REDEVELOPING OR PRESERVING PUBLIC HOUSING:
THE FUTURE OF COLUMBIA POINT

by

SHARON HSUEH-JEN LEE

B.A., University of Pennsylvania 1977

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Architecture and Master in City Planning at the
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ABSTRACT

Columbia Point, Boston's largest and most stigmatized public housing project, has been a focal point for public and private investment strategies to create a new mixed-income residential community. Columbia Point provided attractive housing for 1,500 families or close to 6,000 people for more than 15 years. Presently, only 350 households remain. Problems in management, maintenance and lack of concern for low-income housing led to the rapid deterioration of the project in the 1960s. More than a dozen redevelopment plans have been proposed which have spanned four periods of active initiatives by the major actors.

This thesis examines the history of the planning process and the rationale for the proposed redevelopment plan. The implication of redevelopment on the low-income population as related to four main issues is addressed: private redevelopment, mixed-income housing, demolition and disposition of public housing, and the proposed physical design.

The study concludes that the events surrounding Columbia Point and the evidence presented in the plans do not justify the recent proposals for demolition or disposition, nor is private redevelopment an appropriate solution to the problem. Significant losses will be sustained by the low-income population if the present plan is implemented. Moreover, mixed-income housing is overstated as a desirable goal and is fraught with serious problems.

Recommendations are made to the Boston Housing Authority to insure that necessary measures are taken so that the low-income population will benefit from the revitalization of Columbia Point.

Thesis Advisor: Tunney F. Lee
Title: Associate Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning
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To my parents and grandparents.
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"The real question is not what is America going to do about Pruitt-Igoe? The real question is what is America going to do about its poor people?"

--A former tenant of Pruitt-Igoe
INTRODUCTION

Background
The national need for low-income housing has never been so great while at the same time, public housing, the largest low-income housing subsidy program, is under attack for its "failure" to provide decent housing for the poor. The recognition of certain problems with the conventional low-income public housing program and increasing pressures from the private sector has resulted in new programs being created, such as Section 8, rent subsidy, turnkey housing, Section 236, etc. These are allegedly created to avoid the pitfalls of public housing. This is perhaps the most vulnerable period for public housing. The "image" and stereotype of public housing and the population it serves is so negative, that there are continuing problems with political and financial support from government officials, housing experts, and the public.

While Congress and the Administration are cutting the budget and diverting funds into other programs, an essential question arises of what to do with the existing public housing projects, especially the small percentage of "troubled" projects in many of our large cities. For many Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), the strategy for improving some of their large projects has gone beyond attempts at modernization, management
reforms, and special programs such as the Target Projects and Urban Initiatives Programs. The PHAs are increasingly in favor of private sector revitalization and redevelopment of public housing. This trend reflects the PHAs' inability to internally finance major redevelopment, the acceptance of the desirability of income mix, and the yield to political and economic pressures from the private interests and local governments for private solutions in development. The efforts to abandon public ownership, management, and control over public housing are political questions which go beyond cost-effective measures. The motives of those who support private redevelopment must be examined. The playing out of the political scenario, the struggles of the low-income population, public housing tenants, housing advocates and their allies, against the private and public interests for private redevelopment, will be the decisive factor in determining the future of many housing projects.

Recent experiments in private redevelopment have resulted in demolition, disposition and the loss of low-income and public housing units. The implication of redevelopment on the low-income population must be closely analyzed to determine who benefits from this. Redeveloping public housing is often pursued in the "public interest," but frequently, inadequate information and research exists to understand the impact of certain policies on residents of a particular development,
on the city-wide public housing population, and on the low-
income population as a whole.

In Boston, more than 10% of the population lives in public 
housing. 65,000 people reside in 22,000 family, elderly and 
leased-housing units scattered throughout the city. As 
changing market pressures affect the stock of low-income hous-
ing, including public housing, the displacement of low-income 
residents and "gentrification," found prevalent in private 
housing, may become a trend in public housing.

Thesis Objective
This thesis examines the background and rationale for the 
private redevelopment of Columbia Point into a mixed-income 
residential community. The implications of the proposed rede-
development plan on the low-income population are addressed and 
recommendations are made to the Boston Housing Authority to 
insure that low-income people will benefit from this process.

Columbia Point, the largest public housing project in Boston 
and New England, is located on the Columbia Point peninsula 
in Dorchester. The project contains a total of 1,504 units 
distributed in eleven mid-rise and twelve low-rise buildings 
on a 37-acre site. Originally built and fully occupied in 
1954, Columbia Point experienced severe problems in management 
and maintenance, and today stands 80% vacant with only 350
remaining households. But despite the mothballed units and vacant buildings, the project sits on an attractive waterfront location overlooking Dorchester Bay and the skyline of downtown Boston.

Since the late 1960s, the Columbia Point housing project and the total peninsula became a focal point for redevelopment efforts from the Mayor's Office, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), neighboring institutions, businesses, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) and other public agencies. The waterfront location, easy access to downtown Boston, and other amenities have made the Columbia Point peninsula a prime target for private redevelopment, if it were not for the massive, stigmatized housing project.

The City could not proceed with redevelopment of the whole peninsula without an adequate solution for the public housing site. The Boston Housing Authority attempted through modernization and rehabilitation to revitalize part of the housing stock, but was largely unsuccessful because of limited capacity and other problems. The BHA received $8 million in Target Projects Program (TPP) and Modernization funds, and $10 million in Urban Initiatives (UI) funds for Columbia Point, but was unable to significantly upgrade the project.

The Columbia Point tenants, who for more than ten years were
largely ignored in the planning process, formed the Columbia Point Community Task Force (hereafter referred to as the Task Force), to represent their interest in redevelopment. After an extended period of negotiation among the Task Force, the BHA and the BRA, the three parties entered into an agreement in 1979 to redevelop the Columbia Point peninsula, including the housing project, as a mixed-income residential community. After an extended period of negotiation among the Task Force, the BHA and the BRA, the three parties entered into an agreement in 1979 to redevelop the Columbia Point peninsula, including the housing project, as a mixed-income residential community.4

Public and private funds will be combined and the Task Force will be a participant in redevelopment with a private developer.

For the first time in Boston, a major public housing project will be redeveloped into a mixed-income community, and nationally, Columbia Point has become the Urban Initiatives program demonstration for revitalizing a "troubled" housing project. For low-income tenants, the involvement of the tenant organization in negotiations, and joint participation in redevelopment are seen as significant achievements. Currently the redevelopment process is underway with the preparation of a developer's selection kit. It is anticipated that a developer will be designated in 1981.5

Analysis

This study looks at the redevelopment of Columbia Point within the context of Boston's need for low-income housing. Both an examination of the history of the planning process and a
critique of the current redevelopment plan are included. Four main issues which are central to redeveloping Columbia Point and to public housing in general are discussed:

1. **Mixed-income housing** - a proposal for a mixed-income housing community on a public housing site has certain implications as to programmatic outcome, and in the nature of the social environment for low-income residents. Questions arise concerning the validity of income mix, including social mix, as a necessary or desirable goal in redevelopment. Evaluative judgment can be made according to the method of income mixing.

2. **Private redevelopment** - contract stipulations and guarantees to maintain low-income housing are some of the constraints which can be placed on a developer. But to what extent should the private sector be involved in redeveloping public housing, and under what conditions? What are the foreseeable consequences of such involvement?

3. **Demolition and disposition** - a redevelopment plan proposing demolition and disposition must be evaluated according to certain criteria which establish long-term benefits to the low-income population. Demolition and disposition, and whether replacement housing is provided, will affect Boston's supply of low-income housing. What conditions should be followed to insure that the well-being of the low-income population is taken into account?
4. **Physical design** - the quality of a new physical environment must be supportive of the needs of low and moderate-income households. The proposed "image" of the new community and the physical plan will be looked at to assess its appropriateness to Columbia Point.

The study draws upon my first-hand knowledge in the planning process; from interviews with various actors and housing experts; and from the use of primary and secondary documents and other sources.

**Organization**

The study begins with a brief overview of the population comprised primarily of women, children, minorities, the elderly and the very poor, who are served by public housing. Criticisms which have been made against public housing are examined as to their validity. One of the manifestations of the urban crisis is the further impoverishment of the poor and minority population in the urban housing market. Boston is discussed as a city with scarce land resources, limited development opportunity, and a changing housing market brought about by the increased attractiveness of urban living and changing lifestyles for middle and upper-income households. This trend, in conjunction with the City's low-income housing policy has resulted in public housing becoming a battleground between the private interests and the poor over scarce resources. This is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
The concept of redeveloping public housing is an alternative which is growing in popularity as a means for improving "troubled" housing projects. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of Pruitt-Igoe and King's Lynne, two precedents in redevelopment, and an examination of the justifications for public and private redevelopment.

The history of redevelopment efforts at Columbia Point is traced to identify the significant issues which have emerged around the control and use of the housing site, and who is to gain from redevelopment. This is extracted from more than 12 redevelopment plans and four periods of active initiative from major actors. Private development and private management have been represented as the "ideal solution" for Columbia Point for more than a decade by the City. Tenants lived in constant fear that the Authority, which was controlled by a five-man Board with four mayoral appointees and an Administrator also sent over by City Hall and answerable to that Board, would ultimately create a housing community in which only very few low-income tenants will remain. Chapters 4 and 5 document the plans and events in some detail to provide a source of historical record. The history includes references to past commitments and actions which remain relevant to the current planning process.

In the latest redevelopment plan we find a proposal for a
social experiment in mixed-income housing, tenant and developer partnership, the maintenance of a certain number of low-income units after redevelopment and significant levels of demolition and disposition. Chapters 5 and 6 include a presentation of the major actors and their point of view, and a critique of the current redevelopment plan.

Conclusions from the study are related to recommendations to the Boston Housing Authority to insure that low-income people will benefit from the redevelopment of Columbia Point. An examination of the history of the planning process and the current plan is intended to contribute to the on-going events at Columbia Point, and to provide a framework in which to evaluate the redevelopment of public housing.

The Tenants Policy Council

My interest in this topic is due to my association with the Tenants Policy Council, beginning in 1978. First as a HUD Intern and then as an Architecture and Planning Consultant, I worked with tenants in various developments in planning and modernization. My involvement at Columbia Point was to provide assistance to the TPC Board of Directors to: (1) assess the long-term impact of redevelopment at Columbia Point; (2) research the questions of demolition and disposition of public housing and explore the possibilities for replacement of lost units; and (3) evaluate the proposed site plan as to its
responsiveness to the needs of the low and moderate-income populations. These tasks were to lead to my knowledge of and participation in the planning process during 1979.

This study has been conducted under the auspices of the Tenants Policy Council, but the statements and conclusions contained herein are mine, alone. I assume responsibility for the accuracy of the information.

The Tenants Policy Council originated in 1963 in response to the Modernization Program. TPC is the recognized elected city-wide tenant organization representing all tenants living in Boston's public housing. Elections are held in each development every two years to form up to an eight-member Task Force or Local Tenant Policy Council (LTPC). Two representatives from each development are elected to serve on the TPC Board of Directors. An Executive Director and staff complete the structure of the TPC and carry out the decisions of the Board.

TPC functions as a liaison between tenants and management, the Boston Housing Authority. Official input is established by a 1972 Agreement. TPC traditionally has supplied tenant input at the decision-making levels in matters pertaining to the living conditions and environment in public housing, and actively seeks tenant participation. TPC is responsible for
articulating the needs of tenants in individual developments and advocating the interests of public housing tenants and prospective tenants. In this context, TPC plays a vital role in insuring that any redevelopment effort should be in the interest of all public housing tenants and those who are in need of public housing.

In an effort to correct the serious housing conditions resulting from BHA mismanagement, in 1976, TPC entered as Plaintiff Intervenors to Perez vs. BHA, a case brought by individual tenants to alleviate the substandard living conditions in the BHA developments. This case resulted in a Consent Decree issued by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1977, calling for major reforms in every aspect of BHA's operations, including administration, management, maintenance, security, tenant selection, legal, planning, development, modernization, and personnel. In 1979, the Plaintiffs petitioned the Court for relief and moved for Receivership of the Boston Housing Authority. In February 1980, the Court issued an order for Receivership, and Lewis H. Spence was appointed as Receiver and charged with the reorganization and revitalization of the Boston Housing Authority.

Addendum
This research was undertaken during 1979 and early 1980 prior to the Receivership Administration. The research and recommendations remain pertinent to the new Administration.
"You can make do without education, you can make do without most things, but everyone has to have a place to live. Even the poor have got to live someplace!"

--A public housing tenant
CHAPTER 1
THE NATIONAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING

INTRODUCTION

As a nation, the problems of affordable housing continue to grow. In 1975, close to a quarter of all households, 17 million out of 73 million, were paying more than 25% of their income to cover housing costs. Nine and a half million were paying 35% or more of their income.¹ Those who suffer from one or more forms of housing deprivation: physically sub-standard housing, overcrowded living conditions, a high rent burden or living in environmentally impacted neighborhoods, comprise more than one-third of the population.²

The high cost of homeownership is pricing more and more families out of the market. In 1979 only 15% of the nation's households can afford a newly constructed house compared with one-fourth in 1975 and two-thirds of the households in the 1950s. According to the estimates of the National Association of Home Builders, for every $100 increase in the cost of housing, 14,000 families are priced out of the market.³ Housing needs are therefore reflected in the rental market.

In April 1979, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimated 14.8 million lower-income households were in need of housing assistance. Of these, 10.1 million (68%) were
renter households. The problems in the rental housing market are reaching critical proportions due to the increasing burden of rents, a rental housing shortage, and the conversion of rental units into condominiums. 130,000 conversions are predicted for 1979 compared to 50,000 during 1977. HUD's Tenth Annual Report on the National Housing Goals in 1979 reported that from 1973 to 1976, about 1.1 million renter-occupied housing units were removed from the rental market. In March 1979, the national rental vacancy rate of 4.8% was the lowest ever recorded by the Bureau of Census.

The problem is so severe that the Comptroller General of the United States, in a report to Congress in 1979, declared rental housing to be a "national problem that needed immediate attention":

Millions of Americans cannot afford homeownership and cannot find affordable rental housing. Immediate national attention is necessary if an adequate supply of affordable rental housing is to be made available. . . . The Congress and the Administration should take steps to mitigate this nationwide crisis.

This chapter will look at those who are most affected by the worsening of the housing crisis: the poor, minority, female-headed and elderly population, and how this population is reflected in public housing. An attempt will be made to dispel some of the common indictments of public housing and to show that it is in the public interest to support and improve the public housing program.
LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS

In 1977, the Bureau of Census shows that over 48% (11.9 million) of all renters are paying more than 25% of their income for rent, with 7.4 million paying 35% or more.\textsuperscript{8} It was found that the number of renters paying 35% or more had increased by about 1.9 million (or 35%) during the period from 1973 to 1977. Of those paying 35% or more, 86% had annual incomes of less than $7,000, and 57% pay more than 50% of their income for rent.

Within the population as a whole, the Black population show a greater need for housing assistance.\textsuperscript{9} 28% of Black families compared with 7% of white families live below the poverty line. In 1976, the median income is $9,240 for Black households and $15,400 for white households. In comparison to white households, more Black households in urban areas rent their housing. 42% of Black households are more likely to live in multi-family structures and apartments in urban areas, and in housing built before WWII. In 1976, 10% of the total population, compared with 21% of the Black population, lived in housing that was flawed (lacking adequate plumbing, heating, etc.). Of all rental units, 22% were physically deficient, but 37.7% of units rented to Black households were deficient. 80% of all households are able to find adequate housing paying 25% of their income, and 84% can find adequate housing paying 30% of their income. But only 63% of Black
households are able to find adequate housing for 25% of their income, and 70% for 30% of their income. Many have no other choice but to live in substandard housing.

For female-headed households, housing conditions are also worse than for the population as a whole. In 1976, 17.8 million or one-quarter of all households were female-headed. Of this population, 78% were white, 17% Black, 4% Hispanic and 1% other. 14% of all families are headed by women. One-third of the households have incomes below the poverty line, and more than half of the women work full or part-time. Female-headed households are more likely to be renters (53%) than the general population (35%) and they are more likely to live in multi-family structures and apartments than in single-family dwellings. Of the 8 million female-headed households with family, 15.1% live in substandard housing as compared with the national rate of 9.7%. The probability of being ill-housed for a poor, female-headed household is the following: white .18, Hispanic .26, and Black .28. 80% of all households, as opposed to 53% of female-headed households, are able to find adequate housing for 25% of their income. The chances of being ill-housed also increase with family size. A 1978 HUD-released study concludes that family size, race, and ethnicity rather than sex alone affect how well poor, female-headed households live.
Age-related statistics reveal the conditions of poor elderly households. The poor elderly males living alone are the worst housed, with a probability of 27% for white, 43% for Black and 56% for Hispanic of being ill-housed. 75% of the women over 65 who are living alone must spend a quarter or more of their income to afford adequate housing. 31% of women over 65 who head a multi-person household must spend a quarter or more of their income to afford adequate housing.

In looking at the housing problems of the poor, female-headed, elderly and minority households, it was found that housing in the private market did not meet their needs. Even when income was held constant, housing choices differed according to certain factors such as race, age, sex, number of children and the presence of single-parent-headed households. The creation of housing submarkets restricted access and mobility for certain groups and concentrated them in characteristically worse housing than for the population as a whole.

WHO LIVES IN PUBLIC HOUSING

Public housing serves the population in need of housing. From 1955, the tenant composition of public housing changed dramatically as families who exceeded the income limits or became financially better off sought housing in the private market. These families were gradually replaced by the unemployed, under-employed and fixed-income families consisting mainly of
poor white and Black families and the elderly. Many of them resorted to public housing because of their inability to find affordable housing elsewhere.

In 1952, the Black population in public housing was 38%, in 1965, this increased to 51%. In 1978, approximately 63% of the total population residing in public housing are minorities (52% Black and 11% Hispanic and other minorities). The population residing in family public housing is astounding: 80% of the households are minority households (66% Black and 14% other). The number of single-parent-headed households in public housing is also dramatic. In 1978, close to 78% of all families in public housing are single-parent-headed households, with the overwhelming majority being female-headed. 78% of white and 81% of Black households are single-parent-headed.

In observing the recent characteristics of families moving into public housing, in Table 1, more than half of the families were moving in from substandard housing or were previously without housing. One-third of all minority as compared with one-fifth of white families, were moving from substandard housing. Moreover, close to 45% of white families and 36% of minority families who previously lived in standard housing were moving into public housing.
A survey of public housing incomes reveal that public housing is housing poorer and poorer families. In 1961, the median family income of public housing residents was 47.1% of all families, an income gap of $3,330. In 1970, the median for public housing was 36.9% of all families, an income gap of $6,231.17

Employment characteristics of the public housing population reveal that public housing houses not just the unemployed, but the working poor. In 1970, 60% of younger households, both white and non-white, had at least one wage earner, but the median earning capacity was extremely low. The population suffers from underemployment as the median income for a wage
earner under 65 with a family was only $2,000 more than a family with no earners.\textsuperscript{18} Within the elderly population, one-fourth of the non-white and one-tenth of the white households had at least one earner. By 1977, the number of family households with wage earners dropped: 69% had no earners, 28% one earner, 3% two earners, and the median income was $3,691. 86% of white families, 73% of Black families, 64% of Spanish-speaking families and 57% of Native American families received public assistance or other benefits aside from housing. A total of 23% received no other benefits except housing.\textsuperscript{19}

In examining some of the differences by race, we find the modal age of white heads-of-households to be over 65, of Black heads-of-households to be between 25 and 35.\textsuperscript{20} Of the households who moved in during the 12 months ending September 1977, a total of 33% were elderly. 49% or close to half of the white households, and only 21% of the Black households were elderly.\textsuperscript{21} Of all households, white households had a mean of 2.02 persons per household, and Black households had a mean of 3.48. Minority households had a higher rent payment and a higher mean income than white households.\textsuperscript{22} The white population in public housing contains an increasing number of elderly. Their housing needs are for small units. Blacks and other minorities continue to be in greater need for family housing and larger units. The higher rent payment and mean income of minority households reflect not only their
family composition but that public housing is a better buy for their money because of discrimination in the private market.

The critical need for public housing is also manifested in the eligibility rate, vacancy rate, the waiting list, and in the rents for public housing. The present public housing population comprises only 2.9% of those who are eligible to participate in the program. Of the more than 1.3 million conventional units or 14,000 public housing developments, HUD statistics for 1978 report that the national vacancy rate in public housing is 2.8%, or approximately half the vacancy rate for private housing. More than 3 million families are on the waiting list. The average monthly rent of $62 shows that it is an unequaled buy for people who are in need of the assistance public housing offers.23

THE ATTACK ON PUBLIC HOUSING

Subsidies and support for public housing are decreasing at a time when public housing is serving a poorer constituency. The 1973 Nixon "moratorium" of massive cuts and other setbacks to the program continue to this day. We can only account for the lack of support as stemming from those who would like to see the dissolution of the program regardless of the needs.

The benefits of the program are clear. In HUD's National
Housing Policy Review, the findings reported that: "the overwhelming majority of public housing tenants occupy better housing and are able to purchase more goods than they would in the absence of the program." Henry Aaron from the Brookings Institute states that: "public housing obviously raises the living standards of its tenants, if it did not, they would not have chosen it, or if they had blundered in, would have moved out. Most tenants probably occupy better housing than they would occupy if they paid commercial rents." Lawrence Friedman finds that: "public housing in the broad sense, is the only program which might perhaps actually provide a significant supply of decent homes for people below the poverty level."

But despite the demand for public housing by the poor, we have seen the continued attack on the program by politicians, housing experts, government officials, and private interest groups. These attacks do not go unheeded as they have led to major cuts in budget appropriations to the conventional program. As evidenced by Table 2, contract and construction activity for public housing has been drastically reduced since 1970.

The criticisms against public housing can be roughly divided into three categories: (1) the cost effectiveness of public housing versus other programs in supplying housing for the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Placed Under ACC</th>
<th>Placed Under Construction or Rehabilitation**</th>
<th>Made Available for Occupancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>101,932</td>
<td>104,410</td>
<td>73,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>58,228</td>
<td>72,230</td>
<td>91,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>80,319</td>
<td>44,760</td>
<td>58,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>33,453</td>
<td>27,807</td>
<td>52,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>22,438</td>
<td>19,050</td>
<td>43,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>12,858</td>
<td>15,090</td>
<td>24,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,286</td>
<td>9,907</td>
<td>6,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3,440</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>6,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Includes Indian housing.

**Includes construction and rehabilitation under the old leased housing program.
poor; (2) social criticisms "heaped" upon public housing by the uninformed to the "housing expert"; and (3) physical flaws attributed to the buildings' design. Each of these will be briefly addressed.

Cost Criteria

Opponents of public housing have argued for alternative programs such as Section 8, rent supplements, and leased-housing, which rely on the private rental market to provide low-income housing. The common arguments against the conventional program are as follows:

- Public housing provides for government reliance on new construction as opposed to the improvement of existing stock through conservation, rehabilitation, or direct rent subsidies.
- Construction of new low and moderate-income housing has proved not only inefficient, but also inequitable and politically explosive.
- The housing allowance and rent subsidy programs are superior because they affect the demand for housing by inducing landlords to upgrade and rehabilitate existing stock, and thereby prevent the filtering down and further deterioration of housing units.

If programs are to be measured by outcomes, it is assumed that the provision of decent housing for the poor should be based
on supplementing incomes of households to compete in the urban housing markets, rather than through construction of new units. Eligible low-income households would then realize an economic right to an economic commodity. With the conventional program, even with the same eligibility criteria, it would, by nature, serve a fixed number constrained by the amount of subsidized units constructed. There would be increased equity in the housing allowance program as the external social benefits would rise. This includes the selection of housing based on factors of human welfare: location; closeness to work, access to schools, services, transportation, etc. Problems such as income and racial segregation would be easier to alleviate as poor families have a greater chance to disperse into other areas—therefore minimizing their impact in any one area. Public housing was thought to concentrate the poor in already impacted areas.

The arguments in favor of rent subsidy programs emerged during a period of out-migration of middle and upper-class families to the suburbs. As the cities faced a declining population between 1960 and 1970, Arthur Solomon noted: "The units vacated by middle-income whites have been occupied by families whose rent paying ability is insufficient to command a decent level of maintenance and repair. At the same time the inflationary costs of operating properties has exacerbated the problems caused by slack demand." Policy-makers, fearful
of the cities becoming the "isolated preserves for the elderly, the poor, the blacks and Puerto Ricans, and others unable to escape to the suburbs," and the consequences of urban disinvestment, recommended that rental assistance programs to the poor be used to preserve the housing stock.

But this condition is no longer the case as our major cities are experiencing population changes. The desirability of city living, changing lifestyles, and the energy crisis, all mean tremendous pressures on the urban housing markets. Vacancy rates of 2% or less are now common. Gentrification and recycling of the older stock of housing, and the resulting displacement of low and moderate-income households are now common occurrences. Rent subsidies have become costly as fair market values have continued to climb, and have become another mechanism for subsidizing landlords with high rental incomes while there has not been a corresponding improvement or expansion of the stock because of housing demands. Tenants are now finding that they are renting the same units and paying landlords inflated rents guaranteed by the government. Furthermore, housing choices for these households have not changed as the housing crisis deepens. Racial and income segregation, and other discriminatory practices continue.

The Section 8 program was ambitious in what it purported to do: redistribute housing resources and upgrade conditions.
Unfortunately, these goals have not been achieved, and critically needed new housing has not been produced. Additionally, the Section 8 program has not expanded proportionally to need, nor has it received significant allocations since the height of its funding in 1976. (See Table 3.)

Table 3: Section 8 Contract Reservation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Actual Reservations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>490,581 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>330,977 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>257,517 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>265,822 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>193,000 units (estimate)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>159,000 units (estimate)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Campaign for Housing estimates.

Section 8 is also highly unstable as the nature of the program easily permits for contraction of the program by simply cutting the budget or letting attrition take people off the program. The conventional program is more immune to political manipulation and budget cuts as the costs of construction, operating subsidies, and other funds must be maintained for the duration of the ACC. The housing allowance program was found to be
more costly than public housing new construction in a study performed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and was found to have minimal effect on the expansion of the low-income housing supply. Supporters of the Section 8 program have been politically short-sighted or naive; the shifting population trends and tightening of housing markets compounded with a public more hostile to low-income people have laid the ground work for a declining commitment to low-income housing. Therefore, programs which can easily be stripped will be the first to go.

The rent subsidy program, moreover, demonstrates a simple solution to the problems of housing the poor which leads to political defeatism rather than serious attempts to make appropriate changes to the public housing program. As explained by Jewel Bullush and Murray Hausknecht:

In the rent subsidy program we can still see the myth at work. . . . the program implicitly assumes that the poor are distinguished from others only by a lack of money; that their values, aspirations, and styles of life are not meaningfully different from others; that once the lack of money has been compensated for they will merge relatively easily into their surroundings. . . . The rent subsidy proposal, therefore, is quite conventional in its approach, since it concerns itself with individuals and the deserving poor. It demonstrates a failure to see public housing in relation to the poor as members of a community, and to see the community in terms of its class characteristics. Thus, the inability to come to terms with the class dimensions of urban ills leaves the champions of public housing pursuing traditional paths that lead to defeats in the political arena, and to a further weakening of commitment to public housing.
Social Postulates

Perhaps the sharpest criticisms about the public housing program are from the subjective indictments of the poor. Some of the familiar arguments once heard against public housing run the gamut from: the "deserving" poor and not the "problem" poor should receive assistance; public housing rewards those who have failed to achieve; why should Blacks or poor families receive new or better housing than hard-working white middle-class families. Today, more sophisticated attacks are levelled against public housing, these have evolved from social and behavioral research and are promulgated by policy makers, housing experts, politicians, and even liberal proponents of low-income housing. Their concerns have focused on resident homogeneity; racial, income and social mix; density; and the impact of low-income population concentrations on real estate values, adjoining neighborhoods, the livability of the city, etc. Interestingly, the effects of these "new" social theories are not so different from the old familiar racist, anti-poor and anti-welfare arguments. They have the same result of limiting the access of the poor and minority households to benefits and services.

Social policies that were once implemented as a means to provide population groups that have been historically underrepresented and excluded from access to society's resources have been subtly changed to reinforce discriminatory and
exclusionary policies. The civil rights movement raised fundamental questions about the right of people of color to access in all aspects of society by striking at the institutions which enforced segregation and discrimination. Public housing, once the domain of the white submerged middle-class and veteran households was opened for occupancy to poor and minority populations in the 1950s. In other areas of housing, poor and minority demands brought about policies and court decisions that addressed abolishing housing and residential desegregation, exclusionary zoning, and providing fair housing, and other increases in housing opportunities. But the expansion of housing opportunities is no longer the trend. With the increase of minority and the poor population concentrated in the urban areas, the original fears of "white flight" and now the desire of wealthier white households to relocate in the cities have changed housing policies around to again restrict access to poor and minority households. Two examples of recent housing policies come to mind: the concept of "racial balance" in public housing, and "fair share" distribution of housing opportunities in metropolitan areas.

In the first example, the struggles to end racial discrimination and the demise of public housing minimum income regulations meant that poor and minority households could reside in public housing. Tenants and civil rights leaders moved for the courts to integrate all-white projects and to insure that
minority people had a right to housing according to need and locational choice. Today, integration still exists as a goal to be achieved by eliminating discriminatory practices against Blacks and other minorities who are eligible for and in need of housing, as overt discrimination is sustained by the lack of minority housing opportunities, discriminatory practices in tenant placement and assignment, the under-representation of minority households in leased housing and in elderly housing, and so on. But while certain practices have successfully opened up housing opportunities for the poor and minority populations, "racial balancing" has emerged for entirely different reasons. As the numbers of minority households served by public housing continues to increase, housing authorities have become concerned. Large numbers of minorities in the developments have falsely come to be synonymous with the decline in housing conditions and deteriorated living environments. The practice of racial balancing establishes a ratio of white to minority households in each development and thereby places a ceiling on the number of minority households.\textsuperscript{31} As minority households have come to represent a majority, and in some cities as high as 90% of those in need of public housing, restrictions will deny housing to these families.

In some cities, such as Cambridge, the housing authority has placed a freeze on the waiting list until marketing techniques
are implemented so as to attract white applicants to public housing. Many PHAs also stop filling vacancies until the numbers of white applicants increase. Often this can result in placing white households with serious problems, e.g., criminal records, a history in mental institutions, or a history of other problems, into the development, thereby denying housing to responsible minority households. Often the result is that white families with problems contribute to any instability which may already exist in the project. In St. Louis and other places, white college students and single adults are encouraged to apply and are admitted to public housing so as to racially balance the developments.

These policies do not address those who are in need of public housing, nor do they lessen racial tension. Instead, racial animosity may increase. In a similar vein, income mix is encouraged by those who want to break up low-income and minority developments, to "eliminate the pathologies" found in these communities. Those who advocate for racial balancing without addressing housing needs fail to see the problems in their argument. As discussed by Frances Piven and Richard Cloward:

Stress on racial integration as a necessary component of housing programs has drained support for these programs; as a result of a policy of "either integrated housing or no housing," those most in need of better shelter have been denied the benefits of...
potentially helpful programs, and are in fact paying the price for goals and ideals that are less important to the poor than they are to the reformers.32

The effects of unemployment, poverty and discrimination have resulted in a disproportionate share of minority and poorer households who turn to public housing, therefore the composition of those who resort to public housing will not necessarily reflect the racial make-up of the larger population in the surrounding area or in the city. There will continue to be a large percentage of minority and poor households having the greatest housing need until discrimination is eliminated. In essence, public housing cannot be "racially balanced" if private sector housing is "imbalanced" or segregated. Sophisticated and insidious forms of racism continue to emerge which in reality are no different than the former policies which are overtly exclusionary and discriminatory.

The policy of "fair share" housing has similar problems in its effect on the distribution of housing resources. Allocations for housing assistance such as Section 8, rent subsidies, and other low-income rental programs are based on a calculation of need for each town, city or jurisdiction. These are examined along with the past performance of a community in meeting low-income housing needs.33 Locations where minority and poor populations live or are "unduly concentrated" are noted, and an allocation plan is developed which would award
housing resources to communities, usually in suburban areas, which have made little progress in the past in meeting housing needs. Positive outreach goals are then established for these jurisdictions so as to attract low-income and minority households and to induce residential mobility from "concentrated" to "unconcentrated" areas. The result of fulfilling positive outreach goals would be to redistribute housing assistance to the suburban and outlying areas; large cuts would then be made in upgrading or increasing the supply of low-income housing in the cities.

Planners, policy makers, and others have considered fair share housing as a simple computational process which would result in a redistribution of housing resources. Some even feel that the poor are a burden and should be redistributed or "shared fairly". A prevalent belief is that if minorities and the poor are over-represented in certain areas in comparison to their overall percentage, they should simply be "spatially deconcentrated" and dispersed. Little thought is given to the consequences of the continued displacement of poor and minority households and families from an area, and the breaking up of social and community ties.

Racial balancing and fair share housing in addition to other emerging social policies fail to recognize that: (1) the minority and poor populations have formed as communities and
have evolved as communities; (2) the communities have historically followed a pattern of movement and forced relocation in accordance with the economic changes in an area; and (3) the control over location and mobility are factors of empowerment--such that the ability to continue to live in the central cities, in one's community, or the ability to choose where to live, are inextricably tied to the fight for jobs, the right to a quality of life, and other opportunities which have been denied them.

The original movement for increased housing opportunities has presently been replaced. Although there appears to be liberal and enlightened reformation of our housing policies, inequalities in the distribution of housing and other resources to the poor and minority population continue to be perpetuated.

Design Factors
The majority of public housing constructed in the first 20 years of the program was primarily low-rise garden apartments and was of considerably higher quality when compared with the existing private housing. Programmatic changes and population shifts developing in the late 1950s through the 1960s necessitated massive construction to house the expanding poor population in the central cities. They type of housing constructed was dominated by the monstrous and monolithic high-rise and high-density settings that public housing is stereotypically known for.
Development in the fields of behavioral and environmental psychology have focused on some of the design consequences such as: the effect of high-rise living on families, especially poor families; the interactive qualities of security; the circulation patterns; open space; and other physical and psychological factors which can support or inhibit desired activities. Social research looked at the symbolic relation of housing to individual and group identity and brought about the significance of housing type and design as an identifying element. This has led to increased understanding in designing low-income housing that can successfully integrate into the fabric of existing neighborhoods, instead of reproducing isolated and foreboding housing projects.

The development of improved physical design criteria has also brought about new approaches to understanding housing as an integral component of a social and physical environment. Simply stated, "housing is a web of social services which go beyond the mere provision of shelter." But in the application of this new body of research, designers, planners and policy makers have tended to be narrow in their approach to appropriate solutions to housing problems. Often they end up with proposals addressing single issues such as: density, security, open space, unit size and layout, and spatial hierarchies. Thus, they frequently devise rigid design solutions to be applied everywhere. How often are we made aware of the
simplistic arguments of designers who claim that successful family housing must have the following qualities: it must approximate single-family homes or townhouses, have a private front and back entrance, ground-floor access, private yard, a kitchen overlooking the yard, and so on, without addressing the contextual setting of the house and the various other social and environmental factors which impinge on the quality of life. In criticizing past design and housing policies Chester Hartman states:

Research into the sociology of housing, while illuminating many aspects of the residential process and some of the broader ramifications of the physical home itself, . . . has not attempted to study housing issues in the context of the community. . . . it is still the house per se that provides the focus for policy and programs. The underlying assumption is one of uniformity and importance of certain physical standards and attributes with regard to housing. The housing programs and policies which derive from this concern still focus almost exclusively on changes in physical features of the dwelling unit, employing certain fixed standards for what is desirable.

This general assumption of physical determinism--that physical features of the immediate environment are of critical importance to human well-being and ought to be the principal object of planned change--is at the core of most approaches to housing at the public and private levels. In sum, public policy and most related research have approached the environment in physical terms without adequate study of and concern for the social and sentimental aspects which may be of equal or paramount concern to those who are the subjects of policy and research.36

Whereas certain new design criteria can be used successfully in the design of new housing developments, especially if management and services are also addressed, they are not so
easily adapted to existing developments. Nor should they be. When it comes to remedying "troubled" developments, one cannot just assess the workability of the development by comparing the physical design and layout of the existing housing with the "ideal" or prototypic model of successful family housing. First, since they rarely match, this often leads to wasteful decisions to demolish the development if adaptations cannot easily be made to transform the existing housing to conform to these rigidly set criteria, and secondly, physical design issues in themselves do not determine the livability of an environment. Often, those who are quick to call for demolition by citing physical design flaws are usually searching for justifications for a prior political decision to rid an area of low-income housing.

A double standard also pervades in the field: the number of stories from the ground floor; questions of density; the number of children per acre; the need for private entrances; and so on, are never the sole stipulations for providing upper-income housing, whereas they have been rigidly applied to low and moderate-income housing. Efficient management has always been an important factor in the operation of market-rate housing, but it is rarely seen as such for low-income housing. Failures in low-income housing are more likely to be attributed to physical design factors than to the quality of housing services. The inability of many planners and design pro-
professionals to politically and ideologically support the concept of low-income or public housing has also resulted in narrow definitions of what kind of housing is to be provided.

Recent research has lent some insight to the myths of certain conventional and assumed measures of physical determinism in low and moderate-income housing. A HUD-released study entitled "Residents' Satisfaction in HUD-Assisted Housing: Design and Management Factors" have revealed some significant findings. Conducted during the period from 1972 to 1977, the study surveyed and evaluated 37 HUD-Assisted housing developments in ten different states, including New York and California. Ten public housing developments along with state housing, corporation-owned and privately-owned developments funded through 221(d)(3), 221(d)(4) and Section 236 programs were researched. All developments except one elderly development were for general occupancy. The developments comprised all building types: low-rises, mid-rises and high-rises. A total of 3,900 residents were surveyed. Delving into the multiplicity of design and management factors that contributed to the successful workings of a development, the following findings were made:

A blend of factors is responsible for creating a satisfactory living environment, not a single aspect. . . . the most careful and sensitive attention to matters of planning and design, for instance, will have practically no bearing on the final success of development, unless attention is also paid to the other important ingredients, namely the characteristics of the residents themselves, the attitudes
and performance of management, and the attributes of the surrounding neighborhoods or community. Density, per se, was not a predictor of resident satisfaction. . . . We can conclude from the results of our analysis that both high and low densities can be satisfactory when a development is adequately designed and managed. The small size of a development [in numbers of dwelling units] was a weak predictor of resident satisfaction. There was no significant difference in general satisfaction between subsamples of residents living in high-rise and low-rise developments. . . . This finding contradicts widely held notions to the effect that high-rise projects are inherently less satisfactory for family living. . . . we must conclude that well-designed and well-managed high-rise housing can be as satisfactory as any other well-designed and well-managed building type. Indeed in our sample the high-rise residents were more satisfied than low-rise residents with privacy from neighbors, recreation facilities, and parking arrangements. The type of site layout was not related to residents' satisfaction. . . . no particular type of site layout seems to exist that will be intrinsically better and that will strongly influence residents satisfaction. No matter what type of layout is chosen, the specific detail way in which a variety of important attributes are handled is what makes a real difference to people. Satisfaction with management was found to be among the strongest predictor of overall satisfaction. . . . In practical terms, the key role played by responsive, fair efficient and effective management in fostering residents' satisfaction cannot be overemphasized. In summary, . . . specific aspects of the residents, the physical environment and of management all contributed to generate residents' satisfaction. Because of the importance of aspects in these three domains it is unlikely that successful developments will score highly on all three. Likewise, it is unlikely that attempts at improving performance in one domain will increase residents' satisfaction if attention is not paid to the other domains as well.
In dispelling certain fallacious concepts about designing for low and moderate-income housing communities, the study raises the often neglected factors of resident satisfaction in management performance. These factors cannot be overlooked in the planning for new housing and changes in existing housing. Some of the newly constituted developments show the results of accumulated wisdom from past mistakes. Practice has established that we are able to improve our approach towards providing better housing. Unfortunately, the science of intervention into dysfunctional communities has not been so successful, being narrowly construed with physical determinism as an underlying supposition. The important aspects of innovative management reforms applicable to low and moderate-income housing rather than traditional management practices have not been adopted. Potentials for community empowerment such as economic development, job training and placement have usually been pushed aside as an inconsequential part of social services. The full development of tenant participation and community organizing has largely been ignored, thus defeating any attempts at improving the vital social organization of the community and of sustaining resident contribution in the upkeep of their environment.

Housing officials, policy makers and planners have instead resorted to solutions which attempt to solve the housing problems by getting rid of poor and minority people and
"problem" tenants. This is done by subtle actions, such as attrition, or drastic actions, such as massive demolition. Positive actions would be to rehabilitate the housing and apply creative approaches towards improving the social environment, but instead, income and racial mix are readily resorted to--rather than attempts to deal with the existing populace.

The reality of the situation is that housing problems of the poor will not go away just by displacement, dispersion, demolition, or changes in physical design. Housing improvement and community development in all their constituent parts must take place from the ground up--in the interest of tenants. Any other approach only reveals the weakness of a commitment to house the poor.

CONCLUSION

The political arena is dominated by the point of view that speaks to the failure of public housing. This has lead to the ideological defeat of the program, despite the research which reveals the contrary--that public housing actually meets the needs of the majority of tenants and, when properly designed and managed, is as satisfactory as, or more satisfactory than, housing in the open market.45 As evidenced by data from HUD's Target Projects Program (TPP), it was found that only 5% or 700 projects out of 14,000 projects nationally are "troubled"
and less than 200 are "critically troubled" developments.\textsuperscript{46} Unfortunately, the lack of adequate funding compounded with mismanagement of the housing authorities in certain cities has made it difficult for public housing in those cities to be maintained as standard housing. The creation of slum conditions in comparatively few family developments has fed the notion that public housing has failed as a national program. But, despite its problems, public housing has been a mass housing approach for decent and affordable housing for the low-income population. Located in 2,700 communities, public housing shelters an estimated 3.4 million people.\textsuperscript{47} The importance of public housing cannot be overemphasized, in metropolitan areas there exists one public housing unit for every five poverty-level households.\textsuperscript{48} This represents a significant part of any local housing stock; public housing can no longer be considered as "temporary" housing as it has become a permanent part of the housing stock.

The current attack on public housing is jeopardizing the program by inducing budget cuts, a decrease in new housing starts and cynicism towards public management and ownership of housing. Many of the popular arguments against public housing not only undermine the existing program, but divert attention away from how society will house the poor. The alternative programs cannot solve the housing problem for the poor given
the severe private housing shortages found in many of our major cities. Furthermore, "the housing problem is not going to be solved by gimmicks, but by spending enough money on very simple things."49

If the evidence points to the importance of management, services, reforms in the housing authorities, and development of the social communities in public housing, one wonders why opponents usually call for the dissolution of public housing rather than the application of appropriate measures to alleviate and improve conditions.

As enumerated in this chapter, the arguments in themselves do not justify the dismantling or abandoning of public housing; instead, public housing should be improved and expanded as a means for providing housing for the poor. Unfortunately, in looking at who is served by public housing, one can only conclude that the attack on public housing, in all its broad manifestations, is fundamentally an attack on the low-income population: the poor, minority, female and elderly population, and on their right to decent and affordable housing.
CHAPTER 2: THE LOCAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING

"...[T]he housing problem of the disadvantaged has gradually ceased to be of major concern to those responsible for public policy. Faced with declining ratables and rising costs for municipal services, cities have used federal renewal funds for projects that would shore up local finances."

--William Grigsby¹
CHAPTER 2
THE LOCAL NEED FOR PUBLIC HOUSING

INTRODUCTION
It is not only helpful but necessary to understand the redevelopment of Columbia Point within the context of the local need for public housing, lest a solution for Columbia Point exacerbates rather than alleviate the housing problem.

The present housing shortage in the City of Boston will increasingly affect a larger segment of the population as it will become more difficult to obtain adequate and affordable housing and to keep pace with rent increases and the rising cost of homeownership. The population which continues to be the most impoverished are the poor and working class households, especially, the elderly, minority and female-headed households. While the housing needs of the low-income population may be a familiar story, certain manifestations in Boston's housing market have heightened the need for a constructive solution in assessing the use of our present stock of public housing.

Boston's housing market is changing due to the growing numbers of middle and upper-income individuals and families who are selecting urban sites as their housing choice, changing life styles, and the increasing numbers of new households in formation from the post war baby boom.
The anticipated creation of more than 200,000 jobs in the city by 1985 will also attract new households. Speculation and real estate activities are at an all time high; rent levels and property values are up; the tightened mortgage market has restricted new housing consumers to certain income groups; and the housing industry is geared towards supplying market-rate housing for those who can afford it.

Renewed interests in construction of market-rate rental and sale housing and an upsurge in condominium conversion activities create increased market pressures not only on the existing supply of all standard housing, but also on the vast supply of substandard housing in residential areas which have certain environmental amenities. Many neighborhoods which have deteriorated are now coming back into vogue, and within these neighborhoods, the supply of public housing has not been overlooked as a potential resource for middle and upper-income housing.

This chapter includes a brief description of Boston's changing housing market, an examination of Boston's low-income population's policy, and a discussion of public housing as a critical component in solving the housing problem.
BOSTON'S HOUSING MARKET

The population of Boston has stabilized after experiencing close to 20 years of population decline from 1960 to 1979. Although the population projected for Boston is estimated to be between 617,000 to 662,000 through 1985, the number of households will increase at a faster rate than the population during the next 20 years. Household formations are at an all time high as a dramatic increase of persons age 25-35 is projected for the period from 1970 to 1979.²

If the population remains stable, household formation from the baby boom will increase households by 40%, and if there is a modest increase in population, households will increase by 50% in 1985.³ There is also a need for more units due to changing lifestyles such as singles living alone, couples without children, smaller families, and separated or divorced households. The Boston area is also experiencing an increase in the elderly population because of longer life spans and because the elderly are less likely to live with their children.

From 1970 to 1975 more than 100,000 jobs were created in Boston, bringing the total employment from 376,604 to 483,671. An increase of 200,000 jobs is expected from 1970 to 1985.⁴ This will continue to contribute to the migration of people from the suburbs and other regions into the city to live and
work. Many of these new jobs will be professional and white collar jobs, which will be increasing at a time when industrial and blue-collar jobs are declining in the area.

The influx of middle and upper-income households into the city will make increasing demands on the limited housing stock. This group is profiled as follows: the renter profile for market housing is predominantly young professional couples, often with two incomes, empty nesters, singles living alone, and unrelated individuals pooling their rent.\(^5\) They create the greatest demand for one and two bedroom apartments. The profile of condominium buyers is similar to the top segment of the renters and includes: young professionals, empty nesters and first time home buyers with no children or preschool children. The demand is high not only for luxury and market-rate housing in downtown areas and designated new development sites, but many of the first time home buyers and young professional couples starting families will desire larger units and more space and will choose to locate in attractive residential areas in the city.

In a BRA study, it was reported that the existing residents are poorer, have more dependents and often less income than the newcomers. The process of gentrification and recycling of the housing stock for middle and upper-income households moving into the city and those starting households will
displace existing homeowners and residents as: "Boston is on the point of breaking out of the twenty year stigma against urban living...suddenly urban amenities are being rediscovered and some trendsetters are finding it smart to be living in the center city." 6

In order to understand the impact of these changes on the housing market, we must look at the existing housing conditions. As of 1978, a third of Boston's housing stock was in substandard condition. 7 The city's vacancy rate in 1970 was 6.4%, and has since dropped below 3.8% in 1979, and below 2% in 1980. In many neighborhoods, vacancies are almost non-existent. In 1979, of the more than 229,000 units in the city, there were only 2,800 vacant available units for sale and 10,900 available rental units. 8 But in taking a closer look at the total available units, only 6,800 units, less than half, were in standard condition.

When one considers the seriousness of the housing shortage and the numbers of substandard units, the increased market demands will have serious impacts on the low-income housing supply.

Young professionals and wealthier households have the purchasing power and can outbid other segments of the population for the available rental and sale housing.
Their demand alone far exceeds the available supply of standard housing.

Low-income and working-class households, especially families, will have to compete with a wealthier population group for not only the limited available stock of standard housing, but also for the substandard housing. Middle and upper-income groups also have the financial resources to rehabilitate substandard housing. This, concurrent with the conversion of rental housing into condominiums, is part of the process creating a severe housing shortage for the poor. There is a lack of affordable standard housing to match the housing needs in terms of unit size, price and tenure of Boston's population, in particular the low-income population.9

Boston's housing needs as established by the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) as of January 1978, call for a total of 67,000 family and elderly units to be provided through new-construction and substantial rehabilitation to cover increases in the number of new households needing housing, and to replace units which are lost due to fire, demolition, conversion, permanent abandonment, etc.10 But the prospects of meeting this goal is unlikely with the low level of present and projected construction activities. Even if the desired level of rehabilitation and adaptive reuse of existing structures is achieved, the area would
experience a severe housing shortage unless many new units are constructed during the coming years.

The housing supply in terms of new construction is unlikely to keep pace with the demand due to high land costs, a tight mortgage market, lack of available land and the high cost of new construction. The BRA estimates that from now until 1985, there will only be a net gain of 6,000 units beyond what is already scheduled for construction in Boston.\(^{11}\) With Boston needing at least 10,000 new units annually, any unmet need will be reflected in the scarcity of existing and available housing.

In the production of new housing, the present market will only support construction of market housing in selected areas of the city. But as land prices are high and land availability low in established areas, housing and development opportunities will take place in the up-and-coming areas in neighborhoods that are in the process of being revitalized. Thus new markets are opening up for market-rate housing while there is a corresponding tightening of the market for other income groups.

A logical question to ask is, why would middle and upper-income households choose to locate in deteriorated neighborhoods at all, given all the options?
It becomes clear that to open up a market or to market an area that suffers from a negative image, the dollar cost to the housing consumer must be below that of his/her other options. As the housing shortage is driving up costs for low income households and also for many middle-income households, it is creating a shortage of "acceptable" offers. There are only limited numbers of available units in Beacon Hill, East Boston, the North End and other attractive parts of the city, as the turnover rate in those areas is much lower than what the market can attract. Thus, other options for real estate speculation and development are resorted to. In a BRA report it is noted that:

Significant new production, if it comes, will be developed by new partnerships. New condominium forms, recycling obsolescing commercial [buildings]... Because of the high cost of new construction, necessity will also spur inventiveness and competition in recycling existing stock...12

For certain markets to open up for a wealthier clientele and at the same time be financially feasible and competitive with other offerings, the City must be an active agent in facilitating the transformation of previously deteriorated neighborhoods into attractive areas for middle and upper-income groups. The City can lower considerably development costs in many ways such as: write-downs, urban renewal, land clearance and transfers, provide services and development incentives, in addition to implementing a set of unstated
revitalization policies. These may include: limiting or halting further construction of subsidized housing in an area, especially family housing; inducement of public and private investment to increase property values in a neighborhood; and through a policy of allowing certain parts of the city to deteriorate, actions such as public acquisition, land-banking, demolition or rent decontrol, can prepare for a change in the resident population.

These actions, on the whole, facilitate the displacement and relocation of the poor and other low-income residents who by virtue of limited income, constricted mobility, residential segregation and discrimination, will be further concentrated in substandard housing in deteriorated neighborhoods.

The most prominent example of displacement is in the experience of the South End neighborhood. Ironically, many perceive the construction of a limited number of subsidized housing in the area as a satisfactory solution to the widespread urban renewal and demolition which had taken place. But in a special report, the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC) found that despite the fact that private investments had revitalize parts of the South End:

In too few places have low and moderate income people benefited by private market activity...the South End has been and continues to be an area of the City with rising market pressures. This is healthy and desirable in terms of bringing a middle-class population with more buying power back into the South End and
the City, but it is becoming increasingly more difficult for low and moderate income and marginally employed people to remain in the area....

The production of over 3,000 low and moderate income housing units between 1966 and the end of 1974, seems to have met the need of moderate-income units but failed to meet the need for low-income housing... more than 3,000 low-income households are not being served by low-income housing subsidies.13

Just as the production of new housing will not meet demand, the rental housing market will not be expanding. Landlords' perception of inadequate returns on most rental housing, even independent of rent control, has resulted in no new rental units being placed on the market, except for units which can command market or above market rents.

Boston's housing market shows that substantial new units need to be supplied by direct provision, new construction and upgrading of existing stock. Housing must be developed for low-come and disadvantaged households, or the turnover from housing for the poor to housing for the wealthy will supplant a basic need for a significant portion of the population.

In looking at the traditional housing resources for the poor, we find: (1) standard and substandard ownership and rental housing in the private market, (2) housing in deteriorated neighborhoods or neighborhoods currently undergoing revitalization, (3) community-sponsored and other subsidized
housing, and (4) the stock of public housing. What were once opportunities for housing the poor: rehabilitation of sub-standard housing, new construction of subsidized housing, rental assistance for standard units, and the upgrading of existing private stock, are now harder to realize. Existing non-profit and subsidized housing and public housing appear to be the only stable supply of low-income housing.

LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS

In observing some of the overall housing and population characteristics, we find the following conditions: Boston has a high percentage of renters, 74%; a tight housing market with a vacancy rate below the acceptable 4%; a large low-income population of 72,000 households comprising 31% of all households; and a housing stock that maintains 75,300 or 33% of all households in substandard housing. Close to 75% of the substandard units are rental units.14

Taking a closer look at the composition of the low-income population in need of housing assistance, we find that the majority, 63% or 45,360 are family households: 54% are small families (4 persons or less), and 12% are large families (5 persons or more).15 The remaining 37% of low-income households are elderly and handicapped households. A high percentage, 84% of low-income families are in the rental market. The same cannot be said of the low-income elderly,
(except for the minority elderly), as their rate of home-ownership is comparable to the city's average.

Large discerencies in housing characteristics exist between minority and white households for both family and elderly households. Minority households comprise 17% of all households in Boston, but they comprise 40% of the low-income households. 49% or close to half of the minority population lives in substandard housing as compared with 13% of the white population. 16

Of all households in Boston, one in four is a homeowner. This ratio exists for white low-income households despite their low-income status. But for low-income Black households, only 7%, (1,500 households) less than one in fourteen, is a homeowner. For low-income Hispanic households, there exists a total of 320 owner-occupied units or 5%, with approximately one in twenty being a homeowner! The elderly low-income households on the whole have a homeownership rate of 27%, but only 9% of the minority low-income elderly are homeowners.

Female-heads of households comprise 19% of the low-income households and are divided into two groups. The elderly constitute 44% of female heads of households, and account for 72% of the female-headed homeowners. The female-heads of households with family constitute 56% of all female-heads of
households, but they account for only 12% of the homeowners. In the city, only 670 low-income female-heads of households with small families (4 persons or less) are homeowners, and only 260 female-heads of households with large families (5 persons or more) are homeowners. Low-income minority, female-headed, and minority elderly households are under-represented as homeowners and reside in the more unstable market of rental housing.

Families comprise a majority of the low-income housing need. Low-income families find it particularly difficult to obtain adequate housing in the private market because of discrimination against children, large families, female-headed households, source of income, and racial and economic discrimination. Large units also tend to be expensive and in short supply.

In the brief assessment of the housing conditions of the low-income population, certain very clear patterns emerge showing the housing need for many low-income families, minority households and female-heads of households.

THE CITY'S HOUSING POLICY

Having assessed some of the low-income housing needs in Boston by household, population, tenure and housing type, what has been the City's response to low-income housing? Boston's
housing assistance need as of 1970 was 33,206 units. The City's effort from 1970 to 1976 resulted in only supplying 2,633 units or 7.9% of the 1970 need.\textsuperscript{17} As of 1978, the need has jumped to a total of 72,000 family and elderly units. It will be increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the low-income population unless the City takes a radical departure from its current policies towards low-income housing.

Taking a look at Boston's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) is perhaps the best way to evaluate the City's approach towards low-income housing. The HAP, a requirement of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) application process, is the mechanism by which communities with populations over 25 thousand submit a detailed plan to HUD on how the community's low-income housing needs will be met. HUD recommends that a goal of 15% of the total need, reflecting proportional need by family size, tenure and housing type, be established for each three-year plan.\textsuperscript{18}

Boston's Housing Assistance Plan must conform to the Area-wide Housing Opportunity Plan (AHOP) prepared by the Metropolitan Area Planning Council for consistency with the area housing needs. MAPC established the following three-year percentage goals for Boston:

1. The breakdown by households type should result in 52% of assistance to families: 36% to small families:
and 16% to large families. Assistance to the elderly should constitute 48%.

2. Distribution based on tenure requires 79% assistance to renters, and 21% to homeowner.

3. Housing type to be assisted should be distributed 50% to existing housing and 50% to new or substantially rehabilitated units. 19

While these figures are similar to the housing needs discussed in the preceding section, let us now look at the City's proposed HAP. The HAP submitted to HUD in 1979 by the City of Boston, through the Mayor's Office of Housing, proposed the following three-year goals covering the period from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982: 20

1. Of the 1,300 new rental units to be provided, 78% are proposed for the elderly and handicapped and only 22% for families. Only 240 small family and 60 large family units are to be provided.

2. Of the total assisted units, 52% instead of 79% will go to renters, and 48% will go to homeowners. Thus the City proposes fulfilling 36% of the need for homeowners, greater than twice the percentage recommended by HUD, and only 7% of the need of renters.

3. Of the housing type to be assisted, the City proposes 85% assistance to existing housing and only
15% for new or substantially rehabilitated units. Here, again, housing assistance will go disproportionately to homeowners as opposed to renters.

The City's low-income housing policy is directed towards benefiting the small numbers of homeowners, who are predominantly white and moderate-income, and the elderly population. Benefits will unlikely reach the low-income households and the large-population of minority family and elderly households, female-heads of households, and large families as they are drastically under-represented as homeowners.

In defense of their lack of assistance to low-income renters and families, the City states as its goal the "spatial deconcentration" of housing opportunities: "It is obvious that the overwhelming need for low-income family housing must now be addressed on a metropolitan level," i.e., outside of Boston. Some of their proposals include: outreach, counselling, and referral services to "enable lower-income persons and minorities residing in impacted areas either inside or outside of the city to obtain assisted housing outside of the impacted areas," and the City will support BHA in establishing an interjurisdictional Section 8 existing housing program to provide opportunities for low-income and minorities to lease units outside of Boston.
The implications of the lack of housing assistance in "impacted" areas, either for rental assistance, substantial rehabilitated, or new subsidized housing, will mean that neighborhoods such as the South End, Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and other areas where low-income and minority households reside will not be upgraded for existing residents. A "hold" on increasing the low-income housing supply in these areas will contribute to the continuing threat of displacement as low-income families without housing assistance will be unable to remain in their neighborhoods.

The City's HAP is an unfortunate testament to the City's policy of getting rid of low-income families and people of color by denying them the necessary housing assistance. Now that new jobs are being created in Boston and urban living is again an attractive option for many people, the City is assisting in the displacement of the poor. The implication is that with the continuation of such policies, increased displacement will occur, and the existing supply of public and subsidized housing will become that much more valuable in serving the needs of the poor.

BOSTON'S PUBLIC HOUSING

We cannot understand the effects of redeveloping public housing without first examining the population who is served by public housing.
The population in need of low-income housing is reflected in Boston's public housing. While housing 10% of the City's population, public housing as of 1978, serves the following population subgroups to an even greater extent:22

- 20% of Boston's low-income households.
- 26% of Boston's low-income households in need of housing assistance.
- 22% of Boston's low-income minority family households.
- 27% of Boston's low-income minority family households in need of house assistance.
- 13% of elderly low-income households in need of housing assistance.
- 86% of Boston's low-income one-parent headed households in need of housing assistance.

The demographic changes within public housing itself reveals the trend of poorer households and an increase in minority and one-parent headed households. From 1963 to 1970, the percentage of tenants on public assistance and fixed incomes rose from 57% to 75%. In 1960, 13% of the families received AFDC, in 1975, 21% and in 1978, 46%.23 The percentage of adult non-workers was 79% in 1975 and 86.5% in 1978. In the 1960s, the non-white population increased from 13.5% to 37% and in 1979, to 53% in the family developments.24 In 1975, 72% of all BHA households were one-parent headed house-
holds. The median income of tenants was $3,390 compared with $9,133 for Boston.

These trends are unlikely to reverse themselves because we are observing not only an increasing demand on the part of existing low-income households for public housing, but also an increase in the general population who are becoming eligible for public housing. The 1960 Census indicated that about 15% of the families living in Boston had incomes which were hardly enough to afford anything but public housing, and sometimes too little to afford even that. By 1968, a survey commissioned by the BRA indicated that this figure had increased to at least 19%.25

In 1970, MAPC reported that the private market did not adequately meet the needs of approximately 260,000 households in the Boston area, and 27% of the households were in need of some form of housing assistance because of the failure of the private market.26 The University of Massachusetts Center for Survey Research found that in 1980, 43% of Boston's households were eligible for public housing.27

A report from the Master's Office found that BHA family housing is increasingly a resource for minority households as they represent between 65-75% of the family waiting list. But, as the developments in South Boston, Charlestown and
East Boston are not safe for minority families, the "effective minority demand for the remaining family developments is even greater than 65%." Minorities also constitute 76% of the waiting list for leased housing and Section 8.

Despite the continuing problems in BHA management and maintenance, the waiting list for BHA housing contains over 7,000 households. 5,158 applicants or 75% of the waiting list is for family housing and 1,785 for elderly housing. Approximately 500 households are added to the waiting list each month, and it is projected that if the image of public housing improved even slightly, the waiting list could easily increase to 10,000.

The estimated average waiting period for a family on the waiting list was a means of 3.69 years and a median of 4.69 years in 1975. And for selected developments, the period spanned from .41 of a year in Charlestown to 87.33 years in Camden Street. In looking at Table 4, the long waiting periods are due to the high demand and low vacancy rates in certain developments, and also to the long delays in re-occupancy.
TABLE 4: Selected BHA Developments and Estimated Length of Waiting for 1975 (In order of increase time length)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charlestown</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Hill Extension</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard Park</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Hill</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Field</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orient Heights</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South End</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archdale</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington/Beach Streets</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Hill</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallivan Boulevard</td>
<td>18.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenox Street</td>
<td>19.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Street</td>
<td>20.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairmount</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whittier Street</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden Street</td>
<td>87.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unfortunately, the decline in all phases of BHA's operations and an unstated policy of a "freeze" on assigning new tenants to many of the developments, has resulted in a large number of vacancies. (See Table 5.) In 1977, the vacancy rate for family
Table 5: Vacancy Rates for Selected BHA Family Developments in Boston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Units Built</th>
<th>Units Available</th>
<th>1975 Vacant Units</th>
<th>1975 Percent</th>
<th>1977 Vacant Units</th>
<th>1977 Percent</th>
<th>1979 Vacant Units</th>
<th>1979 Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archdale</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orient Heights</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Hill</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Extension</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Broadway</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

developments was 15%, by 1980, this figure had almost doubled to 29%, or 4,000 vacant units. The vacancy rate does not testify to a lack of need for these units, but that swift rehabilitation and re-tenanting must become a priority. Even full occupancy of the existing stock would not meet the current need for public housing, as it can be demonstrated that development of a significant number of new public housing units is necessary. The high vacancy rate only contributes to the flight of existing tenants by making the developments more unlivable, and increases private and speculative interests on the sites.

Public housing is viewed by the City and others as a liability just as it is increasingly needed by an expanding low-income and minority population as a vital housing resource. Once a stable housing resource because of its construction on unattractive or isolated sites, public housing not sits on prime land and is seen as a development opportunity for many neighboring institutions.

More than half of the BHA family developments, 16 of the 24 developments are threatened by outside interests for private redevelopment. This ranges from requests from private companies and institutions who are interested in acquiring the sites, to actual development activities already underway. Cathedral, Charlestown, Lenox and Camden, Mission Hill Main,
Mission Hill Extension, Franklin Hill, Maverick, Orchard Park, Orient Heights, and Whittier Street, are all located in up-and-coming areas; unsolicited proposals and inquiries have been made on these sites. Columbia Point, Commonwealth, West Broadway ("D" Street), and Franklin Field are in the planning and implementation stages for redevelopment.

The strategy for expanding Boston's housing stock through new construction, rehabilitation and upgrading of existing stock is presently being undertaken for upper-income groups. Unless this trend reverses, we can talk of none other than public housing as an essential resources in meeting low-income housing needs. It becomes imperative that improvements in public housing, including redevelopment, serves the fulfillment of low-income housing needs and that public housing not fall prey to a middle and upper-income housing strategy.

CONCLUSION

Parallels can be drawn between neighborhood decline, deterioration, and its eventual revitalization for a different population group with the situation facing public housing. If the process of emptying-out and boarding-up public housing continues, we can anticipate a redevelopment process which will unlikely be in the interest of low-income people.
The trend towards privatization, supported by official bodies, speaks to the present weakness of the institution of public housing. If adequate management and maintenance were provided, and the Authority properly administered, opponents would gain little ground in their attack upon public housing. A negative perception of public housing leads to remedial solutions such as private redevelopment, disposition and demolition, which jeopardized the existence of the very institution itself. The answer to the problem would be very simple if we all agreed to the dissolution of public housing, but public housing tenants, who are the ones directly affected by the conditions in the developments, have not sided with the private interests and liberal housing advocates who call for disposition, demolition and an end to public ownership, management and control of public housing. Tenants continue to advocate for major improvements in public housing and reform of the BHA so that the public housing stock can be maintained and expanded to meet their needs. Tenants, through their efforts in the Perez Case, the Consent Decree, and now Receivership, have essentially held the point of view that as the single largest housing resource for the poor, the apparatus and institution of public housing must be reformed to fulfill the original mandate of the program: the provision of decent, affordable housing and suitable living environment for those in need.
Thus a strategy for meeting the housing needs of the poor must first be one of a defensive posture, of holding on to the existing low-income inventory; and second, of doing the most to improve the existing housing through rehabilitation and community development; and third, to aggressively expand housing opportunities through selected channels that make the most of government agencies, public and political bodies.

The manipulation of these essential institutions is necessary so as to convert the institutions into work in the interest of low-income housing. Public housing is one such institution, even though in Boston it has been perceived as an enemy and slumlord to the residents. But it is at this time that the potential exists and overriding circumstances demand that basic reforms must be made to the institution of public housing so as to make it a protectorate of low-income housing needs in the City. Boston's housing market, the housing needs of the low-income and public housing population, and the City's housing policy, all speak to the need to maintain public housing as a low-income housing resource.
CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF REDEVELOPMENT

"The property would be marketed to middle income market rate tenants ... put on the tax role of the City of Boston ... [and] be privately owned and managed.

It is generally assumed although not always proven that private sector interests coincide with the public best interests. In this case however, the opportunity exists to structure the sale of the buildings in such a fashion to best guard the public interest."

--Consultant's Draft Report on: Refinancing and Marketing the Commonwealth Housing Project, prepared for the BHA, March 1979
CHAPTER 3

THE CONCEPT OF REDEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Private redevelopment appears to be an attractive and readily available solution to the problems of our "troubled" public housing projects. Privatization of public housing is seen as an alternative by many which should pervade all areas: from the already established pattern of private development of low-income housing, to the familiar cry for private management, and hence to private ownership of what is now public housing.

Unlike the previous programmatic and jurisdictional exclusion of the private sector, the trend now calls for public housing to be placed under the control of the private sector. This drastic change is presumably justified for both financial and social reasons. Criticism has not only been levelled against the present operations and conditions in public housing, but also against the fundamental premise for how the low-income population should be housed in this society.

This chapter takes a look at Pruitt-Igoe, an historic precedent for redevelopment; and public and private initiatives in redevelopment, including an examination of King's Lynne, a recent experiment in limited partnership.
THE CASE OF PRUITT-IGOE

The concept of redeveloping public housing is not a new nor strange process unfamiliar to us. The sensationalism surrounding the partial demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in 1972, to the total clearance of the site in 1976, cannot be seen solely as a failure of the housing project, as has been presented to the public. Instead, the razing of Pruitt-Igoe was a sign of a larger redevelopment process that was taking place in the City of St. Louis over the control of land. We must look into the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe to find clues for why it happened.

Built in 1954 to house 2870 households in 33 eleven-story high-rise buildings on 57.5 acres, Pruitt-Igoe provided housing for 12,501 persons. In 1960, the vacancy rate was 14% with 401 vacant units, but by 1970, the population dropped by more than half to 6,007 persons with a vacancy rate of 57%. Poor living conditions and a drastic population decline were to precede demolition.

Before it was demolished, Pruitt-Igoe was a designated area for the poverty (OEO) and Model Cities Programs. The Department of Housing Education and Welfare (HEW) committed over $5 million in 1962 to alleviate social problems: a day care center, health clinic and other facilities were established. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
allocated $7 million in 1965, followed by another $5 million in 1972 for physical rehabilitation. Part of the funds were to be used experimentally to determine whether the high-rise structures could be converted into three or four-story buildings by cutting off the top floors. Numerous proposals and plans were developed to restructure the buildings, including an action plan developed by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill. But none of these plans were carried out. They were all abandoned due to doubts about the economic feasibility of revitalizing the project. The project was subsequently razed.

But it was not public housing tenants, residents in the surrounding neighborhood, and the low-income population who "gave-up" on Pruitt-Igoe or advocated for its demolition. Pruitt-Igoe's housing, even though densely packed on the site, was of sound construction. The buildings contained large apartments which were quite different from the usual minimum spaced units provided in many public housing developments. Tenants and others had worked for years to get the St. Louis Housing Authority and the City to improve conditions so that the development could be saved and made habitable. A statement representing their sentiment is enlightening:

When housing for 2,500 families on the Pruitt-Igoe site was allowed to deteriorate and was subsequently demolished, a gash was ripped in the flesh of the black community just as, ten years before, the razing of Mill Creek Valley cut deeply into the black community.
When Pruitt-Igoe came down, City officials and the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) quickly responded with a redevelopment proposal for the creation of a "Business Industrial Square", with a mix of offices, service distribution and light industrial usage to take place on the site. The site's convenient access to major streets, highways and thoroughfares ample labor supply, and readily available utility service, were cited in the proposal for the "Re-use of the Pruitt-Igoe Site." The report, issued in 1977, stated: "The economic well-being of this City and this region, depends ultimately on jobs for the people who live there. This site is presently unoccupied (sic) and offers an excellant opportunity to start meeting the need for city-based jobs." It was noted that the "utilization of the site for commercial-industrial purposes would generate more jobs, incomes and taxes than would other usages," as more than 2,000-2,500 jobs would be created.

The redevelopment proposal was to be approved by the St. Louis Housing Authority. As the feasibility of development was dependent on the cost of the land to the developers, a letter from Harry Morley, Jr., President of the RCGA contained the following:

Our initial analysis indicated that the cost of developed land in this site, made ready for industrial and/or business purchasers, must be low enough to compete with existing developed properties throughout the St. Louis area, in order to make marketing
of this site attractive for immediate turnover. The cost of land, which will be established by the Housing Authority, is of critical importance and has yet to be determined. We do know that the cost of improving the property with water, sewers, streets and lighting for commercial and industrial purposes allows a very small margin for land cost in order to keep the market price at a highly competitive level. 7

This RCGA proposal was submitted to the housing authority and considered along with other proposals for residential re-use, educational and community use. Not surprisingly, even from an institution supposedly responsible for the provision of low-income housing, Executive Director Costello stated the Housing Authority's staff was "biased towards industrial development." 8

The community's response as represented by Macler Shepard, President of Jeff-Vander-Lou Incorporated, a non-profit community organization, was the following:

Designating the Pruitt-Igoe site as industrial most certainly will allow right-of-way for the North-South Distributor highway and by so doing cause the immediate disruption of even more families and provide a nice bite size chunk of the black community between a newly built commercial and industrial strip. I see this Pruitt-Igoe industrial park designation as a new name for urban renewal...

...As a scheme to remove black people and disrupt the black community, proposing the industrialization of the Pruitt-Igoe site makes sense. 9
The community was to cite eight other designated industrial parks on the City's drawing board and more than 800 acres of undeveloped land in present industrial districts, making it unnecessary to use the Pruitt-Igoe site.

The community wanted housing replaced on the Pruitt-Igoe site since it was located in a residential area; zoned for housing; and adjacent to two schools, a library, a community center and other residential uses. A low-income housing shortage in St. Louis also justified the use of the site for housing. But presently, some eight years after the first building was demolished, the site remains vacant. Within St. Louis, the Housing Authority, the City, and the business community still continue to discuss the optimal re-use of the site. It is clear that low-income housing has long since been an abandoned concern.

Pruitt-Igoe established a precedent. We find private interest in obtaining cheap and available land from a public source—a continuation of urban renewal, and we find that the process of total or partial clearance of the site is based on the re-use of valuable infrastructures and amenities which remain intact, e.g., access to transportation, labor supply, utilities, and services. Public housing now falls within the "domain"
for urban renewal. We can now expect redevelopment to propose an entirely different "economic process" to take place. For example, what was once public housing can be proposed to industrial or commercial use, private housing or even mixed-income housing, as long as it is privately developed.

A public housing site is to be put to the "highest and best use," and may be cleared and left vacant for years, like Pruitt-Igoe, or left to deteriorate, as in Columbia Point, until such time as economic conditions are ripe for private redevelopment to take place.

Columbia Point can be viewed as a second generation Pruitt-Igoe. During the 1960's, Pruitt-Igoe was the target for government intervention just as Columbia Point is today the national demonstration for the Urban Initiatives Program. The superficial factors cited for the failure of Pruitt-Igoe are no different than at Columbia Point: design problems; the tenant characteristics of predominantly black, minority and very poor households; large numbers of female heads of households; the location and isolation of the site; and a history of unsuccessful attempts at upgrading the development.
Even though what took place at Pruitt-Igoe could happen at Columbia Point--resulting in total demolition and a complete re-use of the site, it will be unlikely for the following reasons:

1. HUD cannot withstand another experience of massive demolition of a recently built housing project; this is a sign of gross failure by the government.

2. A private redevelopment approach will take place from the very beginning in the planning stage, and not after demolition. Optimal results can then be achieved by the participation of the private sector early on.

3. The redevelopment of Columbia Point, as opposed to Pruitt-Igoe, offers the potential for market housing as a profitable venture which is comparable to commercial or industrial development options.

4. The "system" is adaptable and flexible so tenant participation and tenant "partnership" is readily discussed by HUD, the City and the Housing Authority.
5. The new ideology of mixed-income housing, the use of rent supplements, and other measures to "disperse" the poor, have become the touted answers to the low-income housing problem while maintaining a semblance of a commitment to the poor.

Columbia Point may not go up in dust exactly like Pruitt-Igoe, but for low-income tenants, the potential exists for the results to be similar.

PUBLIC REDEVELOPMENT

HUD subsidies and Modernization

Public redevelopment and revitalization of our housing projects have been the norm until recently. In examining past initiatives by HUD in improving public housing, we find many programs which were designed to supplement the budgets of the PHAs. These were to assist the authorities in maintaining their operations and were not necessarily designed for making substantial improvements to the developments. As operating deficits continued to climb for the PHAs, who could no longer meet their expenses from rental
income and reserves, the federal government made increasing levels of operating subsidies available from $2.6 million in FY 1968 to $985 million in FY 1978. Operating subsidies became essential to the survival of the program in many localities, in particular the larger cities.

The Modernization Program began in 1968, more than 30 years after the start of the public housing program, and provided through FY 1978 approximately $2.6 billion for capital improvements covering emergency items, comprehensive improvement programs and substantial rehabilitation. Recently, the program also made available funding for "major repairs" and for deferred, non-routine maintenance. In 1975, HUD instituted the Performance Funding System (PFS) to provide each PHA with the subsidies needed for efficient management by employing a formula based on statistical averages of well managed authorities. This provided some additional funds to the PHAs to improve their operations.

The programs described did not adequately maintain all the developments. They were especially inadequate in making major impact on developments experiencing a variety of serious social, managerial and physical problems. For example, the programs did provide the funding for important items such as
social services, improved management, security, tenant participation, and other services which were needed in many of the larger developments in the inner cities. But over succeeding years, the combined factors of escalated energy costs, higher costs for materials and labor, increased operating expenses, maintenance costs for antiquated buildings with worn-out mechanical systems, had left many housing authorities with depleted financial resources. The passage of the Brooke Amendment in 1969 and similar amendments in some states, along with the increase of lower income tenants in public housing, and inadequate subsidies from the state and federal government, further diminished the reserves of the housing authorities.

Housing conditions continued to deteriorate with little recourse for most housing authorities except to cut maintenance and services, and defer problems until such time as they were able to correct them.

The Target Project and The Urban Initiatives Programs

It was not until the mid 70's that HUD created comprehensive programs to address the severe problems in some of the major developments. Both the Target Projects Program (TPP) and the Urban Initiatives Program (UI) provided special funding to severly distressed public housing projects. Funding is provided to supplement modernization funds and operating
subsidies, and amounted to an extension of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC). It provides for substantial rehabilitation, extensive site improvements, security/crime prevention programs, and physical restructuring of the site.

Begun under the Nixon Administration in 1974, the TPP gave priority to management improvements, the start-up of social services and tenant programs, capital improvements and deferred maintenance. Funds were distributed to over 300 projects. The program had some successes, but since funds were spread so thinly, many of the PHAs were not able to meet their objectives of "turning around" some of their most "troubled" housing projects. Among those with large allocations, none succeeded as Columbia Point did in doing so little with so much, for few PHAs were funded at a high level of $8.4 million for one development.

The Urban Initiatives Program, announced in July 1978, unveiled the most comprehensive program to date by the federal government. Some 67 public housing authorities were to share nearly $264 million in a coordinated program between HUD and the Departments of Labor, Justice and Interior, to restore rundown projects in the large urban areas. The UI program was the Carter Administration's response to growing concerns and pressures from public housing tenants and others who increasingly saw the dangers of continual deterioration and the
potentials of demolition after the Pruitt-Igoe incident. The National Tenant Organization and local and regional tenant groups were increasingly fearful that PHAs would resort to demolition as a quick and simple solution to their housing problems, rather than apply a concerted effort to explore alternative approaches in rehabilitation.

The spirit and thrust of the program is well stated by Patricia Harris, then Secretary of HUD, during the announcement of the Program on July 10, 1978. The following is an excerpt from her speech, made after showing film footage on the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe:

What you have just seen, ladies and gentlemen, is $36 million of the taxpayers' dollars going up in a cloud of dust. What is even more disturbing is that for 12,000 people, a potentially decent place to live and raise a family ended up in a pile of debris.

This is the way things used to be done. It was quick and easy, to be sure. But it did not solve the problem, it just caused it to be moved to another part of the community.

Demolition is not the answer! It is an extravagant wast. Quite often, these projects can be turned around to provided an atmosphere in which the disadvantaged can live with pride and dignity.

This is the approach which this Administration is taking, not the approach which believes troubles can simply be "blasted away". No longer will we destroy people's hopes and dreams by blowing up troubled public housing projects that are structurally sound. 11

Subsequently, the majority of the funds, $259 of the $264 million, were awarded to 33 local housing authorities for
targeted rehabilitation to physically upgrade and do major restructuring of selected developments. The proposals had to contain comprehensive approaches to problem solving, while also demonstrating innovative efforts to avert the course of mothballing and demolishing buildings. The BHA received $10 million to rehabilitate 1504 units at Columbia Point and an additional $450 thousand for management improvements.

These federal programs have only just begun to address the serious problems confronting many developments. (At the State level, Massachusetts responded in 1979 by legislating funds for state-aided developments.) Much of the subsidies targeted to the developments are claimed to be inadequate, but some have successfully been applied to upgrade and "turn around" critically troubled projects. Cabrini Green in Chicago, Millvale in Cincinnati, and Riverview in Springfield are some of the projects which became successful under the Target Projects Program. Hunter's Point in San Francisco is a moderately successful public redevelopment attempt under the Urban Initiatives program. It will be some time before we are able to judge the results of the developments receiving UI funding as many are still in the planning stage. Nevertheless, there are examples which show that public redevelopment can work, given sufficient funding and proper management of the redevelopment process.
PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT

Public housing authorities may turn to private redevelopment as a solution when they believe that insufficient funds exist to "turn around" a development, to keep it well-managed, or when the development does not provide a desirable social environment. While these are often the official responses, other underlying explanations may exist.

First, we will briefly address the variability of internal factors which may influence a PHA to turn to private redevelopment. While it is often acknowledged that financial conditions impinge heavily on the decision, many other factors contribute to or deter the ability of the PHA to provide viable housing. Some of these factors reflect the extent of the PHA's commitment to the long-term maintenance of their public housing inventory. This may include the cost and social effectiveness of particular management techniques which will affect the housing conditions; the context in which the PHA operates, either as an agency for the delivery of housing services or as a political patronage machine, may affect the PHA's long-term interest in maintaining their developments; the extent and nature of labor/management relations will affect workers' performance; and the quality of tenant/management relations and management responsiveness will affect the level of services and tenant responsibility in maintaining their development.
Existing housing conditions, administrative efficacy, and the availability of funding and services, also impact on the future of the development.

But what becomes clear is that certain decisions by the PHAs can either contribute to the successful delivery of low-income housing and discourage the need for income mix and other experiments, or doom public housing to failure regardless of the level of subsidies and funding provided.

The internal solvency of a PHA is perhaps one of the key factors in how it responds to the external pressures for redeveloping its stock. Housing authorities with a history of mismanagement have a difficult time acquiring the necessary funds and lack the ability to properly expend any allotted funds. They may be politically and ideologically uncommitted to the public housing program and more likely to seek random solutions for solving their problems. This may include relieving themselves of their responsibilities through refinancing mechanisms such as the use of Section 8 for refinancing, federalizing state developments, and disposing of their housing stock to private developers.

The call for income and social mix appears to be for both financial and social reasons: so that a higher rental income can be realized and fewer "social problems" exhibited in
the community. The racial make-up of a development is often used to judge the quality of an environment. The clamor for income and social mix may not have been thoroughly studied or justified, but often it is unconditionally supported by many public housing officials. Important questions have not been answered prior to charges against public housing for "concentrating" low-income households, as stated by Chester Hartman:

> to what extent are current public housing projects unhealthy places to live in simply because of this population concentration and to what extent are they objectionable on other grounds (public ownership and management, oppressive design, lack of amenities, excessive rents, etc.,) thereby making the issue of population concentration irrelevant?  

One would expect that responsible PHAs serious in their intent to provide housing to those eligible would at least go to the extent of achieving income mix allowable under public housing, and upgrading physical and social condition in the developments, prior to drawing any conclusions about the reprehensibility of maintaining viable low-income communities.

External pressures also influence a PHAs decision to opt for private redevelopment. Within both HUD and the Congress, there are forces urging income mix and greater reliance on the private sector. The housing and construction industries, facing a lag in construction starts and high interest rates, are encouraged by the use of the private and public finan-
cing backed with public guarantees for developing subsidized housing.

In addition, many PHAs, particularly large authorities in the major cities, are facing a variety of local factors related to changes in the city's real estate market which makes many of the housing projects attractive for private redevelopment. In Boston, developments such as Orient Heights, Lenox and Camden, Commonwealth and Gallivan Boulevard, would easily make attractive market-rate housing because they are well situated in secure neighborhoods. These and others are easily developable as private housing.

It is thought that only a few developments offer private redevelopment potential--it is assumed that the majority of Boston's public housing is in such bad condition that they would never leave the public inventory. Recent trends have shown that this is not necessarily the case. Extremely poorly run and dilapidated projects such as Mission Hill Main and Extension, Charlestown, and Columbia Point attract investors who can profit by investing in presently downgraded stock. Even some of the worst developments in Boston are being proposed for private ownership for funding under Section 8, such as East Broadway and Franklin Field. The inefficiencies and problems in public ownership and management of the BHA, moreover, lend support for a private solution.
As many vehicles for developing housing can be manipulated to increase opportunities for investors such as tax shelters, depreciation and syndication, increased risks will be brought to the continual survival of public housing.

Many justifications are made for the move towards privatization. They range from the benefits to be gained when housing is placed back in circulation in the private market to a naivete that ownership and the motives behind privatization do not matter as long as housing is delivered. More often than not, proponents forget to explain the deplorable conditions in the private market which maintains a majority of the poor in substandard conditions. The following excerpts from the BHA consultant's report on refinancing the Commonwealth development presents a commonly held view:

Unfortunately, public housing as it exists in a never, never world outside of the market, pays little or no heed to the rationales which motivate investors or operators/owners. It goes without saying that public purposes and motives need not, and perhaps should not, conform to the private sector. But when the public sector performs so badly in the same field as the private sector perhaps the time has come to look and learn from the private sector.

While public and private motives might not be the same, perhaps the time has come to recognize effective methods of delivering standard housing, regardless of the motive.¹³

But it is hard to ignore "motives" as a factor. The "cost" to the public will not be insignificant in attracting private
interest in providing housing for the poor, furthermore, the results may be questionable. As stated by Chester Hartman:

One of the distinct advantages to greater involvement of the private sector is the opportunity thereby presented to solve the dilemmas of insufficient motivation and inadequate jurisdiction regarding the issues of incentives, it is axiomatic that if these are made sufficiently attractive, the private sector will produce...The obvious question that must be asked about utilizing the private sector to achieve a public welfare goal is at what price?\textsuperscript{14}

It is also argued that part of the problem with existing public housing is that when property is publicly held it cannot benefit from the substantial tax benefits which play an increasingly important role in real estate development today.\textsuperscript{15} Even if tenants were to somehow own their units, they would be unable to take advantage of traditional benefits, since for low income tenants, equity contribution and thus accumulation would be small, tax savings insignificant, and capital appreciation uncertain.\textsuperscript{16} According to this line of reasoning, it only follows that ownership of housing should be so structured so as to benefit investors or limited partners who would gain from tax shelters and through claiming depreciation losses.

This is possible through the sale of equity to limited partners by syndication. Other benefits such as cash flow and capital appreciation, could accrue to the general partner(s). As long as acquisition costs to the developer are low, and

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massive public funds are allotted for the maintenance of low-income and subsidized housing, what was once public housing could then be privately owned and managed. Tax revenues would benefit fiscally distressed city, and the desired social goals of income, and possibly racial mix, could be achieved as long as there are necessary incentives provided to the developer.

The Nature of Public Housing

Despite the gains from private redevelopment, the abandonment of public ownership of housing should be considered beyond questions of cost effectiveness; there are long-term political and social consequences from any private redevelopment attempt which must be carefully evaluated. Certain short-term financial advantages may be gained by redevelopment, such as market rental incomes, syndication proceeds, and possibly lower management costs, but what may be at stake is the long-term commitment to low-income housing and to housing as a public good.

Housing in the United States can be simply characterized as "a commodity for the present and/or future profit of its owners, rather than for use." Private housing is expensive; the cost reflects the accumulated profits from the developer, builders, material producers, landowners, speculators, and financial institutions. Through income and
resale the original construction costs of a building may have been repaid several times, but each property transaction requires refinancing and extrapolation of profits to the previous investor(s), therefore the purchase price to the new buyer is high and rents are high. Speculation will continue to increase housing costs, especially in attractive neighborhoods. Costs to the homebuyers and renters will continue to climb irrespective of the extent of repayment of the initial principal and financing costs.

Programs other than public housing, such as Section 8, rent supplement programs, Section 236, 11(b) and 221(d)(3), continue to rely on landlords and developers to provide housing at inflated costs. The budgets allocated for these programs must be substantially increased along with rising rent levels and financing costs, or benefits will be cut. The public housing program offers the only possibility of avoiding these problems.

The most distinctive feature of public housing which sets it apart from private housing and other subsidy programs, is that it does away with the commodity nature of housing. Land is removed from the market through government action: construction and financing are managed through the public sector (with the exception of turnkey public housing); and the
government guarantees the long-term financing and maintenance of the units as low-income units. While public housing still borrows from the private credit market by selling tax-exempt bonds to financial institutions and individual investors to cover initial development and modernization costs, once the bonds are paid off, there are no more debts.\textsuperscript{19} Expenses will consist only of continuing operating and modernization costs. During this extended period of public ownership, the interest rate will be below the market rate because of the long-term "mortgage". Unlike most private housing, public housing is not repeatedly resold and refinanced with an upward spiral of costs, interest rates and a succession of owners or landlords who continue to thrive and profit from their investments.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, public housing offers the advantages of long term guarantees for low-income housing, government subsidies to cover the major costs, in addition to decreasing costs over time. Housing and housing services will be provided for use, not profit.

It would therefore appear that the critical problems of inadequate funding and management should be addressed within the context of maintaining public housing so as not to jeopardize the inherent advantages of public ownership.
The Section 8 Alternative

With the objective of achieving better results, there are those who argue for other subsidy programs to replace public housing. Section 8 and 11(b), applied to existing public housing, could bring quick financial relief by commanding prevailing rents, rehabilitating the units, and letting the Housing Authority off the hook for some of their most dilapidated units.

Fallacious assumptions are often made when Section 8 is proposed as a solution: first, that the government is willing to go along with the higher costs and inefficiencies of the program (as lower costs weigh in favor of public housing), and second, that the government will continue to fund the level of subsidies needed to maintain or increase rent subsidy programs. There are serious doubts that as the costs for Section 8 increase—as it must increase with the level of market rents, that it will remain economical. There are no guarantees that the initial grant will cover the increased costs 20 years from now: this includes the cost of replacing mechanical systems, increased operating costs, and other major expenses. Once adequate funding is no longer available, the units will revert to non-low-income usage.

The Section 8 program is currently predicted to last only a few more years, and will be increasingly harder to justify
for the Administration or Congress to maintain. The government might continue certain of its initial commitments, but major expansion is unlikely. Boston and the surrounding areas have received increasingly fewer units, and an extraordinary effort in politicking and lobbying with the City and other agencies is required for Section 8 allocations.

In reality, a Section 8 unit is a private rental unit subsidized for the poor. The concerns for social services, job training and other opportunities are non-existent for the tenant. Low-income households may be scattered throughout the city, more isolated than in public housing, and with no means to address common problems. As a strategy to gradually reduce publicly-owned housing and to make short-term gains for landlords and developers, Section 8 is an excellent ploy.

Redevelopment in the form of non-profit ownership and limited partnerships are other ideas proposed for public housing. Again, the problems are with the disposition of public housing stock and the necessity to package a variety of subsidy programs to guarantee any low-income units. These would seem unlikely as solutions for most of public housing, even if the ideas were widely supported, because of the lack of available subsidy programs to fund the low and moderate-income components. Also, the use of rental subsidy programs piggy-backed on existing public housing appears wasteful, as other
communities would be deprived of low-income housing opportunities. Even if public housing units are vacant, the cost of program conversion to Section 8 in the long-run may far exceed the cost of rehabilitating those units as public housing.

Limited partnership has been singled out as a model for certain developments, including Columbia Point. King's Lynne, one of the first experiments in the region, provides an example of this approach.

THE KING'S LYNNE PARTNERSHIP

King's Lynne, a partnership between the tenants organization, the King's Lynne Residents Council (KLRC), and the developer, Cocorhan, Mullins and Jennison (CMJ), has been raved about as a successful model for redeveloping "troubled" public housing projects. Formerly America Park, it was one of the worst housing projects in the country due to its poor design and construction. The transformation of America Park into a mixed-income community was a difficult process: it took special state legislation in order to finance and dispose of the site; a local injunction stopped progress for over a year; and local and state politicians had to rally around the project to see its successful completion. The time between the initial planning for redevelopment in 1972 and the start of construction spanned 5 years.
Tenants and tenant leadership were strong and exemplary; Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD) served as consultants to the tenants; and the Massachusetts Home Finance Agency (MHFA), the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and the Lynne Housing Authority all cooperated in providing extraordinary funding and resources. Unfortunately, it may be precisely the uniqueness of the redevelopment process at King's Lynne which makes it impossible to reproduce elsewhere, especially at a level which can protect the interests of low-income tenants.

Other factors also contribute to the risk of such a venture. Demolition of the 408 original low-income units was to result in 900 new construction units for family, elderly, and adult households divided into low, moderate and market units. But local opposition brought this figure down to 750 units and then 654 units. Budgetary problems finally resulted in 441 units of housing being provided on the 58 acres site, with a total of 166 low-income units. New housing or relocation assistance was committed to more than 369 low-income households during the development process. Many relocated off-site with the use of Section 8 and Chapter 707 funds. Funding for 288 Section 8 units had to be provided for the new development and for relocation. Large units, 6 and 7 bedrooms, were eliminated from the plan because of community opposition. Larger families had to leave, and were
assisted with relocation monies as down payment on private homes. By the start of construction, only 140 of the original 369 low-income households remained to be rehoused in the new development.

In 1972, it was estimated that a new construction unit would cost $31,388. By 1974, the cost for a 5 bedroom townhouse was estimated at $57,000. A 4 bedroom unit plus den was finally constructed in 1978 for $72,000. In addition to the high per unit cost, substantial additional funding was necessary for: relocating more than 200 households and providing them continuing subsidies, subsidies for 300 low and moderate-income units for the new development, interim management, and providing social services during the relocation and rehousing phases.

Funding for the $21 million development was obtained from a $19.1 million permanent loan from MHFA; the $4.6 million debt for America Park was retired by the State; rental subsidies were provided through the Chapter 707 and 705 Programs and Section 8; and the site was transferred to the development entity for a mere cost of $500 thousand.

Although the total cost is not available, it should be noted that actual per unit costs are substantially above the already high mortgage value of the units, and the public
share of costs far exceeds the private share.

To insure tenant/developer joint-decision making, the tenants and CMJ formed the King's Lynne Apartment Corporation (KLAC). The KLAC Board is comprised of 2 representatives from CMJ and 2 representatives from the King's Lynne Residents' Council. KLRC has rights to 10% of syndication proceeds or $200,000, whichever is greater, and 16% of cash flow. KLRC also has rights to first refusal upon sale of the development.

While King's Lynne appears to be a successful attempt at private redevelopment of a public housing site; management appears more efficient, and tenants have a major role in decision-making, the resulting outcome for the low-income population must be carefully look at. This includes the loss of low-income units, difficult lifestyle adjustments in a mixed-income development (which will be discussed in Chapter 7), remaining problems in the quality of services and social services, and no surety of the future if the partners want out, sell the development, or if subsidies decrease or become unavailable. In all, the attractiveness of King's Lynne may be overstated.

Furthermore, cost overruns were excessive, even though widespread support was given by all parties to see the development
completed. Nevertheless, quite a few units were cut from the plan. Not surprisingly, subsidies per unit are one of the highest of any subsidized housing, making it ironic to characterize King's Lynne as a "private" redevelopment solution. In effect, if the same extent of public funds were used for the limited number of low and moderate-income units, private involvement may not have been necessary.

$19.1 million of public dollars for less than 300 units of subsidized housing, in addition to rent subsidies for all those units plus other costs, is hardly an impossible feat to accomplish! The whole development could conceivably have been publicly redeveloped and remained under public ownership to provide quality housing for those in need. Moreover, the tenants, the "stand-in" for the public sector which put up 57 acres, $19.1 million and additional resources for the $21 million project, to only obtain 10% of syndication proceeds and 16% of cash flow, appears highly imbalanced. One begins to question the public losses and the private gains from this experiment. Incredible amounts of public funds were expended to subsidize market-housing and private ownership. The market mix component also meant excessive subsidization at all income levels to make the site attractive to market-rate tenants.
The case of King's Lynne not only poses the question of whether the experiment can be duplicated elsewhere, but if the public sector has any business subsidizing market housing and deeding property rights to the private sector prior to the fulfillment of low and moderate-income housing needs.

**Limited Partnerships**

In further discussing the advantages and disadvantages of private redevelopment, in particular, limited partnership, many factors make this option attractive to private investors. But experience has not shown the positive results of such arrangements; it will be hard to predict what will happen to King's Lynne five to ten years down the road.\(^{25}\)

Initial syndication brings certain advantages to the developer(s) by providing the needed capital to cover construction and development costs. Tax shelters would benefit the investors. But this arrangement no longer becomes profitable for the investors at a certain point in time, usually when the development is well underway. The benefits from depreciation at that time may no longer serve the tax shelter needs of the partners if it declines below a certain level. This is determined by the method of depreciation selected. For example, accelerated depreciation such as the 200% declining balance and the five-year straight-line methods...
make it particularly profitable for the limiteds to only invest up to the point when depreciation deductions reach a level corresponding to the straight-line method, or when diminishing returns are such that investments elsewhere would bring greater benefits. Accelerated depreciation methods bring the greatest return to investors during the first 5 years, what happens afterwards is hard to tell, as there are few examples of syndicated mixed-income developments which have been in existence for very long.

Important factors in postponing the point at which investors pull out are arrangements to stagger or delay payments by the investors over a period of years. The avoidance of front-end loaded payments and rapid initial depreciation will help maximize, at least for a while, the time before investors withdraw. But at a certain point, capital appreciation and increased cash flow from a successful development will also present a liability to the investors, as they are not in the business for additional income. This is profitable only to the general partner(s) who may have a long-term interest in the valuation of their property and in holding on to their assets.

Other problems presented by a partnership include the possibilities of the development getting sold because the investors or the developer(s) want out. Even with certain
safeguards such as setting conditions for resale, program commitments, secondary mortgage guarantees, and the right to first refusal by the tenants or non-profit entity (such as in King's Lynne), the security and maintenance of subsidized housing may still be jeopardized. Problems of insufficient investment and declining economic viability may develop. If viability is not possible without programmatic changes, such as shifting the income mix towards market-rate housing, even the tenant co-partners have fiduciary responsibilities to their partner(s) to agree to sale or change package mix to insure financial solvency.

The precedents so far of high rates of foreclosure of 221(d)(3)s and Section 236s and MHFA programs, resulting in recapture by HUD or the state, have not shown syndication to be such an attractive alternative. Therefore while syndication and new forms of tenant/private partnerships are becoming popular, the long-term consequences for low-income residents are not optimistic.

CONCLUSION

We have seen new programs initiated apart from public housing which increasingly rely on the private sector in providing housing, but now we see the active supplanting of existing public housing. Both the redevelopment of Pruitt-Igoe and King's Lynne reveal a clear reversion to traditional market
mechanisms such as urban renewal, private ownership, and the importance of equity and tax shelters, in place of upgrading and preserving public housing. The consequences are such that one would question the existence of any long-term commitment to housing the poor.

The results of the private redevelopment efforts, whether initiated by the local governments, the PHAs, tenants, developers, or housing specialists, contain these basic elements: (1) the removal of substantial number of units through demolition, and/or disposition, from the public inventory; (2) a significant reduction in the number of available units for low-income occupancy; (3) provide the private entities an inexpensive and available source of land or housing stock for negligible costs; and (4) changes in land-use and/or resident composition in terms of income, and race and often family size. In other words, past and present redevelopment efforts are premised on basic changes vis-a-vis who will be served by redevelopment. Many beneficiaries fall into place the city, developers, investors, middle and upper-income groups. If commitments to the poor exist, there are no examples of public housing redevelopment attempts which have served the low-income population by making available an equivalent number of low-income units prior to providing housing for upper-income groups.
The long-term stability of subsidized units will weaken when a development enters the private housing market. Fluctuation and change in urban real estate, including the recycling of properties and the invariable goal of attracting market-rate tenants, will be a constant pressure which may jeopardize the low-income component regardless of the safeguards.

The process of privatization also precludes the eventual status of debt-free existence after expiration of the ACC, and to other means for long-term, low-cost financing, direct grants, operating subsidies, and other resources through the public sector.

The results of private redevelopment have come to reflect those who do not believe in housing the poor rather than those who claim the inadequacies of funding and wish to maintain low-income housing. If private redevelopment were to have meant an increase in commitments to the low-income population by expanding the number of low-income units under private ownership, in addition to providing better designed and constructed units, it is speculated that private redevelopment would not be eagerly undertaken.

There is no magic to the "redevelopment" of public housing. Just as we are familiar with urban renewal, gentrification, neighborhood recycling and revitalization which have
historically displaced poor and minority households, we are seeing the same trend in a domain originally immune to market forces by virtue of public ownership. But land and housing are commodities as are any resources under capitalism, and public housing, if permitted, will once again enter the market to be sold and resold for profit.

Private redevelopment can result in a Pruitt-Igoe or a King's Lynne. The lessons and dangers cannot be ignored in seeking a solution for Columbia Point.
CHAPTER 4: THE COLUMBIA POINT HOUSING PROJECT

"With the commitment to build the JFK Library and the Massachusetts Archives next near the U Mass Boston campus, many consider the Columbia Point housing project the only sore spot left on what is turning into a billion dollar peninsula."

--Boston Sunday Globe, June 13, 1976
CHAPTER 4
THE COLUMBIA POINT HOUSING PROJECT

INTRODUCTION

Located 3 miles southeast of downtown Boston on a peninsula overlooking the Dorchester Bay and the spectacular downtown skyline of Boston lies Columbia Point, the largest public housing development in New England. Considered as part of the Dorchester neighborhood, the project is comprised of 1,504 units of family and elderly housing on 37.5 acres of land contiguous to the waterfront.

Construction of the project began in 1951 and was completed in 1954 at a cost of $20.2 million. The project, when first built, was intended to be an innovative physical and social experiment. Today, one can speculate about the many problems that brought about its downfall, but it should be on record that Columbia Point was fully tenanted when it opened 25 years ago, provided housing for a population of 6,000, and operated successfully in this manner for more than 15 years.

During a period when the tenant population became poorer and increased numbers of minority households moved in, changes came about in BHA's management and maintenance practices. Services were cut rather than increased, and 15 years of adequate and timely upkeep were followed by 10 years of progressively poorer management and maintenance. Problems of
unemployment, crime, vandalism and drugs were out of control, and the tenant population was faced with minimal housing services, social amenities, and city services. This was all to happen during a period when the rest of the peninsula began to prosper with the location of major institutions and increased interest from the local government and the private sector.

This chapter will give a short description of the neighborhood institutions in the area; a description of the housing site; and a discussion of the tenant population at Columbia Point.

**AREA DESCRIPTION**

Columbia Point presently shares the 351 acre peninsula with the University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus, (hereafter known as U Mass), the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, the First National Bank, the Boston College High School, the Bayside Mall, the Dever Elementary School, the McCormack Middle School, the St. Christopher's Catholic Church and other institutions and facilities including a sewer pumping station. Further down Morrissey Boulevard are the headquarters of the Boston Globe and other commercial enterprises. Close to 5,000 jobs are located within walking distance of the housing project. As we will see, the neighboring institutions and businesses will play an active role in planning for the future of the Columbia Point project, the only residential site on the peninsula.
Figure 1: The Columbia Point Peninsula
Figure 2: U Mass and the Columbia Point Housing Project
Figure 3: Location of Columbia Point
Figure 4: Existing Structures at Columbia Point
Figure 5: Existing Ownership
Figure 6: Existing Land Use
The Bayside Mall

The Bayside Mall is perhaps best known for its notoriety as a failure in marketing, management, and design of a commercial shopping center. The Bayside Mall opened in 1966 next to the housing project and east of Carson Beach. It was a large shopping center with 280,000 square feet of rental space, and 33 stores containing a mix of discount stores for food, home-furnishings, toys and clothing. It was the largest shopping area outside downtown Boston and provided for the residents of Columbia Point, Dorchester and South Boston.

The Mall was reasonably successful in the first few years, but because of management, marketing and security problems, by 1970, the shopping center began to lose its tenants. Major chains began closing their operations, so that by 1975, only a drive-in bank remained of the original tenants. The John Hancock Life Insurance Company acquired ownership of the property after the original owners defaulted on their mortgage.

Today, only one of the buildings is occupied, the Boston Teachers Union leases 33,000 square feet for an office and meeting hall. The large parking area of the Mall is used as a bus transfer point where police escorts are deployed to protect school buses going into South Boston and Roxbury.
When the construction of the U Mass Harbor Campus on the other side of the housing project began in 1970, it was hoped that the University could save the Mall with an increased market and by changing the image of the peninsula. But nine months before the planned opening of the University in 1973, the last store vacated the Mall.

A University of Massachusetts study evaluating the closing of the Mall stated that "vandalism, shoplifting and shrinkage within the stores has not been reported as abnormally high for urban centers, but harrassment and purse snatching by young people in the parking lots plus the proximity to the housing project has created a psychological barrier for the people in the neighboring communities."\(^1\) The closing of the Mall contributed to the notion that the housing project was the cause of its failure, and strengthened a growing belief at that time that the project had to be torn down or sold.

The University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus

The decision in November of 1968 to locate the University at Columbia Point was the result of primarily negative factors: the location would be in an area with no loss to the City's tax base, there would be no significant landtaking and no strong opposition from the immediate neighborhood.\(^2\) One of the final sites under consideration was to locate in Copley Square, but as the Boston Phoenix reported, it "was killed largely by the BRA, which didn't want to lose tax-producing
property, and the John Hancock Insurance Company, which wanted to build its office building there."³ In addition, Hancock had a positive incentive for U Mass to locate on the peninsula as the Company now owned the Bayside Mall.⁴

Located on 103 acres at the southeastern end of the Columbia Point peninsula, the present structures cover 60 acres, including College I and II, the Library, Science Center, Administration Building and Service Building and a recently completed gymnasium. The campus represents an investment of $149 million, the single largest appropriation from the State budget, and consists of 1.6 million square feet of building area and 1,623 parking spaces. The partially completed campus opened its doors to students in the Spring of 1974. The 1979 enrollment of 8,200 students served by 700 faculty and staff members⁵ is not expected to grow significantly above 10,000 students.

The Master Plan of the campus reflects the isolationist and "fortress" like design of the buildings to protect it from the "hostile" environment: including the noise from Logan Airport, exposure to the open sea and prevailing wind, poor sub-surface conditions, and its neighbor, the public housing project.⁶

Presently, there exists poor access between the University and the housing project. Separate vehicular access to U Mass from Morrissey Boulevard is provided, and the University
Figure 7: University of Massachusetts Harbor Campus

Figure 8: Bayside Mall
maintains its own shuttle bus between the MBTA Redline and the campus. There exists only one public bus connection between the University and the housing project. No pedestrian links exist and one encounters barbed wire and chain link fence when cutting across from the housing project to the University. U Mass, having prided itself as an urban-related, higher education institution with the purpose of educating the poor and working-class students, found itself moved from downtown Boston to an isolated site on the peninsula next to a community it wanted to have nothing to do with.

The John F. Kennedy Library
The location of the Library was narrowed down to two choices, the Charlestown Naval Yard in South Boston and Columbia Point. After much lobbying from Dorchester, a heavily Irish community, the Library Trustees made a final decision to locate the library at the tip of the peninsula. The $12 million Library was completed and opened in October of 1979. A staff of 45 hosts approximately one million visitors annually. The design of this building also shows an attempt to close off any view towards the housing project by focussing on the open waters.

Morrissey Boulevard Business Facilities
In 1964 the First National Bank located its computer facility on Columbia Point between Mount Vernon Street and Morrissey Boulevard. Employment having grown steadily since 1970, the Bank currently employs 1,700 on a full-time basis.
The Boston Globe's main office and printing facilities are located on the extreme southern edge of Columbia Point. Built in 1963, it is currently the largest employer in the area, employing some 3,700 people. Several other small manufacturing facilities and a broadcast station are located in the area.

**Boston College High, the Dever & McCormack Schools and St. Christopher's Catholic Church**

Boston College High School is situated on a 40 acre campus on Morrissey Boulevard, opposite the housing project. The school has a daily attendance of 1,700 students. The Dever and McCormack schools, an elementary and middle school respectively, are also located directly across from the housing development. Both minority and white students are bussed to the schools. Some Columbia Point residents attend these schools, but the majority are bussed out. Adjacent to the schools is St. Christopher's Catholic Church which is the community church. It frequently lends its space for use to the tenants.

**City Park**

A city park is located on 8 acres of a 13.5 acre city-owned site directly north of the housing project along the shoreline. The park contains ball fields, tennis and basketball courts and a tot-lot area.
Pumphouse Area
A City of Boston sewer pumping station is located at the end of Mount Vernon Street. Most of this facility is vacant and available for re-use with approximately 20,000 square feet of floor area in an 85 foot high space. The City and University owned land totaling 17.4 acres adjoining the pumphouse and waterfront is undeveloped. Redevelopment proposals have recommended the re-use of the pumphouse as a University/Community Center and area around the pumphouse for new housing.

Transportation Conditions
Columbia Point is 15 minutes from downtown Boston, potentially making it one of the most accessible and attractive sites in the city. The site is served by both highways and mass transit systems. Two regional highways bound Columbia Point on the west. Morrissey Boulevard and the Southeast Expressway interface at the Kosciuszko Circle. The public transportation system includes the MBTA Redline connection at Columbia Station on the Ashmont Line located across Kosciuszako Circle and two bus connections. The recent appropriation of $8.5 million for construction of a new station on the Quincy Line will further enhance the peninsula's accessibility by increasing inter-area transportation.

The transportation linkages have all focused on accessing the growing numbers of institutions on the peninsula. The Kennedy Library, as well as U Mass, are reached by a separate road from Morrissey Boulevard, whereas the housing project is reached
through Mount Vernon Street, to a dead end at the pumphouse. Transportation services for the residents of the housing project are presently inadequate, and pedestrian access between the project and the University and Library is nonexistent.

SITE DESCRIPTION

The development consists of a total of 30 buildings: 15 seven-story mid-rise buildings serviced by elevators; 12 three-story low-rise walkups; and 3 one-story structures. The buildings are aligned on three parallel streets running the length of the development. The low-rise buildings are primarily located along Mt. Vernon Street and the western part of the site and the mid-rise buildings form a dense core in the center of the development and continue out towards the eastern edge of the site. Intended for family living, the majority of the low-rise buildings and centrally located mid-rises contain 3-5 bedroom units. Of the total stock, more than half are three or more bedrooms, with another 39% containing two bedroom units. The majority of housing suitable for elderly units (1 and 2 bedroom units) are on the eastern part of the site in 4 mid-rises. The low-rises constitute 34% or 384 units, and the mid-rises, 66% or 1,120 units. (See Table 6). Four different types of low-rises and mid-rises exist. But they all contain the basic elements of four wings arranged around a stair or elevator core, with entrances to 4 units per floor. Any variations are in the length of the wings, number of stories, and unit sizes.
**Table 6: Unit Size Distribution at Columbia Point**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Size</th>
<th>Low-Rise</th>
<th>Mid-Rises</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 br.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 br.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 br.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 br.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 br.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Columbia Point, view from Mt. Vernon Street

Figure 10: Columbia Point, typical low-rise building
Figure 11: View From Dorchester Bay
Figure 12: Columbia Point Building Number Plan
The buildings are better designed and of higher quality when compared with other family developments around the city. The arrangement of no more than 4 units per floor around a circulation core provides more privacy than developments with contiguous units sharing common walls on both sides, and double-loaded corridors. All of the units have cross ventilation, with the majority having exterior orientation in three different directions. The buildings are of first class construction of reinforced concrete frame with masonry walls and brick exteriors and contain full basements with the first floors raised 4 feet above the ground level. As with most public housing units built for families during the 1950's and 1960's, the units are undersized and are approximately one-half the square footage of MHFA's current design guidelines. Tenants complained that bedrooms and kitchens are too small, common space does not increase appreciably with unit size, 4 and 5 bedroom units contained only one bathroom and closets are inadequate and do not have doors. Nonetheless the buildings have non-load bearing interior walls, easily lending themselves for renovation within the existing framework.

Density was a problem in certain parts of the site, especially in areas which contained a large number of children, but problems were contingent on the level of parental supervision and tenant assignment policies at a given time. When fully occupied, the tenants lived with a density of 38.7 units per acre, which is in the low to mid-range of density of the
developments in Boston. Other developments, such as Mary Ellen McCormick and Old Colony, which are large and generally regarded as "successful" BHA developments, have comparable or higher densities.\textsuperscript{9} The area of major deficiency is the location of the buildings in the center of the site. Two mid-rise buildings are completely surrounded on all sides, making it the most unappealing section of the site. Lack of open space and play areas for children of all ages created additional problems.

Most of the present problems with the buildings are non-structural. The majority of the problems stem from the lack of maintenance and repairs: broken exterior doors, damage to the interior walls and ceilings, broken windows and fixtures, elevators that are in need of repair, hallways filled with debris, broken mailboxes, and other superficial problems. Extensive work was completed in 1978 to upgrade and overhaul the heating, electrical, and plumbing distribution systems at a cost of \$4.5 million.

The following complete the site: a one story administration building containing offices, an assembly hall and a day care center are located on Mount Vernon Street. A renovated steam heat generator plan and a City of Boston Parks Department recreational building are located on the eastern edge of the site.
Approximately 80 residential units are occupied by social service agencies employing some 125 people. They include, a Health Center, Community Security Program, the Columbia Point APAC, A Senior Center, and an Alcoholic Program.

POPULATION

In the early years, Columbia Point housed many Second World War and Korean War veterans and their families. These families included two parent households comprised of young couples with one or two pre-school age children occupying the smaller units, and large families occupying the 4 and 5 bedroom units. Many of the families were Irish, had one person employed, and came from the Roxbury area or from throughout the city. Surprisingly, few came from South Boston. Italian, minority and other households made up the rest of the development. As early as 1959, Columbia Point housed 241 minority families, most of these were small families, as 99% of the 4 and 5 bedroom units were occupied by large white families.

The veteran households had a high turnover rate as they would move out to the suburbs or other areas as soon as they were economically able to. But many households also remained and contributed to what was considered a self-contained community they were content to live in. Many chose Columbia Point because of its location, it was separate and removed from problems in the rest of the City and was therefore a good place to raise children. The isolation of the site even reinforced a sense of community.
When periodic fights would erupt between the white youths at Columbia Point and the youth at Old Colony and South Boston, and later, when many of the white and minority children were bussed to South Boston for school, the population at Columbia Point absorbed the problems and still maintained a sense of community.  

During the first 10 years from 1954 until 1964, Columbia Point had close to full occupancy of the 1500 units (see Table 7). Characteristic of most of Boston's public housing at the time, it remained predominantly white. By 1965, the minority population had increased from 13% to 44%, but the vacancy rate remained small with 123 vacant units. Management, repairs and services were still being maintained and tenants lived in a functioning and viable community. Ground maintenance was reputed to be "excellent" as a sweeper and groundkeepers would go through the site daily. Repair and upkeep of the units were not as satisfactory, but materials and hardware were obtainable from management.

This was all to change. By the late 1960's, the project experienced tremendous problems in security, crime, vandalism, juvenile delinquency, and drugs. In 1966, the Health Center opened and other social service agencies began to locate at Columbia Point. It was during this period, with the agencies' cooperation, that BHA started to assign "problem" tenants and families to Columbia Point because of the availability of services.
According to BHA, family profiles at Columbia Point in comparison to other projects suggested a higher concentration of families with problems. From this time on, the quality of management and housing services deteriorated and large numbers of vacancies symbolized the decline of the community.

In 1969, after the decision to locate U Mass at Columbia Point, the vacancy rate rose to 23.4% or 339 vacant units. When the University was under construction and the communities of Dorchester and South Boston were demanding a response from the University on its impact on the community, the project experienced its worst decline. In a two year period 670 units were vacated: In 1971, living conditions got so bad that 324 families (21.5% of all households) moved and in 1972, another 347 families (23.1% of all households) moved.16

By early 1974, when U Mass first opened its doors and the Mayor announced the first revitalization plan for Columbia Point, the vacancy rate rose to 29% or 425 units. The 1,021 occupied units now housed approximately 5,000 residents. The population was 23% white, 64% Black and 13% other households. 66% of the population was under the age of 20, and 9% over age 65. The median income was $4,150, 77% of the households were on public assistance, and 62% received AFDC.17

The location of the University on the peninsula had brought about renewed interest in developing the rest of the peninsula.
Table 7: Change in Occupancy - Columbia Point (1954-1979)

Key:  
* Total units occupied  
+ Elderly units occupied  
••• Units occupied by social agencies
A series of major plans were proposed; Columbia Point became the proving ground for all sorts of approaches to solving the social and physical problems of the housing project. Developers, government officials, planners, social workers, architects, and do-gooders were armed with proposals they tried to sell the tenants. The actual effect of all this interest fed the rumors that the project was to be demolished, sold, given to U Mass for use as offices, classrooms and/or dorms or converted to market rental housing. In all cases, many tenants felt that their days in Columbia Point were numbered and left "while the going was good."18

The tenants who remained firmly rejected all of the plans they were offered. It was during this period that the accusation was first made that conditions in Columbia Point were the result of a deliberate plot to rid this highly desirable tract of land of its undesirable public housing tenants. Up until now, only $350 thousand had been spent on Columbia Point through modernization, while $5 million in additional work was needed for major improvements to the elevators, incinerators, water proofing, roofing, painting, security, paving and the electrical distribution system.

The desirability of the development as a place to live was sharply reduced by an increasingly high crime rate, accelerating physical deterioration, and the increasing vacancies. Crime at Columbia Point had risen as in the rest of the city, and reached
a peak in 1971 when 522 serious and 234 minor crimes were reported. Tenants no longer wanted to live in a place perceived as unsafe and deteriorated. Columbia Point had become a center of drug dealing, not necessarily from the residents, but from outsiders who specifically came to Columbia Point to do business. The residents themselves felt abandoned by the police who appeared to have given up any attempt at deterring these activities at the development. Even though the crime rate had decreased substantially by 1973, elderly and small families continued to vacate the one and two bedroom units. These were especially hard to re-tenant at the time. Larger families were reluctant to move, as few other options were available elsewhere.

In 1975, through the use of Modernization and other funds, and after considerably opposition from the tenants, the BHA consolidated residents in better maintained structures to achieve 100% occupancy in these buildings. This resulted in full occupancy in 16 of the 27 buildings, while 11 seven-story buildings were boarded and welded shut. The vacancy rate was now 44.8% or 618 vacancies. Eventually, 772 units in mothballed buildings were taken off the rent roll.

By 1976, the minority population increased to 86% and the overall tenant population declined to 2,100 as tenants continued to move out. The average family size exceeded 4.0 persons and the median age was 14. The lack of repairs and deferred maintenance problems had resulted in fostering a high population
turnover. This made it extremely difficult for those with any long-term interests to live in the development. Up until this time, 55% of the 555 remaining households have resided in Columbia Point for 5 years or more.\textsuperscript{21}

The mothballing of the mid-rise buildings was intended to improve security by reducing the areas in which the criminal element flourished. But instead, the mothballed and empty buildings seem to have foreshadowed the continuing physical as well as social decline of the development.

When the City proposed The Boston Plan in August of 1977, there were only 470 occupied units with 390 family and 80 elderly households. The median income was $4,107 compared with $9,133 for the rest of the city. 95% of families lived below the poverty line and 36% of the youth and 20% of the adults were unemployed.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1979, only 347 households, 280 family and 67 elderly households, remain in the development.\textsuperscript{23} The families occupy 12 of the buildings mostly located at the western part of the site. Other families are housed in partially occupied buildings scattered throughout the site. The elderly live in 3 mid-rise buildings on the eastern part of the site. These units, along with 96 of the family units, had been modernized in 1978.
Columbia Point became one of the most expensive developments to maintain, operating deficits were among the highest in comparison with other BHA federally assisted developments. It had over an $800,000 operating deficit in 1975; but as shown by the high number of vacancies and continued population loss, there was a dramatic decrease of necessary revenues from rental income. Furthermore, the high cost of maintenance, and problems with vandalism and security, could be attributed in part to BHA's tenant assignment policy, of placing families with problems at Columbia Point, and in part to inefficient management and maintenance, calling for a significant amount of deferred maintenance and repairs to be made under emergency conditions.

CONCLUSION

Larger families, decreasing incomes, problem families and other changes in the tenant population made it more difficult to maintain the initial positive environment in the development through the years. The community, lacking social cohesion, was no longer able to control what went on within the development. As soon as a community is perceived as transient, with no strong collective feeling among its people, illicit activities begin to take hold. Female heads of households are absorbed in taking care of younger children, young men are left to roam the site, no viable economic opportunities exist and the community experiences a condition which is hard to turn around. But these factors cannot be isolated from the changes in BHA's management and tenant assignment policies during this period.
The BHA was unable to keep up with daily maintenance and embarked on a process of cutting services and maintenance functions as planning for the peninsula's redevelopment progressed. BHA did not re-tenant units after families relocated, moved or transferred out of the development, and thus encouraged a steady decline in the number of Columbia Point residents. These conditions, as we shall see, precipitated the call for drastic solutions in redevelopment.
"The project is a stepchild who has suddenly become Cinderella. Everyone wants to surround her with luxury. But if the money for this proposal doesn't come through, the stepchild is back on the doorstep, and all the concern for her welfare is gone."

--Edward Sorrell, Director of the Columbia Point APAC, 1974
CHAPTER 5
BACKGROUND HISTORY AND PLANNING INITIATIVES

INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the background history of Columbia Point and documents four periods of active planning for redevelopment by (1) The University of Massachusetts and the City of Boston, (2) The Boston Housing Authority, (3) the Peninsula Planning Committee, and (4) the Columbia Point Community Task Force. Each period is characterized by its own set of actors, events and redevelopment proposals. An attempt will be made to focus specifically on the evolution of the redevelopment plans for the public housing site and the events which impact on the population at Columbia Point. This chapter will identify the significant issues which emerge around the planning process, the control and use of the housing site, and who is to gain from redevelopment.

HISTORY AND EARLY PLANS
The history of Columbia Point is fascinating. In 1630, the Puritan settlers landed on a place called "Mattapannock" (Columbia Point) by the Indians, and went on to build the first Dorchester settlement near the junction of Pleasant and Cottage Streets. Columbia Point was used solely as a calf pasture for the town of Dorchester.
in 1883, at the tip of the calf pasture a pumphouse was constructed to pump sewage through a tunnel under Dorchester Bay to discharge it at Quincy Bay in the outgoing tide. The existing pumphouse (see Figure 13) was built in 1905 as the world's largest--with a fly wheel spanning 50 feet in diameter and weighing 72.5 tons.

From 1915 until the 1930's the site south of the pumping station was used by the Boston Consolidated Gas Company to manufacture gas from coke (see Figure 13). The site was next used for dumping refuse from the City of Boston. In 1942, the site where the Bayside Mall is now located was filled and a prisoner of war camp was constructed for Italian prisoners. After the Second World War the temporary shacks were used to house returning veterans.

Only three miles from downtown Boston, the Columbia Point peninsula was bypassed in the city's urban development plan. Originally marsh land, the area is primarily land fill and as recently as 1950 contained only a sewage pumping station, a city dump, an abandoned prisoner of war camp, and two industrial buildings.

In the 1950s and 1960s major construction took place on the site, even though it was still used as a dump until 1962. From 1949 to 1953, the Boston College High School was built.
Figure 13: Aerial photo of Columbia Point, c.1919
Construction of the housing project began in 1951, with the addition of 10 acres of fill in the surrounding tidal flats and salt water marshes. In addition, the City planned for the additional construction of 800 units of veterans housing and for 2 elementary schools, 1 junior high school, a church and shopping facilities. The 800 units of veterans housing were never built, but one elementary school, the Dever School, was built in 1957. St. Christopher's Catholic Church was built in 1957, and the McCormick Middle School, in 1965. Shopping facilities were non-existent until the construction of the Bayside Mall in 1966.

With the opening of the Southeast Expressway in 1959, and the closing of the Old Colony Railroad, commercial developments started to expand adjacent to Morrissey Boulevard. These included: the WHDH Radio Station (1960), the Dickie-Raymond Company (1962), the First National Bank Computer Center (1964), and the Boston Globe (1963). Development boomed along the transportation arteries leaving the land further down the peninsula beyond the housing project untouched (see Figure 14). The housing project was now a thriving community of close to 1,500 households. Bus connections served the needs of the residents, taking them into South Boston and to the markets on Broadway.
Figure 14: Columbia Point early development, c.1965
From the beginning, the lack of concern for the project was apparent. The project was known for its stench as refuse was dumped and burned. Leaking sewage was also prevalent. It was not until 1962, 5 years after the opening of the housing project and after numerous demonstrations by tenants, that the State Legislature passed an act directing the City to prohibit all dumping of trash and refuse at Columbia Point.

In 1962, Edward Logue, became Director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), and in 1964 proposed to designate the Columbia Point peninsula as an urban renewal area. The Department of Housing and Urban Development turned down the request as Columbia Point was not a slum, not blighted, and not a developed area in need of renewal. This effort was the first by the City to identify the site as a candidate for renewal and to consider a comprehensive development plan for the peninsula.

From the 1960's on, plans were introduced regularly for the peninsula and the housing project; Columbia Point became the focus of everyone's vision of creating their "utopia" in an undeveloped part of the City. Many of the plans did not amount to much. In 1962, Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), the local anti-poverty agency, came to the housing project and suggested that the development could be improved by hanging balconies on the buildings and renting
the units to middle-income tenants.\(^6\) In 1966, a short-lived proposal was developed by the BRA to use the site for a World's Fair! This plan included linking by bridge, the peninsula and Thompson Island and re-using the infrastructure built for the fair in creating a new "town-in-town\(^7\). In 1968, a privately sponsored development plan was proposed that also didn't make any headway.\(^8\) Also in 1968, Columbia Point tenants were approached by the BHA to become a demonstration project in tenant management to be funded by the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The BHA Board was in favor of selecting Columbia Point for this experiment, but the tenants were skeptical of the BHA's motives. The demonstration was to finally take place at the Bromley-Heath housing project.

Even though none of these plans came to fruition, they demonstrated increasing interest in developing the peninsula. As most of the land was in public ownership, the subsequent location of the U Mass Harbor Campus, the Kennedy Library, and the designation of the State Archives on the peninsula became part of the City's strategy to improve the area for eventual private investments. It was hoped that initial public actions could be followed by private actions.
The University and the Community

When the decision to locate the University in Columbia Point was announced in 1968, the seriousness of the impact of the University in creating housing and transportation problems led to the formation of coalitions and active organizing of both students at U Mass and neighborhood residents in Dorchester and Columbia Point to work for their active involvement in the University's plan. A newsletter issued by the U Mass Boston-Dorchester Alliance, a group of students and community people, states their concern:

The site is filled land, facing Dorchester Bay; but the campus abuts the largest of the working-class neighborhoods of old three-deckers that lie beneath Boston's veneer of education, culture, and style. Most Dorchester people did not want U Mass at Columbia Point. Indeed most students, faculty, even administration preferred an in-town location. Even so, the school is being set in Dorchester like some expensive chess piece, and it is now clearly the responsibility of the University--students, faculty and administration--to see that it serves and responds to that community. Right now there is every indication that the entry of U Mass will be nothing short of a disaster to most of the people of Dorchester.9

The primary opposition came from the Dorchester community who were concerned about the impact of 6,000 students, when the University opened, and the 20,000 projected students converging on their neighborhood. The impact of the
University on the residential housing pattern was seen as a major problem. Students would hold legal residence within 30-40 miles of Boston, but would be unwilling to commute long distances or live with their parents and would seek housing close to campus. Residents were fearful of students turning to the relatively inexpensive housing stock in Dorchester and other housing within walking distance of the school. The residents cited these examples: the results of neighborhood change in Allston-Brighton, the Back Bay, the Fenway, Cambridge, Somerville, and Waltham had brought about large settlements of students in secure neighborhoods containing a supply of low-priced housing. This had led to serious problems for residents in those areas. The charge was made that "for every unit of housing that students occupy in Dorchester, one unit of housing would be subtracted from the already critically low supply available to Dorchester residents." Rents would rise and landlords would exploit both students and desperate community residents. The poorest tenants would be driven out to make room for the more lucrative students. Transportation would be another problem created by the commuter campus as thousands of staff, faculty and students would arrive from throughout the city and suburbs.

In November of 1971, two neighborhood organizations, the People First (TPF), and Dorchester Tenants Action Council (DTAC), approached U Mass with questions about the University's impact on the neighborhood. They were informed that the
University would be glad to work with a more representative group from the area. The Community residents organized themselves into the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force to again approach the University about what it intended to do to protect the community from adverse impacts related to the construction of the new campus. The Task Force included more than 26 community organizations in addition to individual residents from Columbia Point and Dorchester.

The University was not caught unprepared. Robert Wood had become President of U Mass in 1970. With an extensive background in urban development and planning, recently as an Undersecretary at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and previously as a Professor at M.I.T., affiliated with the M.I.T. and Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, he had an interest in solving the problems created by the location of the University and wanted to develop an overall plan that could fit the needs and future of the University. He was well known for his ability as a strong "mover" who had great determination in accomplishing his goals.

By December 1971, a month after the community first approached the University, a committee appointed by President Wood issues its "Report on the Future of University of Massachusetts" or "The Alden Report", outlining the new
direction of U Mass as an urban educational center, and acknowledging that it had a special obligation to "help develop plans and marshal resources for increasing the housing supply in Dorchester" in order to avoid disrupting the community, and "at the very least, to see that it has no deleterious effects on the surrounding areas."\textsuperscript{14}

In response to the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force's concerns, particularly around housing, Robert Wood sought funds for the hiring of a consultant to be selected by the Task Force. More than $30,000 for the study was raised by the University from local corporations and businesses.\textsuperscript{15} The subsequent hiring of Justin Grey Associates (JGA) by the Task Force in 1972, became the start of an ugly battle between the University and the community. Even though the Task Force was to direct the consultants, the University paid the consultants and expected the result of any study to be in accordance with the University's plans and for JGA to focus specifically on the housing impacts.

In taking on their task, the consultants redefined their assignment from the University and saw themselves as solely responsible to the Task Force and the community.\textsuperscript{16} Not only were housing issues addressed, but also transportation, physical planning, admissions policies, campus employment, contracting and purchasing and other benefits, such as community access
to University facilities. All of these items were contained in the "Scope of Services" pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement between the Task Force and U Mass on the funding and management arrangements for the study. In the end, the community controlled the conduct of the study.

Prior to the formulation of the Task Force's housing recommendations, a preliminary assessment by the consultants showed an estimated one-third of the student body would seek housing nearer or more accessible to the campus, and predicted that about 40% of those students would be willing to live in on-site housing. It was found that University staff would have no impact on the area's housing, although there would be some influx from the faculty. Therefore, thwarting pressures from the University and others who were calling for a "housing market analysis" to be made, the consultants embarked on a "survey of student housing needs" by interviewing more than 400 U Mass students at random to ascertain in greater detail the potential impact of large numbers of students on the community. Questions were asked in relation to the students' present housing status, housing costs, mode of transportation, housing requirements and anticipated changes in residency, e.g., whether the students intended to live at home or move to Boston, Dorchester, or close to campus.
The survey increased the level of friction between U Mass and the Task Force; the University feared that the results of a student housing needs survey would only exacerbate the fears of neighborhood residents of an encroaching student population and confirm the severity of the housing problem. The Task Force felt that the results of a housing market analysis desired by the University could be damaging to the community as a trend towards housing deterioration could call forth improvements which could lead to "displacement of large numbers of residents through University-related influx". The Task Force and the consultants continued their work with little contact with U Mass or the President's Office. Monthly reports were sent from JGA to the U Mass Boston Monitoring Committee, a committee established to oversee the study.

The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report

Twelve months in the making, the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force's "Report on the Impact of U Mass in Dorchester" was released in January 1973. The most significant findings predicted a "major housing impact" with up to 35% of the students expected to move closer to campus. The 1980 enrollment of 15,000 students would mean 4,625 students looking for housing in an already impacted area, and more than 40% of the affected students would be willing to live in student apartments on campus. The Task Force Report recommended that student housing be built on part of the University's site and not in the community; that the University curb its
enrollment from 15,000 to 10,000 students; and supported the Alden Report in that the University itself should not expand, but remain small as the center of a university system which is dispersed throughout the Boston area. (The actual enrollment at U Mass Harbor Campus is 8,000 for 1979, and is not expected to rise above 10,000).

The Task Force, in cooperation with the Columbia Point Development Council and Coordinating Committee, also recommended that the University raise funds for an organizational effort to mobilize Columbia Point tenants to make decisions on what physical and social changes would take place in the housing project; the University should set up permanent community-wide vehicles for communication and offer technical assistance in proposal writing; and the University should:

...Assist the tenants of Columbia Point and the BHA in raising about five million dollars for upgrading the physical condition at Columbia Point, not just with a minimum of physical necessities, but including the amenities which would make it an appealing and attractive place to live.22

The Task Force rejected the notion of U Mass taking over the Columbia Point housing project for student housing, but left open the possibility of tenant approved married student occupation of the project.
Other recommendations were that the University should negotiate with the Task Force for a specified number and types of jobs to be filled by Dorchester residents; that U Mass should open a slot on its Board of Trustees for a Dorchester resident; that transportation in the form of shuttle buses or a "people mover" be installed; and that the use of private cars be discouraged.

The President's Office did not respond particularly well to the Task Force Report and felt "double-crossed" by the consultants who were viewed as helping to spread discontent among the community. Apparently President Wood had wanted a document to serve the University by laying the basis for a broad, private development proposal for the peninsula, to pacify rather than to provoke the community, and reassure uneasy City and State officials who were concerned with the community protest.  

The publication of the Task Force Report was seen by community residents as a confirmation of the severity of the University's total impact on the community. Mrs. Jean Matthews, Chairman of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force viewed the Report's conclusions as a vindication of the Dorchester Tenant Action Council's position: "The report says the same thing we said a year ago, namely that U Mass had to build housing. People didn't believe us when
we said that because they thought of us as a radical organi-

cation. But (a) $35,000 (report) is making people believe."24
Response also came from other parts of the community. The
U Mass Boston-Dorchester Alliance spearheaded a drive to
demonstrate that the community would be severely impacted
unless housing was built by the University for students and
also community residents. The U Mass administration had until
now stated that money for housing was not available and
"a commuter school has no business in housing."25 The
Alliance even criticized the Justin Grey Associates' survey
as poorly designed and that it had insufficient input from
students and residents. They felt that consideration was not
given to the question of different rent levels affecting
the housing choices of students. The Alliance claimed for
example, rents in Dorchester at $50 per month would attract
more students than the Back Bay at $75-100 per month.
Therefore, the results of the survey were inadequate and
housing needs were even greater for the area. The Alliance
concluded that "attractive, economically practical housing
must and can be built, possibly on University land at
Columbia Point, possibly on other locations within or near
the community."26 Dormatories were not acceptable to students
and should not be built, and housing for students and
community residents should be considered in a form that
does away with apartment hunting and "exploitative land-
lords." Any housing was to mutually benefit the Dorchester
neighborhood and the students. At issue from the Task Force Report was the need for the University to take measures to lessen the severe impacts projected on the community's housing and transportation patterns. First, for transportation impacts to be alleviated and housing to be constructed to meet community needs, that is, low and moderate-income housing for residents and students. Second, the University should not encroach on the public housing project. Third, the community ought to benefit from employment opportunities, admissions policies, access to University facilities, and participation in the planning and direction of the University.

The community felt so strongly about the University's impact in the area that in March 1973, the Columbia-Savin Hill Civic Association demanded that the University delay opening its Columbia Point Campus until a "total transportation solution" was worked out. Governor Francis Sargent was called upon to "give this his highest priority," as "unless more attention is devoted to transportation difficulties, Dorchester's housing market would be severely strained by students wanting to live near the campus."27

Also in this month, Mayor White issues a policy statement expressing concern about the impact of the campus on the community, even though he had supported the University's
location there in the first place! He recommended that funding for part of the building program (College III) be denied until the impact was "better addressed," and reiterated the Alden Report recommendation that U Mass Boston not expand. The Mayor filed a bill with the State Legislature requesting a master plan for the campus. He also requested that any contracts over $25 thousand require his approval. The City proposed that 300 units in the housing project be reserved for students. In turn, the City would intensify its own efforts to safeguard existing housing in Dorchester through regulatory means.

Finally, the City proposed a committee with joint University, City and community participation be formed to study all housing and related issues. Not surprisingly, the Mayor's bill did not pass the Legislature, the BHA rebuffed the City on proposing a modified takeover of the project, and the Dorchester Tenant Action Council noted that it had yet to see code enforcement, rent control, housing assistance, etc. come from the City. One thing that did emanate from the city's effort was the "joint committee." This was to bring together the interests of U Mass, the City and local businesses in the near future.
The Campus Impact Study Group

Under tremendous pressure, the University convened a thirty member advisory group to give the U Mass community input into the development plans. The Campus Impact Study Group (CISG) comprised nine faculty members, eleven administrators, and ten students, who for 7 weeks looked at the issues raised by the Task Force Report. The "Report of the Campus Impact Study Group," a 58 page statement, was released in April 1973, only 3 months after the Task Force Report. This was the first response from within the University on the Task Force Report.

The Report listed 46 specific measures to avert the housing and transportation crisis when the new campus opened, noting that:

...nowhere are the problems more glaring or more pressing than in the areas of housing and transportation. According to one popular version, UMB (U Mass Boston) is a commuter school to which no one can commute. Despite over-simplification and distortion of the facts, there is an element of truth in this charge. ...The housing problem is even more acute than transportation. 29

The CISG "accepted" the general analysis and recommendations of the Task Force concerning transportation as "both accurate and reasonable" and expanded on Task Force recommendations in more detail. 30 Included was the recommendation that despite three unsuccessful attempts of U Mass to elicit funds from the Legislature and the Governor's Office for a
study of transportation problems, (including a request for $9 million in 1969, $2 million in 1970, and a third request in 1971), the University should "support the concept of construction of a mass transit linkage to the campus" and increase its efforts to secure $12 million for a "permanent mass transit link." Additionally, a stop on the Quincy Line at Columbia Road should be explored in addition to subsidized parking at outlying MBTA parking lots. Commenting on the Vollmer Associates Report, which was undertaken by the MBTA in response to the University's transportation needs, CISG said that the University should not rely exclusively upon this report as a basis for planning a mass transit linkage because "it does not adequately take into account access to the Columbia Point housing project" among other linkages. In the design of the mass transit connection, both Columbia Point residents and U Mass should have access to it," and be planned so that it also "reinforces any future plans to develop Columbia Point." Other recommendations were that the University set up an Office of Transportation, limit parking spaces, raise parking fees, and encourage car pools and mass transit over automobiles.

In the area of housing, the CISG stated that while they were aware of the long-standing decisions of the Legislature and the Board of Trustees that the University should "keep out of the housing business":
We agree with the Task Force that the University has the responsibility to help local community groups protect and strengthen their housing resources...development and renovation of additional housing units for community residents will be essential in enabling local residents to withstand the UMB impact.32

The CISG recommended rejection of student housing on the U Mass campus or in the surrounding area, but that the University should "make a strong commitment to cooperate with Dorchester neighborhood organizations who wished to develop housing." Additional measures such as University support for a Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation were recommended. The CISG focused on dispersing the student housing impact and increasing the University's "active participation" to develop "joint student-community housing" outside the high impact area of Dorchester, Columbia Point and South Boston by recommending the U Mass also work with community organizations within Boston, Cambridge, and Quincy who "wished to provide low rent housing for neighborhood residents," who would agree to the University leasing space for establishing "UMB learning centers," and who would rent a certain percentage of units (20-35%) to students. The concept of mixed residential learning facilities would be a major undertaking and the University should be a partner in the effort. Moreover, "every agency which was a party to the decision to locate the University campus on Columbia Point, including the City, the State, and those private enterprises who opposed its location elsewhere-bear a direct responsibility
In addressing the public housing project, the recommendation by the CISG that "the University assist local community organizations in efforts to protect and improve their neighborhood housing resources must apply fully to the Columbia Point housing project. It was suggested that a public statement by the Board of Trustees be made showing the commitment of the University that it had "no intention of taking over the Columbia Point housing project for student housing." The educational interests of the residents were to be addressed and youth with academic potential living in Columbia Point were to be identified and encouraged to attend U Mass. It was stated that "education is the University's business" where it can best serve the community. In responding to other issues raised by the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force Report and recent events, the following statement was made:

The Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force recommends that the University take strong action to assist the Columbia Point residents in their efforts to improve their housing situation. This recommendation clearly relies on the University's proximity
to the Housing Project as the means for improving conditions for the residents. The Campus Impact Study Group agrees that UMB, as an urban campus and next-door neighbor, must work in cooperation with the housing project. The University certainly should not allow itself to be used as the "cutting edge" to get rid of low-income people. We oppose the proposal put forward by the Mayor's Office that 300 units in the Columbia Point housing project be set aside for students.35

The report stated that "students should not be used to fill vacancies when there is a need for low cost housing throughout the City," unless they can qualify under the same criteria as other Columbia Point tenants and this was found acceptable to the tenants. The development of on-campus student housing was decided not to be consistent with the educational role of the University nor "popular" with the students as it would increase friction and tension between the members of the campus, the community and the residents of the housing project by creating two fundamentally different communities. Nevertheless, after good faith negotiation with the community, if a dispersed student housing impact was not achieved, "a limited number of housing units might be constructed on or near the campus," but under no circumstances were they to be student-only housing.
In response to the Task Force's fear of a partial or full takeover of the project, the Committee recommended: "Protection of the total square footage that now exists at the Columbia Point housing project should be guaranteed for present and future low income tenants." The University cannot help directly with major capital improvements or funding for new management alternatives, but as "change will occur as a result of the juxtaposition of the housing project and the University Campus," the University should insure that "whatever change occurs, is beneficial for present and future low-income residents of Columbia Point." Cooperation and strengthening of relations are needed to work in areas of mutual benefit and concern. University commitment of manpower and certain funds should be made, including fund raising for technical assistance. A strategy for cooperation for the next few years should be developed with the following objective for residents to consider: joint cooperation with the University for "mixed community-student housing under the control of the community that might be built on the City land adjacent to the project and the pumping station or on part or all of the current Bayside Mall." This was the first mention of a housing development plan for the peninsula by a University group.

It was recommended by the CISG that the Board of Trustees adopt their recommendations and that other efforts be made to work with the community in areas such as transportation, employment safety, recreation and the need for shopping facilities.
The CISG then asked that the University postpone regular classes at the campus from September 1973, until January 1974, at the earliest, and that the University refuse to agree to move to the Columbia Point campus, which was then nearing completion, until the Board of Trustees adopted the housing policies proposed in the report. In a concurring statement by eight members of the CISG, this accusation was made:

...we go beyond the CISG report to emphasize, in the strongest terms, that the Columbia Point campus must remain closed not just until January, 1974, but until it can open without inflicting substantial hardships upon the people of Dorchester-Columbia Point. This position, it must be understood, is not a rejection of the spirit or the particulars of the CISG Report. It is, however, an indictment of those in the University whose previous unwillingness to respond adequately to the Dorchester-Columbia Point Community has brought us all to the brink of confrontation and disaster.

University of Massachusetts Trustee's Statement

On May 10, 1973, William Hamilton, Jr., Acting Chancellor, addressed a memorandum to President Wood and the Board of Trustees transmitting the Report of the CISG. In it he stated his support for many of the Task Force as well as CISG recommendations: "most of them should be implemented in some form or another." The issues of transportation, admissions, and employment were also mentioned in the memorandum. In assisting local residents "to protect and strengthen their housing resources," the University's role is defined in his memorandum as a "catalyst," with activities to be initiated directly by the Chancellor, the President's Office and the Trustees.
Furthermore, a request was made of the President's Office and the Trustees to make a specific statement and to take action concerning the role the University is prepared to play in the long-range development of the Columbia Point peninsula:

...this should include the possibility of housing renovation and development associated with and adjacent to the Columbia Point Housing Project and in the context of mixed income, mixed community-student housing as proposed by the CISG Report. Proposals have been put forward for the development of light industry at the Bayside Mall site. From the University's point of view, improved and expanded residential facilities for existing residents as well as for others in need of housing would be much more desireable for Columbia Point. Continued leadership is requested from the President and the Trustees, so that we may work with community leaders, the Mayor, the Boston Housing Authority, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, and others to explore what residential possibilities might exist for the future development of the Columbia Point Peninsula. 37

The significance of the memorandum is it reveals for the first time, the University's interest and leadership in establishing a mixed-income residential community on the peninsula. Nowhere does the CISG Report make any mention of a mixed-income residential community! This new development and the intrigues behind it will soon become apparent.

Throughout this period, angry community residents continued to meet over housing and transportation problems as the campus was due to open in four months. "The people of Dorchester have got a right to some answers out of him (President Robert Wood)," said Jean Matthews, Co-Chair of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force, "that campus is not going to open until we get them." 38
In response to the continuing community pressure and the CISG's recommendations, the University Board of Trustees, in June 1973, restated their determination to "make this campus an asset for its immediate neighbors, the community adjacent to the Columbia Point campus, and to address promptly any problems associated with the University's new location." The Board's statement stressed that the University would remain a commuter institution, and would support the City's effort to rehabilitate and revitalize the project for the benefit of present residents: "the university has no intention of taking over the project for student use," and would "cooperate with city agencies and community groups to discourage conversion of local family dwellings to student use." Also expressed were the goals of providing quality higher education and of serving the public interest. 39

The University then took measures to insure that the campus would open without incident. Prior to the opening of the Harbor Campus, the University established 2 Field Offices, one in Dorchester, and one in Columbia Point, to facilitate relations between the community and the University. The offices were aimed at providing assistance to "impact area" residents, identifying and helping them take advantage of employment and education opportunities at the campus. Library service, athletic programs for high school students and a variety of other services were developed. A commitment was made for special recruitment and admissions for students from the impacted area.
To avert the problem of students moving into the community, the University's Housing and Transportation Office would monitor student residential movement into the communities and adopt a "no-listing" policy which excludes from the University's housing list all housing resources within Dorchester, South Boston, and Columbia Point. In addition, the University established the New Directions Committee to address the issues raised by the Task Force Report, the CISG, and the Monitoring Committee.

Even though initiatives were undertaken by the University, a central problem remained of how to avoid a confrontation with the opening of the new campus. By the end of the summer, it became clear that the University's construction was behind schedule, that certain factions within the University were resisting the move, and that relations with the community had deteriorated. The University's opening date was postponed until January 1974.

In a confidential memorandum from the U Mass planning staff to President Wood, the long-range objectives of the University were expressed: the need for a large neighborhood that could sustain adequate shopping facilities and successfully co-exist and be more effectively linked with the University. The planners felt that the problem with the housing project was the high concentration of poor people isolated on the
peninsula with very few amenities. Social isolation was further intensified by the surrounding neighborhoods of Dorchester and South Boston who wanted to keep out the poor who were predominantly Black and Spanish-speaking. The solution would have to be the absorption of the low-income community into a mixed-income setting, and the creation of major transit links that would break up the isolation. Land adjacent to U Mass and to the Bayside Mall could be used to double the residential population without displacement of any of the existing residents, while creating a mixed-income community. The memorandum suggested that only a major developer could take on this task of creating a "New Town," and that the University had "no authority nor mandate to do anything except to work in ways of joint cooperation with the residents."

A "housing proposal" and a redevelopment plan for the peninsula became the basis for the University to "patch-up" relations with the community, plan for the future improvement of the University's surroundings so that it would become a "good" location, and insure the goodwill of the community when the University opened its doors. During the summer of 1973, President Wood, Vice President Peter Edelman and other U Mass officials held preliminary discussions with Mayor Kevin White, BHA Administrator Samuel Thompson, and officials from the BRA and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). According to
Vice President Edelman, U Mass now saw itself as a "broker" using its academic resources to make housing proposals attractive to potential developers. Initial discussions centered on a limited dividend approach for "a housing development of 2,500 units, including the 1,500 unit Columbia Point project on a 88 acre tract next to U Mass Boston." This was to "ease the anticipated pressure on housing in Dorchester and South Boston, with no loss of low-income housing." The University and City officials, in response to Columbia Point residents fear of displacement by students and staff, insisted that any housing scheme would maintain the number of low-income units. Andrew Olins, the Mayor's Assistant for Housing, stated: "Nobody is going to be relocated. If eligible students and faculty go in there, it will be to the extent that new, low-income housing is constructed and existing low-income units are renovated."

High level discussions continued through the summer. The Bayside Mall site was isolated as a likely site for additional housing, even though it was questionable that the cost of the site, valued at $4 million, would permit anything but luxury housing. The City was asked to consider the development of housing on the peninsula as a top priority, and William White, Head of MHFA, said his agency would give 90% toward the private development of housing in the area. The announcement of these activities put a halt on the Hancock Company's effort to seek rezoning of the Bayside Mall site for industrial use.
According to newspaper accounts, in spite of community opposition, Hancock had applied for a zoning change to permit light industrial development, and had held preliminary discussions with the Boston Gas Company, the Polaroid Corporation, among others. Now with the zoning changes blocked by the City, Hancock had to reconsider the future of the Bayside Mall.46

The Thompson Plan
After consultation with the University's planning staff, the Mayor's office, the BRA, and the U Mass President's office looked at two architectural firms and selected Ben Thompson Associates (BTA) to prepare an overall redevelopment scheme for the peninsula.

In September, 1973, the announcement was made of the consultants who were to begin a process of working with the University and a newly composed "Task Force" of community, public and quasi-public bodies on a cooperative effort for redevelopment. The 17 member Columbia Point Task Force consisted of representatives of the City of Boston, the BHA, the BRA, U Mass, and neighborhood organizations and agencies from Dorchester, South Boston, Columbia Point, and Savin Hill. A representative from one of the Columbia Point agencies, who was also a Columbia Point tenant was a member of the Task Force.

With the technical assistance of Ben Thompson Associates, the Task Force worked in a cooperative effort to plan the re-
development of the peninsula. In an interview, one participant observed: "The nice thing about this proposal is that it gives everyone a 'win,' the Mayor with his commitment to the city; Wood with his commitment to an urban university; and the community people with their demand for housing." 47 "What we have been doing is creating the process by which we will find out what is best for the project, and for the peninsula," proclaimed Samuel Thompson, BHA Administrator. "Perhaps then this peninsula can become a very lively interesting community in which the University happens to be one member," commented U Mass Chancellor Carlo Golino, who had formerly served under Governor Ronald Reagan at the University of California and was now the prime University spokesman in the Task Force.

The new planning activities along with the University's construction brought about a changed atmosphere among the participants. The Boston Globe reported: "The sight of the University's brick red towers rising from the old City dump seems to have inspired everyone. Critics who four months ago were complaining about 'heavy' traffic and housing 'crises,' are now debating the number of parking spaces and written proposals for specific parcels of land." 48

The approach of the Columbia Point Task Force is interesting. Contrary to earlier public statements made by Task
Force members, the proposal assumed that at least 300 of the projects 1504 units would be removed to lower the density and to make room for new construction, even though project residents had repeatedly opposed removal of any low-income housing units. Not by coincidence, more than 300 units were presently vacant and another 80 were used for agency offices. Among the participants there existed differences in the number of low-income units which were to be removed. BHA, which previously opposed any diminution of low-income housing, changed its mind and began to support "judicious pruning." As stated by Jerold Hickey, spokesperson for BHA: "We are not opposed to having units refurbished, or even replaced, as long as we get back an equivalent number." The BRA and the City proposed the retention of only 1,000 low-income units in the redevelopment plan. But at the same time, Andrew Olins stated that: "There is no question of forcing people out, it won't happen." During this period, the City also guaranteed existing residents housing in the new development.

By the time it was completed, the Plan proposed 1,000 low-income units after redevelopment for the approximately 1,000 remaining households at Columbia Point. Taking this base figure, 2,000 additional units of moderate income, and 1,000 units of middle-income housing would comprise a 4,000 units development, or "four times the number of low-income units needed." On the question of demolition, "complete rehabilitation of
existing units" was proposed, even though some units would be "selectively removed" for the purposes of increasing open space and for community facilities. New housing construction along the northern coastline and near the pump-house would complete the remainder of the housing development. A "town center" proposed near the Bayside Mall would provide a neighborhood meeting area and municipal services. The existing Bayside Mall would be redeveloped into a major shopping center.

After seven months of work by the Task Force and the Ben Thompson Associates, in January, 1974, "The Columbia Point Peninsula: A Program for Revitalization," was completed. The plan contained the following:

- The physical and social conditions of the existing neighborhood must be improved by the creation of a more broadly-based social structure with major emphasis on the needs of the low and moderate-income family.

- The construction of new housing and the maximum integration of subsidized housing and non-subsidized housing should create a setting which would attract new residents in a family oriented development and greatly improve living conditions for present residents.

- The completed development should have approximately 4,000 low, moderate and middle-income units, depending on the type and availability of housing subsidies.
Residents of Columbia Point will not be displaced from the Peninsula. The housing to be constructed or rehabilitated shall be, as far as is practical, staged to coincide with the necessary relocation within the project and shall include an adequate number of affordable units of appropriate size to allow the relocation of all residents who desire to remain at Columbia Point.

Adequate public facilities, including elementary and high schools, must be provided, if it is likely the new population would overburden existing neighborhood facilities. Moreover, the new facilities and services provided shall be available to the surrounding communities.

The shopping facilities at Columbia Point must be revitalized to serve a wide area of the South Boston and Dorchester communities as there are few modern shopping centers nearby. The complete change in the image of Columbia Point, as well as the new market potential generated by the University of Massachusetts and the major residential expansion described in this proposal will enable a shopping mall to meet the needs of the community.

On January 17, 1974, Mayor White, at a City Hall press conference, announced the "$150 Million Proposal" for revitalization to transform Columbia Point into "one of the handsomest neighborhoods in the City," and to make it one of the "great assets of the City of Boston." A large model put together by Ben Thompson Associates was unveiled before the press and public showing the total redevelopment plan and a 12 page booklet was distributed describing the Task Force's policies and development program (see above). The Columbia Point Task Force had now completed its work.

As planned, on January 26, 1974, 9 days later, the University of Mass opened its doors for the first time. The opening took place with little incident and no opposition from the larger community.
The Response to the Thompson Plan

The representatives of South Boston, Dorchester and Columbia Point on the Task Force had mixed response to the Thompson Plan. Those who supported it felt the Thompson Plan addressed the community's need for shopping and housing by proposing the renewal of the Bayside Mall and increasing the supply of housing for the area. The reactions from others were different. Thelma Peters, one of the Columbia Point agency representatives and a former tenant, and Bernard Sneed, a tenant, objected to the lack of community participation from the housing project in the plan. They were both members of the Task Force, but represented the agencies they worked for and had not been chosen by Columbia Point residents as their representatives. Therefore, they did not report to the tenants' meetings. Sneed was to comment, "as a resident, I would just like to be assured that the proposal is going to benefit the residents of Columbia Point. The residents must have input." Not a single tenant representative was informed nor involved in the development of the plan, even though at least two tenant organizations existed at the time, along with Columbia Point tenant leaders and TPC, other concerned tenants could have been approached. But the City felt differently. Andrew Olins commented that: "This project is the opposite of Park Plaza. There the plans were all drawn up before the community was asked what it thought. Here the community will be involved at every step."
Response to the plan was also voiced by those not on the Task Force. Jan Wampler, an architect and M.I.T. professor, who had been working with Columbia Point residents for the past few years in small-scale revitalization, had not been consulted during the planning activities. "They say that the whole plan was based on community participation. How much could the community have been involved if the plan calls for tearing down something the community worked on for two years," Wampler commented. The Thompson Plan called for the demolition of 110 Monticello Avenue, a building Wampler had just completed plans for. Wampler, perhaps reflecting the worst fears of the tenants said that: "In order to attract a developer, they'll have to move the poor out of Columbia Point."

Equally skeptical about the lack of tenant involvement were a number of faculty members of U Mass who stated their concerns in an article in the campus newspaper, the Mass Media, on February 26, 1974:

The $150 million development plan for Columbia Point was officially unveiled at Boston City Hall last month. After the show, several Columbia Point residents asked that the model be taken to the Columbia Point project so that the people who would be most affected by it would have a chance to see what had been planned for them. They were told that the project residents would have to come down town to City Hall because the model couldn't be moved.
As the Columbia Point people left City Hall, they noticed that the model was being taken apart so that it could be moved to another location in City Hall. A week later the model was again disassembled and this time transported to Cambridge to the office of Benjamin Thompson and Associates.

In addressing the proposed elements of the housing plan, criticisms were raised by the residents concerning the uncertainty of the proposed housing subsidies--only market-rate housing seemed assured. The proposed 2,000 units of moderate income housing did not specify rent levels, and contained "nothing to discourage fearful visions of a middle class invasion at Columbia Point," reported a Boston Phoenix article. The subsidized housing pieces were deemed infeasible by the critics of the plans given the policies of the Nixon Administration. Inconspicuously footnoted in the Thompson Plan itself was the following: "As of this writing, federal housing programs have been suspended and new legislation has not been approved by the Congress. The final mix of housing cannot be determined at this time." The Dorchester Community Action Council (DCAC), which consistently advocated the preservation of 1,500 low income units, protested the provision of the only 1,000 low-income units after redevelopment. Their position was that keeping 1,500 units should be an "absolute minimum...the real need is for an even greater number." But the most poignant remarks came from Columbia Point itself. The tenants and the Columbia Point Inter-agency Council opposed the plan in favor of immediate efforts to improve present housing conditions.
Thelma Peters remarked, "it's fine to go downtown and imagine what might happen here in the long run, but the residents are more interested in what is going to happen in the short run. People are living here under intolerable conditions, and nothing is being done." Edward Sorrell, Director of the Columbia Point Area Planning Action Council (APAC), commented:

If existing housing is allowed to deteriorate, residents will continue to be driven off the Point, and any guarantees for rehousing existing tenants will be useless. We've got 300-350 vacancies this year. Next year maybe there'll be 500-550. The Housing Authority and the BRA can afford to wait three to four years, until living conditions are really intolerable. Then when there are 300-350 families left... they can say 'we don't displace anyone' and be perfectly accurate.

Unfortunately, this statement made in 1974 was to be most prophetic of events to come. The Thompson Plan was never carried out, first, because financial feasibility was never established to begin with—the evidence leads one to believe that the parties never had any intention of implementing the Plan. Second, the peaceful opening of the U Mass Harbor Campus was perhaps in itself, the achievement of the unstated objective.

Even though the plan fulfilled the desires of the Mayor, the BRA, U Mass and others as to their vision of what should take place on the peninsula, Andrew Olins had to admit "the New Town is a dream, not a plan." There were no specifics on the public or private investment needed for the 150 million dollar "dream."
The planning for the redevelopment of the peninsula, as correctly feared by tenants at Columbia Point, distracted from the real problem of improving or upgrading the housing project for existing tenants and public housing applicants. In referring not only to the planning process which excluded the residents, but also to the impact of the proposed redevelopment plan on the poor, Lou Finfer, Director of DCAC commented: "what we could have is a sneaky Park Plaza".\textsuperscript{65}

In summing up many people's thoughts about the timing of the revitalization plan, especially in light of the opening of the U Mass campus, one community participant observed, "sometimes I think it's just something to keep people busy."\textsuperscript{66}

The Thompson Plan can be seen as the first major redevelopment proposal in the history of Columbia Point. The Plan itself was to meet a quick demise after the opening of the University, but the components of commercial, recreational transportation and housing improvements, and the theme of a mixed-income residential community are present in all subsequent plans, even until today--6 years later. The precedent was also established by the Mayor and the BRA to guarantee housing solely to existing tenants in the development. The City maintained its position in all of the following plans.

As the number of existing households decreased because of worsening conditions in the project, each subsequent redevelopment scheme contained fewer numbers of low-income units.
While appearing generous in guaranteeing housing to existing low-income residents, the City's policy in reality worked to the long-term detriment of low-income people. As will be seen, this policy shows that the number of low-income units provided in the redevelopment plans are politically determined and not based on a financial nor social assessment of the number of low-income units which can be maintained in the new community.

The commitments made by U Mass during this period cannot be overlooked—especially the University's statement of support and assistance to present tenants and in not "taking over" the project for student use. U Mass was successful in its institutional mission of opening its doors to students without undue community protest, but U Mass still has to contend with its relations to its neighbor, a deteriorated housing project that U Mass made a commitment to assist and not harm.
THE BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY
THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

In the aftermath of the massive publicity surrounding the Mayor's unveiling of the $150 million Columbia Point Revitalization Plan, pressure mounted on the public agencies to do something about the housing project. U Mass had just opened its doors, the Kennedy Library had $500 thousand appropriated for design and planning, the State Archives and the Boston Opera Theatre were also being considered for location on the site. The period from 1975 to 1977 is characterized by public initiative from the BHA, the Court, the BRA, and HUD in response to the serious physical and social conditions at the housing project. In addition, it was a time of growing tenant activity in the affairs of their community.

It was during this time that Columbia Point received $8.4 million of Target Projects Program (TPP) monies from HUD for modernization and tenants programs and BHA prepared a $10 million proposal which was eventually funded under the Urban Initiatives (UI) program. For the first time, tenants were active participants in deciding the level of modernization, as a result of a referendum which came about after a series of confrontations between BHA and TPC. The 17-page balloting package was probably the most comprehensive piece of infor-
mation ever made available to every family in a development and included detailed information on five proposed levels of modernization.

Developments at Columbia Point were not separate from the city-wide events. The suit by tenants against the BHA in 1975, Perez et al. vs. BHA, the subsequent Consent Decree orders, and the appointment of the Court-Appointed Master, were to lead to more pressures on the BHA for increased tenant participation. TPC's Task Forces throughout the city had become more active in their developments as housing conditions continued to worsen.

The tenant population at Columbia Point was suffering tremendous strains as 240 households had moved out between June 1974 and August 1975; conditions were declining precipitously because of increased crime and vandalism and the lack of housing services. Long-deferred maintenance and repairs had led to serious problems with the heat, hot water, plumbing and electrical systems, and to the need for extensive repairs, roof and finish work. The number of remaining households was 721. Tenants were angry at the present conditions and at the prospects for the future. In a petition signed by the residents, including many elderly, it stated the following:

What are we waiting for? For me to move or die, whichever comes first, and then there will be another empty apartment to be devastated? Why?
I pay my rent, I keep my apartment clean to the best of my ability. I love my home at Columbia Point, but BHA is making it more and more difficult for me to live here, is it a part of an inhuman plan to empty Columbia Point and make it available to them that has?

How and where do we of 70, 80, and 90 years get the energy to pack a houseful of furniture for moving? And why should we? 68

Many of the concerns during this period, from both the public agencies and the tenants, were around immediate issues such as security, social services, maintenance, repairs, etc. These were seemingly far afield from planning for the redevelopment of the peninsula, but the manner in which these issues were addressed was to have important long-term consequences. Policy decisions relating to mothballing of buildings, demolition, tenant relocation, tenant participation, re-tenanting of vacant units, rehabilitation, management and preliminary negotiations on long-range planning did not alter the course of redevelopment. They, instead, reinforced the City and the private sector's dominance over the redevelopment process.

The Target Projects Program
The Target Projects Program was the brainchild of H. R. Crawford, then Assistant Secretary at HUD, who had earmarked Columbia Point as one of the chosen projects. 69 With the announcement of the program from HUD, BHA submitted an application on January 16, 1975 for a requested budget of $20
million for the following:

1. Management assistance for staff training, development of a computerized work order system, data processing, and staff performance and hiring guidelines.

2. Development of a security program including the hiring of security personnel.

3. Physical improvements to the buildings and housing rehabilitation.

4. Improved tenant services and communications with management.\(^7\)

The TPP awards were announced in April of that year. Columbia Point was one of 10 awards made to major cities during the first year of the program. (The Year Two awards were smaller and were distributed among many housing authorities.) HUD continued to consider Columbia Point a top priority, although by this time, Crawford was no longer there. The $8.4 million in TPP funds and the modernization funds of $6.3 million brought a total of $14.7 million to be added to the $10 million in Urban Initiatives funding.

In 1977, the Perez case resulted in the Consent Decree, a more than 270-page document detailing reforms BHA must complete over a three-year period to bring about a complete reorganization of the Authority, and improve its administration and management, and to begin to effectively spend accrued modernization and program funds. Columbia Point was included in a Special Order because the modernization plan had not been
completed. Weekly meetings were held between the Court-Appointed Master's office, which was charged by the Court to oversee the implementation of the Consent Decree, BHA, TPC, Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS), and a few tenants and the architectural consultants, to discuss plans for the housing project around vacancy rehabilitation, security and mothballing of the buildings.

The Master, Robert Whittlesey, stipulated to BHA that modernization funds for Columbia Point had to be committed in 1975 and TPP funds expended by March 1977. Furthermore, part of the Court Order stated: The parties (BHA, TPC and GBLS) and the Master were to "closely cooperate in the preparation of a comprehensive proposal for the revitalization of those units in Columbia Point," and submit an application for funding to HUD by October 1, 1977. The order for the interim was as follows:

... In addition, by July 1, 1977, the parties and the Master will prepare interim procedures to ensure, to the extent reasonably feasible, that the number of families currently living at Columbia Point (approximately 430) does not significantly decrease during the preparation and implementation of this comprehensive proposal.

Included in the Order were measures for the "prompt processing and assigning of tenants to Columbia Point, to the degree feasible, of both current and future applicants who select Columbia Point." The appropriate social service
agencies were to inform eligible persons of the availability of apartments, and BHA was to undertake the procedures for cleaning and repairing the vacant units for occupancy. The order appeared to deal with the components of an overall strategy for "turning around" and fixing up the development by placing emphasis on vacancy rehabilitation, security, re-tenanting and insuring no decrease in the resident population, but actual events were to turn out quite differently. For numerous reasons, BHA did not carry out the Order. Some of the reasons may be attributed to the inherent difficulties involved, yet others to the general unwillingness of the BHA to follow through on making the development a viable community for present and future tenants. Contrary to what most people believed, the Master did not have the power to force the Authority to do anything. The Master's role was only to make recommendations and to evaluate BHA's activity.

In 1975, Columbia Point had three on-site managers and a full maintenance staff responsible for the upkeep at the development. Once TPP funds were received, management staff was divided into four components: (1) security, (2) social services, (3) tenant employment and training and (4) modernization. Additional full-time staff were hired: a vacancy rehabilitation/mothballing crew of 20 craftsmen was put in operation, a TPP Director, a Community Organizational Specialist, a Tenant Training and Employment Specialist, six
Building Service Aides, a secretary, and security personnel. The Aides, security forces, and the secretary were mainly tenants. Already Columbia Point had a disproportionate share of management staff when compared with other developments.

The first TPP Director, it was reported, could not successfully coordinate all TPP efforts and was relieved of his responsibility. The then Deputy Administrator at Central Office took responsibility for the program, and according to management staff, was available at his desk "once every three weeks" while awaiting retirement. Unfortunately, Roland Burke, Chief Planner for Columbia Point and other developments, who eventually became the Columbia Point Development Coordinator, had to seek approval from the Deputy Administrator prior to any action. This caused considerable delays and last minute changes in planning and implementation at a time when critical steps had to be taken for extensive rehabilitation and improvements in management and security. By December 1975, tenants and community agencies were angry and vocal; modernization had not progressed and conditions were worse than before in spite of the funds from HUD:

Why am I living from day to day for several years with the ceiling of my apartment peeling to pieces all around me, into my food, and into my body, with money available for rehabilitation?

Why do I have to remove draperies and curtains from windows and spend my days and nights bailing out my apartment when there is a bad rainstorm, in some instances even move furniture away from walls and there is money available for rehabilitation?
The prevailing sentiment at the time was that BHA "didn't give a damn" about tenants; rumors were spreading that the development was going to be sold; the tenants were unorganized and disheartened; and many described the morale of the community as having reached its lowest. Justification for these sentiments was only to be confirmed in a confidential report circulated in BHA's Department of Planning, Development and Modernization which stated that:

... there is little to suggest that the BHA will be able to live up to its responsibilities by providing timely routine and nonroutine maintenance and that there will be a Columbia Point social system wherein rules will be enforced by the managers and tenants and where deviant behavior [e.g., vandalism] will be successfully reduced.77

The problems of delays and inaction continued to plague the modernization program. In a letter from Administrator Samuel Thompson, BHA notified the Master that progress as of March 4, 1976, resulted in: 53 vacant apartments being prepared for occupancy for relocated households from mothballed buildings, 3 mid-rises (7-store buildings) had been vacated with windows sealed and utilities shut down; and repairs had been made to approximately 88 units in "most serious condition."78 This was the extent of progress a year after the TPP award.

While the BHA continued with its slow-paced and inefficient work procedures, there was considerable confusion among the residents about what was taking place. The weekly discussions
with the Master, BHA, TPP staff, and TPC led to the following decisions:

- tenants were insufficiently involved in the planning for TPP and modernization and time should be allotted for BHA to fully inform tenants of the plan,

- a joint BHA and TPC letter should be issued to inform tenants of the current status of the work schedule and to reassure them that they would not have to leave Columbia Point.

- the decision to mothball buildings should be seen only as a temporary measure until funding became available for rehabilitation, and a decision was made as to the future use of the buildings.79

May 27, 1976, a BHA/TPC letter was sent to all Columbia Point tenants. It was the first letter issued on joint letterhead and signed by both Board Chairmen. It advised tenants of the following:

- To insure safe and desirable housing for the 600 families, the mothballing of largely vacant mid-rises is proceeding along with the consolidation of families in restored apartments in the development.

- In one and a half years, approximately 330 families will be housed in three-story buildings with the remaining families and the elderly housed in mid-rises.

- Beginning in the fall, "every one of the approximately 750 family, handicapped and elderly apartments will be modernized."

- Modernization will be for existing tenants at Columbia Point.

- Mid-rises that are "mothballed" will remain vacant and boarded--no decisions have been made for their future use and no decision will be made for at least one year.
Meetings will be scheduled with BHA personnel, including TPP staff and TPC, to discuss these plans in detail with the tenants.80

Originally, the combined TPP and modernization funds were to fully rehabilitate 754 units with an initial estimate of $3 thousand per unit. The proposed number of units then dropped to 654 with an estimated $8 thousand per unit.81 After spending close to $4 million on overhauling the heating, electrical and plumbing systems, mothballing, and other services, approximately $4.8 million remained for housing rehabilitation. By July 1976, it became apparent that substantially fewer units could be redone than was originally planned; it was decided that enough funds were available to rehabilitate two out of five designated areas, including one for the elderly.

By now, BHA knew that additional funds would be needed for the easterly portion of the site and circulated a draft "Application to HUD for Supplemental Funding" in October, hereafter known as the "October Plan." Before delineating the contents of the plan, it should be said that BHA put together this plan without input from the tenants nor proper notification to the parties, TPC and GBLS or to the Master's Office. Considerable friction between tenants and management developed as to the content of the plan, necessitating intervention by the Court. The Master was designated to coordinate meetings between the tenants and the Authority on the future
development plans for the project and to insure that tenants
themselves made a decision on the final use of the remaining
$4.8 million TPP monies. This broke the impasse between
tenants and management.

The Modernization Referendum
Up to this point, BHA planners had argued that large tenant
meetings could be avoided and only tenant leaders be consulted
on the BHA's modernization plan. Whereas TPC, GBLS, the
tenants, the architects, and the Master had maintained through-
out discussions that tenants must be part of the decision-
making process. Now was a prime opportunity for tenant input
and to build an organized tenants' voice.

By request of the Court, on January 18 and 19, 1977, four
meetings were scheduled in the development to provide detailed
information to tenants in voting on the various options for
modernization. TPC noted that: "The first round has been
won, Columbia Point tenants will make decisions about the
future of the community now that their participation in the
planning process has been assured."84

Of the remaining TPP budget for modernizing family and elderly
apartments, tenants had to make the decision on how to spread
the limited funds. Five options were presented ranging from
a plan that rehabilitated 420 units at $15 thousand per unit,
to rehabilitating 608 units at $7,200 per unit. All tenants, 16 years of age and over, were to rank order their choices with the clear understanding that selecting the option for a higher level of renovation would essentially mean that fewer units could be renovated for existing families. The consequence, as described by one tenant, would be: "those with better apartments will not be in good stead with people whose apartments have not been improved." Large numbers of tenants turned out for the meetings and the final vote took place on January 27. An overwhelming majority chose Choice No. 1: modernizing 420 units (252 family and 168 elderly units) at a cost of $15 thousand per unit. BHA's expectation to the contrary, tenants selected a level of modernization for the smallest number of units so as to insure that the renovation would be of the highest quality. The modernization items included were new kitchen cabinets and sinks, washer hook-ups, new recessed showers and fittings, heavy security screens for all windows, glass brick for the hallways, new entrances, and landscaping. This was a result that surprised BHA and others who had feared that any significant decision left up to tenants would be poorly considered, and tenants would have elected to spread the money among as many units as possible. Moreover, 200 tenants had attended the meetings, showing a successful demonstration of tenant participation.
While the tenants' decision was commendable, BHA then managed the design and implementation phases with questionable competency and efficiency. Prior to the tenant referendum, Stull Associates had been hired by the BHA. They had in the meantime proceeded with design and working drawings. Problems abound: BHA was late in providing an exact budget and the final design by Stull Associates had problems with its esthetical appeal and functional use. Proposed entrances and vestibules were little improvement over the existing entrances but cost $10,000 each. A section of the living room on the first floor front units was awkwardly enlarged as a result of the vestibule. Many tenants felt that these changes were unnecessary. Complaints were made that an intercom system was not installed and that the entrance design of contrasting red brick against the existing orange brick made a mockery of their housing.

Within the units other problems were found. Fuse boxes were placed in the middle of living room walls and closets still lacked doors. In the stairwells, the particular design of the fire hatches and fire escape installations created more of a problem than before and became dysfunctional in a short time.

The contractor hired was the lowest bidder but was tackling his largest rehabilitation job. Work crews left unfinished work. Six to eight-inch gaps existed between newly installed
partitions and existing outside walls and security screens did not fit. Pipes were also not adequately encased nor sealed and the walls were not properly painted. Poor workmanship was so pervasive that a year later plaster was falling down and pipes and ceilings leaked.

After completion of the rehabilitation work, Alan Root, then Chairman of the TPC Board, sent a letter to Brendan Geraghty, the BHA Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and Modernization, stating the results of TPC's inspection of the renovated buildings: "Quite frankly, I am aghast at what I saw. From both design and construction points of view, the project is a disaster of the first magnitude." On the positive side, it was noted that halls have been cleaned and roofs replaced, but on the negative side: "the overall redesigning of the buildings is unimaginative and incompetent. . . . Somewhere along the line, the architects became confused. They were being asked to redesign an apartment building in which people live--not a fortress and not a zoo for caged animals."89

By the end of the first phase of modernization with the completion of all the elderly and only 96 family units, the cost per family unit came to $21 thousand. This was a high price for a questionable design and for units of poor quality. In addition, 156 occupied family units were still not rehabilitated.
The TPP experience showed an example of BHA's inability to manage adequate design review and construction; correct its deficiencies in contract supervision and make adequate work inspections. The high per unit cost meant that the agreed upon number of 252 family units could not be completed within budget since only about $1 million remained. Tenants and BHA staff agreed to suspend the remainder of the work rather than to start work on another building and encounter the same problems. The BHA's original commitment to the tenants to rehabilitate 750 units resulted in only 168 minimally rehabilitated units for the elderly on the eastern part of the site, and 96 units for families in four low-rises on the western part of the site.

Also during this period, the mothballing of buildings resulted in 618 units removed from the rent roll in addition to 134 units which had already been removed as they were occupied by social services. A total of 722 units, close to half of the original units were now unavailable for occupancy. (See discussion in Chapter 4.)

The HUD Task Force
In June 1976, at the initiative of HUD, an attempt was made to set up a new Task Force on Columbia Point. A group of more than 40 people attended meetings chaired by Ed Pollack and Lee Dennison from HUD. HUD wanted to bring together a
larger and more representative body than the 1973 Columbia Point Task Force to once again work on outlining a development plan for the housing project and the total peninsula. It was also to be a public counterpart to the private efforts already underway by U Mass President Robert Wood and local business and corporate officials who were informally meeting on their own to develop plans for the peninsula. The Task Force membership included, among others, representatives from the BHA, the BRA, HUD Regional and Area offices, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), Office of State Planning (OSP), the Master's Office, TPC, Columbia Point tenants, and local Columbia Point agencies. The First National Bank of Boston, U Mass Harbor Campus and the U Mass President's Office also sent representatives. A large number of Columbia Point tenants, more than a dozen, were to participate in this planning for the future of the development.

The Task Force proved to be short-lived, but certain important discussions and decisions were to take place at the meetings. For the first time, HUD went on record as not being in favor of having public housing sold and also not being in favor of any demolition on Columbia Point. BHA concurred with HUD in not wanting to sell Columbia Point, and agreed (again) that citizen participation from now on was to include the tenants and TPC, and residents were once again assured that they would be guaranteed the right to housing in all future plans.
Some participants questioned whether the development could survive on the existing scale and if there should be some form of income mix. James Baecker from the BRA stated that the City was interested in developing a larger income mix and a "more balanced neighborhood with better relations." Gershon Ratner, GBLS attorney for the Class (tenants) in the Perez case, responded that 600 units were now occupied and any redevelopment plan should have 1,500 units for low-income residents. Housing for any income mix should be beyond the 1,500 low-income units. Even Robert Whittlesey, the Court-Appointed Master, went on record to say that revitalization of apartments to attract people with more money to move in was not necessary. Vacant units at Columbia Point should be rehabilitated with the necessary landscaping, physical amenities and possibly lowered density in some areas.

Columbia Point tenants, including James Jackson, then Task Force Chairman, Al Irving, Chairman of the Columbia Point Community Development Council, and some elderly tenants expressed their strong fears of mothballing, of the diminishing population, and of tenants being permanently "put out." They would rather see units all occupied than vacant.

When the Task Force was presented with five options from the BHA covering the range of possible solutions for the project—from full occupancy of the 1,500 units to demolition, the
group arrived at a consensus to reduce the density in the development, maintain family and elderly occupancy, keep the project within BHA income limits and also seek more moderate-income public housing eligible tenants. The following assumptions were established for the future of the project: (1) the continued existence and maintenance of low-rent housing with "no sale, no demolition"; (2) no tenants will be "forced out"; and (3) the necessity to concentrate on seeking additional funding for renovations. A proposal to decrease density while still maintaining low and moderate family and elderly housing and upgrading the physical and social environment was supported by this body.

In spite of the intense frustration among the participants, especially the tenants, the program outlined by this Task Force did point the direction towards a feasible and viable alternative for revitalizing the housing project and maintaining it for low and moderate-income households. The proposal depended on increased allocations from HUD for rehabilitation, but steps necessary to improve the housing project could proceed independent of or in conjunction with a total redevelopment plan for the peninsula.

The Task Force's work was to lend impetus to the verbal commitment from HUD for funding for the "October Plan" in 1976, which was subsequently funded through the Urban Initiatives
program in 1978. Even though the Task Force disbanded, the commitments made by HUD and BHA on no demolition were stated. The Task Force's solution to the housing project is one which substantially improves housing conditions by lowering density without demolition and maintains Columbia Point as long-term, low and moderate-income public housing.

The October Plan
The draft of "The Columbia Point Housing Development and the Peninsula: A Proposal for Revitalization," otherwise known as the "October Plan" was first submitted to HUD for supplemental funding by the City of Boston and the BHA in October 1976. This was one of the few jointly produced proposals by the City and the BHA which explicitly articulated the short and long-term policies of the agencies in redevelopment. The plan delineated a clear set of housing policies as regards "problem" tenants, reoccupancy, and housing improvements which were consistent with the objective of eventual private redevelopment.

The proposal called for $10.8 million to augment the current $8.4 million in committed TPP funds to implement a "realistic" program to "create within the Columbia Point housing development a sound, safe residential community that is and will continue to be an integral part of the changing character of the Columbia Point Peninsula." Without it, "the use of
presently available funds must inevitably be a short-term holding operation, benefiting neither the needs of present residents nor the general public interest in what happens on the peninsula." The funds would be applied to supplement existing work items under the TPP and modernization program, including: reroofing, mothballing, breakthroughs, upgrading of buildings and systems, renovation and site work, security, social services, and improving the circulation and usable outdoor space. The proposal stated that:

> It has become even more clear that the stabilization of the Columbia Point housing development which dominates the mid-section of the peninsula is key to the successful implementation of any revitalization program. This issue is central to not only the interest of the present Columbia Point residents but also for those interests focused on the future development of the peninsula.

Not surprisingly, the report attributes many of the problems at Columbia Point to "original design and site planning flaws," requiring extensive physical restructuring. No mention was made of management problems. "Stabilizing" Columbia Point was discussed for the first time with the ultimate objective of looking "beyond modernization towards the challenging possibilities for the total peninsula."

Standard housing for low and moderate-income or public housing residents was not the stated goal, because improved housing was needed to "assure a permanently upgraded residential environment that can be a catalyst for revitalization elsewhere on the peninsula." Furthermore, this would "make
possible future consideration of the integration of the upgraded buildings into a broader and more comprehensive development program for the total peninsula." The goals further specified a substantially upgraded environment for 640 low-income housing units: 400 family and 240 elderly units when the actual tenant population at the time was 456 family and 99 elderly households. Ironically, the proposal states: "The request for supplemental funding can be seen as an appropriate continuation of the commitment to current residents."

Over 860 or 56% of the apartments, including many large family units were vacant, but the plan did not address their renovation. The mothballed buildings would remain, and additional ones would be mothballed and conserved for future use. Rehabilitation of all units was said to be too expensive, costing at least $40 million. "Current thinking leads to the conclusion that renovation of all the structures is not a sound option; rather it is one which would deter the realization of the inherent potential of the peninsula as a whole." Moreover, since the construction of Columbia Point 25 years ago, thinking has changed regarding policies which concentrate so many low-income families in any one housing development.

The October Plan also discussed the option of turning the
Columbia Point project into one entirely for the elderly, handicapped, adults over 50, and for households without children.\textsuperscript{100} This was discarded because the elderly were considered too "neighborhood conscious" and wouldn't want to relocate—therefore a sufficient market for elderly housing at Columbia Point did not exist. Furthermore, the City and BHA couldn't ignore the fact that this would violate the commitments to rehouse existing family households!

Additionally, the City and BHA recommended policies directed towards reducing the overall population of low-income families. Eviction policies were to be "vigorously" enforced, and social services would be brought in to work with disruptive and "problem" tenants. Simultaneously, the City would make housing commitments to only present tenants—no new families would be moved in as only 400 family units would be provided.

Once made public, the October Plan drew heavy criticism and anger. In a letter to BHA, the Master addressed a list of 25 items for clarification in the proposal.\textsuperscript{101} Gershon Ratner from GBLS also drew up an extensive list of questions. Columbia Point tenants and TPC protested their lack of input. In a letter on November 23 to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area Director, TPC stated their serious concerns about the contents of the proposal and complained that they were not notified.
prior to its circulation. Apparently, the tenants had received the proposal the same time it reached HUD. The proposal was labeled as "vague" and "flimsy," specific long-range goals for the project were purposely left out; tenants questioned the commitment of the City, HUD and BHA for Columbia Point to remain a low-income housing development. Not even the short-range goals were adequately defined. The answers to questions of improved maintenance and repairs; continuing attrition; the need for rehabilitation; the number of buildings to be demolished; etc., were not addressed or were skillfully avoided. TPC further questioned why the proposal provided rehabilitated units for only 400 families, given the presence of a greater number of families who were living at Columbia Point.

The final plan submitted to HUD on November 4, 1976 did not receive funding as anticipated. Instead, an award was postponed for two years until the submission of another proposal under the Urban Initiatives Program in 1978.

To summarize, the October Plan outlined the objective of the City and BHA in redevelopment. This was to be nothing short of a mixed-income housing scheme with a substantially reduced low-income housing population. Even though the proposal was not funded, BHA and the City were able to carry out certain policies in the interim. This meant a "hold" on all vacant
units and buildings until such time as a plan consistent with redevelopment for mixed-income housing could proceed. Attrition would continue as units were not retenanted. It can be inferred from the October Plan that any major improvements in housing conditions for existing and new tenants would be incompatible with the overall objective of private redevelopment. An improved, fully occupied, well-run housing project could jeopardize the City and the BHA's plan, but a largely vacant and deteriorated project would not only confirm that public housing could not work, but would easily justify redevelopment.

This period of activity at Columbia Point included a poorly managed attempt at small-scale modernization, an aborted attempt at defining a low-rent housing approach to redevelopment, and, finally, submission by BHA to the City embracing private redevelopment. The BHA did not show any evidence of working in the long-term interest of low-income residents nor of maintaining public housing. A major effort by tenants did not bring forth substantial improvements. Also the tenants were "jerked around" by the inconsistencies of the public agencies who varied their positions on demolition, mothballing and their commitment to public housing.

Among the protagonists, the City, the BHA, the BRA, the tenants, and HUD, only the tenants were to suffer. Columbia
Point residents were now faced with 40% of their development mothballed, one-fifth of the units modernized out of the 750 units which had been expected, and continuing problems in management and maintenance.
The Peninsula Planning Committee

When modernization plans were being developed by BHA and Columbia Point tenants, a group representing private sector interests proceeded to work on an overall redevelopment strategy for the Columbia Point peninsula. This group originated as "The Neighbors" and was later renamed the Peninsula Planning Committee (PPC). Under the leadership of U Mass President Robert Wood, the group was formed to spearhead a private initiative comprised of financial and commercial "giants" to tie together the total development of the peninsula including: completion of the U Mass campus and the JFK Library, planning for the State Archives, and the Boston Opera House, redeveloping the housing project, and reopening the Bayside Mall, and attracting new residential and commercial development of the area.\(^\text{102}\)

The group's membership in 1976 consisted of representatives of local businesses and institutions including Ephron Catlin, former Executive Vice President of the First National Bank of Boston, and Treasurer of Affiliated Hospitals; Robert Wood, President of U Mass; Gerhard Bleicken, Chairman of the John Hancock Insurance Company; Richard Hill, Chairman of the First National Bank; Thomas Galligan, President of Boston Edison Company; William Taylor, President of the Boston Globe;
Steven Mugar of Star Markets; Raymond Nasher, a major Dallas housing developer; and others. Public institutions or affiliated members consisted of Samuel Thompson, BHA Administrator; Paul Guzzi, Secretary of the Commonwealth; Andrew Olins, Assistant to the Mayor; Robert Kenny, BRA Director; and other agency representatives. Columbia Point tenants, community and neighborhood organizations were not included as original members of the group.

By this time, the project had only 542 occupied units, including 460 Black and Hispanic households and 90 elderly households. A large part of the project was already mothballed, including 9 seven-story buildings. To the members of the group, it was apparent that only publicly supported institutions were locating on Columbia Point, e.g., U Mass, the JFK Library, and the State Archives, because of City and State actions, legislative decrees, other public action, and the like. For more than 10 years, public initiatives were unable to leverage private sector interest. The mostly vacant Bayside Mall was a symbol of the failure to attract continuing private investment. In the past few years, only one new tenant, the Boston's Teachers Union, had moved into the Mall. It was high time for major private developments to take place on the peninsula and for better utilization of public funds to achieve this.

There was firm belief that Columbia Point had great potential for development in the immediate future. Robert Wood, in a
meeting of the group on September 22, 1976, described the peninsula as "Boston's next major opportunity for residential and commercial development." But the prevalent feeling among members of the group was that the housing project presented "the most serious fiscal, political and psychological obstacle that must be overcome," prior to any major private investment or redevelopment effort on the peninsula. 104

These and other sentiments of The Neighbors group were reported in a Boston Globe article the next day. To everyone's surprise, on September 28, a few days later, a group of Columbia Point tenants demonstrated outside the Boston Globe office in protest over the development of plans for the area without their involvement, objected to the portrayal of the housing project as a "psychological obstacle" to private development plans and as a "dumping ground" for Black and Hispanic families.105 The protestors said that they were not allowed to participate in the meetings of The Neighbors and were "fed up with the insinuation that their intelligence is such that they cannot speak for themselves, do not know what they want, or cannot participate in meetings with educators, businessmen, government agency representatives, etc."

Among the tenants' demands, the Boston Globe was to retract its negative characterization of the project, and tenants were to have representation on The Neighbors group.
Tenants also requested a written commitment from U Mass that it would assist tenants in their efforts to improve their housing.

Robert Wood responded that The Neighbors was to represent a positive force in the community, "not a conspiracy, but a partnership." And tenants for the first time, on September 29, a day later, attended their first meeting of the Neighbors. Even though tenants came to this meeting, the representatives subsequently chosen were again, like the Mayor's Task Force, employees of various Columbia Point agencies and not tenants. They included Charles Knowles, Executive Director of the Columbia Point APAC; Mark Goode, TPP staff member from BHA; and Al Irving, Chairman of the Columbia Point Community Development Council. These representatives contributed to The Neighbors group but could not speak for the tenants themselves.

**Senior Citizen City**

In the midst of all the controversy surrounding Columbia Point, in February, 1977, City Councilor Louise Day Hicks, a member of the Council Committee on Housing and a known segregationist, proposed the conversion of the Columbia Point housing project into an "exclusive Senior Citizen City complete with health clinic, shuttle transportation and a shopping mall." This was to be the first Senior Citizen City in Massachusetts if not in the East. A resolution
was submitted to the Boston City Council calling for the establishment of a commission composed of municipal, state and federal officers to "devise and implement a conversion plan" for the housing project. 108

This event was viewed by the tenants as yet another attempt to displace low-income minority families under the guise of providing elderly housing. This plan by Hicks did not result in much, but did show the opportunism inherent in those who were hostile to the tenants. Nevertheless, the event did have some impact on how officials viewed Columbia Point. As noted by a BHA Planner:

Columbia Point is the only development to have had the entire Boston City Council, certain HUD officials and diverse BHA Board members go on record that the only way to make the development into a liveable environment is to convert it into an all-elderly development.109

Land Use Approaches

Returning to The Neighbors group, Ephron Catlin was named Chairman and Robert Wood Vice-Chairman. A year long planning process began for the peninsula. On May 17, 1977, the group, already renamed the Peninsula Planning Committee (PPC) issued preliminary ideas in a report called the "Columbia Point Land Use Approaches." The report received limited circulation and was an attempt to look at redevelopment alternatives in both plan and program. The land-use options represented three approaches to the site. They were not mutually exclusive; ideas from each one were to be juxaposed and
combined where appropriate. Each of the options reflected a different overall community character for the peninsula. The first option placed an emphasis on continuing institutional development; the second, on creating a large and diverse residential community; and the third, on economic development and new employment opportunities. Each option incorporated a mix of use in addition to its primary emphasis. They were all to represent a realistic picture for how redevelopment could occur. 110

Option 1: Institutional Emphasis

- Existing institutions will serve as a base to attract other institutions. For whatever reason, substantial funds for new housing will be unavailable, and in this absence, the existing housing will be made a safe, stable and attractive, low-income residential community of up to 1,000 households.

- The Bayside Mall will be revitalized as either a retail shopping center, serving the neighborhoods or as a regional attraction such as a trade center or a commercial recreation center.

- Remaining land areas will be developed as amenities to the housing project.

- A hotel/conference center will be developed and the pumphouse structure will be used for services such as a restaurant, tourist and student related shops, and a community center.

Option 2: Housing Emphasis

- The advantages of a rare waterfront location with a view and proximity to Boston and surrounding institutions would attract the interest of private housing developers. Public planning and investment in infrastructure would be provided.
A commitment to 588 low-income units (the number of existing households) will be sustained, and up to 1,800 new or additionally renovated housing units will be developed with an overall mix of 25% low-income, 50% moderate-income and 25% market-rate units.

The need to attract a residential market to the areas would imply that the new development be of high quality, with density controls for open space and amenities.

New housing would be developed along the waterfront for nearly a mile long stretch with less than 30 dwelling units per acre.

Presently mothballed buildings would be renovated or demolished and new housing built in place.

The area immediate to the pumphouse will be developed as a community center and for service-related functions.

Option 3: Economic Development Emphasis

A primary need would be to develop employment opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed residents. Columbia Point is a well-suited location for major employment intensive development.

Businesses locating on the peninsula would be compatible with local employment goals and result in tax revenues to the City.

The natural amenities coupled with historic and academic facilities could attract retail and commercial activities with a broad geographic appeal. Combination light manufacturing/retail and employment intensive office uses would be ideal.

The present commitment to 588 low-income units would be sustained. Also mixed-income residential needs could be met within a reduced housing area, by an emphasis on units for adults and childless couples.
The three land-use approaches present a snap-shot view of development possibilities. Certain thematic emphasis are present in all of them. The institutional emphasis, the first option, can be seen as a continuation of the current trend on the peninsula, with scattered and uncoordinated plans for each section of the site. Mostly, non-tax producing public institutions would locate there. A developer would be found for the Bayside Mall, and the public housing site would remain low-income, as in all likelihood a housing developer could not be found. This option basically outlined a "no market," or negligible development interest in the site. This was the only plan which sought to maintain substantial units of low-income housing.

The Committee did not choose this option. Low-income housing and continued institutional development were not desireable results for the City and local businesses, if private development potential existed. No new housing would leave low-income housing as the only residential area and continue the stigmatization of the peninsula. It was feared that this would probably discourage all private redevelopment. Low-income units subsumed into a new, mixed income development which would be privately owned and managed would be a far wiser option.

The housing and economic development options presented alternatives with market potential. Since the site was attractive, either private housing or some form of profit-making
and tax producing enterprise could locate there. Mixed-income housing, as long as it private, and commercial and industrial development were interchangeable, productive land-uses. The choice was solely dependent on what the participants saw as more suitable for the peninsula. Therefore, both options only considered 588 units of low-income housing--so as to defer development activities to more profitable uses, regardless of the extent public housing could be rehabilitated. While available funding was seen as no different than in Option 1, the emphasis would be placed on developing mixed-income housing.

The final selection made by the Committee most closely approximately Option 2, the housing emphasis. In conjunction with this, the development of specific parcels such as the Bayside Mall, the Pumphouse, and the land adjacent to the MBTA station would be undertaken.

The Composite Development Plan
In June, 1977, four weeks after their review of the Land-use Approaches, the PCC issued the "Composite Development Plan" to solicit consensus among Committee members about a more specific course of action. The PPC's work had to be speeded up so that it could be incorporated in the City's "Boston Plan," by July. The Composite Development Plan reflected the work by the Committee to define a framework for future activities and to outline both public sector investment and
policy requirements and private development opportunities.

In the Composite Development Plan, mixed-income occupancy was "an essential factor in the overall development success of the peninsula," and $30 million of public investment was to serve as the catalyst for $142 million of private investment. Development opportunities were outlined in four areas:

1. The Bayside Mall.
2. The area occupied by the housing project and residential open space.
3. The underdeveloped land surrounding the pumphouse and shoreline.
4. The area surrounding the Columbia Station transit stop.

The final redevelopment plan would result in the following:

- Creation of a new, mixed-income housing community with a population of 25% low, 50% moderate and 25% middle-income households.
- A commitment to house 420 existing tenants in new or modernized housing.
- Construction of 780 to 1,040 new units with an average density of 30 to 40 units per acre.
- Demolition of more than half of the existing housing project (16 of the 27 buildings).
- Conversion to non-public management and private ownership of existing housing.
- Conversion of the pumphouse to a conference and cultural center and the possible development of a new hotel complex to create 650 jobs.
o Revitalization of the Bayside Mall for retail and office use to create 850 jobs.

o Development of the beach front area, two marinas, and facilities for recreational boating.

o Relocation of the Columbia station to allow for industrial development on 11 acres of land.

o Creation of a special entity with authority to raise funds through bonding as well as from federal and state sources directed towards the development of the peninsula.

The decisions made for the housing site will be looked at in more detail. The plan contained the following on demolition:

Demolition of the existing structures is assumed as the most reasonable approach, because of the prevailing negative image attached to these "hi-rise" buildings, the difficulty of incorporating them successfully into a new mixed-income community and the related difficulty of attracting private development interest in adjacent land parcels.

The possibility of selective retention and renovation of some of these buildings would depend upon as yet unanalyzed potential for renovation into market housing, availability of funds, developer interest and market conditions.114

On income mix, the plan proposed to rehouse only 420 low-income households and that a "successful merger of new and renovated housing and the utilization of income waivers with the low-income component would allow gradual social transition to a broader income spread."115

Regarding ownership and management, the PPC recommended that public bodies involved in the ownership and operation of Columbia Point should investigate mechanisms allowing transfer of ownership, particularly to permit incorporation of older, renovated units into a comprehensive mixed-income housing
development program under non-public management. In assessing the Composite Development Plan, decisions on demolition of the "hi-rises", ownership, selective retention and renovation, depended on market conditions and the ability to attract private development interest. The motives behind the Plan were not premised on the re-use potential of the buildings. Comparative cost advantages of rehabilitation, or an examination of the existing physical design problems and how the buildings can be corrected and made suitable for habitation were not undertaken. Neither were there attempts to look at how the 7 story "mid-rises" (not hi-rises) could be renovated.

In achieving a merger between new and existing housing, the use of housing subsidies other than public housing would help to disperse the poor and eliminate their presence as an identifiable element. As long as all housing on the peninsula is made sufficiently attractive, a market would exist for other income groups, therefore, the less low-income tenants were tied to particular units because of subsidy programs, the better. If the buildings have a negative "image," hence no market demand, they should come down. The need to "merge" old and new buildings to allow for market housing and income mix would mean the disposition of public housing land and stock to the private sector. It is interesting how one requirement leads to another the moment the objective becomes the creation of mixed-income housing.
The Peninsula Planning Committee's proposal represented the private sector's interest in putting the site to its highest and best use; it had very little to do with maintaining the integrity of the housing authority or the public sector in fulfilling their mandate to house the poor.

The Boston Plan
The Peninsula Planning Committee's Composite Development Plan was submitted to Mayor White in July, 1977, to be incorporated into "The Boston Plan," as part of the City's newest strategy to obtain federal funds. As there had been close collaboration between the Mayor's office and the PPC, major revisions were not made to the basic plan. The PPC's plan was inserted into the body of the new document as one of the four target areas in Boston for neighborhood and commercial revitalization.

Changes and additions to the plan were made simply to outline in greater detail development and financing mechanisms, and to elaborate on the economic and social benefits to the City. For example, the City of Boston, acting through the BRA, would designate a sole developer for each parcel, and "acquire all the land necessary for public ownership with the BHA, U Mass and the City donating land." Marketing strategies for the new residential development would "focus on the growing middle and upper-income sector demand for housing." The City also expected the development to increase the property values on the peninsula and thereby increase the City's tax base.
The BRA provided assistance in producing schematic drawings and constructing a model of the new redevelopment plan.

The Boston Plan was announced by the Mayor in August, 1977. The Plan first drew an indifferent response from the tenants, who had become aware of it by reading the newspapers. They just viewed it as another plan in a succession of plans, with no more likelihood of being implemented and no different than the 1974 Thompson Plan. Tenants were becoming accustomed to being excluded from plans which never seemed to address their needs and which had little potential for realization.

The Columbia Point tenants were not consulted during the development of the plan, even though many tenants were actively involved with the BHA modernization efforts underway at the time. An initial response came from Gershon Ratner, GBLS attorney in the Perez Case, who said that the demolition proposed "doesn't respond to the need for low-income housing in the City." The City and the Peninsula Planning Committee's claim of tenant endorsement of the plan was attributed to the participation of Charles Knowles, Executive Director of the Columbia Point APAC, who had praised the plan. He did not even live in the project.

On September 4, 1977, came the announcement of a "summit meeting" for Columbia Point called jointly by Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Thomas O'Neill to launch efforts to obtain
Figure 15: The 1977 Boston Plan, BRA Model

Figure 16: Proposed new marina and townhouse development
funds for the Boston Plan. Senator Kennedy, Governor Dukakis Lieutenant Governor O'Neill, Mayor White, Representative O'Neill, Speaker Thomas McGee, Senate President Harrington and Peninsula Planning Committee members were present to discuss two items: insuring federal funds for the Boston Plan, in particular Columbia Point; and devising a mechanism to manage and coordinate the peninsula's development. The Boston Globe reported that it was the "first time that such an array of political figures had gathered to unite being a single project such as the Boston Plan's Columbia Point development." Again, no tenants were invited, nor informed of the meeting.

Three days later, Columbia Point tenants began holding major community meetings in the development to discuss the Boston Plan, specifically the issues of demolition, income-mix, tenant employment and housing guarantees to present tenants. Demands were made to the City and HUD to rehouse present tenants, give them preferences for new units, and increase housing subsidies and employment opportunities. On September 21, 1977, in a letter addressed to Governor Dukakis and attendees of the "summit meeting," signed by Marjorie Hardiman, TPC Chairman and Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director was the following:

TPC formally protests the continuous planning for the public housing at Columbia Point without any proper tenant involvement. We also have a responsibility to and for the 10,000 families on the current waiting
lists. (With) the increasing need for affordable housing for low income people, we have a commitment to increasing the number of units available...

...We, and the tenants at Columbia Point, are increasingly concerned that with the three groups now actively planning for this area, the ultimate winners will be the financial and development community--and the tourists. A majority of the tenants at Columbia Point have now lived there for ten or more years. THESE TENANTS WILL NOT MOVE OUT OF COLUMBIA POINT. NOR WILL WE PERMIT MAJOR DEMOLITION OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS. 122

Tenant's reactions were now so strong around the disclosures of the plans for Columbia Point that on October 17, 1977, a month later, at the TPC's Annual Meeting comprising all the city-wide tenant Task Forces, the following resolution was passed (see Appendix):

Be it known that the TPC, representing more than 60,000 tenants of Boston Public housing does hereby express its complete and active opposition to any action which would result in any reduction in the total number of occupied or unoccupied rental units now administered by the BHA.

TPC opposed any reduction of rental units in public housing, at any development, or in subsidized housing for any reason, unless compensated by the addition of at least an equal number of new rental units--either through subsidized housing or other public housing programs.

Like all the other plans, the Boston Plan resulted in no action, while conditions continued to deteriorate in the development. In October 1977, only 453 family and elderly households were still living in Columbia Point. This was a decline of another 90 households from the year before. 123
Some important precedents were established during this period. To summarize, the Peninsula Planning Committee's Composite Development Plan and the City's Boston Plan reiterated a commitment to rehouse existing tenants and the creation of a mixed-use and mixed-income environment on the peninsula as outlined in the Thompson Plan. But instead of the commitment in 1974 to rehouse 1,000 low-income households, only 420 households would now be provided for. The original proposal for a 4,000 unit mixed-income development had been reduced to 1,500 units.

Both the Composite Development Plan and the Boston Plan laid the basis for more detailed development issues on the extent of demolition and disposition of the public housing site, converting to private management, developing marketing strategies for attracting middle and upper-income households, and identifying individual parcels as public and private investment opportunities. The two plans, moreover, established a rationale for private redevelopment of the public housing site, which remains a dominant theme even now.

Columbia Point tenants were still excluded from the planning process. But, as momentum and support of the plans developed among private and public sector officials, the Columbia Point tenants and the city-wide public housing tenants' organization, the Tenants Policy Council protested the exclusion of tenants from the planning process, and passed a resolution opposed to the reduction of low-income units in Boston.
Tenant Task Force Elections

In April 1978, Columbia Point tenants elected a new Tenant Task Force which was to be the most active in bringing tenants into the redevelopment process. Over 50% of the households voted in the elections, a result of intense organizing work done by the residents; TPC; Mark Goode, the Community Organizational Specialist; and Stan Gibson, the Revitalization Director. For the first time, an elected and representative tenants Task Force was established at Columbia Point.

Until now tenants had been largely excluded from decision-making. A combination of factors changed the climate for negotiation and leverage to enable active participation from tenants. First, the successful tenants' referendum on modernization spurred momentum for the involvement of tenants in an organized fashion; positive results for both the tenants and the BHA were attainable from increased participation of the residents in decisions affecting their housing and community. The progress made under the Target Projects Program, even if limited, had encouraged tenants to be more active. Second, TPC continued to advocate for tenants' input in all levels of decision-making in full awareness that the interests of tenants would never be served unless an active and vocal Task Force existed.
Columbia Point was seen as a precedent for the rest of public housing in the city. The results of redevelopment could have serious implications for all public housing tenants. A cohesive local tenant body was absolutely necessary since TPC could not continue to play a central role in negotiating with the different parties around planning for Columbia Point. Third, the Master's Office and the TPP staff had supported the employment of tenants in security, construction, and management positions and were able to achieve increased tenant interest. And fourth, the Consent Decree had been signed on May 8, 1977. This put pressure on the BHA to perform in all aspects of management, including tenant participation. HUD regulations under TPP and UI programs also allowed for the funding of independent tenant activity.

The Tenants Policy Council announced the election of an eight member Task Force with an additional seven elected auxiliary members. The officers were Terry Mair, Chairman; Robert Rodriguez, Co-chair; Ruby Jaundoo, Treasurer, and Annie Smith Lacy, Secretary. Regular meetings were established with the Master's Office to discuss the Special Orders; with management and TPP staff to discuss modernization and ongoing concerns; and with BHA central office staff and local social service agencies to keep abreast of any new developments. The Task Force formed several working committees after completing a training program dealing with the Task Force's oversight responsibilities in such areas as BHA management and maintenance, security tenant employment, social services and planning for redevelopment. Special training sessions were
conducted which covered aspects of housing management, subsidy programs, tenant assignment procedures, budgets, information on the Consent Decree, and updated information from BHA, BRA and TPC, on the redevelopment efforts.

Part of the educational process led to a trip in May to King's Lynne (formerly the America Park housing project, described in Chapter 3), to visit the partially completed site. During this trip, Task Force members were impressed with King's Lynne's history and the recent redevelopment efforts. The Columbia Point Task Force and the King's Lynne Residents Council entered into a dialogue about the possibilities of redeveloping Columbia Point in a similar manner. Eleanor Wessell, the King's Lynne tenant leader came to speak at a Columbia Point Task Force meeting. In June 1978, the Task Force took another trip to King's Lynne.

This experience was to be an important turning point for the Task Force who had little knowledge of a redevelopment effort which encompassed not only the components of tenant decision making, but also tenant ownership. In contrast to this, the existing plans for Columbia Point lacked any significant gains for tenants. As stated by Terry Mair:

Many of us feel that the present plans for Columbia Point are disappointing, the modernization that is ongoing needs to be re-evaluated as the community needs something more substantial than a lick and a promise.  

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In the Spring of 1978, the Peninsula Planning Committee as a group had pretty much dissolved. Gordon Brigham, who had worked on Columbia Point in the U Mass President's Office had left to work for the City, heading up the Boston Plan. U Mass President Wood, was one of the few PPC members how remained active. He continued further efforts to establish a public entity or development mechanism to proceed with implementation of the Boston Plan. The PPC had already proposed 3 development options in a July 22, 1977 memorandum from Paula Rosen, the PPC attorney, to its members:

1. Establishing an urban renewal corporation.
2. Amending the Massport Authority Statute so as to develop Columbia Point.
3. Establishing a Columbia Point Development Corporation as a public corporation.¹²⁵

Robert Wood backed the idea of enactment of a statute creating a city agency or authority to deal exclusively with the development of the peninsula by establishing a separate entity from the BRA and BHA to handle Columbia Point. He even prepared the draft legislation to be approved by the State Legislature. This alternative would give the new entity unparalleled powers to acquire parcels by eminent domain, grant 121A tax status, float bonds, and essentially perform all functions of a state housing agency without influence from the City, the Mayor's Office or the City Council. It was to be modelled after New York's Urban Development Corporation (UDC). But Mayor White did not like the idea, and put a halt to any further activities in this direction.¹²⁶
With a dormant Peninsula Planning Committee, the BRA controlled the planning process. Robert Walsh, the new BRA Administrator, reputedly said that the BRA would "call the shots" from then on as to what would happen on the peninsula. BHA who had up to now taken a back seat in the process, finally said "no," after all it was BHA who owned the housing site. Brendan Geraghty, the Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and Modernization moved to establish BHA as co-partner in the process. 127 Roland Burke had already left, and a new BHA Columbia Point coordinator had to be hired. The Planning Department was restructured so that the new coordinator would be responsible directly to the Assistant Administrator. In the Spring of 1978, the BHA and BRA proceeded with negotiations on a joint development plan.

The Columbia Point Survey and Planning Program

The "Columbia Point Survey and Planning Program" undertaken by the BRA and BHA was to encompass the work items needed for implementation of the Boston Plan. It became necessary to acquire planning funds for a work plan which included: market studies for moderate and market-rate housing, an assessment of the availability of housing subsidy programs, a market study, for the Bayside Mall and other commercial parcels, transportation studies, sub-soil analyses and other studies. In carrying out the work plan, the BRA and the BHA agreed to sharing information, holding regular meetings, and consulting each other prior to any funding submissions. 128 If disagreements surfaced, immediate efforts
made to resolve them. These measures were taken to prevent either agency from "taking over" the redevelopment process. Each agency recognized the other's "legal responsibilities and legitimate rights" with regard to the development of the peninsula.

The work items were divided into two parts: the revitalization of the existing public housing project and the development of "contiguous areas for recreation, commercial and housing users." BHA was responsible for the public housing site, including an analysis of the physical conditions, the resident population, tenant composition, the demand for low-income family and elderly housing, ownership options, financing mechanism for subsidized housing, and the different management techniques. Included as part of its task, BHA was to analyze alternative "replacement housing" for low-income units lost through redevelopment.129 The BRA tasks included overall urban design of the peninsula, project inventory, housing market analysis for the entire site, environmental, transportation and air quality studies, development potentials, and financial feasibility.

On March 16, 1978, a joint letter signed by Robert Walsh, Director of the BRA and Kevin Feeley, Acting Administrator of the BHA, was sent to HUD Secretary Patricia Harris to inform her of two agencies cooperation in comprehensive planning and approximately $1 million would enable the agencies to carry out the Survey and Planning Program over a two year period.130
This package to HUD contained two important elements of the City and BHA's policy on redevelopment:

Any demolition of conventional public housing units cannot be implemented in isolation to the housing policy and needs of the City of Boston as a whole. Accordingly, Boston's plan for the peninsula proposed that every unit which is demolished or otherwise not available for low-income housing purposes be replaced by an alternative unit of low-income family housing somewhere in the City of Boston. As part of the survey and planning process, the City and BHA will develop a city-wide policy that assures through the location of units and administration of subsidy that such replacement units can be created.131

An agreed upon task by the two parties was for the BHA to take prime responsibility for organizing and directing a planning process which would investigate "alternative methods of achieving a viable socially integrated residential community adequately serving the needs of low-income families and other residents," this included:

In the event that the development alternative finally selected represents less low-income housing than presently exists in the Columbia Point development (1,504), alternative replacement low-income family housing units must be provided within the City of Boston. These units must be in addition to the level of units which would otherwise be received.

The various methods by which this commitment could be met, (either by developing or obtaining such units through subsidized or public housing, new construction, rehabilitation, Section 8 certificates, etc.) must be analysed and evaluated. This planning process should be conducted in a joint manner between BHA and BRA.132

Even though the requested funds were not awarded by HUD because of the imminent funding of the Urban Initiatives Program, the work plan was nevertheless undertaken by the BHA and BRA in the succeeding months, that is all items except for replacement housing.

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The Goody and Clancy Plan

Continuing relations between the Columbia Point Tenant Task Force and residents at King's Lynne eventually led to the Task Force contact with the firm of Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison, Inc. (CMJ), the co-developer with the tenants of King's Lynne. CMJ proceeded to work with the Task Force in formulating a suitable plan. The architectural firm of Goody and Clancy was brought on to develop with the tenants an overall concept and design for the public housing and the adjoining sites. The result was "Harbor Park: A Proposal for the Redevelopment of Columbia Point." It was modelled after King's Lynne with the Columbia Point Tenant Task Force and CMJ as co-developers.

The collaboration between CMJ and the Task Force almost led to the designation of CMJ as sole developer in the awarding of Urban Initiative funds to Columbia Point. Joan Goody had spent several weeks with the Task Force developing the site plan and the building and unit design; Joe Mullins was a friend of the BHA Board Chairman Barbara Carpenter; meetings between CMJ and Steve Coyle at HUD took place; and John Connolly, a BHA Board member, and others supported CMJ as developer for the site. For a period it looked as though CMJ might be "wired into" the UI program, and have a likely chance of being designated the developer for the rest of the housing parcels on the peninsula.
The Harbor Park plan contained the following elements:

- Development of a mixed-income residential community on a 50 acre site including the BHA site, the northern shoreline, and part of the U Mass property.

- Substantial rehabilitation and new construction with retention of all existing low-rises for renovation into family housing would take place.

- Approximately 8 mid-rises would be demolished and the remaining 6 mid-rise buildings would be used for elderly housing. 192 units of new townhouses would be constructed on the easterly side of the site, and 6 high-rise towers would be located near the shoreline.

- Low-rises would contain duplexes with separate ground floor entrances. Fourth floors and balconies were to be added to the buildings for stacked duplexes of 3, 4, and 5 bedroom units. The wings of the buildings were to contain 2 bedroom units and new exterior stairs.

- Mid-rises would contain 1 and 2 bedroom units for elderly and adult households with the existing 3 bedroom units converted to three elderly units.

- New townhouse family units would consist of 2 stories, two to four bedroom units facing onto pedestrian paths or walkways. Parking would be removed from the units. All townhouse units were to have private back yards and balconies.

- The construction of community and service facilities would include an elderly service center, an adult educational/cultural center, a daycare center, and play area, large outdoor play spaces, a swimming pool to be added to the existing recreation center, and a beach and a marina.

- Street patterns would be arranged diagonally from Mt. Vernon Street to the shoreline. A new road would be constructed along the shore.

The plan did not receive support from the staff at BHA, the only group skirted by CMJ's lobbying effort. This included Brendan Geraghty and Kevin Feeley, who wanted to submit several letters not just CMJ's showing developers' interest in the site so as to insure competition in the selection process. Friction
developed between the Task Force, who wanted the CMJ designation and the BHA staff who did not want to name a sole developer. Differences were also apparent between the BHA staff and the various BHA Board members who were in favor of CMJ.

The Urban Initiatives application which was submitted by BHA in August 1878 finally contained several letters of interest from other developers. This a clear affront to the Task Force and CMJ who already had completed work on a partnership proposal.

The Task Force was back at step one now that a developer selection process would have to take place prior to the awarding of a contract. Even though the Harbor Park Plan did not receive serious consideration due to the politics surrounding its introduction, it was the first time in any of the proposals that a more detailed and realistic plan was proposed showing actual unit design; a concept for the redesign and adaptation of existing buildings; and an attempt at producing a cohesive site plan for the residential community. This was also the first time tenants were directly involved in the formulation of plans for the housing development. The tenants were to learn quickly from this unsuccessful experience.

The Urban Initiative Proposal
Steve Coyle, Assistant to the Secretary of HUD and a former Director of the Dedham Housing Authority, had created the Urban Initiatives Program with Columbia Point in mind.
The BHA Urban Initiatives application requested funding for Bromley-Heath and Orchard Park in addition to Columbia Point, but HUD was to single out Columbia Point.

The BHA application as originally proposed requested funds for housing rehabilitation and made only brief references to private redevelopment. The total request for $10.7 million was for rehabilitating all of the low-rises, a few of the mid-rises, and landscaping to create a basis for a stable community. Low-rises were to contain vertical breakthroughs for duplex units on the ground floor. The rehabilitation improvements proposed for the low-rise section of the development included:

- Extensive modernization of buildings including design modifications to provide optimum security and surveillance opportunities for tenants. Modernization of apartments will include breakthroughs and other measures to increase the amount of living space available and to reduce overcrowding.

- Major new landscaping and exterior construction to create a hierarchy of public and private spaces and a sense of community and security for tenants.

- Rehabilitation of unused space in existing buildings to accommodate service or rented uses for tenants (small grocery and drug store operated by a community development corporation).
Although the requested $10 million figure was a hold over from the previous BHA request, the unsuccessful "October Plan," HUD wanted to grant BHA only $8 million until Senator Brooke, Senator Kennedy and Representative Moakley supported the retention of the $10 million. As a result, Columbia Point received one of the highest per unit allocations of the more than 30 "troubled" developments selected nationally.  

The announcement of the Urban Initiatives award in September 1978, brought forth the following response from Terry Mair, Task Force Chairman, "I'm overjoyed, it's a step towards progress. Columbia Point should be the place most envied by every neighborhood in the City. It'll be a privileged place to live in a mini-capital of Boston." David Carter, Columbia Point Coordinator, succinctly summarized BHA's plan: "We see the tenants as the key to the success of the entire strategy. They and we want to create a mixed-income community." 

But for the tenants, the award still brought no assurances of tenant input. The lesson learned by the Task Force from the Harbor Park experience was that it was futile to place their energy in design issues until such time as tenants can control part of the planning and decision making.

The Columbia Point Redevelopment Agreement

After the Harbor Park affair, relations between the Task Force and BHA rapidly deteriorated. By late fall, the Task Force was
working with the assistance of Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD), to achieve a greater role for tenants in the redevelopment process. GBCD had also provided technical assistance to the tenants of King's Lynne. GBCD agreed to work for the Columbia Point Tenant Task Force and to defer payment until such time as a Task Force budget was approved by BHA.

The Task Force incorporated itself in December of 1978 as the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc. so as to be able to receive funds, contract for services, and assume the role of a development entity. The Task Force's work concentrated on seeking a legally binding agreement with the BHA to guarantee the Task Force certain rights in representation and negotiation, establish the terms on tenant input, and to require the BHA to seek concurrence with the Task Force prior to any decisions in redeveloping the housing project. This was to include any expenditure of funds. In the proposed agreement, a schedule for issuing the developer's selection kit was included, as was an agreement for BHA to fund a Task Force budget.

The terms of a BHA/Task Force agreement became the major subject of weekly meetings of the Columbia Point Coordinating Committee, a committee initiated by BHA with representation from BHA's field and central offices, the Task Force, and later the BRA, to deal with management and maintenance concerns and planning for redevelopment. But, during this period, BHA became unresponsive on reaching an agreement with the Task Force, as
they did not want to provide the tenants with a budget so that they could hire GBCD. GBCD was a source of contention since the Court-Appointed Master was its former Executive Director. BHA maintained that the Task Force should not select consultants who might be in a position to influence BHA in its official duties, but BHA also did not respond to the Task Force's request for assistance with the consultant selection process, nor did they supply any guidelines or criteria. Revisions in the Task Force's by-laws were also insisted on by BHA, who felt that they were seriously flawed and open to potential abuse.

On December 18, 1978, Terry Mair, Task Force President, addressed a letter to Barbara Carpenter, Chairman of the BHA Board, stating that implementation of UI was in jeopardy because of the refusal of the Authority to agree to a reasonable basis for tenant involvement. The elected Task Force had supported the UI proposal back in August with the understanding that tenants had the right to approve decisions on the expenditure of any funds and that funding for technical support to the Task Force would be provided. The letter stated that BHA refused to agree to any role for the Task Force despite four months of work to reach a written agreement, and backed off solely based on GBCD's involvement with the Task Force: "we are seriously concerned that BHA wants the form of a major tenant role but is not prepared to live with the substance of that tenant involvement." The letter continued to say that unless an agreement is reached and signed, the Task Force will "oppose BHA going forward with
the UI program here. We have so notified HUD in writing today. 148 Enclosed along with this letter was the 3rd draft of an agreement for BHA to sign.

BHA was still reluctant to sign the agreement, but in a letter from Kevin Feeley to the Task Force, BHA agreed to enter into a contract with the Task Force for technical assistance as long as the BHA Board approved the selection of the Task Force's consultant. The Task Force was to interview a number of consultants, including a minority firm prior to making their decision. 149 The message was clear, BHA did not want GBCD to be hired.

In the meantime, the BHA/Task Force agreement still remained unsigned. But as time passed, BHA became eager to proceed with an agreement so that a developer's kit could be issued by February 20, 1979. BHA was also under pressure from HUD to get things moving. At the same time, BHA knew that without such an agreement, they could take a chance and issue a kit on their own. So without first consulting the Task Force, BHA sent to HUD a draft developer's kit titled a "Request for Qualifications and Site Analysis: Columbia Point Housing Development and Adjacent Parcels." 150 This caused considerable outrage from not only the Task Force, but also the City, who did not approve of BHA soliciting on non-BHA parcels without their approval. BHA was to pay dearly for this.
In a letter to Kevin Feeley, January 22, 1979, the Task Force again insisted on the full participation of tenants, the right of the Task Force to jointly select a developer with BHA and BRA, and for no actions to be taken until a "detailed plan" for the total housing site on the peninsula was agreed upon between the Task Force, BHA and BRA. What had originally been a BHA and Task Force agreement, now became a three party agreement. The Task Force enclosed another draft of an agreement for both the BHA and BRA to consider.151

The inclusion of BRA as party to the agreement from now on was to "haunt" BHA; a game of two parties teaming up against the third was to set a trend for the negotiating style that followed. Now BHA was also under pressure from BRA to sign so as to get the redevelopment process underway. It is widely believed that the real reason BHA finally signed the agreement was because Tarry Mair addressed the BHA Board and said the Task Force was no longer pressing for the hiring of GBCD as their consultants.152

The BHA Chairman signed the agreement on February 21, 1979. The three party agreement, known at the Columbia Point Peninsula Redevelopment Agreement was signed by Terry Mair, President of the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc; Kevin Feeley, Acting Administrator of BHA; and Robert Ryan, Director of the BRA. The agreement contained the following:

1. All residents of Columbia Point on or after July 1, 1977, who wish to remain will be provided decent housing on the peninsula with housing costs not to exceed 25% of their income.
2. The First Phase of redevelopment shall include to the maximum extent possible the revitalization of the existing public housing development and the provision of decent housing for current residents.

3. The Task Force, as the representative organization for residents of the peninsula, will be joint participants in the modernization, development and operation of all new and rehabilitated housing on the peninsula.

4. All housing will be planned to accommodate a mixture of residents with income, within each part to the extent legally permissable, in a fashion which provides as good a living environment for lower income people as for those of upper income.

5. The Task Force will participate in the selection of a developer for the BHA parcel with the final decision to be made by the BHA Board.

6. The parties agree that the extent of demolition on the public housing site shall be carried out only after the agreement of the Task Force and the BHA to that demolition as consistant with an overall plan for the Peninsula that effectively meets current and future residents' needs.

7. At the earliest possible date, management of the public housing development shall be transferred from BHA to a private firm.

8. The Task Force, BHA and BRA would agree to the details of an overall plan, including income mix, location of new and rehabilitated housing and the schedule of development.

9. Social and community services, and job training should be provided for the current residents.

Preparation of the next developer selection kit and completion of outstanding work items were due by the end of March, so that the kit could be released in April. Developer's proposals were to be received by July 1, and the developer or development team designated by July 31.
The Coordinating Committee continued the process of reviewing the work items, including the retail and market housing studies prepared by the BRA and an assessment of low and moderate-income housing needs prepared by the BHA. The Committee also reviewed a proposal for the new MBTA Quincy Station, and prepared the Task Force budget and contract to be approved by the BHA Board.

During this period, BHA contracted the architectural firm of Steffian Bradley Associates to do a limited study on the feasibility of rehabilitating the existing buildings. This was to include ideas for opening up the ground floors of the buildings, redesigning living quarters and exploring alternatives to massive demolition. Solutions for redesigning the mid-rises were to be developed. The consultants were to explore possibilities for vertical breakthroughs in the low-rise as well as on the ground floor of the mid-rises. They were also to study the use of facade treatments such as balconies and different materials to break up the surface of the orange brick exteriors and change their appearance. 155

By March 1979 a letter was sent from Brandan Geraghty to Marvin Siflinger stating that progress was being made by the parties. 156 The Task Force was to be a joint developer with the private development entity, the anticipated schedule for release of the kit was still April, a developer would be designated by July, and an estimated $50 to $60 million would be needed for

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redevelopment. BHA then requested from HUD a waiver of contract bidding procedures for developer selection in favor of a developer review process which would include input from the BRA and the Task Force.

By the end of March, the BHA Board approved $7,000 in seed money for the Task Force with a full budget of $82,000 to be approved by the Board at a later date. Throughout this period, the Task Force was working with BHA and Steffian Bradley Associates on design issues, and they also worked separately with the urban design firm of Carr, Lynch Associates to develop their own version of a redevelopment plan for the BHA and adjoining sites. This was done without informing BHA and BRA.

In order to meet the deadline for issuing the developer selection kit, the Coordinating Committee decided to informally solicit opinions from developers, builders and architects on the attractiveness of developing mixed-income housing and services at Columbia Point. The initial feedback from firms such as F.D. Rich, State Street Development, Stull Associates, Peabody Construction, Cruise Construction, Housing Innovations, etc., was positive. It was felt that a private developer should be brought on as soon as possible with the immediate expenditure of the UI monies. Even though a demand existed for market-housing, recial and income mix have to be carefully planned. Simultaneous development should start on the BHA and other sites and market housing started in the rehabilitated units. As the anticipated
market rents for new housing were anywhere from $400 to $700 monthly, other forms of ownership and financing such as Section 8, cooperative housing, and home-ownership programs were to be considered for the low-income component.

By now the Coordinating Committee had been meeting extensively, but was still unable to reach consensus on the following issues: the range of unit sizes, building mix, the range of demolition, the definition of income levels, income mix, and the location for new units. The role of the Task Force, the review process for developer selection, interim management and who was to be rehoused, were other sensitive issues that were still unresolved because of the diverse perspectives of the three parties. The "threat" of any one party dropping out of the process kept up the pressure to reach an agreement.

Different strategies were adopted by each party in the negotiations. The Task Force wanted to tie in the development of the adjacent non-BHA owned properties with the public housing site to insure the construction of low-income housing throughout the peninsula. The tenants wanted sufficient numbers of low-income family housing to be provided in newly constructed townhouses so as not to be confined to rehabilitated units in the housing project. Cooperation with the City and the BRA was necessary for the urban renewal designation, for packaging the adjoining sites, and providing the necessary public improvements and investments for large scale redevelopment.
If BRA or the City pulled out of the redevelopment effort, there was sure to be no future development on the peninsula--further jeopardizing any improvements to the housing project. The City could just wait another few years until all low-income tenants had moved and then redevelop the total site for market-rate housing.

The BRA wanted to see market-rate housing constructed, but market-rate housing could not succeed on the peninsula as long as the public housing remained in its present condition. The image of the peninsula had to be significantly changed by redeveloping the public housing. Furthermore, the public housing site was the largest developable parcel and well situated. It provided an inexpensive and scarce source of prime land if the City could get BHA to dispose of it. In any case, if private development could take place on a major portion of the BHA site, it could result in a large number of moderate and market-rate housing. In addition, the use of the $10 million UI monies and other public funds could leverage substantial private investments on the peninsula.

The threat to both the City and the Task Force was the possibility of BHA abandoning the joint development process and redeveloping the public housing site on its own. But BHA was already reputed for its inability to maintain or manage, let alone redevelop its properties. It was further under the dictate of the Mayor who appointed 4 of the 5 BHA Board members. Therefore, it was unlikely for BHA to take any leadership.
Even if BHA wanted to proceed with redeveloping the housing site by itself, it still needed the tenants approval and sign-off for the use of the UI funds, and it needed additional funding from HUD.

The BHA, with its history of negligence and indifference towards tenants, didn't see any reasons to maintain public housing, especially if it could "acceptably" relinquish its responsibilities through disposition, private management and other means. Thus, while willing to give lip service to "low-income housing needs," it had basically already acquiesced to the City's program for the development of the housing site. But unlike the other parties, BHA was also accountable to HUD, its parent organization, who did have concerns about the final impact of any redevelopment scheme on the low-income housing population, and to the availability of low-income housing, the unit type, ownership and demolition.

The three parties with widely divergent interests were thus juggling the issues of income mix, the number of family and elderly units, how to phase construction, etc., to arrive at some sort of compromise to keep the planning process intact.
The Columbia Point Community Task Force Plan

On June 13, 1979, the Columbia Point Community Task Force unveiled their proposal for the peninsula: "The Columbia Point Revitalization Plan," to the BHA, BRA, TPC, and the Master's Office. With the assistance of Carr, Lynch Associates, and GBCD, the Task Force developed the "first plan of the revitalization of Columbia Point prepared by its residents." The plan was to meet the needs of current residents and help them make decisions on the most appropriate ways of using the funds. The result of 3 months of intensive work, the Task Force saw its plan as an important step in the joint work process and as a basis for continuing negotiations with the BHA and BRA.

The written report, a 130 page document known as the "Green Book" (it has a green cover) was issued in July. The Plan contained the following elements:

- Development of 1,250 units of mixed-income housing with 770 units of family housing (64%), and 480 units of elderly housing (36%).

- Income mix is established with a minimum of 37.5% low income, 37.5% low to moderate income, and 25% market income. A minimum of 450 low-income units would be provided to honor the February 21, 1979 Agreement to the Columbia Point tenants.

- Development would proceed in 3 phases over an 8 year period: Phase 1 is to take place on the easterly portion of the site, including the BHA site and adjoining area near the pumphouse, and contain 568 new and rehabilitated units. Phase 2 encompasses the remaining portion of the BHA site with the development of 257 units of rehabilitated and new townhouse apartments. Phase 3 would develop an additional 325 units of housing primarily for adult (childless) households in two towers on the rear portion of the Bayside Mall site.
The development would be owned and managed by a limited partnership in which the Task Force would be a co-general partner with a private developer.

Existing families would be rehoused as soon as possible in the new townhouses, in 253 or 45% of the 568 units in Phase 1.

Sixteen of the total 27 buildings would be demolished or partially demolished. 822 units would be lost and 493 rehabilitated from the 1,504 existing units.

Use of the $11.2 million of UI and Modernization funds would be for Phase 1. This would include rehabilitation, demolition, a three year interim management program and landscaping.

Substantial income mix would be achieved through both ownership and rental housing with the use of Section 235, Section 8, moderate and market homeownership, low-income cooperatives and other subsidy programs.

Market level rents were estimated to be $615 per month for a one-bedroom rehabilitated unit for the elderly, $540 for a one-bedroom unit in new construction walk-up, and $768 to $1,080 for 3 to 6 bedrooms new construction, townhouses.

To accomplish 25% market rate income mix, the Task Force felt that a reasonable goal would be 10% market housing in Phase 1 which would increase to 50% by Phase 3 so as to gradually develop a market over time.

The comprehensiveness of the Task Force plan is demonstrated by the inclusion of an overall site plan, a model, general program and planning requirements for the housing site, a survey of resident housing needs, housing design guidelines and a development program encompassing construction phasing, subsidy programs and implementation strategies. This was the most comprehensive plan proposed by any of the parties. But, as with all the preceding plans, it also contained problems as to its adequacy in meeting the needs of low-income residents.
In May, 1979, prior to their presentation, the Task Force, with the assistance of Gayle Epp, produced a "Resident Needs Survey" to evaluate current housing conditions and to identify specific needs of the tenants in the new environment. This information laid the basis for some of the recommendations presented in the Green Book. The results of the survey, based on interviews with 71 Columbia Point residents, called for some of the following modifications to the apartment units: a generously dimensioned kitchen, partially or fully separated dining/family rooms, and a separate living room. Larger units should contain half-baths, more storage space, and living space on the ground floor with the bedrooms above. As to landscaping and open space, residents preferred designated areas for community and recreational use: sitting areas for adults, playgrounds, tot lots, defined green space and areas for enjoyment of the waterfront, instead of sprawling, undifferentiated open spaces.

In analyzing the unit-to-ground relation, the Survey found that 50% of the families in the low-rises preferred living on the second floor and 25% on the third floor because it was safer, more private and had less traffic. 25% preferred the first floor because they had difficulty climbing stairs or it was convenient for their children. While this showed the same preference for living on the first and third floor, the Survey concluded that "the majority of families responding indicated a preference for living on the first and second floor of a building," thus a
recommendation was made in the Green Book that as many units as possible should be located at or near the ground floor. Statistically, even though the residents voiced an equal desire for the first and third floor (25% in each category), the Survey did not conclude that the majority of residents preferred to live on the second and third floor.

Other problems were revealed in the Survey. For example, the conditions of families living in the mid-rise buildings were not adequately addressed. The Survey did not comment on the factors affecting the desirability of mid-rise living based on interviews with the residents, but made a prior assumption that mid-rise living was unsatisfactory. Efforts were not made to ascertain the relation of family size, family composition, or children's age with preferences for floor levels. Factors such as the desire for direct access to the units from the ground floor may well have been a response to the poor management and maintenance, and other problems such as the lack of security, than direct ground access being itself a crucial factor for family living. (See discussion in Chapter 1.)

The Resident Needs Survey is incomplete and ambiguous in certain areas, nevertheless, it is the first attempt in the history of planning at Columbia Point that current needs and residents satisfaction were documented. The Survey is a commendable achievement for the Task Force as the Thompson Plan
and the Boston Plan did not collect or analyze any data reflecting residents' needs. Unfortunately, it is in the translation and interpretation of the Survey that the weakness of the Green Book is revealed. The design and site plan have little to do with a rationale understanding of the tenants' needs or with a realistic solution for low-income housing.

The Task Force's housing objectives were to: (1) Create an attractive mixed-income family housing environment at Columbia Point; (2) provide decent and affordable housing as soon as possible to meet the current residents' needs; and (3) to maintain "a substantial commitment embodied in the initial development of public housing at Columbia Point." While these are laudable goals, it is questionable that the results of the plan proposed in the Green Book are consistent with these.

To achieve a "predominantly low-rise, family oriented community" the following decisions were made: demolish or "top" most of the mid-rises, create a community of garden apartments and walk-ups of the existing low-rises and 2 or 3 story new construction townhouses, and maintain a few of the existing mid-rises for the elderly. All units with three or more bedrooms would have direct ground access and small semi-private outdoor space. The old and new units should resemble "homes" with pitched roofs, entrance porches, balconies, and so on. A low density development with extensive landscaping and sprawling greenery could then transform the present image of the development and make the site attractive for mixed-income housing.

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Here is a look at some of the planning principles presented in the Task Force Plan:

1. There must be no visually distinct buildings or areas for one income group or racial group.164

While this appears to be a desirable and enlightened goal for total income and racial integration, it is unlikely that this can be achieved with the existing subsidy programs. In order to meet this goal would require getting rid of the public housing units—the most stable form of low-income housing, because it does not provide for broad income mix or for market housing. The use of Section 8 appears to be a solution, but insufficient funds exist to maintain the number of low and moderate-income units proposed in the Plan. This goal is therefore unrealistic. Furthermore, the benefits of total social mix are questionable (see discussion in Chapter 7).

2. There should be no separate areas of the development and "no sharp visible differentiation between old and new buildings." Functional and visual continuity should be provided.165

The Plan proposes that for old and new buildings to have consistent use patterns and massing, it requires the "thinning out" and demolition of many of the buildings. New townhouses would then be evenly distributed throughout the site. Design continuity requires brick exteriors and similar materials to be used for both the new and old buildings.166 Therefore,
while some of the old buildings are taken down, new ones are built to resemble the remaining old ones. The distribution of new townhouses "evenly" across the site would mean additional demolition. This principle calls for the demolition of many buildings which could otherwise be rehabilitated. It also makes little sense to create new buildings to look like the old ones.

3. "A single, connected circulation system" should be provided for the new community. 166

The proposed street system has streets running through existing buildings--resulting in considerable demolition. No clear rationale is made for the radical restructuring of the streets except to provide a single, long winding street so that the access points can be controlled for security reasons.

4. There should be a "continuous and ample flow of green open space,...areas behind buildings should be treated as open, generally unencumbered, common greens." 167 These areas are to include "winding paths between clumps of evergreen or deciduous trees, where picnic tables might be located." 168 While this conjures up a suburban like setting, the Plan also states that "the active use by children and families will be intense enough to warrant initial sodding rather than seeding of the greens." 169 It appears questionable that the open space will remain "green." Undifferentiated and uncontrolled open spaces behind the buildings
could lead to security and surveillance problems.

Internal inconsistencies are revealed in the Plan. The attempt is made to replicate suburban housing: tree-lined streets, and expanses of green space, but insufficient area appears to have been provided even with the demolition proposed. One can more easily imagine "patches" of grass and fields of dirt! Even more demolition should take place to gain more space, or a different "model" used than that of suburban housing. The Plan is also inconsistent with resident preference for defined open space, as shown by the Resident Needs Survey.

In the Green Book, the present site is described as too dense for successful family living.\(^{170}\) Except for buildings designated for the elderly, all seven-story mid-rises will be partially taken down or totally demolished. Even some of the low-rises are slated for demolition. One questions the decision to demolish and then build new units, unless new space requirements cannot be accommodated in the existing buildings or they have been deemed infeasible to rehabilitate. Many of the changes cited by the tenants in the Resident Needs Survey look as though they could be incorporated into the existing buildings. Some of the changes could include creating larger kitchens and living spaces, vertical and horizontal breakthroughs, extensive landscaping, in addition to overhousing families, are some of the changes that can be made. This can serve to decrease density without demolition, and make use of the
existing buildings. Even the Task Force Plan testifies to the feasibility of rehabilitation and to the adaptability of the buildings to redesign:

The buildings are of first class construction with reinforced concrete columns . . . fortunately, the interior walls are not load bearing, so that the building interiors may be gutted and redesigned to provide apartments of adequate size . . .

. . . townhouse units are the most difficult to develop from a feasibility perspective, given today's construction costs, available housing program guidelines, and the particular soil condition. 171

The extensive use of breakthroughs and duplex units in the low-rises as well as the lower stories of the mid-rises is a logical followthrough of the Task Force's own findings. Instead, the Task Force Plan calls for the demolition of 822 units, or 55% of the existing units, and construction of 757 new units. 172

The intensive work between the Task Force members and their consultants took place with little input from the larger Columbia Point community. The Green Book was widely distributed to those concerned with the redevelopment of Columbia Point, e.g., HUD, the City and the BRA, as representing the tenants' position, whereas most of the Columbia Point tenants remained uninformed as to the Plan's content. They might have been one of the families surveyed,
but they had no prior knowledge of a plan proposing demolition of more than half of the development and the conversion to private ownership and management.

The BHA Plan
On June 15, 1979, three days after the presentation of the Task Force Plan, the "Steffian Bradley/BHA Re-Use Program for Existing BHA Columbia Point Buildings" was presented. This was an unintentional counter proposal to the Task Force Plan.

The BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan (hereafter called the BHA Plan), proposed some ideas for creative adaptation and rehabilitation of the existing buildings more in line with the objectives and feasibility of redeveloping the BHA site as public housing. The objectives and feasibility of the study was limited in scope as it was not intended to present a total development program for the peninsula and was quickly overshadowed by the Task Force plan. The following are the components of the BHA plan:

- The proposed development of a total of 856 revitalized family and elderly units on the BHA site. This included housing for 408 family and 448 elderly households (See Table 8).
Table 8: Proposed Units: BHA/Steffian Bradley Re-Use Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Units</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>5 bedroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>4 bedroom</td>
</tr>
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<td>104</td>
<td>3 bedroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>2 bedroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 bedroom</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

408 Units of Family Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Unit Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>2 bedroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>1 bedroom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

448 Units of Elderly Housing


- Large family units will be provided in the low-rises in duplexes on the ground floor and small family units will be provided on the third floor. Some of the mid-rise buildings will be brought down to 4 stories and will contain stacked duplexes with separate entrances on the ground floor for families with children and small apartments on the upper floors for adult families.

- Elderly housing will be contained in 6 seven story buildings with new elevators, enlarged lobby space, balconies, new interior treatment and fixtures. Some interior walls will be moved to create larger units with fewer bedrooms.

- Two elderly buildings will be joined by new construction and reworked as a single-loaded corridor building. An interior courtyard will be constructed between the buildings.

- Demolition would consist of total demolition of 6 seven story buildings and partial demolition of 4 buildings. A total of 460 units will be lost through demolition and 188 by consolidation.
All units will be retained by BHA and managed either by BHA or under contract to tenant/developer entity managing adjacent housing on other parcels.

Cost estimates for rehabilitation were $33,284, per family unit and $28,500 per elderly unit. These were in contrast to new construction townhouses estimated at $53,000 per unit.

On the critical issue of demolition, the Task Force plan proposed that at least 820 units be demolished compared with 450 units in the BHA plan. The BHA plan maintains most of the project as public housing (with low and moderate-income mix) and an option for contracting out management and services. The Task Force plan calls for disposition of the majority of the site to a partnership between the private developer and the Task Force. In addition, the two plans provided significantly different approaches in the reuse and rehabilitation of the existing buildings. The BHA plan proposed a solution for using the lower stories of the mid-rises for family housing, and did not propose any major changes in restructuring the streets and site. From a design perspective, the BHA plan addressed many of the concerns raised in the Resident Needs Survey through rehabilitation instead of demolition and new construction. (See Appendix.)

During this period, BHA had also contracted the services of Dan Walker of Commonwealth Design, Inc. to estimate the feasibility of rehabilitation versus new construction. In 1979 a new construction unit at Columbia Point was estimated at
$66,000, and rehabilitation at an average of $32,900 per unit. This ranged from $28,000 for an elderly unit, to $37,600 for a large family duplex unit. Demolition was estimated at $1.55 per cubic foot for total demolition. David Carter, the Columbia Point Redevelopment Director, took these base estimates and applied them to the Task Force's proposal for rehabilitation of 360 existing units, construction of 78 new units and demolition of 3 buildings for Phase 2. The Task Force's total cost of construction and demolition came to $17.4 million with an average cost of $39,646 per unit. The cost per family unit being $44,891.175

BHA then proposed an alternative plan for Phase 2 by rehabilitating 602 existing units (242 more units than the Task Force), construction of 58 new units (20 units less than the Task Force), and demolition of 2 buildings (1 building less than the Task Force). Also using Dan Walker's estimates for construction and demolition, the total cost for the BHA alternative came to $21 million, but had a lower average cost of $34,953 per unit. The cost per family unit being $40,683.176 (See Appendix.)

For the whole public housing site (Phase 1A and 2), the BHA alternative proposed a lower cost per unit and retention of 1,048 total units in comparison to the Task Force's 824 units.177 The BHA alternative also called for demolishing 456 units compared with 680 in the Task Force plan. This information presented
a strong case for rehabilitation as opposed to demolition of the existing units, but BHA did not actively advocate for their own plan and as a result, did little to redirect attention away from the Task Force's plan. The feeling of the BHA staff at the time was that they were overwhelmed by the Task Force's plan and could not risk fighting against a "tenant initiated" plan regardless of the validity of the criticisms.

The August Letter

Discussions continued among the three parties, the BHA, BRA and the Task Force, focussing on the Task Force plan as the basis for negotiations. One of the first results of the Task Force plan was agreement by the parties to the location of the first phase of development, the easterly portion of the site. Urban Initiative funds would be committed to finance this part (Phase 1A) and the parties agreed to try and obtain Section 8 for existing and new family units within this phase. An effort would then be made to turn over the units (approximately 408) to a private developer. Additional funds also had to be found to transfer ownership and management from BHA.

When the BHA plan was first presented to HUD, HUD did not react nor show enthusiasm about it until after the Task Force's presentation. On August 9, 1979, the Task Force plan was presented to HUD who gave their response in a letter from
Edward Pollack, HUD Area Manager to Kevin Feeley, BHA Acting Administrator. It was noted that the completion of the developer's kit was behind schedule as agreement to income mix, market mix, and other issues were over due as of June 30, 1979. The Task Force plan was found inconsistent with other proposals because of the greater degree of demolition, the different course of development activity, and HUD "questioned the economic feasibility and cost of the tenants' plan." HUD also "questioned the BHA course of action in financing 408 family units through the Section 8 program and then turning these over to a private developer." Furthermore, HUD had previously established a September 30th deadline for the execution of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC), and the lack of this would result in the recapture of $10 million in UI reservation. Therefore, BHA, BRA and the Task Force were to submit the following no later than August 20th: an agreed upon plan for parcel 1A, approvable by HUD: agreement on the extent of demolition, market mix, elderly and family mix, and a commitment to an acceptable date prior to September 30, for completion and approval of the developer's kit.

During this period, BHA had also met with HUD officials to seek a waiver from competitive bidding requirements to permit the developer chosen for the overall development of Columbia Point to perform the modernization work. HUD General Counsel responded that since the development work might include work on
and improvements withdrawn from the present public housing project, and a detailed plan has not been approved by HUD, a decision on waiving the requirements was premature: "Any proposal for conversion of public housing units to other uses would have to be based on a specific proposal and justification ... Public housing modernization funds for Columbia Point may only be used for units which are to be kept in the public housing inventory."180

In response to HUD, on August 20, 1979, a three party letter, known as the "August letter" was signed by Terry Mair, Kevin Feeley, and Robert Ryan and sent to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area Manager, stating the development phasing agreed to: This included Phase 1A, a schedule of development activities, and management proposals. No mention was made of overall income mix, family/elderly mix and demolition figures. These parts of the development plan were outlined:

- Total redevelopment would result in 1,200-1,500 units of housing and a rehabilitated shopping mall.
- Large families would be best served by construction of new townhouses.
- All parcels were to be economically integrated.
- As soon as possible the entire BHA development should be brought under private management.
- First phase of construction should start at the easterly portion of the site: with Phase 1A on the BHA site and 1B on the non-BHA site. Total of Phase 1 will consist of between 600-920 units.
Within Phase 1A, 3 of 8 buildings included would be totally demolished and one "topped" and 2 buildings would be designated for the elderly and 2 for large families.

One-half of the present Columbia Point families would be relocated into new or substantially rehabilitated units as a result of Phase 1A.

Ownership opportunities for low, moderate and market-income residents would be evaluated.

A request was then made to HUD to approve the contracts for site planning, rehabilitation and design work on Phase 1A, preparation of demolition specifications, and a preliminary re-use evaluation. The August letter further stated: "We propose not to proceed past design development stage on the family buildings until a decision has been reached among all parties on whether to include these buildings in the developer's kit, or a decision by HUD to allow 50% moderate income occupancy."

It remained unclear whether the family buildings would be disposed of to a private developer unless HUD agreed to substantial income mix.

Until now, negotiations were difficult in arriving at a consensus on the development plan. But for the first time, the three parties agreed to some details on the housing site. Many important issues were still left unresolved, but with the signing of the August Letter, one can see the convergence of the BHA, BRA and the Task Force towards privatization of as much of the public housing site as possible, a change to private management, full acceptance of income mix, including
market mix and the use of demolition as a first resort.

It is interesting that the Task Force presented the strongest position on demolition, total social and economic integration, a conversion to private management as quickly as possible, and also supported private ownership of the site. The BHA readily backed down from their previous position on limiting demolition and maintaining the site as public housing in the interest of "what tenants wanted", that and "if the private sector can do a better job, why not?" The City and the BRA now did not have to negotiate single-handedly on most of the items which it had originally proposed in the Boston Plan. The major differences now between the BRA leaning heavily towards a larger market-rate family and elderly population, and whether the Task Force had a role in redevelopment.

The significant change bringing the parties to agreement during this period was that now the Task Force was fully supporting the move to private control and ownership of the site in hopes of becoming partners with the developer. All other issues were secondary to this. With the August Letter, the three parties were successful in retaining the UI funds.

On September 9, 1979, Clyde McHenry, HUD Assistant Secretary for Public Housing, came to Boston for a decision on spending UI funds for design and planning work for Phase 1A. At the
insistence of the three parties, the BRA, the Task Force, and the BHA, he was backed into a position that UI funds could be expanded for preliminary design and planning work on Phase 1A, while it was still unclear whether the property would be retained under BHA ownership. The condition was that some form of compensation to HUD would be necessary if it came under private ownership. The total debt on the property would not be counted towards the purchase cost of the site in case of disposition, and HUD would just have to "bite the bullet." The three parties were present at this meeting, in addition to Robert Ryan, Director of the BRA; the Master; Alan Root, Chairman of TPC and Myra McAdoo, Executive Director of TPC. TPC was the only group to comment on the lack of commitment of the City to low-income family housing with Columbia Point being another example of displacing poor families.

In the meantime, while the second draft of the developer's kit was being issued for circulation and comment, the Kennedy Library opened its doors October 20, 1979. Called a "Boon for Dorchester...few deny that the library played a part in expediting plans to revive the housing complex."183 As far as its impact on neighborhood revitalization, Michael Traft, President of the Dorchester United Neighborhood Association, (DUNA), said, "property values in Dorchester have been on the upswing anyway. The library is certainly contributing to that positive development."184
In a newspaper interview explaining the demand for new housing development at Columbia Point, Ephron Catlin, former Chairman of the Peninsula Planning Committee, simply commented that "there isn't a heck of a lot of land around Boston." The interviews with tenants showed their concern about whether low-income tenants will continue to live on the peninsula. Bernard Sneed said that the residents have made the institutions feel welcome, but residents remain uneasy about their institutional neighbors. "There's still fear out there," Ruby Jaundoo, a Task Force member said, "When U Mass came in, people thought that this would become dormitories... Grant you, that the Task Force is part of the planning for the point. But a lot of political things can take over."\textsuperscript{185}

The tenants' fears and scepticism can easily be confirmed, in September, 1979, Columbia Point had a population of only 369 family and elderly households.\textsuperscript{186} While major construction was taking place on the peninsula, Columbia Point tenants continued to live in some of the worst conditions in Boston.

In November the 3rd draft of the developer's kit was released. The Task Force was unable to get the Phase 1A contract from the BHA for their design consultants, Carr, Lynch Associates, due to questions of the firm's qualifications. Steffian Bradley Associates were given the design and landscape contract for Phase 1A. The Task Force budget, which was resubmitted to the
BHA Board for $200 thousand, was finally approved, although not released. The BHA used the budget as a leverage for reaching an agreement on the developer's kit.187 In the meantime, GBCD and Carr, Lynch Associates remain unpaid, the broader community remained uninformed of the plan, and the project continued to deteriorate.

When the planning process was broadened to more actively involve the Columbia Point Community Task Force, the basic elements of the plan, since the days of the Thompson Plan and the Boston Plan did not change appreciably, except that the Task Force wanted a partnership role with the developer. Demolition, disposition, income mix including market mix, and substantial reductions of low-income units are all present in the latest plan disclosed in the draft Developer's Kit.

The BHA, the Task Force and their consultants produced evidence supporting the feasibility of rehabilitation and re-use of the existing buildings. The Task Force's Resident Needs Survey documented the problems with the existing housing, Steffian Bradley Associates produced a plan which addressed those problems with creative design solutions. Dan Walker of Commonwealth Design, Carr, Lynch Associates and David Carter all presented information showing that comparative costs weighed in favor of rehabilitation rather than demolition and new construction.
But all of these were to be disregarded in the final plan. The resulting design and program remained premised on political and market motivations and not on inherent problems with rehabilitating the existing housing.

CONCLUSION

In examining the history of Columbia Point, two important levels of concern become apparent. First, the events surrounding the planning for redevelopment, and second, the daily activities including management, maintenance, and short-term policies affecting the living condition in the development. The manner in which the long-range planning and the immediate housing needs are addressed are inseparable when it comes to determining the future of the housing project.

Over a ten year period, the attention given to planning for redevelopment, while management and other responsibilities were shunned, only contributed to the deterioration and decline of the project. The two processes fed on each other; if the redevelopment plans assume that public housing is to be demolished or disposed of, and the low-income population reduced, the short-range housing practices would reinforce these objectives. The policies of mothballing the buildings, the promise to only rehouse existing tenants, and population attrition, are then consistent with the overall redevelopment plan. As housing and other services continue to be neglected,
conditions will decline and provoke more drastic redevelop-
ment solutions from those hostile to public housing.

The 1974 Thompson Plan, the 1977 Boston Plan, the 1979
Task Force Plan and the latest plan in the draft developer's
kit, consistently escalate the pressure and support for
privatization, demolition, and fewer low-income households
after redevelopment. This position was only deviated from
in the BHA modernization effort in 1978, the HUD Task Force,
and the 1979 BHA Plan. But these few efforts were all
short-lived, and did not alter the ultimate course of
redevelopment.

Throughout the history, certain trends emerged which spoke
to the dominance of the City and the private sector, includ-
ing those represented by the Peninsula Planning Committee,
in determining the direction of redevelopment. Even though
the City and the private interests did not own nor have legal
authority over the BHA site, they were able to control the
planning process. The failure of the BHA to perform re-
responsibly and defend the interests of tenants, left a vacuum
for any major public initiative. BHA's historically poor
relation with tenants also hampered the BHA's ability to play
a significant leadership role. The BHA, moreover, was a will-
ing partner with the City.

The tenant organization at Columbia Point remained uniformed
and uninvolved in all of the plans prior to 1978. The Harbor Park Plan and the Columbia Point Community Task Force Plan resulted in increased tenant participation in the planning process, but the major components of the redevelopment plan, even with substantial Task Force input, did not change appreciably. The Task Force, instead, with the assistance of their consultants, took the opportunity to attempt to become "partners" in redevelopment, rather than to alter the plan. In their haste to develop a "tenant plan," the Task Force did little to communicate with the rest of the Columbia Point residents, therefore the Task Force Plan cannot be seen as representational.

All the redevelopment plans were premised on attracting market income tenants and private investment. Therefore, the question of maintaining and rehabilitating as many low-income or public housing units as possible was never a consideration. Even when the research and other evidence pointed to the feasibility of rehabilitation and retention of the buildings, this data was ignored as the public housing site was no longer perceived as a low-income housing resource.

The result is that the redevelopment planning for over the years did not change very much. The City and the private interests still dominate the process, and the tenants remain "corralled" into some scheme. In the meantime, day-to-day
living conditions decline precipitously, and none of the three parties, the City, the BHA or the Task Force were left to upholding the long-term interest of the low-income population.
"In another time, the Peninsula Committee's proposal to demolish a good share of the public housing there could have been a formula for urban dynamite. But the remaining Columbia Point public housing tenants have on their own, already sanctioned just such a proposal."

--Boston Globe Editorial, July 26, 1977
CHAPTER 6
THE COLUMBIA POINT REDEVELOPMENT PLAN

INTRODUCTION

The Columbia Point Community Task Force Revitalization Plan became the focus for discussion and continual negotiation by the three parties on development issues such as income mix, family and elderly mix, the extent of demolition and the role of the Task Force in redevelopment. Agreement was reached on location of the new beach, marina, modification to the Bay-side Mall, and development phasing.

In late November 1979, HUD was still applying pressure for a consensus plan to be submitted for approval in order to issue the developer's kit and release the Urban Initiatives funds. During this period, conditions continued to deteriorate at Columbia Point. Central management and senior administrative staff aware that they were considered incompetent by the Master's Office knew they would be out of a job as soon as a Receiver was appointed (February 5, 1980) and were moving to seek other employment or quietly waiting until their contracts expired. In the meantime, Authority responsibilities were neglected, resulting in further disorganization and inefficiencies. It became even more difficult for the Authority to carry out its normal level of operations.
The weakening of the Authority's position affected its political strength in negotiations on Columbia Point as pressure was put on it to render concessions both to the Task Force and the City. In lieu of a strong and credible housing authority, a pervasive view by the Master's Office and others was that the Authority should "give in" to whatever the tenants wanted, and the City and the BRA remained unyielding on their position on redevelopment. Preparation of the developer's kit became the avenue for the BHA, the City, the BRA and the Task Force to reach a consensus.

This chapter contains a brief summation of the current plan and the perspective of the various actors: the City and the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the Boston Housing Authority, the Columbia Point Community Task Force, University of Massachusetts, the Tenants Policy Council and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

THE CURRENT PLAN
The redevelopment plan is revealed in the 3rd Draft Developer's Selection Kit issued on November 16, 1979, by the City of Boston, BRA and BHA in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force. The redevelopment program calls for 1,470 units of new and rehabilitated mixed-income housing, 510,000 square feet of new and renovated retail space, development of waterfront parkland, improved public utilities and
roads on a 106.1-acre development area.

The Housing Development Program comprises the following:

- Income mix will consist of one-third low, one-third moderate and one-third market-income households for the family units. (See definition of household income in Table 8.) Elderly units will be predominantly low and moderate income.

- Development will take place in two phases. Phase 1 included Phase 1A, the easterly portion of the BHA site, and Phase 1B, the pumphouse land and U Mass property. Phase 2 included the rest of the BHA site and the adjacent Bayside Mall area.

- Phase 1 will contain a total of 690 units of new and rehabilitated housing. Phase 1A, includes substantial rehabilitation of 2 elderly buildings, demolition and partial demolition of 3 mid-rises, substantial rehabilitation of 3 family buildings and new construction.

- Phase 1B will take place on the land presently owned by the City of Boston Public Facilities Department, the Boston Water and Sewer Commission and the University of Massachusetts. This phase will consist of a total of 440 units of new construction townhouses for families and one mid-rise containing 100 units of elderly and adult housing.

- Mixed-income housing will be largely financed by Section 8 and be privately owned. A small portion of the BHA site will be retained as public housing. Section 221(d)(4) HUD insurance will be used for adult housing; ownership housing will be funded with Section 235 mortgage subsidy and Section 234 mortgage insurance; and a UDAG grant will be used for secondary mortgaging for moderate income housing. Use of Section 8 rental assistance for low-income, cooperative housing will be possible with the use of a UDAG for repayment and establishment of an equity purchasing fund for sustaining low-income ownership through equity appreciation.

- Phase 2 consists of development of the remainder of the BHA site, land next to the shore and behind the Bayside Mall. Design and detailed development of Phase 2 will proceed as Phase 1B begins construction. Financial commitments will be in place prior to demolition.1
Table 9: Housing Development Program for Phases 1 and 2

TOTAL PHASE 1 DEVELOPMENT

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<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Household Income*</th>
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<td>Mod.</td>
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<td>Adult</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Family (1-2 bedrooms)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger Family (3-6 bedrooms)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total 690

Source: City of Boston, Boston Housing Authority, and Boston Redevelopment Authority in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., "Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit," 3rd Draft, November 16, 1979, pp. 3-11, 3-12.

*Low-income households consist of "households with incomes less than 80% of the median income for the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, with most of the low-income residents expected to be existing residents with incomes of less than 50% of the SMSA income. Households with income in the range of 80%-110% of the SMSA median income are considered moderate income, except that, within the Phase 1A area, households with incomes between 50% and 80% of SMSA median income will be considered moderate income. Higher income households are those with incomes over 110% of SMSA median income for the appropriate family size." In 1977, the SMSA median income for Boston was $18,600 for a family of four.

286
Table 9: **Housing Development Program for Phases 1 and 2** (continued)

**TOTAL PHASE 2 DEVELOPMENT**

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Source: City of Boston Housing Authority, and Boston Redevelopment Authority in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., "Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit," 3rd Draft, November 16, 1979, pp. 3-11, 3-12.

*See footnote on preceding page, "Total Phase 1 Development."
On demolition and disposition of the public housing site, the following is proposed:

The 37.5 acre existing public housing site will become an integral part of the redevelopment plan for the Columbia Point peninsula. A portion of the site will remain in BHA ownership and be redeveloped into innovative low and moderate-income housing with federal and state public housing resources. The remainder of the housing site plus 37.8 acres of tidal land a substantial portion of the BHA site will be declared surplus and sold to the joint venture of the designated developer and the Task Force.3

Deed restrictions will require that the number of low and moderate-income units be retained in perpetuity and "the price of the surplus portion of the site would be negotiated with HUD and will be based on the financial feasibility of the proposed re-use. . . . The price will allow for a reasonable return to the development entity." HUD will then retire the debt outstanding against the site and not use that debt in calculating sale price. Urban Initiatives funds will be used for demolition on Phase 1A and, depending on final detailed cost, it may also be used for demolition or site treatment on the Phase 2 portion of the BHA site. Up to 660 units would be demolished and one-half to four-fifths of the BHA site disposed of.

In the 3rd draft of the Developer's Selection Kit the issues surrounding the total number of units in the development, private ownership, mixed-income housing, demolition and dis-
position were largely agreed to by the City, BHA and the
Task Force. But disagreement still existed among the parties
on the exact mix of incomes, the definition of income levels,
and the percentage of low, moderate and market housing to be
constructed in each phase. Some of the disagreements on the
Developer's Selection Kit, in addition to a general discus-
sion of the point of view of each of the actors, will be
brought out in the next section.

ACTORS AND POINTS OF VIEW

The City and the Boston Redevelopment Authority

Columbia Point is viewed by the Mayor's Office and the BRA
as a valuable development opportunity because of its attrac-
tive waterfront location and proximity to downtown Boston.
It is one of the last "frontiers" of undeveloped land in the
City. The successful redevelopment of Columbia Point is one
of the primary objectives of the White Administration.

Columbia Point will be declared an urban renewal area, and the
BRA will play the major role of acquiring and packaging par-
cels for the developer or development team. The following
are some of the highlights of the City's position from the
Boston Plan:

Demolition of abandoned public housing and construc-
tion of new mixed-income housing will convert non-
taxable property into tax producing revenues and will
encourage new middle-income and upper-income residents
to the area. . . .
The marketing of the new housing development will focus on the growing middle and upper income sector demand for housing. The proposed Columbia Point development would be the only middle and upper income housing in Boston with direct beach access.

At completion, this project will create 400 jobs annually during the new housing construction, 250 jobs at the new retail center, and housing units for 4500 people. $200,000 in new property tax revenues will directly benefit the City's fiscal health.

The City's Boston Plan originally called for an income mix of: 25% low, 50% moderate, and 25% market-income units, but as of August 20, 1979, the City changed its position to 23% low-income, 30% moderate-income and 47% market-rate units.

In defining income limits, the City attempted to create the widest spread for the categories of "low," "moderate" and "market" by using the Section 8 limits of low as 80% of SMSA median income. "Moderate" income is defined as 80% to 110% of SMSA median and market as above 110%. This is significantly different from public housing income limits with "low" as below 50% of SMSA median and "moderate" as 50% to 80% of SMSA median. Therefore, the City's or the Boston Plan by proposing 50% moderate and 25% market income will result in two-thirds of the population being above the Section 8 limits. Their revised plan calling for close to 50% market units and fewer moderate income units will provide housing for even fewer households in need of housing assistance. The City's concept of "income mix" becomes a largely middle and upper-income "mix" of incomes.
The Task Force had proposed that "low" income be defined as less than 50% of SMSA median, "moderate" as 50% to 100%, and "market" as over 100%, but the City's income definitions were adopted by the three parties with some modifications (refer to reference note in Table 9). Nevertheless shifting definitions continue to confuse the actual picture of income mix.

Since the City's primary concern has been to increase tax revenues through development of the total peninsula and to attract private sector interest in the renewal of the Bayside Mall and the housing site, the feasibility of market-rate housing has been given considerable attention and research by the BRA. The following are some of the findings from the BRA's "Evaluation of the Potential for Market Rate Housing at Columbia Point":

As the market gets tighter, either prices will go up in sought after locations and/or housing in more areas will become "acceptable." Since it is projected that the cost of producing housing on Columbia Point will result in sales prices higher than the surrounding existing housing, it is imperative that the peninsula be perceived as more desirable than the alternatives, or a more acceptable place to live.

If, in fact, the cost to produce rental housing on Columbia Point (either new or rehab) approaches $50,000 per unit, the resulting rents would exceed what the market, to date, has borne in a mixed income development. A below market interest rate on the mortgage, a nominal land cost, and a 121A tax agreement below the recently established guidelines would be required to keep rents competitive. . . .

. . . The problem with doing sales housing as the first phase of a development which will be testing an untapped market is one of risk--for both the developer and the prospective buyers. . . . Sales
can proceed only after the credibility of a project has been established. . . .

. . . Renters and purchasers of homes in new developments in the Boston area have not sought out income mixed communities. . . . However, according to the most successful developers of mixed income developments, they are marketable if they are competitive or above average in terms of environmental factors, location and price. . . .

. . . The challenge [at Columbia Point] is to use these advantages [public improvement and amenities] to capture the family market. However, as mentioned earlier, families with children are among the most risk conscious house hunters. They are unlikely to purchase in an area suffering from a negative image until more pioneering households establish the area and the media reinforces the general acceptability of it.6

For all the reasons just mentioned, the difficulty of establishing market housing at Columbia Point become apparent. Therefore, the City recommended that, to insure successful development, new housing should be "physically linked with U Mass rather than the housing project"; the housing must be competitively priced; waterfront and public improvements be in place; and homeownership rather than rental housing be encouraged. Since family housing is more risky to establish, early development should appeal to "childless couples as well as families since they are to be disproportionately represented in Phase 1." Furthermore, "Phase 1 cannot be top heavy on subsidized housing, if the image of the peninsula as the low-income houser of the last resort is to be reversed."7 The City then proposed that 42% to 50% of the housing developed in Phase 1 be market-rate housing so that for marketing
and investment purposes, Columbia Point would not be viewed as a "subsidized" community.\textsuperscript{8}

These findings have led the City and BRA to continue to push for the fewest possible number of low-income residents preferably with no increase in the existing number of low-income residents in either the existing project or in the new development. The City has interpreted a February 21, 1977 three-party agreement with the Task Force and BHA for rehousing all tenants who "on or after July 1, 1977" wish to remain at Columbia Point as only the tenants who remain on Columbia Point up to the time of development will be guaranteed housing (see Chapter 5). Whereas the Task Force has interpreted the agreement as all tenants on or after July 1, 1977, including the ones who have left since that date because of intolerable conditions, will be guaranteed housing. Thus BRA's figures for rehousing is approximately 230, and the Task Force's figure is more than 450 households.\textsuperscript{9}

In accordance with the City's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) to minimize the development of low-income family housing in Boston (see discussion in Chapter 2), the City and the BRA have instead supported increases in housing for the elderly and childless or adult households. The BRA consistently calls for more elderly units and fewer units for large families than the Task Force and the BHA.\textsuperscript{10} In addition to the
City's middle and upper-income populations the BRA also emphasizes housing and services for new and existing institutions and businesses on the peninsula. The new housing is potentially attractive to U Mass faculty and staff, employees of the Boston Globe, the First National Bank, and others.11

From the City's point of view, the development of a mixed-income community would require racial mix as well as a large market-rate housing component.12 Wealthy white households will be brought into the development as market rental and sale housing will be unaffordable to most minority households (as well as many white households). The City also insists on racial mix at the low-income level in full awareness that integrating the low-income component may decrease the total number of minority households on the peninsula because integration at other income levels will be unlikely to be achieved.

The City supports whatever level of demolition is necessary to make market housing successful. Disposition of a major part of the public housing site is considered by the City as an inexpensive source of land for the developer. The BHA site, $11.2 million in Urban Initiatives and Modernization funds, the anticipated $11 million UDAG grant, among others, are all part of the public investment and resource package.
that the City is using to leverage private investments. It is their hope that with a 1 to 4 ratio of public to private investment, HUD and other agencies will provide the necessary matching funds to ensure that sufficient public investments are provided for the necessary infrastructure, improvements, amenities, and housing subsidies to get development underway.

The redevelopment of Columbia Point was among the top ten development priorities of the City, but after experiencing little progress through the years, the City has become somewhat cynical. Because the City does not own the public housing site, the City cannot proceed ahead with redevelopment, even though it controls and sets the policies. But unlike the tenants and the BHA, who are directly affected by any impasse, the City can afford to wait for redevelopment to take its course.

The Boston Housing Authority

The BHA had the least credibility and the weakest negotiating position of all parties (prior to Receivership). The following encompasses the BHA's position on redevelopment:

- BHA supports the creation of a mixed income community as the only feasible solution in providing low-income housing. BHA staff is in favor of allowing the BHA site to be integrated with adjacent land parcels to be privately redeveloped. (An official BHA Board decision has not been rendered.)

- BHA would dispose of a major portion (from one-half to four-fifths) of its site to a developer. As of November 1979, BHA has taken the position that they desire to sell
and/or lease their property with conditions to maintain a certain number of low and moderate-income units on the site. A final decision would be made after a developer is hired.

- BHA's original position in the BHA/Steffian Bradley plan proposed demolition of 460 public housing units. In November 1979, BHA was negotiating with the Task Force for demolition of 660 units.

- BHA has not supported the Task Force in the number of low-income residents to be housed or rehoused in the new development. They have not interpreted the February 21, 1979 Agreement as a commitment to rehouse 450 low-income tenants.

- In December 1979, BHA originally sought Section 8 funding for rehabilitating the family units in Phase 1A so that Urban Initiatives funds did not have to be used. In this way, the units could then be turned over to a private developer.

- BHA has been reluctant to spend the Urban Initiatives funds for any major housing rehabilitation because it would commit those units to public ownership. While the monies were originally awarded for rehabilitating family units, the BHA wanted to expend the funds only for elderly units, site improvement and demolition. But after pressure from TPC, BHA modified their position.13

The BHA saw no intrinsic problems with demolition and disposition as it could not maintain its housing stock in decent condition. But problems facing the Authority included reactions from HUD, the Court, TPC and those in favor of preserving low-income and public housing, and problems stemming from the Authority's own confusion of their precise role in redevelopment.

The Housing Authority's management policies for existing housing were clearer than its position on a specific course of action in redevelopment. The BHA administration
and staff involved in the negotiations from 1978 on had fully supported private redevelopment and private management of Columbia Point, since Columbia Point was to eventually be disposed of, BHA's housing policies allowed deterioration and neglect to continue. It was the larger question of redevelopment which posed a dilemma. With the Task Force taking on a greater role in planning and negotiations than before, the BHA was faced with supporting private redevelopment but being unsure of how much it wanted to relinquish its responsibilities and ownership rights to a developer if the Task Force became partners with the developer. Therefore, the BHA kept vacillating in its position between maintaining public housing under BHA ownership and control, and disposing of the BHA site.

According to many senior staff members, the problems of managing public housing had largely to do with the characteristics of the tenants and, more recently, with the restrictions and interferences by the Court in the Consent Decree. Even though BHA had shown by its own performance that it was neither capable nor willing to properly manage its housing, the placing of the Authority under court order made BHA antagonistic to doing anything which could politically benefit the tenants. But, at the same time, BHA was under pressure to be careful in not taking an "anti-tenant" posture publicly as this would only confirm the need for the Consent Decree.
BHA continued to avoid taking a strong position against any element in the Task Force plan and at the same time did not lend support to the Task Force in its dealings with the City when it came to the number of tenants to be rehoused, the number of low-income units after redevelopment, or the mix of family and elderly households. Behind the scene, the BHA Board allowed their displeasure with the Task Force's consultants, GBCD, and GBCD's relation to the Court-Appointed Master to get in the way of negotiations with the Task Force (see discussion of the Task Force in Chapter 5). As Robert Whittlesey was the former Executive Director of GBCD prior to being named the Master, the BHA Board did not want the Task Force to hire GBCD as their consultant. They attempted to make sure that the consultants did not get paid after they were hired, and saw to it that the Task Force did not gain a partnership role in redevelopment.15 (During this period, the BHA Board approved the West Broadway Task Force co-developer agreement without question or discussion.)

The BHA held numerous meetings with HUD on problems with the Task Force budget and the "conflict of interest" arising from the Master's relation with GBCD. BHA also met privately with HUD to discuss the risks of tenant partnership, specifically that this partnership would in all likelihood discourage any interest from potential developers.
The BHA had a complex relationship with the City: the BHA Board and the former Acting Administrator, Kevin Feeley, had close ties with the BRA and the Mayor's Office and supported the City's position on redevelopment. At the same time, pressure from HUD, the Court, TPC and the tenants resulted in hesitancy on BHA's part in accepting everything from the City. Despite the close ties with the City, the BHA did not want to give the impression that it was the City who was "running the show" since it was BHA who had final responsibility for its housing site.

While the three parties continued to debate the terms of redevelopment, certain BHA practices remained intact: Columbia Point was left to deteriorate until redevelopment; attrition and non-retenanting of the units continued even though 140 families were on the Columbia Point waiting list; and mothballed units requiring a minimal amount of work remained unoccupied. A site inspection by BHA management and modernization staff as recently as September 1979 estimated that only $3,000 of work per unit was required to make many of the vacant family units habitable. Another 100 sound elderly units in "move-in" condition also remained vacant.

Management and maintenance staff continued to be removed from Columbia Point, either through transfers or attrition,
creating a "serious and continuing erosion of living conditions" as reported in a BHA staff memorandum. In 1980, BHA staff reported that:

... Three full-time carpenters are presently available for all 2,543 units in District V. Of that total, one carpenter is assigned to Columbia Point on a part-time basis; another is assigned on paper full-time, but he has been out for a year with a back injury. When the assigned carpenter is available, he must spend his time on "emergency" (read catastrophe) work orders.

... According to records, four plumbers are available for the entire district. One is assigned to Columbia Point three days per week. Unfortunately that individual had a nervous breakdown, [and] was out for some time.

... According to the manager, he often has difficulty assembling the basic crew of four [laborers] for Columbia Point.

... Jim Connolly, the first-rate superintendent who worked with Gibson to restore the development, has been transferred to Franklin Field.

... Problems with craftsmen at Columbia Point are reportedly a combination of the obvious lack of skilled individuals in any category and in some cases low productivity or short working days in those few instances when individuals are on the job at Columbia Point.

... In addition to the problems with craftsmen, other management resources have been reduced at Columbia Point. These reductions have often times resulted from promotions or other reasonable individual actions. The unfortunate result has been a serious discontinuity in high level management at Columbia Point.

... At the end of Gibson's tenure, work orders were handled on a same day basis. Now as you can see from the attached work order backlog list, there are significant numbers of work orders that have gone beyond both the 30 and 90 day marks. This sort of inability to deal with basic repairs rapidly communicates an attitude to residents and can contribute to the same disrepair and extensive vandalism that characterized Columbia Point a few years ago.
By 1980 the Target Projects Program staff no longer existed. The new District Director, who replaced the Columbia Point Revitalization Director, relocated his office to one of the other developments assigned to him. Finally, the Columbia Point security program was consolidated as part of central security. In the beginning of 1980, only one manager was on site, although six months earlier there were three managers, a Revitalization Director and a Relocation Officer. BHA's dominant attitude was, "why put any effort into Columbia Point, if it will be redone anyway and if it is not going to remain under BHA ownership." 20

The BHA has been primarily concerned with development on its own parcel consisting of 37.5 acres and tidal land but has been unable to come up with a redevelopment plan or a successful rehabilitation program with the $20 million allocated by HUD since 1975. As the agency accountable for the future of the public housing site, the BHA has one person planning for the total site compared with BRA, which has two full-time staff plus research and design back-up. 21 Even the Task Force employs two fully staffed consultant teams. BHA does not have an in-house physical planner or designer working on the site, nor a planner familiar with public housing, housing programs, modernization, and low-income housing issues. Instead, the Columbia Point Coordinator, while well intentioned, is doing what he knows best, packaging the publicly-
owned housing site as a private investment opportunity. 22

Despite its vacillation on certain issues in redevelopment, the BHA finally developed its own rationale for arriving at a private redevelopment solution for Columbia Point. BHA's capitulation to the interest of the City and the private sector is revealed in the November 19, 1979 draft Developer's Selection Kit:

BHA is seeking the most effective way possible to carry out its mandate of providing "safe, decent, and sanitary housing for low-income residents." After years of management and maintenance difficulties with the Columbia Point development, BHA has become convinced that it is not possible to maintain 1,500 functional low-income units on the Columbia Point site. . . . It could best fulfill its responsibilities to low and moderate-income families by participating in the creation of a new, mixed-income community on Columbia Point. . . . The provision of low and moderate income units through the private sector reutilization of much of the BHA property is seen as an effective action that is specific to the Columbia Point site and not necessarily representative of a city-wide reutilization of BHA housing resources. 23

Privatization is the prescription for Columbia Point, but BHA would like to calm the fears of tenants throughout the city who are concerned with the future implications of this action. Many developments experience "years of management and maintenance difficulties," but Columbia Point is supposedly different because of its increased attractiveness in comparison to other sites around the city. The policy which can be inferred is that, when problems exist within a
development and private redevelopment is determined as feasible, BHA will resort to privatization as opposed to other options which maintain public housing. The existence of market demand for the housing site appears to be BHA's central argument for disposition.

BHA as of November 1979 indicated its intention to retain ownership of only two elderly and two family buildings to be substantially rehabilitated in Phase 1A; four family buildings rehabilitated with 1975 Modernization funds on the easterly portion of the site; and the buildings housing social services. 24

Among the three parties, BHA's position on demolition has been the most conservative. This is in part attributed to HUD's reservations on massive demolition, the Steffian Bradley Associates' re-use proposal and opposition from TPC and public housing tenants. The BHA has been somewhat persuasive with the City and the Task Force in bringing the demolition figure from 822 down to 660 units (the most recent figure in the November draft Developer's Selection Kit), but demolition of this many units--44% of the existing units--remains.

BHA fully realizes that the mid-rise buildings which are slated for demolition contain one, two and three-bedroom units which
correlate with the demand by low-income households (see Chapter 2). A majority of the BHA's waiting list of 7,000 households are in need of one and two-bedroom units. But BHA refused to argue its position based on low-income housing needs as this would open them up to maintaining the whole site as low-income housing.

Moreover, the BHA staff in private disagreed with the 660 demolition figure, but they felt they had no power to hold their ground for minimal demolition because of the pressures from the City and the Task Force, who remained adamant about massive demolition. BHA received no help from the Master whose only response was to allow whatever the Task Force and their consultants want as long as it's "not too unreasonable."  

Even though BHA has major say in approving or rejecting the final demolition scheme, it has not been strong enough to push for selective or minimal demolition. In attempting not to impede the progress of getting the developer's kit issued, BHA continues to yield to political pressure and, therefore, does little to protect the interest of public housing tenants. BHA's position on demolition, disposition, and its weak position in redevelopment is unlikely to change, unless the Receiver, the Court, or HUD intervenes.
The Columbia Point Community Task Force

The history of tenant participation has been a long struggle from total exclusion in the 1974 Thompson Plan and the 1977 Boston Plan to inclusion as one of the negotiating parties in 1979. The possibility of Task Force partnership with a developer has also been an encouraging sign to some.

Tenants have the most at stake in the future of Columbia Point; some have been there since the development opened in 1954 and three, even four, generation families are not uncommon. But through the years, thousands of families have been driven out by the intolerable living conditions. A population of 6,000 has been reduced to less than 1,000. Only 340 households remained as of January 1980. 1,100 units are vacant, although there are families on the Columbia Point and city-wide waiting lists.

While BHA was involved with its own problems, the Columbia Point Community Task Force attempted to represent the interest of low-income tenants in redevelopment. The following are components of the Task Force's position:

- Tenants are to be full participants in housing development, management and the long-term future of Columbia Point.

- In housing which is not owner-occupied or retained by BHA, the Task Force wants partnership with the developer in a full or limited partnership.

- The Task Force wants to hold title to land parcels where it is developed for rental housing.
The current housing is too dense and not appropriate for successful family living. Families should be housed in two and three-story townhouses. Seven-story buildings should be demolished or cut down to three stories, except those used for elderly housing.

The Task Force's original plan called for the demolition of 822 units: with 11 mid-rise and low-rise buildings to be demolished or "topped." Now in the current plan they have agreed to reduce the demolition figure to approximately 660 units.

Originally in the Green Book, the Task Force stated that "the net loss of low-income housing units should be compensated for by additional allocation of Section 8 funding from HUD for use through the city." Out of the 1,504 units, more than 800 low-income units will be lost. But the Task Force has not followed up this demand.

The Task Force wants the BHA site and the other parcels to be developed together in each phase of construction to insure that the City's commitment to low and moderate-income housing construction on non-BHA parcels is honored.

The Task Force in its original plan called for an income mix of 37 1/2% low, 37 1/2% low to moderate and 25% market rate with low and moderate-income units not to exceed 700 units. Presently it has backed down to the position of one-third of all family housing to be from each income group.

Originally the Task Force had proposed a lower range for incomes (see preceding sections), but the Task Force eventually adopted the BRA's income definitions.

The Task Force originally proposed demolition of 822 units so as to decrease density, provide a new circulation system and open space. Their proposed site plan makes it impossible to retain many of the buildings because of restructured streets, but the Task Force and their consultants, Carr, Lynch Associates, refuse to make major changes to save the units. On the mix of family and elderly housing, the Task Force claims to place a greater emphasis on providing family housing,
especially larger family units (three to six bedrooms). Even so, the Task Force and the BRA figures for large family units results in a difference by no more than 20 units. 28

The current redevelopment plan proposes only 26% or 380 three to six-bedroom units for larger families and the remainder, 74% or 1,048 units of one and two-bedroom units for small families, the elderly and adult-only households. 29 The Task Force's alleged concern for large family units appears to be an excuse for the massive demolition they propose rather than any real interest in actually housing more large families. The Task Force is caught in a position of proposing massive demolition, especially of the mid-rises, by claiming the need to create more space for large families, while proposing an insignificantly larger number of units to warrant the level of demolition.

At present, 66% of the BHA city-wide waiting list for family housing are for one and two-bedroom units. 30 The mid-rises contain 1,116 one, two and three-bedroom units. Considering that the units are undersized, these can be converted into more spacious one and two-bedroom units to meet the needs of those on the waiting list. The arguments for demolishing the mid-rises because they are obsolete in terms of unit size, in excess of need, or negatively affect the availability of large family units are not defensible.
On the issue of rehousing existing households, the Task Force has made it their priority to insure that existing households, in addition to those who lived at Columbia Point up to and after July 1, 1977 and who have since left, will also be guaranteed housing after redevelopment. The Task Force has vigorously fought this issue with the City and the BHA. But having proposed a 1,250-unit new residential development in the Green Book (even fewer units than the current plan of 1,470 units), and endorsed substantial income mix, the Task Force has little, if anything, to offer other low-income households. During negotiations on income mix when the number of low-income units proposed equal the rehousing figure for Columbia Point tenants (450 households), the Task Force's desire to provide additional low-income family housing is close to non-existent.

The Task Force's position on massive demolition of more than half the site, privatization, private management and commitments solely to existing Columbia Point tenants appear very surprising. The question arises as to how the Task Force arrived at its position. There appears to be three major causes: (1) the pressures from the BRA, the City, the BHA and other parties to continue the planning efforts in the direction of demolition, private development, and mixed-income housing; (2) the nature of the Task Force's consultants and their influence on the Task Force; and (3) the lack
of political sophistication and organization of the Task Force in upholding the long-term interests of tenants citywide.

The pressure from the BRA for a large-scale solution of mixed-income housing and redevelopment of the Bayside Mall, the pumphouse and the shoreline continued throughout this period as the City attempted to implement the Boston Plan. This need not be described here, except to mention that there was a constant threat of the City withholding funds for public improvements until some form of agreement is reached. The City's control of BHA and their willingness to allow gross deterioration of the development were feared by the Task Force. Streets and sidewalk repairs, development of the shoreline, improvements in public transportation and other services could only be obtained from the City or with the City's support. The result of all this was the acceptance of mixed-income housing as the only "compromise" solution everyone, including the Task Force, could live with. At least a commitment to rehouse existing tenants would insure their presence after the transformation of the peninsula.

The ideology of the Task Force's consultants permeated the view of the Task Force. The tenants once advocated that people not be "forced out" of Columbia Point; that daily maintenance and services be promptly delivered; and opposed
demolition, attrition, and other measures which decreased the low-income population, but the Task Force was now doing little in the way of addressing these issues. The Task Force, like all the other parties, opted to place their energy in long-range planning.

The Task Force received more than ample assistance from Carr, Lynch Associates, environmental design consultants, and Greater Boston Community Development, technical and legal consultants. Let us look briefly at the perspective of the consultants in aiding the Task Force. The problems of BHA gross mismanagement and poor maintenance did not become the focal point for change; these problems were to be remedied by eventual transfer to private management. Until then, little would be done to improve existing conditions. The design consultants emphasized the physical defects of the site and proposed major restructuring as the only solution to the present problems. Both firms did little to assist the tenants with immediate problems. Instead, the focus became obtaining Task Force partnership with the developer. All other concerns were subordinate to this goal. The Task Force was "sold a bill of goods" by their consultants, they were led to believe the following:

1. Tenants have the "right" to luxury housing.
2. Tenants can obtain luxury housing, if they take the route of private redevelopment.
3. Tenants can have decision-making and veto powers, professional private management and share in the proceeds, if they became partners with the developer.

4. Mixed-income housing can work in their interest by diminishing the concentration of low-income tenants.

5. The Task Force only needs to be responsible for rehousing the 450 low-income households in any redevelopment plan regardless of the original 1,504 units, the waiting list, and the escalating need for subsidized housing throughout the city.

6. Since the existing housing is a far cry from desirable, luxury or market quality housing, massive demolition and alterations to the site are necessary. The new community must be physically "ideal" for it to work as family housing.

7. Cost factors are not a consideration, e.g., the cost of rehabilitation versus new construction, because sufficient private investments and public subsidies can be obtained. Therefore, it is not important to consider the re-use potential of the buildings or retain as many of them as possible.

It must also be noted here that the Task Force's primary goal, according to its Bylaws, is to provide "decent housing and related improvements for low-income people." Choosing luxury
market-rate townhouses over the best quality "rehab" of existing units, and providing housing for middle and upper-income households, seems inconsistent with its stated goal.

The consultants correctly viewed the problems of public housing as caused by BHA's failure to be responsive to tenants' needs; BHA's lack of accountability to the community; the presence of inadequately trained and qualified staff; insufficient funds; etc., but their solution is to divest BHA of its property. As a result, there were no attempts to force BHA to bring in professional and highly trained management and maintenance staff and to provide the needed craftsmen, equipment and materials.

Existing tenants received little assistance with their complaints or grievances from the Task Force and their consultants. Minor problems became serious and physical defects were exacerbated. It was felt that all problems would be solved, once BHA no longer administered the development. The simple answer was to seek the necessary agreement from the other parties and create the incentive for private management to take over. Both an interim and long-range management plan were developed to be under the control of a developer and the Task Force. Likewise, private redevelopment would solve any other problems stemming from BHA ownership.
In looking at the consultants' design attitude it should be recalled that Columbia Point was one of the more desirable developments in Boston when first constructed. Even though there were problems (see discussion on design and density problems in Chapter 4), they were not so serious that they presented a major obstacle to the well-being of the community. Even without significant physical improvements, Columbia Point achieved a 90% occupancy rate until 1970. But the designer's fantasy is revealed in the Task Force's proposals to tear down half the existing housing, reroute all the streets, and create a suburban townhouse community. The image of "successful family living" is low-rise, low-density housing surrounded by extensive open space, trees, patios, private backyards, etc., in other words, the "American Dream of suburbia."

The proposed housing is not typical of housing common to Boston, such as the three-decker homes or apartments found in the surrounding area. Instead, the consultants' design process resembles one in which the designers design for a vacant site with little economic or institutional constraints. In this case, an appropriate design is made for a large parcel situated on a beautiful shoreline without regard for the existing buildings. The process starts with the "ideal" and saves only those buildings which happen to "fit" the ideal plan, instead of examining the physical, social and management components which have failed, and proposing a physical design
solution making use of the existing buildings. For example, the consultants assume an inherent problem with the mid-rise buildings. One would have to condemn most of New York City for "mixing families and high-rises," if one were to condemn Columbia Point for this. The structures at Columbia Point are neither "high-rises" nor are they of formidable scale making them unlivable. The consultants left unexplored the possibilities of making the mid-rises viable by refusing to look at management, security and creative design solutions.

The Resident Needs Survey by the Task Force sheds light on some of the physical changes that should be made to the existing low-rises. But one must be wary of surveys which address questions unrelated to costs or constraints, as they can be misleading. For example, asking residents if they would like two bathrooms, a duplex, a backyard, wall-to-wall carpeting, a private entrance, a front lawn, etc., would most likely result in affirmative responses. Designs based on unqualified answers to these questions could result in radically different housing than what exists regardless of the present levels of habitability. In this regard, the Carr, Lynch Associates plan, to quote one participant, is "a poor translation" of the Resident Needs Survey. Designers often ignore the relation of management and institutional factors in determining the quality of a physical space and fall victims to architectural determinism. It is naively assumed that the
siting of the buildings and the unit design must be "just so" or else it will fail. (See discussion in Chapter 1.) Often the concerns regarding social factors and their influence on the environment are also misconstrued. Creation of total racial and income mix, so that poor and minority households are dispersed within a larger community, is seen as an ideal solution which can automatically upgrade their class position in society and improve the social environment.

The Columbia Point Community Task Force was elected with broad tenant support more than two years ago, but since undertaking its redevelopment plan, it has failed to maintain contact and communication with the rest of the tenants. The Task Force leadership, primarily Terry Mair, has been strong and active, but little of the Task Force's negotiations and decisions have filtered out to the community. Community-wide meetings were not held regularly, substantive tenant input apart from Terry Mair, a few members of the Task Force, and their consultants has not been part of the current redevelopment plan. Most of the tenants were not aware of the proposed demolition, the problems surrounding income mix, relocation, and rehousing, or the details of the redevelopment plan. Some tenants did not even know that the Task Force had developed its own plan. Not surprisingly, there is a growing awareness on the part of tenants that basic, safe, sanitary housing provided by a well managed Authority as part of the conventional program is
more desirable and more permanent than luxury units. The tenants are less interested in mixed-income communities, if good management and maintenance are provided. Contact between the Task Force and the tenants was also hard to maintain as tenant complaints, emergencies, and problems of repair and maintenance were not adequately addressed. Day-to-day problems are often an important means for communication between the tenant organization and the tenants.

Recently, the Task Force itself acknowledged the need to inform all tenants fully of the redevelopment process and to seek their input. In December 1979 the Task Force hired a community organizer to see that the community becomes more involved in the redevelopment issues.

Other problems stemmed from the Task Force itself having too much power and control, so that it rarely felt the need to communicate with the larger community. The BHA contributed to the Task Force's isolation and their sense of omnipotence when it came to tenant representation by only approaching the Task Force, or more often, the Task Force President for feedback on official BHA policy. Soon, even the eight-member Task Force as a whole was not active. BHA should not subvert the Task Force's legitimate role in representation, but should act responsibly to assist the Task Force in informing Columbia Point residents of important issues which affect the community.
The dominant influence of the consultants, GBCD and Carr, Lynch Associates, further reinforced the isolation of the Task Force. Their assistance in providing planning, design, legal and other technical expertise led to Terry Mair and the consultants working to the exclusion of other tenants. This process also led to the leadership's lack of confidence in other tenants to make decisions as they relied more and more heavily on their consultants. This is not to deny that technical assistance is not an important factor in obtaining full tenant involvement, but unless broad tenant participation is maintained, as one tenant leader said, "pretty soon the consultants will lead the tenants and not the other way around." She was also to comment on her experience with GBCD, "they are very good, but put them in their place or they will take over the show."31 No matter how well-intentioned the consultants may be, they cannot replace the knowledge or political insight of those who are directly affected. A strong tenant organization which can uphold the long-term interests of tenants can only do so by maintaining contact with the tenant body.

The University of Massachusetts
The University of Massachusetts was the first major participant in planning for redevelopment. Beginning with President Robert Wood's activities during the period prior to the opening of the new Harbor Campus, through the 1973 Columbia Point
Task Force and the Peninsula Planning Committee, numerous plans were developed. Commitments were made to the community and public housing tenants concerning the University's obligation to them (see Chapter 5). When President Wood left, U Mass involvement ceased and the University no longer assumed a major planning role for the peninsula.

In the past couple of years, U Mass has been left out of the process for peninsula-wide planning and also for the planning of its own site (vacant land adjacent to the pumphouse). In Fall 1979 when the second draft of the Developer's Kit was circulated, U Mass was confronted with a plan involving the use of its site for mixed-income housing and other non-institutional purposes without having been informed of these proposals. Fearing that the Legislature could simply transfer the land at will, U Mass became uneasy about the possibility of losing its land.

In October 1979, U Mass issued a questionnaire to all faculty and staff at U Mass Boston to assess their need for new housing.³² This was an attempt to preempt losing its land by showing the University's own needs. This survey was a defensive action by the University administration who felt cut out of the process after having failed to take initiative on the proper use of its land. Until now, the University had not only neglected its institutional responsibilities to protect
its interest in the land but also had neglected its social responsibilities to maintain its commitments to the public housing project by not protecting its long-term interest as a viable low-income community. On December 5, 1979, the U Mass Board of Trustees voted that the President enter into discussion with the BRA and BHA on the redevelopment plan. 33

In the Spring of 1980, when the BRA issued its Environmental Notification Form (pursuant to an application for urban renewal designation) for the peninsula, the University again found that the plan precluded the University's interest. The University made a belated response by seeking legal action. 34 On June 18, 1980, a University Buildings and Grounds Committee recommended that the Board of Trustees state strongly their objection to the BRA plan to take jurisdiction of land under a provision that designated it as "blighted." 35

The University defended the use of its own land purely for selfish reasons. Although it had legitimate institutional interests concerned with expansion and housing needs, it failed to concern itself with its previous commitments to the community. On November 20, 1979 a petition to U Mass Chancellor Robert Corrigan signed by U Mass faculty and staff at College of Public and Community Service expressed concern about the University's questionnaire and its future role in planning for Columbia Point:

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We feel strongly that the University can and should do more than just advocate its own particular interests in the future development of Columbia Point. The University must recognize that the decision to develop a "Harbor Campus" on the peninsula precipitated both recognition of the development potential of the area and anxiety within the neighboring communities about the probability of displacement.

As a public, urban university committed to providing opportunities to people traditionally denied them, UMB should not tolerate displacement of poor people and reduction of the city's supply of low-rent housing in general, and especially in its own back yard. This does not mean that the University should advocate the preservation of the original 1500 units in the existing project, but it does mean to insist on the inclusion of no less than 1500 units of housing for low-income people in the plans for the area and to oppose the removal of any existing units before new ones are assured.

The petition included among other things that the University commit itself formally and publicly to:

Public meetings, forums, and workshops must be set up to provide input and feedback by interested parties at all points in the planning process.

The number of low-rent public housing units included in the final plans must be no less than the 1500 units of public housing in the existing Columbia Point housing development.

First priority for rehabilitated and new housing must be given to present and former residents of the Columbia Point Housing development.

In response to the petition and the growing concern with the University's role in protecting public housing, on June 7,
1980 a conference was held sponsored by the University of Massachusetts and the Tenants Policy Council. As stated by U Mass Chancellor Robert Corrigan:

Through the conference we seek to provide an opportunity for public housing tenants and advocates, policy makers, and the University to present their views of the current problems concerning public housing and the direction they see for solving these problems. We also wish to explore the ways in which the University, as an urban institution, can support the interests of low-income tenants in Boston and specifically what role the University should take relative to the development of housing on the Columbio Point peninsula.37

At the conference, U Mass was to issue a statement strongly supporting public housing in the city and no reduction of public housing units city-wide.38
The University was subject to criticisms from within because of its failure to protect its institutional interests and support the interest of low-income tenants. If the University remains an aggrieved party and continues its non-involvement, it can simply say that the University is not accountable for the redevelopment plan and its impact on the poor. If the University becomes an active participant, it would be obliged to uphold both the University's and the community's interest.

The Tenants Policy Council
The Tenants Policy Council, the city-wide organization for all public housing tenants, remained active throughout the planning for Columbia Point. In the early days TPC directly articulated the needs of Columbia Point tenants to the BHA and sought to establish tenant input among the various bodies planning for redevelopment. When the Columbia Point Task Force became active, TPC assumed a reduced role, but remained involved in overall policy issues relating to the BHA, the Master's Office and the Consent Decree.

In 1977, TPC at its Annual Meeting passed a resolution opposed to any reduction in low-income units city-wide (see Chapter 5 and Appendix). In 1979 when the Task Force presented its Revitalization Plan, or the Green Book, and the drafts of the developer's kits were released, TPC, concerned with the
implications of demolition, disposition and the loss of low-income housing units, held numerous meetings with the Task Force and the BHA to persuade them to take a different course in redevelopment. TPC sought to clarify BHA's policy on rehabilitation and demolition at Columbia Point. This resulted in a BHA document outlining the city-wide need for low and moderate-income housing, demolition as a negative precedent, the need for replacement housing, and the responsibility of the public sector, and an alternative plan showing the feasibility of rehabilitation versus new demolition and new construction. (This document was subsequently ignored by the BHA itself.) TPC held meetings with the Task Force to discuss the implication of the Carr, Lynch Associates' site plan on the low-income population, and other meetings were held with the Task Force and BHA staff on the specifics of demolition and privatization.

TPC encouraged the Task Force to play an active and informed role, but TPC differed with the Task Force on certain issues.

In a letter addressed to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area Director, TPC clarified its position on the Columbia Point plan:

The Tenants Policy Council, as the city-wide organization, is responsible for considering the broadest impact of any policy which may be set by a Local Tenant Policy Council (formerly known as the Task Force). The issues of demolition and sale in Columbia Point certainly are appropriate causes for grave concern on the part of the TPC Board of Directors.
In behalf of the 7,000+ families on BHA's waiting list, and because of the impact on about half of BHA's family developments, the TPC Board of Directors cannot, and will not, agree to any policy which permits any loss of units by demolition, sale or conversion without a prior commitment to replace all lost units on a one for one basis and in addition to any units which would be allocated to BHA through regular programs.

Demolition as a possible solution for vacant units in even one development is a dire threat to every development with relatively high vacancies.

In a city with literally no available housing, and especially no affordable housing for low, moderate or middle-income families the permanent loss of public housing would be criminal. In addition, the impact of the planned urban redevelopment throughout the city, condominium conversions, today's economy and the lack of new family construction are all important elements which do not seem to be part of the decisions made in Columbia Point.

The redevelopment plan for Columbia Point was revealed to the larger population of public housing tenants and those concerned with low-income housing, but the BHA had still not addressed the issue of how low-income housing was being protected. In a letter addressed to Clyde McHenry, HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing in December 1979, William Hurld, TPC Board Chairman, and Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director, stated the organization's objections to the Columbia Point plan and made an appeal to HUD:

The Tenants Policy Council, the recognized, elected, citywide representative of more than 60,000 tenants who live in Boston's public housing, strongly protests the actions calling for demolition and disposition of the public housing stock, the shrinking of the public housing inventory, and any actions which would result in the displacement of low and moderate income households in the City of Boston. The recent disclosures
in Boston around the proposed redevelopment of Columbia Point will have serious implications on the supply of low-income housing. We appeal to HUD to stop the processes that would jeopardize the welfare of public housing and low-income residents in Boston.41

The letter stated a need for more than 67,000 low-income units for Boston. A third of all households are living in substandard housing, and third of the population is low-income. The proposed redevelopment plan would result in the permanent loss of public housing units at a time when Boston's housing needs were expanding: and the needs of the elderly, large families, minority households and female heads of households cannot be ignored, "measures to take away our housing will not solve the housing problem but can only exacerbate already reprehensible conditions."42 TPC's position on redevelopment was the following:

Boston's public housing tenants cannot afford the careless and wasteful demolition of public housing buildings. The massive disposition of public housing properties for private redevelopment purposes is an irresponsible act on the part of the BHA, and will result in the net loss of low-income housing opportunities.

Tenants would like to see improvements made to the existing stock, the swift reform of an incompetent and mismanaged BHA, the institution of highly professional management, and an expansion of the assisted housing program. We feel that public housing is the only avenue that can provide decent and affordable housing for those in need.

... The TPC fully supports the Columbia Point tenants and the Columbia Point Community Task Force, in creating a suitable living environment for low and moderate income households, and we are in support of increased funding to develop Columbia Point. But we do not want to see public housing property as a
"give-away" to the City or the private sector at the expense of public housing tenants and the low and moderate income population in Boston. We are well aware of the attractiveness of the Columbia Point site, especially the waterfront location, and the potential private development opportunities it provides.43

While the Task Force itself had proposed demolition, disposition and private redevelopment of the public housing site, TPC felt that given its legal authority, BHA was the party responsible for any action in these directions. Further, BHA was using the Task Force's plan as an excuse for its own reluctance to deviate from what the City, the private sector, and even its own staff wanted for Columbia Point:

We feel that the BHA, as, supposedly, the institution for the provision of low-income housing, has acted irresponsibly in protecting the interests of public housing tenants. Until the designation of a Receiver, BHA will continue the process of abandoning the needs of public housing residents. . . . [S]upporting the demolition of 660 units at Columbia Point is an indication of their gross negligence and irresponsibility in providing for the needs of the poor in Boston.44

TPC also felt that the Task Force was not doing its part to inform other tenants at Columbia Point of the nature of the plan, so TPC sought to represent the interest of the majority of tenants at Columbia Point, other public housing tenants and the low-income population in general. For public housing tenants and for those who were cut out of the process, TPC maintained a clear and consistent position in redevelopment.
This was to create a certain amount of tension between the Task Force and TPC. Even though other parties such as the BHA and the City took this opportunity to exploit the differences between TPC and the Task Force to weaken the overall position of tenants, TPC felt that this was not as important as achieving a responsible approach to redevelopment.

TPC took a strong posture against demolition, disposition and the loss of low-income units in light of the following circumstances: first, in the memorandum of agreement between the BHA and TPC dated March 21, 1972, TPC is delegated as the vehicle for the views of all tenants. Each local tenant body is given broad autonomy to work to improve living conditions in the development but TPC has overall supervisory authority over Task Forces and can overrule them on any particular matter. Second, TPC believes that the demolition and disposition regulations issued by HUD, November 9, 1979, (described in the next section), would show that demolition and disposition are not warranted; and third, the court order issued for the Receiver makes no authorization for demolition. The responsibilities of the Receiver are to "preserve and to rehabilitate for occupancy by low income persons or families the maximum number of housing units as are consistent with the provision and operation of decent and safe and sanitary housing for all residents therein."
As the Task Force became more isolated from the community, and as BHA, prior to receivership, continued to lose its credibility in defending low-income housing interests, TPC became the only party to represent the interest of low-income people.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUD is an important recourse for the low-income population in upholding their interest at Columbia Point. HUD will ultimately have to approve any redevelopment plan for the BHA site. The developer's kit, plans for demolition, disposition, refinancing and subsidy programs all have to be commented on by HUD Area and Regional Offices and approved by the Assistant Secretary's office. HUD's position until now has been reserved and timid on the questions of demolition and disposition as they have mostly been observers to the planning process. HUD has been unwilling to take a firm position until final plans or the developer's kit are presented for approval.

HUD is unlikely to completely halt the redevelopment process as it is eager to see the public housing "turned around," but neither is it anticipated that HUD would support a solution which recreates the sensationalism surrounding Pruitt-Igoe. HUD does not want further delays nor embarrassment in seeking a solution at Columbia Point. In response to TPC's concerns, HUD has informed TPC:
Please be assured that the Department [HUD] is equally concerned that the needs for assisted housing in the City of Boston be met, and that actions are not taken which will adversely affect either present tenants of the BHA or those people currently in need of housing assistance.47

On November 9, 1979, HUD issued its Rules and Regulations (24 CFR Part 870) on the partial or total demolition of buildings and disposition of PHA-owned land:

It is HUD's policy to conserve and maintain the existing stock of low-income housing to the maximum extent consistent with considerations of need and feasibility. Unless it can be demonstrated that a project, or a portion of a project, is excessive to local needs for low-income housing, every reasonable effort will be made by HUD and the PHA to keep the property within the low-income housing inventory. If the project is not excess to local needs, but is unsuitable for housing use because of its physical condition, every reasonable effort shall be made to return it to a condition suitable for housing use, through the Modernization Program or other means. Accordingly, HUD will limit approval for demolition or disposition to those cases where such action can be fully justified in accordance with the criteria set forth under this part.48

The primary criteria for determining whether a PHA's request for demolition or disposition is justified are the following:

1. Current and projected needs for low-income housing in the jurisdiction served by the PHA. . . . If there is a local need for low income housing, the PHA's request for demolition or disposition of dwelling units shall include a plan for replacement housing on a one-to-one basis or as approved by HUD to be warranted by current and projected needs for low-income housing, subject to HUD's finding as to the availability of funds.
2. The physical condition of the property and, where pertinent, the feasibility of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation shall be considered feasible if its estimated cost does not exceed the published prototype cost limit for similar structure in the same prototype cost area.49

The secondary criteria for HUD's evaluation include the following in order of importance:

1. location in an area that adversely affects the life, health or safety of project residents;
2. social conditions affecting the marketability of the project;
3. the project's density which seriously affects the marketability of the project;
4. benefits to the project or public interest from disposition of a limited interest in real estate e.g., easements;
5. the views of tenants and the local governing body.50

In addition, HUD's approval of a PHA's request for demolition and/or disposition is subjected to applicable requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Regulations also govern aspects of tenants' participation, of PHA's proper notification to the tenants and tenant organization, and submission of all comments to HUD.

With a "good faith" application of these criteria, the HUD regulations make it very difficult for the Columbia Point proposal to be approved. The arguments by the various parties, the BHA, the BRA and the Task Force, up until now
do not appear to meet the criteria for either demolition or disposition. Their arguments have been concerned with the following: the "image" of the housing and not its use potential; the "marketability" of the housing to upper-income groups and not to low-income tenants; and the benefits of the plan to encourage private development interest as opposed to any "limited" public good. The units have not been found in excess to need nor infeasible to rehabilitate. On the contrary, an overwhelming need for low-income housing has been documented by the Columbia Point and the BHA overall waiting lists and the housing assistance needs for Boston (see Chapter 2). All the studies to date have shown the feasibility of rehabilitation as opposed to demolition and new construction (see Chapter 5). In 1979, rehabilitation was estimated at $28 to $37 thousand for a substantially modernized unit at Columbia Point, compared with $66 thousand for a new construction unit (excluding demolition costs). As to the secondary criteria, density at Columbia Point has been shown to be lower than average for developments in Boston (see Chapter 4) and even in its present condition, the project remains marketable to public housing eligible households as shown by the waiting list. HUD's last criterion, the "views of tenants and the local governing body," e.g., the Task Force, the City, and the BRA, appears to be the only criterion met by the BHA in proposing demolition and disposition. In the manner demolition and disposition have been proposed,
the parties have acted as if the last criterion was the most important!

The HUD regulations issued in November were not to become effective until December 10, 1979. In the meantime, the BRA, the BHA and the Task Force revised the third draft of the Developer's Selection Kit (November 19, 1979) which mentioned demolition of up to 660 units, and disposition of a substantial portion of the BHA site, in order that the fourth draft (issued January 14, 1980) not mention any figures for demolition and disposition. Even though the plan had not changed, the parties did not want to specify the details on demolition and disposition because of the HUD regulations. Instead, a strategy was adopted by the parties for HUD to approve the Developer's Selection Kit without the BHA having first defined the extent of demolition and disposition. Only with a developer aboard would the final decisions on demolition and disposition be made. Late in the process, these figures would be submitted to HUD for approval, HUD would then be under pressure to approve the plan. Moreover, since neither the BHA nor the City had any intention of proposing a replacement housing plan, forcing HUD into approving the plan at the last minute would facilitate this problem; it will then be convenient for HUD to say that no extra funds were available and none were allocated for replacement housing at Columbia Point.
Other factors also influence HUD's point of view on demolition and disposition. BHA's proposed use of the UI funds does not follow the normal guidelines for modernization: the use of funds for rehabilitation, deferred maintenance, site improvement, etc. Instead, the current plan proposed a major use of the funds for demolition. The UI program, initiated specifically to seek alternatives to demolition, thereby poses the question of massive demolition as an eligible item. The request would have to be approved by the Area Office and the HUD Assistant Secretary's Office.

Private redevelopment which maintains a commitment for a certain number of subsidized low and moderate-income units can only be achieved with massive subsidies from HUD for a combination of programs: Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation, Section 234, 235, a UDAG grant, in addition to public housing subsidies, and continuation of HUD payment for debt service. There are limits to the availability of such funds. HUD should clearly question the feasibility of massive demolition and disposition of public housing and then refinancing low and moderate-income new construction and substantial rehabilitation housing through other programs. With the limited funds available, even if HUD could commit funds through normal allocations or from the Secretary's discretionary funds, it would seem a wasteful process to achieve substantially fewer low-income units after
redevelopment. Serious problems exist with the logic of
demolishing sound buildings and then requesting funds for
new construction, since this would cut into normal pipeline
allocations that could produce additional housing elsewhere.
Just as HUD is reluctant to commit new construction alloca-
tions to Boston when large numbers of vacancies exist in
public housing, it would appear that they would be reluctant
to demolish sound units and provide new units in the same
location.

Close to 5,000 new low and moderate-income units are required
at a time when fair share allocations for Boston are extremely
low. Approximately 130 new Section 8 units are allocated
for all of Boston for Fiscal Year 1980, with one-half for new
construction and the other half for substantial rehabilita-
tion. Providing even a hundred new low-income units at
Columbia Point will require a substantial commitment from the
Secretary's discretionary fund.

Economic feasibility and cost efficiency would hopefully
govern HUD's decision on demolition. A careful assessment of
the rehabilitation cost for the units "to return it [them] to
a condition suitable for housing use" as stated in HUD's demo-
lition regulations would be necessary. This is clearly
distinct from the attainment of "luxury" quality housing,
which is explicitly not the objective of the Urban Initiatives
program.
Demolition and disposition continue to be of central concern to HUD, but the agency has chosen not to intervene because "it does not want to get involved in local decision making." Thus, HUD has only applied pressure for a consensus among the three parties. This posture might appear appropriate for HUD, but there are those who are concerned that if HUD continues to stand aloof, plans and developments would progress so far that HUD would have to "go along" with an approval or face the pressures of halting a process that took considerable negotiation, resources and energy by the three parties.

HUD has been kept considerably abreast of the redevelopment plan, but it has not given the parties much direction to insure that the plan conforms to the specific regulations for demolition, disposition, replacement housing, and for preservation of low-income housing. In the meantime, the parties proceed with little regard for HUD's regulations.

HUD's indecisiveness on clamping down on the BHA and the City to pursue a reasonable approach at Columbia Point only reinforces the belief among the residents that there are no possibilities for improvements short of private redevelopment. HUD's inaction to make sure that the UI funds are used by BHA to immediately rehabilitate occupied and vacant apartments and to provide the needed repairs, further contributes to the delay in any improvements in living conditions for existing residents.
CONCLUSION

Even though the view of the City, the BHA and the Task Force differed, the parties arrived at a consensus on the draft developer's kit. To summarize, the City and the BRA remained committed to their original plan and pushed to keep the main elements intact. Interestingly, the City's current proposals for massive demolition and disposition of public housing, private redevelopment, and a significant decrease in the low-income population were not only a continuation of their previous position, but were also the results of the City's unsettled fear about whether a market for upper-income housing and private investment actually could exist on the peninsula. The results of BRA's own housing market study left doubts that market housing was feasible given the negative "image" of the peninsula, the high cost of new construction, the reluctance of families to move to an area perceived as "risky," the problems of making a mixed-income development attractive to upper-income groups, and the amount of public investments which would be necessary to leverage sufficient private interest. These and a host of other problems had to be addressed prior for a market to be established.

The more it appeared that market housing would be difficult to achieve, the more adamant the City became in pushing for drastic solutions for the public housing site to guarantee future development success. The City's plan retained its "idealized" version in the Thompson Plan and the Boston Plan,
even though the workability of the plan became questionable. Therefore, the City's position in negotiations, e.g., its arguments for greater numbers of market-rate units and for more elderly and adult-only housing, served to undercut low-income housing interests, even when it became uncertain that the City's goals were attainable.

The BHA was caught between going along with the City's plan or fulfilling its mandate to provide low-income housing. Members of the BHA Board, administration and staff on the whole supported the City's plan, but the BHA had to find a credible justification for this position because of its accountability to HUD and to the Court. BHA was further confronted with TPC and others opposed to BHA's proposed actions. Deviating from its own consultants' findings (who supported rehabilitation), BHA used the excuses of the Task Force's support for private redevelopment and of pressures from the City, the BRA and the private sector who needed BHA's support for demolition and disposition of public housing. BHA was not interested in protecting the public housing tenants, as evident in BHA's long-range plan as well as short-term housing policies for Columbia Point.

The Task Force was unable to conceive of a redevelopment plan which was fundamentally different from what the City wanted. The Task Force plan, developed with the assistance
of GBCD and Carr, Lynch Associates, accepted the basic premise of the Thompson Plan and the Boston Plan and merely added the role of the Task Force as partners in redevelopment. This point of view first assumes that the Task Force will be successful in obtaining not just partnership, but significant status as co-equal partners with a developer; and second, that if this is achieved, the plan would benefit the low-income population.

The Task Force attempted to make a case for "good family living" by proposing its own set of reasons for demolition and disposition of public housing, but this only served to play into the hands of the City, the BRA and the private interests. In the end, the Task Force's figures for income mix, family and elderly housing mix, demolition and disposition differed little from the City's. A significant loss of low-income housing opportunities remained.

Without contact with the rest of the Columbia Point community the Task Force did not maintain a perspective which benefited the low-income population as a whole. The Task Force's plan, like the City's, reflected a narrow and selfish concern with who is to gain from redevelopment. In this case, a small number of tenants who remain after redevelopment will receive "luxury" quality units and will be able to share in the proceeds from private development.
The University of Massachusetts, having been a major participant in the planning process, found itself left out of the planning for even its own site. Late in 1979 U Mass sought to become involved again, only to find concern within its own community that U Mass's participation in the planning should reflect not only valid institutional needs but also the needs of the public housing community. From the previous Trustee's statement in 1973, U Mass' support and commitment to the housing project was raised again in 1979, resulting in U Mass taking a position in support of no reduction in the number of public housing units in the city.

When the City relinquished any concern for providing low-income housing opportunities at Columbia Point or elsewhere, the BHA was entangled with the Court over its basic ability to manage and maintain public housing, and finally, the Task Force shirked its responsibility to represent the interest of tenants. TPC tried to hold the parties accountable to their institutional mandates. The impact of redevelopment on the Columbia Point tenants, public housing tenants, and the low-income population city-wide became the concern of TPC. TPC was in favor of no demolition of public housing without replacement housing, no disposition of stock and no decrease in the number of low-income units. TPC continued to strongly support public housing as a vehicle for providing low-income housing. TPC also called for the swift rehabilitation and
occupancy of the units at Columbia Point and for improvements to be made for present and future public housing residents.

Having experienced years of problems with Columbia Point and suffering from the lack of any recent successes in public housing, HUD was "laying low" in directing a course for redevelopment. HUD did not feel it appropriate to be involved with the detailed negotiations and "local" issues. Therefore, it did little to see to it that BHA abide by the HUD demolition and disposition regulations. Thus, without HUD's active and firm involvement throughout the process, decisions may be made which are unacceptable to HUD--but by then it will be too late.
CHAPTER 7: THE IMPLICATION OF REDEVELOPMENT

"Whether it's 10, 20 or 5 that should be torn down, who knows? I think it's ridiculous to keep all the buildings up as physical eyesores."

--Andrew Olins, Special Assistant to the Mayor for Housing, speaking on Columbia Point, 1976
CHAPTER 7
THE IMPLICATION OF REDEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Once consensus is reached on program mix, demolition, disposition and other development issues, we will find a proposal for a significant social experiment in tenant and developer partnership in redeveloping a major public housing site for mixed-income housing. It becomes clear that redevelopment will come at a high cost to those who have been in the greatest need for housing. A critical appraisal of the implications of redevelopment has not been undertaken by any of the three parties, nor by HUD.

Even though the plan has not been finalized, the progress made on the draft developer's kit is sufficient for drawing some conclusive statements about the implications of the plan.

This chapter seeks to assess the impact of the most recent redevelopment plan on the low-income and public housing population. This includes discussions of four factors: (1) mixed-income housing, (2) private redevelopment, (3) demolition and disposition of public housing, and (4) the physical design of the site.
THE CONSENSUS PLAN

The implication of redevelopment from the third and fourth draft of the Developer's Selection Kit are summarized below: 2

1. Reduction of Low-income Units

The proposed plan would reduce the total number of public housing units by more than 790 units, or more than half of the existing 1,504 units. This is a reduction of 7% of the City of Boston's supply of federally-aided units for low-income families. More than 700 units would be provided for households above the Section 8 income limits for moderate and market housing at a time when 7,000 households are on the public housing waiting list. The evidence instead points to an appropriate need for increased numbers of low-income family and elderly units (see Chapter 2).

2. Massive Demolition of Sound Public Housing Units

Demolition is being considered for close to 660 units, close to half of the existing stock. 3 Ten to 15 of the mid-rises and 7 to 12 of the low-rise buildings will be demolished or partially demolished. Both mid-rises and low-rises will be demolished to provide for new construction units in the same location. In analyzing the redevelopment plans, the cost advantages for rehabilitation as opposed to new construction were ignored. Creative
redesign and rehabilitation solutions by Steffian Bradley Associates, and cost studies by Dan Walker and David Carter demonstrated the exciting potential for re-use of the existing buildings, but these were all overlooked in the latest proposal (see Chapters 5 and 6). Instead, the proposed site plan shows well-maintained, renovated and occupied buildings to be torn down or "cut" for reasons as capricious as the buildings blocking the view towards the pumphouse and the U Mass site. 4

3. **Permanent Loss of Low-income Units**

Public housing units demolished or disposed of will be permanently lost. No plans have been made for replacement housing. According to HUD regulations, the BHA is required to prove that the units are in excess to local need prior to demolition or disposition, or present a one-for-one replacement housing plan, but BHA has refused to do this. Moreover, the existing buildings have not been shown to be infeasible to rehabilitate. The loss of low-income units is also contrary to TPC's resolution stating "complete and active opposition to any action which would result in any reduction in the total number of occupied or unoccupied rental units administered by the BHA . . . unless compensated by the addition of at least an equal number of new rental units--either through subsidized housing or other housing program." 5
4. **Disposition of Low-income Housing Resource**

One-half to four-fifths of the BHA site of 37.5 acres of developable land in addition to another 37.8 acres of tidal land will be given away or sold to the developer. Even though the final size of the parcel to be disposed of has not been decided, BHA is willing to declare the land as "surplus." The surplusing of land at Columbia Point is in question as to conforming with the HUD regulations. Privatization will also result in the loss of an irreplaceable and necessary social resource. The inherent problems of privatizing public housing, as discussed in Chapter 3, will make it more difficult to meet low-income housing needs.

5. **Transfer to Private Ownership**

Private ownership by a developer of most of the BHA site is proposed. BHA will maintain ownership of only 7 to 10 of the 30 buildings as it is reluctant to retain any more. BHA will keep only those which it is required to: 2 to 3 buildings housing social services, 4 buildings already rehabilitated with 1975 Modernization funds, and 2 elderly and 2 family buildings to be rehabilitated with the Urban Initiatives funds. Private management is also proposed as an adequate solution to the present problems. While the parties continue to pursue a private redevelopment solution, the example of King's Lynne and similar attempts
(see Chapter 3), show an overstatement of the benefits of this approach.

6. **Inefficient Use of Urban Initiatives Funds**

A total of $11.2 million Urban Initiatives and Modernization monies will be used only for demolition, rehabilitation of the social service buildings, site work and rehabilitation of four buildings. The BHA is unwilling to spend major program funds for housing rehabilitation on its site because it would commit those units to BHA ownership. In other words, an "effective" solution to the problems of public housing appears to be getting rid of the buildings so that BHA no longer has ownership and maintenance responsibilities. The proposed use of the Urban Initiatives funds, of spending excessive funds for rehabilitating very few units to achieve "luxury" quality housing, is also inconsistent with the HUD Urban Initiatives Program guidelines which state that:

> The goal of the rehabilitation is to make all necessary changes to bring the physical structure up to an acceptable condition. This may entail the revision of unit sizes and changes on project design . . . to bring the project up to non-luxury code standards. [Emphasis added.]

7. **Unrealistic Density Figures**

The redevelopment plan proposes a density of less than 20 units per acre on a 106.1-acre site. The 1,470 units on
82.2 acres which comprise the residential site will result in less than 18 units per acre. This is in contrast to the density in areas of Boston which averages 40-45 units per acre, and 35 units per acre in Dorchester and South Boston. The existing housing on the BHA site is 38 units per acre, already in the low to mid-range of densities of BHA's family developments (see Chapter 4). The plan for a "utopian" suburban, beachfront, townhouse setting is unrealistic and misleading; it inhibits the development of an urban site and artificially constrains the provision of additional low and moderate-income housing. The 1,470 proposed units is less than what presently exists on 37 acres. There appears to be no rational basis for the proposed density in each of the plans, as it has ranged from 4,000 units in the Thompson Plan to the present low of 1,470 units.

8. Lack of Alternative Plan
The securing of financial resources and commitments has not been made. The development of any new low and moderate-income housing is solely contingent on funding for Section 8, Section 235, a $11.3 million UDAG, and other grants. It is highly unlikely that some or all of these funds will be forthcoming. In the meantime, no alternative plans have been proposed to redevelop the BHA site as viable public housing or low and moderate mixed-
income housing. Urban Initiative funds are already being committed to improve only a minimal portion of the site in anticipation of other funds—but, if these don't come through, the presence of low-income households on the peninsula will be jeopardized.

9. Displacement Pressures

Mixed-income housing will not only decrease the number of low-income units at Columbia Point, but displacement and gentrification pressures will be present in the surrounding communities of Dorchester and South Boston. The opening up of a market for upper-income households on the peninsula in the form of condominiums, sale housing and luxury rental units will mean that the already tight housing market in existing neighborhoods will be exacerbated. The income mix proposed for Columbia Point does not conform to the current mix in Dorchester or South Boston. For both these neighborhoods, the median family income is less than the City's average, and the percentage of households below the poverty level is greater than the City as a whole. An unmet need for low and moderate-income housing exists, but once the area is perceived as attractive to wealthier households, market pressures will diminish the supply of housing for neighborhood residents.
10. **Columbia Point as a Precedent**

Many BHA developments are in an equal or greater state of deterioration than Columbia Point. Without major efforts in seeking alternatives to demolition and disposition, an unfortunate precedent will be set; BHA can readily be expected to opt for demolition and disposition when sufficient pressure is applied from the City, the BRA and the private sector. Columbia Point has become of central concern to public housing tenants; rehabilitation and demolition are seen in a city-wide context because of the BHA's role as a main provider of subsidized housing.

**MIXED-INCOME HOUSING**

It is commonly argued that mixed-income housing is the solution to Columbia Point, just as it is the answer to the nation's low-income housing "problem." By breaking up the concentration of poor people, a development can be transformed into a "healthy" social environment unencumbered by the problems of chronic unemployment, large numbers of single-parent heads of households, large numbers of children, the presence of crime and vandalism, etc. While this may be the typical explanation given for redeveloping Columbia Point, in reality, mixed-income housing was initiated for other underlying reasons: (1) U Mass wanted a compatible residential community as their neighbor and not a low-income project; (2) the
BRA wanted a total change of image so that property values could increase and development opportunities be expanded on the peninsula; (3) income mix would also bring about racial mix, so that others besides poor, black and minority families could live on the attractive site; and (4) BHA would willingly be relieved of its financial and managerial burden of maintaining its largest and most stigmatized housing project.

In seeking a solution to Columbia Point, the parties could have proposed mixed-income housing without lessening housing opportunities for the poor by supporting a stable low and moderate-income mix for the BHA site, and other mixed-income housing for the non-BHA parcels. The City, the BRA, and the BHA instead, wanted a substantial decrease in the number of low-income households after redevelopment. They were able to propose this under the guise of mixed-income housing. The Task Force, with the assistance of its consultants, was led to believe that income mix was also in the tenants' best interest. The Task Force thought it was somehow possible to achieve "no separate areas by income or racial group."

In accepting the idea of "total" income mix, an artificial proportional limit on the number of low-income units is established. The redevelopment plan proposes limiting low-income units to one-third of the total development. No rationale is given for this, nor is the proposed income mix
comparable to the mix in the surrounding area. Successful housing for low-income residents is dependent on the support and livability of an environment for them and not on pre-determined decisions arbitrarily established by largely unrelated standards including density, development size, housing type, income mix, etc. (see discussion in Chapter 1 on HUD's Residents' Satisfaction Study). The parties did not undertake any study to assess the numbers of low-income units which could be supported on the total peninsula, nor did they produce evidence showing a lack of low-income housing needs to justify any reduction in the original 1,500 low-income units.

Complete or "ideal" income mix cannot be achieved programmatically; funding sources and subsidy programs play a major part in physically differentiating the site according to ownership, housing type, unit size and subsidy levels. It is unlikely that sufficient housing resources are available for the subsidized components if Section 8 and programs other than public housing are used to achieve full income integration. Total income mix is not practical nor obtainable.

The pursuit of this objective only results in further reductions in the number of low-income units. Attempting to "disperse" or distribute low-income units evenly throughout the site means that public housing is essentially discarded as a viable vehicle for supplying low-income housing, and an opportunity is foregone to develop any appreciable number of
subsidized housing in an area. Therefore, while appearing to be an embraceable concept, income mix is fraught with serious problems when carefully analyzed.

The Task Force, as well as the BHA, have been misled as to the attractiveness of mixed-income housing. Any hope of full income as well as racial mix is unrealistic and naive, since institutional constraints will connote some general geographic location of subsidized units, if housing programs are to be used at all. If the Task Force and the BHA are concerned with the welfare of the low-income population, proposing greater and more effective utilization of Urban Initiatives, Modernization and other public funds on the BHA site, and obtaining low and moderate-income housing commitments on the non-BHA sites both for public housing units lost through rehabilitation or consolidation, and additional units, would bring the greatest return. To make the best use of available subsidies and provide for the greatest numbers of low and moderate-income households, the public housing site would have to be rehabilitated for low and moderate-income households, and funding obtained for new subsidized housing, including public housing, Section 8, Section 235, 236 and Chapters 705 and 707 housing for the adjacent sites. Condominiums, market rental and ownership housing would be developed only on non-BHA owned land and could be economically integrated using Section 8 and low and moderate-income cooperative housing.

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Mixed-income housing should be viewed as a desirable alternative only if low-income housing opportunities are increased, as opposed to decreased. The present proposal for Columbia Point results in increased housing opportunities for middle and upper-income groups. There is a direct correlation between the number of low-income units lost and upper-income units gained, even though the area of the residential site has been more than doubled from 37.5 acres to 80.1 acres.

In addition to the concerns raised about the impact of income mix in reducing the quantities of low-income units, certain social ramifications are also present. Effectively, the low-income population is being told that the existence of a cohesive and functioning community is contingent on upper-income households being brought in to "turn around" the development. A belief that a "culture of poverty" exists, and that poor people need "role models" for upward mobility is still the opinion of many who support mixed-income housing. Accordingly, the pressures for income and social mix are applied one way: to integrate low-income housing developments and low-income neighborhoods, while segregated upper-income and exclusive areas are tolerated. Moreover, the focus and pressures for integration take on a racist character as "race" also becomes a dominant mode for housing policies (see discussion in Chapter 1 on "racial balancing" and "fair share" housing).
In contrast to much of the prevailing literature, the report prepared for HUD on "Residents' Satisfaction in HUD-Assisted Housing" (described in Chapter 1), suggests that the benefits of social mixing in subsidized projects are often illusionary or overstated. It was found that: "the more other residents in the development were perceived to be similar to oneself, the higher the level of satisfaction with other residents and with living in that development." This was true for questions about similar child-rearing ideas, similar interests, similar education and similar beliefs about right and wrong. This finding led to a recommendation to HUD that: "A re-examination of policies fostering deliberate socio-economic mix be undertaken. . . . Presently available findings suggest that mixing households having widely different moral beliefs, life styles and education should be avoided within a single development."

Comments from some of the residents who were surveyed included statements such as:

I would like to say that I think college people are real snobbish. There are more college people in this place. They seem to think they are so much better than everyone else. I wasn't raised this way.

The people around me are like pigs, very sloppy. They throw garbage around our yard and step on our plants. They throw rocks and snowballs at our house and cut our screens.

The first comment shows a response to the imposition of another income group with a different educational background.
and lifestyle, the second, of a response to disruptive and irresponsible tenants. Both comments typify the responses to groups which tend to cause problems in low-income communities.

The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) study, "A Social Audit of MHFA Housing," looked at sixteen MHFA developments comprising 3,200 households. The following research question was constructed: are tenants in housing developments with a mix of income levels more or less satisfied than tenants in developments that are more homogeneous with respect to income mix and racial mix? The study concluded that income and racial mix are secondary factors in determining tenant satisfaction:

The basic fact appears to be that income mix, surely, and racial mix, very probably, have no significant effect on satisfaction; whatever conceivable effect they might have is overwhelmed and completely overshadowed by more basic factors of design, construction, space facilities, location, maintenance and management.

Housing, housing services and broader issues represented the relevant realm in assessing tenants' satisfaction, instead of social mix:

In its first year or two, MHFA stimulated the production of a significant amount of housing of a very high quality. . . . Broad income mix "works" in these MHFA developments, producing higher levels of satisfaction at all levels--market income, moderate income, and low income, principally because these developments are superior in design, construction and
management. Income mix as such does not seem to be an important determinant of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.14

Income and racial mix per se cannot improve the housing or the environment in lieu of proper management and maintenance. The MHFA study also found that "perceived income mix and perceived number of minority families in the development were not correlated with satisfaction." Often a fallacious assumption is made of identifying communities which are poor and minority as being "problem" communities.

An associational relation is not the same as a causal relation; the predominance of low-income and minority households with poor living conditions and substandard housing is a reflection of their diminished economic status in society and the denial of housing and other opportunities to them and not because poor and minority people cannot live in decent and well-maintained housing. We have seen many examples of well-designed and properly run housing developments for low-income households even when the population is predominantly minority--because the deciding factors of management, social services, maintenance, and so on, are adequate. Within a context of satisfactory housing and housing services, residents are then able to contribute to the social maintenance and control of their community. For example, a conclusion which states that there are inherent social or community
problems in maintaining Columbia Point for a low-income popula-
tion is usually an excuse for why satisfactory housing services have not been provided.

Housing experts and others are quick to dwell on the problems of homogeneous low-income communities while they overlook the social problems resulting from mixed-income developments. Often, new social relations develop from class integration. This, combined with traditional management practices, may either jeopardize the tenancy of low-income residents or compound their problems by the threat of non-conformity to established management rules which are in keeping with a different lifestyle. Single women with children experience great difficulty in taking care of their children while working or seeking employment. Instead of being provided appropriate services for day care or child supervision, and employment opportunities, the women are usually subjected to more oppressive conditions in mixed-income communities where their social status is labeled as deviant and their children are surrounded by unachievable affluence.

Unanticipated problems experienced by the low-income residents have already emerged in the King's Lynne development. Because low-income households were to be totally integrated in a mixed-income development of one-third low, one-third moderate and one-third upper-income households, during the
transition from America Park to King's Lynne, social services were provided to assist former public housing tenants make a "successful transfer" into the new development. A study evaluating the King's Lynne social service program found that the program's "underlying objective appeared to be to help residents change lifestyles and behavior so that vandalism, crime, lack of rent payment and other such problems would be considerably decreased or eliminated. . . ."16

At King's Lynne, new management policies were established: children are prohibited from playing in front of their homes, are restricted to back yards and designated play areas, and often must have parental supervision at these play areas; cars cannot be repaired on-site; the exterior of the buildings cannot be decorated; and so on. Something as simple as not being allowed to repair one's car within the development seems reasonable only if one can afford to take the car to a garage for every minor repair.

While many of the management rules were acceptable given a middle-class community, some rules posed a threat to tenants who did not have any alternatives in dealing with their particular situation. Perhaps the most threatening factor to the low-income single parent is the fear of eviction due to their children's behavior. The following is from "Management Notes," a newsletter distributed to every tenant by the King's
Lynne Management Office:

It is truly unfortunate that each newsletter must begin with this same message. This office has been supplied with various names of youths who do not seem to be able to cope with the regulations of King's Lynne. . . . I have spoken with several of these youths and have stressed the point that they are endangering their rights to remain a resident of this development as well as the right of their families. . . . If you do not want to remain a resident of King's Lynne apartments, the Management Office will know soon enough by your actions, and will take every necessary step to assist you in leaving.17

Low-income tenants, in particular single women with children, lived under the perpetual fear of eviction or the pressure to move. In some cases families were evicted from King's Lynne, but many families also voluntarily left King's Lynne because of the strict rules which were set for the mixed-income development. They had difficulty making the transition due to their continuing problems with unemployment, school problems, family stress and instability--let alone their children's behavior. Management regulations regarding personal conduct and property imposed a new mode of behavior on low-income residents when basic economic and social conditions had not improved. The reprimanding of an individual "problem" family is understandable, but not if a significant portion of the low-income population is negatively affected by management rules being imposed.

The social reformer's dream may appear to have been fulfilled in the experiment at King's Lynne. But despite similar
housing conditions and the inability, at quick glance, to
distinguish the low-income units while driving through the
site, the class differences do reveal themselves after a
short time. It may be in furnishing the new unit that low-
income residents have to "make do" or find it difficult to
fix up their units appropriately; and it may be in lifestyle
differences where poor kids stay home in the summer and the
wealthier ones go off to summer camp. Other psychological
and social problems also develop from residents of different
class backgrounds living in such close proximity to each
other. Often, low-income families feel a great sense of
inadequacy in their inability to materially provide for their
children the way middle-class families are able to. Proxim-
ity may heighten class differences without providing any
real means for "social mobility" among the poor.

In looking at the other side of the picture of what upper-
income households have to gain from a mixed-income housing
development, we find that as housing conditions are improved
to attract market-rate tenants, the physical housing features
and amenities become important, and not income mix. After
all, how many market-rate tenants are willing to relocate and
pay market rents just because they want to live next to poor
people? In the case of Columbia Point, they will only seek
those opportunities if the conditions, e.g., housing standards,
beach access, proximity to downtown Boston, etc., become more
desirable than other options. At King's Lynne, a swimming pool, tennis courts, an indoor gym, a club house, and hand-ball courts were provided to create the incentives for upper-income households to want to live there. In order to attract a wealthy clientele, mixed-income housing must be made sufficiently more attractive than other housing on the market. This has meant a high public subsidy for other than low-income housing (see discussion in Chapter 3).

The belief that successful housing for the rich lies in attractive housing conditions, but for the poor, it lies in them becoming part of a mixed-income housing solution, is a double standard. There are those who argue that in order for the poor to have upgraded housing conditions, they must depend on the status of the rich who can leverage quality housing and other services. Since mixed-income housing will be better constructed and serviced because it has to meet the needs of upper-income households, the only solution for providing better low-income housing is within a framework of mixed-income housing. This argument resembles a point of view already familiar to low-income residents: that wealthy households should be encouraged to move into or "gentrify" the slums in order for improved city services and other amenities to be provided to those areas!

The "right" of the poor to adequate housing should not be
replaced by solutions which seek only to reproduce the inequalities within society by providing upper-income housing at the expense of the poor. Mixed-income housing is a "bag full of tricks" and should only be supported if it substantially increases low-income housing opportunities and increases the economic and social security of the poor. Any lessening of a commitment to public or low-income housing in the name of "income mix" should be avoided.

PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT

The three parties have all agreed on the following: the need to have a developer or development team for the total peninsula including the housing project, and to place the housing project under private management as soon as possible.

The reasons for private ownership and management will be briefly summarized: The City wants to see major private investments to change the trend of only public institutions locating on the peninsula. Major new development of the Bayside Mall and the housing sites is the primary objective. Incompetency and mismanagement by BHA has led tenants to a position of supporting a swift transfer to private management and private ownership as long as the Task Force becomes co-developers or partners with joint decision-making powers and rights to a share of the proceeds. The BHA is defensive of their management capabilities, despite their lack of a track
record, but BHA is willing to concede to contract management and turning over title of their property in order to see a successful development process underway. Having already taken management staff and work crews off the site in anticipation of a private developer redoing the site, BHA has chosen to interpret its responsibility for providing decent and affordable housing as including the passive acceptance of private redevelopment.

The benefits to the private sector are immense: private interests, as represented by the bankers, businessmen and investors, on the Peninsula Planning Committee have always been very clear as to their intent on redevelopment. Public housing provides a cheap and inexpensive source of land—a scarce commodity given the diminishing stock of developable and relatively low cost land in Boston. As in Pruitt-Igoe, the location, land costs, and public tenure have been critical factors for developers. Given the right conditions, a lot of money can be made from redeveloping Columbia Point. At both Columbia Point and Pruitt-Igoe, the private sector pursued privatization relentlessly and did little to encourage the housing authorities to upgrade its housing through the normal process of rehabilitation. The "concerned" parties did not want better housing as much as they wanted "better" people.
The Task Force, in its eagerness to have control over the future of Columbia Point, conceded to a private redevelopment as long as it can get a piece of the action. The Task Force is confident that constraints can be placed on the partner(s) to maintain a certain number of low-income units after redevelopment, and minimize the risks of resell. What remains unanswered is how the Task Force plans to address the lack of funds for other subsidy programs (now that a minimum number of public housing units will be retained), and the long-term consequences of what a partnership arrangement will bring. The problems with syndication and limited partnership raised in Chapter 3 have not been resolved. By concentrating its energies on defining a strong organizational role during and after redevelopment, the Task Force has overlooked the serious consequences of privatization.

The Columbia Point Community Task Force is presently comprised only of low-income tenants. After redevelopment, it will represent all residents who live on the peninsula. The consequences of a mixed-income population, including middle and upper-income households, becoming members of the Task Force have not been given much thought. The willingness of middle and upper-income people to defend the interest of the poor is doubtful. When low-income households become the minority in the new mixed-income development, the tenant organization will take on a dramatically different character.
Market tenants, whether in luxury townhouses, condominiums, or rental units will have different interests from those living in subsidized units.

An analogy for what may take place at Columbia Point after redevelopment is the experience of the South End during the period of urban renewal (see discussion on the South End in Chapter 2). Community organizations comprised of indigenous residents were originally active in advocating for the construction of subsidized housing and other concessions from the City because of the extensive loss of low-income housing in the area. But after the processes of gentrification and recycling in the neighborhood, the new membership of middle and upper-income residents were not interested in seeing any more subsidized units constructed in the area. It is not surprising that community organizations which represented wealthy homeowners concerned with property values lobbied at the City Council to close the South End Urban Renewal Project and went to court to prevent the construction of any more subsidized units.

The risks are high for existing Columbia Point tenants and other low-income tenants if the property is first taken from a stable form of public ownership, then transferred to a private developer/Task Force partnership, and finally, the composition of the Task Force is changed to include middle
and upper-income residents. This can only appear as a "death wish" for low-income residents, despite the "safeguards" the Task Force may attempt to provide.

More importantly, the above discussion assumes a strong Task Force presence after redevelopment, but even this may be in question. In the current negotiations, the Task Force has been unable to obtain partnership status or have a significant role in decision making because of resistance coming from the City, the BRA and the BHA. The Task Force has been strongly pushing for private redevelopment, private ownership and massive demolition when it has not obtained the requisite guarantees that low-income tenants will have substantial input once redevelopment is underway. The Task Force has not even been able to get the City and the BHA to guarantee housing to those families who on July 1, 1977 were living at Columbia Point and who have since moved (see discussion on the February 21, 1979 Agreement in Chapters 5 and 6). The City and the BHA still insist that only those who remain up to the time of redevelopment will be provided housing.18

As the final figures on income mix, demolition, and disposition are being decided, the Task Force is still at the beginning of its battle for partnership status, joint decision-making powers, a share in the proceeds, and for rehousing a certain number of low-income tenants. Opposition
to a strong Task Force role in redevelopment is coming from all parties, including HUD. The City and the BRA have always sought to restrict the involvement of low-income people at all levels of decision making. And BHA and HUD do not want the tenants to have extensive control over redevelopment because this would be unattractive when soliciting for a developer. 19

The Task Force has "gone out on a limb" in buying into private redevelopment while anticipating a strong and valid role for low-income residents. The whole plan hinges on tenant partnership or co-developer status, and if there is none, the tenants would have lost everything. But even if the Task Force could achieve a powerful and influential role, redevelopment could still occur with little regard for low-income needs. The many problems with a private redevelopment approach present great risks. The Task Force must be able to adequately handle the relocation problems when redevelopment is underway and protect the rights of households to return. It must be able to protect the low-income units negotiated for by obtaining the necessary long-term subsidies. The Task Force must have the political muscle and resources to: maintain low-income units, obstruct the sale of the development if it occurs, work out any cash flow problems, and inhibit market forces from transforming Columbia Point into a totally luxury housing development.
The fundamental problem with privately redeveloping public housing is the irreconcilable goals of providing attractive and affordable family and elderly housing for low-income residents, and obtaining this from the private sector. No matter how well one can finesse the system to make subsidized housing advantageous for the private sector to build, own and manage, developers will do so only as long as profit margins are maintained, and if the presence of low-income households does not diminish the attractiveness of the development to their market clientele. If not, privately owned low-income housing can revert to market housing at minimal cost to the owner. The lack of sufficient long-term housing subsidies, and the inability to maintain a "desirable" social environment for market tenants, e.g., problems with youth, would make it difficult for the owner to achieve the necessary rental income. This could lead to a situation where low-income units are converted to market units before financial and social deterioration set in.

The argument is made that because of enhanced financial capacity and professional experience, the only means of providing "luxury" housing for the poor is through the private sector. But this approach brings the risk of a permanent loss of low-income units if sufficient incentives are not maintained and if low-income residents do not conform to an acceptable mode of middle-class behavior.
A further implication of privately redeveloping Columbia Point is the precedent it would set both locally and nationally. Given the various interests which will profit from the privatization of public housing, it will be an enticing road to follow regardless of whether the poor will benefit. Every time the public sector can't manage its housing stock, an opportunity is ripe for demolition and redevelopment. There are "expensive" private redevelopment solutions which hold the parties accountable in maintaining the initial commitment to low-income housing by replacing all low-income units, or "cheap" solutions, which will provide a significantly fewer low-income units after redevelopment. "Cheap" solutions will become the rule, especially if the site is attractively located; developers won't put up with the low-income constraints because they want to build market or mixed-income housing, and housing authorities can then make their excuses about the lack of funds and their inability to properly manage low-income units.

DEMOLITION AND DISPOSITION

The impact of demolition and disposition of public housing at Columbia Point will be severe. As already illustrated, the loss of close to 800 public housing units through redevelopment, disposition, and demolition is a significant number given the current housing need. The magnitude of loss is even greater when considering what it
would cost to build the same number of units today.

Demolition and disposition must have HUD approval. The HUD regulations give a fair assessment of the relative importance of physical and social factors in considering demolition and disposition, but one of the weaknesses of the regulation is an option for HUD to commit the necessary funds for replacement housing (see Chapter 6 and Appendix).

Based on the criteria established by HUD, the units slated for demolition at Columbia Point cannot be demonstrated as in "excess to local needs," as there is a critical low-income housing need in Boston (see Chapter 2). Those who argue that the units are in "excess" because they are currently vacant only show that they support attrition as a legitimate practice. The units are vacant largely because of the unwillingness of the BHA and BRA to move in households from the waiting list. Hundreds of sound units requiring a minimal amount of "fix up" remain vacant because of this.

The regulations stipulate that if there is a local need, the request for demolition should include a one-to-one replacement housing plan or a plan warranted by the current and projected needs for low-income housing in the locality "subject to HUD's findings as to the availability of funds." This is a highly contentious part of the regulations, as it could
let the parties argue against replacing lost units because of the lack of funds. But before this claim can be made, BHA should at least attempt to make provisions for a replacement housing "plan." But the record shows that BHA has not even tried to replace one unit at Columbia Point. BHA has simply contended that HUD does not have the available resources.

The "availability of funds" can be interpreted to include other resources—if not through HUD, then through the State housing programs such as Chapters 705 and 707, MHFA programs, or programs through the City. Any combination of these funding sources should bring about a one-to-one replacement housing plan. Citing a lack of funds is, therefore, only an excuse for the BHA and the City's reluctance to develop any additional low-income housing.

If HUD permits a "zero" replacement housing plan, it must justify the following: funding an $11.3 million UDAG for Columbia Point to subsidize private redevelopment, including secondary mortgages for moderate and market homeownership; providing funding for Section 235, 236 and other moderate-income housing programs; and permitting the demolition of sound housing units when the replacement housing needs of the low-income population have not been met. HUD could draw from the HUD Secretary's discretionary budget to provide for replacement units, or at the very least, require the BHA to submit a plan for consideration.
The other criterion for evaluating the redevelopment proposal is the feasibility of rehabilitation. According to the BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan and estimates by Dan Walker, rehabilitation has been shown to be more cost effective than new construction. The Carr, Lynch Associates plan also showed that rehabilitation is feasible, even though decisions based on the design of the site made the consultants propose the rehabilitation of a limited number of units. David Carter, the Columbia Point Coordinator, also worked out demolition and cost figures and showed lower costs per unit as more of the units were saved from being demolished.20 (See Chapters 5 and 6.)

In looking at the HUD regulations, the following other conditions do not appear to justify demolition or disposition as proposed by the three parties:

1. The project is not located in an area where the surrounding condition on the peninsula or in the surrounding neighborhood "adversely affects the life, health or safety of project residents." (This is a different criterion than if one had to evaluate the project's impact on the surrounding neighborhood.)

2. The marketability of the project is not severely affected by social conditions as applicants still remain on the waiting list in spite of the present condition of the project. If HUD makes "every reasonable effort" to
"return it to a condition suitable for housing use," those on the waiting list will be able to move in and the development will undoubtedly attract other applicants.

3. High density has been claimed by all three parties as a condition justifying demolition of all mid-rises (except those for the elderly) and even some low-rises. This claim has been made under the assumption that families should not live in the mid-rises—not even on the lower floors. The lack of recreational and parking spaces are secondary reasons for demolition. But neither the presence of the mid-rise buildings nor density have been shown to significantly affect the quality of living conditions at Columbia Point in the past, whereas the factors of poor management and maintenance have. As already discussed, density at Columbia Point cannot be considered high in comparison with other developments in the City. And in relative terms, the building height and density at Columbia Point are insignificant when contrasted with typical apartment living in urban areas. Households with children in New York and other cities have not found building height and density to be insurmountable obstacles to good family living. The rigidity with which physical design standards are applied at Columbia Point are unnecessary and unrealistic. They seem to speak more to the political stance of their proponents in advocating demolition and disposition than to actual problems with the physical design of the buildings.
4. Demolition and disposition will not result in any "dedication for public use," e.g., easements, or right-of-way. This argument cannot be made by the supporters of the redevelopment plan.

5. The fifth and last criterion to be used by HUD in evaluating the proposal are the views of tenants and the local governing body. Most of the tenants at Columbia Point have not been made aware of the recent plan for demolition and disposition, even though it is backed by the Task Force. Tenants should be informed prior to the final proposals to HUD. Furthermore the city-wide tenants' organization, TPC, has stated its opposition to the plan.

According to HUD, it "will limit approval for demolition or disposition to those cases where such action can be fully justified in accordance with the criteria. . . ." It will be interesting to see how HUD can support the plan given its own espoused position.

To summarize, demolition and disposition are not justified at Columbia Point because of the following: a local need exists for low-income housing; rehabilitation has not been determined infeasible; a one-to-one replacement housing plan has not been proposed; the project is not located in an adverse neighborhood; the marketability of the project is not
severely impacted; no "public benefits" will derive from demolition; and there remains some divergence of opinions among the actors. In not conforming to HUD regulations, the plan represents an abdication of public responsibility by proposing demolition and disposition.

In refuting a fundamental claim by the BHA and the City that unavailability of funds from HUD and the lack of other resources account for the inability to redevelop the BHA site for low-income housing, or to provide for replacement housing, the following argument can be made: HUD has already invested more than $8.6 million for rehabilitation, systems modernization, and services, in addition to committing another $10 million. A substantial portion of the funds have been spent for infrastructure improvements as recently as two years ago for modernizing the power plant and overhauling the entire electrical and heating distribution systems to the buildings. Now these buildings are being proposed for demolition. This would appear to be a waste of public resources. The remaining debt on the property stands at more than $26 million in short and long-term notes, which will have to be paid by the public even after the site is converted to private ownership. In addition, another $10 to $20 million will have to be committed by HUD for a UDAG and other housing programs, along with funds from the State and City for public improvements, e.g., streets, marina, shoreline development, transportation,
etc., to support private redevelopment of the site. The contradictions are apparent. The costs are high for avoiding a reasonable approach which addresses the housing needs of the low-income population. Those who speak of a shortage of public resources to redevelop the site as public housing or low-income housing have failed to justify why substantial public resources will be committed for a private mixed-income housing solution where the benefits will largely go to upper-income households who are not in need of housing assistance.

THE PHYSICAL SITE

The Columbia Point plan must be assessed as to whether the proposed environment will be supportive of the needs of low and moderate-income residents. The plans proposed by the City and the Task Force assume the development of Columbia Point as a low-density, suburban site in order for it to be successful for family living and attractive to market tenants. The most thorough plan developed thus far has been prepared by Carr, Lynch Associates for the Task Force. Comments will be directed at this plan as it has become the basis for detailed discussion of the site plan and the design philosophy can be viewed as representative of the final plan.21

The Task Force plan is modeled after King's Lynne, a suburban site of townhouses surrounded by vast green space, located in the outskirts of the town of Lynn. Redevelopment is not
seen as resembling other urban neighborhoods in Boston or surrounding cities, such as Cambridge. The design and planning concepts embodied in the plan are taken from the "American dream," suburban imagery as discussed in Chapter 5 under the Task Force plan. The association of King's Lynne, which is 25 miles outside the city, with Columbia Point is misleading. Different financial and institutional opportunities, as well as a different community exists at Columbia Point. It is hard to imagine the development of a valuable urban site as low-density townhouses with sprawling green spaces. This will serve to inhibit the development of all but luxury housing. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the success of a suburban typology superimposed in an urban context on a diverse community.

Columbia Point today, even with the remaining population of approximately 1,000 and the deteriorated living conditions, is similar to most urban neighborhoods in the level of social interaction and community life. This is shown by a highly interactive social environment among the residents, an existence of residential street life, neighborhood activities, and other signs of community cohesion. Even though all signs of interaction among residents are not necessarily positive, efforts should be made to recognize and encourage appropriate forms of social interaction rather than to deny all forms of interaction. The proposed plan is overbearing in its attempt...
to obliterate all semblances of the existing community, both socially and physically. By denying the present residents and new residents the richness and diverse quality of an urban neighborhood environment, and by massive destruction of existing buildings and rerouting of streets, the plan reflects more a reactive response to the present deteriorated conditions at Columbia Point than a reasonable approach towards redevelopment.

What is being proposed are monotonous townhouses of questionable quality (given the high cost of new construction) which must conform to some rigidly established design criteria. The plan takes as its basic assumption that successful family living can only take place in two and three-story single-family houses, townhouses and garden apartments. Each individual unit must have a front entrance, a back entrance with a private yard, direct ground access, pitched roofs, and all the images of "home." While many of these features are attractive, they are inaccurately presented as essential.

In reality, many factors such as the quality and accessibility to open space, management, maintenance, security, unit size and condition, the quality of individual or common entrances may be more important to the success of a residential community than whether the unit has a formal front and back entrance or direct ground access. It is proposed that all
three-bedroom units or larger must have direct ground access
and that all mid-rise buildings be demolished or cut to three
stories (except for elderly buildings). These rigid rules
result in the inability to re-use existing low and mid-rise
buildings in a number of creative ways. Stacked four-bedroom
units cannot be rehabilitated into three-bedroom units because
of lack of ground access. Small families are not able to be
housed in mid-rise buildings in any way. Given these con-
straints, it is no wonder that the redevelopment plan results
in such a high amount of demolition.

Maintaining Columbia Point as a predominantly family-oriented
development can be achieved without massive demolition and
restructuring of the present BHA site. In certain areas
adequate open space and other amenities must be provided, but
the rehabilitation and re-use of the existing low-rise and
mid-rise buildings can create appropriate family units. Many
design solutions for the rehabilitation of the low-rises have
already been proposed which would seem to warrant their re-
tention, even though the plan proposes demolishing some of
the low-rises.

The mid-rises present multiple opportunities for rehabilita-
tion as elderly housing, as housing for adults and small
families, and for mixed-use purposes. Community space, ser-
vices, congregate facilities, activity areas, and even
retail/commercial space are some of the re-use possibilities for the ground and first floors of the buildings. Lobbies can be expanded and large glass panels installed to light up and open up space for community facilities and services on the first floors. For both low and mid-rise buildings, volumes can be added, such as porches, balconies, patios, including built additions and extensions so that the present stark quality of the buildings can be substantially altered without having to resort to demolition or to token gestures such as "pitched" roofs to create an image of a residential community.

The new street and circulation system proposed results in long, winding stretches of streets without any bisecting street. Intersections are not used as interfaces between different parts of the site, since the design is intended to make formidable any penetration of the site by unwanted intruders. The streets are thus more accessible to vehicles because of their length, and are in effect hostile to pedestrian traffic and activities. Even when pedestrian paths are provided, they are not located in the appropriate places, and are not associated with the major streets. The circulation, in effect, denies appropriate street life activities common to residential neighborhoods. Streets are well located and are an asset when they serve as meeting places, when they provide visual access to other parts of the site, and when
they serve the function of efficiently directing pedestrian movement.

Streets at Columbia Point should be planned as urban streets to embody specific functions: a place for residential social interaction, visual accessibility, a focal point for limited activities and for directed and purposeful movement. Corners, intersections, and pedestrian paths should be used to enhance the desired street life and connect different circulation systems and activities, e.g., pedestrian path connections at an active corner of the site. Circulation systems should also enhance such site attributes as landscaping, internal vistas, and vistas toward the ocean. Variables, such as the scale of the street, size, length, texture, etc. should help to define the character of the street as residential, or active and should define the nature of the traffic flow. Street surfaces or clearly demarcated pedestrian paths should extend through the site and relate the various centers of activities.

The plan for a "continuous and ample flow of open space" will result in serious problems in maintenance, security surveillance, control and efficient use of space. The plan contains rehabilitated and new construction units along the street edges with vast common green space located in the middle. The use of the open space is not very well defined either as
private space or semi-public space. Thus, it opens an ongoing argument as to who, tenant or management, is responsible for its maintenance, which will be an extensive ongoing cost.

The following are some of the anticipated problems that will result from the proposed site plan: the uncontrolled flow of open space will create vast visual and physical wastelands behind the residential buildings, instead of the pleasant image of large open spaces that was intended. The undefined use of the space will result in improper uses, such as active recreational uses behind buildings, teenagers hanging out, etc. The location of open space almost totally enclosed by buildings (even with the occasional attempt at visual penetration) will cause problems of personal safety and security. These spaces provide insurmountable opportunities for personal attacks and assaults. Undifferentiated uses for the open space will also create problems of surveillance and territoriality, since the publicness or privateness of the green spaces in relation to immediate residents, neighbors, and the larger community or public is not defined.

A hierarchical classification of open space from private back yards, to tot lots, playgrounds, sitting areas, playing fields, to semi-public or public beaches appropriate for the site is a superior method of planning and siting usable open space rather than the anonymous allocation of large plots of
green space as planned. These should be structured in terms of specific activities, e.g., active and passive uses, and according to age and population groups. Greater definition of the types of activities will determine the success of the open space, not just an increase in the amount of open space.

Even without the overriding problems of management and maintenance or inadequate funding, Columbia Point from its earliest days suffered because of its isolation as a multi-bedroom facility with nothing else but housing, schools, and people to characterize it as a community. Even low-income communities in other parts of Boston had substantially more resources, a more diverse living environment, and more geographic access to employment opportunities. The redevelopment of Columbia Point as another bedroom community, with the only difference being its mixed-income nature, will not create a substantially improved environment. The development of diverse, mixed-uses within the physical site as well as greater access to the larger community are needed. Something as simple, but important, as local stores and shops for personal service have not been provided for in the plan. The diversity of stores: sub-shops, food stores, laundromats, cleaners, hair dresser/barber shop, etc., which characterize other urban communities are also important at Columbia Point.

The proposed site plan and the physical design fall short of
creating a suitable living environment. Instead of a plan which is supportive of the needs of low and moderate-income households, we find one which solely attempts to justify the demolition, disposition, and lessening of low-income housing opportunities proposed by the City and others.

CONCLUSION

The evidence points to the serious consequences of mixed-income housing, privatization, demolition and disposition of public housing and the proposed physical design on the low-income population. We must question the motives and interest of the local, state, and federal government to willingly commit substantial resources and funding for private ownership while unwilling to do so under public ownership.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"For what has happened to Columbia Point, I put 60% of the blame on the desk of Andy Olins for the Mayor's housing policy towards the poor, 20% on the BHA for following along, and 20% on the tenants: 10% for tenants because they do create a certain amount of the problems and 10% for stupidity, because they'll believe anything said to them and take the crumbs."

--Joanne Ross, Former tenant of Columbia Point

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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The research presented in the previous chapters strongly supports the conclusion that public housing is a vital housing resource which must be preserved for low-income use. With the increase in local housing needs and a housing crisis which impacts severely on the poor and minority populations, the privatization of public housing will result in further displacement of low-income people. This study challenges the assumptions that private redevelopment, mixed-income housing, demolition and disposition are the appropriate solutions to Columbia Point.

The current redevelopment plan for Columbia Point offers neither a satisfactory or compensatory solution to the low-income population who have and will be affected. If the present redevelopment plan is implemented, a drastic decrease in low-income housing opportunities, including the loss of an attractive housing site from public tenure, will herald a second generation "Pruitt-Igoe." To summarize, redevelopment will reduce the total low-income units by 800 or more, 660 units will be demolished; and a major portion of the site will be disposed of.
Even though a number of low-income tenants, at least those who manage to remain, will receive new or rehabilitated housing, this does little to insure the future of low-income housing on the peninsula. While it has been shown that the BHA failed to maintain public housing at Columbia Point during the last 10 years, it is a mistake to conclude that public housing is inherently unable to house people adequately. With private redevelopment, ownership and subsidy programs can change and any commitment to low-income housing will be tenuous at best. In spite of the constraints which can be placed on the developer, principal reliance on Section 8 and Section 236 allocations will jeopardize the presence of low-income residents. Funding for the programs is not only limited and difficult to obtain, but is also highly volatile and unstable. This could result in market-rate and luxury housing as the only housing to exist after redevelopment.

Many arguments are made for a decrease in the number of low-income units after redevelopment, but these have not been substantiated. No financial analysis has been made nor does proof exist that low-income people are incapable of sustaining a viable community. Let us look at some of the underlying assumptions of the plans: The early plans maintained most of the public housing units and proposed a substantial number of new units above and beyond the existing public housing units to accommodate the mixed-income housing components. The
1974 Thompson Plan proposed a 4,000-unit development, with one-fourth or 1,000 units to be low-income housing, because this figure represented the number of existing households living on the peninsula. The number of low-income units proposed in each subsequent plan was to decrease at a rate approximating the number of low-income households remaining. Due to attrition, this resulted in a rapid drop in the number of low-income units included. Since low-income families were to comprise only one-fourth to one-third of the new development, the number of existing low-income families became the multiplier for the overall residential community. Through the years, the proposed development decreased from 4,000 units under the Thompson Plan in 1974 to 1,800 under the Peninsula Planning Committee’s plan, 1,500 under the Boston Plan in 1977, and to 1,470 units under the current plan.

As of September 1979, 369 households were living at Columbia Point. The redevelopment plan proposed 335 units, or 25% of the units for low-income families. With the addition of moderate and market housing units, the redevelopment plan results in less than the 1,504 original units. The number of low-income family units to be provided is based solely on the number of existing households and not on any valid criteria which address the numbers which can be maintained on the site.

The plans cannot simply be judged by the number of low-income
units they purport to provide. The Thompson Plan proposed 1,000 low-income units but could not specify where the subsidies could be obtained. Louise Day Hicks, the City Council, the BRA, and the BHA in 1977 considered a totally low-income development, but it was to be all elderly. In the most recent plan, the proposed number of low-income units is also deceptive. The definition of "low-income" varies according to the subsidy programs, and income mixing within the low-income category will result in a resident population substantially different from the typical public housing population. "Low-income" has been generally defined as households with incomes of less than 80% of the SMSA median income for Boston: "moderate" as 80% to 110%; and "market" as above 110%. This results in two-thirds of the family households being above the Section 8 limits. Therefore, a household making $21 thousand annually in 1979 is considered moderate-income. This must be contrasted with an income mix which considers "low-income" as public housing eligible households which are below 50% of SMSA median ($9,700); "moderate" as above public housing and below Section 8 ($15,500), or 50% to 80% of SMSA median income; and "market" as above Section 8 limits or above 80% of SMSA median income. This results in the majority of units being provided to households in need of some form of housing assistance. Equating the existing public housing population with the new "low-income" population is a dissimilar comparison. Of the
710 proposed "low-income" units, less than half will be for families, and only 190 units will be for larger families (three or more bedrooms). The remaining units will be 280 elderly, 65 childless households, and 175 small families (one to two bedrooms). 4 The units proposed for low-income elderly, small families and childless households are important factors deliberately used to decrease the number of larger family units and inflate the overall number of low-income units.

The phasing of construction may also affect the final yield of low-income units. Phase 1, which will take more than a year for completion, will result in only 80 low-income, small family units (one to two bedrooms), and 95 low-income larger family units (three to six bedrooms). 5 The present plan does not even rehouse all of the existing family households nor meet the July 1, 1977 commitment to families in residence on that date, let alone add new low-income households in Phase 1. Phase 2 will commence only after completion of Phase 1, and proposes mostly new construction. Any funding for low-income housing may be jeopardized in the three to four years it will take for construction of Phase 2. Low-income units are also proposed for Phase 3, but for both Phases 2 and 3, they are so far in the future that funding has not even been discussed. The plan may call for 710 total low-income units, but the results may be quite different.
Other factors which deterred the provision of a significant number of low-income units included predetermined density figures; these corresponded to whatever lifestyle was in vogue at the particular time. The Harbor Park Plan proposed high-rise, high-density towers on the waterfront. The Boston Plan focused on the growing middle and upper-income sector demand for housing and proposed a complex of luxury condominiums directly related to the new marina.6 And now with the Carr, Lynch Associates' plan, low-density "suburban" housing is popular. In all cases, density was assessed independent of what an 80-acre housing site could accommodate in an urban setting.

None of the plans attempted to provide the equivalent number of low-income units on the BHA site or on the adjoining parcels, nor do the plans address the economic feasibility of rehabilitating as many units as possible into suitable "non-luxury" housing. Availability of low and moderate-income subsidies was not a consideration in determining the number of subsidized units to be provided. This is illustrated by the Peninsula Planning Committee's Land-Use Options which considered rehabilitating significant numbers of public housing units, but then discarded this option. Instead, an option was selected which retained the fewest number of low-income units (588), and which reflected the number of existing households.7 The PCC's "housing" option contained fewer low-income units than their "institutional development" option.
Even in the later plans, the retention of as many subsidized housing or public housing units as possible was not attempted. The parties wanted the fewest number of public housing units, especially larger family units, to exist after redevelopment. Public housing would house the elderly, but family housing would largely be provided through the Section 8 and other subsidy programs. As a result, the number of low-income family units would be further constricted, as funding for these programs, in comparison to public housing, would be difficult to obtain.

In minimizing the low-income component within a mixed-income housing development, the implicit concerns for market housing could be maintained. Therefore, the City guaranteed housing only to existing tenants. Since only a small number of tenants could be expected to remain, the City's housing guarantee was a token gesture which could serve to curb public protest against overt displacement and bring about a largely middle and upper-income "mix" after redevelopment. Instead of an enlightened decision for any real income mix, mixed-income housing was, therefore, a purely political strategy.

To the extent that publicly held property could change hands and public financial resources obtained to benefit the private sector, a "mixed-income" scheme was also a small concession. Mixed-income housing could justify major public
investments which would be hard to ask for in a luxury housing development. Public investments could be made available in the form of transportation, shoreline and street improvements, parks and recreation facilities, and other amenities which would create a residential environment with a high market value. In addition, an urban renewal designation, special tax status (121A), and other funding, e.g., a UDAG, housing construction and mortgage subsidies could help lower development costs. Any consideration of the needs of the low-income population would be but a fallout of the overall redevelopment process. An improvement as simple as rerouting bus lines to Columbia Point to provide for greater transportation service has not been made for existing residents. But a whole transit system, including the construction of a new MBTA Red Line station, will be provided for the new community.

The numerous plans for Columbia Point contain essentially the same elements: a drastic reduction in the number of low-income units; the undermining of public ownership and the public mandate to provide low-income housing; and the use of major public resources to benefit middle and upper-income households.

A look at the history of planning at Columbia Point discloses the trend of powerful forces backing a private redevelopment solution; this is primarily manifested in the initiatives of
U Mass, the Peninsula Planning Committee, the BRA and the City. The attention given to this public housing site has been unequaled. The parties were not concerned with the welfare of the poor—that Columbia Point would remain and be upgraded into a well-run, functioning low-income community, and would become a desirable neighbor to the institutions. These goals were superfluous, as a prior decision had been made to dramatically change the economic, racial and cultural characteristics of those who were going to live on the peninsula.

Regardless of housing needs and the feasibility of rehabilitating and improving the housing project, the City had long since pursued a city-wide housing policy antagonistic to the poor. The inability of the BHA to provide decent housing also contributes to the lack of any City commitment to housing the low-income population. Nor should the fact that four of the five BHA and BRA commissioners are mayoral appointments be forgotten.

In many of the redevelopment plans the assumption is made that Columbia Point is beyond hope of revitalizing as a viable low-income community. The belief stressed is that any attempts at revitalization would fail and the project would only revert back to its present condition. This argument appears to be plausible, but it has never been proved to be true. Prior to
proposing massive demolition and disposition, responsible efforts should have been undertaken to revitalize Columbia Point as public housing, and to meet the need of the residents for effective management and maintenance services.

The BHA modernization effort was an inadequate attempt at upgrading the development, but this, as documented, was well within the range of being competently and professionally handled by appropriately trained personnel. One needs only to look at the successful modernization undertaken by other housing authorities to know that it can be done properly. This failure of the modernization program cannot be attributed to the presence of low-income households, but to BHA's lack of necessary expertise in construction management and housing rehabilitation and to its fear of any innovative or creative solutions to its problems. The BHA should, at the very least, have learned how to effectively handle its weakness during these years. But the actions of the City, private interests and the BHA itself precluded any serious attempts to provide decent and affordable housing for existing Columbia Point residents, let alone propose a redevelopment plan which could address the needs of other low-income households. Even the areas of security, tenant selection, tenant services, management and maintenance have not been adequately addressed.

"Reasonable efforts" to keep the project within the low-income
housing inventory, and "to return it to a condition suitable for housing use, through a modernization program or other means," as required by HUD, have not been undertaken, prior to proposals for demolition and disposition. There has not been a systematic documentation of the source of the problems which have led to the deterioration of Columbia Point in only the last seven to nine years of the project's 25-year history, nor an explanation of why the project could function adequately at full capacity for well over 15 years, given the "insurmountable" problems in design, density, and location which the critics so simplistically claim are the problems today. To say that Columbia Point can't work because it is low-income, or because of its physical design and isolation, are mere speculations, not facts, and are arguably untrue.

It is ironic that, after more than 10 years of planning for Columbia Point and the production of numerous studies, the policies adopted by the parties on demolition and rehabilitation are in conflict with the actual findings in the studies. As discussed above, the Boston Plan, the Task Force Plan, the BHA/Steffian Bradley Plan all speak to the sound construction of the buildings and the possibilities for easy rehabilitation. The Task Force's Resident Needs Survey reveals some of the physical design changes which could improve the existing site, and Dan Walker of Commonwealth Design and David Carter of BHA show the cost advantages of rehabilitation over demolition.
The internal logic of the plans differed with the resulting actions calling for massive demolition and major restructuring of the site.

The discrepancies cannot be attributed solely to faulty reasoning. Instead, the evidence is subordinated to the political motives of the parties who forge ahead with their program regardless of their own consultants' findings.

Sufficient evidence already exists to draw conclusions in favor of rehabilitation as the primary mode of upgrading conditions. No more studies are needed, just the application of some consistent logic in formulating a housing revitalization program.

What we see at Columbia Point is a relinquishing of the mandate to provide decent housing for the poor. The call for privatization, mixed-income housing, demolition and disposition cannot be viewed as the sole recourse for Columbia Point after "all else has failed," but rather as an aggressive strategy to appropriate essential housing resources from the poor.

It is not surprising that the "ideal" conditions for the development of market housing at Columbia Point require no more than the massive demolition and disposition of public
housing; a competent developer to take over the housing site and adjoining land; the use of marketing techniques; major public investments; and so on. This is exactly what is being proposed in the current plan. While the Mayor's Office and the BRA may support a redevelopment plan which substantially reduces the presence of low-income households at Columbia Point, BHA and the Task Force are self-defeating in backing such a position. The BHA has been a pawn for the City and the Task Force has been a willing victim. Neither benefit if the long-term interests of low-income tenants are not upheld. BHA has its institutional integrity at stake, and the Task Force cannot single-handedly protect the interest of existing tenants if redevelopment conditions are hostile to a low-income presence. A danger exists with a plan that only rehouses existing families. As attrition resulted in a decrease of 130 families per year beginning in 1970, it is not hard to see that the commitment to rehouse only the remaining residents is a small concession for the City to make. Having to plan for fewer and fewer low-income families makes it easier to propose greater disposition of the public housing site.

Low-income families throughout the city who cannot obtain decent units at Columbia Point are deprived of their right to housing. The small number of luxury units which will result from redevelopment cannot be viewed as a "gift" to a select group of low-income tenants, as valuable public housing
property will be disposed of for use by other income groups. Given the existing need, an argument can be made for retaining 1,500 low-income units at Columbia Point, or at the very least, the low-income units rehabilitated on-site or replaced at another location should total 1,500 units.

It is understandable that neither Columbia Point nor any single housing site can meet the City's total low-income housing need, but a redevelopment solution should not deepen the housing crisis. The planning for Columbia Point and other publicly held sites must benefit low-income tenants to the fullest extent or housing problems will further aggravate the living conditions for the poor in the City.

A Redevelopment Plan must be seen as unacceptable if it neglects the interest of public housing tenants, families on the waiting list, those who have moved from Columbia Point because of intolerable conditions, and other low-income families in need of housing in Boston.

In addressing the rationale of the various parties in supporting the redevelopment plan, a decrease in the number of low-income units is often justified by the following: a small number of low-income units which meet luxury housing standards in a mixed-income community is a far superior alternative to any public housing revitalization attempt. The trade-off for
"quality" housing units in a superior living environment is the quantity of low-income housing provided. The seemingly well-intentioned and laudable objectives of the three parties for full income integration, and the belief that all units should be similar, has led to serious problems. Given a mixed-income community, a certain housing quality must be achieved to attract market tenants. The result is that all housing on the peninsula must conform to market-rate or luxury housing standards.

The BRA and the Mayor's office uphold market-rate housing standards because this would provide for the marketability and interchangeability of the housing stock and redress the stigmatization of Columbia Point. The BHA supports this because of their own inability to manage the development, and is eager to relinquish all responsibility for one of their most troubled projects by seeking an acceptable solution. The Task Force supports market quality housing because they feel that low-income households have a right to live in the same housing as upper-income groups.

No matter what the perspectives of each party may be, the results are the same. The plan calls for elaborate physical redesign to achieve full integration of all existing and new housing into one development—requiring radical restructuring of the existing site. One of the major consequences is that
housing which could be either rehabilitated or preserved would be slated for demolition because it does not meet the standards of low-rise, low-density, luxury, "suburban" housing. Non-luxury, standard housing which is well-managed and maintained no longer becomes a housing objective.

In addition, cost effective criteria are subsumed under the desire for luxury housing. The result is that $11.2 million of Urban Initiatives and Modernization funds will go primarily for the rehabilitation of 74 family and 160 elderly units in Parcel 1A, and for demolition. Of the total family units, including 74 rehabilitated and 10 new construction units, only 84 public housing eligible units will be provided. Of this, only 30 units for larger families (three to six bedrooms) will be made available. These are small gains at a tremendous cost to the public. This comes to an expenditure of approximately $70 thousand for each rehabilitated family unit, if we estimate a generous $30 thousand for rehabilitating each of the 160 elderly units. This is an expenditure which is hard to justify, given the scarcity of funds for housing in Boston.

The debate on "luxury" housing versus "standard" housing for the poor must be viewed within an historical context. It is too simplistic to postulate, as liberal housing advocates often do, that poor people have a "right" to luxury housing.
Or, as the Task Force has stated in response to criticisms raised about the impact of their proposed plan on the low-income housing stock: "the Task Force believes that low-income tenants deserve to live in a 'suburban' like environment as much as those of moderate and upper income."\textsuperscript{11}

The "right" to housing cannot embody a static view of housing "quality." Real housing gains and concessions for the poor, including the question of housing quality, are won only in so far as they are successful in solving part of the housing crisis for the poor. Given the realities today, even those who well-meaningly argue for "luxury" housing as the standard for the poor cannot avoid the impact of high costs or fewer units to be provided after redevelopment. Nor can they defend units which can be feasibly rehabilitated being demolished and replaced with expensive, but not necessarily better constructed, units.

Unfortunately, the limited housing subsidies available are a reflection of society's lack of support for low-income or mass housing. Until this picture is changed in the political arena to increase public funding and financing, the determination of housing "quality" must be astutely calculated to deal with the political and economic realities of housing the poor. Something as basic as "good," standard and decent housing which can encompass new design standards, management practices,
innovative solutions for rehabilitation, and the provision of a supportive social environment, can go a long way towards social and political empowerment of the poor. Housing, per se, is neither so complex nor so problematic that it becomes unmanageable or unlivable because it does not meet "luxury" housing standards. Residential communities, including low and moderate-income communities, are successful for many reasons, and luxury housing standards are not crucial factors.

Judging a housing site by its marketability to upper-income groups does not necessarily speak to the quality of the housing stock, nor to the nature of the social environment. In other words, attractiveness to a market clientele may not account for many factors which make a community desirable for low and moderate-income households. For example, communities such as East Cambridge, Jamaica Plain, Dorchester, and the North End, "work" for many reasons--few of which may resemble upper-income communities.

To require that the new low-income housing on the peninsula--to be accomplished through massive demolition and disposition--be comparable to what market-rate tenants would pay $700 to $1,200 per month for is political suicide. Low-income tenants cannot afford to lose the battle because they are fighting over luxury housing standards, especially when there are clear examples of desirable and well-run public housing throughout the country.
To decide in favor of private redevelopment and massive demolition when rehabilitation is feasible, or in favor of disposition of public housing property just to gain a few units of luxury housing for the poor as a "right," is an enormous price to pay--one which is not without serious consequences both locally and nationally.

Luxury housing is neither a reality nor a necessity for low-income people, especially when utilizing massive public funds would deprive other low-income families of housing. It is not only wasteful, but irresponsible, for the government to spend such sums on luxury units, even if they are to be occupied by the poor.

Cost conservation would appear to be an important factor in achieving a mass housing solution, unless, of course, there is no longer a mass housing commitment. Decent and affordable housing is quite different from luxury housing; the cost to the public sector, and the impact on the public housing and low-income communities by the substantial loss of low-income units, is not warranted. Tampering with luxury and mixed-income housing schemes in place of providing suitable low-income housing can only be seen as against the interests of low-income people.

An initial look at the events surrounding Columbia Point
appear similar to other struggles over the control of land. The lines are drawn, the politics are well-played, and one is clear about the intentions of the major actors in transforming the peninsula. The struggle of tenants to determine their future closely parallels other community struggles for influence and control. But what has been unique in the case of Columbia Point has been a major battle lasting more than 10 years over a public housing site. Even today, it is far from being resolved. The fate of Columbia Point will be of major significance as it has become the symbol of society's commitment to the future of public housing. Columbia Point has become the testing ground for a solution to one of the most devastated developments in the country. Many important lessons can be learned from this experience.

While we see the empowerment of a tenant organization in successfully gaining means to architecture, planning and technical assistance, we also see the pitfalls of an isolated leadership reinforced by the manipulative and patronizing posture of their consultants and the BHA. The consultants played a dominant role in the decision making, and "led" the tenants, instead of the other way around. The consultants, the BHA, and the City were content and pleased to be dealing with a small group of tenants they could influence, without having to reach out and inform the larger Columbia Point community when major issues were at stake.
The parties, the BRA, the BHA, and the Task Force, all had illustrious ideas about creating a beautiful new community, but little knowledge about dealing with the existing problems the tenants were facing. The parties, by primarily concerning themselves with planning for redevelopment, as opposed to day-to-day operations, did not attempt to address the immediate needs of the residents. Thus, the continuing problems of the vacancies, lack of repairs, security, and maintenance persisted, further contributing to the arguments for more drastic redevelopment plans as the years went by. One of the most important lessons learned by the Columbia Point experience is that the relinquishing of day-to-day responsibilities by the housing authority in delivering basic services is a sure road leading to rapid deterioration--creating irreparable conditions which can most easily bring forth solutions calling for demolition and disposition.

While the BHA and the City initially called for the mothballing and closing of buildings, and refused to re-tenant more than 1,000 units, the Task Force itself played a role in allowing this process of attrition to continue. Some leaders were fearful of new tenants moving into rehabilitated units while others continued to live in existing, substandard housing. So, instead of seeking a just solution, the BHA's policy of no "move-ins" was condoned by the Task Force. As tenants left the development, units would remain vacant and welded
shut. This further diminished the number of households which had to be rehoused or guaranteed housing in the new development.

It is ironic that the history of the tenants' struggle shows that, in comparison with the early plans which had no formal mechanism for tenant input, the present plan proposes the greatest loss of public housing units. A misguided and self-serving tenant organization cannot fulfill the role of protecting the low-income housing interest. Nevertheless, there is hope that the Task Force will see beyond its narrow interest, move to inform and involve tenants in the current plan, and start to see its relation to the larger public housing community.

It is here that it is important to examine the perspective of GBCD, the consultant organization to the Task Force. GBCD, like many housing groups, advocates the value of community-based, decentralized housing as a solution to low-income housing needs. While this has worked successfully in certain cases with community churches and nonprofit-sponsored housing, it is questionable that this can be a far-reaching solution for housing the poor on a scale like public housing. Private partnership is suggested as an alternative, but while it may be appropriate in developing various forms of subsidized housing, the cost may be greater than the gain when applied
to public housing. It is doubtful, for example, that the King's Lynne experiment can be reproduced any place else, especially in the City of Boston. It was a highly politicized and dangerous process for tenants to engage in and questions arise as to its economic feasibility as massive public subsidies per unit will probably never be provided again.

While community or privately sponsored low-income housing can be made to work successfully, there are inadequate available funds to sustain housing on the scale of the public housing program. Funding for Section 8 is limited and obtained politically. Even today, individual communities across Boston are lobbying with the City and the Mayor for scarce housing funds which barely match the level of funding for public housing. There exist major problems with private tenant partnership and private management of public housing. The level of financial commitment needed and the volume of housing that has to be maintained will be much greater than what local community and tenant organizations can provide. Section 236, Section 221(d)(3) and other programs continue to default with the risk of sale and resale to private landlords. Meth Union tenants are part of a pilot program designing an approach to tenant management and ownership, they hold property valued far in excess of the mortgage, but which they can benefit from only by selling. The question of available funding may be tenuous and private market gains cannot be realized unless the non-
profits or tenant organizations participate as traditional landlords and investors. Some can perform successfully and maintain subsidized housing, but usually this requires outstanding financial and management skills and strong political muscle.

Housing the poor need not be such a difficult task requiring complex financial arrangements and teams of special consultants each time a building goes up! The long-term solution of housing the poor in a city the size of Boston must be a dual strategy which reforms and expands the public housing program--so as to achieve competence and excellence in an agency such as the BHA; and continues the efforts in developing community-sponsored housing. The two should work together for the greatest gain to the low-income population. This feat of making public housing work--even with the convolutions of city and national politics, cannot be so difficult since the program works in New York and other large cities.

Public housing in Boston houses 10% of the population and 26% of the low-income households and 27% of the low-income minority households in need of housing assistance. The long-range objective of a mass housing solution can be better realized with the reform and change in the institution of public housing than by any other effort--especially given the unstable Section 8 and other rental subsidy programs which house the
poor at great cost to the public sector. Public housing and community-based housing development must be seen as compatible enterprises, both of which are necessary given the political realities of existing funding programs. While the Task Force and their consultants may be correct about the failures of the BHA up until now, their strategy of supporting private redevelopment, demolition, disposition, and Task Force partnership brings with it many risks.

Perhaps most devastating has been the breakdown of the institution supposedly protecting low-income housing interests: the BHA has been shown to be incapable not only of delivering basic services, but also of long-range planning. In the meantime, HUD has been too "chicken" to put their foot down on this nonsense. Neither BHA nor HUD up until now had the guts to stand up to the City and the private interests and to redirect the development of Columbia Point in a responsible manner.

In the many years of planning for redevelopment, BHA did not undertake any major initiative to upgrade and improve conditions for existing residents. What little was done at Columbia Point came to a crashing halt as management pulled work crews and staff from the development. The BHA, as has already been discussed, poorly and improperly spent the TPP money and had never really developed its own plans for the
site. Having taken a back seat to first what U Mass, the City, and the private sector wanted, and then what the Task Force wanted, it has been caught in the position of neither defending the real interest of the tenant population nor of fulfilling its responsibilities to HUD. Not having any credence in anyone's eyes, the BHA has been vulnerable to the whims of the most influential forces for private redevelopment.

The argument that the BHA cannot do anything to redress the present housing conditions short of waiting until the redevelopment effort is underway is fallacious. With the allocation of UI monies, the BHA thinks only of leveraging private funds instead of attempting to improve its housing. Deviating from the UI modernization guidelines, the Authority is reluctant to spend the money for rehabilitating vacant units for occupancy or for modernizing the occupied units. Thus the money is sitting until a private redevelopment solution is reached. With each passing month, the money devalues at a rate of 1%. From the initial grant, the money has lost more than a quarter of its original value. But the most important fact is that the tenant population still remains neglected.

The BHA has also interpreted the UI allocation as a final allocation--as if no more funds would ever be appropriated by HUD. But, while it is true that it would be impossible to totally redevelop Columbia Point with the UI monies, it is
difficult to comprehend a course of action which views the UI funds as the "be all and end all" of future funding for the project. The succession of Modernization, TPP and UI awards showed, if anything, that multi-year allocations were being committed. Nationally, there was an interest in turning around Columbia Point, therefore, multi-year funding averaging $5 to $7 million per year was being provided by HUD from various program sources. This would have been continued if the funds were adequately spent by the BHA.

If the Target Projects Program, Modernization, Urban Initiatives, and other supplemental funds were expeditiously appropriated for rehabilitation, site work, needed repairs and services, it is conceivable that a substantial portion of Columbia Point could have by now been redeveloped as public housing. It would then require smaller allocations to redo the remainder of the site. But beyond overhauling the mechanical systems and roof work, the BHA did not pursue a viable housing rehabilitation plan with the monies.

One cannot be too surprised with HUD's reluctance and skepticism in providing additional funding to BHA—as funding is usually contingent on some level of satisfactory performance. If funds for Columbia Point were put to good use, HUD would most likely have increased their commitment yearly, instead, HUD has learned its lesson by refusing to release the UI
monies or allocate additional funds until such time as a reasonable and acceptable plan has been developed.

It is estimated that Columbia Point has by now lost more than $20 million in supplemental funding, in addition to costs incurred, and foregone purchasing power, by not spending the money expeditiously and efficiently. HUD continues to feel the acute embarrassment of successive major funding awards to a housing authority which cannot seem to develop adequate plans for its sites--in other words, the experience of Columbia Point is like "egg on their face."14

It is hoped that the historic court order for receivership will create the environment for an opportunity to redress some of the serious problems in BHA's operations. Perhaps at this time, a change in direction can deal with the concrete management and maintenance problems which are the primary reasons for the decline of Columbia Point and other developments. Scapegoating these problems on "density," the presence of low-income tenants, insurmountable design problems, and the need for private management and mixed-income housing, has diverted attention away from the real question of providing satisfactory housing and housing services to the poor.

But if the pattern of events continues with the Receiver aboard, low-income tenants will still be faced with massive
demolition and loss of public housing units--an alternative even HUD had hoped to avoid. Implementation of the current redevelopment plan will not guarantee long-term stability for low-income housing, and would in the long run commit HUD to higher costs. HUD commitment to multi-year funding for public housing would be more cost effective, even if upfront grants are made, than the use of Section 8, Section 236, and a UDAG--all of which must be allocated from HUD anyway.

The cost of substantial rehabilitation and site modifications, along with the necessary management reforms, coordination of social services and security, in the creation of a stable housing environment for a mix of low and moderate-income, public housing eligible households would be a far wiser investment for HUD. Redeveloping Columbia Point as public housing would result in low and moderate-income units for the residents of Boston and herald the direction for upgrading and preserving public housing. This would bring about recognition of society's commitment to house the poor.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are directed at the Boston Housing Authority, the entity responsible for the past and present housing conditions and for the future of Columbia Point. This research was conducted prior to the appointment of the Receiver, nevertheless, the recommendations are
relevant to the present administration. In light of the Receiver's responsibility charged by the Court to "preserve or to rehabilitate for occupancy by low-income persons or families the maximum number of housing units as are consistent with the provision and operation of decent, safe and sanitary housing," it is hoped that the Receiver would undertake a careful reevaluation of the past policies of the Housing Authority at Columbia Point in order to seek a solution which is in the maximum interest of the low-income population. It is incumbent on the BHA that any plan for Columbia Point protects the long-term interest of existing residents, public housing tenants and the low-income population in Boston.

The 15 recommendations proposed herein are derived from examining the Columbia Point case, but are applicable to public housing in general; the issues of demolition, disposition and private redevelopment are also facing other BHA developments. The final recommendation proposes an alternative to the current redevelopment plan for Columbia Point.

**Recommendation 1:**

Private redevelopment and disposition of public housing should be avoided at all costs and measures should be undertaken to substantially upgrade and preserve Columbia Point for continued public ownership and operation as low-income housing.
Rationale:

While privatization is an option for the development of new subsidized housing, this should not be seen as a desirable option for existing public housing. This alternative leads to a decrease in the supply of low-income units after redevelopment, and the uncertainty of long-term maintenance of low-income housing due to inadequate subsidies, termination of subsidy programs or the threat of resale of the development. Moreover, it is questionable that with the current decrease in housing subsidies and funding programs a developer could better maintain a significant number of low-income units than a reorganized housing authority.

In tracing the history of Columbia Point, the push for private redevelopment reflected the desire of the City and the private sector to increase their return on property traditionally removed from market circulation rather than a commitment to house the poor. If Columbia Point were transferred into private hands, it remains unclear even according to the City and the BRA, that housing could be marketable for upper-income groups because of the project's stigmatization. It is both negligent and futile to redevelop the BHA site for anything other than low and moderate-income, public housing eligible households.
Recommendation 2:

Private redevelopment should only occur on the City-owned and non-BHA-owned sites on the peninsula. BHA should take a firm position that low-income housing be included on adjoining sites with at least one-third low and one-third moderate-income units.

Rationale:

New low, moderate and middle-income housing could most readily be developed on the U Mass, Boston Water and Sewer and the Bayside Mall sites to create a mixed-income community. The development of additional low and moderate-income units are necessary due to the City's housing needs and for any replacement units from loss sustained on the BHA site.

Recommendation 3:

Given its legal mandate, the BHA should take full responsibility for upgrading Columbia Point for low-income use rather than abdicating its role by participating in a trilateral decision-making body with the Columbia Point Community Task Force and the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Columbia Point tenants should be fully involved in the planning process, but the BRA and the City should not have "equal say" in determining the future use of the BHA housing site.

Rationale:

As documented by the case study, BHA, throughout the planning
for Columbia Point, has yielded to the influence of the Mayor's Office, the BRA and the Peninsula Planning Committee. The BHA has been unable to fulfill its mandate to provide decent low-income housing when taking leadership from city officials who explicitly want to make Columbia Point a home for upper-income households. The February 1979, Three Party Agreement between the BHA, the BRA and the Task Force came about solely because of the ineffectiveness of the BHA in proceeding with any credible plan of action--a sign of its weakened role in defending the interest of low-income tenants.

While tenants should become full participants in the planning for revitalization, BHA should not concede to the views of the tenants' consultants nor the City in their proposals for massive demolition and disposition of public housing. BHA cannot simply relinquish its responsibilities by following blindly along, it must fully recognize and correct its failure at Columbia Point.

Joint decision making is necessary for a concerted effort to redevelop the whole peninsula, but the public housing site can and should be a discrete entity within a larger mixed-income community; therefore the BHA should be held accountable for its own site.
Recommendation 4:

Income mix should only be attempted on the BHA site within the bounds allowable for low and moderate-income mixing under the public housing program. Mixed-income housing should only be supported if it increases housing opportunities for the low-income population such as in the integration of low-income units with moderate and market units to be developed on non-BHA properties.

Rationale:

Mixed-income housing has not been shown to be a crucial nor positive factor in improving either tenant satisfaction or low-income housing environments. In addition, all of the plans for mixed-income housing at Columbia Point have proposed significant reductions in low-income housing opportunities. Achieving low and moderate-income mix is possible under the existing program, but to seek a mixed-income housing scheme which jeopardizes the existence of public and low-income housing is not an acceptable solution.

Housing subsidies, including public housing, needed for the maintenance of low and moderate housing tend to segregate households by income. Therefore, complete income mix is not achievable even though it may be a stated goal. Income segregation in public housing must be seen as no more a segregating factor than housing in the private market or in upper-income communities. Moreover, the arguments for income
mix, and often racial mix, have been used primarily in attacking low-income communities rather than to desegregate upper-income communities. To allow mixed-income housing to be a factor in decreasing housing opportunities would result in serious repercussions to the low-income population, including questionable benefits to the small number of tenants who will be rehoused. In the end result, mixed-income housing is not necessarily desirable. In the current plan, low-income units would also be replaced one-to-one by market units.

As presented in the research, the income mix ratios proposed were politically derived to minimize the presence of the poor, thereby having no relation to the creation of a suitable living environment for low-income residents. Given the trade-offs proposed in the latest redevelopment plan, income, social and racial mixing are not as important as supplying housing to those in need.

Recommendation 5:

Decent and affordable low-income housing in a stable community should be the BHA's housing objective and not luxury housing for the poor.

Rationale:

Research and development in providing attractive, well-designed housing and responsive management can provide improved living conditions for the poor. Many examples of well-
run and well-managed public housing projects exist nationally. Even Boston has its own examples, such as Mary Ellen McCormick, Lenox, Camden and South Street. The concept of "luxury" housing has no place in a housing solution because luxury housing for the poor has not been a reality, it is a carrot held in front of liberal housing specialists and susceptible tenants to distract them from a realistic mass housing solution. Promising a handful of Columbia Point tenants luxury housing or the "American Dream" is a means of coopting them from seeing that their interest lies with the larger public housing community.

Despite all the clamor about the failures, a stable housing community at Columbia Point is possible because the records show that the project did function adequately for more than 15 years. The residents were able to feel a part of their community when management and maintenance services were adequate prior to the early 1970s.

**Recommendation 6:**
Demolition should not be considered as an option for Columbia Point. Creative rehabilitation and redesign, changes in occupancy policy, e.g., overhousing, and reducing residential density without demolition should be undertaken.
Rationale:

Numerous plans and studies, including the BHA/Steffian Bradley plan, estimates from Dan Walker, and even the Task Force's plan show the redesign potential of existing buildings and the cost effectiveness of rehabilitation over new construction. The reports from the consultants laud the soundness of the existing buildings and show that rehabilitation is feasible given the non-bearing interior walls. The physical condition of the units themselves does not justify demolition. Duplexes, vertical and horizontal breakthroughs are all possible, in addition to changes in occupancy policies, such as underhousing by providing more bedrooms per household to compensate for the small size of the units. Because the major systems have already been overhauled, many units require a minimum cost for rehabilitating for occupancy. Nevertheless, the options are many for redesign. An emphasis on site work, landscaping, and creating a suitable mix of uses on the site should be a major focus of revitalization.

This study shows that despite the findings, the parties chose to forego rehabilitation in favor of massive demolition. Therefore, alternatives have not been fully considered prior to the latest proposal to demolish 660 units. The density recommendations should also not be taken at face value; they have little credibility if the plans range from a proposed density of 1,400 to 4,000 for the total development. These
have also been shown to be political decisions not determined by what the site can realistically accommodate.

Residential density can be reduced without the need for demolition by adaptive re-use or by consolidation of units to create larger apartments. Diversity in housing type could also be accomplished by substantial rehabilitation and by constructing new units on the site.

**Recommendation 7:**

In the event that any proposal is made for any demolition, the BHA should request funding from HUD to commission an independent study to determine the causes leading up to the deterioration of Columbia Point, the consequences of such demolition on the low-income housing supply, and if any alternatives to demolition warrant consideration.

**Rationale:**

The Receiver, the Court and TPC should have an accurate picture of the events leading to the necessity for such drastic actions in order to ascertain whether there was a deliberate failure to maintain or improve the housing project so that demolition would be the only feasible alternative.

The consequences of demolition are particularly important in light of the BHA's policy regarding rehabilitation or demolition of other housing projects. An independent evaluation
of the alternatives to demolition would help to insure that demolition is, indeed, a "last resort."

Recommendation 8:

Replacement housing on a one-to-one basis should be provided on the BHA site or on adjacent non-BHA site as a result of any decrease in the 1,500 low-income units at Columbia Point. BHA should undertake the preparation of a replacement housing plan along with representatives of HUD, DCA, the Mayor's Office, TPC and the Task Force to develop a plan which cuts across jurisdictional areas.

If, for any reason, full cooperation is not reached nor adequate financial resources available in developing a satisfactory one-to-one replacement housing plan, BHA should reassess any reduction of units on its site through demolition or other means, and consider other options to insure that no units will be lost. Every effort must be made to provide 1,500 low-income units through rehabilitation and new construction.

It is proposed that the following criteria are met in a replacement housing plan:

1. A one-to-one replacement housing plan be provided on or off-site for each unit lost through demolition, disposition, breakthroughs, consolidations, re-use, e.g., for social services, or for any other reasons.

2. Replacement units shall be additional low-income public housing units and/or low-income subsidized housing units comparable to public housing to be provided above and beyond the normal allocations for Boston.

3. If subsidized housing other than public housing is proposed, e.g., Section 8, it must meet the full
criteria for public housing in terms of low-income eligibility, and a 40-year commitment or reservation for long-term financing.

4. Bedroom distributions of the replacement units shall be consistent with low-income housing needs in the city.

The following replacement housing plan is proposed:

1. HUD to commit new construction reservations for public housing and low-income subsidized housing to compensate for lost public housing units.

2. HUD and BRA-owned vacant properties appropriate for residential use shall be committed for the development of low-income housing.

3. The City and the HUD shall increase Boston's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) above the current three-year plan for low-income rental housing and prospective homeownership to compensate for lost public housing units.

4. State resources through DCA and/or MHFA shall also be considered a resource for replacement housing.

5. If other sources are not sufficient, exploration should be made for City or State bonding for financing additional low-income housing--this may involve the development of a City housing agency or expansion of the BHA to encompass this work.

Rationale:

Given the current and projected need for low-income housing in the City, the total number of units should not be allowed to decrease. The numbers on the BHA family as well as the Columbia Point waiting list alone justify the need.

It is far too easy to simply propose massive demolition, but unless there is some form of accountability from the City, State and Federal government to replace these units, it is
also irresponsible and negligent. Thus demolition or any decrease in low-income units must be carefully assessed as to the cost for replacing those units.

**Recommendation 9:**

A replacement housing plan should be in the implementation stage prior to demolition or any expenditure of funds for Section 8, Section 234 and 236, the UDAG, and other funding.

**Rationale:**

This is to insure that a reasonable effort is underway to replace lost units lest other housing is developed in lieu of low-income housing. Tenants have been most concerned that commitments are carried out prior to demolition, as all too often, such as in King's Lynne, low-income units are lost in between the initial and final implementation stages. Or worse yet, the site could remain vacant.

**Recommendation 10:**

BHA should place priority on the daily operation and management of Columbia Point by professional and competent staff to meet the needs of the residents and attain some standards of maintenance and management.

**Rationale:**

The abandoning of BHA management and maintenance services and
letting the project go to waste in hopes that a private developer or private manager will take over operations, only compounds the problems for the residents. Day-to-day management and services and the responsiveness of management to tenants are important factors in making the project livable. The poor quality of management has served to drive out tenants from the development, and problems of attrition, disrepair and deterioration will continue this process unless abated. It is not sufficient for BHA to provide staff and personnel who are solely "well-intentioned" in their desire to upgrade Columbia Point because this has produced little results in the past. Professionally competent and experienced personnel backed by solid support and cooperation from BHA's central office are necessary for any successful attempt at a "best effort" in improving conditions.

Continued deterioration in the development has led to proposals for demolition and disposition. A priority placed on planning for redevelopment while neglecting the immediate needs of the residents is of disservice to the public housing community.

Recommendation 11:

The remaining $11 million in Urban Initiatives and Modernization funds should be expended for housing rehabilitation as soon as possible for existing and new low-income tenants.
Rationale:

The BHA has held on to these funds to leverage private investment. In the meantime, the funds have devalued over a quarter of their initial value and existing units remain in disrepair. BHA has been reluctant to expend these funds for fear that any investment in the buildings will commit the unit to the public inventory by extending the ACC. Therefore, BHA has been finding ways of sinking the funds into other items aside from housing rehabilitation. This is a gross misuse of HUD funds.

Recommendation 12:

BHA should lift the "freeze" on tenant assignment to vacant units as many of the units are in satisfactory condition and require little work. These units should be rehabilitated and retenanted so that attrition does not continue and additional family and elderly households can be provided housing.

Rationale:

Rapid attrition since the early 1970s has made it all the easier to redevelop Columbia Point without large numbers of low-income units to be provided after redevelopment. This can easily be corrected. From BHA site inspections in 1979, many units were found to be in need of a minimum amount of repairs, these should be retenanted as soon as possible.
Recommendation 13:

Housing guarantees should be made to all existing tenants and future tenants, as well as to all tenants who resided at Columbia Point on July 1, 1977 and who have since moved due to the intolerable conditions.

Rationale:

The City has always supported the fewest possible number of guarantees--contending that those as of July 1, 1977, who vacated their units should not be entitled to rehousing. The tenants have maintained that the agreement signed in February 1979 provides those tenants the right to rehousing. BHA has not as yet taken a position on this matter. If BHA does not protect the interest of the tenants, attrition will result in an insignificant number of Columbia Point tenants who will be guaranteed housing after revitalization. New families who move in must be guaranteed rehousing.

Recommendation 14:

BHA should request from HUD substantial funding to insure that Columbia Point is publicly redeveloped to provide for at least 1,500 public housing eligible units on the BHA site or at another location. BHA should request an extended schedule of funding from HUD through the Modernization program, discretionary funds, and increased operating subsidies.

Rationale:

With the Receiver on board, additional funding to BHA is
needed for responsible management and rehabilitation to reverse the trend of neglect. Substantial funding from HUD is imperative for revitalizing Columbia Point as low-income housing.

Recommendation 15:

A redevelopment plan calling for the creation of at least 1,500 low-income units in a mixed-income residential community should be supported as an alternative to the current plan for Columbia Point:

Rehabilitation of the existing BHA site (37 acres) can result in 1,000 "good" units for public housing eligible households through substantial rehabilitation and redesign. From the initial 1,500 units, 1,000 units of well-designed and well-maintained units can be achieved by reducing the density in the buildings without the need for demolition. Within the BHA site, 200 to 300 of the units can be newly constructed to create a mix in housing type.

2,400 additional units of mixed-income housing should be developed on the non-BHA-owned parcels: the U Mass site, the Boston Water and Sewer site, the Bayside Mall site and other City-owned land. This should include 800 units of moderate-income housing, 800 units of market housing, and 800 units of low-income housing for replacement housing for the 500-unit reduction on the BHA site, and for additional units.

The total development would result in a 3,400 unit mixed-income community which maintains a commitment to low-income households. The planning for services,
stores, site improvements, recreation, employment and other needs can make Columbia Point a diverse urban neighborhood with its own identity and charm, while providing housing for approximately 12,000 people.

Rationale:

The current redevelopment plan in the third and fourth draft of the Developer's Kit has been shown to be a clear abrogation of the BHA and the public responsibility to provide low-income housing commensurate with the original commitment at Columbia Point.

During the course of its tenure, the past BHA administration indisputedly failed to provide for the needs of low-income tenants. The elements of demolition, disposition and private redevelopment in the plan reflected the position of the BHA at the time as how best to extricate itself from its responsibilities at Columbia Point.

The arrival of the Receiver has at least symbolized a "reform administration" or a "last ditch" effort to salvage public housing. Therefore, a conscientious attempt to provide for the long-term recovery and preservation of public housing cannot take the form of continuing the present trends at Columbia Point. If the Receiver goes willingly along with the current plan, or does not initiate action to protect the
long-term interest of low-income people, the institution of public housing would once again fail to make in improvement in the lives of its tenants.

The elements of an alternative plan described above would insure the continuity of a low-income presence in an attractive community without the wasteful and inexcusable demolition and disposition of public housing. The plan provides for adequate replacement housing, an expansion of low-income units, income mix, a reasonable urban density and a neighborhood which is comparable to the size of other neighborhoods in the city.

The BHA could maintain its charge to provide for its constituency, instead of solving the upper-income housing problem at the expense of the poor. Private investment and development opportunities could still be provided on the peninsula; sufficient latitude for any number of private subsidized housing schemes can exist on non-BHA sites without infringing on the rights of the low-income population to at least 1,500 units of housing. A justifiable goal of a "social experiment" is the creation of a residential community which is inclusive of low-income households and not one which solves the housing problem by getting rid of them.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


3. See the "Columbia Point Peninsula Redevelopment Agreement," signed by Terry Mair, President of the Columbia Point Community Task Force; Kevin Feeley, Boston Housing Authority Acting Administrator and Robert Ryan, Boston Redevelopment Director, February 21, 1979.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1


5. Ibid., p. iii.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., cover page.

8. Ibid., p. 5.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


18. Ibid., p. 118.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 238.

22. Ibid., p. 246.


31. A racial balancing policy may establish a "tipping" point of 51% minority to 49% white population in a development. The PHA therefore will not assign minority households to those developments.


33. See HUD Regulations 891.503, in Metropolitan Area Planning Council, "AHOP Plan for the MAPC Region," Vol. 2, Draft of June 1979, as amended July 6, 1979. See Appendix A for discussion on establishing positive and negative outreach goals for communities over 25,000.

34. As an example, Boston's Mayor's Office of Housing claims that since Boston constitutes 25% of the total population of the SMSA and houses over 40% of the area's poor and near poor, assisted housing should be supplied elsewhere in the region. See the City of Boston "HUD Approved Housing Assistance Plan," September 1, 1979 for discussion.


38. Ibid., p. 3-5.


40. Ibid., p. 8-11.

41. Ibid., pp. 8-11, 8-12.

42. Ibid., pp. 8-11, 5-8.

43. Ibid., p. 6-24.

44. Ibid., p. 3-9.

45. Ibid., p. 7-10.


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CHAPTER 2


8. Ibid.


11. Heudorfer, op. cit., p. 3.


15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.


22. Ibid., p. 9, and information obtained from BHA "Vacancy Printout," 1978.


29. Letter from Jerold Hickey, Boston Housing Authority Director of Communications, to Sharon Lee, September 18, 1979.

NOTES
CHAPTER 3


5. Letter from Macler Shepard, President of Jeff-Vander-Lon, Incorporated, to St. Louis Board of Aldermen, concerning the Proposed Industrialization of the Pruitt-Igoe Housing Site, February 17, 1978.


7. Letter to the Board of Aldermen, April 21, 1978.


16. Ibid., p. 37.
18. Ibid., p. 211.
19. Ibid., p. 221.
20. Ibid., p. 220.
23. Interview with Dan and Eleanor Wessell, op. cit.
25. Interview with Robert Whittlesey, Court-Appointed Master and former Director of Greater Boston Community Development, at the Master's Office, Boston, January 24, 1980.
26. Ibid.
NOTES

CHAPTER 4

1. University of Massachusetts study of Bayside Hall.


4. Interview with Michael Stone, University of Massachusetts Professor, March 24, 1981.

5. City of Boston, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Housing Authority, "Developer's Selection Kit for Three Parcels at Columbia Point," 2nd draft, September 27, 1979, section 2.


8. Interview with Joanne Ross, former tenant of Columbia Point, January 25, 1980.

9. Interview with Michael Stone, op. cit., and Michael Jacobs, op. cit., March 24, 1981. Mary Ellen McCormick has a density of 36.8 units per acre and Old Colony 53 units per acre.


12. Ibid.


15. Interview with Myra McAdoo, Executive Director, Tenant Policy Council.


18. Myra McAdoo, op. cit.


22. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 5


2. City of Boston, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Housing Authority, "Developer's Selection Kit for Three Parcels at Columbia Point," 2nd Draft, September 27, 1979, pp. 6, 7.

3. Interview with Joanne Ross, former tenant of Columbia Point, January 25, 1980.


5. Baecker, op. cit.

6. Ross, op. cit.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


13. Interview with Myra McAdoo, Tenants Policy Council Executive Director, January 14, 1980.


19. Justine Grey Associates and the Task Force refused to conduct a detailed analysis of the existing housing market because it would call for two to three times their entire budget and divert attention away from the "impact" of 6,000 students arriving within the year. See Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force, Mass Media, pp. 1, 2.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 5.


26. Ibid., p. 3.


30. Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

31. Ibid., pp. 7, 14.

32. Ibid., pp. 36, 37.

33. Ibid., p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 42.

35. Ibid., p. 44.

36. Ibid., pp. 57, 58.

37. Memorandum from William R. Hamilton, Jr., Acting Chancellor to President Robert Wood and the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees on "The Report of the Campus


41. Mark Waltch, op. cit., pp. 55, 56.

42. Ibid., p. 70.


44. Ibid., p. 1.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Berkeley, op. cit., p. 95.


55. Thelma Peters worked at the Columbia Point APAC and Bernard Sneed at the U Mass Columbia Point Field Office. Both were chosen by the officials who set up the planning process and not by the tenants. See University of Massachusetts, Mass Media, February 26, 1974, pp. 6, 7.


57. Berkeley, op. cit.

59. Ibid.


63. Ibid.


65. Ibid.


68. Columbia Point Community Development Council, Inc., petitions signed by individual tenants, December 3, 1975.

69. Interview with Myra McAdoo, Tenants Policy Council, January 14, 1980.

70. Boston Housing Authority, "Application to Participate in the Target Projects Program (TPP) for Columbia Point (Mass 2-20)," January 16, 1975.


72. Refer to Tenants Policy Council minutes of weekly meetings on Columbia Point with the Master from April 29 to August 19, 1976. Regular attendance at the meetings included: Robert Whittlesey from the Master's Office; Roland Burke, Andy Walsh, Mark Goode, Dave Gillis, Al Griffith, Doug Kehoe from the Boston Housing Authority; Myra McAdoo from the Tenants Policy Council; Gershon Ratner from Greater Boston Legal Services; and James Jackson and Esther Santos from the Tenant Task Force.

73. Armando Perez, et al. vs. Boston Housing Authority: Consent Decree, op. cit., Exhibit C.
74. Interview with Mark Goode, former Columbia Point TPP Community Organizational Specialist and Relocation Officer, Boston Housing Authority, January 11, 1980.

75. Interview with Myra McAdoo on January 20, 1980.

76. Columbia Point Community Development Council, Inc., op. cit.


80. Joint letter from Domenick Pasciucco, Boston Housing Authority Board Chairman, and Barbara Carpenter, Tenants Policy Council Board Chairman, to Columbia Point residents, Report on Work in Progress, May 27, 1976.

81. Tenants Policy Council, minutes of Columbia Point meeting, July 1, 1976, p. 2.

82. Tenants Policy Council, minutes of Columbia Point meeting, July 21, 1976.


84. Flyer circulated by Tenants Policy Council to all Columbia Point residents for notification of the January 18 and 19, 1977 meetings.


86. Al Irving, quoted in the Dorchester Community News, February 77, p. 10.

87. Interview with Myra McAdoo, January 24, 1980.

88. This information was collected from private interviews from Boston Housing Authority Staff, the Master's Office and from tenants. A site visit was made on September 19, 1979 with Boston Housing Authority engineers to inspect...
the D-75 modernization work. Also refer to minutes of meeting with the Master on Columbia Point, December 2, 1976, and memorandum from A. Tom Philis, HUD Community Services Assistant to Philip Salamone, HUD Community Service Advisor on "Columbia Point Master's Meeting," January 1977.


90. This decision was made by Brendan Geraghty, David Carter and Terry Mair in the fall of 1978, from interview with David Carter, March 3, 1981.


92. See HUD and TPC minutes of the Columbia Point Task Force Meeting, June 16, 1976. HUD commitment was made by Marvin Siflinger.


94. Ibid.


96. Ibid., p. 4.

97. Ibid., p. 8.

98. Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

99. Ibid., p. 21.

100. Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

101. See letter from Robert Whittlesey to Boston Housing Authority on the Columbia Point Plan, October 20, 1976; also see letter from Gershon Ratner, Greater Boston Legal Services Attorney for Plaintiffs and their Class to Kevin Feeley, General Counsel on the Draft "Application for Supplemental Funding," October 20, 1976; and Minutes of Columbia Point Task Force Meeting, October 25, 1976.


107. Boston Globe, April 21, 1977, p. 44.
111. See memorandum from Ephron Catlin, Peninsula Planning Committee Chairman to Members on the Columbia Point Composite Development Plan, July 11, 1977.
113. Ibid., pp. 9-16.
114. Ibid., p. 12.
115. Ibid., p. 7.
116. Ibid.
117. The Boston Plan was a set of proposals that consolidated federal, state, city and private sector development resources on four key areas in the City of Boston: the Boston Waterfront (including the Charlestown Navy Yard), Blue Hill Avenue, Hyde Park/Jamaica Plain, and Columbia Point, see City of Boston, "The Boston Plan: Executive Summary," Draft for Community Review, August 1977.
119. Interview with Myra McAdoo, November 12, 1979.
122. The letter was addressed to Governor Michael Dukakis, Mayor Kevin White, Lt. Governor O'Neill, Senator Edward Kennedy, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker Thomas McGee, and Senate President Kevin Harrington.

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130. Robert Walsh, BRA Director and Kevin Feeley, BHA Acting Administrator to Patricia Harris, HUD Secretary on "Developing the Columbia Point Peninsula, March 16, 1978.


132. Ibid., pp. 7, 10.

133. Interview with David Carter, February 19, 1981.


136. See "Tenant Organization/Private Developer Partnership Proposal for Columbia Point," Appendix to BHA PHUIP submission to HUD.

137. Interview with Myra McAdoo, January 20, 1980.


139. Interview with Myra McAdoo, January 20, 1980.


142. See "Agreement By and Between the Boston Housing Authority and the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc.," 1st Draft, December 1978.

143. The Columbia Point Coordinating Committee was chaired by David Carter from the BHA and attendance included: Terry Mair, Annette Bazley and Annie Smith-Lacy from the Columbia Point Community Task Force; Edward Marchant and Pat Clancy from GBCD; Ilene Blenick from HUD, Stan Gibson and Mark Goode from the TPP staff. James Baecker from the BRA joined the Committee in February 1979.

144. Interview with David Carter, November 28, 1979.

145. Interview with Myra McAdoo, October 16, 1979.

146. Letters from Paul Merrill, BHA Assistant Administrator for Management to Terry Mair, Task Force President on the Authority's concerns with the corporate structure of the Columbia Point Community Task Force, December 29, 1978 and February 21, 1979. See also letter from Kevin Feeley, BHA Acting Administrator, to Terry Mair on Bylaws Revisions, January 24, 1979.


148. Ibid., p. 3.


152. Information obtained through private interviews.


155. Boston Housing Authority minutes of Coordinating Committee Meeting, February 20, 1979.

156. Letter from Brendan Geraghty, BHA Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and Modernization to Marvin Siflinger, HUD Area Manager on Work Progress, March 15, 1979.

157. See Minutes of the Columbia Point Coordinating Committee for April 11, 1979 and April 18, 1979.

158. Interview with Terry Mair, September 14, 1979.


160. Ibid., pp. 102-105.

161. Ibid., p. 109.

162. Ibid., p. 15.

163. Ibid., pp. 17, 26, 28.

164. Ibid., p. 17.

165. Ibid., p. 18.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid., p. 19.

168. Ibid., p. 42.

169. Ibid.


171. Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

172. Ibid., pp. 61, 74, 83, 85. This includes 274 new units in Phase 1, 158 units in Phase 2 and 325 in Phase 3.


175. Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

176. Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

177. Ibid., p. 12.


184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.


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CHAPTER 6


2. Ibid., p. 3-5.

3. Ibid., Section 5.


7. Ibid., p. 27.


9. Information obtained from Coordinating Committee meetings in August 1979; meetings and interviews with Terry Mair, Pat Clancy and David Carter. Also see the Columbia Point Community Task Force, "Revitalization Plan," op. cit., and letter from Bill Hurld, TPC Board Chairman and Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director to Clyde McHenry, HUD Assistant Secretary for Public Housing, on Columbia Point, December 12, 1979.


12. Information obtained from Coordinating Committee Meetings in August 1979, and from interviews with the parties.

13. Information from interviews with Brendan Geraghty and David Carter on September 30, 1979, October 10, 17, 23, 1979; from Coordinating Committee meetings; and the 3rd Draft "Developer's Selection Kit," op. cit.
14. Interview with David Carter, March 26, 1981. Both he and Brendan Geraghty were fully in support of private redevelopment and management.

15. Information from interviews with David Carter, Iyra McAdoo and Terry Mair.


17. Information obtained from BHA Management Staff and from Edward Ross and Ernest Ketchum, BHA engineers, during walking inspection of vacant units on September 19, 1979.


19. Ibid., p. 2.


21. These figures are for 1980. In 1981 the BRA disbanded with their full-time staff for Columbia Point.

22. David Carter was the BHA Columbia Point Coordinator until Spring 1980. David Curtis Gilmore, who is a lawyer with a background in syndication and development, is the new Redevelopment Director.


27. Information obtained from "Revitalization Plan," op. cit., and Coordinating Committee meetings.


31. Interview with Eleanor Wessell, King's Lynne Residents' Council, at King's Lynne, Lynn, Massachusetts, September 14, 1979.


33. University of Massachusetts, Board of Trustees Meeting minutes, December 5, 1979.

34. Interview with Michael Stone, March 31, 1981.


36. University of Massachusetts, Petition to Chancellor Robert Corrigan on the Advance Office's Housing Questionnaire, signed by faculty and staff of the College of Public and Community Planning, and cover letter from University of Massachusetts, Center for Community Planning to Chancellor Robert Corrigan, November 20, 1979.


38. Speech by Robert Corrigan to U Mass/TPC Conference on Columbia Point, June 7, 1980.


40. Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director, and William Hurld, TPC Board Chairman, to Marvin Siflinger on Clarification of the Relationship Between the TPC Board of Directors and the Columbia Point Task Force, December 27, 1979.


42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 2.

44. Ibid.

45. BHA and TPC Agreement signed by Julius Berstein, BHA Chairman, and John McNeil, TPC Chairman, March 21, 1972.

47. Letter from Clyde McHenry, HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Housing and Indian Programs, to Myra McAdoo, TPC Executive Director, in response to TPC's December 12, 1979 letter, February 4, 1980.


49. Ibid., pp. 65369, 65370.

50. Ibid., p. 65370.


52. This draft was completed right before the new Receiver, Lewis Spence took office. City of Boston, BHA, BRA in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., "Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit," 4th Draft, February 19, 1980.


54. HUD, Urban Initiation and Modernization Programs guidelines.

55. See Chapter 2.


57. Interview with Ilene Blenick, Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 28, 1979.

58. Interview with Myra McAdoo, November 12, 1980.
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CHAPTER 7


2. Figures obtained from the 3rd Draft, "Developer's Selection Kit," op. cit., pp. 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, as the 4th Draft contains no mention of details for demolition and disposition.

3. Ibid., Section 7.3.2.


5. TPC Resolution, October 17, 1977, see Appendix 2.


10. Ibid., p. ES-5.

11. Ibid., p. 4-5


13. Ibid., p. 21.


15. This information on King's Lynne was obtained through private interviews.


21. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p. 3-3.
NOTES

CHAPTER 8

1. Interview with Joanne Ross, op. cit.

2. Figures obtained from the 3rd Draft, "Developer's Selection Kit," op. cit., pp. 3-9, 3-10, 3-12.

3. Ibid., p. 3-6.


5. Ibid., pp. 3-8, 3-9.


7. Refer to discussion in text on the Peninsula Planning Committee, Chapter 5.


10. Ibid., p. 3-9.


12. 1,000 vacant housing units existed September 1979, whereas BHA claims only 254 vacant units existed since 722 units were permanently removed from the rent roll. See BHA "Minority Occupancy Report," September 1979, and TPC "Occupancy and Vacancy Report," July 24, 1979.

13. Interview with Myra McAdoo, November 12, 1979.

14. Ibid.


**Reports (chronological)**


City of Boston, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Housing Authority. Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit. 2nd draft. Boston: City of Boston, BRA, BHA, September 27, 1979.
City of Boston, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Housing Authority, in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force. Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit. 3rd draft. Boston: City of Boston, BRA, BHA, Columbia Point Community Task Force, November 16, 1979.


City of Boston, Boston Housing Authority, Boston Redevelopment Authority, in conjunction with the Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc. Columbia Point Developer's Selection Kit. 4th draft. Boston, City of Boston, BHA, BRA, Columbia Point Community Task Force, Inc., February 1980.

Public Documents


**Thesis and Other Papers**


**Interviews**

Actenberg, Emily, Citizen Housing and Planning Association, Boston, Massachusetts, November 16, 1979.

Baecker, James, Project Coordinator, former Boston Redevelopment Authority Columbia Point, Boston Massachusetts, August 28, 1979, December 21, 1979, April 28, 1981.


Geraghty, Brendan, former Assistant Administrator for Planning, Development and Modernization, BHA, Boston, Massachusetts, August 29, 1979, September 30, 1979, October 10, 17, 1979.

Goode, Mark, former Boston Housing Authority Columbia Point Community Organizational Specialist and Relocation Officer, BHA, Boston, Massachusetts, January 11, 1980.

Jacobs, Michael, Boston Housing Authority Planner, BHA, Boston, Massachusetts, January 8, 1979.

Mair, Terry, President, Columbia Point Community Task Force, Boston, Massachusetts, September 14, 1979.

McAdoo, Myra, Tenants Policy Council Executive Director, Tenants Policy Committee, Boston, Massachusetts, October 16, 1979, November 12, 1979, January 14, 20, 24, 1980.

Pierce, Harry, Greater Boston Legal Service Attorney, GBLS, Boston, Massachusetts, October 1980.

Ross, Joanne, former Columbia Point tenant, Boston Massachusetts, January 25, 30, 1980.

Stone, Michael, University of Massachusetts Professor, U. Mass, Boston, Massachusetts, December 5, 1979, March 24, 30, 31, 1981.

Wessell, Dan and Eleanor, King's Lynne Residents' Council, King's Lynne, Lynn, Massachusetts, September 14, 1979.

Whittlesey, Robert, former Court-Appointed Master, Master's Office, Boston, Massachusetts, October 11, 1979, January 24, 1980.

Wise, Shirley, President, National Tenant Organization, Boston, Massachusetts, Summer 1979.
APPENDIX

1. Peninsula Planning Committee: Composite Development Plan (Excerpt)

2. Columbia Point Task Force and Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison, Inc.: Harbor Park (Excerpt)

3. Boston Housing Authority: Urban Initiatives Program (Excerpt)

4. Boston Redevelopment Authority: Model of Redevelopment

5. Boston Housing Authority: Steffian - Bradley Reuse Program for Existing Columbia Point Buildings (Excerpt)

6. Columbia Point Community Task Force: Revitalization Plan (Excerpt)

7. City of Boston, BRA, BHA and the Columbia Point Community Task Force: 4th Draft Developer's Selection Kit

8. HUD Demolition and Disposition Regulation

9. Tenant Policy Council Resolution

10. BHA/TPC: An Evaluation of the Carr, Lynch Redevelopment Plan for Columbia Point
COLUMBIA
POINT :
COMPOSITE
DEVELOPMENT
PLAN

PENINSULA
PLANNING
COMMITTEE
JUNE, 1977
INTRODUCTION

In May 1977, the Peninsula Planning Committee staff produced and distributed a document, "Columbia Point Land Use Approaches," which described three directions for the future growth and development of Columbia Point. Following review and continuing analysis of these development options, this composite plan has been developed to solicit consensus among Committee members concerning a more specific course of action.

The organization of this report reflects three major areas of attention and study in plan development, presented in three sections -- a statement of the plan's fundamental elements, assumptions about public sector policies and investment requirements and a description of private development opportunities. A summary relating these three issues, and indicating the potential investment and employment impact of the plan, represents the concluding section of the report.

1. BASIC PRINCIPLES

The principles described in this section represent the base of assumptions about development direction from which the Composite Plan proceeds.

1.1 HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

Substantial new housing development geared toward mixed income occupancy is an essential factor in the overall development success of Columbia Point. Within this emphasis, the commitment to assure housing for the existing tenant population will be sustained, with the successful execution of Phase I (420 units) of the modernization program and a significantly restructured management system providing the departure point for additional development.

1.2 RETAIL DEVELOPMENT

Bayside Mall offers an optimum location for new retail development or revitalization, because of positive site qualities of visibility and accessibility, and because of exhibited demand for better located and more competitive retail services by neighboring populations. 100,000-150,000 square feet of retail space here could be supported successfully by populations within a 1 - 1 1/2 mile radius.

1.3 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A strong institutional presence should be maintained on the peninsula because of the generally positive impact of
2. PUBLIC POLICY AND INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS

Initiative and activity in private development depends upon a set of basic public policies and investments to produce a suitable and functionally adequate support environment. Funding from local, state and federal government sources must be involved in improving or adding to necessary public structures. Assumptions about the focus and scope of public actions on Columbia Point are described in this section.

2.1 UTILITIES

2.1.1 WATER

Capacity of the existing system is inadequate to serve major scale new development beyond presently planned U/Mass expansion and JFK Library construction.

An increase in capacity, involving cleaning and relining of a length of trunk line and construction of a new distribution line, is a prerequisite to private development at the level proposed in this plan.

Estimated cost: $1,500,000*

Expansion of the existing local water distribution system on the peninsula will be necessary to serve presently underdeveloped land parcels. Cost may be partially assumed by private developers involved, and will vary depending upon specifics of proposed development.

* See Appendix for references on cost estimates used here and elsewhere in the text.
present and proposed institutional uses upon land values, community quality and development potential. Continued development of the U/Mass Harbor Campus within the perimeter road, establishment of the JFK Library and development of the State Archives should be pursued, and the development of a cultural center or other additional institutional uses should remain possibilities within the existing area of primarily institutional land use on the eastern end of the peninsula.

1.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PUMPHOUSE AREA: MIXED USE

A mix of commercial uses (including a hotel facility, conference center, restaurant facilities, and retail and student services) supporting nearby institutional and residential uses would be appropriate in this location. In addition, a community center providing services to the residential population would serve as a link to the University and other institutional uses.

1.5 BEACHFRONT DEVELOPMENT

The exceptional site qualities of Columbia Point, related to waterfront access and views of the island and downtown skyline, should be utilized both to provide areas for recreational and open space use, and to provide the amenities of a waterside location for new residential development. These site advantages are also a major attraction for certain kinds of site-specific commercial uses (e.g. hotel, restaurant) which are seen as alternate uses for waterfront development.

1.6 CIRCULATION IMPROVEMENTS

Provision for improved access to development parcels on the peninsula is necessary to stimulate a meaningful level of private development activity. Immediate public planning attention and investment should be directed toward T-stop improvements and toward vehicular access improvements related to existing roadway modifications. Later modifications to internal street systems will become necessary as development plans are defined, with costs supported by both public and private investment.

1.7 JOBS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Significant employment opportunities are associated with both new commercial and residential uses and with the continued growth of existing commercial and institutional uses. Aspects of new development to be emphasized include environmental fitness as well as employment intensity and potential for career-related skills development. On the job training in some instances may be tied to degree-granting educational programs, and can make an important contribution to the economic development needs of both the local community and the total city. New construction also will create immediate job and training opportunities.

1.8 A DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM

A special purpose entity is required to direct future planning and development activities on the peninsula. Its structure and function should be designed to insure the active involvement of all with a direct interest in the peninsula's future, and to provide for a continuance of the public/private partnership that has characterized the work of the Peninsula Planning Committee. It should have the authority to adopt a plan and see to its execution; and to raise funds through bonding as well as from federal and state funding sources. It should complement the city's broader community development efforts in the peninsula area and not absorb or compete with them.
VIEW TO THE EAST

HARBOR PARK BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

COLUMBIA POINT TASK FORCE AND CORCORAN, MULLINS, JENNISON, INC., CO-DEVELOPERS GOODY, CLANCY & ASSOCIATES, ARCHITECTS
NEW SITE PLAN

HARBOR PARK  BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

COLUMBIA POINT TASK FORCE AND
CORCORAN, MULLINS, JENNISON, INC., CO-DEVELOPERS
COOK, GLUCK & ASSOCIATES, ARCHITECTS

RENOVATED LOW-RISE BDGS
RENOVATED MID-RISE BDGS
NEW TOWNHOUSES
NEW TOWERS
COMMUNITY FACILITIES
HARBOR PARK  BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

COLUMBIA POINT TASK FORCE AND
CORCORAN, MULLINS, JENNISON, INC., CO-DEVELOPERS

CLAUDY & ASSOCIATES, ARCHITECTS
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT

URBAN INITIATIVES PROGRAM

Boston Housing Authority Proposal

SUBMITTED BY:

The BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY

with the cooperation and assistance of:

BROMLEY-HEATH TENANT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

ORCHARD PARK TENANT TASK FORCE

COLUMBIA PARK TENANT TASK FORCE

The CITY OF BOSTON

August 10, 1978
SKETCH OF A "CLUSTER" COURTYARD, COLUMBIA POINT
COLUMBIA POINT DEVELOPMENT

KEY

PROGRAM A

LEVEL I
SITE WORK & LANDSCAPING

LEVEL II
BUILDING MODERNIZATION & SITE WORK

LEVEL III
SUBSTANTIAL REHABILITATION & SITE WORK

LEVEL IV
RECONSTRUCTION & SITE WORK

PROGRAM B

DESIGN DEVELOPMENT

482
BRA CONCEPT FOR REVITALIZATION OF COLUMBIA POINT PUMPHOUSE AREA
STEFFIAN - BRADLEY/BHA REUSE PROGRAM FOR EXISTING BHA COLUMBIA POINT BUILDINGS
Summary of Construction Program and Estimated Costs

A. Family Development

69 5 bedroom units  
80 4 bedroom units  
104 3 bedroom units  
151 2 bedroom units  
4 1 bedroom units  

Total 408 units in family development

Buildings which remain 3 story will contain duplexes on ground floor with separate entrances and small flats on third floor

Buildings which are brought down from 7 stories to four stories will contain stacked duplexes

Buildings which remain seven stories will contain duplexes with separate entrances on the ground floor (thus combining the first and second stories) and small apartments on the upper five floors accessed by key elevator (see illustration)

B. Elderly Development (Building #'s 18, 3, 12, 20, 26, 27)

224 2 bedroom units  
224 1 bedroom units  

Total 448 units in elderly development

Building #'s 12, 20, 26, and 27 would have new elevators, enlarged lobby space, balconies, new interior treatment and fixtures and repositioning of some partitions to create larger units with fewer bedrooms

Building #'s 18 and 3 would be joined by new construction and reworked as a single-loaded corridor mode, new elevators, lobby space, and balconies

All units would be retained by the BHA and managed either by BHA or under contract to tenant/developer entity managing adjacent family development. The BHA would explore with HUD the possibility of restructuring a substantial portion of the debt on the BHA site ($27 million) around these rehabilitated units, thus reducing price of remainder of site.
COLUMBIA POINT DEVELOPMENT

BUILDING NUMBER PLAN

DEMOLITION KEY

--- Total Demolition

--- Reduction in Height
BRA Concept of Peninsula Redevelopment, 1978.
Before (above) and after (below). A view down Montpelier Road today, and tomorrow, after the proposed changes are completed.
A plan depicting the major proposed site changes. Except for three buildings housing the elderly, all 7-story structures are cut down to two and three stories.
Columbia Point Community Task Force Model
Map 3. PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PHASING  (4th Draft, Developer's Kit, 1980)
Map 6. PROPOSED TREATMENT OF EXISTING BUILDINGS (4th Draft, 1980)
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Office of The Assistant Secretary for Housing—Federal Housing Commissioner
24 CFR Part 870

(Docket No. R-79-600)

PHA-Owned Public Housing Projects—Demolition of Buildings or Disposition of Real Property; Policy and Procedures

AGENCY: Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: HUD is issuing a final rule adding Part 870 to provide policy and procedures regarding partial or total demolition of buildings and partial or total disposition of land of PHA-owned public housing projects.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wayne Hunter, Office of Public Housing, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410, (202) 755-6460. This is not a toll-free number.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 27, 1978, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (43 FR 60301) to specify requirements pertaining to the demolition or disposition of public housing property. A subsequent Notice, published on April 16, 1979, (44 FR 22472), extended the public comment period to May 18, 1979.

A total of 54 comments were received. Each comment was carefully considered. The following is a summary of the comments received and the changes made to the proposed rule.

Some comments reflected a misunderstanding of HUD's intent in publishing a rule on this subject. Contrary to the apprehensions expressed in those comments, this rule does not signal a relaxation of standards or encouragement for reducing the stock of public housing. HUD's intent is to codify its present policy of maximum conservation of existing public housing.

This rule provides that demolition or disposition shall be used only as a last resort, in those special situations where it can be convincingly demonstrated that continued operation as low-income public housing cannot be justified. Approval for demolition or disposition can be given only by the Assistant Secretary for Housing. Decisions will be based on thorough documentation submitted by the PHA and careful review by HUD staff.

The second sentence of § 870.2 has been revised to provide that this rule is not applicable to the sale of dwellings to homebuyers under any homeownership opportunities program.

In response to several comments, the definition of "demolition" (§ 870.3) has been modified to make it clear that the term includes partial demolition of a single building, if razing of dwelling units or nondwelling space results. The definition of "disposition" has also been changed to indicate that the determination of what constitutes "normal operation of the project for low-income housing and related purposes" is governed by the ACC.

The policy statement of § 870.4 remains consistent with that stated in the proposed rule. A number of commentors argued that this statement was too vague and objected to qualifying language, such as "every reasonable effort." HUD has nevertheless determined that the provision is a sound policy statement and serves as a basis for the more precise formulation of criteria set forth in § 870.6 of the final rule.

A significant change has been made in the first sentence of § 870.5. The parallel provision of the proposed rule stated that written HUD approval shall be required for demolition or disposition. The final rule specifies that only the Assistant Secretary for Housing may approve demolition or disposition.

Several commentors recommended that § 870.5 go into much greater detail as to the content of the supporting documentation to be submitted with the PHA's request for HUD approval of demolition and/or disposition. HUD does not consider this necessary or appropriate. Detailed procedural instructions will be covered in a HUD Handbook which will be distributed to all PHAs. The requirement for a relocation plan for displaced tenants has been placed in this section, a more appropriate position than the section on criteria, where it was placed in the proposed rule, and language has been added to require the PHA to pay the actual reasonable moving expenses of displaced tenants. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, mentioned by some commentors, is not applicable.

The provision on criteria (§ 870.7) has been extensively revised, in response to comments which advocated a stricter and more precise approach. Some commentors expressed the view that demolition should not be permitted when the need for low-income housing exceeds the availability of low-income units. Others said that, while factors other than housing need may deserve consideration, the proposed rule would allow HUD to give excessive weight to them.

In response to these concerns, the final rule distinguishes between primary and secondary criteria (§ 870.6). The primary criteria relate to local needs for low-income housing and to the physical condition of the property. Other factors—such as location, social conditions and density—are relegated to secondary consideration.

In connection with the needs criterion, some commentors argued that the provision on replacement housing should be strengthened by eliminating the condition regarding availability of funds and stipulating that the replacement housing must be over and above development levels planned without reference to the proposed demolition and/or disposition. The final rule modifies the replacement housing provision to specify that the determination as to the availability of funds will be made by HUD.

The final rule tightens the second of the two primary criteria as it pertains to the feasibility of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation will be considered feasible if its estimated cost does not exceed applicable prototype cost limits. This final rule eliminates consideration of the availability of rehabilitation funds.

The secondary criteria (§ 870.6b) listed in the final rule are modified versions of some of the criteria listed in the proposed rule. Those pertaining to social conditions and density have been limited by specifying that they may be considered only with regard to project marketability. The criterion relating to disposition of limited interests in real estate (§ 870.6b(4)) is expanded to include reference to benefits to the public interest, as well as to the project itself. The criterion in the proposed rule concerning the effect on the surrounding neighborhood and wider community, was deleted as being too vague. Such factors are covered under location, social conditions and the last of the secondary criteria—consideration of the views of tenants and the local governing body.

Another major area for comment was the section on tenant participation. A number of commentors argued that tenants should have veto power over proposals for demolition and/or disposition, rather than the advisory role indicated in the proposed rule. Several commentors advocated that HUD impose an elaborately detailed, uniform procedure for tenant participation. The tenant participation section of the final rule (§ 870.7) retains the approach set forth in the proposed rule, but adopts the suggestion of some commentors th
the PHA be required to submit to HUD copies of written tenant comments and recommendations, rather than a mere summary of them. This approach to tenant participation is consistent with the Department's present general policy on the subject, as similarly expressed in requirements for the Modernization Program.

The proposed rule's provision on waiver of tenant participation requirements in the case of emergencies has been deleted. A situation posing an immediate threat to life, health or safety might warrant expeditious action including HUD waiver of certain procedures under this part. Tenant participation requirements were not meant to be singled out for such waiver, as the requirements to be waived would depend on the individual situation.

Some commentors felt that HUD should make special provision for technical assistance to the tenants or tenant organization. HUD cannot provide special funding for this purpose. The PHA might, however, provide such funding, to the extent consistent with requirements pertaining to permissible expenditures of operating funds and modernization funds.

One commentor pointed out that the proposed rule made no reference to historic preservation requirements. This omission has been rectified by § 870.8, which specifies compliance with both environmental and historic preservation requirements of Federal law.

The provision on A-95 clearance (§ 870.9) has been changed to conform with existing HUD regulations governing the thresholds for A-95 review (24 CFR Part 52). Some commentors argued for a threshold of fewer than 100 dwelling units as specified in the proposed rule, or for elimination of any threshold. The Department believes, as stated in § 52.102(a) of the HUD regulation, that the thresholds identified in paragraph 7, Part I Attachment A of OMB Circular No. A-95 are appropriate. The final rule thus requires Clearinghouse review for requests to demolish or dispose of 50 or more dwelling units in urbanized areas as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and for requests to demolish or dispose of 25 or more dwelling units in all other areas.

Some commentors advocated elaboration of § 870.10, with regard to procedures for disposition of property determined to be excess. One commentor recommended that HUD restrict use of sale proceeds to housing or certain other types of public purposes. Section 870.10 merely reflects a provision of the ACC, and no requirements inconsistent with that ACC provision may be adopted. HUD believes that, if any further procedural guidance on this point is needed, it should be included in a Handbook.

A Finding of Inapplicability respecting the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 has been made in accordance with HUD procedure. A copy of the Finding of Inapplicability is available for public inspection during regular business hours at the office of the Rules Docket Clerk, Office of the General Counsel, Room 5218, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410.

Accordingly, 24 CFR is amended by adding Part 870 as set forth below.

PART 870—PHA-OWNED PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS—DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS OR DISPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 870.1 Purpose.

This part sets forth requirements concerning requests by public housing agencies (PHAs) for HUD authority to demolish buildings or dispose of real property of PHA-owned, low-income public housing projects.

§ 870.2 Applicability.

This part applies to PHA-owned, low-income public housing projects which are subject to Annual Contributions Contracts (ACCs) under the United States Housing Act of 1937. It does not apply to the Section 23 and Section 10(c) Leased Housing Programs or the Section 23 and Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Programs; nor does it apply to the sale of dwellings to homebuyers pursuant to and in accordance with the rules and procedures for any HUD homeownership opportunities program.

§ 870.3 Definitions.

"Demolition" means the razing of one or more buildings of a public housing project, or the razing of a part of a building comprised of one or more dwelling units and/or nondwelling space.

"Disposition" means the conveyance by a PHA, pursuant to sale or other transaction, of any interest in the real estate of a public housing project (e.g., fee title, leasehold, right of way or easement) and the improvements located thereon, except for leasehold interests incident to the normal operation of the project for low-income housing and related purposes, as permitted by the ACC.

§ 870.4 HUD policy.

It is HUD's policy to conserve and maintain the existing stock of low-income public housing to the maximum extent consistent with considerations of need and feasibility. Unless it can be demonstrated that a project, or a portion of a project, is excess to local needs for low-income housing, every reasonable effort will be made by HUD and the PHA to keep the property within the low-income housing inventory. If a project, or a portion of a project, is determined by HUD as not excess to local needs, but it is unsuitable for housing use because of its physical condition, every reasonable effort shall be made to return it to a condition suitable for housing use, through the Modernization Program or other means. Accordingly, HUD will limit approval for demolition or disposition to those cases where such action can be fully justified in accordance with the criteria set forth under this part.

§ 870.5 PHA request for HUD approval.

Written approval by the Assistant Secretary for Housing shall be required prior to any transaction involving either demolition or disposition or both. To obtain such approval, the PHA shall submit a written request to the appropriate HUD field office. The request shall include a description of the property involved, a statement of the proposed PHA action and additional supporting documentation pertinent to the criteria prescribed in § 870.6 and other applicable requirements. If demolition or disposition of any occupied dwelling is proposed, the PHA shall also submit a plan for relocating displaced tenants to other decent, safe and sanitary housing within the tenants' means. The relocation plan shall provide for the PHA to pay the actual reasonable moving expenses of displaced tenants.

§ 870.6 Criteria.

a. Primary criteria. HUD will rely primarily upon the following criteria in determining whether a PHA's request for demolition and/or disposition is justified under the policy stated in § 870.4:

(1) Current and projected needs for low-income housing in the jurisdiction served by the PHA, taking into account
both demand and supply factors. If there is a local need for low-income housing, the PHA's request for demolition or disposition of dwelling units shall include a plan for replacement housing on a one-to-one basis or as approved by HUD to be warranted by current and projected needs for low-income housing, subject to HUD's finding as to the availability of funds.

(2) The physical condition of the property and, where pertinent, the feasibility of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation shall be considered feasible if its estimated cost does not exceed the published prototype cost limit for similar structures in the same prototype cost area.

b. Secondary criteria. In addition to the primary criteria for determining whether demolition and/or disposition is justified, HUD will consider the following additional factors:

(1) Location, in terms of any conditions in the surrounding neighborhood that adversely affect the life, health or safety of project residents.

(2) Social conditions which have seriously affected the marketability of the project.

(3) The project's density, in terms of population density and needs for open space for recreation, parking or other purposes, which have seriously affected the marketability of the project.

(4) Benefits to the project or the public interest from disposition of a limited interest in project real estate (e.g., easement, right of way or dedication for public use).

(5) Views of tenants and the local governing body.

§ 870.7 Tenant participation.

a. Before submission to the appropriate HUD field office of a request for demolition and/or disposition, the PHA shall provide written notification to the tenants of the project and the tenant organization, if any, of the proposed request, and afford them a reasonable time to submit comments, including suggested alternatives, concerning the proposed action of the PHA. The PHA shall give full and serious consideration to the comments submitted by the tenants. The PHA shall provide HUD with copies of all written comments and alternatives submitted to the PHA by, or on behalf of, tenants and/or the tenant organization as well as the PHA's position concerning each comment and alternative.

b. When the PHA submits the request to the appropriate HUD field office, it shall notify the tenants of the project and the tenant organization, if any, that the submission has been made and that a copy of the request, including supporting documentation, is available for their review.

c. After HUD's decision on the PHA's request, the PHA shall notify the tenants of the project and the tenant organization, if any, of the decision.

§ 870.8 Environmental and historic preservation requirements.

HUD approval of a PHA's request for demolition and/or disposition shall be subject to applicable requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

§ 870.9 A-95 clearance.

With respect to any request for demolition or disposition of 50 or more dwelling units in urbanized areas, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, or 25 or more dwelling units in all other areas, the following requirements are applicable:

(a) At least 45 days prior to the submission of the PHA's request to HUD, the PHA shall transmit a copy of the request to the appropriate State and areawide A-95 clearinghouses for comment.

(b) The PHA shall transmit all clearinghouse comments with the request to HUD. If comments are not received by the PHA within the 45-day period, the PHA shall submit a statement indicating that the clearinghouse(s) was notified and no comments were received.

(c) If the A-95 review comments contain any finding of inconsistency with State, areawide or local plans or non-compliance with environmental or other applicable requirements, the PHA must indicate how it proposes to resolve the finding or provide justification for proposing to proceed with the requested action despite the finding.

§ 870.10 Disposition of excess property.

Where HUD approves the disposition of real property of a project, the PHA shall, in accordance with the requirements of the ACC, determine such property to be excess and shall sell it as soon as practicable at a public sale for not less than the fair market value thereof, unless another method of disposition is approved by HUD. The proceeds of sale or other disposition shall be applied as directed by HUD in accordance with the ACC.


Marilyn Malkonian,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing,
Federal Housing Commissioner.

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BILLING CODE 4210-01-M
OCTOBER 17, 1977

ANNUAL MEETING
70 ST. BOTOLPH STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

RESOLUTION

Be it known that the Tenants Policy Council, representing more than 60,000 tenants of Boston Public Housing does hereby express its complete and active opposition to any action which would result in any reduction in the total number of occupied or unoccupied rental units now administered by the Boston Housing Authority.

The Tenants Policy Council opposes any reduction of rental units in public housing, at any development, or in subsidized housing, for any reason, unless previously compensated by the addition of at least an equal number of new rental units — either through subsidized housing or other public housing programs.
AN EVALUATION OF THE CARR,LYNCH REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR COLUMBIA POINT

The Columbia Point Community Task Force has established some laudable objectives for the redevelopment of the Columbia Point peninsula:

* the creation of an attractive, mixed-income family housing environment at Columbia Point;
* a redevelopment plan which will provide decent and affordable housing to meet the current residents' needs as soon as possible;
* the maintenance of a substantial commitment to provide housing for low-income households consistent with the commitment embodied in the initial development of public housing at Columbia Point.

While the BHA fully concurs with and supports the above objectives, an evaluation of the Carr-Lynch redevelopment plan reveals the proposed plan to be inadequate in certain of its key planning concepts, resulting in problems with the site plan and the physical design solutions. Because of these deficiencies, the Carr, Lynch plan falls short of creating a desirable mixed-income living environment which will be supportive of the needs of low and moderate income residents.

The Carr,Lynch plan in essence proposes the redevelopment of Columbia Point as a suburban site and as a bedroom community in the City of Boston. The design concepts employed are drawn from the "American dream", suburban imagery of single-family homes and low-density townhouses. The plan even proposes picnic tables to be strewn randomly throughout the site. The site plan results in vast uncontrollable open green spaces located behind the housing, winding, tree-lined streets for easy vehicular access, pedestrian paths criss-crossing the interior of the site, and massive demolition of existing buildings to provide for the construction of new townhouses. The site plan may be familiar in a suburban middle- and upper-class homogeneous community. It is difficult, however, to visualize the success of this suburban format superimposed on an urban context and the imposition of a monotonous, suburban life-style on a heterogeneous population in an urban area like Columbia Point.

Columbia Point is an urban site with redevelopment potential resembling more the South End and the North End than suburban sites such as Newton or Lincoln. The frequent analogy of associating the redevelopment of King's Lynne in Lynn, Mass. (formerly America Park) with Columbia Point is misleading at best and fails to recognize the contextual differences in the fact that Columbia Point is located in the City of Boston and not 25 miles away in a very suburban portion of Lynn. Substantially different community, financial, and institutional opportunities exist at Columbia Point. Columbia Point must be redeveloped as an urban site if it is to remain viable for low and moderate income residents.

Columbia Point today, even with the remaining population of approximately 1,000 and the deteriorated living conditions, is similar to most urban neighborhoods and communities in the level of social interaction and community life. This is evidenced by a highly interactive social environment among residents, the
the existence of residential street life, neighborhood activities and other signs of attempts at community cohesion. Though all signs of interaction among residents are not necessarily positive, redevelopment efforts should be made to recognize and encourage appropriate forms of social interaction rather than to deny all forms of interaction. The Carr, Lynch plan is overbearing in its attempt to obliterate completely all semblances of the existing community, both socially and physically. By denying the present residents and new residents the richness and interactive qualities of an urban neighborhood environment and by massive destruction of existing buildings and rerouting of streets, the plan reflects more a reactive response to the present deteriorated conditions at Columbia Point than a reasonable and responsible approach towards redevelopment.

The purpose of this evaluation is to discuss some of the design concepts and assumptions in the proposed plan, and to suggest criteria for the redevelopment effort. A viable mixed income family community at Columbia Point must provide the highest level of support for the low and moderate income population and fulfill the objectives established by the Columbia Point Community Task Force.

The following issues will be addressed:

1. Rehabilitation and re-use of buildings
2. Street and circulation systems
3. Use of open space
4. Community development
5. Management and maintenance

Rehabilitation and Re-use of Buildings

The Carr, Lynch plan proposes a rigid adherence to certain abstract design principles. The plan takes as its basic assumption that successful family living can only take place in two and three story single-family houses, townhouses and garden apartments. Each individual unit should have a front entrance, a back entrance with a private yard, direct ground access, pitched roofs, and all the images of "home". While many of these features are attractive, they are inaccurately presented as essential for successful family living. In reality, many factors such as the quality and accessibility to open space, management, maintenance, security, unit size and condition, the quality of individual or common entrances may be more important to the success of a residential community than whether the unit has a formal front and back entrance or direct ground access. The Carr, Lynch plan proposes that all three bedroom units or larger must have direct ground access and that all mid-rise buildings be demolished or cut to three stories (except for elderly buildings). These rigid rules result in the inability to reuse existing low- and mid-rise buildings in a number of creative ways. Stacked four bedroom units cannot be rehabilitated into three bedroom units because of lack of ground access. Small families are not able to be housed in mid-rise buildings in any way. Given these constraints, it is no wonder that the Carr, Lynch plan results in such a high amount of demolition.

Proposal:

Maintaining Columbia Point as a predominantly low-rise, family-oriented development can be achieved without massive demolition and restructuring of the present BHA site.
In certain areas selective demolition is necessary to provide adequate open space and other amenities, but in other parts of the site the rehabilitation and re-use potential of existing three and seven story buildings should be much more thoroughly explored. Substantial rehabilitation of existing low-rise buildings into duplexes is an appropriate way of housing large families, but modifications can be made to house smaller families more than adequately in stacked apartment flats in the three story buildings. Successful family living in most urban areas does not have to adhere rigidly to all the design concepts contained in the Carr,Lynch plan.

The mid-rise presents multiple opportunities for rehabilitation as elderly housing, as housing for adults and small families, and for mixed-use purposes. Community space, services, congregate facilities, activity areas, and even retail/commercial space are some of the re-use possibilities for the ground and first floors of the buildings. Lobbies can be expanded and large glass panels installed to light up and open up space for community facilities and services on the first floors. For both low and mid-rise buildings, volumes can be added, such as porches, balconies, patios, built additions and extensions, and roof additions, so that the present stark surface of the buildings can be substantially altered.

Streets and Circulation Systems

The Carr,Lynch plan calls for a "single connecting circulation system." In reviewing their site plan, we find massive horizontal stretches of street surfaces without any cross-streets breaking vertically through the site. Cross-streets and intersections are not used as interfaces between different parts of the site, since the intention is to make formidable any penetration of the site by unwanted intruders. The streets are thus more accessible to vehicles because of their length and are in effect hostile to pedestrian traffic and activities. Even though independent pedestrian paths are provided, they are not located in the appropriate places.

A closer look at the pedestrian circulation system and at street use reveals the following problems:

* The use of pedestrian pathways which are scattered through the site and ill-defined open space. Many of the pathways are located in the common back yards, but they do not relate to any specific activities that take place in the yards except for the picnic areas.

* The pathways are not directionally related to centers of activities, e.g. they do not lead to communities centers, nor do they provide an appropriate means of access or a short cut to other parts of the site.

* The pathways are not planned in relation to the streets, intersections or corners. They do not provide for the purposeful flow of pedestrian traffic through the site.

* In rerouting existing streets dead spaces was created in the interiors of the site. No adequate uses have been provided for that extra space.

* Pedestrian movement along the streets is in many instances artificially constrained. In some places a pedestrian must travel the length of four blocks before being able to make a turn.
There are no clear nor direct paths or streets to take to reach the beach, the recreation center, the playing field, the day care center, or Mt. Vernon Street.

The circulation in effect denies appropriate street life activities common to residential neighborhoods. Streets are well located and are an asset when they serve as meeting places, when they provide visual access to other parts of the site, and when they serve the function of efficient and direct pedestrian movement to places.

The continuous winding streets also contribute to the visual breakage and lack of spatial orientation and identification in relation to other parts of the site.

Proposal:

Streets at Columbia Point should be planned as urban streets to embody specific functions: a place for residential social interaction, visual accessibility, a focal point for limited activities and for directed and purposeful movement. Corners and intersection and pedestrian paths should be used to enhance the desired street life and connect different circulation systems and activities, e.g. pedestrian path connections at an active corner of the site. Circulation systems should also enhance such site attributes as landscaping, internal vistas, and vistas toward the ocean. Variables such as the scale of the street, size, length, texture, etc. should help to define the character of the street as residential, active and should define the nature of the traffic flow. Street surfaces or clearly demarcated pedestrian paths should extend vertically through the site and relate the various centers of activities. Further exploration should be made into the effects of rerouting the existing streets and, constrainingly, of increasing the numbers of streets through the site.

Specifically, Monticello Ave. should remain open for rear access to the mid-rise buildings. At evaluation of the site plan for Parcel 1A also concludes that the use of streets for residential purposes and for pedestrian access to the elderly buildings should be maintained. Consideration should be given to keeping Monticello Ave. open on the wester part of the site for limited vehicular access (possibly one-way) and for a pedestrian path.

Use of Open Space

The recommendation for a "continuous and ample flow of open space" will result in serious problems in maintenance, security surveillance, control and efficient use of space. The plan contains rehabilitated and new construction units along the street edges with vast common green space located in the middle. In some areas the open space spans 280 feet between buildings. The use of the open space is not very well defined either as private space or semi-public space. The following are some of the anticipated problems that will result from the proposed site plan:

* The uncontrolled flow of open space will create vast visual and physical wastelands behind the residential buildings, instead of the pleasant image of large open spaces that was intended.
The undefined use of the space will result in improper uses, such as active recreational uses behind buildings, teenagers hanging out, etc.

The location of open space almost totally enclosed by buildings (even with the occasional attempt at visual penetration) will cause problems of personal safety and security. These spaces provide insurmountable opportunities for personal attacks and assaults.

Undifferentiated uses for the open space will also create problems of surveillance andterritoriality, since the publicness or privateness of the green spaces in relation to immediate residents, neighbors, and the larger community or public is not defined.

Proposal:

More open space for recreation and leisure than in the present Carr, Lynch plan must be provided at Columbia Point. This necessitates selective demolition in certain areas, but, more importantly, structuring and defining the use of open space in terms of specific activities (e.g. active and passive use, recreation needs according to age and population groups). Limits and definitions of types of activity will more likely determine the success of the use of the open space than an absolute increase in the amount of open space.

A hierarchical classification of open space from private back yards, tot lots, playgrounds, sitting areas, playing fields, to semi-public or public beaches that are appropriate for the site is a superior method of planning and siting usable open space to the the anonymous allocation of large plots of green space as in the Carr, Lynch plan.

Careful consideration should be given to the location of recreational needs such as the following:

* Some recreational activities should be centrally located in the interior of the site and adjoining the units, since small children will not venture out the the large playing fields.

* Some uses should be specified with structural elements. For example, playgrounds and garden areas can help maintain the location of a particular activity.

* Locating recreational and open space facilities close to community services or in visible areas will increase the amount of resident control over the use of the space.

* The location of the day care center and the play areas have high accessibility and visibility. Sitting areas, patios, and gardens should be in greater abundance near the elderly buildings.
Mixed-use and Community Facilities

Even without the overriding problems of management and maintenance or inadequate funding, Columbia Point from its earliest days was doomed to fail because of its isolation as a multi-bedroom facility with nothing else but housing, schools, and poor people to characterize it as a community. Even low-income communities in other parts of Boston had substantially more resources, a more diverse living environment, and more geographic access to employment opportunities. Columbia Point became a warehouse for the poor as they were socially and physically isolated from the larger community.

The redevelopment of Columbia Point as a homogeneous, monotonous housing site will result in another bedroom community, except that it may be mixed-income. An analysis of the needs of the residents, or how they use space as individuals, as households, and collectively, and how household functions blend into community functions should bring us closer to creating a socially as well as physically supportive environment.

Proposal:

* A simple aggregation of units at Columbia Point results in sub-communities or sub-neighborhoods within the total Columbia Point site. This aggregation provides another method of structuring the focal points for activities, for community facilities, and for mixed uses to take place.

* An analysis of subgroups within the site (large family, small family, adult, elderly) is another means for allocating services and recreation facilities and placing them strategically across the site. For example, an elderly center should be located on the first floor of building 20 to serve all three elderly buildings in Phase IA. Building 2 or 21 may serve as a center for the units and buildings immediately surrounding.

Community Development

Redevelopment provides community and economic development opportunities for the residents to acquire skill and training in certain enterprises and also provides necessary services to the site.

Proposal:

* Explore community development opportunities through the different entities such as community sponsored businesses, community joint sponsorship, sub-contracting, franchising, etc. Projected facilities and businesses which could be supported on site are neighborhood food stores, food coop, sub-shop, fast food, laundromat, cleaners, hair dresser/barber, and others. Opportunities are also possible for light industry and assembly enterprises.

* Explore funding sources such as EDA, SBA, CDFC, and CDAC
Management and Maintenance

Management and maintenance practices are the prime determinants of the condition of the housing stock. The Carr, Lynch plan proposes the unconditional transfer of management responsibilities to a private management firm without considering certain other options which might result in substantial improvements.

Proposal:

* Explore the possibilities of non-profit sponsored management

* Explore the possibilities of an innovative program of decentralized management and maintenance with full tenant involvement in decision-making and opportunities for tenant employment.
**DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: PHASE II A & C, BHA SITE**

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<td>136 elderly/adult</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. New construction: 50 family units</td>
<td>$66,000/unit</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40 3-6 BR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 1-2 BR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Demolition</td>
<td>$1.55/cu. ft. total demo.</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bldg. 11</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bldg. 25</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bldg. 7</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Total II A Construction &amp; Demolition</td>
<td>$11,523,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bldg.</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Unit Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>24 (P); 36 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$34,350/unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>16 (P); 24 (R)</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$34,350/unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Rehab units Phase IIC
   120 family

B. New construction: 28 family units
   22 3-6 BR
   6 1-2 BR
   $66,000/unit
   1,848,000

C. Total Phase IIC Construction
   $5,841,800

D. Total Task Force Phase II A & C construction
   $17,365,200

E. Total Task Force per unit cost
   438 total units: $39,646/unit
   302 family units $44,891/family unit
### Alternative Phase II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Phase II</th>
<th>Bldg.</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>Price/Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24 (P); 36 (R)</td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>$32,900</td>
<td>789,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80 (P); 84 (R)</td>
<td>1-2 BR</td>
<td>$28,000</td>
<td>2,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24 (P); 36 (R)</td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>$36,699</td>
<td>878,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24 (P); 36 (R)</td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>$36,600</td>
<td>878,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56 (P); 56 (R)</td>
<td>1-2 BR</td>
<td>$28,000</td>
<td>1,568,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24 (P); 36 (R)</td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>$36,600</td>
<td>878,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Rehab units Phase IIA

- 128 family
- 272 elderly

B. New construction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>Price/Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>24 3-6 BR</td>
<td>$66,000</td>
<td>1,980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1-2 BR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Demolition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bldg.</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>163,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>163,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D. Total construction and demolition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,720,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-3-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 19</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (P); 24 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>526,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 14</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (P); 24 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>526,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (P); 24 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>526,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 16</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (P); 24 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>526,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 6</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (P); 36 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>789,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 9</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (P); 36 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>789,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bldg. 23</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (P); 36 (R)</strong></td>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$32,900/unit</td>
<td>789,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A. Rehab units Phase II C**
- **136 family**

**B. New construction Phase IIC**
- **28 units $66,000/unit**  
  - 22 3-6 BR  
  - 6 1-2 BR  
  - Total construction cost Phase IIC: $6,320,600

**C. Total Alternative construction cost, Phase II A & C**
- **$21,041,400**

**D. Total Alternative units, Phase II A & C**
- **IIA 166 family**  
  - **272 elderly**  
  - **IIC 164 family**  
  - **602 total units**

**F. Total per unit cost**
- **$34,952/each unit**  
  - **$40,683/family unit**
Comparison of large and small family units: Phase II A & C

**Task Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total family:</th>
<th>302</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 BR</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total elderly</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total units</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alternative**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total family:</th>
<th>330</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-6 BR</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 BR</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total elderly</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total units</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison of retention and demolition totals for Phase IA, Phase II A & C

**Task Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total retention:</th>
<th>824</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase II A &amp; C</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IA</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total demolition:</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alternative**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total retention:</th>
<th>1,048</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase II A &amp; C</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IA</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total demolition:</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A REVIEW OF BHA POLICY ON REHABILITATION AND DEMOLITION AT COLUMBIA POINT

Over the past several months the intensive work on site planning at Columbia Point has been the cause of a careful review within the Planning, Development, and Modernization Department of the BHA of policies toward rehabilitation and demolition at existing developments. While this policy review has focused primarily on Columbia Point, decisions taken at Columbia Point clearly have ramifications for many other developments, and, therefore, issues of rehabilitation and demolition must be seen in a city-wide context.

There are many reasons why selective demolition ought to be supported at Columbia Point and these reasons have often been listed in BHA reports and funding applications. Particularly at Columbia Point where demolition and construction of new townhouse units is a high priority of the tenant task force, the BHA has attempted to be as responsive as possible on this issue. However, because of city-wide housing issues which are inextricably bound up in decisions at Columbia Point, the BHA's basic policy is to be in support of rehabilitation of units and not demolition wherever this is reasonable. Within the context of sound site planning principles some demolition may be supported, but the evidence for demolition on a building-by-building basis must be compelling.

The following are basic reasons why the BHA adopts a strong pro-rehabilitation policy. Unfortunately, not all these reasons respond immediately to specific tenant concerns at Columbia Point. They are, nonetheless, reasons of significant importance to the BHA in its role as the main provider of subsidized housing in the city of Boston.

1. Overwhelming citywide need for low and moderate income units for families of all sizes and for elderly

While there may be an expressed desire at a development like Columbia Point to demolish a substantial number of units in order to provide a certain kind of ambience on the site that is perceived as desirable, the overwhelming need for subsidized units of all types and sizes in Boston leads the BHA to be able to support demolition only where careful site analysis indicates that no alternative is really possible. Some specific numbers, taken from an April 17, 1979 summary of the BHA waiting list, makes this point especially clear. The waiting list contained the following needs by bedroom size:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family developments plus Leased Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7285
### Elderly developments plus Leased Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>BR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BR</td>
<td>2746</td>
<td>106 = 2852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BR</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>169 = 601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost 60% of the family need for low and moderate income housing is for one and two bedroom units. Such units can reasonably be provided either in flats on any floor of existing low-rise buildings or on any floor of a mid-rise building. When elderly needs are added in, the city-wide demand for one and two bedroom units rises to almost 73% of the city-wide total. Therefore, while the BHA wishes to be as responsive as possible to the need for fully functioning large family units, it dare not provide such units at the insufficiently supported cost of existing one and two bedroom units. So long as sound site planning principles are maintained for larger families, one and two bedroom unit buildings should be maintained and rehabilitated wherever possible.

2. Demolition as a precedent in the rehabilitation of developments

It is no secret that there are developments around Boston in an equal or greater state of deterioration than Columbia Point. The total revitalization of Columbia Point is but the first step in a mandatory city-wide program to revitalize most of the older, predominantly family developments owned by the BHA. In many developments as at Columbia Point, residents have had to live with deteriorated buildings for years, and those buildings themselves become the symbol for the myriad of problems that infect each development. The clearest indication to many residents that, indeed, things are changing at a development is to remove entirely that symbol of the way things use to be, the old building. Demolition on such a psychological basis, however, while a valid and important factor in resident satisfaction with a new community, ought not be allowed to overshadow sound planning principles and the many opportunities to create an outstanding community in existing, rehabilitated buildings, a community which may be impaired by the shortcomings of new construction. The psychological need for demolition should not be used as a pathway into rather uncreative design work that is not able to respond to the challenges and opportunities of reuse. Especially when viewed in a city-wide context, the BHA must push for this latter sort of design excellence in revitalizing its developments.

Massive demolition within the many developments around the city is beyond any reasonable financial means. To allow such an option beyond prudent planning requirements in any one development is to offer it as an opportunity in all troubled developments.

3. Need for replacement units if housing stock is diminished

The BHA may well consider demolition and the reduction of overall units in a particular development as an appropriate means to revitalize that development. In addition to specific design failures, developments may in fact be too dense and be well served by selective thinning. Indeed, in some of the more deteriorated developments it can be argued that the "as built" number of units have not been adequately functioning for low income people for years and that it is unfair to count them as existing units. Nevertheless, BHA does have an obligation throughout the city to maintain in superb condition as many units for low income people as it can. The existing private sector subsidized housing programs (Sec. 8) etc.
do not necessarily add low and moderate income units to the housing stock on a long-term basis. Since initial Sec. 8 contracts run out in five years, if demand for market rate housing is stronger in an area where a Sec. 8 development was originally established, that development may routinely be converted to market rate housing. It is only certain community-based subsidized housing developments and public sector subsidized housing that has a strong certainty of remaining available to low and moderate income people throughout its useful life. Therefore, the BHA has a strong obligation, for whatever reason units are removed because of a particular demolition program and a particular development, to find equivalent replacement units for those demolished elsewhere in the city. This obligation of BHA results in a primary disposition toward rehabilitation and as little reduction in existing units as is reasonable.

4. Overall responsibility for public sector subsidies

All the public sector resources for subsidized housing, whether through the Sec. 8 program and other HUD subsidy and guarantee programs which are utilized primarily by the private sector or through standard public housing monies, are woefully insufficient to meet the demand for subsidized housing. That demand is expected to increase significantly in the near future as more and more individuals are in the household formation age and as living conditions become more extreme and expensive, especially in the Northeast. While demolition and new construction in many development reuse programs might be the ideal solution, the BHA and others trying to provide low and moderate income housing must make the most responsible use of the extremely limited financial subsidies for new low- and moderate-income housing (i.e. new or rehabilitated). In many cases this means that the BHA is obligated to attempt creative use of its existing units and existing subsidy programs in rehabilitated buildings rather than encumbering the subsidy programs with the far more expensive burden of new construction. While it might be pleasant to act as if one had almost a blank check when it comes to the rehabilitation of an existing development (the argument would be made that one should spend substantial amounts of funding on that one development so that at least one development will be successful, although resources may in the process be denied to several others), in fact everyone involved in producing subsidized housing has a responsibility to be prudent in the use of subsidy programs so that they can be stretched as far as reasonable to provide subsidized units. Again, extensive refinancing should not be avoided to the extent that an attempted development rehabilitation fails for lack of adequate financial support. The deployment of subsidies should be carefully considered, however, so as to maximize their impact.

A related point is that if one is attempting to revitalize a development through private development resources, substantial rehabilitation of existing buildings is a significant key to the financial success of that rehabilitation program. Developers are allowed to take five-year accelerated depreciation on such rehabilitation projects. This write off aids immeasurably in the financial feasibility of a redevelopment effort.
5. The quality and stability of rehabilitated units

An important point not to be overlooked is that rehabilitation in existing buildings often provides a much higher quality dwelling units for substantially less money than new construction. The steel frame, concrete slab construction and masonry walls that characterize many of the BHA developments are in fact prime constituents of a successful and high quality rehabilitation. The sound deafening and energy retention characteristics of these buildings, when properly rehabilitated, is far superior to the stud and drywall of new construction. The long-term stability and durability of such construction, especially when plaster walls are compared with current drywall construction, argue for retention of units when ever a rehabilitated unit with appropriate design characteristics can be created.