thousands of residents like a Damocles sword.

Are the authorities unaware of their plight? Can no alternative accommodation be provided to these people? Or, is that the authorities are simply not interested in doing anything for them?

Demolition in full swing by DDA in Sewak Park, Najafgarh road on Tuesday. — HT photo

Houses demolished near Najafgarh

BY Correspondent

NEW DELHI, May 29

Hundreds of people were rendered homeless in the blistering mid-day heat today when the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) demolished many houses, including double surveyed ones, at Sewak Park Extension near Najafgarh Road, here.

A stretch about half a mile long and 51 metres wide from Najafgarh Road to DDA's prestigious Papankala Project area through the Sewak Nagar Extension was cleared by bulldozing what DDA termed as unauthorised construction on acquired land to lay a road.

As the three companies of police force virtually surrounded the area bulldozers razed to ground the houses in the area. Tension in the area mounted as house after house was brought down. The people helplessly collected their belongings and piled them in mounds.

Senior DDA officials including Commissioner Papankala Project J. P. Singh and land acquisition collector R. P. Singh as well as land and buildings department officials assisted by their staff looked on as the residents first protested and then resigned themselves to watch aghast as their homes were being turned to rubble.

The overpowering presence of the massive police force comprising one company of Delhi Police and two of Maharashtra Police precluded much of the simmering discontentment and tension from exploding.

It took about five hours for the demolition squad to complete their work. By 3 p.m. the demolition was over but the tension only mounted further when the residents and owners who had witnessed the whole operation were told that only after proper identification would they be given alternate accommodation of a Janta flat at Hasalpur about three km from the area.

While Mr. J. P. Singh claimed that about 100 boundaries had been cleared and 40 houses demolished, residents and house owners claimed the figures of families removed to be about 200 and houses razed over 100. Police sources also stated that the number of houses demolished far exceeded than that claimed by DDA.

However, as the affected people gheraoed DDA officials conditions became chaotic as there was no proper method of identifying those to be given Janta Flats. While people milling around making their claims the officials insisted they pile their belongings on to parked trucks and go to the Papankala Project office where the flats would be allotted.

As a dust storm engulfed the Capital in the afternoon the chaos there became worse. Several residents of the area told this correspondent that they had been given no notice regarding demolition to be carried out today. One woman fainted out of sheer exhaustion and heat. An aged man looked on vacantly. "It happened so suddenly and all my family is now on the streets", said Anam Sharma, another resident.

Tara Chand, a resident, said: "If the authority was to demolish this area they should have provided alternate accommodation to these people.

He even paid the house rent! He has been paying electricity and water bills regularly."

Mr. Singh, however, denied that the residents had not been warned. They had been given notice a year and a half back that construction on this land which had been acquired by DDA would be demolished. Sources on the other hand said that senior police officials had cautioned top DDA officials to begin demolitions only after various families living in the area and owning the houses built there had been given allotment letter for alternate accommodation. But the DDA did not heed to this advice and began the allotment of alternate accommodation only after the demolition was complete, sources said.

Fig. 2.8 Hindustan Times (New Delhi). May 29, 1988.
2) the people of the settlement are not well connected with the political and administrative system at a high enough level, or
3) the community is not well organized.

One such settlement, Sitapuri, which was demolished in 1988, had been notified for acquisition to make space for the prestigious large-scale DDA Project of Papan Kalan. In addition, the resident population was poor and not well connected or organized. These two conditions made it particularly vulnerable to demolition. In such cases when serious demolitions do occur, they are planned in great secrecy, and only higher officials are aware of the location and extent of the demolition planned. The law requires that notices be given to the residents before demolition, but if notices are given near the time of the demolition, the residents obtain stay orders from the courts to prevent the bulldozers from razing the settlement. For this reason no notification was given. The demolition of houses at Sitapuri occurred on a Sunday while the residents were watching the popular TV serial "Ramayan." The bulldozers arrived with policemen who spread out and cordoned off the area to be demolished. Demolition began immediately.

2. Residents' Perceptions of Demolition

The threat of demolition can also be perceived to have meanings other than that of the actual intention to demolish. Often the threat of demolition is used by local policemen to establish their rent seeking activities, or by politicians to sustain support. Demolition is often started by the DDA followed by the timely intervention of the politicians. The demolitions or threat of demolitions by the DDA and the intervention of the politicians forms a part of the "system" that is implicitly understood by all the

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10 Papan Kalan is a large scale residential mini-township proposed by the DDA

11 This was one of the cases where the demolitions galvanized the people into organizing. The residents association mobilized resources and collaborated with three other settlements that had been demolished at the same time to fight and win a joint case against the DDA in the Supreme Court of India on the grounds of demolition without any notice. It is interesting to note here the contrasting positions of two arms of the state - the judicial and the executive, which reinforces rejecting the notion of a monolithic state.

The DDA’s bulldozer pulls back

By Gargi Parsai

NEW DELHI, June 24 — After a sudden decision to “get back” its unauthorisedly occupied land, the Delhi Development Authority has been forced to pull back for various considerations, the foremost being political. On the face of it, the Authority will continue its demolition programme, but in reality it has decided to go easy. And so, even when unauthorised construction has re-started in Delhi, barely within a week after a massive demolition operation there, the DDA has decided to look the other way.

Doordarshan has shown a rare burst of heroism in reporting the Sitapuri-Dabri demolitions on public land. Public lands in Sangam Vihar, Narela, and trans-Yamuna have thus become open spaces. Men, women and children who had been forced to live on public land and their demolition has been repeatedly deferred because of faulty, inadequate, and out-dated land records. The DDA needed land for its own development purposes in the metropolitan area. The substantial increase in the commercial value of public land and their demolition has been justified. The Administration decided to open all built-up encroached land in Delhi. This was mostly in West Delhi and trans-Yamuna.

In fact, the government of India had raised the legal status of the land to a “transferable and saleable” condition. The Administration decided on a new policy of “affordable housing” on public land. The Administration is locked in legal battles in about 7,000 cases and the chances of success in normally 10 per cent. The DDA can demolished any unauthorised construction on public land and construction of unauthorised nature should be made a criminal offence, the MCD through an amendment to the DMC Act made both the offences cognisable in 1985, which the MCD Commissioner said, had been considerably successful. Under this Act all built-up encroachments or even unauthorised construction can be demolished. Also, the Commissioner can seal the unauthorised construction under the amended Act.

The MCD, as also the DDA, is hampered in effectively dealing with office workers, tenants, and field staff of lower staff due to involvement of lower staff and field staff and inadequacy of police assistance. Yet, Mr. Chauhan felt absenteeism and authorisation of public land and their demolition. He started large-scale colonisation.

Farm Land

Under the Delhi Land Reform Act, agricultural land cannot be used for commercial or residential purpose but the DDA acquisition changes the status of the land and colonising begins. In Municipal limits, a construction is unauthorised when building bye-laws are flouted or when constructions outside the planned area are done. The DDA created an artificial scarcity of land where the whole of Dabri was notified in 1959, or it should have constructed speedily, which did not, encouraging colonisation. Besides, when the Administration did not draw award, the Supreme Court in a 1984 decided that if award were not drawn in three years then all previous notification would stand cancelled. Perhaps, DDA started acquiring parcels of land but was unable to cope with the compensation and again under pressure the Administration decided to open all built-up encroached land in Delhi. This was mostly in West Delhi and trans-Yamuna.

Fig. 2.9 Hindustan Times (New Delhi). June 25, 1988.
actors, residents, politicians and the police. When policemen want to continue taking bribes, the apparent threat and its meaning is implicitly understood by both the residents and the policemen. One resident of Sant Nagar particularly asked me not to get the policemen into trouble. He perceived the policemen as human in "risking" their jobs by letting the people continue building. At the scale of individual plots, the local police often demolish some construction to sustain their collection of bribes. In exchange for the money they provide "protection" from further bribe collectors as well as land grabbers. They could also provide forewarning of more serious threats of demolitions when contemplated by the authorities.

Sant Nagar was threatened twice by the demolition squads. The first time, in 1985, the bulldozers came up to the main road of the settlement. All the women of the colony were mobilized by the association and went out to protest by sitting down in front of the bulldozers and refusing to move. They pleaded for continued settlement on humanitarian grounds. After some negotiation, protest and shouting, the demolition squad gave up and returned to the city.

The second time the settlement was threatened with demolition appeared to be similar to the first incident. However, in an informal interview, the president of the association told me a different reason behind the threatened demolition. The story goes that the local SHO (Station Head Officer of the police station) had five years ago purchased a plot of land of 200 square meters from a local dealer. He gifted the plot to his daughter in her wedding as dowry. When his son-in-law went to inspect the plot, it was found to be occupied by another household who had built their small house on it. The dealer, in his greed for money, had sold it again to a poor family when he noticed the plot unoccupied for a long time. A dispute arose when the family on site refused to vacate. The SHO arranged with his police connections for a bulldozer to come.

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11 The DDA maintains bulldozers for demolitions in different localities. Officers of the DDA assisted by the local police force carry out the demolitions according to orders. Not surprisingly, the land immediately around the bulldozer storage compound is conspicuously vacant, while further out the unauthorized colonies spread.

12 The bulldozers arrived on a weekday morning and the association had probably got some forewarning due to which they were able to mobilize the women. These conditions, when contrasted with the Sitapuri case mentioned earlier lead me to believe that the appearance of the bulldozers was just a threat, and not intent to actually demolish. When the intention to demolish is serious, adequate precautions are taken to maintain an element of surprise.
Fig. 2.10  Comparison of layout patterns of streets in Block B and Block C.
and threaten the settlement with demolition. The dispute was ultimately resolved through negotiation and a monetary settlement. While the facts of the case could not be verified, the story illustrates that the changed perceptions of risk has created situations where the power of the public authorities is used in a similar manner as before, but for personal reasons.

II. IMPACTS OF LOWERED RISKS OF EVICTION

A. Market Response to State Policy

It has been argued by some authors that a regularization policy based on the fulfillment of certain conditions and standards can lead to better planning of layouts and following of standards by the illegal colonizers in anticipation of regularization (Hamer 1985, Gilbert and Ward 1985). Broadly speaking this was not the case. Increasing land prices and the policy of regularization have led to colonizers seeking to maximize profits.

In 1975, a survey conducted by the DDA found that colonies in existence before the commencement of the master plan exhibited better standards than those that evolved later, in terms of roads, availability of infrastructure and community facilities (DDA 1984:13). One of the surprising findings to me was that, in some respects, standards were higher in illegal subdivisions compared to legal subdivisions whereas in overall layouts, illegal subdivision were poorer. For example, unlike legal settlements, almost all plots had roads on two opposite sides, but these roads were very narrow. Upon closer observation, it appears that both the observations resulted from the economics of selling land.

Before proceeding to elaborate on the argument, certain issues need to be clarified. Unauthorized colonies vary extensively in their plot layouts and sizes. From the organic layouts of some colonies to the planned layouts of other colonies there is a vast spectrum of types of layouts.¹³ I do not, in this section, attempt to describe the variety and nature of these. This section will therefore use two specific kinds of data. I will use layout

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¹³ DDA has classified the colonies into ten categories according to the existing physical conditions, and their location in the zones of the master plan. (DDA report, 1985)
a. Traditional pattern of development.  
(Lyari, Karachi.)

b. Organised pattern of illegal subdivision.  
(Mohamed Nagar, Karachi.)

c. Organised pattern of planned development.  
(Gulshan-E-Shahbaz, Hyderabad.)

a. Traditional pattern of development.  
(Mehrauli, Delhi.)

b. Organised pattern of illegal subdivision.  
(East Guru Angad Nagar, Delhi.)

c. Organised pattern of planned development.  
(Resettlement scheme, Delhi.)

Fig. 2.11  Comparison between layouts of traditional, illegal and planned settlements in Karachi and Delhi.
patterns observed citywide when a particular feature is common to most settlements in the city. Secondly, I will use information provided by developers as to how their layout formulas have changed over the years especially comparing earlier and later parts of Sant Nagar.

1. Layouts and road widths

Recent literature has evidenced that the most common morphological feature of illegal subdivisions is that they mimic an urban rather than a traditional organic layout (Linden and Baross 1990). The layouts are naturally constrained by available parcel configurations and the quest for maximization of sale area. While supporting this general observation, I would like to qualify it further. First, market considerations, rather than any hope of eventual legalization, seem to govern layouts. Thus most plots are two-sided, a feature which decreases saleable area but increases the prices of the plots. Secondly, within more planned layouts the urban form that emerges is more akin to traditional urban fabric rather than the controlled settlement pattern observed elsewhere.

The most common feature among layouts is that plots are fronted by roads on two sides. This feature is not found in the case of sites and services projects nor in legal residential projects (see Fig. 2.11). Moreover, while it seems that every plot has an excessive frontage, quantitatively the road width is the minimum - a main road of 3.6 to 4.5 meters and a service lane of 1.8 to 3 meters. Additionally, it will be noticed that the roads are quite long compared to their width. The colonizers and property dealers in Sant Nagar, when questioned, stated that they were following accepted planning standards by leaving a lane to run service pipes. The DDA standards for road widths even in sites and services are usually six meters. However, the residents’ perceptions, as well as my own, is that two-sided plots have more market value. As the service lane is minimal, the loss of land is more than made up by the increase in value of the smaller plot size. It also makes later subdivision of larger plots easier because the plot can be divided lengthwise as well as breadth-wise if it is fronted on two sides by a road. Thus profit motives regulate the ratio between road area and plot area. In the words of a small scale colonizer:

The logic of roads is usually 12 feet [3.6 meters]. We do not have any government standards so we have our own standards. Our logic is to sell the maximum amount of land at the highest possible price making maximum profits.
a. Plot sizes in earlier layouts.

Common plot sizes  50 - 200 square yards
Proportions  50 square yards  30 by 15 feet
Proportions  200 square yards  60 by 30 feet

b. Plot sizes in later layouts.

Common plot sizes  25 - 75 square yards
Proportions  25 square yards  15 by 15 feet
Proportions  75 square yards  30 by 18 feet

c. General density of later layout.

d. Key plan Sant Nagar.

Fig. 2.12  Comparison between earlier and later plot sizes, Sant Nagar.
Although the layouts are regular, and resemble legal layouts, the settlement pattern that emerges resembles traditional urban fabric, where in the absence of bylaws, open space within the plot is internalized in the form of courtyards.

The tendency to build up to the edge of the street, the absence of laws restricting height of building, and the narrow street widths forecast an urban form more akin to traditional urban fabric than the kind that the laws seek to foster. If unauthorized colonies are to be the major form of housing settlement in the city of Delhi, the resultant new kind of urban fabric needs to be better understood.

2. Plot sizes

Plot sizes throughout the city have been decreasing over the years due to market conditions (Mitra 1988). The colonizer usually lays out the major and minor roads at a specific distance apart; buyers can then choose any plot size which is marked out in the length of the frontage they buy. One colonizer summarized the layout of the roads as, "Whoever comes first [to buy], we decide to cut plots accordingly." Most who buy with the intention of building a home buy plots between 20 and 160 square meters. Speculative buyers buy between 800 square meters and 1.6 hectares. Due to higher prices, people are able to afford smaller plots, indicated in smaller frontages. Additionally, earlier plotholders are subdividing their plots to cash in on the increase in prices. In Sant Nagar, the smallest plot size I found was 22 square meters, a size which was fairly common. However, some other colonies in the city have plot sizes of even 21 square meters. For instance in Bapa Nagar, about 25 percent of the plots are less than 21 square meters. The DDA provides the official minimum standards of a plot size of 25 square meters. DDA’s own recent decision to offer squatter plots of 12.5 square meters in sites and services has probably increased the tendency for illegal subdivisions to have smaller plot sizes. These features are evident from comparing the layouts of earlier and later parts of Sant Nagar Block B (See Fig. 2.12, 2.10). It is evident that later colonies have tighter layouts and smaller plot sizes in response to market conditions which are caused by the policy of regularization -- a condition that the policy was hoping to ameliorate.
a. High tension electricity pole in Block B.

b. High tension electricity pole in Block A.

Fig. 2.13 Denser settlement near high tension electricity poles due to cheaper land prices, Sant Nagar.
3. Consolidation of settlement

After layout and plot sizes, a third area in which we can see the market’s dominance of the state is in the people’s response to regulation. The illegality of unauthorized colonies leads to the low price of plots. Similarly, I found that consolidation within the settlement happens most where land is inexpensive, due to additional violation of the laws. The law prohibits buildings within 180 meters of a high tension electric wire line due to safety considerations. Consequently, land within 180 meters of high tension lines is cheaper than other similarly located land, because in case of regularization, buildings located here are most likely to get demolished and relocated (see Fig. 2.13). This finding once again contradicts the argument that a regularization policy will lead to law abiding in illegal settlements due to the eventual expectation of legalization.

These observations regarding layouts, road widths, plot sizes and consolidation of the settlement suggest that if an area is illegal in the written laws, then the illegality arising from breaking a particular law gives license for the residents not to follow any laws regarding buildings and layouts. The buildings and layouts that result could be inefficient and pose health and safety hazards.

B. Implications for Plotholders

The most important question, however, is at the scale of individual actions. How has the reduced risk of eviction affected the actions of the residents? Most obviously, at the general level it has increased prices of the plots due to higher demand. But more specifically it has affected the process of housing consolidation and increased the economic mobility of some lower-income groups and therefore changed the nature of various housing sub-markets.

1. Physical aspects of housing consolidation

The perception of increased security of tenure has caused some physical characteristics of consolidation. Firstly, in anticipation of future roads, recent plotholders

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14 This should not be confused with the land price gradient related to the distance from the main road.
a. Older house with plinth now below road level.

b. High plinth in anticipation of roads.

c. Shops on side of plot fronting wider street in a small plot.

d. Shops on side of plot fronting wider street in a large plot.

e. Traditional roof construction in Mughal times

f. Roof construction in unauthorized colonies.

Fig. 2.14 Physical aspects of housing investment reflecting the anticipation of regularization, Sant Nagar.
build a high plinth for their houses usually about 1.2 meters above the level of the ground. The absence of such foresight in the earlier built up plots has resulted in the street levels being higher than the houses (see Fig. 2.14 a,b). Secondly, while the walls of the houses are built of permanent materials (brick and cement mortar), the roof is usually red sandstone slabs laid on iron T-girders, unlike the reinforced concrete slab construction of legal settlements. This is a form of construction traditionally employed in the old city as well as in the villages; it enables easy expansion. And perhaps, in the unfortunate event of demolition, it is easier to salvage the materials and build again (Benjamin 1991). Thirdly, the overall planning of the plot itself is done in the beginning, often with the shop built on the side fronting the wider road (see Fig. 2.14 c,d).

2. Economic mobility

It was a surprise for me to find that some of the residents interviewed said that they had moved to Sant Nagar by selling plots previously allotted to them in resettlement colonies (sites and services projects). Of the twenty-five residents interviewed, four residents (all living in the illegal portion of Sant Nagar Block B) had sold their plots in sites and services, on which most had built houses, and bought land in the illegal subdivision. The main reason cited by them for leaving the plots was that the plot of 25 square meters was too small to accommodate their large families and allow for their outdoor utilization of space. Additional reasons mentioned were the ability to choose locations near friends both at the level of the city and within the settlement. One family had moved in order to repay a loan taken for building a house on the sites and services plot. With the money obtained through the sale of the sites-and-services plot the family was able to repay the loan, buy a plot of land 40 square meters and construct two rooms.

These families were essentially capitalizing on the subsidy provided by the government on the sites and services plots, and bought a larger unserviced plot (typically 40 square meters) with insecure tenure. Thus they traded off title, secure tenure, services

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15 While this is a small number compared to the population of the settlement, and is not statistically significant, it shows a process that is occurring in however limited a scale. Moreover, given the structure of the market based on personal linkages and trust as will be discussed in the next chapter, the phenomenon maybe more prevalent than a limited exploration of this kind suggests. I could also not find any information supporting or rejecting this trend in other parts of the city through other literature.
a. Mobile informal activities, selling buttermilk, Sant Nagar.

b. Informal street activities, a tea shop,

c. Production activities, a factory along the main street.

d. Production activities, a metal casting factory in the interior,

e. Building materials store along the main road.

f. Shopping arcades planned for future operation along main road.

Fig. 2.15 Economic opportunities through use of land, Sant Nagar.
and a smaller plot for unclear title, insecure tenure, minimal services and a larger plot in the expectation of future economic and social gains.

I would also argue that the existence of heterogeneous income groups within the settlement supported the move economically by providing alternative opportunities for income generation. First, illegal subdivisions provide favored conditions for the flourishing of informal production activities. Cheap labor, land and capital (often "black" or illegal money) come together in illegal subdivisions somewhat like the inner city. They also subsequently prove to be a training ground for future small scale production activities (Benjamin 1991). Illegal subdivisions support the informal service industry. For example, one informal building contractor who originally used to work in other parts of the city finds enough work within the settlement to support himself. Similarly shoe repairers, vegetable vendors and other small commercial enterprises thrive, through the support of the better-off residents who pay higher costs to compensate for the time and trouble of going outside the settlement.¹⁶ In addition, illegal subdivisions offer possibilities of earning rental income. Land transactions in illegal settlements can be yet another source of income -- either through the system of commissions which will be discussed in the next chapter or through speculative gains by subdividing and selling off land at a later stage.¹⁷ Land is an attractive investment because the returns are high and land in illegal subdivisions is easily available.

Finally, I believe that the delinking of social status from addresses in illegal subdivisions due to their partially heterogeneous income composition could be a factor in people moving from sites and services to illegal subdivisions.

If the limited findings of the study are indeed a trend then the argument that sites and services are a better option but are ineffective due to limited supply needs rethinking. If people are moving from sites and services to illegal subdivisions, then it

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¹⁶ An exception to this was observed in the housemaid service. None of the women who worked as housemaids would work for houses within the settlement because poorer households did not want to send their women off to work in the same neighborhood that they lived in.

¹⁷ Typically commissions are two percent and price rises in the Sant Nagar area have doubled in the past five years.
a. Undeveloped plot.

b. Terrace.

c. Plinth of plot.

d. Encroaching on back street.

Fig. 2.16 Greater outdoor usage of space in low income areas, Sant Nagar.
indicates that the standards provided by the projects are too high for the poor to retain, and that the subsidy provided by the government is too high.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{18} The innovative approach of the Hyderabad Development Authority in their incremental development scheme is a promising attempt at a solution to this problem. In 1986, the Hyderabad Development Authority (in Pakistan) carried out an innovative scheme for provision of low income housing. In a bold approach, they used some of the strategies of illegal subdividers to meet their goals of affordability, target groups, and reduction in the time taken for the allotment and consolidation of the plots. The unserviced plots were carved out of 100 acres earmarked for a low income housing project. They demarcated a reception area where the families who wanted plots would come and live with their belongings till their house was built. No papers were allotted to the families, presence (possession) was considered tenure. Plots that remained were reallocated to other families. The approach taken in this scheme has shown that the state can partially assume the role of the subdividers and successfully follow their strategies.
Chapter 3

THE GROWING RISK OF LAND GRABBING AND FRAUDULENT DEALING

INTRODUCTION

A person is trapped both ways — if one stays on the land there is risk of eviction [by public authorities] and if one doesn't live on the land one risks losing possession.¹

The greatest risk in buying land in the illegal subdivision of Sant Nagar is not the risk of eviction by public authorities, but the risk of losing possession due to fraudulent dealing and land grabbing.² While fraud has always been a risk in illegal land transactions (Bose 1969), it has evidently increased in recent years. Along with the increasing incidence of organized land grabbing (Singh 1990), rising fraud has aggravated the riskiness of buying land in subdivisions.

In this chapter, I will analyze the problem of the risk of fraudulent dealing and land grabbing. The first section will describe the causes of the increase in fraud and land grabbing and the perceptions of the problem by the residents and colonizers. The second section focusses on the effects of these risks on the nature of the market and the implications for the individual plotholder.

¹ Interview with colonizer of Budh Vihar, January, 1991.

² Fraudulent dealing in land transactions occurs when the seller either does not own the land or does not have partial claim to it, or has already sold the land to someone else. Land grabbing occurs when people occupy land without having any claims to it. Squatting could be considered one form of land grabbing.
I. CHANGES: INCREASING RISK OF LOSING POSSESSION

As in many other third-world cities, the title and tenure of land in Delhi are clouded by controversy. The land records are not clear, there are multiple claimants to the same parcel, and many land disputes await resolution in the courts. Unscrupulous entrepreneurs take advantage of the clouded titles to profit through fraudulent dealing and land grabbing. If taken to court, these entrepreneurs can escape because of unclear titles; because the transactions are illegal the buyers rarely take these disputes to court. The entrepreneurs also often use muscle power to continue their operations. The increasing land prices and the unpredictability of public planning decisions have added to the profitability and prevalence of fraud and land grabbing.

In Sant Nagar, interviewees described many incidents of fraudulent dealing and land grabbing. Throughout the city, the local public officials are often involved in land grabbing. Land grabbing actions by policemen are the most common (Subraminian 1989). Sant Nagar is located near the city's police training grounds and police involvement with the settlement is high; many police have bought plots in the settlement for future retirement. Changes in price have been a remarkable aspect of the illegal land market. The price of land in illegal settlements has risen tremendously. A study done on the impact of prices on residential development estimated that the land prices in the legal market rose 700 percent between 1980 and 1989, and the price of land in unauthorized colonies rose by 500 percent in the same interval (Negi 1990). These increases compared to the interest rates offered through conventional investments have made land an attractive investment. And although appreciation of legal land is higher than illegal plots, the higher supply of illegal plots and the ability to invest "black money" (undeclared income) in them makes land in illegal subdivisions even more attractive.

A. Fraudulent Dealing and Land Grabbing

In addition to the growing demand for land and the increasing land prices, unclear titles to land have caused an increased incidence of fraud in land transactions.

3 "Muscle power" refers to the entrepreneur's henchmen who ensure there is no effective protest against fraudulent dealing. The threat of violence is usually adequate to prevent protest.
Traditional patterns of inheritance have resulted in fragmented holdings and joint tenure situations which are often under dispute. The situation is further complicated by land reforms imposed on traditional tenure systems. As a result, there are often multiple claimants to the same parcel of land and even title to government land is unclear. The Union Territory of Delhi is no exception. Government intervention in the land market has confused titles further and complicated land transaction process. Two laws have been instrumental in causing disputed titles.

The first, the Land Reforms Act of 1954, aimed to consolidate fragmented landholdings. Under this act, all agricultural land privately held in fragments by farmers was consolidated and given by the state to the bhumidars (legal owners). Bhumidars who did not cultivate their land leased it out to asamees (leaseholders) for ten years. After ten years the asamee often claimed title to the land and refused to renew the lease agreement. To prevent fragmentation, the land reform also determined the size of the economic farm holding at 3.2 hectares. If a consolidation resulted in less than 3.2 hectares remaining with the landowner, the land would revert to the hands of the gaon sabha (village committee). In practice, however, the land is usually transferred in the records only and actually is retained by the owner or the purchaser. To complicate matters further, the Delhi Land Reforms Act of 1954 was based on surveys conducted between 1906 and 1910. In the intervening period much of the government land had been encroached upon.

The second law, the Large-Scale Land Acquisition, Development and Disposal Policy of 1957, aimed to control urban development and promote equitable access to land through a large-scale land acquisition program. The policy had four major goals: to achieve the optimum use of land; to ensure the adequate supply of land at the right time and price; to prevent concentration of land in few hands and to make land more accessible to the poor; and to control prices and prevent speculation. It served however to stop the activities of legal, formal private developers and froze all notified land from development. Between notification and actual acquisition by the DDA there was a gap of many years during which many landowners sold off their land to the colonizers. Of the 30,800 hectares of land notified under Section IV in 1961, only 20,350 hectares had been acquired by 1986. There was also a gap between acquisition and development of DDA acquired land. In the interim period the Delhi Administration is vested with the responsibility for maintenance. Because no specific section of the Delhi Administration
By Satyen Mohapatra

NEW DELHI, May 6

It's a continuing battle between DDA and colonisers for large tracts of land in Papanasam (Dwarka) Phase II. While DDA officials are interested in keeping the land free from construction, the colonisers are interested in buying the land, settling it and using it for development.

Papanasam sub-city will accommodate about 1.1 million people by 2001 on a total land area of 10,000 acres. Residential areas and work centres, commercial blocks and government offices have been approved by the DDA and the Delhi Urban Arts Commisison. Forty per cent of its land area belongs to a cooperative group housing societies.

The agricultural land on which this sub-city will come up belongs to a number of villagers from Palam, Kakrola, Bindapur, Matiala, Amberghai, Pochanpur, Dholeswar, Bhartal, Bijwasan, Naiwarpur and Bagoda villages. Out of 13,000 acres of agricultural land belonging to these villages, the DDA has decided to develop 10,000 acres, of which 5,000 acres has already been acquired.

The Phase I of Papanasam fell under proposed urban extension according to Master Plan and was back in 1984. It has not been approved under Section-VI (intention to acquire) and later under Section-VI (final acquisition) were given on 5,000 acres of the first phase and the land was acquired by DDA some time in 1986-87.

However, the planning process started, according to DDA officials, was that adding another 5,000 acres would stop growth of unauthorised colonisation at the periphery of the area.

Since 1986-87, the DDA has been pressing that the orders of Section-IV and Section-VI be passed fixing the acquisition of the rest 5,000 acres of land.

The DDA had to be satisfied with 10,000 acres of the 13,000 acres of land because 3,000 acres had already been colonised before acquisition. The entire 10,000 acres area was placed under Development Area Control Act by the DDA, which meant that the area is under urban planning and no one can construct any building within its boundary without DDA clearance.

However, this did not stop farmers from selling their land. While the DDA moved swiftly on the Papanasam Phase-I project and acquired about 5,000 acres in villages like Matiala, Bindapur, Naiwarpur, Palam, Amberghai, Bagoda and parts of Pochanpur, the process was slow in the acquisition of the rest of 5,000 acres.

This happened because the 10,000 acres of land for the sub-city was divided into almost equal parts by oil pipelines and the Delhi Administration decided to let DDA develop one part first (Phase-I) and the next part later (Phase-II).

However, the delay led the villagers, particularly in Kakroli, Pochanpur, Bijwasan and Bhartal, to sell their land to colonisers who were reported to have paid Rs. 3 lakh or more to the villagers per acre whereas the DDA compensation was Rs. 1 lakh per acre.

The DDA is also developing plots for 1,200 families near Bagoda and Amberghai villages which would be given as alternative plots to a large number of villagers whose agricultural land has been acquired. The colonisers further sold the land for high prices to unsuspecting buyers which led the DDA to advertise that public should not fall into their trap.

In some cases, boundary walls have come up, while in some areas small one room sets have also been constructed. According to officials, six months ago, unauthorised constructions had been demolished in Pochanpur and two weeks ago demolitions were undertaken on 30 acres of land in Kakroli village.

What is alarming is that new constructions have again come up in the area. The DDA officials feel that the recent hike in compensation might have caused the growth of unauthorised colonisation in agricultural land.

Meanwhile a parceling out of (5) DDA plots go on around these areas to check unauthorised construction and even making announcements in public address system and distributing pamphlets discouraging sale and purchase of land, officials say.

It is reliably learnt that the Delhi Administration will come up soon with the orders for acquisition under Section-IV and Section-VI for these areas.


THE TIMES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1989

By A Staff Reporter

NEW DELHI, October 7: One has heard of creeping land grabs. Over the past months, the Delhi administration has been taxing a creeping land regularisation. For the record, it still exists this way.

In January 1977 all 600 odd unauthorised colonies in Delhi were regularised. Since then, another 500 odd have come up. New group of jhuggis but something more permanent. That's an immense lot of people. And voters.

BIG DILEMMA: There's a big dilemma here. The formal policy till a decade or so back was to demolish and resettle, wherever possible. Now, the accent is on "civic upgradation" right there. Resettlement is becoming more and more difficult. Delhi is running out of land, for one. And the numbers involved make it very ticklish. So much so there is a de facto freeze on even demolishing slum clusters. Civic officials have been told by Raj Nives to just ensure nothing new comes up.

Meanwhile, the existing settlements want something done about their talk to where they stay and the attendant civic benefits something more than just ration cards and the right to vote. That's something even most slum clusters have. With a difficult election coming, that restiveness has political implications.

SOOTHING NOISES: Electors and administrative sensors of the Delhi administration have been making soothing noises about doing something from time to time. The latest was the LG's emphasis on his speech to the metropolitan council recently.

Quoting last year's gastro-enteritis epidemic as an imperative, the civic committee of the municipal corporation said it was going to provide regular water connections to all those colonies built before January 1981. The electricity wing followed suit. This did not mean regularisation of these places, they said; it was only to improve hygiene.

That was some weeks back. The city's executive council, with the LG in the chair, has now decided to take the next logical step.

All unauthorised colonies built before January 1, 1987, will get all civic amenities - roads, drainage, brick pavements, etc. By the municipal corporation, not Delhi Development Authority - unlike the latter, the LG goes to the local (elected) councilor. And electricity and water won't stop at houses who apply for it. Any "place of worship" in that place will get it. Provided these connections are not being billed by commercial agencies.

Fig. 3.1 The Times of India (New Delhi). October 8, 1989.
is responsible, the land is easily encroached upon through political and bureaucratic contacts.

The Delhi Development Act of 1957, stated that no development could be carried out on rural land except through the DDA. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act of 1957 covered areas within the urban limits of Delhi and required that all prospective subdividers should get their development layouts sanctioned by the DDA or by the MCD depending upon which area their land fell in. However, there was no enforcement of the laws. The Land Registration office and the DDA had no effective form of communication regarding land development, so that the DDA had no way of finding out where violations of laws were occurring.

Colonizers found various ways to circumvent these laws. Traditionally, land has been registered for ownership and revenue purposes through "khasra" numbers and rough maps with boundaries demarcated with reference to prominent landmarks. High turnover and fragmentation make identification of specific parcels difficult. As mentioned above, under the Delhi Land Reform Act of 1954, land parcels under 3.2 hectares could not be registered under a single owners name. The colonizers of illegal subdivisions circumvented the problem of registering title by registering the subdivision as a "farmers cooperative" under the name of all the plotholders. They gave the plotholders a copy of the registration along with details of their specific parcel.

New efforts to control land transactions were no more successful. To curb the illegal dealings in land, the Delhi Administration enacted the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act in 1972, which prohibited any transactions of notified land. This covered almost all the land in the immediate periphery. In reaction, colonizers started transferring land on power of attorney, which gave purchasers the legal right to use the land without restrictions, but without a transfer of the legal title. In practice power of attorney worked much the same as the legal title, except that it was cheaper and simpler to obtain; it could be obtained within a day with a ten rupee stamp-paper in the presence of a lawyer. This is the means through which most land is being sold today. By 1986,

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4 Transactions of land in India are typically done with reference to "khasra" numbers which divide the agricultural land into parcels according to some prominent landmarks. Typically, these maps are not accurate, and reference adjacent owners to fix location and size of property.

5 Interview with colonizer Block B, Sant Nagar, Dec 1990
Policemen as land grabbers

By NIRUPAMA SUBRAMANIAN Express, New Delhi

NEW DELHI, July 31

It is one of the best organised land scams in the Capital, and a story of how the administration, the police, the social workers and the courts have joined hands to turn a 500-acre area in Khirkee Village, South Delhi, into one of the most unsanctioned colonies in the city. People haveHarish Singh, they will have to authorise this before the elections. Then we watch the land grabbers at work," he said.

A pride of place

In this still unauthorized colony, the Additional Commissioner's "bailiwick" occupies the pride of place and, for this reason, is also the easiest to locate. People just drive in to follow a thick black arrow drawing electricity from a meter lamp on the main road.

At the end of the trail stands a small but temporary structure with a green jut, door and window. It is the 400-acre plot. As it is close to the main road, land costs at least Rs 2,250 per sq. yard. In the next six months, it will be a virtual goldmine.

"The structure is really a big low-built in the middle of a field. It houses a suitcase tank on the terrace. A seep pit is in the process of being dug. According to neighbours, the construction was completed a year-and-a-half ago, but has remained huddled since then.

The personal visits of the DIG (Additional CP) himself seem to have taken place quite often when construction work was under way," he said. "It was upon seeing them doing this, the Additional CP herself decided to rent the plot to the ACP's personal assistant. The DIG, the ACP have assured people."

The colony stretches over a kilometer in length on the south of Millstone Nagar. It was initiated by the GDA for recreation. But instead of creating the five and a half acre illegal sprawl and construction on the road, policemen, including the Additional Commissioner, have found the law and order situation in this sector over the last few years.

Not until they decided to do the job, the Additional Commissioner, an IPS officer, has pulled the colony's well-shuffled Monica of this unauthorized colony.

Power theft

The area which once belonged to the Kishore Extension wheat allotments, is now dotted with commercial units, and small workshops, most of them having offices, in and on stored vehicles, or electronic or water, or it is a green oasis. But once going into the building between the houses of the Additional CPs two junior officers.

"More homes are being constructed on the new "plot," a house in the southern part of the colony, is currently under construction.

Land-Grabbers Invite Delhi as Demand for Housing Hits the Ceiling

By AARY SHETH

NEW DELHI — To earn some extra money, a widow and her two daughters decided to make a living as a local doctor. But after 11 months of practice, the doctor refused to vacate the premises.

To bully the landlord, he told him that if he did not move out, he would be "killed." The doctor then had the police that one of her daughters was a "national" and a "national" was considered a "terrorist," and insisted on being moved out of the premises. The doctor then had the police that one of her daughters was a "national" and a "national" was considered a "terrorist," and insisted on being moved out of the premises.

Call it the New Delhi charm. Land and housing are scarce in the city, and more and more people want to make the capital their home. Housing demand will keep rising. People want to live in stylish new apartments. And this has led to a surge in apartments. And this has led to a surge in apartments.
an estimated 1,900 hectares of land were under unauthorized use. The government lost the meager revenues it had been previously getting before from the land taxes, and also lost the possible land transfer taxes. In addition, the power of attorney document can be given by a landowner to many people, unlike the land title which was changed in the land registration records. This has compounded the ease with which fraud can occur. Moreover, most transactions occur by oral agreements until the whole price of the plot is handed over and the formal power of attorney documents are drawn up. In markets where the price of land increases overnight (as when the regularization or servicing decisions are announced), there is an increased temptation for the colonizer or dealer to play foul.

Fraudulent dealings, for example double sales, may occur in the transaction between landowner and colonizer or between colonizer and plot buyer. In the first case, it is possible with joint farmholdings for one person to sell the land to a colonizer without the knowledge of the other holders until the land is occupied by the plot buyer. As the sale is illegal and the colonizers usually possess muscle power as well as political power, the other owners may lose all or part of their share of the land. In another situation two joint landowners may sell off the land to two different colonizers. In the transactions between colonizers and plot buyers, disputes may arise over double sales by dealers who sell a sold or partially sold plot once again. In such cases, the first buyers, who are usually poorer since the earlier price of land is usually lower, suffer. The disputes are generally settled through a combination of muscle power and some negotiated monetary compensation. The large increase in land prices (possible even overnight through public planning decisions) have contributed to the incidence of fraud seek quick profits from a single piece of land. A sequence of policies on land transactions together with the existing unclear titles to land have compounded the difficulties of detecting fraud in land sales.

These general problems common to unauthorized colonies of Delhi have been amplified in Sant Nagar due to two reasons. Firstly, until a dam was built in 1978, the Najafgarh Nallah (a tributary of the Jamuna river) used to flood annually, making the identification of individual plots after the flood difficult. Dealers naturally capitalized on the resulting uncertainty. Secondly, partially because of the flooding and partially because of poor services, plots in Sant Nagar have until recently been bought not for
SURVIVAL AMID HIGH LAND PRICES

By a Staff Reporter

The urban man has been forced to adapt his lifestyle to survive in a world where scarcity is the name of the day. Like in other parts of the world, the real estate in Delhi too has learnt the art of survival amidst scarcity, or shortened to "survival amid high land prices".

According to one school of thought, the sudden spurt in land prices in the capital during the 80s is directly linked with the facilities which were developed during the 80s. A new Delhi has been created with plush five-star hotels, luxurious roads and numerous skyscrapers, which all have left a mark on the new residents. The population, which was already in a state of overcrowding, has increased considerably over the years with the acquisition of more and more land from neighboring areas. It has not been possible to accommodate these people in the available space, leading to a shortage of land.

The scarcity of land has led to a migration of people from other parts of the country, looking for better opportunities. The city's nominal rates of residential land have increased by about 500% over the years. Land in Delhi has become an ideal investment for the rich, who want to invest in a place that is close to their homes. The demand for land has increased, leading to a rise in its prices.

Some of the land transactions have fetched Rs 12,000 a square foot, which is a significant increase. But even in the present scenario, the land prices are not unique to Delhi. The town planning at the State University in the 80s was not unique to Delhi, but it is an acute shortage of land that has led to this situation.

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Selling prices

Even as people continue to grumble about the soaring prices, the real estate promoters are happy with their situation. Delhi is no more the city where one could buy a piece of land for Rs 500. A real estate agent, who has been a resident of the locality for some time, told this reporter that even 5 years ago one could hope to buy the same plot at one third the present price.

In parts of North and West Delhi, there has been an alarming increase in land prices. The rise in prices is not only due to the lack of suitable land, but also due to the increased demand for land. The sales of properties have increased over the years, and this has led to an increase in land prices. The demand for land is high, and the supply is low, leading to an increase in prices.

The problem of land shortage is evident in the fact that a proposal to construct an artificial island, 20,000 hectares in size, in the Tokyo Bay itself is being considered. According to one school of thought, the sudden spurt in land prices in the capital during the 80s is directly linked with the facilities which were developed during the 80s. A new Delhi has been created with plush five-star hotels, luxurious roads and numerous skyscrapers, which all have left a mark on the new residents. The population, which was already in a state of overcrowding, has increased considerably over the years with the acquisition of more and more land from neighboring areas. It has not been possible to accommodate these people in the available space, leading to a shortage of land.
living in but for speculative purposes. In 1978 the DDA conducted a survey which showed that of the 1000 plots which had been carved out of agricultural land in Sant Nagar, only 98 were built up (DDA 1984). The absence of a large resident population has increased the chances of fraud going undetected. In addition to fraudulent dealing, land grabbing has also been on the increase:

Ten years ago, the most common crime stories reported in newspapers concerned incidents of jewelry snatching. Nowadays such thefts are out and land grabbing is in.\(^6\)

The main causes of this rise are the attractiveness of land as a speculative investment and the increasing organization of professional land grabbers. The phenomenal rise in prices of land have resulted in a spate of speculative buying in illegal settlements. The existence of vacant land with a higher land value has made land grabbing very profitable. In addition, the territorial organization of colonizers has stimulated the emergence of mafia like organizations.

B. Perceptions of Risk

The actual probability of an event occurring is not as important for the actions of individuals as their perceptions of the probability based on prior experience. It is important therefore to understand the perceptions of the risks by the actors in the process. I will discuss the risks perceived by the buyers of land as well as the perceptions cultivated by the colonizers.

For those plotholders who reside in the colony, I expected the main fear would be eviction by public authorities. However, all of them felt quite secure because they paid off the local police. They also felt secure in their numbers and pointed to others living in the colony as a source of security. When reminded that bulldozers had twice appeared in the settlement and that the police have periodically demolished individual structures in the process of construction, one resident summed up the collective view: "colonies are settled through a process of demolition," indicating that some small losses naturally occur in trying to settle illegally. The small scale demolitions were dismissed

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Stage 1.
The land is subdivided and the main streets are laid out. Plot sizes are flexible and prices are low. At this stage the area does not look very different from the agricultural land. No services are present.

Stage 2.
Some of the plots have been sold and the plot holders build their boundary walls for protection. The turnover in plots at this stage is quite high. Most of the plots are bought by speculators. Some poor residents begin living in their plots. Vegetable gardening and cattle rearing are common income earning activities. The colonizer provides minimal roads. Water and electricity is usually tapped from the existing lines for tube wells.

Stage 3.
Plot holders begin to develop their plots, planning for regularization. People begin to move in. Some shops appear. A resident association is formed and the demand for proper servicing begins. Turnovers in plots are still quite high, and prices have risen.

Stage 4.
The colony has densified. Plot holders have invested in their plots to incorporate income generating uses like production units, shops, rental rooms etc. The resident association is active in its demand making. Some services have been provided by the public authorities. Prices are high and the turnover of plots has reduced.

Fig. 3.4 Various stages of development of unauthorized colonies.
as caused by the plotholders not paying adequate bribes. Residents who had bought recently were apprehensive about the possibility of that they had been given fraudulent papers. Plotholders who had delayed construction or were speculating were afraid of land grabbing. One family described how they delayed occupancy and found that the land had been grabbed by another family. After much negotiation the dispute was settled by the plotholder paying the land grabber some money. Often I heard that some households had turned land grabbing into an occupation, making money with every negotiation. In other parts of the city similar perceptions about demolition were prevalent:

That’s the last thing to be worried about. *Jiska kabja uski zammeen* (the land belongs to whoever has possession). No one can move you from here.\(^7\)

The colonizers perceive the risk of civil action against them as very low since so far there have been no convictions of illegal colonizers in Delhi.\(^8\) However, the colonizers do not explain the risks to the buyers in a disinterested way. The residents’ perceptions of risk depend in part on their understanding of the colonizers’ political and bureaucratic connections. Some colonizers indicate that buying land in illegal settlements is risky. It is my perception that this view is more often propounded by a colonizer who wants to retain a level of fear among the residents so that his own position as a power broker is maintained. One colonizer who spread this view was an influential power broker within his well-consolidated colony. He had switched from creating colonies to assuming a more political role in the settlement as the president of its association. His main visible source of finance was property dealing and he was not engaged in any further subdivisions. It was in his interest to instill fear of eviction in the residents.

In contrast, other colonizers suggest that there is little risk in buying land in their settlement. While some locations are riskier than others as indicated in an earlier chapter, this view too is spread due to the colonizers motivations. For example, the colonizer of Block B in Sant Nagar was actively engaged in colonizing a new settlement—Chandan Vihar. He had invested money in the land and was obviously eager to sell it off given the current slowness of the market due to political uncertainties. When I

\(^7\) Mrs. Singh of Khirkee Extension, *Indian Express*, July 31, 1989.

\(^8\) In Indore, Madhya Pradesh, four colonizers were taken to court for their illegal colonizing activities.
The large-scale demolition of houses by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and the Delhi Development Authority in Nangloi village, which began last week, is not only illegal, but also indicates how the poor people seeking shelter have been exploited by these colonists and their agents on the assumption that nothing would happen to their houses.

It is not the first time that the Municipal Corporation and the Delhi Development Authority have undertaken such demolition operations in one part of the city or the other. Similar demolitions in Budh Vihar near Nangloi had led to violence somehow back. The villagers of Nangloi Devi near Indira Gandhi International Airport a few weeks ago fought a pitched battle with the police to save their land from being grabbed by urban Delhi.

Despite these so-called clearance operations, thousands of acres of land acquired or intended to be acquired are still being grabbed by unauthorised or unapproved occupants in the rural areas and sold to the private parties only to create a house of their own. Not only this, unauthorised construction on agricultural land despite the several government measures has assumed a serious proportion. The Administration itself has been acting as a major supporter of this illegal activity obviously for reasons of political advancement or money consideration.

One would like to ask whether hundreds of acres of land unauthorised or unapproved can be constructed or come up overnight? Can any colfactory oung political backing sell hundreds of thousands of rents to needy people in one day? Can large-scale demolitions carried out in the construction of buildings be undertaken in a week? The answer is obvious. The Administration and official agencies, such as, the Municipal Corporation, the Delhi Development Authority and others have been openly conniving in this illegal activity, thus turning the planned and orderly growth of the city.

Not only that the official agencies are not only indifferent, but also in fact, using their authority to cover up such illegal activities.

However, it is shocking to note that the MCD and the Administration have been providing all basic facilities to those whose houses are now being demolished. It would be pertinent to ask whether Fair Price Shops can be sanctioned in unauthorised colonies?

This has been going on because of the Administration's conniving and shortsighted policies. Political parties, particularly those in power, have been using unauthorised colonies as their own banks, a fact which can hardly be disputed. In other words, people constructing houses on unapproved land have all along been exploited for political purposes.

Over 300 dwelling units were put down at Kakrola as they had been constructed on land which was sold to the Municipal Corporation. The Administration is solely responsible for what has been going on in the rural areas of this Capital city as stated by the DDA Vice-Chairman or the Administration, the fact remains that thousands of acres of land which is otherwise acquired to be acquired for developmental programs have been grabbed.

But surely, the DDA has a basic responsibility on land development planning and unchecked growth of Jhuggi-Jhonnis in different parts of the Capital.

The DDA has been indulging in sordid matters of public money. Crores of rupees are being spent annually to maintain heavy administrative infrastructure. Knowing how they are, the DDA has not only miserably failed on the house construction front but has also failed to protect and utilize government land which has been acquired for several years ago. The acquired land handed over to the DDA has again been grabbed or encroached upon by illegal squatters or unauthorised colonists.

Reverting to the main question of demolition of houses, one has to blame the unauthorised colonists. The functioning of the DDA has been far from satisfactory. Erratic power supply, unplanned landholding in different parts of the Capital causing extreme hardships to the citizens of Delhi and unhelpful attitude of DDA employees certainly suggest that there is something seriously wrong with the working of the Undertaking. Citizens in most parts of the city have been bitterly complaining against the arbitrary attitude of the DDA. But surely, the DDA has not only miserably failed on the house construction front but has also failed to protect and utilize government land which has been acquired for several years ago. The acquired land handed over to the DDA has again been grabbed or encroached upon by illegal squatters or unauthorised colonists.

Reverting to the main question of demolition of houses, one has to blame the unauthorised colonists.
asked him about risk of eviction, he assured me that there was no risk involved in buying plots in his settlement. It appears that the element of risk is emphasized by the colonizers after the land has been sold. The individual perceptions of risk are thus tempered by the views expressed by the colonizer of the settlement depending upon the stage of his involvement with the settlement.

II. IMPACTS OF INCREASED RISK OF LOSING POSSESSION

A. Market Response to Perceptions

At the settlement level, the workings of the illegal land market are strongly influenced by the prevalent risk of fraud and land grabbing. The two main effects on the illegal land market are to create the territorial organization of colonizers and dealers and the system of commissions through which the market operates.

1. Territorial Organization

Most of the market is territorially organized with individual property dealers concentrating their business in particular colonies. Because many plots are for sale at any one time, sellers must compete and maintain a good reputation to assuage buyers' concerns about fraud. Working in one area also reduces a dealer's chances of being defrauded. One small-scale property dealer used to conduct business in several unauthorized colonies in different parts of the city. He did not have strong local contacts in any one particular settlement and lost some money due to fraudulent deals. Since moving permanently to Sant Nagar three years ago and concentrating his business within this colony, he has not faced any loss due to fraud. Even if the incidence of fraud is low, the perceived risk of fraud can be high as a result of even a small number of actual cases with high losses. Additionally, dealers may spread such rumors about other dealers to increase the value of their own good reputations. The importance of building a good reputation was emphasized by the colonizer of Block B, Sant Nagar, who was the most successful colonizer in the locality. Information and trust, both requiring some length of residence in the settlement, are critical to successful transactions and lead to the territorial location of colonizers.
a. An unused board lying in the terrace to be used when the owner gets some land to sell.

b. Most property dealers locate on the main road to attract potential customers.

c. Typically, property dealers operate from small offices and most business is conducted outdoors.

Fig. 3.6 Property dealing is a widespread occupation in newly developing areas.
2. System of Commissions

The market for land in illegal subdivisions in Delhi operates through a system of commisions. Contacts through known and trusted people are less risky for the colonizers and dealers. Colonizers do not advertise in local newspapers because of the illegality of the sales. Since the profits from the sale of land are quite high, it is worthwhile to give commissions to personally known contacts who bring buyers.

From the viewpoint of the dealers, who are usually residents of the subdivision, the system of commissions allows dealers to use their personal contacts with friends and relatives so that they can finance their own plots with the commissions earned. This system of commissions and personal relations is so mutually beneficial that most heads of households are occasionally engaged in property dealing. One estimate put the number of resident property dealers who displayed boards at 300. When I was in the field, even the local tea-shop owner offered to find a plot suitable for me!

From the buyer's perspective, the trustworthiness of the colonizer-property dealer and the safety of the colony for investment purposes are reinforced by the plotholder-agent himself investing in a plot. The system of commissions also offers the buyer the possibility of partially financing his own plot by becoming a dealer. Moreover, he finds housing in a community where he knows some people. The system of commissions seems to be beneficial from the perspective of all the actors involved in it. Later on in the life of the settlement it can also be the basis of forming community solidarity. The system also illustrates the penetration of market relations into what are commonly understood as purely social relations.

B. Implications for Plotholders

There are two main findings about the effects of fraud and land grabbing on the plotholders. First, in terms of access to land and housing, the poorer residents are likely to lose land in cases of dispute, but have easier access to rented accommodation. Second, initially housing investment is greater than in the other major form of illegal settlement

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8 Most advertising occurs through word of mouth and signboards along nearby main roads. Sometimes pamphlets advertising the sale of plots are distributed in areas containing potential buyers. One small colonizer recounted his experience with distributing pamphlets — buyers who came to the settlement bought from others so that his marketing expenses were wasted.
a. Vegetable gardening by renters in plots owned by speculators.

b. Goat rearing by residents in vacant plots.

Fig. 3.7 Strategies to protect against land grabbing. Speculators often rent their plots for low or little rent to poor families. The plots can be used for income earning by the renters.
— squatter settlements. This might be partially due to higher-income groups investing in these settlements for other reasons. The high initial housing investment also illustrates a sequence of consolidation and tenure security that differs from conventional expectations. I will examine these two implications as they apply to the three broad kinds of buyers of these plots.

1. **Access to land and housing**

   Access to land and housing has been affected in different ways for different kinds of buyers. First, plotholders in Sant Negar who do not have alternative accommodation or cannot afford to pay rents any longer move in almost immediately. Their main fear is risk of eviction by public authorities and the risk of losing the land to better-off people in case of disputes due to fraud.

   Second, plotholders who need to delay occupancy of their plot in order to save money for construction face the risk of losing possession due to land grabbing. Some of these are the lower middle class who buy to settle down after retirement. They have alternative accommodation either government provided or through a rent allowance. Their main concern was the risk of losing possession of land. Often they bought plots near residents whom they knew so that the latter could keep an eye on their plot, a strategy that seemed to work well.

   The third kind of buyers are speculators with adequate money or power to maintain possession of their plot. The speculators often rent out small rooms for little or nominal rent. Their strategy of retaining control over the land is to build a minimal core, rent the land to poor people without demanding key money, and enforce their ownership by using social connections with the local influentials. The renters were poor households who in exchange for the housing kept an eye on the plot. Most of the speculative plots were large, so the renters were able to grow vegetables on the remaining land to sell in urban markets.

   The illegality of the plots, variety of plot sizes and inadequacy of infrastructure in illegal subdivisions make the plots affordable to different income groups. In the case of disputes, unfortunately, the poor are vulnerable to loss of their investment. On the positive side, however, some poor renters find cheap housing and the means to earn income by growing vegetables.
a. Even swampy low lying land is cut up into plots and protected by brick walls.

b. Brick walls to protect against encroachment are a characteristic feature of illegal subdivisions.

c. A minimum shelter built to indicate possession may not be sufficient; the building materials are stolen for construction.

d. A minimal shelter which is occasionally visited has better chances of stopping encroachment.

Fig. 3.8 Strategies to protect against land grabbing. Plotholders need upfront investments.
2. Investment in housing

The investment pattern in illegal subdivisions begins with the owner making a large upfront investment to build brick boundary walls and fill in the plinth. This construction indicates to the community and potential encroachers the owner’s possession of and active interest in the land. Simultaneously, or soon after, the owner builds a room with brick walls, with a roof of stone slabs on iron T-girders. The minimal investment of filling in the plot to the desired plinth and of constructing a boundary wall can be a substantial part of the required investment in the plot.

The high initial investment in housing is contrary to the general literature linking housing investment and tenure. Conventional wisdom, most clearly articulated by Turner (1969), indicates that tenure security is a precondition to housing investment. Illustrating that it is the perceived security of tenure that matters, Doebele (1983) argues that these perceptions of security can be created by “hope giving” governmental interventions such as the provision of services. In an article comparing consolidation of illegal subdivisions and squatter settlements in Medellin, Colombia, Barross and Mesa (1986) conclude that while initially the settlement process occurs faster in the illegal subdivisions due to higher perceived security of tenure, both settlements illustrate a progression of housing quality from the initial temporary shacks to more permanent buildings, implying that consolidation improves with the age of the settlement and higher perceived tenure.

However, I would argue that the residents increase housing investment in order to increase their security of tenure. By making high upfront investments and building upon their plot as soon as possible they secure possession. Possession also leads to making demands through resident associations that ultimately seek legal tenure. In a similar vein, Hirschman (1984) argues that people believe that consolidation increases security of tenure and reduces risk of eviction, since governments are reluctant to demolish structures that are well built and represent substantial investments.

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10 Collier (1976:22) mentions that after getting access to the land the squatters build boundary walls. This however, is to protect encroachment on their land by other squatters, rather than a response to the risk of losing possession despite having quasi-title to the land.

11 Such an inverse relationship between tenure and housing investment has also been noted through research in illegal subdivisions in Oman (Omar Rezaz, talk at MIT, April 1991).
Vacant plot in denser part of Sant Nagar, Block A protected by boundary walls.

Fig. 3.9 Vacant plots with boundary walls are the most common characteristic feature of unauthorised colonies.
The increased risk of fraud and land grabbing has had mixed effects. The need for high upfront investment to retain claim to land in the case of delayed occupation has reduced poorer income groups' chances of retaining possession. At the same time, the poor have also gained access to low-cost rental housing as a direct result of these risks. From my research, I believe that plotholders build to secure tenure not from actions by the government but from fraud and land grabbing by private agents.
INTRODUCTION

During the fieldwork, while questioning residents about the financing of their plots, I was struck that no one reported paying in installments, which the literature suggests is the usual practice. Many people asked me about the possibilities of obtaining loans for various purposes. This cry for credit came not only from the residents but also from the colonizers, who previously offered credit to buyers. My research into this question revealed that the inability of colonizers to provide credit resulted from the less profitable and more formal relations that have developed between colonizers and the landowners. What had caused the changed situation and what did it imply for access to land? These are the issues I will deal with in this chapter.

The increased commercialization of land markets in the past few years has been noted by researchers. Doebele (1987: 116) states:

Urban land markets that twenty, or even ten years ago seemed relatively responsive to demand are now inelastic. Private owners, who formerly were willing to enter informal agreements with the poor for cultural or ethnic reasons now often find their land in a premium position for commercial development and can no longer afford to offer it on the basis of social obligation or religious principle.

This chapter explores the dynamics of this commercialization of contracts between the landowners and the colonizers and the implications of the changes for the access to land by potential plot buyers. In the first section I will focus on the causes of increasing formalization of contracts between colonizers and landowners. In the second section I focus on the impacts of these changes at two levels. At the settlement level I will elaborate on the increasing involvement of colonizers with the settlement and the role of
resident associations. On the resident level, I will focus on the implications of the unavailability of installment credit.

I. CHANGES: FORMALIZATION OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN COLONIZERS AND LANDOWNERS

There have been two distinct phases of illegal subdivision in Sant Nagar. The differences between the agreements in the two phases reflect some interesting developments. In the earlier phase when there were no close personal connections between the landowning farmer and colonizer, the agreements between them were ambiguous whereas in the later phase the contracts negotiated between colonizer and farmer often from the same locality were more rigid and time bound. In addition, earlier colonizers sold the plots on installment credit and within a year or two collected the money owed and disappeared from the scene, leaving the plotholders to fend for themselves. Later colonizers have continued their involvement with the settlement even though they sold the plots on a cash-down basis and thus had no apparent reason to remain. Finally, earlier colonizers were presumably operating in other regions after they finished with the Sant Nagar area whereas the later colonizers stayed mostly within fixed geographical boundaries, even after they had sold all the plots within a settlement.

A. The two phases of illegal subdivision
1. The pre-1977 phase

In the first phase of settlement, which began in 1960, five to six colonizers who were outsiders to the area came and bought agricultural land from the farmers of Burari village. This land consisted of holdings between 400 and 4000 square meters. The land bordered the village settlement area defined by the lal dora\(^1\) (village boundary) and was some distance from the nearest urban area, that of Kingsway Camp. The colonizers

\(^1\) The lal dora is the legal settlement limit of rural villages within which building activities are permitted and electricity and water supply is provided by local authorities. Outside the limits of the lal dora (literally red line), no permanent structures can be built and domestic services are not provided. This acts as a means of conserving agricultural land and delineating revenue lands by preventing sprawling settlements. The original village lal doras were demarcated in 1908.
probably thought that eventually when the village boundary was extended the land would become legalized. Meanwhile, the settlement could tap the existing service lines of the nearby village and later get them extended.

The early transactions between the colonizer and the farmers in Sant Nagar were typical for the early phases of subdivision throughout the city. Early colonizers bought land at the periphery at low prices from the farmers, subdivided it and sold it to the buyers at higher prices. The freeze on land sales in 1959 and the low rates of compensation offered to the landowners for sale to the government encouraged many of the land sales which occurred during this time. Additionally, colonizers were willing to pay the landowners more than the official compensation rates, since they could in their turn sell the subdivided land for a reasonably high profit. These early agreements were loose and the colonizer dictated the terms. The prices agreed upon were low and the unwritten agreements included payments without interest to the only as the sale of the plots proceeded. Under these conditions, the personal investment at risk for the colonizer was quite low.

The colonizers bought the land for between two and three rupees per square meter and sold it to some city households for between 15 and 20 rupees per square meter. The buyers had to pay an initial deposit after which they could pay the remaining cost in installments within up to two years. The initial colonizers soon disappeared from the scene, having sold the plots for high profits. This initial phase of subdivision did not result in significant building on any of the plots. The area was flood-prone and, in the absence of any clear demarcation of the plots, after one or two years it became difficult to locate individual plots. The plotholders discovered that the plots they had been shown were different from the land for which they were given papers. The absence of services (water, electricity, etc.) further deterred the early development of plots.

So who were these colonizers of the earlier pre-1977 phase? I will make a necessary digression here to the origins of the earlier legal colonizers and their operations. Between 1955 and 1959, a number of private land development companies flourished. Their mode of operation was similar to that of the pre-1977 colonizers of
unauthorized colonies that emerged later. Some of the colonizers of the pre-1977 phase had emerged from these companies.\(^2\)

With the steep rise in prices and the land freeze in 1957, the larger established private colonizers virtually all went out of business from 1959 onwards (Bose 1973). Almost all land transfers became illegal. On one hand there was an increasing demand of the rising population and on the other hand the land freeze cut off all private provision of land. The land policy eliminated the role of the legal private developer, and, due to the problems in implementation, simultaneously failed to increase supply through state measures. A new breed of colonizers who specialize in the illegal sale of land emerged.

2. The Post-1977 Phase

The second phase of subdivision can be distinguished from the first both in space and in time from the earlier phase. In this phase, land nearer the main road towards the urban area was subdivided into plots and called Sant Nagar. This phase was catalyzed by a series of events. First, some of this land was notified under the large scale land acquisition program of the DDA of 1959. The likelihood of it being acquired with little

\(^2\) The companies either bought land directly from the landowners or alternatively, bought it through brokers. The brokers were given commissions of between one and two percent which were incentives for them to lookout for "available" land. The land price given to the farmers was low and the company was able to finance the land with its own capital. Plots were often sold as soon as land was acquired from the land even before the legal transactions were complete. The colonizers prepared blueprints for the colonies and obtained the necessary municipal sanctions. Plots were then sold regardless of the stage of development of the colony. Sometimes the companies paid the farmers along with the sale of the plots, thereby minimizing their own investment.

The earliest colonizers had charged low prices (Rs 10-15/sq yard) and even this money was collected in installments. All transactions were strictly on a cash basis. The plot could generally be sold three times before it was finally registered. The profits made on these intermediate transactions were not claimed by the company, neither was the increased price of land recorded in the registration deed. Profits made by the companies were 15 - 30 percent on the paper, however, in an independent study of one such company Bose (1973) concludes that the actual profits made were nearer hundred percent. All the plots were not generally released at once as the companies feared that the market would get depressed.

The stages of development of the colonies were financed through the installments paid by the plotholders. Thus the colonies were developed all at once - operation wise rather than area wise. The companies failed to provide urban infrastructure (water supply, sewerage, electricity etc.) at the time of the sale. In many cases the colonizer disappeared from the scene and the municipal corporation took some time before addressing the problem thus creating a period of no facilities (Bose 1973).
compensation from the DDA made the illegal sale attractive. Second, in 1978 a major flood damaged a lot of land and property. In the following year, under pressure from the villagers, the government built a dam to protect the land from future flooding. The building of the dam made the land safe for settlement and it decreased the water table making the water brackish and not very suitable for agriculture. Third, the Delhi Administration, in 1977, passed a policy for the regularization of pre-1977 colonies (there were 612 colonies by then), thereby increasing expectations of future regularization. On paper, the policy included strict action against the formation of further colonies but in practice it was not implemented, thereby increasing the perception of possibilities of future regularization by the residents.

After 1977, the relationships between the landowners and the colonizers had also evolved into more complex and rigid forms. I was surprised to find that in the more recent subdivisions, the role of the colonizer in the sale of land had shifted to being more like that of a broker. The agreements between the colonizer and the landowner were clearly laid out. The colonizer agreed to sell the land for the farmer within a period of two to six months at a price mutually agreed upon. Moreover, he would also collect a commission of between two and three percent of the price of the land. The colonizer would then make a subdivision plan for the land and begin the sales. His strategy was to sell the land for as highest price that the market could bear, so that he could pocket the difference between the price promised the farmer and the actual sale price. As the plots were sold, money was paid to the farmer. The plotholders were meanwhile pressuring the authorities to consider a redefinition of the village lal dora, which had been set in 1908, to include Sant Nagar by claiming that it was being occupied by the growing village population. In 1983, the extension of the lal dora was officially legalized through

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3 See Solomon Benjamin, Jobs, Land and Urban Development, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1991, for a description of the low prices paid by the DDA.

4 Anthony (1990) found similar processes elsewhere in Delhi.

5 Often, the colonizer uses the name of the nearby regularized colony to name his subdivision and gain the advantages of the regularized colony. Thus Sant Nagar already existed and had legal status, by calling his subdivision Sant Nagar Block B, he could possibly confuse the buyers into thinking that either the colony was legal, or that it was another phase of Sant Nagar A which was to be regularized in time.
Colonisers brazen it out

By Ashutosh Handoo

NEW DELHI, Sept 9 — The recent expanse of vacant land in south-west Delhi lying in Palam-Kokhria-Bijwasan tracts, proposed to be developed by the Delhi Development Authority, is witnessing unauthorised colonisation on a staggering scale despite official warnings.

This brazen but systematic activity of private colonisers is going on at a pace that would put to shame the "working" of any official agency like the Government's monopoly outfit DDA, whose professed approach towards planned development has been a pet subject of ridicule in the Capital.

Hundreds and thousands of people are being taken for a ride, a costly one at that by the unscrupulous colonisers while many others treat the purchase of plots as a mere extension of their routine business activity. Some of these deals, part of the proceeds of which are being shown on the books as income from real estate, is being treated by conservative estimates of the agents in the profession.

To ensure continued feasibility of these deals, the Transaction which change hands every season are carried out with meticulous care on power of attorney basis. Total business turnover of these deeds in south-west Delhi which do involve an element of risks has been in several cases, according to the conservative estimates of the agents in the profession.

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A couple of days ago, the DDA issued a public warning in the national dailies. It stated "for the planned development of Delhi, land has been acquired in south-west Delhi. The entire process is taking place these days, notices under Sections 4, 6, 9 or 17 have not been issued as yet. The situation is so messy that the DDA has only some days ago written to the Delhi Administration for issuing the Section 4 notification which is still under consideration."

The DDA has only some days ago written to the Delhi Administration for issuing the Section 4 notification which is still under consideration. It is like putting the cart before the horse. The order of action should have been first acquisition and then planning of development of the area. The administration is also sitting pretty over the matter and by the time it is all over, the full extent of private colonisation has already taken place. The modus operandi of the colonisers is that they do not wait for the bulldozer, but rather construct boundary walls illegally on Government land in Palam village.

Waiting for the bulldozer? Boundary walls constructed illegally on Government land near Palam village. —HT photo by N. Thiagarajan

Colonisers brazen it out

The buyers are in plenty especially because of the boom in real estate in the recent past. Financially sound parties are being taken for a ride, a costly one at that by the unscrupulous colonisers while many others are being taken for a ride, a costly one at that by the unscrupulous colonisers while many others treat the purchase of plots as a mere extension of their routine business activity. Some of these deals, part of the proceeds of which are being shown on the books as income from real estate, is being treated by conservative estimates of the agents in the profession.

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Some of the resettlement colonies like Maniyapuri are also nearby. Mahabir Enclave phase I and II have also come up in a big way. Geared by the guidelines of the Delhi Administration a 100 per cent built-up portion in an area under acquisition notice need not be brought down, sources said.

However, the areas which the DDA claims is under the process of acquisition and where most of the colonisation is taking place these days, notice under Sections 4, 6, 9 or 17 have not been issued as yet. The DDA has only some days ago written to the Delhi Administration for issuing the Section 4 notification which is still under consideration. It is like putting the cart before the horse. The order of action should have been first acquisition and then planning of development of the area. The administration is also sitting pretty over the matter and by the time it is all over, the full extent of private colonisation has already taken place.

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Waiting for the bulldozer? Boundary walls constructed illegally on Government land near Palam village. —HT photo by N. Thiagarajan

Fig. 4.1 Hindustan Times (New Delhi). September 10, 1987.
a Delhi Administration gazette. The regularization of Sant Nagar with legal rural settlement status gave new momentum to the subdividing of land.

Most of the colonizing activities in the area after 1978 were orchestrated by a single colonizer. He was originally a farmer from the village Burari who had earlier on sold his land to a colonizer. Soon he realized that large profits could be made from land subdivisions and began by colonizing a two square kilometer parcel of land now called Sant Nagar block B. When his initial venture was successful he got involved in further subdivisions and is currently engaged in creating a new colony nearby called Chandan Vihar.

The agreements that this colonizer had with the landowning farmers, who are mostly known to him through his village connections, are typical of agreements between colonizers and landowners in the post-1977 phase. The role of the colonizer is now more like a broker or property dealer than a colonizer. The colonizer of Sant Nagar block B in 1983, contracted to sell the land for 30 rupees per square meter with a two percent commission within six months. The colonizer paid a deposit to the farmer of about ten percent of the selling price of the land. As the price agreed upon was nearer the price that the market could bear, his profit margin has reduced considerably since earlier times. Within six months he was unable to sell off all the plots that he had created so he borrowed some money from financiers at interest rates of 24 to 36 percent per year and paid the money he owed to the farmer on time. To improve sales, he put in a road and built a temple on the land. He also later installed hand-pumps to pump up ground water. He was able to sell off the remaining land for approximately 75 rupees per square meter in 1985, and could repay his debts as well as make a profit.

He sold the plots through some supporters as well as through contacts who received commissions. These commissions were usually in kind, through adjusting the

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6 In another settlement, Sitapuri (formed in 1973), Anthony (1990) indicates that the colonizers acted like property agents rather than colonizers. They coordinated the efforts of two or more farmers desirous of selling their land. In these transactions he found that the deposit component in the transaction is higher in the settlement’s infancy and reduces substantially as the settlement consolidates.

7 Another developer, in an interview, said that nowadays no farmer gives you more than two to three months to sell the land. In addition you have to pay the deposit of ten percent and if you are unable to sell the land you can lose a lot of money.
Landowners turn racketeers

by Hardeep Kang

NEW DELHI, Sept 5: Shy years ago, even a bicycle was a rare thing in Saiy village in south Delhi. Today, several landowners own Maruti cars and their houses boast colour TVs and videos.

A look at the village is the reason for its new-found prosperity—Sangam Vihar, a sprawling unauthorized colony nearly 20 kilometres in circumference according to one estimate, occupying what was once agricultural land belonging to five villages.

In September, 1980, land belonging to eight south Delhi villages including Dau, Saiy, Taglalkhah, Dhanpur and N. Azimuddin was notified under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1981. (Later five other villages in south Delhi received a similar notification.) This created commotion among the villagers who feebly began selling off their land—privately, probably illegally.

'The logic was simple, explains Mann Singh of Saiy. 'How much compensation would the government have given me? Five or six rupees per gaj (yard) and then I would have been neither here nor there. As it is, he points out, he has managed to sell off a portion of the land to DDA for Rs 1.40 per square yard but an area of nearly 200 square yards that he left behind has been sold to a private concern at Rs 80 to 90 per square yard.

So, the land of Taglalkhah, where the Nehru Place commercial complex now stands, was taken at the absurdly low rate of Rs 1.40 per square yard. In Lado Sarai, the rate was Rs 3.50 per square yard. In Dau, the land where the Vaagan Kunj residential complex is rising up, was sold at Rs 1.20 per square yard. In Lado Sarai, Saiy, and Taglalkhah, a per square yard price varied from Rs 1.40 to Rs 10 per square yard.

So, of the 53 bighas of land he sold off, Mann Singh has nothing for the government to say. He says the government either sold his land or he sold it himself. It is, however, in keeping with the government's policy of selling land for agricultural purposes, becomes collateral (minimum income) for buying further land.

At another landowner's point out, however, 'taking below market rates' is illegal. 'They claim that he and his fellow villagers have bought everyone from policemen to politicians and bureaucrats to make the compensation official.

According to Singh, he and 49 other landowners in the area paid Rs 10,000 in bribes to bureaucrats and petty officials to look the other way when the fraudulent transactions were going on. Without these bribes, Sangam Vihar could not have come up, he says.

Now, how else, he asks, could he have sold off his land when registration of land transfers has been banned in Delhi. Also, Delhi was in a ''state of emergency' during that period.

While the land was being sold off, he says, the DDA also received its share of the. DDA's share was Rs 25,000 per bigha and the remaining Rs 1.40 per square yard.

In November, 1981, as per section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1981, a public notary with the help of a false attorney which was registered in the M. S. G. building, registered his land.

In Dau, the rate was Rs 3.50 per square yard. In Lado Sarai, Saiy, and Taglalkhah, a per square yard price varied from Rs 1.20 to Rs 10 per square yard.

According to Singh, he and his fellow villagers bought everyone from policemen to politicians and bureaucrats to purchase land from the authorities.

Sangam Vihar is a sprawling unauthorized colony that appears to be registered under the Land Acquisition Act, 1981. Many of the residents of Sangam Vihar don't know where they stand.

A doctor, who recently purchased a house in Sangam Vihar, says, 'The land is bought and paid for in far as we are concerned, but it is a matter of fact that the authorities refuse to let us build on it and claim that the original landowners have forfeited the land.' Mann Singh, who claims this, has a point.

Thus, Sangam Vihar's residents are class III and class IV employees, with a few shopkeepers, traders, businesswomen and government workers. "We have managed them on our own," explains a Saiy businessman, who runs a two-torry office in Sangam Vihar. "And indeed they have.

Electricity is supplied from overhead lines, which are wanted to be moved underground in the colony, a connection is taken to supply several houses. Water is drawn from handpumps. Children in the colony go to the Saiy village government school, already overcrowded.

What is in store for the residents of Sangam Vihar? Demolition or regularization? They are worried, but not indispensable. The elections are out for the time being, and parents for regularization is just around the corner.
price of the plot of the agent. Payment for the plots was on a strictly cash-down basis with an agreement to pay the entire amount within fifteen days (this period was extendable for a maximum of four months if the colonizer wanted to oblige the buyer, with an advance of between 500 and 1000 rupees depending upon the size of the plot). Around 1983, in his early days, the colonizer also ran a building materials supply operation, but he soon specialized in selling land and delegated the materials supply operations to his friends and relatives.

B. Causes for the Changes in Contracts

In this section, I will examine the causes of increasing commercialization of the illegal subdivision process through two parallel related occurrences -- the learning process of the farmer, and the changed origins of the colonizer.

1. Farmer learns of prices

The learning process of the farmers has been instrumental in the changes in the contracts. Earlier, the farmers were not aware of prevailing urban land prices of the pent up demand for land. Traditionally, relations between various castes in village societies have depended upon the control, ownership and use of land and the jajmani (patron-client) system. Landowners had never thought of land as an urban asset or considered its sale since it was their main means of livelihood. One would expect that within a short time market forces -- the supply of legal land constricted by the land act of 1959 and the increasing demand -- would make the landowners aware of the market value of their land but in reality this awareness has taken some time.

2. Farmer turns colonizer

The second factor instrumental in the changed nature of contracts has been the territorial nature of operations caused by the farmers turning into colonizers. The land owners themselves, even if they were aware of the prevailing land prices, could not have in the earlier phase created subdivisions. Even the apparently simple procedure of dividing the land into plots and selling it requires some understanding of possible plot sizes and street widths, a means of locating buyers of plots who would trust them and
familiarity with the legal aspects of land transfer, registration and power of attorney procedures.

A central quality in the success of the early colonizers was "street smartness." The process of illegal land subdivision required the colonizer to be "street smart," a quality is commonly attributed to the urban. In an interesting report of a conversation with a colonizer Bose (1973:174) reports:

We: Is your land not covered by the Land Acquisition Order of 1959?
Colonizer: Yes, but all land in Delhi is covered by this order. You see, only Section 4 (notification only) of the Land Acquisition Act has been applied and this is the opportunity to buy land Delhi. Once Section 6 (acquisition procedures) is applied it will be difficult.
We: Can I build a house straightaway if I buy the land?
Colonizer: Of course. And you should hurry up. Once a large number of houses are built, this colony will be regularized.
We: But don't you think all this is illegal?
Colonizer: But what can we do? Land is selling at Rs. 200/- a square yard in Delhi. We are offering you land for only Rs. 10/- per square yard.

The farmers did not initially possess this kind of quickness in convincing skeptical buyers to invest in illegal land.

Two factors contributed to the growing number of farmers turned colonizers. First, the older generation of landowning farmers was being replaced by the younger generation who were more urbanized than their parents and also less attached to the land. They were able to negotiate more favorable contracts with the colonizers as they spoke the same kind of language and were more aware of the demand for their land and the prevailing prices.

Second, many farmers who sold their land were now unemployed. They could not readily engage in any other skilled trades. Subdividing land required little in terms of skills that could not be learned by doing with relatively small costs. Moreover, they could see that subdividing land was profitable. Their position as villagers also gave them contacts and credibility with other landowners who were yet to sell the land. Mitra (1988) gives a fascinating account of a farmer who turned into a colonizer after seeing

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In some cases small farmers, who were not prepared to sell their land were forced to sell due to the breaking of essential agricultural linkages. For example, the smaller farmers in the village Mundka, who used the water from the tube wells of the large landholders, had to sell their land when the large landholders sold their land forming illegal subdivisions.
adjacent land turned into a illegal subdivision. The evidence of considerable rise in land values fuelled this tendency to turn from agriculture to subdividing. In many cases where subdivisions have appeared the land was not fertile enough to make agriculture economical. The changes in the subdivision process have had significant effects on the access to land. First, the role of the colonizer has changed into being a political power-broker for the settlement. Second, land can no longer be bought in installments, a situation which has had an adverse impact on the access to land for the poor. I will elaborate upon these two implications in the next section.

II. IMPACTS

A. The Increased Involvement of the Colonizer with the Settlement

The colonizer now has a new role to play in the consolidation process of the illegal subdivision that he creates. As the profit margins in the initial transaction have been reduced considerably, he has discovered land speculation as an easy means of profit making. Due to his borrowing on the market to finance his subdivision activities he is turning towards catalyzing settlement consolidation to drive up the price of his plots increase his profits (Benjamin 1991).

Literature on informal subdivisions often portrays the colonizer as a profiteer who disappears after the sale of the plots (Payne 1982). Subdividers are described as often promising the provision of services of but not providing them (Blaesser 1981, Payne 1982, Yonder 1987). Yonder argues that the social and political ties of the subdividers

9 Anthony (1990) reports that agriculture is no longer economical at the urban periphery due to fragmentation of holdings and limited returns to land. On one acre of land he calculates that the income from agriculture is 16,000 Rs. per annum, whereas the interest earned on capitalising the land would be about 20,000 Rs. per annum in addition to releasing the farmer for additional economic activity.

10 Joan Nelson argues that such conditions may result in increased organization among the settlers. "In such settlements, neighbors lack any shared experience as dramatic as an invasion. But, unlike squatters, they share a sense of outraged betrayal: having paid for lots, they lack both title and basic services. They may also share a common target, the developer."

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a. Main street, Sant Nagar.

b. Filling in mud in the main street to prevent water from collecting.

c. Back lane, Sant Nagar. Note the bridges across the open drain, and the openings from the wet areas of the houses.

d. Street in the illegal part. Note the water collected in the center.

e. Brick paved lane provided by a colonizer in one part.

f. Main street, Sant Nagar. Note that it is just wide enough for vehicular traffic.

Fig. 4.3 Condition of streets in Sant Nagar.
determined their market conduct and obligations to clients. Thus outside colonizers would leave early on and local leaders would continue their involvement with the settlement through service delivery and political advocacy.

There are relatively few studies on subdividers who have actively assisted settlement consolidation beyond the sale of the plots. Exceptions are Payne and Nientied, and Mitra. Payne studied developers in Turkey who had accidentally moved from provision of materials into subdividing land during troughs in business. They provided materials, technical assistance and credit in the initial stages, but later on they specialized and stopped providing these services.

Van der Linden and Nientied show how *dalals* (colonizers) in Karachi, Pakistan, often organize the provision of water supply and transportation. However, in the case of Karachi, Hasan (1986) notes how the *dalals* have gained complete control over land subdivision to the extent that government officials are in their employ. Closer to my case, Mitra (1987) cites the case of a colonizer in Budh Vihar, Delhi, who has continued involvement with the settlement consolidation. She supports Yonder's contention that political ambitions and efforts to increase land value are causes of this continued involvement.

In this section I will show how earlier colonizers did operate as expected in the literature, disappearing after completing sales, while recently the territorial organization of subdividers and the changed nature of contracts have motivated the colonizers oversee settlement consolidation. In Delhi, Bose (1973) cites cases where the colonizer vanished after the sale of plots, leaving the purchasers to deal with the servicing. Other studies of illegal colonies (Khurana:1968, Mitra 1976, Mukherjee 1988) report similar findings. Even within the Sant Nagar, the first wave of colonizers vanished after selling the plots. However, my evidence suggests that colonizers are increasingly locating in specific areas and continuing their involvement with the settlement (Mitra 1987, Anthony 1990). What factors have contributed to these changed conditions?

A series of interlinked factors have contributed to this change. First, the changed nature of contracts between the landowner and colonizer has decreased profit margins. To fulfill conditions of the agreements and make reasonable profits the colonizer has to speculate with some plots. He thus has a stake in seeing that the settlement consolidates quickly and acquires services and infrastructure to increase the value of the land. The
a. Provision of open space and community hall, Budh Vihar.

b. Provision of a savings bank and a post office within a school, Budh Vihar.

c. Private school, Sant Nagar.

d. Provision of a temple to deter eviction, Sant Nagar.

e. Control over the ration shop, Sant Nagar.

f. Control over resident's association and traders association, Budh Vihar.

Fig. 4.4 Colonizers often provide social infrastructure. They exert control over the settlement through these institutions.
colonizer of the parts of Sant Nagar Block B and C provided at his own cost, an improved main road and a temple. He also donated land for a private school under the condition that the school admitted two students from the settlement every year free of tuition. More recently, he also organized the provision of water supply. Of more importance and a development I will deal with in detail later is that he formed the residents organization.

Other settlements in the city are experiencing similar involvement of their colonizers. I will argue that these developments are caused by two factors besides the motive of increasing the land value. First, the increased attractiveness of subdividing has saturated the market with aspiring colonizers. Most of these are territorially located, either originating from the village itself or developing close contacts and relations with the local landowners, police and the representatives of the public authorities. Given the importance of trust and reputation in the success of the sales in subdivisions, the continued involvement in the affairs of the subdivisions they have created seems logical.

Second, the constant contact with the local and public authorities makes the colonizer familiar with the "system" in which the informal contacts and information he acquires could be translated into political power. In the case of Sant Nagar, the colonizer advised the association about strategies and contacts. The residents thus became obliged to him and he gained status as a local leader. From the side of the politicians with whom he had contact he could promise support in elections as well as assure turnouts for political rallies. The colonizer of Block B and C had only just begun to refine his power broker role when, in November 1990, he rallied the people of the settlement to attend a political rally in support of the Mandal commission report.

In other settlements this role of a power broker is much better defined. In Budh Vihar for instance, the colonizer was the local leader and perceived by the residents to

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11 One of the centers of control is the ration shop which sells subsidized basic necessities. In the area, the local ration shop is owned by the colonizer and run by the president of the association. The ration shop owner has the authority to make ration cards which are in India really the only evidence of a family's existence. Moreover, they are seen as evidence of having lived in a particular area. Access to a ration card is access to cheap oil, sugar and food-grains and kerosene as well as proof of legal residence. A large business in falsifying as well as selling ration cards exists which is another example of the "parallel system" that exists in India.

12 The controversial Mandal Commission Report was commissioned by the V.P. Singh's government and advocated the reservation of jobs for members of scheduled castes and tribes.
be the *malik* (owner) of the settlement, and he exemplified the traditional patron-client feudal relationship.\textsuperscript{13}

1. **Conditions for the emergence of the colonizer as power-broker**

   This emergence of the colonizer as power broker is not universal. In Sitapuri, the colonizers played more the role of property dealers and no single influential colonizer emerged. This poses the question of what conditions foster the emergence of the colonizer power brokers?

   It is useful to compare the two parts of Sant Nagar in this respect. In Block A, no single influential colonizer emerged. This could be due to the greater age of the earlier settlement and its legal situation. But in Budh Vihar, despite the age of the settlement, the colonizer power broker did become influential. Two factors probably encouraged the emergence of the colonizer power broker.

   The first factor is the size of land controlled initially. In the earlier development of Sant Nagar, the landholdings were relatively small, and individual landowners sold land to individual colonizers. Thus, no single colonizer emerged as dominant. In Block B and C however, the colonizer was able to negotiate for a two square kilometer parcel of land, which meant control over a larger area and population. In Budh Vihar, even though land holdings were not very large, the colonizer negotiated with all the landowners to assemble a large single parcel.

   The second factor is the type of resident population. The earlier settlement in Block A consisted of a higher income population than Block B and C. This was probably a result of infiltration rather than any initial precondition. The middle class residents of Block A had contacts of their own in the city administrative and political system and made their own demands making through their own association.

2. **Resident associations and the struggle for services**

   What is the role of resident associations in the struggle for regularization? What forms does this struggle take? If the struggle to obtain basic services forms the main

\textsuperscript{13} In March 1983, when the DDA demolished some houses in Budh Vihar, he provided the house-owners building material to rebuild their houses. This action increased the faith of the plotholders and increased the prices of land in his colony.
binding force within the resident associations, how far does it help to unite different resident associations? What forms does this struggle take? These are the questions I will address in this section.

Most of the associations' demand making is done by some members who are delegated the responsibility of approaching officials. In these the petitioner emphasizes his role as representing an association rather than appealing in the personal capacity. The most successful petitions have been those where informal links existed between the residents and the administrative structure. When links do not work or do not exist the alternative is to demonstrate outside the Lieutenant Governor’s house. Political links are perceived to function faster than administrative linkages, yet they are less stable.

Resident associations do not always see it in their interest to collaborate in their demand making. The limited availability of resources, and the fear that the fruits of cooperation will be enjoyed unequally makes the associations wary of cooperating with other associations in the area.14 Usually they tend to collaborate in issues which are not related to limited resources, for example, the collaboration between associations of colonies which have been demolished, to prevent future demolition by DDA without notice.

However, the resident associations of Sant Nagar Block A and Block B collaborated in their demand for services. The paucity of public funds for providing complete infrastructure makes it necessary for residents to pay for part of the services installed.15 Also, often the residents in illegal settlements install parallel systems which are either self sufficient (like electricity generators) or tap illegally into existing systems. The tapping of services by the unauthorized area obviously imposes a strain on the quality of services received by the regularized area, resulting in a common interest of

14 However, a federation of Transjamuna Unauthorized Colonies exists. One colonizer speculated that the reason this could have occurred was pressure of the politician involved (from above) rather than any visible advantages perceived by individual associations. In the case of Sitapuri, the association joined with other association of settlement who had been demolished to fight and successfully win a joint court case. It would seem therefore, that the associations cooperate in issues which do not involve the distribution of limited resources or when the proximity of two settlements makes them somewhat interdependent.

15 In India unlike many Latin American countries, utilities are provided through public agencies.
Women waiting for their turn at the public water tap in the Block B of Sant Nagar. Sometimes the wait can be up to four hours for two to four gallons of drinking water.

Fig. 4.5 The struggle for services. Water is the most immediate need.
receiving better services. The case of electricity and water supply in Sant Nagar depict this point.

After considerable petitioning, in 1986 the Delhi Electricity Supply Union installed an electric substation on land donated by the residents association. The residents had to pay only an initial sum to buy the land; the electricity is not metered as it falls in the rural zone. Blocks B and C tap the existing lines of Block A causing a fluctuation in the overall supply of electricity. On one occasion the excessive electricity drawn rose beyond the capacity of the transformer in the local substation and blew it, leaving the settlement without electricity until the transformer was replaced.

Water supply too, poses problems. The regularized settlement of Block A gets piped water supply through taps in individual households. In the wave of pre-election servicing, Blocks B and C were provided with a public water standpipe in every main lane. Now, these pipes were naturally an extension of the water supply pipes of those of the existing settlement. As Block A is on higher ground than the unauthorized part, Block B and C, (the better land is settled first,) the water flowed more easily to the unauthorized part where the demand for water was high. In both situations the services of the legal settlement were tapped by the illegal settlement creating conditions of friction between the two. Under these conditions the residents of Block A naturally wanted Blocks B and C to have their own services. As a result, the associations of the two parts cooperated and succeeded in their demand to have deeper water lines laid.

3. Who is the association?

Does the process of formation and regularization of unauthorized colonies contribute to the mobilization of the poor? Often, the literature elaborates on the potential for widespread mobilization of people around the issue of tenure. If the formation of resident associations is occurring through the colonizers, do the poorer residents have a "voice"? Who is really represented in these organizations?

In both parts of the settlement the association was made up of the better-off among the residents.\(^{16}\) And even their perception of their task was not to make housing

\(^{16}\) For an extensive discussion of the extent to which neighborhood organization can represent the poor see Nelson (1979).
available for the poor but to improve the locality. "It is only when the services and infrastructure come that better off people will locate here and the neighborhood will improve," said the head of one association.

Moreover, the average citizens of both parts were not very aware of what the association did for the settlement. One resident claimed that the association was falsely claiming the credit for the services the public authorities were providing. Mistrust in the handling of funds is also a major reason for doubting the association, perhaps because the association often collects money for services which have been slow in coming. The residents seem to take little part in the association's activities besides paying dues and other charges for water etc.

Illegality in housing is often explained as a means of mobilization of the poor through demand making in a "bottom up" manner. Sometimes such organization is also encouraged from the "top down" by bureaucracies for ease in administration, an approach which is followed by the DDA. However, the formation of the association by the colonizer with a section of the residents suggests that the residents association is more a "mid level" organization. This finding is supported by the fact that in Sant Nagar (as in other places) more than one association existed. The aims and agenda of all the associations were more or less the same. The president of the main resident association explained to me that they existed largely due to "political" reasons. Thus instead of the demand for services leading to the formation of resident associations, the formation of resident associations by colonizers with a political and profiteering agenda, may lead to them using the demand for services to justify the association.

B. Implications for the Plotholders: No More Installments

The effects of the changed nature of contracts have been felt most by the plotbuyers. Land can no longer be bought in installments. The more rigid time-bound contracts, have made the colonizer borrow money on the market at high rates of interest to pay back the landowner. He can therefore no longer afford to sell land on installments. Furthermore, due to the increased acceptance of unauthorized colonies and his improved political connections, he does not have to settle the colony by giving land to the poor at almost no cost as earlier (Benjamin 1991). One could argue that the colonizer could always pass the costs of interest to the plotholders as an increase in price.
However, cost recovery from poor households is both uncertain and time consuming and he does not need to offer credit as the demand for land is quite high. Naturally, the income groups who have access to land in unauthorized colonies has risen.

The upward filtration can be discerned through two effects on access to land and housing. Earlier incremental housing construction could occur along with the payment for the plot. Nowadays, as the entire cost of the plot has to be met upfront, people need more money to afford these plots. This is reinforced by the rising land prices.

Additionally, the lump sum amount required for purchasing a plot (a typical price would be 10,000 rupees for a plot of 40 square meters) has meant that in the initial stages of the settlement more land is bought for speculative investment than for housing. This speculative buying has been encouraged by the safety of the investment if one has the right political and bureaucratic connections. These new conditions represent a serious shift in the accessibility of land in illegal subdivisions from the poor to higher income groups and speculators.

The ability to pay for the land in installments has been cited as one of the main attractions of illegal subdivisions in the literature. Hamer (1985:6) also argues that the access to land, on credit through installments of one to three years in Bogota, improves access to credit for house construction. If this important mechanism is disappearing from the illegal land markets of third world cities, then the argument for the support of illegal subdivisions as a more attractive choice for housing the poor is considerably weakened.

The changes in the nature of the contracts between the landowners and the colonizers has thus resulted in reduced access to land for the poorest of the poor through the loss of credit through installments. In addition, the implications of the role of the "new style" colonizer I have described are unclear. He is in contrast with the conventional literature which emphasizes the colonizer as a "profit and run" person. On the one hand it seems that the new role is beneficial to the residents in their struggle for regularization. However, this new role, along with the risks perceived in buying land in illegal subdivisions may be contributing towards the creation of a new kind of mafia with land as its power base. This situation has already occurred in the illegal land market in Karachi (Hasan 1988). While the relative implications of such a situation are not clear, it is clear that the control of land concentrating in the hands of a few colonizers will not help efforts of improving equitable access to land.
Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis questions the conventional understanding of illegal subdivisions and argues for a new look at the role of the state. My main contention has been that changes occurring in the illegal subdivision process have reduced the role of illegal subdivisions as attractive and affordable options for the poor. In the earlier chapters, I elaborated on the three developments that have changed the access to land and the process of development. First, I showed how the risk of eviction by public authorities has fallen. Second, I showed how the risk of losing possession through land grabbing and fraudulent dealing has increased. Third, I showed how the contracts between landowners and developers have become more formalized and less profitable for the developer, which has resulted in the developers playing a new role in settlement consolidation.

In the earlier chapters, I organized the description of the findings by tracing their possible causes. In this chapter, I will summarize the conclusions by focusing on the effects that the changes observed are likely to have on various actors. I then identify some issues for further research.

I. RECASTING FINDINGS

A. Access to land

The changes described above have had mixed effects on the access to land in illegal subdivisions. Overall, land in illegal subdivisions is definitely less accessible to the poor than before. There are two questions that arise at this point: what are the main
Shakuntala, 42, came to Delhi from Bulandshahar twenty years ago.

At first they lived in a slum near Kingsway camp and she and her daughter worked as housemaids in the nearby affluent colony of Model Town. In 1977, the government evicted them from their slum and provided alternative serviced plots in a sites and services scheme, two hours away from Model Town by bus.

Shakuntala moved to the serviced plot in Nandi Nagari with her two daughters and a son and continued going to work two hours away in her old jobs. She first built a small one room house on the plot. Later, she borrowed 3000 Rs. from the government to expand her house. She had to bribe the officials, lie about her job being secure and show them her existing house to prove that she could repay the money.

She saved her money and joined a "committee" a small chit fund. She always took the kitty last and so collected a high rate of interest on her money. With her savings, through a local shop-owner, she was able to buy a plot in Sant Nagar, near her place of work, for 15,500 Rs. (She and her daughter earn about 1000 Rs. per month.)
factors governing continued access to land in illegal subdivisions, and how does access to land differ for owners and renters?

1. **Affordability**

Access to land seems to be governed by two factors, affordability and information. Affordability of plots has been reduced due to the increased price of land, inaccessibility of installment credit, and the higher upfront costs involved in retaining possession of the land. Affordability of plots in illegal subdivisions through lower prices and the ability to pay for the land in installments has been cited as one of the main attractions of illegal subdivisions in the literature. It is also argued that the access to land improves access to credit for house construction. This important mechanism seems to be disappearing from the illegal land markets of third-world cities, weakening the argument for illegal subdivisions as an attractive choice for housing the poor.

However, if one can somehow obtain a plot of land, then one’s economic position is much improved. To overcome the difficulty of getting credit, chit fund committees have emerged that provide access to credit using quasi-legal titles as collateral. Access to land eases access to credit in the informal market. Unauthorized colonies also provide opportunities for income generation, once one has access to land, through informal production activities, trade, renting and speculation. The system of commissions has helped those with some connections to dealers and other buyers to get reduced prices for their own plots.

Conventional thinking has also indicated that security of tenure is a prerequisite to investment in housing. In contrast with the literature, the risk of losing possession, has made people invest; the less the security of tenure the more they need to invest. Having invested in the plot, they then organize to improve the security of tenure and the level of services through demand making.

In this situation of high upfront investment and tightening of credit availability, what should be the role of the state in improving the access to land and housing? It is evident that public authorities cannot provide credit to buy land with quasi-legal titles. The challenge, then, is to increase the supply of unserviced land through innovative schemes and to provide credit within them.
The nature of the illegal land market makes information a critical factor. Options in housing are useful only when the prospective resident knows where land is available and has trustworthy contacts to help buy a plot. As these contacts are usually made in existing low-income areas like squatter settlements, resettlement colonies and inner-city rental areas, most of the poor plotholders have arrived in illegal subdivisions after having spent some time elsewhere in the city. As the population of the unauthorized colonies increases, I speculate that the time between migrants arriving in the city and locating in unauthorized colonies is becoming shorter.

The risks prevalent in the illegal land market have also had mixed implications for access to land. The poorest have a better chance of retaining possession against land grabbing, but lose out to higher-income groups in case of fraud. Those who delay occupancy are at risk of losing land through both fraudulent dealing and land grabbing.

2. Owning vs. Renting

Regularization, scholars often argue, has negative implications for renters since they are priced out of the market. My research has also pointed out that speculators rent out their plots to the poor for little or no rent to help retain possession. The low rent, combined with the ability to use the plot of land for growing vegetables or rearing cattle, enables the poor to earn some income. However, such rental opportunities are few since speculative plots are large and therefore fewer opportunities to rent in this way exist.

Rentals in newer illegal land subdivisions are also attractive because they are cheaper and do not require the special deposits (pugrees) required in older subdivisions and inner city rentals. Even for shops, the owners did not demand the deposit since the renters could later claim a stake in the property. With regularization, rents increase and the system of pugree becomes more prevalent, forcing poorer renters further out into the periphery.

B. Community Organization

Scholars of housing often emphasize the potential of widespread mobilization around the issue of tenure (Evers 1987). Squatter settlements formed through invasion are held up as examples of such organization. Researchers also suggest that organization is the most active when the need for tenure and services is the greatest, eventually
reducing as the needs of the settlement get satisfied (Nelson 1979). In a part of Sant Nagar, and perhaps in some other settlements, an inverse sequence can be evidenced. The colonizers are forming resident organizations and have become increasingly involved with the process of settlement consolidation, including assuming the role of power broker for the settlement. In Sant Nagar, besides the two main associations, many other smaller ones exist, suggesting that their origins are motivated by some residents' desires for political power. This brings up the question of who is really being represented in these resident organizations. Poorer residents were not very active in the activities of the resident association and often looked upon them with suspicion. Such apathy and the increased role of the colonizers require us to question the ability of illegal subdivisions to mobilize the poor. With the price of land rising, due to the reduced risk of eviction, the stakes are now higher for the colonizer. Furthermore, the territorial organization of colonizers and the increased fraud in land and organization of land grabbers may result in conditions as in Karachi, where the colonizers control the politicians and the bureaucracy. This is a cause for concern.

However, in settlements where higher income groups are present, the emergence of the colonizer as power broker is limited since the higher income groups have their own links in the bureaucracy and politics. Access to land also brings increasing income levels. This suggests that settlements would move sequentially from poorer ones characterized by insecure tenure, minimal services and domination by a power broker to better-off ones with more secure tenure, improved service levels and a loss of control by the power broker. The degree of heterogeneity of income groups within the settlement would suggest the possibility of a colonizer as power broker dominating the settlement. While the ability of residents to organize and participate effectively in decisions regarding their community might be threatened by the emergence of the colonizer-power broker, their increasing income level may allow them to break free of these linkages.

Some scholars suggest that well established illegal settlements view new settlements as a threat. Usually, most residents' associations see no advantages in collaborating with other associations who are competing for the limited resources of the state. Under some conditions, however, they will collaborate. In Sitapuri the resident association collaborated with others throughout the city who had experienced similar
incidents of demolition. In Sant Nagar, however, the two resident associations had to collaborate on the issue of services because it was in the interests of both the legal and the illegal parts to obtain services for the illegal part of the settlement.

C. Urban Form

The policy of regularization, which researchers thought would curb the further growth of unauthorized colonies, has instead catalyzed the formation of new colonies. Colonizers are cashing in on the high land values created by the expectations of regularization by subdividing land rapidly. The failure of the public authorities to increase the supply of land or take strict action against the colonizers has fuelled the growth of unauthorized colonies.

 Scholars have argued that regularization of some subdivisions would improve layouts and standards in others because of expectation of regularization. On the contrary, layouts are getting tighter and standards lower. Consolidation is occurring most where settlement violates additional land-use laws and land is therefore still cheaper. Moreover, plotholders plan their consolidation in anticipation of regularization. They build a high plinth in anticipation of roads, and a roof of stone slabs on T-girders for easy upward expansion. A shop is usually planned for on the side of the plot facing the wider street. To protect against land grabbing, most plotholders build a boundary wall around their plot immediately. In the early stages of the settlement, the plots sizes are nearer the agricultural minimum, whereas later as they are subdivided, they get filled in. The urban periphery consists of large tracts of walled-off land in various stages of development, and various land-uses, including production activities, agriculture and housing.

What has all this meant for the settlement pattern as a whole? First, while illegal subdivisions have fairly regular layouts that in some ways resemble the layouts of legal settlements, in other ways they resemble traditional settlements. The colonizers create regular plot layouts with straight roads and regular layouts within the constraints of agricultural parcel configurations. However, within the plots, there is no control through bylaws over built area. Plotholders tend to maximize the covered area while internalizing any open space that they leave. This kind of internal courtyard pattern is
similar to traditional designs and is appropriate to the hot climate of Delhi. The older, more settled colonies may come to resemble traditional ones in their urban form.

The resultant city form consists of huge sprawling, semi-urbanized areas with low densities in various stages of urbanization. A great part of this city form results not from the incremental nature of the building process in these colonies, but from the plots of land held by speculators. Unless alternative investment opportunities are made attractive, speculative buying of land will continue, thus creating urban sprawl.

II. ROLE OF THE STATE

In the introduction, I argued that the state can accomplish actions in favor of poorer people. My central argument has been that we need to rethink the role of the state as the process of creation of unauthorized colonies evolves. It is clear that state intervention is imposed from above and influenced from below. People influence the state not only by organized demand making through political linkages but also by working within the system through informal linkages. We also need to think of the state in more pluralistic terms, not as a monolithic body, but as composed of various agencies with different interests and usually little coordination with regard to urban development. Along with the choice of policies to adopt is the question of the best institutions to implement those policies.

What role then could the state play in improving access to land and housing? On the one hand, unauthorized colonies seem to be catering to higher income groups than before. On the other hand, it is evident that access to land helps better the economic position of the poor who do get access. What we need to concentrate on therefore are income groups who are not gaining access to land in the new style of illegal subdivision. Since the loss of installment credit has been one factor in preventing access to land in illegal subdivisions, increasing the availability of credit becomes central to increasing access to land.

Recommending increased access to land means emphasizing the value of ownership. Some people have traded the security of tenure in sites and services for the greater flexibility and larger plots offered by illegal subdivisions. Clearly, people
prioritize security of tenure differently, depending upon their age, their income-earning capacity and their commitment to the area. In order to target housing options, different levels of tenure security may be needed by the poor, with a variety of ways of reaching these levels.

The different levels of tenure could also be related to the provision of credit. In unauthorized colonies, access to quasi-legal titles has allowed plot-holders to join informal chit fund committees, giving them access to credit at market rates, which many people used to finance their local shops. A government supporting the system of property rights cannot be expected to provide credit with quasi-legal titles as collateral. To be able to provide credit the state has to increase the supply of unserviced land available for housing. This could be achieved through two ways, either the state acting as a developer itself, or the state encouraging private sector initiative by reducing barriers that increase the time and cost of developing land. Perhaps both alternatives are needed.

In the first option, the state would increase the supply of unserviced land, an objective which could be accomplished at costs lower than those of sites and services projects. Using this strategy one would be able to reach the poorer income groups by allotting plots payable in installments and using possession as the substitute for legal title until the plot is paid for. The experience of the innovative approach used by the Hyderabad Development Authority in the Hyderabad Incremental Development Scheme would be useful in this option. Different levels of tenure with different ways of achieving them over time could be incorporated into such a scheme.

In the second option, the state would encourage private initiatives in land development. The lowering of standards and the reduction of bureaucratic procedures would be a part of this strategy. Since experience has shown that private market mechanisms are not efficient in reaching the poorest, these initiatives would reach a higher target group than the first option. Providing credit to these developers could hasten the process of development. New alternatives of integrating private initiative with existing methods of development used by the state, like plot reconstitution, might also be helpful. It is clear that the state cannot develop all the land that is required and that private initiatives will have to play a part in any realistic solution.

Finally there is the problem of urban form. If one advocates vast sprawling cities with incremental development going on at different rates in different parts, how does the
whole fit in to some idea of efficiency of services such as transportation or water supply, and the reduction of fertile agricultural land at the periphery of cities? In a sense, this dilemma reflects the old paradox of the balance between equity and efficiency.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

A conclusion is also a beginning. While doing this research, I became interested in some other issues that I think deserve further attention. Some of the questions that arise from the preliminary conclusions concern the relationship between illegal land subdivisions and other housing submarkets. If illegal subdivisions are catering to higher income groups than before, how are the lower income groups being housed? Are squatters, street sleepers and renters increasing? What factors govern substitution between different submarkets?

The first question that arises directly from my conclusions is that if residents in sites and services are selling off their plots to come to unauthorized colonies, who is buying the plots from them in the sites and services? Why are some people choosing the sites and services plots when they too could buy land in unauthorized colonies, both of which are located at the periphery of the city? Is there some pattern to the infiltration of sites and services by higher income groups? In other words, do we need both kinds of options in the city?

The second question is the role of resident organizations as mediating institutions between the residents and the public authorities and politicians. What are the strategies resident associations employ in successfully demanding services and regularization from the authorities? What characterizes the more successful associations? How do those associations controlled by a colonizer-power broker succeed in comparison to others? Why? When do individual resident organizations collaborate with others in their demand making? If resident associations are the common mediating organization around which people mobilize, we need to understand how they function internally and in the context of the city.

The third interesting issue is the role of chit funds in financing housing and informal production or trade activities. When used for incremental house construction
This is the house that José built...

This is the Academic
That studied the house that José built.

This is the Architect-Planner
That read the Academic
That studied the house
That José built.

This is the Politician that laid on the services
Prompted by the Architect-Planner
That read the Academic
That studied the house that José built.

This is the Land Speculator
That bribed the Politician that laid on services
Prompted by the Architect-Planner
That read the Academic
That studied the house
That José built.

This is the profit
Made by the Land Speculator
And by the Politician
That paid on the services
Prompted by the Architect-Planner
That read the Academic
That studied the house that José built!
is there a correlation between the size of the fund, time period and patterns of consolidation? Also, are they related to cycles in trade and production? What interest rates are the borrowers really paying and how is this interest rate determined by demand for credit in the market? Do these chit funds help mobilize people’s activities in other spheres by transferring organizational abilities as well as the savings habit? How do these informal organizations in the economic sphere relate to resident organizations in the political sphere?

The fourth issue of interest to me is the different ways in which land in unauthorized colonies can be used to generate income, and the role that heterogeneity of income groups plays in supporting these activities. What are the factors that determine whether production, trade, renting, speculation will be able to link up to the city system? How do people strategize to improve their economic position? Research in the field along these lines will increase our understanding of how the informal subdivision plays many roles within the complexity of the city.
Growth of Units in Unauthorized Colonies,
Total Households and Housing Stock, Delhi, India- 1961-1986

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Housing Stock</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>31,562</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>78,872</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>508,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>191,960</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>248,504</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bharathi (1986)

Growth of Units in Unauthorized Colonies, Resettlement Colonies
Squatter Settlements and Slum Rehousing, Delhi, India-1961-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>31,562</td>
<td>42,819</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>248,504</td>
<td>214,108</td>
<td>113,186</td>
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</table>

Source: Bharathi (1986)

Appendix 1: Tables showing growth of units in Unauthorized colonies,
housing submarkets and the total housing stock.
Appendix 2: Charts showing growth of units in Unauthorized colonies, housing submarkets and the total housing stock.
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Chapter 1

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